1 Thursday, 27 May 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody. Shall we begin,
7 Mr. Karadzic?
8 THE ACCUSED: Excuse me, I didn't hear.
9 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: Thank you. Thank you.
11 WITNESS: COLM DOYLE [Resumed]
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning Your Excellencies.
13 Good morning to everybody.
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
15 Q. [Interpretation] And good morning to you, too, Colonel.
16 A. [Interpretation] Good morning.
17 Q. I wanted to go through some documents speedily and efficaciously,
18 I hope, which the Prosecution offered up and which you provided -- well,
19 into the list. So may I have 65 ter 11036, please, to start off.
20 While we're waiting for that to come up, Colonel, did you have
21 any instructions to be completely unbiased and show respect for all three
22 sides? Was that your brief and the position of your bosses?
23 A. Well, part of the principle of service with the European Union
24 was always to remain impartial and not to show any bias. So the answer
25 would be yes.
1 Q. Thank you. Now, we have here your report. Was it written in
2 your own hand?
3 A. Yes, it was.
4 Q. Thank you. It's dated October, the 15th to the 23rd, 1991;
6 A. Yes, that's correct.
7 Q. We see here that your team visited Banja Luka, Doboj, Gracanica,
8 Derventa, Srbac, Bosanski Kobas, Slavonski Kobas, Bosanski Brod and
9 Slavonski Brod; right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. May we zoom into the last sentence on the first page, please,
12 where it says it became apparent that the Croatian authorities are
13 using -- well, could you continue reading that, please? It's difficult
14 for me to read your handwriting, and it goes on to the next page. So
15 beginning with "It became apparent."
16 A. Can we go down, I think.
17 Q. We need the top of the second page. On the first page it said,
18 "It became apparent that the Croatian authorities are using," and then I
19 can't read further. So the top of the following page, please. Could you
20 continue reading. [No interpretation] or what. [In English] Control,
21 ah, control?
22 A. "Control of the bridge and the ferry as a political weapon. The
23 following points are listed by the team as general observations. We were
24 made very welcome everywhere. There was a general feeling that the EC
25 must solve the political problem. The political parties distrust of each
1 other, mainly Croats and Muslims against Serbs without any side
2 indicating a willingness to compromise. Constant reference to each -- a
3 constant reference by each to the past and an almost hysterical fear by
4 Serbs of Croatia
5 Serbian intent on creating a Greater Serbia. The Croatians at
6 Slavonski Brod insist they're at war."
7 Q. [Interpretation] Yes, thank you. We can stop there. We can
8 pause there. I'm going to tell you briefly how in World War II the
9 crimes against the Serb farmers and poor people were justified. It was
10 said that it was the fault of Petar Karadjordjevic, the King, and the
11 blame allegedly was paid -- or the guilt was paid by the Serb peasantry.
12 Now, there is a parallel here. That's what it is.
13 JUDGE KWON: I'm wondering the relevance of those comments. Put
14 your question.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, here's the question:
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Do you consider that the fear of a Greater Serbia justifies the
18 crimes committed against the Serbian poor people in Bosnia and
20 A. My role here as a member of the EC was to observe and to report
21 and to give an indication of the views that were being expressed by
22 various sides. I don't think it is for me to make any comparison with
23 what may have happened in the Second World War. In fact, I would say
24 here that it was a distinct disadvantage because every time had meetings
25 with people everybody referred back to the atrocities of the war and I
1 felt if we were to make any progress that we should forget about what
2 happened in the past and concentrate on what was happening in the recent
3 times. So it became my practice that when I would meet a political
4 party, be that as the head of the monitor mission or when I was in places
5 like Banja Luka, that I requested each side, please don't give me a
6 history lesson. That's the last thing we needed.
7 So I was aware that there was a lot of emphasis back to the war
8 and to what happened in the past and where I thought that these matters
9 which took place then might be a deterrent to this conflict arriving. In
10 fact, it would be my view that it became an excuse.
11 So, yes, I was aware of what happened in general during the war,
12 but I don't think -- I think because of what happened made our job more
14 JUDGE KWON: For the record, if the Court Deputy could tell us
15 what exhibit number this is.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this document was admitted as
17 Exhibit P922.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Now, under item number 5, you say that the
21 Croats in Slavonski Brod insisted that they are at war. Is that what you
22 say there; right?
23 A. Yes, I got that impression. That's what they said to me when I
24 met the mayor, when I met the mayor of the town.
25 Q. Thank you. Can we take a look at page 062, the last digits are
1 062, of this same document. Page 5 of the document. That's right.
2 You were in Doboj, and you met three people there. You had
3 meetings with three individuals; right?
4 A. Yes. I met members of the JNA there.
5 Q. Well, do you notice that this man Hadzic Cazim, did you know he
6 was a Muslim?
7 A. No, I did not.
8 Q. Now, later on you received just two, Pavlovic and Hadzic, and
9 they told you a different story, different to what they told you when
10 that third man in the tripod was there. Now, did you notice that when
11 the Serbs and Croats or Muslims saw you alone they would blacken each
12 other, and when they were alone they would tell you a different story?
13 A. I think you'll have to explain further to me, Mr. Karadzic. Are
14 you referring to it a specific report of mine? And can I have that --
15 I've got a report here of October the 22nd, and there's no mention of
16 anybody's name here so I am not totally understanding of what you're
17 trying to ask me.
18 Q. Well, you had a meeting in Doboj. You received together with the
19 military person the president of the municipality and municipal Assembly
20 together with the commander of the army, and the deputy major, or was it
21 mayor, was also there. Is it -- there was a fruitful discussion, you
22 say. Well, perhaps you could read it. Could you continue that.
23 Something was crossed out there, but not crossed out in my copy.
24 A. Can I ask you, are you referring to a -- a report of October the
1 Q. Yes. Except in my copy nothing has been redacted. Looking at
2 the ELMO and the screen, I see that the names have been redacted. So
3 we'll stick to that. We'll stick to the names being deleted. All I want
4 to say is that you received three individuals here and that you had a
5 discussion, a very proper and correct meeting, and that you spoke about
6 the reservists and -- well, could you read that paragraph, please.
7 A. "Met with the vice-president of the municipality and Assembly
8 members together with the military garrison commander." The names are
9 blacked out. "There was a fruitful discussion on the fears proposed by
10 the reservists while the military commander followed the official federal
11 argument he did agree that there was a degree of indiscipline and he
12 promise to investigate any future complaints."
13 Shall I go on?
14 Q. No, we don't need to. We can move on to the next page, please.
15 And let's look at the second paragraph there. Could you read the second
16 paragraph out where it says Bosanski Brod. It refers to Bosanski Brod.
17 A. "Met with the mayor and officials of Bosanski Brod and having
18 listened to their points of view on the effects of prohibiting commercial
19 and vehicle traffic over the bridge by the Croats. Proceeded across the
20 bridge by foot to Slavonski Brod and had a discussion with the other
21 side. No progress. The Croats were intransigence and very arrogant. It
22 was obvious that the issue of the bridge is a political weapon of Croatia
23 and we feel progress on the matter cannot be achieved at a local level.
24 Q. Thank you. May we turn to the next page now, please.
25 This time you met all three leaders here of the religious groups;
1 right? All the religious leaders?
2 A. Yes, you'll see there that it was team 3 and 4 which means both
3 teams of the ECMM that was deployed to Banja Luka joined together. This
4 was the last effort we made to try and have a meeting with all three
5 political parties at the one time, and the results of this meeting
6 indicated to me that there was no longer any common ground for the
7 parties, so from that day on, as far as I recall, we met with the parties
9 Q. Thank you. Now in -- well: "[In English] On the contrary. It
10 was apparent the deep division and the mistrust does not give confidence
11 for a peaceful solution."
12 [Interpretation] So already at that time you realised that the
13 communities were divided and that there was great mistrust among them,
14 and you even foresaw that it didn't bode well for a peaceful solution;
16 A. That is correct.
17 Q. Thank you. We can move on now. Next page, please.
18 Do you know who lives in Bosanski Kobas?
19 A. No, I don't.
20 Q. Well, the population is 90 per cent or thereabouts Muslim
21 settlement, and all around are Serbian villages, and it is a markedly
22 Serbian majority municipality.
23 A. Well, when I went on these trips, we had -- we had an interpreter
24 who was the person who translated all of the information we were given,
25 and I accepted what that translator was telling me because I don't speak
1 Serbo-Croat. That interpreter was offered to us by the authorities in
2 Banja Luka. So I could only have found out or I could only have put down
3 what, in fact, I had been told by the interpreter. I assumed he was
4 telling me the truth, but if you say it's completely different to there,
5 then he wasn't telling me the truth, and he was a Serb.
6 Q. Why do you think he wasn't telling the truth? What makes you say
8 A. Because if you're telling me that the community was over --
9 overwhelmingly Muslim and I have it down here that it's 98 per cent Serb,
10 I could only have got that information either from something that was
11 told to me by one of the people I met or it was a different
12 interpretation or translation given to me by the interpreter.
13 Q. Perhaps I wasn't precise enough and clear enough. Srbac as a
14 municipality is 90 per cent Serb, but Bosanski Kobas, a village on the
15 river that you visited, is almost 90 per cent Muslim. Do you remember
17 A. No, I don't, but if that's what you're saying, I accept that.
18 Q. Thank you, and it's easy to establish. But would you read out
19 the second paragraph, the team?
20 A. "The team drove along the border between Srbac and
21 Bosanski Kobas. The local people in Kobas had similar concerns as those
22 in Srbac. Passage across the river has been stopped by the Croats," or
23 "Croatians," I have written down here. "The ferry is kept on the far
24 side and is rigged to explode. The team arranged a meeting between both
25 sides having been allowed to cross the river by boat. It was agreed that
1 the team will meet with Croatian officials at Slavonski Brod on Monday,
2 October the 21st at 1400 hours to discuss the ferry."
3 Q. Do you agree that you, yourself, noticed that there were these
4 same fears in Srbac and in Bosnian Kobas on the Croatian side; right?
5 A. Yes, there were fears on both sides. I got the impression at
6 that time, if memory serves me correctly, that the fears were greater on
7 the side that was in Bosnian. The Croats had a different fear, as I
8 recall. The Croats on that occasion referred to some aircraft flying
9 over, and we never saw any evidence of that. But generally most of the
10 places we went to all sides were telling us of the fears they had and the
11 concerns they had in their communities, and that would have been true
12 for -- for all sides.
13 Q. Thank you. I'd like to say here and then to hear your position,
14 that Bosanski Kobas is almost 100 per cent a Muslim concentration
15 completely surrounded by Serbs. Throughout the war they were safe and
16 secure. They took part in our army. They weren't afraid of the Serbs.
17 What they were afraid of was the Croats across the Sava River
19 A. Well, I have no personal knowledge of that.
20 Q. But they weren't afraid of the Serbs. They didn't say they were
21 afraid of the Serbs from Srbac but that they were afraid of the Croats
22 across the Sava River
23 A. Well, you'll have to take the interpretation from -- from that
24 report as it is written. I wrote it based on the experience we had of a
25 team. I don't exactly recall the day. I was in many, many place on
1 many, many occasions, and I can't vividly remember every single person I
2 met, but I'm satisfied that the report that I made out and those of my
3 team accurately reflected the feelings and concerns at the time, and
4 that's all I can say.
5 Q. Thank you. May we turn to the next page now, please. And the
6 sentence reads as follows:
7 "[In English] Met with mayor of Banja Luka and afterwards
8 visited hospital and refugee control centre." Or what -- "Nothing of
10 [Interpretation] Can I ask you why there was nothing of
11 significance whereas you saw so many refugees? Who were all these
13 A. We -- we had met with the various leaders in Banja Luka prior to
14 this. This report was based on just simply we were actually requested
15 would we visit the hospital and the refugee control centre. There may
16 have been a report submitted by another team, because when we were based
17 in Banja Luka there was two teams sent to different locations. So the
18 other team may have made a report themselves specifically on this issue.
19 I don't know one way or the other.
20 Q. What I wanted to ask you was this: Who were these refugees that
21 you came across?
22 A. I can't recall. I simply can't recall.
23 Q. And if I tell you that they were Serbs from Western Slavonia,
24 does that sound reasonable to you?
25 A. I really can't pass a comment on it, because I simply don't know
1 where those refugees came from.
2 Q. Thank you. This is already an exhibit. Now may we move on to
3 the next page, please. And then afterwards -- next page, please, first.
4 Could you read out the second paragraph there, please.
5 A. "We were informed that the Ozren area between Doboj and
6 Petrovo Selo had now a division of communities with the Muslims and the
7 Serbs separated (except for work) by the -- by the Spreca river - Muslims
8 to the north and Serbs to the out."
9 With respect, I would have to say that had I known a lot of these
10 reports would resurrect themselves after 18 years I probably would have
11 spent a better time trying to write in a better manner. I apologise for
13 The last sentence reads:
14 "Uncertainty expressed by withdrawal of Serbian members from the
15 National Assembly."
16 Q. Thank you. And do you know what Ozren looks like? Do you
17 remember what it looks like on the map? We're going to call up the -- I
18 think -- well, just give me one second, please.
19 This is a map showing the ethnic composition of Bosnia
21 this is map number 3 in the binder.
22 How could we call it up differently?
23 JUDGE KWON: I don't think I'm following what Mr. Karadzic is
24 saying. What binder are you referring to?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the map from -- map
1 number 3 from the binder made specially for this occasion, and this is
2 binder -- this is ERN number 0701 to 0724.
3 JUDGE KWON: The only binder the Judges are provided with is the
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please put this
6 on the ELMO?
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we can provide the binder to
8 you --
9 JUDGE KWON: I appreciate it.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- later.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Colonel, sir, do you know what the term "gerrymandering" means?
13 A. Well, there are various interpretations of that, so I'd like
14 to ...
15 Q. Let me remind you. This is the manipulation of electoral units
16 that Jerry Mander committed in the 19th century in America to ensure that
17 a minority party could win the elections everywhere by redistribution of
18 the territory. Does that comport with what you know about
20 A. Yes, it does.
21 Q. Thank you. Sir, as soon as we see this map I'm going to give you
22 a little bit of an introduction. The objection of the Serbian party in
24 Serbian areas distributing it in such a way that the Serbs were a
25 minority everywhere. Look, in Gracanica there's 73 per cent of Muslims,
1 12 per cent of Serbs?
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I think the witness should be
3 asked questions. We should not hear --
4 JUDGE KWON: Correct. I was about --
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- the accused giving evidence.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we have the map before us. What is your
7 question, Mr. Karadzic?
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Colonel, sir, do you see Ozren here in the middle of this map,
10 this blue island?
11 A. I think you'll have to point it out to me because I don't. I
12 don't know where it is on this map.
13 Q. To the left you see Tesanj and then you have a blue island
14 surrounded by green. It's south of Doboj. I cannot make markings on the
15 map, but are you able to?
16 You can see Tesanj, Maglaj, Zavidovici, Gracanica, and Doboj. Do
17 you see it now?
18 A. I see --
19 Q. It's in the form of a hook. Do you see that this area is 100 per
20 cent inhabited by Serbs. The blue colour indicates the Serbian
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And do you see the somewhat thicker lines marking the municipal
24 boundaries? The thinner ones mark village boundaries. The thicker ones
25 indicate municipal boundaries.
1 A. Are we talking about this area here?
2 Q. I cannot see what you are pointing, but this is the blue area.
3 The only -- yes. It's in the very centre. No. There it is. A little
4 bit -- the biggest one. East of Maglaj.
5 A. There?
6 Q. The large area. Yeah. Yeah. And up to the north. This area
7 that you were pointing -- more to the east. More to the east. A little
8 bit more to the east. This large blue area. Do you see it?
9 A. Right here.
10 Q. Yes. That's it. That's Ozren.
11 A. Okay.
12 Q. And do you see these thicker lines indicating the boundaries of
14 A. Within that blue area.
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And now can you see that a part of Ozren has been joined to
19 A. I can see where Maglaj is, and I can see it's a different colour
20 to the blue that we've just pointed out.
21 Q. But the municipal boundary does not correspond to the ethnic
22 boundary. You see the thicker line indicating the Maglaj municipality.
23 So a large part of Ozren, up to a third, belongs to Maglaj; is that
25 A. Well, I don't know what this map was before. If I could say
1 something here, Your Honour. One of the major problems the monitor
2 mission had was to try and find an ethnic map of Bosnia that was accepted
3 generally as the definitive areas of the municipalities that were Serb,
4 Croat, and Muslims. And when I was going out I asked was there a
5 definitive map that I could be able to refer to, and I was told no
6 because all sides disagree. And there was one map that we used in the
7 mission where we had the Muslim municipalities in green, the Croat were
8 in blue, and the Serbs were in red. And when I produced that, I was
9 told, Well, that's not good enough, because depending on who you are and
10 what you are, we don't believe it.
11 The map was made by two people who wasn't accepted to another
12 side. So this is one of the great problems that this country had in my
13 view, that nobody seemed to agree on a definitive breakdown of the
14 various communities of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. And I have to say
15 that as a general point. So looking at a map of this nature I can see
16 what Mr. Karadzic is pointing out, but I have no idea what the map was
17 before or what the map was after, and people became obsessed with maps.
18 So we didn't -- we went to communities to talk to leaders, not basically
19 to look at maps.
20 Q. Thank you. Colonel, this was done by an official state institute
21 marking each village, each area. So these thin lines indicate the
22 boundaries of the villages. So when there is a large majority, it is
23 coloured with a certain colour. These thicker boundaries indicate
24 municipal boundaries. So all of these villages belong to the Maglaj
25 municipality to the south-west. Then in the south they belong to
1 Zavidovici. To the south-east they belong to Lukavac, and Gracanica to
2 the north-east.
3 Do you see that these villages marked by thin lines are
4 belonging, according to the thicker municipal boundaries, to the
5 neighbouring municipality? The seats of those municipalities are green.
6 These are majority Muslim municipalities, Tesanj, Maglaj, Zavidovici.
7 I'm speaking from the west towards the south, Zavidovici, Banovici,
8 Lukavac and Gracanica.
9 A. Yes, I can see what you're referring to.
10 Q. Thank you. And let me now tell you that Petrovo Selo, Petrovo
11 was a municipality once, a Serbian municipality, and again it's a Serbian
12 municipality now, but at one point this area was divided between the
13 neighbouring municipalities with Muslim population in which the Serbs
14 were a minority. Do you see that now?
15 A. Well, I don't see that from looking at this map. I am simply
16 looking at a map that has different colours on it and you're giving me
17 this information. So I don't agree and I don't disagree. I don't have a
18 view on it.
19 Q. All right. But you did go to Petrovo Selo; right? Petrovo Selo
20 is in the middle of this blue area indicating Ozren; right?
21 A. No. I don't -- I don't recall going to that village. I mean, I
22 say in my report here that we were informed. That doesn't mean we were
23 there. We were informed that the Ozren area between Doboj and Petrovici
24 had now a division of communities. That's what the report says. I don't
25 recall going to the place at all because I used to make out a report on
1 the areas that I visited or the opstina I visited. So I have no
2 recollection. Even though it's on my report it doesn't say in my report
3 that I was actually there.
4 Q. Thank you. That's possible. It's possible. But now we can see
5 a high Serbian concentration divided among neighbouring municipalities,
6 and what you heard, and it was written that they had now established or
7 determined to have a different organisation in the municipality or
8 different municipal organisation, and, Colonel, sir, this is something
9 that you have been informed about, why Serbs were asking to have their
10 old municipalities restored to them, because as minorities in
11 neighbouring municipalities they weren't faring all that well. Did
12 anyone informed you about that, although I see that you did write down
13 that there was a fear everywhere of being in a minority?
14 A. Yes, they were one of the concerns of, the general concerns that
15 were expressed at those meetings, but as I say before, all of them
16 expressed their concerns. We wrote down what those concerns were and we
17 reported back on it. That was our role. We didn't go into the minute
18 detail because if we had done that we would need a huge amount of people
19 to do it, to do a survey. So my reports basically reflect the general
20 feelings of the various groups at that time in those places.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you know that according to the constitution these
22 local communities or villages do have the right to opt for a different
23 municipal organisation, to leave a municipality and form a municipality
24 with neighbouring local communities or to join a different municipality?
25 Did you know that our constitution allowed -- or allows for this option?
1 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
2 Q. But you do believe me; right?
3 JUDGE KWON: That's not a relevant question, Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. And I would like for
5 the transcript to state that this map in e-court is 4250, 65 ter number
6 4250, and I would like to tender the map because we will be using it a
7 lot. Thank you. We don't need the map any more on the ELMO. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: I take it there will be no objections.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection.
10 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D225, Your Honour.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. What we're looking on the screen right now states that the
14 population in Gracanica is 60.000, Muslims 73 per cent, Serbs
15 23 per cent, and others 4 per cent; is that what we see written here?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Thank you. We can continue. Next page, please.
18 And we can see what things are like in Gracanica. This is the
19 next page, 68068.
20 Doboj has names deleted, but there's a Croat and a Muslim
21 referred to, and then you will see when there is no third then they will
22 then focus on the Yugoslav People's Army and report to you the way they
23 see fit, but let's look at Gracanica. The names are crossed out here,
24 too, and as you can see, there is no SDS anywhere; is that correct? We
25 have the SDA, the SDP
1 A. I can see that, yes.
2 Q. Do you understand better now why Serbs felt bad when they were a
3 minority in an intolerant environment and intolerant society?
4 A. No, I don't see that. I simply see that the Serbs were not at
5 that particular meeting, so obviously they decided not to turn up. We
6 let it be known to everybody that we were going to a particular area,
7 that we were anxious to speak to all sides. If one of the sides decided
8 not to turn up, we just accepted that. So I can't see just because there
9 were no Serbs representatives there that there was anything untowards
10 about that situation at all. So I wouldn't accept that.
11 Q. Colonel, sir, you can see here that those are posts. The
12 president of the Executive Board, the president of the municipality, the
13 president of the SDA, president of the municipality, the Executive Board,
14 and so on. These are public functions, but they have nothing to do with
15 the SDS
16 A. From those who attended on that particular occasion, there
17 appears not to have been representative of the SDS. I certainly agree
18 with that. But beyond that I don't see -- I have nothing to -- I have
19 nothing to say.
20 Q. If we look at your diary, there was some 10 or 15 meetings in
21 which there were no representatives of the SDS or not even Serb
22 representatives. You only met once with all three religious leaders, and
23 then for the most part it was meetings with Muslims and Croats. Well,
24 let's look at the next page.
25 And we can see here that you visited Manjaca and the refugee camp
1 in Banja Luka and the Catholic bishop and the Muslim mufti. You didn't
2 visit the Serbian bishop; is that correct?
3 A. No, it's not correct. I had dinner with the Serbian bishop and
4 his assistant. I got a special invitation from him, and I was very
5 pleased to attend. It may not have been in that week. But the last
6 event that I attended before I was appointed head of the mission was to
7 have dinner with the -- with the -- the Serb bishop of the area. So I
8 certainly remember him and I have photographs taken with him. So I mean,
9 he may not have been -- excuse me. He may not have been available during
10 that week, but I certainly met him on more than one occasion and was very
11 pleased to do so.
12 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at the end of the second paragraph.
13 Can we scroll the text up, please, and look at the end of the second
14 paragraph where it says:
15 "[In English] There is also uncertainty about the referendum due
16 on 8th to 10th November."
17 [Interpretation] This is the Serb referendum that you're
18 referring to; is that correct?
19 A. Sorry, I don't get that in the report here. Maybe you're on the
20 wrong page.
21 JUDGE KWON: Up a bit.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. No. It's the end of the second paragraph: "There is also." The
24 last sentence in the second paragraph.
25 A. Yes, I see that now, yes.
1 "There's also uncertainty about the referendum due on the 8/10th
3 I presume that refers to the -- to the Serb community having
4 their referendum. But this report is not in my writing, so it may have
5 been another member of the team who made that report out, but that
6 doesn't mean I don't accept its content.
7 Q. It's possible, but you did sign it. So what is meant by this
8 uncertainty about the referendum?
9 A. Well, I presume that it would be that people were concerned that
10 there was a referendum being held by the Bosnian Serbs which was
11 something they were going to do themselves and that that wouldn't be very
12 accepted by the other sides. I can only give an opinion on what that
13 sentence might mean, because we were all concerned about the consequences
14 of having this referendum. The Serbs had already established their own
15 autonomous regions. This was a cause for concern. There were other
16 members who didn't want to go into those areas, they were very nervous.
17 There's one of my reports that reflects that. So anything of this nature
18 that was going to concern one element of the population, obviously there
19 would be a certain degree of uncertainty about it. I don't think that's
21 Q. And do you agree that similarly the Serbs had reason for
22 uncertainty and tension when it came to the referendum that was conducted
23 by the Muslim and Croatian communities at the end of February?
24 A. Yes, I do agree.
25 Q. So you have understanding for both these reasons for tension;
2 A. Yes, I have.
3 Q. Thank you. May we have the next page. Top of the page, please.
4 You visited in Banja Luka the mufti and the head of the SDA party
5 in Banja Luka. Do you remember what that chief of the SDA was called?
6 What was his name?
7 A. No, I don't, I don't recall his name. Again, I have a photograph
8 taken but his name, no, I don't recall.
9 Q. Do you agree that there were 14 per cent Muslims in Banja Luka
10 that the population of Banja Luka was 14 per cent Muslim? Do you accept
11 that piece of information from the population census?
12 A. I have no reason to disagree with that, no.
13 Q. Now, the last paragraph reads as follows: It says that you
14 continue to be well-received by the assemblies and the public and that
15 there has been considerable media attention.
16 Now, Colonel, I'd like to remind you that that this gentleman,
17 the president of the SDA, was called Krzic. His surname was Krzic. I
18 think it was Muhamed [sic] Krzic; right? Does that refresh your memory?
19 A. No, I'm sorry, it doesn't.
20 Q. Now, the Muslim population in Banja Luka counted for 14 per cent.
21 Now may we have on e-court 1280, which is -- 1D; right? 1D1280. For you
22 to see what this man Mr. Krzic was preparing in Banja Luka, and it's all
23 written in his own hand. It's his authorship. He is the author of this.
24 And it describes an uprising, preparations for an uprising, a rebellion
25 in Banja Luka, although the war at that time was at least a hundred
1 kilometres away. His name was Muharem Krzic.
2 May we have the next page, please. Next page, please.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes?
5 JUDGE KWON: The witness said that the name Krzic didn't ring a
6 bell to him. There's no point of you reading out this document. Just
7 put your question in -- in a brief manner, and then if the witness
8 doesn't know, you should proceed and move on to your next topic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Now, did anybody inform you that the SDA in Banja Luka, of which
12 14 per cent were Muslims, do you agree that the mayor of Banja Luka,
13 Mr. Radic, who has died since, was a very cautious man and that he took
14 into account the rights of the Muslims and Croats in Banja Luka, because
15 I do believe you met him; right?
16 A. Yes, I met the mayor of Banja Luka. I don't recall exactly the
17 details of our conversation, but, yes, I met him.
18 Q. And do you agree that he was a very responsible man and caring of
19 the Muslims and Croats?
20 A. Well, I can't answer that because I simply don't know. I
21 remember meeting him and my recollection of him was somebody who was very
22 definite in his views, and beyond that I don't know, but certainly
23 because we lived in the city of Banja Luka, we were aware of the concerns
24 that existed at that time. And the main concern we had was the actual
25 behaviour of reservists because we saw them in the hotel at night and --
1 so that was one of the concerns. But I can't remember the detail of the
2 meeting I had with the mayor.
3 Q. Thank you. Did you know that the SDA under the leadership of
4 this man Mr. Krzic was preparing an armed rebellion in the midst of
5 Banja Luka? And that's what's described in this document.
6 A. No. I have no knowledge of that.
7 Q. Thank you. Then I'll produce this document with some other
8 witness, but may we go on to the next page, please. The previous
9 document, the old one, next page.
10 JUDGE KWON: Do you mean the handwritten report, Exhibit P922?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. May we have 071 next, please.
13 It's the last page, 071. This is 058. So we need to go to 071.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Doyle, it says here that people complained about the price of
16 business premises. Do you mean to say there that the prices of business
17 premises just rose for Muslims, whereas the Serbs were given those
18 business facilities cheaper?
19 A. Excuse me. This report refers to the rents demanded for the
20 business, not the purchases of them. So it was to do with rents. And
21 that was from a meeting we had, and these were the concerns that were
22 being expressed and that was one of them.
23 Q. Yes, that's what I meant, rent. Did you understand that there
24 was discrimination in rent, one price for the Muslims and another for the
1 A. That was my understanding of that meeting, yes.
2 Q. And did you check that out with the Serbs? Did you ask the mayor
3 about that and check it out?
4 A. I didn't bring it up with the mayor, and I didn't check it out,
6 Q. Thank you. Now may we move on to page 075. But if I were you, I
7 would have checked that out because it was a drastic piece of
8 information, and they were trying to blacken us and besmirch our image in
9 your eyes.
10 Could you read out the last sentence of that: "Informed us."
11 Informed us what?
12 A. "They informed us that the most serious problems were a lack of
13 heating fuel and medicines. We suggest that another team visit -- we
14 suggest that --" I can't -- sorry. "We suggest that maybe the other
15 team," because this would have been the second monitor team, "inform the
16 mayor of this problem."
17 As I mentioned to you, the second team that was in Banja Luka
18 dealing also with the city, so we wouldn't -- my team wouldn't have gone
19 necessarily to all of them. So that's why one team replaced another
20 team. So when the other team replaced us, this is one of the suggestions
21 we had made, that maybe this issue be taken up by the next team on duty
22 to bring it to the attention of the mayor. So that's an assumption.
23 That's an assumption I have.
24 Q. And in the previous sentence what is being suggested is that the
25 number of refugees and the overall situation and especially the number of
1 refugees has become a burden to the area and that there was a shortage of
2 fuel and medicines; right?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. And we're dealing with the 28th of October here. That's the
5 date; right?
6 A. Yes. Yes.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance to the
9 Prosecution or the Registrar. There are quite a number of documents that
10 crop up under a different number. So that makes the whole thing more
11 voluminous. So that's why I'm skipping those that are repetitive.
12 May we have 65 ter 21084 next, please. Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Is the date is the 27th of November, and you received the prime
15 minister. You had a meeting with the prime minister.
16 A. Yes. This was my first day as head of the monitor mission.
17 Q. Well, if I tell you that what the prime minister did was abuse to
18 the advantage of the Republic of Croatia
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that he informed you about something that was not
20 the government position, what would you have to say to that?
21 A. Well, it all depends on what you want to say about it. I don't
22 know what you're talking about, Mr. Karadzic. This is a report of my
23 meeting with the prime minister. It's as simple as that.
24 Q. What I mean to say is that you should have received three men,
25 the prime minister and two vice premiers, and then you would have heard
1 differently because the prime minister presented a view that was not the
2 government position and the prime minister is not an institution. Do you
3 agree with that? The government is the institution.
4 A. Well, with all due respect, Mr. Karadzic, if the head of the
5 monitor mission is asked to meet with the prime minister, the least I
6 might do is meet with him at his request. I wasn't going to demand that
7 I meet the deputy prime minister because he was from another ethnic
8 party. This is all about ethnicity. All of these reports. It's about
9 one side disagreeing with the other side, and this is part of the major
10 problem we had. Nobody seemed to trust anybody else if they came from a
11 different ethnic background. I see absolutely no reason for not
12 accepting an invitation from the prime minister of a state to a meeting.
13 Q. Colonel, I'm not attacking you. I'm attacking the prime minister
14 who was abusing his powers and post to behave as if he were an
15 institution. He was there to convey the government position, not his
16 personal position under the guise of the government. Do you agree?
17 A. Well, I'm not too sure how I should have treated this other than,
18 you know, accepting his invitation to meet him. He's a prime minister.
19 I had no idea what the meeting was going to be about, and this report
20 indicates the issues that he brought up with me, and I'm only reporting
21 on what they were.
22 Q. Thank you. But did you happen to notice later on that not only
23 when people came to see you individually -- well, when they came
24 individually, their stories would be different than if those same people
25 came with two others, as three, as three representatives? They would
1 tell a different story?
2 A. Yes. That would be very possible. I have no actual proof of it,
3 but I understand what you're -- what you're saying. I mean, I met with
4 the prime minister who was a Croat, and then afterwards I met with the
5 deputy prime minister who was a Muslim. So they are two of the ethnic
6 groups. I hadn't any problem not meeting either of them.
7 Q. Thank you. May we have 65 ter 30320 next, please. It's an
9 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to tender the previous document? So
10 it has already been admitted.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. The previous document was
12 admitted as Exhibit P946 under 65 ter 11084.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have --
15 JUDGE KWON: Could the Court Deputy give the exhibit number
16 again, exhibit P?
17 THE REGISTRAR: It was P946, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE KWON: 946. Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. This is an intercept of a conversation between
21 Bozidar Vucurevic -- no. No, sorry. 30 --
22 THE INTERPRETER: My mistake in quoting the numbers. Could
23 Mr. Karadzic quote the numbers again, please.
24 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the number.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 30323.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Colonel, can you see that my conversations were intercepted and
3 the code-name was Latas for me, they used the code-name Latas. Can you
4 see that?
5 A. I can see that code is written here, yes.
6 Q. Do you know who Latas was?
7 A. I have no idea.
8 Q. There is an Ivo Andric novel in which Latas appears. He was a
9 Serb who converted and became a Turk, became a great Pasa, a Turkish
10 Pasa, and the Sultans sent him to punish the Bosnian Beys. So I laughed
11 when I saw that, what the code sign for me was. They sort of saw me as
12 somebody being sent by Stanbul -- Istanbul or, rather, Belgrade
13 the Bosnian Beys. Now may we look at page 4 of this, please?
14 JUDGE KWON: It's not for the witness. Yes. What is your
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have page 4 of this document,
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Vucurevic, the mayor of Trebinje here, is informing me and
20 telling me that they have quite a lot of prisoners. You were in contact
21 with Mr. Vucurevic, I believe, and we have here a question for you but a
22 general warning, first of all, with respect to translation.
23 It says here Radovan Karadzic speaking, "Oh, keep them well."
24 And what is referred to is 132 prisoners among whom there were some
25 foreigners too. Now, did you know that there were 132 prisoners in
1 Bileca, including foreign mercenaries?
2 A. No, I had no idea.
3 Q. I'd like to draw your attention to the fact that the translations
4 of these intercepts are drastically different between the original and
5 the translation and lead to a number of difficulties. First of all, it
6 says "Okay, keep them well," and I said, "cuvajte ih dobro," or "Take
7 care that nothing happens to them." "Take good care that nothing happens
8 to them," which is essentially a different meaning. "Look after them,"
9 is what I said.
10 And now, on the following page -- I'll find it. Let me just take
11 a moment.
12 Where there was a drastic mistake. It says that it should not be
13 published, made public, and I said that it should be made public. So I
14 spoke in the affirmative. The translation was in the negative.
15 Now, what I want to ask you, Vucurevic says towards the end,
16 "Yes, we'll now it's tomorrow. Our forces are here near that, and these
17 are coming over Konavlje and from Boka and Zubac, and they are very
18 close. [In English] Tomorrow our forces -- well, tomorrow our forces
19 will meet at the entrance of Kupare here."
20 [Interpretation] So whose forces were they at the end of 1991,
21 sir, Colonel?
22 A. Mr. Karadzic, I'm sorry. I don't understand what this is about.
23 Q. Mr. Vucurevic is referring to certain forces who are south of the
24 Trebinje towards Kupari, and I wanted to ask you -- well, you knew the
25 area and you knew what was going on in the area. So which forces were
1 they that he refers to as "our forces"?
2 A. I have no idea.
3 Q. The Yugoslav People's Army; right?
4 A. The only occasion that I was in Bileca was to meet
5 General Strugar, who was the commander of the 2nd Operational Group, and
6 I met the mayor on that morning. And the consequence of that meeting
7 with the general was that he indicated to me he had shelled Dubrovnik.
8 That's the subject of a different trial. And he informed me that the
9 reason he did it was because some of his troops, the JNA, were being
10 attacked by -- by Croats. So they're the only two references I recall on
11 that occasion had to do with military forces, that some Croats were
12 harassing members of the JNA on General Strugar's command and he took
13 retaliatory action.
14 I was aware that they were --
15 Q. All right. We will go through this with another -- with a
16 different witness then. Thank you. But you were quite busy there in
17 1992 around Neum; is that correct?
18 A. Yes. I visited Neum because I was concerned about developments
19 in that area. So I went down there, and that would have been in December
20 1991. And I returned to the Bileca area with the head of the monitor
21 mission, the Portuguese Ambassador Salguero for a formal meeting,
22 and that could have been around February 1992. I'd have to check my
23 notes on that. So those were the only two occasions that I was in the
24 that area. I had been to Mostar because there were problems there.
25 Q. Thank you. Can we now have 65 ter 11039. It's the same as
1 21076, actually.
2 This is a document. It's your report that you signed. You
3 probably wrote it as well, about a meeting of the Assembly on the 24th of
4 January, 1992
5 here that we were some kind of cosmetic device to provide legitimacy to
6 the Assembly just by appearing there. And we can see by these numbers --
7 first of all, do you -- do you recall this report of yours?
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 JUDGE KWON: For the record, I note that this is Exhibit P942.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. And we can see on the first page that:
12 "The main feature, among others, discussed [In English] was the
13 question of whether a national referendum be held on the question of
14 sovereignty and, if so, the wording and date."
15 [Interpretation] Do you remember this was the session where we
16 accepted the offer by Muhamed Cengic for a regionalisation to be carried
17 out and then for us to also take part in the referendum? Do you remember
19 A. I remember writing this report, having attended the session in
20 parliament. As I've mentioned before, I don't speak Serbo-Croat, so I
21 was depending on interpretations of what was being said, and this was my
22 subsequent report back to my headquarters, the content of that.
23 Q. Would you be kind enough to read these ten points. You will do
24 it much better because this is something that you yourself wrote.
25 A. You'll have to forgive me because the first few there the typing
1 hasn't come out too well, but if I'm correct, it says:
2 "If Yugoslavia
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. We will not allow the Serbs to be outnumbered."
4 I can't read the first few words of the next line.
5 "The only guarantee for the Serbs is a separate Serbian state in
7 "5. They do not believe that the rights would be protected if
8 they became a minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
9 "6.The Serbs will not be forced into something that they do not
10 want or don't want.
11 "7. No referendum was possible because of what happened to
12 Serbs in World War II.
13 "8. The aim of the SDA (Muslim party) the creation of an
14 Islamic state in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15 "9. Not against a referendum as an expression of free will but
16 against one formulated by the president.
17 "10. Recommend that SDA/HDZ go ahead without SDS as they (SDS
18 already had a plebiscite of their own on November 9th and 10th."
19 Excuse me. That is as best as I can read them.
20 Q. Thank you. Our position was that if Yugoslavia was transformed
21 and changed, then Bosnia
23 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
24 Q. Thank you. Can we look at the next page of your report, please.
25 In the first paragraph where it says "The concession." Can you
1 read the following paragraph, "there were considerable..." You can read
2 the first paragraph from the beginning if you would be kind enough.
3 Thank you.
4 A. Is this under the heading of "Comments"?
5 Q. Yes, but actually the very first paragraph starting at the top of
6 the page.
7 A. "There were considerable recesses to consider certain points.
8 At 0100 hours it appeared that a 'deal' had been struck. An agreed
9 document was circulated to all members laying out the wording of the
10 referendum. The concession by the SDS
11 allow regionalisation to each ethnic community. What this was to mean
12 exactly was not clear. However, as the president of the SDS,
13 Mr. Karadzic began to speak, it became clear that what was intended by
14 the SDA/HDZ was not as had been understood by the SDS. After a further
15 recess, the president of the Assembly declared that as no progress was
16 being made, the session was being concluded and the SDS withdrew."
17 Q. Thank you. We will deal with that at another time. What this is
18 is Muhamed Cengic offering something, and we accepted that, but then
19 after the break they rejected that. Could you please read the comments
21 A. Comment:
22 "1. It would appear that the SDS, although agreeing to attend
23 the session, were only there for cosmetic purposes and would only support
24 the referendum on attaining reasonable concessions.
25 "2. The SDS
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is questionable if their fears are justified.
2 "3. It is to be regretted the decision on the referendum was a
3 majority one and not supported by all. This fact may be used by the SDS
4 as an argument against its acceptance.
5 "4. It is by no means certain that some Serbs will not
6 participate in the referendum. Some of the opposition parties supporting
7 the motion represent Serbs. There is also a feeling by some Serbs that a
8 sovereign independent republic is inevitable."
9 Q. Colonel, why did you call the concessions unreasonable if you
10 know that we already at that stage were in negotiations with
11 Ambassador Cutileiro and that we did get such a proposal and this is
12 actually what was finally adopted in Dayton?
13 A. The impression I got and again you have to understand again that
14 all of this debate was in Serbo-Croat and it was depending on
15 interpretations. The impression I got from those translations was that
16 the Bosnian Serbs did not want this referendum to go ahead if -- if it
17 wasn't -- if there was not an agreement by consensus; and therefore once
18 there would be an objection by the Bosnian Serbs against this, and if you
19 use the principle of consensus, then we realised that there would not be
20 an agreement. So that was the inference I drew from that element of the
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We will have a break for 20 minutes.
23 --- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 10.47 a.m.
25 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Colonel, sir, we stopped at your estimate that the concessions
4 were unreasonable. Do you believe that it's unreasonable that
6 or specificities?
7 A. Well, I'm not an expert in the make-up of the -- of the Swiss
8 political system, so -- I don't really have any expert knowledge on it,
9 so I don't have a comment on it.
10 Q. Under number 2 you say it is questionable if their fears are
11 justified. Are you informed of the fact that numerous western sources or
12 authorities said that these fears were justified? For example,
13 Colin Powell and many others who said that these were justified? For
14 example, in "The New York Times" of the 19th of September, Colin Powell
15 says -- perhaps we can place this on the ELMO for the Colonel to see what
16 the position was of the person who was in command of the US armed forces?
17 JUDGE KWON: I don't think we need to see that. The colonel is
18 capable of answering the question.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I read it then?
20 JUDGE KWON: It's not for the witness to comment upon others'
21 comments. If you have a question, just put it to him.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Colonel, sir, were you interested in and did you register the
24 standpoints of Western sources about this particular item where you said
25 that it is a questionable if the Serb fears are justified, and are you
1 aware that all of them concluded that they actually were justified?
2 A. No, I'm not aware that all of them said that. What I'm giving
3 here is my estimate of my experience for the time that I served in
5 for them. It doesn't affect me.
6 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at 65 ter 21075, please. Can we look
7 at the next page, please.
8 You wrote here in paragraph 2:
9 "On October 13th, President Izetbegovic declared neutrality in
10 [In English] A unilateral statement before seeking the agreement of the
11 member Presidency (the 2 Serbs objected)."
12 [Interpretation] Do you know that Mr. Izetbegovic said to that
13 that there are laws and laws and that perhaps they had violated the law
14 somewhat and that everything was fluid and that there were laws that
15 didn't have to be respected?
16 A. No, I don't remember him actually saying that, but what I do
17 appreciate is that depending on what ethnic background you were,
18 everybody seemed to have their own interpretation of what these very
19 famous rules were. So everybody differed depending on your ethnic
20 background. This was constant throughout my time there.
21 Q. Does that mean that there was no constitution and that ethnic
22 belongingness was more important than the constitutional provisions?
23 A. No, not necessarily, but if I may just at this juncture point out
24 that the last sentence of the report I made out on the referendum debate
25 in the parliament raised concerns that I had in relation to whether or
1 not the decision on this referendum was constitutional or not, and
2 therefore as I mentioned in -- in my testimony, I think yesterday, I
3 sought an opportunity to try and get a proper legal definition on all of
4 these issues from the highest legal authority in the state, and I could
5 not get from them a definitive interpretation of this referendum. Now,
6 if the highest legal brains in the state were not able to have a
7 consensus on what was and was not constitutional, it was going to be
8 pretty difficult for the monitor mission, and for me, to get that
9 definitive definition. And therefore, it was always a difficulty for us,
10 and all I could do is put down in writing the concerns that were being
11 expressed about all of these issues, which I think I did.
12 Q. Thank you. I'm not attacking you, but I just want to be more
13 specific about certain points that were imprecise.
14 When we're talking about neutrality, would Wales be able to
15 declare neutrality if Great Britain or the United Kingdom were to declare
16 a state of war or some kind of threat or Bavaria, for example? Any unit
17 within any country, would it be able to declare neutrality?
18 A. From the point of view of another state, it would probably depend
19 on the make-up of that state. I'm not an expert in the field and I
20 always like to keep out of things to do with the British Isles as an
22 JUDGE MORRISON: If I may say so, I think that's very wise.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. But still, you do make some political assessments. And in the
1 next item it you say that:
2 "On October 24th [In English] The Serbian Democratic Party
3 demonstrated their inability to accept true democracy when they
4 established an inner parliament to show their displeasure --"
5 A. Displeasure.
6 Q. Yes. "... displeasure at being out-voted on such a key issue as
7 sovereignty which they will never accept."
8 [Interpretation] Do you agree that forms of democracy are ordered
9 by the constitution, and if we have a constitutional regulation
10 envisaging the right to a veto is that one of the conditions to respect
11 the democracy and does that allow for the possibility of not respecting
12 the constitution?
13 A. Yes, I would agree with that, but once again I have to say that I
14 was concerned to try and find out what exactly the constitution stated,
15 and that's why I attempted to get a proper explanation for it, but I
16 couldn't get a definitive, and the normal path that would be taken in a
17 democratic institution with a what standard -- you know, with a standard
18 set of rules and regulations that would be accepted by all parties, but
19 it was my belief that the elements of the constitution were being used to
20 the benefit of each side for their own purposes. Therefore, I don't know
21 whether there was a unilateral acceptance of the constitution of Bosnia
22 Q. Thank you. I must note regrettably that you were not very well
23 prepared in the European Community because in February 1991 and March
24 1991 the Muslim and the Croat sides tried to get the declaration on
25 sovereignty. We placed a veto on that and sent that to the council on
1 ethnic equality. The council was prevented from doing its job and that's
2 why we formed our National Assembly. Do you know that there was a
3 council for ethnic equality where we did have the right to a veto?
4 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
5 Q. Well, please believe me when I say that I'm not attacking you but
6 I'm attacking those who should have prepared you properly, because we
7 didn't want to leave the last safeguard, the last constitutional
8 safeguard of our equality which was trampled on. Do you agree that if a
9 national equality council exists, a sort of Assembly of nations, if it is
10 abolished, did we have the right to take counter-measures then?
11 A. I'm afraid I have to say here that all of these reports that made
12 out were going to a higher authority and would inevitably end up at
13 some -- you know, with the European Union that's who we all worked for.
14 And these are the people who make all of these decisions. These are the
15 people who are qualified. I was there as a monitor to observe and
16 report, and that's what I did to the best of my ability, so beyond that I
17 really can't say too much. But I would be surprised if the content of
18 these reports weren't examined properly by the head of the -- the team
19 that were heading the monitor mission back in Zagreb, but once again I
20 was trying to reflect what was happening on the ground, and it would be
21 up for them to take the -- the recommendations or otherwise of those
23 Q. Thank you. Thank you very much. That is a great relief to me,
24 because after these reports the European Community came up with the
25 Cutileiro Plan, which means that they realised -- well, I have to
1 apologise to them too, they saw on the basis of these reports, they came
2 to realise that the situation was what it was and that we did have the
3 right to what we were calling for, and so they offered us the
4 Cutileiro Plan. Do you know that's a plan offered up by the European
6 A. I know the plan was put up by the Cutileiro team. Where that
7 would have come out of, I simply don't know. I wasn't at that level.
8 Q. But you agree that it was within the frameworks of the conference
9 on Yugoslavia
10 Lord Carrington right up until the end of August 1992; right?
11 A. Yes, that is correct.
12 Q. Were you aware of the basic premises of that plan?
13 A. No, I was not. That plan was from the 7 -- from the 18th of
14 March, and at that stage I was head of the monitor mission. I wasn't
15 working with Carrington. So I wasn't involved in it.
16 Q. Thank you. But nevertheless, the plan came up again on the 12th
17 of April during the truce, the cease-fire, that you helped broker, and
18 the cease-fire refers to that plan and says that the conference should be
19 continued and work accelerated to define, et cetera, et cetera. We'll
20 come to the document, to defining the territory of the constituent units
21 according to the Cutileiro Plan.
22 So on the basis of your reports, the European Community was able
23 to offer up the Cutileiro Plan and said that our rights were justified.
24 If necessary, we can call up those documents. I think that the
25 Prosecution is in possession of the Lisbon Agreement, for instance. But
1 if you don't know about that, we'll deal with that subject with someone
3 Staying with the document, yes, that's right, may we have a look
4 at page 218. It says 218 at the bottom of the page, where you're
5 reporting about the formation of the Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 That's 219. May we have 218, the previous page, please.
7 It says:
8 "[In English] Sarajevo
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina verified last night the results of the plebiscite of
10 the Serbian nation in this republic held on November 9th and 10th."
11 [Interpretation] That's right, isn't it? So that was understood
12 as the realisation of our plebiscite. And in the same paragraph it goes
13 on to say that approximately 1.400.000 Serbs voted, as well as 40.000
14 others, Muslims and Croats; rights?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now, in paragraph 4, you say who the Assembly authorised to
17 negotiate with other communities, and then the second sentence reads:
18 "[In English] In the negotiations, they are obliged to respect
19 the interests of the -- of the other two nations, as well as not to --"
20 what -- [Interpretation] What word is that? "[In English] ... not to
21 oppose insofar Muslims and Croatian decide to form a separate joint
23 [Interpretation] Do you agree that what we are asking for
24 ourselves we recognise as being the right of others and that the Assembly
25 ruled as it did on that day?
1 A. Well, this document came into my possession. I don't recall
2 who -- who gave it to me or how formal it was, but I do know that a
3 consequence of the result of this plebiscite meant there was great
4 concern in the Presidency of Bosnia because I was informed by members of
5 the Presidency, and this did not include Serb members, that the
6 government felt it was losing its control in these areas. And I visited
7 one or two of these areas, and the people I had with me who were not
8 Serbs were extremely anxious, very nervous, and the government -- the
9 collective government of Bosnia
10 areas, and that was of great concern to them.
11 Q. Thank you. Now we would have to debate the point, why they lost
12 their authority and were the country didn't have the proper attributes of
13 a state. But we'll do that with someone else. May we have 1138, next,
14 please, on our screens.
15 THE INTERPRETER: 11038, interpreter's correction.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, just for the record the previous
17 document was admitted as Exhibit P919 under 65 ter number 11038.
18 JUDGE KWON: 11038.
19 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE KWON: So exactly the same document that we're going to see
22 THE REGISTRAR: That appears to be this case, Your Honour.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it is repeated, but may we
24 have page 4 of this document.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. G: "[In English] The influx of about 150.000 refugees."
2 [Interpretation] Somebody assessed, I don't know whether you
3 signed this, so whether it was you or not, that these 150.000 refugees
4 were a burden and contributed to tensions and were a burden to
5 circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the influx of the reservists, the
6 policy of mobilisation, so on and so forth.
7 Now, do you know who those 150.000 refugees were?
8 A. At this point I don't. I would have to -- I would probably have
9 to refer to some other reports, but just off the top of my head, no, I
10 can't answer that.
11 Q. Does it sound reasonable if I tell you that they were Serbs from
13 A. No, not particularly. I simply don't know. So they could have
14 been Serbs, yes.
15 Q. Who else could it have been except from the Serbs?
16 A. Well, it could have been Muslims who moved out of their area,
17 maybe. I simply don't know.
18 Q. Within the frameworks of Bosnia, and what date are we dealing
19 with here? What's the date? It's still 1991 here, October 1991. So who
20 could be a refugee in Bosnia
21 but the Serbs could it have been?
22 JUDGE KWON: I note, Mr. Doyle, this report is dated as 20th of
23 February, 2002.
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, this was a report I prepared because the head
25 of the monitor mission was coming on a formal visit and we set up
1 meetings with the political authorities and higher authorities so I was
2 asked to put this report together that would better inform the head of
3 the monitor mission who had only taken up at the end. He was Portuguese,
4 so he would only have taken up his appointment at the start of the year,
5 January, and he was to -- to come earlier, but there was an attack on the
6 monitor mission and five of my colleagues were killed, so that trip was
8 JUDGE KWON: Just for the record, I should have said 1992 instead
9 of 2002.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. But can you tell us of any area from which people moved out,
13 except from the Serb territories in Croatia, from which the Serbs fled to
15 A. No, I can't, but I do know that there were people from within
17 on the situation up in Banja Luka where some of the Muslims felt that
18 they were being forced to -- to -- with the issue of higher rents and
19 education, and they were going to move. A group of Muslims came to me
20 one evening in my hotel to tell me that they felt the conditions were
21 becoming fairly difficult and that they were going to move towards
23 they're internal movement of peoples. So they could be termed as
24 refugees. I simply can't answer the question as to exactly the 150.000 I
25 mentioned as refugees. I don't know where they came from, and I don't
1 know who it refers to, and if that's something I should have done, well,
2 maybe I should have done it and I accept it, but I cannot answer your
3 query there.
4 Q. Thank you. Let me put it to you that they would have been
5 displaced persons, for example, if it was the Serbs from Livno who
6 escaped in March. That happened, but these were displaced persons.
7 These were refugees fleeing from another republic.
8 May we have page 4 displayed, please. And you're reporting from
9 Mostar and under item 3 -- 088 are the last three digits of the page I'd
10 like displayed, please, thank you. This is 085. We need 088.
11 Point 3:
12 "[In English] The emergence of HOS in the area in close proximity
13 to the JNA troops."
14 [Interpretation] Who were these HOS forces whose proximity with
15 JNA troops led to tension?
16 A. I understand them to be Croats, some from Western Herzegovina and
17 some who had crossed the border into Bosnia from Croatia
18 Q. Thank you. I hope your memory is improving, because yesterday
19 you didn't know who HOS was or what HOS was. Today it seems to be
21 A. Yes. It was only when I finished my testimony yesterday and I
22 was trying to recall where I had heard the phrase before, and I'd heard
23 the phrase in the area of Western Herzegovina. So that's why.
24 Q. Thank you. We won't be needing this document any more.
25 May we now have number 11069, 65 ter, which should be the same as
2 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit number?
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this was not admitted in the
4 collection provided by --
5 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes. Thank you. This is the one which was
6 excluded from the Prosecution tendering, yes.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we continue?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. This is a report by your mission of the 8th of March, 1992
12 I'd like to draw your attention to the second half of paragraph 2. The
13 JNA sees itself as -- could you read it out, please. You'll be able to
14 read it more easily.
15 A. "The JNA sees itself as a force of stability and peace. The
16 mayor and the community of Neum will resist any attempt by the JNA to
17 enter the community of Neum, and they see themselves as the front line of
18 Western Herzegovina (Croatian communities) should the JNA decide to move
20 Q. Thank you. And lower down we have, "In territory of Neum
21 facto invasion of --"
22 "[In English] We have in territory of Neum
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Croatian Army. There are large numbers of
24 Croatian soldiers involved, but they are described by the Croatian -- by
25 the Croat soldiers -- Croatian Army as legal --
1 A. Local, local.
2 Q. As?
3 A. L-o-c-a-l, I think it is. Local.
4 Q. "[In English] As local defence forces." [Interpretation] Can you
5 continue reading please?
6 A. "There are large numbers of Croatian soldiers involved but they
7 are described by the Croatian army as local defence forces which the
8 Croatian Army cannot control. These local defence forces are (admitted
9 by the Croatian Army) equipped, organised and advised by the
10 Croatian Army. They use Croatian Army trucks with Croatian Army
11 markings, have new rifles, new uniforms, new steel helmets, and 'come to
12 work' a very --" that should be, "that should come to work every evening
13 from the Neum and Metkovic area." Metkovic.
14 Q. Thank you. And could this be the reason for the concern of Serbs
15 in the area who during World War II were thrown into pits and were only
16 buried in 1991? Could this have been the reason for the concern of fears
17 who were living in the environs of Neum in Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 A. Yes, I would agree with that.
19 Q. All right. Thank you. Can we look at the following paragraph
20 now: "Despite Croatian Army." Please, would you kind enough to read it?
21 A. "Despite Croatian Army protestations that these forces are not
22 under their control, we see evidence to the contrary. EC monitors have
23 been," blocked out "have seen --" obviously the name there would have
24 been the name of the Croatian Army, "under the 16th Brigade in
1 some names blocked out, "who commanded the Croatian Army units which used
2 to be in the Zupa/Imotica area (regular Croatian Army front line
3 opposite --" and I can't read the next word. "These units rotated out
4 this past month, and it is assumed that they are in Bosnia-Herzegovina
5 with their commanders but we have no proof of that. Any -- any evening
6 we can monitor the Croatian troops coming to the area," and there's
7 another name here which I don't read, "in minibuses, cars trucks, et
8 cetera, to man the positions during the night. We have seen them walking
9 at last light forward to operational -- to observation posts towards the
10 town of Stolac, one community --"
11 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Colonel, sir. This is enough.
12 A. If I just may say here that some of this information that we
13 received would have come from the monitor mission -- [French on English
15 Q. [No interpretation]
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Now you understand why you should
17 put a pause between the question and answer. We just heard the French
18 translation. So I hope it -- [French and B/C/S channel]. I hope the
19 problem is solved, and let us continue.
20 THE WITNESS: If I may, I was just saying here that some of the
21 information that we would have been -- in this particular issue would
22 have been given to us by the members of the monitor mission who were
23 based in Croatia
24 split, and they would have been monitoring the situation from the
25 Croatian side of the border, and the names of these commanders would have
1 been given to us by the monitor mission based in Croatia. But there was
2 sufficient concern on my part to make out this report, because there were
3 developments down there in Western Herzegovina which were sufficient
4 serious enough for me to go down there and to get as much information
5 about the situation in Western Herzegovina, and I brought this to the
6 attention of the Presidency.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Thank you. And did the European Community warn Croatia to
9 withdraw its forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina?
10 A. I have no idea on that.
11 Q. Thank you. Can we look at the next page, please. In this first
12 paragraph it says that the JNA was proper, correct, and that they were
13 asking questions of passers-by, but they were not bothering anyone nor
14 were a threat to anyone but in the following paragraph it says "On the
15 other hand" and I would be very grateful if you could read it, please [In
16 English] "On the other hand"?
17 A. "On the other hand, the Croatian forces are threatening the
18 local Serbian villagers who are terrified. The old ladies tell us that
19 they sleep in the hills at night, and that there is firing at their
20 village from the Croatian villages all night. When we are there talking,
21 there is firing from the hills and these are in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in
22 the opposite direction of the front line."
23 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. And then in the next paragraph it
24 says that Serbian civilians were being evacuated and that they were
25 fleeing and that the JNA is furious about the invasion of the B and H:
1 "[In English] The JNA have moved tanks and infantry into position
2 around the periphery of the community of Neum. The JNA have stated
3 repeatedly as high as command of 2nd Corps and command of 4th Army that
4 the Croatian Army does not stop this movement into B and H the army will
5 be forced to stop them. Croatian Army seems to want JNA to do so that
6 they can come to the rescue of the endangered Croatian citizens of
7 community of Neum."
8 [Interpretation] Do you remember that up until recently the
9 Croatian president Stjepan Mesic constantly was saying that the war would
10 cross over from Croatia
11 make the position of Croatia
12 the JNA?
13 A. No, I don't know what the president of Croatia said at the time,
14 but as I said already, I was aware of what was happening in the general
15 territory of Western Herzegovina
16 myself, investigate it, compile the report and submit it.
17 Q. Thank you. And the second half of the following paragraph says:
18 "[In English] This JNA movement is not on the front line of the 2
19 January cease-fire is well inside the B and H and is in the areas
20 occupied normally by the Titograd
21 of anything. The JNA feel that they are being more than tolerant and are
22 reaching the end of their patience."
23 [Interpretation] The Croat side is negotiating the movement of
24 the Uzice and Podgorica Corps in their area of responsibility and your
25 observer believes that this is not any sort of violation because corps
1 are manoeuvering within their area of responsibility; is that correct?
2 A. I accept that the corps was doing what it -- its duty required of
3 it, but again I would say that most of this information was coming from
4 the monitor mission based in Croatia
5 they were able to see what was happening. When I went down to Neum, I
6 wasn't particularly welcomed by the Croat community down there.
7 Q. Thank you. Just one moment, please. Can we -- I'm sorry, is
8 this document already admitted, the one that we're just looking at?
9 JUDGE KWON: I don't think so.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If not I would like to tender it,
12 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D226.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have 65 ter
15 11098, please, and can we also see whether that document has already been
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It is admitted as Exhibit P920.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Colonel, this is a document that you signed, and to confirm once
21 again you -- you received or your instructions were that you would need
22 to be objective, unbiased; is that correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you. And can we look under paragraph A:
25 "[In English] The area in Western Herzegovina has been tense for
1 some time as mentioned in the special report submitted to CC Zagreb on
2 8th of March. The area of Neum, Capljina, Stolac, and Ljubinje has a
3 large amount of HOS (Croatian paramilitary forces). It is now apparent
4 that the authorities of B and H either have no control or choose not to
5 tackle this issue."
6 [Interpretation] Would you agree that Ljubinje was predominantly
7 a Serb municipality?
8 A. I'm not -- I'm not personally aware of that. I'm not sure. I
9 have no reason to say it isn't. I just don't know.
10 Q. I must say that this is a sharp observation, that the Bosnian
11 authorities perhaps did not want to be dealing with that problem because
12 they were not bothered by the intimidation of Serbian civilians in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina but let's see what it says under B:
14 "[In English] These forces have also been seen in the areas of
15 Travnik (confirmed), and Bosanski Brod (unconfirmed). These forces
16 openly bear arms and wear CA uniforms."
17 [Interpretation] Can you remember now that these forces carried
18 out a massacre of Serbs on the 3rd of March in Bosanski Brod?
19 A. No. I have no information or knowledge of that.
20 Q. Thank you. Would you be kind enough to read this Muslim ethnic
21 groups of the SDA.
22 A. "There are increasing reports of the presence of Muslim armed
23 paramilitaries (Green Berets). As yet we have to establish the
24 information, size, and location of these troops. However, we are
25 satisfied that they are armed and equipped with uniforms. We are hopeful
1 of getting more information on these forces."
2 Q. I'm afraid that I didn't receive a correct interpretation:
3 "[In English] However, we are satisfied that they are armed
4 and equipped with uniforms. We are hopeful of getting more informations
5 of those -- those forces."
6 [Interpretation] Why would the European monitor mission be
7 satisfied because Muslim paramilitary groups were equipped and trained?
8 A. No. The -- I think you're taking the wrong interpretation from
9 that sentence. It's not that the European unions are satisfied that they
10 are armed. It is satisfied that they are aware that they are armed. It
11 is in no way condoning this issue at all. I want to make that perfectly
12 clear. We were satisfied in our information that Muslims were armed and
13 equipped with uniforms.
14 Q. [In English] "We are satisfied that they are armed."
15 [Interpretation] Then it's an expression, it's a term, but I was a little
16 bit concerned with this term that you are satisfied that they are armed,
17 but in any case, do you agree that according to Muslim sources 2 -- 75 to
18 80 per cent of the Muslim army waged war throughout 1992 in civilian
19 clothing? I think that is the information. Meaning that what you did
20 see actually accounted for only 20 per cent of the Muslim armed force?
21 A. I really don't have any knowledge of percentages of -- of those
22 wearing uniforms and those not.
23 Q. Colonel, sir, let's see now what your concluded about the Serbs,
24 the SDS
25 "[In English] The Serbian community in B and H had an abundant
1 supply of weapons. This is evident by their display of strength and the
2 barricades in and around Sarajevo
3 from our team survey of the municipalities. At this time, the leader of
4 the leader of the SDS
5 group of heavily armed bodyguards. The SDS party crisis committee is
6 located in the Holiday Inn Hotel. Members of this committee openly bear
7 weapons and this is causing concern to the advance UN party which is
8 presently located in the Holiday Inn."
9 [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, we have already cleared up that my
10 escort was a police escort assigned to me by the MUP because there was an
11 attempt, an assassination attempt against Minister Ostojic. Can one
12 conclude on the basis of this paragraph that the Serbs have weapons but
13 that they do not have units, organised units and that you cannot refer to
14 any Serbian paramilitary formation; is that correct?
15 A. No. What I'm saying here is that -- that a lot of the reports we
16 had received was that the Bosnian Serbs were becoming armed. We've been
17 through this before. And a lot of them were not wearing uniforms. That
18 would lead me to believe they weren't in organised units. This would
19 have been more evident with the withdrawal of the JNA army, the federal
20 army from Croatia
21 But all of the reports we had and I saw for myself the amount of weapons
22 that were being carried by Serbs who had manned the barricades in the
23 city. I came under fire from some of those barricades as I attempted to
24 evacuate the European Union referendum monitors, so I'm just reporting
25 what I had seen.
1 Q. Thank you. I would just like to remind you, though, that the
2 Serbian side supported the JNA and responded to call-ups, received
3 weapons, kept those weapons and the uniforms as per Tito's doctrine on an
4 armed people, and here you can name Croat and Muslim paramilitary
5 formations in this report, but you cannot refer to any Serbian
6 paramilitary forces because they do not exist; is that correct?
7 A. Well, I don't know whether they existed or not. I didn't see any
8 Bosnian Serb military units wearing uniform and organised as military
9 units. That does not mean that there was not a considerable amount of
10 Bosnian Serbs who were carrying weapons and displaying those weapons
11 openly. As I said, I saw this myself on the 1st and 2nd of March.
12 Q. My point is this: That the Serb community was oriented towards
13 the JNA and that it did not have any paramilitary formations, but never
14 mind. If nobody could name them and point a finger at them, then I
15 suppose that should mean that they didn't exist, but let's have a look
16 towards the end under B:
17 "[In English] The certainty --"
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Mr. Doyle, do you have a comment on
20 Do not make comments.
21 THE WITNESS: No, I don't have a comment on it, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 Continue, Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [In English]
1 "It is apparently heightened intentions and being brought about
2 in our view by, A, the apparent lack of progress in the roundtable talks
3 under the auspices of the EC; and B, the uncertainty as to if and when
4 the independence will be recognised."
5 [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, did you become aware later on of
6 the positions of the vast number of Western statesmen and politicians
7 about the fact that recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a big mistake
8 on the part of the international community?
9 A. Well, the only comment I'd have on that is that when the peace
10 conference was established, it was established under three conditions, it
11 was my understanding. One was that there would be a cease-fire. Two,
12 there would be no change in the borders unless it was agreed by all the
13 republics; and three, there was no recognition of a republic unless it
14 was negotiated. Lord Carrington expressed concern himself when there was
15 recognition given to the one of the republics and was done outside the
16 terms of the peace mission or the EC conference on Yugoslavia. So in
17 that regard, what the politicians of Europe were doing may have been
18 different to what the interpretation was to have been by Lord Carrington,
19 but again these were concerns outside my remit and my pay grade.
20 Q. I'm not attacking you at all, nor am I looking for any mistakes
21 on your part. All I want is to gain from your knowledge, and here's what
22 James Bissett said, the Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1990 to
23 1992, in a Congress hearing:
24 "[In English] I witnessed at first-hand how Western diplomatic
25 ineptitude and the clumsiness has earned the break-up of Yugoslavia
1 contributed to the dreadful bloodshed and violence that followed the
2 disintegration of this country. Here are a few examples: The premature
3 recognition of Croatia
4 were given to the Serbian population of Croatia which because of the
5 horrendous events from -- that occurred during the Second World War made
6 civil war inevitable.
7 "Second the encouragement of Alija Izetbegovic to withdraw his
8 signature from the so-called Lisbon Agreement and to proceed with the
9 referendum on independence in Bosnia
10 the death and end in the displacement of thousands."
11 [Interpretation] So that was the congressional hearing of
12 Canadian Ambassador James Bissett. Does this sound to you as a good
13 assessment, an informed appraisal?
14 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, Mr. Doyle.
15 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it's now going too far. We
17 have heard a lot this morning. We have heard a lot of comments of
18 Dr. Karadzic, and the witness has dealt with it. But now putting to the
19 witness whatever politician elsewhere in the world meant on a certain
20 topic where the witness has already taken and stated what he knows about
21 it and what he can say to it, I think that -- that is not assisting this
22 Trial Chamber and it's irrelevant.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with the -- Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff's
25 observation. We are of the opinion you exhausted this topic, so move on
1 to your next topic, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just read out a brief
3 statement to the colonel from Colin Powell, General Powell, about the
4 fears and the concerns that the colonel was concerned with as well?
5 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Then we'll do that with
7 another witness.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. But anyway, Colonel, do you agree that if the international
10 community had made many mistakes and did make many mistakes in
11 recognising the republic, would it have been in order for the
12 international community to put those mistakes right, to rectify them?
13 A. Well, I think it's often the case that lessons are learned after
14 the fact. It doesn't change the facts though. I was aware myself that
15 there was a considerable difference of opinion within the membership of
16 the European Union as to how to deal with the whole issue of the
17 republics of -- of the former Yugoslavia
18 the Presidency of the European Union policies seemed to be changing, but
19 beyond that I really don't have a comment.
20 Q. Thank you. Has the previous document been admitted? Yes, it's
21 already an exhibit, is it, with a P number?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have on e-court 06220 next,
24 please. It's Resolution 749 of the 7th of April, 1992. You weren't
25 there, but the Resolution is from New York, so wherever you were, the
1 resolution is what it was, and there was one.
2 Do you agree that under "Welcoming the progress," that paragraph,
3 "The Secretary-General with all parties and others concerned to stabilise
4 the cease-fire." Do you agree that all parties are mentioned here, all
6 A. Yes, I see that.
7 Q. May we turn to the next page, please. Number 6:
8 "[In English] Appeals to all parties and others concerned in
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina to co-operate with the efforts of the
10 European Community to bring about a cease-fire and a negotiated political
12 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the Security Council stands
13 behind and supports negotiations for a political solution, negotiations
14 led by the European Community?
15 A. Yes, I accept the content of this -- of this Resolution.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Has this been admitted?
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour, it has not. It's a new
19 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted now.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D227, Your Honour.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 65 ter 09276,
22 please. It's P947, I believe, as an exhibit. I think this is a document
23 you're very familiar with, because you worked on it as well. It's a
24 cease-fire, an agreement on cease-fire, reached on the 12th of April in
1 and in your presence and in the presence of Ambassador Cutileiro and
2 perhaps Lord Carrington was somewhere nearby too.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you agree that this is the agreement which was supposed to
5 come into force on Sunday, the 12th of April at midnight. That's what it
6 says in paragraph 1; right?
7 A. Yes, that's correct.
8 Q. And do you agree that -- let's see now. Paragraph 4:
9 "To disband all irregular armed forces in accordance with an
10 agreed timetable."
11 Do you agree with that?
12 A. Yes, I do, yes.
13 Q. In your opinion the Green Berets and the HOS, were they irregular
14 armed formations, armed forces, in your opinion?
15 A. Well, they weren't part at that stage. They weren't part at all
16 of the -- of the official federal army of the former Yugoslavia, which is
17 the JNA. So all forces outside of the JNA I would have referred to all
18 of them as paramilitaries, whether they Serb, Croat, or Muslim. So they
19 were all irregular armed forces, Croats, Serbs, and Muslims, and that is
20 what is referred to here.
21 Q. And what were the Serb irregular armed forces called then?
22 A. Well, we didn't have -- I don't think at that stage there were
23 any organised units. It was just that everybody happened to have a
24 weapon around the place, particularly the Bosnian Serbs. There were
25 weapons everywhere, and we looked upon those as an organisation that had
1 access to weapons and were using the weapons as evidenced on the
2 barricades. And when I tried to negotiate through all of the check-point
3 to get the European Monitors back to the airport it took three hours to
4 get through three miles, and I had to negotiate through eight armed
5 Bosnian Serb armed barricades. Now, if you want to refer to them as
6 units, it's probably to me a cosmetic exercise. But these were organised
7 because somebody had organised the setting up of the barricades, and it
8 was organised by Bosnian Serbs, so they were certainly being advised, and
9 in my view, if they don't have to be referred to as a military force but
10 there were civilians who bore arms. So it might be a cosmetic exercise.
11 Q. Well, I'll show you that that wasn't the case in a while. Do you
12 know that according to our law there is the Territorial Defence in every
13 municipality and that the mayor or president of the municipality is the
14 chief of defence for his particular municipality?
15 A. Yes, I'm aware of that.
16 Q. And do you know that this Territorial Defence system was subject
17 to control and command of the Yugoslav People's Army and that it was
18 responsible to it?
19 A. Yes, I could see that when I was -- when I was in the area of
20 Banja Luka.
21 Q. Colonel, do you know of a single Serb armed force except the
22 Territorial Defence in each of the municipalities and in each company,
23 for that matter, they had their TO and weapons, do you know of any single
24 Serb armed formation outside the Territorial Defence system in the
25 municipalities responsible to the JNA?
1 A. When I was -- all of the time that I was in Bosnia we had a
2 difficulty in attempting to differentiate between, as I mentioned this
3 before, armed forces. If you go back to the example of the attack which
4 we suspected were from Muslims in the area of Ilidza and the hotel where
5 I was, all of that was repulsed by -- by people wearing police uniforms.
6 They were all police militia. All of those were Bosnian Serbs. So the
7 same as you saying to you that you were given a police escort. They were
8 all in uniform, but they were Serbs. They were Serb police. And that
9 was one of the difficulties we had. If you had an organisation like the
10 JNA, how many of those happened to be Bosnian Serbs? Did they take their
11 uniforms and equipment and their tanks with them and then became a
12 Bosnian Serb Army. So the whole issue here was the actual access to
13 access and armaments rather than maybe the uniforms. It might have
14 suited the Bosnian Serbs not to be in uniforms initially because it would
15 have made it more difficult for us to recognise as to what they were.
16 Q. Thank you, but look at the next paragraph, or another:
17 "[In English] To stop all activities that can provoke fear and
18 instability among the population like the action of snipers and the
19 bombardment of Sarajevo
20 house searches, barricades and general arbitrary actions of all kinds
21 should stop immediately."
22 [Interpretation] Do you remember that the president of the
23 municipality, the Serb municipality of Ilidza
24 you after this telling you that the Muslims had continued these house
25 searches, searches of Serbian houses?
1 A. No, I have no information on that, and I don't --
2 Q. This is an exhibit, is it, the document we're looking at now? Is
3 it? But let's go back to the penultimate paragraph:
4 "[In English] To start in the most urgent way work on defining
5 the areas of future constituent units of Bosnia and Herzegovina
6 [No interpretation]
7 "[In English] In this context three main parties reaffirm their
8 opposition to any territorial gain by force and agree on the right of
9 return of refugees -- of the refugees without adverse consequences in
10 respect to -- of employment and -- or otherwise."
11 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the conference continued its
12 work and that this agreement provides for an accelerated definition of
13 borders or areas of the constituent units, as you say there, and that
14 that continues to be a political process?
15 A. Yes, but the two points I'd raise here, one is that as we know,
16 the cease-fire, even though it was signed, was not respected, and if we
17 talk about agreed the right of return of refugees, the only instance that
18 I was personally aware of in my area was people being forced out of the
19 area of Ilidza, and they were being forced out by Bosnian Serbs.
20 Q. Well, Colonel, you have no proof or evidence of that, because
21 people left of their own accord. When there was a war, they would go
22 back to their own areas where they're in the majority, and you don't have
23 any proof showing that they didn't leave of their own accord.
24 A. Excuse me, Dr. Karadzic. I have the word of the leader of the
25 Bosnian Serb -- the new leader of the Bosnian Serb community in Ilidza
1 who admitted to me that the non-Serbs were moved out of area. He agreed
2 it was against their will, but he said it was for their own protection,
3 and that was admitted to me the leader of the Bosnian Serb community in
4 Ilidza. So I certainly have that example.
5 Q. What was the name of that Bosnian Serb leader who told you that?
6 A. I -- as I mentioned yesterday, I do not have his name.
7 Q. Colonel, sir, in whose interest was it to sabotage the
8 conference, the Serbs or the Muslims?
9 A. I'm -- I'm not happy with the word "sabotage the conference." I
10 don't know that there was any -- I wouldn't accept that any of the
11 political parties wanted to sabotage any conference. However, I would --
12 I would accept that regardless of what was being signed, thing -- other
13 things were being done. So --
14 Q. Can we look at your diary of the 27th of April, please, and to
15 look at your entry where you say that you were trying to convince the SDA
16 and the HDZ to attend the talks in Lisbon and that this was difficult.
17 Do you agree? This is at the top of the page.
18 A. Yes. Yes.
19 Q. Did you ever have any problems with the Serbs for them to respond
20 to the invitation? Why were -- was it only the Serbs who did not need to
21 be persuaded and convinced to go to the conference?
22 A. Well, the circumstances which prevailed on Monday the 27th of
23 April to go to peace talks was completely different to other occasions
24 and the difficulty for the president was the president thought he would
25 be killed by the Bosnian Serbs if he went to the airport; and, therefore,
1 in order for him to go to the airport, I arranged an escort to be
2 provided by the United Nations, because most of the routes to the
3 airport, and the airport itself, were in difficult areas where a lot of
4 sniping and firing had gone on, were aware of what happened when
5 Cutileiro and Pinheiro arrived for those talks. So the main reason why
6 it was difficult here, I have no explanation as to why the Croats -- the
7 man I was talking to was Mr. Brkic. I have no idea why he pulled out,
8 but as soon as I guaranteed the safety of the president, I -- he agreed
9 to go, and as we know, one of the reasons he couldn't go that day was
10 because Belgrade
11 refused to allow the aircraft - which we had acquired - land to pick up
12 the president. And it was only the next day that we managed to
13 renegotiate his departure.
14 So the president was more anxious about his own safety to go to
16 because when he returned he was taken hostage by the JNA. So it's in
17 that context that I would mention why I had to try and persuade the
18 president to go to Lisbon
19 experience of being out there, where there was any reluctance on the part
20 of a party to -- to attend talks. And if I was to just continue on that
21 issue, I had problems with the -- trying to get the Bosnian Serbs to come
22 to peace talks at the United Nations headquarters after we'd secure the
23 release of the president because at that stage most had gone to Pale, and
24 when I issued the invitation to the Bosnian Serbs, nobody could -- nobody
25 turned up. So these were some of the issues and some of the concerns
1 that existed at that time.
2 Q. Colonel, you would agree that they killed many soldiers and
3 officers in the column. Do you accept that Serbs would allow even
4 General Delic to pass through a check-point? And I state that they would
5 never kill Izetbegovic, but they did let Delic pass and say hello to him
6 and allow him to pass through the check-points escorted by the UNPROFOR,
7 by the UN. Do you agree with that?
8 A. Well, again I wasn't there on that convoy incident, as you know.
9 I was held as collateral back in Lukavica. If that's what you're
10 referring to. But I know that the convoy was attacked and I know that
11 members of the JNA were killed. The number -- the exact numbers I don't
12 recall, but I think maybe 7. So if you're referring to that, yes. There
13 was an attack on this convoy. I'm not too sure that I get your drift on
15 Q. Before the break I will have time, at least, to tell you this. I
16 believe that your speculation that the Serbs would kill Izetbegovic is
17 groundless because we don't have terrorist experiences. We don't have a
18 tradition of terrorism, and we are against killing.
19 JUDGE KWON: Is it a question, Mr. Karadzic?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Do you know that Serbs do not have and it's foreign to them this
23 tradition of terrorism?
24 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, I -- I noted just now you were
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I think there was a
2 misrepresentation of what the witness said. The witness didn't
3 speculate. He simply said that that was the fear that Mr. Izetbegovic
4 had and that he had -- that's why he had to negotiate with or, rather,
5 convince Mr. Izetbegovic to go.
6 JUDGE KWON: Now the witness has the question, do you know that
7 Serbs do not have -- it's foreign to them, this tradition of terrorism?
8 Can you answer the question?
9 THE WITNESS: I don't -- I don't accept that from what I'd seen
10 myself. I was the person who was fired on when I attempted to go through
11 Serb barricades to the airport of Sarajevo
12 monitor mission. I wore a uniform. I had my car, and yet Bosnian Serbs
13 fired at me when I tried to negotiate a passage for monitors. That is a
15 If you want to call that terrorism or not, that's up to somebody
16 to interpret.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Very well. With that question and
18 answer, we will have a break for 30 minutes.
19 --- Recess taken at 12.07 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I think that -- has
23 this cease-fire agreement been already admitted? I think so. It's a
24 Prosecution document. Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Colonel, sir, in your diary of the 2nd of May, it says:
2 "President detained [In English] At airport." [Interpretation] Detained
3 is in quotation marks. Does this mean anything to you?
4 A. No. Detained means he was held basically against his will. So I
5 didn't know whether to put down taken hostage or detained, but, no, it
6 doesn't mean anything except that he was taken against his will.
7 Q. Thank you. Would you agree that in relation to this 27th when
8 you had to convince them to go and when you said that this was perhaps
9 because Izetbegovic was -- or there was a danger of Izetbegovic being
10 killed, do you agree that before then, at least ten days before the
11 command of the 2nd Military District was under siege by the Green Berets
12 pursuant to a directive issued by Hasan Efendic on the 12th of April,
13 1992, to barricade the barracks and to do everything to the barracks that
14 had previously been done to them in Croatia
15 A. Yes. I mean you showed the document yesterday and I have no
16 reason to disagree with it, so, yes, I understand that this had taken
18 Q. Thank you. And do you agree that on the 23rd the same
19 Hasan Efendic issued a directive followed by one -- by the Ministry of
20 the Interior to intensify attacks on the installations and personnel of
21 the JNA?
22 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
23 Q. We also saw that yesterday. This is 222, D222. D222. Exhibit
25 We looked at this yesterday, Colonel. This is the directive
1 on -- issued by the Territorial Defence Staff of the Republic of Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina
3 the document, please. And we can see what the assignments are of the
4 district TO staffs. Form TO units, volunteer units, the Patriotic
5 League. Excuse me. Look at the top first:
6 "Immediately occupy the ammunition and weapons depot and block
7 barracks, occupy them and capture members of the Yugoslav Army in the B
8 and H territory. First stage, group combat activities, detachments and
9 mass arms resistance of the citizens to last from 10 to 15 days. Phase
10 2, carry out the operation in the period of 20 to 30 days with the
11 objective of routing the enemy and creating conditions for their
12 expulsion from the territory. Readiness for action immediately."
13 What is this enemy that is being referred to here? What do they
14 mean? Who do they mean when he refer to the enemy?
15 A. Well, first of all, the document is not in a language that I can
16 understand, so -- so there's no English translation of that here.
17 I would assume that the enemy would have been the Bosnian Serbs
18 if it was issued by Efendic or -- because they were looked upon as an
19 enemy at that stage. There had been intimidation. There had been
20 expulsions. The city was now getting to the stage where it was
21 practically under siege. That's all I can assume it was.
22 Q. Thank you. This was issued on the 23rd of April. We have shown
23 here an information given by the Croats that that line from the SDA -- of
24 the SDA would like to throw us out of Bosnia. We're going to look at
25 another document where the US
1 are completely correct. They are trying to throw us out of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. But if this was issued on the 23rd of April, would
3 this not be a reason for concern and not fear of the Serbs? You have
4 declared total war to the Serbs and the JNA, and then you need to go to
5 the conference. Why would you go to the conference when you have chosen
6 the option of war? Would you agree?
7 A. Well, there could be an interpretation of that that could go both
8 ways. One is that let's keep complying with the request to have peace
9 talks, but let's keep, on the other hand, taking as much territory as we
10 can, because the more we take, the more we can negotiate back. That
11 could be an interpretation. So what was done on the ground with units
12 may have been totally different from what people were signing documents
13 for and that could have been probably applied to all sides. If I give my
14 own professional opinion, one of reasons in my view why there was a
15 blockade of barracks was that the mainly Bosnian Muslims did not have any
16 access to weapons. The Bosnian Serbs already had weapons, and the only
17 way that the Bosnian Muslims were going to get weapons was to take them
18 by force or get them from the JNA. That's just my assumption. So a
19 blockade of the barracks was, in my view, with a view to making sure the
20 JNA wouldn't give any more weapons to the Bosnian Serbs who had plenty,
21 and the Bosnian Muslims had -- had very little access to weapons. I was
22 actually requested by the deputy president Ejup Ganic to see if I could
23 do anything that would allow for Muslims to be given weapons to be able
24 to defend themselves. So everything around this period was pointing to
25 the fact that the weapons that were under the control of the JNA would
1 probably be given to the Bosnian Serbs because the Bosnian Serbs, as you
2 know, were organising their military units, and that's just my
4 Q. Your assumption is not correct, Colonel, because the JNA
5 considered Serbs as a reserve to replenish their forces and not as a unit
6 or somebody to be under my command. I had no command over the JNA. But,
7 Colonel, let's look at the sequence of events. The military district
8 command was besieged by the Green Berets. On the 12th of April, we
9 signed an agreement on the cease-fire, on the same day, the directive was
10 issued for attacks and blockades; on the 22nd of April, I issued the
11 platform offering a peaceful solution; on the 23rd of April, they are
12 issuing a directive opting for total war; on the 27th, they're going for
13 the conference; on the 2nd of May, they are killing soldiers all over
15 Dobrovoljacka Street
16 What else is necessary in order to be able to come to the
17 conclusion who's for war and who isn't? Don't you think that Serbs had
18 shown enough patience and enough willingness for peace and that this was
19 not accepted and that these actions by the Muslim side were of a very
20 combative nature?
21 A. Well, I don't agree with your assessment, Mr. Karadzic. I have
22 to say that the knowledge of what was going on in the territory of Bosnia
23 would disagree with that. We had a huge amount of ethnic cleansing right
24 down from Bijeljina to Zvornik in such areas. This didn't give the
25 picture that the Bosnian Serbs were in anyway tolerant the other
1 societies. So I think this argument can be made by anybody to suit their
2 own purpose. A lot depends on, you know, the implementation of
3 cease-fires, the implementation of platforms. They were the difficult
4 ones. As I said, cease-fires were signed with monotonous regularity. It
5 didn't seem to have any effect on the ground. A similar accusation could
6 have been placed at the UN for all the Security Council Resolutions it
7 issued on Bosnia
8 difference to his daily life, just -- it didn't help the situation.
9 So I can only give you here an interpretation of what I thought
10 was the situation at the time. You may not agree with it, but that's my
12 Q. Thank you. Now, do you deny that UNPROFOR concluded that 90 per
13 cent of the cease-fire violations came from the Muslim side? Do you
14 accept that and that assessment made by them?
15 A. Well, as I said before, I wasn't a member of UNPROFOR, so I don't
16 know where you get the figure 90 per cent. That according to UNPROFOR,
17 90 per cent of the cease-fire violations came from the Muslim side. All
18 I know is that when UNPROFOR was there the city was under the siege,
19 basically by the Bosnian Serbs. So I find that hard to accept. I'm not
20 denying it was reported by the United Nations. I'm just saying that
21 would not have been my view.
22 Q. And, Colonel, do you make the deference between a siege and an
24 A. Well, either an encirclement or a siege are designed to keep
25 people inside an area. So it really is a difference in terms. It means
1 you deny them the freedom to go about their daily lives. So encirclement
2 or siege is -- they're not the same, but they're -- they're of the same
3 family, let's say. So I'm not too sure what -- what you're -- I'm not
4 too sure. I mean if it wasn't -- if it wasn't a siege, then I'm
5 wondering why they had to build a tunnel underneath the runway of
7 international community would have accepted that the city was under
8 siege, but again, that may be an interpretation. That's my view.
9 Q. But, Colonel, we're going to show, among other things, a document
10 from the London Conference showing that the restrictions imposed by the
11 Serb side around Sarajevo
12 military facilities. We propose the opening of seven roads. We proposed
13 free traffic for commercial transport and road transport and that the
14 sole restriction referred to military material and equipment and military
15 personnel. Do you deny that or do you allow for that possibility?
16 A. Well I'm not too sure what the London Conference basically said,
17 but I don't agree with that, no. Not from my experience.
18 Q. Very well. The previous document has been admitted. Now may we
19 have 1D315 next please?
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the previous document had not
22 been admitted. It's marked for identification because we don't have a
23 translation, and we even couldn't take a position on the document not
24 knowing the contents really.
25 JUDGE KWON: This -- you referred to this D222.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
2 JUDGE KWON: But the previous document, 947, was admitted. It's
3 the agreement of cease-fire.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes, Your Honour.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. We'll have to move into
6 private session for a previous moment for 1D01292.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll go into private session briefly.
8 [Private session]
11 Page 2869 redacted. Private session.
25 [Open session]
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We are now in open session.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we have called up,
3 please, 65 ter 01136 next, please. I think that's already an exhibit.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this is Exhibit P941.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. This is, Colonel, the minutes from a meeting between
7 Secretary Vance and Lord Carrington, the chair of the president -- of the
8 conference on Yugoslavia
9 Now, I'll read it in English:
10 "[In English] Dr. Karadzic said that the Serbs were willing
11 negotiate. Regrettably the Muslims have always negotiated in bad faith.
12 The Muslims had accepted the 18th March principle -- principles, but had
13 now reneged from them. They were only interested in a Muslim state."
14 [Interpretation] And then:
15 "[In English] The Serbs were willing to return territory and were
16 content to remain part of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the existing
17 boundaries, but the Serbian people of Bosnia wanted full autonomy from
18 the Muslims and Croats."
19 [Interpretation] Paragraph 2:
20 "[In English] Was willing to talk about giving back territory as
21 part of a overall agreement but any such agreement will also have to
22 protect Serbian property," [Interpretation] et cetera.
23 Let's move on to the next page now, please:
24 "[In English] Secretary Vance asked that Karadzic was prepared --
25 what Karadzic was prepared to do in order to stop the fighting.
1 Lord Carrington said world opinion was firmly against the Serbs,
2 particularly after the recent escalation of fighting around Sarajevo
3 Dr. Karadzic said that the Muslims were responsible for the escalation.
4 The Serbian forces had permission to fight back only in order to defend
5 themselves. The Muslims regularly shelled their own people. They could
6 have been responsible for the heavy shelling of Sarajevo on 24th and 25th
7 August. Commandant Doyle said that the Serbian paramilitaries backed by
8 the JNA had started the fighting by shelling the Old Town of Sarajevo in
9 April. The Muslims might be responsible for some provocations, but the
10 Serbs had much to live down. Inflammatory statements by Serbian
11 commanders who threatened to shoot down UN," [Interpretation] and so on.
12 [Interpretation] The last sentence:
13 "[In English] Karadzic was said he was willing to accept UN
14 monitors at all Serbian artillery positions in and around Sarajevo
15 [Interpretation] That was paragraph 4. Do you remember that
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. Do you remember, furthermore, that Professor Koljevic said the
19 Serbs had reached agreement with the UN about Sarajevo and had proposed
20 the demilitarisation of the city?
21 A. No, I don't remember that. I remember the conversation from the
22 talks in Lisbon
24 Q. Do you accept that we always offered the monitors to be alongside
25 our artillery positions and that we offered the demilitarisation of
2 management? Well, let's take first things first. Did we hand over the
3 airport to the UN?
4 A. Yes, that was eventually done after intense negotiations.
5 Q. The negotiations were over technicalities, right, not over
6 substance, whether it was to be handed over or not; right?
7 A. At the peace talks in Lisbon
8 which indicated that under certain conditions that Bosnian Serbs or the
9 airport would be handed over to the United Nations. I certainly recall
11 Q. Thank you. Now, do you accept that we kept offering the
12 demilitarisation of Sarajevo
13 A. I can't remember it in this particular context, but we became
14 very used to phrases which being said by people like, All I'm doing is
15 I'm only going to protect the Serbs, and I promise to do this and I
16 promise to do that.
17 And I go back to the point that I made earlier, that there were a
18 considerable amount of cease-fire agreements signed in Sarajevo
19 nothing was done about them. They were broken almost as soon as they
20 were signed. So there was a feeling that some of the people
21 participating in these peace talks wanted to be seen to co-operate with
22 the international community, but in reality the actions didn't measure up
23 to what was signed in the agreements, and therefore a piece of paper with
24 a signature saying we agreed to a cease-fire really came to very little,
25 and, in fact, the United Nations military command referred to the signing
1 of a cease-fire as simply a term, I recall being used, even though those
2 of us involved in the cease-fires were trying to do the best we could to
3 get this conflict to stop.
4 So in other words, the principle of the cease-fires did not
5 measure up in many instances to the actions subsequently taken.
6 Q. Thank you. Now do you see it says:
7 "[In English] Dr. Karadzic said that he had issued instructions
8 to stop his forces from harassing those Muslims and Croats who are
9 willing to 'leave' Serbian areas from signing papers to that effect. He
10 confirmed that any such paper would have no validity in the light of a
11 final settlement."
12 A. Well, I'm aware of the conversation you and I had in the hotel in
14 purposely brought up this issue with you personally because of a
15 photograph which was displayed on the front page of the "Sunday Times,"
16 and we had an unofficial conversation in the lobby of the hotel. You may
17 recall that and I brought the up the issue. It was I who brought up the
18 issue of people being forced to sign away their homes, and you indicated
19 you would take some action to let it be known that this was illegal.
20 Now, we had this discussion at our meeting last Monday, and you said that
21 you took action on it. I'm personally not aware of that because I wasn't
22 around at that time. So the issue of signing away territory was -- was
23 something that I brought up myself, and I think you did acknowledge that.
24 Q. I accepted that, but I didn't recognise it, because you told me
25 about two municipalities away from Pale that that's what was happening
1 there. But may I have D101 next, please.
2 You informed me on the 16th of August; right?
3 A. Sorry, can you repeat that, Mr. Karadzic, about the 16th?
4 Q. You informed me about that on the 16th of August in London
6 A. No. I informed you in Brussels
7 Q. Yes, probably Brussels
8 A. Yes, it was.
9 Q. Here, Colonel, is what I issued on the 19th. Perhaps we can look
10 at both versions, the Serbian and the English. And let's look at item 3
11 together. In the preamble it says to the Main Staff. The date is the
12 19th of August, the headquarters of the Serbian Republika Srpska Army,
13 the Ministry of Internal Affairs, all centres of the security services:
14 "According to our act of the 13th of June, 1992, in respect of
15 international norms of war, I again hereby order," and look at number 3
17 "To prevent the forced resettlement and taking of other illegal
18 actions against the civilian population, and the possible confirmation of
19 the selling of property or statements that the refugees will not return
20 do not have any legal validity and are declared null and void."
21 Do you know, Colonel, whether any such confirmation was
22 implemented and became valid after this order which had the force of law
23 and proclaimed them to be null and void? Yes, the original translation,
24 null and void, although other terms can be used.
25 A. Well, I would have to say that I'm pleased to see that on my
1 initiative when I brought this up with you that you took some action on
2 it, and also it's probably an indication to me that this practice was, in
3 actual fact, common knowledge and being done up to this point, where
4 people were being ordered to sign away their property, which as you
5 rightly point out was illegal. So I'm pleased to see that element of
6 that in that document.
7 Q. But I have to react to what you've said, that was it generally
8 known, common knowledge. No, it wasn't. This is what I hear from you
9 for the first time. It just happened in two municipalities, Kljujic and
10 Sanski Most with which we had nothing to do, and this impeded the
11 resettlement and departure of these people because if you ask for their
12 property, then they would give it second thoughts whether they were going
13 to leave or not. So it was precisely against ethnic cleansing, a measure
14 against ethnic cleansing. It wasn't to speed up and accelerate the
15 resettlement of the population. That only happened in two municipalities
16 and none of these confirmations or certificates were actually implemented
17 and acted upon. What would you say to that?
18 A. Well, I've no knowledge of what exactly was the consequences of
19 this directive you gave except to say that I'm glad that action would
20 appear to have been taken as a result of my initiative in Brussels.
21 Q. Three days after your initiative, right, Colonel?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you. So in this document, the previous document from the
24 conference, that is, we established and confirmed that we were ready to
25 accept the observers and monitors with our artillery and that we were
1 prepared to hand over the airport to the United Nations and that I would
2 place null and void or declare illegal these documents. Do you
3 declare -- do you confirm that what we told you at that conference is
4 what we carried out in practice?
5 A. Well, I don't know what was carried out in practice. That's the
6 point, Mr. Karadzic. I wasn't with the United Nations. The only
7 reference I saw to United Nations observers in these areas surrounding
9 in custody, but I've no direct personal knowledge of that because it's
10 while I was well out of the area of operations at that stage, but it's
11 what I saw in the world's media at a later stage. So I know that at that
12 time the monitor mission had been withdrawn from the territory of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so the only observers that could have been there
14 would have been United Nations and not being a member of the
15 United Nations I -- I didn't have any knowledge of what the modus
16 operandi was at that time, and as you point out, I wasn't in Bosnia
17 working at that stage.
18 Q. But do you know that we didn't -- do you know that we didn't keep
19 our promise, promises, and carry out the responsibilities that we said we
21 A. I have no knowledge otherwise. I simply don't know.
22 Q. Thank you. Now may we have 1D1276 next, please. And while we're
23 waiting for that to come you, Colonel, let me remind you that Serbian
24 policy was very consistent. On the 12th of April we signed the
25 cease-fire and we adhered to it. Here now we have a letter from the
1 president of the Serbian municipality of Ilidza
2 He's writing to you. And that is 1276, or, rather, 1D1276 is the
3 document number.
4 JUDGE KWON: Could you give the number again. Yes, we have it.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Here it is.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Now, in the 12th of April cease-fire that you worked on, we
8 pledged not to disturb the civilians by searching their flats, and so on
9 and forth. So there was this cease-fire, and we said we'd leave the
10 citizens alone.
11 Now, here's what Nedeljko Prstojevic from the Crisis Staff is
12 writing to about from the Ilidza municipality on the 3rd of May. The
13 English version seems to be a better copy, so I am going to -- it says
14 "Respected gentlemen," I'll read in English:
15 "[In English] Respected gentlemen, in all three communities
16 Hrasnica Rutmice and Sokolovic Kolonija, the Muslims are holding Serbs as
17 their hostages.
18 "They are barging into Serbian homes, pillaging them,
19 demolishing them, and forcibly taking many individuals to undisclosed
20 locations. As an example, a civilian man, Obrad Milovic of Djerdaps
21 Ulica Street 2, Sokolovic Kolonija, was beaten and returned home, then
22 ordered to report to the Green Berets headquarter at a rate of every two
23 hours. During every visit there he would be beaten up yet again in such
24 a way that these unfortunate men had succumbed to heavy bleeding from the
25 mouth and nose, and doctors suppose he was also suffering internal
2 "We are pleading to the European Community Mission to
3 immediately form a mixed commission which would, going directly from the
4 door-to-door, confirm the situation of the Serbian population in all
5 three of the aforementioned neighbourhoods."
6 [Interpretation] Do you remember this letter, sir?
7 A. No, I do not remember the letter. I have no knowledge of ever
8 having received it. It's titled, it's addressed to the mission of the
9 European Community. I assume that would have been the monitor mission.
10 I was no longer a member of the monitor mission. I have no knowledge of
11 it. The only knowledge I have of an issue of that nature was a complaint
12 made to me by a -- a woman whose husband who was a Muslim who was taken
13 to an area controlled by the Bosnian Serbs and allegedly tortured, but I
14 have no knowledge of this document, no.
15 Q. Well, it's interesting that you know about that but not about
16 this. Well, that gives rise to doubt with respect to the question of
17 bias that we discussed earlier on.
18 A. I -- I -- I object to that comment, Mr. Karadzic, very much.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, it is an objectionable comment,
20 Dr. Karadzic. The question of doubt is, in any event, in the prerogative
21 of the Tribunal.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, all right. Let's not doubt.
23 But I have my doubts with respect to the colonel's need to answer
24 questions that I didn't put to him.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Do you know who Sereda is, Sereda or Sereda whom this was sent to
2 in addition to yourself?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Yes. Thank you. I'd like to tender this letter then, please.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, according to the directions
6 that we have on the admission of documents in this court, the witness has
7 not adopted it. He has not received it. He could not comment on the
8 content, so we oppose.
9 JUDGE KWON: We didn't even need your assistance. Thank you,
10 Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.
11 This will not be admitted.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I have 1D315 next,
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. This, Colonel, sir is a letter from the prime minister of the
16 Serbian Republic
17 3rd of May. Did you receive that letter?
18 A. I can't -- I can't guarantee that I did. I'm not too sure. I
19 may have, but I know that my -- what I was doing between the 2nd of May
20 and the 12th of May was a total and focused attention given to
21 cease-fires, negotiating the hostage release of the president and trying
22 to negotiate the withdrawal of the federal army from the territory of
24 me. It doesn't come readily to mind, but I can't deny I didn't receive
25 it. I simply don't recall it.
1 Q. Let's see what the prime minister says, Djeric.
2 "[In English] After our yesterday's talk in Pale, estimated by
3 both sides as successful, last night units of so-called BH TO attacked
4 our positions on the following points: Vojkovici and Grlica, so from
5 Sokolovic Kolonija. Vraca from all directions with automatic rifles and
6 mobile artillery."
7 [Interpretation] Do you remember the meeting that you had on the
8 1st of May with the prime minister, Mr. Djeric?
9 A. I remember the meeting, and I certainly do not agree that it was
10 estimated by both sides to have been successful. As far as I was
11 concerned, it was totally unsuccessful, because the only reason I went up
12 there was to ascertain whether or not artillery was moved back following
13 the instructions I received from Lisbon
14 from that point of view, this wasn't successful at all. So that is the
15 view that may be expressed by this gentleman. It certainly is not my
17 Q. Now let's see what he says in paragraph 3:
18 "[In English] If armed attacks from SDA and HTZ units continue,
19 we shall have to react sharply. This means that we cannot be asked to
20 withdraw artillery weapons from around Sarajevo if this is immediately
21 followed by the TO BH, Territorial Defence BH, attacks upon the positions
22 of our units. If radio, TV and the press, completely under the control
23 of just one side, continue the informative terror of the Serbs, we cannot
24 be required to prevent talking -- taking possession of relays and
25 changing their directions."
1 [No interpretation]
2 "[In English] Unless the other side gives firm guarantees that
3 they will not put their soldiers and weapons into convoys carrying
4 medical and humanitarian aid, and use of the airport to supply weapons,
5 we will not be ready to deblockade roads because this would mean acting
6 against our own interests. As a soldier, you know well that this would
7 be a suicide."
8 [Interpretation] Sir, Colonel, did you take into account the fact
9 that prime minister of the Serbian Republic
10 informing you that you did not secure appropriate actions by the other
11 side and that we were being asked to do something that is giving the
12 other side a military advantage. Do we have to do something that would
13 give the other side a military advantage?
14 A. Well, I don't accept that the content of this letter is in any
15 way true. I would refute most of it. There's an inference here that the
16 United Nations were allowing weapons to be taken in through the airport,
17 that weapons were being put into convoys, that I had a satisfactory
18 meeting in Pale on the 1st of May, which is not true. So why should I
19 automatically accept what is being mentioned in this letter. As I said,
20 I have no recollection of -- of getting this letter, and the more I look
21 at it, if this -- if this letter was translated into English as it is
22 here, I would certainly have reacted to its content because I didn't
23 accept its content at all. So I have to admit in truth that I do not
24 recall getting it, but I certainly would not be pleased with its content.
25 It seems baffling to me that a city that's under siege, you know,
1 is now referring to attacks by -- by Muslims. I mean, it's just -- it's
2 just against the reality of what was happening on the ground.
3 JUDGE KWON: It seems it's sent in English with the signature and
4 stamp on it.
5 THE WITNESS: I see that, Your Honour. And I have absolutely no
6 recollection of receiving it. A lot of these I retain in files, and I
7 certainly don't have it.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. But, Colonel, sir, you testified yourself first that the attack
11 on the Serbian part of Ilidza did occur one week before this, and in your
12 diary you did not even mention that you had met with Mr. Djeric but only
13 with Ms. Plavsic?
14 A. No. What I was saying in that context, Mr. Karadzic, is that I
15 went and I accompanied Mrs. Plavsic to Pale. I'm not saying that I
16 didn't meet anybody else. I met a lot of people. I didn't know who a
17 lot of them were because they, as far as I knew, they were newly
18 appointed ministers of the Republika Srpska which wasn't a recognised
19 entity at that stage, and so I don't know who -- I don't know -- I was
20 informed that they were -- they were now ministers of the
21 Republika Srpska, but I didn't know any of them. The only person I
22 actually knew there that I recall was Mrs. Plavsic, because I knew she
23 was a member of -- a Serb member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
24 So that's the only reference that I made to her. It's with her I went up
25 to Pale. But the personnel that I met, I have no recollection of their
1 names because they were new to me.
2 Q. I don't wish to attack you, Colonel, sir, but let's look at your
3 diary and then you will see that. First of all, you are having very
4 infrequent meetings with any Serbs; and secondly, you recall only two or
5 three names but with others it is different. Well, on the 12th of April
6 you met Ganic, and then you met with the HDZ. Then on the 13th of April
7 you had a meeting with the SDS
8 such -- the 16th of April the HDZ. The 17th of April, the TV board. So
9 the television. The HDZ and the SDA, brief meeting later with Karadzic
10 and Koljevic. This is in Ilidza. Then Cutileiro, then -- overall,
11 Colonel, sir, you've infrequently met with, for example, Somun:
12 "I warned Somun on the 22nd, [In English] I warned --"
13 [Interpretation] Can you please help. What does this mean, "I
14 warned Somun"? This is the 22nd of April. On the right-hand side.
15 A. Sorry, on the 22nd of April did you say?
16 Q. Yes, but it's on the right side. Perhaps that's the 23rd of
17 April, but anyway, it's on that side. Visit of Pinheiro it says.
18 A. Yes, I can refer to that, if you wish. When --
19 Q. Would you kindly read it out, please.
20 A. "Problems with French minister Kouchner, Presidency tried to
21 force the issue of talks with the president of the SDA as head of state
22 with the HDZ and from higher status against the enemy. I warned Somun
23 and then both president of the HDZ that they would lead to disaster."
24 Now, Mr. Karadzic, if you want me to explain why I said that, it
25 would be easier for me than just reading from a diary which might be
1 taken out of context by people I have no problems with that, if you want
2 me to do that.
3 Q. Well, you can briefly if you can briefly, but it's a fact -- no,
4 go ahead briefly. Please go ahead.
5 A. Jaoa Pinheiro, who was the president of the council of ministers
6 of the European Union, and Lord Carrington were due into Sarajevo airport
7 for talks that you were -- you were party to, and that morning the
8 president asked -- he felt that he would like to meet Lord Carrington as
9 he came off the aircraft, and I said no, because my view at that time was
10 that the president was there as the leader of the SDA party. You were
11 the leader of the SDS
12 a president meeting the plane it might somehow give an indicate that he
13 was on a higher level than you, and I didn't want that to be and that's
14 why I warned Mr. Somun who was attached to my mission as a liaison to the
15 Presidency, that if anybody was playing political games I would take
16 action by getting a message to the aircraft not to land. The issue of
17 Kouchner was different and it has no relevance, I think, on this instance
18 to what we had in mind.
19 So in actual fact, I felt on that day that the president might
20 have been using his position as president to meeting the aircraft and I
21 felt he shouldn't, that all of you were on an equal footing and you would
22 all meet him at the same time. So, in fact, it was in your interests
23 that I had given a warning to Mr. Somun.
24 And the reference to below is difficulty in getting each to
25 return to the airport. Now, there is some emphasis put on the fact that
1 you were very willing to signing the cease-fires and, in fact, you were
2 first to sign the cease-fire, which is true. The only reason that was
3 done because you were the only political leader that was left at the
4 airport. The others had actually gone. So of course it was easier for
5 you to sign the cease-fire, but it's not something I would deem that
6 needs to be exploited. The problem I had then was to try and persuade
7 the president to get back to the airport because he was worried because
8 the area around the airport was controlled -- elements of it was
9 controlled by Bosnian Serbs.
10 So I managed to persuade the president to come back and sign the
11 document that evening so there -- they're the notes I took on that day.
12 So if you have any further questions on that I'll try and answer them for
14 Q. Thank you. Has this letter from Mr. Djeric to Mr. Doyle -- I
15 don't think it's been admitted. Can it be tendered. Obviously it was
16 handed over to your representatives. You should have received it.
17 JUDGE KWON: Unless it is objected to it will be.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted to as --
20 THE REGISTRAR: [Overlapping speakers] Exhibit D229,
21 Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Then we have to move to private session briefly and this is
1 01283. This is the daily report from your mission of the 1st of June.
2 You weren't there but it's important to compare that with what we talked
3 about relating to the mission. This is 1D01283, and if we could move
4 into private session for a short period please.
5 [Private session]
11 Page 2888 redacted. Private session.
1 [Open session]
2 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please continue.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Colonel, sir, your position is that the Muslims did not have
6 sufficient weaponry, and I made the assertion yesterday that the Muslims
7 had formed the Patriotic League on the 30th of April. The decision was
8 made on the 31st of April, and the league was formed on the 30th of
9 April, 1991
10 Staff, regional staff, and units in 103 municipalities, units of the
11 Patriotic League, that they had taken the weapons from the Territorial
12 Defence, were receiving weapons from Croatia, buying them in Slovenia
13 and that they were violating the arms embargo even with the knowledge of
14 some larger countries, and the general secretary -- Secretary-General
15 said very early in a report to the Security Council that the question of
16 the Muslims not being armed any more was no longer an issue. Do you
17 accept that Muslims received substantial arms from -- on the basis of the
18 agreement on the evacuation of the barracks and in the e-court could we
19 have 21286, please, this is a Prosecution document.
20 A. Well, you asked me a question there, Mr. Karadzic, and the answer
21 is I have absolutely no idea if Muslims had many weapons. And what I was
22 saying before is that in comparison to the amount of weapons that were in
23 the possession of the Bosnian Serbs, the amount of weapons in the
24 possession of the Bosnian Muslims were very, very small. That's what I
25 was saying yesterday. I am not saying for a moment that there weren't
1 weapons, but there's no comparison in the amount between Bosnian Serbs
2 and Bosnian Muslims, in my estimation.
3 Q. But let us come back then to the fact. Who was in command of the
4 Bosnian Serbs and who was in command of the Bosnian Muslims? You accept
5 that up until the 20th of May the Bosnian Serbs were under the command of
6 the Yugoslav People's Army or of their own municipal territorial
7 organisations while during that time the Muslims had their own armed
9 A. Well, I don't -- you know, I don't have great evidence of that.
10 I mean, the Muslims could have an arm -- they may have established one or
11 two or some formations, but there was always the question of they trying
12 to get weapons. This is why they were trying to put a blockade on the
13 barracks, to make sure the weapons would not continue to be handed over
14 to the Bosnian Serbs. That was the assessment of the monitor mission,
15 and that was my assessment. That's all I can give is my assessment. And
16 if that's not acceptable, that's -- that's another matter. That's fine.
17 But I can't change what my views were, which was based on my experience.
18 Q. Thank you. That is also good. We need to know that these are
19 your views and that these are not facts that you established.
20 Let us now look at this agreement signed, and I believe that you
21 did participate in it, and you are noted here under number 4 as the
22 personal envoy of Lord Carrington; is that correct?
23 A. Yes, that is correct.
24 Q. We can look at Article 2, and we can say:
25 "[In English] The parties to the agreement agreed that within the
1 framework of the withdrawal of the JNA from the Republic of Bosnia
3 armament, ammunition, mines and explosives, equipment and movable
4 property, which remains after restoring what that belongs to -- what
5 belongs to the Territorial Defence, from the garrisons, barracks of
6 Zenica, Travnik and Konjic as well as from barracks in Sarajevo
7 Marsal Tito, Victor Bubanj, Jusuf Djonlic, Gavrilo Princip,
8 [Interpretation] Jajce barracks, [In English] Army district headquarters
9 military institutions Romanija and home of the army."
10 [Interpretation] Is it clear from this article that the Yugoslav
11 People's Army returned the weapons of the TO to the Muslims and even left
12 a lot of heavy weaponry in Sarajevo
13 Zenica of which we have evidence and that as of a certain point in time
14 nobody could say that the Bosnian Muslims were insufficiently armed. Do
15 you recall that the JNA gave 6.000 barrels to Sarajevo through
16 General Boskovic to the Muslims in exchange for the release of the cadets
17 from the Marsal Tito Barracks?
18 A. I think the point that I should probably mention here is that --
19 that when this agreement was being negotiated, I was there personally, as
20 is rightly pointed out as the personal envoy of Lord Carrington. I
21 didn't -- I wasn't chairman of these talks, and I was almost immediately
22 evacuated from the city of Sarajevo
23 So I have absolutely no idea as to what elements of this -- or this
24 articles were implemented because I wasn't in a position to establish.
25 And also, I should point out that the entire monitor mission of the
1 European Union was also evacuated, I think, on the day before myself or
2 early in the morning. So while we were trying to negotiate this
3 withdrawal, I do accept that the JNA were very anxious to have a
4 dignified withdrawal from the entire territory of Bosnia
5 brought home for a meeting I had with the general command of the Serb
6 army in Belgrade
7 army, the JNA army the following day in Belgrade. But the actual detail
8 of this arrangement I had no way of knowing whether it was going to be
9 implemented or not because I was quickly evacuated from -- from the area
10 of operations.
11 Q. If I were to tell you that there was one other document --
12 actually, has this agreement already been admitted?
13 THE REGISTRAR: Its been admitted as Exhibit P950, Your Honours.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Could we look at another document before we stop. 1D01263 of the
16 11th of May. You were still there. And the Main Staff of the armed
17 forces of the SFRY, command of the 5027 military post in Sarajevo,
18 Colonel Enes Taso. I assume that you know that he is a Muslim. Then we
19 have Laslo Pravda, a Hungarian, the others seem to be Serbs. And then
20 under number 2 it says:
21 "In the course of tomorrow the evacuation of people and movable
22 materiel will begin from four barracks: Marsal Tito, Viktor Bubanj,
23 Jusuf Dzonlic, Gavrilo Princip, the JNA Dom and the Romanija military
24 institution. The condition for the evacuation of the barracks is to
25 return the TO weapons from the four municipalities on whose territory the
1 TO, the chief of the General -- of the General Staff. Colonel Panic has
2 agreed to restore these weapons. The evacuation has been agreed, and the
3 weapons are to be returned to the TO. As you see, there was a fast
4 implementation of this agreement which you attended, and on the second
5 page it states it is essential in agreement with the Chief of the General
6 Staff weapons be prepared of the Territorial Defence from the four
7 municipalities referred to of the city of Sarajevo as per the list that
8 we provided to you the previous day. Branko Cadjo.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not see the
10 original of the document on the screen.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Do you know how much weaponry these four city municipalities had
13 and that the Serbs did not receive any of those weapons?
14 A. Well, there's two points I would mention here. One is that I
15 began being evacuated at 0530 hours on the 12th of May, so I've -- I've
16 no idea as to the content of this letter. And the other is that I was
17 informed at later stage - I don't know what the source were - but that a
18 lot of weapons that were left by the JNA in these places were rendered
19 inoperable because they didn't want to fall into -- they didn't want them
20 to fall into hands where they could be used. So I really don't know. I
21 simply do not know what amount of weapons were taken over by Muslims. So
22 I really can't comment on it. My -- my priority on the 12th of May was
23 to be evacuated from the city, because I was informed of the threat of my
24 life, and that was more important to me at that stage.
25 Q. Colonel, sir, a few guns in Zenica did not have the safety parts,
1 but for the other ones they did make them, but everything in Sarajevo
2 functional. They received 6.000 barrels, mostly rifles and machine-guns
3 and heavy machine-guns. Do you recall that there was a crisis between us
4 and Yugoslavia
5 actually in exchange for the cadets?
6 A. I certainly remember the incident in relation to the cadets, but
7 I don't know under what conditions the blockade was lifted against that
8 barracks. So I simply don't know. I -- I would venture to suggest here
9 that the United Nations who remained in the city might be in a better
10 position to -- to give comment to -- to these rather than I who was, as I
11 said before, on my own and evacuated on the 12th of May. So I presume
12 clarification could be given by the United Nations because I understand
13 that General MacKenzie himself took over these -- the element of the
14 negotiations after -- after I was gone and the monitor mission. So I
15 think that's the only contribution I can make to this issue.
16 Q. Colonel, do you accept that this document of the 11th of May
17 corroborates the previous document, the signing of which you attended and
18 that has your name on it? Do you see that this is the next step towards
19 the implementation? I mean, can you confirm that at least?
20 A. Well, in -- in truth, I can't -- I wouldn't be able to confirm it
21 unless I compared it with the other one, and this does not have an
22 English translation. So I don't want to verify that it is on the basis
23 of those other articles unless I was able read it. I'm sorry.
24 Q. You have it in the transcript. I translated it for you, the gist
25 of the agreement that you attended. Colonel Cadjer [phoen] here is
1 implementing the next day immediately, practically speaking. Does this
2 content that you have in the transcript correspond to the contents of the
3 document of the agreement the signing of which you attended?
4 A. If does if your direct translation is, in fact, a direct
5 translation. I simply don't know. I have learned in my experience that
6 documents can be translated, interpretations can be given. I've -- I've
7 suffered as a consequence of that. So I'm not denying your translation,
8 Mr. Karadzic. I'm just saying that I don't see it because I can't read
9 Serbo-Croat. It's as simple as that.
10 Q. I was reading in the Serbian and the translation was given by the
12 JUDGE KWON: We will now rise for today.
13 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, was your position about this document?
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It should be admitted pending, of course,
15 the translation.
16 JUDGE KWON: It will be marked for identification.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
18 JUDGE KWON: We will continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.
19 Thank you for the interpreters and court reporter for their
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.56 p.m.
22 to be reconvened on Friday, the 28th day
23 of May, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.