1 Friday, 28 May 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody. I read the Prosecution
7 notice for the -- of witnesses for the next week. I take it from the
8 fact that Mr. Van Lynden is scheduled to come back on Monday that it has
9 been agreed by the parties that, Mr. Karadzic, you will conclude your
10 cross-examination by today.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope so, Your Excellencies.
12 JUDGE KWON: How much -- how much would you need for your
13 redirect, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Not more than ten minutes.
15 JUDGE KWON: There are several matters to deal with on the part
16 of the Chamber at the end of today's session, so, Mr. Karadzic, I would
17 like you to bear in your mind to conclude at least 40 minutes before the
18 end of today's session.
19 Let's continue.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to say
21 good morning to everyone.
22 WITNESS: COLM
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
24 Q. [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, yesterday we showed what we had
25 undertaken as our obligation at the London Conference and how we reacted,
1 and I'm glad that you noticed that I did what I said I would do three
2 days after our meeting.
3 Now I would like to see 65 ter 01559 - this is a Prosecution
4 document - to see what our army did in terms of our obligations from the
5 conference. This is a document of the 6th of June, after the Lisbon
6 conference where we were together. This is one of those notorious
7 directives by General Mladic, so let's see what General Mladic ordered
8 and how he understood things.
9 This is a directive for further actions, dated the
10 6th of June, 1992.
11 In the first paragraph it says:
12 "The enemy started a general offence in the direction of
14 And the last sentence in that paragraph states:
15 "The operation is intended to be carried out in the next five to
16 six days in order to create favourable conditions for possible
17 negotiations about demarcation in the broader area of Sarajevo
18 Paragraph 2:
19 "The military of the Serbian Republic
20 task to use offensive actions with the restricted objective of improving
21 the operational tactical position in the broader area of Sarajevo
22 And then paragraph 4, the first sentence.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And in the English it's on the next
24 page, please.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. "I have decided with a persistent defence to defend the achieved
3 And then:
4 "The goal of the action, secure parts of Sarajevo with a majority
5 Serbian population, mop up or cleanse the broader area ..."
6 Now, a new page in the Serbian.
7 "... the broader area of the Sarajevo airport, and mop up or
8 cleanse its wider area of remaining groups and of individuals belonging
9 to the enemy, thus ensuring the safety needed to bring in -- for
10 aircraft's bringing in humanitarian aid and render possible the normal
11 supply of food and medication to the civilian population."
12 And then C:
13 "Open the following roads for the traffic: Sarajevo
14 Kalinovik, in order to provide regular supplies of humanitarian aid to
15 the population."
16 If you recall, we had agreed to have humanitarian aid deliveries
17 through Metkovic as well. Do you recall that?
18 A. No, I don't recall that.
19 Q. All right. It's in the documents. We took it upon ourselves
20 that we would open the Metkovic route through Eastern Herzegovina, and
21 Mladic is ordering the security of that communication here.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next page is both in English
23 and Serbian. Actually, we need to look at page 4 in the English. Where
24 it says:
25 "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps ..."
1 Last sentence:
2 "Secure the communication -- the broader area of the airport to
3 ensure the safe arrival of humanitarian aid."
4 Then 6, paragraph 2, can we look at the next page in the English,
6 "I strictly forbid the abuse of the civilian unarmed population
7 and treat the prisoners in the spirit of the Geneva Conventions."
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Is this more or less in accordance with what we agreed in Lisbon
10 at the end of May, Colonel, sir? If you recall, I signed a statement
11 which we can show. I signed it in Lisbon
12 all the instructions issued by Mladic arise.
13 A. I don't recall the exact details of -- as is portrayed in this
14 letter, which -- which I'm totally unaware of. My understanding of the
15 main achievement in Lisbon
16 the bread queue in Sarajevo
17 the consideration of handing the airport over to the United Nations.
18 That's the main achievement, as I recall.
19 These are all details of a letter that was sent out by a general.
20 It doesn't mean very much to me. I'd like to see the spirit of it going
21 into being implemented rather than just being written in a letter.
22 So I have no knowledge of this letter. I have no knowledge of
23 the details. And, therefore, I have no further comment on it.
24 Q. Colonel, sir, you can comment on everything when it's in favour
25 of the Prosecution, but when the Defence is putting something evident to
1 you, what do you think about what I'm saying to you now? Colonel, sir,
2 you are quite partial now. This is not a letter. This is an order, a
3 directive, which must not be understood as a letter. It has to be
4 executed. Whoever knows Mladic knows that this had to be executed. And
5 the fact that a shell forced me -- well, this is quite partial, Colonel.
6 Since you don't know anything of the things that I was ordering, do you
7 recall the directive of the 12th of April? How can you be so partial,
8 and why are you so partial? Can you explain this to everybody?
9 A. What I'm simply saying, Mr. Karadzic, is that you have produced a
10 plethora of documents allegedly giving directives. What I'm saying to
11 you is I have no proof as to whether the contents of those directives
12 were obeyed. It's as simple as that. I have never seen any of these
14 Q. I didn't ask you that. I asked you whether the contents of this
15 directive are in accordance with what I stated and signed in Lisbon
16 A. And I'm saying to you that I do not know the exact content of
17 everything that was agreed in Lisbon
18 that was signed, then I might be in a position of commenting on it. I
19 don't recall its exact detail, except the portion which emphasised the
20 need for the airport to be handed over to the United Nations in order to
21 provide humanitarian assistance.
22 Q. How can you say, Colonel, sir, that a shell forced me to do it
23 when it was something that I proposed even before the conference and when
24 you know about my platform of the 22nd of April? We have been listening
25 your quite partial testimony for the past three days when you say, Yes,
1 but the Serbs did something in Zvornik. But you don't know what was
2 actually going on in Zvornik. You have to be aware that the Defence
3 considers you to be a completely partial witness who is defending
4 himself. I'm not attacking you. I'm asking for your knowledge, your
5 conclusions. I'm asking for what you know about the events as somebody
6 who was actually there. Yes, you can tell us what you are thinking. I
7 am just saying that you are evading to answer.
8 JUDGE KWON: Put your question one at a time instead of making a
9 long speech.
10 Mr. Doyle, you are --
11 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I'm simply saying that my recollection
12 of what was discussed in Lisbon
13 mortar, the mortar attack in Sarajevo
14 progress made on anything. And it was a consequence of that mortar
15 attack that the chairman of the peace talks, Mr. Cutileiro, persuaded
16 Mr. Karadzic to give something out of that conference that would be of
17 some benefit. And that is my clear recollection. All of these details
18 that are in this letter I'm certainly not familiar with.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Colonel, sir, you will agree that the 17th of May came before the
22 27th of May.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this document,
24 Your Honours, please?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It will -- unless it is objected to, it will
1 be admitted.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour, no objection.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit Number D232.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] can we now look at 1D891 in
5 e-court, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
7 Q. And while we're waiting, sir, this is my letter to
8 Ambassador Cutileiro of the 17th of May, and you will see that the
9 Serbian side is constantly making initiatives, and you are saying that I
10 was forced to do something by a bomb which we didn't fire, and it's not
11 in my indictment, and I can prove that we did not fire it.
12 Here is the letter, sir. For example, we would like to keep you
13 properly informed about the situation [In English] in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
14 particularly in Sarajevo
15 turning into a disaster. We have made many peaceful proposals directly
16 to the Muslim side and UNPROFOR, but there was no response but more and
17 more fire. Finally our Assembly," excuse me. "Finally our Assembly
18 declared a unilateral cease-fire, and it expires tomorrow, May the 18th.
19 Our unilateral cease-fair was understood as our weakness, and we were
20 attacked even more savagely. In spite of talks and at the time the talks
21 were being held, Mr. Izetbegovic made two statements in two days that
22 they were going to victory, until they clean Bosnia from terrorists. By
23 terrorists, he meant Serbs. His statement sounds -- sounded as a call
24 for jihad. Today next-door neighbours in the Serbian suburbs of Pofalici
25 killed at least 50 Serbs."
1 [Interpretation] To correct this, 250 Serbs. We knew at that
2 point in time that Colonel, sir, 250 Serbs were killed in Pofalici at
3 that time, and that was the only Serbian settlement we were not
4 controlling. At least 50 Serbs. But some estimation make it 200.
5 "[In English] Every day, Muslims make savage attacks on Serbian
6 municipalities, particularly on Ilidza, and Serbs never attacked Muslim
7 municipalities. As far as the Croatian side is concerned, Kupres is
8 quiet. The situation in the Neretva valley is better but not good.
9 [No interpretation] [In English] In Bosanski Brod, Croatian regulars has
10 doubled armed forces and chasing Serbs out of this municipality.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we look at the last page,
12 please, page 2. Ah, we can stay on this one.
13 MR. KARADZIC:
14 Q. "Mr. Izetbegovic does not want this conference anymore. He is
15 asking for foreign military help from Islamic countries. We have strong
16 evidence that Libya
17 its consulate in Sarajevo
18 countries are getting interested in the outcome of the Bosnian crisis.
19 If the conference does not continue, the war will become even more
20 terrible, and it will not stop until the side is - next - is completely
21 defeated. As you know, all my predictions have become true, and I am not
22 happy about it. So we propose unconditional resumption of the
23 conference. If it is conditioned by cease-fire, that means that
24 Mr. Izetbegovic will have a way to hinder and sabotage it as long as he
25 wants to do it."
1 [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, may I remind you of the directive
2 of -- actually, the platform of the 22nd of April, and would I like to
3 ask you if you have anything of our statements or declarations to show
4 that was warmongering and that was against a political resolution of the
6 A. No, I don't have any documentation, and I would just say for --
7 during that period that was made out, I was in the United Kingdom. I
8 wasn't in Bosnia
10 Q. You don't -- that's -- you were not in Sarajevo on the
11 27th of April, but in Lisbon
12 Colonel, sir, you are partial, and you can see that from the moon. By
13 the 22nd of May we had made these proposals, but the shell fell on the
14 27th of May. This was on the 17th. It was five days after you arrived.
15 But you knew what was going on; you were in Lisbon, weren't you?
16 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the accused is arguing with the
18 witness. He's not really asking questions any more. He's making
19 statements and arguing.
20 JUDGE KWON: To a certain extent.
21 Mr. Doyle, if you could answer the question.
22 THE WITNESS: What I'm saying in relation to this is that if this
23 is a letter that was made out on the 17th of May, I was not in Bosnia
24 the 17th of May. I had left on the 12th of May when I was evacuated from
25 the city of Sarajevo
1 on the 1st of October I was in Bosnia
2 Mr. Cutileiro for the talks in Lisbon
3 content of the agreement that was attained in Lisbon, yes. But in
4 relation to this letter, I have no knowledge of, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE BAIRD: But, Colonel, do you have any idea at all of its
6 content, any idea at all of it?
7 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour, of this letter?
8 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes.
9 THE WITNESS: No. I have not.
10 JUDGE BAIRD: No idea at all?
11 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
12 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue?
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Then, Colonel, if you have no knowledge of that, why then do you
18 not withdraw your allegations and those additions you made to your
19 answer -- in your answers to questions I didn't ask you? How can you
20 say, if you have no knowledge and awareness of this and if you weren't
21 informed properly in the conference where you took part as
22 Lord Carrington's representative, why are you stating that a shell forced
23 me to be humane and peace-loving?
24 A. Because, Mr. Karadzic, I've already explained under testimony as
25 to what the consequences of that mortar shell was on the peace talks in
2 into the conference and informed Mr. Cutileiro that because of this
3 mortar attack, which everybody saw on international television, he saw
4 there was no use to continue the talks. He said he was leaving. And
5 then you come in a short time later to inform the conference or to inform
6 those of us who were there that the Serbs were not responsible for the
7 mortar attack on the bread queue.
8 Mr. Cutileiro was of the view that if the talks were to be
9 suspended without any progress, this would not look well; and, therefore,
10 he suggested to you that as a gesture and that if you were to give under
11 certain conditions an assurance that the airport of Sarajevo
12 handed over to the United Nations, that would be a positive outcome of
13 the talks, and that's what was achieved.
14 Nobody is saying who fired the mortar bomb. I don't know who
15 fired it. I've already said that in testimony yesterday. I assumed the
16 United Nations, who had a large contingent of troops in the city and
17 would have done a crater analysis would be a better judge to make that
18 call. I do not know. I don't have an answer for it. So I have nothing
19 further to say on that mortar attack, except that the conference
20 exploited that attack to get you to give an undertaking that under
21 certain circumstances you would be agreeable to hand over the airport to
22 the United Nations to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
23 Q. And do you know, Colonel, that I proposed that even earlier and
24 that we were always in favour of having humanitarian aid delivered?
25 A. No, Mr. Karadzic, I'm not aware of that.
1 Q. Thank you. Well, in the meantime, I'll find that statement of
2 mine made in Lisbon
3 directive of General Mladic's, Colonel, both from -- the one from June --
4 well, that one's been adopted.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But can I have
6 Prosecution Exhibit 1600 up next, please. The previous document has been
7 admitted; right? Is the directive in evidence? Well, it's a letter
9 JUDGE KWON: I don't think so. Let's -- it will be admitted.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D233, Your Honours.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 May we have Prosecution 65 ter 1600 next, please.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. This is also one of Mladic's directives for further action on the
15 8th of August, which completely reflects the continuity of his efforts to
16 ensure that humanitarian deliveries arrive.
17 Now, let me ask you first, Colonel. You said that Silajdzic
18 arrived and that he used the mortar to interrupt the conference. Now, we
19 claim and state that all those incidents were geared towards stopping the
20 conference, because they were offered the whole of Bosnia. What do you
21 have to say to that?
22 A. Well, that's -- that to me is -- is an opinion being expressed by
23 you, and that's fine by me. It's not the opinion that I would have. I
24 agree with you when you say that the conference -- the main reason why
25 the conference was stopped was because of this attack which took place in
2 Q. And do you also agree that the Serbs didn't want the conference
3 to be stopped, whereas the Muslims did? And that you never had to
4 prevail upon the Serbs to attend the conference, whereas you did have to
5 persuade the Muslims to do so?
6 A. I don't know of any occasion when I had to persuade the Muslims
7 to attend a conference, Mr. Karadzic.
8 Q. Well, that's what it says in your diary. You had to persuade the
9 HDZ and SDA to go to the conference, and we looked at that yesterday.
10 A. No, Mr. Karadzic. I've already explained that the reason why we
11 had to persuade the president to go was because he thought he would be
12 killed by Bosnian Serbs on his way to the airport. It wasn't a question
13 of his unwillingness to attend the conference. It was his concern about
14 his own safety in getting to the airport. No more than that. It was a
15 security measure and a matter of safety.
16 Q. May we now have a look at this directive from General Mladic from
18 JUDGE KWON: Partly due to the accused's habit of asking multiple
19 questions, but how about the first part of his question, whether you
20 would agree that Serbs didn't want the conference to be stopped, whereas
21 the Muslims did. What is your observation?
22 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I -- I -- my only observation is, I
23 don't know if any side wanted the conference to cease. I don't know if
24 any side took efforts to ensure the conference would cease, so I don't
25 have a -- I don't have an answer for that.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Now, can we just for a moment look at another document, and we'll
5 come back to this one. It is 65 ter 05875, 05875, just for a brief
6 moment, and then we'll get back to the directive.
7 It's my letter to Ambassador Cutileiro, dated the 5th of June.
8 And that's the first page.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we turn to the second page,
10 please. This is the Serbian version. The second page in English,
11 please. Here it is.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. "Dear Mr. Cutileiro.
14 "Tonight, the 5th of June, Mr. Izetbegovic gave a negative reply
15 to Lord Carrington's letter about the conference on Bosnia. On the news,
16 television news, he explicitly said," and I quote, "that now everything
17 is different and that he does not want any conference about the
18 constituent units." Those are his words.
19 "Despite the goodwill we showed in our readiness to open the
20 airport unconditionally," unconditionally I repeat, "we were blackmailed
21 with the lives of JNA families to leave the heavy arms in the
22 Marsal Tito Barracks. That same evening the Muslim side started shelling
23 Serb residential areas in Sarajevo
24 "We hope that you can still mediate and bring the Muslim side to
25 the conference. However, we have to know the truth because the Serbian
1 people feel both tricked and in jeopardy. Namely, if you cannot keep
2 your promises, publicly announced and confirmed by the
3 European Community, we have to protect the Serbian people on their ethnic
5 And it is to be sent to Lord Carrington, forwarded to
6 Lord Carrington, as well.
7 Do you know that Mr. Izetbegovic, in the television news, said
8 that he was no longer interested in any conference about constituent
9 units and that everything was different now, and that was his permanent
10 position, that the conference was to be avoided? First of all, do you
11 know that he said that? Let's take that first.
12 A. No, I have no personal knowledge that he said that, Mr. Karadzic,
13 but I'm sure Mr. Cutileiro might be in a better position, because the
14 letter was addressed to him.
15 Q. Well, Colonel, I have a problem here with witnesses. Not only
16 with you but some others too. With all due respect, it would be better
17 if your bosses came in to testify then because you know nothing about the
18 conference. You know nothing about the conference, and yet you were a
19 participant and this letter is important. And you're testifying as an
20 eyewitness and a participant and yet you say you know nothing. How come
21 you know nothing about this? Did you follow the conference? Were you a
22 participant and associate of Lord Carrington's or not?
23 A. I was assisting the peace conference on Yugoslavia based on my
24 experience and my service as head of the monitor mission in whatever
25 capacity it was felt I might be able to make a contribution. If you deem
1 that not to be sufficient, that's your choice, Mr. Karadzic. But I'm
2 trying to give a truthful account of what I did, what I didn't, what I
3 saw, and what I didn't, and beyond that I really do not have any comment.
4 Q. And did you see Zvornik and Foca and that's what you're
5 testifying about?
6 A. No, I did not see Zvornik and Foca. I repeated earlier that I
7 was given the content of a verbal report from the monitor mission who
8 attempted to get to Foca. And I was given the content of a verbal report
9 given to me by Mr. Martin Bell of the BBC in relation to Zvornik, and I
10 believe that's what I said here under testimony.
11 Q. Colonel, you were in Sarajevo
12 you know what happened to the hotels in Sarajevo proper, both -- and to
13 the Serbs working in those hotels? We heard what you said about the
14 hotel at Ilidza, that they were taken to the centre of town for their
15 security. Now, down what happened to the hotels in Sarajevo?
16 A. I know that I witnessed a battle outside the hotel, the
17 Bristol Hotel, the day the barricades went up, and I know what happen
18 outside the hotel or in the confines of the hotel that I stayed in.
19 Those are the two incidents in which I personally witnessed.
20 Q. And do you know that the Green Berets took control of all the
21 hotels and forcefully evicted all the directors and Serb employees? We
22 had a document showing that. We presented it with another witness.
23 Do you know that that's what happened when you were there?
24 A. No, Mr. Karadzic, I do not know.
25 Q. Did you have anyone in town? You had 50, 60 people in town, did
1 you not?
2 A. I had 56 or approximately 56 people when I was head of the
3 monitor mission. When I went back to Sarajevo on the 10th of April, I
4 was on my own in a different capacity.
5 Q. But from your diary we can see that you were in town frequently.
6 You had meetings in town. So how is it possible that you didn't know
7 what was going on in town, whereas you knew what was going on in Zvornik
8 and Foca?
9 A. Because, Mr. Karadzic, I don't give you the opportunity of making
10 accusations against me of being biased. Therefore, I will stick exactly
11 to the truth, and I will say exactly where I was and what I did. And
12 that's what I'm doing.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender that now,
15 please. And may we have the directive back, 1600 was its number. This
16 is my letter to Cutileiro, and there's no doubt about that.
17 JUDGE KWON: I take it there will be no objection. It will be
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 05875 will be Exhibit D234.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Would you focus on the document from August 1992, that is to say,
24 before the London Conference, during Carrington's time; you were still an
25 associate of his. And this is what General Mladic writes. It's one of
1 the directives.
2 Number 3. I'd like to focus on item 3. No, number 1.
3 "The enemy started violating the agreed 14-day cease-fire before
4 its end, and offensive operations, in particular, have been underway
5 since an agreement was reached between Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic on
6 joint operations aimed at crushing the Army of the Serbian Republic
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina and subjugating and exterminating the Serbian people."
8 Not to read the whole paragraph, the beginning of paragraph 3
10 "The objective of the planned operation is to break the blockade
11 of Sarajevo
12 axes while simultaneously utilising part of the forces from," et cetera.
13 "The enemy has settled scores mercilessly with the Serbian people
14 and captured members of the SR BH army who were skilled with brutal and
15 savage torture unrecorded in history."
16 Now, Colonel, do you know that on the 3rd of June the Muslim
17 forces in the village of Cemerno
18 brutal way. They resorted to mutilation of Serb civilians. It was a
19 very drastic event. Do you know about is it?
20 A. No, I do not.
21 Q. Thank you. Now, let's continue.
22 "Certain European countries are doing their utmost during their
23 influence in the Security Council and the EC to legalise the arming of
24 Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and prevent the implementation
25 of United Nations sanctions against Croatia
1 against Bosnia-Herzegovina."
2 Did you know that the regular units of the Croatian Army were
3 constantly present in certain parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
4 A. I was aware that certain elements of Croats wearing Croatian Army
5 uniforms were periodically in the territory of Western Herzegovina, and
6 I've already mentioned that in my testimony. Beyond that, I have no
7 knowledge in relation to this directive.
8 Q. Let's be very precise, Colonel. Were they elements of an entire
9 brigade, or were they tactical units? Were they the elements of the
10 whole brigade, the 108th Brigade of the Croatian Army, the Guards
11 Brigade, and other brigades - and we'll show proof and evidence of
12 that - but are they those elements, or is it an army?
13 A. I have no idea.
14 Q. You have no idea whether they were elements. When we say
15 "elements," it might seem that these are some tourists coming to wage war
16 in Bosnia
17 Croat soldiers present in Bosnia
18 A. No, I have no knowledge as to how many Croatia soldiers were in
19 the territory of Bosnia
20 Q. Did you do anything about this matter or did the conference do
21 anything about this? Was Croatia
22 threatened with bombing or anything that would have been done had the
23 Army of Serbia
24 A. I have certainly no comment on that suffice to say, Mr. Karadzic,
25 you were seeing a document that you have in your possession of a report I
1 made out on the situation of the Croatian soldiers in Bosnia. Beyond
2 that, I have nothing to say.
3 Q. Thank you. We can now go back to the directive. Last paragraph:
4 "Some of these countries, Germany, Austria --" actually, can we
5 look at page 3 in the English.
6 "Just like some countries of the Islamic Community who are
7 financing the Islamic jihad want to equip Muslim units so that they would
8 be superior enough in strength to deal with the Army of Republika
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can now move to the third page
11 in English and also the second page in the Serbian.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. "The international community did not undertake specific measures
14 that would treat equally all the forces in the conflict, but there is the
15 influence of the major powers supporting the blockade of the
16 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, threatening the Serbian people of
17 aggression, and threatening with armed intervention while the Croatian
18 peoples are being declared the victims of aggression and tacit approval
19 is given to their shipments of weapons through Austria and Croatia
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think -- actually, I think this
22 is page 2 in the English. Perhaps we can go back to page 2 in the
23 English so that all the parties could actually follow what I'm reading.
24 This is paragraph 2:
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
1 Q. "The international community has not taken any peace steps. The
2 so-called peace conference of BH and London under the leadership of
3 Lord Carrington have not produced the desired results, and the conclusion
4 can be drawn that their objective was to buy time for the consolidation
5 of Croatian and Muslim forces in order to settle their score with the
6 Serbian people?"
7 JUDGE KWON: Slow down, Mr. Karadzic.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. And let's continue. It says --
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, instead of reading out all the
11 documents, put your question. What is your question?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then I have to back and look
13 for page 5 to show what Mladic ordered.
14 Can we look at page 5 in the Serbian, please, and also 5 in
15 English, please.
16 Before that, it is said, I have decided who will do what, and
17 then he talks about the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
18 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are waiting to see the text on
19 the screen.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 5, please.
21 This is page 3.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. We see it in the Serbian. In the English it's not so important.
25 "The Sarajevo
1 by main forces keep the positions reached in Sarajevo and the broader
2 area and with part of the forces coordinate operations with the
3 Hercegovina Corps in opening the Sarajevo-Trnovo-Kalinovik and
4 Visegrad-Ustipraca-Gorazde road.
5 And then it says:
6 "Task," last sentence, "with persistent and active defence and
7 gradually tighten the siege of Sarajevo
8 towards Sarajevo
9 So the encirclement -- or, actually, that's the word. It's not
10 "siege." It has been wrongly translated here. Colonel, do you see that
11 in this article 5 -- actually, paragraph 4, Mladic insists on the opening
12 of the road through Herzegovina
13 directive that the task or the objective of that is to have a way to
14 deliver humanitarian aid?
15 A. Yes. That's what it says in the -- that's what it says in the
16 document in front of me.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please tender directive
19 number 3. Actually, this is already a Prosecution number. I don't know
20 if it's already been admitted.
21 JUDGE KWON: Do you agree with the -- Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, with
22 the accused's observation that that word - I don't know what it is - but
23 it's wrongly translated as "siege"? It should have been translated as
24 "encirclement"? I hope there's a way we can sort it out.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I think that's rather a matter
1 for the CLSS to decide what's the correct word. This document has not
2 been, so far, admitted, but there's no objection to doing this.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D235, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE MORRISON: Colonel Doyle, is that -- as I under it, all
6 that you're saying is that, as all of us, you're reading the document and
7 confirming that what is in the document is in the document. You're not
8 confirming that you had a personal knowledge or that you were aware of
9 the -- the opinions or the objectives of General Mladic.
10 THE WITNESS: That's perfectly correct, Your Honour, yes.
11 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Colonel, sir, we now have to go back to the transcript of your
14 examination-in-chief so that we could be more specific about things. I'm
15 afraid that there have been things that were said easily and imprecisely,
16 and they can reflect very negatively on the Defence.
17 I'm not accusing you of doing that deliberately, until I give you
18 an opportunity to maybe be a little more specific.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to look at page 67 of
20 the 21st of May now, please, so that we can look at that page.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation.
22 Q. I'm going to read it to you. This is a summary by
23 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, and she says:
24 He recalls that the local Serbs -- [In English] Serb leaders were
25 often referred back to historical events and atrocities of the Second
1 World War and expressed fears of their repetition."
2 [Interpretation] Colonel, did you believe that we shouldn't be
3 doing that, that we didn't have any grounds or reason to recall what was
4 happening to us during World War II?
5 A. What I meant here, Mr. Karadzic, is that on very many meetings
6 that I had with various political parties there was the tendency for a
7 lot of emphasis to be put on the atrocities in the Second World War.
8 This was from all sides. I'm not accusing this of being only the Serbs.
9 And I found that it wasn't helpful to use up a lot of valuable
10 time in referring back constantly to what happened in the Second World
11 War. So it became my practice to request the parties not to give me a
12 history lecture any time I entered into negotiations or discussions. I
13 felt it wasn't going to make any contribution towards understanding the
14 current situation. And I felt it would be more important to talk about
15 the concerns and the fears and the views and the opinions that the
16 various parties had at the time that I was there.
17 So I simply referred and asked the parties to please refrain from
18 giving me a history lecture, because it seemed to be the tendency in that
19 part of the world of referring constantly back to events of the past.
20 Q. Thank you. Can we be a little bit more specific. Now, you
21 didn't say that Serbs talked about it constantly; you said the sides, the
22 parties did. But here in the transcript it states that only the Serbs
23 constantly referred back; is that correct?
24 A. Well, I can say that, yes, I will acknowledge that. It was
25 predominantly Serbs, but it was also Croats. I --
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Excuse me. Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
3 Excuse me.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we are talking about page 2646,
5 and the witness did not say "only Serbs." He only refers to local Serbs,
6 what they told him, but he doesn't say "only Serbs."
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Colonel, do you know -- do you agree with my assertion that there
10 was no war in the Yugoslav territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina without
11 having a fratricidal component, a component of civil war? Would you
12 agree with that?
13 A. Yes, I would.
14 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that we had reason for concern because
15 Mr. Izetbegovic wore a Nazi uniform during World War II and was a friend
16 of -- Hitler's friend, the great Mufti of Jerusalem, al-Husseini, and he
17 hosted him in Sarajevo
18 A. No. I have no knowledge of that.
19 Q. And if I were to tell you, Colonel, sir, that Mr. Izetbegovic, as
20 an extremely developed intellectual person, from 1991 until his death he
21 continuously developed the kind of thought regarding Islamic ideas, and
22 because of that this could not be something that was far from our minds
23 once he came into power in 1994, and because of that do you believe that
24 we were not right to be concerned about that when he came to power?
25 Mr. Izetbegovic was a member of the Young Muslims Organisation
1 from 1939, and he never changed these beliefs. So I'm correcting the --
2 the year in the transcript. He never changed those beliefs from then
3 until the beginning of the war.
4 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, where's the question in that?
5 What you've done is made a statement of what you believe to be the
6 factual situation. The proper way that that should come into the
7 proceedings is, if and when you elect to give evidence, that you can
8 explain your views and the historical basis for them, but I doubt very
9 much whether Colonel Doyle is an expert on Mr. Izetbegovic and his
10 intellectual and philosophical views as to Islam. If I'm wrong,
11 Colonel Doyle will no doubt direct me.
12 THE WITNESS: No, I agree with you, Your Honour. I'm aware that
13 the ideological principles of Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Izetbegovic would be
14 different because they are from different ethnic groups. That's to be
15 understood. But beyond that, I don't have a view as to what
16 Mr. Izetbegovic might have been thinking or what was the basis of his
17 philosophy. No, sir, I don't.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. There was a question,
19 but it did not enter the transcript. My question is -- and then I will
20 go back to what you said:
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. My question is: As far as we're concerned, is that a remote
23 distant past which should not have been mentioned once a person came to
24 power who had worn a Nazi uniform during the war and socialised with
25 Hitler's closest associates in the Middle East? Was that something that
1 should not have been taken into account, this historical aspect as far as
2 the Serbs were concerned, or was it something that had become a part of
3 our present?
4 A. Well, history always has a tendency of becoming part of the
5 presence, Mr. Karadzic, but I wasn't aware of these allegations against
6 Mr. Izetbegovic. I was aware of his general background of being a Muslim
7 and having different philosophies to you, and if that was some concern
8 for you in the current situation, then I can understand that, but I have
9 no basis for thinking that this was a strong influence on his current
10 thinking. I simply don't know, and I don't have a view on it beyond
12 Q. Colonel, sir, you were in Sarajevo
13 recall I made a public appeal to Mr. Izetbegovic to give up his
14 Islamic Declaration so that tensions could be relieved and lessened, and
15 he refused to do that? Do you remember that?
16 A. No, Mr. Karadzic, I do not remember that.
17 Q. Are you familiar with this programme called the Islamic
19 A. I've heard reference to it, but I have no knowledge of it in any
21 Q. Do you know that Mr. Izetbegovic, in 1947, was brought to trial
22 because he continued the activities of young Muslims illegally, and in
23 1983 he was brought to trial because of the Islamic Declaration as a
24 programme for the forceful change of the regime in Bosnia and in
1 A. I was aware that he was brought to trial in 1983, but nothing
2 about 1947.
3 Q. Thank you. Let us now go back to the differences between me and
4 Izetbegovic, stemming from the fact that we originate from two different
5 communities. Do you know that Adil Zulfikarpasic is also a member of the
6 Muslim ethnic community as well as Muhamed Filipovic and that they are
7 very committed Muslims? Do you know that they are Muslims as well?
8 A. No, Mr. Karadzic. I don't know these people.
9 Q. Both of them are leaders of a smaller Muslim party, a
10 Muslim-Bosniak organisation, and do you know that we, with that party,
11 with the agreement of --
12 JUDGE KWON: If the witness said he didn't know the two Muslims
13 you referred to, there's no point on your part to continue that question.
14 What is your next question?
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Do you know or -- well, do you know Fikret Abdic?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. Do you know that we agreed with Abdic and that we signed a truce
19 sometime in 1993 with him?
20 A. No, I don't. I wasn't in Bosnia in 1993.
21 Q. And do you know that Mr. Abdic won the most votes from the Muslim
22 people and that he wasn't considered a fundamentalist, labelled a
23 fundamentalist, and that is to be respected, that the Muslim people voted
24 for a man who wasn't a fundamentalist.
25 A. No. I'm not aware of that.
1 Q. Do you accept now, Colonel, since I have informed you about this,
2 so you do know now, that we had a historical Serbian-Muslim agreement
3 and -- with Abdic who was from the SDA, that we concluded a truce and
4 adhered to that? So do you accept that the difference between myself and
5 Mr. Izetbegovic is not merely from our affiliation to the Serbian or
6 Muslim corpus but that it is something deeper?
7 A. If you say so, Mr. Karadzic. I don't have a problem with that.
8 What I'm saying to you is that I'm not aware of these points that you are
9 raising and therefore don't wish to comment on them.
10 Q. But you're behaving as if you do know. And you say that the
11 differences stem from the fact that he's a Muslim and I'm a Serb, whereas
12 I am telling you that there were Muslim parties with which we agreed with
13 and got on well with. And I'm saying that it's because Mr. Izetbegovic
14 was a fundamentalist, whereas these other Muslims were not. Do you
15 accept that?
16 A. I -- I accept what you're saying. The dilemma I had was that
17 most of the political parties in Bosnia were established along ethnic and
18 religious lines, and that made the dilemma of getting them to a common
19 agreement far more difficult to achieve. The various elements of
20 whatever type of Muslims was not something that was of a major concern to
21 me. I was dealing with members of the Presidency. As far as I was
22 concerned, there were two members who were Serbs, there were two who were
23 Muslims, and there were two who were Croats, and I think there was one
24 other. So to me I wasn't concentrating in any way in the degrees of
25 whether one was a fundamentalist Muslim or whether one was a different
1 type of Muslim. No, I wasn't.
2 Q. Thank you. Unfortunately, we did have to deal with that kind of
3 thing, and this third person was Ejup Ganic, also a Muslim extremist. Do
4 you agree?
5 A. If you say he was an extremist, that's fine. I don't think he
6 was an extremist, but that's my opinion, and --
7 Q. But he represented those others, the Jews, the Czechs, the
8 Italians, all those minorities living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He
9 represented them; right?
10 A. Well, he wasn't a strict member of the SDA, the SDS, or the HDZ,
11 and my understanding was that he was -- well, what you just referred to,
12 as a Bosniak. In other words, somebody who didn't have a strong
13 affiliation to any one side, and I accepted that.
14 If you say he was representing the Jews and all the other
15 non-main parties, I don't have a -- I don't have a comment on that.
16 Q. Thank you. Now, Colonel, he couldn't be a Bosniak because that
17 was for other ethnicities, for minorities. That was that place. And so
18 we nominated a Jew for that post. Now, the SDA wanted to camouflage
19 Ganic and make him a Yugoslav to have three members in the Presidency.
20 Are you aware of the fact that it wasn't following the party
21 line? It couldn't have been a Serb, a Croat, or a Bosniak, whereas he
22 was. So was that trickery? Was that intended to dupe and deceive?
23 A. Mr. Karadzic, I have no idea. If you say this was trickery,
24 that's your opinion. It isn't mine. So there we stand.
25 Q. Very well, Colonel, but I have to fight against many of your
1 statements that you made in passing which are not precise.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now may we have a prosecution
3 exhibit. 09446 is the number.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
5 Q. And when we go through your transcript, we'll be able to have a
6 look and see what that is like in documents, on the basis of documents.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, for the record, this was admitted
8 as Exhibit P925.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. This is the 10th of April, Colonel, 1992, 10th of April, 1992,
11 and it's still the JNA there, the command of the 2nd Military District,
12 the operative duty team, et cetera. Now let's see what they say about
13 the enemy. Second sentence:
14 "Under the guise of demobilisation of Croatian Army units,
15 members of the HV who are from BH are being sent to BH in an organised
16 manner, and conscripts are being mobilised in Croatia to replace them.
17 Heavy weaponry is being brought in to the area of Bosanski Brod from
19 situation in BH and hopes for large-scale armed conflicts as soon as
20 possible. The enemy forces in the Kupres sector have been defeated at
21 the Kupres-Vrata pass;" et cetera.
22 Now, did you know of this large scale operation launched by the
23 regular Croatian Army in the area of Kupres?
24 A. I was aware of action that had taken place in Kupres which
25 involved members of the Croatian Army. The exact size, I wasn't. I'm
1 just wondering, Mr. Karadzic, in that document, what does the enemy --
2 who does "the enemy" refer to?
3 Q. Well, the Yugoslav People's Army refers to the Croatian Army as
4 the enemy, and later on you will see that they were the paramilitaries,
5 too, that were the enemy.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we move on to page 3 -- or,
7 rather, page 2 in the English. And I think it's page 2 in the Serbian as
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
10 Q. I'll read it out in Serbian:
11 "The situation in the territory --" [No interpretation]
12 "[In English] The situation in the 2nd "Vojna Oblast," military
13 zone of responsibility, is becoming increasingly troubled and is reaching
14 boiling point. The situation is deteriorating in trouble spots,
15 especially in Visegrad, Zvornik, Jajce, and Sarajevo sector."
16 [No interpretation]
17 "[In English] Hatred of the JNA among the Muslims and Croatian
18 population is becoming even greater. The president of B and H claims
19 that the JNA is the only force capable of acting to save the Muslim
20 population in the Zvornik sector but is unwilling to do so, which will
21 only compound further the hostile stance of the Muslim population toward
22 the JNA."
23 [Interpretation] Then the next page.
24 "[In English] Armed conflict between the Sarajevo Romanija --
25 Romanija SAO and Green Berets and the MUP of Ministry of Interior
1 continues throughout the day with occasional pauses with the use of
2 small-arms fire and mortars. Mortar fire was again used today, directed
3 at feature -- at -- in the city of Sarajevo
4 Green Berets, armed citizens, and MUP members control all movement in the
5 city of Sarajevo
6 [Interpretation] So here this intelligence officer is informing
7 that the Muslim part of the MUP, the Green Berets, and the armed
8 civilians took over control of the city of Sarajevo.
9 Is that what you knew too?
10 A. My information at that time was that certain areas of the city
11 were under control by the various parties and that there was continuous
12 harassment and attacks. The exact detail of what occurred, I simply
13 don't know. This refers to a report on the 10th of April.
14 The 10th of April is the day I returned to Bosnia, having been
15 away for some weeks back in Ireland
16 was quite a considerable amount of conflict going on. Movement in the
17 city was very difficult, so I wasn't in a position at that stage to be
18 able to get detailed information as to who was doing what.
19 And I had met with the commander of the second group, but he
20 certainly didn't give me the detail that is in this document when I met
21 with him.
22 Q. Thank you. Now under the title "5th Corps," third sentence:
23 "The arming of the SDA [In English] party and the HDZ.
24 Paramilitary formations is being legalised under the guise of the newly
25 established Territorial Defence.
1 "In the Banja Luka garrison, acts of sabotage in the town and
2 attacks against Islamic and Catholic places of worship are on the
3 increase which may cause the situation to escalate even further."
4 [Interpretation] Do you see, Colonel, that this intelligence
5 officer of the Yugoslav People's Army is painting the right picture and
6 stating that it was uncontrolled elements who were responsible for doing
7 all this?
8 A. Well, certainly in reference to his report from Banja Luka saying
9 that the sabotage at the time and the attacks against Islamic and
10 Catholic places are on the increase certainly would indicate that the JNA
11 were painting a picture from all sides. These acts of sabotage in the
12 town and attacks, I don't know who these were committed by against the
13 places of worship. So, I mean, have you a specific question for me on
15 Q. Well, what I want to ask you, Colonel, is this: Do you see that
16 the Yugoslav People's Army is monitoring the situation, not taking part,
17 and that the assessment was -- that it made, was that there was an
18 uncontrolled eruption, and we'll see that on the penultimate page,
19 conclusions and forecasts. And I'll come to my question after I read
20 this bit out. Or, rather, after you take a look at the penultimate page.
21 The activities of the ECMM are there too.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's L006-8130 in English. That's
23 the page number. May we have page 130 of the English. Or, rather, it's
24 number 7. Here it is.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] He says that Cutileiro has arrived
1 at about 1500 hours.
2 "[In English] On April the 10th in 1992, the Portuguese
3 ambassador Mr. Cutileiro arrived in Sarajevo."
4 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. And then down there
5 conclusions and forecasts.
6 "[In English] Uncontrolled eruption of fighting in B and H can
7 be expected in the situation of widespread anarchy and lawlessness, and
8 the units of the 2nd military district will -- will very probably be
9 dragged into it. Large-scale provocation and attacks on JNA units,
10 military installations, officers and their family members can be
12 [Interpretation] Now let's see how you characterise this. The
13 question is this, Colonel: Do you see that the army is taking an
14 objective and neutral stance with respect to the situation that it is
16 A. At that time in Sarajevo
17 not getting actively involved in the various -- in the various attacks
18 that were taking place in the city of Sarajevo. I have no evidence or
19 information as to what they might have been doing in other areas of
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is already an exhibit, I
23 believe; right? Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Now may we take a look at page 68 of the transcript where your
1 views are being interpreted by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
2 Have we got that page? I'll read it out:
3 "[In English] On March the 2nd, 1992, the day after the results
4 of the referendum were announced, shooting commenced in Sarajevo
5 barricades were elected by the Serbs. "
6 And at the end it says that you said:
7 "[In English] Colonel Doyle was informed by the person in charge
8 at that time barricades would only be dismissed upon Karadzic's specific
10 [Interpretation] Do you agree that that's not what it says in
11 your diary? And do you agree that the barricades were dismantled only
12 after the agreement reached between Mr. Dukic and the Presidency?
13 A. Excuse me. I just need to check my diary here.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, just for orientation,
15 we're talking about page 2647 of the transcript.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. You already answered that, but I'd just like to -- well, we
19 showed you that. Do you remember the agreement -- or, rather, the
20 Presidency meeting of the 2nd of March?
21 A. This was the one in which there were demands. Are we talking
22 about that? Okay. Yes, I do.
23 Q. Thank you. Now, let's see what it says here. On the
24 10th of April, 1992, Martin Bell of the BBC informed Colonel Doyle
25 [In English] That about 25.000 refugees were moving from Zvornik,
1 [Interpretation] and so on.
2 Now, you say that you were informed about ethnic cleansing. Now,
3 who informed you of this ethnic cleansing, and how was that piece of
4 information formulated precisely?
5 A. That information was given to me by members of the ECMM. And So
6 that's where I got the information. How it was compiled, I don't know.
7 I wasn't a member of the ECMM.
8 Q. Was it said that ethnic cleansing was being committed?
9 A. As far as I recall, yes, that people were being forcibly removed
10 from their areas where they lived.
11 Q. I'm interested in the phrasing. Were you told that ethnic
12 cleansing was being committed?
13 A. Yes. We understood this to be ethnic cleansing.
14 Q. If I were to tell you that the term "ethnic cleansing" was
15 introduced publicly much later, what would you say?
16 A. Well, I can't -- I don't have a comment on that. I would have to
17 say now that after 18 years I don't have as good a recollection as I
18 might have had at the time, but we were -- we were satisfied that there
19 was a huge amount of displacement of residents from various locations
20 generally along the east side of the country in places like Bijeljina and
22 Q. And do you know about the departure of a large number of Serbs
23 from Livno even before the war, in late March and early April?
24 A. No, I don't.
25 Q. Do you know what was actually going on in Zvornik?
1 A. I had no detailed knowledge of what was going on in Zvornik
2 except on the basis of what I was informed by Mr. Bell of the BBC, and
3 you will see there that I simply put down that 25.000 refugees were on
4 the move. I don't know what direction they were going in, but they were
5 leaving the town or the area of Zvornik. And that's the information I
6 passed on to you. You asked me where I got the information from, and I
7 told you I got it from Martin Bell of the BBC, and you said you did not
8 believe it.
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We will have a break. This time we will
10 have a break for half an hour.
11 --- Recess taken at 10.22 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Colonel, you noted the address by Mr. Vojo Kupresanin and one
17 part of his speech in the Assembly cited here. First of all, do you know
18 that Vojo Kupresanin was the president of a small party that was in
19 coalition with us, the homeland front, and that he was not a member of
20 the SDS
21 A. No, I was not aware of that. I don't know this gentleman.
22 Q. But on page 75, the question was -- just to say, it's
23 Mr. Kupresanin speaking.
24 "[In English] This can be seen from the two pages previous, and
25 he is saying," and so on and so on.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 65 ter number 39,
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. I am not trying to disown Kupresanin, but I would just like you
5 to know something a little bit more about him. He was not a member of
6 the Radical Party.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 5921. That document has already
8 been admitted, I think. P921, P921. Prosecution document. And then
9 page 53 of that document, please, which is quoted in the transcript. In
10 the English, this is page 77. In the Serbian, it's page 53, and in the
11 English it's page 77. The English text, that's not it; but in the
12 Serbian, we are on the right page.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. In the middle paragraph:
15 "The generals and the Serb army --" I'm going to be reading in
16 the Serbian because the translations are not good. I'm going to point
17 that out.
18 "The generals and the Serb army did not have adequate Serb
20 Colonel, I'm reading what the Prosecution failed to present as a
21 whole statement.
22 "... they didn't have adequate Serbian leaders. Nobody told
23 those Serb officers, Gentlemen, this and that is your task. After all,
24 the Serbian Democratic Party was not preparing the Serbian people for
25 war. We do remember that our leaders, and I'm not criticising here but
1 only try to point out the mistakes we made, thinking of the leaders, said
2 that there would be no war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that we would
3 politically solve the problems. That is exactly the same thing that is
4 going on in Geneva
5 head of a small party which was in the coalition with us is pointing out
6 that the Serbian Democratic Party did not adequately prepare the people
7 for war."
8 And now the next paragraph, we have it in the transcript
9 partially from line 12 on page 75, and it says:
10 "Now we're going back to this. We had aviation, howitzers,
11 tanks, cannon, but what did the Muslims have? A gun here and there, a
12 machine-gun that they had bought from the Serbs," and so on and so forth.
13 First of all, sir, Colonel, we have the tense wrongly translated
14 here. It says "we have," and in the Serbian, in the original, it says
15 "we had had," and so I would like to indicate, Colonel, that this is an
16 important matter.
17 Secondly, Mr. Kupresanin is speaking about Yugoslavia and the
18 army, which was actually not told what it was supposed to do in
20 Do you see the difference here, now that you are able to see both
21 of these paragraphs?
22 A. Well, Mr. Karadzic, you seem to be rather selective in the
23 portions of this document that you -- you are referring to. I've seen
24 the sentence which talks about possession of the aviation and the
25 howitzers and the tanks --
1 Q. I'm not asking you that, Colonel. I put a question to you, so
2 please answer the question and don't go beyond the -- what is being
3 asked. And don't work for the Prosecution.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic. That's not a proper comment on your
5 part. Don't interrupt the witness when he answers your question.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, he's not answering my
7 question. And this is something that can be put in the re-examination by
8 the Prosecution. Now, I see that the witness is completely biased. He's
9 answering questions that I didn't actually put to him.
10 JUDGE KWON: Your interference is unacceptable --
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- to show the Serbs in a worse
13 JUDGE KWON: Please, Mr. Doyle.
14 THE WITNESS: I would ask Dr. Karadzic to ask the direct question
15 again because he has said so much in the last few minutes that I don't
16 know how many question he wants me to answer.
17 So if you would ask me a question, Mr. Karadzic, I will attempt
18 to answer it.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, you remember I told you some time
20 ago, if you ask broad open-ended questions you get broad open-ended
21 answers. If you closed, direct questions and concentrate the witness's
22 mind on a single issue, you are much more likely to get a single, concise
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. My question is: The Prosecution interpreted only this bottom
2 paragraph for us. The previous passage speaks about how the Serbian
3 Democratic Party did not prepare the people for war, and that is being
4 said by a leader of a different party that -- and that he's taking issue
5 with that.
6 Do you see that here, please?
7 A. Well, what I'm reading here is that the generals and the Serb
8 army did not adequate Serb -- did not have adequate Serb leaders. So
9 I -- I really don't understand what is being said here.
10 Q. Continue:
11 "Finally, the Serbian Democratic Party did not prepare the
12 Serbian people for war."
13 Do you see that written there?
14 A. Yes, I do. And, Mr. Karadzic, I can see it, but I'm trying to
15 understand exactly what that's supposed to mean. The Serb Democratic
16 Party was not preparing Serb people for the war. What -- I'd like to
17 have the context for that.
18 Q. The context, Colonel, is this: In the transcript it is presented
19 as if Mr. Kupresanin is saying that at that point in time we had planes,
20 howitzers, tanks, cannon, and so on and so forth. What I'm actually
21 telling you now is that this is something that was in the past, that we
22 had had, thinking of the Yugoslavia
23 Now I am giving you two paragraphs for your consideration instead
24 of one that the Prosecution opted for. Do you see that this previous
25 paragraph explains better this subsequent paragraph that is cited in the
2 A. Well, what I'm getting from this, Mr. Karadzic, is that you're
3 not happy that there's an exact accurate translation of the document that
4 is in your language to the English language. So I'm not too sure what I
5 should be referring to. Am I referring to what you believe the English
6 translation should be or what exactly the translation is on the document?
7 That's my dilemma at the moment.
8 Q. Colonel, what I'm trying to point out here is that with the
9 previous paragraph, this paragraph is properly translated as "we had
10 aviation," and it looks different than it looks in the transcript.
11 A. But I don't read Serbo-Croat, so what exactly do you wish me to
12 say? The only document that I understand is the document that's in the
13 English language in front of me, and are you saying that that's not an
14 adequate translation of the original document? I'm sorry, I think you
15 will have to explain it to me because I really don't understand what
16 we're getting at here.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the document that's translated before
18 us says: "We had aviation," in past tense.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But in the transcript it is not
20 cited correctly by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. It says here "we have aviation."
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. And, Colonel, do you agree that this is a major difference? At
23 this point in time we "have" in January 1993 or we "had." Is this a
24 significant difference or not?
25 A. Well, if there are two different documents with two different
1 translations that are different, then, of course, there are differences.
2 But I'm looking at a document in front of me which simply says "we had
3 aviation, howitzers, tanks, and cannons." Now, if you're telling me
4 there's another document which says "we have aviation, howitzers, tanks,
5 and cannons," then, of course, it's different. But I don't know what the
6 official translation is at this stage because you are -- what you're
7 saying is the translation isn't accurate. So I'm not too sure what I
8 would be looking at.
9 JUDGE KWON: And I'm looking -- I'm reading the transcript of
10 21st of May, the last line, line 25 of 2654. Madam Uertz-Retzlaff is
11 cited as correctly citing:
12 "We had aviation, howitzers, tanks."
13 If you have the transcript which says "we have," it's a typo. I
14 don't know how come you have that translation. And the correct one
15 should be the document we have in the e-court, in our exhibit, and our
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have a transcript where it says
18 on page 75, line 12, "We have aviation, howitzers, tanks," and so on.
19 This is the translation that I have -- actually, the transcript that I
21 JUDGE KWON: As I told you before, the transcript is being edited
22 by a court reporter, correcting all the typos, et cetera, so the
23 official -- you have to check what the official transcript would look
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I assume that Dr. Karadzic is
1 looking at LiveNote, but LiveNote, of course, always has a lot of
2 mistakes in it. But what we get in -- a few hours after the session is
3 the correct version.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I'm looking at the corrected LiveNote.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Then this has been
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Colonel, sir, does the leader of a smaller party here criticise
9 the Serbian Democratic Party for opting for a political solution and for
10 not preparing the people for war?
11 A. That would appear to be what's inferred in this document, yes.
12 Q. And now when it is said "we had aviation," you allow for the
13 possibility that Mr. Kupresanin, who is the leader and the founder of a
14 party called the Otadzminski Front [phoen], the Homeland Front, speaks
15 about Yugoslavia
16 and not about Republika Srpska?
17 A. Well, I don't know. I really don't know. I simply don't know,
18 Mr. Karadzic. I'm getting confused now because we have a document in
19 front us and you're indicating that it's not an accurate translation of
20 an official document. So I don't know. What it says here is the
21 generals in the Serb army did not have adequate Serb leaders. That's one
22 point. Then they talk about the party was not preparing the Serb army
23 for war. That's a second point. And then the third point relates to
24 munitions and -- and tanks, et cetera.
25 Now, you're saying if the official document that we are to accept
1 actually says "we had aviation" as if that were to mean we had it in the
2 past and we don't have it now, that could be an interpretation. That may
3 be something which is the opinion of something. I simply don't know.
4 And if that's the case then, this was an official transcript from the
5 Assembly of the Republika Srpska, and maybe it should be more accurate to
6 give a more definitive explanation as to what exactly it meant. But here
7 I think we're talking about opinions. And I don't want to give my
8 opinion on this because if I give you my opinion, I may be accused of
9 being biased, and I don't want to do that.
10 Q. Thank you, but the Prosecution used that in their interpretation
11 of your meeting with Mr. Kupresanin whom you actually considered as more
12 radical. So the Prosecution used this to corroborate your impression
13 about Mr. Kupresanin. Mr. Kupresanin is a deputy. He has the right to
14 say whatever he wants. And he cannot be held responsible for that. And
15 the government and the Assembly is held responsible for the documents it
16 issues. Resolutions, conclusions, and so on and so forth. So anyway, we
17 have finished with this.
18 Not only did he say what you mentioned, but he also said one more
19 thing: Nobody told the Serb officers what their task was. That's what
20 he said, and that is the objection by all the Yugoslavs, that the
21 Yugoslav Army was not issued with the assignment of protecting Yugoslavia
22 in accordance with its constitutional duties.
23 Do you agree with that?
24 A. No, I have no comment to that because I simply don't know what
25 directives were given to the Federal Army of Yugoslavia. I mean, how
1 would I know that? I assume the JNA Army was an army for all of the
2 republics, a federal army, and that it was doing its tasks. Exactly what
3 those tax were individually, I simply don't know.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 82 of the
6 transcript, please.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
8 Q. Where you are cited as saying that:
9 "The president of Bosnia-Herzegovina claims that the JNA's [In
10 English] only force capable of acting to save the Muslim population is
11 Zvornik sector but it is unwilling to do so which will only compound
12 further the hostile stance of the Muslim population towards the JNA."
13 [Interpretation] Let me just ask you briefly: Up until Zvornik,
14 was the position of Izetbegovic and the Muslim political elite friendly
15 towards the JNA or was it hostile right from the very beginning towards
16 the Serbian side, the JNA? To simplify, when do the misunderstandings
17 begin between the Muslim leadership and the JNA? Would you agree that
18 this was at the point in time when they refused to send recruits and
19 reservists to the JNA?
20 A. Yes, I would say that is one of the factors that may have
21 contributed to it. The other factor, of course, is the first time - and
22 I refer to this in my testimony - that I had a meeting with the prime
23 minister in which he referred to the JNA as an army of occupation and
24 that the JNA were taking in munitions from another republic under what
25 could only be described as -- as covert means. So there was a general
2 You'll also be aware of the fact that it was my recommendation to
3 the prime minister as head of the monitor mission that there was no
4 reason why there should not have been dialogue between the Government of
6 territory. And that was my recommendation. So I don't disagree with the
7 points that you're raising there, no.
8 Q. Thank you. I just want to add that Mr. Pelivan was defending the
9 interests of Croatia
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was not an official B and H government
11 decision. You didn't have a government decision. This was actually an
12 opinion of Mr. Pelivan at that point in time when you had your meeting
13 with him.
14 A. Well, I think I've adequately explained that yesterday, so I'm
15 not going to repeat it, Mr. Karadzic.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 The question is not in the transcript. I asked: "Is that so?"
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Has this transcript been admitted
19 in its entirety from the session of the National Assembly of Republika
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now look at
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. And while we're waiting, Colonel, this is a report by
1 General Kukanjac of the 5th of May after what happened.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The same document is a 65 ter
3 document, 3721. That's a Prosecution document. And there is an English
4 version as well. So perhaps it would be better to look at that, 3721.
5 This is of May 7th, after the massacre in Dobrovoljacka Street,
6 and he's writing -- the command of the 4th Corps writes to the commander
7 personally, and this is a very interesting and important document.
8 Can we now look at page 2 in the Serbian, and then this is page
9 8A in the English. Sorry. This is page 2, but it's paragraph marked
10 with the number 8. I think it's actually the same in the English and the
11 B/C/S. Page two, please.
12 Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. And it says, under (A):
15 "Based on the experience gained in Slovenia, Croatia
17 soldiers of the army are facing a difficult time and that we have to
18 start evacuating to safe areas in which connection the following was
19 carried out:
20 "For months, weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives, and
21 other equipment are being relocated to safe areas with long-term
22 potential for the army."
23 Colonel, sir, do you agree that the army should not remain in an
24 encirclement where it is considered to be an enemy side or entity?
25 A. Well, if this is based on the attack on the convoy on the
1 2nd of March, I can well understand the comments of the military
2 commander putting this down in writing. I can certainly understand that,
4 Q. Now I'd like to draw your attention to where they are relocating
5 their equipment.
6 "To safe areas with long-term potential for the army," it says.
7 Now, Colonel, are they moving the weapons for the Serbs to Serb
8 territory or for themselves?
9 A. Well, according to this report, they are moving weapons,
10 ammunition, mines and explosives to safe areas so that they can be used
11 by the army at a future date. That's my interpretation of that -- first
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this document already an
15 exhibit? It's a Prosecution document.
16 JUDGE KWON: We did not admit this over the agreement on the part
17 of the Prosecution, but given the answer offered by the witness right
18 now, we are minded to admit it this time.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit Number D236.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Now, Colonel, on page 84 there was a question from
23 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. She said:
24 "Colonel, you testified that you spoke about information on
25 ethnic cleansing in Foca. With Mr. Koljevic in April 1992. [In English]
1 The term ethnic cleansing, what did you understand it to entail?"
2 [Interpretation] You say what you understand the term to mean,
3 and I say that the term ethnic cleansing came into use later on. But let
4 me ask you, How did you know what was going on in Foca?
5 A. The reference I made to Foca was simply that the monitor mission
6 was attempting to go to Foca because of certain information it received.
7 I don't know what that information was, and I was aware that when they
8 came back, after failing to get to Foca, and I asked them, Why is it you
9 didn't get to Foca? They told me that they were stopped by the JNA who
10 told them that they could not guarantee their safety and security. And I
11 a general discussion with Mr. Koljevic who approached me about that, and
12 Mr. Koljevic regretted that we weren't able to get there, that's what he
13 said to me, and that he would try to see -- could he arrange passage to
14 Foca, which subsequently did not occur.
15 That's the only reference I have to Foca.
16 Q. I remember that, Colonel, and I know that Mr. Jeremy Brade was
17 with Koljevic and that there was still snow on the ground and that
18 Mr. Koljevic was threatened by the local territorials because he failed
19 to protect the people, as they said, and that he was threatened by
20 execution. Did Mr. Brade inform you of that?
21 A. No, he didn't. I'm not too sure why you're mentioning Mr. Brade,
22 because I don't have a recollection of -- of Mr. Brade at that time. So
23 you might have to remind me, but I just don't recall that. Not the
24 element to do with Mr. Brade, no, I don't.
25 Q. There was an attempt to break through to Koljevic and Brade in
1 April, and both of them informed me that the people were furious over
2 there, having been left without protection and that they threatened
3 Vice-President Koljevic, although they liked him, but they threatened him
4 because they considered him to be responsible as a person in authority.
5 But, right, you say you don't remember that. So I just told you about
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D77 next, please. Or,
8 rather, 00077. 1D77.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. And while we're waiting for that, Colonel, I'm going to show you
11 a document from the Muslim intelligence service about the circumstances
12 and situation in Foca, and I want to ask you, Did you know that
13 Halid Cengic, the father of Hasan Cengic, formed the first Muslim
14 paramilitary formation during the days of the Communists, before the
15 elections in 1990 in Foca?
16 A. No, I did not.
17 Q. Thank you. Now, let's take a look at this document from the
18 Muslim intelligence -- Military Intelligence Service. That's the first
19 page, the cover page.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we turn to page 2, please.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
22 Q. And towards the end it says "namely," the paragraph starting with
24 "Namely, after the democratic elections, Taib Lojo, an electrical
25 engineer, respectable citizen of the vice-president of the Foca SDA, was
1 appointed president of the Foca SO. However, from the very beginning,
2 Senad Sahinpasic, also known as Saja, and Halid Cengic, who are related,
3 have had the greatest political influence in the SDA, thanks to the
4 powerful support of influential relatives and friends from Sarajevo
5 especially Muhamed Cengic, the then deputy prime minister ..."
6 Now, do you know of a journal by the name of "Vox," owned by this
7 same man, Senad Sahinpasic, who was a deputy in the Assembly?
8 A. No, I don't.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There seems to be an error in the
10 transcript. The journal "Vox" was owned by Sahinpasic. It was a
11 journal, a magazine. Now we'll see what it wrote about, that journal.
12 Magazine, magazine. "Casopis" as in "magazine."
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Now let's continue.
15 Sahinpasic is a private trader from Foca and a deputy in the
16 citizens' Assembly of BiH. And Cengic is an accountant at the
17 Mljin [phoen], a work organisation in Uskopljina, and councillor in the
18 Foca SO.
19 Now, let's move further down.
20 "From the time they came into power, having gathered around them
21 their family and friends, they started with all kinds of fraud and
22 smuggling which brought them huge amounts of money. The increasingly
23 complex political situation and deteriorating interethnic relations
24 during 1991 played into their hands since arms smuggling was flourishing.
25 And they did nothing to appease the situation, but on the contrary,
1 incite it with their actions and political activity.
2 "They included Aziz Sljivo and a wide circle of men loyal to them
3 in the armed smuggling so that the Muslim people in this area from fear
4 of the ever-increasing Chetnik threat are giving their last penny to
5 those whom they have elected to protect their interest to supply them
6 with weapons. So they pay, the rifles that Sahinpasic and Cengic sell
7 them, for from 1.200 to 1.500 German marks. According to some
8 intelligence, 5.200 rifles came to Foca via the SDA, which Sahinpasic and
9 Cengic sold."
10 Now, did you know that the SDA of Foca was armed in this way
11 before the outbreak of the conflict?
12 A. No, I have no knowledge of that. As I said, attempts to get to
13 Foca failed, so I have no information from it. And I notice this report
14 was made out in July, I think, 1993. I saw from the front. Even though
15 it refers to something in 1992. So, in other words, this document was
16 made out a year after I had left Bosnia
17 the people that are being mentioned in it or the -- the contents of what
18 it says.
19 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, what I want to say is the following:
20 It was known to us, and it was known to the Serbs in Foca as well, and
21 the conflict broke out because the SDA had 5.200 rifles and units, while
22 the Serb side was waiting for the JNA to protect it. And that is why
23 they threatened Professor Koljevic, because the JNA did not reach Foca in
24 time to protect them. So are you aware of the fact that the JNA was late
25 in coming to Foca?
1 A. No. I have no knowledge of this, Mr. Karadzic, and as I said,
2 if -- if the JNA had given an escort to the team to go in, maybe events
3 would have been different, but they didn't, and they didn't go in, so
4 we'd no information.
5 Q. And do you see now why the JNA was not able to guarantee
6 security? Do you see that it was because of these 5.200 rifles that the
7 JNA was not certain that it could guarantee its own safety, let alone the
8 safety of a foreign delegation?
9 A. Well, I mean, if what is said in this report is true, then that
10 may well have been the case. But I don't know. I mean, this is just
11 another document. How true it is, I simply don't know.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have the last page of
13 this document so that we can see that it was signed by the chief of the
14 military security administration, General Fikret Muslimovic, who was a
15 Muslim and that there's no room for doubt. He is informing his command
16 about the situation in Foca from before the war to the present day, that
17 is to say, until 1993.
18 Here we have the original seal and signature of
19 Fikret Muslimovic. But since it's 1993, I won't pursue the subject, but
20 we can see that they are describing 1991 and 1992.
21 May I tender this document now, please.
22 JUDGE KWON: No. The witness couldn't confirm anything about the
23 content. Pursuant to our consistent rule, we will not admit it.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But then I have to ask the Colonel
25 whether he stands by his assertion about the events in Foca.
1 JUDGE MORRISON: I don't recall the Colonel making any stand
2 about events in Foca.
3 THE WITNESS: What events --
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, on page 84. I just quoted it
5 all. On page 84 of what I have. The question was:
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Colonel, you testified that you spoke about information on [In
8 English] ethnic cleansing in Foca with Mr. Koljevic in April 1992. The
9 term ethnic cleansing and so on. [Interpretation] And then the Colonel
11 "Well, my interpretation of the term ethnic cleansing was ..."
12 and so on and so on.
13 So its linked to Foca. It is linked and refers to Foca.
14 A. I think I've already mentioned, Mr. Karadzic, the only reference
15 to Foca that occurred at that time, and it was information I received
16 from the monitor mission. Exactly what happened and who did what, I
17 simply don't know. The reference was made to the term ethnic cleansing,
18 or I thought it was. Certainly a forced removal of a population. And
19 the monitor mission was not in a position of going to Foca in order to
20 check it out because the JNA stopped them and said they couldn't go
21 forward. That's all I know.
22 Q. And did the JNA prevent them, or could they not guarantee their
24 A. The JNA physically prevented them, and the excuse for preventing
25 them was they said, We cannot guarantee your safety and your security.
1 Q. And how do you know that that was an excuse?
2 A. I'm simply letting you know what I was informed of by a team of
3 the monitor mission. I have absolutely no reason to disbelieve what they
4 said to me.
5 Q. But Mr. Brade informed me quite differently of the situation. Do
6 you, Colonel, maintain that in Foca there was not any heavy fighting
7 going on before the Serbs left and went to one area of Foca and the
8 Muslims to the other? Did this happen without fighting or was it because
9 of the fighting and after the fighting?
10 A. I have no idea, Mr. Karadzic. The monitor mission did not get
11 into Foca, and I don't want to make any comment on what you might feel is
12 speculation on my part. So I'm not going to say anything more on
13 something I don't know personally about. As to what Mr. Brade may have
14 said, I -- I have no idea what you're talking about there. Mr. Brade may
15 have said to Mr. Koljevic what you think he said or he did say it. I
16 simply don't know. I can't verify that.
17 Q. So you don't have reliable information to the effect that there
18 was any ethnic cleansing in Foca; right?
19 A. I never said it was any reliable information, Mr. Karadzic. I
20 simply said what the monitor mission told me. I've said that on a few
22 Q. Thank you. Now, on page 85 you say that you don't remember --
23 or, rather, when I questioned you, you said you don't remember the letter
24 sent to you by Prime Minister Djeric, and you said that you kept
25 the letters -- you kept your letters, but you didn't keep that particular
1 letter. So may we ask you now to hand over your correspondence, the
2 correspondence you had during the war and that you kept and everything
3 related to Bosnia
4 A. I'm not too sure what you're getting at here, Mr. Karadzic. All
5 of my documents I handed in to the Tribunal when I made my witness
6 statement in 1990 -- 1995 or 1996 - I can't remember. So beyond that,
7 I'm not too sure what -- what you're seeking. I certainly -- I certainly
8 have absolutely no recollection of receiving any letter from
9 Mr. Djerkic [sic]. The name is not familiar with me.
10 And I suggested yesterday, if that letter was sent in English, I
11 certainly would have reacted to the content of that letter had I received
12 it in English because its content is directly different to my
13 interpretation of what happened up in Pale. So there would have been no
14 reason for me not to have taken action on that, had I received it. I
15 have no recollection of receiving it. I have no record of receiving it.
16 I have no knowledge of what it says. What I have done is I have
17 commented on the content of that letter which I totally disagree with.
18 Q. Thank you. And when you explained that, you said that you kept
19 your letters but that you don't have that letter amongst your collection.
20 A. I'm sorry. You may have misinterpreted me. I haven't -- I
21 haven't possession of any letters of this nature that I haven't -- or
22 reports that I haven't handed in to the Tribunal. So maybe -- maybe I --
23 I said it incorrectly. If I did, I do apologise. I don't have any
24 letters of a personal issue that -- that I haven't handed up and that
25 refer to my service in the former Yugoslavia
1 Q. Well, possibly you said "recollection," whereas the
2 interpretation I got or I heard "collection," so that is also possible.
3 Now, on page 86, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff says -- we now go down to
4 paragraph 5, and I'll read to you. It says -- and that's from a report
5 by Mr. Goulding:
6 "All international observers agree [In English] that what is
7 happening is a concerted effort by the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina with
8 the acquiescence and at least some support from the JNA to create
9 ethnically pure regions in the context of negotiations on the
10 cantonisation of the republic in the EC conference on Bosnia
12 of the seizure of territory by military force," and so on and so on.
13 [Interpretation] Who informed Mr. Goulding in this way?
14 A. I have no idea. I would assume it was the United Nations force
15 that was operationally deployed in Bosnia, and maybe a certain amount of
16 the United Nations observers who were deployed in different parts of
18 Q. Colonel, can you say which territories did the Serbs take or
19 occupy that was not already theirs?
20 A. Well, I'm not able to say that, Mr. Karadzic, but I certainly was
21 aware at the time, that there was -- there was assertions by Serbs that
22 they were the original occupiers of certain territories and that's the
23 reason why they were taking them. I have no exact detail of that. It
24 was just a general view that people of all races and all ethnic
25 backgrounds were being expelled from certain territories.
1 Q. How do you know that, Colonel?
2 A. I know that because of the information that I received when I was
3 head of the mission by the monitors.
4 Q. This was information from the Presidency of Bosnia and
6 A. Well, then, of course, I received a lot of information from the
7 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina because I had frequent meetings.
8 Q. You think that that information should have been checked that, it
9 could have been one-sided?
10 A. The information would have been better checked if we had been
11 guaranteed and continued to enjoy the freedom of movement that was part
12 of the condition under which the monitor mission was deployed. The
13 monitor mission was an unarmed observer group of monitors who were
14 deployed into the territory with the agreement of all sides. And the
15 conditions under which they were deployed was that they were to be given
16 freedom of movement and safety and security.
17 The monitor mission was withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia
18 the morning of the 11th of May, which was 24 hours before I left, I
19 think, because that guarantee of freedom of movement and safety and
20 security could not be guaranteed. That left the monitor mission in a
21 predicament of wondering why they couldn't have been given these
22 guarantees any more and the questions as to whether there were events
23 taking place that people didn't want them to become aware of. That's
24 what I assume.
25 The United Nations, on the other hand, stayed deployed in Bosnia
1 So maybe they're in a better position to give you some idea, better
2 than -- than myself or the monitor mission. And as I mentioned, the
3 UNPROFOR also had in its -- in its ranks a group of monitors that were --
4 a group of observers that were deployed in the early days who were based
5 in different parts of the republic. So maybe some of those personnel are
6 in a better position to answer your queries in this regard.
7 Q. Thank you. Are you aware, Colonel, that we were in favour of a
8 greater presence of Asian and African elements that we believed were
9 impartial and that we distrusted representatives of the West, especially
10 those from NATO countries, and that is why we asked for more Asian and
11 African troops and observers? Are you aware of that?
12 A. No, I have no idea to that. I had no hand, act, or part in the
13 deployment or selection of observers for the United Nations. As you
14 know, I wasn't a member of the United Nations, so I have no idea. I know
15 that the original United Nations observers that were deployed into Bosnia
16 were volunteers of those nations that were already in service in other UN
17 missions. The first UN people to go into Bosnia were officers from
18 existings -- existing United Nations missions throughout the world.
19 But, no, I'm not aware of your point in relation to Asian and
20 African elements.
21 Q. Colonel, the mission of the European Community actually ignored
22 Serbs to quite an extent. They avoided being photographed, being
23 photographed with them out of fear that that would be understood as some
24 kind of recognition, although we were not actually asking for anything.
25 So do you doubt that we considered Western countries' representatives as
1 biased towards the Serbs? Of course, not you personally. We considered
2 you to be quite impartial, but representatives from European countries.
3 A. Well, for the period that I was held of the monitor mission,
4 there was no instance that was every brought to my attention that the
5 European Community ignored Serbs or that they avoided being photographed.
6 I never issued any directive as head of the mission to that extent, so I
7 can't accept that. And I'm surprised you actually bring it up,
8 because -- and I'm also quite surprised on the reference to Western
9 countries, because I wasn't aware of it.
10 As I've said before, the ECC
11 made welcome by all sides, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, by all political
12 parties, and we attempted to do our job in an impartial manner, and we
13 were never at any stage refused any meetings by any sides in the
14 conflict. It was only when the military situation appeared to be
15 escalating that the monitors were being stopped from going to areas. As
16 I said, they were -- this was done by the JNA on the premises that they
17 wanted to ensure that the monitors who were unarmed would have safety and
18 security and freedom of movement, and this became more difficult to
19 achieve and for some reason that I'm not directly aware of because I
20 wasn't with the monitor mission at the time they were evacuated.
21 Q. Thank you. Thank you. I'm waiting for the interpretation.
22 Can we look at D217 to see what General MacKenzie says about
23 this, who was there at the same time. But let me remind you, Colonel,
24 sir, you refused to go to a dinner in Ilidza so you won't be photographed
25 with the Serbs and in Pale so that that would not be taken as recognition
1 of Republika Srpska. We were not asking you to recognise
2 Republika Srpska, but we were an acknowledged, recognised party in the
3 negotiations and in the conflict, so you couldn't have been surprised.
4 You were probably restrained in relation to the Serbian side, but -- but
5 you believe the Presidency on its word.
6 A. I'd just like to correct you there, Mr. Karadzic. I did not
7 refuse to go to the dinner in Ilidza. It was during the dinner when I
8 listened to comments that I certainly didn't agree with that I decided
9 that I would leave the dinner. So that's one correction.
10 And as I mentioned before, the conditions under which I went to
11 Pale that were agreed upon with not honoured by the Serbs of Pale on that
13 Q. Thank you. Do you know that I officially said, when I was asked
14 do I accept foreign troops, that I officially said to the mediators that
15 we would be glad to see Asian and African troops for which we believed
16 didn't have any interest in the matters and for whom we believed -- and
17 who we believed would be impartial. Could you just answer with a yes or
18 no, please.
19 A. Did I know that you officially asked for these? No, I don't know
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 182 now,
23 please, of this book by General MacKenzie.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. 11th of May you were still there. I'm going to read it. We will
1 have it.
2 "[In English] The European Community had been conducting marathon
3 peace talks over the previous few days."
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 182, not 183. That's it.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. "[In English] The EC continued to exclude the Bosnian Serbs from
7 the deliberations and as a result was becoming less and less popular with
9 Do you see that General MacKenzie had a good sense and is of the
10 same opinion as myself?
11 A. I can see that General MacKenzie has a different sense, not
12 necessarily a good sense, because it was the same that you had,
13 Mr. Karadzic. I've already explained why it is that we did not have the
14 Bosnian Serbs at those talks.
15 The Bosnian Serbs were invited, and they didn't want to come to
16 the location because they had more or less left the city. They had
17 established their headquarters in Pale. And just because they weren't at
18 the talks doesn't mean that they weren't invited. They were invited.
19 The second point on that is most of these talks were
20 concentrating on the withdrawal of the federal army, the JNA, from the
21 territory of Bosnia
22 And the third point is that General MacKenzie is a United Nations
23 military officer. I was a monitor from the European Union doing a
24 different task. He is entitled to his opinion, as I'm sure I am to mine.
25 Q. Thank you, Colonel, sir. I agree as to the opinions, but we're
1 talking about criminal proceedings here now, and we need to stick to the
2 facts. And the facts were that we were always available for all talks at
3 the airport, in Lukavica, in Pale, and abroad, Brussels, London
4 and so on and so forth. Do you remember a single conference that we left
5 early or did not attend?
6 A. No, I don't.
7 Q. Thank you. Can you look at February 28th. You were with Hebib,
8 high-ranking police official. I'm talking about your diary.
9 This is D217. Can we put that away now? We don't need it.
10 But in your diary of the 28th of February, you were with Hebib,
11 and you were at the Presidency then, on the 2nd and the 3rd of March.
12 On the 28th, you didn't see any Serbs. You did see Hebib. On
13 the 2nd and the 3rd of March, you saw the Presidency. On the
14 5th of March, you saw the Presidency and met with Ganic. There are no
15 Bosnian Serbs anywhere. On the 6th you were at the Presidency, and you
16 met with Hebib, who is not a Presidency member, but you did see him. On
17 the 7th you had dinner with Kukanjac and Aksentijevic from the army, but
18 they are not Bosnian Serbs. On the 9th, Spanish monitors. On the 10th,
19 the Presidency. There are no Serbs anywhere. On the 11th, Presidency.
20 On the 12th, Konjicija and Prlic. And then here we have the 13th, there
21 is nothing. The 14th, again, Hebib.
22 Look, for half a month you had no connection with Bosnian Serbs,
23 Colonel, and the conference was underway, and we were getting ready for
24 the 18th of March to accept the Lisbon Agreement. 16th, the Presidency.
25 On the 17th, Dr. Hadzic; he's also a Muslim. On the 18th there was an
1 interview on television, and then on the 19th Ganic and the Presidency.
2 So for almost a month you had no contacts with the Bosnian Serbs.
3 Wasn't General MacKenzie right?
4 A. No, he was not right. I made myself available to anybody in
6 all religions, all ethnic groups. There were some people who were more
7 available than others. Any day I went to the Presidency, I was available
8 to talk to members of the Presidency, any members of the Presidency;
9 Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.
10 If, Mr. Karadzic, you are trying to get the message across here
11 that somehow I was trying to treat the Serbs any less than any other --
12 any of the other ethnic groups, I refute it strongly. And I will not
13 have my integrity questioned in any way by those comments. I take it as
14 a personal insult. I never ever refused to meet you or anybody else in
15 the Bosnian Serb side. You can look at the diary all you want. People
16 came to me. I went to people. I made myself available. There has never
17 been an accusation against me or members of the monitor mission of the
18 type that you're trying to make here, and I refute it vehemently.
19 Q. Colonel, please don't be insulted. I am speaking about official
20 matters, not private matters. You were without contact with the Serbian
21 side for a whole month. Should Professor Koljevic have asked to have
22 been received by you or Mrs. Plavsic for you to be able to receive them
23 and inform the European Community on Serb positions, or you should have
24 perhaps asked for meetings with them. And if I am wrong, is your diary
25 wrong, which indicates that there have been -- there were no contacts
1 with the Serb side for a whole month? And is General MacKenzie right
2 because he was saying the same thing that I am saying, that you were
3 being -- that you were excluding us and that is why you were popular [as
4 interpreted]. I mean, not you, but the European Monitor mission.
5 A. Mr. Karadzic, I've already said everything I'm going to say about
6 this matter. I have no intention of repeating myself or changing any of
7 it. You can take it or you can leave it.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 And can we accept this diary with the redactions in which I state
10 that the European Monitor mission does not have any insight into the
11 state of affairs and the political efforts by the Serbian side? We were
12 not in Pale then. It was March. We were in the middle of Sarajevo
13 it was very easy to communicate with us.
14 JUDGE KWON: Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No -- of course I object against his remarks
16 that are just being made, but I have no objection against admitting this
18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Page 63, line 7 of the
19 transcript, Dr. Karadzic says: "... and that is why you were less
21 JUDGE KWON: What is the 65 ter number of this diary?
22 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
23 JUDGE KWON: Do we have to put it under seal? I take it that you
24 voluntarily handed over the photocopy of it, redacting some confidential
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, I did, yes.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted as evidence as ...
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D238 [sic], Your Honours.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Can we look at 65 ter 11086 now, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. And let me ask you briefly, Colonel. Is that my statement that I
8 signed in Lisbon
9 our police to escort the convoys, that you didn't ask me to do that; I
10 did that of my own accord?
11 A. I'm sorry. You're asking me about a statement, which I -- oh,
12 hold on. Here. I'll have a look at it. Can I have a moment, please.
13 Yes, that's the document that was signed.
14 Q. Now, in paragraph 2 does is say that the Serb police was
15 prepared, although we didn't ask for that, was prepared to extend their
16 full co-operation for regular escorts of humanitarian aid through
17 Serbian-controlled territory to any destination and to members of any
18 community to avoid any misunderstandings? Do you remember that, and do
19 you remember that the proposal came from us? It was our proposal.
20 A. I don't remember that it came from you, but I accept it fully.
21 It's in the document which you signed, so I accept it. Whether it was
22 actually put into practice or not is quite another matter. I simply
23 don't know.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document
1 into evidence now, please.
2 JUDGE KWON: It has already been admitted as Exhibit P949.
3 THE REGISTRAR: 949.
4 JUDGE KWON: How much longer do you have, Mr. Karadzic, for your
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I had hoped to have until the end
7 of today's proceedings, but I see that I'll have to accelerate. If I
8 were to ask shorter questions and get shorter answers, I could manage.
9 And leave you the 50-odd minutes that you said you needed.
10 JUDGE KWON: We will have a break now for ...
11 THE ACCUSED: Fifteen minutes, no?
12 JUDGE KWON: We had 30 minutes in -- during the first break. We
13 will have 20 minutes' break.
14 --- Recess taken at 12.02 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 12.24 p.m.
16 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, a clarification on the record for
18 the exhibit number for the diary will be D237. Thank you.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Also, Mr. President, I will ask to --
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
21 MR. ROBINSON: I just will ask to clarify that the diary that's
22 been admitted goes from the period of the 1st of March to the
23 11th of May.
24 JUDGE KWON: It's from 11th March -- could you give the date
25 again. The first -- the beginning date.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. 1 March to 11 May.
2 THE WITNESS: That's correct.
3 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you.
4 JUDGE KWON: You have no objection to that, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
7 THE ACCUSED: Thank you. May I now have P927 next, please.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. And while we're waiting for that, Colonel, I'd like to draw your
10 attention to page 100 of the 21st of May where Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff asked
11 you the following:
12 "[In English] My last question is, Dr. Karadzic have control over
13 these Bosnian Serb paramilitaries?"
14 [Interpretation] And you were answer was:
15 "[In English] Well, I always assumed that he did, because as --
16 as the conflict escalated, he seemed to be always in the presence of
17 people who were armed who were close to him. Some of those were wearing
18 the uniforms of JNA on occasions and sometimes they weren't. So it was
19 my -- I suppose it was my interpretation or my view that as the leader of
20 Bosnian Serbs, that he controlled or should have controlled over all
21 aspects of the Bosnian Serbs, and that would include armed forces."
22 [Interpretation] Let's clarify that a bit. We've already said
23 that the escort I had was a police escort sent to me by our joint MUP and
24 then our own MUP later on, but do you agree that when I was going to
1 clothing, they had to be in civilian clothing?
2 A. I'm not aware of the details of the security that you would have
3 had going to meetings, so I don't know.
4 Q. I'm just referring to the comment you made that some of them
5 weren't in uniform, but never mind.
6 Can you now tell me --
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Or, rather, may we have on e-court
8 P927 first, please. Page 3.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. And then I'm going to ask you whether you can tell me here and
11 now which --
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, that's not it. That's not the
13 document I would want, I need.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. So what paramilitary forces were they that I could control before
16 the 20th of May?
17 A. I'm talking about people who were armed, who were Bosnian Serbs;
18 whether they were actually armed forces or not, I don't know because most
19 of the time they weren't in uniform. So this is an assumption I have.
20 But such was the amount of firing and conflict that going on in
22 attacking Serbs and there was no response. I'm mindful of the siege that
23 took place in that city, but ...
24 So I thought I had mentioned this yesterday, Mr. Karadzic, in
25 relation to those people who were -- that you had protecting you. I
1 don't know whether they were an armed, whether they were a unit of such,
2 or whether they were just people who just had weapons who were giving you
3 their protection.
4 Q. Thank you. That was 8 to 12 people assigned to me by the police,
5 but what I'm saying is that we agreed that each municipality had its
6 Territorial Defence and that the president of the municipality was the
7 commander of the Territorial Defence, and you accepted that and said that
8 that was in keeping with the Law of Yugoslavia and Tito's Doctrine of All
9 People's Defence.
10 Now, do you consider that I could have controlled any
11 Territorial Defence until the 12th of May in the municipalities, that I
12 had a system of communications and the necessary authority, official
13 authority, to be able to be in charge of those people?
14 A. No. What I am saying is that as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs
15 I would be my assumption that you as the leader would have had or should
16 have had control over all armed and unarmed elements of Bosnian Serbs,
17 whether they were armed or not. I'm not talking about -- and here I'm
18 talking mainly about the city of Sarajevo
19 where you were frequently present. So that's what I'm saying, that part
20 of the authority of holding a position of leadership is to have control
21 over those elements that are under your influence. And whether that be
22 military or not, it's all the one to me.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have 65 ter 11591 next,
25 please, and then we'll look at page 3 of that document. It's a report
1 from the Secretary-General, 23.900, of the 12th of May.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Now, Colonel, do you agree that up until the 12th of May I was
4 the political leader of the Bosnian Serbs and that it was only on the
5 12th of May that I was elected to some state organ, that is to say, to
6 the Presidency?
7 Perhaps I was speaking too fast. This is what I asked you: Did
8 you -- do you agree that I, until the 12th of May, 1992, was only the
9 political leader without any state functions, state posts, public office,
10 and that it was only on the 12th of May that I was elected to the
11 Presidency and that I became the president of the Presidency elected at
12 the Assembly on the 12th of May in Banja Luka; right?
13 A. Yes, from a state organ that may have been the case, but I have
14 no doubt you had a huge influence over the actions of armed Bosnian Serbs
15 in the city of Sarajevo
16 firing coming from the Holiday Inn hotel, and there were many other
17 instances. So I do not accept that you had no influence over armed Serb
18 elements in the city of Sarajevo
19 Q. And who and when shot from the Holiday Inn, Colonel?
20 A. We're talking about a period after the referendum results.
21 Q. Now, do you know, Colonel, that there was shooting from the Unis
22 tower and that the Serbs wouldn't have dared to shoot with 50.000 Muslim
23 demonstrators, that Juka Prazina did the shooting in order to create
24 chaos? And we have footage of that, Colonel. So how can you maintain
25 that it was a Serb shooting from the Holiday Inn? Do you have proof or
1 evidence to show that?
2 A. I don't have proof or evidence but I'm saying that that is
3 something that was generally accepted. The point I'm trying to get
4 across here is that you were the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, you had a
5 huge amount of influence in the city, and therefore it is my belief that
6 you had influence over armed elements of Serbs in that city. That's what
7 I'm saying.
8 Q. That's your opinion and belief, but I'm asking for your
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now let's have page 3 of this
11 document that's an exhibit already.
12 Q. And I'd like to focus on the end of paragraph 5 where it says:
13 "There will leave -- Mr. Goulding had informed the
14 Secretary-General --"
15 Well, let's start this way:
16 "Further concern has been caused by the decision of the Belgrade
17 authorities to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina [In English] by
18 May the 18th, all JNA personnel who are not citizens of that republic.
19 This will leave in Bosnia-Herzegovina, without effective political
20 control, as many as 50.000 mostly Serb troops and their weapons. They
21 are likely to be taken over by the Serb party."
22 [Interpretation] So this was reported on on the 12th of May,
23 Colonel. And from this it clearly follows that the Serb side, up until
24 then, did not have political control over the army and that for the time
25 being it would not have. And I claim that the decision to form an army
1 was taken on the 12th of May coming into force as of the 20th of May.
2 Is that so or not?
3 A. I don't know. I do know that you made a statement to the effect
4 that there would be an army raised. We're not talking here about an
5 army. We're talking about armed Bosnian Serbs that, in my view, were
6 under your control and under your influence. That's what I'm talking
8 Q. Do you have proof of that, Colonel?
9 A. No, but I have service in the Republic of Bosnia
10 I'm -- I'm rather anxious here about giving my opinion about anything,
11 because you've always looked for facts, but when you're given a position
12 of responsibility, you carry out certain acts and then you're asked to
13 make a summary and your views and your recommendations and your
14 conclusions, and I've always attempted to do that. If you don't accept
15 those as my conclusions, that is your privilege.
16 Q. But, Colonel, do you make the difference between a party function
17 and a public function, state function? Is there any -- is there a
18 differentiation there be it the head of a political party, the political
19 leader, who, only on the 12th of May, became part of the official state
20 structure? Do you make that difference?
21 A. Yes, there is a difference. I repeat again that in my view you
22 had an influence over the actions of Bosnian Serbs in the city of
24 you may not.
25 Q. Now, a conclusion is one thing; a belief is another. Now, what
1 strings could I pull for organising the self-organised people of the
2 local community and Territorial Defence? How could I command them and
3 who could I command them? How could I put this into practice, sitting in
4 the Holiday Inn negotiating with you, with Izetbegovic, with Kukanjac,
5 how would I have been able to do that then?
6 A. I don't know, and I have no evidence of it, but I assume you
7 would have a people who would have done that on your behalf.
8 Q. Well, let's leave your assumptions to one side. We'll have a
9 glass of wine after these proceedings and then we can assume all we like.
10 But would you focus on paragraph 7 now of this report by the
11 Secretary-General. Who killed this representative of your mission?
12 A. I'm sorry, what are you referring to here?
13 Q. Paragraph 7.
14 A. Okay. I'll have a look at that. Yes. I was aware of the fact
15 that a member of the monitor mission was killed near Mostar. He was from
17 it happened or who did it. Is this -- is this what you're referring to?
18 Q. [No interpretation]
19 A. Okay.
20 Q. Thank you. Well, we've finished with this document.
21 Now, Colonel, the next thing I want to address is not on e-court,
22 but I'm just going to read it out to you. It dates to 1994, the
23 numerical state of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army. Officers, 18.803; and
24 soldiers, 228.000; non-commissioned officers, 24.000; which makes a total
25 of 271.000. Yes, 271.000, and I've been asked to speak slower.
1 Anyway, Colonel, can you tell me where these 18.803 officers were
2 schooled and educated and the 24.263 non-commissioned officers? Were
3 they officers and non-commissioned officers of the former JNA?
4 A. I have no idea.
5 Q. And which other army could they have belonged to?
6 A. I have no idea what other army they could belong to. I assume
7 most of them came from the JNA, but if you're talking to the numerical
8 state of the Bosnian Serb Army as in -- sorry, the not the Bosnian Serb
9 Army, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army as in those elements that were not
10 Serb, a number of 18.800 officers and 228.000 men and 24 [sic]
11 non-commissioned officers seems a huge number to me, so I really don't
12 know. I don't know.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Dr. Karadzic was reading from a document,
16 but we don't have that document. Nobody else has this document. So I
17 wonder what -- what value it is when he reads from an unknown source.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I agree.
19 When you put the document, you should introduce the foundation of
20 the document. I take it you're going to do that. If you could tell us
21 what the document is about.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the Muslim review of the
23 replenishment of the BH Army on the 1st of November, 1994. I will
24 present that and tender it on another occasion because the Colonel wasn't
25 there at the time. I'd just like to show him that on that day they had
1 almost 300.000 soldiers and officers, all of whom were officers of the
2 Yugoslav People's Army, and the soldiers were the reservists of the JNA.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. So I'm putting that to you Colonel and asking you the question
5 that I asked you a moment ago. Do you accept the fact that the Yugoslav
6 People's Army was the mother of all the republican armies that came into
7 being after the disintegration of Yugoslavia?
8 A. Yes, I do. I agree that the JNA was the federal army which
9 represented all of the republics. The figure of these -- these
10 Bosnian-Herzegovinian army at that time with that amount of officers,
11 non-commissioned officers and men, I have no idea. I don't know how they
12 were constituted of where they came from or who trained them or what
13 percentage would have come from the federal army. I simply don't know.
14 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to call up another document on the ELMO.
15 Well, I'm not going to tender it today. I'd just like you, Colonel, to
16 have a look at it, and I'd like us to objectivise, that is to say, to see
17 what forces the parties in Bosnia
18 saying that I want to say that the Muslim side had more than two and a
19 half times more soldiers than the Serbs did and that from the very
20 beginning they were ready for war, that they were well armed, especially
21 after they left the JNA barracks.
22 And now, as I say, I'm going to put this document on the ELMO for
23 you to look at, but I'm not going to tender it today. Just to give you
24 an idea of the actions launched by the 2nd Corps of the BH Army during
25 the period you were there, that is to say, up until the 12th of May.
1 JUDGE KWON: Before you put it to the witness, tell us what this
2 document is about.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is -- well, the number of the
4 document on the top is 020 -- can you lower it down? 0203-1418. It's a
5 Prosecution document. And the title is a list of -- can we see the top.
6 Yes. Thank you. A list of combat operations conducted in the area of
7 responsibility of the 2nd Corps from 1992 to 1995.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. And that's the Tuzla Corps, isn't it? The Tuzla Corps; right,
11 A. Sorry, I don't know.
12 Q. You don't know that Tuzla
13 rather, BH Army Corps?
14 A. Yes, I know it had a corps, but I don't -- I don't understand the
15 title of this document.
16 Q. There's an ERN number at the top. It's one we were disclosed by
17 the Prosecution.
18 A. I'm sorry, I'm talking about the actual document itself, not the
19 number that's on it. What does it mean?
20 Q. The title is the following: "List of combat actions," BD is
21 combat actions, "carried out in the area of responsibility of the
22 2nd Corps from 1992 to 1995."
23 So I have marked in red only those offensives that were launched
24 while you were there. Number 5, the attack on Cer, for example. That
25 took place on the 26th of April. Otherwise, from the beginning, the
1 defence that we have, Becirevic Defence, Potocari Defence, an ambush
2 there, Snagovo, attack on Cer. So number 5, listed under number 5.
3 Then under number 8, attack on Setici. And then it says,
4 Serb Setici in Zvornik - there's the Muslim Setici in Zvornik, but they
5 attacked the Serb Setici, Zvornik, on the 1st of May.
6 Then we come to number 13, a diversion at Srpski Nezuk. You have
7 a Muslim village and a Serb village there. The Muslim made up of the
8 initial Serb village. But it's all in Zvornik municipality. Then we
9 have the attack on the village of Sapna
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, what is your question?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question is this,
12 Your Excellency, while the Colonel was in the area, the 2nd Corps of the
13 BH Army, fully ready and prepared, launched a number of armed operations,
14 many of which were offensives, offensive, and I want to show the Colonel
15 that the Muslims weren't helpless and attacked. They did have their own
16 army, and they did launch combat actions.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
18 Q. Let's -- and this lists all the actions undertaken by the
19 2nd Corps, Colonel, while you yourself were there.
20 A. Could I ask you, Mr. Karadzic, is this document that was made up
21 by the official JNA Army or by the army that you're calling the Army of
23 Q. The army which I called and which was the Army of Bosnia and
25 negligible number of Serbs and Croats in it. This is the corps of the
1 officially called Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, from the first
2 day, had offensive combat actions. And Mr. Martin Bell informed you
3 about the departure of civilians from Zvornik. And you can see that in
4 Zvornik and around Zvornik fierce fighting was being carried out and that
5 the Tuzla Corps was taking parted in them.
6 My question is: Did you know that the corps from Tuzla was in
7 readiness from the 1st of April to go into action, the Muslim Corps from
9 A. No, I was not aware of that.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please scroll down to
12 number 12 to see how many offensive actions this corps carried out. Can
13 you move the page a little bit, please.
14 JUDGE KWON: What point is there if the witness has no -- knows
15 nothing about it?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, the Colonel should
17 know. He was the head of the monitor mission. He was in Krajina, in
18 Derventa. If I had time, I would show him the massacres around Derventa
19 of the Serbian population at the time that he was there. He should know
20 that the Muslim army was numerous and well armed and that already as of
21 the 4th of April it was capable of conducting extensive combat actions.
22 And if he knows, this is quite significant information; and if he doesn't
23 know, then by his own admission he should state that he was not highly
24 enough placed to know about these things and then we would need to listen
25 to what his superior would have to say. He -- we have a reference that
1 he was in Zvornik and the -- Zvornik is in the area of responsibility of
2 the 2nd Corps.
3 JUDGE KWON: Instead of reading out the document, put your
4 specific questions one at a time.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I put the question and I received
6 an answer.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. My thesis is that the Muslim army had plenty of soldiers and
9 weapons as of the 4th of April, 1992, to embark on extensive offensive
10 actions, and this is what this document indicates. Did you know that?
11 You said that you didn't know that.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I do have a translation of this document
15 here, and what we hear here from Mr. Karadzic is a misrepresentation.
16 Because looking at the document and the English version, it's -- I
17 haven't counted it, but I would say it's mostly defence of certain
18 villages. And it's not, as it is shown here, offensive actions
19 throughout. If we continue to use this document, I would rather think
20 that we should also have the English version of it because it's
21 definitely -- it gives it a different character, at least the actions
22 that are referred to.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, that's very helpful. But I think we
24 almost exhausted this topic. Would you like to bring up the English
25 translation and pursue further on this line?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't have to insist any more.
2 I just wanted to say that I marked the assault actions. Of course, there
3 were defensive actions as well, but the entire document you will see
4 later I limited myself up until the 12th of May. But the entire document
5 will indicate that they attacked much more than they defended themselves.
6 I state that it is not correct that the Muslims were disorganised and
7 unarmed because on the 4th of April this corps began to undertake
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. My second question, Colonel, is this: Do you know that
11 Mr. Izetbegovic declared a general call-up on the 4th of April?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Thank you. Do you accept that you did not receive complete
14 information from Mr. Bell about the events in Zvornik?
15 A. Well, I don't know whether the information was complete or not.
16 He came to me about a particular incident, and that -- that's all.
17 In relation to this document here, I did a survey of all the
18 senior JNA commanders in Bosnia
19 by them when I met these commanders. There were general issues. The JNA
20 army commanders were concerned about the future stability of the
21 republic, but when I made myself available to all of them, I met the
22 commander, I think his name was Djeneral Jankovic, up in Tuzla in this
23 area and none of these matters were brought to my attention at that
24 meeting. So I'm not denying that they took place, I just have no
25 knowledge of it and I don't have any reports on it.
1 JUDGE KWON: And, Colonel, as for the general call-up, we are
2 talking about 1992.
3 THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought -- that's an error there
4 on my part. I thought we were talking about the decision by the
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE WITNESS: To -- to --
8 JUDGE KWON: President Izetbegovic's declaration of a general
9 call-up. You answered yes to the question of whether it was on the 4th
10 of April.
11 THE WITNESS: No, I'm actual not aware of that instance. I'm
12 sorry. I thought Mr. Karadzic was referring to the declaration by the
13 president that there would not be a mobilisation of -- by the JNA.
14 That's my error. I apologise.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Thank you. And did you know that Izetbegovic had declared the
18 general mobilisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina of the Territorial Defence
19 the police and everything on the 4th in the evening?
20 A. I do recall he making an appeal for -- for call-ups, but I don't
21 know -- I don't recall when that was.
22 Q. Thank you. For your information, Serbian members of the
23 Presidency, Plavsic and Koljevic, objected to that, and could not have
24 called for a general mobilisation without their agreement.
25 I would now like to call up one of your reports of the 7th of May
1 when you informed Ambassador Cutileiro about the events in Mostar. There
2 were two UNPROFOR members in Mostar who were wounded at the time, one of
3 them seriously. And then you go on to say -- this is an associate of
4 yours, Boban HDZ.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D018 -- 1D01281,
6 please, in e-court.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. You are informing here that Boban and Karadzic have reached an
9 agreement [In English] at a meeting concerning the resolution of all the
10 differences between the two nations through conciliatory means including
11 the territorial delimitation and at the auspice of the
12 European Community. They reassured firmly the agreement of principles
13 defined in the conference in Lisbon
14 continuation of armed conflict between the Serbs and the Croats. The
15 territorial delimitation between the -- between the nations will be made
16 until the 15th of May. Cease-fire will be decreed from today,
17 2400 hours."
18 [Interpretation] Do you remember these events and this report?
19 A. No, I don't.
20 Q. On the way back from Lisbon
21 concluded, in accordance with the conference and the call by
22 Mr. Carrington, that we should accept the working map and that there was
23 no point in fighting over a small number of disputed territories. You
24 don't remember that, but I think this was sent while you were still
25 there. Is that correct?
1 A. Well, this is the EC monitor mission, and it's from head of
2 mission. The head of the mission was based in Zagreb,
3 Ambassador Salguero. So I have no knowledge of this document.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this document accepted? I would
5 like to tender the document.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE KWON: Considering this document has come from the
9 organisation the witness belonged to and then there's no doubt as to the
10 authenticity, we'll admit it.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D238, Your Honour.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D01247.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
14 Q. And while we're waiting, let me inform you that this
15 Djeneral Jankovic whom you've mentioned is informing on the 3rd of April
16 about events up to the 3rd of April and on the 3rd of April.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There's no translation, is there?
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
19 Q. There is no translation, but I am going to read it to you. We
20 can see here in paragraph 3 that the paramilitary formations from the
21 direction of the village of Koraci
22 located in the Kostrec and Barice villages. Then in the next paragraph
23 it says one of our soldiers was killed in the conflict. This is before
24 the official beginning of the war. Then it goes on to say in the last
25 paragraph on the first page:
1 "On the 3rd of April, 1992, a meeting was held in Tuzla
2 council for national defence."
3 I think you have been given the minutes from the meeting. At
4 1700 hours also, a meeting was called of the Municipal Assembly of Tuzla
5 on the political security situation in the territory of the SO Tuzla to
6 which our representative was not invited. On the 3rd of April there was
7 also a meeting on the political security situation in the municipality of
8 Doboj which was attended by the commander of the 6th Militarised Brigade
9 on the territory and so on and so forth.
10 In the territory of the municipality of Brcko
11 forces had been called up and police stations have been set up in certain
12 village settlements. Leaders of national parties are carrying out
13 intense preparations for new conflicts. Arms are being publicly
14 distributed to members of the SDA at several public places. At 1500
15 hours on the 3rd of April, weapons were distributed to SDA members in the
16 village of Ciljuge, the Zivinice municipality near Dzamir [phoen]. And
17 these men were supposed to move towards Bijeljina in the course of the
18 3rd and 4th of April, 1992.
19 So you mentioned the general who was not sympathetic towards us
20 at all. He was an old-fashioned general, against all national parties
21 and against the multi-party system, but here his soldiers are getting
22 killed before the beginning of the war, and he's informing his command
23 about what was going on there. I am -- I have to admit to you that we
24 Serbs did not know how to sell our misfortunes very well, but do you
25 accept that there were tensions, that it was very tense around Tuzla
1 even though former Communists were in power in and around Tuzla
3 A. I have no reason not to accept the content of this report by the
4 general. I have no detailed knowledge of each of the incidents he's
5 referring to, but I have no reason to have any objection to it.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would I like to tender this
8 document for identification only.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we do have actually a
10 translation, because it is a duplicate of an exhibit that the Prosecution
11 actually also wanted to bring forward at some point in time, and it's
12 0 -- 07089. And we do have a translation, and it should be available
13 through e-court under that number. And there is no objection to
14 tendering it.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted.
17 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 07089 will be admitted as Exhibit D239.
18 JUDGE KWON: Now, Mr. Karadzic, you have to conclude your
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How much time do I have?
21 JUDGE KWON: Five minutes.
22 [Defence confer]
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at D225 in e-court,
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Colonel, do you remember what the confrontation line was like?
2 What did it look like at the time that you were there?
3 A. I think you'd have to be more specific as to the time. I was --
4 I was there for --
5 Q. The conflict began on the 6th of April on our side, although the
6 conflicts began before. But let's say from the 6th of April until the
7 12th of May, what did the demarcation line look like or the line of
8 confrontation; do you recall?
9 A. No, I don't at all.
10 Q. Do you see these blue areas marking the areas with a pronounced
11 Serb majority?
12 A. Yes, I can see the map in front of me.
13 Q. Do you recall that the demarcation line mostly followed the
14 outlines of these blue areas?
15 A. Not to any great extent. In general detail, yes, but the monitor
16 mission wasn't in any way involved in making out detailed divisions of
17 territories depending on their ethnic percentages. It was something we
18 did not want to get involved in, because then, as I had mentioned before,
19 we stayed away from internal borders in opstina, et cetera, et cetera.
20 In other words, most of our -- most of our work was done in
21 actually speaking with people, speaking with political groups, and didn't
22 have very much to do with maps.
23 Q. Do you accept that what was referred to in the war as
24 Republika Srpska was mostly limited to these areas that are represented
25 here in blue? Was that Republika Srpska?
1 A. In -- in general terms, yes.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D01275, please.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. That is a document of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
7 29th of April.
8 Colonel, do you see this conversation between -- in the English
9 it says the 28th of August, 1992, but I believe, actually, it's April
10 according to the contents. By the contents, I believe that it is April.
11 Now, let's see. This General Siber is speaking with Hosen. Hosen is
12 probably an UNPROFOR officer. And it says here three French soldiers
13 were seriously wounded in Nedzarici today. One is in critical condition,
14 and the second one lost an eye. And then later, 500 metres away from our
15 facilities, they are not being observed.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Karadzic is kindly asked to point to the
17 interpreters where he's reading from.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters were not able to
19 follow your reading, so could you kindly indicate what part -- from what
20 part you are reading and --
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am reading from the middle of the
22 first page.
23 "... in Nedzarici. That is not a game. That is not a game. I'm
24 very open. I have come to help as much as I can. The desire of the
25 United Nations in term of establishing the peace should be achieved.
1 Guns should be silenced. And the beautiful song of peace should be
2 heard." And so on and so forth.
3 And then a few sentences later:
4 "Three French soldiers were seriously wounded in Nedzarici
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Do you agree that Nedzarici is Serbian settlement next to
9 A. No, I'm not familiar with it.
10 Q. And then it goes on to say are --
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we zoom down the page to see
12 the bottom of the English page. Around about "500 metres." Can we see
13 the English better, please. You can -- that's right. Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. "[In English] In relation -- [Interpretation] In relation to the
16 500 distance from our facilities, it is not respected."
17 And r. Hosen is the person speaking.
18 "Three days ago, some mortars were active near the PTT building.
19 The Serbs responded and hit our building, but luckily there were no
20 casualties. I'm asking for your co-operation and understanding. Please
21 order a 500 metre distance from our facilities."
22 And Siber says:
23 "We've already issued that order."
24 And then Hosen goes on to say:
25 "We received this from London -- the following from London
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page for the English page,
2 next page.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. "In London
5 96 hours they would allow UNPROFOR access to all locations of heavy
6 artillery around Sarajevo
7 as well."
8 Now, you mentioned the PTT building, Colonel, and I'm telling you
9 that this was what happened all the time, that Muslim artillery and
10 mortars would come close up to the United Nations installations and open
11 fire on them. And then when we respond, they accuse us and blame us.
12 Now, in the previous paragraph it said that in Nedzarici the
13 United Nations were repairing installations, gas installations and other
14 things that everybody needed including the Muslims, whereas the Muslims
15 shot at a Serb settlement and wounded three French soldiers.
16 Now, do you know about this formula for behaviour on the part of
17 the Muslim army? They bring their weapons close up to UN installations
18 and then open fire as this gentleman, Mr. Hosen, says. And he's asking
19 them to keep a distance of 500 metres.
20 A. I know from my experience of severing with the United Nations as
21 a military officer that parties to a conflict have always used -- has
22 often used a United Nations position in which to launch fire at their
23 enemies so that the enemy doesn't want to respond by firing into a
24 United Nations position. That's been something that's been done by all
25 sides in most of the countries that I have served in with the
1 United Nations. This particular document I'm for the familiar with. I
2 don't know who the Hosen is. You say he may be a general of the
3 United Nations, I don't know. This is something that might be better
4 taken up with respect with somebody who served with the United Nations
5 and UNPROFOR. I'm not familiar with it.
6 Q. I'm not only speaking about that particular case, but the general
7 formula according to which they acted. And did the Serb side do anything
8 like that during the war? You said the Serb side -- you said the various
9 sides, but I claiming that the Serb side didn't.
10 Now, the last document - I'd like to tender this document - but
11 let's see what the Serb police has to say and the information it put out
12 by looking at the next document.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this document?
14 JUDGE KWON: The witness didn't have anything to comment upon.
15 We will not admit it.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But the witness did say earlier on
17 that the Serbs shooted at the PTT building without reason. That what
18 said a long time ago and in the statement. And I said that there was
19 every reason. It wasn't that there wasn't a reason.
20 JUDGE KWON: You will have another opportunity to introduce
22 So was that your last examination -- question?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to show another Serb
24 police document on this same event to see -- to show that the two things
25 are identical.
1 JUDGE KWON: If the witness was not able to answer the question
2 about the incident you are referring to, there's no point.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Colonel, then, my last question: Looking at this document and
6 taking into account the fact that I'm speaking about a pattern of
7 behaviour, not individual incidents, do you exclude the possibility that
8 the Muslim side used this war ruse, especially with respect to the PTT
9 building but also in respect of other UN installations?
10 A. When I was in the PTT building, it was the headquarters of the
11 United Nations UNPROFOR operation. They might be in a much better
12 position to answer that than I would. I do know that mortar bombs fired
13 at the building when I was in the middle of trying to negotiate a
14 cease-fire. Who exactly fired those, I don't know. The general feeling
15 at the time, they were coming from high positions on the outskirts of
17 Bosnian Serb positions. But I have to say to you that I -- I don't have
18 any evidence of this. Rather, I have a suspicion and nothing more than
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Colonel.
21 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Before the Prosecution asks some
22 questions in redirect, Judge Baird has some questions.
23 Questioned by the Court:
24 JUDGE BAIRD: Colonel Doyle, I would like your assistance in a
25 particular area, and I shall direct your attention to the evidence that
1 was given yesterday.
2 Now, you stated in answer to Dr. Karadzic, he asked you:
3 "Did you understand that there were discrimination in rent, one
4 price for the Muslims and another for the Serbs?"
5 And your answer was:
6 "That was my understanding of that meeting."
7 Do you agree with that?
8 A. Yes, I do, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes. And he then asks you:
10 "And did you then check that out with the Serbs? Did you ask the
11 mayor about that and check it out?"
12 And your reply was:
13 "I did not bring it up with the mayor, and I did not check it
15 A. That's my recollection, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE BAIRD: Now, my question, Colonel, is did you -- is there
17 any reason at all why you didn't check it out?
18 A. A lot of the points that were brought to our attention at the
19 various meetings, we would have tried to discuss those at the next
20 highest level. I can't recall whether or not I brought up that specific
21 point with the mayor. It is 18 years. And rather than say I did, I
22 probably said, Well, maybe I didn't. But there were many issues that
23 were brought up around that time.
24 What we were attempting to do was we were attempting to bring the
25 concerns of one side to the attention of the authorities, to find out if
1 they would have a response. So the answer is, I can't answer that
2 question, Your Honour, because I don't recall.
3 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you.
4 JUDGE KWON: Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 I would like to have the 65 ter number 07868 brought up in
8 Re-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:
9 Q. And, Colonel, you discussed with Dr. Karadzic a letter that
10 Karadzic sent to Cutileiro on the 5th of June, 1992, and you said that
11 you do not remember this and you do not know about this.
12 Now, we have now on the e-court -- we have the answer, as it says
14 "Thank you for your letter of the 5th of June."
15 It's the answer of Cutileiro on the 12th of June, and it refers
16 here in the -- in the first paragraph it refers to Lord Carrington and
17 his views, and it's stated here:
18 "I firmly believe that the only way to bring peace to Bosnia
20 And a lit bit further down in that paragraph:
21 "Territorial claims which have been pursued by force are totally
23 Is that what the views of Lord Carrington were at that time?
24 A. Yes, they were.
25 Q. And now to the last paragraph. Cutileiro writes here as follows:
1 "Let me add one thing. Referring to the last paragraph of your
2 letter, the EC has not made any promises to you. What happened, as you
3 well know, is that talks on future constitutional arrangements for
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina among the three main political parties (Muslim,
5 Serb, and Croat) under my chairmanship, were established by
6 Lord Carrington and in early -- in early February. On 18th March, we
7 reached agreement on a set of principles. The validity of that
8 agreement, however, can only be upheld if borders and competences of the
9 constituent units be defined by negotiated consensus and not by force,
10 and if ethnically cleansed territories be restored to their antebellum
11 ethnical composition. I am sure you relies that it is in your interest
12 to do everything from your side to help achieve those results."
13 Do you have any further comment on this, Colonel?
14 A. No, I would say that, as I had mentioned before, I was aware that
15 there was to be the elements of agreement, which was dated to the
16 18th of March, the content of which I certainly was not aware of. So
17 this probably reinforces what Mr. Cutileiro was saying, which I have no
18 reason to -- to oppose. But I personally had not been involved in those
19 negotiations and, therefore, I have -- I have no definite views on it.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the Prosecution would like to
21 tender this document.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can I now, please --
24 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit number ...
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Please.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, Exhibit P952.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Could we now have Exhibit 65 ter 12051, the
3 first page both in the English and the B/C/S, brought up.
4 Q. Colonel, yesterday Dr. Karadzic on several occasions addressed
5 with you the existence or nonexistence of a Bosnian Serb Army before the
6 official establishment of the VRS and before the withdrawal of the JNA in
7 May 1992, and he put to you - and I'm referring here to page transcript
8 page 2890, line 4 - he put to you the following:
9 "You accept that up until the 20th of May the Bosnian Serbs were
10 under the command of the JNA or of their own municipal territory
11 organisation while during the same time the Muslims had their own armed
13 Looking at the first page here, it -- it is a press report on
14 Srpska "Oslobodjenje" titled "Happy Birthday, Republic," and it's an
15 interview that Radovan Karadzic gave on the 6th of January, 1995
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can we please have page 3 in the
17 English, and page 1 of the B/C/S remains.
18 Q. In the -- in the first paragraph -- let me just ...
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Page 3. Is that page 3 in the English?
20 Q. In the first -- in the first paragraph it says -- and
21 Dr. Karadzic is quoted as saying:
22 "Of course, Republika Srpska is a reality, the same as the
23 Republic of Serbian Krajina is a reality, and we believe that these are
24 just steps in creation of a single Serbian state."
25 Colonel, this notion of a single Serbian state, is this something
1 that you heard being mentioned during meetings or conferences?
2 A. Yes, the -- the general feeling at these conferences was that the
3 overall objective of Serbs was to join physically the territories that
4 the Serbs controlled in Bosnia
5 Greater Serbia
6 Q. And further on that same page - and it is page 2 in the -- in the
7 B/C/S - further down in this -- in the English Dr. Karadzic is quoted as
9 "We had a list of the actions and steps to take, but we always
10 waited for the Muslims to make a mistake, and after they made one, we
11 created a union of municipalities and the Serbian autonomous areas next,
12 followed by the regions, and eventually our Assembly, and finally
13 republic. Every time that the Muslim and Croat -- Croatian
14 representatives told us that we were breaking up former Bosnia and
16 mistakes and their aggression against our political rights."
17 Colonel, is that consistent with the information that you had
18 during your term of office?
19 A. Yes, it is.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And now if we go to page 4 of the English,
21 and it's -- it remains to be page 2 of the B/C/S.
22 Q. And I -- I'm reading now another of the quotes:
23 "The Serbian Democratic Party also endured the armed struggle in
24 a superior manner. It was the first time that the people knew what was
25 in store for them. With such well-organised defence, the majority of our
1 people has been saved, and lines towards the enemy were established. We
2 should always remember that the people themselves and the SDS fought and
3 set up the front lines in 45 days from 5th of April to 20th May while our
4 army was still being established. Eventually, of course, this army
5 became non-Partisan, but we did not want to appoint any SDS commissioners
6 to it because we relied on the patriotism of each of our officers and
8 Colonel, is this consistent what -- with what you saw and what
9 you have referred to before during your term of office?
10 A. Yes, it is.
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, that -- one other point. One
12 other point. Sorry.
13 Can we again have the Exhibit 11591. Oh, I forgot. I would like
14 to have this -- this document admitted.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P953, Your Honours.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you. And, again, the item 11591, the
18 65 ter. That was already admitted, but now it's the further report --
19 no, that's the wrong. It should be the further report of the
20 Secretary-General of 12 May 1992. It's item 11591, 65 ter. It has a P
21 number. 937, sorry. 937. And I would like to have page 3 and --
22 page 3.
23 Q. And that's the paragraph number 5 on top of it that you just
24 discussed with Dr. Karadzic.
25 When we look at it, it says here:
1 "Further concern has been caused by the decision of the Belgrade
2 authorities to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina by 18 May all JNA
3 personnel who are not citizens of that republic."
4 And then the next sentence:
5 "This will leave in Bosnia-Herzegovina without effective
6 political control as many as 50 [sic] mostly Serb troops ..."
7 Does this relate to the form JNA troops or not?
8 A. I assume it would relate to those members of the JNA who were
9 Serbs and were from Bosnia
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, this concludes the
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 JUDGE MORRISON: Just one question, Colonel Doyle, just to
14 satisfy my own curiosity. Were you an infantry officer?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
16 JUDGE MORRISON: I thought you were.
17 JUDGE KWON: That concludes your testimony, Colonel Doyle.
18 Thank you for your coming yet again to give it.
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE KWON: Now you're free to go.
21 [The witness withdrew]
22 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether the Court Deputy is able to do
23 it without the assistance of the usher. Can you draw up the exhibit
24 number D324? No, it's not -- or it may be -- might have been D235.
25 Where we can find the word "siege," for which the exact
1 translation should have been "encirclement," according to the accused? I
2 think it was page 5 in the e-court.
3 Yes. In the middle of the page. Along with "task," we can see
4 the word "siege of Sarajevo
5 And can you go back to page 3 there. In the "I have decided"
6 column or the "Operation Objectives," third paragraph, Mladic says:
7 "Keep Sarajevo
8 So with the -- if the Court Deputy would relay with the CLSS to
9 find out what words in B/C/S were used for the "siege" and "blockade" and
10 compare them with the transcript of 19th of May as well as 27th of May
11 when the -- Mr. Karadzic tried to explain the difference between the
12 "encirclement" and "siege," and I'd like to know what B/C/S words were
13 used at those times. So I would like the CLSS to produce a written memo
14 on those things and file it.
15 There are several matters, administrative matters, to deal with.
16 I'll begin with some minor things.
17 There's a motion from the Prosecution to add a witness,
18 Amir Begic, to its witness list. And I take it there is no opposition
19 from the Defence, but there is a request from the Defence that
20 Prosecution would call the witness after the summer recess.
21 Do you have any position?
22 MR. TIEGER: I think we can accommodate that, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE KWON: With that understanding, we'll -- your motion is
25 And there are two further motions: Leave to reply; one in
1 relation to the videolink testimony, and the other related to certain
2 protective measures. So they are granted.
3 And this relates to the -- the motion from the accused for
4 extension and adjournment: Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber has received a
5 request from you for an extension of time to respond to the Prosecution's
6 second motion for leave to amend its Rule 65 ter exhibit list which
7 pertains to the Mladic notebook. We have also taken into account the
8 Prosecution's response to that request filed today.
9 The Chamber considers some extension of time is appropriate for
10 you to prepare your response to the motion and that an addition two weeks
11 is sufficient. You are, therefore, required to file your response to the
12 Prosecution motion, if any, by 14 June 2010.
13 You have also requested that the Chamber adjourn the trial
14 proceedings for a period of 30 days to allow you to study the Mladic
15 notebooks which were disclosed to you in your own language first on
16 12th of April, 2010, and determine their impact on your cross-examination
17 of the upcoming Prosecution witnesses.
18 The Prosecution has stated its opposition to this request.
19 Having considered all the submissions made, the Chamber finds
20 that it is not necessary nor in the interest of justice to adjourn the
21 trial proceedings at this time. As we have previously stated, you have
22 had sufficient time to prepare your cross-examination of the
23 Prosecution's witnesses and have been on notice of the witnesses to be
24 called in this initial phase of the trial for many months now.
25 If after reviewing the notebooks that have been disclosed to you
1 or indeed any other material recently disclosed by the Prosecution you
2 determine that there are additional questions you would wish to put to a
3 particular witness on cross-examination, you may make the appropriate
4 application to the Chamber.
5 With regard to the majority of the upcoming witnesses, the
6 Chamber is convinced that this remedy would suffice. We will, therefore,
7 deny your motion for an adjournment at the present time.
8 Having said that, the Chamber would like to encourage the
9 Prosecution to rethink its order of upcoming witnesses and suggests that
10 it would be appropriate to move Witness KDZ88 down the schedule so that
11 this evidence might be heard a little later in the proceedings after the
12 accused has had a little more time to analyse the notebooks disclosed to
13 him on 12th of April. Given the expected content of KDZ88's evidence, it
14 seems to the Chamber that such a rescheduling will be prudent.
15 The last matter, last agenda that I have, relates to your conduct
16 of your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic. In relation to that, I would
17 like to make some comments on behalf of the Chamber concerning the manner
18 in which you are conducting your cross-examination in general.
19 Before your cross-examination of the very first witness, I told
20 you that the Chamber did not consider your time estimate for
21 cross-examination of the initial witnesses to be realistic or reasonable.
22 The Chamber has, nonetheless, given you significant latitude to conduct
23 your cross-examinations in the way you consider most appropriate and has
24 granted extensive time to you to do so. This is partly because we
25 recognise that you are not a trained lawyer and that effective
1 cross-examination can be a difficult skill to master.
2 Asking open questions or multiple questions in cross-examination
3 is not only a poor technique but is not likely to be effective. Closed,
4 direct questions put one at a time are both more effective and in general
5 more likely to generate more concise and precise answers.
6 You should also note that it is only the answers of the witness
7 to your questions that amount to evidence as well as the documents or
8 parts thereof that the witness adopts and which are admitted into
9 evidence. Reading
10 transcript is a time-consuming procedure which does not have the effect
11 of turning the transcripted parts into evidence if the document is not
12 ultimately admitted. It's a far better use of time to formulate the
13 questions from the document and only resort to the document if necessary
14 to contradict the witness's answer.
15 You have received such advice repeatedly from the Bench about how
16 to more effectively conduct your cross-examination as well as warnings
17 not to make statements and comments, not to read out extensive passages
18 from documents, but, rather, to show documents to the witnesses and ask
19 pointed questions in relation to them and not to put questions to
20 witnesses about matters which they have stated they have no knowledge of.
21 Despite our efforts in this regard, and I hope also the efforts
22 of your own legal advisors, to guide you, the Chamber is concerned that
23 you are not making more effective use of your time for your
24 cross-examination. We are also concerned again by the time estimate you
25 have recently given for the next nine witnesses.
1 The Chamber is therefore contemplating setting time limits on
2 your cross-examination of each witness, which we will determine on a
3 witness-by-witness basis, and which you will be required to comply with
4 unless you can show good cause why additional time is necessary.
5 Should you not demonstrate during your cross-examination of the
6 next witnesses that you are taking seriously our advice, the Chamber will
7 begin to impose such time limits. Having said this, the Chamber is of
8 the view, based on the time you have already used for cross-examination
9 of Mr. Van Lynden, your own estimate of how much additional time you need
10 with him and on the nature and content of Mr. Van Lynden's evidence, that
11 you should be able to complete your cross-examination of him within two
13 The Trial Chamber's primary task is to ensure a fair trial, but
14 that entails fairness for everyone involved, and undue delay is not
15 consonant with fairness.
16 We will rise for today. We will resume again on Monday afternoon
17 at 2.15. Everybody have a good weekend.
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.
19 to be reconvened on Monday, the 31st day
20 of May, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.