Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3096

 1                           Tuesday, 1 June 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, Doctor.

 6             Good afternoon, everybody.

 7             Yes, Mr. Harvey.

 8             MR. HARMON:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  I would like to

 9     introduce Mr. Avi Singh from my team who is assisting me here today.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, Mr. Singh.

11             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.

13                           WITNESS:  ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]

14                           Examination by Ms. Edgerton: [Continued]

15        Q.   Good afternoon, Dr. Donia.

16        A.   Good afternoon, Madam Prosecutor.

17        Q.   To begin today, I'd just like to go back very briefly to a couple

18     of aspects of your evidence from yesterday, if I may.  Yesterday I asked

19     you at page 3093, lines 22 to 23, of the transcript of evidence whether

20     the territory encompassed by the strategic objectives covered

21     multi-ethnic areas.  And your response was:

22             "Yes, insofar as we can determine from the strategic objectives

23     what was intended in territorial terms."

24             Do you recall that?

25        A.   Yes, I believe I went on then to say yes and give an example of

Page 3097

 1     the corridor.

 2        Q.   Correct.  Now, to follow-up on that in a way, could I ask you

 3     then whether the same applied to the fifth objective and the city of

 4     Sarajevo.  Did the fifth objective also transect a multi-ethnic area?

 5        A.   Yes, it did.

 6        Q.   And yesterday when we broke we were talking about the ethnic

 7     distribution across Bosnia and Herzegovina and when we broke we were

 8     speaking about Sarajevo in particular in that regard.  Do you recall

 9     that?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Now, if I could ask you, going back to the first objective that

12     you discussed yesterday of separation, the first overarching objective,

13     could you tell us did it embrace any change to the country's ethnic

14     distribution?

15        A.   Well, the goal, if achieved, would certainly have -- would

16     dramatically change the ethnic composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- at

17     least the ethnic distribution.

18        Q.   In what regard?  How so?

19        A.   Well, it would have attached human residents to territoriality in

20     a way that was radically different from the situation as of 1991.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Now, on the subject still of this overarching

22     objective, was there any strategy that you see to achieving that

23     objective, any central perhaps strategy?

24        A.   Well, I think there were strategies employed that actually well

25     preceded the formal adoption of the strategic goals, and I divide those

Page 3098

 1     strategies into two, one being the -- a very public and -- I'd say public

 2     performance component of state building that the SDS leadership engaged

 3     in starting in October 1991 and proceeding for the next seven months in a

 4     series of steps taken in the Bosnian Serb Assembly and then a few cases

 5     outside of it.

 6             The second element is the -- what I call the municipal strategy,

 7     and that word is mine but I think it's apt to describe the SDS policies

 8     toward municipalities in the course of the period January 1991 through

 9     about the summer of 1992.

10        Q.   Perhaps I could ask for a document be called up at this point in

11     time, 65 ter 00972, which is a record of a speech by Dr. Karadzic on the

12     occasion of the plebiscite of November 1991.  And once we see that

13     document I could ask you some further questions.

14             Perhaps you could display the B/C/S page 2, which should be the

15     first page of the document, and similarly English page 2.  Could we go,

16     please, to page 3.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  My apologies, Your Honours, I have not seen these

18     two pages in the documents before.  Thank you.  And now on to page 4,

19     please.  I see two B/C/S pages in front of me rather than one English,

20     one B/C/S.

21        Q.   Dr. Donia, given that you've indicated your -- you have command

22     of the English and the Serbo-Croatian language, perhaps I could ask you

23     this question with respect to the B/C/S version of the document, which is

24     the cover page of the document.  Have you seen this document before?

25        A.   Yes, I have.

Page 3099

 1        Q.   And what do you recognise it to be yourself?

 2        A.   It is a transcript of a speech that Dr. Karadzic delivered

 3     sometime in the days prior to the referendum of November 9 and 10, 1991.

 4     The two cover pages indicate that it was collected and transcribed by the

 5     state commission for the investigation of war crimes, I believe, which

 6     was headed by Mr. Gavran Kapetanovic.

 7        Q.   If we could go now to page 9 of both versions, the English and

 8     B/C/S of this document, please.

 9             Now, on the English version, if I could direct your attention,

10     please, Dr. Donia, to the very last paragraph, the sentence that begins

11     immediately after the italicised portion of the last paragraph.  And for

12     the record, that same passage should be found at e-court, page 9 in

13     B/C/S, nine lines up from the bottom of the page.  Do you see the

14     sentence, Dr. Donia, that begins:

15             "Municipalities are not" -- and I'm sorry it's cut off on the

16     left hand part of the English version.  Thank you.

17              "Municipalities are not God given ..."

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Now, this speech by Dr. Karadzic or this extract from

20     Dr. Karadzic's speech then reads:

21             "Municipalities are not God given.  They were established to the

22     disadvantage of the Serb people, in such a way that all Serb units in

23     Bosnia were split and Serbs became a minority instead with their own

24     municipality; let them also have a majority in their municipalities."

25             Do you have any comment on this passage and this speech in any

Page 3100

 1     regard, Dr. Donia?

 2        A.   This passage essentially repeats the critique that I indicated

 3     yesterday developed by some Serb intellectuals in Bosnia, including

 4     Dr. Karadzic, in the last years of the 1980s and 1990, which argued that

 5     the municipal organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was discriminatory

 6     against Serbs.  The example of Ozren which Dr. Karadzic offers here,

 7     which he says he keeps repeating, he did indeed repeat on several

 8     occasions to argue that Ozren should have been its own municipality.

 9     Part of the rest of the speech goes on to spell out what he believes

10     should be the remedy for that in terms of reorganising municipalities and

11     laying claim to Serb land based on certain criteria.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I offer this, please, as the next exhibit,

14     Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P958, Your Honour.

17             MS. EDGERTON:

18        Q.   Now, this document that we've just looked at, Dr. Donia, is a

19     very early-on document.  Perhaps I could ask you, was there any -- was

20     there any evolution to this municipal strategy?

21        A.   Yes.  The municipal strategy began very shortly after the

22     elections of 1990 with a programme of regionalisation, and

23     regionalisation at this point in time, which meant the first six, eight

24     months of 1991, entailed taking existing municipalities and joining them

25     together in community or associations of communities or communities of

Page 3101

 1     municipalities.  The most significant and active of which was the

 2     community of municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina, which was --

 3     eventually had its seat in Banja Luka.  The -- there was none or very

 4     little discussion at that point.  There was certainly no effort to change

 5     existing municipal boundaries, but rather to associate these

 6     municipalities in a single body, an association of municipalities.  A

 7     practice that had been followed under socialism as well, but established

 8     for the purpose of co-ordinating municipal services and other, let's say,

 9     points of convenience for the governance of these municipalities.  The

10     effort on the part of the SDS was a -- promoted by a single party with

11     the intent of linking up the municipalities in which Serbs had an

12     absolute or relative majority.  That's the first phase of this and -- of

13     the municipal strategy.

14             It then was followed by a second phase in which the issue of

15     revising municipal boundaries came to the forefront, and that can be

16     identified as beginning in -- on October 15, 1991, one could pick other

17     dates but that's the -- I think the operative date when the municipal

18     strategy takes on this effort to try to alter municipal boundaries within

19     the republic.

20             And then a --

21        Q.   Well, if I could just stop you at that moment.  What happened on

22     October 15, 1991?

23        A.   Well, 19 -- October 14th/15th is this watershed date in which the

24     Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina passed a resolution called a declaration

25     of sovereignty and a platform, which was a platform for the negotiating

Page 3102

 1     team for Bosnia-Herzegovina to be used in negotiations with the

 2     Europeans.  And the point at which the SDS essentially lost the battle to

 3     veto the drive toward independence that the Croatian and the HDZ and the

 4     SDA, the Croatian and Muslim parties, had initiated.  In the -- that

 5     happened in the very early morning hours of October 15th, and from that

 6     point on the energies of the SDS seem to have been directed largely

 7     toward planning a -- and it's not a single plan but a extended planning

 8     process which entailed a number of documents along the way and some

 9     shifting in tactics, but can be seen as a consistent planning process

10     from that date into the early weeks of 19 -- or of April 1992.

11        Q.   At this point I'd like us to see a clip from a speech delivered

12     by Dr. Karadzic at this Assembly session on October 15, 1991, that's 65

13     ter number 45005.  And it should begin at timer number 00:07:56:3, and I

14     hope that my colleagues -- the interpreters in the booth have received

15     copies of the transcript.  I'm sure I'll be advised if that's not the

16     case.  Could we begin.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             MS. EDGERTON:  I --

19             JUDGE KWON:  We are not hearing any translation.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't know if there's been a transcript that's

21     been delivered.  I thought we had taken steps to do that.  It has been

22     delivered.  Perhaps we could be advised by the interpreters.

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We have a different

24     transcript but not that one that you referred to just now.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence then, for a moment, please,

Page 3103

 1     Your Honour.

 2                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We've just received the

 4     proper copy.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  I hear that the proper copy has been delivered in

 6     the nick of time, and I apologise to my colleagues, the interpreters.

 7     And if it's possible, perhaps we could begin afresh.

 8                           [Video-clip played]

 9             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Sovereign people in Bosnia and

10     Herzegovina can each say for themselves what they want but not for other

11     people as well.  It was one of the conclusions made in this Assembly.  We

12     shall disable you to carry out violence against Serbian people,

13     constitution violence in front of local and international public.

14     Because after the constitution violence, all other violence will come.

15     We won't be consulted regarding the situation anymore.  We won't be

16     consulted if we come into the situation in which Slovenia and Croatia are

17     in, especially Croatia.  Knowing that in Bosnia and Herzegovina that hell

18     would be 1.000 times worse and there would be no way to stop it.  I must

19     send a message to all delegates.  Gentlemen, believe me, even if you

20     would make -- if you were to make it because we have the constitutional

21     manner to prevent you from voting, but even if you would make something

22     that would be the source of shame for Mr. Izetbegovic in The Hague

23     because we would have other ways to make it impossible, even in The

24     Hague.  It would also be a great shame for the image of this parliament

25     in Europe, especially, you're embarrassing Croats and Muslims who are

Page 3104

 1     loyal to this idea.  Your shame and your prove how much you respect

 2     sovereignty and equality of Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 3     I'm asking you one more time.  I'm not threatening, but asking, pleading,

 4     to take seriously the interpretation of the political will of the Serbian

 5     people which is represented here by the Serbian Democratic Party and the

 6     Serbian Movement of Renewal and several Serbs from other parties.  Please

 7     take it seriously, it is not good what you are doing.

 8             This is the road that you want Bosnia and Herzegovina to take,

 9     the same highway of hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia went

10     through.  Don't think you won't take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell and

11     Muslim people into possible extinction because Muslim people will not be

12     able to defend itself if it comes to war here!

13             "Please, I know these are serious words.  Serious situations call

14     for serious words.  How will you prevent that everybody start killing

15     everybody in Bosnia and Herzegovina?  Can war in Croatia be prevented?

16     Especially in the border areas where Serbs and Croats are in contact,

17     whose two political wills are in conflict, and weren't realised in a

18     legal manner so there's only one way left to realise them.

19             From now on gentlemen, I will ask for the floor on a regular

20     basis until you take the matter of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina

21     off the agenda.  That is my right.  I want to send a message to Muslim,

22     Serb, and Croatian people that you want to achieve something in Europe

23     what you have no right to.  Thank you."

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

25             And my thanks to the interpreters.

Page 3105

 1        Q.   Dr. Donia, do you have any comment on what we've just seen?

 2        A.   Well, I -- this was a youthful and energetic Dr. Karadzic

 3     speaking to the Bosnian Serb Assembly -- or to the Assembly of

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the multi-ethnic Assembly, in what was actually a

 5     fairly long address, the last part of which you have just played.  And he

 6     seemed to gain momentum in the course of that speech and warned I think

 7     against taking the step of approving the two documents that I just cited.

 8     Said that he was not threatening but pleading, and then moved to a phase

 9     and used some expressions which at least were interpreted by others there

10     as threats.  That was language that he in fact had used in the weeks

11     prior to that in telephone conversations with other SDS and Serb leaders.

12        Q.   Thank you, and we'll come back to those conversations you've just

13     referred to in a short while.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  But at this moment, Your Honour, I'd like to

15     tender, if I may, the clip that's just been played from the timer number

16     I originally cited 07:56:3 to 10:44:7.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Please.

19             JUDGE KWON:  It will be admitted -- oh, just a second.

20             You have objection, Mr. Karadzic?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I do have something to add,

22     and that is:  Why don't you admit the entire speech?  We will certainly

23     be needing the entire speech, so why not admit it that way?

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any observation, Ms. Edgerton?

Page 3106

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  It seems quite practical, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  How long is the entire clip?

 3                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  This -- your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.

 5                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  My colleague's just raised an important point.  If

 7     there's a difference between Dr. Karadzic's speech as a whole and the

 8     video as a whole and a significant time difference, and perhaps

 9     Dr. Karadzic could specify which portion he would like to see in that

10     place.

11             JUDGE KWON:  So we stick to our practice.  So we'll admit this

12     time only those part played at the courtroom, and then whether we can

13     think about there can be a better way to admit these video-clips.  This

14     time only those played at the courtroom will be admitted.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P959.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, and we can take steps, of course,

18     Your Honour, to see if there's any other portions which we can reach

19     agreement on that might serve to help proceedings later.

20        Q.   Now, Dr. Donia, you mentioned that the events of this day that

21     we've just been discussing started a planning process as regards the

22     municipal strategy.  Was -- what was the next step after this date that

23     you've been able to identify?

24        A.   Well, let me just say, I think they were followed by a planning

25     process, not necessarily did they start it.  But they were followed by a

Page 3107

 1     planning process which began with a meeting of the political counsel of

 2     the SDS, which was a group of largely academic advisors and other

 3     party -- leaders of the party.  That convened on the evening of that same

 4     October 15th and discussed broadly and with no specific conclusions the

 5     options for party plans going forward.

 6        Q.   And following that?

 7        A.   In the wake of that or in the aftermath of that meeting, the

 8     party leadership decided to take certain steps that had been discussed at

 9     that meeting in a particular order.  They decided, first of all, to form

10     a separate Assembly, to be made up of those members of the SDS and other

11     parties -- other Serb parties that had been elected to the Assembly of

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina in the November 1990 elections.  They further decided

13     to hold a plebiscite on a question which was essentially:  Do you want to

14     remain in Yugoslavia?  To be held in early November.  So their sequence

15     was, first of all, to form the Bosnian Serb Assembly in October; then

16     hold the plebiscite in November, the Bosnian Serb Assembly then ordering,

17     organising, and managing the plebiscite.

18             Following the plebiscite, other Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions

19     were held.  The December decision -- these came about once a month by

20     coincidence, but the December decision was to announce preparations for

21     the formation of a -- the Serbian -- Republic of the Serbian People of

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And then on January 8, to proclaim a separate state

23     with that name.  In February to approve a draft constitution.  In March

24     to implement that constitution or approve it, promulgate it.  And then in

25     April to formally declare the republic independent.

Page 3108

 1        Q.   And to go back to my question, was there a next step to the

 2     municipal strategy?

 3        A.   At first the municipal strategy was kind of an integral part of

 4     the overall discussion.  The -- many of the leaders favoured what they

 5     characterised as intensifying regionalisation, which meant essentially

 6     drawing -- redrawing municipal boundaries.  At the third Bosnian Serb

 7     Assembly session on the 11th of December, the leaders of the party,

 8     specifically Mr. Krajisnik, supported by Dr. Karadzic, introduced a

 9     resolution which took this in a somewhat different direction, one that

10     was not incompatible with redrawing municipal boundaries, but was given

11     priority over it for the time being, and that was to create separate Serb

12     Assemblies, Serbian Municipal Assemblies at the municipal level in those

13     municipalities where Serbs lived.  That resolution passed with one

14     dissenting vote on the first try, and the chair, Mr. Krajisnik, evoked --

15     then asked the delegate who voted no why he had opposed it.  And there

16     followed then a discussion about the resolution itself and its

17     relationship to the redrawing of municipal boundaries.  And it became

18     evident that there was considerable opposition in the Assembly to the

19     idea of forming separate Serb Municipal Assemblies.

20             Consequently, the bill was or the proposal was amended to make it

21     voluntary, and then that voluntary recommendation passed unanimously.

22     That was an Assembly session that was actually quite contentious, and in

23     fact toward the very end of it Mr. Krajisnik adjourned -- abruptly

24     adjourned the session and walked out of the hall.  Then another leader

25     stepped up and concluded the session.

Page 3109

 1             In the wake of that experience on the 11th of December, the

 2     municipal strategy took a new turn, and that was represented in the

 3     dissemination of a set of instructions to SDS municipal leaders that was

 4     dated the 19th of December, 1991.

 5        Q.   Perhaps at this juncture I can ask for 65 ter 00224 to be

 6     displayed, please.  The cover page for that document should suffice in

 7     both the English and B/C/S.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  So in the meantime, Dr. Donia, so was that the

 9     resolution on 11th, the one you referred to as December decision in the

10     previous answer?

11             THE WITNESS:  No, Your Honour, the document that we're just now

12     looking at was not disseminated until the 19th and was never voted on as

13     a document by the Assembly.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, when you referred to December decision, so I

15     didn't follow that -- okay, we'll come to that.

16             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

19             MS. EDGERTON:

20        Q.   Now, Dr. Donia, do you see the pages in English and

21     Serbo-Croatian on the screen in front of you?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Is that a copy of the instructions to municipal leaders dated

24     December 19, 1991, that you've just referred to?

25        A.   Yes, it is.

Page 3110

 1        Q.   Could you then tell Your Honours whether this document -- the

 2     significance of this document and whether it represented anything in

 3     terms of the municipal strategy you've been discussing.

 4        A.   Looking at this document in comparison to the trajectory that the

 5     leadership was on on the -- at the session on the 11th of December,

 6     this -- these instructions move the principal organising body from the

 7     Bosnian Serb Assembly to the SDS itself, and thereby go from a

 8     legislative decision-making body into a party organ, where they were

 9     considered -- I wouldn't call it in secret, but in private.  And they

10     were also disseminated in private.  So there is a move here from the

11     legislative body to the party organ and from a very public discussion to

12     the -- let's say circles -- inner circles of the party.

13             In addition, it moves from expecting local leaders to form one

14     institution, that is, the Bosnian Serb Municipal Assembly -- or the Serb

15     Municipal Assembly to two institutions, one still being that Bosnian

16     Serb -- or the Serb Municipal Assembly and the other being a Crisis Staff

17     of the Serbian people, so from one institution to two.  In addition, it

18     tasked local SDS leaders to assume military functions in the terms of the

19     instructions and it added considerable specificity to the steps to be

20     taken by those municipal officials.

21        Q.   In your Sarajevo report we've seen this document referred to as

22     the Variant A and B document.  Could you explain the significance of that

23     description.

24        A.   Yes.  The document distinguished between municipalities in which

25     Serbs were in a majority and those in which they were not in a majority,

Page 3111

 1     thus the name A and B.  And furthermore was to proceed in two stages.

 2     One was a preparatory stage and the other second stage was an actual

 3     implementation stage, which according to the terms of the document was to

 4     be activated by a secret signal from the party president.

 5        Q.   Could you -- I note this document bears the number in the top

 6     right-hand corner 93, whereas in your Sarajevo report you cite to copy of

 7     this same document numbered 96.  Is there any significance to the

 8     numbering of these documents?

 9        A.   Well, the numbers apparently refer to the municipality to which

10     the particular copy was distributed.  I referred to number 96 in my

11     paper.  One in fact has a choice.  I think there are something like seven

12     copies all together that have been acquired from various municipalities.

13     That copy 96 was found in the municipality of Trnovo, one of the

14     Sarajevo -- one of the ten Sarajevo municipalities.  This is number 93.

15     It was found in the Holiday Inn offices of the SDS.

16        Q.   Was this document acted upon by municipalities?

17        A.   Yes.  The reaction to the distribution of this document was quite

18     varied by municipality.  There was also a convening of a committee for

19     all ten municipalities of the city of Sarajevo in the days after the

20     document was distributed.  In some municipalities SDS leaders convened

21     meetings within the next week and acted to pass along these instructions

22     to various party members and move forward with the preparatory phase.

23     Other municipalities, SDS leaders, did nothing; they just sat on their

24     hands for some weeks and in some cases a couple of months.  And in a few

25     municipalities, there was outright resistance to implementing the

Page 3112

 1     instructions.  I have described in my Sarajevo paper the particular

 2     situation in Centar municipality in Sarajevo, where the president of that

 3     municipality, Radomir Bulatovic, publicly refused to implement the

 4     instructions until he was basically found one -- found these institutions

 5     had been created without his direct participation.

 6        Q.   If I may, one just quick follow-up question related to that.  Do

 7     you know what happened to or did anything happen to Bulatovic as a

 8     consequence of that refusal?

 9        A.   He suddenly found the formation of these institutions -- or at

10     least of the Bosnian -- or the Serb Assembly to be a great idea and

11     publicly endorsed it, reversing his earlier stand on this.  And I don't

12     believe there were any adverse consequences for him in the subsequent

13     weeks.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, if you could kindly direct us to where

15     in his Sarajevo report this document is referred to.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Footnotes 48 to 51 of his Sarajevo report,

17     Your Honours.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Before we move on,

20     perhaps I could request that this be marked as the next Prosecution

21     exhibit, please.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P960, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED:  No objection.

25             MS. EDGERTON:

Page 3113

 1        Q.   Dr. Donia, did any stage at the implementation of these

 2     instructions become mandatory?

 3        A.   Yes.  In the -- at the 12th Assembly Session in March of 1992,

 4     the party leaders required that all municipalities -- actually, required

 5     that the regional organisations enforce the creation of these

 6     institutions in the various municipalities, and a resolution was passed

 7     to that effect by that Assembly session.

 8        Q.   In that regard, perhaps I could ask that 65 ter number 00021,

 9     which is the transcript of the 12th Assembly Session dated 24 March 1992,

10     be displayed.  English page -- pages 22 to 24, so beginning with page 22;

11     and B/C/S pages 39 to 42.  And while we wait for that, can I just ask,

12     Dr. Donia, when you referred to party leaders just now, who in particular

13     did you mean?

14        A.   Mr. Krajisnik and Dr. Karadzic.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Dr. Donia, do you see the excerpts from the 12th

16     Assembly Session on the page in front of you in English and

17     Serbo-Croatian?

18        A.   Yes.  I have reviewed this before and seen the entire document.

19     And this is indeed a record of the 12th Session.

20        Q.   Can I direct your attention to the fourth full paragraph, the

21     large paragraph in the centre of the page, third sentence which begins:

22             "We have a legal basis in the Law on Internal Affairs ..."

23        A.   Can I suggest we look at the speaker here.

24        Q.   Sure.  Let's go back two pages I think.  One page.  My apologies.

25     Wonderful.

Page 3114

 1             Do you see the speaker designated at the bottom of the page

 2     displayed in front of you, Dr. Donia, that's English page 21,

 3     Dr. Karadzic appears at the bottom of the page as the speaker?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  If we could now go back to the highlighted passage

 6     that I've just referred to on page 22.  Thank you.

 7             Dr. Donia, this passage that begins:

 8             "We have a legal basis on the Law on Internal Affairs, and we

 9     also have the insignia and at a desired moment, and this will be very

10     soon, we can form whatever we want.  There are reasons why this could

11     happen in two or three days."

12             Is this one of the directions by the party leaders you've just

13     referred to as regards the implementation of these instructions?

14        A.   This and the rest of this paragraph constitute one of the

15     requirements that I have cited, yes.

16        Q.   Could we now go over to English page 24, please -- I think it

17     might be actually e-court page 23.  I note at the bottom of e-court page

18     23 the speaker at this moment is the chairperson, which is who,

19     Dr. Donia?

20        A.   At this session it was Dr. -- or Mr. Krajisnik.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And then over to the next page, 24, please.  Perfect.

22             Could I direct your attention, Dr. Donia, to the notation about

23     just over one-third of the way down the page immediately after the

24     sentence that is underlined which reads:

25             "The chairperson explained that all the presidents of autonomous

Page 3115

 1     district had received instructions and should have prepared and organised

 2     this.  Those who have not done it should do it by Friday."

 3             Is this one of the or the other direction by the party leaders

 4     you've just referred to?

 5        A.   Yes, it is.  Some time ago I went back to a calendar and it was a

 6     three-day period until Friday from the day of the Assembly.  I'd also

 7     just like to clarify that I think I used the pleural in speaking of the

 8     institutions.  This in fact -- this directive pertains to the formation

 9     of Serbian Municipal Assemblies and not to Crisis Staffs.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, could I ask that this 12th Assembly

12     Session be admitted, please, as the next exhibit.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE ACCUSED:  [No interpretation]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat.  I didn't hear the translation.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that the Chamber has

17     already had the practice of admitting the transcript as a whole, the

18     whole session, that it's all admitted.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P961.

21             MS. EDGERTON:

22        Q.   Dr. Donia, these instructions that we've been discussing, could

23     you tell us whether they were specifically discussed at subsequent

24     Assembly sessions?

25        A.   Yes.  On several occasions later in the war at sessions of the

Page 3116

 1     Bosnian Serb Assembly, a few different speakers referred to the A/B

 2     instructions, and specifically Dr. Karadzic did on two occasions.

 3        Q.   Perhaps I could ask now for 65 ter number 00055, the transcript

 4     from the 50th Assembly Session of the -- 50th Session of the Republika

 5     Srpska Assembly from 15 and 16 April, 1995.  My notation says that the

 6     passage -- the relevant passage should be at pages 316 of the English and

 7     278 of the B/C/S.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  First page says the 34th Session.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  You know, Your Honours, I'm quite happy to come

10     back to this and move on in the meanwhile.  We can address this session

11     after the break, and I can move on.

12        Q.   Shall we do that, Dr. Donia.  I'll move on to another area and

13     come back to this one exhibit later on today.  I'd like to move on -- I'd

14     like to ask you the next -- this next question.  When do you recall first

15     expressions of the intent to use violence by the Bosnian Serb leadership

16     against Sarajevo or otherwise?

17        A.   Well, I don't know that I could identify that point in time.

18     There was a great deal of discussion of violence going back even to the

19     period of the election campaign.  There were a few references to it.  I

20     think in terms of, say, discussions of consistent and massive violence I

21     would say there were a number of expressions of that in telephone

22     conversations among SDS leaders in early September of 1991.

23        Q.   What was the context of those conversations, do you recall?

24        A.   From about the 2nd until the 9th of September, there were four

25     crises in quite rapid succession in the boundary areas of Bosnia that

Page 3117

 1     drew the attention of SDS leaders.  I think the one that's -- that was

 2     the most acute and the one that occasioned some of these statements was

 3     the detention of Mr. Milan Martic, who was the minister of the interior

 4     of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina in Croatia.  He was crossing a

 5     bridge and was detained by a patrol, taken to a police station in a tiny

 6     village called Otoka, and the police station was then surrounded by a

 7     crowd of principally Muslim local residents.  It was a situation that was

 8     quickly escalating into a dangerous one, and in the subsequent hours,

 9     Dr. Karadzic tried to mobilise the Yugoslav national army, basically come

10     in and rescue him, and also called upon Milan Babic, who was the head of

11     the RSK at that time, to mobilise forces to be prepared to move into

12     Bosnia to rescue him as well.

13             That episode ended when a senior police official from Sarajevo,

14     Avdo Hebib, arrived and police under his command essentially created a

15     cordon, took him out of the jail, and escorted him out of town, that is,

16     Mr. Martic out of town, and arranged for him to be transported to a

17     Yugoslav People's Army installation nearby.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, excuse me.

19             Doctor, just to be clear, by telephone conversation, do you

20     mean -- did you mean intercepted conversations?

21             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I did.

22             JUDGE KWON:  So was this evidence of yours based upon the --

23     based upon those intercepts?  Was your knowledge that you got from

24     these -- hearing these intercepts?

25             THE WITNESS:  In part, Your Honour.  The periodical press covered

Page 3118

 1     this rather major event very closely.  There were reporters from Glas

 2     newspaper in Banja Luka, "Oslobodjenje," and other publications that

 3     subsequently then gave very specific accounts of these events.  And so

 4     the -- my summary of it that I just provided was based on a consolidation

 5     of those sources and the intercepts.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:

 8        Q.   Well, actually perhaps if I may, to follow-on with what you

 9     had -- from the question you've just raised, Your Honour.  I remember

10     yesterday, Dr. Donia, you identified four criteria for your selection of

11     sources for your reports.  And I wonder if it might be useful if you

12     could explain how these and the other intercepts you've referred to in

13     your reports might fit within those criteria.

14        A.   Well, they -- from my point of view, looking at the veracity of

15     them, I was primarily interested in cross-checking the information

16     referenced in the intercepts with other events going on as reported in

17     the periodical press or other documentary sources.  This particular

18     incident, the cross-checkability is extraordinary and provides

19     confirmation of a single story with very few details differing, not only

20     between the periodical press accounts and the intercepts, but also among

21     the various reports in newspapers of somewhat different political

22     orientation.

23        Q.   I would like now, if I may, to play an intercept from this period

24     of time, 65 ter 30214 dated 9 September 1991, and I hope that my

25     colleagues in the booth have been given copies of the transcripts.

Page 3119

 1                           [Intercept played]

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  And it appears perhaps not because I don't hear

 3     the interpretation.  Perhaps Mr. Reid can assist.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We cannot hear anything.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  It might be a technical problem, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Or if it's convenient, we may take a break now.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  We could do that, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  25 minutes.

 9                           --- Recess taken at 3.20 p.m.

10                           --- On resuming at 3.47 p.m.

11             JUDGE KWON:  I hope technical problems have been solved.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  We'll try, Your Honours, but in the event they

13     haven't we do have a backup.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

15             MS. EDGERTON:

16        Q.   Let's try then, if we may, to play for you, Dr. Donia, an

17     intercept of a telephone conversation from September 9, 1991, between

18     Dr. Karadzic and Malko Koroman.  Now, before we begin, could I ask you

19     this:  Do you know who Malko Koroman was.

20        A.   Mr. Koroman was at this time the head of the police in the

21     municipality of Pale.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Can we try that intercept now, please.

24                           [Intercept played]

25             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

Page 3120

 1             "Malko KOROMAN:  Good afternoon.

 2             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Good afternoon.

 3             "Malko KOROMAN:  Malko Koroman from Pale speaking.  How are you,

 4     Mr. Karadzic?

 5             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Fine, thanks.  How are you?

 6             "Malko KOROMAN:  I apologise for calling you at this number.  I

 7     have never done it so far but the situation has forced me to do so.

 8             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Tell me.

 9             "Malko KOROMAN:  Well, I heard this morning that Matic was

10     blocked up there in Otoka.

11             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Yes.

12             "Malko KOROMAN:  Well, I would like to know what was done

13     regarding that matter.  I spoke to Banja Luka just now.

14             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Yes.

15             "Malko KOROMAN:  With this head of centre up there.

16             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Zupljanin?  Zupljanin, right?

17             "Malko KOROMAN:  Ah, yes, Zupljanin.

18             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Right.

19             "Malko KOROMAN:  And he says that he's been blocked by the people

20     in Otoka.

21             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Yes, yes.

22             "Malko KOROMAN:  Exactly, but it cannot be with somebody's

23     direction and --

24             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Well, the SDA direction, that --

25             "Malko KOROMAN:  Yes.

Page 3121

 1             "Radovan KARADZIC:  And we have, all night been in touch with --

 2     all night.

 3             "Malko KOROMAN:  Did you speak to Cengic about this by any

 4     chance?

 5             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Yes, yes.  I did last night and he was

 6     supposed to fly there with Zepinic this morning.

 7             "Malko KOROMAN:  Well, Zepinic did not go.

 8             "Radovan KARADZIC:  He didn't go, right?

 9             "Malko KOROMAN:  He did not.  You know Zepinic, he would not.

10     This morning, you know what was done by the ministry, only Avdo Hebib got

11     into the car somehow around 8.00 to go up there by car, as if by car he

12     could make it to finish it.

13             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Yes, yes.

14             "Malko KOROMAN:  And please, you are to this -- Cengic freely,

15     that if Mr. Martic is not released he is going to have all of the

16     Romanija region above Sarajevo tonight.

17             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Yes, yes.

18             "Malko KOROMAN:  This is our personal opinion.  Yes.  I spoke to

19     the Romanija guys and our attitude is that we are not going to let them

20     get away with this because it means tomorrow they can do it to you or

21     anyone in this way.

22             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Yes, yes.  Now we'll tell him that now, but

23     they said that they were going and I was -- told me that this Zepinic was

24     going to go.  I will call him now.

25             "Malko KOROMAN:  Just to let you know, he did not move now --

Page 3122

 1             "Radovan KARADZIC:  I will now --

 2             "Malko KOROMAN:  -- a finger at all, as they would say.

 3             "Radovan KARADZIC:  I will call now.  Come on.  I will call the

 4     General Staff to -- because last night, yes, I spoke to Slobo too.  He

 5     spoke to Kadijevic.

 6             "Malko KOROMAN:  Could I be in touch with you to know what is at

 7     hand so they will not raise the people if there is no need?

 8             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Yes, yes.

 9             "Malko KOROMAN:  And we'll raise it completely.

10             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Yes, yes.  You have to have it prepared, to

11     have the people prepared if they fuck around, but I will.  I will finish

12     it by now.

13             "Malko KOROMAN:  Huh, say that to Mr. Cengic freely.

14             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Okay.  It's a deal.

15             "Malko KOROMAN:  He can finish it with one phone call only.

16             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Yes, yes.  We know he can.

17             "Malko KOROMAN:  The fact that Avdo Hebib drives around their car

18     and agrees with them on the way what he will do and how long he will be

19     there and what will be there and he will --

20             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Yes, yes.

21             "Malko KOROMAN: -- do that is their problem.

22             "Radovan KARADZIC:  I know that.  Now we are completely familiar

23     with their -- their slyness.  I will -- yes --

24             "Malko KOROMAN:  That please, do not do that.

25             "Radovan KARADZIC:  I will now, yes.

Page 3123

 1             "Malko KOROMAN:  So that you know that's the way it is.

 2             "Radovan KARADZIC:  We'll be in touch.  We'll have the people

 3     prepared and not only you but all of Krajina will -- we will send them

 4     all to fucking hell because of this.

 5             "Malko KOROMAN:  Shall I call this number again or will you call

 6     me at --

 7             "Radovan KARADZIC:  You will call this number, dial occasionally.

 8             "Malko KOROMAN:  Call this number.

 9             "Radovan KARADZIC:  It's a deal.

10             "Malko KOROMAN:  Thank you.

11             "Radovan KARADZIC:  Good-bye."

12             MS. EDGERTON:

13        Q.   Dr. Donia, do you have any comment on the audio of the

14     intercepted conversation you've just heard?

15        A.   Well, I believe according to the press reporting at the time,

16     Mr. Hebib did in fact arrive by helicopter, did not drive.  That -- it

17     appears to me in the conversation that this was very early in the day and

18     perhaps the two interlocutors in the intercept, Dr. Karadzic and

19     Mr. Koroman, did not yet have that information.  The assumption that

20     Dr. Karadzic made was that this gathering around the police station in

21     Otoka had been instigated by the SDA.  I don't know whether that was the

22     case or not.  It was in a sense a test of Mr. Izetbegovic's dual roles as

23     president and as party -- as president of the SDA and president of the

24     Presidency, and in this particular instance in dispatching a professional

25     policeman rather than a political leader, he clearly opted to try to view

Page 3124

 1     this as a police rather than a party matter.  And it was in fact resolved

 2     by the use of policemen in Bosanska Krupa to take Mr. Martic out of that

 3     small police station and escort him through the crowd with the assistance

 4     of tear gas and under a hail of stones.

 5             The idea which came in this conversation from Mr. Koroman,

 6     Mr. Koroman was to use the prospect of the Serb population of Romanija,

 7     the mountainous area around Sarajevo, essentially to threaten the other

 8     side, the Muslim side, with dramatic and physical action in the event

 9     that they didn't release him to the custody of -- or release him into

10     safety immediately.  That was, I think, the essential point of this

11     conversation and the reason for Mr. Koroman's call was to convey that

12     willingness to rally his people to take that step in the event that

13     Dr. Karadzic so ordered.

14        Q.   Now, in terms of the chronology of these September 1991

15     intercepts that you've referred to in your Sarajevo report at footnotes

16     187, 188, 189, where would you place this intercept?

17        A.   I'm afraid I don't have the report in front of me.  I wonder if

18     perhaps you could provide it to me so I can have a look.

19        Q.   We can do that and I can refer to the citations for you.

20     Footnote 187 is an intercept of a telephone Karadzic between Karadzic and

21     Babic 9 September 1991.  188, an intercept between Karadzic and one

22     Gojko Djogo 12 October 1991.  189, same intercept, same date.

23        A.   Thank you.

24             Well, this conversation is noted in footnote 179, so prior to the

25     three intercepts that you just mentioned.

Page 3125

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Now, Your Honours, keeping in mind Your Honours'

 3     guidance in regards to intercepts, I will not be asking to tender this at

 4     this time.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  And --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Unless the Defence is willing to admit that part.

 8             Let's move on.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have it marked for identification,

10     Your Honour?

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll do that.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be MFI P962.

14             MS. EDGERTON:

15        Q.   If we could move on then to another area more specifically

16     related to Sarajevo, Dr. Donia I would like to ask you this:  Was the --

17     was the municipal strategy implemented in the Sarajevo area?

18        A.   Yes, it was.  In the -- what I've called in my report the western

19     approaches, that is, the six western-most municipalities of Sarajevo, the

20     municipal strategy in its two primary components, that is, the

21     implementation of the A/B instructions and the redrawing of municipal

22     boundaries was probably fulfilled more thoroughly than almost anywhere

23     else in Bosnia.

24        Q.   And how so?  How was that done?

25        A.   Well, first of all by the creation of Serb Municipal Assemblies

Page 3126

 1     in several municipalities, the creation of Crisis Staffs, and a thorough

 2     redrawing of municipal boundaries in the western part of the city so that

 3     essentially the map as it had stood in -- at the end of 1991 by the end

 4     of March 19 -- I would say April 1991 -- or 1992 was essentially

 5     unrecognisable.  It was quite different.  The further implementation of

 6     the municipal strategy was seen in that a number of leading municipal SDS

 7     civilian leaders were given military functions and in fact military

 8     commands and emerged in the course of the early months of the war as

 9     significant military commanders with specific areas of responsibilities

10     and units reporting to them.

11        Q.   Perhaps we could move now to some examples of the implementation

12     that you've just cited, and in that regard could we see 65 ter number

13     01447, a November 1994 article in the news magazine of the Republika

14     Srpska Ministry of the Interior on an interview with Malko Koroman.

15     Thank you very much.

16             Dr. Donia, in preparation for your testimony today, have you seen

17     this document previously?

18        A.   Yes, I have.

19        Q.   And if we could go then to e-court page 2, just about halfway

20     down the page, and in the B/C/S version e-court page 3, second full

21     paragraph left-hand column.  I would like to draw your attention in the

22     English section to the second full paragraph after the bolded portion

23     that reads:

24             "Everybody in the former MUP knew about Pale.  They knew that

25     when we do not allow anyone to nose around there without us knowing about

Page 3127

 1     that.  In September 1991 we 'moved' the Pale municipality borders to

 2     Lapisnica, that is Brus on Trebevic, so as to protect all the Serbian

 3     places and the population that was in our territory."

 4             Dr. Donia, is this one of the examples of the different matters

 5     of implementation that you referred to, a redrawing of municipal

 6     boundaries?

 7        A.   No, this isn't specifically what I had in mind.  This is the

 8     delineation of a boundary that was to be protected or guarded by the

 9     police forces of that municipality as opposed to what I was considering

10     as the redrawing of municipal boundaries to be -- with the municipality

11     to be governed by a Serb Municipal Assembly.  It's a closely related

12     delineation of boundaries, but it's not quite the same.

13        Q.   And is this Malko Koroman interviewed in this article to your

14     knowledge the same Malko Koroman who was identified in the intercept

15     we've just listened to?

16        A.   Yes, he is.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Could that be admitted, please, Your Honours, as

18     the next exhibit.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Unless it is objected to, it will be admitted as --

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P963, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             MS. EDGERTON:

23        Q.   With regard to deconstructing or -- deconstructing

24     municipalities, perhaps I could ask for us to look at 65 ter number

25     21361, an article entitled:  "Serbs Bade Their Farewells to Sarajevo,"

Page 3128

 1     from "Oslobodjenje" dated 25 December 1991.

 2             Dr. Donia, do -- have you had an occasion to look at the document

 3     that appears on the screen in front of you in preparation for your

 4     testimony today?

 5        A.   Yes.  This is the -- an article from the Sarajevo newspaper

 6     "Oslobodjenje."  It's coverage of the Sarajevo area.

 7        Q.   And could you place the discussion that this document records,

 8     the decision to separate Ilijas municipality from the city of Sarajevo in

 9     context, please.

10        A.   Well, this article is dated only a few days after the

11     dissemination of the A/B instructions and is in part a report -- a report

12     on the implementation of those instructions with the added feature that

13     the newly formed Ilijas board elected to leave the city of Sarajevo, that

14     is, withdraw as being one of the ten municipalities of the city and

15     instead join the autonomous region of Romanija, which was the

16     Serb-created alternate -- alternative to the city of Sarajevo with

17     that -- with the name of the mountain range that is near the city.

18        Q.   Did any other Sarajevo municipality take similar steps prior to

19     this one?

20        A.   The municipality of Pale had taken the same step in very late

21     April of 1991, so about eight months prior to this.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, could this be admitted as the next

24     exhibit, please.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 3129

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P964, Your Honours.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 3        Q.   Now if we could turn to 65 ter number 30595, which is a

 4     transcript of an intercept between one Prodanovic and Jovan Tintor, and

 5     this intercept was referred to in your Sarajevo report at footnote 53.

 6     And do you recognise the document on the screen then in front of you,

 7     Dr. Donia?

 8        A.   I do not believe it is in footnote 53 of the report, but I

 9     recognise the intercept that's appeared on the screen, yes.

10        Q.   And did you have occasion to review this in preparation for your

11     testimony today?

12        A.   Yes, I did.

13        Q.   Now if we could go to e-court page 5 of the translation and B/C/S

14     page 7, please.  In e-court page 5, just above the very large paragraph,

15     Tintor's interlocutor Prodanovic asks about his house in Donja Vogosca

16     and he's advised:

17             "It belongs to SAO Romanija.  Everything from Vrelo Bosne to

18     Visoko, brother, all of it will be connected and incorporated into

19     Romanija.  Of course new municipalities will be made, a new municipality

20     is already being made, Rajlovac, which will include Zabrdje and the area

21     all the way up to Vrelo Bosne and over here to the Serbian Vogosca."

22             A couple of questions in regard to this intercept.  First of all,

23     are you familiar with Tintor?

24        A.   Yes, Mr. Tintor was a key leader of the SDS in the Vogosca

25     municipality and later on went to assume a -- I believe a position in the

Page 3130

 1     government of the Republika Srpska as well.

 2        Q.   Can you comment on the expanse of territory covered by Tintor in

 3     his response to his interlocutor and that, in particular, the new

 4     municipality which will include Zabrdje all the way up to Vrelo Bosne and

 5     over here to Serbian Vogosca?

 6        A.   Well, I'm sure this means nothing without the map in front of us,

 7     but just to put this in context:  Vrelo Bosne is -- means the source of

 8     the Bosnian river.  It is a park and recreational area in the Ilidza

 9     municipality, and on the map we were looking at yesterday would be at the

10     extreme left side of that map.  The territory that he is referring here

11     to would extend to the north and east to include the -- a broad swath of

12     territory going through Rajlovac, which is a settlement just to the north

13     of Ilidza and became a separate municipality in 1992 and over to Vogosca,

14     which is the town directly to the north of down-town Sarajevo and a --

15     one of the ten municipalities of the city.  So he's speaking about the

16     creation of a new municipality in the context here of a large territorial

17     sort of unimpeded territorial sweep where he -- are used that Serbs are

18     in the majority.

19        Q.   Thank you.  I was just getting the number of the map because it's

20     going to assist us when we deal with this next document.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, could I ask that this intercept be

22     marked for identification, please.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll mark this for identification.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI P965, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE KWON:  We don't have the audio recording for this just for

Page 3131

 1     the record?

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  That's correct, we do not.

 3             Could we move next to a further intercept between Dr. Karadzic

 4     and one Grkovic dated 22 February 1992.  That's 65 ter 30611.  30611, an

 5     intercept for which in fact we do have an audio file, but I'll not be

 6     playing it.

 7        Q.   Dr. Donia, do you see the original B/C/S transcript of that

 8     intercept on the screen in front of you, and now the English one appears

 9     as well?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Have you had an opportunity to review those in preparation for

12     your testimony today?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Now, the intercept we just discussed in which Tintor was involved

15     talked about the formation of the municipality of Rajlovac, and this

16     intercept about two-thirds of the way down the first page - if we could

17     scroll down, please, and it's also at the same location in B/C/S, thank

18     you - Ljubo Grkovic tells his interlocutor, Dr. Karadzic, that he's just

19     arrived from Reljevo saying:

20             "We established a municipality down there ..." and further

21     explains:

22             "It will be called Rajlovac Serb municipality and includes R

23     eljevo and everything until Vogosca and Ilijas and over here until Osijek

24     and the television."

25             Do you see that passage?

Page 3132

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Now I want to refer you to the map you've just referred to, the

 3     map from yesterday, Dr. Donia, P815.  P815, please.  Because, Dr. Donia,

 4     perhaps you could comment on the expanse of territory covered by these

 5     two intercepts.

 6        A.   Well, both intercepts go to the creation of the Rajlovac

 7     municipality, which was carved out as a separate municipality from the

 8     existing municipality of Novi Grad.  And that is of course in the -- just

 9     to the left centre, slightly above the centre of this map.  And one sees

10     here that the Novi Grad municipality encompassed considerable piece of

11     territory in the western part of the city and went -- actually, existed

12     both to the north and south of the main thoroughfares.  The -- Rajlovac

13     took its name from a settlement -- do I get to draw again?

14        Q.   I would invite you, if we could move past the experiences of

15     yesterday with the map.

16        A.   Okay.  Here.  And --

17        Q.   Making a blue circle just to the left of the printed words "Novi

18     Grad."

19        A.   Yes.  And Rajlovac was in fact at one time in the early years of

20     socialism a municipality on its own, but it was also this community which

21     included an airstrip and an academy for air force instruction that was

22     run by the Yugoslav People's Army.  The new municipality of -- newly

23     created municipality of Rajlovac also included Zabrdje, which was the

24     family home of Mr. Krajisnik.  And that is a little bit further north of

25     the circle that I've just indicated along -- just inside the main road,

Page 3133

 1     roughly there.  That's an approximation.

 2             So Rajlovac emerged as this new municipality on the Serb-drawn

 3     map of the western approaches as a large central area with considerable

 4     settlements but also a large swath of mountainous or very hilly territory

 5     where the words "Novi Grad" are on this map and to the north and east of

 6     that.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Doctor, if you could kindly put a letter R and Z

 8     respectively for future identification.

 9             THE WITNESS:  All right.  Let's see.  R and Zabrdje.  Okay.  Very

10     good.

11             MS. EDGERTON:

12        Q.   And -- thank you for that, Dr. Donia.  And I wonder, although it

13     might be difficult at this magnification, I wonder if you're in a

14     position to indicate approximately on this map the television station so

15     that Their Honours can get an idea of the breadth, the approximate

16     breadth of the territory to encompass this new municipality.

17        A.   Let's see here.  I'm going to pick about here for the television

18     station.  I guess it's actually a little bit closer to the road rather

19     than the railroad here, but that's approximately where it is.  And the

20     television -- what's called a television station is in fact a huge

21     concrete structure that was pretty much despised for its architecture by

22     everybody in Sarajevo and was nonetheless a very pronounced feature in

23     the western approaches area.

24        Q.   So from this succession of documents relating to Ilijas, Vogosca,

25     Rajlovac area, what do you see as being a new configuration of the

Page 3134

 1     municipal boundaries of the western approaches to the city?

 2        A.   Well, the new municipal boundaries as they ended up in early

 3     April of 1992 caused the municipalities to flank this main transportation

 4     or artery east-west rather than to flow across it, as was the case in the

 5     prior municipal organisation.  So that was accomplished by eliminating

 6     Novi Grad, creating Rajlovac as a municipality wholly on the north side

 7     of the road, and taking part of Novi Grad that was south of the road and

 8     dividing it -- if I may just do this kind of conceptually.  I really

 9     don't know exactly where the boundary ran, but taking part of it and

10     including it in Novo Sarajevo and part of it -- and including it in

11     Ilidza.  This piece here actually -- the Dobrinja settlement was included

12     in the Ilidza municipality.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Perhaps I could ask you, just as you've done with R,

14     Z, and T for the television station, T and an arrow in fact, to mark

15     Dobrinja with a D, perhaps Novo Sarajevo with NO, and Ilidza with an I?

16     Would that be appropriate, Dr. Donia?

17        A.   Well, Ilidza is I think already on the map and it was a matter of

18     redrawing the boundary of Ilidza.  Actually, that happened in mid-April.

19        Q.   So in terms of this redrawing of municipal boundaries, do you see

20     this as -- add rationale to the linkage or behind the linkage of these

21     particular areas?

22        A.   Well, it removed municipal organisation from the business of

23     having to transect -- or cross major thoroughfares and created

24     municipalities which had both a, say, a demographic population base of --

25     that were substantial -- included substantial numbers of Serbs, and left

Page 3135

 1     some Muslim settlements which were -- there were really two of them that

 2     were largely Muslim, Sokolovic, Kolonija, and Sokolija [phoen] as

 3     enclaves within these newly designed municipalities.

 4        Q.   Was this a peaceful process?

 5        A.   Well, the redrawing of the boundaries was not a violent act.  It

 6     simply established new jurisdictions that challenged the governmental

 7     jurisdiction of the city of Sarajevo and of the existing municipalities.

 8        Q.   You eluded earlier in your testimony to civilian leaders being

 9     given military functions in regard to the implementation of the municipal

10     strategy.  What was their role?  What did they do in carrying out these

11     functions?

12        A.   Well, as I indicated, they became commanders of units and led

13     people from their municipalities in establishing the Siege of Sarajevo

14     and in linking up the lines of the siege with other municipalities and

15     defining the territories which were to come under Serb control.

16        Q.   Was this a peaceful process?

17        A.   That part of it was not.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Before we move further, Your Honours, if I could

19     go back to the intercept of 65 ter 30611 between Dr. Karadzic and

20     Ljubo Grkovic of 22 February, 1992, I wonder if I could ask that be

21     marked for identification, please.

22             JUDGE KWON:  So would you like to save this marking,

23     Ms. Edgerton?

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Absolutely.  I was just going to do that next, but

25     as long as we catch both items, please.  And I would like this map as

Page 3136

 1     marked by Dr. Donia to become the next Prosecution exhibit.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P966.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  And the intercept, please.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Is this the one?

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, it is, Your Honour.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this will be MFI P967.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

10        Q.   Now, if I may, on the subject of these civilian leaders who

11     became commanders of units and led the people from their municipalities

12     in establishing the siege lines, I'd like actually to play a video-clip

13     now from 65 ter 45111 depicting an interview by Risto Djogo of

14     Jovan Tintor dating from 1994.  And before we begin the video, perhaps I

15     could ask you this, Dr. Djogo -- Dr. Donia, are you familiar with Risto

16     Djogo?

17        A.   He was a journalist who did a lot of interviews for I believe the

18     Serbian television station in Pale.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Perhaps we could play this video, which will be the

20     last video of this presentation today.

21                           [Video-clip played]

22             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

23             "Risto DJOGO:  You were in control of Zuc at the time and

24     everything else, Pofalici.  How did you see the tragedy of the Serbian

25     people in Pofalici?  You were close by.

Page 3137

 1             "Jovan TINTOR:  Well, you see, then war already began.  I don't

 2     have two minutes of military education and kind of -- but I put myself at

 3     the head of this people as the commander and kind of civilian leader.  I

 4     took the gun and organised the people the best I could.  The front line I

 5     held was big.  It wasn't only Vogosca.  I believed that I should help all

 6     Serbs living on the territories where they weren't properly connected, so

 7     I held 64 kilometres of front line.  From the Jezero hospital, that is,

 8     the child -- the maternity hospital through Vogosca over the middle,

 9     coming down on the territory -- a part of the territory of Ilijas, then

10     back across Rajlovac, Ahatovici, and a part of Ilidza.  The barracks in

11     Butim were the first barracks that were left empty, so I took my units

12     from Vogosca and filled the barracks so that it wouldn't stay empty, so

13     they would not take that territory of ours.  Because those were Serbs

14     living there.  So coming back over Sokolje again, Zuc, from Zuc, Vogosca,

15     to Potonje, again all the way to Kobilja Glava.  It's a huge territory.

16     And I came to Zuc because I considered it to be a very important

17     strategic point.  With me and lucky for me or for us I had Colonel

18     Vukota Vukovic with us who was the only officer of the JNA at the time,

19     that is, one of the individuals who offered -- who put himself at the

20     disposition of the Serbian Democratic Party, that is to say, the

21     insurgents of Serbian Vogosca.  He helped me at the very beginning, I

22     mean the beginning of the organisation of people and organisation of the

23     defence.  We went to Zuc and we conquered that very important strategic

24     point.  And we connected up with Pofalici.  However, once I officially

25     asked from Pofalici representatives to come for a discussion, they came a

Page 3138

 1     few times, and one time I said that they had to -- they did not accept

 2     that plan.

 3             After that I issued the order twice, that they have to retreat,

 4     so that we can make an action and go down to the city.  Because I was

 5     informed -- I was present at a meeting in Vrace where Mr. Kukanjac was

 6     supposed to be present too.  I wasn't lucky enough to meet him at the

 7     time, but I met our present General Subotic, President Karadzic,

 8     President Krajisnik, Mico Stanisic, Momcilo Mandic, and at that meeting

 9     we spoke about getting together to cut the city in two and, well, to

10     enter the city using that bridge, the former Brotherhood and Unity

11     Bridge."

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

13        Q.   And, Dr. Donia, before I ask you for comment on this clip, could

14     you tell us if you're familiar with some of the names identified by

15     Mr. Tintor.  First, Mr. Kukanjac?

16        A.   General Kukanjac was the JNA commander of the military district

17     centred in Sarajevo which covered essentially all of Bosnia-Herzegovina

18     and also had some residual responsibility for Croatia.

19        Q.   Mico Stanisic?

20        A.   Mr. Stanisic was a member of the government of the Bosnian Serb

21     republic when it was first proclaimed, and subsequently in I think

22     April -- March or April became the minister of the interior of that

23     government, essentially the top policeman in the Republika Srpska.

24        Q.   Momcilo Mandic?

25        A.   Was the -- Mr. Mandic was the deputy minister of the -- of the

Page 3139

 1     Ministry of the Interior who later founded the separate Serbian Ministry

 2     of the Interior and police in late March of 1992.

 3        Q.   And finally, General Subotic.

 4        A.   General Subotic was a commander in the JNA who subsequently had a

 5     major command in the Army of Republika Srpska.

 6        Q.   Now, do you have comment on this video-clip that we've just seen

 7     with regard to the theme we've been discussing of civilian leaders being

 8     given military functions or taking on military functions?

 9        A.   Well, I think he -- Mr. Tintor pretty well spelled out what those

10     military functions included.  They included establishing a line of

11     defence, taking the strategic hill of Zuc in the very heart of the

12     Rajlovac municipality, and linking up with other military units and

13     leaders as a part of the plan to establish the ring around the city of

14     Sarajevo.

15        Q.   Now, you've explained earlier that Mr. Tintor held a function in

16     Vogosca.  Did situation that he's described and the tasks he's taken on,

17     was that the case in other Sarajevo municipalities?

18        A.   Yes, it was.  It was similar process took place in Ilidza, in

19     Ilijas, and in the general area of Rajlovac.

20        Q.   Perhaps we could turn to a transcript of an intercepted

21     conversation dated 21 May 1992, 65 ter 30788, between one

22     Nedjeljko Prstojevic and Milisav Gagovic, and while we're waiting for

23     that to come up, can I ask you, Dr. Donia, are you familiar with

24     Mr. Prstojevic, do you know who he is?

25        A.   Mr. Prstojevic was the president, I believe, of the SDS party in

Page 3140

 1     Ilidza.

 2        Q.   Now, do you see the intercept on the monitor in front of you?

 3        A.   Yes, I do.

 4        Q.   Have you had occasion to review this intercept prior to -- in

 5     preparation for your testimony today?

 6        A.   Yes, I have.

 7        Q.   Would you like to comment on the intercept?

 8        A.   Well, I -- I'm not seeing it all here, so I don't know exactly

 9     what -- without seeing the whole thing, I'm not going to be able to

10     comment on it.

11        Q.   If we could move over to the next page, please.  And scroll down.

12     And I note, Dr. Donia, at the bottom of this page Mr. Prstojevic's

13     interlocutor Gagovic notes that:

14             "The Muslims are fleeing Dobrinja for no reason."

15             And then if we could scroll over to the third page.  At the top

16     of the page I note Mr. Gagovic stating:

17             "Yes, I ordered the press centre to release the information that

18     we are allowing Muslims to leave Dobrinja, but as long as it's only

19     entire families that are leaving. "

20             And further down six cells up from the bottom --

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.

22        Q.   Six cells up from the bottom Prstojevic says the words:

23             "Check-point in Nedzarici," word missing, "through towards

24     Bascarsija, they say there's a lot of living space there."

25             Does -- do you recall now the context of this conversation?

Page 3141

 1        A.   Well, it's a conversation about the rather fast-moving events in

 2     the area of the western approaches, and indicates that the Muslim

 3     population from Dobrinja, which is this large housing complex, high-rise

 4     housing complex that was built for the 1984 Olympics, is proceeding with

 5     the approval and sponsorship, if you will, of the SDS leaders.  The

 6     conversation then goes to talk about the check-point in Nedzarici, which

 7     is another location in the western approaches area, and the fact that

 8     there is a lot of empty space, presumably empty apartments in that area

 9     on the way toward -- toward the centre city.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.

11                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

12             MS. EDGERTON:

13        Q.   Perhaps, Dr. Donia, I could direct you to footnote 273 of your

14     Sarajevo report, where I believe this intercept was cited.

15        A.   Okay.  What -- I have that in front of me.

16        Q.   Do you have anything to add to your comments about this

17     intercept, looking at the citation from your report?

18        A.   Well, in the report I link this conversation with an event that

19     was taking place at that time and the -- started I believe the 20th of

20     May, in which a large convoy of a couple hundred -- or a few kilometres

21     long sponsored by the children's ambassador in Sarajevo was detained as

22     it left the city and retained -- or detained for two days while

23     negotiations proceeded involving the Red Cross to allow the children and

24     few women who were part of the convoy to exit the city.  That convoy

25     eventually was released I think on the 22nd or the 23rd of May, and it

Page 3142

 1     was -- it then proceeded I think to the Adriatic coast and left Bosnia.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, I --

 3        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Donia.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  -- I omitted to ask to tender the video which we

 5     played, 65 ter number 45111, timer number 00:22:05 to 00:26:22.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be admitted as

 8     Exhibit P968.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

10        Q.   And now not dealing with the tendering of that intercept for a

11     moment, I'd like to turn to something Mr. Prstojevic said during the

12     course of the 17th Bosnian Serb Assembly Session on 24 to 26 July 1992,

13     and that is at D00092, page 66 in English and 66 in the B/C/S.  Thank

14     you.

15             Dr. Donia, could I direct your attention in English and in B/C/S

16     to the passage towards -- no, on the bottom half of the page, please,

17     where you see Prstojevic and a colon on both sides - thank you - where

18     halfway down the paragraph in which Mr. Prstojevic begins speaking, he

19     notes:

20             "Moreover, we even did not know if Mr. Karadzic was alive during

21     the first couple of days.  When we learned that he was alive and when he

22     visited us in Ilidza and encouraged us, the Serbs from Sarajevo retained

23     control over the territory and even extended their territory in some

24     areas, driving the Muslims out of the territories where they had actually

25     been a majority."

Page 3143

 1             And ask if you have any comment on that.

 2        A.   Well, I think in one sentence here Mr. Prstojevic has summarised

 3     a lot of what happened in the western approaches simultaneously with the

 4     establishment of the siege of the city and the conquest of most of the

 5     territory in the western approaches.

 6        Q.   And do you find this statement to be reflective of any policy on

 7     the part of the SDS leaders around Sarajevo?

 8        A.   Well, it was a policy of ethnically cleansing the territories

 9     which they conquered and removing the non-Serb populations from most of

10     those territories.  It further indicates that the stated goal of previous

11     months of acquiring only Serb land was in fact considerably exceeded in

12     carrying out the action that he's describing here.

13        Q.   Thank you.  In that regard, perhaps I could ask that we - staying

14     with the same session - go to e-court page 19 of the English and page 16

15     of the B/C/S.  Now, if you could enlarge the bottom of the page, please,

16     I have to count up the number of lines.  I'm looking for the 19th line up

17     from the bottom on this English page, and I see it.

18             Dr. Donia, could I direct your attention to a statement by

19     Dr. Karadzic here at the 17th Assembly Session.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  And if you could please, Mr. Registrar, display

21     the left-hand side of the English page.  It's a little difficult to see

22     and it's cut off.

23        Q.   And I think the 19th line up Dr. Karadzic says:

24             "We do not have any more reason to fight.  We have liberated

25     almost everything that is ours.  In final talks we could even return some

Page 3144

 1     territories, villages that do not belong to us."

 2             It's been very hard to identify that passage when we don't have

 3     any paragraph indentations, but are you familiar with that passage,

 4     Dr. Donia?

 5        A.   I'm familiar with the Assembly session and as part of it familiar

 6     with this excerpt, yes.

 7        Q.   Do you have any comment in relation to this statement by

 8     Dr. Karadzic?

 9        A.   Well, I think he's stating here that the Bosnian Serb nationalist

10     conquest of territory has gone considerably beyond what had previously

11     been the territorial claims based on the identification of Serb lands.  I

12     think it also could be taken as an indication that Dr. Karadzic conceived

13     of this additional land as bargaining chips for arriving at a territorial

14     settlement to end the war.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And now if we could move briefly to the very final

16     area of questioning, I'd like to recall that yesterday in commenting on

17     Dr. Karadzic's articulations of 12 May 1992 at page 3079, line 2 and

18     onward, you said that Dr. Karadzic valued this separation of the

19     city - referring to Sarajevo - as a way of crippling or denying --

20     crippling the state or denying to the Bosnian -- to the Republic of

21     Bosnia and Herzegovina the attributes of a state."

22             Do you remember that?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   In that regard could I ask that we look at 65 ter 11570.  It's an

25     interview with Stanislav Galic in Sarajevo Srpske Novine, dated 25 March

Page 3145

 1     1994 entitled:  "Aggression in Blue."  And while we wait for that, I take

 2     it you know who Stanislav Galic is, Dr. Donia?

 3        A.   General Galic was at that time the commander of the Romanija

 4     Corps which was besieging Sarajevo.

 5        Q.   Now, I -- do you see the interview on the screen in front of you?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   And have you had an opportunity to review that in preparing for

 8     your testimony today?

 9        A.   Yes, I have.

10        Q.   Could I ask that we go to page 6 of the translation in English,

11     please, and just for the record page 2 of the B/C/S, the bullet point in

12     the middle column.  Now that we see the English translation in front of

13     us, I'd like to direct you to the question of the interviewer that

14     appears at the top of the page which says:

15             "Many people say that the keys to war or peace are held in

16     Sarajevo.  What do you think about lifting the blockade of the city?"

17             And the sixth line down from that General Galic responds:

18             "As long as we have Sarajevo in such a territory, Alija has no

19     state."

20             Do you see that in the sixth line down from the interviewer's

21     question?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Do you have any comment on that statement and General Galic's

24     articulations in this article as a whole?

25        A.   Well, in this particular passage he is echoing a thing -- a

Page 3146

 1     statement that Dr. Karadzic frequently made about the -- his observation

 2     that most civil wars end up in some sort of negotiated settlement without

 3     a winner or a loser, and that Sarajevo is the critical point, critical

 4     area, for the ultimate resolution of the war.  He then goes on to say

 5     that the critical issue in Sarajevo is to deny Izetbegovic a state and --

 6     or polity with the attributes of a state and that therefore the

 7     Sarajevo -- Sarajevo will be central in any subsequent negotiations.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I tender this as the next Prosecution

10     exhibit, please.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P969.

13             MS. EDGERTON:

14        Q.   And one final question for you, Dr. Donia, have you seen evidence

15     in these Assembly sessions and elsewhere that the strategic objectives

16     that we began our presentation with guided Bosnian Serb army operations

17     during the course of the war?

18        A.   Yes.  There are numerous references to the importance of the

19     strategic objectives in statements by military leaders, including most

20     significantly General Mladic, before the Bosnian Serb Assembly and also

21     in some of the -- I think the concepts of the strategic objectives are

22     reflected in some of the general orders that guided the military

23     offensives in the course of the war.

24        Q.   Could we see, please, 65 ter 00085, the transcript from the 50th

25     Session of the Republika Srpska Assembly, dated 15 and 16 April 1995, and

Page 3147

 1     I'm looking for page 22 of the English, please.

 2             Now, I -- and -- my apologies.  It's B/C/S page 18.

 3             Dr. Donia, I'd like to direct your attention to this statement by

 4     General Mladic that's recorded on this page and the large full paragraph

 5     in the middle of the page.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  You're going to have to scroll down, please,

 7     Mr. Registrar, and you're going to have to centre the English on the

 8     page, please, just a little bit better.  No, it's going too far over to

 9     the left.  Thank you.

10        Q.   Do you see the last sentence in this large paragraph which reads:

11             "The tasks of the army in this war stem from the known six

12     strategic objectives adopted by our Assembly which have not been carried

13     out to the full due to the lack of material or other support"?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Is this one of those statements by General Mladic regarding the

16     strategic objectives that you've referred to and seen over the course of

17     your research?

18        A.   Yes, it is.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, I'd like to move this session,

20     please, the 50th, into evidence then.

21             JUDGE KWON:  As a whole?  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P970.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  And subject to any questions Your Honours may

24     have, that concludes my examination-in-chief.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 3148

 1             Mr. Karadzic, do you like to start now or do you like to have a

 2     break before you start your cross-examination?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if it's all the same, then it

 4     would be better to take the break now and then to work until the end of

 5     the session.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Before we take a break, have we admitted the report

 7     of the doctor, Dr. Donia?

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, my apologies, my sincere apologies.

 9     Your Honours, it would be appropriate for me at this moment to move -- to

10     request to move the three reports, 65 ter number 11699, that's the

11     origins of the Republika Srpska report; 65 ter number 11700, which is

12     the -- what we've called the excerpts report throughout the presentation

13     of this evidence; and 65 ter number 21894 into evidence.  And at the same

14     time, Your Honours will recall there is of course the matter of

15     originally 19 - now I think 18 - exhibits which were identified in

16     appendix B in our notification and exhibits list which we filed for

17     Dr. Donia in February of this year.  A number of those documents,

18     Your Honour, I think three, I can perhaps stand to be corrected if I turn

19     to my copy of the filing beside me, are transcripts of intercepted

20     communications relating to the September incident Dr. Donia was

21     discussing in his evidence earlier today.

22             JUDGE KWON:  By appendix B, do you refer to the several documents

23     in the -- attached to Sarajevo report, including maps?

24             MS. EDGERTON:  No, Your Honours.  By appendix B I'm referring to

25     our filing of 5 February 2010, which attached two lists of documents,

Page 3149

 1     those which we would be referring to -- we would be using in evidence

 2     with Dr. Donia and a further 19, as I said now I think 18, selected

 3     sources used by Dr. Donia in compiling the reports for admission.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  So let me be clear.  How many are there for items

 5     that would be using in evidence, 18 and further 19?  So have you used all

 6     18 or are you suggesting to tender those documents which were not used

 7     during the course of your examination-in-chief?

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Appendix A was the -- is the list of documents

 9     from which we drew the evidence we've exhibited during the course of

10     Dr. Donia's presentation today; and appendix B is exactly as you've

11     described, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE KWON:  We'll hear from the Defence.

13             Mr. Robinson.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  First of all, with respect to

15     the second report of Dr. Donia, the excerpts, we note that in the Perisic

16     case the Trial Chamber excluded that because it was not really an expert

17     report.  If you -- we believe that the underlying Assembly session

18     records should be admitted, and if you find it convenient to have

19     excerpts from Dr. Donia, then you certainly can admit the report if you

20     would like.  And we would seek probably when we have Defence expert

21     witnesses to use the same procedure.  So we don't have any particularly

22     strong objection, but we do note in another instance it has been

23     rejected.

24             If I can -- also I wanted to turn to the appendix B, but perhaps

25     Mr. Tieger can address this point now if he would like.

Page 3150

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 3             In that connection we have had the opportunity to discuss this

 4     matter with Mr. Robinson, and we certainly don't suggest that the

 5     excerpts report should come in without the benefit of the underlying

 6     Assembly sessions.  And to provide the Court with a broader overview of

 7     this, pursuant to the Court's encouragement following the decision on

 8     further guide-lines for admission, we did meet with Mr. Robinson to

 9     discuss the possibility of reaching agreement on certain documents.

10             I'm sure it won't surprise the Court, given what it's already

11     heard about the Assembly sessions, that those were the first items on our

12     agenda for agreement.  And we agreed to, at least momentarily, defer the

13     submission of a joint -- joint submission in connection with the Assembly

14     sessions because of Dr. Donia's testimony and reports, concluding that it

15     would be preferable to seek to jointly agree to the admission of those

16     Assembly sessions referenced in Dr. Donia's reports.  And I would note

17     that all of the Assembly sessions, I'm advised by Mr. Sladojevic, appear

18     on the list of Defence documents to be cross-examined, another reflection

19     of the significance regarding those documents and the anticipation by the

20     parties of their extensive use during the course of these proceedings.

21             So again, to follow-up on Mr. Robinson's comments, we didn't

22     anticipate that the excerpts report would come in without the benefit of

23     the underlying Assembly sessions, and we agree that they should be

24     admitted.

25             JUDGE KWON:  As regards the remaining documents, other parts?

Page 3151

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, thank you, Mr. President.  With respect to

 2     appendix B, I note that at least one of those documents has already been

 3     admitted, directive 3, I believe, was admitted through cross-examination,

 4     so perhaps that list might have to be paired a little bit.  But also I

 5     would note that it seems to fall outside of the guide-lines of the

 6     Chamber since it wasn't put to the witness, and he's not actually a

 7     92 ter witness.  But having said those things, once again we do encourage

 8     the admissibility of documents which seem to be relevant to the case and

 9     these do seem to be relevant.  So if you're willing to see that something

10     outside your guide-lines may nevertheless be admitted, we don't have any

11     problem having the documents in appendix B admitted.

12             JUDGE KWON:  And you have no objection to the reports themselves?

13             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             We will give our ruling after the break.  We will break for 25

16     minutes.

17                           --- Recess taken at 5.07 p.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 5.35 p.m.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, the -- given the reports are his

20     product of his expertise and also the -- that basically there was no

21     objection from the Defence and finally that particularly in relation to

22     the thematic excerpts, although they are the collection of excerpts, the

23     manner it is organised or categorised can be viewed as an exercise of his

24     expertise.  So we will admit the three reports, all of them.  And as to

25     the appendix B, we are satisfied with the probative value or reliability

Page 3152

 1     and that is the way it is tendered is consistent with our guide-lines and

 2     our previous decision.  But certain items have been already admitted and

 3     the -- being consistent with our practice, we will not admit the

 4     intercepts, and I don't think we need to mark for it, given that they are

 5     not played during the court session.

 6             As for the appendix A, which was supposed to be used during the

 7     examination-in-chief, we will admit only those part that were actually

 8     used during the -- during your examination-in-chief.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Of course, Your Honour.  Thank you very much.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Donia.

15        A.   "Dobra dan."

16        Q.   I'm glad that you speak our language, so it will be easier for us

17     to understand each other.  Tell me, please.  What case is this for you, I

18     mean in which you're testifying, number what?

19        A.   I'm not certain exactly, but I think it's about 15.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me how was it that you established contact with

21     the OTP and the Tribunal?  Did they seek you out or did you recommend

22     yourself?

23        A.   Back in 1997 I received a phone call from a Prosecutor, asking if

24     I was interested in considering testifying in the Blaskic case.  So that

25     was initiated by the Prosecution.  I was employed in other things at the

Page 3153

 1     time and didn't have much interest in doing it at first, but indeed did

 2     pursue it.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Why did you come to their minds?  What was it that

 4     recommended you to them?

 5        A.   I understand from speaking with them further that I was

 6     recommended by Dr. Dennison Rusinow who is a long -- was a long -- he

 7     passed away a few years ago, a long-time scholar of the former

 8     Yugoslavia, lived for a long time in Zagreb and wrote a number of books

 9     and many individual articles about the history of the region.  They spoke

10     to him.  He was, for I don't know what reasons, either not selected or

11     chose not to participate and so he recommended me.

12        Q.   Thank you.  At that point in time you were in Merrill Lynch in

13     actual fact, but you were certainly not a scholar.  You were not involved

14     in history at that point in time?

15        A.   That's correct.

16        Q.   And what was it that guided this gentleman to recommend you?

17     Could he not have thought of someone who was actively engaged in history

18     at some institute?

19        A.   I rather suspect he did.  He may have given them several names to

20     suggest.  I really don't know.  We had known one another well for at that

21     point 20 years, so he knew my -- not only my writings but my other

22     activities in life and teachings.  So I would assume that he was -- I was

23     one of several people that he suggested to the Prosecution.

24        Q.   Thank you.  So he was aware of your writings and of your views;

25     right?

Page 3154

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  You say that at first you were not very keen on this.

 3     What was your motive to accept this after all?

 4        A.   Well, I wasn't keen on it because I had a full-time job and was

 5     otherwise engaged, but I did agree to just come and explore and see what

 6     the work entailed.  I knew at that point that I wouldn't have time to

 7     pursue really much independent research or preparation, but could perhaps

 8     call on my knowledge at that point.  So the question in my mind was

 9     whether I would be able to take the time to do the preparation that they

10     would require for work that I'm doing now.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have to leave your old job then or did you

12     keep it?

13        A.   No.  I stayed in that position until -- to say this was 1997 when

14     I interviewed with them, I stayed in that position until the fall of

15     2000, my position with Merrill Lynch.

16        Q.   Did you leave them then or was it that Merrill Lynch faced

17     difficulties then or was it that they faced difficulties later after all?

18        A.   Well, I'd like to say that everything was fine when I was there.

19     They in fact did face severe difficulties later on, but I probably left

20     at about the best time prior to the down side to -- both in the market as

21     a whole and at the firm.

22        Q.   And what have you been doing since then?

23        A.   I teach occasionally.  I've taught one course at the University

24     of California at San Diego.  I've taught on numerous occasions at the

25     University of Michigan.  I've done -- probably devoted the bulk of my

Page 3155

 1     time to research and writing in the ten years since I left Merrill Lynch.

 2        Q.   Can one make a living like that?

 3        A.   One can make a living having worked for Merrill Lynch.  One

 4     cannot make a living doing the things that I have been doing since then.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now, tell me who provided the titles to those works

 6     of yours, your studies and reports?

 7        A.   I did.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now, are you the author of these works?

 9        A.   Yes, I am.  I'm not the author of the excerpts, but I'm the

10     author of the two reports and selected the excerpts as indicated to in a

11     sense make it a coherent narrative.

12        Q.   Perhaps it's not a scientific work, a scholarly work - correct me

13     if I'm wrong - but it is a professional work based on scientific truths.

14     Would that be right?

15        A.   I'm not too sure what the difference is.  I certainly followed

16     the normal professional procedures in preparing all three reports and

17     tried to adhere to the canons of the professional in preparing them.

18        Q.   And were you given an assignment by the Prosecution; and if so,

19     how was the assignment worded?

20        A.   Well, in each case in which I've been involved, I have first sat

21     down with the Prosecutor and discussed what the Prosecutor wanted in

22     terms of a report, by which I mean what the topic was to be, if there was

23     a question of the chronological framework within which the report should

24     be confined or a particular municipality or set of municipalities or the

25     entire Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It just depended on what the Prosecutor

Page 3156

 1     requested.  My feeling was that it is up to the Prosecutor to outline,

 2     essentially set the boundaries, of where my reports would lie.  It's my

 3     job then to work within those boundaries to create an account as best I

 4     can from the sources and information I have.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now, what are your obligations towards the OTP in

 6     general terms?  Do you have to adhere to their views and the tasks that

 7     they set you and live up to their expectations?

 8        A.   Well, I have to prepare a report within the guide-lines that they

 9     establish, they set.  Those guide-lines are not qualitative or they don't

10     prescribe any particular viewpoint, but -- so I'm free to have different

11     views or interpretations, both in the written reports and testimony, and

12     actually have never been asked to adhere to a particular viewpoint,

13     either in the report or my oral -- verbal testimony.

14        Q.   Now, could we get hold of those guide-lines perhaps, the

15     guide-lines that they provided you with, the Prosecution I mean?

16        A.   Well, as I indicated in -- I think in every case, they were

17     verbal.  They were a result of a discussion between us.  And so there's

18     no written guide-lines that have ever been provided to me that I can

19     recall.

20        Q.   Thank you.  We received some correspondence, so I was asking

21     about the instructions and guide-lines.  But anyway, who chose the

22     material that you were to study?

23        A.   Well, most of it I acquired myself.  The exception being the

24     documentation that's provided to me by the Prosecution typically at my

25     request, which usually starts out with a very general request and gets

Page 3157

 1     more specific as I'm carving out the report itself.  So my -- I think

 2     what I bring to the table perhaps more than anything else is a lot of use

 3     of independent sources, sources that the Prosecution may think are

 4     inconsequential or not available to them or in other ways are not a part

 5     of their database.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And did you have an insight into all the material

 7     that you wanted to see?  Did you decide on the selection of material or

 8     did somebody propose what they thought you should look at?

 9        A.   I think I'd say I've never been 100 per cent fully satisfied with

10     what I was given.  I have asked for a great deal and been given a great

11     deal, but usually there was something else that I wish I had and

12     sometimes something that occurs to me much later on that I wished I had

13     asked for.  But in general, I would say the Prosecution has responded to

14     my specific requests for documentation on the themes that I'm working on.

15        Q.   I see that you devoted quite a lot of attention to statements

16     made in newspapers and in interviews.  Now, do you agree - and we should

17     check this out first - whether the statements were authorised, whether

18     they were accepted or disputed?  And when someone gives statements to

19     newspapers, they usually have a political note and are usually different

20     to what we say when we're under oath.  Would that be right?

21        A.   There's a few different questions there.  Do I check to see if

22     the statements were authorised.  You mean the statements that are

23     published in the periodical press?

24        Q.   Yes.  For instance, did somebody actually say what the newspaper

25     printed or was it the journalist's interpretation of what was said?

Page 3158

 1        A.   I think in the newspapers that I consulted, the journalist

 2     normally distinguishes between a direct quote or what specifically was

 3     said and the interpretation.  Now, not every newspaper does that, I

 4     recognise, but I've mainly been using sources that follow that

 5     journalistic canon.  And so I would -- for example, speeches that you've

 6     made, there are a lot of direct quotes, and I have relied on those quotes

 7     or press releases, things like that.  But to be honest I didn't call you

 8     up and ask you if you had said those things.  Your number was unlisted

 9     through much of the time.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now, would you agree with me that statements and

11     speeches, that they have a political goal as well?

12        A.   Many do, yes.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now, did you have an insight into the documents and

14     the behaviour of other parties in the conflict, just like those that you

15     studied on the Serb side, analogous to those?

16        A.   I have and have paid some attention to them, but in the cases of

17     the reports before us they weren't my primary target and area of

18     interest.  As you may know, I've prepared some reports about the HVO,

19     Herceg-Bosna, essentially the Croatian nationalist undertaking.  And for

20     studying those, that movement, I used documents of that party.  I'm

21     familiar with many of the other sources for the study of other parties,

22     including the social democratic party and the left opposition and the

23     SDA.  I have not consulted the vast majority of them.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now, yesterday you mentioned that it was the job of a

25     historian to study the cause and effect, relationship, and to look at the

Page 3159

 1     context of issues - you mentioned that yesterday I believe.  Did you do

 2     that in this particular case?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   You also said that the Serbs - and then you quoted my

 5     words - saying that we waited for them to make a mistake or make a move

 6     and then we responded with a counter measure.  Now, our counter measures,

 7     when you showed them did you show what caused these counter measures and

 8     caused that kind of conduct on our part?

 9        A.   In some cases, yes; and in others no I think.

10        Q.   Why not in all cases?

11        A.   Well, it wasn't central to the story or sufficiently central to

12     fulfil the assignment.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I hope we'll arrive at that together now.  But a

14     personal question now.  What are the earnings per case and per day in

15     this job?

16        A.   Well --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Is it relevant, Dr. Karadzic?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think, Your Excellency,

19     that it is indeed and you'll see why.

20             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, I think you need to tell us why before the

21     witness answers the question, Dr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, because we're all human

23     beings, and if you imagine that Mr. Donia did something that the

24     Prosecution didn't like, would he be testifying 15 times?  Certainly not

25     because they have their own interests in all of that.  So I'm interested

Page 3160

 1     in knowing how come the Prosecution has some favourite witnesses and

 2     keeps bringing them back in.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We don't think it's relevant.  Move on to your next

 4     question.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Now, in your report about Sarajevo, Mr. Donia, on page 2 you

 8     speak about nations and nationalist movements.  Do you distinguish

 9     between national and nationalistic?

10        A.   Very good question.  It's a distinction that is a major one in

11     B/C/S.  And when I'm addressing these issues in B/C/S I usually use the

12     term "national."  And I'm very reluctant to call anything nationalist --

13     nationalistic.  In English to me the distinction is somewhat different.

14     In fact, there's very little distinction.  So I freely use the term

15     "nationalist" to describe all three parties, for example, in

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina, to distinguish them from what I conceive of as

17     non-nationalist political formations and non-nationalist attitudes.

18        Q.   Thank you.  So the three parties that you talk about are not

19     nationalist, but national, if we look at the Serbian language; would that

20     be right?

21        A.   I would call them that, yes.  I would use that term in describing

22     them, and I do when I am using that language.

23        Q.   Thank you.  So it's not a disqualification of any kind, it's not

24     a value judgement, political judgement, to say nationalist movement using

25     the English?

Page 3161

 1        A.   That is my intent, that it not be judgemental.  It's not a

 2     condemnation.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Next what I'm interested in is a paragraph where you

 4     opt for Professor Paula Pickering's position, and she considers that

 5     we're not born in a nation and that cultural identity does not exist, but

 6     that a nation -- a nation is an environmentalist creation or socially

 7     conditioned creation.  Would that be right?

 8        A.   Insofar as you just quoted this excerpt, yes.  I used that very

 9     brief passage to summarise what I consider a vast school of thinking

10     about the constructed nature of nations or peoples and would kind of let

11     her stand for this group of people that includes Benedict Anderson,

12     Rogers Brubaker, Ron Sunia [phoen], and a host of other scholars who

13     think of nations in this way.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Now, at one point - and we'll come to that - you said

15     you were very happy when you saw that these ethnic borders aren't visible

16     between municipalities or among municipalities.  So I wanted to ask you:

17     Is this your basis for opting for Ms. Pickering's view, is that your

18     basis for the standpoint, too, to the effect that the Croats and Serbs in

19     Bosnia should have agreed to create a new nation in Bosnia?

20        A.   Insofar as I understand your question to be that -- or you're

21     asking me whether I opt to quote Professor Pickering because of my view

22     that -- or it is my view that the Serbs and Croats wouldn't agree to form

23     a new Bosnian nation, that would be wrong.  I kind of start the other way

24     around.  Looking at the current thinking about nations and peoples, to

25     approach and better understand the nature of nationalism and the three

Page 3162

 1     nationalisms in Bosnia.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now, would you agree with Edouard Balladur, the

 3     former prime minister of France, and I do I believe that this is the

 4     position of other scholars, that a nation starts by superseding tribalism

 5     and tribes within one national group, that that is transcended?

 6        A.   As a very partial statement of how nations develop, yes, I would

 7     agree with that but I would say it's very incomplete, particularly in the

 8     light of our current understandings of how nations are formed.

 9        Q.   And would you agree that nations were formed in the 19th century

10     and that it is difficult to form a new nation in the 20th century?

11        A.   No.  It's always difficult to form a new nation, and the point is

12     that nations are always in flux.  They can appear and disappear and they

13     are always changing their boundaries, their content, and for that matter

14     the programmes of their political leaders.

15        Q.   Let us put aside the fact that you've probably heard of -- well,

16     you know about Jung's work and Zondi's on the collective familiar

17     subconscious and unconscious and Freud's views, that this is -- would you

18     agree that this is just one-sided and that we should quote other authors

19     that have -- that talk about other effects, apart from the social and the

20     environmental in the creation of a nation?

21        A.   Well, I think you're wading into an area about which there is a

22     huge literature and many differences of opinion in terms of exactly how

23     many and what elements should be included in examining the origins and

24     development of a nation.  You are citing people that you know better than

25     I do in terms of their psychological expertise, and certainly it would be

Page 3163

 1     true that a comprehensive study of how a particular nation arises and

 2     develops should take into account the psychological viewpoint of those

 3     matters.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Do you nonetheless think that the Serbs and Croats

 5     should have accepted an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unitary

 6     state as conceived by the SDA and Mr. Izetbegovic?

 7        A.   Should have accepted, well things would have been much simpler if

 8     they had.  I don't know that the premises of your question -- that I

 9     would agree with all of them.  I don't necessarily think that the

10     conception of the SDA and Mr. Izetbegovic is best described as a unitary

11     state, but I would I guess point out that this is really the -- goes to

12     the heart of the difference between what happened in the former

13     Yugoslavia and what happened as the Soviet Union broke apart, where the

14     independence of the various republics that made up the Soviet Union,

15     which contained in them about 25 million Russians in the near abroad, did

16     not contest the independence of the republics in withdrawing from the

17     Soviet Union and didn't have the kinds of linkages with the leadership of

18     the parent republic.  That was the case in Yugoslavia.  That it was a

19     huge difference and many of those leaders of the Russian communities in

20     the near abroad, in fact, participated in the push for independence.

21             So it is not out of the question that one should think that the

22     Serbs could have accepted an independent state and lived happily in it,

23     but do I think they should have -- I wouldn't presume to prescribe that.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Well, I'm sure you agree that the Soviet Union was

25     created in one way and Yugoslavia was created in a different way, with

Page 3164

 1     the Trianon Agreement, the Saint-Germain Agreement after the First World

 2     War?

 3        A.   They certainly were created in two different ways, and of course

 4     Yugoslavia was created twice and a different time each way -- or a

 5     different way each time.

 6        Q.   And that other way, was it a democratic way?

 7        A.   No.

 8        Q.   Do you think that the Serbs in Krajina and Bosnia would have

 9     accepted to remain in those republics if the condition for that had not

10     been the existence of Yugoslavia?

11        A.   I'm sorry.  I'm not -- I don't understand the question.

12        Q.   Well, the question is the following:  Croatia was formed from

13     Croatia and the Serbian Krajina, and the Serbian Krajina was given to the

14     Serb people by Austro-Hungary.  And the Serbs agreed to become -- to join

15     Croatia, but they were a constituent people.  In all the post-war years,

16     it was a dual-nation republic of the Serbs and the Croats.  That's right,

17     isn't it?

18        A.   There's several questions here.  The assumption that the Serbs

19     were a constituent people is of course a statement out of Yugoslav

20     constitutional theory, and I don't have any problem agreeing that under

21     that theory they were a constituent people of Yugoslavia.  The issue of

22     whether they were a constituent people in Croatia, I'm just afraid I'm

23     not able to answer because I don't pretend to be an expert on the

24     constitutional theory of the -- of either Croatia or the former

25     Yugoslavia.

Page 3165

 1             I wouldn't agree with your formulation about the Serbian Krajina

 2     being given to the Serb people by Austro-Hungary.  That's not the case.

 3        Q.   And do you know that the Serbs were given autonomous rights in

 4     Austro-Hungary for having defended the area from the Turks?

 5        A.   Well, they weren't given autonomous rights by Austro-Hungary

 6     because Austro-Hungary didn't exist before 1867.  The Krajina area was,

 7     in fact, the beneficiary of autonomous rights, which drew many Serbs to

 8     the area to populate the military frontier region.  And they were engaged

 9     in military actions at times, usually with people on the other side who

10     in many cases were Serbs as well.  So I wouldn't agree with the

11     formulation that they were actually fighting against the Turks as

12     their -- certainly not as their sole activity in manning the military

13     frontier.

14        Q.   Well, I think that we can agree that it was Austria first and

15     then Austro-Hungary later.  But we're not disputing the fact that the

16     Serbs were given autonomous rights in Krajina, today's Krajina, and that

17     they were given them by Austria; right?

18        A.   Well, just to get the chronology right, the -- most of those --

19     many of those Serbs actually relocated, migrated, or moved to the area

20     and were rewarded with the autonomous rights particularly of the church,

21     the Serbian Orthodox church, and some administrative autonomy as well.

22        Q.   I was just waiting for the interpretation.  That's why I paused

23     for a moment.  But do you know who the "ktitor" of the Krka monastery,

24     the head priest of the Krka monastery?  It's the Orthodox monastery.

25        A.   No.

Page 3166

 1        Q.   The endowment.

 2             That was far before Austria, the Nemanjic dynasty and endowment.

 3             But let me ask you this, Mr. Donia:  Do you know how those lands

 4     became united, the lands which were within Austro-Hungary?  Vojvodina was

 5     different, but today's territory of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and

 6     Herzegovina, how they united with Serbia?

 7        A.   Well, the actual proclamation of Yugoslavia which was on 1

 8     December 1918 brought those lands together with the Kingdom of Serbia and

 9     Montenegro to form the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

10        Q.   All right.  But how did they unite?  Do you agree that before

11     that a state was formed of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in this united

12     area, this united territory, and that that territory united with Serbia.

13     It didn't last long, but it has to be established so that America would

14     agree to the united state ultimately.

15        A.   Again, a number of questions there.  I think I just described how

16     the state was actually formed.  It was formed by proclamation of the

17     Serbian prince regent Aleksandar on December 1, 1918.  It -- there

18     certainly were -- there was a Yugoslav committee formed prior to the

19     proclamation in the course of the First World War, and the Corfu

20     declaration of 1917 set the stage in a sense for that unification, but

21     the act itself was a -- not really a -- didn't have a whole lot to do

22     with the international, let alone, American participation in creating the

23     Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

24        Q.   Let us try to clarify this.  Do you agree that the Nis

25     declaration and the Korfu declaration in actual fact meant that the Serbs

Page 3167

 1     had given up on creating Serbia, rather they advocated the creation of a

 2     joint state of the southern Slavs?  That's a pretty easy question.  It

 3     can be answered just by yes or no.

 4        A.   No.

 5        Q.   So how were things then?

 6        A.   Well, I think many Serbs saw the Yugoslav state as an expanded

 7     Serbia and saw no inconsistency between wanting to see an expanded Serb

 8     state and calling it the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.  So I

 9     wouldn't -- I can't agree with you that the Serbs gave up on creating

10     Serbia at that point.  That would not be consistent with the flow of

11     events that resulted in the creation of the kingdom.

12        Q.   Tell us then, after 1918 when did Serbia first come into being,

13     the Banovinas included.  Serbia disappeared in 1918, it melded into

14     Yugoslavia, but when did it reappear?

15        A.   That's a good question.  I guess it first reappeared as a

16     separate polity in 1941, and as the -- through the creation of the German

17     occupation.  There were certainly -- one of the Banovinas favoured Serbia

18     to be sure, but that really was not a separate polity.  And then after

19     that would have come into -- came into being with the proclamation of

20     socialist Yugoslavia.

21        Q.   However, do you agree that that Serbia, Nedic's Serbia, came into

22     being on the basis of the remnants that were left over after the

23     dismembering by the neighbours carried out, that this is what was left

24     over after all the neighbours of Serbia dismembered Serbia and this was

25     what was left over and then Nedic was compelled to become prime minister?

Page 3168

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   So how was it then?

 3        A.   Well, I think the -- you know, the -- the Serbian occupation

 4     polity under Nedic was a -- was indeed a creature of convenience for the

 5     German occupiers, but I wouldn't describe it as all that was left after

 6     the neighbours had dismembered Serbia, no.

 7        Q.   Did Hungary take Vojvodina then?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Did Bulgaria take Macedonia and parts of Serbia?

10        A.   Bulgaria did take effectively all of Macedonia and a little bit

11     of Serbia.

12        Q.   Did Albania take Kosovo as assisted by Italy?

13        A.   Much of it, not all of it.

14        Q.   Did Croatia take Zemun and did it get to the other side of the

15     river viewed from Belgrade, all the way to Zemun, all the way to Zemun?

16     Zemun and Zagreb were territorially linked.  It was contiguous territory

17     in a single country?

18        A.   That's correct.

19        Q.   So Serbia was dismembered, wasn't it?

20        A.   Well, Serbia didn't exist before that.  Yugoslavia was

21     partitioned by the occupying powers, and parts of it were given to

22     neighbouring states that were considered allies or allies of the Germans

23     and Italians in 1941.  So I don't know that you can talk about Serbia

24     being partitioned when it as a polity didn't exist at that time.  It was

25     a dismemberment of Yugoslavia that took place, and each part that was

Page 3169

 1     sort of hived off was given to someone else or stood alone.

 2        Q.   Did Croatia take all of Bosnia-Herzegovina and part of Srem and

 3     so on and so forth?

 4        A.   Well, I probably put it that all of Bosnia-Herzegovina and part

 5     of Srem were given by the German occupiers and to some degree the Italian

 6     occupiers to the independent state of Croatia.  I don't know that Croatia

 7     was in a position to take anything at that point other than what they

 8     were given to administer by the Germans.

 9        Q.   We'll go back to the independent state of Croatia, the NDH,

10     that's a very important subject.  But now let me ask you this:  Do you

11     remember what it was that the Allies offered to Yugoslavia in the London

12     Agreement of 1915 -- actually, what it was that they offered to the

13     Serbs?  Yes, the Serbs?

14        A.   No.

15        Q.   Do you remember that their offer to the Serbs was a western

16     boundary of the Serb lands along the Virovitica-Karlobag-Karlovac line?

17        A.   I don't have any recollection or knowledge of that, no.

18        Q.   That is a very important point because Serbia had suffered a

19     great deal and the western Allies had made an offer to Serbia to forget

20     about Slovenia and Croatia and to create a Serbia, and in Corfu they made

21     a different decision, they passed the Corfu Declaration.  Isn't that

22     right?

23        A.   As I say, I can't confirm that or don't have the information to

24     either agree or disagree with that.

25        Q.   All right.  Those are historical facts.  We'll deal with that

Page 3170

 1     easily.  You mentioned the Yugoslav committee.  Do you know that the

 2     Yugoslav committee existed in Zagreb and in Split -- actually, do you

 3     know about that, that they existed in Zagreb and in Split and the one in

 4     Zagreb consisted of Slovenes as well; right?

 5        A.   Yes.  The Yugoslav committee had representatives I think from

 6     Slovenes, Croats, I think even one Bosnian or two -- maybe one or two

 7     Bosnian members, and Serbs.  It was a committee made up of people who

 8     were preparing to come together to form the kingdom.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that the Split committee had blackmailed

10     the Zagreb committee?  They said either go and strike a deal with the

11     Karadjordjevics or we will decide to the effect that Dalmatia will join

12     Serbia.  Are you aware of that?

13        A.   No.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D1369 or 1?  What was

16     it?  1361.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   So do you remember the 14 points of Woodrow Wilson, Mr. Donia?

19        A.   I couldn't name them, no.  I know there were 14 and that he was

20     famous for them, so to that degree, yes.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the Serbian version as

22     well -- oh, no, there isn't one.  Sorry.  So then can we just have one so

23     we can see it better in English.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   So we can agree -- or rather, you will agree that on the 8th of

Page 3171

 1     January, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson presented his 14 points to the US

 2     Congress and that they contained a basis for achieving a lasting peace in

 3     Europe; isn't that right?

 4        A.   That was his intent, yes.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  That is what he made public and that was what paved

 6     the way for the end of the First World War.  The US was always a major

 7     power, wasn't it?

 8        A.   No, it wasn't.  It certainly -- the United States played an

 9     important role in the latter, particularly in the latter year and a half

10     or two of the First World War and was an important player in the

11     diplomatic arrangements that were brought about, but not as -- let's --

12     let me just say the principles that you see here that Wilson laid out

13     were probably not as influential as some idealistic historians have

14     proposed in actually ending the conflict.

15        Q.   However, you do accept that there are such historians who claim

16     that these 14 points were the basis for the establishment of peace in

17     Europe and for Germany's surrender; right?  It's a large number of

18     historians who believe that; isn't that right?

19        A.   No so many anymore, but certainly there have been.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we scroll down a bit.  Can

21     we -- yes, yes.  We need that part of the document.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Donia, that the principle of self-determination

24     of nations was established then and it was proposed by America through

25     its very president, Woodrow Wilson?

Page 3172

 1        A.   I wouldn't agree it was established then.  I would concur that it

 2     was proposed by Woodrow Wilson in this document and that it seriously

 3     failed in the actual application of the principles to the making of the

 4     peace.

 5        Q.   And is this principle of the self-determination of peoples and

 6     nations part and parcel of the international covenant on human rights?

 7     Did anyone else propose that before Wilson?  Let's put it that way.

 8        A.   I'm sure it was around before Wilson.  The principle, of course,

 9     of self-determination of peoples is -- goes back much further than this,

10     but the -- it's also, you know, one of several principles which often

11     enter into conflict in the -- both the sense of international law, but

12     also more importantly - and I wouldn't speak to the international law

13     side of it - but in the actual implementation of agreements based on it.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that the principle of self-determination

15     of peoples is part of the international covenant on human rights?

16        A.   Yes, yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Would you like to read point 11 out of the 14.

18        A.   "Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied

19     territories restored; Serbia accorded the free and secure access to the

20     sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another

21     determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of

22     allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political

23     and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan

24     states should be entered into."

25        Q.   Do you see, Mr. Donia, that your country owes us access to the

Page 3173

 1     sea?

 2        A.   No, I don't.

 3        Q.   But you see, we want the right to access to the sea and we

 4     carried it through, through the establishment of two Yugoslavias, but now

 5     we, that is to say, Serbia and Republika Srpska, are landlocked.

 6        A.   If you're suggesting that on the basis of Woodrow Wilson's

 7     proclamation of 1918 that the United States owes any country in 2010

 8     access to the sea, I think that's kind of an absurd proposition.  The

 9     nature of this document is not a promise for all time and eternity; it's

10     a set of guide-lines that Wilson hoped would lead to a conclusion of the

11     First World War.

12        Q.   It wasn't only Wilson.  It was accepted by both the House and the

13     Senate; right?

14        A.   I don't have much good to say about either of those right now

15     either, but that still would not make it a policy commitment of the

16     United States for all time and eternity.

17        Q.   May I remind you what was promised in 1915 to the Kingdom of

18     Serbia by the London Conference -- or rather, the Allies, Britain,

19     France, and Russia, before the revolution broke out.  The Dalmatian coast

20     from Krka to Ston was promised to the Kingdom of Serbia.  Do you know

21     that that coast had belonged to the Serbian Emperor Dusan; right?

22        A.   You asked two questions, one about the London Agreement or London

23     Conference of 1915, and I indicated that I'm not aware of what the London

24     Conference promised or if it promised anything at that time.  Was the

25     Dalmatian coast from Krka to Ston belonged to the Serbian Emperor Dusan,

Page 3174

 1     I think much of it did.  Frankly, that was a time when maps didn't have a

 2     whole lot of meaning in that regard, and it's been owned and occupied by

 3     a number of different polities both before and since then.  So I wouldn't

 4     want on that basis to conclude that it should be part of Serbia today or

 5     at any time after that, really.

 6        Q.   But you will agree that occupation is one thing and an integral

 7     part of a state with a population that speaks the same language and that

 8     share the same religion is a completely different matter.  So it is from

 9     that point of view that that area belonged to the Serbia of Emperor Dusan

10     at the time and that is quite different from foreign occupation; right?

11        A.   I wouldn't agree with your characterisation of the Serbian empire

12     under Dusan as a state with a population that all spoke the same language

13     and shared the same religion.  I think that's a stretch, a real stretch,

14     to suggest that.  And I didn't refer to foreign populations.  I said that

15     the area has been owned and occupied by a number of different polities,

16     both before and since then and Venice among them.  But -- the Ottoman

17     Empire in parts.  The fact that a given piece of real estate was at one

18     time part of any polity doesn't mean that it should -- that that polity

19     should reacquire that territory six centuries later.  That's just a -- I

20     think a kind of a contentious use of the historical record to suggest a

21     territorial claim.

22        Q.   Well, you should tell the Allies that.  You should have said it

23     to them in London in 1915.  Emperor Dusan stated which the languages of

24     his empire were.  He bore the title of the king of Serbs and Arbanians

25     and Greeks; right?

Page 3175

 1        A.   Well, I probably was not in a position to say much to the London

 2     Conference in 1915.  I don't know what Emperor Dusan's title or position

 3     really has to do with the issue of territorial claim.  The fact of the

 4     matter is that kings acquired titles periodically throughout their reign,

 5     lost them again, and so I think on the basis of a king holding a title to

 6     a piece of territory six centuries ago doesn't really represent a very

 7     convincing claim to territory today.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, albeit very interesting, we've been

 9     into this historical discussion for more than an hour.  When will we come

10     to 1990s?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We're getting there, Excellency.  I

12     just want to put the following to Mr. Donia.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   We are not saying all of this for the sake of Emperor Dusan;

15     rather, that was the basis for making an offer to Serbia in 1915 and it

16     consisted of the following, the Dalmatian coast, and you know that there

17     was a large Serb population there, Split, Brac, all of

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina, Srem, Backa, Slavonia -- well, Slavonia although

19     Italy opposed it, and some parts of Albania.  So in 1915 Serbia refused

20     that.  That is the information that they received on the 4th of August,

21     1915, but Serbia refused that all for the sake of the pan-Yugoslav idea.

22     Isn't that the case, yes or no?

23        A.   I don't know.

24        Q.   Well, thank you.  But I don't know who I'm going to discuss this

25     with if you don't know about this.

Page 3176

 1             Now, let me remind you of something else.  The state of the

 2     Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was it not proclaimed with the intent of

 3     unifying with Serbia if it was proclaimed as a united state.  The

 4     Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, did they not constitute this state that came

 5     into being?  These were territories that were set free with the decline

 6     of Austro-Hungary, along with the 14 points of Woodrow Wilson.

 7        A.   Now, what's the question?

 8        Q.   Well, this state consisting of three peoples, did it include

 9     Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes -- or rather, the other way around, Slovenes,

10     Croats, and Serbs?  Were they equal?  Were they constituent peoples?  Did

11     they constitute that state?

12        A.   Well, that's three questions that I hear.  It was in fact Serbs,

13     Croats, and Slovenes was the name of the kingdom, not the other way

14     around.  The nationality policy of the state was that these were three

15     tribes of one people, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes being those tribes.

16     That then excluded other groups that were within the confines or the

17     boundaries of the Kingdom of Croats -- Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as it

18     eventually evolved.  Were they equal -- I think they were equal in theory

19     at the beginning of the period anyway.  I don't know that they were

20     really equal in -- in terms of the way they were treated during the

21     course of the kingdom's history.  And certainly after the dictatorship

22     was proclaimed in 1929, you really couldn't say that the Croats and

23     Slovenes were -- had equality with the Serbs in the kingdom.

24        Q.   With all due respect, Mr. Donia, I'm not speaking about the

25     kingdom, I'm speaking about the state.  The official name was the state

Page 3177

 1     of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes or Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs.  Do

 2     you know that the object was to unite with Serbia and that America

 3     recognised that unification?  There's something wrong with the

 4     interpretation.  Let's see what.

 5             It is my assertion that the territories which were once under

 6     Austro-Hungary, apart from Vojvodina that joined up with Serbia, the

 7     territories of today's Croatia, Slovenia, and today's Bosnia-Herzegovina,

 8     in using the principle of self-determination of peoples set in the

 9     American Congress and set out in Woodrow Wilson's 14 points, formed a

10     state - a state, not a kingdom, a state - of the Slovenes, Croats, and

11     Serbs which united with the Serbs, the kingdom came later.  Now, do you

12     know the existence of this state, the one that came before?

13        A.   The name of that state was the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and

14     Slovenes.  And it was -- it consisted of what had been the Kingdom of

15     Serbia.  It -- the Kingdom of Serbia had just completed a rather brutal

16     annexation of Montenegro, which also then became a part of the kingdom,

17     but with a proclamation of December 1.  And then the other territories

18     also became part of the kingdom with that proclamation.

19             Now, there was certainly diplomatic, let's say, endorsement or

20     validation of that proclamation and that creature, the Kingdom of the

21     Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, in subsequent agreements as you've noted.

22     But the act itself was something that took place in Belgrade and has to

23     be seen, I think, as a -- it was certainly something that was done with

24     the willing consent of all those people who claimed to represent those

25     areas of the country at that time.

Page 3178

 1        Q.   Unfortunately, Mr. Donia, it's an important link in the chain

 2     without which you can't understand the Yugoslav crisis.  You don't know

 3     that before unification there was the state of Slovenes, Croats, and

 4     Serbs.  It wasn't the kingdom, it wasn't called the kingdom, it was the

 5     territory west of the Drina, it was the Serb state west of the Drina

 6     composed of three peoples, the Slovenes, the Croats, and the Serbs, and

 7     if you don't know that, you are unable to understand the Yugoslav crisis.

 8     And it's a state in which they are constituent peoples, and if Yugoslavia

 9     was going to break down they wanted to have their own entity.  So how can

10     we continue this discussion if you don't know that fact?

11        A.   Which fact is that?

12        Q.   The fact that a state existed, that the Slovenes, Croats, and

13     Serbs, it was independent, without unification and before unification

14     with the Serbs.  It was formed and proclaimed --

15             JUDGE KWON:  [Overlapping speakers]

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Donia doesn't know this

17     key fact, and it's a key fact that the Serbs formed a state west of the

18     Drina River and that together with the Slovenes and Croats they had a

19     three-people state which united with Serbia.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, just put your question.  You can give

21     your evidence later on if you so wish.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   So you don't think that that state ever existed before

24     unification, you don't know about that?  You're not conscious of any such

25     state having existed; right?

Page 3179

 1        A.   I believe you must be referring to something, but I have no idea

 2     what it is.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, these 14 points set out by

 5     Woodrow Wilson, I'd like to tender that into evidence.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Well, I'm not sure how relevant it is, but we'll

 7     admit it.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D243.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Now, Mr. Donia, you mention further on -- you mention the

12     Bosnians, Bosniaks.  Do you agree that we Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats and

13     Bosnians -- Muslims by adopting this term, appropriated the term, and

14     placed the monopoly over Bosnia?

15        A.   The question's a little convoluted.  I'm not exactly certain what

16     you're asking when you said -- well, please, if you could ask the

17     question again.  I'm not sure I understand.

18        Q.   Well, perhaps it was down to the interpretation.  The Muslims

19     recently changed their national name; isn't that right?

20        A.   They changed their national name in 1993.

21        Q.   And they took the name of Bosniak; right?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Do you agree that we, Serbs and Croats, are also Bosniaks, that

24     Bosnia is our country too; so by the same token that's what we would be

25     too?

Page 3180

 1        A.   No.  There is a distinction I think in both languages between

 2     "Bosnjak" and "Bosanac" or "Bosnjaci" and/or "Bosanci" in B/C/S and

 3     between Bosniak, which is a term that refers specifically to those

 4     people -- that people who used to be called the Bosnian Muslims and

 5     Bosnians, which refers to all citizens and/or residents of Bosnia,

 6     regardless of their national identity or ethnicity.

 7        Q.   Well, all right.  But it is the usurpation of the name Bosniak,

 8     and the Muslims want to say by using Bosniak that Bosnia is theirs and

 9     that we're some guests there or something like that?

10        A.   I think there is a -- some Bosniaks have attempted to do that.

11     Most I think are of the view that the Bosniaks are now one of three

12     primary nations living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with the Croats and

13     Serbs, and would not accept that view of things.

14        Q.   Well, they accepted that quite recently.  Do you know what they

15     were called during the Turkish occupation?

16        A.   I would call their identity hybrid.  They -- there were a number

17     of different names that were used to refer to them depending region where

18     they were.  I'm sure you have a particular word in mind here, but they

19     were known as -- to some people they were called Turks, to some people

20     they were called simply Muslims, and in Bosnia a lot of people were

21     called Bosnians.

22        Q.   Together with us, the Serbs and Croats.  Then they were called

23     undetermined, then they were called Muslims -- or rather, they were the

24     constituent peoples.  And now they're called Bosniaks, which the Serbs

25     and Croats needn't like.  But let's leave that aside.

Page 3181

 1             The B/C/S language, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, do you use it on a

 2     scientific scholarly basis or a political basis, this B/C/S language?

 3        A.   To me it's a means of communication.  I read it and speak it as

 4     best I can and use it to communicate.  I don't know that I would say I

 5     use it on a political basis.  I certainly use it in my scholarship.

 6        Q.   And does B/C/S exist or is it in fact the Serbian language?

 7        A.   You can do an interesting analysis of the language as it is used

 8     around here and probably not come up with an answer specifically, but I

 9     don't -- wouldn't agree that it is in fact the Serbian language.  I think

10     it is a -- B/C/S as it is referred to in this Tribunal and in some other

11     international organisations probably is a blend of Serbian, Croatian, and

12     Bosnian language, particularly emphasizing their -- the common

13     denominators among the three languages.

14        Q.   And do you know when the Stokavian variant of the language came

15     do -- do you know who Vuk Karadzic was?  Let me ask you that?

16        A.   To your last question, yes, I believe he was a distant relative

17     of yours and -- or at least you look to his family for your family

18     origins.  And he was a Serbian literary figure at the beginning of the

19     19th century who collected folk tales and poetry and codified essentially

20     the Serbian language.

21        Q.   Well, he's a relative.  My father's name was Vuk, his father's

22     name was Stefan, so it's the same family.  All Karadzics are related one

23     way or another.  But do you know that the Vienna Agreement -- Vuk allowed

24     the Croatians to use the Stokavian language as being their language too

25     and that the differentiation came later on and that the Serbs -- that

Page 3182

 1     this was stolen from the Serbs, and is language the cultural property of

 2     a people?  Let me ask you that.

 3        A.   I'm not a linguist, a linguistic expert.  I can tell you that the

 4     languages don't get stolen, and the notion that it is a cultural property

 5     of a people I would really not agree with.

 6        Q.   Well, do you think that Australia could say that it spoke

 7     Australian and not English or Brazil to say that it spoke Brazilian and

 8     not Portuguese?  Do you think that that would be okay?

 9        A.   That's well outside of my area of expertise, I'm afraid.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now, on page 2 you said that in Yugoslavia national

11     elections were never held on an ethnic, national basis, but that they

12     were -- that the elections took place in the republics.  Now, who

13     prevented elections at the level of the nation of Yugoslavia according to

14     the principle of one man/one vote?  Did the Serbs prevent that from

15     happening or was it separatists, perhaps?

16        A.   My understanding is they never came to an agreement.  And so

17     there were certainly people in all groups who favoured it, and I wouldn't

18     reduce it to saying the Serbs favoured it and others opposed it.  It just

19     never got agreed upon.  And just to clarify, we're talking now not about

20     elections on an ethnic principle, but a single election for the entire

21     SFRJ, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

22        Q.   Well, yes.  A state nation or country-wide I think you said.

23     Now, let me inform you that the Serbs were always while Yugoslavia

24     existed in favour of the principle of one man/one vote, but that was

25     unsuccessful; whereas, today the republics which separated are

Page 3183

 1     introducing the principle of one man/one vote to disenfranchise the Serb

 2     minority.  Do you agree with that?

 3        A.   No, I don't agree with either premise.

 4        Q.   Do you agree that now those republics are asking for the one

 5     man/one vote principle, whereas they failed to accept that while

 6     Yugoslavia was in existence?

 7        A.   No, I -- that's just too simple a way of putting it.  It's --

 8     first of all reduces -- your original formulation reduces a very wide

 9     variety of viewpoints to the simple expression "the Serbs," and I guess

10     you are speaking for the Serbs in that formulation.  But I wouldn't agree

11     that that was the case on such a universal basis at all, no.

12        Q.   I'm not speaking on behalf of anyone now.  Quite simply, one

13     man/one vote at the level of Yugoslavia did not go through because the

14     separatist republics would not allow it to go through, whereas now they

15     are asking for one man/one vote.  Now, who did we beat at the elections

16     in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990?  I think this is on page 4 of this report

17     of yours dealing with Sarajevo.  You say:

18             [In English] "A dozen or other parties that had been founded and

19     registered in the preceding months."

20             [Interpretation] Is it true that we beat the communists mostly

21     and that there was a regime change?

22        A.   I think the three nationalist parties together or separately did,

23     in fact, defeat the two major non-nationalist parties, the socialist

24     democrats and the reformists -- we're talking about Bosnia, if that's

25     what we're referring to.  And was there a regime change?  Certainly.

Page 3184

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Karadzic, I'm noting the time.

 2     Shall we adjourn for today?

 3             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Two very quick matters to

 5     raise.  First I wanted to inquire whether the Court had made a

 6     determination or confirmed that it can sit the extra time on the week of

 7     June 21st, our revised schedule is dependent to some extent on that --

 8     well, to a large extent on that.

 9             And secondly, with respect to the recently filed application for

10     certification and stay.  I wanted to indicate that the Prosecution

11     anticipated filing a response tomorrow if it's helpful for us to

12     foreshadow that, I can do so at this point.  But if the timing is

13     satisfactory, we'll have that filed tomorrow.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             Taking ...

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, I simply can't refrain from

18     observing that which George Bernard Shaw said that "England and America

19     are two countries separated by a common language."

20             JUDGE KWON:  2.15 tomorrow afternoon.

21                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,

22                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 2nd day of

23                           June, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.