1 Tuesday, 1 June 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Doctor.
6 Good afternoon, everybody.
7 Yes, Mr. Harvey
8 MR. HARMON: Good afternoon, Your Honours. I would like to
9 introduce Mr. Avi Singh from my team who is assisting me here today.
10 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Mr. Singh.
11 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
12 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours.
13 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]
14 Examination by Ms. Edgerton: [Continued]
15 Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Donia.
16 A. Good afternoon, Madam Prosecutor.
17 Q. To begin today, I'd just like to go back very briefly to a couple
18 of aspects of your evidence from yesterday, if I may. Yesterday I asked
19 you at page 3093, lines 22 to 23, of the transcript of evidence whether
20 the territory encompassed by the strategic objectives covered
21 multi-ethnic areas. And your response was:
22 "Yes, insofar as we can determine from the strategic objectives
23 what was intended in territorial terms."
24 Do you recall that?
25 A. Yes, I believe I went on then to say yes and give an example of
1 the corridor.
2 Q. Correct. Now, to follow-up on that in a way, could I ask you
3 then whether the same applied to the fifth objective and the city of
5 A. Yes, it did.
6 Q. And yesterday when we broke we were talking about the ethnic
7 distribution across Bosnia and Herzegovina and when we broke we were
8 speaking about Sarajevo
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Now, if I could ask you, going back to the first objective that
12 you discussed yesterday of separation, the first overarching objective,
13 could you tell us did it embrace any change to the country's ethnic
15 A. Well, the goal, if achieved, would certainly have -- would
16 dramatically change the ethnic composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- at
17 least the ethnic distribution.
18 Q. In what regard? How so?
19 A. Well, it would have attached human residents to territoriality in
20 a way that was radically different from the situation as of 1991.
21 Q. Thank you. Now, on the subject still of this overarching
22 objective, was there any strategy that you see to achieving that
23 objective, any central perhaps strategy?
24 A. Well, I think there were strategies employed that actually well
25 preceded the formal adoption of the strategic goals, and I divide those
1 strategies into two, one being the -- a very public and -- I'd say public
2 performance component of state building that the SDS leadership engaged
3 in starting in October 1991 and proceeding for the next seven months in a
4 series of steps taken in the Bosnian Serb Assembly and then a few cases
5 outside of it.
6 The second element is the -- what I call the municipal strategy,
7 and that word is mine but I think it's apt to describe the SDS policies
8 toward municipalities in the course of the period January 1991 through
9 about the summer of 1992.
10 Q. Perhaps I could ask for a document be called up at this point in
11 time, 65 ter 00972, which is a record of a speech by Dr. Karadzic on the
12 occasion of the plebiscite of November 1991. And once we see that
13 document I could ask you some further questions.
14 Perhaps you could display the B/C/S page 2, which should be the
15 first page of the document, and similarly English page 2. Could we go,
16 please, to page 3.
17 MS. EDGERTON: My apologies, Your Honours, I have not seen these
18 two pages in the documents before. Thank you. And now on to page 4,
19 please. I see two B/C/S pages in front of me rather than one English,
20 one B/C/S.
21 Q. Dr. Donia, given that you've indicated your -- you have command
22 of the English and the Serbo-Croatian language, perhaps I could ask you
23 this question with respect to the B/C/S version of the document, which is
24 the cover page of the document. Have you seen this document before?
25 A. Yes, I have.
1 Q. And what do you recognise it to be yourself?
2 A. It is a transcript of a speech that Dr. Karadzic delivered
3 sometime in the days prior to the referendum of November 9 and 10, 1991.
4 The two cover pages indicate that it was collected and transcribed by the
5 state commission for the investigation of war crimes, I believe, which
6 was headed by Mr. Gavran Kapetanovic.
7 Q. If we could go now to page 9 of both versions, the English and
8 B/C/S of this document, please.
9 Now, on the English version, if I could direct your attention,
10 please, Dr. Donia, to the very last paragraph, the sentence that begins
11 immediately after the italicised portion of the last paragraph. And for
12 the record, that same passage should be found at e-court, page 9 in
13 B/C/S, nine lines up from the bottom of the page. Do you see the
14 sentence, Dr. Donia, that begins:
15 "Municipalities are not" -- and I'm sorry it's cut off on the
16 left hand part of the English version. Thank you.
17 "Municipalities are not God given ..."
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now, this speech by Dr. Karadzic or this extract from
20 Dr. Karadzic's speech then reads:
21 "Municipalities are not God given. They were established to the
22 disadvantage of the Serb people, in such a way that all Serb units in
24 municipality; let them also have a majority in their municipalities."
25 Do you have any comment on this passage and this speech in any
1 regard, Dr. Donia?
2 A. This passage essentially repeats the critique that I indicated
3 yesterday developed by some Serb intellectuals in Bosnia, including
4 Dr. Karadzic, in the last years of the 1980s and 1990, which argued that
5 the municipal organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was discriminatory
6 against Serbs. The example of Ozren which Dr. Karadzic offers here,
7 which he says he keeps repeating, he did indeed repeat on several
8 occasions to argue that Ozren should have been its own municipality.
9 Part of the rest of the speech goes on to spell out what he believes
10 should be the remedy for that in terms of reorganising municipalities and
11 laying claim to Serb land based on certain criteria.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Could I offer this, please, as the next exhibit,
14 Your Honours.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P958, Your Honour.
17 MS. EDGERTON:
18 Q. Now, this document that we've just looked at, Dr. Donia, is a
19 very early-on document. Perhaps I could ask you, was there any -- was
20 there any evolution to this municipal strategy?
21 A. Yes. The municipal strategy began very shortly after the
22 elections of 1990 with a programme of regionalisation, and
23 regionalisation at this point in time, which meant the first six, eight
24 months of 1991, entailed taking existing municipalities and joining them
25 together in community or associations of communities or communities of
1 municipalities. The most significant and active of which was the
2 community of municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina, which was --
3 eventually had its seat in Banja Luka. The -- there was none or very
4 little discussion at that point. There was certainly no effort to change
5 existing municipal boundaries, but rather to associate these
6 municipalities in a single body, an association of municipalities. A
7 practice that had been followed under socialism as well, but established
8 for the purpose of co-ordinating municipal services and other, let's say,
9 points of convenience for the governance of these municipalities. The
10 effort on the part of the SDS
11 the intent of linking up the municipalities in which Serbs had an
12 absolute or relative majority. That's the first phase of this and -- of
13 the municipal strategy.
14 It then was followed by a second phase in which the issue of
15 revising municipal boundaries came to the forefront, and that can be
16 identified as beginning in -- on October 15, 1991, one could pick other
17 dates but that's the -- I think the operative date when the municipal
18 strategy takes on this effort to try to alter municipal boundaries within
19 the republic.
20 And then a --
21 Q. Well, if I could just stop you at that moment. What happened on
22 October 15, 1991
23 A. Well, 19 -- October 14th/15th is this watershed date in which the
24 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina passed a resolution called a declaration
25 of sovereignty and a platform, which was a platform for the negotiating
1 team for Bosnia-Herzegovina to be used in negotiations with the
2 Europeans. And the point at which the SDS essentially lost the battle to
3 veto the drive toward independence that the Croatian and the HDZ and the
4 SDA, the Croatian and Muslim parties, had initiated. In the -- that
5 happened in the very early morning hours of October 15th, and from that
6 point on the energies of the SDS
7 toward planning a -- and it's not a single plan but a extended planning
8 process which entailed a number of documents along the way and some
9 shifting in tactics, but can be seen as a consistent planning process
10 from that date into the early weeks of 19 -- or of April 1992.
11 Q. At this point I'd like us to see a clip from a speech delivered
12 by Dr. Karadzic at this Assembly session on October 15, 1991, that's 65
13 ter number 45005. And it should begin at timer number 00:07:56:3, and I
14 hope that my colleagues -- the interpreters in the booth have received
15 copies of the transcript. I'm sure I'll be advised if that's not the
16 case. Could we begin.
17 [Video-clip played]
18 MS. EDGERTON: I --
19 JUDGE KWON: We are not hearing any translation.
20 MS. EDGERTON: I don't know if there's been a transcript that's
21 been delivered. I thought we had taken steps to do that. It has been
22 delivered. Perhaps we could be advised by the interpreters.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We have a different
24 transcript but not that one that you referred to just now.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence then, for a moment, please,
1 Your Honour.
2 [Prosecution counsel confer]
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We've just received the
4 proper copy.
5 MS. EDGERTON: I hear that the proper copy has been delivered in
6 the nick of time, and I apologise to my colleagues, the interpreters.
7 And if it's possible, perhaps we could begin afresh.
8 [Video-clip played]
9 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Sovereign people in Bosnia
11 people as well. It was one of the conclusions made in this Assembly. We
12 shall disable you to carry out violence against Serbian people,
13 constitution violence in front of local and international public.
14 Because after the constitution violence, all other violence will come.
15 We won't be consulted regarding the situation anymore. We won't be
16 consulted if we come into the situation in which Slovenia and Croatia
17 in, especially Croatia
18 would be 1.000 times worse and there would be no way to stop it. I must
19 send a message to all delegates. Gentlemen, believe me, even if you
20 would make -- if you were to make it because we have the constitutional
21 manner to prevent you from voting, but even if you would make something
22 that would be the source of shame for Mr. Izetbegovic in The Hague
23 because we would have other ways to make it impossible, even in The
24 Hague. It would also be a great shame for the image of this parliament
25 in Europe
1 loyal to this idea. Your shame and your prove how much you respect
2 sovereignty and equality of Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina
3 I'm asking you one more time. I'm not threatening, but asking, pleading,
4 to take seriously the interpretation of the political will of the Serbian
5 people which is represented here by the Serbian Democratic Party and the
6 Serbian Movement of Renewal and several Serbs from other parties. Please
7 take it seriously, it is not good what you are doing.
8 This is the road that you want Bosnia and Herzegovina to take,
9 the same highway of hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia
10 through. Don't think you won't take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell and
11 Muslim people into possible extinction because Muslim people will not be
12 able to defend itself if it comes to war here!
13 "Please, I know these are serious words. Serious situations call
14 for serious words. How will you prevent that everybody start killing
15 everybody in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Can war in Croatia
16 Especially in the border areas where Serbs and Croats are in contact,
17 whose two political wills are in conflict, and weren't realised in a
18 legal manner so there's only one way left to realise them.
19 From now on gentlemen, I will ask for the floor on a regular
20 basis until you take the matter of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina
21 off the agenda. That is my right. I want to send a message to Muslim,
22 Serb, and Croatian people that you want to achieve something in Europe
23 what you have no right to. Thank you."
24 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
25 And my thanks to the interpreters.
1 Q. Dr. Donia, do you have any comment on what we've just seen?
2 A. Well, I -- this was a youthful and energetic Dr. Karadzic
3 speaking to the Bosnian Serb Assembly -- or to the Assembly of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the multi-ethnic Assembly, in what was actually a
5 fairly long address, the last part of which you have just played. And he
6 seemed to gain momentum in the course of that speech and warned I think
7 against taking the step of approving the two documents that I just cited.
8 Said that he was not threatening but pleading, and then moved to a phase
9 and used some expressions which at least were interpreted by others there
10 as threats. That was language that he in fact had used in the weeks
11 prior to that in telephone conversations with other SDS and Serb leaders.
12 Q. Thank you, and we'll come back to those conversations you've just
13 referred to in a short while.
14 MS. EDGERTON: But at this moment, Your Honour, I'd like to
15 tender, if I may, the clip that's just been played from the timer number
16 I originally cited 07:56:3 to 10:44:7.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Please.
19 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted -- oh, just a second.
20 You have objection, Mr. Karadzic?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I do have something to add,
22 and that is: Why don't you admit the entire speech? We will certainly
23 be needing the entire speech, so why not admit it that way?
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any observation, Ms. Edgerton?
1 MS. EDGERTON: It seems quite practical, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE KWON: How long is the entire clip?
3 [Prosecution counsel confer]
4 MS. EDGERTON: This -- your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.
5 [Prosecution counsel confer]
6 MS. EDGERTON: My colleague's just raised an important point. If
7 there's a difference between Dr. Karadzic's speech as a whole and the
8 video as a whole and a significant time difference, and perhaps
9 Dr. Karadzic could specify which portion he would like to see in that
11 JUDGE KWON: So we stick to our practice. So we'll admit this
12 time only those part played at the courtroom, and then whether we can
13 think about there can be a better way to admit these video-clips. This
14 time only those played at the courtroom will be admitted.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P959.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, and we can take steps, of course,
18 Your Honour, to see if there's any other portions which we can reach
19 agreement on that might serve to help proceedings later.
20 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, you mentioned that the events of this day that
21 we've just been discussing started a planning process as regards the
22 municipal strategy. Was -- what was the next step after this date that
23 you've been able to identify?
24 A. Well, let me just say, I think they were followed by a planning
25 process, not necessarily did they start it. But they were followed by a
1 planning process which began with a meeting of the political counsel of
2 the SDS
3 party -- leaders of the party. That convened on the evening of that same
4 October 15th and discussed broadly and with no specific conclusions the
5 options for party plans going forward.
6 Q. And following that?
7 A. In the wake of that or in the aftermath of that meeting, the
8 party leadership decided to take certain steps that had been discussed at
9 that meeting in a particular order. They decided, first of all, to form
10 a separate Assembly, to be made up of those members of the SDS and other
11 parties -- other Serb parties that had been elected to the Assembly of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the November 1990 elections. They further decided
13 to hold a plebiscite on a question which was essentially: Do you want to
14 remain in Yugoslavia
15 was, first of all, to form the Bosnian Serb Assembly in October; then
16 hold the plebiscite in November, the Bosnian Serb Assembly then ordering,
17 organising, and managing the plebiscite.
18 Following the plebiscite, other Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions
19 were held. The December decision -- these came about once a month by
20 coincidence, but the December decision was to announce preparations for
21 the formation of a -- the Serbian -- Republic of the Serbian People of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And then on January 8, to proclaim a separate state
23 with that name. In February to approve a draft constitution. In March
24 to implement that constitution or approve it, promulgate it. And then in
25 April to formally declare the republic independent.
1 Q. And to go back to my question, was there a next step to the
2 municipal strategy?
3 A. At first the municipal strategy was kind of an integral part of
4 the overall discussion. The -- many of the leaders favoured what they
5 characterised as intensifying regionalisation, which meant essentially
6 drawing -- redrawing municipal boundaries. At the third Bosnian Serb
7 Assembly session on the 11th of December, the leaders of the party,
8 specifically Mr. Krajisnik, supported by Dr. Karadzic, introduced a
9 resolution which took this in a somewhat different direction, one that
10 was not incompatible with redrawing municipal boundaries, but was given
11 priority over it for the time being, and that was to create separate Serb
12 Assemblies, Serbian Municipal Assemblies at the municipal level in those
13 municipalities where Serbs lived. That resolution passed with one
14 dissenting vote on the first try, and the chair, Mr. Krajisnik, evoked --
15 then asked the delegate who voted no why he had opposed it. And there
16 followed then a discussion about the resolution itself and its
17 relationship to the redrawing of municipal boundaries. And it became
18 evident that there was considerable opposition in the Assembly to the
19 idea of forming separate Serb Municipal Assemblies.
20 Consequently, the bill was or the proposal was amended to make it
21 voluntary, and then that voluntary recommendation passed unanimously.
22 That was an Assembly session that was actually quite contentious, and in
23 fact toward the very end of it Mr. Krajisnik adjourned -- abruptly
24 adjourned the session and walked out of the hall. Then another leader
25 stepped up and concluded the session.
1 In the wake of that experience on the 11th of December, the
2 municipal strategy took a new turn, and that was represented in the
3 dissemination of a set of instructions to SDS municipal leaders that was
4 dated the 19th of December, 1991.
5 Q. Perhaps at this juncture I can ask for 65 ter 00224 to be
6 displayed, please. The cover page for that document should suffice in
7 both the English and B/C/S.
8 JUDGE KWON: So in the meantime, Dr. Donia, so was that the
9 resolution on 11th, the one you referred to as December decision in the
10 previous answer?
11 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour, the document that we're just now
12 looking at was not disseminated until the 19th and was never voted on as
13 a document by the Assembly.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, when you referred to December decision, so I
15 didn't follow that -- okay, we'll come to that.
16 THE WITNESS: Okay.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 MS. EDGERTON:
20 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, do you see the pages in English and
21 Serbo-Croatian on the screen in front of you?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Is that a copy of the instructions to municipal leaders dated
24 December 19, 1991
25 A. Yes, it is.
1 Q. Could you then tell Your Honours whether this document -- the
2 significance of this document and whether it represented anything in
3 terms of the municipal strategy you've been discussing.
4 A. Looking at this document in comparison to the trajectory that the
5 leadership was on on the -- at the session on the 11th of December,
6 this -- these instructions move the principal organising body from the
7 Bosnian Serb Assembly to the SDS
8 legislative decision-making body into a party organ, where they were
9 considered -- I wouldn't call it in secret, but in private. And they
10 were also disseminated in private. So there is a move here from the
11 legislative body to the party organ and from a very public discussion to
12 the -- let's say circles -- inner circles of the party.
13 In addition, it moves from expecting local leaders to form one
14 institution, that is, the Bosnian Serb Municipal Assembly -- or the Serb
15 Municipal Assembly to two institutions, one still being that Bosnian
16 Serb -- or the Serb Municipal Assembly and the other being a Crisis Staff
17 of the Serbian people, so from one institution to two. In addition, it
18 tasked local SDS
19 instructions and it added considerable specificity to the steps to be
20 taken by those municipal officials.
21 Q. In your Sarajevo
22 the Variant A and B document. Could you explain the significance of that
24 A. Yes. The document distinguished between municipalities in which
25 Serbs were in a majority and those in which they were not in a majority,
1 thus the name A and B. And furthermore was to proceed in two stages.
2 One was a preparatory stage and the other second stage was an actual
3 implementation stage, which according to the terms of the document was to
4 be activated by a secret signal from the party president.
5 Q. Could you -- I note this document bears the number in the top
6 right-hand corner 93, whereas in your Sarajevo report you cite to copy of
7 this same document numbered 96. Is there any significance to the
8 numbering of these documents?
9 A. Well, the numbers apparently refer to the municipality to which
10 the particular copy was distributed. I referred to number 96 in my
11 paper. One in fact has a choice. I think there are something like seven
12 copies all together that have been acquired from various municipalities.
13 That copy 96 was found in the municipality of Trnovo
15 It was found in the Holiday Inn offices of the SDS.
16 Q. Was this document acted upon by municipalities?
17 A. Yes. The reaction to the distribution of this document was quite
18 varied by municipality. There was also a convening of a committee for
19 all ten municipalities of the city of Sarajevo in the days after the
20 document was distributed. In some municipalities SDS leaders convened
21 meetings within the next week and acted to pass along these instructions
22 to various party members and move forward with the preparatory phase.
23 Other municipalities, SDS
24 hands for some weeks and in some cases a couple of months. And in a few
25 municipalities, there was outright resistance to implementing the
1 instructions. I have described in my Sarajevo paper the particular
2 situation in Centar municipality in Sarajevo, where the president of that
3 municipality, Radomir Bulatovic, publicly refused to implement the
4 instructions until he was basically found one -- found these institutions
5 had been created without his direct participation.
6 Q. If I may, one just quick follow-up question related to that. Do
7 you know what happened to or did anything happen to Bulatovic as a
8 consequence of that refusal?
9 A. He suddenly found the formation of these institutions -- or at
10 least of the Bosnian -- or the Serb Assembly to be a great idea and
11 publicly endorsed it, reversing his earlier stand on this. And I don't
12 believe there were any adverse consequences for him in the subsequent
14 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, if you could kindly direct us to where
15 in his Sarajevo
16 MS. EDGERTON: Footnotes 48 to 51 of his Sarajevo report,
17 Your Honours.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours. Before we move on,
20 perhaps I could request that this be marked as the next Prosecution
21 exhibit, please.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P960, Your Honours.
24 THE ACCUSED: No objection.
25 MS. EDGERTON:
1 Q. Dr. Donia, did any stage at the implementation of these
2 instructions become mandatory?
3 A. Yes. In the -- at the 12th Assembly Session in March of 1992,
4 the party leaders required that all municipalities -- actually, required
5 that the regional organisations enforce the creation of these
6 institutions in the various municipalities, and a resolution was passed
7 to that effect by that Assembly session.
8 Q. In that regard, perhaps I could ask that 65 ter number 00021,
9 which is the transcript of the 12th Assembly Session dated 24 March 1992
10 be displayed. English page -- pages 22 to 24, so beginning with page 22;
11 and B/C/S pages 39 to 42. And while we wait for that, can I just ask,
12 Dr. Donia, when you referred to party leaders just now, who in particular
13 did you mean?
14 A. Mr. Krajisnik and Dr. Karadzic.
15 Q. Thank you. Now, Dr. Donia, do you see the excerpts from the 12th
16 Assembly Session on the page in front of you in English and
18 A. Yes. I have reviewed this before and seen the entire document.
19 And this is indeed a record of the 12th Session.
20 Q. Can I direct your attention to the fourth full paragraph, the
21 large paragraph in the centre of the page, third sentence which begins:
22 "We have a legal basis in the Law on Internal Affairs ..."
23 A. Can I suggest we look at the speaker here.
24 Q. Sure. Let's go back two pages I think. One page. My apologies.
1 Do you see the speaker designated at the bottom of the page
2 displayed in front of you, Dr. Donia, that's English page 21,
3 Dr. Karadzic appears at the bottom of the page as the speaker?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Thank you. If we could now go back to the highlighted passage
6 that I've just referred to on page 22. Thank you.
7 Dr. Donia, this passage that begins:
8 "We have a legal basis on the Law on Internal Affairs, and we
9 also have the insignia and at a desired moment, and this will be very
10 soon, we can form whatever we want. There are reasons why this could
11 happen in two or three days."
12 Is this one of the directions by the party leaders you've just
13 referred to as regards the implementation of these instructions?
14 A. This and the rest of this paragraph constitute one of the
15 requirements that I have cited, yes.
16 Q. Could we now go over to English page 24, please -- I think it
17 might be actually e-court page 23. I note at the bottom of e-court page
18 23 the speaker at this moment is the chairperson, which is who,
19 Dr. Donia?
20 A. At this session it was Dr. -- or Mr. Krajisnik.
21 Q. Thank you. And then over to the next page, 24, please. Perfect.
22 Could I direct your attention, Dr. Donia, to the notation about
23 just over one-third of the way down the page immediately after the
24 sentence that is underlined which reads:
25 "The chairperson explained that all the presidents of autonomous
1 district had received instructions and should have prepared and organised
2 this. Those who have not done it should do it by Friday."
3 Is this one of the or the other direction by the party leaders
4 you've just referred to?
5 A. Yes, it is. Some time ago I went back to a calendar and it was a
6 three-day period until Friday from the day of the Assembly. I'd also
7 just like to clarify that I think I used the pleural in speaking of the
8 institutions. This in fact -- this directive pertains to the formation
9 of Serbian Municipal Assemblies and not to Crisis Staffs.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, could I ask that this 12th Assembly
12 Session be admitted, please, as the next exhibit.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
15 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat. I didn't hear the translation.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that the Chamber has
17 already had the practice of admitting the transcript as a whole, the
18 whole session, that it's all admitted.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P961.
21 MS. EDGERTON:
22 Q. Dr. Donia, these instructions that we've been discussing, could
23 you tell us whether they were specifically discussed at subsequent
24 Assembly sessions?
25 A. Yes. On several occasions later in the war at sessions of the
1 Bosnian Serb Assembly, a few different speakers referred to the A/B
2 instructions, and specifically Dr. Karadzic did on two occasions.
3 Q. Perhaps I could ask now for 65 ter number 00055, the transcript
4 from the 50th Assembly Session of the -- 50th Session of the Republika
5 Srpska Assembly from 15 and 16 April, 1995. My notation says that the
6 passage -- the relevant passage should be at pages 316 of the English and
7 278 of the B/C/S.
8 JUDGE KWON: First page says the 34th Session.
9 MS. EDGERTON: You know, Your Honours, I'm quite happy to come
10 back to this and move on in the meanwhile. We can address this session
11 after the break, and I can move on.
12 Q. Shall we do that, Dr. Donia. I'll move on to another area and
13 come back to this one exhibit later on today. I'd like to move on -- I'd
14 like to ask you the next -- this next question. When do you recall first
15 expressions of the intent to use violence by the Bosnian Serb leadership
16 against Sarajevo
17 A. Well, I don't know that I could identify that point in time.
18 There was a great deal of discussion of violence going back even to the
19 period of the election campaign. There were a few references to it. I
20 think in terms of, say, discussions of consistent and massive violence I
21 would say there were a number of expressions of that in telephone
22 conversations among SDS
23 Q. What was the context of those conversations, do you recall?
24 A. From about the 2nd until the 9th of September, there were four
25 crises in quite rapid succession in the boundary areas of Bosnia
1 drew the attention of SDS
2 the most acute and the one that occasioned some of these statements was
3 the detention of Mr. Milan Martic, who was the minister of the interior
4 of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina in Croatia. He was crossing a
5 bridge and was detained by a patrol, taken to a police station in a tiny
6 village called Otoka, and the police station was then surrounded by a
7 crowd of principally Muslim local residents. It was a situation that was
8 quickly escalating into a dangerous one, and in the subsequent hours,
9 Dr. Karadzic tried to mobilise the Yugoslav national army, basically come
10 in and rescue him, and also called upon Milan Babic, who was the head of
11 the RSK at that time, to mobilise forces to be prepared to move into
13 That episode ended when a senior police official from Sarajevo
14 Avdo Hebib, arrived and police under his command essentially created a
15 cordon, took him out of the jail, and escorted him out of town, that is,
16 Mr. Martic out of town, and arranged for him to be transported to a
17 Yugoslav People's Army installation nearby.
18 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, excuse me.
19 Doctor, just to be clear, by telephone conversation, do you
20 mean -- did you mean intercepted conversations?
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did.
22 JUDGE KWON: So was this evidence of yours based upon the --
23 based upon those intercepts? Was your knowledge that you got from
24 these -- hearing these intercepts?
25 THE WITNESS: In part, Your Honour. The periodical press covered
1 this rather major event very closely. There were reporters from Glas
2 newspaper in Banja Luka, "Oslobodjenje," and other publications that
3 subsequently then gave very specific accounts of these events. And so
4 the -- my summary of it that I just provided was based on a consolidation
5 of those sources and the intercepts.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 MS. EDGERTON:
8 Q. Well, actually perhaps if I may, to follow-on with what you
9 had -- from the question you've just raised, Your Honour. I remember
10 yesterday, Dr. Donia, you identified four criteria for your selection of
11 sources for your reports. And I wonder if it might be useful if you
12 could explain how these and the other intercepts you've referred to in
13 your reports might fit within those criteria.
14 A. Well, they -- from my point of view, looking at the veracity of
15 them, I was primarily interested in cross-checking the information
16 referenced in the intercepts with other events going on as reported in
17 the periodical press or other documentary sources. This particular
18 incident, the cross-checkability is extraordinary and provides
19 confirmation of a single story with very few details differing, not only
20 between the periodical press accounts and the intercepts, but also among
21 the various reports in newspapers of somewhat different political
23 Q. I would like now, if I may, to play an intercept from this period
24 of time, 65 ter 30214 dated 9 September 1991
25 colleagues in the booth have been given copies of the transcripts.
1 [Intercept played]
2 MS. EDGERTON: And it appears perhaps not because I don't hear
3 the interpretation. Perhaps Mr. Reid can assist.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot hear anything.
5 MS. EDGERTON: It might be a technical problem, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: Or if it's convenient, we may take a break now.
7 MS. EDGERTON: We could do that, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well. 25 minutes.
9 --- Recess taken at 3.20 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 3.47 p.m.
11 JUDGE KWON: I hope technical problems have been solved.
12 MS. EDGERTON: We'll try, Your Honours, but in the event they
13 haven't we do have a backup.
14 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
15 MS. EDGERTON:
16 Q. Let's try then, if we may, to play for you, Dr. Donia, an
17 intercept of a telephone conversation from September 9, 1991, between
18 Dr. Karadzic and Malko Koroman. Now, before we begin, could I ask you
19 this: Do you know who Malko Koroman was.
20 A. Mr. Koroman was at this time the head of the police in the
21 municipality of Pale.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Can we try that intercept now, please.
24 [Intercept played]
25 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
1 "Malko KOROMAN: Good afternoon.
2 "Radovan KARADZIC: Good afternoon.
3 "Malko KOROMAN: Malko Koroman from Pale speaking. How are you,
4 Mr. Karadzic?
5 "Radovan KARADZIC: Fine, thanks. How are you?
6 "Malko KOROMAN: I apologise for calling you at this number. I
7 have never done it so far but the situation has forced me to do so.
8 "Radovan KARADZIC: Tell me.
9 "Malko KOROMAN: Well, I heard this morning that Matic was
10 blocked up there in Otoka.
11 "Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.
12 "Malko KOROMAN: Well, I would like to know what was done
13 regarding that matter. I spoke to Banja Luka just now.
14 "Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.
15 "Malko KOROMAN: With this head of centre up there.
16 "Radovan KARADZIC: Zupljanin? Zupljanin, right?
17 "Malko KOROMAN: Ah, yes, Zupljanin.
18 "Radovan KARADZIC: Right.
19 "Malko KOROMAN: And he says that he's been blocked by the people
20 in Otoka.
21 "Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes.
22 "Malko KOROMAN: Exactly, but it cannot be with somebody's
23 direction and --
24 "Radovan KARADZIC: Well, the SDA direction, that --
25 "Malko KOROMAN: Yes.
1 "Radovan KARADZIC: And we have, all night been in touch with --
2 all night.
3 "Malko KOROMAN: Did you speak to Cengic about this by any
5 "Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes. I did last night and he was
6 supposed to fly there with Zepinic this morning.
7 "Malko KOROMAN: Well, Zepinic did not go.
8 "Radovan KARADZIC: He didn't go, right?
9 "Malko KOROMAN: He did not. You know Zepinic, he would not.
10 This morning, you know what was done by the ministry, only Avdo Hebib got
11 into the car somehow around 8.00 to go up there by car, as if by car he
12 could make it to finish it.
13 "Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes.
14 "Malko KOROMAN: And please, you are to this -- Cengic freely,
15 that if Mr. Martic is not released he is going to have all of the
16 Romanija region above Sarajevo
17 "Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes.
18 "Malko KOROMAN: This is our personal opinion. Yes. I spoke to
19 the Romanija guys and our attitude is that we are not going to let them
20 get away with this because it means tomorrow they can do it to you or
21 anyone in this way.
22 "Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes. Now we'll tell him that now, but
23 they said that they were going and I was -- told me that this Zepinic was
24 going to go. I will call him now.
25 "Malko KOROMAN: Just to let you know, he did not move now --
1 "Radovan KARADZIC: I will now --
2 "Malko KOROMAN: -- a finger at all, as they would say.
3 "Radovan KARADZIC: I will call now. Come on. I will call the
4 General Staff to -- because last night, yes, I spoke to Slobo too. He
5 spoke to Kadijevic.
6 "Malko KOROMAN: Could I be in touch with you to know what is at
7 hand so they will not raise the people if there is no need?
8 "Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes.
9 "Malko KOROMAN: And we'll raise it completely.
10 "Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes. You have to have it prepared, to
11 have the people prepared if they fuck around, but I will. I will finish
12 it by now.
13 "Malko KOROMAN: Huh, say that to Mr. Cengic freely.
14 "Radovan KARADZIC: Okay. It's a deal.
15 "Malko KOROMAN: He can finish it with one phone call only.
16 "Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes. We know he can.
17 "Malko KOROMAN: The fact that Avdo Hebib drives around their car
18 and agrees with them on the way what he will do and how long he will be
19 there and what will be there and he will --
20 "Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes.
21 "Malko KOROMAN: -- do that is their problem.
22 "Radovan KARADZIC: I know that. Now we are completely familiar
23 with their -- their slyness. I will -- yes --
24 "Malko KOROMAN: That please, do not do that.
25 "Radovan KARADZIC: I will now, yes.
1 "Malko KOROMAN: So that you know that's the way it is.
2 "Radovan KARADZIC: We'll be in touch. We'll have the people
3 prepared and not only you but all of Krajina will -- we will send them
4 all to fucking hell because of this.
5 "Malko KOROMAN: Shall I call this number again or will you call
6 me at --
7 "Radovan KARADZIC: You will call this number, dial occasionally.
8 "Malko KOROMAN: Call this number.
9 "Radovan KARADZIC: It's a deal.
10 "Malko KOROMAN: Thank you.
11 "Radovan KARADZIC: Good-bye."
12 MS. EDGERTON:
13 Q. Dr. Donia, do you have any comment on the audio of the
14 intercepted conversation you've just heard?
15 A. Well, I believe according to the press reporting at the time,
16 Mr. Hebib did in fact arrive by helicopter, did not drive. That -- it
17 appears to me in the conversation that this was very early in the day and
18 perhaps the two interlocutors in the intercept, Dr. Karadzic and
19 Mr. Koroman, did not yet have that information. The assumption that
20 Dr. Karadzic made was that this gathering around the police station in
21 Otoka had been instigated by the SDA. I don't know whether that was the
22 case or not. It was in a sense a test of Mr. Izetbegovic's dual roles as
23 president and as party -- as president of the SDA and president of the
24 Presidency, and in this particular instance in dispatching a professional
25 policeman rather than a political leader, he clearly opted to try to view
1 this as a police rather than a party matter. And it was in fact resolved
2 by the use of policemen in Bosanska Krupa to take Mr. Martic out of that
3 small police station and escort him through the crowd with the assistance
4 of tear gas and under a hail of stones.
5 The idea which came in this conversation from Mr. Koroman,
6 Mr. Koroman was to use the prospect of the Serb population of Romanija,
7 the mountainous area around Sarajevo
8 side, the Muslim side, with dramatic and physical action in the event
9 that they didn't release him to the custody of -- or release him into
10 safety immediately. That was, I think, the essential point of this
11 conversation and the reason for Mr. Koroman's call was to convey that
12 willingness to rally his people to take that step in the event that
13 Dr. Karadzic so ordered.
14 Q. Now, in terms of the chronology of these September 1991
15 intercepts that you've referred to in your Sarajevo report at footnotes
16 187, 188, 189, where would you place this intercept?
17 A. I'm afraid I don't have the report in front of me. I wonder if
18 perhaps you could provide it to me so I can have a look.
19 Q. We can do that and I can refer to the citations for you.
20 Footnote 187 is an intercept of a telephone Karadzic between Karadzic and
21 Babic 9 September 1991
22 Gojko Djogo 12 October 1991
23 A. Thank you.
24 Well, this conversation is noted in footnote 179, so prior to the
25 three intercepts that you just mentioned.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Now, Your Honours, keeping in mind Your Honours'
3 guidance in regards to intercepts, I will not be asking to tender this at
4 this time.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 MS. EDGERTON: And --
7 JUDGE KWON: Unless the Defence is willing to admit that part.
8 Let's move on.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have it marked for identification,
10 Your Honour?
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll do that.
13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI
14 MS. EDGERTON:
15 Q. If we could move on then to another area more specifically
16 related to Sarajevo
17 was the municipal strategy implemented in the Sarajevo area?
18 A. Yes, it was. In the -- what I've called in my report the western
19 approaches, that is, the six western-most municipalities of Sarajevo, the
20 municipal strategy in its two primary components, that is, the
21 implementation of the A/B instructions and the redrawing of municipal
22 boundaries was probably fulfilled more thoroughly than almost anywhere
23 else in Bosnia
24 Q. And how so? How was that done?
25 A. Well, first of all by the creation of Serb Municipal Assemblies
1 in several municipalities, the creation of Crisis Staffs, and a thorough
2 redrawing of municipal boundaries in the western part of the city so that
3 essentially the map as it had stood in -- at the end of 1991 by the end
4 of March 19 -- I would say April 1991 -- or 1992 was essentially
5 unrecognisable. It was quite different. The further implementation of
6 the municipal strategy was seen in that a number of leading municipal SDS
7 civilian leaders were given military functions and in fact military
8 commands and emerged in the course of the early months of the war as
9 significant military commanders with specific areas of responsibilities
10 and units reporting to them.
11 Q. Perhaps we could move now to some examples of the implementation
12 that you've just cited, and in that regard could we see 65 ter number
13 01447, a November 1994 article in the news magazine of the Republika
14 Srpska Ministry of the Interior on an interview with Malko Koroman.
15 Thank you very much.
16 Dr. Donia, in preparation for your testimony today, have you seen
17 this document previously?
18 A. Yes, I have.
19 Q. And if we could go then to e-court page 2, just about halfway
20 down the page, and in the B/C/S version e-court page 3, second full
21 paragraph left-hand column. I would like to draw your attention in the
22 English section to the second full paragraph after the bolded portion
23 that reads:
24 "Everybody in the former MUP knew about Pale. They knew that
25 when we do not allow anyone to nose around there without us knowing about
1 that. In September 1991 we 'moved' the Pale municipality borders to
2 Lapisnica, that is Brus on Trebevic, so as to protect all the Serbian
3 places and the population that was in our territory."
4 Dr. Donia, is this one of the examples of the different matters
5 of implementation that you referred to, a redrawing of municipal
7 A. No, this isn't specifically what I had in mind. This is the
8 delineation of a boundary that was to be protected or guarded by the
9 police forces of that municipality as opposed to what I was considering
10 as the redrawing of municipal boundaries to be -- with the municipality
11 to be governed by a Serb Municipal Assembly. It's a closely related
12 delineation of boundaries, but it's not quite the same.
13 Q. And is this Malko Koroman interviewed in this article to your
14 knowledge the same Malko Koroman who was identified in the intercept
15 we've just listened to?
16 A. Yes, he is.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Could that be admitted, please, Your Honours, as
18 the next exhibit.
19 JUDGE KWON: Unless it is objected to, it will be admitted as --
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P963, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 MS. EDGERTON:
23 Q. With regard to deconstructing or -- deconstructing
24 municipalities, perhaps I could ask for us to look at 65 ter number
25 21361, an article entitled: "Serbs Bade Their Farewells to Sarajevo
1 from "Oslobodjenje" dated 25 December 1991.
2 Dr. Donia, do -- have you had an occasion to look at the document
3 that appears on the screen in front of you in preparation for your
4 testimony today?
5 A. Yes. This is the -- an article from the Sarajevo newspaper
6 "Oslobodjenje." It's coverage of the Sarajevo area.
7 Q. And could you place the discussion that this document records,
8 the decision to separate Ilijas municipality from the city of Sarajevo
9 context, please.
10 A. Well, this article is dated only a few days after the
11 dissemination of the A/B instructions and is in part a report -- a report
12 on the implementation of those instructions with the added feature that
13 the newly formed Ilijas board elected to leave the city of Sarajevo
14 is, withdraw as being one of the ten municipalities of the city and
15 instead join the autonomous region of Romanija, which was the
16 Serb-created alternate -- alternative to the city of Sarajevo with
17 that -- with the name of the mountain range that is near the city.
18 Q. Did any other Sarajevo
19 this one?
20 A. The municipality of Pale
21 April of 1991, so about eight months prior to this.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, could this be admitted as the next
24 exhibit, please.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P964, Your Honours.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
3 Q. Now if we could turn to 65 ter number 30595, which is a
4 transcript of an intercept between one Prodanovic and Jovan Tintor, and
5 this intercept was referred to in your Sarajevo report at footnote 53.
6 And do you recognise the document on the screen then in front of you,
7 Dr. Donia?
8 A. I do not believe it is in footnote 53 of the report, but I
9 recognise the intercept that's appeared on the screen, yes.
10 Q. And did you have occasion to review this in preparation for your
11 testimony today?
12 A. Yes, I did.
13 Q. Now if we could go to e-court page 5 of the translation and B/C/S
14 page 7, please. In e-court page 5, just above the very large paragraph,
15 Tintor's interlocutor Prodanovic asks about his house in Donja Vogosca
16 and he's advised:
17 "It belongs to SAO Romanija. Everything from Vrelo Bosne to
18 Visoko, brother, all of it will be connected and incorporated into
19 Romanija. Of course new municipalities will be made, a new municipality
20 is already being made, Rajlovac, which will include Zabrdje and the area
21 all the way up to Vrelo Bosne and over here to the Serbian Vogosca."
22 A couple of questions in regard to this intercept. First of all,
23 are you familiar with Tintor?
24 A. Yes, Mr. Tintor was a key leader of the SDS in the Vogosca
25 municipality and later on went to assume a -- I believe a position in the
1 government of the Republika Srpska as well.
2 Q. Can you comment on the expanse of territory covered by Tintor in
3 his response to his interlocutor and that, in particular, the new
4 municipality which will include Zabrdje all the way up to Vrelo Bosne and
5 over here to Serbian Vogosca?
6 A. Well, I'm sure this means nothing without the map in front of us,
7 but just to put this in context: Vrelo Bosne is -- means the source of
8 the Bosnian river. It is a park and recreational area in the Ilidza
9 municipality, and on the map we were looking at yesterday would be at the
10 extreme left side of that map. The territory that he is referring here
11 to would extend to the north and east to include the -- a broad swath of
12 territory going through Rajlovac, which is a settlement just to the north
13 of Ilidza and became a separate municipality in 1992 and over to Vogosca,
14 which is the town directly to the north of down-town Sarajevo and a --
15 one of the ten municipalities of the city. So he's speaking about the
16 creation of a new municipality in the context here of a large territorial
17 sort of unimpeded territorial sweep where he -- are used that Serbs are
18 in the majority.
19 Q. Thank you. I was just getting the number of the map because it's
20 going to assist us when we deal with this next document.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, could I ask that this intercept be
22 marked for identification, please.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark this for identification.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
25 JUDGE KWON: We don't have the audio recording for this just for
1 the record?
2 MS. EDGERTON: That's correct, we do not.
3 Could we move next to a further intercept between Dr. Karadzic
4 and one Grkovic dated 22 February 1992
5 intercept for which in fact we do have an audio file, but I'll not be
6 playing it.
7 Q. Dr. Donia, do you see the original B/C/S transcript of that
8 intercept on the screen in front of you, and now the English one appears
9 as well?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Have you had an opportunity to review those in preparation for
12 your testimony today?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Now, the intercept we just discussed in which Tintor was involved
15 talked about the formation of the municipality of Rajlovac
16 intercept about two-thirds of the way down the first page - if we could
17 scroll down, please, and it's also at the same location in B/C/S, thank
18 you - Ljubo Grkovic tells his interlocutor, Dr. Karadzic, that he's just
19 arrived from Reljevo saying:
20 "We established a municipality down there ..." and further
22 "It will be called Rajlovac Serb municipality and includes R
23 eljevo and everything until Vogosca and Ilijas and over here until Osijek
24 and the television."
25 Do you see that passage?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now I want to refer you to the map you've just referred to, the
3 map from yesterday, Dr. Donia, P815. P815, please. Because, Dr. Donia,
4 perhaps you could comment on the expanse of territory covered by these
5 two intercepts.
6 A. Well, both intercepts go to the creation of the Rajlovac
7 municipality, which was carved out as a separate municipality from the
8 existing municipality of Novi Grad. And that is of course in the -- just
9 to the left centre, slightly above the centre of this map. And one sees
10 here that the Novi Grad municipality encompassed considerable piece of
11 territory in the western part of the city and went -- actually, existed
12 both to the north and south of the main thoroughfares. The -- Rajlovac
13 took its name from a settlement -- do I get to draw again?
14 Q. I would invite you, if we could move past the experiences of
15 yesterday with the map.
16 A. Okay. Here. And --
17 Q. Making a blue circle just to the left of the printed words "Novi
19 A. Yes. And Rajlovac was in fact at one time in the early years of
20 socialism a municipality on its own, but it was also this community which
21 included an airstrip and an academy for air force instruction that was
22 run by the Yugoslav People's Army. The new municipality of -- newly
23 created municipality of Rajlovac
24 family home of Mr. Krajisnik. And that is a little bit further north of
25 the circle that I've just indicated along -- just inside the main road,
1 roughly there. That's an approximation.
2 So Rajlovac emerged as this new municipality on the Serb-drawn
3 map of the western approaches as a large central area with considerable
4 settlements but also a large swath of mountainous or very hilly territory
5 where the words "Novi Grad" are on this map and to the north and east of
7 JUDGE KWON: Doctor, if you could kindly put a letter R and Z
8 respectively for future identification.
9 THE WITNESS: All right. Let's see. R and Zabrdje. Okay. Very
11 MS. EDGERTON:
12 Q. And -- thank you for that, Dr. Donia. And I wonder, although it
13 might be difficult at this magnification, I wonder if you're in a
14 position to indicate approximately on this map the television station so
15 that Their Honours can get an idea of the breadth, the approximate
16 breadth of the territory to encompass this new municipality.
17 A. Let's see here. I'm going to pick about here for the television
18 station. I guess it's actually a little bit closer to the road rather
19 than the railroad here, but that's approximately where it is. And the
20 television -- what's called a television station is in fact a huge
21 concrete structure that was pretty much despised for its architecture by
22 everybody in Sarajevo
23 the western approaches area.
24 Q. So from this succession of documents relating to Ilijas, Vogosca,
25 Rajlovac area, what do you see as being a new configuration of the
1 municipal boundaries of the western approaches to the city?
2 A. Well, the new municipal boundaries as they ended up in early
3 April of 1992 caused the municipalities to flank this main transportation
4 or artery east-west rather than to flow across it, as was the case in the
5 prior municipal organisation. So that was accomplished by eliminating
6 Novi Grad, creating Rajlovac as a municipality wholly on the north side
7 of the road, and taking part of Novi Grad that was south of the road and
8 dividing it -- if I may just do this kind of conceptually. I really
9 don't know exactly where the boundary ran, but taking part of it and
10 including it in Novo Sarajevo and part of it -- and including it in
11 Ilidza. This piece here actually -- the Dobrinja settlement was included
12 in the Ilidza municipality.
13 Q. Thank you. Perhaps I could ask you, just as you've done with R,
14 Z, and T for the television station, T and an arrow in fact, to mark
15 Dobrinja with a D, perhaps Novo Sarajevo with NO, and Ilidza with an I?
16 Would that be appropriate, Dr. Donia?
17 A. Well, Ilidza is I think already on the map and it was a matter of
18 redrawing the boundary of Ilidza. Actually, that happened in mid-April.
19 Q. So in terms of this redrawing of municipal boundaries, do you see
20 this as -- add rationale to the linkage or behind the linkage of these
21 particular areas?
22 A. Well, it removed municipal organisation from the business of
23 having to transect -- or cross major thoroughfares and created
24 municipalities which had both a, say, a demographic population base of --
25 that were substantial -- included substantial numbers of Serbs, and left
1 some Muslim settlements which were -- there were really two of them that
2 were largely Muslim, Sokolovic, Kolonija, and Sokolija [phoen] as
3 enclaves within these newly designed municipalities.
4 Q. Was this a peaceful process?
5 A. Well, the redrawing of the boundaries was not a violent act. It
6 simply established new jurisdictions that challenged the governmental
7 jurisdiction of the city of Sarajevo
8 Q. You eluded earlier in your testimony to civilian leaders being
9 given military functions in regard to the implementation of the municipal
10 strategy. What was their role? What did they do in carrying out these
12 A. Well, as I indicated, they became commanders of units and led
13 people from their municipalities in establishing the Siege of Sarajevo
14 and in linking up the lines of the siege with other municipalities and
15 defining the territories which were to come under Serb control.
16 Q. Was this a peaceful process?
17 A. That part of it was not.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Before we move further, Your Honours, if I could
19 go back to the intercept of 65 ter 30611 between Dr. Karadzic and
20 Ljubo Grkovic of 22 February, 1992, I wonder if I could ask that be
21 marked for identification, please.
22 JUDGE KWON: So would you like to save this marking,
23 Ms. Edgerton?
24 MS. EDGERTON: Absolutely. I was just going to do that next, but
25 as long as we catch both items, please. And I would like this map as
1 marked by Dr. Donia to become the next Prosecution exhibit.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P966.
4 MS. EDGERTON: And the intercept, please.
5 JUDGE KWON: Is this the one?
6 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, it is, Your Honour.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be MFI P967.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
10 Q. Now, if I may, on the subject of these civilian leaders who
11 became commanders of units and led the people from their municipalities
12 in establishing the siege lines, I'd like actually to play a video-clip
13 now from 65 ter 45111 depicting an interview by Risto Djogo of
14 Jovan Tintor dating from 1994. And before we begin the video, perhaps I
15 could ask you this, Dr. Djogo -- Dr. Donia, are you familiar with Risto
17 A. He was a journalist who did a lot of interviews for I believe the
18 Serbian television station in Pale.
19 Q. Thank you. Perhaps we could play this video, which will be the
20 last video of this presentation today.
21 [Video-clip played]
22 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
23 "Risto DJOGO: You were in control of Zuc at the time and
24 everything else, Pofalici. How did you see the tragedy of the Serbian
25 people in Pofalici? You were close by.
1 "Jovan TINTOR: Well, you see, then war already began. I don't
2 have two minutes of military education and kind of -- but I put myself at
3 the head of this people as the commander and kind of civilian leader. I
4 took the gun and organised the people the best I could. The front line I
5 held was big. It wasn't only Vogosca. I believed that I should help all
6 Serbs living on the territories where they weren't properly connected, so
7 I held 64 kilometres of front line. From the Jezero hospital, that is,
8 the child -- the maternity hospital through Vogosca over the middle,
9 coming down on the territory -- a part of the territory of Ilijas
10 back across Rajlovac, Ahatovici, and a part of Ilidza. The barracks in
11 Butim were the first barracks that were left empty, so I took my units
12 from Vogosca and filled the barracks so that it wouldn't stay empty, so
13 they would not take that territory of ours. Because those were Serbs
14 living there. So coming back over Sokolje again, Zuc, from Zuc, Vogosca,
15 to Potonje, again all the way to Kobilja Glava. It's a huge territory.
16 And I came to Zuc because I considered it to be a very important
17 strategic point. With me and lucky for me or for us I had Colonel
18 Vukota Vukovic with us who was the only officer of the JNA at the time,
19 that is, one of the individuals who offered -- who put himself at the
20 disposition of the Serbian Democratic Party, that is to say, the
21 insurgents of Serbian Vogosca. He helped me at the very beginning, I
22 mean the beginning of the organisation of people and organisation of the
23 defence. We went to Zuc and we conquered that very important strategic
24 point. And we connected up with Pofalici. However, once I officially
25 asked from Pofalici representatives to come for a discussion, they came a
1 few times, and one time I said that they had to -- they did not accept
2 that plan.
3 After that I issued the order twice, that they have to retreat,
4 so that we can make an action and go down to the city. Because I was
5 informed -- I was present at a meeting in Vrace where Mr. Kukanjac was
6 supposed to be present too. I wasn't lucky enough to meet him at the
7 time, but I met our present General Subotic, President Karadzic,
8 President Krajisnik, Mico Stanisic, Momcilo Mandic, and at that meeting
9 we spoke about getting together to cut the city in two and, well, to
10 enter the city using that bridge, the former Brotherhood and Unity
12 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
13 Q. And, Dr. Donia, before I ask you for comment on this clip, could
14 you tell us if you're familiar with some of the names identified by
15 Mr. Tintor. First, Mr. Kukanjac?
16 A. General Kukanjac was the JNA commander of the military district
17 centred in Sarajevo
18 and also had some residual responsibility for Croatia.
19 Q. Mico Stanisic?
20 A. Mr. Stanisic was a member of the government of the Bosnian Serb
21 republic when it was first proclaimed, and subsequently in I think
22 April -- March or April became the minister of the interior of that
23 government, essentially the top policeman in the Republika Srpska.
24 Q. Momcilo Mandic?
25 A. Was the -- Mr. Mandic was the deputy minister of the -- of the
1 Ministry of the Interior who later founded the separate Serbian Ministry
2 of the Interior and police in late March of 1992.
3 Q. And finally, General Subotic.
4 A. General Subotic was a commander in the JNA who subsequently had a
5 major command in the Army of Republika Srpska.
6 Q. Now, do you have comment on this video-clip that we've just seen
7 with regard to the theme we've been discussing of civilian leaders being
8 given military functions or taking on military functions?
9 A. Well, I think he -- Mr. Tintor pretty well spelled out what those
10 military functions included. They included establishing a line of
11 defence, taking the strategic hill of Zuc in the very heart of the
12 Rajlovac municipality, and linking up with other military units and
13 leaders as a part of the plan to establish the ring around the city of
15 Q. Now, you've explained earlier that Mr. Tintor held a function in
16 Vogosca. Did situation that he's described and the tasks he's taken on,
17 was that the case in other Sarajevo
18 A. Yes, it was. It was similar process took place in Ilidza, in
19 Ilijas, and in the general area of Rajlovac.
20 Q. Perhaps we could turn to a transcript of an intercepted
21 conversation dated 21 May 1992
22 Nedjeljko Prstojevic and Milisav Gagovic, and while we're waiting for
23 that to come up, can I ask you, Dr. Donia, are you familiar with
24 Mr. Prstojevic, do you know who he is?
25 A. Mr. Prstojevic was the president, I believe, of the SDS party in
2 Q. Now, do you see the intercept on the monitor in front of you?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. Have you had occasion to review this intercept prior to -- in
5 preparation for your testimony today?
6 A. Yes, I have.
7 Q. Would you like to comment on the intercept?
8 A. Well, I -- I'm not seeing it all here, so I don't know exactly
9 what -- without seeing the whole thing, I'm not going to be able to
10 comment on it.
11 Q. If we could move over to the next page, please. And scroll down.
12 And I note, Dr. Donia, at the bottom of this page Mr. Prstojevic's
13 interlocutor Gagovic notes that:
14 "The Muslims are fleeing Dobrinja for no reason."
15 And then if we could scroll over to the third page. At the top
16 of the page I note Mr. Gagovic stating:
17 "Yes, I ordered the press centre to release the information that
18 we are allowing Muslims to leave Dobrinja, but as long as it's only
19 entire families that are leaving. "
20 And further down six cells up from the bottom --
21 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.
22 Q. Six cells up from the bottom Prstojevic says the words:
23 "Check-point in Nedzarici," word missing, "through towards
24 Bascarsija, they say there's a lot of living space there."
25 Does -- do you recall now the context of this conversation?
1 A. Well, it's a conversation about the rather fast-moving events in
2 the area of the western approaches, and indicates that the Muslim
3 population from Dobrinja, which is this large housing complex, high-rise
4 housing complex that was built for the 1984 Olympics, is proceeding with
5 the approval and sponsorship, if you will, of the SDS leaders. The
6 conversation then goes to talk about the check-point in Nedzarici, which
7 is another location in the western approaches area, and the fact that
8 there is a lot of empty space, presumably empty apartments in that area
9 on the way toward -- toward the centre city.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.
11 [Prosecution counsel confer]
12 MS. EDGERTON:
13 Q. Perhaps, Dr. Donia, I could direct you to footnote 273 of your
15 A. Okay. What -- I have that in front of me.
16 Q. Do you have anything to add to your comments about this
17 intercept, looking at the citation from your report?
18 A. Well, in the report I link this conversation with an event that
19 was taking place at that time and the -- started I believe the 20th of
20 May, in which a large convoy of a couple hundred -- or a few kilometres
21 long sponsored by the children's ambassador in Sarajevo was detained as
22 it left the city and retained -- or detained for two days while
23 negotiations proceeded involving the Red Cross to allow the children and
24 few women who were part of the convoy to exit the city. That convoy
25 eventually was released I think on the 22nd or the 23rd of May, and it
1 was -- it then proceeded I think to the Adriatic coast and left Bosnia
2 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I --
3 Q. Thank you, Dr. Donia.
4 MS. EDGERTON: -- I omitted to ask to tender the video which we
5 played, 65 ter number 45111, timer number 00:22:05 to 00:26:22.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be admitted as
8 Exhibit P968.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
10 Q. And now not dealing with the tendering of that intercept for a
11 moment, I'd like to turn to something Mr. Prstojevic said during the
12 course of the 17th Bosnian Serb Assembly Session on 24 to 26 July 1992,
13 and that is at D00092, page 66 in English and 66 in the B/C/S. Thank
15 Dr. Donia, could I direct your attention in English and in B/C/S
16 to the passage towards -- no, on the bottom half of the page, please,
17 where you see Prstojevic and a colon on both sides - thank you - where
18 halfway down the paragraph in which Mr. Prstojevic begins speaking, he
20 "Moreover, we even did not know if Mr. Karadzic was alive during
21 the first couple of days. When we learned that he was alive and when he
22 visited us in Ilidza and encouraged us, the Serbs from Sarajevo retained
23 control over the territory and even extended their territory in some
24 areas, driving the Muslims out of the territories where they had actually
25 been a majority."
1 And ask if you have any comment on that.
2 A. Well, I think in one sentence here Mr. Prstojevic has summarised
3 a lot of what happened in the western approaches simultaneously with the
4 establishment of the siege of the city and the conquest of most of the
5 territory in the western approaches.
6 Q. And do you find this statement to be reflective of any policy on
7 the part of the SDS
8 A. Well, it was a policy of ethnically cleansing the territories
9 which they conquered and removing the non-Serb populations from most of
10 those territories. It further indicates that the stated goal of previous
11 months of acquiring only Serb land was in fact considerably exceeded in
12 carrying out the action that he's describing here.
13 Q. Thank you. In that regard, perhaps I could ask that we - staying
14 with the same session - go to e-court page 19 of the English and page 16
15 of the B/C/S. Now, if you could enlarge the bottom of the page, please,
16 I have to count up the number of lines. I'm looking for the 19th line up
17 from the bottom on this English page, and I see it.
18 Dr. Donia, could I direct your attention to a statement by
19 Dr. Karadzic here at the 17th Assembly Session.
20 MS. EDGERTON: And if you could please, Mr. Registrar, display
21 the left-hand side of the English page. It's a little difficult to see
22 and it's cut off.
23 Q. And I think the 19th line up Dr. Karadzic says:
24 "We do not have any more reason to fight. We have liberated
25 almost everything that is ours. In final talks we could even return some
1 territories, villages that do not belong to us."
2 It's been very hard to identify that passage when we don't have
3 any paragraph indentations, but are you familiar with that passage,
4 Dr. Donia?
5 A. I'm familiar with the Assembly session and as part of it familiar
6 with this excerpt, yes.
7 Q. Do you have any comment in relation to this statement by
8 Dr. Karadzic?
9 A. Well, I think he's stating here that the Bosnian Serb nationalist
10 conquest of territory has gone considerably beyond what had previously
11 been the territorial claims based on the identification of Serb lands. I
12 think it also could be taken as an indication that Dr. Karadzic conceived
13 of this additional land as bargaining chips for arriving at a territorial
14 settlement to end the war.
15 Q. Thank you. And now if we could move briefly to the very final
16 area of questioning, I'd like to recall that yesterday in commenting on
17 Dr. Karadzic's articulations of 12 May 1992 at page 3079, line 2 and
18 onward, you said that Dr. Karadzic valued this separation of the
19 city - referring to Sarajevo
20 crippling the state or denying to the Bosnian -- to the Republic of
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina the attributes of a state."
22 Do you remember that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. In that regard could I ask that we look at 65 ter 11570. It's an
25 interview with Stanislav Galic in Sarajevo Srpske Novine, dated 25 March
1 1994 entitled: "Aggression in Blue." And while we wait for that, I take
2 it you know who Stanislav Galic is, Dr. Donia?
3 A. General Galic was at that time the commander of the Romanija
4 Corps which was besieging Sarajevo
5 Q. Now, I -- do you see the interview on the screen in front of you?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And have you had an opportunity to review that in preparing for
8 your testimony today?
9 A. Yes, I have.
10 Q. Could I ask that we go to page 6 of the translation in English,
11 please, and just for the record page 2 of the B/C/S, the bullet point in
12 the middle column. Now that we see the English translation in front of
13 us, I'd like to direct you to the question of the interviewer that
14 appears at the top of the page which says:
15 "Many people say that the keys to war or peace are held in
17 And the sixth line down from that General Galic responds:
18 "As long as we have Sarajevo
20 Do you see that in the sixth line down from the interviewer's
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you have any comment on that statement and General Galic's
24 articulations in this article as a whole?
25 A. Well, in this particular passage he is echoing a thing -- a
1 statement that Dr. Karadzic frequently made about the -- his observation
2 that most civil wars end up in some sort of negotiated settlement without
3 a winner or a loser, and that Sarajevo
4 area, for the ultimate resolution of the war. He then goes on to say
5 that the critical issue in Sarajevo
6 or polity with the attributes of a state and that therefore the
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Could I tender this as the next Prosecution
10 exhibit, please.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P969.
13 MS. EDGERTON:
14 Q. And one final question for you, Dr. Donia, have you seen evidence
15 in these Assembly sessions and elsewhere that the strategic objectives
16 that we began our presentation with guided Bosnian Serb army operations
17 during the course of the war?
18 A. Yes. There are numerous references to the importance of the
19 strategic objectives in statements by military leaders, including most
20 significantly General Mladic, before the Bosnian Serb Assembly and also
21 in some of the -- I think the concepts of the strategic objectives are
22 reflected in some of the general orders that guided the military
23 offensives in the course of the war.
24 Q. Could we see, please, 65 ter 00085, the transcript from the 50th
25 Session of the Republika Srpska Assembly, dated 15 and 16 April 1995, and
1 I'm looking for page 22 of the English, please.
2 Now, I -- and -- my apologies. It's B/C/S page 18.
3 Dr. Donia, I'd like to direct your attention to this statement by
4 General Mladic that's recorded on this page and the large full paragraph
5 in the middle of the page.
6 MS. EDGERTON: You're going to have to scroll down, please,
7 Mr. Registrar, and you're going to have to centre the English on the
8 page, please, just a little bit better. No, it's going too far over to
9 the left. Thank you.
10 Q. Do you see the last sentence in this large paragraph which reads:
11 "The tasks of the army in this war stem from the known six
12 strategic objectives adopted by our Assembly which have not been carried
13 out to the full due to the lack of material or other support"?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Is this one of those statements by General Mladic regarding the
16 strategic objectives that you've referred to and seen over the course of
17 your research?
18 A. Yes, it is.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I'd like to move this session,
20 please, the 50th, into evidence then.
21 JUDGE KWON: As a whole? Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P970.
23 MS. EDGERTON: And subject to any questions Your Honours may
24 have, that concludes my examination-in-chief.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 Mr. Karadzic, do you like to start now or do you like to have a
2 break before you start your cross-examination?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if it's all the same, then it
4 would be better to take the break now and then to work until the end of
5 the session.
6 JUDGE KWON: Before we take a break, have we admitted the report
7 of the doctor, Dr. Donia?
8 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, my apologies, my sincere apologies.
9 Your Honours, it would be appropriate for me at this moment to move -- to
10 request to move the three reports, 65 ter number 11699, that's the
11 origins of the Republika Srpska report; 65 ter number 11700, which is
12 the -- what we've called the excerpts report throughout the presentation
13 of this evidence; and 65 ter number 21894 into evidence. And at the same
14 time, Your Honours will recall there is of course the matter of
15 originally 19 - now I think 18 - exhibits which were identified in
16 appendix B in our notification and exhibits list which we filed for
17 Dr. Donia in February of this year. A number of those documents,
18 Your Honour, I think three, I can perhaps stand to be corrected if I turn
19 to my copy of the filing beside me, are transcripts of intercepted
20 communications relating to the September incident Dr. Donia was
21 discussing in his evidence earlier today.
22 JUDGE KWON: By appendix B, do you refer to the several documents
23 in the -- attached to Sarajevo
24 MS. EDGERTON: No, Your Honours. By appendix B I'm referring to
25 our filing of 5 February 2010
1 those which we would be referring to -- we would be using in evidence
2 with Dr. Donia and a further 19, as I said now I think 18, selected
3 sources used by Dr. Donia in compiling the reports for admission.
4 JUDGE KWON: So let me be clear. How many are there for items
5 that would be using in evidence, 18 and further 19? So have you used all
6 18 or are you suggesting to tender those documents which were not used
7 during the course of your examination-in-chief?
8 MS. EDGERTON: Appendix A was the -- is the list of documents
9 from which we drew the evidence we've exhibited during the course of
10 Dr. Donia's presentation today; and appendix B is exactly as you've
11 described, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE KWON: We'll hear from the Defence.
13 Mr. Robinson.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. First of all, with respect to
15 the second report of Dr. Donia, the excerpts, we note that in the Perisic
16 case the Trial Chamber excluded that because it was not really an expert
17 report. If you -- we believe that the underlying Assembly session
18 records should be admitted, and if you find it convenient to have
19 excerpts from Dr. Donia, then you certainly can admit the report if you
20 would like. And we would seek probably when we have Defence expert
21 witnesses to use the same procedure. So we don't have any particularly
22 strong objection, but we do note in another instance it has been
24 If I can -- also I wanted to turn to the appendix B, but perhaps
25 Mr. Tieger can address this point now if he would like.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 In that connection we have had the opportunity to discuss this
4 matter with Mr. Robinson, and we certainly don't suggest that the
5 excerpts report should come in without the benefit of the underlying
6 Assembly sessions. And to provide the Court with a broader overview of
7 this, pursuant to the Court's encouragement following the decision on
8 further guide-lines for admission, we did meet with Mr. Robinson to
9 discuss the possibility of reaching agreement on certain documents.
10 I'm sure it won't surprise the Court, given what it's already
11 heard about the Assembly sessions, that those were the first items on our
12 agenda for agreement. And we agreed to, at least momentarily, defer the
13 submission of a joint -- joint submission in connection with the Assembly
14 sessions because of Dr. Donia's testimony and reports, concluding that it
15 would be preferable to seek to jointly agree to the admission of those
16 Assembly sessions referenced in Dr. Donia's reports. And I would note
17 that all of the Assembly sessions, I'm advised by Mr. Sladojevic, appear
18 on the list of Defence documents to be cross-examined, another reflection
19 of the significance regarding those documents and the anticipation by the
20 parties of their extensive use during the course of these proceedings.
21 So again, to follow-up on Mr. Robinson's comments, we didn't
22 anticipate that the excerpts report would come in without the benefit of
23 the underlying Assembly sessions, and we agree that they should be
25 JUDGE KWON: As regards the remaining documents, other parts?
1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, thank you, Mr. President. With respect to
2 appendix B, I note that at least one of those documents has already been
3 admitted, directive 3, I believe, was admitted through cross-examination,
4 so perhaps that list might have to be paired a little bit. But also I
5 would note that it seems to fall outside of the guide-lines of the
6 Chamber since it wasn't put to the witness, and he's not actually a
7 92 ter witness. But having said those things, once again we do encourage
8 the admissibility of documents which seem to be relevant to the case and
9 these do seem to be relevant. So if you're willing to see that something
10 outside your guide-lines may nevertheless be admitted, we don't have any
11 problem having the documents in appendix B admitted.
12 JUDGE KWON: And you have no objection to the reports themselves?
13 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
15 We will give our ruling after the break. We will break for 25
17 --- Recess taken at 5.07 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 5.35 p.m.
19 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, the -- given the reports are his
20 product of his expertise and also the -- that basically there was no
21 objection from the Defence and finally that particularly in relation to
22 the thematic excerpts, although they are the collection of excerpts, the
23 manner it is organised or categorised can be viewed as an exercise of his
24 expertise. So we will admit the three reports, all of them. And as to
25 the appendix B, we are satisfied with the probative value or reliability
1 and that is the way it is tendered is consistent with our guide-lines and
2 our previous decision. But certain items have been already admitted and
3 the -- being consistent with our practice, we will not admit the
4 intercepts, and I don't think we need to mark for it, given that they are
5 not played during the court session.
6 As for the appendix A, which was supposed to be used during the
7 examination-in-chief, we will admit only those part that were actually
8 used during the -- during your examination-in-chief.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Of course, Your Honour. Thank you very much.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 Mr. Karadzic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Donia.
15 A. "Dobra dan."
16 Q. I'm glad that you speak our language, so it will be easier for us
17 to understand each other. Tell me, please. What case is this for you, I
18 mean in which you're testifying, number what?
19 A. I'm not certain exactly, but I think it's about 15.
20 Q. Thank you. Tell me how was it that you established contact with
21 the OTP and the Tribunal? Did they seek you out or did you recommend
23 A. Back in 1997 I received a phone call from a Prosecutor, asking if
24 I was interested in considering testifying in the Blaskic case. So that
25 was initiated by the Prosecution. I was employed in other things at the
1 time and didn't have much interest in doing it at first, but indeed did
2 pursue it.
3 Q. Thank you. Why did you come to their minds? What was it that
4 recommended you to them?
5 A. I understand from speaking with them further that I was
6 recommended by Dr. Dennison Rusinow who is a long -- was a long -- he
7 passed away a few years ago, a long-time scholar of the former
9 and many individual articles about the history of the region. They spoke
10 to him. He was, for I don't know what reasons, either not selected or
11 chose not to participate and so he recommended me.
12 Q. Thank you. At that point in time you were in Merrill Lynch in
13 actual fact, but you were certainly not a scholar. You were not involved
14 in history at that point in time?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. And what was it that guided this gentleman to recommend you?
17 Could he not have thought of someone who was actively engaged in history
18 at some institute?
19 A. I rather suspect he did. He may have given them several names to
20 suggest. I really don't know. We had known one another well for at that
21 point 20 years, so he knew my -- not only my writings but my other
22 activities in life and teachings. So I would assume that he was -- I was
23 one of several people that he suggested to the Prosecution.
24 Q. Thank you. So he was aware of your writings and of your views;
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you. You say that at first you were not very keen on this.
3 What was your motive to accept this after all?
4 A. Well, I wasn't keen on it because I had a full-time job and was
5 otherwise engaged, but I did agree to just come and explore and see what
6 the work entailed. I knew at that point that I wouldn't have time to
7 pursue really much independent research or preparation, but could perhaps
8 call on my knowledge at that point. So the question in my mind was
9 whether I would be able to take the time to do the preparation that they
10 would require for work that I'm doing now.
11 Q. Thank you. Did you have to leave your old job then or did you
12 keep it?
13 A. No. I stayed in that position until -- to say this was 1997 when
14 I interviewed with them, I stayed in that position until the fall of
15 2000, my position with Merrill Lynch.
16 Q. Did you leave them then or was it that Merrill Lynch faced
17 difficulties then or was it that they faced difficulties later after all?
18 A. Well, I'd like to say that everything was fine when I was there.
19 They in fact did face severe difficulties later on, but I probably left
20 at about the best time prior to the down side to -- both in the market as
21 a whole and at the firm.
22 Q. And what have you been doing since then?
23 A. I teach occasionally. I've taught one course at the University
24 of California
25 University of Michigan
1 time to research and writing in the ten years since I left Merrill Lynch.
2 Q. Can one make a living like that?
3 A. One can make a living having worked for Merrill Lynch. One
4 cannot make a living doing the things that I have been doing since then.
5 Q. Thank you. Now, tell me who provided the titles to those works
6 of yours, your studies and reports?
7 A. I did.
8 Q. Thank you. Now, are you the author of these works?
9 A. Yes, I am. I'm not the author of the excerpts, but I'm the
10 author of the two reports and selected the excerpts as indicated to in a
11 sense make it a coherent narrative.
12 Q. Perhaps it's not a scientific work, a scholarly work - correct me
13 if I'm wrong - but it is a professional work based on scientific truths.
14 Would that be right?
15 A. I'm not too sure what the difference is. I certainly followed
16 the normal professional procedures in preparing all three reports and
17 tried to adhere to the canons of the professional in preparing them.
18 Q. And were you given an assignment by the Prosecution; and if so,
19 how was the assignment worded?
20 A. Well, in each case in which I've been involved, I have first sat
21 down with the Prosecutor and discussed what the Prosecutor wanted in
22 terms of a report, by which I mean what the topic was to be, if there was
23 a question of the chronological framework within which the report should
24 be confined or a particular municipality or set of municipalities or the
25 entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. It just depended on what the Prosecutor
1 requested. My feeling was that it is up to the Prosecutor to outline,
2 essentially set the boundaries, of where my reports would lie. It's my
3 job then to work within those boundaries to create an account as best I
4 can from the sources and information I have.
5 Q. Thank you. Now, what are your obligations towards the OTP in
6 general terms? Do you have to adhere to their views and the tasks that
7 they set you and live up to their expectations?
8 A. Well, I have to prepare a report within the guide-lines that they
9 establish, they set. Those guide-lines are not qualitative or they don't
10 prescribe any particular viewpoint, but -- so I'm free to have different
11 views or interpretations, both in the written reports and testimony, and
12 actually have never been asked to adhere to a particular viewpoint,
13 either in the report or my oral -- verbal testimony.
14 Q. Now, could we get hold of those guide-lines perhaps, the
15 guide-lines that they provided you with, the Prosecution I mean?
16 A. Well, as I indicated in -- I think in every case, they were
17 verbal. They were a result of a discussion between us. And so there's
18 no written guide-lines that have ever been provided to me that I can
20 Q. Thank you. We received some correspondence, so I was asking
21 about the instructions and guide-lines. But anyway, who chose the
22 material that you were to study?
23 A. Well, most of it I acquired myself. The exception being the
24 documentation that's provided to me by the Prosecution typically at my
25 request, which usually starts out with a very general request and gets
1 more specific as I'm carving out the report itself. So my -- I think
2 what I bring to the table perhaps more than anything else is a lot of use
3 of independent sources, sources that the Prosecution may think are
4 inconsequential or not available to them or in other ways are not a part
5 of their database.
6 Q. Thank you. And did you have an insight into all the material
7 that you wanted to see? Did you decide on the selection of material or
8 did somebody propose what they thought you should look at?
9 A. I think I'd say I've never been 100 per cent fully satisfied with
10 what I was given. I have asked for a great deal and been given a great
11 deal, but usually there was something else that I wish I had and
12 sometimes something that occurs to me much later on that I wished I had
13 asked for. But in general, I would say the Prosecution has responded to
14 my specific requests for documentation on the themes that I'm working on.
15 Q. I see that you devoted quite a lot of attention to statements
16 made in newspapers and in interviews. Now, do you agree - and we should
17 check this out first - whether the statements were authorised, whether
18 they were accepted or disputed? And when someone gives statements to
19 newspapers, they usually have a political note and are usually different
20 to what we say when we're under oath. Would that be right?
21 A. There's a few different questions there. Do I check to see if
22 the statements were authorised. You mean the statements that are
23 published in the periodical press?
24 Q. Yes. For instance, did somebody actually say what the newspaper
25 printed or was it the journalist's interpretation of what was said?
1 A. I think in the newspapers that I consulted, the journalist
2 normally distinguishes between a direct quote or what specifically was
3 said and the interpretation. Now, not every newspaper does that, I
4 recognise, but I've mainly been using sources that follow that
5 journalistic canon. And so I would -- for example, speeches that you've
6 made, there are a lot of direct quotes, and I have relied on those quotes
7 or press releases, things like that. But to be honest I didn't call you
8 up and ask you if you had said those things. Your number was unlisted
9 through much of the time.
10 Q. Thank you. Now, would you agree with me that statements and
11 speeches, that they have a political goal as well?
12 A. Many do, yes.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, did you have an insight into the documents and
14 the behaviour of other parties in the conflict, just like those that you
15 studied on the Serb side, analogous to those?
16 A. I have and have paid some attention to them, but in the cases of
17 the reports before us they weren't my primary target and area of
18 interest. As you may know, I've prepared some reports about the HVO,
19 Herceg-Bosna, essentially the Croatian nationalist undertaking. And for
20 studying those, that movement, I used documents of that party. I'm
21 familiar with many of the other sources for the study of other parties,
22 including the social democratic party and the left opposition and the
23 SDA. I have not consulted the vast majority of them.
24 Q. Thank you. Now, yesterday you mentioned that it was the job of a
25 historian to study the cause and effect, relationship, and to look at the
1 context of issues - you mentioned that yesterday I believe. Did you do
2 that in this particular case?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You also said that the Serbs - and then you quoted my
5 words - saying that we waited for them to make a mistake or make a move
6 and then we responded with a counter measure. Now, our counter measures,
7 when you showed them did you show what caused these counter measures and
8 caused that kind of conduct on our part?
9 A. In some cases, yes; and in others no I think.
10 Q. Why not in all cases?
11 A. Well, it wasn't central to the story or sufficiently central to
12 fulfil the assignment.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, I hope we'll arrive at that together now. But a
14 personal question now. What are the earnings per case and per day in
15 this job?
16 A. Well --
17 JUDGE KWON: Is it relevant, Dr. Karadzic?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think, Your Excellency,
19 that it is indeed and you'll see why.
20 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, I think you need to tell us why before the
21 witness answers the question, Dr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, because we're all human
23 beings, and if you imagine that Mr. Donia did something that the
24 Prosecution didn't like, would he be testifying 15 times? Certainly not
25 because they have their own interests in all of that. So I'm interested
1 in knowing how come the Prosecution has some favourite witnesses and
2 keeps bringing them back in.
3 JUDGE KWON: We don't think it's relevant. Move on to your next
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Now, in your report about Sarajevo
8 speak about nations and nationalist movements. Do you distinguish
9 between national and nationalistic?
10 A. Very good question. It's a distinction that is a major one in
11 B/C/S. And when I'm addressing these issues in B/C/S I usually use the
12 term "national." And I'm very reluctant to call anything nationalist --
13 nationalistic. In English to me the distinction is somewhat different.
14 In fact, there's very little distinction. So I freely use the term
15 "nationalist" to describe all three parties, for example, in
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, to distinguish them from what I conceive of as
17 non-nationalist political formations and non-nationalist attitudes.
18 Q. Thank you. So the three parties that you talk about are not
19 nationalist, but national, if we look at the Serbian language; would that
20 be right?
21 A. I would call them that, yes. I would use that term in describing
22 them, and I do when I am using that language.
23 Q. Thank you. So it's not a disqualification of any kind, it's not
24 a value judgement, political judgement, to say nationalist movement using
25 the English?
1 A. That is my intent, that it not be judgemental. It's not a
3 Q. Thank you. Next what I'm interested in is a paragraph where you
4 opt for Professor Paula Pickering's position, and she considers that
5 we're not born in a nation and that cultural identity does not exist, but
6 that a nation -- a nation is an environmentalist creation or socially
7 conditioned creation. Would that be right?
8 A. Insofar as you just quoted this excerpt, yes. I used that very
9 brief passage to summarise what I consider a vast school of thinking
10 about the constructed nature of nations or peoples and would kind of let
11 her stand for this group of people that includes Benedict Anderson,
12 Rogers Brubaker, Ron Sunia [phoen], and a host of other scholars who
13 think of nations in this way.
14 Q. Thank you. Now, at one point - and we'll come to that - you said
15 you were very happy when you saw that these ethnic borders aren't visible
16 between municipalities or among municipalities. So I wanted to ask you:
17 Is this your basis for opting for Ms. Pickering's view, is that your
18 basis for the standpoint, too, to the effect that the Croats and Serbs in
20 A. Insofar as I understand your question to be that -- or you're
21 asking me whether I opt to quote Professor Pickering because of my view
22 that -- or it is my view that the Serbs and Croats wouldn't agree to form
23 a new Bosnian nation, that would be wrong. I kind of start the other way
24 around. Looking at the current thinking about nations and peoples, to
25 approach and better understand the nature of nationalism and the three
1 nationalisms in Bosnia
2 Q. Thank you. Now, would you agree with Edouard Balladur, the
3 former prime minister of France, and I do I believe that this is the
4 position of other scholars, that a nation starts by superseding tribalism
5 and tribes within one national group, that that is transcended?
6 A. As a very partial statement of how nations develop, yes, I would
7 agree with that but I would say it's very incomplete, particularly in the
8 light of our current understandings of how nations are formed.
9 Q. And would you agree that nations were formed in the 19th century
10 and that it is difficult to form a new nation in the 20th century?
11 A. No. It's always difficult to form a new nation, and the point is
12 that nations are always in flux. They can appear and disappear and they
13 are always changing their boundaries, their content, and for that matter
14 the programmes of their political leaders.
15 Q. Let us put aside the fact that you've probably heard of -- well,
16 you know about Jung's work and Zondi's on the collective familiar
17 subconscious and unconscious and Freud's views, that this is -- would you
18 agree that this is just one-sided and that we should quote other authors
19 that have -- that talk about other effects, apart from the social and the
20 environmental in the creation of a nation?
21 A. Well, I think you're wading into an area about which there is a
22 huge literature and many differences of opinion in terms of exactly how
23 many and what elements should be included in examining the origins and
24 development of a nation. You are citing people that you know better than
25 I do in terms of their psychological expertise, and certainly it would be
1 true that a comprehensive study of how a particular nation arises and
2 develops should take into account the psychological viewpoint of those
4 Q. Thank you. Do you nonetheless think that the Serbs and Croats
5 should have accepted an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unitary
6 state as conceived by the SDA and Mr. Izetbegovic?
7 A. Should have accepted, well things would have been much simpler if
8 they had. I don't know that the premises of your question -- that I
9 would agree with all of them. I don't necessarily think that the
10 conception of the SDA and Mr. Izetbegovic is best described as a unitary
11 state, but I would I guess point out that this is really the -- goes to
12 the heart of the difference between what happened in the former
14 independence of the various republics that made up the Soviet Union,
15 which contained in them about 25 million Russians in the near abroad, did
16 not contest the independence of the republics in withdrawing from the
17 Soviet Union and didn't have the kinds of linkages with the leadership of
18 the parent republic. That was the case in Yugoslavia. That it was a
19 huge difference and many of those leaders of the Russian communities in
20 the near abroad, in fact, participated in the push for independence.
21 So it is not out of the question that one should think that the
22 Serbs could have accepted an independent state and lived happily in it,
23 but do I think they should have -- I wouldn't presume to prescribe that.
24 Q. Thank you. Well, I'm sure you agree that the Soviet Union was
25 created in one way and Yugoslavia
1 the Trianon Agreement, the Saint-Germain Agreement after the First World
3 A. They certainly were created in two different ways, and of course
5 different way each time.
6 Q. And that other way, was it a democratic way?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Do you think that the Serbs in Krajina and Bosnia would have
9 accepted to remain in those republics if the condition for that had not
10 been the existence of Yugoslavia
11 A. I'm sorry. I'm not -- I don't understand the question.
12 Q. Well, the question is the following: Croatia was formed from
14 Serb people by Austro-Hungary. And the Serbs agreed to become -- to join
16 it was a dual-nation republic of the Serbs and the Croats. That's right,
17 isn't it?
18 A. There's several questions here. The assumption that the Serbs
19 were a constituent people is of course a statement out of Yugoslav
20 constitutional theory, and I don't have any problem agreeing that under
21 that theory they were a constituent people of Yugoslavia. The issue of
22 whether they were a constituent people in Croatia, I'm just afraid I'm
23 not able to answer because I don't pretend to be an expert on the
24 constitutional theory of the -- of either Croatia or the former
1 I wouldn't agree with your formulation about the Serbian Krajina
2 being given to the Serb people by Austro-Hungary. That's not the case.
3 Q. And do you know that the Serbs were given autonomous rights in
4 Austro-Hungary for having defended the area from the Turks?
5 A. Well, they weren't given autonomous rights by Austro-Hungary
6 because Austro-Hungary didn't exist before 1867. The Krajina area was,
7 in fact, the beneficiary of autonomous rights, which drew many Serbs to
8 the area to populate the military frontier region. And they were engaged
9 in military actions at times, usually with people on the other side who
10 in many cases were Serbs as well. So I wouldn't agree with the
11 formulation that they were actually fighting against the Turks as
12 their -- certainly not as their sole activity in manning the military
14 Q. Well, I think that we can agree that it was Austria first and
15 then Austro-Hungary later. But we're not disputing the fact that the
16 Serbs were given autonomous rights in Krajina, today's Krajina, and that
17 they were given them by Austria
18 A. Well, just to get the chronology right, the -- most of those --
19 many of those Serbs actually relocated, migrated, or moved to the area
20 and were rewarded with the autonomous rights particularly of the church,
21 the Serbian Orthodox church, and some administrative autonomy as well.
22 Q. I was just waiting for the interpretation. That's why I paused
23 for a moment. But do you know who the "ktitor" of the Krka monastery,
24 the head priest of the Krka monastery? It's the Orthodox monastery.
25 A. No.
1 Q. The endowment.
2 That was far before Austria
3 But let me ask you this, Mr. Donia: Do you know how those lands
4 became united, the lands which were within Austro-Hungary? Vojvodina was
5 different, but today's territory of Slovenia
7 A. Well, the actual proclamation of Yugoslavia which was on 1
8 December 1918 brought those lands together with the Kingdom of Serbia
10 Q. All right. But how did they unite? Do you agree that before
11 that a state was formed of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in this united
12 area, this united territory, and that that territory united with Serbia
13 It didn't last long, but it has to be established so that America would
14 agree to the united state ultimately.
15 A. Again, a number of questions there. I think I just described how
16 the state was actually formed. It was formed by proclamation of the
17 Serbian prince regent Aleksandar on December 1, 1918. It -- there
18 certainly were -- there was a Yugoslav committee formed prior to the
19 proclamation in the course of the First World War, and the Corfu
20 declaration of 1917 set the stage in a sense for that unification, but
21 the act itself was a -- not really a -- didn't have a whole lot to do
22 with the international, let alone, American participation in creating the
23 Kingdom of Serbs
24 Q. Let us try to clarify this. Do you agree that the Nis
25 declaration and the Korfu declaration in actual fact meant that the Serbs
1 had given up on creating Serbia
2 joint state of the southern Slavs? That's a pretty easy question. It
3 can be answered just by yes or no.
4 A. No.
5 Q. So how were things then?
6 A. Well, I think many Serbs saw the Yugoslav state as an expanded
8 state and calling it the Kingdom of Serbs
9 wouldn't -- I can't agree with you that the Serbs gave up on creating
11 events that resulted in the creation of the kingdom.
12 Q. Tell us then, after 1918 when did Serbia first come into being,
13 the Banovinas included. Serbia
15 A. That's a good question. I guess it first reappeared as a
16 separate polity in 1941, and as the -- through the creation of the German
17 occupation. There were certainly -- one of the Banovinas favoured Serbia
18 to be sure, but that really was not a separate polity. And then after
19 that would have come into -- came into being with the proclamation of
20 socialist Yugoslavia
21 Q. However, do you agree that that Serbia, Nedic's Serbia
22 being on the basis of the remnants that were left over after the
23 dismembering by the neighbours carried out, that this is what was left
24 over after all the neighbours of Serbia dismembered Serbia
25 what was left over and then Nedic was compelled to become prime minister?
1 A. No.
2 Q. So how was it then?
3 A. Well, I think the -- you know, the -- the Serbian occupation
4 polity under Nedic was a -- was indeed a creature of convenience for the
5 German occupiers, but I wouldn't describe it as all that was left after
6 the neighbours had dismembered Serbia, no.
7 Q. Did Hungary
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Did Bulgaria
10 A. Bulgaria
11 of Serbia
12 Q. Did Albania
13 A. Much of it, not all of it.
14 Q. Did Croatia
15 river viewed from Belgrade
16 Zemun and Zagreb
17 in a single country?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. So Serbia
20 A. Well, Serbia
21 partitioned by the occupying powers, and parts of it were given to
22 neighbouring states that were considered allies or allies of the Germans
23 and Italians in 1941. So I don't know that you can talk about Serbia
24 being partitioned when it as a polity didn't exist at that time. It was
25 a dismemberment of Yugoslavia
1 sort of hived off was given to someone else or stood alone.
2 Q. Did Croatia
3 so on and so forth?
4 A. Well, I probably put it that all of Bosnia-Herzegovina and part
5 of Srem were given by the German occupiers and to some degree the Italian
6 occupiers to the independent state of Croatia. I don't know that Croatia
7 was in a position to take anything at that point other than what they
8 were given to administer by the Germans.
9 Q. We'll go back to the independent state of Croatia, the NDH,
10 that's a very important subject. But now let me ask you this: Do you
11 remember what it was that the Allies offered to Yugoslavia in the London
12 Agreement of 1915 -- actually, what it was that they offered to the
13 Serbs? Yes, the Serbs?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Do you remember that their offer to the Serbs was a western
16 boundary of the Serb lands along the Virovitica-Karlobag-Karlovac line?
17 A. I don't have any recollection or knowledge of that, no.
18 Q. That is a very important point because Serbia had suffered a
19 great deal and the western Allies had made an offer to Serbia to forget
20 about Slovenia
21 a different decision, they passed the Corfu Declaration. Isn't that
23 A. As I say, I can't confirm that or don't have the information to
24 either agree or disagree with that.
25 Q. All right. Those are historical facts. We'll deal with that
1 easily. You mentioned the Yugoslav committee. Do you know that the
2 Yugoslav committee existed in Zagreb
3 know about that, that they existed in Zagreb and in Split
5 A. Yes. The Yugoslav committee had representatives I think from
6 Slovenes, Croats, I think even one Bosnian or two -- maybe one or two
7 Bosnian members, and Serbs. It was a committee made up of people who
8 were preparing to come together to form the kingdom.
9 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the Split committee had blackmailed
10 the Zagreb
11 Karadjordjevics or we will decide to the effect that Dalmatia will join
13 A. No.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D1369 or 1? What was
16 it? 1361.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. So do you remember the 14 points of Woodrow Wilson, Mr. Donia?
19 A. I couldn't name them, no. I know there were 14 and that he was
20 famous for them, so to that degree, yes.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the Serbian version as
22 well -- oh, no, there isn't one. Sorry. So then can we just have one so
23 we can see it better in English.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. So we can agree -- or rather, you will agree that on the 8th of
1 January, 1918
2 Congress and that they contained a basis for achieving a lasting peace in
4 A. That was his intent, yes.
5 Q. Thank you. That is what he made public and that was what paved
6 the way for the end of the First World War. The US was always a major
7 power, wasn't it?
8 A. No, it wasn't. It certainly -- the United States played an
9 important role in the latter, particularly in the latter year and a half
10 or two of the First World War and was an important player in the
11 diplomatic arrangements that were brought about, but not as -- let's --
12 let me just say the principles that you see here that Wilson
13 were probably not as influential as some idealistic historians have
14 proposed in actually ending the conflict.
15 Q. However, you do accept that there are such historians who claim
16 that these 14 points were the basis for the establishment of peace in
18 historians who believe that; isn't that right?
19 A. No so many anymore, but certainly there have been.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we scroll down a bit. Can
21 we -- yes, yes. We need that part of the document.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Donia, that the principle of self-determination
24 of nations was established then and it was proposed by America through
25 its very president, Woodrow Wilson?
1 A. I wouldn't agree it was established then. I would concur that it
2 was proposed by Woodrow Wilson in this document and that it seriously
3 failed in the actual application of the principles to the making of the
5 Q. And is this principle of the self-determination of peoples and
6 nations part and parcel of the international covenant on human rights?
7 Did anyone else propose that before Wilson
8 A. I'm sure it was around before Wilson. The principle, of course,
9 of self-determination of peoples is -- goes back much further than this,
10 but the -- it's also, you know, one of several principles which often
11 enter into conflict in the -- both the sense of international law, but
12 also more importantly - and I wouldn't speak to the international law
13 side of it - but in the actual implementation of agreements based on it.
14 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that the principle of self-determination
15 of peoples is part of the international covenant on human rights?
16 A. Yes, yes.
17 Q. Thank you. Would you like to read point 11 out of the 14.
18 A. "Rumania
19 territories restored; Serbia
20 sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another
21 determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of
22 allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political
23 and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan
24 states should be entered into."
25 Q. Do you see, Mr. Donia, that your country owes us access to the
2 A. No, I don't.
3 Q. But you see, we want the right to access to the sea and we
4 carried it through, through the establishment of two Yugoslavias, but now
5 we, that is to say, Serbia
6 A. If you're suggesting that on the basis of Woodrow Wilson's
7 proclamation of 1918 that the United States owes any country in 2010
8 access to the sea, I think that's kind of an absurd proposition. The
9 nature of this document is not a promise for all time and eternity; it's
10 a set of guide-lines that Wilson
11 First World War.
12 Q. It wasn't only Wilson
13 Senate; right?
14 A. I don't have much good to say about either of those right now
15 either, but that still would not make it a policy commitment of the
16 United States for all time and eternity.
17 Q. May I remind you what was promised in 1915 to the Kingdom of
20 from Krka to Ston was promised to the Kingdom of Serbia
21 that that coast had belonged to the Serbian Emperor Dusan; right?
22 A. You asked two questions, one about the London Agreement or London
23 Conference of 1915, and I indicated that I'm not aware of what the London
24 Conference promised or if it promised anything at that time. Was the
25 Dalmatian coast from Krka to Ston belonged to the Serbian Emperor Dusan,
1 I think much of it did. Frankly, that was a time when maps didn't have a
2 whole lot of meaning in that regard, and it's been owned and occupied by
3 a number of different polities both before and since then. So I wouldn't
4 want on that basis to conclude that it should be part of Serbia
5 at any time after that, really.
6 Q. But you will agree that occupation is one thing and an integral
7 part of a state with a population that speaks the same language and that
8 share the same religion is a completely different matter. So it is from
9 that point of view that that area belonged to the Serbia of Emperor Dusan
10 at the time and that is quite different from foreign occupation; right?
11 A. I wouldn't agree with your characterisation of the Serbian empire
12 under Dusan as a state with a population that all spoke the same language
13 and shared the same religion. I think that's a stretch, a real stretch,
14 to suggest that. And I didn't refer to foreign populations. I said that
15 the area has been owned and occupied by a number of different polities,
16 both before and since then and Venice
17 Empire in parts. The fact that a given piece of real estate was at one
18 time part of any polity doesn't mean that it should -- that that polity
19 should reacquire that territory six centuries later. That's just a -- I
20 think a kind of a contentious use of the historical record to suggest a
21 territorial claim.
22 Q. Well, you should tell the Allies that. You should have said it
23 to them in London
24 his empire were. He bore the title of the king of Serbs and Arbanians
25 and Greeks; right?
1 A. Well, I probably was not in a position to say much to the London
2 Conference in 1915. I don't know what Emperor Dusan's title or position
3 really has to do with the issue of territorial claim. The fact of the
4 matter is that kings acquired titles periodically throughout their reign,
5 lost them again, and so I think on the basis of a king holding a title to
6 a piece of territory six centuries ago doesn't really represent a very
7 convincing claim to territory today.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, albeit very interesting, we've been
9 into this historical discussion for more than an hour. When will we come
10 to 1990s?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We're getting there, Excellency. I
12 just want to put the following to Mr. Donia.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. We are not saying all of this for the sake of Emperor Dusan;
15 rather, that was the basis for making an offer to Serbia in 1915 and it
16 consisted of the following, the Dalmatian coast, and you know that there
17 was a large Serb population there, Split
20 that. That is the information that they received on the 4th of August,
21 1915, but Serbia
22 Isn't that the case, yes or no?
23 A. I don't know.
24 Q. Well, thank you. But I don't know who I'm going to discuss this
25 with if you don't know about this.
1 Now, let me remind you of something else. The state of the
2 Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was it not proclaimed with the intent of
3 unifying with Serbia
4 Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, did they not constitute this state that came
5 into being? These were territories that were set free with the decline
6 of Austro-Hungary, along with the 14 points of Woodrow Wilson.
7 A. Now, what's the question?
8 Q. Well, this state consisting of three peoples, did it include
9 Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes -- or rather, the other way around, Slovenes,
10 Croats, and Serbs? Were they equal? Were they constituent peoples? Did
11 they constitute that state?
12 A. Well, that's three questions that I hear. It was in fact Serbs,
13 Croats, and Slovenes was the name of the kingdom, not the other way
14 around. The nationality policy of the state was that these were three
15 tribes of one people, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes being those tribes.
16 That then excluded other groups that were within the confines or the
17 boundaries of the Kingdom of Croats
18 eventually evolved. Were they equal -- I think they were equal in theory
19 at the beginning of the period anyway. I don't know that they were
20 really equal in -- in terms of the way they were treated during the
21 course of the kingdom's history. And certainly after the dictatorship
22 was proclaimed in 1929, you really couldn't say that the Croats and
23 Slovenes were -- had equality with the Serbs in the kingdom.
24 Q. With all due respect, Mr. Donia, I'm not speaking about the
25 kingdom, I'm speaking about the state. The official name was the state
1 of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes or Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. Do
2 you know that the object was to unite with Serbia and that America
3 recognised that unification? There's something wrong with the
4 interpretation. Let's see what.
5 It is my assertion that the territories which were once under
6 Austro-Hungary, apart from Vojvodina that joined up with Serbia, the
7 territories of today's Croatia
8 in using the principle of self-determination of peoples set in the
9 American Congress and set out in Woodrow Wilson's 14 points, formed a
10 state - a state, not a kingdom, a state - of the Slovenes, Croats, and
11 Serbs which united with the Serbs, the kingdom came later. Now, do you
12 know the existence of this state, the one that came before?
13 A. The name of that state was the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and
14 Slovenes. And it was -- it consisted of what had been the Kingdom of
16 annexation of Montenegro
17 but with a proclamation of December 1. And then the other territories
18 also became part of the kingdom with that proclamation.
19 Now, there was certainly diplomatic, let's say, endorsement or
20 validation of that proclamation and that creature, the Kingdom of the
21 Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, in subsequent agreements as you've noted.
22 But the act itself was something that took place in Belgrade and has to
23 be seen, I think, as a -- it was certainly something that was done with
24 the willing consent of all those people who claimed to represent those
25 areas of the country at that time.
1 Q. Unfortunately, Mr. Donia, it's an important link in the chain
2 without which you can't understand the Yugoslav crisis. You don't know
3 that before unification there was the state of Slovenes, Croats, and
4 Serbs. It wasn't the kingdom, it wasn't called the kingdom, it was the
5 territory west of the Drina
6 composed of three peoples, the Slovenes, the Croats, and the Serbs, and
7 if you don't know that, you are unable to understand the Yugoslav crisis.
8 And it's a state in which they are constituent peoples, and if Yugoslavia
9 was going to break down they wanted to have their own entity. So how can
10 we continue this discussion if you don't know that fact?
11 A. Which fact is that?
12 Q. The fact that a state existed, that the Slovenes, Croats, and
13 Serbs, it was independent, without unification and before unification
14 with the Serbs. It was formed and proclaimed --
15 JUDGE KWON: [Overlapping speakers]
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Donia doesn't know this
17 key fact, and it's a key fact that the Serbs formed a state west of the
18 Drina River
19 three-people state which united with Serbia.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, just put your question. You can give
21 your evidence later on if you so wish.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. So you don't think that that state ever existed before
24 unification, you don't know about that? You're not conscious of any such
25 state having existed; right?
1 A. I believe you must be referring to something, but I have no idea
2 what it is.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, these 14 points set out by
5 Woodrow Wilson, I'd like to tender that into evidence.
6 JUDGE KWON: Well, I'm not sure how relevant it is, but we'll
7 admit it.
8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D243.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Now, Mr. Donia, you mention further on -- you mention the
12 Bosnians, Bosniaks. Do you agree that we Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats and
13 Bosnians -- Muslims by adopting this term, appropriated the term, and
14 placed the monopoly over Bosnia
15 A. The question's a little convoluted. I'm not exactly certain what
16 you're asking when you said -- well, please, if you could ask the
17 question again. I'm not sure I understand.
18 Q. Well, perhaps it was down to the interpretation. The Muslims
19 recently changed their national name; isn't that right?
20 A. They changed their national name in 1993.
21 Q. And they took the name of Bosniak; right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you agree that we, Serbs and Croats, are also Bosniaks, that
1 A. No. There is a distinction I think in both languages between
2 "Bosnjak" and "Bosanac" or "Bosnjaci" and/or "Bosanci" in B/C/S and
3 between Bosniak, which is a term that refers specifically to those
4 people -- that people who used to be called the Bosnian Muslims and
5 Bosnians, which refers to all citizens and/or residents of Bosnia
6 regardless of their national identity or ethnicity.
7 Q. Well, all right. But it is the usurpation of the name Bosniak,
8 and the Muslims want to say by using Bosniak that Bosnia is theirs and
9 that we're some guests there or something like that?
10 A. I think there is a -- some Bosniaks have attempted to do that.
11 Most I think are of the view that the Bosniaks are now one of three
12 primary nations living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with the Croats and
13 Serbs, and would not accept that view of things.
14 Q. Well, they accepted that quite recently. Do you know what they
15 were called during the Turkish occupation?
16 A. I would call their identity hybrid. They -- there were a number
17 of different names that were used to refer to them depending region where
18 they were. I'm sure you have a particular word in mind here, but they
19 were known as -- to some people they were called Turks, to some people
20 they were called simply Muslims, and in Bosnia a lot of people were
21 called Bosnians.
22 Q. Together with us, the Serbs and Croats. Then they were called
23 undetermined, then they were called Muslims -- or rather, they were the
24 constituent peoples. And now they're called Bosniaks, which the Serbs
25 and Croats needn't like. But let's leave that aside.
1 The B/C/S language, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, do you use it on a
2 scientific scholarly basis or a political basis, this B/C/S language?
3 A. To me it's a means of communication. I read it and speak it as
4 best I can and use it to communicate. I don't know that I would say I
5 use it on a political basis. I certainly use it in my scholarship.
6 Q. And does B/C/S exist or is it in fact the Serbian language?
7 A. You can do an interesting analysis of the language as it is used
8 around here and probably not come up with an answer specifically, but I
9 don't -- wouldn't agree that it is in fact the Serbian language. I think
10 it is a -- B/C/S as it is referred to in this Tribunal and in some other
11 international organisations probably is a blend of Serbian, Croatian, and
12 Bosnian language, particularly emphasizing their -- the common
13 denominators among the three languages.
14 Q. And do you know when the Stokavian variant of the language came
15 do -- do you know who Vuk Karadzic was? Let me ask you that?
16 A. To your last question, yes, I believe he was a distant relative
17 of yours and -- or at least you look to his family for your family
18 origins. And he was a Serbian literary figure at the beginning of the
19 19th century who collected folk tales and poetry and codified essentially
20 the Serbian language.
21 Q. Well, he's a relative. My father's name was Vuk, his father's
22 name was Stefan, so it's the same family. All Karadzics are related one
23 way or another. But do you know that the Vienna Agreement -- Vuk allowed
24 the Croatians to use the Stokavian language as being their language too
25 and that the differentiation came later on and that the Serbs -- that
1 this was stolen from the Serbs, and is language the cultural property of
2 a people? Let me ask you that.
3 A. I'm not a linguist, a linguistic expert. I can tell you that the
4 languages don't get stolen, and the notion that it is a cultural property
5 of a people I would really not agree with.
6 Q. Well, do you think that Australia
7 Australian and not English or Brazil
8 not Portuguese? Do you think that that would be okay?
9 A. That's well outside of my area of expertise, I'm afraid.
10 Q. Thank you. Now, on page 2 you said that in Yugoslavia national
11 elections were never held on an ethnic, national basis, but that they
12 were -- that the elections took place in the republics. Now, who
13 prevented elections at the level of the nation of Yugoslavia according to
14 the principle of one man/one vote? Did the Serbs prevent that from
15 happening or was it separatists, perhaps?
16 A. My understanding is they never came to an agreement. And so
17 there were certainly people in all groups who favoured it, and I wouldn't
18 reduce it to saying the Serbs favoured it and others opposed it. It just
19 never got agreed upon. And just to clarify, we're talking now not about
20 elections on an ethnic principle, but a single election for the entire
21 SFRJ, the Socialist Federal Republic
22 Q. Well, yes. A state nation or country-wide I think you said.
23 Now, let me inform you that the Serbs were always while Yugoslavia
24 existed in favour of the principle of one man/one vote, but that was
25 unsuccessful; whereas, today the republics which separated are
1 introducing the principle of one man/one vote to disenfranchise the Serb
2 minority. Do you agree with that?
3 A. No, I don't agree with either premise.
4 Q. Do you agree that now those republics are asking for the one
5 man/one vote principle, whereas they failed to accept that while
7 A. No, I -- that's just too simple a way of putting it. It's --
8 first of all reduces -- your original formulation reduces a very wide
9 variety of viewpoints to the simple expression "the Serbs," and I guess
10 you are speaking for the Serbs in that formulation. But I wouldn't agree
11 that that was the case on such a universal basis at all, no.
12 Q. I'm not speaking on behalf of anyone now. Quite simply, one
13 man/one vote at the level of Yugoslavia
14 separatist republics would not allow it to go through, whereas now they
15 are asking for one man/one vote. Now, who did we beat at the elections
16 in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990? I think this is on page 4 of this report
17 of yours dealing with Sarajevo
18 [In English] "A dozen or other parties that had been founded and
19 registered in the preceding months."
20 [Interpretation] Is it true that we beat the communists mostly
21 and that there was a regime change?
22 A. I think the three nationalist parties together or separately did,
23 in fact, defeat the two major non-nationalist parties, the socialist
24 democrats and the reformists -- we're talking about Bosnia, if that's
25 what we're referring to. And was there a regime change? Certainly.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Karadzic, I'm noting the time.
2 Shall we adjourn for today?
3 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. Two very quick matters to
5 raise. First I wanted to inquire whether the Court had made a
6 determination or confirmed that it can sit the extra time on the week of
7 June 21st, our revised schedule is dependent to some extent on that --
8 well, to a large extent on that.
9 And secondly, with respect to the recently filed application for
10 certification and stay. I wanted to indicate that the Prosecution
11 anticipated filing a response tomorrow if it's helpful for us to
12 foreshadow that, I can do so at this point. But if the timing is
13 satisfactory, we'll have that filed tomorrow.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
15 Taking ...
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, I simply can't refrain from
18 observing that which George Bernard Shaw said that "England and America
19 are two countries separated by a common language."
20 JUDGE KWON: 2.15 tomorrow afternoon.
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.
22 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 2nd day of
23 June, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.