1 Wednesday, 2 June 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.27 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, everybody. Good afternoon.
7 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I would expect you to concentrate
9 today on the matters or time period that is covered by the indictment.
10 Let's proceed.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies. In
12 ten minutes' time we'll be in the 1990s, but before that, I'd like to
13 inform you that I intend to send the Prosecution and the Chamber,
14 Trial Chamber, to send from time to time a collection of so-called agreed
15 fact lists so that we don't dispute and challenge elementary points. So
16 the Prosecution can either reject or accept, but if we have this list,
17 then that will help us. Now may we have 1D1409 called up, please.
18 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]
19 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not on e-court I've been
21 informed. Well, in that case let's put it on the ELMO. So may the
22 witness be provided with a copy. I have a copy for the witness.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Donia, do you see this map?
25 A. I do not have a copy of it yet.
1 Q. Can you see it on the overhead projector?
2 A. Yes, I can.
3 Q. And can you see that that is what the Allies offered Serbia
4 1915 in London
5 A. May I ask the provenance of this -- this map?
6 Q. Well, it's from the documentation, the historical documents
7 pertaining to the 1915 London Conference. Just tell me whether you agree
8 or not. In your opinion, is that what this is, this is what it shows?
9 And you should know about that?
10 A. I don't know.
11 Q. Very well. You know nothing about what Serbia was offered in
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now move on and have on
14 e-court 1D1407 called up, please.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, that's not what the witness said.
16 What he said is he didn't know about this map.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. And does Mr. Donia know -- or, Mr. Donia, do you know that in
20 1915 Serbia
21 that these territories were offered to Serbia
22 part of Dalmatia
23 A. Yes. I'm not certain that the map accurately reflects what was
24 offered, but I would concur that approximately those lands were discussed
25 at the conference.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'd like to tender this
2 document into evidence, please.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Now, do you agree after that with the Corfu Declaration that
6 all South Slavs except for the Bulgarians?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Thank you. On another occasion we'll be offering up the
9 Corfu Declaration, but can I admit this document now, please.
10 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I don't think Dr. Donia has
12 addressed any aspect of this map whatsoever.
13 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, that's obvious, but does the Prosecution
14 disagree that this map accurately sets out those territories which were
15 on offer by the Allies in the 1915 conference in respect of the setting
16 up of the state of Serbia
17 MR. TIEGER: If I could answer that, Your Honour. To me that
18 underscores the lack of relevance of this portion of the examination.
19 You -- it's not an aspect of the case to which the Prosecution has
20 devoted extensive attention. But to the extent that the Court considers
21 that the witness's answer in some way provided a sufficient nexus to the
22 document and accepts that the examination in that respect or the
23 examination in that regard was relevant, then I think the guidelines
24 would apply in their normal manner, but the relevance of this area of
25 questioning has already and addressed, and I think the point's been made
1 before. I don't think there's any major reason to spend time disputing
2 this particular document, but if the Court is asking for the
3 Prosecution's position on a relevant or marginally -- or on aspects of
4 the case the Prosecution considers irrelevant or marginally irrelevant,
5 that that won't assist the admissibility issue.
6 JUDGE MORRISON: I was simply asking whether or not the map, as
7 it is set out, is a map which is disputed by the Prosecution. Issues of
8 relevancy can come later in the Tribunal's determination. I simply want
9 to know whether this is a map which is disputed in the terms of its
11 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, the witness asked for provenance. We
12 weren't given -- I didn't hear it provided in response. We're not aware
13 of the provenance of this document, so we're not in a position to assist
14 with regard to whether it accurately reflects the territories on offer.
15 JUDGE KWON: That was the answer Judge Morrison wanted to hear.
16 Mr. Karadzic, we are not satisfied as to the foundation of this
17 map, and the witness was not able to confirm anything about it. We'll
18 not admit it. You can tender it at a later stage.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me just say what the foundation
20 for this is, Your Excellency. First of all, this London Agreement is
21 mentioned in the intercepts. That's the first point. Secondly --
22 JUDGE KWON: It has bee ruled. You will have another opportunity
23 to tender it. Let's move on to the time period to which you're going to
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. One more document, please, or, rather, yesterday, Mr. Donia said
2 that he didn't know something about certain matters, and I should like to
3 take five minutes or ten minutes to present the documents which are
4 basic, elementary, without which we cannot discuss anything because these
5 are all documents about the creation and disappearance in Yugoslavia, and
6 the Bosnian crisis took place within the Yugoslav crisis, and Mr. Donia
7 is speaking about --
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Donia -- so we have to go back.
10 JUDGE KWON: -- don't make a speech. Just directly go to your
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D1407 next, please.
13 On e-court, that is.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Donia, that Yugoslavia was not created by the
16 association of republics, them polling together?
17 A. When are you talking about?
18 Q. The creation of the first joint state, the Kingdom of Serbs
19 Croats, and Slovenes.
20 A. Well, in most of the polities that became part of Yugoslavia were
21 not republics, so I would agree that they were not created by an
22 association of republics, no.
23 Q. And do you agree that by the same token it couldn't have become
24 dissolved with the dissociation of the republics?
25 A. Well, I don't believe the first Yugoslavia had republics.
1 Q. But in 1991, President Kucan presented the thesis whereby
3 to say that Yugoslavia
4 republics. Have you heard of that term, disassociation?
5 A. I think you're asking a point of constitutional interpretation
6 that I'm really not qualified to answer and would note that it was
7 heavily contested at the time as well. So I'm really not in a position
8 to give you an answer to that question.
9 Q. Thank you. May we now look at page 151 of this same document,
11 As you can see, Mr. Donia, this is a collection of documents on
13 displayed, please. In the document itself, the document page.
14 So it's just a collection of documents. These aren't documents
15 written by anybody or authored by anybody. They're a collection of
16 documents about Yugoslavia
17 151 is the page I'd like us to look at, please. Thank you.
18 It's rather a poor copy, but this is what it says -- may
19 somebody -- could the usher hand this to Mr. Donia, please. I think this
20 is a better copy.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I think we can manage if you take a
22 look at the monitor. Let's proceed.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'll have to read it
24 out then.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. "[In English] National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs
2 declares the unification of the state of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs,
3 created on the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy with the
4 Kingdom of Serbia
5 Serbs ..."
6 [Interpretation] And so on. Now, do you now agree that this is a
7 fact that we were not able to agree upon yesterday, that the -- the state
8 of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs did exist west of the Drina River
9 that it is that state that united with the Kingdom of Serbia
10 A. Yes. It, I guess, lasted seven days.
11 Q. Thank you. May we now have 163, page 163, displayed, please, of
12 that same document. It's page 88 on e-court.
13 Well, actually, it's chapter 67, "Treaty."
14 "[In English] The treaty of peace between the principal allied
15 and associated powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene state."
16 [Interpretation] Let's take a look at what it says lower down:
17 "[In English] Whereas the Serbs, Croats, and Slovene peoples of
18 the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy have of their own free will
19 determined to unite with Serbia
20 forming a single sovereign independent state under the title of Kingdom
21 of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes."
22 [Interpretation] Does that say quite clearly, and this is a
23 treaty, an international covenant, agreement, it's history, the history
24 of the creation of Yugoslavia
25 Croats, and Slovenes from the former Austro-Hungary became peoples,
1 constituent peoples, on a territory on a footing of equality?
2 A. Could I see the -- the rest of this document, please?
3 Q. Well, yes. The document is the whole book. It's on e-court, and
4 you can look at all of it. I had actually expected that you would bear
5 this in mind, because you're our most important expert in these matters,
6 after all, but let's move on to the next page so that Mr. Donia can have
7 a look at the following page.
8 MS. EDGERTON: And --
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Ms. Edgerton.
10 MS. EDGERTON: If I may, Your Honour. The book is a very diverse
11 collection of documents.
12 JUDGE KWON: Which is titled as "Yugoslavia Through Documents."
13 MS. EDGERTON: Exactly.
14 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, I mean for your purposes, wouldn't
15 it suffice simply if the witness agrees, and he may or may not, that
16 after the west kingdom of Serbia
17 of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbia
18 of Serbia
19 Kingdom of Serbs
21 entity really for the first time.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, no, that's not how
23 it was. The crux of the matter is that the territories which until 1918
24 were within Austro-Hungary were constituted into a state of three
25 peoples, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, or, rather, Slovenes, Croats,
1 Serbs, and it is that state which became united with Serbia which existed
2 ever since the Berlin Congress as an independent state. So the crux of
3 the matter is that the Serbs west of the Drina River and along the
5 Croats and equal owners of that state. They have their statehood rights,
6 and it is that state which became united with Serbia. The main point of
7 the matter is that it was a state. It doesn't matter how long it lasted.
8 It was able to conclude international agreements, and it became united
9 into a new state, but it is a state, and the Serbs there were a
10 constituent people, and they had -- they had their state rights. And if
11 Mr. Donia can confirm that, we can move on and needn't dwell on this
13 THE WITNESS: I would agree with Your Honour's formulation of
14 what I can affirm, which is that the Kingdom of Serbia
15 proclamation of 1 December 1918
16 polity known as the kingdom of Serbs
17 representatives that we have been seeing here formed first as the
18 Yugoslav committee and then for this very fleeting period of about seven
19 days having declared themselves a state were parties to that agreement.
20 JUDGE MORRISON: Thereafter, whatever one names it, it was
21 recognised as a state and had the rights and attributes of a state
22 including, for instance, negotiating treaties.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, it did.
24 JUDGE MORRISON: So Dr. Karadzic is right as to that. So
25 whatever we call it, let's not argue about the names, that's really the
1 pivotal period and perhaps Dr. Karadzic can move on from there.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. It was wrong in the
3 transcript. Serbia
4 as an independent state from the Berlin Congress; whereas, the state of
5 Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs lasted for a short period of time, but it was
6 a state nonetheless and it became united.
7 Now, in the transcript it says that that state, Slovenes, Croats,
8 and Serbs lasted from the Berlin Congress. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia
9 independent from the Berlin Congress and it became associated with this
10 other state. Now, if we've dealt with that we can move on. And I'd like
11 to tender all these documents now.
12 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, Mr. Karadzic. All these documents? We
13 looked at page 1051 and some more pages. You referred to those -- those
14 pages we've looked at.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 151, page 151 of this collection of
16 documents, 163 is the next page I'd like to tender. Well, we can look at
17 168 as well. And 168. It also refers to the unification of those
18 states. Well can we have 168 called up, please. It's a very important
19 page. 168 of the same document. Page 90 on e-court. That's right.
20 Article 12.
21 "[In English] Pending the conclusion of new treaties or
22 conventions, all treaties, conventions, agreements, and obligations
23 between Serbia
24 Associated Forces -- Powers, on the other hand, which were in force on
25 the -- August the 1st, 1914, or which have since been entered into
1 shall -- shall ipso facto be binding upon the Serb-Croat-Slovene State
2 [Interpretation] Therefore, Serbia was bringing into that new
3 state all its state duties and responsibilities.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Do you agree with that?
6 A. Not quite. This -- this states simply that the agreements that
7 were in force as of 1 August 1914
8 Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. There obviously would be some commitments to
10 which would not pass to the new state according to this -- this
12 Q. And where does it say that?
13 A. Well, it simply says that pending conclusion of new treaties, all
14 treaties, conventions, agreements, and obligations between Serbia
15 principal Allied and Associated Powers which were in force as of 1 August
16 1914 or which have since entered into shall ipso facto be binding upon
17 the state. So there may have been agreements that were -- things that
18 were promised to Serbia
19 that did not pass. The entire -- I don't think that you can say from
20 this that the entire state character of the Kingdom of Serbia
21 the new state. It may have by some internal agreement, but that's not
22 what this says.
23 Q. But one should understand this in the following way: That in
24 future, it won't be Serbia
25 everything that Serbia
1 what you said is correct, but it says pending the conclusion of new
2 treaties. So after this. Serbia
3 but it will be the new state that will do that. Now I'd like to tender
4 those three pages, Your Excellencies, into evidence.
5 Well, we can look at another page perhaps.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm just wondering how relevant this
7 is to our case.
8 Ms. Edgerton, are you opposing to the admission of these three
10 MS. EDGERTON: No, but the document that Dr. Karadzic was
11 excerpting from actually runs from pages 163 to 169. So these three
12 pages are part of one document. If the Trial Chamber does deem it
13 relevant, it might be useful for them to have the whole document so pages
14 163 to 169.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll do so.
16 Mr. Karadzic, let's move on to your next topic.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, these pages will be Exhibit D244.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we have page 206
20 and then 207 straight after that, please. It's 110 on e-court and that's
21 the last page.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And the date is 1943.
24 JUDGE KWON: -- let's come to the 1990s.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, just cast your eye
1 on that document. The republics are being created there and that's very
2 important. It's pivotal. Let's see what republics and what peoples. So
3 just a little patience, three more minutes.
4 So the republics are being created here in Jajce. Is Jajce an
5 important place, Mr. Donia, for understanding the Yugoslav crisis?
6 AVNOJ, the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation and its session in
7 Jajce, AVNOJ as it was called.
8 A. I don't think it's terribly important in terms of the dissolution
9 of Yugoslavia
10 socialist Yugoslavia
11 existed under a number of other names prior to 1990.
12 Q. Thank you. That was 1979. But do you agree, Mr. Donia, that the
13 AVNOJ borders were the main topic during the dissolution of Yugoslavia
14 that it was the AVNOJ borders that were disputed? The disputes were all
15 about the AVNOJ borders; right?
16 A. Well, they were referenced as the AVNOJ borders, but in many
17 cases I think they were actually drawn well after the conference in Jajce
18 and after that time that this document was generated.
19 Q. I agree. Can we move down, down 97 where it says "Decision to
20 create Yugoslavia
21 please. And may we turn to the next page. Item 2 on the following page.
22 At the top. Thank you. Yes.
23 "[In English] In order to carry out the principle of sovereignty
24 of the peoples of the Yugoslavia
25 a true homeland for all its peoples and never again to become a domain of
1 any other hegemonistic clique, Yugoslavia
2 along the lines of the federal principles which will provide for full
3 equality of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Macedonians, and
4 Montenegrins, respectively the principles [sic] of Serbia, Croatia
6 [Interpretation] Are there five peoples mentioned there,
7 Mr. Donia?
8 A. There, I think, actually five named, and then the door is opened
9 for peoples that are not named in the very final phrase of the -- of the
10 Resolution. I think it's worth noting that this formulation follows the
11 model of Soviet nationality theory from the Stalinist era which used
12 these terms like "hegemonistic clique" and "constituent peoples" or
13 "sovereignty of peoples," and some of that is shared with other systems
14 as well, but this document really, I think amply shows the origins of
15 this type of formulation in Stalinist nationality theory.
16 Q. I didn't understand what you said fully, Mr. Donia. Is part of
17 human rights the right to national feelings? Does a group have the right
18 to have national rights, peoples rights, group rights?
19 A. Well, just to clarify, my comment was that the provenance of this
20 language and this document comes much more from Soviet nationality theory
21 than it does from the western democratic tradition of rights of nations
22 or international human rights.
23 Q. Well, we're not going to debate that. I agree that AVNOJ was not
24 a democratic body, but we lived under this AVNOJ.
25 At this point in time, though, Mr. Donia, what do you think?
1 What is the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
2 A. When?
3 Q. 1943, when this was being created.
4 A. Bosnia-Herzegovina? Probably somewhere around 2.5 to 3 million
6 Q. And in terms of ethnicity, who are they?
7 A. Well, if you want to accept the term "ethnicity" as the primary
8 group identification, I would say that the population was a mixture of
9 Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, and some Yugoslavs and some other peoples
10 including Roma, Slovenes, Albanians, and so on.
11 Q. Were there any Yugoslavs then? Did they exist as a category in
13 A. Well, you immediately come across the question of how we know
14 what -- what they were, and the answer is, of course, we really don't --
15 didn't have a census until 1948 in the socialist period, and the last
16 census in the kingdom -- or in Royal Yugoslavia, I think, was 1930, '34,
17 something like that, before the Second World War. So the fact is what
18 the composition was at that time really isn't knowable. The best we
19 could do is go to the 1948 census, and recognising that the 1948 census,
20 like every census, limits or recognises only certain responses in
21 counting people that -- that would be the best we could do.
22 Q. And do you agree that that census of 1948 was affected by the
23 suffering of the Serbs during the course of the Second World War? You
24 admitted to about 100.000, so we'll go back to that later, but do you
25 agree that in 1948 the number of Serbs was smaller than it would have
1 been otherwise?
2 A. I don't know when I admitted to 100.000. I -- just -- going back
3 to the antecedent to your question there, I don't recall making that
4 statement. I think the -- I would agree that the census of 1948 was
5 affected by the suffering of all individuals and peoples during the
6 course of the Second World War and certainly was profoundly affected by
7 the suffering of the Jews and also -- I mean, I think every group that we
8 think of as a nation today suffered substantially during the course of
9 the Second World War.
10 Q. That's correct what you said about the Jews, that is, but do you
11 accept that it was the Serbs who suffered the most during the Second
12 World War and that genocide was committed against the Serbs then?
13 A. I don't accept the first part of your question, that it was the
14 Serbs that suffered the most, no. I concur that genocide was committed
15 against the Serbs in the course of the Second World War.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, can you admit these
18 two pages, 206 and 207, and then we can move on.
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well, we'll admit it. But what's the practice?
20 If we admit part of the book it will be added to the originally admitted
21 part. So that is admitted.
22 THE REGISTRAR: It can be admitted also as Exhibit D244,
23 Your Honour.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Is 1D1408. That's what
1 I'd like us to have a look at now, from 4721 to 4807. We are going to
2 play this, and let's hear what Lord Carrington has to say about this.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. You will agree, won't you, that it was Lord Carrington who
5 chaired the first conference?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, we were actually notified about this
8 item when we came into the courtroom, so perhaps it's appropriate that
9 this be played later, because I wouldn't think that notification the
10 moment we step into the courtroom is actually sufficient notification.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's a well-known film. It's
12 well-known footage, but all right.
13 JUDGE KWON: Very well. How long would you need to prepare?
14 Just if it is to be played at the end of today's session would it be okay
15 for you?
16 MS. EDGERTON: I can have a look at it over the break, Your
17 Honour, but I simply haven't had an opportunity until this point.
18 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Donia, I would like to put a few things to you, and if you
22 agree, we don't have to prove them any further. And if you say that this
23 is not the case, then I'm going to try to prove it later on.
24 Do you agree that in Yugoslav practice, in Yugoslav
25 constitutional practice, there are peoples and national minorities, and
1 later on they were called nationalities as you noted as well, and you
2 observed that, too, didn't you?
3 A. Well, in -- in Yugoslav theory, nationality theory, if you will,
4 yes, there were nations, nationalities, and national minorities, and
5 the -- and that -- that spoke to -- and there was a hierarchy, the top
6 rung being the nation.
7 Q. Do you agree that peoples are those whose homeland Yugoslavia
8 and national minorities are those who have their mainstream state, as it
9 were, somewhere in the neighbourhood? Well, not necessarily in the
10 immediate neighbourhood. Say Czechoslovakia
11 A. In terms of Yugoslav nationality theory that's correct, yes.
12 Q. Do you agree that that Yugoslavia
13 state of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Muslims, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and
14 Yugoslavs? Do they have their own national state anywhere else but in
16 A. That's two questions. I agree that you have named the nations
17 that have their principal homeland in Yugoslavia, on Yugoslav territory,
18 and none of those nations have a national state or had a national state
19 outside of Yugoslavia
20 Q. So you agree that these seven categories are not national
21 minorities. Rather, they are state creating peoples of Yugoslavia;
23 A. In terms of Yugoslav nationality theory, that's correct.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you know that my last political endeavour had been
25 in 1968, in the student movement?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that up until 1990 I was a silent
3 dissident who was involved in psychiatry first and foremost, but then
4 also literature and sports as well?
5 A. I honestly don't know how much of a dissident you were. I would
6 agree with the rest of your formulation. You were involved in psychiatry
7 first and foremost. You were an accomplished poet and also involved in
8 coaching or counselling a sports team. So, yeah, I agree with that part
9 of your question.
10 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to tell you about all the things
11 that happened from when I stopped being politically involved until I went
12 back into politics.
13 As for November 1968, do you agree that the Albanians in Kosovo
14 started celebrating the national holiday of the Albanian flag? So that
15 was a different state altogether. And they were celebrating that holiday
16 on the territory of Yugoslavia
17 more than that. I mean, we will provide further proof, if necessary,
18 later on.
19 A. I don't know.
20 Q. Thank you. Do you know that on the 15th of March, 1969, the
21 League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the only political party and the
22 ruling political party, introduced the principle of parity? That is to
23 say that its organs consisted of an equal number of representatives from
24 each and every republic.
25 A. I don't specifically know that that's the -- I don't know that to
1 be the case.
2 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that from the 14th up until the 17th of
3 January, 1970
4 of Communists of Croatia was held and it laid the foundations for the
5 so-called mass movement?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. This mass movement, was it a separatist movement, a pre-eminently
8 separatist and national movement? Not a national movement but a
9 nationalist movement?
10 A. I don't believe it was pre-eminently separatist, but there were
11 certainly members of it or those who participated in it who held
12 separatist views, but I -- and I don't want to make a distinction that
13 you would like to make here between it being national and nationalist
14 purely in terms of the English translation. I would call it a national
15 movement in English and recognise that it was a flowering of democratic
16 sentiment and of national sentiment on behalf of Croatia.
17 Q. And do you agree that under the pressure exerted by that
18 movement, on the 30th of June, 1971, amendments were adopted to the
19 constitution of Yugoslavia
20 amendments 20 through 42. Amendments to the constitution of Yugoslavia
21 A. I don't know specifically which number amendments were adopted.
22 I certainly agree that amendments were adopted at about that time. And
23 I'm -- I wouldn't say that they were adopted under the pressure exerted
24 by Masbuk [phoen] but, rather, in response to the flowering of national
25 sentiment in general at -- of a number of groups at that time and then
1 concerns about the, let's say, unity and coherence of the federal state.
2 Q. Did these amendments establish new relations between and among
3 the republics and in this case the autonomous provinces within Serbia
4 gained further importance as well?
5 A. Both are -- both questions are true, yes.
6 Q. Was this the first time that Serbia became federalised?
7 A. I don't think it became federalised, no. Again, it maybe is a
8 question of constitutional law, but I wouldn't characterize it that way,
10 Q. Do you agree that Josip Broz Tito, on the 1st and 2nd of
11 December, 1971, in Karadjordjevo, put an end to the mass movement of the
12 Croats and punished them all? Actually, he called for their
13 resignations, and the entire top political echelon of Croatia was
14 removed. They were declared nationalist, separatist, et cetera, and they
15 were removed.
16 A. Not all, but the general tenor of your question, the answer is
18 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that again that Josip Broz Tito
19 generated and carried out on the 26th of October, 1972, a removal of the
20 Serbian leadership headed by Marko Nikezic and Latinka Perovic, having
21 labeled them as the protagonists of a liberal policy?
22 A. I don't know. I can't attest to the date or the specifics of
23 that assertion.
24 Q. And do you agree that the Croatian leadership was replaced as
25 nationalist, whereas the Serb leadership was removed as neo-liberalist?
1 A. No.
2 Q. So how were Nikezic and Latinka Perovic removed? What was the
3 label that was used in their case, and what pretext was resorted to?
4 A. I don't know.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that on the 21st of February, 1974, a
6 new constitution was passed, a well known 1974 constitution?
7 A. I don't have the specific date, but certainly would concur that a
8 new constitution was passed in 1974, not only in the SF -- the SFRJ, the
9 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but also in each of the
11 Q. Yes. Do you agree that this constitution gave the autonomous
12 provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija within Serbia, practically
13 the level of republics? They were -- they were declared constituent
14 elements of the federation as well.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that in this way Serbia was federalised;
17 namely, that it could not pass laws and other legislation without the
18 agreement of the Assemblies of Kosovo and Vojvodina?
19 A. As I said, I'm not -- the use of the word "federalised" here is
20 to me problematic, and I can't agree simply because I don't know what you
21 mean by -- by "federalised." And I know that over time you've meant a
22 lot of different things by using the term "federal."
23 Q. Do you agree that it was only Serbia that had entities within it
24 that it had to ask before it would carry out any changes in the territory
25 of Serbia
1 or in Slovenia
2 A. That's a matter of Yugoslav constitutional law, and I just don't
4 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that Josip Broz Tito died on the 4th of
5 May, 1980
6 A. I accept the date of 4 May 1980 as the date of his death, yes.
7 Q. Do you agree that in Kosovo, on the 11th of March, 1981,
8 large-scale demonstrations broke out under the slogan "Kosovo Republic
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that on the 2nd of April, 1981, the
11 Presidency of the SFRY passed a decision on martial law in Kosovo, and
12 they also set up through the secretariat -- the Federal Secretariat for
13 the interior units that were sent to Kosovo?
14 A. No. I don't know the specific date nor the specific content of
15 the decision that you're referring to.
16 Q. However, martial law is a historical fact. Martial law is a
17 historical fact. Because of what had happened in Kosovo, that is why it
18 was declared. Don't you agree?
19 A. I'm not agreeing with your characterization simply because I
20 don't know.
21 Q. Thank you. But I thought that you had to know about that because
22 that was the beginning of the crisis. It's not even the beginning, for
23 that matter.
24 Do you agree that due to all of these developments
25 Lazar Kolisevski, a high-ranking Macedonian official, revealed that the
1 essence of the policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was
2 contained in the slogan a weak Serbia
3 A. No.
4 Q. You disagree or you simply don't know that he said that?
5 A. Well, I -- I don't know precisely what he said, nor do I know
6 that it's purely because of those developments that -- that he made a
8 Q. Have you heard of Lazar Kolisevski?
9 A. Yes, I have.
10 Q. He was a member of the Presidency, and I believe that after
11 Tito's death he was the first president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia;
13 A. I believe that's correct, yes.
14 Q. He was the representative Macedonia in the Presidency, wasn't he?
15 A. Yes, he was. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that on the 28th of September, 1989, the
17 Assembly of Slovenia
18 amendments to the republican constitution, thus initiating a process of
19 moving away from the Yugoslav Federation?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you agree or do you know that I, in the beginning
22 of 1990, together with my entire family, was a supporter of the
23 ecological movement of the Greens in Sarajevo? If you don't know, never
25 A. Yes, I -- I -- I know that you were for a brief period of time at
1 least a supporter of the Green movement.
2 Q. Yes. Yes, I was one of the leaders, and I chaired meetings, and
3 I thought that that was the only thing that was worth working for and
4 that's why I was there.
5 All right. Mr. Donia, do you agree that on the 27th of March, a
6 group of top Muslims disclosed that they would establish the Party of
7 Democratic Action?
8 A. Yes.
9 JUDGE KWON: What year are we talking about? Doctor do you know
10 the year?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, in 1990.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Now, on the 27th of March, 1990, this was made public; namely, an
15 initiating committee was established. Do you know the names of the
16 signatories? There were about 40 of them.
17 A. No, I don't.
18 Q. Do you agree that among them there was Alija Izetbegovic,
19 Omer Behmen, Hasan Cengic, and others, who later became the leadership of
20 the SDA?
21 A. Those were among them, yes. Mm-hmm.
22 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the core of this group that was --
23 that established the SDA were people who were actually tried because of
24 subversive political activity against the state in 1977 and in 1980?
25 A. The -- there were a few people in this group, including
1 Izetbegovic, Behmen, and I believe Cengic, who were prosecuted in 1947.
2 I think the translation came across as 1977, but they were prosecuted in
3 1947, and Izetbegovic again was prosecuted by the Republic of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, convicted, and imprisoned in 1983.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you know that Mr. Izetbegovic was among the
6 founders and top officials of the organisation of the Young Muslims,
7 starting from 1939.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Do you know that this organisation was actually an affiliate of
10 the well-known Muslim organisation of the Muslim Brethren from Egypt
11 A. No.
12 Q. That's the organisation that assassinated Sadat because he was
13 involved in peace talks with Israel
14 A. Yes, and I don't think there's a link of any consequence between
15 the Young Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina after the period of the, you
16 know, immediate post World War II era and the Young Muslims of Egypt --
17 I'm sorry, the -- yes, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.
18 Q. Thank you. Have you heard of the great Jerusalem mufti
19 el-Husseini who is the uncle or some similar relative of Yasser Arafat's?
20 A. Yes, I've written in my Sarajevo
21 about the mufti of Jerusalem
22 War, and his relationship to the Ustasha regime.
23 Q. And did you know that he was a personal friend and ally of
25 A. I don't think Hitler had personal friends. He was, as I say --
1 he had good relations with the Ustasha regime and certainly with the
3 Q. Well, that's from Hitler's point of view. Perhaps he didn't have
4 any friends, but el-Husseini considered they were friends, and we saw a
5 photograph of them together here, but do you agree that the el-Husseini
6 visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina resulted in the creation of one and then
7 another SS division, the Handzar Division. That's what it was called.
8 A. Yes, and again I've written about that in my Sarajevo book and
9 also the second book that I wrote with John Fine, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: A
10 Tradition Betrayed." It's common knowledge, I would say, in the history
11 of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
12 Q. Thank you. Yes, but the Trial Chamber is not aware of that. So
13 the Chamber has to learn of these things.
14 Now -- now, do you know where el-Husseini stayed when he was in
16 A. That I do not.
17 Q. And if I tell you that he stayed with Omer Behmen and he
18 socialised with Alija Izetbegovic, would you accept that?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Are you denying it then?
21 A. I said I didn't accept it.
22 Q. But are you denying it? Do you say that that was not the case?
23 A. I don't know whether it was the case. I just simply said I do
24 not accept it.
25 Q. Because you don't know that's how it was, or because you know
1 that that is not how it was?
2 A. I don't know -- I don't know whether that was the case.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now may we have 1D33, please. On
5 e-court. 1D33.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. We don't seem to have the translation. I had hoped that we did,
8 but I'll read it out.
9 This is a prisoner's list for Alija Izetbegovic. The date is
10 1947. Name, surname, et cetera. Army military court found him guilty of
11 acts against the nation and the state, and in 1976 that sentence was
12 struck from the list because he'd served his sentence in actual fact.
13 Now may we see page 35. But let me ask you first. Well, you
14 said that you knew that he was sentenced to a prison term, but he was
15 sentenced by the army court, right, for acts against the state and
16 nation; right?
17 A. Yes. I would concur with this document as evidence of that, yes.
18 Q. Thank you. Now, do you think that that reference should have
19 found a place in your expert report?
20 A. Well, no. It did find a place in my book on Sarajevo, as I know,
21 and I think I also mention it in the "Tradition Betrayed," book, but I
22 think it was outside the purview, both chronologically and topically, of
23 my Sarajevo
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this into
1 evidence now, please.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, but can we mark it for identification pending
3 translation. I think some kind of failure in the LiveNote. I think it's
4 a convenient time for a break after assigning the number for this
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be MFI D245.
7 JUDGE KWON: Twenty-five minutes.
8 --- Recess taken at 3.36 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 4.01 p.m.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: Thank you. May I ask -- [Interpretation] may I ask
12 for 1D165, please, on e-court.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you know the name of Hasan Cengic?
15 A. Yes, I do.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Dr. Donia. Microphone.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. And do you know his father's name, Halid Cengic?
19 A. I didn't, no. I believe that's accurate, but I didn't before you
20 just told me.
21 Q. Thank you. May we turn to the next page, please. It's an
22 interview given by Halid Cengic speaking of his son Hasan. So next page,
23 please. We haven't got a translation, I'll read it:
24 "Halid Cengic, the main war logistics person of the Army of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, an army and a Hadzija."
1 May we turn to the next page, please. May we turn to the next
2 page. What it describes on this page, actually, is how he was received
3 by Dobrica Cosic and Ljubo Tadic and expressed their sympathy. Anyway,
4 here it says Hasan, referring to his son:
5 "Hasan left prison on November 1987, Alija, a year later. So in
6 1988. The SDA was created on the 26th of May, 1990. And on the -- we
7 had the "Obznana." I think it was the 27th but it says 7th. "Until
8 Alija and Omer had left prison, there was no mention of the party. What
9 was most important for us at that point was for people to get out of
10 prison. When Alija was released, circles began to peak -- speak about a
11 party in Sarajevo
12 Did you know that the SDA party, the idea about a party, the
13 nucleus of it, was within the circle of these prisoners doing sentence in
15 A. Well, I think the -- this -- this statement is correct that it
16 wasn't until Izetbegovic was released from prison that this gathering
17 took place that you mentioned in -- in February, and indeed the --
18 Izetbegovic's release was critical for the -- this nucleus of people to
19 come together and make plans to form the Party of Democratic Action on
20 the 26th of May, which I would point out is a different date than you
21 used earlier, which was the February date.
22 Q. I think it was announced in March but formed on the 26th of May.
23 I agree with that. May we turn to the next page please.
24 In the highlighted area it says:
25 "Foca was the centre for arming. It was from there that several
1 thousand barrels were distributed all over Bosnia-Herzegovina, from
2 Ljubinje to Srebrenica. Even Naser Oric came to collect arms there."
3 Now, do you agree that Ljubinje was a predominantly Serb
5 A. I don't know what the percentage of the populations and the
6 peoples in Ljubinje was.
7 Q. I think it's 80 per cent, but we'll come to that. Anyway, Cengic
8 goes on to say:
9 "I don't know whether it was the centre or not, but we did assist
10 various municipalities in BiH to the best of our ability."
11 Now, since you speak Serbian, I'm sure you can read this and
12 follow what I'm saying. And when the weapons were brought into Foca,
13 nobody was to know about it let alone to take it into their homes. Saja,
14 Sahinpasic complained to me and I said drive it to my house, and that's
15 what happened. So the problem wasn't in the weapons, it was in the
16 consciousness of the people and in the organisation.
17 Now, did you know that Foca was armed in that way and that it
18 was, in fact, a logistics centre?
19 A. No, and I don't think that's what this says.
20 Q. Well, that's what he says. I don't know whether it was the
21 centre, but we helped many other municipalities. So the weapons went
22 from Foca to other municipalities. Is that what it says here?
23 A. [Interpretation] And when the weapons were brought to Foca,
24 nobody was to know about it. Nor to take it into their homes. That's to
25 me what it says. I don't know about the idea that it was a logistics
2 Q. But it says here, I don't know whether it was a centre in actual
3 fact, but we assisted. And when the weapons were taken to Foca, nobody
4 dared take them over.
5 So they had the problem of storing it. Not weapons. There were
6 enough weapons, but the problem was who dared take the weapons home?
7 A. Yes. And I think you yourself have now agreed that this states
8 that it may not have been a centre at all.
9 Q. Thank you. Now, in your report did you include this piece about
10 arming and weapons in Foca?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Thank you. May we turn to the next page now, please. The
13 underlined part it says:
14 "Precisely at the time of the meeting in Karadjordjevo, for 50
15 days he waited with people in Zagreb
16 as he. "And with the help of --" let's start from the beginning.
17 "Saja, with the beginning of some people from Focatrans, took
18 people, procured weapons, drove them in along with thousands of problems.
19 During the time the meeting in Karadjordjevo, he waited for 50 days in
21 weapons, barrels." Do you know who Gojko Susak was?
22 A. Yes, but I've not followed you on the rest of this article. I
23 take it you're representing that this is a continuation of the same
25 Q. Yes, it's the same article, and I'm reading from the top part
1 where it says Sahinpasic, nicknamed Saja, with the help of some people
2 from Focatrans, the Focatrans company - and we'll come back to that in
3 due course - procured weapons and that he waited in Zagreb because Gojko
4 Susak promised him 5.000 barrels. Now, who was Gojko Susak?
5 A. I do not see Sahinpasic here. I'm sorry.
6 Q. Saja, nicknamed Saja. There you are.
7 A. Saja. Okay. You've been saying Sahinpasic.
8 Q. Yes, to make it easier for you to understand. Saja is Senad
9 Sahinpasic, a well known deputy from Foca.
10 Now, who was Gojko Susak? Do you remember?
11 A. Gojko Susak was the minister of defence of the Republic of
13 Q. Thank you. May we turn to the next page now, please.
14 Do you know that a major crisis broke out in the Focatrans
15 company before the elections while the Communists were still in power in
16 Foca and that the Serbs were expelled from the Focatrans Company? Do you
17 remember that?
18 A. I remember a major controversy erupting in Foca associated with
19 Focatrans. I've never been able to figure out exactly what took place to
20 set that off or -- I think it probably was never resolved fully, but I'm
21 not actually -- I'm not actually familiar with the specifics of what
23 Q. Thank you. Now, here in this rectangle the question is:
24 "You formed the first unit of Patriotic League and in
1 And Cengic's answer is this:
2 "Already on the 1st of August, 1990, during the defence of
3 Focatrans, we had a platoon of arm -- a platoon armed with automatic
4 weapons, a machine-gun, and a mortar. All of them had camouflage
5 uniforms, and they took the oath in the Ustikolina mosque by placing
6 their hand on the Koran. The unit was commanded by the late," "rahmetli"
7 meaning "the late," "Husein Cavrk, major of the BH Army and holder of the
8 golden lily. He was killed at Preluca near Gorazde. Kemo Karisik
9 carried out a review of the unit and it was already a company at the time
10 in September 1991."
11 Now, can we see from this that on the 1st of August, 1990, that
12 is to say, before the elections while the communists were still in power,
13 that in Focatrans the first unit of the Patriotic League was formed and
14 it was armed with automatic weapons?
15 A. No. The reference to the Patriotic League, I believe, is in the
16 question, not in the statement by Mr. Cengic.
17 Q. All right. But was an armed formation established that took the
18 oath in a mosque with their hands on the Koran and that it was armed with
19 automatic weapons?
20 A. That was Mr. Cengic's assertion, and I believe that his words are
21 represented accurately here.
22 Q. Thank you. Now do you see that this man Kemo Karisik carried out
23 a review of the company in September 1991, which is before the war?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Did you know that the Muslims made an airport in Visoko and --
1 constructed an airport in Visoko near Sarajevo? During the war that is.
2 A. I was not aware of that, no. I am not aware of that.
3 Q. Thank you. May we now move on two pages. Thank you.
4 This is what it says on the right:
5 "The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1992, took the decision
6 to construct an airport in a locality near Visoko."
7 Now, the question is this: Did a plane ever land at that
8 airport? And Cengic's answer is:
9 "What our enemies know is something that our people should know
10 too. Had we not had that airport, it would have been difficult for us,"
11 and then he uses this word "predeverati." I assume you know what that
12 means. "We would have found it difficult to contend with the situation.
13 Omer Kulic landed first on the 19th of April, 1994, when we had nothing.
14 It -- had the Serbs known that they could have just walked in."
15 And then he goes on to write that in 1995 already other special
16 planes began landing bringing in other materiel and technical equipment.
17 Do you believe Mr. Cengic? Do you believe that the airport
18 existed in Visoko and that there were flights and landings carrying
19 military equipment?
20 A. Noting that this is quite late in the war, his first reference is
21 to April of 1994, yeah, I find that plausible.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document
24 into evidence, please.
25 MS. EDGERTON: No objection, Your Honour, but just to ensure my
1 understanding is correct, I take it when this Court has been marking
2 documents for identification pending translation that refers to a
3 translation of the document in its entirety rather than only these
4 highlighted and circled portions. Is my understanding correct?
5 JUDGE KWON: I think so.
6 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted. Marked for
10 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D91 next, please.
12 1D91, please. Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. This is an order on the appointment of Halid Cengic, the person
15 we mentioned a moment ago, to see that he was well placed to talk about
16 the matters he talked about.
17 May we scroll down. Halid Cengic is appointed to the post of
18 assistant commander for the reception, control, and distribution of
19 materiel and also deputy commander of the centre in the organ for the
20 reception, control, and distribution of material resources, and the rank
21 is colonel brigadier?
22 JUDGE KWON: Stop there. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
23 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, Your Honour, but I believe there is a
24 translation, a Defence translation, of this document, and it might be
25 helpful for us all if both could be displayed.
1 JUDGE KWON: By all means.
2 MS. EDGERTON: In fact, Your Honour, this could be one and the
3 same document as D00074.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it's his son, Hasan Cengic,
5 and that one was far more active, as we will see.
6 Can we see the translation of this document, please.
7 MS. EDGERTON: And I'm always happy to be corrected if I've
8 misrepresented something, Your Honour, but the document that we have as
9 being released was the appointment of Hasan Cengic.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. So we'll move on with this untranslated
12 MS. EDGERTON: Yes.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. So, Mr. Donia, do you see that Halid Cengic was appointed to this
15 position and that what he said in that interview was well-founded? He
16 deserved this position of a colonel or a brigadier in logistics in the
17 Muslim army, although he hadn't held any rank before that. Isn't that
19 A. No. I think you've extrapolated too much from this document.
20 This document simply says that he was appointed to this position. It
21 doesn't really speak to his qualifications, his prior experience, or
22 position in the organisation. It's just merely a notice of appointment.
23 Q. But how is it that a man who is not a military officer can be
24 appointed to such a high-ranking position? I am linking this to what we
25 saw in the interview, that from 1990 onwards, he was arming the people of
1 Foca; right?
2 A. Actually, it's not that unusual to see people in certain types of
3 positions be given relatively high ranks in military organisations to
4 exercise their particular professional expertise. So I wouldn't -- I'd
5 say that is unremarkable. I don't see anything here about his background
6 that would lead me to be concerned or to find it worthy of note that he
7 was appointed to this position.
8 Q. Thank you. Did you take into account at all his activity? I
9 mean, in your report his activity in terms of arming the Muslims from the
10 1st of August, 1990, onwards?
11 A. Well, I've noted as a matter of general policy the formation of
12 the Patriotic League in, I think, March of 1991. I have not specifically
13 dealt with Halid Cengic or the arming of anyone at the local municipal
14 level largely because it's just simply outside the purview of my -- my
15 commission to prepare the report. It's interesting though.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
17 Q. And before that, are you trying to say that the OTP asked you not
18 to take into account the arming of Muslims?
19 A. No. That's evident by the fact that I addressed it in the
20 report. What I'm saying is that the OTP and I came together on an
21 agreement that I would deal with specific topics dealing with the -- the
23 treatise on the activities of these sort of Muslim politicians in waiting
24 in the very late days of socialism, but that was a bit outside of my --
25 my brief.
1 JUDGE KWON: This document will be marked for identification.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Donia, can the actions of the Serbs be understood even if one
5 does not present what it was that led to those actions? You said
6 yourself the other day during the direct examination that it is a
7 historian's job to establish the link between cause and consequence. Can
8 the position of the Serbs be understood at all if we do not shed more
9 light on the circumstances in which they operated?
10 A. Well, I think the purpose of our -- the endeavour is to
11 understand the position of the Serbs and the circumstances in which they
12 operated, and I personally don't attribute much importance to this
13 Focatrans incident in terms of spinning up the actions of the SDS in the
14 subsequent period, but it's certainly a factor in the environment
15 generally in which people were operating. The -- this was one of a
16 couple of local incidents that took place that kind of sort of roiled the
17 environment in the period from 87 to 90. I don't think that any of those
18 things predetermined actions or mandated a particular course of action by
19 the SDS
20 Q. Mr. Donia, you said that Serbs would often say that they do
21 something and then we do something. That is what you said. Wouldn't it
22 be useful if you portrayed certain actions the way you did on the basis
23 of what you actually said yourself, and you quoted me? Wouldn't it be
24 necessary to shed more light on the preceding action taken by the Muslim
25 police and that caused a reaction on the part of the Serbs? Can we see
1 the truth at all if we do not look at it that way?
2 A. Well, I didn't say this, you did, and you also, for example, said
3 that you deliberately waited to form the SDS until the Croat and Muslim
4 parties were organised so that the SDS could never be accused of
5 fomenting inter-ethnic rivalry. These are your statements. I did not
6 task myself to identify specifically what happened and how you reacted to
8 I think one could do that for the events that I spoke of
9 yesterday from October 1991 to April of 1992. I think it's a little bit
10 more difficult to do that prior to the October -- October 15 events. But
11 one could look at the whole scope of activities and see these things. I
12 would not want to attribute a linear causation to these actions. I think
13 there was a period of time certainly in which there was -- there were a
14 lot of options to be taken by everybody concerned, and -- so wouldn't get
15 as specific as I guess you'd like to hear in attributing event A to event
17 Q. Do you agree that Serb dissidents and intellectuals on the 28th
18 of June, 1990, renewed the Prosvjeta Serb cultural society that had been
19 banned sometime after the Second World War?
20 A. Yes. Concurrent with the revival of the cultural societies of
21 other groups, yes. This all happened right about the same time.
22 Q. Do you know that that Serbian elite had opted for not
23 establishing a political party? Rather, they wanted to meet all the
24 needs of the Serb people through this Prosvjeta society.
25 A. No, I think that's not true. I think by your own account in some
1 published statements there was considerable agitation to form a Serbian
2 national party starting at the very beginning of 1990. The first efforts
3 went to try to form a branch of a party in a neighbouring republic.
4 First of all, the democratic party with Mr. Cavoski and a few other
5 people. And then there were some efforts to form a party that was going
6 to be a branch of the SDS
7 some people who were advising you at that time, including Mr. Cosic, who
8 suggested to you that it would be better to have a party that was not an
9 affiliate of any party in a neighbouring republic.
10 And so I think that your own position, which was that you were
11 very interested in seeing a party formed but you were not willing or
12 prepared at that point to assume the leadership of the party, attests to
13 the fact that you were there was a lot going on to organise and create a
14 party. Mr. Vladimir Srebrov talked about -- or, actually, I think
15 announced the formation of a Serb national party in Drvar in February,
16 and so there was a lot going on to move toward the direction -- toward
17 forming a political party at that time.
18 By the time that Prosvjeta was created there were people in the
19 group, certainly in this group of the elite or as you call them the
20 leading intellectuals, who wanted to do things strictly through Prosvjeta
21 but that was not the only thing that was going on and indeed the party
22 went on to organise very shortly after that and to have its formal
23 founding on the 12th of July.
24 Q. Mr. Donia, do you agree that it was established quite late, about
25 four months prior to the elections, and that didn't really leave much
1 time to get properly organised; right?
2 A. Well, the establishment of parties actually proceeded all at
3 about the same time. The first party to hold its founding Assembly was
4 actually the Social Democratic Party League of Communists on May 25th.
5 The second party to organise formally was the Party of Democratic Action
6 on May 26th. You were third on July 12th. The fourth party to organise,
7 major party to organise, was the Reformists. That was on July 27. And
8 the final party to organise formally was the HDZ, the Croatian Democratic
9 Community, and that was on August 18th. So in line here I see the SDS
10 organising third and two parties had even less time by that metric to
11 prepare for the election than the rest of you.
12 Q. Do you agree that the HDZ was active in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
13 especially in Western Herzegovina, considerably before it was actually
15 A. Yes. I believe that all the major national parties -- all the
16 parties, for that matter, with the possible exception of the Reformists,
17 were active in Bosnia-Herzegovina considerably before they were formally
18 established, and, in fact, were caught in somewhat of a dilemma because
19 of the law passed in February 1990 that approved the formation of
20 political parties but not along national or religious lines. And so much
21 of the activity that you're speaking of was actually carried out with the
22 understanding that it was illegal, and the people who were doing it could
23 be prosecuted. You made references to this yourself and indicated that
24 you had many people organising on behalf of the SDS but operating
1 The HDZ took a little bit different approach and operated pretty
2 much in private gatherings, and the Party of Democratic Action, the
3 Muslim party, took a different approach and adopted a nonnational name in
4 its organising activities and believed in so doing it was in conformance
5 with the law forbidding the organisation along national and religious
7 Q. Let us try to clear up a few matters. First of all, I claim that
8 the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not affiliate of the
9 Serb Democratic Party from Croatia
10 the programme of that party. Is that right or is that not right?
11 A. I agree with that. Yes. That's right.
12 Q. Thank you. Secondly, do you agree that at municipal level we
13 could establish a national party for a while but not at central level,
14 and that is why in every municipality we established a separate party and
15 later on they were all brought together, and that would perhaps speak
16 about that illegality that you had referred to.
17 A. Well, my understanding of that process was that there were some
18 spontaneous local efforts to organise a Serb national party, a major one,
19 in Eastern Herzegovina, one in the Drvar area. You referred to some
20 organising efforts in Romanija, which would be the area around Sarajevo
21 and it was to prevent this from developing into a factionalised
22 organisation, that you did indeed step up and seek to create a single
23 centralised organisation and to bring these separate spontaneous groups
24 or organising groups together. You then had the idea to form a party
25 that had at least two wings. One was to be the national wing, which was
1 led by you, and the other was the social democratic league wing which was
2 to be led by -- I forget who it was. It was -- but this, I think, was --
3 you received -- according to your account, you received advice from
4 Mr. Cosic that this was indeed a really bad idea, which I think it
5 probably was, to form a party that built into it factions. And though
6 you held to that idea in the period probably right up till September of
7 1990, it was something that you had to be dissuaded from doing by
8 Mr. Cosic and other advisors to the party.
9 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that the main concern of the Serb
10 intelligentsia was that the Serb people would have no one to vote for
11 except for the formal Communists, just like the Serbs in Croatia
12 for Racan's Communists, and that that was the motive for establishing the
14 A. I think it's one of the motives. I do believe that the results
15 of the Croatian elections, which were in late -- mid-April, came as
16 something of a jolt to the Serb nationals -- nationalists, yourself and
17 others, in Bosnia
18 at the prospect of the same thing happening, which was that most Serbs,
19 in fact, voted for the League of Communists rather than the -- the
20 Croatian SDS
21 So, yes, I think that was a factor. I think there were -- there
22 was a general evolving sense that there had to be a point of unification
23 for Serb organising efforts in Bosnia
24 party, as you say, taking the name and programme from -- not -- not --
25 let's say repeating them for a separate party in Bosnia was the best way
1 to go.
2 Q. Thank you. Do you agree with Lord Owen that the Serbs in Croatia
3 were frightened because World War II insignia and rhetoric had come back
4 and that they had reason for their fear? They had reason to fear a
5 return to 1941. That was actually the title of a book, "1941, Coming
7 A. I'm not -- I'm not familiar with the book. Who is the author?
8 Q. It was a statement made by David Owen, and the book is authored
9 by Goldstein, the president of the Jewish community in Croatia?
10 A. I agree with the general statement that the Serbs in Croatia
11 frightened by the revival of World War II insignia and rhetoric emanating
12 from not only the HDZ but other Croatian bodies. It -- I think one has
13 to be careful about exactly when one would speak about that phenomenon,
14 because there was a genuine effort to achieve an agreement that would
15 resolve that concern in the summer of 1990, prior to the -- prior to the
16 adoption of the constitution.
17 So in -- as a general principle, I would agree that they had
18 reason to be concerned.
19 Q. Thank you. Can we now see this part that pertains to
20 Lord Carrington, who chaired the peace conference. We will see him
21 speaking about what you talked to us about just now.
22 [Video-clip played]
23 "The war saw it differently
24 "The Serbs in Croatia
25 vivid memory of what happened in 1941, '42, when Hitler declared Croatia
1 as an independent puppet state, if you like, and the horrors that went on
2 there and the murders of the Serbs were still very -- I mean, a very
3 large number of Serbs were murdered at that time. I mean, hundreds of
4 thousands. And I think it was very understandable that when Croatia
5 declared its independence and promulgated a new constitution without any
6 safeguard for the 600.000 Serbs who still lived in Croatia, that the
7 Croatian -- that the Serbs were very perturbed about this."
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Thank you. Do you agree with Lord Owen -- or, rather, Lord
11 A. Not fully, no. And I point out you played one part of a, very, I
12 think, controversial tape that gives a very one-sided view of not only
13 the events in question but carefully selects excerpts from key
14 policy-makers on their views. So I think -- I've agreed already that
15 there was cause for concern in the wake of the promulgation of that
16 constitution which it looks to me like was in part a product of the
17 failure of the Serbs to -- of Serb representatives to offer the
18 appropriate language that they were asking for.
19 So in terms of the time that he's speaking of, I do agree with
20 that. I think also you have to look at the progression of events which
21 is much broader than what he attempts to deal with and conclude
22 accordingly what the responsibility for that was.
23 Q. Well, now we're only dealing with the Serbs in Bosnia, whether
24 they had any reason to worry about insignia and rhetoric, and now let us
25 see whether they had cause for concern regarding the actions of the new
1 government. Let us see what it was that the new government it did.
2 Actually, did you include that in your own report, that the Serbs in
4 A. Well, I gave a fairly extensive account of the events. I
5 wouldn't maybe say extensive, but I certainly covered the events in
7 fact, receive some attention. I don't know that I put it exactly the way
8 you just formulated it, but was certainly prepared to note the phenomenon
9 in my writings.
10 Q. Well, Lord Carrington says here that the proclamation of
12 reason for great concern amongst the Serbs. That is what this is all
13 about. Croatia
14 one of the constituent peoples of Croatia before this community had
15 received any kind of guarantees.
16 Was that included in your report, that the premature recognition
17 of Croatia
18 A. As I said, I did, in fact, cover the events associated with
19 the -- or I gave an account of the events associated with the Croatian
20 move to independence and the Serbian movement within Croatia for -- to
21 form separate associations, to rally the population behind the separatist
22 project. Again, I didn't formulate it the way that you just did and
23 would not think that this is -- I don't agree with the way you put it. I
24 think that one would have to take a more nuanced look at it and not
25 conflate these events between the spring of 1990 and June 25th, 1991.
1 Q. Well, let's put it this way, Mr. Donia: Up until the arrival of
2 Tudjman in power, were the Serbs a constituent peoples in Croatia? Was
3 it the republic of Croats and Serbs? That's what its name was. Yes or
4 no? We can deal with that quickly.
5 A. No. It was the Republic of Croatia
6 Q. So you don't know that in the constitution of Croatia, in all the
7 constitutions of the Republic of Croatia
9 A. Dr. Karadzic, you asked me about the name of the republic. I
10 told you the name of the republic is the Republic of Croatia
11 think you're contesting that.
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Is your microphone on?
13 THE WITNESS: Yes. Hello.
14 JUDGE KWON: Did you hear the translation?
15 THE WITNESS: I think we lost just a little bit in the
16 translation here and the dead microphone. We agree, I take it, that the
17 name of the republic was the Republic of Croatia
18 was no mention of Serbs. Was there a mention of Serbs in the
19 constitution? Yes, and I believe we agree on that as well.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Thank you. So are they stipulated as being one of the two
22 constituent peoples of Croatia
23 A. Yes, they are.
24 Q. Thank you. Now, the new authority, did it introduce new rhetoric
25 or, rather, the old rhetoric of 1941? Did it re-introduce that rhetoric?
1 We agreed, I think, that it did; right?
2 A. No, I -- look, there was some revival of those things, but I
3 think that the official circles tried to avoid at least the most
4 ostentatious of it, and I think it depended on who you're speaking about
5 and the degree to which those symbols and that rhetoric was
7 The -- the whole issue of translating this Stalinist notion of
8 constituent nations, which came to really be just an article of faith, an
9 unquestioned part of nationality policy in Yugoslavia, the whole issue of
10 translating that into a democratic period was to me extremely fraught,
11 and I'm just not certain that it -- that concept worked very well or
12 works very well in a democratically elected system. So I'm perfectly
13 happy to note these designations of the constituent peoples in the
14 Communist people period, but I think that you really have to recognise
15 that the movement to that to a different system caused all sorts of
16 problems and challenges.
17 Q. Well, I assume you know that there are national states and
18 civilian states?
19 A. Not that simple. I think, you know, the -- what one would think
20 of as the national states of Western Europe all have systems of
21 government that are based on the civil concept, and I don't know that
22 there is a pure case of a national state without some civil element,
23 or -- and there are probably very few examples of a civil state with no
24 national element.
25 Q. Thank you. You know, that Slovenia wiped out tens of thousands
1 of its citizens coming from the southern republics in origin from its
2 register of civilians of Slovenia
3 know about that? It erased them from the list.
4 A. Which list -- no. The answer is no.
5 Q. Thank you. Now, do you know that President Tudjman said at an
6 HDZ meeting that the Independent State
7 creation but was also the realisation of the legitimate aspirations of
8 the Croatian people for their state, for a state of their own?
9 A. I'm familiar that he said words to that effect, yes.
10 Q. And do you remember that he also said that he was happy that his
11 wife was neither a Serb nor a Jew?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Thank you. And do you know that President Tudjman christened a
14 Muslim family, an eight member Muslim family?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to play -- well, do you know this person
17 that we're seeing now?
18 A. I -- I know both the person on the left and the film you're about
19 to play, yes.
20 Q. Well, who is it then? Can you tell us?
21 A. This is Martin Spegelj who was -- I don't know exactly what his
22 title was, but he was in the government of Croatia by late 1990.
23 Q. I think you're right. He was the defence minister, in actual
24 fact. May we now play this. It's the 19th of November, 1990.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
1 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, Your Honour. Just before we get into
2 another video, I note on the record the 65 ter number of that last
3 video-clip was never uttered.
4 JUDGE KWON: No.
5 MS. EDGERTON: And that was 1408. And in that regard, I also
6 noted as the transcript was playing that on page 45, line 23, there seems
7 to be a line missing in regard to Dr. Donia's observation as regards the
8 video from which that clip was drawn. He said something -- my
9 recollection is to the effect that it was a controversial film, and
10 his -- so that line appears to be missing, and it's -- my notation is
11 page 45, line 23, and his comments run to page 46, line 8.
12 JUDGE KWON: That will be checked or that has been reinstated by
13 your comment.
14 Do you have, Mr. Karadzic, the 65 ter number of this video-clip
15 that you're going to play now?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says on the tape, I assume. At
17 least I hope so.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, it reads 1D892.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the 19th of October, 1990
20 the Yugoslav People's Army knew about this. May we play the footage.
21 [Video-clip played]
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic. Mr. Karadzic, are we supposed to hear
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, you should be hearing the
25 Serbo-Croatian -- or, rather, Croatian, if that is a separate language,
1 but the subtitles are in English, but, yes, we should hear the sound. So
2 may we put the volume up and have some sound.
3 JUDGE KWON: So you expect the interpreters to read out these
4 subtitles, or if they can, they can translate, interpret, what they hear
5 on the tape.
6 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters cannot interpret without a
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll play both, because the
9 subtitles are a translation of what Martin Spegelj is actually saying.
10 JUDGE KWON: I've just heard from the interpreters that they
11 can't interpret without the transcript.
12 THE INTERPRETER: But we can read the subtitles, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's give it a try.
14 [Video-clip played]
15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that there's still no
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I was just told that the soundtrack in
18 B/C/S is very weak and they can't hear anything. Would you like them to
19 read out the subtitles?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, perhaps that would be best,
21 because the subtitles are the correct translation. But if you remember,
22 I played this footage, this film, during my opening statement. There
23 seems to be something wrong now. We'll try something else.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Did you know, Mr. Donia, that Martin Spegelj was caught in this
1 action where he's educating his killers on the ground and that at the
2 time he had 80.000 Kalashnikovs, and that he was training them and
3 telling them how JNA officers should be shot in the stomach?
4 A. Yes. I love this video. In fact, I start out one chapter in
5 "Tradition Betrayed," speaking about it because it is -- it's a very
6 dramatic moment that shows both, I think, the advanced point at which the
7 Croatian Defence forces were contemplating and were preparing for
8 conflict and also the degree to which the KOS, the counter-intelligence
9 service of the JNA was intent on discrediting the Croatian leadership.
11 threats against security to the state.
12 So it's to me just a very vivid example of what was going on at
13 the time and, in fact, was played at a session of the Federal Presidency
14 or at least a session at which the -- which Tudjman was present in
15 January of 1991, and in a sense worsened relations at that point between
16 the presidents of the various republics because of the two things that it
18 Q. Thank you. Let's try and play it again. I hope it will be
19 successful this time.
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Ms. Edgerton.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Maybe we could try, Your Honour. I think it might
22 be working from the machines on this side of the courtroom for some
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It will be just more proof of the
1 inequality of arms.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voice-over] There are 9.000 JNA officers and
4 18.000 JNA soldiers on the whole territory of Slovenia
5 of Bosnia
6 "We will resolve Knin in the way that we will butcher them. We
7 have the international -- especially now when this whore has won in
9 had won the Americans offered to help us. And up until then they had
10 only speculated. They said now it will be like this: 1.000 armoured
11 vehicles, cars, who knows what else. They will provide weapons and
12 equipment for 100.000 soldiers, all free of charge. The army has no
13 business there. They will be massacred. Everybody will be massacred
14 already in their homes. To kill on the spot, on the street, in the army
15 barracks compound, anywhere, just take a pistol and shoot in the stomach.
16 This will not be a conventional war.
17 "It will be a civil war with no consideration towards anyone.
18 Not even towards women or children. The bombs simply need to be thrown
19 into family apartments. Physical liquidation. Somebody enters the
20 apartment. The courier. He appears in front of the door bang, bang,
21 bang, and returns downstairs. Let them call the police to establish who
22 it was. Then down the stairs he goes to the other and kills him at the
23 same time. Don't mind the women or the children. It does not matter.
24 "Boljkovac: We will use all means. We will also use weapons.
25 Serbs will never again be in Croatia
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Did you recognise the other man, Josip Boljkovac, the second man
4 who appeared?
5 A. No, I did not.
6 Q. Thank you. Now, Mr. Donia, you describe this in your book, but
7 did you include it in your report?
8 A. No, I don't believe I did, no.
9 Q. Thank you. You said that the filming of this footage in the
10 Presidency deteriorated the relationship between the presidents in the
11 republic -- or, I mean the members of the Presidency.
12 A. Yes. I assume Mr. Milosevic didn't appreciate being called a
13 whore, and certainly was evidence of a high-ranking Croatian official
14 plotting against Yugoslavia
15 Q. So did the filming deteriorate relations or the actual fact?
16 A. I think both, but the -- the evidence in the film would be -- was
17 the primary contributor to the deterioration of relations.
18 Q. Thank you. Does it say there that they would massacre the Serbs
19 in Knin? And Boljkovac adds that the Serbs will never be what they had
20 previously been in Croatia
21 A. Yeah. I think we've seen what it says, and I don't know that I
22 want to take a paraphrase other than the text of what actually has been
23 entered into the record. So I think it says what it says. It's clear
24 that that's the -- that's a nasty piece of intent, to massacre people.
25 Q. Do you believe that that had to give rise to the Serbs' concern
1 in Bosnia
2 A. Not necessarily, no. This really pertained to Croatia and might
3 have been -- might have contributed to, let's say, fear on the part of
4 some Serbs in Bosnia
5 Bosnians in general that what was going on in Croatia was something
6 different than what was going on in Bosnia. This is, after all, the
7 time, January of 1991, when you formed a government with the HDZ, and the
8 SDA designated the ministers that you wanted to designate and prepared or
9 initiated this period of a partnership amongst the three national
10 parties. So I would have to say, I think, that this is something that
11 probably had much more impact in Croatia than in Bosnia
12 Q. Let me now remind you of the 26th of May, 1990, the founding
13 Assembly of the SDA party. Do you remember that at that founding SDA
14 party session, Dalibor Brozovic, a high-ranking official, Croatian, said
15 that Croatia
16 fact that Croatia
17 State of Croatia
18 A. First of all, just to note that Mr. Brozovic was not -- he was
19 there as a guest of the -- of the SDA. He was not a part of the
20 organising function of that founding Assembly. I don't recall him
21 saying -- referring to the NDH, but he did indeed say that Croatia
22 consider the boundary -- its boundary to be the Drina River
23 Q. Do you know that another party, the Croatian Party of Rights,
24 said that Croatia
25 Independent State
1 A. Yes, that's the case.
2 Q. Thank you. On the 26th of May, 1990, was I in politics?
3 A. I think at that time you were very politically engaged in talks
4 and meetings and arrangements for what was going to follow in very short
5 order. I don't think you held any formal position in -- in political
6 life until the 12th of July, 1990.
7 Q. Mr. Donia, on the 3rd of July, in a talk show on television, it
8 was announced that there would be such a party, but on the 26th of May we
9 still didn't know that there would be a Serbian Democratic Party. There
10 was no talk of that yet. Can you remember a single public event, or
11 secret event for that kind, of the Serbian Democratic Party or speech or
12 intellectual circle on the 26th of May?
13 A. On the 26th of May, no. I'd have to check records to see if that
14 was the case, but I think in terms of your own account and the account of
15 some of your closest friends and observers, activity that eventually led
16 to the formation of the SDS
17 Q. I'd like to tender this video into evidence now, please.
18 JUDGE KWON: The previous one as well, Lord Carrington.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
20 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
21 MS. EDGERTON: I take it he refers to the excerpts that were
22 played in court and to that I would have no objection.
23 JUDGE KWON: We understand that a transcript will be submitted in
24 due course?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, as soon as we get it, we will
1 provide it.
2 JUDGE KWON: So we shall mark for identification until that time
3 both of them.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. 65 ter 1D1408 will be
6 MS. EDGERTON: Just again, those 65 ter numbers refer to the
7 whole videos which -- the first one of which is extremely long, so I take
8 it we're just referring to the clips that were played in court.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much. I should have noted the
10 time-frame, but I couldn't note it. So I'll leave it to the court
11 Defence team to identify exactly what portion was played in the
13 Yes, we have more -- is it convenient to take a break now? Yes.
14 We will have a 25-minute break now.
15 --- Recess taken at 5.17 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 5.46 p.m.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Let us finish with Croatia
21 Mr. Donia, let me read the actual wording from the constitution before
22 this last one, namely that Croatia
23 Serbian peoples as well as others living in it. And the new constitution
25 "The Republic of Croatia is being established as the national
1 state of the Croatian people."
2 And the state of members of autonomous minorities, Serbs, Czechs,
3 Hungarians, Germans, Jews, et cetera. So now instead of being a
4 constituent people the Serbs were turned into a national minority. That
5 is why we had to see how it was that Yugoslavia came into being. Also
6 the fact that the Serbs had united with Serbia as a state-forming people
7 to the west of the Drina
8 In Bosnia
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina is a state of equal peoples and citizens, Serbs,
10 Croats, Muslims, and members of other nationalities?
11 A. There are several different questions there. I don't see a
12 document that you actually were reading from. If you could just identify
13 what exactly you're reading from. You were reading from the constitution
14 of the Republic of Croatia
15 Q. The first one was the pre-Tudjman constitution and the other one,
16 that it was the state of the Croatian people and national minorities,
17 including Serbs, that is the Tudjman's Christmas constitution, the
18 so-called Christmas constitution of the 22nd of December, 1990
19 A. 1990. Okay. Okay. Thank you. Now, your next question was
20 about Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I don't believe you quite read that
21 constitutional provision in full. I don't know if you have a document
22 that would provide that or it's a fairly delicately worded provision, and
23 it changed, I believe, in July of 1990, if I'm not mistaken, with the
24 adoption of amendment 60. So I just would want to be clear on exactly
25 what you're reading from and what date it was enacted.
1 Q. I'm reading from my notes. So what I copied here was the wording
2 concerning the Republic of Croatia
3 Just from the point of view of the constitutionality of the Serbs.
4 That's what I'm talking about.
5 Now, as far as the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is
6 concerned, Article 1 says that:
7 "The Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a democratic
8 sovereign state of equal citizens and peoples, Muslims, Serbs, Croats,
9 and members of other peoples and nationalities living there."
10 Article 2: "Bosnia-Herzegovina is within the Socialist Federal
11 Republic of Yugoslavia
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not have the
13 original document.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Now, I was just interested in the following: What happened in
17 into the national minorities? And what happened in Bosnia
18 remain as one of the peoples?
19 JUDGE KWON: Just one by one. Doctor, you wanted to comment upon
20 his question about Croatian constitution.
21 THE WITNESS: Yes. I think I've given that, made that comment.
22 I concur with the reading that he did of the article.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 THE WITNESS: So -- well, unlike in Croatia where the
25 constitutional -- or new constitution was adopted in December, and it was
1 discussed for some months before then, the Bosnian constitution underwent
2 changes in July of 1990 that were approved by the outgoing
3 Communist-dominated Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Assembly of the
4 Socialist Republic
5 read was, I believe, the version of Article 1 that resulted from those
7 So, yes, that's -- that's the way things stood as at the end of
8 July 1990. And I believe, furthermore, if you go to the other -- there
9 are several articles in the first part of the constitution which not only
10 mention these three peoples, but they actually change the order so that
11 one of the peoples is first in amendment 1, another is first in one of
12 the subsequent amendments, and -- and then they switch it yet to the
14 So I would have to say there was a great deal of attention to
15 this -- the relative -- to the equality of these peoples in the
16 constitution of Bosnia
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Thank you. You do agree that in paragraph 2, Article 1, it says
19 that the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is within the Socialist
20 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
21 A. I don't see anything in front of me to that effect, but I
22 certainly don't contest it.
23 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the Serb Democratic Party -- or,
24 rather, Professor Koljevic and I, had asked the Assembly to introduce a
25 Chamber of Nations in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina on that very
1 same July, before the amendments were passed, to have a Chamber of
2 Nations within the Assembly. Actually, respond to that first. Do you
3 remember that?
4 A. I recall that all three national parties in Bosnia appealed in
5 the -- this organising period of organising the parties for the inclusion
6 of a Chamber of Nation -- a Chamber of Nations, yes. I do recall that.
7 Q. Do you remember that amendment 70, paragraph 10 to the
8 constitution on the 31st of July, 1990, envisaged the establishment of a
9 council for looking into matters pertaining to the equality of rights of
10 peoples within Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
11 That was actually instead of having a proper Chamber of Nations. That
12 was the only concession they were willing to make. Do you remember that?
13 A. Yes. Actually, there's a very good succinct description of this
14 very situation in -- I think it's the first entry of my Excerpts report,
15 by Mr. Krajisnik from -- I believe it's the first Bosnian Serb Assembly
17 Q. Do you know that the SDA never allowed this council to be
19 A. No, that's not my -- I don't think that's my understanding of it,
20 and it's not exactly Mr. Krajisnik's understanding of it either. The
21 dispute was not about its establishment. It was about what its
22 jurisdiction was going to be, and failure to reach an agreement on that
23 meant that it was never created.
24 Q. Do you agree that what was envisaged was for this council to
25 operate on the principles of consensus and that 20 MPs would have the
1 right to send a particular issue to the council and the question would
2 remain pending in the meantime?
3 A. Yes, that's exactly right.
4 Q. Thank you. 1D01391. Could we have that, please.
5 And in the meantime, Mr. Donia, do you remember that the first
6 attempt to pass a declaration on the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina
7 had been halted because the Assembly, including the SDA, had accepted the
8 fact that this question had to be dealt with by the council for the
9 equality of national rights first? That was in the spring of 1991; isn't
10 that right?
11 A. You're very close. The SDA submitted a proposal which was
12 characterized as declaration of sovereignty that included essentially new
13 language about this, proclaiming the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
14 I forget how many points, four or five or six points. And as that was
15 about to come to a vote, the members of the SDS appealed to the
16 parliamentarian for a ruling. That was Mr. Campara. And, in fact, he
17 ruled that the resolution had to be referred to the council that we're
18 talking about, the substitute for the separate Chamber, before it could
19 be voted on. Since there was no such council in effect or in existence,
20 the legislation died at that point. And indeed the parties did accept
21 that, and it fell off the agenda of the Assembly, not to come back until
22 the fall of 1991.
23 Q. Since you know our language, in all fairness this is Cyrillic,
24 but this is the Serb Democratic Party, the Main Committee, and do you see
25 here it says number and date? Do you see that?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I think if we look at 65 ter number
3 17566, we'll see another version of that document that's been translated
4 into English. And I hope I've not misled you.
5 JUDGE KWON: I take it that this time that you are absolutely
6 correct. Let's try.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Did you notice the number and the date underneath the heading
9 where it says "Main Board"?
10 A. Yes, I see the number 01-79/90, and the date of 8 October 1990
11 Q. Did you see that all the documents that had gone through party
12 organs bear a number and a date?
13 A. It's not been my experience that all of them do, no.
14 Q. Well, then those were documents that had not gone through party
15 organs. Well, let's have the English version.
16 JUDGE KWON: So, Mr. Karadzic, can you confirm the document you
17 are seeing is the exact identical document you're referring to? I think
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's a translation of the same
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. So actually, we're not going to look at the entire document, but
25 let us see what the party is asking for. Amendment 17 [as interpreted]
1 is not in accordance with amendment 60. Amendment 17 [as interpreted]
3 "The Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a democratic
4 sovereign state of citizens with equal rights and peoples of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslims, Serbs, and Croats as well as members of
6 other nations and nationalities living in Bosnia-Herzegovina."
7 "Amendment 70, section 1 does not provide for the national
8 equality of Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim nationalities, and it is not in
9 accordance with amendment 60, and it does not allow for amendment 60 to
10 be put into practice."
11 "The Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina demands that
12 amendment 70 conform with amendment 60 and that section 10 of this
13 amendment be amended and that section 10 of amendment 70 be extended to
14 include the following text:
15 "At the request of no less than 20 deputies in the Council of
16 Citizens and Council of Municipalities in respect of issues relevant for
17 the fulfillment of the principle of national equality and, in
18 particular," and now the six questions are specified.
19 "The Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
20 shall establish the following three national councils: The Serbian
21 National Council, the Muslim National Council, and the Croatian National
22 Council which will be composed of all deputies from both Assembly
23 councils, the issues of interest for the realisation of the national
24 equality in the Assembly of the SRBH shall be decided in accordance with
25 a separate procedure.
1 "Decisions shall be considered adopted if a simple majority of
2 deputies in each of the three national councils vote in favour."
3 So do you see that we ask for the consistent implementation of
4 the constitution through all the amendments involved and that could have
5 saved us from a great deal of trouble?
6 A. This is when I'm glad I'm not a constitutional scholar, because
7 separating out which amendment should prevail in two constitutional
8 amendments numbered 60 and 70 is far beyond my ability to -- to do. I
9 would note that the document prescribes -- I look at it kind of as a
10 historian as an effort to ratchet up or elevate the role of the parties,
11 the national parties, to equate them to the national communities and to
12 kind of put the parties in a position to veto legislation on behalf of
13 national communities using this device of the concepts inherent in -- in
14 amendment 70 -- or I'm sorry, amendment 60.
15 I don't see the rest of the document. I just see the first page,
16 but that would be my comment on this. I guess it was a proposal that in
17 the form this read was -- stood no chance of being accepted by the
18 other -- other two national parties.
19 Q. Does it say parties here anywhere? It says here consisting
20 proportionately of all political parties. That goes without saying. But
21 there is no reference to political parties, rather, ethnic communities?
22 A. "The Serbian Democratic Party of BH demands that amendment 70
23 conform with amendment 60." I think that's a reference to a party, and
24 pretty clearly an effort to elevate the party's status to essentially
25 acquire the right to represent the national community in this matter.
1 Q. I think that there is some misunderstanding here, Mr. Donia. The
2 party is not asking that for themselves but for the ethnic community.
3 One set of elections is won by one party and another set of elections can
4 be won by another party, so this so has to do with the proportionality of
5 all political parties. Does it say here that this has to do with
6 political parties or is it the National Council?
7 A. My comment was that this is -- this is a time when you and
8 leaders of other parties are desperately trying to establish the fact
9 that you embodied the -- the will of the Serb people and the Serb
10 national community and that the SDS
11 this to me is something that attempts to further extend that claim to be
12 the embodiment of the will of the -- of the Serb people with this demand.
13 I still can't see the second page. I don't know what this goes
14 on to say.
15 Q. Can we have page 2 in English, and in Serbian too. I mean, both
16 in Serbian and in English.
17 While we're waiting for that, Mr. Donia, do you agree that 31
18 point something per cent were Serbs and that the SDS won 97 per cent of
19 all Serb votes because they won about 90 -- 31 per cent of all votes;
21 A. You're, I think, referencing a couple of different things here.
22 Are you referring to the census and -- the 1991 census and the per cent
23 of the total population who declared themselves as Serbs in the census,
24 or are you talking about the election outcome?
25 Q. I'm comparing these two proportions, as it were. About 32 per
1 cent of the population of Bosnia
2 of the vote. So I'm saying that most Serbs voted for the Serb Democratic
3 Party; right?
4 A. I would agree that most Serbs voted for the Serb Democratic
5 Party. I don't think that percentage is right, because a good number of
6 Serbs also voted for the non-national parties, the Social Democrats, and
7 the Reformists. And, in fact, you complained about that a great deal in
8 the period after the election and viewed it as your job to make sure that
9 they saw the error of their ways and came to the -- rallied to the SDS.
10 Q. Do you agree that the Serb Democratic Party won 72 seats in
12 A. Yes. Out of, I believe, 240, if I'm not mistaken. Yes.
13 Q. Do you agree that there was a total of 86 Serbs in the parliament
14 of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
15 A. I don't know that to be the case.
16 Q. But you do agree that 83 of the 86 had established the Assembly
17 of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to this day the Assembly of
18 Republika Srpska has 83 MPs; right?
19 A. I didn't know that. That's interesting.
20 Q. So the Serb Democratic Party had 72. Then there was one from the
21 Serb Renewal Movement, and the rest were among the Reformists,
22 Socialists, et cetera. Out of those 86, 83 were against the secession of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they moved to the Assembly of the Serb people in
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that right?
25 A. That's approximately correct. I can't confirm for you that
1 specific number, but in general, yes.
2 Q. We will agree that 83 is more than one-third and that these MPs,
3 even on the assumption that all the Muslims and Croats had wanted
4 secession, that these 83 could nevertheless prevent the Assembly from
6 Because two-third -- a two-third majority is required for constitutional
8 A. Well, there's a number of assumptions built into that proposition
9 that I'm not sure are right. I don't believe that the -- I don't know
10 that it came to a vote in terms of what the actual number of votes
11 against the independence would be in the Assembly. Of course, the
12 probably more decisive factor was the referendum held in late February
13 and 1st of March, 1992, which you and the SDS boycotted. And
14 furthermore, you walked out of the Assembly. So I don't know that that
15 would be -- that you can jump to the -- leap to the conclusion that 6 --
16 83 people would have voted against independence.
17 Q. Well, now I'm going to read this out to you.
18 "Amendment 42, paragraph 1, bullet point 2:
19 "The constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina:
20 "Borders of the republic can be changed by a decision of the
21 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina only provided that the will of all the
22 citizens of the republic is expressed by way of a referendum if at least
23 two-thirds of the total number of voters vote in favour of that."
24 So the referendum towards the end of February 1992, did
25 two-thirds of the total number of voters vote in favour of the
1 independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
2 A. Dr. Karadzic, I'd like to you show me the document if you could
3 that says this. I'm kind of stuck here just following your words and the
4 translation of your words. I'd sure prefer to be looking at a document.
5 Q. Do you agree on the whole that in any country a simple majority
6 would not be sufficient for carrying out constitutional changes, but more
7 than that would be required?
8 A. I would say in most countries that's -- that would be the case.
9 Q. Now we're going to play another little video-clip, and let's hear
10 what Lord Carrington has to say.
11 [Video-clip played]
12 "This was a war that European leaders believe could have been
14 "The Bosnian Serbs until comparatively recently have been in the
15 majority in Bosnia
16 birth rate than the Serbs became the predominant -- the majority
17 population, and this of course was something very hard for the Serbs to
18 swallow, and they made it abundantly plain very early on that they were
19 not prepared to accept the situation in which there was an independent
21 constitution which then prevailed, it was illegal for Izetbegovic to
22 declare independence because any constitutional change of that magnitude
23 had to be agreed by all three parties."
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to put this to you, Mr. Donia: What I
1 read out was from the constitution, but I can't find the constitution of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I assume that all the constitutions exist. But
3 anyway, the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not provide for the
4 independence and existence of Bosnia
5 agree? Is there any provision of the constitution saying that Bosnia
7 A. I don't know.
8 Q. And do you think -- well, how can you not know? You must know
9 something like that.
10 A. I'm not a constitutional expert, and I'm certainly not a
11 constitutional expert on the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As I
12 say, I would not want to be one and have to sort out these apparently
13 directly conflicting positions of various amendments to the constitution.
14 And I think that -- exists for the question of the republic becoming
15 independent as well, differing things stated in different articles that
16 would come in to play in that decision, and I can't sort them out.
17 Q. I'd like to tender the previous document into evidence and then
18 move on. And the video extract, please.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The Assembly session transcript is the minute.
20 17566 will be admitted as ...
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D250, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: And that video-clip. Do you have an objection,
23 Ms. Edgerton?
24 MS. EDGERTON: No, and it seems like it's another clip from
25 1D01408, which Dr. Donia already referred to.
1 JUDGE KWON: I think so. And then I -- for the record, I note
2 that the clip ran from 47 minutes, 20 seconds, to 48 minutes, 06 seconds.
3 So that part of the video-clip will be marked for identification till we
4 receive the transcript.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's correct.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D251.
7 JUDGE KWON: I don't think we heard the number. It's
9 THE REGISTRAR: 251, that's MFI
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Now, in your report, Mr. Donia, did you make any mention at all
13 of questions of a constitutional nature? You mentioned boundaries and
14 municipalities. Is that not a constitutional question as well?
15 A. It -- it could be, and I think in part it is, but it's also
16 matter of political decisions, which is the -- let's say the spirit in
17 which I addressed it.
18 Q. And do you consider that somebody has the right to make political
19 decisions having to do with constitutional matter in an unconstitutional
21 A. No, I don't. If one has the ability to determine what is
22 constitutional and what is unconstitutional.
23 Q. Well, common sense would allow you to make that determination.
24 Now, Mr. Donia, I'm going to put something to you now, and here
25 it is: The constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not provide for the
1 possibility of secession from Yugoslavia
2 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not. Yes or no?
3 A. Let me respond to your comment first that common sense would
4 allow to you make that determination. I think the point of my answer
5 here is to say no, it doesn't. It is a matter of constitutional
6 interpretation that allows you to make that determination, and what I
7 find was that all parties at this time to this conflict were freely
8 throwing around the allegation that the other side was engaging in
9 unconstitutional behaviour. It became a litany of complaints. For
10 example, the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the government of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina called unconstitutional the mobilisation of soldiers
12 in Bosnia
13 end of September 1991, and they cited five different ways in which what
14 was going on was unconstitutional. They never bothered to consult the
15 Constitutional Court
16 of what they were doing. They simply declared it. And I think you were
17 essentially doing the same thing at this time, and now you're trying to
18 do it with me.
19 I can't make that determination. I would argue that all of you
20 who were throwing this terminology around at the time consistently
21 refrained from submitting these arguments to a constitutional court and
22 chose instead to just fight them out on the basis of denouncing the other
23 side for acting that way.
24 Q. Do you agree that federal matters should be resolved by the
25 federal constitution; right?
1 A. I -- in most cases I believe that's the case, but I'm not sure
2 it's always true.
3 Q. Do you know that the federal constitution in Yugoslavia
4 proclaimed several decisions of the secessionist republics as unlawful?
5 A. Well, the federal constitution didn't declare them unlawful, no.
6 Q. The federal Constitutional Court proclaimed some decisions taken
7 by the republics as being unlawful because they delved into the
8 composition of the constitution and they were deemed unlawful.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. I'm going to read out now what it says in article 5 of the
11 federal constitution, and that relates to common reason:
12 "The territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
13 one and is made up of the territories of the socialist republics."
14 And one of the following articles says that the borders of the
15 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cannot be changed without
16 agreement from all the republics and autonomous provinces.
17 Now, is it common sense that there can be no secession until
18 everybody agrees about secession?
19 A. Well, I hate to repeat the point, but this is not a common-sense
20 question. It is one assertion of this principle that, in fact, had other
21 formulations that were in at least some potential conflict with it. So I
22 can't make the judgement based on the question that you just asked me.
23 Q. Do you consider that the secession of those reports, the ones
24 which did secede, did you consider that to be legal, lawful?
25 A. I don't make judgements like that.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, may we have 1D163 called up
2 next on e-court, please.
3 And while we're the waiting for that, Mr. Donia, if you are
4 unable to say, then how can you assess the conduct and steps taken by the
5 Serb side engulfed by this mass of unlawful conduct and moves on the
6 other side, because you've been evaluating all our steps and movements,
7 the municipal boundaries, resistance to the secession of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so on and so forth, and we say that it was all a
9 result of the unlawful action of the Bosnian Croatian coalition in the
11 Now, let's see what Antonio Cassese says about this, a professor
12 of law and a Judge of this Tribunal and President of the Tribunal at one
14 Next page, please. The highlighted portion.
15 "[In English] The achievement of independence by Slovenia
17 revolutionary process that has taken place beyond the regulation of the
18 existing body of laws."
19 [Interpretation] Do you accept that? Do you accept that
20 Mr. Antonio Cassese is an expert in the field?
21 A. I will certainly more than concede his status an expert in the
22 field. I would also suggest you read the next paragraph which indeed
23 suggests that the -- there is some qualifications to what he said about.
24 Q. But the referendums, Mr. Donia, must go back to the Assemblies,
25 and the deputies must reach a decision. Do you agree?
1 A. Well, I think you're just proving the point that the legal
2 constitutional system with its multilayers and many, often conflicting,
3 provisions just provides a great deal of fodder for those who would
4 declare one part -- one act or another of their rivals to be
6 I -- it certainly, you know, was the case that referendums
7 resulted in Assembly resolutions. I don't know whether they were
8 considered binding or not, just as I really don't know whether these
9 rulings by the Constitutional Court were considered binding or whether
10 they were, in fact, also referred to Assemblies for further action.
11 So I just don't know how to respond to your question. I can't
12 answer your question yes or no.
13 Q. Look at the previous paragraph which talks about the right to
15 "[In English] ... adopted by the committee of the Yugoslav
16 Federal Assembly on January the 20th, 1992, was never passed by the
17 Plenary Assembly because it was rapidly overtaken by the dramatic
18 secession of various republics."
19 [Interpretation] Do you know that there was preparation for a
20 law, a legal basis -- or, rather, ways and means for the republics to
21 secede should they wish to do so, but the secessionist republics avoided
22 and bypassed that and opted for the war option?
23 A. Well, I -- I didn't know about this proposed or draft law. I
24 would not accept your characterization of the republics opting for the
25 war option. I think that the road to war in both Slovenia and Croatia
1 was more complicated than that and not -- not a simple matter of one --
2 one side opting for war.
3 Q. And do you know a statement made by President Tudjman who said
4 that there would have never been a war had Croatia not wanted war, and
5 that war provided us with independence?
6 A. I'm not sure exactly what his statement was. He at one point
7 said words approximately to that effect. Again, I don't see any document
8 that would say exactly what he said.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document
10 into evidence.
11 JUDGE KWON: Can I ask how the opinion of a scholar or -- is
12 relevant? You can use it in your submission later on, but I don't
13 understand how it can become evidence before this Chamber.
14 Ms. Edgerton.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think the relevancy of a
16 scholar, Judge Cassese, is more relevant than newspaper articles that we
17 accepted and were commented on by Mr. Donia.
18 JUDGE KWON: He was not there at the time. We will not admit
19 this. Let's move on.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we then have 1D163 next,
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Let me remind you of Mr. Tudjman's words, and he uttered them at
24 a large rally. He said there would have been no war had Croatia
25 wanted war. We'll show that and present it to you. He said there
1 wouldn't have been a war had Croatia
2 said, "We could have opted for peace but then we would have had to stay
3 in Yugoslavia
4 JUDGE KWON: Did you have the number right? Was Cassese article
5 not 1D163?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 162. 162. There seems to be some
7 mistake. 1D162. Yes, it was a mistake.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Do you know that they were statements made by the these two men,
10 two presidents, the president of Croatia and the president of the
11 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that they opted for the war option?
12 A. Again, I'd like to see the document if you could be so kind.
13 Q. Well, this will be a document, but I'm asking about the
14 statements. They are eminently political. They are not constitutional.
15 These people said that they had opted for war. Do you have that in your
16 report, who was in favour of war, who caused the war? Provoked the war.
17 A. Well, I think I talk a great deal about the events that led up to
18 war. Not trying to be careful not to, you know, isolate it to either a
19 single statement or a single event, because I basically reject this
20 notion which I think is implicit in a lot of your questions that there is
21 a linear predetermined road to conflict from which there seem to be no --
22 no human volition to stop it from -- from moving forward.
23 I would like to look at the broad spectrum of causes and events
24 that did, in fact, lead to war, and I tried to do that. I think there
25 are a lot of things that I did, in fact, not include that should be
1 noted. I did not, for example, talk much about the Anti-Bureaucratic
2 Revolution, which was the source of great distrust of Serbia and
3 Milosevic in the period from 1989 on. I did not mention -- I think I
4 mentioned in passing the removal of weapons by the Yugoslav People's Army
5 from the Territorial Defence forces in May of 1990, which caused so much
6 anxiety about the intentions of the JNA amongst the various republics.
7 I think -- you know, one could certainly look at my report and
8 say there are factors that are not there, and I would agree. I think the
9 effort that I made was to include what I thought were the most
10 significant and relevant factors leading to the outbreak of war.
11 I did not attempt to assess the constitutionality or legality of
12 those matters. I did report when one party or another contended that
13 there was unconstitutionality or illegality in these various acts, but as
14 I said, that was just a routine litany presented by the various parties
15 to the conflict in order denounce the other.
16 Q. Well, you've taken me back to the 17th of May, 1990, now, when
17 the Presidency -- or, rather, the JNA decided to put under control the
18 weapons -- under its control the weapons of the Territorial Defence.
19 That's what you had in mind, didn't you?
20 A. That's correct. Yes, I did.
21 Q. Now, do you think that the JNA did not have the right to do that?
22 A. That's -- that's a good question. My understanding of the way
23 the hierarchy worked was that they did, but I -- there may be
24 constitutional issues or legal issues in there which would suggest the
1 Q. No, there are no such things. If so, show us. Was the
2 Territorial Defence subject to the JNA, or, rather, under the control and
3 command of the JNA?
4 A. My understanding was that the Territorial Defence reported to the
5 JNA and to the Ministry of Defence of the various republics.
6 Q. Thank you. Now, we can look at the English version. This is
7 Josip Boljkovac. We don't need the other version. We saw him at the
8 beginning when he said that the Serbs would no longer be what they were,
9 but obviously he wasn't in favour of war. So may we just look at the
10 English version, have the English version up on our screens. That will
12 "[In English] All Serbs and Yugoslavia were under attack, not
14 [Interpretation] Says he.
15 "[In English] In the exclusive interview, Franjo Tudjman's
16 internal affairs minister Josip Boljkovac admitted Croat leadership
17 carried out planned attacks on Croatia Serbs in 1991 in order to start a
18 war. 'Tudjman wanted the war at any cost following the concept according
19 to which Serbs must disappear from Croatia,'" [Interpretation] Boljkovac
21 Now, this probably relies upon what Tudjman said. We could have
22 done without war.
23 "[In English] Croat war time leader Franjo Tudjman wanted the
24 war at any cost."
25 [Interpretation] Did you take into consideration the fact that a
1 civil war and the events that take place during a civil war are
2 determined by the nature of a civil war and that we have to ask ourselves
3 who wanted war and could a war have been avoided?
4 A. What -- what publication is this from? I'm sorry, I don't see
5 the title of the publication or -- it's from --
6 Q. This was taken from the internet, Mondo, text --
7 JUDGE KWON: But just out of curiosity, Mr. Karadzic, why do the
8 English version and B/C/S version contain different pictures referring to
9 different internet address? One refers to Mondo. The other refers to
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This interview was given to the
12 daily Sudwest [phoen] from Frankfurt
13 various agencies and summarised or shortened, but the main passages
14 remain intact. I can read the Serb version if you like or the English.
15 "During the testimony Glavas accused me of persecuting him
16 because he destroyed the bridge on the river Drava in Osjek. He claimed
17 he had destroyed the bridge to protect the town from the JNA tanks, and I
18 responded and said that at the time the JNA was a regular army of an
19 internationally recognised state while Croatia, which was not recognised,
20 was part of Yugoslavia
21 in that part of Slavonia
22 And this entire interview was published and carried in the
23 different media and agencies, but the substance of it is that
24 Mr. Boljkovac confirmed that it was Croatia
25 you take that into account in your report.
1 A. I have not seen this article before. It's apparently an
2 interview given in 2009. Is that right? Yes. I guess I wouldn't know
3 exactly what to make of it, because it does appear that he references
4 here some testimony at a trial in which he was testifying against a
5 former mayor, and so that may have, may have, influenced what he said
7 I really wouldn't -- let's say it doesn't meet my highest
8 standards in terms of document reliability, or least I can't determine
9 that it does without checking some of this a little bit more.
10 So did I take it into account? No.
11 Q. Thank you. Well, does that mean that I now have to have
12 reservations towards your testimony, because you're actually testifying
13 on behalf of the Prosecution?
14 A. Well, I would assume that you have a number of reasons to be --
15 to have reservations about my testimony. I would expect that. I am
16 testifying in response to an invitation of the Prosecution and, let's
17 say, a commission by the Prosecution to prepare the report. I'm not
18 really testifying on their behalf.
19 Q. Thank you. But, Mr. Donia, just say yes or no when I ask you
20 this: Did you know that Izetbegovic and Tudjman acknowledged that they
21 consciously opted for the war option?
22 A. I think you've secured, you know, the -- established that, that
23 Tudjman made such a statement. I need to see Izetbegovic's statement to
24 agree that he stated exactly as you put it here, which is to consciously
25 opt for the war option. I don't think it's quite that -- quite that
1 explicit. Again, if you can show me the document, I'm happy to
2 acknowledge its -- its content.
3 Q. Thank you. Now, let me tell that we will be producing this
4 document where he said, "We could have done without a war, but then we
5 would have stayed within Yugoslavia
7 [In English] We made our choice, and we could have easily done it
8 differently. The price we paid is high, but it had to be paid. If I am
9 to be blamed for it, then Karadzic should not. We could have avoided
10 this conflict had we remained united as Yugoslavia, but we wanted
11 independence. Towards the end of 1991, we established a Patriotic League
12 in order to prepare for war."
13 [Interpretation] And so on. That was published in different
14 writings, the transcript of that statement of his, but we'll deal with
15 that later.
16 Let us now link this up with the proposal that was being prepared
17 by the federal parliament in order to find a legal way to secede.
18 Actually, there was a law that was being prepared for legal secession.
19 Do you see that now? The federal parliament is preparing a way that
20 would allow legal secession. Tudjman and Izetbegovic avoid that in order
21 to go to war. Why is that not included in your reports, that they wanted
22 to go to war?
23 A. Even without seeing the document, the quotation that you just
24 read and contended was by Mr. Izetbegovic did not say what you said it
25 did. That was that he consciously opted for the war option. He talked
1 about preparation for war, not consciously opting for the war option.
2 Now, that was a misrepresentation on your part of what that citation
3 said, which is why I'm asking you to show me documents that say what --
4 what you -- what you contend they say or what you're proposed to suggest
5 that they say.
6 And I think I've explained that included in the reports are a
7 wide variety of things that are said by various parties. I think I've
8 presented the information on, for example, the formation of the
9 Patriotic League and the Council for National Defence of the SDA. I view
10 that as a significant factor in the preparation for and lead-up to war,
11 and tried to describe, to some points anyway, the position of the -- of
12 the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
13 These did not make it into my corpus of things that I chose to
14 cite to analyse the sources of the war. I believe they were not
15 representative of the policies that were pursued. They certainly are not
16 represent of -- representative of a conscious desire for war. I don't
17 think anybody had a conscious and deliberate desire for war until perhaps
18 the very last minute in this. I don't believe you did.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted,
20 this interview of Josip Boljkovac's.
21 JUDGE KWON: The witness didn't confirm anything about the
22 content of this.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, all right then. We'll deal
24 with it some other time.
25 1D1408. Could we have that again, but now it is 13.35 -- at
1 13.35, that is.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 "Because we said if Yugoslavia
4 there's going to be one hell of a civil war. It nevertheless broke up
5 non-peacefully. It broke up through the unilateral declaration of
6 independence by Slovenia
7 countries, republics, of their border posts, which was an act of force
8 and which was an act that was in violation of the Helsinki principles.
9 But the European powers and the United States ultimately recognised
11 member -- and admitted them to the United Nations. The real problem was
12 that there was a unilateral declaration of independence and a use of
13 force to gain that independence rather than a peaceful negotiation of
14 independence, which is the way it should have happened."
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Do you recognise the person who was speaking?
17 A. Yes. That's US Secretary of State James Baker.
18 Q. He was Secretary of State at the time, wasn't he?
19 A. Yes. He was Secretary of State at the time of the recognitions,
20 I believe.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we keep this same number, but
22 from 46:17. Let us see what another high US official has to say.
23 [Video-clip played]
24 "When we finally went ahead and recognised, one of the reasons
25 we did so was because it had become a major domestic political issue for
1 us here. We have particularly a large Croatian American community, and
2 Mr. Bush lost most of them in the election that he lost because they were
3 unhappy with our having delayed as long as we did in recognising Croatia
4 "While German actions encouraged the armed secession of ..."
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. So do you see that this was a purely political issue, a domestic
7 political issue related to the elections, and that Mr. Eagleburger is
8 aware of the fact that it was unlawful?
9 A. No, I wouldn't concur that what you just showed me establishes
10 that. He -- this is, first of all -- these are very carefully selected
11 excerpts from statements by, as I indicated, many different public
12 figures in the crisis which are deliberately selected, apparently, in
13 this -- in this video to make a particular point, and that means it's
14 really, I think, a Serb propaganda film.
15 The statement that he made, I think you can see the problem with
16 this, that the US
17 ambassador in Belgrade
18 all, related to domestic political considerations. The US position over
19 this time I would call quite consistent from the time of Baker's visit to
22 were -- introduced a great deal of doubt, I think, into American policy
23 or American policy-makers' minds about the wisdom of this.
24 So I don't -- I don't accept your characterization of what he
25 said. I don't think it's what he said, and would just acknowledge that
1 he said it.
2 Q. Let us leave US
3 what is a good thing to do in politics or not. But James Baker did say
4 that it was unlawful because it was one-sided and violent, breaking up a
5 country and it's borders that had been guaranteed by the Helsinki
6 act and the constitutions of the republics and the constitution of the
7 SFRY. So did Baker not confirm here that it had been illegal? So is
8 that Serb propaganda?
9 A. He held that opinion.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, these
12 excerpts? The number is the same, but the minute references are
14 JUDGE KWON: I have noted the end time for each, but I take it
15 there's -- there's no objection from the Prosecution?
16 They will be admitted separately.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibits D252 and D253 respectively, Your
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Donia, let me ask you, on the 17th of May, 1990, the Yugoslav
22 People's Army placed under its control the weapons of the Territorial
23 Defence. Do you agree that that was done in a lawful way? Actually, you
24 agreed to that already, but do you agree that they did that because they
25 were in fear that the secessionist republics would create their own
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Did the republics have the right to establish their own armies?
4 A. Well, they had the right to have a Territorial Defence force and
5 a police force and a reserve police force. They didn't have the right to
6 form a new separate army, to my knowledge, but they -- they had plenty of
7 military forces, in fact, at their disposal when this whole thing
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D36. Could we have that, please.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Do you remember, Mr. Donia, that Izetbegovic, at a very early
12 stage already in the spring of 1991, said that he would sacrifice peace
13 for a sovereign Bosnia
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina for the sake of peace? Do you recall that?
15 A. Again, I'd like to see the specific document, and if you could
16 tell me what the provenance of this is.
17 Q. This is a transcript of the session of the joint Assembly of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I think that this was already in February 1991.
19 This is very important, a very drastic statement, and it was received
20 with a great deal of bewilderment everywhere. Did you include this
21 statement in your report? The 27th of February, 1991. A month after the
22 joint government had been established.
23 A. I'm looking at a -- it looks like a partial translation of a
24 partial quote, and I -- I'd like a minute to review this or get the
25 entire thing at least before the applause line there. I don't know that
1 this is a representation of the entire statement that he made. It looks
2 like it is not.
3 Q. It's huge the entire transcript, but this is the fourth joint
4 session, only the fourth joint session of the joint Assembly. The 27th
5 of February. It's in EDS
6 If you wish, we can get the entire transcript, but this is his statement,
7 and in the Serbian version you can see the original transcript.
8 He said:
9 "However, these two things that I mentioned here a sovereign and
10 integral Bosnia-Herzegovina, a peaceful path to achieving it, are for me
11 not on the same scale in terms of value. For a sovereign Bosnia
12 sacrifice peace. For peace in Bosnia
14 A. Go on. Go on, please.
15 Q. I'm interested in this, what he had stated. Were you aware of
16 the fact that already in February 1991 he said that even at the expense
17 of sacrificing peace he would go for a sovereign Bosnia? P969 is the
18 Prosecution number, right? 969?
19 A. Dr. Karadzic, I'm just asking you to go one sentence further and
20 get this entire statement. I'm not asking for the whole transcript or
21 the entire speech even. I'm just asking that where you cut off this
22 translation, in the middle of a sentence, that you can continue it to the
24 Q. I can't see it very well. It says:
25 "Likewise, because --" oh, I see, just a moment, please.
1 "Likewise, because that is also, I don't know what, the subject
2 of polemics. On that scale of values, if I had to choose, for me Bosnia
3 comes first and then Yugoslavia
4 However, either -- it's not Bosnia or Yugoslavia that is my
5 point, it is sovereignty or peace.
6 A. Well, my point is you shouldn't take this out of context. You
7 should be representing this statement which is, I think, an integral
8 statement in which he shows some balance between these two
9 considerations, that if you just read the first part alone is not there.
10 So I think it's important to have the entire statement viewed
11 in -- in the context that he's kind of groping for a way to say this that
12 does, in fact, state emphatically his commitment to Bosnia and puts the
13 commitment to Yugoslavia
14 relationship between war and sovereignty.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we'll adjourn for today here.
16 Doctor, you have access to those minutes or transcripts?
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE KWON: It's dated 17th of February, 1991. So overnight you
19 may have the opportunity to read those parts and come back again.
20 There are a couple of matters briefly. As for the -- Mr. Tieger,
21 this extended sitting in -- on or in the week of the 21st, I have noted
22 some vacant slot in the courtroom, so there seems to be no reason why
23 that cannot be done if necessary. So we will request the registry to
24 mark the courtroom for -- for our use if necessary, in the future, on
25 those days.
1 And the -- secondly, the request from the Defence for their
2 experts to be present for the -- for the coming -- the Prosecution expert
3 witnesses. Subject to our ruling on the motion which is still pending,
4 it is the -- the Defence request is consistent with the practice of the
5 Tribunal and our guideline. We'll grant them. I should have noted that
6 the Prosecution didn't oppose it.
7 We'll rise, and we will resume tomorrow at 2.15 but at
8 Courtroom III
9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.04 p.m.
10 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 3rd day
11 of June, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.