1 Monday, 7 June 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody. Let's start, Mr. Karadzic.
7 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning. May I first
9 introduce a new member of our team, our Defence team here in the
10 courtroom, he's Mr. Enrico Boninsega, my legal assistant, and I would
11 like to welcome him to the courtroom.
12 JUDGE KWON: Welcome.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning to everybody.
14 JUDGE KWON: As for the motion you -- regarding your question as
15 for the remuneration of Mr. Donia, having reconsidered the substance, the
16 Chamber is of the opinion, given the position of the Prosecution and
17 given the fact that you may have access through other channels, we allow
18 the question, if necessary.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We'll come to that if
20 need be, and I think it will be important, yes.
21 Good morning to everybody.
22 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
24 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning to you, Mr. Donia. For you and I
25 to go home as quickly as possible, I have prepared a set of facts about
1 which we could reach an agreement, I believe, and for us to do that, I'd
2 like the document to be distributed to everybody in the courtroom, and
3 I'd expect you, kindly expect you, to -- and request you to take a look
4 at the document and to confirm the facts that you know took place. These
5 are, generally speaking, court decisions on various events.
6 Now, I don't expect you to speak to the legal side of the
7 question but just to tell us whether these events happened, and thus we
8 could reduce the facts that we have to contest -- or, rather, which we
9 have to prove through you. So just the historical aspects from you,
10 please, in view of the fact that you dealt with this crisis. Just tell
11 us whether those things actually took place.
12 We have a version in Serbian and another one in English. You can
13 do that tomorrow or whenever you have time, if you agree and if all the
14 participants agree. That could shorten our time, because then I wouldn't
15 have to present proof and evidence about these events if you say they're
16 well known to you and did happen.
17 This part of agreed facts only refer to the secession of Slovenia
18 and Croatia
19 history -- or, rather, the history of the crisis itself.
20 So if the Trial Chamber agrees and the Prosecution agrees, then
21 we can hear your views on that document over the next few days and then
22 that would be placed ad acta. We would have finished with that, and we
23 wouldn't have to wonder whether -- well, we don't have to say whether the
24 constitutional court made a lawful decision or not just whether it took
25 that decision or not. What do you say to that?
1 A. Dr. Karadzic, just looking through this at first glance, it
2 appears to me to deal exclusively with legal decisions of courts and
3 perhaps Assemblies. I certainly -- I'm familiar with a few of these but
4 would not want to attest to the complete accuracy probably of the vast
5 majority of them simply because I would need to view the actual decisions
6 as a document. I think again, just quickly passing through this, it
7 looks to me like a lot of this is knowable from documentation but not
8 from my memory.
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We can move on. But speaking for
10 myself, I think the Prosecution may be able to answer these questions on
11 its own, apart from the fact that Dr. Donia may be able to confirm or
13 MS. EDGERTON: In any case, just having received the document,
14 Your Honours, we'll be able to give you an answer in due course if we
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Very well. Let's move on.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Whether the Prosecution
18 or the witness, it would be useful if you could confirm these facts so
19 that we can finish with them. I'm not going into the legal aspects of
20 it, just whether a court took a particular decision or Assembly. It
21 doesn't matter what kind and whether it was lawful to do so or not, but
22 just to reduce the scope of the facts that we have to deal with and
23 perhaps challenge, which are not contentious at all. Thank you.
24 May we continue now.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Donia, you'll remember that there were these two attempts to
2 adopt the declaration on sovereignty in the spring of 1991, and at the
3 same time meetings began with the presidents of the republics or
4 Presidencies of the republics, Yugoslav republics, with respect to
5 resolving the crisis; right?
6 A. I'm only aware of one attempt to have the Assembly of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina adopt the sovereignty declaration, but there certainly
8 was one, and that was indeed followed by the meetings of the -- the
9 round-robin meetings of the six presidents of the republics.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now may we have on e-court 1D37,
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. You confirmed that the secretary of the Assembly, Avdo Campara,
15 confirmed that 20 deputies of the Serbian Democratic Party had the right
16 to send this document to the council for national equality for review,
17 and that was the basis for putting off the whole thing, the adoption.
18 Postponing it.
19 A. What is -- what is the question?
20 Q. Is that right? Did you confirm that, that Campara gave an
21 interpretation of why a postponement was necessary or why it should be
22 forwarded to the Council for National Equality. And that was on the 27th
23 of February, I believe, 1991, early spring.
24 A. Yes, he provided a ruling that any 20 deputies of the Assembly on
25 appealing the matter at hand would cause the proposal to be referred to
1 the Council on National Equality, which did not exist, and therefore that
2 there could not be a vote on the measure. It could be discussed but
3 could not be voted upon until such time as the Council of National
4 Equality had ruled.
5 Q. Thank you. Now, you speak our language. Can you see in that
6 highlighted portion, and we have the translation as well, that where
7 Izetbegovic in Split
8 That the declaration on sovereignty has already been submitted to the
9 BH Assembly and will most probably be adopted. If it is not adopted with
10 the agreement of the SDS
11 So from Split
12 important. And lower down we have the position of President Milosevic
13 set out in response to the question. This is a press conference held in
15 "Peaceful resolution of the problems is possible in a democratic
16 manner. The fate of Yugoslavia
17 peoples," et cetera, et cetera.
18 So do you agree that Izetbegovic set out this message from Split
19 that he would adopt this regardless of what the Serbs thought?
20 A. Not quite in the way that you formulated it. I believe that he
21 referred to the agreement of the SDS
22 was clearly stating a position at the beginning of these negotiations or
23 in the course of these negotiations amongst the six presidents of the
24 republics, which indeed eventually ended in a -- an agreement endorsed by
25 all six presidents in Sarajevo
1 not a direct participant. And reaffirmed again on June 12th. So I don't
2 take this as an absolute statement that this is never going to happen. I
3 take it as a, perhaps, one volley in the course of the negotiating
4 process that was just really beginning at this time.
5 By the way, can I ask this is Politika; is that correct? I see,
6 okay. It is.
7 Q. Yes. Politika of the 30 of March, 1991.
8 A. Very familiar type set.
9 Q. Thank you. May this document be admitted. And in the meantime,
10 Mr. Donia, let me say that my point is that it's going to be adopted even
11 without the agreement of the SDS
12 the Serb people and had the support of all the other Serbs from the other
13 parties in this particular case?
14 A. It did not have the support of all the other Serbs from the other
15 parties. Had the support of some, and in fact the whole the proposition
16 was strongly opposed by some Serbs who were in other parties at the time
17 and later. I understand your point, and he clearly says that here
18 referencing the SDS
19 that I think it is a statement of general approach to the negotiations
20 and not a definitive absolute commitment to make this happened.
21 JUDGE KWON: Unless it is objected to.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Well, actually, with respect, yes, Your Honour,
23 because this is an incomplete, half-page extract from a further
24 collection of extracts of a newspaper article the source of which
25 Dr. Donia actually was able to guess at because he recognised the
1 typeset, of which only two very small portions have been identified for
2 translation. And if this is going to be considered, I would suggest we
3 have the article, at least, as a whole before us.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE KWON: Given that the quoted part is too short, so
6 pursuant -- we accept Ms. Edgerton's observation, so we'll admit the
7 entirely article, and so while it is to be translated and tendered, we'll
8 mark it for identification.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Well, this is the
11 paper's identification. I have page 1. But whenever we tender into
12 evidence a portion of an article, we have nothing against having the
13 whole article admitted.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Now, Mr. Donia, this was the 30th of March, and the press -- it
16 was a press conference of all six presidents in Split, and this is
17 Izetbegovic's statement.
18 Now, did it actually happen later on that the declarations was
19 indeed adopted on the 15th of October without the agreement of the SDS?
20 A. It was a different declaration, and it had a very different text
21 than the one that was taken out of consideration on the 27th of February.
22 Having said that, what is normally referred to as a declaration of
23 sovereignty, along with a platform of the Presidency, were both adopted
24 without the participation and over the objections of the SDS on
25 October 15, in the very early morning hours.
1 Q. Now, do you agree that on the 31st of March, and the very next
2 day -- or, rather, the very next day, a special unit of the MUP
3 intervened at lake Plitvice
4 armed conflict between the Specials of the MUP of Croatia and members of
5 the militia or police of Knin Krajina?
6 A. Just to be clear, we're -- Plitvice's in Croatia, so we're not
7 talking about anything that happened in Bosnia; is that right?
8 Q. Yes, yes. But not that far off. They did affect us. Plitvice
9 aren't that far off from us.
10 A. I'm not absolutely certain of that date. I believe that's about
11 right. There was indeed an armed conflict between the -- I thought it
12 was the JNA that was also involved, but in any case, between the police
13 of the Republic of Croatia
14 Q. I think it was the regular police force, not local paramilitary
15 units. There was a clash between the MUP of Croatia at Plitvice and the
16 ordinary local police, and they were opposed to the disarmament and
17 taking away the reserve weapons from the area. Do you agree?
18 A. No.
19 Q. And how was it then in your opinion?
20 A. I just gave you my understanding of it, and would I actually have
21 to reference documentation to be confident of my memory of it, but to my
22 recollection, the regular police force of Croatia came into conflict with
23 a Serbian paramilitary unit, and there was a substantial conflict in
24 Plitvice, at the -- at the park.
25 Q. Thank you. Now, do you remember that also on the 31st of March
1 the Patriotic League was founded, which the Party of Democratic Action
2 established as its military wing? And let me just remind you and tell
3 you what Dzevad Pasic says about that in his book "Bosnia and Tuzla
4 between east and west," on page 223:
5 "The military wing, the first military wing within the frameworks
6 of the SDA was established by the Municipal Board of this party in
8 organisation came from Alija Izetbegovic, and in Sarajevo it was accepted
9 straight away and put into practice."
10 Does that agree with your findings?
11 A. I'd like to see the document that you're citing as evidence for
12 that, and if I could see the context in which this statement is made.
13 Q. Well, this is in the book, but it's your subject matter, and on
14 the basis of that subject you wrote a number of books and a number of
15 articles; right? Precisely on that same subject matter.
16 A. Dr. Karadzic, you put to me an assertion which actually had
17 several different provisions, and I am prepared to accept some of them,
18 but I would like to see on what -- what source you have -- you are citing
19 to present this as an authoritative disclosure.
20 Q. Thank you. Well, for the time being let me ask you this: Do you
21 agree that on the 31st of March, that is a day after the conference in
23 Democratic Action Party?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Thank you. May we now have called up on e-court 1D01393, please.
1 And let me tell you that we're dealing with the 12th of February. I'm
2 sure there is a translation of this document because it has an OTP
3 number -- or, rather, an EDS
4 the Municipal Boards of the Serb Democratic Party, to the local boards
5 and to all the activists, informing them that it was noticed that flats
6 were being marked and identified if they belonged to military officers,
7 first and foremost, and that rumours were going round about the
8 distribution of weapons. So I'm going to read this --
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
10 MS. EDGERTON: There may not be a need for Dr. Karadzic to read,
11 because this is, I'm informed, 65 ter number 01458, and translation of
12 that document is available.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Shall we --
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you.
15 JUDGE KWON: Bring up the translation of this. 01458. I think
16 we now have it before us.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Donia, could you please have a look at this document. Let me
20 tell you what this is about. Obviously on the basis of this document we
21 have two concerns. One is the marking of Serb apartments and apartments
22 belonging to military officers, and the second one is the fact that
23 weapons are being distributed. So I recommend to our members to report
24 things like that if they happen, that they continue marking everything so
25 that they would not be able to tell what it was that they had marked and
1 what they had not marked.
2 Were you aware of this?
3 A. I'm aware -- I'm aware of the document. I've -- I've seen the
4 document before. The practices I don't know anything about in that
5 period. I really couldn't say that it was happening or not happening. I
6 think the -- the document itself speaks to an effort to bring the
7 Municipal Boards of the SDS
8 their vigilance and to make sure that any incidents that they may observe
9 should be reported both to the party and to the local police station and
10 to the -- I guess to the JNA. If one says "nearest garrison," that can
11 only refer to the JNA.
12 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that this is quite in line with what was
13 known about Martin Spegelj's activities, regardless of whether it was
14 actually happening or not, isn't it a fact that uncertainty was growing
15 at the time and that this is highly reminiscent of what Martin Spegelj
16 said, "Ring the doorbell, shoot them in the stomach"; right?
17 A. Not at all.
18 Q. So why is there this anxiety and concern? Are you saying it has
19 nothing to do with the disclosure of what Spegelj said?
20 A. As I indicated in my answer last week one time, I don't see that
21 at this time the concern of regarding Mr. Spegelj's -- the video-tape and
22 his statements had much echo in Bosnia
23 seem to affect you very much. You were, at this time, in a coalition.
24 In fact, you had just entered into a coalition government with the HDZ
25 and the SDA. I'd even say the language of this memo that you just showed
1 me is one that is hardly alarmist. It is simply a cautionary warning to
2 collect information if you see certain things taking place. So I think
3 that the -- I think there's a lot of ways in which the situation in
5 that at this point to draw a direct line between the Spegelj video and
6 concern about these activities is probably not one that -- that most
7 Bosnians did.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D259, Your Honours.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Donia, do you agree that at that point in time Yugoslavia
15 still in existence and that the Serb people in Croatia and the Serb
16 people in Bosnia
17 and the same people, and that the Croatian people in Croatia, the
18 Croatian people in Bosnia
19 the same people as well? So why do you think that this kind of drastic
20 thing like the uncovering of subversive activity on the part of the
21 minister of defence of Croatia
22 particularly army personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbs in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Do you believe that this had no influence whatsoever
24 and that this did not cause concern or anxiety among the Serbs?
25 A. Well, I -- there are three questions I see that you've put to me,
1 and as I -- relative to the first one, as I have indicated, I think that
2 the notion of a single Serb people is a convenient abstraction that, in
3 fact, glosses over differences among and between Serbs and that it is a
4 notion that came to be an obsession with nationalist Serb politicians,
5 including yourself, in the period of 1991 and early 1992.
6 Your -- your other questions presuppose that I accept your --
7 your notion of a single Serb people, and I just don't -- don't share
8 that, and furthermore, don't agree that this Spegelj tape had anywhere
9 near the impact among the average JNA soldiers and on the streets or in
10 the cafes of Bosnia-Herzegovina as you suggest. It was a well-publicised
11 event that certainly grabbed headlines for a few days. It, in a sense,
12 gave notice to people that the Republic of Croatia
13 gathering arms, but it also indicated, as I say, the far-reaching sweep
14 of KOS
15 that it had much of an impact on the level of concern or anxiety among
16 Serbs in Bosnia
17 Q. Well, this document is proof for you that there was anxiety, but,
18 Mr. Donia, yet again we have to go back to professor Paula Pickering.
19 And you supported her assimilationist views, that new nations could be
20 created, et cetera. Would you recommend to the Jew that is they become
21 Palestinians because they're living in Palestine?
22 A. I'm sure Professor Pickering will be shocked to hear you
23 characterise her views as assimilationist. They're actually quite --
24 quite the opposite.
25 I think that the question is -- derives from just a totally false
1 understanding of what I have incorporated in my paper in terms of
2 identity being constructed and -- and flexible over time and that it
3 really doesn't have anything to do with assimilation or any kind of
4 massive shift of identity or capitulation. It talks about how
5 nationalities are formed, how they are maintained, how their foundations
6 may shift over time, but it's not a moral judgement or any kind of
7 imperative for any sort of change in identity that doesn't come about
8 through the processes indigenous to the nationality itself.
9 Q. Professor Donia, let's try to distinguish between some things
10 now. One thing that we always have to do as far as your views are
11 concerned, is this a scholar or scientific point of view or political
12 view; namely the Serbs in Serbia
13 one and the same people? Is that your political position or is this your
14 position as a scholar?
15 A. Well, I don't think it is my position exactly as you've stated
16 it. I have cited the rather voluminous scholarly literature which now
17 comes down strongly on the side of the view that nations are constructed
18 entities and they are imagined by those who make them up or claim loyalty
19 to them. That's a -- they say what I would call close to a consensus
20 view amongst the scholarship now. It is expressly not political in
21 character, but it is used, that viewpoint or those related viewpoints,
22 are used to investigate the sources of identity and the development of
23 identity and behaviour of peoples. And I have, as I say, been influenced
24 by it in making the inquiry that I have made here.
25 So is it -- is it a scholarly, let's say work? Yes, it is a
1 scholarly work, I believe. It is not derived from political but, rather,
2 from, let's say, scholarly -- I benefitted greatly from the insights and
3 conclusions of other scholars in pursuing it and would find that this is,
4 in fact, a superior methodology or approach to employ in understanding
5 those things. I actually thought you kind of liked this because it goes
6 to your own quest for understanding about the relationship between folk,
7 literature folk, poetry, and group psychology. And I think this is an
8 interesting window into that world which is, I'm sure, different from
9 your own but, in fact, related to the things that interest you.
10 Q. Thank you. However, you are I are not going to be going home
11 very soon if we go into all of this. My question was whether the
12 democratic right of the Serbs of Croatia and Serbs in Bosnia and Serbs in
14 after 1918 and they started living together, united in the same state.
15 Is that not their democratic right?
16 A. If they collectively formulate and assert that right, I think --
17 I think it is. I think the more important, let's say, principle of
18 democracy is that people and not nations get to vote and choose, and to
19 break them down exclusively into national entities which deny the overall
20 right of citizens to vote is, to me, a negation of democratic principles,
21 not an affirmation of them.
22 Q. Where does that exist in the world? Does that exist in northern
24 the Middle East? Where does that exist where the people can --
25 JUDGE KWON: Where are we heading?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, agree with you. We've gone
2 into an academic discussion. I'm just asking Mr. Donia to tell me on the
3 basis of what one can believe that the Serbs of the former Yugoslavia
4 different peoples. If Mr. Donia believes that that's possible, then is
5 it not their democratic right to consider themselves one and the same
6 people, even more so because Mr. Donia believes that Muslims in Serbia
7 are Bosniaks although they had never lived in Bosnia.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Now, Mr. Donia, tell me, do you believe that what happened to
10 Serbs in Croatia
11 account -- or not taking into account the fact that Bosnia was a part of
12 the Independent State
13 A. Well, a number of questions you've raised here and I'm not too
14 sure where -- where to go first. I don't -- I consider the identity of
15 any people to be what they proclaim it to be, recognising that there are
16 always differences and distinctions within that group which make them, in
17 some cases, separate subgroups or in other cases, in fact, groups that
18 split off from what might be called the nation or people as a whole.
19 What I am rejecting is the notion that this is a monolithic homogenous
20 clearly bounded whole that has an entity, that has no distinctions within
21 it and can be represented by one voice, one party, or one individual.
22 That's what I'm rejecting. And I continue to reject that notion. I know
23 that's a notion you live by. You made it the centre of your creed dating
24 back to the programme or speech that you made to the founding Assembly of
25 the SDS
1 that it animated a great deal of what you did and in the way that you
2 conceive of it today, but I would point out that it is something that was
3 absolutised in your thinking as something that was incontrovertible,
4 self-evident and indisputable.
5 Q. I don't understand what you're trying to say. I am asking you
6 whether the things that happened to Serbs in Croatia had any affect on
7 the minds of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yes or no?
8 A. I think the things that happened in Croatia had an impact on all
9 Bosnians. Very little at first, more and more as time went along. And
10 that includes the Serbs of Bosnia.
11 Q. In your view, did this have an equal impact on all Bosniaks --
12 Bosnians, Serbs, Croats and Muslims alike? Now that you've expanded the
13 topic, could you tell us whether you think there was any difference in
14 degree, as it were?
15 A. Well, I think it probably impacted all of them. Most members of
16 each group perceived these events in Croatia differently and developed, I
17 think, let's say different orientations to them. If you will, they had
18 different favourites. But a lot of people who were without these strong
19 nationalist convictions perceived them simply with dismay as the conflict
20 developed and made more likely that this would spill into -- into Bosnia
21 in some way.
22 Q. How was it that you established that, Mr. Donia? How was it that
23 you established that, that there were a lot of people without nationalist
24 feelings or convictions or whatever you had said? Convictions, yes.
25 A. Well, I think that's the essence of the response of the -- those
1 people who considered themselves Yugoslavs or many of those who saw
2 themselves as, first and foremost, opposed to a national division in
4 op ed pieces. Probably represented the major press organs in
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina right up until, let's say, the spring of 1992.
6 Q. Tell us, Professor, the political parties that advocate such
7 views, how many votes did they get, and on the other hand, how many votes
8 did the parties that advocated the preservation of national entities get?
9 Why would media be more important than elections? And we saw that in the
10 elections the three national parties won a lot more than a two-third
11 majority. Wasn't that right?
12 A. I don't think that any of the parties that were elected to
13 offices in 1990 advocated the preservation of national entities. They
14 may have come to embrace that position, but I don't think that they -- I
15 don't think that the voters in 1990 voted for national division.
16 Q. Professor, let us be very specific. The national parties in
18 a leftist party or a civic party, or was it the HDZ, President Tudjman's
19 party that won the election? And do you think that it wasn't a national
20 party that won these elections on a national platform rather than on a
21 civic platform? Please let us have shorter answers. Was it a national
22 party that won in Croatia
23 A. As I said, the HDZ won a -- did not win a majority of votes in
24 the election in Croatia
25 and it won control -- won the office the Presidency, but it did not win
1 the majority of votes. So it was clearly a national party that prevailed
2 in terms of the Assembly seats, but that was not the prevailing voter
3 preference in terms of the actual ballots cast.
4 Q. All right. But that was only to be expected. It was quite
5 lawful, as it were. What about Bosnia-Herzegovina? It wasn't the
6 Reformists, the Communists and other such parties that won the elections.
7 It was the national parties, wasn't it?
8 A. Yes, it was.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have 1D01379.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. While we're waiting for that, Mr. Donia, let me tell you what all
13 of this was like. Something was happening in Croatia, and in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina you, yourself, said that the three ethnic communities
15 were experiencing this in different ways. Now you're going to see what
16 the Party of Democratic Action was doing. You can read our language. So
17 it's the Party of Democratic Action that is sending its own candidates to
18 this very same Croatia
19 Army are experiencing what they are experiencing. They are being killed.
20 They're being laid off because of their ethnic origins.
21 Now, this political party is sending through the MUP its own
22 members to the MUP of Croatia for training. This is what is written
24 "Please find attached a copy of the instructions on the way in
25 which candidates for policeman training -- trainee policemen should be
1 received in the MUP of the Republic of Croatia
2 familiarise your candidates with this.
3 "We would like to note that it is the duty of each and every
4 candidate to take along the referral of the party that we are hereby
5 attaching as well as a birth certificate, marriage certificate," and so
6 on and so forth. Hasan Cengic. Is this not what he is sending?
7 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I should have rose a
8 couple of seconds later but we've just been able to locate a translation
9 of that document. It's not been uploaded in e-court because we just
10 found it but perhaps we could do a couple of things, Your Honour. It
11 would take some time to have it uploaded but we could put it on the ELMO
12 to display it for Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: I'm concerned a bit why this is happening so often.
14 Why is the Defence team not able to locate the proper translation.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Excellency, just look at how
16 many people the OTP has, for every person they have a separate team,
17 whereas I have only a few people here.
18 JUDGE KWON: That's beside the point.
19 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, if I may.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 MR. TIEGER: I have been in some discussions with Mr. Robinson
22 with this. We have suggested some modalities for -- that we understand
23 are the appropriate and most effective ways of identify existing
24 translations. I understood that the Defence team was going to pursue
25 those a bit more aggressively. I don't know what happened with that. It
1 may be that they did so and found some bureaucratic obstacles that we
2 weren't aware of, but we've indicated our willingness to assist in any
3 reasonable way in ensuring that they access existing translations at the
4 earliest opportunity for everyone's benefit.
5 We can continue in those discussions. I don't know the status of
6 that. As I say, there are ways of doing so. There may be ways of
7 enhancing those mechanisms and we're happy to discuss with the Defence
8 our knowledge about those mechanisms and any measures that may be taken
9 to make them more efficient.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. I encourage the continuation
11 of such endeavour.
12 Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic. In the meantime, we'll take a
13 break at half past 10.00 and we will take a break of 25 minutes, and
14 after which it will go until half past 12.00, at which time we will
15 adjourn for the day.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we have the English
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. But, Mr. Donia, let me ask you: Do you know the Party of
20 Democratic Action took over the control of MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
21 state organ and that it sent its young men for training in Croatia?
22 A. I think that's false. The first part of your question is false.
23 The -- I'm not quite certain what to -- what to make of this. It was
24 common practice for the Ministries of the Interior of the various
25 republics to exchange cadets for training in other republics. Bosnian
1 police went to Serbia
2 were Bosnian police involved in -- in police duty in Serbia in the late
3 1980s, and -- so I don't think this is an extraordinary event. What is
4 unusual about it is that it is under the auspices of the SDA, and why
5 that would be I'm not quite certain, whether they are simply endorsing an
6 existing practice or, in fact, conducting some sort of effort to improve
7 co-operation between the MUPs of the various republics.
8 Q. Thank you. May we just move the document down. Although you
9 were able to see that it's acting SDA secretary Hasan Cengic. But
10 let's -- let me ask you this: Can the party deal with police matters,
11 matters of cadre and inter-republican co-operation to which it sends only
12 Muslims? Is that party business or is that ministry business?
13 A. Well, of course the -- all parties were seeking to become more
14 engaged in such business starting from, let's say, the spring of 1991. I
15 don't see a list of these people so don't know what their ethnicity or
16 affiliations would be. There was, of course, in -- in the MUP at this
17 time an effort by the minister of the interior and the deputy minister of
18 the interior and to co-operate on creating a unified, effective MUP for
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So this may have been part of that effort. It --
20 that agreement clearly rested upon the two parties, that is the two
21 parties concerned, the SDA and the SDS
22 the cooperative venture. My own impression is that they had some success
23 at this in July and August of 1991, but they increasingly came into
24 opposition from both the SDS
25 Q. Thank you. Would you please give me shorter answers.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But any way, I'd like to tender
2 this document signed by Hasan Cengic.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D260.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D01378, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Can you see that these are all Muslims? Have a look at the whole
8 list, and you'll see that they're all Muslims. They've arrived in
10 A. I'm sorry, what's the -- what's -- I can't see the date of the
11 document or the nature of the list.
12 Q. The date is the 20th of June, 1991, and it's a list attached to
13 this other document of Hasan Cengic's. They're already in Zagreb, and
14 they're going back home after a short course. The 20th of June, 1991
15 Do you know at that time at Vraca there was a school set up by
16 the Ministry of the Interior and that it held courses and regular
17 four-year training and education courses?
18 A. Yes. That was the school that was used by -- or was the MUP
19 school for training officers and lasted, as you say, some long time.
20 This is clearly a three-day instructional course in Zagreb.
21 I would concur that the first names here, that is the second name
22 on each list, suggests that, at least those I can see are -- are Muslim
23 names. It doesn't necessarily mean that they all declared themselves
24 Muslims in the census or identified themselves as Muslims at the time.
25 And of course it also gives their place of residence. But is not this
1 document prior to the date of the document that you showed me before?
2 Q. Here they're going back home for three days, from the 21st to the
3 24th. They're being given leave to go home, have a brief holiday. But
4 this is some group 1, course 6, and there's not a single Serb there. I
5 don't think there's a single Croat either. The Serbs didn't know about
6 this, nor did they need to go to Croatia
7 does have a school and courses as well.
8 Now, did you know that policemen from Bosnia were going for some
9 kind of education to Croatia
10 JUDGE KWON: You have to link this document to the prior
11 document. The prior document was dated as 11th of July, while this is
12 dated sometime in June, 20th of June. Since Dr. Donia raised it, you
13 have to clarify first and then continue with your question.
14 Was that the point, Ms. Edgerton?
15 MS. EDGERTON: Absolutely. Thank you, Your Honour.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Well, if we look at the first sentence:
18 "Attached we send a copy of the instructions about the way in
19 which the candidates policemen were admit."
20 So this isn't the beginning of that association. It's a
21 continuation of co-operation. And all we see here is them being told
22 what they're going to take and where but that was the practice from the
23 spring of 1991?
24 JUDGE KWON: You have to be very precise in presenting your
25 questions. At the beginning of your question you said this is attached
1 to the prior document.
2 I'm afraid it is not.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Obviously not with that specific
4 one, but it is a fact that it was within the same phenomenon, the same
5 practice of sending Muslims secretly to Croatia for training.
6 JUDGE KWON: Your questions without making a speech.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. Donia, would you take a look and tell us where these people
9 are from?
10 A. Well, they're from a number of municipalities. Some in - let's
11 see - Doboj, would be in, sort of, north Central Bosnia. Same with
12 Gracanica. Velika Kladusa and Sasine are in the extreme north-west
14 Zavidovici, north-eastern Bosnia
15 Bosanska Krupa, which is a municipality along the border with Croatia
16 Brcko, right along the Sava River
17 Q. Thank you. Did you know that the SDA through the MUP was sending
18 its members to be educated in Croatia
19 A. Well, as I said, I find it unsurprising that it was -- that
21 it was sending people for their initial several months or several years
22 training at this time, but the fact that they -- the MUP of Bosnia was
23 sending people to Croatia
24 pattern, but I did not know that -- that that was something that was
25 being done with either the endorsement or participation of the SDA.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I tender this
2 document into evidence.
3 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
4 MS. EDGERTON: No objection.
5 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification pending
7 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we have 1D01398
9 next, please. And while we're waiting for that to come up, Mr. Donia,
10 let me ask you this: Do you know that disagreements cropped up straight
11 away in the government because of the abuse -- abuses in the MUP or
12 abuses of the MUP? And you saw the agreement, the partner agreement on
13 the division of power and authority. Do you know that the SDA did not
14 respect that and that the Serbs were not appointed to posts that belonged
15 to them?
16 A. Well, let's see. This is -- I take it you're putting a document
17 to me here, and this is an SDS
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Just a second, Doctor.
19 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, my apologise.
20 JUDGE KWON: Do you have a translation?
21 MS. EDGERTON: 65 ter 06625.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very kind. Thank you. 06625.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Yes.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Anyway, Mr. Donia, do you agree that Mr. Izetbegovic was the
1 president of the council for the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that that
2 was the position he occupied? It's what the president of the Presidency
3 or president of the republic has as an office together -- while he's
4 president, the president of this council.
5 A. You're saying -- I'm not quite clear that your asserting, that he
6 as president of the Presidency was -- one of his duties was to be the
7 head of the council for the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
8 Q. Yes. Yes. That's right. Do you know that, about that?
9 A. I don't recall the specific name of that body, but something that
10 had responsibility for such matters was indeed headed by the Presidency.
11 By the president of the Presidency.
12 Q. Thank you. Now, do you remember that Professor Plavsic was the
13 president of the council for the protection of the constitutional order
14 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you. Can you see here that on the 25th of July we sent a
17 letter in which we say:
18 "Personnel appointments and dismissals in the MUP, Ministry of
19 the Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly those in the State
20 Security Council have not been carried out according to the inter-party
21 agreement nor according to the constitutional obligation concerning the
22 proportional representation of peoples and state organs.
23 "We kindly ask you to urgently take the necessary measures
24 within your power to address this problem that has arisen."
25 So do you know that we had constant clashes with the SDA because
1 it sabotaged the appointment of cadres who were Serbs to the posts that
2 Serbs were supposed occupy?
3 A. I certainly agree that you had constant clashes with the SDA on
4 the question of appointments, particularly in the police. And a lot of
5 those agreements or disagreements grew out of the dispute over the nature
6 of the inter-party agreements. While the inter-party agreements
7 specified several specific positions that were to be taken by one -- the
8 appointee of one party or another, it wasn't clear in those agreements
9 how deep into the structure the national composition was to be imposed.
10 And in a lot of cases the police forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina had a large
11 number of Serbs serving in them. So the disagreements came not only
12 about new appointments to the senior positions in the police forces but
13 also the overall composition of those police forces, and each party, to
14 my understanding, in this period was trying to achieve an ethnic balance,
15 and I think this is what's expressed here, the -- an ethnic balance that
16 corresponded to the composition of the particular municipality or area
17 under -- that was concerned.
18 So a lot of disagreements floated around that issue and amounted
19 to an essentially deep intrusion into the professional ranks of the
20 police as they then became ethnosized since the only way to keep a job,
21 if you were a cop, was basically to seek the protection of the national
22 party concerned.
23 Q. Well, we'll come to that, Mr. Donia, but I have put it to you or
24 put it to you a few days ago that the SDS did not bring anybody new to
25 the police and that the highest ranking police officers were not party
1 members, and you more or less confirmed that. However, what I'm talking
2 about here now are the tricks that were played and not legitimate
3 concern. This was a trick, and we're going to prove that when we come to
4 discussion 1991 and other aspects of it.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But in the meantime, I'd like to
6 tender this document.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D262, Your Honour.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 1D38, please, since
10 we're dealing with this same month just a day later, the 26th of July.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Let me tell you what it's about. It's the Serbian Democratic
13 Party document or the Municipal Board, signed by me, of the Serbian
14 Democratic Party, and what it says in the second sentence is that the
15 Serbs are fleeing again leaving their ancient thresholds, the thresholds
16 of their forefathers and fathers and have become homeless people without
17 a roof over their heads, without a homeland and without the necessary
18 conditions for life having been respected citizens, and Croatian
19 democracy forced them to do that. And then a little lower down, the Main
20 Board was decided to approach in an organised fashion the collection of
21 assistance in the form of money, food, medicines, clothing, sheets,
22 household equipments, and so on, according to list supplied.
23 Now, may we go on to the last page -- or, rather, the second
24 page. The specifications are set out underwear, clothing for children,
25 men and women, women's clothing, men's clothing, children's clothing,
1 sheets, pillow cases, duvets, blankets and so on, footwear for men and
2 women and children, plates, pots and so on, household goods.
3 Now, do you know where these refugees were from, where they came
4 from, to Bosnia-Herzegovina and that we were doing our best to make their
5 life easier? Do you know where they were from?
6 A. Dr. Karadzic, you moved to page 2 before completing page 1. I
7 wonder if I could have a look at the rest of page 1.
8 Q. Certainly. The part of our people from Croatia are on the move,
9 fleeing, and they're in Vojvodina and Bosnia. Do you want me to read it
10 all out, or are you going to read it out yourself?
11 A. Give me a minute, I'll read it. That's fine. Okay. Thank you.
12 Q. It says: "Part of our people from Croatia are in flight." Do
13 you know that we had refugees from Croatia in Bosnia at that time?
14 A. Yes. Yes, I'm aware that there were small numbers of refugees,
15 Serbs from Croatia
16 found in, as I understand it, Eastern Herzegovina, the Banja Luka and
17 Bosnian Krajina area, and a couple of other areas that are sort of
18 convenient to the conflict that was developing in Croatia.
19 Q. Thank you. And what to your mind is a small number of refugees
20 in peacetime in a country that's not at war? What would you call a small
22 A. Well, I don't know exactly what the numbers were. I -- some of
23 the documents I've looked at talk about a few tens of people. Others it
24 looks like there are some hundreds. So the numbers did, in fact, grow
25 once conflict became more acute in Croatia in the early fall of 1991.
1 Q. Well, do you really think that we would have to collect aid for
2 dozens of people or hundreds of people? Mr. Donia, we were dealing here
3 with thousands and thousands of refugees. Isn't that right?
4 A. Not to my knowledge, no.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document.
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Very well. Tomorrow we'll be dealing with this question of
11 regionalisation in greater detail, but let's try and recapitulate to see
12 where we stand, how far we've come.
13 Do you agree that up until the 30th of January, 1991, both the
14 SDA and the SDS
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And do you also agree that the SDS, only on the 30th of January,
17 made public that it would move to adopt documents on independence -- or,
18 rather, sovereignty?
19 A. I think there's a big difference between independence and
20 sovereignty. That's, to my recollection, about the date that the SDS
21 indicated its intention to move for the Assembly to adopt the declaration
22 that we spoke of last week.
23 Q. Do you agree that from that time on there were accelerated
24 efforts, there was this accelerated chain of events which led to tensions
25 rising? There was the attempt to adopt that declaration on sovereignty
1 and its rejection -- or, rather, postponement, and when it was forwarded
2 to the Council for National Equality.
3 A. No, I don't see it that way. I think the effort to pass the
4 resolution in February, which failed, set off a long period in which
5 the -- that is long and let's say in the next six, seven months, in which
6 the SDA, although it was -- fully intended to resubmit the proposal,
7 basically worked toward arranging an agreement whereby Yugoslavia would
8 be preserved with Bosnia-Herzegovina as having an equal status with all
9 the other republics vis-a-vis Yugoslavia itself. There were certainly
10 things that were going on at that contributed to growing tensions. Most
11 significantly in my mind the rising effort to create separate regional
12 organisations on behalf of the SDS
13 January, 1991, and came into full public view in -- in April of 1991.
14 And there were other things that were contributing to the rising
15 tensions, and sometimes tensions rose and sometimes they fell briefly,
16 but as a general proposition, I don't know that the sovereignty
17 declaration played much of a role in those because it was something that
18 had been tried and not -- not passed and then subsequently put in, at
19 least on the back-burner, by the SDA and other issues came to the fore.
20 Q. In your view, what was it that led to the rising tensions in
22 A. Well, I think the -- there are a number of causes. One was the
23 growing concern among many Bosnians about the behaviour of the Yugoslav
24 People's Army both in prosecuting the campaign on behalf of Serb
25 separatists in Croatia
1 starting in the late spring, summer of 1991, which came again into view
2 and were seen by many as the JNA becoming a force supporting Serb rebels
3 in Croatia
4 The various efforts of the parties to acquire arms, yours and
5 that of the SDA, certainly contributed to tensions, as did the growing
6 role of military forces that actually crossed the border from Croatia
7 Both Croatian forces and the JNA did damage in Bosnia.
8 I guess, to me, one of the factors was the dispatch of the
9 Uzice Corps, which took place in September 1991, sort of a -- viewed
10 by -- or disclaimed by some senior officers of the JNA but was
11 nonetheless was a part of it.
12 So I think there's a lot of causes, and the political forces were
13 at times in contention and at times working together to try to resolve
15 Q. Mr. Donia, why would the question of the Yugoslav People's Army
16 be a cause of concern? Are you trying to say that Bosnia-Herzegovina, I
17 mean in order for it to be living in peace, you're trying to say that
18 everything would be fine if it weren't for the Yugoslav People's Army;
20 A. Well, no. As I indicated, I think there were a lot of causes,
21 many episodes and some general trends that led to the tensions rising,
22 particularly in the fall of -- late summer, fall of 1991. The behaviour
23 of the JNA, the Yugoslav People's Army, was a cause of concern, and as
24 you recognise from the very beginning when you did not pursue the
25 ministries of interior or defence, the JNA was the most powerful military
1 force in the region. It was one of the most powerful militaries in
3 attempt to defend Yugoslavia
4 activities particularly in Croatia
5 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Very well. With that question and
6 answer, we'll have a break for 25 minutes.
7 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.
9 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [French and English channel]
11 JUDGE KWON: We are hearing French translation. Let's continue.
12 I think it has been resolved. I think it has been resolved.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Donia, now I'm going to try to put questions that are going
15 to be as short as possible so that I would get yes or no answers.
16 My position is that the one and only first and foremost reason
17 for tensions is the change in position by Mr. Izetbegovic and the SDA.
18 Instead of being in favour of preserving Yugoslavia, they opted for
19 leaving Yugoslavia
20 started. Yes or no?
21 A. Well, unfortunately you've injected a couple of questions into
22 this one to make it a more complex one, but I reject your position that
23 the only first and foremost reason for tension was the change in position
24 by Mr. Izetbegovic and the SDA.
25 Q. Thank you. I am not disputing the fact that there were new
1 complications. However, my position is that is the foremost reason. Up
2 until the 30th of January, we had no reason to have tensions. Yes or no?
3 A. That's false.
4 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that Mr. Izetbegovic also became
5 president of the Council for the Defence of Muslims?
6 A. I don't agree that he became that on the 30th of January if that
7 is what your question is meant to suggest.
8 Q. No. No. He became president of the Council for the Defence of
9 Muslims. Just yes or no.
10 A. I think it's important to get a date established here. The -- I
11 have recorded that the Council for the Defence of Muslims was founded by
12 the SDA on June 10th, and at that time, it is my understanding that, yes,
13 he did become president of that council.
14 Q. Our information says that the decision was taken in February, but
15 let it be the way you put it.
16 Do you think that that goes hand-in-hand with his position as
17 president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Yes or no? Is that
18 right? Is it proper for him to be president for the defence of just one
19 ethnic group in Bosnia
20 A. No.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that the Serbs had certain priorities
22 that were -- well, that had a certain hierarchy amongst themselves and
23 that their first and utmost priority was preserving Yugoslavia?
24 A. Yes. I think the position as you stated it back in -- in
25 February, namely that if Yugoslavia
1 would be to Mr. Izetbegovic, and if Yugoslavia
2 would be to Mr. Milosevic pretty well summed up that position, and I
3 think you adhered to it consistently into -- well into late 1991.
4 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that among the Serbs, due to the
5 pressure exerted by developments as they were, there was a change in this
6 hierarchy of priorities, as it were?
7 A. There did come a time when that change of priorities took place,
9 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that all the time while there was a
10 possibility for preserving any kind of Yugoslavia we advocated an
11 all-embracing single Bosnia-Herzegovina?
12 A. No. I think you were engaged in separatist activities long
13 before the possibility of a -- of preserving Yugoslavia ceased to exist.
14 Q. When, Mr. Donia, and through which activities?
15 A. Well, you formed various communities of municipalities which --
16 which had a separatist political intent in the early months of 1991, you
17 created Serb autonomous regions in the fall of 1991, and in the meantime
18 were engaged in relations with military forces that were embracing
19 separatism as well. So I think that you were very, in many times,
20 ostentatiously supporting separatism long before that possibility of
22 Q. Are you trying to say that it was Serbs who were separatists; is
23 that right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And who was it that the Serbs wanted to separate themselves from?
1 A. We've been talking about in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
2 and my answer is that Serbs wanted to separate themselves from
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. They started that movement, as I say -- one can date
4 it to January of 1991 and see it continuing right up until the beginning
5 of war and further.
6 Q. Professor, all of that is upsidedown, topsy-turvy, totally wrong.
7 Are you trying to say that we conceived of municipalities not on an
8 economic basis but, rather, for separatist reasons?
9 A. I certainly am, and I think the history of the formation of the
10 Bosnian Krajina community of municipalities is a good illustration of
11 that. When that community was proclaimed on April 25th, 1991, you
12 invited participants from a number of political parties, and including
13 other national parties and members of the opposition, on the premise that
14 that community was going to involve economic development. When those
15 people got to the meeting, they discovered, according to their own
16 accounts, that they were in the midst of a lot of Serbian propaganda.
17 They were offended by the fact that this was a single party undertaking,
18 and, in fact, one of them, Mr. Dodik, who is the present prime minister
19 of Republika Srpska, said he found it the height of political illiteracy
20 and impudence to have this body created by a single political party and
21 said it demanded referral to the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I
22 can further show you, in fact, I'd like to, that both the first president
23 of the Bosnian Krajina community of municipalities and yourself viewed it
24 as a separatist design.
25 If one goes to paragraph 183 of my excerpts report, one can see
1 that this -- and I'd like to do that if Your Honours would indulge me.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I'm not sure if your report has para numbers.
3 THE WITNESS: Just for context, Dr. Karadzic, this -- these words
4 were spoken during the 17th session, which was July of 1992, at a time
5 when the municipal strategy of the SDS
6 about face, and the party -- you and other party leaders discovered that
7 the municipal associations which had served so well to weaken the State
8 of Bosnia-Herzegovina were now turning out to be weakening the new Serb
9 state and therefore had to be diminished in power, and eventually the
10 regions dissolved. And Mr. Vojo Kupresanin was the person who had been
11 elected the president of the community of municipalities of
12 Bosnian Krajina on the 25th of April, 1992. And at that time, he gave an
13 address -- address in which he stressed that the purpose of the
14 association was to express solidarity with the Serbs of Croatia and
15 contribute to the economic self-sufficiency of Krajina. And what he said
16 was, speaking of 1991:
17 "Last year we built up the region and made it strong with a clear
18 purpose and goal. The task of the region of Krajina was to destroy
19 Alija's state. I think that other regions followed suit, and we were
20 successful in that respect. If we continue to affirm the region, we will
21 undermine the Serbian state," meaning the Bosnian Serb state. "We
22 mustn't do that. We will now find possibilities and ways to affirm this
23 state and make it efficient. We are becoming aware of what
24 decentralisation can do to a state in which we have invested considerable
25 live, casualties and efforts. I think we should opt for maximum
1 centralisation not only because of the war but also because we are a
2 newly formed state. Wan see that only very centralised states in the
3 world are, in fact, successful, effective and achieve best results."
4 And, in fact, you express very similar sentiments -- [Overlapping
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. May I ask you, sir, that we go back to what it was that I was
8 trying to say. You have already moved on to the war and the period after
9 the war. I asked you first and foremost --
10 JUDGE KWON: Before you continue your question, can I know where
11 it is in the report.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes it's item number 179. It's on page 71, it --
13 title's at the very bottom of the page.
14 MS. EDGERTON: That's e-court page 75 of the document. The hard
15 copy page, as Dr. Donia said, 73, but e-court page 75.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thematic excerpts. I was looking at the wrong one.
17 Thank you.
18 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Donia, let's not skip anything. Let's not skip periods of
21 time or actual events. Is it not correct that from the very outset our
22 only demand was to change the community of municipalities and that the
23 SDA had accepted that and they went into a coalition with us without any
24 objections in that regard? Yes or no?
25 A. No. They objected strenuously when you proclaimed the community
1 of municipalities, because it was so clearly the creation of a single
2 party on behalf of a single people and without any inclination to pursue
3 the economic development goals that you had cited in the invitation for
4 people to come to this meeting on the 25th.
5 Q. Well, that's not correct. We're going to deal with that
6 tomorrow. I'm asking you about our pre-election programme. Did we ask
7 for anything else but for reorganisation of the community of
8 municipalities? Is that when we announced SAOs and regionalisation, or
9 was that only at the level of the community of municipalities? Yes or
10 no? Let's do it this way. You're not in charge of this
11 cross-examination. Just answer my questions.
12 A. Which one would you like me to answer?
13 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic. Dr. Karadzic, just a minute.
14 When you ask a question in cross-examination, you get the answer which
15 the witness considers to be appropriate unless he is stopped by the
16 Tribunal. You can not control the answer. You can only control the
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, but I'm asking for
19 nothing to be skipped.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Now I'm talking about the pre-election period. In relation to
22 the territorial organisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what did we ask for?
23 Was it not that we only asked for a reorganisation of the community of
25 A. Well, you asked for many things, of course, in the course of the
1 electoral campaign. Some of them related to this theme and many not.
2 You asked for a reorganisation or a redrawing of municipal boundaries,
3 and you asked for a reconstruction of the communities of municipalities
4 that then existed and advocated moving as you indicated in your
5 questioning, advocating moving the centres of those, seats of those
6 communities of municipalities to smaller towns or towns which had a much
7 larger Serbian population.
8 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that we started mentioning the SAOs and
9 establishing the SAOs only towards the end of May or the beginning of
10 June, after everything else had happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina
12 A. No. In fact, you established the SAOs only in September and
13 October. You established the communities of municipalities in this
14 period of late April, May, and June. You established the Bosnian Krajina
15 one, as I indicated, on the 26th of April -- I'm sorry, 25th of April, in
16 Banja Luka and kept the seat of the former community of municipalities in
17 Banja Luka. So there was no change in the seat of the community of
18 municipalities as you had proposed earlier. This process then went on
19 for the next several weeks in which you proclaimed the community of
20 municipalities of Herzegovina
21 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the community of municipalities of
22 Krajina invited the Muslim municipalities to join them as well, because
23 they had had enough of Sarajevo
24 economic point of view and to become more economically independent?
25 A. Yes, the COBK community of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina
1 invited all municipalities in the area to join. No municipalities joined
2 other than those with an absolute Serb majority or near an absolute
3 majority simply because both the opposition -- or the opposition national
4 parties and the left opposition became convinced that this had nothing to
5 do with economic development. It was simply a power grab by the SDS
6 that's why they turned that down.
7 Q. And who was it that was in power in these municipalities?
8 A. It was in, I think, all cases the municipalities that declined to
9 join were either governed by the -- or the SDA or by a coalition of the
10 SDA and HDZ.
11 Q. Municipalities that had joined in had the SDS in power anyway;
13 A. No. Oh, had the SDS
14 questions. The municipalities that joined all had the SDS in power, yes.
15 Q. So the SDS
16 already; right?
17 A. They seized power at the level of the community of
18 municipalities, and, in fact, as their programme unfolded what they did
19 was to take over the existing economic resources of the former community
20 of municipalities in the name of the Serb people and so acquired them
21 rather than take -- doing anything that developed new wealth and new
22 economic initiatives.
23 Q. We'll look at that eventually. So the Serb objective was to
24 preserve Yugoslavia
25 to be their home? When they said that they had built a home in 1918, do
1 you believe that the Serbs considered Yugoslavia to be their home?
2 A. I think virtually all Serbs did. Many Serbs came to believe, or
3 some Serbs anyway, came to belive that the Yugoslavia that they called
4 their home had changed dramatically in character in the period of the
5 Milosevic governance, but, nevertheless, I think that the vast majority
6 of Serbs did, in fact, feel that Yugoslavia
7 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that after that first and uppermost
8 objective the second objective in terms of this hierarchy was, among the
9 Serbs, that is, that if the Croats and Slovenes were leaving Yugoslavia
10 the Serbs should remain within Yugoslavia
11 predominantly Serb and that Bosnia
12 possible. So was that not our second priority?
13 A. Greater Serbia
14 that right? Your second priority was a Greater Serbia. Or am I
15 misrepresenting what your question is?
16 Q. No, sir, it's not a Greater Serbia. It is a Yugoslavia as big as
17 possible. Did you not find that in all our public speeches? How could
18 that be a greater -- Greater Serbia
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia
20 A. Well, I think the -- the programme that you embraced and that
21 Mr. Milosevic embraced also included holding on to those parts of Croatia
22 which Serbs claimed as their land, and thus it wasn't completely
23 congruent with the remaining republics as they were then bounded by -- by
24 the boundaries of Yugoslavia
25 Q. None of that's how it was and we'll clear that up, but did those
1 Serbs want to remain in Yugoslavia? Not Milosevic, the Serbs living in
2 Krajina or Bosnia. Did they wish to stay in Yugoslavia?
3 A. I think most of them did, yes.
4 Q. And was Yugoslavia a sovereign and the sole recognised state
5 amongst all those entities?
6 A. Up until January 15th, yes. January 15th, 1992, that was the
7 status, yes.
8 Q. How then could the Serbs have been separatists if they were
9 calling to remain in the country that they saw as their home, a home
10 which was internationally recognised?
11 A. They were seeking to separate from Bosnia-Herzegovina and
12 undertook all kinds of initiatives and activities to so separate, and, in
13 fact, one delegate at the 3rd Bosnian Assembly session in December 1991
14 asked exactly the question that arises from this. He said:
15 "If we are to stay in Yugoslavia, why do we have to take all
16 these actions to separate from Bosnia
17 separate from us?"
18 But that was not the situation. The situation was that you were
19 taking various initiatives to separate from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well
20 as to inhibit the work of its government.
21 Q. And would that have been the case if Bosnia-Herzegovina had not
22 undertaken secessionist steps?
23 A. Well, it's -- I really don't want to speculate on what might have
24 happened if something else had happened. I would only point out that the
25 effort to form the community of municipalities dates from January 21,
1 which is long before this whole issue of secessionism on the part of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina or its proclamations of sovereignty arose.
3 Q. Do you mean to say, and just yes or no, please, is what you're
4 saying this: That the Serbs would have separated from Bosnia even if
5 Bosnia had remained in Yugoslavia? Yes or no?
6 A. Just -- that's a speculative -- that would be sure speculation.
7 I, you know, really can't -- can't say that. I don't have that much
8 insight into what Serb intentions would have been in that case.
9 Q. Thank you. Now, do you agree that the third in the hierarchy,
10 third position in the hierarchy of Serb interests and aspirations was to
11 create in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if it were to step down from Yugoslavia,
12 their own constituent unit and that that unit should be independent?
13 What was called the Republika Srpska, to create Republika Srpska and for
14 Republika Srpska to be independent.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you. Now, the fourth point, a painful one, the fourth
17 compromise as we called it, for the whole of Bosnia to step down from
18 Yugoslavia and to remain integral and that that Serbian constituent unit
19 should remain in Bosnia without being independent.
20 A. I'm sorry, I don't -- I don't see a question.
21 Q. The question is this: The fourth painful compromise, as we
22 referred to it, was that that Serbian constituent unit should not be
23 independent of Bosnia, just autonomous within Bosnia and to have the
24 Serbs accept the boundaries, external boundaries, of Bosnia.
25 A. Again I don't see a question.
1 Q. Was that, to your knowledge, the fourth painful compromise, the
2 fourth variant that we could or could not accept?
3 A. I don't know that it was the fourth painful compromise. I'm not
4 aware of the other three or can't enumerate it as the fourth. It was
5 presented by you as a fourth variant, I think at the time that the --
6 after October 15th when the whole locus of discussions moved toward the
7 character of organisation within Bosnia.
8 Q. Thank you. Well, that's something that you must have known,
9 Professor, how the theory was developed or practice developed of our
10 political life. Now, do you agree that before the elections, when there
11 were intimations of secession, we proposed the Scandinavisation of
12 Yugoslavia, that is to say that we followed the pattern of Scandinavia in
13 separating and going our separate ways? Yes or no?
14 A. You did discuss that as a -- as a possible option, yes.
15 Q. Did you know that the first idea on cantonisation came from
16 Croatia and that it was published and made public in Croatia and our
17 response to it was that it was an interesting proposition?
18 A. Well, of course the idea of cantonisation is -- first came from
19 the Swiss, and in terms of its being floated as an idea for possible
20 internal organisation of Bosnia, I agree that it first came from Croats.
21 Q. Do you remember that it was Mr. Izetbegovic, already in the
22 pre-electoral campaign, at a large rally held in Velika Kladusa and in
23 Zenica, said the following -- uttered the following words, he said, If
25 Yugoslavia. If Croatia leaves Yugoslavia, then Bosnia-Herzegovina will
1 leave Yugoslavia
2 down. Then those areas which we could control with -- in prosperity
3 would step down.
4 A. I don't have his words before me, and I can't specifically
5 confirm -- or confirm that he specifically said those words. I concur
6 that he said, generally speaking, that if Croatia remains in Yugoslavia
7 then Bosnia-Herzegovina will, and if it leaves then Bosnia-Herzegovina
8 may also have to leave.
9 Q. Do you agree that the first ideas on the division of Bosnia and
11 A. No.
12 Q. Do you agree that this fourth variant that we call the painful
13 compromise, it wasn't the fourth compromise, it was the fourth variant,
14 was that we accept Bosnia-Herzegovina to step down from Yugoslavia and
15 that within it we should have our sovereign constituent unit and that
16 that was almost identical to what the European Community offered up as
17 the Cutileiro Plan?
18 A. It's a long question. I'm just trying to get my arms around it.
19 Well, I -- there's several parts of this question really. At --
20 at some point you did, in fact, accept the idea that Bosnia-Herzegovina
21 would step down from Yugoslavia under the condition that Serbia have its
22 own sovereign constituent unit. I don't -- there are some similarities
23 but not complete congruence with what Mr. Cutileiro proposed and what
24 I've just described.
25 Q. Thank you. Now let's see this: I claim that the only
1 intervention on our part in terms of territorial arrangements before
2 Izetbegovic's plans of secession was the community of municipalities, and
3 I also claim that as relations deteriorated, so we introduced measures
4 for the Serbian Autonomous Region and autonomous region and so on, but
5 let's not more further than July.
6 Do you know an event that I consider to be the pivotal event in
7 1991, which is called the historical Serbian Muslim agreement? Are you
8 familiar with that?
9 A. Yes, also known as the Belgrade initiative to some.
10 Q. The Belgrade initiative is something else. It was a proposal
11 based on this pivotal agreement relating to the Serbs and Muslims in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina later on. Do you agree?
13 A. Mm-hmm, yes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now have called up on e-court
15 1D1412, please. E-court wasn't working, so we couldn't load the
16 translation up onto e-court, so may we place it on the overhead
17 projector. Provide the witness with a copy and put a copy on the
18 overhead projector. The interpreters, I'm told, have a hard copy.
19 May we see the first page, the title page, so that we can see it
20 is a book by Adil Zulfikarpasic, "Articles and Interviews," published
21 towards the end of 1991. Page 2 of the document as a whole.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you know who Mr. Adil Zulfikarpasic was?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Is it correct that he was in the antifascist movement, or,
1 rather, in the Partisans?
2 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Doctor.
4 THE WITNESS: I'm having trouble getting oriented here with the
5 various interventions.
6 JUDGE KWON: Can the Doctor be provided with the hard copy, the
7 English translation, on his own? Sorry for your inconvenience.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. I'll refer you to the relevant pages. I first wanted to ask you
10 whether you remember that the person was an antifascist and that he was
11 in the Partisans and not like Izetbegovic, aligned with Hitler.
12 A. That's a new low, Dr. Karadzic. That is a truly disgusting
14 Mr. Zulfikarpasic was indeed in the Partisans. He left
17 wealthy businessman, and returned then to Bosnia in -- in 19 -- I believe
18 1990, roughly the middle of the year, and cofounded a party that was --
19 eventually became a rival to the SDA, the Muslim Bosniak Organisation,
20 with Professor Filipovic.
21 Q. Thank you. Mr. Donia, why would a scientific fact be disgusting?
22 Do you deny that Mr. Izetbegovic was the founder - and you confirmed
23 this - the founder and in the top leadership of the Young Muslims? Is
24 that something you deny?
25 A. Scientific facts are not disgusting. I think the context in
1 which one can invoke them can be, and I certainly, you know, -- I think
2 you, yourself, would not say that -- that Alija Izetbegovic was an ally
3 of Hitler at any point in time and certainly was not trying not to
4 implement any of his policies when he entered politics in the democratic
5 period of 1990.
6 Q. Well, you agreed that el-Husseini was in Sarajevo and that he was
7 a guest of the Young Muslims, Behmed [phoen] Izetbegovic, and that he
8 formed two SS Handzar waffen divisions of the Bosnian Muslims in 1943;
10 A. Again your conflating my answers in ways that did I not give
11 them. I did not agree to what you just -- what you just said.
12 Q. Thank you. Now let's look at page 587, please. 587. It says:
13 "It is a known fact --" at the end of page 587. "It is a known
14 fact." It doesn't seem to be on our screens.
15 JUDGE KWON: The end of the previous page. Bottom of that page.
16 No, no. Next page. No, no. Show the bottom part of the page. Yes.
17 There. Further. Can we see the bottom part of that page. Further.
18 Yes. "It is a known fact." Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. "It is a known fact that in this region until the annexation of
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Turkish state
22 existed, in which the Muslims were first-class citizens and all
23 Christians, especially the Serbs, were second-last citizens. Naturally,
24 we Muslims viewed that state as our own, regardless of our background,
25 and we identified with it to a great extent. That was our state, a state
1 that fulfilled our interests. That is still a source of pride for us and
2 that Turkish period in Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a silver period
3 of the Bosnian state, just as the Middle Ages represents the golden
4 period of Bosnia
5 to the Turkish state and we aimed to strengthen it in every way.
6 "On the other hand, the other large nation in Bosnia
8 and the birth of their freedom in the destruction of that Turkish state.
9 There is a lot of antagonism there, and what is important, it lasted a
10 very long time. For a very long time that state was the realisation of a
11 century-old dream for the Muslims, and it was the darkest dungeon for the
12 Serbs. That resulted in repercussions that are felt to that day. We can
13 have any type of emotional or rational position towards these
14 repercussions, but we cannot deny them, and we cannot ignore them
15 especially today when we're looking for the sources to this conflict and
16 the manner in which it can be solved. You see, we were sworn enemies
17 then, and when Turkey
18 that the conflict has become an irrational one because neither the
19 Austrian nor later the Yugoslav state were no longer the state of one
20 nation or the other, at least not to the extent that it become a source
21 of conflict."
22 Now, did you know -- were you aware of this position taken by
23 Adil Zulfikarpasic which he takes as the source and basic premise for an
24 agreement with the Serbs?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you. Now may we turn to page 589. It's the answer:
2 "Well, with a kind of reception did you come upon and did you
3 expect more or less? How did that conversation evolved?" That's the
5 THE INTERPRETER: May we have a reference, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. "As far as reception goes, it was how it generally is among
8 civilised and well-intentioned people."
9 JUDGE KWON: First help us finding the phrase in our document.
10 You said page 589?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
12 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I stand to be corrected, but I think
13 it's the seventh line down in the paragraph that immediately follows the
14 italicised portion.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, that's right.
16 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry. On e-court page 21.
17 JUDGE KWON: Do we have an italicised font at all?
18 MS. EDGERTON: On -- I'm looking at the original document, and
19 that's -- obviously Dr. Karadzic is as well, and that's where I'm
20 identifying this passage that appears in our English translation from.
21 Dr. Karadzic read the question, saying it was in italicised -- or in
22 italics from the original document, and I'm just identifying the B/C/S
23 line for the interpreter.
24 JUDGE BAIRD: Ms. Edgerton, what are the first few words of that
25 paragraph? The first few words.
1 MS. EDGERTON: In B/C/S I think begins --
2 JUDGE BAIRD: In English.
3 JUDGE KWON: In English.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Pardon me. "We said: 'We want to save this
5 country ...'"
6 JUDGE KWON: But Dr.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. I was reading the
8 whole paragraph, but I should have read from line 7:
9 "We said: 'We want to save this country. We want peace in this
10 country, equal for all. If you want that as well, let's agree to it and
11 announce that agreement.' They agreed with the need to preserve
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and peace within it. Then we said that we will
13 immediately explain to them the lines that we cannot cross, because we
14 Muslims also had things that we're ready to spill blood for and battle to
15 the last man standing."
16 JUDGE KWON: We can read the book.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Okay.
18 JUDGE KWON: The doctor can read the book. Put your question in
19 a very simple manner.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Do you see from that excerpt, the excerpt of this interview where
22 Mr. Zulfikarpasic speaks our meeting and says that we agreed to all their
23 demands and that we gave up on any regionalisation?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Thank you. Now let's look at page 590, please.
1 Here I have to say that during those talks on behalf of the
2 MBO ...
3 From the very beginning in talks, the SDA was informed -- no,
4 sorry. I'm going to read out, well, not this part, but I'll get to it:
5 "I have to say that on behalf of the MBO, Mohamed Filipovic and I
6 took part in the negotiation on behalf of the SDS, Mr. Karadzic, Koljevic
7 and Krajisnik. It's a highly authoritative meeting and I wish to stress
8 something else. From the very beginning in talks, the SDA was informed
9 as well as Alija Izetbegovic in person. The initiative did stem from us,
10 but on several occasions we discussed it with Alija Izetbegovic,
11 Muhamed Filipovic and I."
12 And you can read the rest yourselves.
13 JUDGE KWON: I don't think that we're following your reading. In
14 order for the witness, Dr. Donia, to be able to answer your question, he
15 should follow what you're asking. You should indicate either in B/C/S or
16 in English page the exact location from where you're reading.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Donia, can you have a look at the Serbian version in e-court.
19 You speak our language. The SDS
20 he says that these are strange things and that Izetbegovic knew about it
21 all the time and that he agreed to that. He says here:
22 "At that meeting, we established once again that we agreed. Even
23 Alija Izetbegovic said that there was no alternative to this agreement
24 and that he accepts it fully."
25 In English we've moved on to the next page now, actually.
1 He said that now he was going to America and that we should put
2 the final version of the agreement with which he agrees on paper and when
3 he returns we will sign it together and announce it. You see that
4 Mr. Izetbegovic was fully aware and in full agreement with the Serb
5 Muslim agreement.
6 THE WITNESS: Is the building burning down or are we --
7 JUDGE KWON: I have no clue.
8 Ms. Edgerton.
9 MS. EDGERTON: It happens the first Monday of every month at
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you. I think we have the translation of
12 the latter part, Mr. Karadzic, read out in English.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] One thing is for sure: I haven't
14 escaped, so it's not on account of me.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Did you know that Mr. Izetbegovic encouraged that agreement and
17 supported it and that we worked with his consent?
18 A. Yes. The account that you've just read, maybe not the opinions
19 of Zulfikarpasic, but the account that you've just read corresponds very
20 closely to my own understanding of how the talks proceeded, how they were
21 initiated and proceeding -- proceeded.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have P593. It is 24 in
23 English. And in the original book, it is 593.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Do you recall that at the time Mr. Zulfikarpasic, Filipovic, I,
1 Koljevic, and others visited mixed Serb-Muslim areas, ethnically mixed,
2 and that we held rallies dealing with that agreement?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And now he says here, you can see it in English:
5 "Every event of this nature and these proportions has its
6 opponents and enthusiastic supporters. Above all, we have extreme
7 elements in both nations who are not happy about this agreement. We also
8 have separatist circles who are participating in the front lines in terms
9 of destroying Yugoslavia
10 emergence of one force that is destroying the illusion that the Serbs are
11 the only defenders of Yugoslavia
12 other nations. That proves that all those people and those similar to
13 them will do everything to reduce the significance of this agreement."
14 And so on and so forth.
15 Do you agree that Zulfikarpasic had viewed the interest of the
16 Muslims to remain in Yugoslavia
17 that? It wasn't that he was doing it as a Serbophile or something.
18 A. Would I agree and characterise him as a good Muslim and someone
19 who is seeking to represent the interests of Muslims in pursuing this
21 Q. Thank you. Can we have page 594, please. 594. We have it.
22 It's this, isn't it? So the journalist is putting a question to him:
23 "Mr. Zulfikarpasic, how do you perceive the congratulatory notes,
24 the one Milosevic sent you and Radovan Karadzic in response to the
25 signing of this agreement?"
1 Now Zulfikarpasic says:
2 "That note strengthened our agreement and showed us that the Serb
3 nation as a whole stands behind this idea, which, in any case,
4 contributed to easing tensions and creating a very good atmosphere."
5 And then further on it says:
6 "At today's conference in Trebinje you said that unfortunately
7 there are those who are bothered by this kind of agreement between the
8 Serbs and Muslims? Who were you referring to?"
9 Do you know that there was this big rally of Serbs and Muslims in
10 Trebinje and that they were thrilled by the fact that we showed up there?
11 A. I'm not certain of the date of it, but I'm aware there was a big
12 rally in Trebinje, yes, at about this time.
13 Q. Thank you. And now his answer has to do with what happened in
15 "You see when they asked Radovan Karadzic at a rally in
16 Zvornik," that was yet another joint rally, "who he was most afraid of,
17 he answered: 'I am most afraid of our crazy people.' I would add to
18 that and say that I am only afraid of those extreme chauvinists who base
19 their policies on conflicts. However they are so insignificant in terms
20 of both numbers and meaning that I hope this agreement will open the
21 eyes of all people of good will."
22 And so on and so forth.
23 Do you agree with that? Does your information show that before
24 the SDA expressed its views against this agreement, the agreement itself
25 raised the hopes of Muslims and Serbs that there would be an era of piece
1 and prosperity that would ushered in?
2 A. It certainly raised the hopes of some Muslims and Serbs that that
3 would be the case, yes.
4 Q. Thank you. Now, there are quite a few interviews of
5 Mr. Zulfikarpasic's here. Can we look at page 601 now, please. Page 30
6 in English. The heading is: "There is no longer a Handzar Division."
7 There is no need for me to read out the whole thing.
8 Mr. Zulfikarpasic here explains that -- that this is no longer a time of
9 conflict, that the Serbs and Muslims constitute 80 per cent of the
10 population and that if we pursue a policy of friendship that the future
11 of Bosnia
12 after welcoming our initiative and after taking part in a three-hour
13 meeting with us and the SDS
14 wing changed their position within one hour.
15 Are you aware of my position that, Mr. Izetbegovic was a lot more
16 constructive and conciliatory than his hidden and public militants who
17 forced him to backtrack several times?
18 A. I -- yes, I'm aware of that. I think he was, in fact, forced to
19 backtrack several times, sometimes at the insistence of his --
20 particularly the religious wing of the SDA and sometimes owing to other
21 groups in the party that were unhappy with agreements that he proposed to
23 Q. Thank you. Further on, do you agree -- it says here in one of
24 these paragraphs: "We are not guided by any kind of religious
25 fanaticism." Just a moment, please. Let's see whether this has been
1 translated at all.
2 Obviously this hasn't been translated. We move on to page 31.
3 It is 602 in e-court. It says:
4 "We had a more rigid position in matters of principle. The party
5 that has been in government for nine months along with the SDS and the
6 HDZ," you can see that on the basis of the question, "now admits that
7 they had not yet taken over the government that Bosnia is still ruled by
8 Communist structures. They have not solved a single basic problem that
9 our country has. That is the only country that is completely dependent
10 on Communist structures. Furthermore, we did not regard the SDS as our
11 enemy but instead as our political opponent. We were always interested
12 in a fair and humane relationship with Croats and Serbs in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but if we deemed that someone seemed to us as opposed
14 to these interests, then we criticised them. We mostly criticised the
15 SDA because we believed that they were the guiltiest of all."
16 So, see, even these other two parties believe that they had not
17 taken over power or government from the Communist structures.
18 JUDGE KWON: What is your question?
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
20 Q. Well, the question is -- well, Mr. Donia had confirmed that we,
21 the Serb Democratic Party, had won the election but was criticised for
22 taking over experts who had belonged to the previous governments, and now
23 we see here that the other two parties had also left the Communist
24 infrastructure in place.
25 A. I still don't hear a question. I'm sorry.
1 JUDGE KWON: No.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Thank you. We'll move
3 on. Could we have page 604, please. It is 31/32 in e-court.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 MS. EDGERTON: I'm wondering as we go through this very lengthy
7 document what the -- what the point is and if -- whether the point hasn't
8 already been made several times over by Dr. Donia in confirming aspects
9 of successive paragraphs.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I suggest the accused to put his question in a
11 simple manner instead of reading out all these passages, but he just
12 doesn't listen to us.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, I am listening, but I care
14 about presenting as much information as possible, and this information is
15 being provided by a participants in all these events, mainly
16 Mr. Zulfikarpasic. I'll try to cut it short.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Please have a look at this page that says, "Imagine." "Imagine,"
19 that's what it says here. It's 32 in English, I think:
20 "Imagine such nonsense and tragedy. The radio broadcast that
21 one political party, actually a part of the SDA, has now created a
22 military unit in Zagreb
23 Cazinska Krajina for the Croatian guard."
24 And now towards the end at this bottom it says that:
25 "This is adventurism which can end catastrophically primarily for
1 us Muslims. There are no longer Handzar Divisions and there are no
2 longer regions."
3 Do you know that the SDA established units in Croatia and that
4 Zulfikarpasic was firmly opposed to that?
5 A. No and yes. I am not aware that the SDA established - what did
6 you call them - units in Croatia
7 opposed to that certainly would have been and was.
8 Q. Thank you. Do you know that under the leadership of the SDA
9 volunteers from Bosnia-Herzegovina went to fight on the side of Croatia
10 on the side of Croatian paramilitary forces, the ZNG and other units in
12 A. No.
13 Q. Do you know that tensions were on the rise when their body
14 would -- bodies would be returned and buried in our ethnically mixed
16 A. I'm -- no.
17 Q. Thank you. Can we look at page 610. It says here:
18 "As of recent, we have heard from different sources about the
19 existence of a protocol that was signed and proposed by Izetbegovic and
20 according to which Croats are to take two regions, Serbs three regions,
21 and Muslims one region. It would be comprised of Sarajevo, Tuzla
22 another small part. In that region of ours we would have more Serbs and
23 Croats," et cetera, et cetera.
24 Do you know that Izetbegovic was always more in favour of a
25 division of reorganisation than he stated publicly?
1 A. I think that's fair, yes.
2 Q. Thank you. Now we are going to find a section where
3 Mr. Zulfikarpasic says that -- that Izetbegovic frightened him a few
4 times by the proposal to have the Croats take their own, the Serbs take
5 their own, and we Muslims will take our own. Do you remember that? You
6 probably were aware of this book of Zulfikarpasic's, weren't you?
7 A. I -- in general, yes, I'm aware of that feeling of Zulfikarpasic,
8 that he was concerned about Izetbegovic's going in the direction of
9 agreeing to partition.
10 Q. Thank you. Then perhaps we could conclude this part and then
11 admit this document, and if necessary, we'll go back to it tomorrow.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the last question and answer was a
13 good example. Just without having to read out the part you asked, you
14 put the question and the doctor agreed. You could have done this whole
15 practice in ten minutes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'll do my best to do
17 it that way.
18 Can we have this it document admitted now that this has been
19 confirmed so I don't have to find it?
20 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?
21 MS. EDGERTON: No objection to those it passages that have been
22 translated being admitted.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just go back to page 668.
24 JUDGE KWON: You'd like to ask more questions about this?
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. I would just like to ask you one thing, Professor. Do you agree
2 that we had agreed that Bosnia
3 is historically justified to have Yugoslavia
4 A. I'm sorry, what -- are you suggesting that the -- ask the
5 question again. I'm not clear what you were asking.
6 Q. Are you aware of the essence of the historic Serb-Muslim
8 A. The essence of it, yes. I note that it was never formally
9 concluded amongst the participants and that it was pretty much negotiated
10 in -- it was negotiated by Muslim representatives who were then in
11 full-time assault on the position of the SDA and Mr. Izetbegovic for
12 various of his and the party's policies.
13 Q. Do you agree that towards the end of August Izetbegovic fully
14 called off this agreement? It was only in August.
15 A. Yes. I think he became concerned about the -- let's say the good
16 faith of the -- particularly Milosevic's commitments that he had
17 expressed to Zulfikarpasic and -- and Filipovic and was concerned about
18 the efforts that you and Mr. Milosevic were taking to undermine his
19 personal position politically at that time. So, yes, he did walk away
20 from it very clearly in the latter part of August.
21 Q. However, it wasn't because of that, Professor. It was because he
22 did not want to remain in Yugoslavia
23 longer including Slovenia
24 not want to stay in a Yugoslavia
1 A. Yes. I think his position at that time and somewhat before it
2 and after it can be characterised as wanting to have Bosnia-Herzegovina
3 have an equal position with the other republics vis-a-vis Yugoslavia.
4 That was the essence of the agreement that he promoted and signed first
5 in Sarajevo
6 in Split
8 Q. Do you know -- do you know that Mr. Izetbegovic, on the 27th of
9 June, concluded a secret military pact with President Kucan and
10 President Tudjman for fighting against Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav
11 People's Army?
12 A. I'm not aware of that, no.
13 Q. Well, the OTP could have showed you that. We are going to show
14 that at a certain point in time.
15 Do you know that Mr. Zulfikarpasic on Mr. Filipovic remained
16 faithful to that agreement all the way up until the end of 1991?
17 A. Well, I think they actually remained faithful to it even beyond
19 Q. Do you know that in this book - we have it
20 somewhere - Mr. Zulfikarpasic accused Izetbegovic of playing a game,
21 trying to slander him as a Serbophile, pro-Yugoslavia, and that therefore
22 he had actually falsely supported that agreement because he had secretly
23 signed that pact with Kucan and Tudjman?
24 A. That's kind of a complicated sequence of things, but I think
25 you're right as you formulated it. It was Zulfikarpasic's perception
1 that Izetbegovic was undermining him or attacking him for being a Serb
2 sympathiser, if you will, or being pro-Serb, yes.
3 Q. Thank you. Since only the sections that have been read out will
4 be admitted, we will have to go back to some of this tomorrow.
5 I want to ask you something else. Do you remember that we had
6 halted all activities in the field of regionalisation during July and
7 August while this agreement was in force?
8 A. No. That was not the case. You did not.
9 Q. What was the case? What was this activity going on between the
10 1st of July and the 1st of September? Was anything new established or
11 did anything new start operating as such?
12 A. You were using the community of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina
13 and other regional associations to drive recruitment for the
14 Yugoslav People's Army in Croatia
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we'll rise for today.
16 But, Ms. Edgerton, is it your position that not only those parts
17 that were read out or used at the courtroom but also those parts which
18 have been translated?
19 MS. EDGERTON: No, I apologise for not being so clear. When I
20 said "translated," I meant translated here in court. Only those portions
21 that we have heard spoken to in court today I would have no objection to.
22 JUDGE KWON: Even for the part which the witness didn't confirm?
23 I refer to page 602. That part was skipped.
24 MS. EDGERTON: I have missed that one, Your Honour, and if I
25 could just speak to that within a couple of seconds tomorrow morning, I
1 would appreciate that.
2 JUDGE KWON: And we'll come back to it tomorrow morning, but how
3 much longer do you have, Mr. Karadzic, for your cross-examination of
4 Dr. Donia?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we haven't come to the 15th
6 of October yet. In the view of the Defence, that was the key event, the
7 agreement between the Serbs and the Muslims that shows our true
8 intentions. So we still have to deal with October and the well-known
9 Assembly. So we expect that 40 hour time that we asked for to be a bear
11 JUDGE KWON: We'll come to that tomorrow morning. 9.00 tomorrow
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.31 p.m.
14 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 8th day of June,
15 2010, at 9.00 a.m.