1 Thursday, 10 June 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at commence 2.17 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, everybody.
7 Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good afternoon to
10 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]
11 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
12 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Donia, yesterday we left off discussing that
13 activity, the military activity, of the SDA, or rather, its military
14 wing, the Patriotic League. Now, I have to conclude my cross-examination
15 today it seems, so to avoid me having to ask you to come back, would you
16 allow me to ask the questions and you give yes or no answers.
17 Now, do you agree that the adversary of the Patriotic League was
18 the -- was the JNA and the Serbs?
19 A. No.
20 Q. So was it the Croats who were the enemies of the
21 Patriotic League, yes or no?
22 A. I don't think that the Patriotic League when it was founded
23 specified an adversary. Its purpose was stated as the defence of the
24 Muslim people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
25 Q. From whom? You must have found that, Mr. Donia.
1 A. I have just told you that I have not found that. I do not know.
2 I simply testify to you, in accord with your request that I give you
3 straightforward answers, that at the time it was founded I don't believe
4 an adversary was specified.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 65 ter 30570 next,
7 please, on e-court.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. And while we're waiting for that to come up, let me ask you,
10 Dr. Donia, do you remember that 83 deputies Serbs, from a number of
11 parties on the 9th of January proclaimed the founding of the Serbian
12 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
13 A. Well, I recall the proclamation of the Serbian Republic
14 Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 9th of January by the
15 delegates in self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb Assembly.
16 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that we continued to work together in
17 organs, both in the Presidency, the government, and the joint Assembly?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Well, where didn't we work then?
20 A. I didn't say you didn't work. Your question was: Did we
21 continue to work together? And it would be my interpretation that
22 although the members of the SDS
23 of the government, Presidency, and Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they
24 were not working together with others in those organs.
25 Q. Well, is it correct that they didn't work together, or rather,
1 they only voted against the decisions that were to the detriment of the
2 Serbian people, whereas other decisions were taken jointly, together;
3 isn't that right?
4 A. Not exactly, no.
5 Q. Thank you. Now, did we take part in the joint session of the
6 Assembly on the 24th and 25th of January?
7 A. And who do you mean by "we"?
8 Q. The Serbs, the Serbian Assembly, all the deputies?
9 A. You mean the SDA deputies?
10 Q. And everybody else from the Serbian Assembly.
11 A. Yes, to my knowledge at least the vast majority did.
12 Q. Thank you. Let's take a look at this document now on our
13 screens. It's a conversation between Jovica Stanisic and
14 Radovan Karadzic, a telephone conversation. And if you don't know, let
15 me tell you that Jovica Stanisic was an intelligence officer and head of
16 the intelligence service of Serbia
17 and gathering knowledge and information from me. Now, this is page 1.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we move on to page 5 of the
19 English which will be page 3 of the Serbian.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
21 Q. And so that I don't have to read this out, I would like to turn
22 to the first long paragraph spoken by Karadzic. Yes, 5 in English, lower
23 down, the bigger paragraph, yes.
24 Now, here you can see that I'm talking to Mr. Stanisic and I'm
25 explaining to him how the conference is evolving. I say the conference
1 started -- Wijnands, Ambassador Wijnands came to see me, and now I'm
2 explaining to him and saying that Bosnia
3 not want any division of Bosnia
4 unnecessary ultimately, because probably there will be no borders
5 anywhere in Yugoslavia
6 English, please. There will be rather a sort of administrative
7 affiliation if there is no war. If there is war, if it goes on for 30
8 years, then nobody will win, nobody will recover from it, and we will all
9 be impoverished and ruined.
10 The next lengthy paragraph there says:
11 "But if it is finished quickly ... I mean, this conversation was
12 interesting and very useful and we believe that a lot can be done there."
13 And then I said to a man who's very close to Tudjman that:
14 "The Serbs and the Croats could resolve all their contentious
15 issues in a month or two."
16 I'm talking to Tudjman's man, not Boban's man.
17 Now, were you aware of this intercept?
18 A. I don't recall seeing it.
19 Q. May we now have page 21 of the English displayed, please, and it
20 is page 079 of the Serbian. It says "079" at the top. And in English
21 it's page 21. Yes, that's right. And Karadzic says there:
22 "On Friday, on Friday -- on Thursday we have the Deputies Club.
23 We must prepare well. Maybe our delegation will go to the joint
24 Assembly. Our Assembly delegation must be very large, numerous."
25 And then Karadzic goes on to say:
1 "... if the Muslims want, we can finish everything peacefully so
2 that everybody is satisfied, and if they don't, there will be chaos."
3 And then lower down, next page, please, he says that:
4 "Everything depends on them."
5 Page 22 in the English, please. Page 22, yes:
6 "So now everything depends on them. And I don't think they would
7 be dissatisfied. We think they would be very satisfied. It is very
8 important what they'll finish or do in Turkey. I'm waiting to see that,
9 to hear what will happen."
10 "And then because I think there will be work here every day we
11 must also continue the conference on Bosnia with lightning speed. I
12 mean, very quickly. Although these talks are part of this conference,
13 the general conference on Yugoslavia
14 "And we achieved important results which will suit the Muslims
16 Now, do you not think that it was important for you to know about
18 A. Well, I've actually taken note of the first part of the intercept
19 that you've read, and to a lesser degree the second part as well. The
20 first part speaks to your growing alliance with the Croats, particularly
21 the Croats directly reporting to Tudjman, whom you'd previously seen as a
22 reincarnation of the Ustasha and the source of racist dissatisfaction
23 with the Serbs. And in particular, the agreement that Mr. Koljevic
24 sought with President Tudjman in Zagreb on the 8th of January, just
25 before the actual proclamation of the state, in which the two of them
1 talked --
2 Q. We'll come to that.
3 A. -- broadly about the division of Bosnia and the formation of new
4 municipality lines, as well as the use of the state's -- [Overlapping
6 Q. Yes, thank you, we'll come to that.
7 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic, please don't interrupt the witness
8 in the middle of his answer.
9 Dr. Donia, please continue.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir. To actually use
11 the coercive powers of the state to enforce the human division in Bosnia
12 as well.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. We'll come to that, sir. But do you mean to say - and please
15 give me a yes or no answer - that we shouldn't have negotiated with the
17 A. Well, I don't think it was appropriate for you to negotiate
18 behind the backs of the Muslims with the Croats about the division of a
19 country in which they were a very significant political force. So I
20 don't think it was -- the way in which you negotiated or Mr. Koljevic in
21 this case negotiated was not appropriate. And, as a matter of fact, when
22 you did this in May and negotiated an agreement in Grac without the
23 participation of the Muslims, you were specifically reprimanded by the EC
24 representatives for trying to cut a two-way deal when the rules of the
25 conference and the negotiations were that any agreement had to have the
1 endorsement of the three national communities.
2 Q. Well, if that's the case, how could there have been the
3 independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina if all three parties had to give their
5 A. This is -- you've asked me about and I've responded to a
6 situation in which you and the head of a neighbouring republic which had
7 actually become a sovereign state were directly negotiating. I think
8 that was not appropriate and isn't really a parallel situation to the
9 independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 Q. Well, the situation was that the -- that two sides cannot
11 out-vote a third side -- well, the HDZ and -- had the HDZ and the SDA
12 made the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a federation of the
13 Croats and Muslims later on without the Serbs, that's analogous; right?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Thank you. Now, on the 6th of May, did I talk to Tudjman or to
16 Boban, which?
17 A. You met with Boban.
18 Q. Boban wasn't the head of state of Croatia, but the head of
19 Herceg-Bosna; right?
20 A. Yes, and I believe he was president of the HDZ at that point as
22 Q. Yes -- well, yesterday -- let's look at this. Do you consider
23 the departure of Kljujic, as Izetbegovic's man, was a rift in the HDZ
24 when the HDZ remained with Boban, stood by Boban, and you said that
25 Kljujic, the good Kljujic left and the bad Boban stayed. So we
1 negotiated with the official majority HDZ party; right?
2 A. Yes, you negotiated with Tudjman's man, the person that Tudjman
3 had put in charge of the HDZ in Bosnia
4 Q. Very well. Well, let's not go into that. I told you that Boban
5 won the elections, he wasn't appointed by Tudjman, but never mind.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this into
7 evidence now, please.
8 JUDGE KWON: Should we mark it for identification?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, as usual.
10 I'd now like to call up 65 ter 00023, please.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Dr. Donia, with all due respect for you personally, I'm not
13 asking you for your political views. I'm asking you for your scholarly,
14 scientific views, to tell us what happened, not how you perceive it.
15 Here we have the Assembly of the Serbian People on the 27th of March, and
16 you know, I'm sure, that we managed to dovetail and co-ordinate the
17 constitutional principles of the Lisbon Agreement on the 18th of March
18 and a map as the starting point as the initial document; right?
19 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, the previous document will be
20 marked for identification as D301.
21 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour.
22 THE WITNESS: I just have to go back to one remark you made which
23 is false, Dr. Karadzic, and that is that Boban won the elections.
24 Stjepan Kljujic won the election on behalf of the HDZ in November of
25 1990, took his position in the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
1 remained in the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the Croat
2 representative I think until about December 1993. Boban never won an
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. I'm talking about the inter-party elections, that the HDZ was --
6 that the HDZ elected Boban. He was a respected leader, but that's not
7 the subject we're discussing now. Do you agree that object on the 18th
8 of March, that is to say that on that date the principles were
9 established according to which for all three communities certain
10 territories were recognised and that Bosnia would be composed of three
11 constituent units.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And may I have 65 ter 142, may I
13 have 65 ter 142, please, first, the 18th of March.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. And that all remained to be dealt with was the map and the
16 question of the army; otherwise, all the other principles were agreed
17 upon. 1492 is the document I'd like to see before we look at this 27th
18 of March document. And I apologise for stating the wrong number. 65 ter
19 1492 is the number.
20 Is that right that the first stage of the conference was
21 completed on the 18th of March by dovetailing and agreeing upon the
22 constitutional principles?
23 A. Without seeing the document, I can't agree with that. I think
24 that probably the authoritative expression of your understanding of that
25 agreement on the 18th of March is found in the opening pages, your words,
1 in the 11th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, in which you repeatedly
2 emphasised to the delegates that this was a negotiation still in
3 progress, that the principles that had been agreed upon were quite
4 limited, and that everything was, in effect, on hold. It was all
5 expressed as something would happen, a state would be established, areas
6 would be defined. And, in fact, when the issue came up of a -- the state
7 becoming independent, you bragged that you had persuaded the other
8 participants in the conference to adopt the language that it would be a
9 state rather than it will be a state.
10 So I don't think you're -- I don't believe that your
11 representation of this agreement during the war was accurate, and I don't
12 think your characterisation of it now is accurate. I think you were much
13 closer to the mark when you described it at great length to the
14 Bosnian Serb Assembly I think on the day after -- two days after the
15 actual agreement was reached.
16 Q. Thank you. But let's not stick to my words or your words
17 necessarily, but let's see what the document says and the words in the
18 document. And this is what it says, what the document says. It was
19 agreed that Bosnia
20 people move out before an agreement was reached. I could not have done
21 that nor would I have. So let's look at page 1 and then we can move on
22 to page 2 to see what was envisaged for the constituent units.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 2 for the English.
24 And we're going to tender this into evidence, but let's look at page 2 in
25 English, "the constituent units." Let's see what their powers would be.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. This is what it says -- well, it enumerates what they would be
3 doing and then below it says:
4 "The police, trade organisations, economic aspects, [In English]
5 constituent units may establish and maintain relations and links with the
6 other republics and with organisations in them, provided that these
7 relations and links are consistent with the independence and the
8 integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
9 [Interpretation] And on the next page in English, please, it goes
10 on to say, number 4:
11 [In English] "All institutions (the civil services and judiciary,
12 and so on) established by a constituent unit would reflect proportionally
13 the national composition of the constituent units."
14 [Interpretation] That was 3. And the next one says:
15 [In English] "Members of the nations who would be in a minority
16 in a particular constituent unit would receive protection similar to that
17 in Article 2.3 of the draft Convention."
18 [Interpretation] Do you say that we didn't celebrate this in the
19 media, we and the Muslims, and the Muslims celebrated it even more than
20 we did I believe; right?
21 A. I wouldn't say so, no.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender that into
23 evidence and to look at 1D47 next, please.
24 JUDGE KWON: I think this has been already admitted as
25 Prosecution Exhibit 782 through Ambassador Okun.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 May we have 1D47 next, please.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
4 Q. I think you said that I said it was a great day for Bosnia
5 that Bosnia
6 effect, quoting me somewhere?
7 A. I think your narcissism is showing. I don't believe I ever said
9 Q. Thank you. Well, you could be a psychiatrist, more perhaps than
10 a historian. Let's see what Ajanovic says here on behalf of the Party of
11 Democratic Action:
12 "The Muslims are satisfied with the statehood agreed upon." And
13 now they believe that they will remain -- well, that they'll be a very
14 small number in any minority. Now -- Ah, there is a translation. This
15 is a statement by the vice-president of the Party of Democratic Action,
16 he was a deputy in the federal parliament and his name is Irfan Ajanovic
17 and he's celebrating. He says that the Muslims fared far better than the
18 Serbs did. Did you know of this statement made by Ajanovic and their
19 general attitude and standpoint on the 19th of March?
20 A. This in no way represents a general viewpoint of the SDA, and I
21 have to say that I think that in the days immediately following the
22 agreement and principle that you just cited, which wasn't signed by
23 anybody and only represented an agreement amongst the party heads, that
24 in the days after that just about every party had very widely differing
25 views on the agreement itself. There was some disagreement within the
2 of opinion within the SDA about the wisdom of the agreement. And, in
3 fact, at a -- some sort of congress or party meeting within a few days
4 afterwards, the party expressed its dissatisfaction with the agreement.
5 There were some people who I think on every side, who felt it was a very
6 positive agreement and a good step forward. And many people in all three
7 national parties who felt it was not a good idea and it was strongly
8 opposed by many people in the opposition. So there was, I think, a wide
9 variety of responses to the agreement, a lot of concern about the numbers
10 that you just cited, about essentially half the population of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina being left in areas in which they would be under the
12 political domination of another group, and the very principle of
13 division, which is something that the SDA itself came to oppose.
14 JUDGE KWON: Doctor, is this "Politika"?
15 THE WITNESS: I don't know. It looks like it.
16 JUDGE KWON: Is there a magazine as well, a "Politika" magazine?
17 THE WITNESS: I don't believe there was.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, it's "Politika," if I may
19 be of assistance.
20 JUDGE KWON: You're not giving evidence, Mr. Karadzic.
21 Was Ajanovic a spokesman of the SDA at the time?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, he was.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. I'm asking you, Mr. Donia, whether you knew that the SDA had
25 stated that, the officials of the SDA. In the evening they accepted, and
1 the next day they stated this? Yes or no. There's no need for you to
2 explain to me what happened with the agreement. We'll get to that. Did
3 they celebrate and did I celebrate that agreement and did the Croats
4 celebrate that agreement?
5 A. I don't believe that any side unanimously celebrated the
6 agreement, no. As I say, I think there were people who were very happy
7 about it, others who were unhappy, and it didn't take very long for the
8 SDA to come to fairly unanimous -- close to unanimous feeling that it was
9 not a sound basis for further negotiations.
10 Q. Is this what they stated on the 19th? That is what I'm asking
12 A. Is that what they stated?
13 Q. Is this their official statement, and may I draw the attention of
14 all participants to the second paragraph:
15 [In English] "The Serbian Assembly would reject tonight's
16 agreement with Jose Cutileiro. Ajanovic commented in his own way by
17 saying that that would be the latest ridiculous act coming out of the
18 Serbian kitchen. 'In that case it will become clear as to who is not for
19 peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and who is cheating the European
20 Community and the Chairman of the Conference on Bosnia,' said Ajanovic."
21 [Interpretation] Ajanovic says that if the Serbian Assembly does
22 not accept that, everyone will see who it is that is cheating the
23 European Union, who is trying to deceive the European Union, and who is
24 in favour of war and who is not. Is that not what he said?
25 A. Given that this is "Politika" and they actually didn't carry the
1 full text of his statement, they just carried a couple of exerts from it,
2 I would say I'm not sure that that's the case, no.
3 Q. Do you have proof that "Oslobodjenje" carried something different
4 and that he had not said this?
5 A. I'm not the one with the documents, Dr. Karadzic. I don't know.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document admitted
8 for identification, and I'd like to call up 1D47 -- sorry, sorry, 47,
9 this is 47. I'd like 49.
10 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?
11 MS. EDGERTON: No objection, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE KWON: We will be admitting that document. I think --
13 THE REGISTRAR: As exhibit --
14 JUDGE KWON: We don't need further translations. That will be
16 THE REGISTRAR: As D302, Your Honours.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm sorry, there is a
18 translation. So 1D49.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Donia, this is one week later. That is what you had referred
21 to. "Politika," again on the 26th of March. Nervousness in the SDA on
22 the eve of the Brussels
25 [In English] "In response ..."
1 [Interpretation] The second paragraph:
2 "In response to the journalist's question why his party had
3 recently accepted the agreement from Sarajevo, Ajanovic had responded
4 that that was, conditionally speaking, a political game to ensure
5 international recognition of a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this
6 relation he said that his party did not want to reject the Sarajevo
7 Agreement because it would possibly be blamed for the end of the talks
8 under the supervision of the European Community, and the balance of power
9 was three against one 'against the Muslims,' SDS, HDZ, and the EC were in
10 favour of Bosnia and Herzegovina remaining within its present borders,
11 but provided that it is transformed territorially."
12 Do you say that he did not say that?
13 A. I simply point out it's "Politika." As we sit here, a Serbian
14 service called E-novine is re-running "Politika's" coverage of events on
15 the eve of and early in the war with the sole purpose of showing how
16 absurdly one-sided "Politika's" coverage was. And I think that alone
17 should caution against taking anything that appears in "Politika" from
18 that time with severe skepticism. And in the -- in this particular case
19 you have again a story with a contentious headline, very limited
20 quotations from the persons concerned, and obviously a political
21 viewpoint being espoused in the article. So, on that basis, I can't
22 agree with your proposition that that's what he said.
23 Q. I'm not asking you to agree with my propositions. Is this what
24 Ajanovic had stated, that he was buying time and that he had deceived the
25 Serbs and the European Community? Is that not right? And you have that
1 in "Politika" too. However, you did rely on "Politika" when you quoted
2 Kadijevic and others. There are a lot of citations from "Politika" in
3 the footnotes in your paper. I'm just asking you the following: Are you
4 aware of the fact that Ajanovic said that they were buying time and that
5 they deceived the European Community and the Serbs, yes or no, "Politika"
6 has nothing to do with that. Give me a direct answer to my question.
7 You're trying to evade it.
8 A. And your question was what?
9 Q. My question is whether Ajanovic stated on the 19th they were
10 happy, that they fared well, and that the Serbs would be blamed, and a
11 week later he's the one who actually deceived them. Are you aware of
12 that statement, yes or no?
13 A. No, I don't have the basis for concluding that he said that.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Well, Mr. Donia, you are totally ruining your own credibility.
18 Is that right or is it not right?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm just asking him is that right
20 or is that not right.
21 JUDGE KWON: No. No, it was not a question.
22 Dr. Donia.
23 THE WITNESS: No, you're doing pretty much doing what I expected
24 you to do. And I think my responses are appropriate to someone who's
25 using increasingly tendentious and biased sources to try to make the
1 points he's making.
2 JUDGE KWON: Given that the whole passage is not translated,
3 we'll mark it for identification. So that will be marked for D303,
4 marked for identification.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we remove the English version
6 so that Mr. Donia can see what is written in the second part of this text
7 on this page.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Mr. Donia, doesn't it say here that "so far over 1.000 shells
10 have fallen on Bosanski Brod," just that, yes or no?
11 A. Is your question: Does the headline state that?
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. The headline says that, yes. You read it very well.
14 Q. Thank you. Do you know what happened on the 25th -- or actually,
15 let me be more specific. Do you know that on the 25th of March in
16 Bosanski Brod, armed formations from Croatia killed a father and a son at
17 a gasoline station, yes or no?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Do you recall that on the 26th, the next day, this same column
20 went on unhindered to Sijekovac and massacred entire Serb families there,
21 everyone they could lay their hands on?
22 A. I'm not certain that it was the same unit or column as you call
23 it. I certainly am aware of the events at Sijekovac and you're
24 absolutely right, that was a brutal slaughter and one that deeply
25 unsettled the political situation in Bosnia at that time.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us remove this sheet of paper.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Did you quote "Politika" in your report?
5 A. I -- well, you said I did. I don't recall quoting "Politika,"
6 but I'm not absolutely certain that I didn't quote it in the report on
7 the formation of Republika Srpska. I don't have it in front of me, so if
8 you'd like to give it to me --
9 Q. Thank you.
10 A. -- I'll be glad to give you an answer to the question.
11 Q. We'll be losing time that way and the Trial Chamber can see that
12 for themselves.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender 49 -- or has it been
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Can we now have 00023, that's the 65 ter number.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Donia, I believe that this session, the 14th Session of the
20 Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia-Herzegovina of the 27th of March is
21 something that you are quite familiar with, yes or no; am I right?
22 A. I'm familiar with it.
23 Q. Do you agree that at that session, the Assembly established a
24 council for national security?
25 A. As -- that's my recollection, yes.
1 Q. Do you agree that at that Assembly session the constitution of
2 the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have page 8 in English.
6 We'll try to deal with this as briefly as possible. I would like
7 to draw the attention of all the participants to my entire speech at that
8 Assembly session, but we don't have more time now. So it's page 8 in
9 English. "Before God," can we find that section, "before God and all men
10 we stand ..." where there's a reference to God. That's the paragraph.
11 JUDGE KWON: I see a passage that "we are clean before God ..."
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's it. It's the previous
13 page. We should have the previous page on the screen. Page 7 in
14 English, please. The last paragraph:
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. [In English] "We stand straight and pure before god! We wanted
17 no division. We did not want the destruction of the things we had in
19 [Interpretation] Now, there's no need for me to read it. Anyone
20 can read this. What I'm doing is recapitulating our crisis, the crisis
21 that culminated, we reached an agreement on the 15th. Mr. Donia, from
22 the 15th of October, when we left the Assembly, did we remain open to a
23 political solution?
24 A. I'm glad you got to the point where you're pure before God and
25 God is on your side. I think this is a very revealing passage about your
1 position at that point. I think you continued to engage in talks up to
2 that point, even as you were rapidly propelling the SDS and the various
3 local municipal organs toward war.
4 Q. Since you are giving all these moralist and political and
5 psychiatric comments more than scholarly, yesterday you said that
6 Variant A and B were not responsive to this massive organisation of the
7 Patriotic League. Would the right kind of response have been had we
8 created a Patriotic League of our own?
9 A. Well, you had an armed formation by that time, which was the SDS
11 Q. What was that?
12 You are saying something that is false, Mr. Donia. You could not
13 have mentioned any in your papers except from a few from Serbia that came
14 as guests, as it were. Do you know what their actual numbers were, those
15 that had come from Serbia
16 A. I hear about four questions here and a couple of accusations --
17 Q. You're the one who's levelling accusations, Mr. Donia --
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, wait until you hear the answers from
19 Dr. Donia.
20 Let's proceed, Doctor.
21 THE WITNESS: Could you kindly ask either one question or make
22 one accusation, and I'll be glad to respond to it.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. The question is: Why in your paper could you not have
25 mentioned -- or rather, you mentioned Croatian and Muslim paramilitary
1 formations and not a single Serb paramilitary formation except for a few
2 that came as guests from Serbia
3 A. I don't know that I used the word "guests from Serbia
4 I wrote a paragraph or perhaps two about the multiple military and
5 paramilitary formations that were being created on Bosnian soil and gave
6 a number which I took from Susan Woodward's estimate of -- along with the
7 comment that there were paramilitaries being formed by every national
8 group in Bosnia
9 JNA was at that time, had been for a long time, the dominant and decisive
10 military force in the area. And I believe I also referenced the fact
11 that it had become a -- kind of an open organisation to any and all
12 volunteers that were either mobilised by Serb municipal authorities or
13 otherwise recruited in conjunction with your efforts on behalf of
14 Milosevic to add strength to the JNA in Croatia.
15 That's my recollection of what I wrote. Again, if we're going to
16 talk about what I wrote, I'd really like to have it in front of me so
17 that I don't have to speculate on stuff I wrote five years ago.
18 Q. I'm going to remind you. We're going to find that now. You said
19 what it was that the HDZ had established, what the SDA had established,
20 and that includes the HOS and the Green Berets and the Patriotic League.
21 For the Serbs you said in Bosnia-Herzegovina that some groups from Serbia
22 had come to them, but you could not mention the name of any Serb
23 paramilitary formation in Bosnia-Herzegovina; right? Can you mention one
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
1 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Hello, Your Honour. I've -- given that Dr. Donia
3 has just asked to have his report in front of me, I just wanted to note
4 that I have all three of them on offer and that may assist all of us in
5 being able to identify which passages or reports, indeed, we might be
6 referring to.
7 JUDGE KWON: I think he has answered -- the witness has answered
8 to this question already.
9 Let's move on to your next topic.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Page 40, military preparations, Siege of Sarajevo, and then you
12 say that the SDA sponsored two paramilitary groups, the Patriotic League
13 and the Green Berets. Do you know that up until the beginning of the war
14 the Patriotic League had about 20.000 [as interpreted] people?
15 A. You know, I think yesterday you were complaining that I didn't
16 note these paramilitary formations by the SDA, and now you see that I
18 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I would like to reiterate my request
19 to have the paper in front of me if I'm being asked about its contents.
20 It's really --
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, by all means.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 120.000 is what the transcript
23 should say.
24 So it is the fifth chapter and the heading is "Military
1 JUDGE KWON: It's page 40 of your Sarajevo report.
2 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 I note the -- I note the -- the paragraph that we're in here does
4 indeed speak about the Green Berets and Patriotic League. I mention the
5 number of Muslim representatives selected by the SDA and in the formation
6 of the Council for National Defence, which we spoke about yesterday.
7 Mentioned HOS, which was, of course, a very important and very, I would
8 say, out-of-control and disruptive organisation that operated quite
9 freely in Bosnia
10 major force. And then mention several Serb paramilitary organisations
11 without giving them a name, and indicated with a reference to
12 Susan Woodward, who's about the most pro-Serb scholar one can find these
13 days, the reference about those paramilitaries.
14 The question of numbers at any point along the time line here is,
15 for me, really unknowable. There are some estimates, as you noted, that
16 there were about 100.000 or 200.000 or some huge numbers of people in
17 these paramilitaries. I think it's really difficult to know. They were
18 probably much more conspicuous by some of their activities than by the
19 sheer numbers that one could attribute to them. In part because the
20 vector sort of changed after the war and a lot of people who were
21 commenting on the numbers had a great incentive to inflate the numbers of
22 people who were in these paramilitaries because they were trying to claim
23 credit amongst their co-nationals for the foresight of organising defence
24 and advance.
25 So I'm certainly open to looking at numbers, but to me the
1 question of numbers is real elusive.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have for a moment 65 ter
5 number 31670. Just one sentence. Let us have a look at just one
6 sentence. This is an intercepted conversation of mine with Radic, I
7 think. English page number 3. So we'll be going back to this Assembly
8 session soon, but let us just see this 31670, page 3 in English.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Here it says we do not have -- is this page 3?
11 [In English] "It's a matter for the army. We -- we, our party
12 doesn't have an army, and if any of our members want to defend the
13 country, we are asking them to join the army."
14 [Interpretation] This is the 11th of November, 1991. I'm talking
15 to Radislav Vukic, and later on Predrag Radic and Brdjanin. Radic was
16 the mayor of Banja Luka. So you see on the 18th of November, when --
17 while conducting this private conversation I'm telling my associates who
18 wants to defend the country should join the army. Apart from the
20 formations - is it not true that you cannot mention a single Serb
21 paramilitary organisation in Bosnia
22 A. I think this intercept is very consistent with what I've stated
23 to be the case, namely, that the SDS
24 recruiting, and putting volunteers into the JNA in response to your
25 urging and -- which was in turn a response to Milosevic's urging to
1 bolster the JNA's war in Croatia
2 Q. Is that illegal, Mr. Donia? You are wasting my time --
3 A. I would like to just point out that also at this time you were
4 making sure that the people in the Bosnian Krajina were not themselves
5 about to go off and march on their own to join the war in Croatia. And
6 that was very critical, I think, to maintaining the position that you
7 were trying to bring the JNA onto your side to effectively become the
8 army of the Serb people; and on the other hand trying to avoid formation
9 of a separate Serb army.
10 Q. Look at this. When I refer to Tudjman, that is 23:
11 [In English] "It is out of the question to base our policies,
12 base them on criminals, let Tudjman do that."
13 [Interpretation] Dr. Donia, just one question, do you believe,
14 yes or no, do you believe that my support to the regular federal army was
16 A. I don't know.
17 Q. Thank you. You don't know. Fine.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us tender this document,
20 JUDGE KWON: I don't think the last passage you read out is not
21 correctly reflected because you abruptly changed from Serbo-Croat to
22 English. So what you said is: "It's out of the question to base our
23 policies, base them on criminals ..." that's the passage.
24 And then we'll mark it for identification.
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this makes Exhibit D3 -- MFI D304.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. It exists in Serbian and English:
4 [In English] "It's out of the question to base our policies, base
5 them on criminals, let Tudjman do that."
6 [Interpretation] Thank you. Now may we go back to that Assembly
7 meeting, 00023 is the 65 ter number. Now I would like to ask you to
8 focus on Radovan Karadzic's speech because there we have a recapitulation
9 of everything, everything we experienced from the elections to the point
10 in time when the Muslim side, or rather, the SDA reneged on what we had
11 agreed. Do you see that in this speech I still hold out hope that there
12 won't be a war and that an agreement will be reached. I'm sure you're
13 familiar with that speech of mine. And I'd like us to look at page 8 of
14 the English, please.
15 Or rather, may we turn to page 20 in English and then 21, and I
16 hope -- no, this is fine, actually. It says:
17 [In English] "We cannot comprehend how they dared to reconcile
18 with the Ustashas, the Muslim people, who rose against the Ustashas
19 during this war ..." [Interpretation] The Second World War that is,
20 [In English] "with the expectations [sic ] expectations, however, which
21 were not few in number. There were many exceptions. But the
22 dictatorship prevailing in the mass media is such that their voices
23 cannot be heard. One cannot hear Zulfikarpasic who does not even dare to
24 live here. The voices of Galijasevic's and Hasan Delic's, Yugoslav
25 Muslim organisation, are quiet. Prominent individuals cannot be heard
1 because the furry of those who have been and who are bent on attaining
2 their goals is horrifying and their revenge would surely be vented on
3 those whom they considered traitors."
4 [Interpretation] Did you notice this part of the speech, when it
5 says that no opposition from the SDA can be heard, that people, prominent
6 people such as Zulfikarpasic fled to Switzerland
7 continue living there?
8 A. Yes. I'm familiar with your speech as a whole, and again I say
9 it's been a while since I looked at it. But, I think this is what you do
10 best, combine these very proclamations of specific intent with some real
11 sabre rattling and efforts to discredit your political opponents.
12 Zulfikarpasic lived in Zurich
13 don't think he moved permanently to Sarajevo
14 1980s. I think your description here of what was happening amongst other
15 Muslims is just an invention. So I just see this as a very --
16 [Overlapping speakers]
17 Q. You're guessing now. You're guessing. What I'm asking you is:
18 Do you know that I said that?
19 A. [Overlapping speakers] ... proclaim what your understanding of
20 the situation was and effort to motivate people to support your position.
21 Q. Thank you. May we look at page 20 and then page 21?
22 JUDGE KWON: I take it, Doctor, you would be able to read the
23 transcript. Could you take a quick look whether some parts are missing
24 or not. Because of the overlapping of the accused, some parts of your
25 answer were not reflected.
1 THE WITNESS: Oh, I see what you're saying, Your Honour, I'm
3 JUDGE KWON: You were interrupted when you say, "I just see this
4 as a very ...," and you continued from, "What your understanding ..."
5 THE WITNESS: I think I was saying it was a very tendentious
6 representation of the position of those Muslims who were in opposition
7 parties, that -- at least words to the effect that these dissents were
8 perfectly free to exercise any opinions they wanted to, and this is
9 absolutely -- it's a fantasy, his description of what the situation was
10 with these people who were not in the SDA but were prominent Muslims.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 You may continue.
13 In the meantime, the previous intercept 31670 was already either
14 admitted or marked for identification as P4. So there's no need to admit
15 it separately.
16 Do you like to tender this minute, 23? 14th Session?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, certainly. It's a very
18 important Assembly session.
19 May we now look at page 20.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, let's go on then.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours --
22 THE ACCUSED: [In English] "A war in Bosnia." [Interpretation]
23 Penultimate paragraph:
24 "A war in Bosnia and Herzegovina will not solve anything. If it
25 breaks out, you will get the plans. But I urge you to immediately
1 organise the people within the Territorial Defence units headed by
2 reserve officers, form squads, platoons and Crisis Staffs, and engage
3 retired officers. This must be done throughout our areas.
4 "The presidents of the municipalities and Executive Boards will
5 hold the highest ranks in the Crisis Staffs in addition to reserve
6 officers. We must study the situation regarding the saving of lives,
7 property, and territory. We have no other plans."
8 So that is a response to somebody who is asking what happens when
9 a war breaks out, will we get some other plans. And I say that there
10 will be no other plans except to preserve and safe-guard lives, property,
11 and territory.
12 So I would like to draw your attention to the whole speech there,
13 but we can move on to page 21 now. The portion about the Crisis Staff is
14 there and there's another sentence which I would like to focus upon.
15 "We are certain that nothing can be achieved by war, that they
16 can't do anything to us. There are as many of us as there are of them,
18 "And according to our information, the Croats do not really
19 aspire to Serbian territories."
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. So here we're hoping that there won't be a war, but, Mr. Donia,
22 we propose the introduction of Crisis Staffs and strengthening the
23 Territorial Defence should we be attacked. Did you put that in our
24 [as interpreted] report, that it was only on the 27th of March that we
25 recommended that Crisis Staffs be introduced and that the
1 Territorial Defence should be strengthened?
2 A. I thought you had -- first of all, this is almost word for word
3 from the A/B instructions. It's obviously the pulling of the trigger to
4 actually go ahead and implement A/B, including the references to the
5 reserve officers, the assignment of military responsibilities to SDS
6 civilians. I don't think it could be any clearer. A little bit of a
7 sanitised version because it doesn't cite those specific provisions in
8 the A/B document which were offensive which were intended to seize the
9 resources of the municipalities and take-over institutions. But I think
10 that's -- that's pretty much what it is.
11 It seems to me also you have here the indication that you, the
13 basically agreed in principle here as much as a month and a half ago on
14 the principle of division, of re-ordering municipal boundaries, and
15 separating people one way or another through the use of governments,
16 coercive forces or force, and that you're now to the point where you and
17 the Croats have reached an agreement that there's not really a conflict
18 between the territorial claims that respectively you're initiating on
20 Q. When you say that are you taking into account that in 103
21 municipalities we have 13 staffs and 13 units and 9 -- 103 -- and 9
22 staffs at the Patriotic League with 120.000 armed Muslims? Are you
23 taking that into account or have you forgotten all that?
24 A. Oh, you don't address it here and I didn't address it in my
25 comment on this.
1 Q. And do I have to tell my deputies something we know about - and
2 we know about this -- and this is the question: Do you remember that the
3 difficulties of living with the Muslims I linked and tied to the
4 appearance of the fundamentalism phenomenon. Do you know that I linked
5 it up to the appearance of fundamentalism?
6 A. Yes, I think you did that starting shortly after the elections,
7 but it wasn't a major theme, as I see it, until about this time when you
8 were really starting to get much closer to the HDZ and Tudjman because
9 you really couldn't use that canard that the HDZ and the SDA were just
10 reincarnations of the Ustasha. That wouldn't work anymore when you were
11 trying to get together with the HDZ and the Croats. So the slogan of
12 Islamic fundamentalism sort of came to the fore as something that could
13 be an accusation that could be directed more specifically at the Muslims,
14 as you and the Croats came into an alliance.
15 Q. Thank you. For the moment I'm not asking your opinions. If the
16 Trial Chamber calls you back, then perhaps we'll go into that, but I'm
17 just asking you for yes or no answers.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I'd like to tender this into
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. And I'm going to ask you a few questions, Mr. Donia, because
22 you're not giving up on your sweeping statements that I see are
23 completely unfounded. Let me ask you this: Is it correct that the SDA
24 planned its projects based on Islamic and especially fundamentalist
25 regimes in the world? Just yes or no. Any answer will suffice.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender the previous
2 document into evidence, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: I think we can use the previous number. So it will
4 be Exhibit D304. Let's move.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Mr. Donia, were you asked to be biassed and politically
8 determined in writing your report? I'll accept any answer, either yes or
10 A. No.
11 Q. And were you asked to be objective and scholarly, with a
12 scientific approach?
13 A. I was asked to prepare an objective report on the topics within
14 the time-frame that the Prosecution specified.
15 Q. Very well. I have here a letter from the distinguished
16 Ms. Edgerton to you, which asks for you to do what you're asked to do --
17 well, it's your choice. It wasn't the OTP asking you to deal with
18 certain matters in one way or another, but it was your recommendation.
19 Yes or no? Is it your choice? Was it your choice to decide how
20 you were going to go about what you were asked to do?
21 A. No, it was subject of discussion between us, and I made certain
22 suggestions. She made certain suggestions. And in the end we agreed on
23 what it was that she would ask me to do.
24 Q. Were you asked to throw light on the events and to characterise
1 A. As best I recall, yes.
2 Q. Do you then think that this Trial Chamber is necessary at all
3 because you seem to have created the indictment and done the sentencing
4 and the judgement?
5 A. I think the trial --
6 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, that's simply a comment. You know
7 very well that this is an expert witness. If you don't agree with what
8 he wrote in his report, that's all very well and you can challenge it.
9 But making comments like this is simply wasting part of the little time
10 you have left.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Now, were you able to throw light on every phenomenon, incident,
15 and so on? Were you successful in that?
16 A. No.
17 Q. And for the most part, do you think that you elucidated matters
18 and characterised them properly?
19 A. Well, as I indicated, we were talking about methodology. I
20 attempted to identify what I believe were the major trends and
21 developments of the time, elucidate them, show what -- at least some of
22 their causes were, and track the development of them. That obviously is
23 a process that relies heavily on individual events and episodes, but
24 doesn't pretend to cover all of them comprehensively.
25 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that at the beginning of your report
1 you said that you wouldn't deal with constitutional and legal matters?
2 A. Which report are you talking about? I --
3 Q. The work -- one of the works -- well, at the very beginning I
4 think you said when we came to the origins of Republika Srpska, you said
5 you wouldn't deal with constitutional and legal matters because you
6 weren't a constitutional and legal expert?
7 A. Words to the effect of -- to that effect, yes.
8 Q. Thank you. Now, in all this, did you ever hear the other side,
9 what the other side had to say? The audiatur et altera pars from Roman
10 law, so did you hear what the altera, other side, had to say?
11 A. What other side are you talking about?
12 Q. Well, the Serb side that stands accused. Did you hear that side
13 and take into account what that side said?
14 A. I spent a couple of months going through the Bosnian Serb
15 Assembly sessions and many of the intercepts. I think I spent a lot more
16 time listening to what the Bosnian Serb position was than I did the
17 positions of any of the other sides, either the SDA or the HDZ or the
18 sort of civic opposition, democratic opposition. Certainly made every
19 effort to obtain an understanding of what the Bosnian Serb position was.
20 Q. Thank you. Well, you said that the Serb actions were
21 coincidental with the Muslims -- coincided with the Muslims. Now, did
22 you establish and differentiate which of those actions of ours were
23 simultaneous and coincided with the other sides and what actions the SDA
24 took and when?
25 A. Well, I think I've said this before in answer to -- basically the
1 same question is I noted that you had said this on two different
2 occasions, that you waited for Alija to take a step and then you took a
3 step. So there was, a way you described it, kind of a pre-established
4 course of action that would be triggered by some action on the part of
5 the other side. And I think some of these are almost self-evidently
6 apparent. The manner in which you declared the preparations for a
7 Bosnian Serb state on the 21st of December and indicated it would be
8 contingent upon the decision on independence or recognition of
9 independence -- I mean, now I think was pretty clearly a statement -- a
10 preparation waiting for the triggering event and then going ahead with
11 the actual event.
12 I honestly didn't bother to or I didn't go through and identify
13 what the triggering event was in each case. As I say, I think in some
14 cases it was pretty evident and in other cases it was not. You spoke
15 about eight or ten incidents. I didn't really see that many incidents in
16 which that was the case, but you had said it so I chose to believe you.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's time to take a break. We'll
18 resume at 4.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 3.38 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 4.03 p.m.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I wonder if I could just speak to
23 you on again a small administrative matter essentially relating to an
24 exhibit we dealt with yesterday or a proposed exhibit, 1D01362. And that
25 was what we -- that document was an extract from a publication and
1 Dr. Donia had questioned the authenticity of this. So we undertook to
2 try and locate it in house. I addressed, Your Honours, and said we
3 hadn't found the transcript, the original transcript, from which this
4 publication was excerpted, and I just wanted to confirm that, but one of
5 my industrious colleagues has continued looking and found minutes, not
6 the transcript, but minutes of the meeting in question which -- I was
7 advised of this while we were sitting here in court today, which we
8 disclosed immediately to Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Robinson, in the event it
9 would be of some assistance.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 Let's proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Donia, in your works -- or let me say that there are
15 differences between your books and your other works on this same subject,
16 yes or no? Are there things that are included in the books but that you
17 haven't included in this report or let me say expert report?
18 A. To be sure, yes.
19 Q. Thank you. Now, is it correct that you said more there than you
20 did in the report?
21 A. Depended a little on the topic I would say. The book is or the
22 books are probably more voluminous, if you will, much longer, move closer
23 toward being more comprehensive and at the same time cover much longer
24 time-periods than the reports I've submitted for this case. So in some
25 sense -- in some areas they are fairly superficial in terms of their
1 treatment of the events that we've been talking about the last, I think
2 it's three months now, and at the same time in some areas may be more,
3 let's say, put into a lengthier chronological context.
4 Q. Thank you. In your book "Sarajevo, the biography of a city," on
5 page 340 and 341, did you write the following:
6 "For months the operatives of the BH army hid the gunpowder in
7 oxygen containers which the UN transported and which were officially
8 intended for the city hospitals ..." et cetera, or words to that effect.
9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note they don't have the
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Is that right?
13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
14 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Perhaps I could just ask for the volume of the
16 book because I'm looking at page 340 and 341 and I don't see that.
17 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, there's an English and a Bosnian
18 translation of the book, so I suspect you're looking at the English,
19 whereas Dr. Karadzic was looking at the Bosnian.
20 JUDGE KWON: If Doctor is able to answer the question without
21 referring -- looking at the actual text of the book, please.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did write those words, yes.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. And in that same paragraph, do you testify and say that you saw
25 the secret throwing in of weapons from Iran and other Muslim countries
1 and that the scope of those operations is difficult to evaluate,
2 et cetera?
3 A. That's my recollection, yes.
4 Q. You don't say that in your study. You didn't include that in
5 your report, did you?
6 A. I know I did not include the story of the oxygen containers in
7 the report. I don't recall whether I may have referenced the import of
8 weapons from Iran
9 if ...
10 Q. Thank you. Now, on page 345 and 346 of the Serbian version you
11 describe an incident which occurred on the 27th of May and you stated
13 "The Army of Republika Srpska shot three mortar shells in
14 Vases Miskin Street in the bread line ..." et cetera.
15 Why don't you describe that in your report?
16 A. Again, I have tried to put these things in a -- in a narrative
17 flow and in -- or to moving from writing this in a book format to
18 preparing the expert report, I tried to be pretty circumspect in terms of
19 what I included as being directly associated with the causation and
20 development of the events I was describing. I don't specifically
21 remember as I was writing weighing putting that in or not. It was my
22 intention in the report to capture the broad sweep of events, and I guess
23 that just didn't quite come to the level of meeting the criteria that I'd
24 set out.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, did you say that the Army of
1 Republika Srpska shot three mortar shells?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's what Mr. Donia said,
3 claimed, but it's well an incident and we claim the exact opposite. And
4 as it's not believable the way he put it, that's why it's not in the
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Now, on page 351, page 3-5-1
8 "Nonetheless, during the year of poverty in which the citizens
9 were afraid daily, the -- they realised -- the citizens of Sarajevo
10 realised that they were at the front line of bestiality ..."
11 THE INTERPRETER: Or words to that effect, interpreter's note.
12 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer that question, you may wish to
13 answer to the comment Mr. Karadzic made to my question.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, I would fully expect you to have a different
15 understanding of that event than I did. I know that that is a heavily
16 contested event in terms of the -- who actually fired the shots. I was
17 convinced sufficiently by the UN reports and other things that I was
18 seeing to include it in the book, but I didn't want it to -- and I didn't
19 want to enter it here in one of my reports and make it the subject of
20 dispute when I knew it would be disputed by you at other -- with other
21 witnesses and on other occasions.
22 JUDGE KWON: And coming back to the question.
23 THE WITNESS: Okay.
24 Now, this is -- I frankly don't remember this sentence. If you
25 have a page or something that I could look at, I have a feeling there may
1 be a translation issue in that "the citizens of Sarajevo realised that
2 they were at the front line of bestiality ..."
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Page 351 --
5 A. And you have -- I don't have a copy of the book in front of me.
6 Q. In Serbian the page is 351.
7 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to put it on the ELMO or do you have
8 it in e-court? Otherwise, let's proceed.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Now, on page 352, did you write the following:
11 "In the months after the beginning of the siege, many Serbs left
12 the city as the shelling and sniper activity increased, and some of them
13 were killed at the hands of the Bosniak or Croatian paramilitaries
14 operating in the city. In Pofalic street or in the battle of Pofalic in
15 May 1992, the paramilitary units under the command of the BH Army killed,
16 incarcerated, and beat a certain number of Serbs."
17 As a historian, should you have established that certain number
18 of Serbs, what number it was exactly?
19 A. I think there have been a lot of efforts to establish the number
20 of Serbs who were killed in that assault and more generally in the city.
21 And I think there actually are some demographers who may appear in this
22 proceeding who have a better idea than I do of even what the approximate
23 numbers are. But unfortunately, there's been a kind of political
24 gridlock in the investigation process as -- and I have to say I don't
25 think it was entirely one side or the other. Either the Serb
1 Republika Srpska side or the Federation side that have stalled this
2 investigation into Serb deaths in Sarajevo and never really been able to
3 reach a satisfactory number. I wish I could reach a number that's even
4 an approximation.
5 Q. And is it clear that on the 15th of May, 1992, the paramilitaries
6 of the SDA attacked the Serb settlement of Pofalic, the civilians there,
7 and killed a certain number without mentioning the exact number? Is
8 there any doubt about who the attackers were and who the victims were,
9 yes or no?
10 A. Yeah, I think there's some doubt. Pofalici was a mixed
11 settlement, probably majority Serb, but there certainly is no -- there's
12 no evidence that I know of that all the victims were Serbs or that none
13 of the victims were non-Serbs.
14 Q. And did a single member of the BH Army -- was a single member of
15 the BH Army killed in this attack on Pofalici?
16 A. I don't know. I'm not characterising the attacking force as the
17 BH Army, I don't believe, but in any case I don't know what the
18 casualties were on either side and can't attest to their nationality,
19 although I believe the majority of the civilian casualties were Serbs.
20 Q. Thank you. These killings of civilians and detentions,
21 et cetera, civilians in Pofalici, is that a war crime?
22 A. I'll leave that to others to judge.
23 Q. Did you include this in your report?
24 A. I think I mentioned the Pofalici action in my Sarajevo report.
25 Q. Thank you. On page 353 did you write:
1 "Pejanovic is writing about a meeting towards the end of spring
2 1992 where prominent Serbs asked President Izetbegovic to stop mass
3 detentions of Serbs in the Kosevo stadium."
4 As for this mass detention of Serbs in Sarajevo, did you include
5 that in your expert report?
6 A. You haven't read it, have you? There's a whole section on that
7 incident in the report. I thought it was noteworthy and actually
8 elaborated somewhat on what I had put in the book, as I discovered
9 through investigating the periodical press that this basic account of
10 Mr. Pejanovic is accurate and that further details were provided in a
11 very candid story in "Oslobodjenje" right at the time that this occurred
12 and certainly was a factor in dissuading the government from allowing
13 this type of thing to take place again. So, yes, I did include it. I
14 elaborated upon it and would put it in again if I were to write the
15 report again.
16 Q. I know what you wrote. I just wanted a yes or no answer. Did
17 you write about the fact that no one was ever held accountable for that
19 A. I don't know that to be the case.
20 Q. You don't know whether anyone was held accountable for that?
21 A. You stated that: "... the fact that no one was ever held
22 accountable for that crime." I've stated: "I don't know that to be the
24 Q. Thank you. And on page 40 [No interpretation]:
25 [In English] "In invoking fears of renewed anti-Serbian genocide,
1 Bosnian Serb leaders relied upon the notion that the political foundation
2 of the Ustasha regime from 1941 to 1945 was being constituted in the
3 government of B&H 1991/1992. This premise reduced the complex alliance
4 and events of the Second World War into a simple story of collaboration
5 among Croats and Muslims against the Serbs."
6 [Interpretation] The other day you confirmed that you did know
7 that two SS Handzar Divisions had been established that consisted of
8 Muslims. What I'm putting to you now is that they were the most cruel
9 troops in Hitler's army. Did you think that that was an insignificant
11 A. Well, being the most cruel troops in Hitler's army is a pretty
12 low standard to set, and I do not believe that the -- this rather ragtag
13 bunch would qualify to be the most cruel troops in Hitler's army, no.
14 Q. All right. Did you believe that -- or actually, is it correct
15 that in your report Bosanska Krajina, on page 21, you said that German
16 occupiers had established a special unit of Muslim recruits called the
17 13th Muslim SS Handzar Division, and you omitted to mention that in the
18 beginnings of Republika Srpska or the origins of Republika Srpska. In
19 this way, the Trial Chamber would have viewed matters in a different
20 light. Yes or no?
21 A. What's the question? I'm not sure.
22 Q. Did you omit to refer to that in the origins of Republika Srpska,
23 what you had written in Bosanska Krajina in the history of Bosnia
24 A. It follows directly upon the sentences that you just read a
25 minute ago. It's on page 40.
1 Q. Do you believe that that was insignificant for the Trial Chamber
2 to know?
3 A. Dr. Karadzic, I can understand that you didn't read this
4 recently, but you just asked me a direct question about whether it's
5 there or not. I've told you it's there. It's on page 40. You can look
6 at it yourself if you like. It's included. I think the sentence is
7 somewhat different than I used in the Krajina report. I think it is a
8 significant fact to be included in explaining why the Second World War
9 and events, including the killings of many thousands of Serbs, did indeed
10 play a role in political revival -- the political revivals in the 1990s.
11 So there it is. I can't do anything more to draw your attention to it.
12 Q. Thank you. Thank you. On page 281 of Sarajevo: The biography
13 of a city. Did you write:
14 "Propagandists underrated the Bosnian Muslims, claiming that they
15 were Serbs of the Islamic faith who had betrayed the Serbian people and
16 who had conspired to create Bosnia
17 as its capital. They were presented as sexually immoral and cowards, as
18 second-rate citizens. Sarajevo
19 suggesting that vestiges of Ottoman repression had poisoned city's
20 life ..." and so on and so forth.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have the
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Are you saying that by saying that the Muslims are the same thing
25 as the Serbs that the Muslims are in that way being disparaged or
2 A. I'm afraid I don't understand the context here or don't recall
3 the context in which I made this statement, whether it was something out
4 of the Second World War or the propaganda assault on the Muslims that
5 came out of Belgrade
6 I was saying. It would help if you'd buy the book, Dr. Karadzic, but
7 failing that perhaps if I had a copy in front of me I could help more on
9 Q. Can you give us the name of one single Serbian propagandist who
10 would have said this kind of thing about the Muslims or who had written
11 or said something like this about the Muslims?
12 A. Once again I'll ask if I could see the context in which I said
13 this and I think I can relate it.
14 Q. Thank you. Do you know that Lord Owen said that the war in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina was a civil war between and among the Serbs of the
16 Orthodox faith, the Serbs of the Catholic faith, and the Serbs of the
17 Muslim faith?
18 A. I know that to be one of many characterisations that he gave to
19 the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I -- they must run into the hundreds.
20 Q. Thank you. Are you aware of the fact that Serbs are proud of
21 Serbs of the Muslim faith from Mehmet-Pasa Sokolovic to Mesa Selimovic
22 and all others, and that all of these Muslims are genuine Serbs and that
23 they're very popular among the Serb people and well liked too. I'm not
24 referring to living persons. I'm only referring to those from the past.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Is that really relevant?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if I may respond. Look at
4 all the things that are being referred to here, what the Serbs are
5 writing about the Muslims. What is relevant is to say that at a recent
6 poll Mehmet-Paso Sokolovic was near the very top with Nikola Tesla,
7 Prince Lazar, not to speak of Emir Kusturica, who is alive and well and
8 Mesa Selimovic, who is a renowned writer in Serbia. No Serbs ever spoke
9 of, in that way, of Muslims. So that is why it is relevant.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Isn't that right, Mr. Donia?
12 JUDGE KWON: Let's move on to your next question.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. On page 340 about this book about Sarajevo did you write:
15 "Undeterred by a lack of weapons, the units of Bosnia-Herzegovina
16 launched tens of offensives during the war with the intention of breaking
17 through the siege or repelling the forces of the Army of Republika Srpska
18 from the most vulnerable parts of town. They never managed to
19 breakthrough the siege, but they did take key positions in town and they
20 extended the territory that was under their control, especially in the
21 western neighbourhoods."
22 Is that what you wrote on page 340?
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have the
25 THE WITNESS: Yes.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Is that in your report, in your expert report?
3 A. I believe it is, yes. Certainly not in those words and same
4 formulation, but the -- I think I've actually described some of the
5 offensives launched by the ARBiH to break the siege and agreed
6 whole-heartedly with the notion that the city was defended.
7 Q. Thank you. What about Davy Crockett and --
8 A. He was not from West Virginia. I can tell you that.
9 Q. And Robin Hood, would you call them bandits?
10 JUDGE KWON: No. What is your next question, Mr. Karadzic?
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Why did you call Serb fighters against the Turks, those who
13 fought the Turks for 500 years, why did you call them bandits? You know
14 that we are proud of these fighters and that there is epic poetry that
15 speaks of that?
16 A. I think we're using the word "hajduk" in some -- yes, I think
17 that's a word that Serb nationalities and Serbs generally use with great
18 pride to describe the -- what they were, bandits, and they were, you
19 know, throughout various parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina particularly eastern
21 probably, the battle of Kosovo or possibly even earlier. And I think
22 that's -- this kind of mythology is true of most peoples -- the folk
23 literature of peoples of south-east Europe and elsewhere in the world.
24 So I don't see what's the problem. It seems to me a source of pride to
25 Serbs and to non-Serbs. I don't agree that these people always fought
1 the Turks. There were times where Serb fighters were fought in the
2 Ottoman forces on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, as well as at times
3 against it.
4 Q. Well, those are vessels, but the "hajduk" are the pride of the
5 Serbian people. If they do not correspond to Davy Crockett, who fought
6 against an occupation, they would correspond to the French resistance
7 movement. Would you call the French resistance movement banditry?
8 JUDGE KWON: No, let's move on here. I think you are coming to a
9 close, Mr. Karadzic. Ask your next question.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With your leave, Excellency, if we
11 do not get more time and if you do not fully reject Mr. Donia's report,
12 the Defence will consider this witness not to have been examined or
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Donia, did you find justification for all actions of the SDA
16 and to a lesser extent the HDZ?
17 A. Do you mean did I identify their -- the reasons that they cited
18 to undertake them? Is that your question?
19 Q. Did you identify them and did you find justification for their
20 sins, or rather, did you hold anything against them? Did you establish
21 any breaches on their part? Did you establish anything that they did
22 that contributed to the outbreak of the war?
23 A. Oh, I think I did, yes. I've been -- we've just been talking
24 about a number of things that I wrote about, some of them in the book,
25 some of them in the paper, some of them in both, which are clearly acts
1 that are -- were unhelpful in terms of the cause of war or the conduct of
2 war. And I don't shrink from that in the least. I think they must be a
3 part of the narrative that we as historians prepare about the war.
4 Frankly, I have to say I think that some of the documents that you've
5 submitted to me and to other witnesses will contribute to making that
6 narrative more -- richer. So when I talk about specific events,
7 certainly I've described the actions associated with the treatment of
8 Serbs in Sarajevo
9 identify all of them, but in general I've made the point that Serbs,
10 indeed, were suffering double jeopardy in the course of the siege. They
11 were being bombarded by you from the hills and they were being
12 discriminated against and some cases imprisoned and killed by
13 paramilitary forces within the city which were either Croat or Muslim.
14 Q. Thank you. You didn't identify anything else apart from that.
15 Is there a contribution to our suffering, ours and theirs during the war?
16 A. What are -- I'm sorry, what are you asking?
17 Q. So that's all that you identified is their contribution to our
18 suffering? You didn't find anything else to have been their sin?
19 A. I don't think that's not -- I don't believe that's true, no. I
20 went into some of these incidents in detail, but as a general rule noted
21 that the various parties were hard-lined in their pursuit of specific
22 interests and that contributed to the outbreak of conflict.
23 Q. Can we expect to get that from you, specified in some way, as you
24 specified all the things that you hold against the Serbs? After having
25 seen what you did and heard what you did from me and from other
1 witnesses, do you intend to expand your report?
2 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, Dr. Donia.
3 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, again that's comment and accusations
5 against Dr. Donia, albeit this time in a much more quiet tone of voice.
6 JUDGE KWON: I think Dr. Donia is capable of dealing with the
8 THE WITNESS: The answer I think is that I have addressed those
9 issues in the report, I'm sure not to your satisfaction and I'm sure not
10 in a way that portrayed this as a -- as the Serbs being lily-white pure
11 and exclusive victims of aggressive hostile actions by the other sides.
12 So I didn't address it the way, I'm sure, you want me to. But I believe
13 the essential story is there, and I have no intention at this point to
14 revise the report.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. All right. You said that the Croats had established first the
17 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna and then the Republic of Herceg-Bosna
18 because of the Serbs. Are you saying that they voluntarily gave up on
19 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, yes or no?
20 A. No.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that to this day that is what they are
22 seeking and that they are not giving up on their entity at all?
23 A. It depends on what Croats you're speaking of. There has been,
24 indeed, ever since the formal abolition of the Croatian Community of
25 Herceg-Bosna in 1998 some interest on the part of extreme nationalist
1 Croats within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to form a third
2 entity. At times that movement has been very active and won widespread
3 support and posed a considerable challenge to, let's say, the integrity
4 of the Federation and the ten cantons that made it up. But I think for
5 the most part it's been something that's been in the back of people's
6 minds and they focused -- Croat nationalists in Bosnia have tended to
7 focus their attentions on life in the individual cantons and also in the
8 Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Presidency.
9 Q. Thank you. Please, now just yes or no. Did they continue to ask
10 for their own entity in order to protect themselves from the Serbs?
11 A. Well, I've said some of them do not -- are not seeking their own
12 entity, and the reasons that those who are seeking their own entity are
13 various. They are, I think, demanding a territorial unit that is the
14 equivalent of the Republika Srpska and under the control of a single
16 Q. Thank you. In the entire activity of the SDA, did you identify
17 actions that pre-eminently led to the outbreak of war? Can you mention
18 some if you did identify any?
19 A. I don't -- you're not bringing me back to a point where I could
20 name you how I identified these things. I did discuss the SDA's role at
21 various points along the way, but my primary focus, of course, was on the
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, and the various activities that the
25 report. I wasn't trying to present a kind of a billiard ball account.
1 That's just the way I refer to these notions that if one group starts to
2 move in one direction, it automatically evokes a response, a
3 predetermined response from the other. I was rather trying to chronicle
4 the development of the Republika Srpska and the main thinking that went
5 into those people, including yourself who formed it.
6 Q. And do you consider that the Trial Chamber wouldn't benefit from
7 knowing what the other two sides did?
8 A. I'm not sure how much. I would certainly love to see someone
9 write a report comparable to the one that I did on the formation of
10 Republika Srpska and one on the behaviour of the various groups that were
11 contending for influence and power in the area of Sarajevo using the
12 documentation of all the other actors. It would be welcome to me. I'm
13 not too sure how much use it would be to the Trial Chamber, but I have a
14 feeling that it will fall to others, other than myself, to prepare
15 those -- that type of narrative because the documentation is voluminous
16 and it's a major undertaking. The reason I say that is the way in which
17 the history of the Second World War has come to be understood really goes
18 considerably to a historian, Professor Tomasevic, who wrote, in fact, of
19 the war from the point of view of the three major actors. I'd love to
20 see the same thing undertaken for the -- both the Sarajevo situation and
22 forward and do that.
23 Q. Thank you. However, the Trial Chamber must work in the meantime
24 and it won't have an overall picture. Can you tell the Trial Chamber of
25 the sins committed by the Muslim part of the authorities because we were
1 in the government too, a third of the government. What about the Muslim
2 part of the government, the sins committed by them which led to war?
3 A. I get the sense, Dr. Karadzic, that you're more than amply
4 testifying to the -- what you consider the sins committed by the other
5 sides. I don't know that I would use the word "sins," and I'm not sure
6 we don't have a translation issue there. But as I say, that's a bit out
7 of the purview of my report. I do try to bring it in, in terms of
8 talking about the controversies, the contests that the SDS fought, and I
9 do that both in the Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo
10 report and also in the origins of the RS report. But I think that my job
11 mainly is to illuminate the conduct and developments -- the conduct of
12 the Bosnian Serb Leadership and the developments that led to the
13 formation of the Republika Srpska in the case of the one report and the
14 Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo in the other report.
15 Q. Do you mean to say that you understood and that the Trial Chamber
16 will understand the acts of the Serb side without an overall
17 comprehensive integral picture, yes or no? Is what you've done enough
18 for the Trial Chamber to gain an impression of what actually happened
19 over there?
20 A. Well, I hope it is enough to enable them to gain an impression,
21 but it is, in a sense, designed to be a framework report. And I am sure
22 the Trial Chamber will dig much deeper into events and the issue of the
23 relative causes and contributions of various events to the principal
24 issues at -- that are contested in the indictment. So I view this as
25 just an introduction in no way comprehensive and not, in fact, intended
1 to enter into the decisions, judgements, that the Trial Chamber will make
2 regarding the case.
3 Q. Thank you. Did you include -- or rather, did you differentiate
4 between what Serb actions were legal and lawful and those that were
5 illegal and unlawful?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Thank you. Did you stipulate a single exculpatory circumstance
8 as far as the Serbs were concerned -- mitigating circumstance as far as
9 the Serbs were concerned?
10 A. Well, I think the excerpts report is in fact a rich collection of
11 statements by Serbs, explaining what they believed were the
12 justifications for their actions, and in fact by SDS members and by
13 yourself as president of the SDS
14 of what you would, perhaps as the attorney for yourself, characterise as
15 exculpatory evidence. I think we both agree that the Bosnian Serb
16 Assembly sessions provide an enormous amount of information about that
17 very topic, and I would hope that it will indeed be weighed by the --
18 anybody seeking to make decisions about exactly the circumstances you're
19 speaking of.
20 Q. But, Mr. Donia, the Serb positions and Serb words you subjected
21 to your own characterisations and they don't look good in your
22 interpretation; isn't that right?
23 A. Many of them do not. I think that the -- I haven't subjected --
24 in the excerpts report, I haven't subjected them to my own
25 characterisations. I have subjected them to my own selection. And
1 certainly you or anyone else can contest the selections that I made, and
2 I would actually expect you to. But the excerpts report is designed to
3 allow you and others to speak for yourselves in characterising the events
4 and causes of the time. That is the whole spirit in which the excerpts
5 report was prepared. It's why I, for example, in the chapter on
6 regionalisation provide a whole series of quotations from people over
7 time, SDS
8 about exactly what was going on with the municipal strategy or
9 regionalisation at that time. I think you've correctly identified what
10 the purpose and spirit of the excerpts report was.
11 Q. Thank you. Can you list the Serb moves that were legitimate,
12 legal, and justified from the elections to the outbreak of war? Can you
13 enumerate them because that was not set out? Could you tell us what it
14 was that the Serbs did with every reason and with every right?
15 A. Well, as I -- you elicited from me previously, and as I spelled
16 out in the preface to the report, my purpose in writing the reports was
17 not to judge what was legal, constitutional, or justified; it was to
18 describe as well as to identify causes. And I further believe that the
19 quest using the constitution and laws to determine what was
20 constitutional, legal, what was unconstitutional and illegal, is
21 something of an exercise in futility because the mechanisms either were
22 not there or were not used by the players at the time to determine what
23 was indeed unconstitutional -- unconstitutional or illegal,
24 constitutional or legal in the eyes of the appropriate courts or
1 So, no, I'm not going to do it now. I did not do it not report.
2 I'm not trying to enter into those judgements of black/white,
3 right/wrong. I'm trying to describe the course of events and account for
4 the reasons that things developed the way they did.
5 Q. Thank you. Would you then agree that the Trial Chamber should
6 not take into account all your characterisations about events as
7 contained in your report? Should they disregard them?
8 A. I'm confident that the Trial Chamber will take into account those
9 matters which they deem to be relevant to their decisions. I have tried
10 to, let's say, hit that target myself, but probably have opted on that --
11 in the direction of being more comprehensive, more descriptive, and more
12 all-encompassing than they will ultimately determine to be within the
13 field or within the world of relevant matters that they will assess.
14 Q. And did you identify any action of the Muslim part of the
15 authorities which led to war?
16 A. I think you're asking the same question but repeatedly in
17 different forms. I have not made those kinds of moral judgements. They
18 do enter the narrative in various ways, going way back to the elections
19 and the -- their relationship to the outbreak of war. I haven't put a
20 percentage on, I haven't attempted to do -- engage in a political science
21 exercise of testing various hypotheses about things leading up to the
22 cause of war. The situation really doesn't lend itself very well to that
23 kind of inquiry in any case, but I believe I've tried to or I have tried
24 to incorporate those events which directly impinged upon the ultimate
25 outbreak of conflict.
1 Q. Thank you. Now let's have yes or no answers, please. Did you
2 show sufficient understanding for the Serbs concerns and fears?
3 A. I have given you, I think, far more than most people frankly want
4 to read to try to capture what Serbs felt their concerns and fears were
5 at the time. That's the essence of the or one -- certainly one central
6 part of the excerpts report. And also figures in -- descriptively in my
7 other two accounts. I personally think the question of fears is a really
8 elusive one and difficult to, let's say, address empirically, although I
9 think it is one that needs to be less a matter of sheer speculation than
10 many people would assume. I think people make a lot of assumptions about
11 what fears were on the basis of sort of an intuitive feeling. And in
12 many cases they may be completely wrong about that. That's why I felt it
13 was important to let Serb delegates to the Bosnian Serb Assembly speak
14 for themselves, let you speak for yourself in the language of the time,
15 expressing -- and I assume that in most cases you were sincerely voicing
16 your viewpoint at that time about the concerns and fears that you had.
17 Q. Unfortunately we don't have the time to go through the Assembly
18 and your selections from the Assembly, but I hope we can have a yes or no
19 answer now. Is it correct that the Assembly exists so that through free
20 discussion it can pass decisions, acts, documents, like the constitution,
21 and so on. Does the Assembly exist in order to engender various acts and
23 A. I think that's its primary purpose, but it also exists to provide
24 a venue in which people can express widely differing viewpoints, issue
25 criticisms of the government, allow for delegates' questions, allow for
1 reports from the various ministers to the Assembly, and to issue
2 guide-lines for behaviour of the government leaders, including yourself,
3 or others, sometimes rubber-stamping them, other times genuinely molding
4 them after a pretty free and open debate. So I think it's fair to say
5 that you've characterised the purpose of the Assembly in a way that I
6 would agree with. I'd probably choose to make it a little bit broader
7 and or comprehensive, at least as I observed the function of the Assembly
8 through these, I think, 63 sessions.
9 Q. Now, in the Assembly -- Republika Srpska Assembly documents, did
10 you ever come across any extremist stands by the deputies mirrored and
11 reflected in the documents?
12 A. Certainly.
13 Q. And that that was unlawful; right? Well, tell us, go ahead, tell
14 us, what did you find?
15 A. Well, I find a growing extremism in the characterisation of
16 claims to Serb lands. That was something that I think began with the, at
17 least, assumption that Serb land consisted of the land in those
18 municipalities in which the Serbs held an absolute majority. But then in
19 the early, say, late winter of 1992, in particular at the -- I believe it
20 was the 11th Session, you kind of indicated that there was a quiet deal
21 made with one of the other sides, which certainly had to be the Croats,
22 that you agreed that land would be claimed by any group that held either
23 an absolute or a relative majority in the municipality. And then very
24 shortly thereafter, that definition was broadened to include the
25 definition of Serb land as anywhere where the plebiscite of November 9th
1 and 10th had been held. Then it was further broadened by the provision,
2 which eventually made it into the constitution, that Serb land also
3 included anywhere that Serbs had been the victims of genocide in the
4 Second World War. And finally you get to the era of the formalised six
5 strategic goals and see at the 17th Session that Serb land is defined by
6 a recommendation to the Assembly presented by Mr. Koljevic that was based
7 on the rivers specified in the strategic goals, plus a series of
8 mountaintops, rivers, river valleys, and cities which seemed to have no
9 relationship to the distribution of peoples in these areas. And I think
10 that -- the Bosnian Serb Assembly functioned as the venue in which these
11 increasingly expansive claims became more extreme. Yes, that's one
12 example I would say of an extremist stands that was deputy -- mirrored by
13 the deputies.
14 Q. I asked you whether you found a law, a law, or some other
15 document passed by the Assembly which was unlawful. Just yes or no.
16 A. That wasn't your question, Dr. Karadzic. I answered your
17 question and you can go back and see it. You're asking me if -- now
18 you're asking me if I found a law that was unlawful; is that right?
19 Q. [No interpretation]
20 A. I think that's a logical impossibility.
21 Q. Well, couldn't some of our laws be in contravention to
22 international law, for example?
23 A. They could be.
24 Q. Well, did you ever come across such a law or any other document?
25 When I say "act," I mean document produced by the Assembly, yes or no?
1 A. I never held any resolution or the -- any resolution, law,
2 proposal, or anything in the Assembly up against that standard. I
3 wouldn't be qualified to judge it even if I had.
4 Q. Thank you. A moment ago you described to us and said that the
5 Christian majority made up of the Serbs and Croats did not have the right
6 to hold consultations and agreements on a possible resistance to the --
7 an Islamic republic. But you're not challenging the right when that
8 majority was composed of Muslims and Croats, yes or no?
9 A. Okay. Just to understand your question: Am I challenging the
10 right of the majority to consult and reach agreements? No. I noted that
11 the agreement that was being pursued between the HDZ and the SDS
12 included -- basically it was being made by -- under the auspices of the
13 president of another neighbouring republic which had become an
14 independent state and that the -- when that agreement was made in Grac on
15 May 6th, 1992
16 a law or such an agreement was contrary to the principles that had been
17 established for the Conference of the former Yugoslavia of the European
18 Community. I think that's a somewhat different issue -- that we were
19 really talking about two different times in the first place, and once the
20 internationalisation of this occurred under the European Community there
21 were clearly different principles in play than existed at the time of the
22 Assembly session on October 14/15.
23 Q. Thank you. Now, taking into account the fact that any
24 negotiation involves giving up on some things, do you agree that many of
25 our statements, at the beginning of a process, were naturally more
1 extreme more tactical reasons, yes or no?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Thank you. Did you happen to notice or do you accept the fact
4 that some of our statements had as their goal to dissuade the SDA or the
5 HDZ from undertaking some of their actions, yes or no?
6 A. I would accept the fact that some of the statements had as their
7 goal or your goal to dissuade the SDA or the HDZ from -- to dissuade,
8 defer them from undertaking some of their actions, yes.
9 Q. Thank you. Do you know what the Islamic Declaration is by
10 Alija Izetbegovic?
11 A. At last. Yes.
12 Q. The Islamic Declaration, if it were to be put into practice, does
13 it envisage further modernisation of life in Bosnia and the convergence
14 of the three national communities or entities?
15 A. I'd like you to show me where it refers to Bosnia in the Islamic
17 Q. Every Islamic society is mentioned, every country in which
18 Islamic is sufficiently strong to carry out a revolution and to topple
19 the old order and establish a new one on Islamic foundations. Let me
20 help you out here. Do you remember how Izetbegovic defended himself in
21 1983 before the court in Sarajevo
23 Muslims, and it doesn't refer to Bosnia either because 39 per cent of the
24 population in Bosnia
25 the fact that it was Bosnia
1 A. Well, I'm not too sure exactly what the question is, but at this
2 point I think you've just acknowledged that neither Bosnia nor Yugoslavia
3 is referenced at all in the Islamic Declaration.
4 Q. Thank you. All territories inhabited by Muslims are mentioned.
5 Now, taking the Islamic Declaration again, does it envisage the
6 Muslimisation of the community; first of all, the Muslims and then the
7 whole community?
8 A. Your statement is false. It does not reference all territories
9 inhabited by Muslims. He probably refers to two to three dozen different
10 states, but he doesn't refer to Yugoslavia
11 now -- or if you look at the former Yugoslavia
12 population. So your -- the premise of your question is false. The
13 Islamic Declaration is basically the writings of a Islamic believer who
14 is seeking to find a middle way between the two trends in Islam at that
15 time which he felt were unwise. And one was the movement toward a modern
16 secular state, the model of which he found in Pakistan. And the other
17 direction that he deplored was the -- what we would probably characterise
18 today as the fundamentalist direction, in which the state functions are
19 all determined by Islamic law. And he tried to weave a -- sort of a
20 middle ground between these, remembering that this was written just after
21 the 1967 Middle Eastern war in which the Islamic countries of the
22 Middle East had suffered substantial defeats. And this had set off a
23 crisis, really, among Islamic thinkers about whether they should try to
24 modernise their societies to become militarily more effective or whether
25 they should return to a much more, let's say, pietistic reliance on
1 Islamic law.
2 Now, it's just helpful to look at what his statements are in the
3 light of that effort to determine or to lay out a middle path between
4 those two, what he considers, extreme options. And I would agree that he
5 makes statements in there in which he argues that Muslims should take
6 over a state if they reach a certain threshold of the population.
7 There -- as you read through it, I think you barely notice them at first,
8 but, of course, they have been highlighted, dragged out many, many times,
9 put on the internet and highlighted by Izetbegovic's critics from people
10 like you to Zulfikarpasic, and a whole bunch of other people to argue
11 that he was an Islamic fundamentalist.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have on e-court 1D1434.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. And let me ask you, Mr. Donia, I have been given permission, what
16 are your earnings at this Tribunal per hour? How much money have you
17 earned during your 15 testimonies here?
18 A. Thank you for the question, yes. I believe you were in the
19 United States in the mid-1970s, and if you watched television there was a
20 programme on featuring James Garner, it was the Rockford Files. And if
21 you recall in the early 1970s, James Rockford, who was a private
22 detective was paid $200 a day plus expenses. That's what I'm paid.
23 Those are days that I spend testifying, preparing for testimony, and
24 preparing the reports that I have submitted to you here.
25 Q. Thank you. Are you anti-Serb, Mr. Donia?
1 A. No.
2 Q. How come you joined this action against the Serbs, Noel Malcolm,
3 Marko Attila, then Branka Magas, Tom Gallagher, Smajo Cekic, Jasmin
4 Jahic, did you sign this letter that you see before you, this letter,
5 this open letter to the presidents of the International Court of Justice,
6 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and to the
7 Republic of Serbia
9 A. I do, indeed, recall signing this some -- several years ago.
10 There was a time when I actually was not certain that I had signed it,
11 but I do now have an active recollection of signing it. I don't consider
12 the document to be anti-Serb whatsoever. I think it is designed to or it
13 is intended to be a direct critique of the refusal of the ICJ to subpoena
14 the records of the Supreme Defence Council. I still believe today that
15 that was a grave mistake, still hold that position, and was willing to go
16 along with this group of people, most of who I know well and share at
17 least some views with, but some with whom I have some pretty sharp
18 disagreements in this particular letter.
19 Q. However, you did agree on this anti-Serb action. Is this
20 activism? Is this political activism, Mr. Donia? Or is this a scholarly
22 A. Well, I reject your characterisation of the action as anti-Serb.
23 I think in fact it's probably something that if it were done would be --
24 that is, if our critique here would be followed would be a pro-Serb
25 action because I think it would contribute to a more healthy environment
1 in Serbia
2 things that the Milosevic regime undertook in the course of 1990 to 1996,
3 1999 even. So, you know, I think the -- I don't know whether I would
4 characterise it either as political or scholarly. It is a protest letter
5 directed to a particular audience. As such, I think you could say, yes,
6 it has a political purpose, to influence behaviour, hopefully to urge the
7 ICJ or some other body to release in full the minutes of the
8 Supreme Defence Council. But it's something that was really done at the
9 same time in the interest of scholarship because I think the scholarship
10 will be better and richer if the full contents of those minutes are put
11 in the public domain.
12 Q. And do you think that you, as an expert and witness, should write
13 to the President of this Tribunal and to take a position? Because this
14 is, inter alia, sent to the President of this Tribunal too.
15 A. Yeah, I don't see -- I see no inherent ban on my participating in
16 an expression of such a view and in an open letter to the President of
17 the Tribunal, no.
18 JUDGE KWON: So, Mr. Karadzic, are you finished?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm interested in how many more
20 minutes I have left.
21 JUDGE KWON: I think you are almost finished, but how many more
22 minutes do you like to have?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to repeat the position of
24 this Defence, namely, that this witness touched upon so many topics in a
25 way that really calls for clarification. It is a fact that this paper is
1 one of the basic foundations of the indictment. We asked for those 40
2 hours, didn't we? I would like to say on behalf of the Defence and on
3 behalf of the accused that if these findings are not rejected, we will
4 need -- I mean, if we don't work longer now, if we don't get more time
5 now, we are going to suggest to bring Donia -- Dr. Donia back once again
6 in order to clarify certain matters that we will not be able to clarify
7 with others. Of course I would like to have his papers rejected because
8 they are partial, unprofessional, political, and we believe that this is
9 no expertise --
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, be practical. You have had so
11 far almost 21 hours for your cross-examination.
12 Let me come to Ms. Edgerton first. How long would you need for
13 your re-direct? There are some administrative matters at the end of
14 today's session.
15 MS. EDGERTON: About half an hour I think, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE KWON: Half an hour.
17 We'll have a break for 25 minutes now and then you will have 15
18 minutes to conclude your cross-examination -- 55 minutes.
19 --- Recess taken at 5.26 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 5.52 p.m.
21 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I was asked to clarify the meaning of 55
22 minutes which appears in the transcript. It should read 25 minutes, the
23 length of the break.
24 Mr. Karadzic, you have 15 minutes.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask you to admit 1D1434,
2 JUDGE KWON: It will be admit.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D305, Your Honours.
4 MS. EDGERTON: The English version of that letter that I see in
5 e-court isn't complete, so perhaps it could be marked for identification
6 subject to the entire English document being uploaded. I miss in the
7 English version several pages of signatories to the letter.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It was only of two pages, so -- but there
9 should be more.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, the Serbo-Croatian version is much longer
12 JUDGE KWON: All right. I don't think there's problem in getting
13 those translations.
14 Yes. For completeness we'll mark it for identification,
15 pending we'll get the full translation.
16 The original should be in English I take it?
17 MS. EDGERTON: So perhaps we could have the full original
19 JUDGE KWON: So with that understanding, we'll just mark it --
20 we'll just admit it in its entirety, but the understanding is that we'll
21 have the full document. That's D340?
22 THE REGISTRAR: That's Exhibit D305, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 1D1434.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 The Defence is also interested in having all the names there
3 because you're not going to find a single document with that many
4 anti-Serbs in one place.
5 JUDGE KWON: That's an unnecessary comment, Mr. Karadzic, and
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 I'd like to say something, Excellencies. What is left for us?
9 The entire activity of the Assembly, the Prosecution and the expert
10 cannot find a single Assembly document that went against the law, either
11 domestic law or international law. So many speeches, sentences, parts of
12 speeches were selected and used against us that it requires a great deal
13 of work to be done in order to bring things into context and view matters
14 in their entirety. Also, we haven't dealt with municipalities at all.
15 We haven't done anything in relation to the Siege of Sarajevo. Believe
16 me, our 40 hours was a conservative estimate. I don't think it would be
17 useful for me to open any of these subjects now that we could not deal
18 with properly. So I am giving this time back as a present. I know it's
19 unnecessary for me to say this but I can't resist. There wasn't even any
20 need to have any re-direct because Mr. Donia handled that on his own.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you need that 15 minutes at all?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, it is pointless for me to raise
23 any subjects without dealing them properly -- actually, I can ask him.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Donia, do you know that Rajlovac was a municipality before it
1 was included in Novi Grad?
2 A. I so reported in my report on the Sarajevo siege, yes.
3 Q. Do you know that in Rajlovac there was an important factory
4 called Orao for the overhaul of aircraft engines?
5 A. Yes, I do.
6 Q. Do you know that that factory and its revenues was the reason to
7 include Rajlovac and Novi Grad, and that the revenues went to the
8 municipality of Novi
9 A. I know no such thing.
10 Q. Why didn't you trust the people who said since we've been
11 abolished we have no schools, we have no sports centres, life has ground
12 to a halt, why didn't you believe people that their revenues went to the
13 municipality of Novi
14 their social institutions?
15 A. Well, I think I noted in my report that the nature of the
16 complaints from people who proposed to separate Rajlovac from Novi Grad
17 changed very much over time. It first -- and these apparently were
18 complaints prepared with some consultation or advice from SDS members.
19 The complaints began, as you've said here, that they had insufficient
20 schools, sports centres, roads, inadequate communication between
21 villages, and these general complaints that one often finds in rural
22 areas about underdevelopment vis-a-vis the urban centre. However, when
23 it came time to actually form the Rajlovac municipality, the argument
24 completely switched and the applicants said: We can become our own
25 municipality of Rajlovac because we have all the characteristics of
1 modern urban life. We have lots of schools, we have sufficient roads, we
2 have a well educated population, we have an economic base. So all the
3 things that it -- these applicants had started out with in, I believe,
4 early or sometime in summer of 1991 were completely reversed with the
5 arrival of February 1992. So which one is to be believed? I mean, I
6 think the -- we have to take both of them seriously, but I think they
7 reflect the changing thinking of the SDS leaders and others who were
8 promoting a separate Rajlovac and note that again the simple argument
9 that we're promoting regionalisation or a new municipality strictly for
10 economic reasons is probably -- probably not the sole reason that's being
11 brought into play.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D1384.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Donia, do you know what "papak" means in our Sarajevo
16 "Papak" as you know is a trotter, that is to say the foot of a sheep,
17 cow, et cetera.
18 A. Yes, the term kind of suggests a peasant of rural, uneducated,
19 unskilled person, whereas the opposite term, "raja" refers more to the
20 urban, more sophisticated, more-comfortable-in-an-urban-environment type
21 of person.
22 Q. And do you know what the original meaning of the word "raja" is?
23 A. "Raja" I think was a term for the sort of common people in the
24 Ottoman period.
25 Q. Common people, non-Turkish, non-Ottoman, that is to say for
1 slaves, Serbs. Mr. Donia, on page 32 you said that:
2 [In English] "The proclamation revealed that peasant nostalgia
3 has expressed for a bucolic rural life had been overtaken by the SDS
4 campaign to acquire the many resources of Sarajevo urbanised Western
6 [Interpretation] Bucolic is "papak" and someone had suggested
7 that to you, some of your informers from Sarajevo; right?
8 A. No. I deliberately stayed away from the "papak" "raja" dichotomy
9 because it does mean different things to different people, and it did, in
10 fact, become entwined in the political struggles of the early 1990s, but
11 I didn't want to use it because it has clear, let's say, value
12 connotations that I didn't particularly think were appropriate for the
13 phenomenon I was examining. Bucolic to me means both rural and peaceful,
14 tranquil, so I find this phenomenon of sort of people who have been let's
15 say caught up in or incorporated into an urban area, but retain much of
16 their -- or are struggling to retain their rural lifestyle, that's
17 actually a very widespread, common phenomenon in the course of these huge
18 urbanisation drives of the 20th century, and not just in Europe but in
19 many different societies, including the US. So I was trying to avoid a
20 value judgement here, and in fact describing this peasant nostalgia
21 movement as authentic. I mean, it may not have a valid basis in terms of
22 the economic arguments in all cases, but it nevertheless is something
23 that's understandable for people in that situation.
24 Q. Thank you. You were wondering who was right, those who said we
25 have nothing and those who said we have everything. Both are right. If
1 a municipality has its own revenue, then they have everything; and if
2 somebody else uses their revenue, then they have nothing; right?
3 A. No, I think you said it right the first time. They are both
4 right. They are coming at the problem from two very different, let's
5 say, interests. In the first instance trying to, let's say, they're
6 trying to recover a sense of their own, let's say, rural tranquility by
7 disparaging the lack of facilities and resources and then when they
8 actually want to argue that they are -- can be self-sufficient, then they
9 turn around and see, yes, we have all this stuff and we have a pretty
10 educated population, we have the potential to do much more. So we
11 believe that we qualify for this position. I don't believe that in the
12 long run either one of those arguments really was -- I believe that they
13 were employed by the SDS
14 to do because the outcome of that was a Rajlovac that was compact
15 territorially, included some important strategic resources, military
16 resources, including the Orao factory, and therefore was in accord with
17 the general SDS
19 Q. However, these people say that that is precisely why they were
20 abolished as a municipality, so that the Serb municipality would not
21 develop. Look at the last paragraph. You know our language and here it
22 says "trump cards in the economy":
23 "Economic potentials are the greatest trump cards of our
24 municipality. The military institute of Orao
25 organisation there. Our giant here from Rajlovac and our pride. The
1 distribution centre of Rajlovac is also a very strong company. The
2 former seat of the UPI ..." and so on and so forth.
3 Are you familiar with a socialist economy where all revenues go
4 to the municipality and nothing is left to the local community, they only
5 get something if the municipality hands something out? Do you know of
6 that method that is the municipality that gathers all revenues?
7 A. First of all, can we look at this document, I assume this to be
8 "Srpsko Oslobodjenje"; is that correct?
9 Q. Do you know that it's no good if it's "Srpsko Oslobodjenje"? The
10 man is saying this. It doesn't matter what newspaper it is. This is
11 what the man is saying, the top person from Rajlovac.
12 A. I would completely disagree that it doesn't make any difference
13 what newspaper it is. "Srpsko Oslobodjenje" was founded precisely as a
14 rival and parallel newspaper to the "Oslobodjenje" newspaper that was
15 published in Sarajevo
16 which was to champion the cause of Serbian Sarajevo and much of its
17 content was, in fact, devoted to that. I do read Serbian Cyrillic, but I
18 have to say I can't read this other than make out a few words. I, you
19 know, find it unsurprising that "Srpsko Oslobodjenje" is trumpeting this
20 cause. I guess I find it a little bit surprising that they're still
21 beating that horse in I think it's 1994 is the date of this thing because
22 it had long since been kind of established as an article of faith in the
24 surprise me, though, that this case is being made in this newspaper with
25 the quotations from Mr. Bozic.
1 Q. Did I omit to inform you that this is not a quotation. This is
2 an interview with the president of one of Sarajevo's municipalities. Is
3 this an interview with Mr. Bozic or not? Just say yes or no. We don't
4 need more than that.
5 A. I don't know. I can't make out enough here to tell you.
6 Q. Can you see the questions in italics and can you see the answers
7 in whatever print this may be, whatever font? The questions are in
8 italics and the answers are given in this regular type of print?
9 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer that.
10 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, with respect, Dr. Donia has said two
12 times now he can't read it. So I would suggest the question's been asked
13 and answered.
14 JUDGE KWON: Final try.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I've read it. I have read
16 it. Economic potentials are our greatest trump card, and he mentions the
17 companies on account of which they should keep the revenues rather than
18 sending them to the Muslim municipality of Novi Grad.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Let me ask you something else, Mr. Donia. Do you know that Pale
21 was also an independent municipality?
22 A. It was not independent, no. It was a separate municipality, one
23 of the ten municipalities of the city of Sarajevo as of 1991, and
24 declared its separation from the city of Sarajevo in May of 1991. As I
25 reported in my report -- cited in my report, it really was the first
1 municipality to declare its break-away from Sarajevo. It was a
2 municipality in which the population was about 68 per cent Serb. The SDS
3 won an absolute majority in its Municipal Assembly, and therefore took
4 power in January of 1991. And it proceeded then to consolidate power
5 further all the way up until it was basically ethnically cleansed in --
6 by the 6th of July, 1992. So it's a separate municipality, had a great
7 deal of authority. As every municipality was a socio-economic entity and
8 I think one of your favourite places to hold your headquarters and
9 meetings and to live. I think it was, in a sense, your home in Sarajevo
10 in some way.
11 JUDGE KWON: Final question.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. A few things that are inaccurate. However, one question: Are
14 you denying that beforehand Pale was a separate municipality, out of
15 town? And since my last question, do you know that Jahorina as an
16 Olympic mountain is in Pale, and that is why Pale was included into
18 this revenue of their own?
19 A. Yes, I think I've explained how that all happened, with the
20 decision in 1976 to pursue this economic development plan, which included
21 the inclusion of four new municipalities in 1977, one of which was Pale,
22 and at the same time to develop both industry and service -- the service
23 economy in these, what I call, peripheral municipalities, including Pale.
24 Pale, of course, was the great beneficiary of the development of
25 facilities in advance of the Olympic games of 1984 and probably received
1 more investment from the city of Sarajevo
2 say, 1984, probably received more investment than any other single
3 municipality. So the -- although there were these people who viewed Pale
4 as a somehow backward impoverished municipality, in fact it had been a
5 huge beneficiary of the economic resources of the city -- capital that
6 was available to the city to develop the facilities for the Olympic
7 games. And it was comparably very easy for Pale to simply draw a line
8 and say, We're going to draw a line and say, We're going to generate this
9 revenue here, not forward it to the headquarters of the companies that
10 had made the investments in the first place in Sarajevo, call it the
11 enterprises that had made those investments, and declare its separation.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this document? I'd
14 still like to request 19 more hours for this witness.
15 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
16 MS. EDGERTON: Well, the only evidence we have on the content of
17 that document comes from the mouth of Dr. Karadzic himself, so I would
18 object to that document, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Agreed. We'll not admit this document.
20 You'll have another opportunity to lead this evidence. Before
21 Ms. Edgerton start your re-direct, Judge Baird has some questions for
22 Dr. Donia.
23 JUDGE BAIRD: Dr. Donia, you have been testifying for some time,
24 so I have no intention of prolonging your stay here, but there are just
25 two small matters on which I should like some clarification. Now, I
1 propose to give a brief summary of the surrounding evidence. First of
2 all, to help you to refresh your memory, and, at the same time, to put
3 the question in some perspective.
4 Now, I want to refer, first of all, to the proceedings of the 2nd
5 of June, and Ms. Edgerton this is -- Dr. Karadzic, this is at page 3270,
6 3270, lines 10 to 14. Now, in reference to a video-clip in which
7 Eagleburger made certain comments, Dr. Karadzic asked you:
8 "So do you see that this was a purely political issue, a
9 domestic, political issue related to the elections and that
10 Mr. Eagleburger is aware of the fact that it was unlawful?"
11 And you replied:
12 "No. I would not concur that what you just showed me establishes
13 that. He -- this is first of all -- these are carefully selected
14 excerpts from statements by, as I indicated, many different public
15 figures in the crisis, which are deliberately selected apparently in this
16 video to make a particular point, and that means it is really, I think, a
17 Serb propaganda film ."
18 Now, this was part of your answer. Do you recollect this?
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE BAIRD: Now I turn to page 3271, Ms. Edgerton,
21 Dr. Karadzic, lines 3 to 9, and Dr. Karadzic then referred you to a
22 video-clip that had been shown a short while before. This is page 3269,
23 lines 3 to 14, of James Baker making certain comments. And he stated:
24 "But James Baker did say it was unlawful because it was one-sided
25 and violent. Breaking up a country and its borders that had been
1 guaranteed by the Helsinki Final Act and the constitutions of the
2 republic and the constitution of the SFRY."
3 And he then asked you:
4 "So did Baker not confirm here that it had been illegal? So is
5 that Serb propaganda?"
6 Now, this was a compound question and you answered the first
7 component. You stated:
8 "He held that opinion."
9 But I think it must have slipped you to answer the second
10 component, and so can you now tell us whether you would characterise the
11 Baker video-clip in the same manner as you characterised the Eagleburger
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the problem I have is these were two
14 American secretaries of state. I think Baker followed Eagleburger, and
15 the time of these pronouncement isn't clear in the film or it wasn't
16 clear to me anyway. I have reviewed the entire film, I've seen the
17 entire film --
18 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes, mm-hmm.
19 THE WITNESS: -- and characterised it, and I think I would still
20 characterise it as a Serbian propaganda film. It is highly selective. I
21 don't dispute the accuracy of the words that were said by the public
22 figures that are interviewed, only that they may have been taken out of
23 context and in many cases were not attached to a particular date.
24 JUDGE BAIRD: That is both the Eagleburger clip and the Baker
1 THE WITNESS: That would be my understanding, yes.
2 JUDGE BAIRD: I see. I see, all right.
3 THE WITNESS: And as you know, US policy was kind of shifting in
4 this period. It started out being very strongly pro-Yugoslav/unified
5 Yugoslav, and then shifted in the course of 1991, the latter half of
6 1991, to much more sympathetic position to the withdrawal of the -- or
7 the separation of Slovenia
8 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you very much indeed.
9 Now, I have -- I take you now to the proceedings of the 7th of
10 June, and, Ms. Edgerton, Dr. Karadzic, this is at page 3428, lines 13 to
11 15; and page 3429, lines 1 to 3. Now, Dr. Karadzic asked you, Dr. Donia,
12 whether you agreed that towards the end of August Izetbegovic fully
13 called off the agreement, the Serb/Muslim agreement, and you replied in
14 the affirmative. And if I might summarise, you stated that he became
15 concerned about the good faith of particularly Milosevic's commitments
16 that he had expressed Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic6 c 18.23.30 and was
17 concerned about the efforts that Dr. Karadzic and Milosevic were taking
18 to undermine his personal position politically at that time. So you said
19 yes, he did walk away from it very clearly in the latter part of August.
20 Now, Dr. Karadzic then sought to correct you. He said that it
21 was not because of that, it was because he did not want to remain in
24 to stay in a Yugoslavia
25 replied: Yes, I think his position at that time and somewhat before it
1 and after it can be characterised as wanting to have Bosnia-Herzegovina
2 have an equal position with the other republics vis-a-vis Yugoslavia.
3 Do you recollect this?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I do.
5 JUDGE BAIRD: Now, my question is: Why then did he walk away
6 from the agreement? For the second reason or for both reasons?
7 THE WITNESS: I think for both.
8 JUDGE BAIRD: For both.
9 THE WITNESS: And if I can clarify a bit about the efforts to
10 undermine him personally.
11 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes.
12 THE WITNESS: Once the initial momentum for this agreement
13 between the MBO and the SDS
14 complicated, there was an effort on the part of Mr. Milosevic, with the
15 knowledge and co-operation of Dr. Karadzic, to make a representation at
16 the opening session of the European Community talks on Yugoslavia that
18 this by convening a group of presidents of the Assemblies of the
19 republics of Yugoslavia
20 the Assembly of Montenegro and the president of the Assembly of Serbia.
21 I believe Macedonia
22 represent of Bosnia
23 declaration then was presented at the first EC -- first opening session
24 of the EC meeting, and Milosevic contended that Krajisnik was authorised
25 to speak on behalf of Bosnia
1 agreement. Now, this was clearly a dubious representation, to take the
2 president of the Assembly and submit that his adherence to this would
3 then mean that all of Bosnia
4 Yugoslav Federation. And it was meant to embarrass Izetbegovic, as we
5 know from a couple of intercepts from around this time, and indeed it
6 did. The European Community leaders didn't really buy this at all, but
7 nevertheless it was run past them, and it was a clear effort to undermine
8 Izetbegovic in the eyes of the international negotiators.
9 That's what I mean by the loss of trust or confidence and the
10 suspicions that developed about Milosevic's intentions.
11 On the other hand, I also cite this other reason, which was the
12 firm position that there should be this parity in the relationship of
13 various republic leaders to the Federation. That was inherent in
14 Izetbegovic's and Tupurkovski's proposal of June of 1991 which was
15 eventually embraced by the presidents of all six republics on June 6th
16 and reiterated on June 12th amongst the three presidents. And that
17 policy carried consistently through until the Assembly session of
18 October 14/15, when it then didn't change. So I think that on both
19 grounds Izetbegovic was uncomfortable about this whole agreement and
20 decided to opt out of it. I kind of wish he hadn't, but that was what
21 was going on. And as far as I can discern, that is what was driving his
23 JUDGE BAIRD: I thank you very much indeed, Dr. Donia, for that.
24 I thank you.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours.
3 Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
4 Q. Dr. Donia, today at page 5, lines 13 to 24, and page 6, lines 4
5 to 5, of this transcript, you referred to an agreement that Mr. Koljevic
6 sought with President Tudjman in Zagreb on the 8th of January just before
7 the actual proclamation of the state in which the two of them talked, and
8 then there's some overlapping speakers, and then you continue, the
9 division of Bosnia
10 overlapping speakers, to use the coercive powers of the state to force
11 the human division in Bosnia
12 A. Yes.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Could I ask for 65 ter 00987, please.
14 Q. And while we wait for both versions, could I -- Ah, we have both
15 versions then.
16 Dr. Donia, we have before us minutes of a meeting between the
17 president of the Republic of Croatia
18 with members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
19 Professor Nikola Koljevic and Mr. Franjo Boras held in Zagreb on
20 8 January 1992
21 A. Yes, I do.
22 Q. Is this document or does this document have any relation to the
23 meeting you referred to in your testimony earlier today?
24 A. Yes, it is, in fact, a meeting I was referring to. It was in
25 President Tudjman's office. He arrives somewhat late in the meeting and
1 is represented by number of his most senior advisors up until the point
2 that he arrives. And Professor Koljevic and -- who's the -- of course
3 the -- one of the two Serb members of the Presidency of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mr. Boras, who was one of the Croat
5 representatives on -- presidents on the Presidency of Bosnia travelled to
7 MS. EDGERTON: Could I ask that we go to e-court page 13, pages
8 13 and 14 in the English version. Ah, thank you.
9 Q. Could I direct your attention to the top of the page where we see
10 Franjo Boras speak, Dr. Donia. And he says:
11 "We have some maps which was drawn up now after the population
12 census on the basis of which, as you can see, that is the part that is
13 primarily Croatian and that is the part which is very compact and the
14 easiest -- eastern Herzegovina
15 Do you see that?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Now, he continues in this paragraph on the subject of a
18 reorganisation of municipalities, and then further in the page
19 Dr. Koljevic enters the discussion, referring to the homogeneity of
20 certain areas. Have you seen these passages before?
21 A. Yes, I have.
22 Q. Now, in Dr. Koljevic's discussion, he talks about the notion at I
23 think three lines down after his name appears to the effect that:
24 "It would be a good idea to establish an agency which would
25 regulate the exchange of property and to raise this to a civilised
1 level." And continues further: "It is not so impossible to divide
3 Do you see these passages?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Do these passages by Dr. Koljevic, and we could go over to page
6 14 in English, and Dr. Boras have any relation to the coercive powers of
7 the state to enforce the human division in Bosnia that you referred to
8 earlier today?
9 A. Yes. I noted the use of government agencies to issue permits and
10 over time to use the various powers of the state to -- permitting being
11 one of them, to actually effect a human separation following the -- in
12 this proposal, following the redrawing of municipal boundaries.
13 Q. In terms of the -- thank you.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Could this be tendered, please, as the next
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P986.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
19 Q. Now, referring to the transcript of the 8th of June, so a couple
20 of days ago, page 3499, lines 9 to 10, you had a discussion with
21 Dr. Karadzic about an intercept between he and one Gojko Djogo. And
22 Dr. Karadzic said to you:
23 "I'm saying to everybody that regardless of what I would accept,
24 there would be chaos, a chaos would ensue in Bosnia-Herzegovina in two
25 hours. Do you think that I could control 2 million Serbs who would rebel
1 against this attempt to take them back to Turkish times?"
2 And your response was:
3 "Yes, I do believe you had sufficient control of the SDS and the
4 broader Serb followers of the party to do that."
5 Do you recall that?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MS. EDGERTON: I'd like to ask for 65 ter 30722 to be brought up,
9 please, that's a transcript of an intercepted conversation between one
10 Mr. Kupresanin and General Kukanjac on -- in April 1992.
11 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, you noted in your testimony as well, this -- on
12 page 3403, lines 10 to 12 that Mr. Kupresanin was the person who was
13 elected president of the community of municipalities of Bosanska Krajina
14 on 25 April 1992
15 A. 1991, yes.
16 Q. Thank you. And similarly, you identified at page 3138, lines 16
17 to 19, General Kukanjac as the JNA commander of the military district
18 centre in Sarajevo
19 do you recall that?
20 A. Yes, it would be the 2nd Military District.
21 Q. Now, the intercept transcript is on the screen in front of us.
22 Before I ask you further questions, could I ask: Are you familiar with
23 this intercept? Have you seen it before?
24 A. Yes, I have.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MS. EDGERTON: If we could turn to page 2 then of the English and
2 I think it's the same in the B/C/S version. The B/C/S version should be
3 a little bit smaller so that we can scroll down in the B/C/S version. It
4 might be page 3. Uh-huh. It should be page 3 of the B/C/S version.
5 Q. Now, page 2, halfway down the page approximately, there's a
6 statement by Mr. Kupresanin in response to a comment by General Kukanjac
7 and he says:
8 "Well, we must and now we are waiting for Karadzic to return from
10 Do you see that passage?
11 A. Yes, I do.
12 Q. Could you read the rest of the passage for us, please.
13 A. "Well, we must and now we are waiting for Karadzic to return
14 from Europe
15 general, that I won't do anything until he returns, when he comes
16 whatever he tells us we will do. He is now for us the supreme commander
17 and we have no other commander. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
18 the one side and the Serb people in the situation they are in on the
19 other. We have our commander, it is that man, we must obey him, you
20 understand us, we understand you."
21 Q. Thank you. Now, is this passage consistent with your articulated
22 position of Dr. Karadzic's control over the SDS?
23 A. Yes, it is. If perhaps I could just elaborate a little bit the
24 recent history prior to this intercept. We've spoken about this
25 persistent challenge to Karadzic's leadership from the Bosnian Krajina
1 area, and this -- that challenge last surfaced at the time that the
2 constitution of the Serbian republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
3 late February of 1992. And at that time there was a real effort to
4 declare the Bosnian Krajina a separate republic, separate from the one
5 that Dr. Karadzic was leading. And the next day after that constitution
6 was approved, Dr. Karadzic made a trip to Banja Luka and spent the entire
7 day meeting with the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, and a
8 couple of different groups of officials and successfully persuaded all of
9 them, persuaded a few of them to actually walk out of the meeting, and
10 the rest of them to embrace the constitution that had been passed in
12 establishing the unity of the SDS
13 crumbled again. It kind of was the crowning event in bringing the
14 Bosnian Krajina back into the -- really, the centre of the SDS and
15 establishing Dr. Karadzic's leadership of the entire party.
16 MS. EDGERTON: Could this be -- please be marked for
17 identification, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE KWON: That will be done -- yes, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I? What this is about is the
20 moment when --
21 MR. TIEGER: [Previous translation continues]...
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- Yugoslavia left us to fend for
23 ourselves, and I --
24 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour --
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- would like the date to be
1 established there. There's no date.
2 JUDGE KWON: That can be -- that can be done, yes. Can we see
3 the first page of this document.
4 MS. EDGERTON: The date that the Prosecution has was April 1992,
5 if I'm not mistaken.
6 JUDGE KWON: I see. April 1992. But we don't have the date?
7 THE ACCUSED: Not good enough for the Defence.
8 JUDGE KWON: It's not for you to comment, Mr. Karadzic.
9 This will be marked for identification.
10 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated]
11 As MFI
12 JUDGE MORRISON: Is there no way the date of this can be
13 absolutely established beyond any doubt?
14 MS. EDGERTON: Possibly, but it would take me to make some
15 inquiries overnight and we could advise the Chamber at the next sitting.
16 I just need to check some additional documentation that isn't immediately
17 available to me, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you.
19 MS. EDGERTON:
20 Q. Next, Dr. Donia, on June -- referring to the transcript of
21 June 9, and I have in my notes the old page citation. My apologies.
22 Page 60, lines 12 to 16. You were asked by Dr. Karadzic:
23 "Have you come across a single document stating that this
24 document," in reference to Variant A and B, "was discussed and adopted by
25 organs of the Serbian Democratic Party?"
1 And your response was:
2 "A lot of documentary evidence that it was forwarded to local
3 municipal boards by the main board and this from a variety of different
5 Do you recall that?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MS. EDGERTON: Could I ask to see P970, please, an excerpt from a
9 transcript of the 50th Session of the Republika Srpska Assembly, dated
10 15/16 April 1995, page 316 in the English and page 278 in the B/C/S. And
11 it's an excerpt from a speech by Dr. Karadzic.
12 Now, in the English page 316, if we could go nine lines down from
13 the top of the first full paragraph.
14 Q. Do you see the sentence, Dr. Donia, in the ninth line that reads:
15 "At the moment the war began in the municipalities where we were
16 in the majority, we had municipal power, held it firmly, controlled
17 everything. In the municipalities where we were in the minority, we set
18 up secret government, municipal boards, Municipal Assemblies, presidents
19 of Executive Boards. You will remember the A and B variants. In the B
20 variant where we were in the minority - 20 per cent, 15 per cent - we had
21 set up a government and a brigade, a unit, no matter what size, but there
22 was a detachment with a commander."
23 Do you see the passage I've just read, Dr. Donia?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. Now, this passage - and for the record that's referred to in
1 Dr. Donia's Sarajevo
2 excerpt from the transcript of the 50th Session one of those documents
3 which you've referred to showing the adoption of Variant A and B by
5 A. Yes, it is one of them.
6 Q. Thank you. To move on. On 9 June at page 3614, lines 23 to 25;
7 and 3615, lines 1 to 7, you were asked by Dr. Karadzic what the Serbs
8 were doing at the time, exclusively political moves they were making, now
9 did you know what the other side was doing and forcing the Serbs to react
10 and take political steps, they were provoking the Serb side?"
11 Your answer was:
12 "I don't share the premise of your question that the Serbs at the
13 time were only doing political moves. I think that the SDS was busy
14 arming its people and becoming essentially a paramilitary unit unto
15 itself and all sorts of things were going on to make sure that the SDS
16 had the co-operation and support of the JNA in pursuing whatever course
17 it might choose to take after the fall of 1991."
18 Do you remember that question and that answer?
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. Further, at page 3615, lines 19 to 25; and 3616, line 1, asked
21 about -- asked by Dr. Karadzic whether you wanted to say that in
22 September 1991 the Serbian Democratic Party was in favour of the
23 disintegration of Yugoslavia
24 fact that the SDS
25 "I did not make that statement and don't believe that that was
1 the case. I think the coming together of the SDS and the JNA, or what
2 really proved to be a very close working alliance, was just getting
3 started in the early couple of weeks of September 1991, and they grew
4 closer but somewhat erratically in the months of that. There clearly
5 were some efforts on the part of the JNA to distribute arms to members of
6 the SDS
7 relationship that started about this same time."
8 Now, with this same document in front of us, I would like to
9 just - if I could have your indulgence for a moment, Your Honours - in
10 the English version page 316 just below the halfway mark, underneath --
11 two lines underneath where you see the words "20 per cent" and "15 per
12 cent," and in the B/C/S it's about 19 lines up from the bottom of the
13 page, I'd like to direct you to the same speech by Dr. Karadzic.
14 JUDGE KWON: Just for record, it's page 145 of 376.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, that's a confusing number that appears on the
16 bottom of the translation.
17 Q. Do you see, Dr. Donia, the passage that -- I'm sorry, could we go
18 back to page 316, please, e-court page 316?
19 JUDGE KWON: I apologise.
20 MS. EDGERTON: No need. Not at all, Your Honour.
21 Q. Dr. Donia, we see here a passage that begins:
22 "The war began and the JNA helped as much as it could here and
23 there ..."
24 And I note we also find this in part in your excerpts report at
25 paragraph 235. Do you see that passage?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. All right. Is this passage which says, among other things,
3 distribution of weapons was carried out thanks to the JNA, a
4 manifestation of that top-level co-operative relationship you described
5 between the SDS
6 A. It reflects it, yes.
7 Q. Thank you. If we could remove that document and go to P979,
8 please. And P979 dated 20 March 1992
9 Yugoslav People's Army 2nd Military District, conclusions of the
10 evaluation of the situation on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
11 the zone of responsibility of the 2nd Military District.
12 Are you familiar with this document, Dr. Donia?
13 A. Yes, I am.
14 Q. Could you tell us what it represents.
15 A. This is a report by General Kukanjac regarding the -- it gets
16 quite specific about the distribution of the various arms in the
17 possession of the JNA into the hands of local SDS authorities.
18 Subsequent pages give both some specifics of places where those were
19 distributed to and times they were distributed, as well as an annex which
20 includes the number of forces in each municipality that are available to
21 the JNA to fight whatever war may be impending.
22 Q. In that regard, if we could go to page 6 of the English and page
23 8 of the B/C/S, please.
24 Dr. Donia, in paragraph 5(f), I note we see reference to the
25 distribution of weapons of 5.000 -- pardon me, 51.900 weapons by the JNA
1 and 17.298 by the SDS
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Is this passage in the document as a whole also reflective of the
4 co-operative relationship you've described?
5 A. Yes, it reflects the, by this time, very close operational
6 co-operation between the SDS
7 Q. Thank you. Now we'll move on to - your indulgence for a
8 moment - the transcript from June 9th, page 3600 lines 1 to 11, first of
9 all, and there, Dr. Donia, in the context of a discussion regarding the
10 Variant A and B document, you were asked a question, and the question
12 "And do you know that in practically all municipalities there
13 were negotiations to the effect that each community would establish its
14 own municipality, in Sanski Most, for instance, in Vlasenica, and
15 Bratunac. Actually, in Vlasenica negotiations to the effect that each
16 community would establish its own municipality. Actually, in Vlasenica
17 and Bratunac that had already been established," and so forth.
18 Your answer was:
19 "The only situations that I know of like that, and I would be
20 open to knowing of other ones, would be -- pardon me, were those
21 negotiations undertaken essentially at the point of a gun starting in
22 early April 1992, usually with an ultimatum of some sort issued by the
25 Do you remember that?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now, further at page 3608, lines 7 to 25, in the context of a
3 discussion about D297, which was a handwritten document, you were asked
4 your view as to whether a demographic imbalance in a given municipality
5 in that case Bratunac precluded a certain disposition and I'll read you
6 the question and answer.
7 "And how do you think that 30 per cent Serbs can force 70
8 per cent Muslims in Bratunac to do this job?"
9 Your answer:
10 "We're talking Bratunac, right, not Vlasenica? I think somebody
11 mentioned Vlasenica earlier. They had the backing of the JNA. They had
12 paramilitaries available to them. It was, as I say, at the point of a
13 gun and I think subsequent events in Bratunac" -- I'm -- pardon me, "in
14 the period after this supposed agreement bear this out. And it's not my
15 role to go into what those were, but I think it also makes all the more
16 empty and all the more just -- it makes it into a mere gesture the
17 statement about the rights of other peoples in the course of the Serb
18 seizure of power."
19 So your answer to that question whether a demographic imbalance
20 precluded a disposition desired by the Serbs was known. Do you recall
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. In that regard could I turn to 65 ter number 00091, an extract or
24 excerpt from the Bosnian Serb Assembly Session of 28 August 1995, a
25 speech by Dr. Karadzic. And the page in the English version is 68 and in
1 the Serbian version page 87.
2 Are you familiar with the 53rd Bosnian Serb Assembly Session and
3 the context of this session?
4 A. Yes, I am.
5 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, please.
6 In the English, if we could go to about three lines up from the
7 bottom of page 68. Thank you. And in the B/C/S about -- it's about 17
8 lines up from the bottom.
9 Q. Dr. Donia, I would like to take you to the passage that begins:
10 "We absolutely cannot let ourselves get any ideas about them
11 taking our traditional territories from us ..."
12 Do you see that passage?
13 A. I do not.
14 Q. It begins with the word "we" on the third line up from the bottom
15 of the page in English.
16 A. Okay, yes, I see it.
17 Q. So again:
18 "We absolutely cannot let ourselves get any ideas about them
19 taking our traditional territories from us. To tell the truth, there are
20 towns that we've grabbed for ourselves." If we could move over, please,
21 in the English, "and there were only 30 per cent of us. I can name as
22 many of those as you want, but we cannot give up the towns where we made
23 70 per cent. Don't let this get around, but remember how many of us
24 there were in Bratunac, how many in Srebrenica, how many in Visegrad, how
25 many in Rogatica, how many in Vlasenica, in Zvornik, et cetera. Due to
1 strategic importance, they had to become ours ..."
2 Have you seen all -- have you been able to read the passage that
3 I've been reading to you?
4 A. Yes, I have.
5 Q. Now, is this consistent, this passage excerpted from a speech by
6 Dr. Karadzic, with your articulated view as regards whether a demographic
7 imbalance precluded a disposition desired by the Serbs?
8 A. Yes, this is the phenomenon to which I was referring.
9 MS. EDGERTON: If that could be tendered as the next Prosecution
10 exhibit, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit P980.
12 THE REGISTRAR: P988, Your Honours.
13 MS. EDGERTON: That concludes my re-examination, Your Honour.
14 And, Your Honour, that intercept that Your Honour,
15 Judge Morrison, asked me about, some quick checking by my colleagues,
16 they've informed me the date of that intercept is 27 April 1992.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.
18 Dr. Donia.
19 THE WITNESS: Sir.
20 Questioned by the Court:
21 JUDGE KWON: If you remember the questionnaire handed over by the
22 accused, whether you would agree to certain facts relating to the events
23 that happened in Slovenia
24 to go over the questions and whether you would be agreeable to those
25 facts or there are some -- any observations?
1 A. Yes, Your Honour. I have lost track of that document somewhere
2 here. I think I left it two days or three days ago. I did review the
3 document the evening that you gave it to me, and found that there were
4 about five or six assertions that I could concur with, either in whole or
5 in part. But the vast majority of -- and I could tell you what they are
6 really enough, but the vast majority of the statements that are presented
7 in this document I neither have the knowledge of or with me the resources
8 to concur with or to dissent from.
9 JUDGE KWON: Your -- is your response related to the content of
10 the decision of some courts or ... ?
11 A. Yes, the -- virtually the -- most of the assertions pertain to
12 rulings by the constitutional court, interpretations by one court or
13 another, and specific acts that were promulgated by either a republic
14 Assembly or the Federal Assembly. And I'm simply not in a position to
15 verify or deny those.
16 JUDGE KWON: Even as to the fact that whether such and such
17 ruling took place at all?
18 A. That is the case in each ruling. There is a couple of
19 provisions, as I say, that I can affirm very briefly number 2, the first
20 sentence -- I don't have -- I agree with that. Then have the -- had the
21 information to be able to verify that. Certainly number 3 I concur with.
22 Number 4. Number 6, the first sentence. Number 9, the first sentence.
23 Understanding that the term "illegally" is not mine, but the term
24 actually used in the Presidency's proclamation. And I believe there's
25 one or two more here that -- as I go through that pertain to Croatia
1 was entertaining bedtime reading, Your Honour. Number 44, concur. The
2 first sentence of number 58. The first sentence of number 59 and first
3 sentence of number 70.
4 I believe that concludes the points that I can --
5 JUDGE KWON: I'm amazed by your memory, Doctor. Thank you.
6 That concludes your testimony here. Thank you again for coming
7 to the Tribunal to give it. Now you are free to go.
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you for your courtesies to me.
9 [The witness withdrew]
10 JUDGE KWON: With the indulgence of the interpreters, we go to
11 ten past.
12 I understand that there's some issues for you to raise,
13 Mr. Robinson.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, I'll be very brief, they
15 pertain to the next witness, Richard Philipps. We have asked OLAD to
16 authorise payment for our expert witness so he can be present in
17 courtroom as the Trial Chamber authorised on the 2nd of June. OLAD has
18 denied any funding for that. Since Dr. Karadzic is indigent, that means
19 that unless that decision is reversed he wouldn't be able to take
20 advantage of the permission given by the Chamber. We have appealed that
21 to the Registrar today and we would intend to raise that with the
22 Trial Chamber as well if that matter is denied by the Registrar. All of
23 this may have an impact with Mr. Philipps commencing his testimony on
24 Tuesday, if, in fact, we're not able to resolve the matter before then
25 and I wished to bring that to your attention. Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, do you have anything to say in relation
2 to that?
3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. We do consider that it has
4 or should have any impact on the witness's upcoming testimony. This
5 matter has been before the Defence for a considerable period of time.
6 The witness has been scheduled for a very long time. All this material
7 has been available for a very long time, and I would also note that this
8 is a 92 ter witness, so the Defence has been aware of the nature of
9 the -- the bulk of the examination-in-chief also for an extremely long
11 Finally, there's no basis for, in our submission, Your Honour,
12 any suggestion of a postponement. I think there is, perhaps, a risk of
13 conflating the opportunity presented by the Court's ruling with some form
14 of requirement or right that is at issue. Again --
15 JUDGE KWON: But you do not take any position in relation to the
16 issue of reimbursement?
17 MR. TIEGER: No, that matter we leave -- I mean, let this matter
18 play itself out in due course. But in due course, it's properly right it
19 should have no impact on the scheduling and hearing of this witness's
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
22 When we issued the decision or -- granting the request from the
23 Defence to permit the presence of Mr. Radinovic, if my pronunciation is
24 correct, the Chamber was of the view that his presence would be of
25 assistance to both the Defence and the Chamber. So it was reasonable to
1 assume at the time that the Chamber's decision to permit his presence can
2 have no effect if financial assistance would not be available. So I
3 would recommend Registrar to make decision as soon as possible, so as to
4 limit the impact of this issue on the proceedings. And the Chamber will
5 also see what it can do outside the courtroom so that the positive
6 resolution can be reached.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 I think from the letter of OLAD that those kind of comments will
9 resolve the issue. Thank you very much.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 Mr. -- Judge Morrison.
12 JUDGE MORRISON: It's really directed to Dr. Karadzic because I'm
13 slightly concerned that you might, not being a trained lawyer, have
14 misdirected yourself to some degree to the effect of expert evidence and
15 the requirement to challenge each and every part of an expert's report.
16 An expert's report is a report based upon that expert's opinion.
17 Of course you can challenge that opinion where you disagree with it, but
18 the fact that you haven't challenged an opinion doesn't turn that opinion
19 into undisputed fact. And the opportunity is always there for you,
20 during the Defence case or perhaps even in respect of the testimony of
21 other witnesses, to deal with issues that you feel you haven't dealt with
22 with Dr. Donia. I think it's important for you to realise that the mere
23 fact that you may not have raised an issue with Dr. Donia does not, in
24 itself, mean that that issue has somehow become set in stone and is not
25 capable of another interpretation when viewed in the light of other
1 evidence that you may choose to bring in due course.
2 My remarks are not intended to encourage you to bring other
3 evidence, but to resolve any worries that you may have as a result of
4 misunderstanding or potentially misunderstanding the nature and effect of
5 opinion evidence, which is what expert evidence is.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Judge Morrison.
7 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE KWON: We have to rise but thank you for your indulgence.
10 MR. TIEGER: Okay. I can -- I could raise the matter later. I
11 would simply note Dr. Karadzic raised the question of context of the
12 excerpts report, and I would remind the Court that it was the Prosecution
13 that raised the issue of the agreement it reached with the Defence to
14 suggest the joint submission or agreement to the submission of the
15 Assembly sessions referenced in Dr. Donia's report. If the Court wishes,
16 we can provide a list of those sessions if it wishes to consider that
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. It's quite recommendable, speaking for
20 Thank you again and I hope everybody will have a very restful,
21 peaceful, and refreshing weekend.
22 Tuesday afternoon at 2.15.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.11 p.m.
24 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 15th day of
25 June, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.