1 Tuesday, 15 June 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.23 p.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, everybody.
6 Mr. Tieger, we have a new member?
7 MR. TIEGER: Not precisely, Your Honour. But for the record,
8 Alan Tieger, Patrick Hayden, and Iain Reid appearing for the Prosecution
9 today, and Mr. Hayden will be calling the witness.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Good to see you again, Mr. Hayden.
11 Last week, during the cross-examination of Dr. Robert Donia,
12 Mr. Karadzic asked Dr. Donia to look at a set of facts, a questionnaire
13 relating to the secession of Slovenia
14 of the documents, Dr. Donia stated that there were five or six assertions
15 with which he could concur, if you remember. So in order to identify to
16 which questions he answered positively, I think we need to record -- file
17 that questionnaire in one way or another, exhibit it or file it as a
19 Do you have any observation, Mr. Tieger?
20 MR. TIEGER: I was trying to think of both -- the most efficient
21 manner of doing that, Your Honour. I mean, one expedient that occurs to
22 me, of course, is simply identifying, with the agreement of the parties,
23 the specific references that were the focus of the witness's response,
24 and introducing those. I'm not sure that it is necessarily as useful to
25 introduce the entirety of the document, which was basically excluded from
1 the answer. So we'll be happy to work with the Defence to make sure that
2 we've identified correctly the single reference or the few references to
3 which the Court just mentioned.
4 JUDGE KWON: Let me deal with this first.
5 At the time, the Chamber also asked the Prosecution to review the
6 facts, and following its review, Ms. Edgerton submitted that most of them
7 were irrelevant to the case against the accused, but that it was still
8 looking at a number of matters that it considered may be relevant; I
9 mean, the Prosecution. So speaking for myself, I'm of the opinion that
10 the degree of relevance may be -- may vary depending upon the context in
11 which it is needed; for example, whether it is in the stage of admitting
12 documents, issuing a binding order pursuant to Rule 54 bis, taking a
13 judicial notice of adjudicated facts, or for the purpose of the agreed
14 facts. In particular regarding the agreed facts on background materials,
15 although the relevance may be only marginal, the Chamber is of the view
16 that it would be assisted and it will benefit from the progression of the
17 case. So if the background matters, such as those discussed in the
18 accused's list of facts, could be agreed by the parties. So I would
19 expect that you would come back with some specific answers to those
20 questions, and then I also recommend the accused to pursue that line of
21 defence in the future.
22 MR. TIEGER: I understood, Your Honour, with the single -- and
23 just to make sure I understand it correctly, we'll pursue that course. I
24 understand that the amount of time invested by either side to determine
25 the accuracy of peripheral facts is affected by that, so -- that issue,
1 so to the extent the Prosecution is in a position to readily identify the
2 accuracy of some of those facts, I will certainly address that matter as
3 soon as possible.
4 JUDGE KWON: So we'll see what you will come up with.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I say something?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My view in respect of this document
8 is the following: I believe that it should be admitted in its entirety
9 and it should be stated which facts were not confirmed by the expert
10 witness, because that is information as well. This expert witness,
11 Donia, simply had to know certain things, and he did not know them.
12 Therefore, I believe what he did not confirm is also relevant.
13 JUDGE KWON: We were about to order the Registry to file your
14 submission in its entirety, so that has been -- that will be resolved.
15 And then for the next matter, shall we go into private session
17 [Private session]
23 [Open session]
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are now in open session again. It concerns
25 the -- yes, Mr. Tieger, yes.
1 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, Your Honour. I didn't mean to interrupt
2 the Court.
3 JUDGE KWON: No problem.
4 MR. TIEGER: I was simply going to note that with respect to an
5 issue raised at the end of last session, and with our understanding of
6 the Court's encouragement, we will submit today the list of Assembly
7 sessions referenced in Dr. Donia's reports, discuss that with
8 Mr. Robinson, and we'll be providing that to the Court hopefully by the
9 end of the day, to the Court, to the Registry, and of course to the
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
12 The last item is related to the sitting schedule at the end of
13 this month, i.e., the week of 28th. So the Chamber will not sit on
14 Friday, the 2nd of July, in that week. Instead, unless there's a serious
15 objection, the Chamber is minded to sit on Monday instead, but starting
16 at 3.00.
17 Having said that, let's call the witness, let's bring in the
19 Yes, we can bring in the Defence expert as well.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you very much, Mr. President, and that would
21 be General Radovan Radinovic who will come in.
22 If I can just ask you a question for clarification, when you said
23 we'll be sitting at Monday, 3.00 p.m.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, 28th of June.
25 We asked General Radinovic in order to deal with some
1 confidential matters.
2 [The witness entered court]
3 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Mr. Philipps.
4 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon.
5 JUDGE KWON: If you could take the solemn declaration, please.
6 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
7 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
8 WITNESS: RICHARD PHILIPPS
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please make yourself comfortable.
10 Mr. Hayden.
11 MR. HAYDEN: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Examination by Mr. Hayden:
13 Q. Mr. Philipps, as we discussed, part of your evidence in this case
14 will be submitted in writing, so let me first address some of the
15 preliminary formalities associated with that submission.
16 Have you previously testified as an expert witness before this
18 A. Yes, I testified in the trial against General Galic.
19 Q. And that was on the --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Could the microphones be brought closer to --
21 MR. HAYDEN:
22 Q. And that was on the 5th, 10th, 16th to 17th of July in 2002;
24 A. In 2002, yes.
25 Q. And did you recently meet with representatives of the OTP to
1 prepare a witness statement that amalgamated your testimony in the Galic
2 case with observations relevant to the amended charts that you prepared
3 for the purposes of this case?
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. And have you had an opportunity to review the statement that you
6 signed on that day?
7 A. Yes, I went through the statement to have a look to make sure
8 that it was correct.
9 Q. And I believe there's a single correction that you wish to make
10 that to statement.
11 Mr. Registrar, if I could have 65 ter 90179, please.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Could the microphones be lowered closer to the
13 witness. Thank you.
14 MR. HAYDEN: If we could turn to page --
15 [French interpretation on English channel]
16 JUDGE KWON: We are hearing French. I think it's resolved.
17 Let's go on.
18 MR. HAYDEN: And if we could scroll down to the second paragraph
19 on that page.
20 Q. And in the second-to-last sentence, you state:
21 "I am able to identify the main command post of the corps ..."
22 Should that read "I am able to identify the rear command post"?
23 A. Yes, that should be "the rear command post of the corps."
24 Q. And in the second -- I apologise. In the last sentence of that
25 paragraph, you state:
1 "I am able to identify the forward command post ..."
2 Should it be "the main command post"?
3 A. To be correct, it should be "the main command post of the corps."
4 Q. With that correction, Mr. Philipps, can you confirm that the
5 statement is accurate, and that if you were asked the same questions on
6 the same topics today, your answers would be the same?
7 A. Yes, the statement is correct.
8 MR. HAYDEN: Your Honour, in those circumstances, I tender 65 ter
9 90179, the statement of Mr. Philipps.
10 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. If I can just raise an
11 issue with respect to this.
12 You've held previously, in the decision on Prosecution's motion
13 for admission of evidence of eight experts pursuant to Rules 92 bis and
14 94 bis, on 9th of November, 2009, that Rule 94 bis is lex specialis to
15 Rule 92 bis, and therefore you didn't allow the procedures for
16 Rule 92 bis to be followed. We now have the issue whether Rule 94 bis is
17 lex specialis to Rule 92 ter. I am not sure that it makes a practical
18 difference and I don't expect it is useful for us to make the Prosecution
19 ask questions of the witness orally, but it seems like since it might be
20 an issue that may have some impact on the jurisprudence, I think our
21 position would be that we should treat his amalgamated witness statement
22 as a report pursuant to Rule 94 bis and admitted on that basis. But I
23 just raise that as a more technical issue than anything that we
24 strenuously object to. Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
1 As a matter of practice, the Prosecution is able to present the
2 expert report without asking any questions, even pursuant to Rule 94 bis.
3 So if you agree. So in that case, given the jurisprudence that 92 ter
4 evidence is similar to the evidence which is given viva voce, so speaking
5 for myself, I don't see any problem. But if Mr. Hayden has any
6 observation to that.
7 MR. HAYDEN: I would only note, Your Honour, that in the decision
8 that this Trial Chamber rendered in November last year concerning those
9 eight 92 bis witnesses, it was noted that 94(b) is lex specialis to the
10 situation where a witness doesn't attend. But, of course, in this
11 situation we have the witness present in the courtroom, and it may be
13 I would also note in that decision the Trial Chamber instructed
14 the Prosecution that it, indeed, may call those eight witnesses pursuant
15 to 92 ter rather than 92 bis.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. To be safe, I will confer with my
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is unanimous in admitting this document
20 pursuant to Rule 92 ter, which will be given the Exhibit number as ...?
21 THE REGISTRAR: P989, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 MR. HAYDEN: I will now read a brief summary of the evidence
24 contained in that statement.
25 Mr. Philipps is a former intelligence officer of the
1 British Army. He held the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Since 1985, he
2 has undertaken various training in military intelligence and analysis at
4 an intelligence officer during the first Gulf War and with SFOR in
6 the Office of the Prosecutor.
7 Using VRS documentation and other documentation, Mr. Philipps has
8 reconstructed the structure of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, also known as
9 the SRK
10 end of 1995. Mr. Philipps has depicted this structure on two charts,
11 employing a standard format used by NATO.
12 The charts show the corps commander at the top of the chain of
13 command. The corps commander is supported by a corps operational staff,
14 including a chief of staff, who was also known as the deputy corps
15 commander. Subordinated to the corps command were brigades as well as
16 the corps supporting units. The troops of the corps supporting units,
17 which included artillery regiments, were directly subordinated to the
18 corps commander, while each brigade had its own troops. The chart also
19 shows the personnel in charge of each formation, unit, and sub-unit over
20 the indictment period.
21 In addition, Mr. Philipps has reviewed approximately 50
23 and he has explained how these documents fit within the SRK chain of
24 command and chain of reporting.
25 That concludes the summary.
1 Q. Mr. Philipps, we see before us in the courtroom two charts which,
2 for the record, are 65 ter numbers 10590, at pages 1 and 2. The first
3 chart on the easel in front of you bears the heading "Sarajevo
4 Romanija Corps, VRS, 1992 to 1994." The second chart just behind you is
5 dated August 1994 to 1995.
6 Did you prepare these charts?
7 A. Yes, I did prepare the charts.
8 Q. And what sources did you rely upon in preparing these charts?
9 A. Primarily, the sources used to prepare the charts were documents
10 from the Sarajevo
11 instructions, combat reports, and instructions to the corps from the
12 Main Staff.
13 Q. Do you consider your review and use of SRK documents to be
14 exhaustive of all the SRK
15 A. No. There are many, many documents from the
16 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and so I was only able to select and go through
17 a part of those documents. And I specifically was looking for documents
18 that related to the organisational structure of the
20 Q. And when you were reviewing those documents, in addition to
21 focusing on information about the organisation and structure, did you
22 review those documents for any other substantive information?
23 A. I was mainly looking at the structure, but also at command and
24 control of the corps. But I didn't go into any detail on other matters
25 relating to the actual combat. I was merely looking at the structure and
1 the chain of command.
2 Q. Now, in your Galic testimony, you refer to the fact that you had
3 relied upon documents purporting to be SRK documents that were disclosed
4 by the Defence in that case.
5 And for the Trial Chamber's reference, this is at page 3 of the
7 Subsequent to the Galic case, have you had an opportunity to
8 verify the reliability of those documents?
9 A. Yes, I've been able to compare those documents to documents
10 directly from the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and been able to establish
11 that those documents provided by the Defence in Galic were, in fact,
12 genuine Sarajevo Romanija Corps documents.
13 Q. With respect to documents not produced by the SRK, what other
14 types of documents did you rely upon in constructing these charts?
15 A. The other main document that I relied upon was an instruction to
16 the 4th Corps of the JNA. This was a document relating to how a corps
17 should be run, the structure of the headquarters of that corps, and the
18 tasks that a corps should undertake. That document outlines the
19 structure of a headquarters and the staff required to run a headquarters
20 of a corps in the JNA. That document was subsequently used by the
21 Sarajevo Romanija Corps in its formation and in its methods of command
22 and control.
23 Q. Now, in terms of -- and, Mr. Registrar, if I can ask for
24 65 ter 02266, please.
25 Do you have a document before you, Mr. Philipps?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. And is this the same document you refer to from the 4th Corps of
3 the JNA?
4 A. Yes, those are the instructions to the 4th Corps Command on
5 carrying out priority assignments in peacetime and wartime.
6 Q. And just briefly, you have touched upon this, but what was the
7 relationship between the JNA 4th Corps and the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?
8 A. In a sense, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps was formed from the
9 remnants of the 4th Corps of the JNA. Many of the units within the
10 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, in fact, bore the same name as the units that
11 had been previously in the 4th Corps of the JNA.
12 MR. HAYDEN: I'd ask for the admission of this document into
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P990.
16 MR. HAYDEN:
17 Q. Turning to the charts, Mr. Philipps, in terms of what is depicted
18 on there, and specifically in terms of the lower-level units or
19 sub-units, such as infantry platoons, do you consider the chart to be a
20 comprehensive reflection of all such SRK units?
21 A. No. To produce a chart that showed every platoon and every
22 company within a corps would make a chart so complex as to be unusable in
23 that sense, so the chart concentrates on headquarters, formations, that
24 is, brigade-sized units, and the battalions that made up those brigades.
25 Occasionally, numbers of companies and companies are shown, and on some
1 occasions, where relevant, a platoon is shown, but most of the detail
2 down to company and platoon level is not shown on the charts --
3 Q. And in the same respect, do you consider it to be a comprehensive
4 reflection of all heavy weaponry; for example, various calibre mortars
5 and guns attached to SRK
6 A. No. Where I found evidence of particular weaponry, heavy
7 weaponry or mortars and other types of heavy weapons, I included them in
8 the chart, but it is by no means a comprehensive list of all the heavy
9 equipment, including infantry support weapons, that were present in the
11 Q. You discuss in detail the methodology you employ in depicting the
12 structure, particularly at pages 6 to 8 of your statement. I'd now like
13 to just clarify a few aspects of that methodology.
14 And if we can turn to Sanction, we may be able to zoom in on the
15 detailed chart.
16 At various points of the chart, we see both unbroken and broken
17 lines running between the boxes; for example, on the first chart, the
18 broken line running to the Engineer Unit within the Igman
19 Infantry Brigade. What is the significance of the use of the unbroken
20 line versus a broken line?
21 A. Where I found two or more documents that confirmed the existence
22 of a unit, I used an unbroken line, that is, a solid line. Where only
23 one document was located, that is, unconfirmed by the sources, then I've
24 used a dotted or dashed line to indicate that there was no other source,
25 simply a single source, to show the existence of that unit.
1 Q. We also see such broken lines depicting boxes; for example, on
2 the first chart, the broken line which forms the Morale Division headed
3 by Radomir Visnjic within the corps operational staff on the screen in
4 front of you. Does the broken line have the same significance in this
6 A. I don't have it on the screen in front of me, but I know what
7 you're referring to from the main chart.
8 Thank you, I can now see that.
9 Again, this dotted line around the Staff Division for Morale
10 relates to the existence of only a single document indicating the
11 existence of that staff division.
12 Q. On the chart, we also see you have employed two different types
13 of broken lines for the boxes depicting the formations. For want of a
14 better description, one line is broken up less frequently, while the
15 other may be described as a finely-dotted line. For example, if we look
16 in the co-operation staff and the boxes there depicting the office
17 computer section and so on, what's the significance of the use of the
18 finely-dotted line?
19 A. The dotted line shows part of the organisation that should exist
20 in the All Bat [phoen] based on the 4th Corps instructions or is very
21 likely to exist, the artillery staff being an example, where we do have
22 artillery staff officers, but I have no reference to an artillery staff
23 organisation. So where the dotted line is used for an organisation, it
24 means that you would expect to find that part of the organisation there,
25 but I have no specific document, other than a general instruction, that
1 such a unit should exist.
2 Q. Now, if we look at the Ilijas Brigade depicted on the first
3 chart, or if we look more generally at the units depicted in the chart,
4 we see that there is -- there are the letters "VP" followed by a number
5 in the top left-hand corner. What do those letters signify?
6 A. The VP number was a method used by the VRS to identify specific
7 units, so no two units would have the same VP number. This means that a
8 VP number would be allocated to the corps, and formations within the
9 corps would also be allocated VP numbers, and each of the battalions
10 within those brigades would have VP numbers, down to the lowest level.
11 So I can see we're zooming in to the Ilijas Brigade, and you can see that
12 each unit and sub-unit within the Ilijas Brigade has its own VP number
13 which consists of four numbers, a stroke, and then two other numbers, and
14 this clearly identified each individual unit.
15 Q. Looking at the units of the Ilijas Brigade, we see one of the
16 units there entitled "Vasko's platoon." Firstly, who do you understand
17 Vasko to be?
18 A. Simply from the documents that list the VP numbers, "Vasko"
19 appeared to just be the nickname or the name given to the commander, and
20 so the platoon that he commanded was simply "Vasko's platoon." His name
21 is actually listed on the chart.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Philipps, what does "VP" actually mean?
23 THE WITNESS: I believe it stands for "Vojni Post," which is
24 "Military Post."
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 MR. HAYDEN:
2 Q. On what basis would you have attributed a VP number to Vasko's
4 A. With reference to a specific document that listed the VP numbers
5 of the Ilijas Brigade, and included in that list of VP numbers was
6 Vasko's platoon, with an allocated number.
7 Q. And, specifically, what does the existence of a VP number
8 assigned to Vasko's platoon indicate to you about its relationship to the
10 A. It indicates to me that that platoon was part -- was under the
11 command of the brigade, and that brigade was under the command of the
12 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, so that platoon forms an integral part of the
13 Sarajevo Romanija Corps and is under the command and control of the corps
14 through the chain of command.
15 Q. On some parts of the chart, you've employed the term "temp
16 attached" or "temp at." For example, if we look under the
17 1st Romania
18 row of subordinated units, and there we see a box within which is
19 written: "MUP strength, 150. 25 May 1993. Temp at," and we see a
20 Milko Koriman [phoen]" in that box. Firstly, is "temp attached" or "temp
21 at" short for "temporarily attached"?
22 A. Yes, it is. I simply used that abbreviation there to fit it onto
23 the chart.
24 Q. And what does the term mean in the context of this example?
25 A. A document existed that showed that a MUP unit with that listed
1 strength of 150 was attached to that brigade for a specific operation.
2 The attachment of the MUP might put the MUP under the control of that
3 unit, but not necessarily under the command of the officer.
4 MR. HAYDEN: Mr. Registrar, if I could have 65 ter 11711. And
5 we --
6 Q. Can you see a document before you, Mr. Philipps?
7 A. Yes, I can.
8 Q. This document we see before us is dated 17th of June, 1992.
9 Looking at the first page before you, who is the recipient of the
11 A. The document is directed to the Main Staff of the VRS.
12 MR. HAYDEN: And if we can turn to the second page.
13 Q. Who is the author of this document?
14 A. The author of the document, that is, the individual writing the
15 report, was the then commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, that is,
16 Colonel Tomislav Sipcic.
17 Q. And returning to the front page, if we scroll down to
18 paragraph 4, and this paragraph begins: "Ilidza MUP ...," followed by:
19 "They are mopping up the Akif Seremet and Georgi Dimitrovi.
20 Streets. They engaged a small number of people. Instead of 210,
21 estimated, they put into action around 40 people and some SRS volunteers
22 who were are under their command."
23 And it lists the casualties.
24 According to your reading of this document, what is the
25 relationship between the MUP, the SRS volunteers and the SRK
1 combat operation?
2 A. The MUP appears to have the SRS volunteers under its command,
3 from what is stated by Colonel Sipcic, and the MUP itself is operating
4 within the area of responsibility of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and
5 that is why that information is being reported up the chain of command.
6 MR. HAYDEN: If I can tender this document into evidence.
7 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, Mr. Philipps. Who is reporting to who in
8 this document?
9 THE WITNESS: The corps commander, Tomislav Sipcic, is reporting
10 to the Main Staff, that is, the army headquarters of the VRS. So he's
11 reporting from the corps up the chain of command to the general
13 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes. At the time, the VRS has a different name?
14 THE WITNESS: It all -- well, it -- there are various terms used
15 for the army, so --
16 JUDGE KWON: Because I didn't follow the GS of the SRBH Army.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, the "GS" is the General Staff, and the SRBH
18 refers to the Army of Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll admit it.
20 THE WITNESS: So the "VRS" and the "SRBH" are the same thing.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P991.
23 MR. HAYDEN: If I can be of assistance there, Your Honour, you
24 can see in the English translation "GS" is followed by "Main Staff."
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, thank you.
1 MR. HAYDEN: If we can call up 65 ter 12445.
2 Q. This is a document dated 16th of September, 1992. Just from the
3 front page there, Mr. Philipps, can you tell us generally what kind of
4 document this is and where it fits in in the chain of reporting?
5 A. This is a report from a brigade commander, in this case the
6 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade up the chain of command to the commander of
7 the Sarajevo
8 MR. HAYDEN: If we can turn to page 2.
9 Q. And approximately halfway down the page, it reads:
10 "The police agreed to all our demands for unified action and
11 armed combat and, among other things, was involved in safe-guarding some
12 of the positions of the Ozrenska Street front-line."
13 Is this an example of the police units working in the area of
14 responsibility of the SRK
15 A. Yes, this report from the brigade commander up the chain of
16 command is reporting on co-operation with the civilian police, and
17 particularly in this case mentioning a position on the front-line where
18 the police appear to be acting in conjunction with the military.
19 Q. And if we look at the paragraph immediately below that one, it
21 "Manpower levels of the brigade command consisted of 80 per cent
22 senior officers already at the beginning and subsequently reached
23 90 per cent, whereas manpower levels of the battalion commands are
24 100 per cent, including all key command positions, which guarantees
25 successful command in all the units, and we really do not face any
1 problems with command and control in the units in combat."
2 What does this aspect of the report tell you about the nature of
3 command and control of one of the SRK
4 A. Well, in this case it does appear that the majority of the
5 command posts are being filled by officers with the appropriate level of
6 training, and only in the brigade command, itself, is there a lack of
7 manpower of trained officers of about 10 per cent.
8 MR. HAYDEN: I tender that into evidence.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P992, Your Honours.
11 MR. HAYDEN:
12 Q. And finally, Mr. Philipps, in light of your experience in the
13 military, and after your review of the collection of SRK documents, what
14 conclusions did you draw about the overall nature or functioning of the
15 command and control structure of the SRK?
16 A. Over the period shown in the charts, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps
17 appeared to run an effective command and control of the units, from
18 formation level, that is, brigade, down through battalions, down to
19 companies, down to platoon level. So the company commanders were able to
20 report up the chain of command to battalions, battalions could report up
21 to brigades, and brigades wrote detailed reports to the corps command,
22 and information passed in the other direction.
23 Further to that, the corps command were able to report those
24 details to the Main Staff, that is, the Main Staff of the VRS, and the
25 Main Staff were able to instruct the corps on its activities.
1 This shows an effective command and control of the corps through
2 the period, with accurate reporting, well-written reports with
3 appropriate details.
4 MR. HAYDEN: Your Honour, that concludes the
6 I would now ask that the documents associated with Mr. Philipps'
7 92 ter statement, which include both the charts before us, be admitted
8 into evidence.
9 JUDGE KWON: So let's take one by one.
10 The chart, are you tendering it as -- tendering two charts as an
11 associate exhibit of his 92 ter statement, or, itself, is it an expert
12 report, itself?
13 MR. HAYDEN: Your Honour, we consider it the expert report. It
14 was -- the charts were listed in the 94 bis notification that was filed
15 last year. Whatever the technicalities of admission, if it's more
16 appropriate under Rule 94, then that would be the case.
17 JUDGE KWON: First, we'll admit those two charts as his expert
18 report. We give them separate numbers. Let's do that first.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P993.
20 JUDGE KWON: 993 will be the chart which refers to the years from
21 1992 to 1994.
22 And then we'll give the Exhibit P994 for the second chart which
23 deals with the year from 1994 to 1995.
24 And, Mr. Hayden, you also said that you would tender the note or
25 seven-page report, as well as the list of units and list of personnel, as
1 associated exhibits?
2 MR. HAYDEN: Again, those three documents were listed in the
3 94 -- Rule 94 bis notification. If it's more appropriate to submit them
4 as expert reports, then --
5 JUDGE KWON: That would be part of his expert report.
6 MR. HAYDEN: The note is an explanation of the charts. The two
7 other documents, the indices that list the relevant underlying documents,
8 we don't seek to tender those or all of those underlying documents as
9 exhibits. But if it would be helpful for the Chamber to have those
10 indices, then we submit those for evidence as well.
11 JUDGE KWON: And about the appendix, Appendix A, so you are
12 tendering that also as a kind of appendix to his expert report, not
13 necessarily as an associated exhibit, I take it.
14 MR. HAYDEN: The appendix lists I think it's 47 documents -- 48
15 documents that we wish to tender into evidence. The appendix was
16 considered part of his 92 ter statement. Again, if the more appropriate
17 vehicle is Rule 94 bis, then we're happy to tender it under that Rule.
18 JUDGE KWON: So we'll consider that the Appendix A as part of his
19 92 ter statement. So having said that, we'll admit separately his note
20 and list of units and, finally, the list of personnel. We give three
21 numbers to those.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. 65 ter 11553 will be
23 Exhibit P995. 65 ter 10592 will be Exhibit P996. And 65 ter 10593 will
24 be Exhibit P997.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 And, finally, we'll come to those 48 documents dealt with in his
2 Annex A.
3 So I would like to recall our guide-line which was given in our
4 decision which was issued on 20th of October last year. I will quote:
5 "Expert reports generally should be complete and understandable
6 in themselves, such that there's no need to tender for admission into
7 evidence the sources used by the expert. However, should the presenting
8 party wish to tender certain sources used by an expert in compiling his
9 or her report, it can reapply to the Chamber for the admission either
10 orally or in writing. The Chamber notes that the presenting party should
11 be very selective in the sources that it tenders for admission into
12 evidence and provide clear reasons as to why these sources should be
13 admitted in addition to the expert report, itself."
14 In the case of Dr. Donia, the Chamber was very pleased to admit
15 those sources. But in relation to these 48 documents, there are certain
16 documents as to which the Chamber is not quite satisfied as to its
17 relevance or necessity or in what context it is used in his report. So I
18 will name those documents. Which will be convenient, in the order filed
19 in the Annex A or in the order of alphabetical number -- no, numerical
21 MR. HAYDEN: Whichever pleases you, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: Then I will give the numbers in the order of
24 These are all 65 ter numbers: 1643, 1864, 9035, 9273, 9383,
25 9469, 10693, 10931, 10932, 11286, 11657, 12178, 12182, 12199, 12202,
1 12377, 12380, 12383, 12400, 12402, 12407, 12409, and 12418.
2 The Chamber is satisfied, with the relevance and the context, in
3 admitting the remaining documents, so as for the main documents, at this
4 moment the Chamber does not admit them at this moment. So you may come
5 back with the full explanation or you may go through either of them with
6 the witness at the end of the --
7 MR. HAYDEN: If I understand your instructions, Your Honour, we
8 have the opportunity to present to you in writing the relevance of those
10 JUDGE KWON: In writing or you can go through them with the
11 witness if you prefer. Of course, the Defence will be allowed to
12 cross-examine in relation to the questions.
13 MR. HAYDEN: I think we'll take the opportunity to submit
14 something in writing. Thank you, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.
16 The Registry will circulate the status of the exhibit in writing
17 in due course.
18 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good afternoon to all.
20 Allow me to introduce Professor Dr. Radovan Radinovic,
21 lieutenant-general, retired, who is assisting me in working with
22 Prosecution experts for military matters.
23 I would also like to thank Mr. Philipps for being so kind as to
24 meet up with the Defence. We did meet yesterday at the Detention Unit,
25 and we looked at certain matters that we may agree upon in order to save
1 time for the Trial Chamber and for all of us. So thank you,
2 Mr. Philipps.
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
4 Q. [Interpretation] This is what I'd like to ask you: As the
5 distinguished Prosecutor said, you are a military intelligence officer;
7 A. I'm a retired military intelligence officer.
8 Q. Can you tell us how one becomes a military intelligence officer?
9 A. Intelligence is simply a specialism within the army. So one can
10 become an intelligence officer or an engineer officer or an artillery
11 officer, and at the beginning of one's career one chooses the specialism,
12 and I, by chance, chose intelligence.
13 Q. What kind of schools need to be completed for that occupation, as
14 it were?
15 A. In the British Army, all officers receive the same basic training
16 to become infantry officers so that they're capable of commanding troops
17 on the battle-field, and later on they specialise into certain areas. I
18 was commissioned into the Intelligence Corps after a course at the
19 Military Academy
20 Q. Thank you. Does that mean that a military intelligence officer
21 has to be familiar with all the other things that other military officers
22 are taught during the course of their military education?
23 A. At the beginning of the training, all officers are trained to the
24 same level, to the same capability of being infantry officers, but then
25 comes the training -- the specialist training. So I would not have the
1 knowledge of, for example, a specialist engineer officer or a specialist
2 artillery officer. I'm an intelligence staff officer.
3 Q. However, as far as military theory and doctrine is concerned, you
4 are all equally familiar with that; right?
5 A. Yes, I've been trained to a certain level in military doctrine.
6 Specifically having been an intelligence officer, I focused on combat
7 intelligence, that is, really, the capabilities of the enemy, in terms of
8 the British Army. So at that time that was considered to be the
9 Soviet Union, so a lot of my work was studying the tactics, strategy, and
10 capabilities of the Soviet Army.
11 Q. Are you trying to say that at every point in time, a particular
12 army has an assumed enemy or a preferred enemy, and that then the army
13 adjusts its doctrine and procedures accordingly?
14 A. The British Army studies other armies all the time. It
15 specifically studies those armies which are at that time a threat. And
16 in 1985, there was no doubt, in a sense, with the existence of the inner
17 German border, that there was a concern that there might be a conflict
18 with the Soviet Union. An army might change the armies that it studies
19 over time. It's a very natural thing to study potential enemies as well
20 as existing enemies.
21 Q. Are you permitted to tell us how things stand now in relation to
22 the British Army?
23 A. I retired in 2006, so I have no current knowledge of what the
24 British Army might consider to be the enemy. But the British Army is
25 currently fighting in Afghanistan
1 for example, would be going on relating to the Taliban and the structures
2 and capability of the Taliban. But that is something that is really
3 general knowledge and not specific knowledge to me.
4 Q. So Karadzic is not being taken into consideration at all in the
5 British Army as a potential enemy; is that right?
6 A. I really couldn't say, sir.
7 Q. Thank you. Tell us, you've included some 50 documents. You've
8 had a look at all the documents involved, but you studied some 50-odd
9 documents of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps; right?
10 A. The references to my report show that I've included several
11 hundred documents in compiling the report, but not all of those are
12 tendered as exhibits, as I understand.
13 Q. Thank you. So the information in your report has, as its source,
14 all of these documents that are listed, not only those 50-odd documents?
15 A. Yes, the charts both have indices relating to personnel units and
16 equipment, and these indices list all the documents that I used to
17 extract data from to create the charts.
18 Q. Thank you. Are there any reports that you had not taken into
20 A. There are many, many documents of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps
21 that I have not read and not been through. There is often, when
22 preparing a report like this, insufficient time to read every available
23 source. It would have taken many, many years to produce a report if I'd
24 been through every available document. I had to be selective.
25 Q. Who was it that carried out that selection, you or the Office of
1 the Prosecutor?
2 A. I selected which documents were appropriate to be referenced in
3 the report.
4 Q. Thank you. Did you have in mind any particular request of the
5 Office of the Prosecutor or a specially profiled task, as it were?
6 A. The task I was originally given was by Mr. Ierace to prepare the
7 charts for the Galic case, and his directive was to prepare an
8 organisational chart showing the structure, command and control of the
9 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, but it didn't extend into any other details.
10 When I was re-tasked to produce the updated reports for this case, a
11 similar set of instructions were given to update the organisational
12 structure, to update any further information we had from additional SRK
13 documents relating to command and control and structure.
14 Q. So there are some differences between your first report and
15 testimony and this report; right?
16 A. Yes, there will be some small differences. The time-period means
17 that the chart was split into two different periods. And, furthermore,
18 additional information was available from original SRK documents which by
19 then had come into the hands of the OTP, and they were then given to me
20 to select.
21 Q. Can you tell us briefly what is the specific difference involved
22 in relation to the first insight you had?
23 A. I'm not sure I understand the question.
24 Q. What is different in the new report as compared to your old
25 report? Did it change your view of this corps?
1 A. The additional information really provided extra detail on
2 certain units, extra information to show when those units existed or when
3 they changed or changed their names. It provided information on units
4 that were formed after 1994. The documents provided additional
5 information on reporting in the chain of command, additional information
6 on combat reporting, strengths of the units, the type of ammunition and,
7 therefore, the type of weapons used. So as I worked through the
8 documents, I was able to, you might say, improve the reports as regards
10 Q. Thank you. Since you said that you were a specialist in
11 assessing combat readiness and capacities, did you assess the
12 Sarajevo Romanija Corps from that point of view as well?
13 A. I did not assess the combat effectiveness or combat readiness of
14 the Sarajevo
15 control capabilities of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
16 Q. Did the Office of the Prosecutor have certain suggestions or
17 instructions in relation to the conclusions to be drawn in respect of
18 combat effectiveness and command and control capabilities of the Sarajevo
19 Romanija Corps? In other words, did you know what the objective of the
20 OTP was?
21 A. No, I didn't. I was simply given instructions to put together an
22 organisational chart and look at the command and control and reporting.
23 I wasn't given any information about their pre-trial brief. I haven't
24 read the pre-trial brief. I haven't read the indictment. All I'm doing
25 is presenting the structure of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. So there was
1 no agenda, if you like, from the OTP that was given to me.
2 Q. It doesn't have to be a hidden agenda of any kind. But, anyway,
3 Mr. Philipps, I would be interested in the following: The structure of
4 this kind of an operative unit like a corps, I mean its functioning, does
5 it depend on the tasks before it? Is that task of relevance? And in
6 relation to that task, does one assess whether things are sufficient,
7 insufficient, exaggerated, et cetera?
8 A. The concept of the structure and command and control of a corps
9 is such that it is able to fulfill a certain set of tasks or operations,
10 and it should, with that structure, be capable of fulfilling the set of
11 tasks such as those laid out in the 4th Corps instructions. You would
12 not expect to keep changing the organisation of a military unit just
13 because the tasks put before it changed. Certainly at the corps level,
14 it's expected to have the capability to fulfill those tasks.
15 Having said that, when circumstances change, it may be necessary
16 to change the structure of an organisation, the relationship between the
17 numbers of troops, the number, for example, of engineers or artillery.
18 So the answer would be: Generally, a corps would have a certain
19 structure to fulfill its tasks, but may be changed over a period of time
20 as those tasks develop, whereas the military situation changes.
21 Q. Am I right if I believe that the development of the military
22 situation is significantly affected by the other party that is at war?
23 A. The -- any military situation of conflict, inevitably the
24 activities of the enemy influence the capabilities of -- capabilities and
25 structure and organisation of any military unit that is fighting.
1 Q. So do you agree that it would have been a good thing if we had
2 had more insight as far as the enemy was concerned or, rather, the other
3 warring party that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps was facing?
4 A. I'm not sure I understand the question. Are you talking about
5 currently or historically?
6 Q. No, no. I'm talking about the time when the Sarajevo
7 Romanija Corps existed. Do you agree that its functioning, its
8 structure, effectiveness, the measures that it took, et cetera, were
9 largely dictated and tested by the enemy, and these are exams that one
10 cannot re-sit, as it were?
11 A. The structure of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps gave it, for
12 example, an intelligence and security division at the corps staff level.
13 Every combat report that came up to the corps headquarters, the first
14 paragraph would cover the actions of the enemy. The purpose of the corps
15 in fighting would be to avoid being pushed, if you like, to avoid being
16 directed into certain actions by the enemy. The purpose of fighting is
17 to prevent the enemy from directing you into course of action. So there
18 was a detailed intelligence flow from the units on the front-line to the
19 command and from the command up to the Main Staff.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would the time be right for the
21 break or should I go on?
22 JUDGE KWON: Well, if it is convenient, it's time to take a
24 We'll break for 25 minutes.
25 [The witness stands down]
1 --- Recess taken at 3.35 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 4.02 p.m.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 If we could move very briefly into private session.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 [Private session]
20 [Open session]
21 JUDGE KWON: I was advised that the morning slot is empty on
22 Friday, so we would prefer to sit in the morning this week, Friday.
23 [The witness takes the stand]
24 JUDGE KWON: Sorry for the inconvenience, Mr. Philipps and
25 Mr. Radinovic.
1 Mr. Karadzic, shall we continue?
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Q. Mr. Philipps, are you familiar with our situation as a whole;
4 primarily, the Yugoslav situation as a whole, but also the Bosnian
5 crisis, specifically?
6 A. Are you referring to the conflict in Yugoslavia during the period
7 of the charts?
8 Q. Yes, yes.
9 A. I have a little knowledge of that, of the events that took place.
10 Q. Thank you. I would like to suggest that we go through the points
11 that we agreed upon considerably during our interview so that we can
12 leave that ad actum.
13 Do you agree that at a certain point in time, the JNA was very
14 powerful? Some people even say it was the fourth-strongest army in
16 A. I'm afraid I was never an expert on the JNA, and so I'm not
17 capable of ranking it in terms of strength or capability at that time in
19 Q. But you do agree that it was the only military force in
22 A. Again, I wouldn't know what the population of Yugoslavia was in
23 the 1990s. I understand that the JNA was recruited from entirely within
24 the former Yugoslavia
25 Q. Thank you. We agreed yesterday that all the officers and the
1 entire reserve force was related to Yugoslavia, was trained in Yugoslavia
2 and belonged to the JNA, as such; isn't that right?
3 A. Many of the officers shown on the chart -- on the two charts
4 behind me were trained JNA officers and trained JNA soldiers.
5 Q. We agreed that the officers of the armies of the other republics,
7 them -- or, actually, all the officers could only come from the Yugoslav
8 People's Army, the JNA; right?
9 A. Again, I haven't studied the composition of those other forces.
10 But as I understand it from what I've read and what I've been told, there
11 were also trained officers from the JNA.
12 Q. Do you agree that some of them had served in the JNA all the way
13 up until the conflict started?
14 A. Yes. Most certainly from the point of the Sarajevo
15 Romanija Corps, which I have looked at in detail, the officers were
16 professional full-time serving officers, or at least some of those
17 officers were full-time officers.
18 Q. Do you agree that in the armies of the other republics, they also
19 got their own officers who until then had been professional officers in
20 the JNA?
21 A. Again, the other armies involved in the conflict haven't been a
22 subject of my study. But if -- it seems likely that they were trained
23 JNA officers. I'm not sure that I'm the person to ask.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that there had been no other army but
25 the JNA and that all the reservists were JNA conscripts in all the
2 A. Again, I'll have to qualify my answer, not having studied the
3 other armies. The SRK
4 conscripts and reservists, and one might assume, therefore, that the
5 other armies consisted of the same types of troops.
6 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that war is always waged with a purpose
7 or objective?
8 A. That's almost a philosophical question, outside my abilities.
9 War is waged for all sorts of reasons, and I wouldn't want to make a
10 general statement about war, through history, that I haven't studied in
11 that way.
12 JUDGE MORRISON: It would be nice to think that it was, though.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. And do you agree that -- with a maxim that when two laws or two
15 rights clash, that a solution can usually be found only in war?
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, where are we going?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, let us see why the
18 Sarajevo Romanija Corps existed in the first place. Let us see why that
19 army existed in the first place.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. If that is too general a question for you, then I'm going to move
23 Do you agree that that corps had a certain military task, a
24 certain area of work, and certain objectives?
25 A. Yes, it would appear that the corps was given military
1 instructions, it was given an area of responsibility, and it was given
2 military objectives.
3 Q. Thank you. You said yesterday, during our interview, that the
4 Sarajevo Romanija Corps had been established under strange circumstances
5 during the war and on an ad hoc basis; right?
6 A. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps was formed when the conflict had
7 already started, and any organisation formed during a conflict does not
8 have a straightforward formation at the beginning.
9 Q. Thank you. And if I tell you that the objectives of the warring
10 parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, taking into account primarily the Serbs
11 and Muslims here because we are discussing Sarajevo, the objective of the
12 Muslim side was to prevail throughout Bosnia and to have 100 per cent
13 authority in Bosnia
14 remain in Yugoslavia
15 they would get their own constituent unit within Bosnia? Does that sound
16 familiar to you?
17 A. You're talking at the political level, and my knowledge is of the
18 military level, and so I can't really answer that question. I don't know
19 what the objectives of the Bosnians were or the objectives of the
20 Serbians were.
21 Q. Thank you. While studying combat documentation of the Sarajevo
22 Romanija Corps, did you manage to glean, as it were, what the objectives
23 of that corps were?
24 A. Are you asking me whether there's a specific instruction to the
1 instruction, but I would be hard pressed to recall it exactly without the
2 document in front of me, and I don't remember which document it was. The
3 objective appeared to be the blockade of Sarajevo.
4 Q. Thank you. We'll have to go through the documents together. We
5 agreed that you don't have much knowledge about the 1st Corps of the
6 BH Army, but that you believe it might have had the same structure as the
7 Sarajevo Romanija Corps because they stem from the same school; is that
9 A. In a sense, all military organisations are similar. Whatever
10 period of history you look at, military formations have a
11 similar organisation. Having been formed from officers and soldiers of
12 the JNA, if that's what you've been saying, then the ABiH may very well
13 have had a similar structure, but I haven't studied it. So, in a sense,
14 I'm the wrong person to ask, not being an expert on the ABiH.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 May we have in e-court 1D01892, please.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. And while we're waiting for it to come up, Mr. Philipps, I'd like
19 to tell you that it's a similar chart, and it originates from the Muslim
20 army. The boxes are not spread out in the same way, they are placed one
21 underneath the other, but if you would look at this and tell me whether
22 it looks convincing and realistic to you.
23 It seems we'll have to have it on the ELMO because it appears not
24 to be in e-court yet, although it should be.
25 By your leave, I'll read out what it says. It's the 1st Corps of
1 the BH Army, Sarajevo
2 number 7, and then it lists the composition. They were brigades at the
4 Does this appear to be the structure of the Sarajevo
5 Romanija Corps? Does it seem similar, rather?
6 A. This is a structure of a corps and laid out in a very similar
7 manner to the nature of the chart of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. It
8 appears to be a corps that is formed with a series of brigades, and at
9 the bottom has an additional set of divisions which also appear to have
10 then been subdivided into brigades.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 May this be admitted into evidence?
13 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
14 Mr. Hayden.
15 MR. HAYDEN: I would note, Your Honour, that the original 65 ter
16 number given by the accused was -- the last two numbers were flipped. It
17 is, I believe, in e-court under 1D01829.
18 JUDGE KWON: 29. Shall we check it first. Yes, we have it.
19 Still missing is the English translation. So do we have the
20 English translation, Mr. Hayden?
21 MR. HAYDEN: Not that I'm aware of.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for the information.
23 We'll mark it for identification, pending translation.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Q. We agreed during our interview --
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you know whose handwriting these
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I really don't. Evidently, it
5 belongs to someone from the Muslim army.
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's move on.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. We agreed that to the best of your knowledge, the Sarajevo
9 Romanija Corps had up to 23.000 men; is that right?
10 A. From one of the documents produced by the corps, itself, the
11 establishment was shown to be at one point in time 23.000, that's
13 Q. Thank you. We agreed that only the command cadre were
14 professionals, and not all of them, reserve officers or even ordinary
15 privates, were in command posts; is that right?
16 A. Some of the posts within the Sarajevo Romanija Corps appear to
17 have been occupied by reserve officers, that's correct.
18 Q. Do you agree that the corps, as a whole, did not have a
19 sufficient number of trained officers?
20 A. That's a very difficult question for me to answer. It would
21 depend on the activities of the corps. And as I haven't studied in
22 detail what the corps was doing, I would not really be able to say
23 whether it had sufficient officers to fulfill the tasks it was given.
24 However, it appears to have had sufficiently well-trained officers for
25 the purposes of command and control, and the purposes of passage of
1 information from the front-line to the headquarters, and from the
2 headquarters back to the front-line.
3 Q. Thank you. Did we agree that apart from the high-ranking
4 officers who were professionals, the other soldiers were not
5 professionals, even though they had served in the JNA and were reservists
6 after that; is that right?
7 A. The answer depends on your definition of a professional officer.
8 Many of the officers in command posts, although not at that time
9 full-time serving officers, had had full training within the JNA, and I
10 suppose I would refer to the document we looked at earlier from the
11 1st Romanija Brigade up to the corps headquarters, stating that
12 sufficiently well-trained officers were occupying the command posts.
13 Q. Maybe that brigade, yes. But did you observe that this was not
14 the case in all the brigades and it was not the case in the corps, as a
16 A. I don't have -- or I haven't seen a document -- all the documents
17 from other brigades to the corps relating to this matter. There may be
18 other documents, but if so, I haven't seen them. Many of the other
19 officers in the other brigades appear to be JNA officers, but the only
20 report that I've seen relating to capabilities and level of manning is
21 the one from the 1st Romanija Brigade. That is to say, there may be
22 other reports that I haven't seen.
23 Q. Thank you. Do we agree -- well, first of all, let's clear up a
24 concept. In our language and in our system, a professional soldier is
25 one who makes a living by being a soldier. Would you agree with that
2 A. It is, in a sense, a good distinction, "profession" meaning,
3 let's call it, vocation. We're dealing with semantics here. In the
4 British Army, you can be a professional soldier for just five years. You
5 can be a full-time serving soldier for five years and then go into
6 another occupation. You can be a part-time soldier, but that doesn't
7 mean that you're less professional. It just means it's not your
8 full-time occupation.
9 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that our reservists, both officers and
10 privates, served in the JNA for nine months or a year, after which they
11 were demobilised and did other jobs, but they were considered to be
12 military conscripts?
13 A. Again, I would have to qualify my answer. Having not studied the
14 JNA, I'm not an expert on JNA training methods or even length of service.
15 If you say they were trained for nine months or a year, then that is a
16 relatively good period of time to train a soldier to a certain level.
17 Does that answer the question?
18 Q. Mostly, yes. Do you agree, then, that some of them were
19 occasionally summoned to manoeuvres once a year, the way it's done in
20 your country?
21 A. I would be assuming the answer to that question. I have no
22 knowledge of it. I imagine that they had military training camps at
23 different times during the year. Again, I'm not really the person to
24 answer that question. I'm not an expert on the training regime of
25 reservists from the JNA.
1 Q. Does this seem to be somewhat similar to your own system, when
2 reservists take equipment home with them, and in our case they also took
3 weapons home with them? We discussed this.
4 A. In the British Army, a reservist is usually an ex-professional
5 soldier who has left full-time service but then has a duty or can be
6 recalled for service full time in the army at a later date. The other
7 type of soldier in the British Army is a territorial army soldier, and he
8 would not have served, necessarily, full-time in the army, but would have
9 had part-time training, and he would be issued with kit and equipment,
10 but not weapons, that he would keep with him at home. And he would then
11 train at weekends or on certain weeks of the year and would also be
12 eligible to be called up for service with the regular army, for example,
13 in Afghanistan
14 British Army, not of the JNA.
15 Q. If I tell you that a conscript in the JNA resembles a territorial
16 army, as described by you, more than he resembles a soldier in Britain
17 would you agree with this?
18 A. I would have to compare the training of the two to see the level
19 of training, so I couldn't give a comprehensive answer. Territorial army
20 soldiers in the United Kingdom are trained to a very high level, and they
21 do take part in combat activities, and they are currently serving in
22 operations in Afghanistan
24 Q. Well, that's a pity. It would be a good thing if you knew this,
25 because it would make it easier for us to understand the structure of the
2 a year, and later on nine months, that there were three or four months of
3 intensive training and the rest was simply life in the barracks in an
4 army unit, and after that people went back to their homes, to their
5 regular work, and after that they were liable for military service and be
6 called upon to attend training exercises, manoeuvres, or serve in case of
7 a war, would that then resemble the description of a territorial army
8 soldier in Britain
9 A. With the exception that territorial army soldiers are rarely
10 trained continuously for three months. They normally are trained for
11 two-week periods at a time and at weekends and on evenings. But with the
12 description you have given, it would make a JNA reservist similar to a
13 territorial army soldier in that respect, possibly even better trained,
14 as they'd spent full time in the army for nine months.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Can we please have 1D018935.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. I believe we agreed yesterday that you knew a little bit about
19 our territorial defence, which is a bit different from your territorial
20 army. But its function is similar; is that right?
21 A. The British territorial army, the word "territorial" comes from
22 the fact that units are recruited from a specific area or territory
23 within the United Kingdom, but the unit is not expected to defend that
24 area or to fight in that area. It could fight for national reasons, or
25 be posted abroad, or be called up for humanitarian reasons. So there is
1 no concept of territorial defence, in the Yugoslavian sense of the word.
2 I have only read briefly of the concept of Tito -- of territorial
3 defence, and by no means an expert on the concept of territorial defence.
4 I understood it to be the defence of Yugoslavia against outside
5 aggression, so that the entire country could defend itself against an
6 aggressive act from outside Yugoslavia
7 Q. Thank you. Do you know that in the Yugoslav Constitution, there
8 was a ban on anyone signing an act of capitulation?
9 A. No, I didn't know that.
10 Q. If I tell you that this meant that regardless of what the
11 government did, every individual, wherever he found himself or herself,
12 would have to oppose whoever was threatening the country --
13 JUDGE KWON: Move on. Let's move on to the next question.
14 Witness --
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm waiting for the document.
16 JUDGE KWON: There's a slight mistake in the number. Is it
17 11835, 1D --
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01835. It was on the screen, but
19 it was turned the wrong way. It has to be recalled on the screen. I'm
20 not sure we have a translation.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. You see, Mr. Philipps, this is dated the 26th of May in 1992. Do
23 you remember that the JNA had to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina by the 20th of
24 May, 1992?
25 A. No, I didn't know that.
1 Q. This is dated the 26th of May, and it's an order issued by
2 Tomislav Sipcic to establish a new Sarajevo
3 defence on the territory of Grbavica
4 formed from the Territorial Defence of certain areas, and the Ilidza
5 Brigade of Territorial Defence was to be formed from the territories of
6 Dreoci, Vrelo Bosne, Ilidza, and Luzanj. These are the Serbian parts of
7 Ilidza. The Kasindol Brigade of the Territorial Defence, the
8 Rajlovac Brigade of the Territory Defence, the Vogosca Brigade of the
9 Territorial Defence -- can we have the next page, please. So the Vogosca
10 Brigade is the last one on this page, and then there's the Lukavica
11 Brigade, the Pale Brigade, the Sokolac Brigade, the Rogatica Brigade, the
12 Ilijas Brigade, and the Trnovo Brigade.
13 Do you see that it was only on the 26th of May that steps were
14 taken to form territorial units according to the municipalities from
15 which they were being recruited and in which they would be active?
16 A. Yes, this seems to be an order to form brigades from territorial
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 I tender this document.
20 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. In our interview, we agreed that the front-lines in Sarajevo were
24 established according to neighbourhoods and that it didn't change much
25 during the war; is that right?
1 A. That's not precisely what was agreed, if that's the word to use.
2 Many of the front-lines were established by the military situation; that
3 is, the front-line came to be in a certain place because of the military
4 activity that had taken place. Does that make sense to you?
5 Q. But I'm interested in the point of time when the defence lines
6 were being set up in particular neighbourhoods. Did we agree that these
7 lines were not JNA lines, but lines of the local population?
8 A. I don't really have enough knowledge of how the lines were set up
9 in the first place. It seems that some of them were set up simply by
10 people wanting to defend a particular area.
11 Q. Thank you. Do you agree, and I think we did agree yesterday,
12 that the military composition consisted of local men, people from the
13 local population, who would go home after their shift; is that right?
14 A. I haven't studied or looked at the home addresses or home towns
15 of the individuals taking part within the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. I can
16 only think of certain orders written by the corps commanders to try and
17 prevent individual soldiers from returning home and fighting what was
18 called a weekend war by the corps commander.
19 Q. Thank you. You were there in the year 2000. You visited
21 A. Yes, I was with SFOR for nine months in 2000.
22 Q. Did you ever find information or did you ever see any
23 infrastructure, any barracks, where the men would be able to sleep, spend
24 the night? For example, in Hadzici, in Vojkovici, in Ilijas, or anywhere
25 else except for Lukavica, where the command was, was there any
1 infrastructure, any dormitories for the men, or did they go home when
2 their shift was over?
3 A. My time in Sarajevo
4 mostly relating to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, and my
5 task was as an intelligence staff officer. At that time, I was not
6 certainly looking at matters relating to the battle for Sarajevo between
7 1992 and 1995, so I can't really comment on what barracks were there or
8 had been built since, since SFOR, of course, had built barracks and were
9 using barracks in and around Sarajevo
10 Q. Thank you. Does it seem self-evident to you that this was a
11 peoples' army, who did not sleep in barracks but went to the front-line
12 the way they would go to work, and then after work they would go home?
13 A. Again, a difficult question to answer, in that I haven't seen
14 documents that relate to that matter. I certainly wouldn't expect
15 soldiers on a front-line to expect to go home to sleep. Normally, in a
16 static battle like that, soldiers would find a place on or near the
17 front-line to spend the night. But, again, this is not an area of my
18 expertise of how the war was conducted in that area.
19 Q. Thank you. Have we agreed that the Territorial Defence existed
20 in municipalities, in local communes, and even in factories, and that
21 these units of the Territorial Defence had their stockpiles of weapons?
22 A. Again, it's an area that I may have read about or heard people
23 talk about, but it's not an area of expertise for me. I don't know what
24 stockpiles of weapons existed or even if they existed, and I don't know
25 enough about the organisation of the Territorial Defence to answer the
1 level of command, if you like. I don't know whether it was at
2 municipality level, or whether local communities had units, or whether
3 factories had units.
4 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that the Territorial Defence preceded
5 all of these republican or -- yes, republican, newly-created armies, that
6 they existed -- or, rather, that that existed as a structure and preceded
7 everything that happened afterwards?
8 A. As I understand it, the Territorial Defence was a concept set up
9 by Tito. So, yes, the Territorial Defence existed before the
10 transformation of the 4th Corps of the JNA into the SRK, for example.
11 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that Tito's doctrine was called the
12 Doctrine of the Armed People?
13 A. No, I didn't know that.
14 Q. Thank you. Did you know that even every factory had its own
15 weapons, and every municipality, and that the Territorial Defence had its
16 own stockpiles of weapons that belonged to that unit, that territorial
17 unit, actually?
18 A. Again, I had heard these things, but I have no -- I'm certainly
19 not an expert on the subject.
20 Q. I'm trying to identify what it was that we had agreed upon during
21 our interview. So did we agree that "siege" would not be the right word,
22 "encirclement" would, the encirclement of Sarajevo; right?
23 A. I don't use the word "siege" relating to Sarajevo, because it's
24 not a military term currently in use. As a staff officer or as a retired
25 staff officer, I try to use military terminology that's in current use,
1 so I described what happened in Sarajevo
2 encirclement or a blockade, but I don't use the term "siege." It's not a
3 modern military term.
4 Q. Thank you. Have we agreed that if someone declares war on
5 someone else, that it is legitimate to win in that war?
6 A. To win by legitimate means would be the objective of a war.
7 That's an answer from my own opinion, not of a -- not from any expertise.
8 That seems a natural assumption of anyone.
9 Q. Thank you. Have we agreed that the task of the Sarajevo
10 Romanija Corps to blockade such large forces of the Muslim army, the Army
11 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the town of Sarajevo, was understandable and
12 justified in view of the fact that a war has to be viewed in at entire
14 A. In general, if one army can blockade or hold down part -- a large
15 part of another army for a period of time, that gives the army an
16 advantage. So from a military point of view, blockading or encircling
17 other forces is of military value.
18 Q. And we also agreed that what happened in Sarajevo cannot be
19 understood without understanding the entire theatre of war. War is a
20 single entity, isn't it?
21 A. If, by that, you mean that to understand the conduct of an
22 individual battle, you have to understand its location or its position
23 within the entire war, then the way to understand battles is by
24 understand the entire strategy of the war. We're into a sort of a --
25 we're talking now at the philosophical level of warfare, if you like, the
1 strategic level of warfare.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Can we call up in e-court the map? Actually, 65 ter 13639.
4 13639 is the 65 ter number.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Are you familiar with this map?
7 A. I'm not familiar with it. I think I've seen it before, but I'm
8 not familiar with it.
9 Q. Can you discern what it is that is depicted there?
10 A. The map is a military map showing abbreviations in Cyrillic. It
11 locates one corps in the center of Sarajevo, and it also shows what
12 appears to be the brigades of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps with
13 front-lines indicated in red and blue, the red line being on the side of
14 the VRS, mostly of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and the blue line
15 being -- showing the line of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ABiH;
16 that is, the 1st Corps of the ABiH inside and outside Sarajevo. The
17 circles that you see show corps artillery groups and brigade artillery
18 groups that are part of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and the -- most of
19 the abbreviations on the side of the map for the SRK are abbreviations
20 for the brigades, themselves, in Cyrillic. It also appears to show areas
21 of -- I think there's, yes, headquarters of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps
22 are shown, what looks to be the rear headquarters at Pale. And I can't
23 see, because of the scale, if the main headquarters are shown. But
24 mostly it's a map showing brigade and corps artillery groups positioned
25 around Sarajevo
1 Q. Can I ask you to take the electronic pen and to mark all of these
2 things that you told us?
3 A. Shall I start with the lines, themselves, so the front-lines?
4 Q. Perhaps you could mark the front-lines. We agreed during the
5 interview that the front-lines were from 10 metres to 200 metres away
6 from one another, depending on the geographic position; right?
7 A. Mostly, those would be approximate distances, sometimes maybe
8 even more than 200 metres in very open ground and sometimes possibly even
9 closer than 10 metres, where two houses were next to each other.
10 I shall now mark on the front-lines as shown on this map.
12 JUDGE KWON: The front-lines are marked here already, but --
13 THE WITNESS: You can see them. I'd just be tracing the line.
14 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to mark them again?
15 THE WITNESS: My marking wouldn't so much --
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. The point is just to mark the area that was under Serb control
18 and, on the other hand, the area that was under Muslim control.
19 So isn't it evident that Serb-held territory is within the red
20 lines; right?
21 A. As I understand it from the map, yes, the SRK and VRS area is
22 within -- inside the red lines and the ABiH is within the blue line.
23 Q. Thank you. Can you see where the airport is?
24 A. Yes, I can see where the airport is.
25 Q. Would you place the letter A by the airport? It's under no one's
1 control, actually. That was that well-known passageway, as it were, for
2 the Muslim army.
3 A. I shall attempt to mark the airport on the map. It's a very
4 difficult scale. But as I understand it, the airport is where I'm about
5 to put an A. [Marks]
6 Q. That's right, thank you. Can you see that the Serb lines are not
7 connected there around Sarajevo
8 A. At that point, it's a very flat area, and I can see that the
9 lines aren't connected. But the airport, of course, was capable of being
10 covered by machine-gun fire, and so was not passable on the surface.
11 Q. But you do recall that entire units left Sarajevo and returned to
13 A. Again, I've heard that the tunnel existed and that then units and
14 individuals passed through the tunnel, backwards and forwards through the
15 tunnel. I don't -- I don't have information on when or the numbers that
16 were involved, and I don't know how many passed over the surface or when
17 that occurred. But, again, I've been told, I've heard that, but it's --
18 Q. Did you see that in the documents of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps
19 or in UNPROFOR documents?
20 A. I recall seeing a specific order from the Main Staff, I believe
21 from General Mladic, to the corps command, demanding that the tunnel be
22 closed possibly by digging a tunnel to intercept it.
23 Q. Thank you. Can you identify Nedzarici here?
24 A. I believe I can. It may be more useful for the Court to have a
25 larger-scale map if they're looking at individual places.
1 Q. Is it this area to the north-west of the letter A, that circle to
2 the north-west of the airport that is within Muslim territory?
3 A. I'd now be hard pressed to mark Nedzarici, as I'm not now sure
4 where it is. I would have to zoom in and have a look, and then I might
5 be able to find Nedzarici for you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we zoom in the area around the
7 airport, around letter A?
8 JUDGE KWON: If we do, we'll lose the marking A, but we can do it
9 again and we know where it is.
10 Let's zoom in there first. Let's give it a try.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The other way around. Can we
12 scroll down a bit?
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Can you now see it, this part that is semi-encircled right by the
15 airport? Is that Nedzarici?
16 A. Shall I re-mark the airport?
17 Q. Please do.
18 A. Sorry. Thank you. [Marks] And as I understand it, Nedzarici is
19 this area here. [Marks]
20 Q. Precisely. Can you place the letter N there?
21 A. [Marks]
22 Q. Thank you. Do you see this number, 155th Mountain Brigade, the
23 101st, the 102nd Muslim Brigade? Do these brigades belong to the
25 A. I see the numbers 102 followed by the Cyrillic for BR and 155
1 followed by what looks like it could be BBR, and then I see 101, which
2 looks like BBR
3 are part of the ABiH, not the SRK
4 Q. Can you put "ABH" there next to these numbers, the 101st, the
5 102nd, the 155th BBR
6 A. Thank you. [Marks]
7 Q. Thank you. Can you see where Grbavica is?
8 A. I think so.
9 Q. Would you please place "GR" there?
10 A. I'm hoping this is correct, again, with the scale of the map.
12 Q. Exactly. Thank you. Can you mark where Lukavica is here or,
13 rather, the corps command?
14 A. Yes, I can see the flag with the Cyrillic with a "KM" and "SRK
15 and then there's a stick from that flag that goes to Lukavica, although
16 it's very hard for anyone to read the actual name. [Marks]
17 Q. Thank you. Can you place the letter L there?
18 A. [Marks]
19 Q. Do you know where Hrasnica is?
20 A. We'd be into the realms of me now guessing on this scale of map.
21 If I had a map I could read, I could find it.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
23 MR. HAYDEN: Sorry, Your Honour. I'm failing to see the utility
24 of again having a witness go through and just mark geographical locations
25 on a map. I don't see the relevance at this point.
1 JUDGE KWON: I didn't expect the witness to be able to follow
2 everything, but he was so far, so we'll see.
3 But if you don't know, say you don't know.
4 THE WITNESS: I'm really not sure where Hrasnica is on this map.
5 I would have to have -- I mean, I could find it by seeing where it said
6 "Hrasnica" on the map, which is not any knowledge at all.
7 JUDGE MORRISON: There's probably not an issue as to where it is
8 on the map. It's a question of a big-enough scale of map so we can see
9 where it is.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, exactly.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Is it over here, where it says "4 MTBR" in Cyrillic underneath
13 "Igman"? You do remember Igman, don't you?
14 A. Yes, I've heard of Igman. Yes, that could be -- now you've
15 reminded me. Hrasnica is down the bottom there, isn't it, I think, where
16 it's showing the -- there's a brigade and two battalion headquarter flags
17 underneath the "4 MTBR"; is that correct? Is that Hrasnica?
18 Q. Yes, yes, precisely, that's where it is. Could you please place
19 the letter H there?
20 A. [Marks]
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, what is your point of asking this
22 question? What --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, this corps exists
24 for a reason. We have to identify what that reason is. Let us see what
25 its position is and what it is that it has to grapple with.
1 We see here on this map that Nedzarici is also semi-encircled.
2 During our interview, Mr. Philipps said himself that everyone was
3 semi-circled by somebody else. We were semi-encircled by the Muslims,
4 and the other way around. So I would just like us to identify this on
5 the map, since Mr. Philipps is familiar with the documentation of the
7 somewhere, then he can confirm that.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Could you please put the date and your initials in the lower
10 right-hand corner, Mr. Philipps. We are going to lose all these markings
11 if we do anything else with the map.
12 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, Mr. Philipps, you confirm what
13 Mr. Karadzic just said?
14 THE WITNESS: Yes. I'll have to, I'm afraid, be reminded of the
16 JUDGE KWON: It's the 15th of June, I take it.
17 THE WITNESS: [Marks]
18 JUDGE KWON: 2010, yes.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Can the map be admitted into evidence, please, so could we have
21 it in its totality?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It will be Exhibit D309?
23 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we zoom out?
25 Thank you, that is fine.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. At the north, do you recognise the Sarajevo municipality of
4 A. Again, I think so.
5 Q. Would you place an I there, then? It's at the very top of this
6 arch; right?
7 A. Well, yes, I was going to put "Ilijas" here. Oops, sorry.
8 [Marks]. I've marked it in blue with an I.
9 Q. Thank you. Do we agree that outside this line, this front-line,
10 there is the 3rd Corps, with its headquarters in Zenica?
11 A. My answer to that question is I don't know what subordination is
12 of the unit on the ABiH side there, so I don't know what level of command
13 it is and I can't really identify the unit. I can see what looks like
14 "134 BBR
15 Q. But you do agree that this is Muslim-controlled territory; right?
16 A. According to this map, yes, that would be identified as ABiH-held
18 Q. Thank you. Do you see where it says "HVO" in Cyrillic, "94 DB
19 HVO"? Would that correspond to the Croatian Defence Council from
20 Kiseljak and Busovaca?
21 A. I'm really -- then I'm into the realms of something I know
22 nothing about.
23 Q. Do you agree that Ilijas is in a kind of semi-encirclement?
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
25 Mr. Hayden.
1 MR. HAYDEN: Your Honour, the witness has stated on numerous
2 occasions now that he has not studied and is not an expert on the other
3 formations. I don't see how it's helpful to have him confirm the
4 existence of something on a map.
5 JUDGE KWON: And, Mr. Karadzic, as I said to you earlier, I doubt
6 whether -- if this is a proper use of time. We can see where Ilijas is
7 and we can see from the map whether it's encircled or not. But whether
8 you have to ask this question to the witness, I doubt it.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, what I'm trying to
10 get to is the following: Was there a JNA unit there when the front was
11 placed there or was it the local population that put up the front-line
12 there? And I cannot do it in any other way but through establishing who
13 was where.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. To the best of your knowledge, was there a JNA unit in Ilijas on
16 the eve of the war and the moment when the war broke out?
17 A. I don't know.
18 Q. Well, I don't know what we can do, then. We should know at least
19 that much. However, during the interview, you did agree that the
20 front-lines came into being by the neighbourhoods protecting themselves
21 and placing lines there; isn't that right?
22 A. I think we agreed that the neighbourhoods -- the front-line came
23 into being by military action that caused them to stop or start where
24 they were.
25 Q. Thank you. However, I would like us to see whether this came
1 into being through action taken by the JNA, or the Sarajevo
2 Romanija Corps, or whether it came into being by having the people there
3 organise themselves against the neighbourhood that was adjacent to them
4 and that was ethnically different. In the documents of the Sarajevo
5 Romanija Corps, did you come across such wording, the self-organised
6 people, and did you see that officers were complaining that they still
7 could not establish an efficient organisation of the corps?
8 A. I'll try and answer each part separately.
9 I don't recall seeing anything about self-organised people. I do
10 recall orders from General Sipcic, trying to establish a control --
11 command and control over certain areas, but whether that's related to the
12 self-organised people, I'm not sure. I hope that answers your question.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 May this map be admitted into evidence?
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Could you please put your date on it and your initials?
17 A. [Marks]
18 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it is relevant. Let's get rid of
19 this. We know where Ilidza is, and all he did is marked I there. We can
20 move on, Mr. Karadzic. All he testified is about the organisation --
21 organigram of the SRK
22 warfare at the time.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 May we have 1D1808. I don't know what the purpose is of knowing
25 about the structure of a corps without knowing anything else concerning
1 the corps. A corps does not exist for no reason. There must be a reason
2 for its existence. I believe that Mr. Philipps would have looked into
3 these things had he not been limited by the tasks set to him by the OTP.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. You were limited and given only the documents of the Sarajevo
6 Romanija Corps; is that right, Mr. Philipps?
7 A. When I was first tasked by Mr. Ierace to put together the
8 structure of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, I was told that I could use all
9 the or any information that I could find, and so I used newspapers, I
10 used witness statements, I used every piece of information, including
11 published information such as Jane's Defence Weekly, to put together the
12 structure of the corps. However, newspapers, hearsay, and publications
13 do not form a structure that could be presented as evidence. And so once
14 I had gathered the general structure of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, I
15 was then able to find documents that could be verified as written by the
16 corps, themselves, given to us by the Defence in the Galic case, that
17 enabled me to put together a chart that could be used as evidence, and
18 not based on media, or newspapers, or witness statements. At no time was
19 I limited as to the information or type of documents that I was able to
20 use. I chose specifically to base all my data on what the corps had
21 produced, itself. As being an intelligence officer, I know how difficult
22 it is to identify a unit or a structure based on what someone thinks it
23 should look like.
24 Q. Thank you. Do we agree that this is a document issued by the
25 chief of artillery on the 29th of July, 1994? It's an analysis of the
1 combat readiness of artillery rocket units; is that correct?
2 A. Given my limited knowledge of B/C/S, I would agree it's an
3 analysis of artillery. It seems to be written to the commander of the
5 Q. Thank you. May we look at the third page of this document, the
6 part circled here. It says:
7 "The problems concerning organisation and mobilisation in
8 artillery originate from the very beginning of the war, when all we had
9 were the armed people organised into units, the establishment of which
10 was changeable and highly unstable, especially as regards manning. This
11 situation has been improving, but it is still not at the level which is
12 indispensable and possible."
13 So would you agree that this commander is evaluating the
14 situation as being not yet satisfactory?
15 A. I can only -- I can only assume that the translation is correct,
16 because I have the B/C/S in front of me, so I take what has been written
17 in front of me in English to be correct.
18 It is a complaint about the manning, that not all the trained
19 staff are available. But on the previous page, I seem to remember quite
20 a sizeable list of equipment, so there appears to be no shortage of
21 equipment. There may be a problem with the manning and the training of
22 the individuals. That's what I understand by the document.
23 Q. Thank you. And he mentions that the problems originate from the
24 very beginning, when all that existed were the armed people; is that
1 A. It appears to say that all they had were the armed people. It's
2 not then clear to me where all the equipment then came from.
3 Q. Well, we agreed that the Territorial Defence in every
4 municipality and company had its own weapons. That was the Doctrine of
5 the Armed People.
6 A. The -- it's difficult to answer that. Is that a question?
7 Q. Yes, it's a question. Is this correct? He mentions the armed
8 people. They inherited the armed people, and in 1994 they already had
9 something, because the Sarajevo Romanija Corps was already in existence.
10 But to begin with, they inherited only the armed people; is that right?
11 A. I don't then understand where the military equipment listed came
12 from. Did the Territorial Defence hold artillery?
13 Q. Well, you should know that. You're the expert in that area. You
14 should know how the Sarajevo Romanija Corps came into existence, on what
15 basis, with what objective, who organised the corps, was it necessary for
16 it to exist. And you agree that opposed to it were the 1st Corps of the
17 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina with three divisions, the 12th, the 14th and
18 the 16th, the 2nd Corps, the 3rd Corps and the 4th Corps of the Army of
19 Bosnia and Herzegovina? You saw that encirclement. Were those four
20 corps opposing the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?
21 A. I will try and answer your questions in the order that you asked
23 I state again that I'm not an expert in territorial defence. I
24 don't know how the Sarajevo Romanija Corps came into existence. That was
25 not part of my brief. I have studied it through the dates shown on the
2 I can agree with you that large parts of the
3 Sarajevo Romanija Corps were opposed by the 1st Corps of the ABiH, but I
4 do not know the composition of the 1st Corps of the ABiH and what
5 divisions were part of it, except based on the document that you put up
6 earlier. But I have no means of assessing whether that is correct.
7 I could see that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, itself, at a
8 strategic level, was encircled, but I can't say that there were 4 corps
9 surrounding the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, as I don't have knowledge --
10 detailed knowledge of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 JUDGE KWON: With this answer, we'll have a break for 25 minutes,
12 after which I would recommend you to organise your remaining
13 cross-examination to concentrate on what he testified --
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document.
15 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification. It is MFI D310.
16 --- Recess taken at 5.27 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 5.57 p.m.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
19 MR. HAYDEN: Your Honour, with respect to the map that the
20 accused was using with the witness, 65 ter 13639, we propose that the
21 base map, which is the zoomed-out version, also be tendered into
22 evidence. We've discussed this with the Defence during the course of the
23 break, and I believe there's no objection to that.
24 JUDGE KWON: You mean the unmarked map?
25 MR. HAYDEN: That's right.
1 JUDGE KWON: If the accused is minded to tender that, we'll admit
3 THE ACCUSED: In addition to the marked.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 The unmarked map of 65 ter 13639 will be admitted as
6 Exhibit D311.
7 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 65 ter 9401. We also
9 have a translation, so I would like both versions, the Serbian and the
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Philipps, I know you have the best of intentions to educate
13 us about what you did, but let's see whether things really were the way
14 they seemed to be to you.
15 Are you familiar with this document? You also have it in
17 A. I'm not sure whether I've seen it before.
18 Q. This is a periodic analysis of the combat readiness of the
19 artillery rocket units of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps; is that right?
20 A. That's what the translation on the left says, yes.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we have page 2.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. We see it says here "Command and Control." It says:
24 "Command and control of the Artillery Rocket Unit may be divided
25 into two periods, the first being from the beginning of the war until the
1 20th of May, 1992 ..."
2 Do you know why the 20th of May is mentioned here?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Do you agree this was when the JNA left and the 4th Corps ceased
5 to exist?
6 A. That's outside my knowledge.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 "In the first period, we managed to withdraw all the equipment,
9 vehicles, and ammunition from the barracks in a timely manner ...," and
10 so on.
11 Can we have the next page, please. It says because of the
12 well-known situation in the former JNA, when equipment was still out of
13 use and when they were short of active officers and soldiers, they formed
14 the unit with very little personnel. Part joined -- some reserve
15 officers left for the SRJ, some of them would not or could not accept the
16 duty of the KV and the KB, which only additionally complicated the RiK
17 and the establishment of the units. That is why the 4th MAP and the 4th
18 MPOAP would recruit the conscripts of different military occupational
19 specialties, who were then trained, retrained, additionally educated, and
21 So do you see that they were having problems with personnel
22 trained for artillery units?
23 A. They're listing problems of detailed specialist training, but
24 they have the equipment available. I think the list was on the previous
25 page of equipment.
1 Q. There's no list here because it refers to the entire corps, yes.
2 But let's see what it goes on to say:
3 "The first batteries of these regiments, which made up the basis
4 for the establishment of other units, were established in a relatively
5 short period of time."
6 And then a little lower down, it says:
7 "Artillery units in the brigades were established depending on
8 the number of pieces of equipment, again due to the absence of active
9 servicemen and with only a handful of reserve military officers."
10 Do you see that? Do you see that there were very few such
11 officers? Do you see that in English?
12 A. Yes, yes, I can -- I can see what you've just read and that there
13 was a lack of trained individuals to use the weapons. And -- but the
14 weapons were still used, I think, as far as I understand it from where it
15 carries on.
16 JUDGE KWON: But before we proceed, Mr. Karadzic, let's confirm
17 what the witness has said.
18 Mr. Philipps said that:
19 "They are listing problems of detailed specialist training, but
20 they have the equipment available. I think the list was on the previous
22 Can you go to the previous page? Let's find out whether it's
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There's no list here, if I can be
25 of assistance.
1 THE WITNESS: I may be mistaken. It mentions the mixed artillery
2 battalion. It doesn't mention the list of equipment. It just mentions
3 the formations, so that's my mistake.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Q. And then it goes on to say:
7 "In the ensuing period of the war, most of the active servicemen
8 left their units and went back to the SRJ, whereas only a small number of
9 officers came from the federal army. Basic shortcomings and defects
10 involve incomplete mobilisation, desertion, bad habits such as sticking
11 to one's own territory while fighting the enemy, shortage of commanding
12 officers, poor knowledge of equipment, poor choice of firing positions,
13 targeting without necessary observation, high consumption of ammunition,
14 poor maintenance."
15 So all these were weaknesses in command and control. Were you
16 aware of these problems in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?
17 A. I was aware that there was a shortage of specialists in all
18 fields of specialisms, such as engineering, artillery, and the like. But
19 I do note that it says there was an increased consumption of ammunition
20 which was normally used for hitting the targets in Sarajevo, and then the
21 communication system supporting the commanding of the artillery, whereas
22 the communications between the neighbouring elements were either poor or
23 nonexistent altogether. So there were also communications problems, but
24 the weapons were still being used despite that.
25 Q. Where did you find these targets in Sarajevo?
1 A. I was just reading from the document in front of me. I don't
2 have a line number. It's page 3 of the English document:
3 "The commanders of the general military provenance [as
4 interpreted] carried out their assignments mainly by the use of
6 Q. I didn't read this; you read it. All right, very well, but do
7 you know that this corps was also fighting in the direction of
8 Central Bosnia
9 A. Yes, that's quite possible, but I was mostly reading the bit
10 where it says it was normally used for hitting the targets in Sarajevo
11 That was the bit just underneath the bits you read, and that the --
12 Q. Do you think that these were not legitimate goals or that there
13 also were legitimate goals in Sarajevo
14 A. I can't really answer that question. I'm simply reading from the
15 document in front of me.
16 Q. Thank you. May we move on to the next page, also in Serbian.
17 The next page, please, "Level of training and skills ...":
18 "Due to well-known defects demonstrated during the
19 demobilisation, when units were mainly consisting of volunteers and
20 military conscripts that fled the territories under Muslim control, there
21 were an insufficient number of soldiers and officers with the artillery
22 specialty, especially when it comes to critical specialties such as
23 reconnaissance, topographers, marksmen, anti-missile operators."
24 Do you see that this periodic analysis points to enormous
25 problems with well-trained personnel in the artillery units with the
1 necessary specialist training?
2 A. Yes, there appears to be a lack of specially-trained artillery
3 operators, including the people responsible for plotting the fall of
5 Q. Thank you. It goes on to say that:
6 "In the initial period, training was conducted on firing
7 positions and observation posts without any training plan."
8 And then a little lower down, it goes on to say that:
9 "The shortcomings in training and the insufficient training of
10 reckoners, topographers, and so on, both in carrying out shooting,
11 finding targets, and so on, that all this influenced the precision of
12 targeting, and that this led to increased consumption of ammunition,
13 there was no correction, so that the effects, especially when firing at
14 night, the results are rather poor. Absence of appropriate literature
15 and so on made it difficult to train men and officers; and inadequate
16 attention was paid, which was sometimes due to an expertness of the
17 commanding officer to the selection and elements of the combat
18 disposition, the results being that pieces of artillery were either
19 positioned at the front and or in places," and so on.
20 So can you see what the problems were on the battle-field?
21 A. Yes, and it's interesting to note that clearly the individuals in
22 command were quite aware of these problems, having written such a
23 detailed analysis, and analysed specific shortcomings of the troops. And
24 we've now moved on to the next page. On the previous page, I note that
25 they were firing without the appropriate observation. So clearly whoever
1 wrote this report was aware of the shortcomings and knew what was going
2 on. So the actual -- the hierarchy, if you like, was aware of these
3 shortcomings, so it tells me that to write such a report as this, you
4 would have to be a trained staff officer and have observed what has
5 occurred. And there are shortcomings in the training at all levels, it
6 seems, so training of individual artillerymen, but also those responsible
7 for reconnaissance and spotting. And as I say, in the previous page it
8 mentions firing at targets without proper observation.
9 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at where it says at the top of this
11 "More attention was paid to training in the second half of 1993,
12 as well as this year," this refers to 1994. "The training courses were
13 planned and organised for commanders of detachments, platoons, and
14 batteries. A training course for commanders of divisions is underway,"
15 and so on.
16 And then a little lower down, it says:
17 "The following elements had a negative impact on morale."
18 Have you found this at the top where it says "1993"?
19 A. I have the part you've read out, but I don't have it on the
20 document, itself. But this shows that they were addressing the problems
21 that they felt they had, that they were looking at training, that
22 training courses were planned, and that training for commanders of the
23 "divizija" [phoen] was underway. So they were addressing the problems as
24 good command and control, because they were looking at the problems that
25 have occurred and training people to improve. I'm not sure what --
1 Q. Thank you.
2 A. It's efficient -- it's efficient staff work.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
4 MR. HAYDEN: Sorry, Your Honour. It might be helpful for the
5 witness to move on to the page that the accused is actually referring to.
6 Page 4, I believe.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. In Serbian, it's page 4. In
8 English, it's the one that was up on the screen just a little while ago.
9 We have to go back. It's page 5 in English.
10 The next page in English, please. Can we have the next page in
11 English, please, and in Serbian as well. I don't know why we've gone a
12 page back.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Can you now see -- can we scroll down in English, please.
15 It says:
16 "The following elements had a negative impact on morale:
17 Inadequate preparedness for the war as a result of an opinion that the
18 war would soon be over; incomplete mobilisation of units."
19 The next page in English, please. Next page. The top of the
20 next page in English, please, the bullet points, yes:
21 "Incomplete mobilisation of units; a drain of officers from the
22 Republika Srpska following the withdrawal of the JNA; the ties some units
23 have with their native territory; inability to place the troops in
25 Do you remember that we said that the men did not live in
1 barracks, but at home?
2 A. Yes, I remember you saying that.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in
5 "Financial problems, irregular and low salaries. War
6 profiteering, black-marketing, thefts, desertions, inadequate provision
7 of footwear, clothes, uniforms," and so on.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. You said that after the arrival of Galic, everything was all
10 right as regards training, staffing, and so on. Do you agree this is
11 dated July of 1994, when Galic had been in command for two years?
12 A. I think I may have stated in the past that under Galic, matters
13 improved. I don't think you could describe everything as all right as
14 regards training staffing and so on, but certainly matters under Galic,
15 as regards command and control improved during that period, as this
16 analysis points out, if we look at the organisation of courses for
17 battery commanders, the organisation of training for spotters and
18 reconnaissance. So the training of the SRK has improved over the period
19 from its formation.
20 Q. Thank you. So this is the transition from Galic's command to
21 General Milosevic; is that right?
22 A. The date of the document again? I'm sorry.
23 Q. July 1994.
24 A. Yes, it's just at that time of the transition from Galic to
25 Dragomir Milosevic.
1 Q. Thank you. Let's look at the conclusions. It's probably on the
2 last page or the page before last. In Serbian, it's the page before
3 last. In English, it might be the last page, where the heading
4 "Conclusion" is. Well, let's see the previous page in English. Here it
5 is, "Conclusion":
6 "The artillery rocket unit of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps have
7 been working under very difficult conditions since the time they were
8 established. They have been requested to fire expediently, precisely and
9 fiercely, inadequately manned with soldiers and commanding officers who
10 are not very familiar with the equipment, instruments, and other
11 accessories, particularly at the beginning of the war, made special
12 demands on all the members of these units. Especially when marksmen,
13 reckoners and operators are to work with different types of equipment and
14 systems, the results achieved were excellent and outstanding."
15 Mr. Philipps, do we agree that in spite of the enormous efforts
16 invested into training in the course of the war, the
17 Sarajevo Romanija Corps was a corps that was being established, that this
18 was in the process of being formed throughout the war?
19 A. It would be fair to say that, as an organisation, it had a staff
20 division devoted to the training of the troops, and so troops were
21 continuously trained, sent on courses, and the Sarajevo Romanija Corps in
22 that sense was forming and improving throughout the war. And the
23 conclusion here is that the results attained were excellent and
24 outstanding, indeed. So we've seen that the -- from a situation of using
25 artillery with -- still using the artillery, but with untrained
1 individuals, with lack of spotting of fall of shells, with incorrect
2 corrections, that they sent people on training, they improved their
3 capability, and then the results attained from their point of view were
4 excellent and outstanding, indeed. So there's a professional approach to
5 the training of the corps which -- throughout the period, so that would
6 be my conclusion on that. It's the signed by the chief of the artillery
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Can this document be admitted?
10 Could we have 1D1811 now?
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D312, Your Honour.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Let us now see, on the basis of this document, how things stand
15 in a particular brigade. Yes, it's the right document. Let's not read
16 all of it. It seems that we don't have a translation for the time being.
17 I beg your pardon, the first sentence:
18 "Determine to defend and preserve the areas of Ilidza, Hadzici
19 and Rakovica. People in these areas became self-organised. Within this
20 framework, in April 1992 the first firing groups were established
21 spontaneously, consisting of 120- and 82-millimetre mortars
23 And now a bit further down:
24 "In view of the fact that the Serb population constitutes about
25 30 per cent of the population in that area, we could not have enough
1 people for -- especially for critical military evidentiary specialties.
2 Therefore, we managed to get to the end of the war with one active-duty
3 retired officer and one reserve officer."
4 This is at the level of one brigade, one active-duty officer.
5 The Igman Infantry Brigade, that's it. So it's at the level of one
6 brigade. They have one active-duty retired officer and one reserve
7 officer throughout the war.
8 Is it correct that that is insufficient and that this is a major
10 A. They would not normally be enough officers to run a brigade
11 artillery group. I see that it mentions 105-millimetre, 122-millimetre,
12 and 155-millimetre Howitzers as well. I can't translate that part, but
13 they seem to be in some form of Howitzer battery, and it's not clear to
14 me whether these officers were in charge of those Howitzer batteries as
15 well. It would be -- to use those weapons with insufficient soldiers
16 would be very difficult to use them effectively.
17 Q. I'm going to read that out to you, since we said that every
18 factory had its Territorial Defence. I think we understand each other,
19 that it was rifles that took back home. But as for heavy weaponry, that
20 remained in the factory in stockpiles; right? We agree on that, don't
22 And let me read this out:
23 "Thanks to fortunate circumstances in Hadzici, we have taken out
24 105-millimetre and 155-millimetre Howitzers out of them, and we
25 established two Howitzer batteries. From the very outset until the
1 present day, we have encountered major problems in terms of manpower
2 levels; that is to say, that they took these Howitzers from the factory."
3 Can this document be admitted into evidence?
4 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have
7 1D01131, 1D01131. I don't know whether we have a translation of this
8 document. It was obtained by the OTP.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Let us see how I communicate with the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
11 You confirmed yesterday that I did not have direct communication
12 with them, and this is a proclamation that I'm addressing to them. Do
13 you remember that we agreed yesterday that sometimes propaganda can be
14 very difficult and that from time to time the president has to speak out
15 in order to confirm that a particular territory had not been sold or,
16 rather, was not supposed to be abandoned; isn't that right?
17 A. We looked at a document where the corps commander had repeated
18 information from a political level, to pass that down to the troops so
19 that they could understand the political situation. And I think that is
20 a normal thing for a commander to do, to inform the troops what is going
21 on at a political level so that they can understand why they're fighting
22 or what the fighting is for, if that answers your question. It's more of
23 a --
24 Q. Yes, yes.
25 A. -- political issue, yeah.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
2 MR. HAYDEN: Your Honour, I believe this is a duplicate document
3 of 1D01132, which does have a translation in e-court, which might be of
4 assistance to the witness.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. That would be a good
6 thing. Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. While we're waiting for that: You have agreed, haven't you, that
9 it is customary to explain to the troops the motive for a particular
10 action that is being taken, and in this case it had to do with
11 negotiations; right?
12 A. In general, it seems that it's essential to explain to troops the
13 situation that they're in, politically and militarily, and the more
14 information they're provided with, the better. It's really a question of
15 keeping the morale of the troops at a certain level. I'm speaking of
16 generally how troops might be -- might be looked after.
17 Q. Thank you. We agreed that you had not come across a single
18 document where I directly communicate with the corps without contacting
19 the Main Staff or without the knowledge of the Main Staff. This order
20 came from the Main Staff; isn't that right?
21 A. Are you talking about the order in front of me?
22 JUDGE KWON: Let us see the second page of the document, and let
23 the witness see the document, last page.
24 And we can go back to the first page.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. I'm talking about the previous one, when you said that you had
2 come across orders in which the corps commander quotes the president of
3 the republic, in terms of why something has to be done; right?
4 A. So you're talking about another document, not the one we have in
5 front of us. Yes, I have had sight of a document --
6 Q. Yes, yes, the one that we dealt with yesterday, that we talked
7 about yesterday. You said that you had come across a document in which a
8 corps commander quoted me. Do you remember that that quotation had come
9 from the Main Staff?
10 A. I don't -- I can't remember the source of the quotation, but
11 I think it was the corps commander or it may have been a brigade
12 commander that quoted you in a bulletin down to the troops of the corps
13 or the brigade. I don't remember the date. I'd have to find that
14 document. I'm not sure -- I don't have the means to find it here now.
15 But it's -- I'm not sure I understand what the question is.
16 Q. Thank you. In addition to that document, have you come across
17 any order of mine that went directly to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?
18 A. No, I haven't seen any directive straight from -- with your name
19 on straight from you to any part of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
20 Q. Thank you. I would now like to draw your attention to this
21 document. I am going to read it out. I'm going to read out certain
23 "To all officers and soldiers of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of
24 the Army of Republika Srpska."
25 And now:
1 "Officers, soldiers, heroes, the perfidy of our enemy compels me
2 to address you in this way."
3 And then let's skip one paragraph:
4 "Our enemy --" well, never mind, I'll read all of it:
5 "You have completely achieved our goals in a military sense. We
6 have protected the people and the state, formed a state, and acquired the
7 consent of the international community to have the BiH be partitioned
8 into three national states.
9 "Our enemy has not reconciled himself with this. It wishes
10 to --"
11 JUDGE KWON: We can read, the witness can read. What is your
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Have you come across this document, Mr. Philipps?
15 A. No, I believe this is the first time I've seen this document.
16 Q. Thank you. Are there many documents that you've missed,
17 Mr. Philipps?
18 JUDGE MORRISON: That's a very difficult question to answer, when
19 you think about it for three or four seconds, Dr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Possibly, yes. All right.
21 Can this document be admitted?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
23 MR. HAYDEN: Your Honour, I wonder whether there's a date for
24 this document.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be allowed to explain.
1 There are some documents, like support to the Red Cross,
2 et cetera, were undated so that they would be of permanent value.
3 JUDGE KWON: With that caveat, you are not objecting to the
4 admission, itself, but you raise the question as to the date of it or the
5 authenticity, itself?
6 MR. HAYDEN: We don't object to the admission. It would be
7 helpful to know when it was issued. I understand the accused to say that
8 it stood once it was issued, but it might be helpful to know when it was
10 JUDGE KWON: We'll see whether we can hear the answer to it.
11 That will be admitted.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D314, Your Honours.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D1816? 1816, that is.
14 This is a document from the book entitled "The Defence of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Ajnadzic. This is the first page, and we don't
17 need to read anything from there.
18 Could we now have page 3?
19 This is page 3. Up here in the text, it says that in 1992, the
20 average for 1992 was 60.442 soldiers.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Did you know that the 1st Corps, in 1992, had over 60.000 men?
23 A. I have not studied the organisation of the 1st Corps of the ABiH.
24 Q. But they are adjacent to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. They are
25 the reason and challenge facing the Sarajevo Corps. It says here in
1 December of 1992, it reached the figure of 73.141 members, before it says
2 "Globalna." Do you see that?
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, what is your point? The witness says
4 he doesn't know, and then you can call other witnesses who can confirm as
5 to the content of this document. I don't think you're appropriately
6 using the time for cross-examination.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, we have an expert
8 here who studied the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. In my view, this was a
9 good opportunity to see what the Sarajevo Romanija Corps was, why it
10 existed, who was --
11 JUDGE KWON: Only as to its organisation. He didn't testify to
12 any activity of the SRK
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Then you probably won't
14 admit this at all, will you?
15 JUDGE KWON: You're now well familiar with the Rules.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1814, please, could we have that
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. This is our document, Mr. Philipps, or rather it's a document of
20 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, or, rather, the Intelligence Service. Have
21 you come across this document, which speaks of the adversary? You see
22 that it says "Sarajevo
23 Zenica, 3rd Corps, 50.000," and so on. This is a Serb document.
24 Colonel Tolimir had signed it. Have you come across this document?
25 A. It's quite possible that I've seen this document before, and I
1 would have used it to identify Colonel Tolimir as part of the
2 intelligence staff.
3 Q. Do you agree that down here, it says:
4 "Total, Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 280.000 soldiers"?
5 A. Yes, I now see the figure 280.000. "Ukupno," is that "Total"?
6 Q. Thank you. The next group is the Croatian Defence Council, and
7 it has 58.200 soldiers; right?
8 A. That's the figure in front of me. If I had looked at this
9 document, the only thing I would have been interested in was the fact
10 that it said "Nacelnik Pukovnik Zdravko Tolimir" as the signatory, so I
11 wouldn't have analysed the figures or looked at the date of the figures.
12 Furthermore, being intelligence about the other side, I would not
13 attribute much weight to figures one side had written about the other.
14 Q. Well, had we looked at the documents a few moments ago, we would
15 have seen the figures are identical. Do you see that the Croatian Army
16 at that moment had 13.000 soldiers in Bosnia?
17 A. That is the figure that Zdravko Tolimir has written down.
18 Whether those are the figures would be impossible for me to say.
19 Q. And do you think that the organisation and structure of the
20 Sarajevo Romanija Corps would have to be adjusted to the levels of the
22 A. Again, I'm not sure I understand the question. Normally, a unit
23 is of a certain size and might -- might be changed over time or it might
24 have additional units for all sorts of reasons.
25 Q. All right. Is there a reason why a unit is the way it is? Is
1 there a rational justification?
2 A. Historically, units have been a certain size in order to be able
3 to exert command and control over them. Without going back to Roman
4 times, a legion was of a certain size because of the command and control.
5 A platoon consists normally of 10 or so men because that's the number you
6 can control. A company is about 60 men. A battalion is anything between
7 400 and 600, and brigades over a certain size. Those figures are true if
8 you go back 2.000 years. There is a certain number of troops that can be
9 commanded by officers, and that's simply a nature of the way humans can
10 be commanded by others, if that answers your question. So, yes, units
11 have a certain size about them.
12 Q. Thank you. And now do you still assert that the
13 Sarajevo Romanija Corps had everything running smoothly, when we see that
14 there weren't enough active-duty officers or reserve officers, that there
15 weren't enough soldiers, that training had to take place along the way,
16 and that already -- or even in 1994 the situation was still
17 unsatisfactory? Did you take into account the documents we showed here,
18 that show that things did not function perfectly?
19 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer the question: You have to confirm
20 whether the witness said that he's asserting that the
21 Sarajevo Romanija Corps had everything running smoothly at all.
22 THE WITNESS: I'll go through it a line at a time, if I may,
23 Your Honour.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE WITNESS: I don't think I've ever asserted that the
1 Sarajevo Romanija Corps had everything running smoothly. The Sarajevo
2 Romanija Corps, however, was able to have a complete reporting chain from
3 the troops on the ground to the corps headquarters. It was able to
4 report up the chain of the command to the Main Staff. And as we've seen
5 from all the documents that you've just shown me, they were able to
6 analyse the problems that they had. They addressed those problems with
7 training, they addressed those problems with moving manpower, and that
8 through the period the training of the corps improved. Now, that to me
9 is an example of a well-run organisation that has effective command and
10 control, whose staff officers understand what's going on and are
11 addressing those problems. So that would be my assessment of those
12 documents; not that the SRK
13 the end, but that it evolved over the period of time and was managed and
14 commanded by the officers within it. I think -- has that covered your
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. I assume that that was a response to the first question. Now the
18 second one. Possibly it is an answer to the second question too.
19 Can you now see, on the basis of all of these documents, that
20 soldiers could not be put up in barracks and that there were less
21 soldiers and officers than necessary?
22 A. Certainly, the level of training of all those individuals was not
23 what you might expect of a professional -- fully professional military
24 unit. However, I would be remarkably surprised, in the case of warfare
25 of such a nature, that soldiers would sleep in barracks. I would find
1 that very surprising.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Can this document be admitted?
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
5 MR. HAYDEN: I don't believe the witness was able to comment upon
6 this document and was not able to confirm or comment upon the figures in
7 that document. We would object to its admission.
8 JUDGE KWON: While he said that he has a caveat as to the content
9 of it, did he not say he might have seen this document and used it?
10 MR. HAYDEN: I understand the witness's answer to be that if it
11 was something he used, he would have used it for the fact that
12 Zdravko Tolimir was the signatory. I didn't understand his answer to be
13 that he had, in fact, used it. It doesn't bear an OTP ERN.
14 THE WITNESS: If I may help. If I had used it, I could look it
15 up and see if it cross-referenced it to the chart, and I could tell you
16 straight away. If it has an ERN, I could tell you whether I used it or
18 JUDGE KWON: What is the number we see at the bottom right part?
19 Can you scroll down further? Is this the ERN number, Mr. Hayden?
20 MR. HAYDEN: No, that's the -- I believe that's the Defence's
21 identification number. We've searched for it in-house, and we don't --
22 or at least our searches have not found that we have a copy of this,
23 which would suggest that it's not a document Mr. Philipps has previously
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is satisfied with its prima facie
3 authenticity as well as its relevance, so we'll admit it. But we mark it
4 for identification, pending translation.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Can we have 1D01831? 1D01821 first, and then 31. 1821.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now we don't have the Serbian
10 version, but all right, I'll read it.
11 It's dated the 5th of July, 1993, signed by Deputy Commander
12 Colonel Dragomir Milosevic:
13 [In English] "Urgent. Regulations of the use of artillery."
14 [Interpretation] We can all read it now; right?
15 [In English] "For the purposes of co-ordinating use of artillery,
16 act according to the following:
17 "Open fire over noticed targets out of the town - center of
19 "Before opening fire, it is obligatory to inform Command of SRK
20 Command -- commanding officer.
21 "Immediately inform about the effects of artillery action.
22 "OC is obliged to inform other units that our artillery is acting
23 from certain VP over the enemy targets that were noticed earlier."
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. You can see now how much effort was invested in having everything
1 be proper and according to the regulations. Have you seen this document,
2 Mr. Philipps?
3 A. I don't think I've seen that document before, as far as I can
5 Q. [In English] "In the previous practice, there were some
6 weaknesses that caused misunderstanding and reaction by our artillery,
7 believing that our artillery acted while the enemy acted instead.
8 "Operative Center of SRK Command must know what is happening in
9 the battle-field, and therefore it is required to strictly respect these
10 elementary requirements regarding the use of artillery fire."
11 [Interpretation] So then Colonel Milosevic is reminding everyone
12 that there were a lot of misunderstandings, that enemy artillery was
13 being fired instead of ours, that there was misunderstandings, and that
14 complete control was required. Does this look to you like an effort to
15 regulate artillery activity in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?
16 A. Yes, it appears to be an order to ensure that the command is
17 aware of all the use of artillery within the corps area.
18 Q. But you see that Colonel Milosevic was not satisfied with the
19 flow of information that had been in place previously?
20 A. Yes, he says there were some weaknesses in the flow of
21 information, and so this document addresses that.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 May this document be admitted into evidence?
24 JUDGE KWON: Were you able to locate the original document?
25 MR. HAYDEN: No, Your Honour, we haven't been able to locate
1 in-house the original of this. I believe it was a Defence exhibit in the
2 Galic case, as the markings at the top of the document indicate, but no
3 B/C/S version was provided in that case.
4 JUDGE KWON: But you do not object to it?
5 MR. HAYDEN: Without having seen the original, I'm not sure how
6 much weight can be placed upon this document. But to the extent that
7 it's authentic, we don't object to its admission on the grounds of
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification, pending -- until
11 we would be able to locate the original one or we hear evidence as to the
12 foundation of this document.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D316.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have still further questions to
15 be asked to the witness?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the topographic map is the
17 next topic. I'm afraid we don't have enough time to deal with it today,
18 to identify the positions of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. If we do have
19 time, we can deal with it now.
20 JUDGE KWON: We'll deal with it tomorrow.
21 In the meantime, Mr. Tieger, as to the subject matter which is
22 the subject of the addition of 65 ter list of exhibits, when will we have
23 the English translations?
24 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'm aware that all efforts are being
25 expended to expedite that process to the maximum degree possible. I
1 don't want to give the Court a projected date that's not the most
2 current. If the Court could give me until the -- I'll inform the Court
3 at the earliest opportunity, but I'd like to double-check this evening on
4 that projection and get back to the Court with the most reliable
5 information possible.
6 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any position as to the request from the
7 Defence, the request relating to a certain witness in relation to that
9 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, we are actually in the process of
10 responding at the moment. We will be objecting to that request and
11 identifying the reasons why. I can articulate those at a more convenient
12 moment, but some of those factors relate to -- well, can be found in our
13 previous submission relating to the same issue. And, again, among other
14 things, we'd focus on the difference between a global effort aimed at
15 that information and one that's focused on particular witnesses. That
16 may be a bit cryptic, but I think the Court knows the reference in the
17 earlier submission to which I'm referring.
18 JUDGE KWON: When do you think you can file your response or
20 MR. TIEGER: We'll do our best to do that by tomorrow,
21 Your Honour, and certainly we'll do it at the earliest possible
22 opportunity. If it can't be filed by tomorrow, we will let the Court
23 know before the commencement of court, and perhaps we can address it in
24 court if that's the case. But I think we'll be able to do that.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 We'll resume tomorrow afternoon at 2.15. Have a nice evening.
2 [The witness stands down]
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.
4 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 16th day of
5 June, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.