1 Wednesday, 16 June 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.25 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Well, we had to start a bit late because of the
7 technical preparations. Okay.
8 Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Good afternoon to everyone.
11 May I have 65 ter 01549, please.
12 WITNESS: RICHARD PHILIPPS [Resumed]
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
14 Q. [Interpretation] And, Mr. Philipps, good afternoon. While we are
15 waiting for it to come up I'll ask you the following: Studying the
16 reports of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, did you notice what problems the
17 corps was up against, problems which were hindering its proper
18 functioning and operation? Will you be familiar with these problems when
19 I show them to you in the documents now?
20 A. The extracts that I took from the many hundreds of documents that
21 I looked at related to the structure of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and
22 to the passage and reporting of information. So I do have some knowledge
23 of the problems and the functioning, but not a detailed knowledge.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you see that this is dated the 29th of May, 1992,
25 when the Army of Republika Srpska had just been established; is that
2 A. I can see that the date is the 29th of May, 1992.
3 Q. Could you enumerate the most frequent problems that the
4 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had in its functioning, especially in the
5 functioning of communications, or do you want me to jog your memory by
6 showing you documents? What would you prefer?
7 A. I certainly wouldn't be able to enumerate the most frequent
8 problems that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had during its functioning.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 3 of this
11 document, please. Page 2 in English, please. Page 2 in English.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do you see where it says 130 men and could you please read what
14 follows that, following stabilisation, and so on.
15 [In English] "Enemy losses are around 130 men ..."
16 [Interpretation] Can you read what follows after the bit I've
17 just read out?
18 A. Yes, I can.
19 "Following stabilisation of our own ranks, we approached the
20 realisation of two main tasks which are:
21 "First: Mobilisation of men and forming of the Hadzici battalion
22 infantry unit. We have difficulties with this task, because armed men
23 are self-organised and disorganised with very deviant convictions
24 concerning their and only their own home.
25 "We plan to solve this problem gradually by reassigning the
1 already existing groups that are in various combat and non-combat task
2 forces to organic battalion task forces. This process can be easily
3 settled administratively, but practical it entails much effort in
4 informing and organising men. It is imperative" --
5 Q. Thank you. Could you look at the demands, number 2.
6 Could you read out point 2 under the heading "demands."
7 A. Point number 2:
8 "As soon as possible procure the command of our battalion with
9 devices that can secure sending and receiving of coded messages on
10 relation battalion command of the Serb municipality of Hadzici
11 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command."
12 Q. Thank you. At our interview we agreed that the
13 Territorial Defence was municipal and that our brigades later on were
14 linked to the municipalities; is that correct?
15 A. As I understand it, the Territorial Defence was based on
16 municipalities. I understood that later on the brigades were really part
17 of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and were cut away from their political
18 control by the municipalities.
19 Q. But there were quite a few problems before that time; is that
21 A. Initially it may have appeared that the commander of the
22 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was trying to gain appropriate control of the
23 brigades that had originally been part of the municipalities.
24 Q. Thank you. You noticed that everyone wanted to defend only their
25 own home and that the psychology of these men from the people was
1 territorial and strictly local; is that right?
2 A. From the first extract that I have read from this document, that
3 I read out earlier, it says that the men are self-organised and that they
4 are concerned only with their own home.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be admitted into
7 evidence, please.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D317.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 65 ter 12189, please.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. And while we are waiting for it, Mr. Philipps, I'll ask you the
13 following: Did you notice how long the front line covered by the
14 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was?
15 A. It is a relatively long front line, but I, at no time, made an
16 attempt to measure it or to work out the exact length of that line.
17 Q. Thank you. If I tell you that it was 240 kilometres long, does
18 that sound about right to you?
19 A. I'm afraid I would have no idea.
20 Q. Do you agree that in the city itself the front line running
21 between the houses and through the houses was 42 kilometres long and that
22 by the end of the war the Muslims had stretched it out to 64 kilometres?
23 A. I can't agree with your figures because I don't know the answer,
24 so I can't agree or disagree with your estimates of the length of the
25 front line.
1 Q. Thank you. But you would certainly agree that if it's 240
2 kilometres that it's very difficult for communication and for control; is
3 that right?
4 A. If the organisation is at the centre of that line, then the
5 communication is on what is called in military terms internal lines and
6 is a much easier form of communication than a communication on external
8 Q. Thank you. May I ask you to read out -- well, let's look first.
9 This is the 5th of March, 1993; is that right?
10 A. That is the date of the document in front of me.
11 Q. This is the command of the Vogosca Brigade. Do you know where
12 the Vogosca Brigade was located?
13 A. The Vogosca Brigade was to the north of Sarajevo in the region of
15 Q. Thank you. May I ask you to read out only number 1, point 1
17 A. Point number 1:
18 "Create a mail and courier service in the command of the brigade
19 to deliver mail and financial resources between the command of the SRK
20 and the command of the brigade.
21 "The headquarters administration will designate a courier, a
22 vehicle for delivering the mail and an armed escort.
23 "Mail will be delivered between the SRK command and the brigade
24 command on every Thursday of the week.
25 "Start implementing this order as of 11th of March, 1993."
1 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that by the 5th of March, 1993, this
2 brigade did not have either wire or other communications with the corps
3 command and had to rely on couriers to establish communication?
4 A. It appears from this document that the courier service was to be
5 started on the 11th of March, 1993. I cannot deduce from that what the
6 method of communication was before March 1993. However, as I understand
7 it, at a particular point in time the Vogosca Tactical Group or
8 Vogosca Operational Group was formed in order to improve communications
9 to the north of Sarajevo
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
13 MR. HAYDEN: No objection.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D318, Your Honours.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 65 ter 12416, please,
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. The document, Mr. Philipps, refers to the activities pertaining
20 to putting the Army of Republika Srpska in order. So could you please
21 read this brief passage:
22 [In English] "Pursuant to your document strictly confidential
23 number..." [Interpretation] and so on. That's the passage I mean.
24 A. "Pursuant to your document strictly confidential number
25 20/15-789 of 3 July 1993
1 Republika Srpska Army strictly confidential number 03/8-57 of 18 June
2 1993 on the creation of operative records of combat-readiness of units,
3 you were obliged under item 3 of our order to forward a copy of operative
4 records by the 15th of July, 1993, so that the SRK command could put the
5 cards in order by the 20th of July, 1993, and forward them to the VRS GS.
6 "Please urgently forward the operative record cards by the 20th
7 July, 1993."
8 Q. Thank you. Does it follow from this document that almost a year
9 and a half or 15 months after the outbreak of the war, the corps was
10 still struggling to establish good record-keeping?
11 A. I think this is a good example of staff work in order to improve
12 the communication within the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. The staff officer
13 is clearly trying to make sure that the combat-readiness information is
14 available on each of the units and is ensuring that they pass the
15 information up the chain of command so that he can view the
16 combat-readiness state of the troops.
17 Q. Thank you. But we see that this is the summer of 1993; is that
19 A. The date, yes, is 18th of July, 1993. One might surmise that
20 there was some other method of not using cards before that time. Combat
21 reports were still passed up through the chain of command and information
22 on combat-readiness was still passed up through the chain of command
23 before the 18th of July, 1993. This document is really looking at
24 improving the method of communication.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be admitted into
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours that will be Exhibit D319.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 15654,
7 I hope there is a translation because this is a Prosecution
8 document. Is there a translation? If not, we'll use what we have.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Philipps, you have sufficient familiarity with our language
11 to see that this is an expose by the Chief of Staff at the analysis of
12 combat-readiness, assessing the morale of units of the 4th Corps for
13 1991, so that was still the JNA; is that right?
14 A. Unfortunately, my knowledge of B/C/S is only sufficient to be in
15 a restaurant or order a beer, but not technical military language.
16 Q. Well, you can trust me and the interpreters can check what I say,
17 but this is an expose of the Chief of Staff for 1991. So let's see what
18 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps inherited from the JNA and let's see what the
19 situation was when it was established.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So may we have page 2, please, the
21 bottom half of page 2.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. I will mentioned only some of the more important tasks that were
24 not realised this year. So they had to desist from their plans. First
25 command staff war exercise of the corps command, manoeuvres. Secondly, a
1 trip by the commander. So that corps did not do all these things, they
2 gave up on them.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.
4 The fifth from this page, which means the sixth page.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. You see what it says here, "planning":
7 "In my assessment planning as one of the most important functions
8 of command and control has put in place the preconditions for the
9 carrying out of regular and extraordinary tasks."
10 And then it goes on to say:
11 "There are still subjective weaknesses in the domain of planning.
12 The most important of these being, one, insufficient co-ordination among
13 the command organs in the process of planning."
14 And at the very bottom it says:
15 "An especially big problem is in the poor manning of the commands
16 and units, so with soldiers and officers, which is impacting most heavily
17 on commands classified as 'R' who are carrying out their tasks with the
18 minimum number of men and officers."
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
21 MR. HAYDEN: Sorry, Your Honour. If Mr. Karadzic would perhaps
22 slow down his speech for the interpreters. Because we don't have a
23 translation of this document, I think it's important for the translation
24 to be accurate.
25 JUDGE KWON: If the interpreters would be able to locate from
1 where he is reading out.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So that was page 6 -- no, this is
3 not page 6. It's page 7. So we are now on page 7. Towards the bottom
4 of page 7 "Control and offering assistance":
5 "Control and assistance to subordinate units were carried out
6 according to plan, but there were still certain weaknesses such as
7 non-executions of ordered activities by the subordinate commands and the
8 repetition of the same omissions and weaknesses from one control to
10 Secondly, a lack of a unified approach and the criteria in work
11 and assessments of the situation in the units by the command teams.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Philipps, that even the JNA started to have
14 weaknesses because of the events in Yugoslavia and because of the lack of
15 military conscripts, the absence of military conscripts of Croatian and
16 Muslim ethnicity so that even this army, which was the fourth strongest
17 in Europe
18 A. I can comment on the document in front of me, but I can't answer
19 questions about the weaknesses in the JNA before the events in
21 Q. Well, does this document show that the weaknesses were already
23 A. This document shows that the corps command was analysing all the
24 weaknesses and problems that were occurring within the corps and appears
25 to be addressing them. Any army unit would be continually reviewing its
1 capabilities, continuing reviewing its level of training, and any army
2 unit that didn't do this one would consider to be in some sense
3 ineffective. This document shows how effective the staff were at
4 analysing the problems, at thinking about how they could be corrected, at
5 looking at the training that could be given to improve the command and
6 control, at looking how the troops could be better trained, better
7 equipped, and better accommodated. So to me this shows effective command
8 and control.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
12 MR. HAYDEN: No objection, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE KWON: We will mark it for identification.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D320, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, at this moment I wanted to remind you
16 of your obligation to diligently see to it that all the MFI documents
17 would be translated and report to the Chamber so that they can be finally
18 admitted. So it is your responsibility to see to it that they are
20 And one further matter is that some -- my understanding is that
21 there are various video-clips you tendered into evidence during the
22 course of your cross-examination. It is also your duty to tender the
23 copies of the CDs that contains that video-clip to the Chamber. Please
24 bear that in mind and let's continue.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I hope that the
1 translation unit will do this. We have commissioned quite a number of
2 translations, but they have to be verified.
3 Can we have 15756, 65 ter. We received this from the OTP so I
4 believe there must be a translation. Apparently not.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. This is dated, you will agree, the 13th of July, 1994. The
7 command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps is sending this to all units and
8 all the units and all the command posts of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps on
9 the 13th of July, 1994. Do you agree?
10 A. I -- if the translation is correct that what you said is true --
11 so I'm hard-pressed to agree with a document that's in a foreign
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
14 MR. HAYDEN: I believe there's a translation of this now
15 available in e-court.
16 JUDGE KWON: With the magic touch of Mr. Reid. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Can I ask you to read the last page of the first task -- or
21 rather, the last sentence --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. -- of the first task, task 1.
25 A. Would you like me to read task 1? Is that what I'm reading?
1 Q. Yes, please. Thank you.
2 A. "Special attention should be given to the command and control on
3 all levels. Orders and information should reach soldiers through
4 commanders of battalions, companies, platoons, squads, and units, and
5 that should be determined by controlling the commands and by giving them
6 a task to train lower levels of command.
7 "Dead-line: Permanent task."
8 Q. Thank you. Do you see that as early as 1994 at lower command
9 level they were still short of trained staff and these officers had to be
10 trained in the course of the war; would you agree with that?
11 A. There's -- from that particular paragraph, there's no mention of
12 the previous training. There's simply mention of the fact that training
13 should go down to all levels. I can't see anywhere in that paragraph
14 that mentions that the training so far was inadequate.
15 Q. At lower levels of command to be trained for command, so that at
16 the lower level of command they didn't have fully trained officers. Does
17 that follow from this document, that they still had to be trained?
18 A. Training is a permanent task throughout the military. I can't
19 think of any point in my time where I wasn't involved in either training
20 others or being trained myself. It's continuous. And as it says here,
21 "permanent task," this is something that is ongoing and continuous within
22 a military unit.
23 Q. Thank you. And look at task 2, please, "it should be
24 forbidden ..." and so on.
25 A. "It should be forbidden for all unauthorised persons to sign
1 report" -- I apologise. "... to sign report and documents that are not
2 under their jurisdiction for the commander.
3 "Dead-line: Permanent task."
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the next page, task 12.
6 Page 12, it's probably on the next page in English -- point 12, I mean.
7 THE WITNESS: Point 12:
8 "To work permanently on the improvement of discipline and of the
9 responsibility of all communications officers, as well as on the
10 improvement of their training. To reduce (to eliminate) all negligence
11 regarding connections to human factor.
12 "Dead-line: Permanent task."
13 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Paragraph 34, please.
18 JUDGE KWON: Next page.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Can you read out point 34, please.
21 A. "With all respect to problems, the army's control and command
22 should endure in developing of internal organisation, responsibility,
23 order, and discipline, respecting of the law, level of training and
24 skills, safety, good relations between people, and the image of Serbian
25 soldier as presumptions of stable morale and entire values in
1 implementing the combat goals."
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go two pages further on,
4 please, 39 and 42. It's the next chapter so the numbers start from 1
5 again. Next page, please. It's page 5 in Serbian. 42. This is 43
6 here. 39.
7 [In English] "Priority reinforce ..."
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Can you read out 39, please.
10 A. I can. 39:
11 "Priority reinforcement of PVL for key duties should be asked, in
12 order to remove any weakness within control and command.
13 "Dead-line: 30th of July, 1994."
14 Q. Thank you. PVL is, is -- it's actually military personnel,
15 right -- oh, professional military personnel, right, that's it. So in
16 1994 he is asking for professional military personnel to be involved,
17 which is to say that that was not the case up until then or at least
18 there weren't enough of them. Do you agree that this caring commander
19 has many problems at that point in time that he has to resolve?
20 A. I'm not sure which commander signed this document. I haven't
21 seen the end of the document. Is it the corps commander at that time
22 that has signed the document?
23 Q. Yes, yes.
24 A. And at that -- by this date that is still General Galic, is it
1 Q. Yes, yes.
2 A. I cannot, therefore, agree with your description of him as a
3 caring commander. I agree that he's attempting to resolve problems
4 relating to reinforcement and the training of - as we called them
5 yesterday - specialist officers who are normally full-time officers.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.
8 JUDGE KWON: Is this only partial translation of the document?
9 From number 27 it goes to number -- point 39 and then 40. Can I see the
10 original one.
11 Can you scroll up. Can we see the previous page of the B/C/S.
12 The same is true in the original.
13 I take it -- unless it is objected to, it will be admitted.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D321, Your Honour.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Can we now have 65 ter number 15891. Fine. We have a
17 translation as well. The next page in Serbian, please. The next page in
18 Serbian, please.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Do you agree that this is a document that was issued on the 19th
21 of April, 1995?
22 A. Yes, that is the date of the document.
23 Q. May I ask you to read the following: "We have information ...,"
24 et cetera.
25 A. "We have information indicating that the enemy is preparing for
1 actions and planning activities against the forces of the corps. In
2 order to thwart their actions and intentions, I hereby order ..."
3 Q. As for the rest, we can all read that. But this bit, "all
4 officers and soldiers." I'll read it:
5 [In English] "All officers and soldiers are to be removed from
6 their homes and taken to the area of their position in combat."
7 [Interpretation] And the next one:
8 "Commanders," as in komandirs and komandants, "have to be in
9 their units as envisaged, not at their homes."
10 Do you see that?
11 [In English] "Commanders must be in their units as foreseen and
12 not at home."
13 [Interpretation] Can we have the next page:
14 "Commanders of the 3rd MAP and 4th" -- I'll read it.
15 [In English] "The commanders of 4th MAP ..."
16 [Interpretation] Do you see that?
17 A. Yes, I can see that.
18 Q. Can you read that.
19 A. I can read that:
20 "The commanders of the 4th MAP," abbreviation, "combined
21 artillery regiment, and the 4th MPOAP," abbreviation, "combined
22 anti-armour artillery regiment, must inform me of their whereabouts (not
23 home or office).
24 "The troops in the SVC," that is, Slavisa Vajner Cica and SPS
25 Slobodan Princip Seljo Barracks must take care of the defence of
2 Q. Thank you. And the last one:
3 "Check that there are no drunken soldiers and officers. And if
4 there are such officers and soldiers, they should be detained straight
6 Does this confirm what I put to you, that this was a people's
7 army that lived at home and that goes to the front line in shifts?
8 A. If we go back to the paragraph about the commanders of the 4th
9 MAP and the 4th MPOAP, those officers, as I understand it, were ex-JNA
10 officers. And he's -- the commander is asking to be informed about their
11 whereabouts. You could infer that they had spent time at home or in
12 their office, but it's not clear that that's what they had been doing.
13 The line about drunken soldiers and officers, I'm sad to say, is a
14 continual problem with military. It occurs all the time and throughout
15 most military organisations and is punished, as is said here, with
16 drunken soldiers being subject to military discipline. I would have to
17 go back and read the previous paragraphs again to remember what was
18 precisely said about the individuals being at home.
19 JUDGE KWON: Can we go back to the first page, page 1.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First page.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. "All soldiers and officers should be taken out from their homes
23 and should be brought to the area where their positions are." And then,
24 "Commanders have to be in their units as envisaged, rather than at their
1 A. Clearly in this point there has been a problem with not all the
2 troops being in the places they ought to be and this has been recognised
3 and measures being taken and, in fact, here is quite a list of orders
4 making sure -- covering all sorts of matters relating to launching aerial
5 bombs to driving around, loitering, avoiding duty, placing anti-tank
6 obstacles, a whole series of things to improve the fighting capabilities
7 of the corps. So in that sense, this is -- this is a continuation of
8 improvements throughout the corps. And yes, I agree with you, does
9 represent the fact that there were problems as you'd expect through any
10 corps that had been fighting for such a period of time.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D322, Your Honours.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Yesterday I asked you to speculate what the objective of the
16 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was. You said that your speculation was that it
17 may have been the blockade of Sarajevo
18 bit less than 200.000 Serbs living in Sarajevo along with declared
19 Yugoslavs 157.000 and that the corps had 19.000 men all the way up to
20 23.000 men when the level of mobilisation was the highest, do you agree
21 that that is over 10 per cent mobilisation, up to 15 per cent actually?
22 A. Are you suggesting that the 200.000 Serbs living in Sarajevo
23 were -- that's 200.000 male individuals, in which case 20.000 would,
24 indeed, be 10 per cent mobilisation of 200.000. But as I understand it,
25 females were not mobilised.
1 Q. No, no. That was the general population. I'm talking about the
2 general population -- well, I mean 30 per cent are able-bodied men,
3 right, of military age?
4 A. I -- I'm not an expert on statistics relating to demographics. I
5 know that there are demographic experts, but I'm afraid I'm not one of
7 Q. But we are talking about the general population here, the
8 mobilisation base is different. So it is less than 200.000. The number
9 of soldiers is, say, between 18- and 20.000. Does that mean that that is
10 about 10 per cent and even more in terms of the general population?
11 A. I agree that 20.000 is 10 per cent of 200.000.
12 Q. If you take into account that there were about 30.000 Serbs left
13 in the Muslim part of Sarajevo
14 isn't it?
15 JUDGE KWON: I find it absolute waste of time. The witness is
16 not in the position to confirm whether it was 200.000 or 300.000, whether
17 it's 20.000. That calculation can be done by anybody if you establish
18 the fact first. I don't think this is the witness who is suited to deal
19 with this kind of evidence.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Actually, I'd like to bring the witness to my question.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. And now my question, Mr. Philipps: What is it that could compel
24 this population to send every able-bodied male into the corps if it
25 weren't for the protection of one's own homes?
1 A. I really can't put myself inside the head of other people, I'm
3 JUDGE KWON: Absolutely.
4 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, what you're asking the witness to
5 do is to speculate, and one thing that is not evidence is speculation. I
6 don't know whether you're going to go into an analysis of the charts
7 which have been produced and which were the, as it were, the principal
8 function of this witness's task. Because that seems to me -- unless you
9 are going to challenge the accuracy of those charts in terms of what's
10 actually on them, the other area of challenge might be an interpretive
11 challenge as to what it means. And it seems to me that that may be the
12 most useful way that this witness's time can be spent in assisting the
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency. Of course
15 formally speaking I am going to proffer a few corrections of this diagram
16 or chart. However, as far as interpretation is concerned, creating an
17 impression of a well-organised huge military force that is fighting an
18 undefended city, I cannot leave the Trial Chamber deluded in that way.
19 That is not the case. Mr. Philipps saw this from the documents that we
20 read today and also the documents that he had read. Literally people did
21 not wish to leave their homes. They defended their very often homes. So
22 it is not the way things have been depicted. This is not a corps of an
23 army that had come from somewhere. These were people who were mobilised
24 right from there, and I have to say that this was a corps that was not
25 operating properly because it had lots of problems. That is what I'm
1 trying to prove through these documents that Mr. Philipps had seen or
2 should have seen.
3 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, I understand that's your position,
4 Dr. Karadzic, but it's -- I don't -- Colonel Philipps, as he is properly
5 to be addressed in the sense of the evidence which he's giving, I don't
6 think, and he'll correct me if I'm wrong, has viewed his task as being
7 that sort of an analysis or claims the expertise to answer that sort of a
8 question. And if that's correct, then asking him that sort of question
9 is simply taking up the time that you might usefully be using in
10 analysing that which he does have expertise in.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But may I remind the witness and
12 the Trial Chamber that the witness had claimed that the flow of
13 information functioned properly, whereas we see here in 1994 that a front
14 line of 140 kilometres still had to be visited by a messenger, courier.
15 This is not a modern way of communication. It is highly pain-staking.
16 12410 is the next 65 ter number that I'd like to have now.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. While we're waiting for that, knowing the terrain around
20 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to comment on the accused's statement
21 he made just now as to the flow of information?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, in a sense I would. The flow of information
23 up and down the corps was evident throughout the period. The means of
24 that communication at some times appears to have been runner or messenger
25 or courier, and it might not be a modern method of communication. And
1 the British army in times when communication fails and in my experience I
2 have sent runners, I have had runners come to me. You use any means
3 capable of passing information. That doesn't always mean a digital
4 radio, it can frequently mean by motorbike or by hand.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue. 12410?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, we have it now.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. However, you do agree, Mr. Philipps, that your task was to
11 portray how this corps functioned, especially from the point of view of
12 its capacity to communicate and to ensure a flow of information; right?
13 A. Yes. My task was to show the organisation of the corps and the
14 lines of command and control up and down the corps and the passage of
15 data up and down the corps.
16 Q. Thank you. Let's save time. We're going to leave this document
17 aside. We're going to drop it all together.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And 01830, that's what we'd like to
19 have. 1D08280. I have the English version here. I believe that one
20 does exist there as well.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. May I ask you to read the part that starts with: "In spite ..."
23 I think we don't have a Serbian version, so just this sentence "in spite
24 of ..." the first sentence.
25 A. "In spite of many warnings, during any group or individual
1 visits to the bodies of SRK command, numerous weaknesses and defects has
2 been found in the subjugated units."
3 Q. Thank you. What about the rest "order," "I order," number 1.
4 A. "I order.
5 "From the 12th of the 4th, 1993, at all levels of RiK and SRK, it
6 is most strictly forbidden to deliver and consume alcohol during both
7 working and extra time."
8 Q. Number 2, please.
9 A. "Immediately and with no exception eliminate all defects in the
10 system of tours of duty, particularly with the bodies that are directly
11 connected to OC SRK command. In that sense, the special attention should
12 be paid to the system of informing OC K-SRK and eliminate the weaknesses
13 specially regarding the speed, completeness, and credibility of the
15 "From now on every information must consist of the following:
16 "Who is informing.
17 "What has happened.
18 "Time, place, consequences, and undertaken measures."
19 Q. May I ask you to read 3 and 4 as well.
20 A. "While informing the superior command, it is obligatory to
21 strictly respect the authority and prevent any communication with
22 unauthorised persons in SRK command.
23 "Starting from the mentioned date it is the most strictly
24 forbidden to perform any oral or written addressing to MS VRS Presidency
25 of RS government, RS government and the presidents of Serb
1 municipalities, that is, their bodies outside SRK command."
2 Q. Thank you. And 7.
3 A. "Immediately upon receipt of this order ensure that all members
4 of the unit must have an excellent appearance strictly in accordance with
5 the temporary rules of the VRS. Special attention should be paid to
6 elimination of the appearance of men with a long hair, beards, untidy
7 moustaches, and holding any kind of designations except regular ones."
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Number 13, please, the first sentence.
12 A. "The commanders of the independent battalions, regiments, and
13 brigades in the zones of their own responsibility will provide a maximum
14 support to the actions of SRK command in arresting and eliminating the
15 killers, thieves, burglars, and similar. In the own units and during the
16 meetings with the soldiers and officers, it is obligatory to explain the
17 role and character of this action and previously achieved results and
18 specially underline an excellent reaction among the population."
19 Q. 14, please.
20 A. "In own units it should ensure that each its member is obliged to
21 report to the bodies in charge and also other officers immediately the
22 perpetrators of the criminal acts and war profiteer so that we could stop
23 it once forever."
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the second paragraph
1 of paragraph 16, please. Can you scroll up a bit. It starts with: "All
2 members ..."
3 THE WITNESS: "All members of the units must be particularly
4 convinced that we not have munitions factory, oil sources, and the stores
5 full of food, so that we can take only what we have. In own units it
6 should prevent, by any mean, further transfer of the munitions, p/g and
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Thank you. 17, please.
10 A. "Again and last time, I strictly forbid the movements of
11 personnel from one unit to the other without permission of the commander
12 and acceptance of those personnel by the commanders of the units to which
13 they come."
14 Q. Thank you. Mr. Philipps, does this look like a people's army
15 that needs quite a bit of discipline, that is lacking at that point in
17 A. There are certainly mentioned there lapses of discipline relating
18 to dress and behaviour and all sorts of problems. The corps at this time
19 had been fighting for a period of time, and you might expect under those
20 circumstances there would be problems with behaviour, with equipment,
21 with the appearance of soldiers. It's a continual effort of the command
22 to maintain the standards of military discipline within a unit, and this
23 represents an attempt, a continuation, to maintain that level of military
25 Q. On the first page you saw that the type of information provided
1 is prescribed, what happened, time, place, measures taken. Is this
2 conceivable, this kind of document, a year into the war in a proper
3 professional unit?
4 A. Um --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the first page again so
6 that Mr. Philipps can be reminded of what it says.
7 JUDGE KWON: From now on.
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, I see. I'm not in the least surprised by
9 order number 1. The military, including the British military, has strict
10 rules about consumption of alcohol while on duty or on the lines. In
11 areas of operations consumption of alcohol is forbidden. So that is a
12 standard, I would say, a standard order.
13 The second point really is relating to the nature of reporting
14 and the list of information, who, what, when, where, and what you're
15 doing about it is the format of a standard military report. This is a
16 reminder to people to submit reports in a standard format. In my
17 experience, even trained soldiers occasionally need to be reminded of the
18 format of reports and how that reporting should be delivered so that it's
19 understandable to the headquarters.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Thank you. My point is that this shows how many problems a corps
22 of a people's army has. A professional unit of this size would certainly
23 not be facing this type of problem. Do you agree with that?
24 A. It's very difficult to put the place of a regular military unit
25 into the situation that had occurred up until that period. The war, at
1 that time of this order, had been being waged for a year, at least. If
2 you have a single unit in combat continuously for a year, even a regular,
3 professional unit would suffer difficulties and would require tight
4 command and control. So I would expect any unit, any corps, brigade,
5 that had been consistently in combat for a long period of time to have to
6 work very hard to keep up its level of military discipline. And that's
7 what this document appears to be. It is an order to ensure the
8 maintenance of good order and military discipline.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Philipps, do you by any chance know what RiK is
10 the abbreviation of?
11 THE WITNESS: I think it refers to another corps, but I could be
12 quite incorrect. But I'm not sure of that abbreviation.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may assist, it's command and
15 THE WITNESS: Oh.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.
17 JUDGE KWON: I take it to be one of the Defence documents in
18 other cases?
19 MR. HAYDEN: Similar to the document yesterday, Your Honour, this
20 is a Defence document from the Galic case. In this instance our quick
21 check of the record shows that there is a B/C/S version; however, we
22 would ask that the translation here be reviewed. There's a number of
23 abbreviations that it's unclear what they mean and for the sake of
24 accuracy --
25 JUDGE KWON: So far we admitted the documents with Defence
1 translation which will be checked again later on.
2 MR. HAYDEN: No objection to its admission.
3 JUDGE KWON: With that caveat we'll admit this.
4 MR. HAYDEN: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D323, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm noting the time. We have five
7 minutes until the break, but I'm -- I'd like to remind you of the
8 time-limit we put for your cross-examination. Given the nature of the
9 evidence Mr. Philipps gave in his chief and the questions you put during
10 the cross-examination so far, we find that the five hours is more than
11 sufficient. I'd like to remind you that the Chamber is not minded to
12 extend any time for your cross-examination. So bear that in mind in the
13 remaining for your time. You've spent so far about a bit less than four
14 hours. So in the next session you will have 70 minutes to conclude your
15 cross-examination. Let's continue.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'll have to adjust to
17 that, but I thought it was a good opportunity to get an overview of the
19 Can we have 1D01156.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. While we are waiting, Mr. Philipps, looking at the documents of
22 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, did you notice to what extent the cease-fire
23 was being violated -- all the cease-fires brokered by UNPROFOR?
24 A. I didn't work on any time-line or data relating to cease-fires,
25 so I had no information of when a cease-fire was in operation and when a
1 cease-fire had been broken. So that did not form part of my report.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we look at 2, at the very
4 bottom. Everyone can read what these violations looked like. Yes, here
5 it is. In Serbian it is number 2. In English it's probably the next
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Can you read number 2: "The state of combat-readiness ..."?
9 A. "The state of combat-readiness in corps units has been improved
10 by the latest activities and combat results. It continues to be
11 encumbered by ineffective command and control at almost all levels and
12 the large influence of the authorities on command and control up to
13 brigade level, especially in the Rajlovac Brigade, the 2nd Rmtbr,
14 Romanija Motorised Brigade, and Vogosca Brigade. The tendency to defend
15 one's own door-step is still present and it is very difficult to get
16 units to move forward short distances, not to mention manoeuvres of units
17 in the corps zone."
18 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at: "The corps command and
19 co-operation with the civilian authorities is taking measures ..."
20 A. "The corps command is taking measures in co-operation with the
21 civilian authorities and the MUP, the Ministry of the Interior, to
22 prevent negative occurrences. The measures have been slow and
23 ineffective so far, and despite the seminar on Jahorina we do not have
24 the same approach to resolving problems. It is noticeable that we agree
25 in talks, but in practice everybody does what he wants."
1 Q. Thank you. Does this also show that this was a people's army and
2 that it was hard to co-ordinate it?
3 A. Again, I think this is showing the recognition of problems that
4 are occurring, and certainly methods are being used to improve that.
5 They've clearly had a seminar on Jahorina about the subject. So there
6 are measures being taken to improve the difficulties. The -- those
7 brigades that are having difficulties are identified individually. And
8 again I'm not sure of the date of the document, but you might expect in
9 such a situation that it would be difficult to get units to attack or
10 move forward at that point in time due to the possibility of casualties.
11 JUDGE KWON: It's dated 21st of September, 1992.
12 THE WITNESS: 1992, so -- yes, quite early.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you agree that it says here that he doesn't want to leave his
15 home, not that he's afraid of getting killed? So he's acting locally; is
16 that right? He wants to defend his threshold, that's the expression we
17 use in our part of the world.
18 A. Yes, I can see the tendency to defend one's own door-step as a
19 phrase, not necessarily literally, but defending a particular area, and
20 that appears to be a problem with these specific brigades. I was
21 referring to the lack of willingness to go forward that is mentioned
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be admitted as Exhibit D324.
1 We'll now have a break for 25 minutes.
2 --- Recess taken at 3.38 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 4.06 p.m.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. If this document has
6 been admitted could we have 65 ter 11707, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, for the record this has been
8 admitted as P1003. Thank you.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 When did we pass 1.000?
12 Can we -- oh yes, we do have a translation.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. We see the date is the 21st of July, 1992. There is quite a lot
15 of information in this document, but I would like us to look at page 3
16 because it refers to the topic you are dealing with. Page 3 and it's the
17 same in English, is it? "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps" -- I'm not sure,
18 it's on page 3. "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps is holding the defence
19 lines" -- I believe it's the next page in English.
20 Could you read -- very well, I'll read it:
21 "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps firmly -- is firmly holding the line
22 of defence of the largest part of Serbian Sarajevo and is successfully
23 controlling the territory in their area of responsibility."
24 This was now called east Sarajevo
25 time the Serbian neighbourhoods in Sarajevo in the suburbs organised
1 themselves as Serbian Sarajevo?
2 A. Do you want me to comment on the document or on your comment on
3 the document?
4 Q. Well, what I just said about the existence of Serbian Sarajevo.
5 The document isn't finished yet.
6 A. I hadn't heard that it was called -- I'd heard of the concept of
7 Serbian Sarajevo
8 Serbian Sarajevo
9 Q. Now it exists as a town, but it's called east Sarajevo because
10 our neighbours don't like it being called Serbian Sarajevo. That's for
11 everybody's information.
12 Can we look at this passage which says the Herzegovina Corps and
13 where it begins with the words "in question," the next passage. Could
14 you please read this out.
15 JUDGE KWON: I think Mr. Philipps is able to read that passage.
16 Why does he have to read out that passage, unless it is that necessary.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I'll read it.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. From the previous passage on the territory of the Serbian
20 republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina there are certain weaknesses which if they
21 are not dealt with quickly can influence the morale of the units and
23 "Primarily it's a question of the non-functioning or poor
24 functioning of the state institutions and organs, and this is
25 significantly burdening the work of the units' commands and the army."
1 Do you see that all this is in the in the process of being set up
2 and that it's functioning with a great difficulty?
3 A. From the date of this document, the hostilities had only just
4 begun in Sarajevo
5 organising itself and sorting out command and control.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.
8 JUDGE KWON: You are informed that this has been already
9 admitted, yes.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, that's 1003. All right. Thank
12 May we have 65 ter 1781. 65 ter 1781. It's quite a voluminous
13 document, analysis of combat-readiness from April of 1993 and there is a
14 translation, I've seen it.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. We've seen the front page, analysis of the combat-readiness and
17 activities and so on for 1992; is that right?
18 A. Yes, this is the front page of a document that has been prepared
19 at army level by the Main Staff.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 32 in Serbian and
22 the chapter heading is "Radio Communications." We have the Serbian
24 MR. HAYDEN: I think it's page 33 in the English.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page. This
1 is "Radio-relay Communications," and then we have "Radio Communications"
2 on the next page. Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. May I draw your attention to the passage which begins: "At
5 brigade level."
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In English it might be on the next
7 page 35. [In English] "At the brigade battalion level."
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. May I ask you to read that passage.
10 A. "At the brigade-battalion level and down to platoon level, radio
11 communication is the fundamental command and control communications link.
12 However, there are quite a few problems at this level using this type of
13 communication. One of the basic problems is the fact that units of this
14 rank do not have appropriate low power equipment. Supplying energy
15 sources to operate the equipment is no less a problem. A large number of
16 users do not properly use portable low capacity equipment and hand-held
17 Motorolas, two-way hand-held radios. These are also susceptible to
18 interception and interference on the part of the enemy, and the users
19 fail sufficiently to use general cryptoprotection documents."
20 Q. Thank you. May we now look at the first passage under the
21 heading "Wire Communications."
22 The first three paragraphs under the heading "Wire
24 A. "Wire communications at the Main Staff - first subordinate
25 commands level, have not been greatly used because of the disruption of
1 these on the main routes.
2 "The use of such communication links at the corps-brigade level
3 have also been quite difficult owing primarily to the great distances and
4 poorly developed SVZL, expansion unknown, and cable lines, particularly
5 in hilly and mountainous areas.
6 "At the brigade-battalion (artillery battalion) level and down to
7 the platoon, and in front line positions, this type of connection is the
8 principal communications link.
9 "However, all Army of Republika Srpska units have made maximum
10 use of an integrated wire service and PTT links by linking up with the
11 nearest PTT communications centre.
12 "The corps uses PTT communication links ranging from 10 PTT
13 connections in the Herzegovina Corps to 93 PTT connections in the
14 Eastern Bosnian Corps, as shown in the following table."
15 Q. Thank you. Did you come across this information pertaining to
16 the difficulties of wireless and wire communications in the Army of
17 Republika Srpska and also in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?
18 A. I have read this analysis and seen this analysis before. As I
19 understood it, the wire communications at the lower level was the
20 principal link, that is, from brigade to battalions. However, their
21 radios were not functioning at an appropriate level. The corps to the
22 Main Staff communication functioned very effectively using teleprinters,
23 as is mentioned on the previous page. So what is happening is that
24 command and communication is maintained by whatever means. So where
25 radio is not available, wire is used. Where wire is not functioning,
1 they're using the local PTT, the telephone network, as a means of
2 communicating. So they're using whatever means are available. When
3 radios don't work, they use wire, when wire doesn't work, they use
4 Motorolas, hand-held radios. So there's an attempt to make sure that
5 communication is functioning, but it is not the -- it's not the perfect
6 communication by any means and it is not the same type of communication
7 that you would expect to find throughout a professional corps.
8 JUDGE MORRISON: That said, if my memory serves me correct, radio
9 communications are the bane of any army's life, particularly when they
10 get wet.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It would be fair to ask a current
12 serving soldier how he felt about modern communications, for example, in
14 functioning communications.
15 JUDGE MORRISON: Which is why there are still runners.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I? Thank you.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Does it say here that they're short of equipment and so on and
19 when it comes to wire communications they say that the lower down one
20 goes the poorer the communications. So at the level of the Main Staff
21 and the corps, communication is functioning well; but between the brigade
22 command and the battalion and company commands, there are all sorts of
23 problems, both in radio communications, wire communications, and so on,
24 because of the mountains, because of damaged main roads, and so on. Do
25 you agree?
1 A. I agree that the communication is not perfect and all types of
2 means were used to try and establish communication.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have three pages further
5 along, it's 35 in Serbian and the heading is the situation in the organs
6 and units of communication.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. While we are waiting for it to come up, I remember our
9 conversation when you confirmed that most information is passed from
10 brigade and battalion level up to brigade level, and from brigade level
11 up to corps level. And the further up one goes, the more the information
12 is summarised and reduced to the most essential points; is that correct?
13 A. Yes, that is correct. At each level the information is
14 summarised so that the commanding officer or the commander of the
15 formation receives the correct amount of data and isn't overwhelmed by
17 Q. Thank you. However, we see that communication on these two sides
18 has the least possible equipment, if I can put it that way?
19 A. I'm not sure I understand the question.
20 Q. We see that the communications up to the corps level are better,
21 but at lower level, brigade level, communications are poorer than at
22 higher levels; is that right?
23 A. It seems from the description here that the level of, let's call
24 them electronic radio communications and wire communications were poorer.
25 But you have to remember that a company commander would see his battalion
1 commander every day, and a battalion commander in such situation, in such
2 an area may very well see his brigade commander every day. Much harder
3 for a brigade commander to visit the corps command post, and so the
4 important communication is between the brigade and the corps -- and the
5 corps up.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in
8 English, please. And in Serbian it's the right page. It has to do with
9 personnel levels.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Let us just see where the personnel levels are. [In English]
12 "Understaffing." [Interpretation] Can you read the paragraph starting
13 with "understaffing"? It's towards the top of the page,
14 "understaffing" --
15 A. I can see it:
16 "Understaffing in respect of key duty officers such as heads of
17 signal corps, signal company, and signal" -- I'll start again. Sorry.
18 "Understaffing in respect of key duty officers such as heads of
19 signals corps, signals company, and platoon leaders, as well as the lack
20 of certain critical specialities such as radio-relay operators, UPF, and
21 radio-relay mechanics, radio teleprinter operators, automatic telephone,
22 and TT exchange mechanics, all affect the communications system and the
23 battle readiness of signals units generally and the signals branch as a
24 whole. One of the problems is also the unresolved status of civilians
25 formerly serving in the JNA and now in the VRS. There is presumed to be
1 a surplus of them which is in fact not the case, as they perform work for
2 which we have no replacements."
3 Q. Thank you. Does this complete the picture regarding these
4 difficulties that exist in communications between different levels within
5 the army?
6 A. I think we have seen that in all specialisms, engineering,
7 artillery, communications, that there was a shortage of highly trained
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, as Exhibit D325.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1815, could we have that, please.
14 It's a map, a map that had been marked.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. You have kindly confirmed that on the basis of the documents of
17 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps you managed to see what the deployment of
18 forces was in the Sarajevo
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps one map so that it would be
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Does this look familiar to you? Is it Sarajevo?
23 A. It appears to be an oblique -- I'd rather not call it a map.
24 It's more of an appearance of a satellite picture or an aerial photograph
25 of Sarajevo
1 approximate the lines during the conflict. But I can't see a date.
2 Q. Thank you. In the lower left-hand corner do you see Ilidza
3 Serbian part?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
5 MR. HAYDEN: Your Honour, as the title of this document in
6 e-court suggests, this is an annotated version of a map. I have two
7 issues here. The first is where those annotations come from. It looks
8 very similar to a map that was presented to a previous witness or
9 Mr. Karadzic asked that previous witness to make annotations, which
10 brings me to my second point. You will recall after that witness made
11 those annotations you asked the Prosecution to come to an agreement with
12 the accused about the positions. I can inform the Chamber that no
13 agreement was reached. One of the reasons for that is what we see before
14 us is not, in fact, a map but is a satellite photograph. It's a visual
15 aid for the Chamber. We're willing to come to an agreement on detailed
16 maps that are on our 65 ter list. For example, we could come to an
17 agreement on the breakdown of map number 1 in the Prosecution's map book,
18 and we can certainly come to an agreement on geographical locations. If
19 the -- if Mr. Karadzic is concerned about coming to agreement on the
20 elevations of those positions, we can certainly do that as well.
21 JUDGE KWON: Did you have time to analyse this aerial image, in
22 particular whether or not you agree with the geographical name of those
24 MR. HAYDEN: We haven't analysed every single position, but I can
25 give you one example. We didn't come to an agreement on the position of
1 Grdonj, for example, at the top of the map --
2 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure it was appropriate to hear that in the
3 presence of the witness, but -- so there are certain areas you cannot
4 agree as to the exact location of those places?
5 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, I didn't mean -- I was going to respond
6 because I was present at the time that I believe this was created and I
7 would just add one additional point. It is correct, we could not come to
8 an agreement on that, and I would simply note that I think it -- if the
9 Court refers back to the testimony, I think it was clear that this was
10 prepared with considerable guidance by the accused and considerable
11 trepidation and misgivings by the witness who was placing markings on
12 there. So to call it a map indicating locations I think would be
13 misleading in contrast to what it appears to be, which is some dialogue
14 between the accused and the witness at the time.
15 JUDGE KWON: So I take it this aerial image, marked image, was
16 produced by the Defence?
17 MR. HAYDEN: The underlying map is map number 2 in our map
18 book --
19 JUDGE KWON: No, no, the aerial image that we are seeing now with
20 the red -- with markings.
21 MR. HAYDEN: The yellow markings are, yes.
22 JUDGE KWON: And then I think I can -- I gather the Prosecution
23 can come up with a suggestion, another suggestion, bearing these places
24 on this image? And then we can see the difference between position of
25 the Defence as well as the Prosecution.
1 MR. HAYDEN: We're happy to use, for example, 65 ter 09390B and
2 C. That's two booklets. The first one -- and we've provided these to
3 the Defence --
4 JUDGE KWON: No -- but I take it these are places the Defence
5 wants to locate in this aerial image, and you can tell us whether you
6 agree with certain locations and you do not agree -- you can indicate the
7 places as to which you do not agree with.
8 MR. HAYDEN: The problem is, Your Honour, we don't agree with
9 placing these images on an aerial image. It's not a map. So we can't
10 place GPS co-ordinates, for example, on an aerial image. This was
11 provided merely as a visual aid for the Trial Chamber to understand the
12 general topography of Sarajevo
13 geographical locations.
14 JUDGE KWON: So is your position that you're not able to indicate
15 where Vogosca is in this aerial image?
16 MR. HAYDEN: Only very generally, not a pin-point location.
17 JUDGE KWON: I don't think Defence is intending to pin-point that
18 Vogosca is at that point. So I would recommend to continue your
19 dialogue, conversation, between the Defence to assist the Chamber. If
20 the Chamber is able to see where Vogosca is in this aerial image, it will
21 be -- the Chamber will benefit -- not only from -- as well in addition to
22 the map. But, first of all, we would expect that the parties can agree
23 to name these -- spot these places on the map first, and then we can see
24 how we can go from there.
25 MR. HAYDEN: Just to clarify, when you say "on the map" --
1 JUDGE KWON: The map you referred to.
2 MR. HAYDEN: The detailed map in the --
3 JUDGE KWON: The detailed map.
4 MR. HAYDEN: I understand, Your Honour. Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 JUDGE MORRISON: It's not going to be very difficult to transpose
7 from the map to the photograph. I mean, the places are either
8 identifiable on the map or they're not, and some are obviously
9 self-evident, like for instance the airport. So I don't think it's as
10 much of a problem as you feel.
11 MR. HAYDEN: I agree generally. It's not as simple as you make
12 out with respect to the confrontation lines and where those appear on the
13 aerial image. It's just not as accurate as you would find on a map
14 rather than a photograph.
15 JUDGE MORRISON: No, I accept that, that that's to do with
16 projection as much as anything else. But we're really I think looking at
17 place names rather than exact positions of front lines. But perhaps
18 we've spent enough time on this already.
19 JUDGE KWON: With that caveat, let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 May I just remind you of the fact that we did not produce this
22 map, it was the OTP. We didn't make the markings. We did not even
23 challenge the confrontation lines. It's the Prosecution that marked
24 them. We did not mind because this is a schematic -- or no, it's not a
25 schematic, but it's not precise enough. However, what is precise enough
1 is that this is the hill of Hum and Mr. Harland confirmed that, that also
2 that this is Debelo Brdo, Mojmilo, Colina Kapa, and that it was held by
3 the Muslim forces. He also confirmed that this was Grdonj, it can be
4 nothing else but this --
5 JUDGE KWON: There is no point continuing that debate. But it is
6 the Defence that put that mark in yellow, Hum, or Vogosca, or Zuc?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That was confirmed by Mr. Harland.
8 I asked him what was where and whether he agreed, and he confirmed that
9 those were the positions concerned.
10 JUDGE KWON: Whether it was confirmed or not is a matter to be
11 analysed by the Chamber, but let's continue.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Can you find your way on this map, Mr. Philipps?
15 A. I can see the oblique aerial photograph in front of me.
16 Q. Can you recognise these localities, the ones that were marked
18 A. Many of them I do recognise, the shape of the roads, the airport,
19 the river quite clear on the photograph.
20 Q. Thank you. Do you see Nedzarici, the place that you had marked
21 on the previous map; right?
22 A. I see the yellow name, Nedzarici, with a yellow dot and an arrow
23 pointing to a specific place.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you see the hill of Mojmilo and does this
25 correspond to what you know of Mojmilo?
1 A. As I understand it, Mojmilo is generally in that area.
2 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that Nedzarici is in the Serb red line
3 and Mojmilo in the Muslim line?
4 A. On this map, yes.
5 Q. Thank you. Can you see where Lukavica is? It hasn't been marked
6 here, but it can be seen on this image. It is to the east of Dobrinja.
7 A. I see a yellow marking for Lukavica.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, what is your question to this witness?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I would like to ask
10 Mr. Philipps how much time we need to go from Lukavica to Nedzarici.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. What is the distance involved in your opinion?
13 A. Are you talking of a direct line from Lukavica to Nedzarici?
14 Q. Yes, yes.
15 A. To measure that, I would require a map. An oblique photograph
16 has a different scale. The nearer you are to the bottom of the
17 photograph, to the top of the photograph -- so, for example, a centimetre
18 at the top of this picture would represent a different distance to a
19 centimetre at the bottom of the picture. So really to measure distances,
20 one requires a map.
21 JUDGE KWON: I don't think Mr. Karadzic asked you the distance as
22 the crow flies. He asked to go from --
23 THE WITNESS: To go round the lines?
24 JUDGE KWON: I think so.
25 THE WITNESS: Yes.
1 Without seeing the map of all the lines except bearing in mind
2 what I saw from the map we had yesterday, you would have to travel I
3 think in a clockwise direction round Sarajevo, so many, many tens of
5 [Defence counsel confer]
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. I believe that it's not more than one kilometre; however, do you
8 know that we had to go 100 kilometres to Lukavica from Nedzarici, 110
9 kilometres, all the way around from Nedzarici to Lukavica?
10 A. Yes, that is the ABiH forces within Sarajevo are fighting on
11 interior lines, and in this case the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps is fighting
12 on exterior lines and therefore communication in that area would be much
13 more difficult.
14 Q. Did you see that on the basis of the agreement, according to
15 which we handed over the airport, we had the right to use the runway for
16 our wounded?
17 A. I haven't read data relating to agreements either between VRS and
18 ABiH or at political level or with UNPROFOR.
19 Q. Thank you. From the report you saw where the forces of the
20 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were. Do you agree that the forces of the
21 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were not at Mojmilo, at Hrasno, at Debelo Brdo,
22 at Colina Kapa, at the Jajce barracks, Grdonj, Hum, Kobilja Glava, Zuc,
23 and Sokolje?
24 A. As far as I can tell, but mostly I admit from the map we saw
25 yesterday, that those areas fall within the lines of the ABiH. But
1 certainly there's confusion about -- let me pick an example. Zuc on the
2 map here is shown as a single dot. Zuc is a large hill. Hum is a large
3 hill. Mojmilo covers several hundred square metres, and Debelo Brdo
4 covers several hundred metres and Grdonj. All of these are large areas
5 if marked by an individual dot, it's somewhat misleading. So I would be
6 hard-pressed to say that the whole of a particular place, for example,
7 Rajlovac on this map is shown as being on the SRK side, but parts of
8 Rajlovac perhaps, according to this map, are also held by the ABiH. So
9 to say that a specific place from the data on this map is held by one
10 side or the other might be misleading, whereas some places are clearly
11 held entirely by one side or the other.
12 Q. We agree that the mountaintops that I mentioned were in the hands
13 of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
14 A. I think I just answered that question. I can't agree that the
15 whole of particular places are held. I would not want to say that the
16 whole of Hrasno Brdo were held by one side or the other without seeing
17 what extent we think Hrasno Brdo covered; when, in fact, here it's shown
18 only as a dot on the map, in the same way that I don't know the exact
19 boundaries of Grbavica and whether Debelo Brdo is considered to go
20 further up the hill or not. You would really have to ask a local
21 Sarajevan what part of the town he considered to be the whole of Hum. I
22 spent nine months there, so I'm not the person to ask about the detailed
23 topography and locations within Sarajevo
24 Q. However, the documents that you did see showed you who was firing
25 and from where, and here you can see that that is in the area of
1 responsibility of the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
2 So from that point of view a millimetre here, a millimetre there, do we
3 agree that these mountaintops are mentioned in reports as places from
4 where there is firing? Remember the reports, Sokolje, Zuc, Hum, that
5 there was firing coming from there and from Grdonj, from Colina Kapa, all
6 of these elevations around Sarajevo
7 A. Many, probably not all of these places, are mentioned within the
8 reports. Again, I did not look at the reports with detailed information
9 about the location of where fire was coming from or who the firing was
10 at, nor did I mark on a map the locations of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
11 My purpose of my report was to show the structure of the
12 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and not locate its position on the ground.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, shall we ask the
14 witness to initial this or shall we deal with this with someone else?
15 JUDGE KWON: There's no point for the witness to sign this.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Then we can remove this
17 map -- however, let's keep it because Mr. Harland had kindly confirmed to
18 us that these were the names of these elevations. If the other side
19 wants us to spell this out in more specific terms, my associates are
20 available to them and they can go into every little millimetre. 1D1 --
21 or actually, 1D0185. Could we have that now, please. 1D01825.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Philipps, you were an OTP investigator as well, weren't you?
24 A. Yes. I think my CV covers the time that I worked for the OTP as
25 a military analyst, not as an investigator.
1 Q. And what was it that you analysed in that capacity?
2 A. I worked on -- originally directed by Mr. Ierace the structure of
3 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Before that I worked on financial data
4 relating to the former President Milosevic. A whole series of matters
5 for the OTP. I worked on the Dubrovnik
6 prosecution of General Dragomir Milosevic relating to the
7 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. I worked on various mapping projects relating
8 to the weapons used in Dubrovnik
9 and the capabilities of equipment for various cases, a whole series of
10 military analytical tasks.
11 Q. You did not testify in the trial of General Milosevic; right?
12 A. That is correct, I did not testify in that matter. The chart,
13 however, I produced may very well have been used by the Prosecution in
14 understanding the structure of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, even if that
15 structure was not used in the prosecution itself as evidence.
16 Q. It also has to do with the structure of the Sarajevo-Romanija
17 Corps, not only the flow of information; right?
18 A. Yes. My chart really shows the command and control structure and
19 the way the organisation is put together. It's sometimes called an order
20 of battle.
21 Q. In your capacity of investigator, did you interview anyone for
22 the OTP?
23 A. Yes, I did. I'm racking my brains now to think of all the people
24 I interviewed. I must have interviewed over 30 or 40 individuals.
25 Q. Thank you. That is considerable investigation work, isn't it?
1 A. I was usually working in conjunction with an investigator, that
2 is, a trained policeman. He would conduct the interviews and I would
3 assist from the point of view of military analysis. Most of the
4 interviews that I was assisting with related to military personnel,
5 either United Nations monitoring officers, members of the ABiH, or
6 members of the VRS. And in some cases JNA -- former JNA officers.
7 Q. Were these high-ranking officers and commanders such as Smith,
8 Rupert Smith? He was a general, Mr. Koenig? Which of the high-ranking
9 people did you interview?
10 A. I don't know -- let me think. I interviewed General Rose, I
11 interviewed General Smith, General Karavelic, and various other senior
12 officers. But I don't know how much -- I don't know what I'm able to say
13 from the OTP's point of view. If you wanted a full list, I think -- a
14 full list of when and how those interviews took place, I don't know
15 whether that's something the OTP would provide or could provide. That
16 might be of more use to you if you wanted to know more about my
17 background. But in a sense you're testing my memory of five years ago,
18 ten years ago.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
20 MR. HAYDEN: I'm not sure where this line of questioning is
21 going, but obviously to the extent that it doesn't relate to
22 Mr. Philipps' analysis of the SRK, the review he's conducted for the
23 purpose of this trial, I don't think he should get into internal matters
24 of the Office of the Prosecutor.
25 JUDGE KWON: We will see.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it's very important for us
2 to know to what extent --
3 JUDGE KWON: No. Put your next question.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. What was your task in these interviews that you mentioned?
6 A. The -- my task within each interview was different. For example,
7 if interviewing personnel who were related to the technical use of
8 mortars, then my job would be to assist the investigator in understanding
9 some of the technical data and the capabilities of the weapons, for
10 example, the noise signature, the flash signature, the range of the
11 weapon, the use of mortar tables, the types of ammunition, and this sort
12 of thing. Where we were interviewing a senior officer, then I may have
13 assisted in helping the investigator understand the relationship between
14 a platoon, a company, a battalion, and a brigade, as these are not terms
15 that civilians readily understand.
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Have you read the indictments -- or rather, did you read the
22 indictments in the cases in which you were involved during the
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And did you glean information from these indictments and were you
1 guided by them in what you should be looking for, what you should be
3 A. I was not responsible for leading the investigation; that was the
4 job of the investigator. My role was to advise on technical military
5 matters. From that point of view I was simply providing technical data,
6 not -- not directing the investigating by any means.
7 Q. But you were guided by the information provided in the
8 indictments, were you not?
9 A. I think it would be fair to say that as a military analyst the
10 indictment is one thing which one tends to put on one side as an analyst
11 and then see what information the investigator requires from you as an
12 analyst. So I wasn't directed in any particular way by the indictment.
13 I would be directed by the investigator.
14 Q. So you were some sort of consultant or assistant in investigating
15 a phenomenon or a person?
16 A. Yes, I suppose consultant is perhaps a term you could use. An
17 intelligence analyst or military analyst is maybe a better term. I
18 answered technical military questions, tried to explain in layman's terms
19 complex military matters; and so in that sense, yes, a consultant.
20 Q. What then did you do during the interview with General Smith?
21 A. I think in the interview with -- cast my mind back to the
22 interview with General Smith which was in London at the Ministry of
23 Defence, I typed the notes contemporaneously with the interview and then
24 assisted the two lawyers and the investigator understand some of the
25 answers so they could then ask further questions of General Smith.
1 Q. Very well. So you were part of a team. What participants did
2 you interview on your own?
3 A. As a military analyst, it would not be normal to interview an
4 individual on my own, although I do have -- I have been trained in
5 interviewing skills, I do not have the interviewing skills of a trained
6 investigator, a policeman. So I would only ever assist in interviews,
7 not conduct the interview on my own.
8 Q. Did your interventions and your instructions enter into the
9 investigator's report?
10 A. Where'd I'd been able to assist the investigator, it might make
11 his report clearer or might make the -- might change the questions that
12 he asked. A good example might be when interviewing about a technical
13 matter relating to combat, I might be able to clarify what had occurred
14 so the investigator could understand what had happened.
15 Q. Thank you. So you were integrated in the OTP to quite a large
16 extent, were you not?
17 A. The military analysis team was part of the Office of the
19 Q. Thank you. Can you look at this document. You mentioned this
20 person, Vaska, and I say that he was some sort of scout and that he was
21 under command and that a disciplinary measure was instituted against him.
22 Is this evident from this document?
23 A. Yes. It appears that this is a report to the Main Staff of the
24 VRS from the deputy commander, Dragomir Milosevic, relating to an
25 occurrence, some conduct of the individual listed here Vaska, and it's
1 been agreed that he will not be arrested and that the corps command has
2 decided for the time to file a criminal charge against Vaska and make him
3 responsible for any further -- it's the English that -- it's got me. And
4 to -- yes, and to make sure that he doesn't actually make any further
5 mistakes as far as I can see. It's a disciplinary document.
6 Q. Thank you. Do you accept that this Vaska is the person you
7 called Vidovic? His last name was Vidovic? Do you accept that?
8 A. I cannot confirm that the individual mentioned here is the same
9 as the individual on my chart. His full name is not listed on this page.
10 Q. Very well. But you have Vaska Vidovic or Vasilije Vidovic in
11 your diagram, do you not? Vaska's Platoon --
12 A. Yes, that is shown on my diagram, but there are also lots of
13 people called Dragomir and it doesn't mean it's the same person. It
14 could be the same person.
15 Q. Thank you. As an expert could you describe to us what happens
16 when an army loses an important territory? Does it have to withdraw to
17 the territory that remains to it?
18 A. In a sense by definition what you've said is the case. If it's
19 lost the territory, then it has to withdraw, it's been pushed from that
21 Q. Does the presence and density of that army on that territory then
23 A. If its area of responsibility has contracted, there would be more
24 troops within the area. That's, I suppose, simply a law of physics.
25 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that demobilisation of a large part of
1 an army is a very complex and sensitive job?
2 A. That would be true. That doesn't follow -- that's a
3 non sequitur, if you like, from the last statement, that's a separate
5 Q. Yes, of course. But if an army loses some of its territory, the
6 war is not yet over, it's not time to demobilise; isn't that right?
7 A. I'm not sure I understand the question. It would not normally be
8 the case for an army to demobilise unless a war was -- the war had
9 concluded, peace.
10 Q. Thank you. But even when a war is over, is large-scale
11 demobilisation a problem from the viewpoint of economic suffer,
12 psychological, sociology, and so on?
13 A. I can only speak about my knowledge of events such as the
14 Napoleonic War, the First World War, and the Second World War. And after
15 any large-scale war, the demobilisation of troops causes a political and
16 economic instability.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.
19 JUDGE KWON: Did the witness confirm anything about this
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Vaska is mentioned here, Vaska's
22 Platoon, which is in the witness's chart.
23 JUDGE KWON: When -- if my memory's correct, when he referred to
24 Vasko's Platoon, it was "o" in Vasko not Vaska; is it not correct?
25 THE WITNESS: That may be simply to do with the ending in B/C/S.
1 I think it's probably a case matter, but I can't say that this Vaska is
2 the same as the Vaska or Vasko on my chart as it doesn't have his full
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
5 MR. HAYDEN: I don't believe the witness has been able to add
6 anything to this document. He hasn't been able to identify that it is
7 the same Vaska. In any event, if this is the -- only the English version
8 and we don't have the B/C/S original, we'd ask it to be MFI'd in any
10 JUDGE KWON: So this is also one of the Defence exhibits used in
11 other case?
12 MR. HAYDEN: It appears, again, to be that case -- the Galic case
13 number is in the top right-hand corner. I'm not sure whether it was
14 admitted as an exhibit or not. We can look into that but we don't have a
15 B/C/S version available to us right now.
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
17 We'll mark it for identification.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D326, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you have ten minutes to conclude.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Did you interview General Milovanovic in the course of your work?
23 A. I was involved in assisting in the interview of
24 General Milovanovic.
25 Q. Did you put questions to General Milovanovic?
1 A. I did put questions to General Milovanovic.
2 Q. Did this interview take place before you compiled your report for
3 this case?
4 A. For the -- yes -- I'm thinking back. Yes, it did occur before I
5 compiled my report for this case. It was when I was working for the
6 Office of the Prosecutor.
7 Q. Did you observe that the northern part of the line in Sarajevo
8 was held by only one Serbian brigade, which was the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry
9 Brigade? I'm referring to the lines fating the city proper?
10 A. I think then we'd have to refer to an SRK map for me to give a
11 conclusive answer about the coverage of the infantry brigades around
13 General Milovanovic?
14 Q. Yes. So that we can see what your understanding of the
15 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps is. If we orient ourselves by the river, do you
16 agree that north of the river the line was held by only one brigade and
17 this was the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade?
18 A. Again, to answer the question, it would be much simpler to have
19 the SRK map in front of us marked by the SRK themselves, and that would
20 say a great deal more than ever I could say about how many brigades were
21 facing the northern part of Sarajevo
22 Q. Thank you. Very well.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D01823.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. And while we are waiting for the document, do you agree that in
1 this territorial disposition in Sarajevo
2 fire to hinder road communications for both sides?
3 A. That's a technical artillery question much better directed to an
4 artillery staff officer.
5 Q. But wasn't it possible to use even infantry fire to hinder people
6 moving in the Trebevic area, the Nedzarici area, and so on?
7 A. I think we must always remember that there was a battle going on
8 in and around Sarajevo
9 the natural effect of mortar fire and of machine-gun fire is to hinder
11 Q. Thank you. Would you now look at this document, please, and
12 could you read it. It's not long.
13 A. "Command of the SRK.
14 "Strictly confidential" --
15 JUDGE KWON: We can read that. What is your question,
16 Mr. Karadzic?
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Well, when we look at where it says "I order," is it evident that
19 one can compile a false report and that when the front lines are so close
20 one can pass on erroneous information purposely to the other side?
21 A. I'm not sure I could conclude that from this document. This
22 is -- this seems to be a request for establishment for reasons for fire
23 having been opened on UNPROFOR.
24 Q. But you can see that the commander doesn't know whether this was
25 the case and he's asking for an investigation; isn't that right?
1 A. That seems to be the case. That is what you would hope would
2 happen in such situation if an event occurred that was outside the
3 instructions that were given or that appeared to be illegal, then the
4 commander should set up an investigation to find out what happened and
5 why -- perhaps to prevent it from happening in future.
6 Q. And he's asking for a reliable report to be sent to the corps
7 command. Do you accept that because of this sort of hearsay I frequently
8 spoke very sharply to my officers, and then later on it transpired that
9 the Serbian army had done no such thing?
10 A. I think for that conclusion we would need the actual report
11 itself rather than the request for a report to take place.
12 Q. Thank you. In your chart do you agree that some things should be
13 corrected? For example, you said that the 4th MAP consisted of
14 batteries. It should actually be artillery battalions, which then
15 consisted of batteries?
16 A. I would certainly agree that the charts I've produced are not
17 complete, not perfectly correct. And I think any additional correction
18 to them could only assist the Court, provided that those additions and
19 corrections were backed up by documents that were reliable.
20 Q. Thank you. And where it says the 4th MAP T12, that artillery
21 piece ought to belong to the 4th Mixed Anti-armour Regiment; is that
23 A. I would agree that it would be unusual to find a T12, which after
24 all is an anti-tank weapon, in the 4th MAP, more likely to be in the
25 4th Mixed Anti-Armour Regiment. I could refer to the document, if that
1 would assist the Court, that made me put the T12 in the position I did.
2 But it's -- in a sense may not be helpful.
3 Q. Do you agree that there is a difference between the
4 organisational structure and the functional organisation for ad hoc
6 A. Yes. An order of battle is put together to command and control a
7 set of units, but there are times when during battle that that
8 organisational structure needs to be adjusted and changed. And so the
9 charts shown are only a snap-shot, if you like, of the Sarajevo-Romanija
10 Corps over a period of time. If we were to have a chart showing the
11 actual structure on each day, we might find each chart to be subtly
12 different -- not very different, but we would need hundreds of charts to
13 represent the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps over the full period.
14 Q. Thank you. So you agree then that the groups for road repairs,
15 and so on, are not formations, but they are functionally organised to
16 carry out certain tasks?
17 A. There may be parts of -- if here we're talking of engineering,
18 there may be parts of the organisation that are shown on the chart and
19 were administered and controlled, but which in reality functioned under
20 command perhaps of a brigade commander or slightly differently. So
21 perhaps you might think of part of the chart showing the administrative
22 structure of the SRK. Certainly that would be the case under
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
2 MR. HAYDEN: Your Honours, this document, thanks to Mr. Reid, was
3 an exhibit in the Galic case again and we do have the B/C/S version. And
4 if I can refer to the prior document, I can now confirm that that was
5 also an exhibit in the Galic case and we also have the B/C/S for that one
6 as well. No objection to the admission of either.
7 JUDGE KWON: So we will admit both of the documents, removing the
8 marked for identification nature of the previous document. Yes.
9 This will be ...?
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D327, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. So Exhibit D326 has been admitted.
12 So you conclude, Mr. Karadzic?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more question.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. It appears that you spoke very highly of the theoretical
16 knowledge of the command officers, but would you agree that things are
17 easy to write down on paper but difficult to have implemented in
19 A. There's always a difference between good staff work and
20 well-prepared analysis and well-prepared orders and the ability to carry
21 them out. However, it does appear from the reports going up and down the
22 chain of command from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that not only were the
23 staff good at analysing what was occurring, good at preparing
24 instructions and orders, but also good at ensuring that those
25 instructions and orders were carried out.
1 Q. However, you do agree that up until the end of the war there was
2 this objection that there weren't enough specialised people,
3 professionals; right?
4 A. Yes, I agree. There was certainly a shortage of specialist
5 officers. It does not appear to have prevented the corps from
6 functioning as regards communications, engineering, and use of artillery.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I have no more time, then that
9 was my final question.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden, you have some questions for your
12 MR. HAYDEN: Yes, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE KWON: So we'll have a break.
14 MR. HAYDEN: Certainly, Your Honour. If you want to take the
15 break first. It will only be 15 minutes.
16 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break. 25 minutes.
17 --- Recess taken at 5.22 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 5.52 p.m.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Hayden, before you commence your
20 re-examination, just one or two matters I'd like to raise with the
21 witness, and then of course you can incorporate those matters in your
22 re-examination, if necessary.
23 Just to -- this is really just to outline the -- your experience
24 and expertise to underscore the basis upon which you drew your --
25 constructed the charts that we have. I think there's sometimes a
1 misunderstanding that intelligence corps officers are really James Bonds,
2 when, in fact, the reality is - and I think you started off by telling
3 us - you would have started off with basic infantry training?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes. My first training was within the officers'
5 training corps in university, and I spent four years doing simple basic
6 military training using what was then called the common military
8 JUDGE MORRISON: Yeah.
9 THE WITNESS: Basic infantry tactics, shooting, living in the
10 field. And then after four years I went to the military academy at
12 officers are.
13 JUDGE MORRISON: And I think a lot of intelligence corps officers
14 are then seconded as subletons [phoen] to infantry battalions as platoon
15 commanders in effect.
16 THE WITNESS: That's correct. In my case I spent some months
17 previously with the Gulf Stream [phoen] Guards and so then didn't have a
18 detachment as a territorial army officer. And so I went -- was
19 commissioned straight into an intelligence corps battalion, as an
20 intelligence corps officer.
21 JUDGE MORRISON: And the function of the intelligence corps, and
22 you will correct me if I'm wrong, really, I mean, the main purpose is
23 collating and analysing information and interpreting it for dissemination
24 to whoever needs it for the purposes of whatever military activity
25 they're engaged in?
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's a precise description of the combat
2 intelligence part of an intelligence corps officer's job, yes.
3 JUDGE MORRISON: And I anticipate that you would have -- there's
4 a counter-intelligence element which would include security intelligence
5 and protective security?
6 THE WITNESS: That's correct. For three years I was a company
7 commander of the counter-intelligence company, then re-named to a
8 military intelligence company.
9 JUDGE MORRISON: All of -- the essential part of that is still
10 analysis and interpretation of information?
11 THE WITNESS: That's correct. Very much of the work going on,
12 for example, in a counter-insurgency situation is about detailing what
13 the enemy might do next. So it's the same sort of analysis whether it's
14 counter-analysis or combat intelligence.
15 JUDGE MORRISON: And within that you would be utilising human
16 intelligence, signal intelligence, electronic intelligence, and imagery,
18 THE WITNESS: That's right. A whole series of data collected
19 using as many means as possible including reconnaissance from our own
20 troops, as well as satellite imagery and the like, yes.
21 JUDGE MORRISON: And you had 21 years of experience as that?
22 THE WITNESS: All together 21 years as a territorial army
23 officer, so that's 21 years, not full-time service, yes.
24 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, but culminating in discharging your duties
25 in the rank of lieutenant-colonel?
1 THE WITNESS: I left as an acting lieutenant-colonel, to be
3 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you very much.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
5 MR. HAYDEN: Mr. Registrar, if I can have 65 ter 11789.
6 Re-examination by Mr. Hayden:
7 Q. Yesterday, Mr. Philipps, Mr. Karadzic said to you - and this is
8 at lines -- transcript page 3791 at line 2 - "during our interview
9 Mr. Philipps said himself that everyone was semicircled by somebody
11 And then further down on that same page at line 12 Judge Kwon
12 asked you to confirm this and to confirm "what Mr. Karadzic just said."
13 And you said "yes."
14 Using -- with the assistance of the map in front of you, can you
15 clarify what you mean when you say that everyone was semicircled by
16 somebody else?
17 A. If we look at the map on the screen, we can see around the
18 outside of the circle on the left there's a large red line that forms
19 a -- almost a square, but more of a triangle, and that is the operation
20 area of responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and you can see
21 that it says "SRK" in Cyrillic in the centre there. That is the area of
22 responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. If we look to the
23 north-west we can see that that boundary is up against a DK, which is the
25 boundary against the enemy. But then we can follow the direction of the
1 lines which travel from the north and all the way down to the south
2 around Sarajevo
3 shape. And you can see that on one side the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps is
4 facing the ABiH, and yet on the -- to the inside there is a pocket with
6 So in my response to Mr. Karadzic I was really talking about the
7 external lines of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and you can see that both
8 sides have pockets where they're enveloped by one side and Sarajevo
9 itself forms a larger pocket within the inside of the Sarajevo-Romanija
11 MR. HAYDEN: For the record, this is map 24 of the Prosecution
12 map book. I tender that map into evidence.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1021, Your Honours.
15 MR. HAYDEN: If I can ask Mr. Registrar for D235.
16 Q. This was a document that Mr. Karadzic discussed with you earlier
17 today. It's dated from April 1993 and it's entitled "Analysis of the
18 combat-readiness and activities of the Army of Republika Srpska in 1992."
19 Sorry, it looks like it's the wrong document before us. I believe it's
20 D235. It was 65 ter 01781.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is 325.
22 MR. HAYDEN: Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is D325 -- no, D325. It was
24 admitted today.
25 JUDGE KWON: 65 ter number 1781.
1 MR. HAYDEN: That's correct.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 MR. HAYDEN: That's correct. If we can have the English as well,
4 please. Thank you. And if we can turn to page 28 of the English.
5 Q. You can see there, Mr. Philipps, at the bottom at the section
6 1.1.6, Signal Units, this is the subsection that Mr. Karadzic took you to
7 today. He precisely took you to -- if we can turn to page 35, and do you
8 recognise that Mr. Karadzic asked you questions today about subsection C,
9 Wire Service?
10 A. Yes, that's what we looked at earlier.
11 Q. Now, turning over the page to page 36, which is a continuation of
12 that same subsection, can you see at the bottom of the first paragraph
13 the sentence reading:
14 "A positive example of fully operational wire communications from
15 the corps command to the first front line positions is in the SRK"?
16 A. Oh, yes, I found that now. Yes. It's just it's been overtyped
17 in some way:
18 "Example of a fully operational wire communications from the
19 corps command to the first front line positions is in the SRK."
20 Q. And is that consistent with your conclusions about the
21 functioning of the chain of information and command in the SRK?
22 A. It appears to confirm that they were able to communicate
23 effectively up and down the chain of command.
24 MR. HAYDEN: If we can turn to page 40.
25 Q. And we see there in the middle of the page 220.127.116.11, Conclusions,
1 being the conclusions of this subsection. And if we can turn over the
2 page to page 41, and the end of those conclusions at the very top of the
3 page reads:
4 "I judge the combat-readiness of the signals system and corps for
5 1992 to have been VERY GOOD."
6 Again, is that consistent with the conclusions that you drew?
7 A. Yes, that follows what I said earlier on.
8 Q. Turning to the front of this report dealing with the VRS
10 MR. HAYDEN: If we can turn to page 7 of the English.
11 Q. And this is the introduction entitled "Control and Command." And
12 if we look down to the fifth paragraph starting with the sentence:
13 "During the past year, the Army of Republika Srpska has been
14 under a single control and command structure, despite the fact that
15 initially we had a large number of different armies and paramilitary
17 And if you can read to yourself the remainder of that paragraph.
18 A. Yes, I've read that.
19 MR. HAYDEN: And if we can turn to page 9.
20 Q. Still within the same introduction under "Control and Command,"
21 and if we look at the second paragraph and the final sentence of that
22 paragraph reads:
23 "The involvement of different Main Staff bodies in the brigades
24 and other units yielded particularly good results because in that way
25 directives, commands, and orders reached those who were to execute them
1 in the fastest possible way, and the planned concerted action was
2 relatively quickly performed."
3 And if we go to the bottom of that page, the final paragraph
5 "Irrespective of the aggravating circumstances and factors which
6 adversely affected the morale of fighters and units, we stress that on
7 the whole it has been good and stable," and turning the page, "despite
8 the difficulties imposed by the war, so that control and command echelons
9 can count on it for the execution of pending missions."
10 Again, is that consistent with your conclusions?
11 A. Yes. The analysis of the Main Staff appears to be consistent
12 with the reporting up and down the chain of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
13 Q. And finally, with respect to this document, if we can turn to
14 page 152 of the English, we see there this section is entitled
15 "Concluding Remarks, the findings of the analysis of the combat-readiness
16 and activities of the Army of Republika Srpska in 1992."
17 If we turn over the page, can you see there, Mr. Philipps, who is
18 the signatory of this report?
19 A. It says "supreme commander of the armed forces of
20 Republika Srpska, Dr. Radovan Karadzic."
21 Q. And if you can read the paragraph number 4 beginning:
22 "The Supreme Command as a whole, as well as every individual
23 member of the Supreme Command ...," if you can read that to yourself.
24 A. Yes, I've read that.
25 Q. And again, is that consistent with the conclusions you drew about
1 the command function of the VRS or a corps within the VRS?
2 A. It's consistent with my view of the functioning, the good
3 functioning of the command and control within the
4 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
5 Q. Yesterday at transcript page 3797 at line 8, Mr. Karadzic put it
6 to you that in the beginning the SRK "inherited only the armed people,"
7 and you responded that if that was the case then "don't -- you don't then
8 understand where the military equipment listed came from." And you
9 asked: "Did the Territorial Defence hold artillery?"
10 And Mr. Karadzic responded to you:
11 "Well, you should know that."
12 Mr. Philipps, yesterday - and this was at page 3747, lines 8 to
13 11 - you spoke about the relationship between the JNA 4th Corps and the
14 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, saying:
15 "In a sense the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was formed from the
16 remnants of the 4th Corps of the JNA."
17 Now, when you say that the SRK was formed from the remnants of
18 the 4th Corps, do you know what happened to the equipment of the JNA
19 4th Corps, particularly their weapons?
20 A. I have some knowledge of that. Some of the weapons of the
21 4th Corps were then into the hands of what became the Sarajevo-Romanija
22 Corps and some equipment was removed when the 4th Corps of the JNA was
23 required to leave Sarajevo
24 became that of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, but a large quantity did.
25 I have no knowledge of what equipment came from the
1 Territorial Defence.
2 MR. HAYDEN: And if I can ask us to turn to Sanction and play a
3 very short clip. This is 65 ter 45013, and we're beginning the clip at
4 timer 00.31.17. And for the record this is a clip from a larger
5 documentary entitled "Serbian Epics," and I believe that this clip is
6 dated around July 1992.
7 [Video-clip played]
8 MR. HAYDEN: We're not receiving any sound.
9 [Video-clip played]
10 JUDGE KWON: Are we expecting some sound, Mr. Hayden?
11 MR. HAYDEN: We are, Your Honour. We appear to be having some
12 technical difficulties. When I checked this clip this morning, it did
13 have sound. I'm not sure whether it's the way it's been uploaded or
14 whether it's something to do with the system in the courtroom.
15 If we're unable to resolve those technical difficulties, then we
16 might leave that clip. Your Honours, that concludes my re-direct
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Hayden.
19 Can you bring up the map 24 which was admitted as P1021. That's
20 my question for the witness. That's the exhibit number, P1021. I don't
21 remember the 65 ter number. Yes. Can we blow up -- zoom it. Yes.
22 Questioned by the Court:
23 JUDGE KWON: It was difficult for me to find out what is what.
24 With the assistance of Mr. Usher, could you draw in coloured pen the area
25 of responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
1 A. Red is good.
2 JUDGE KWON: That's area of responsibility, irrespective of
3 actual confrontation line?
4 A. Yes. The area of responsibility of a corps extends beyond the
5 boundaries of where the enemy are located.
6 JUDGE KWON: Then we can change the colour into blue then.
7 Could you mark the -- draw a line where the ABiH held the
9 A. Yes.
10 JUDGE KWON: If you continue southern direction.
11 A. Yes, that's as far as the boundary line goes, if that makes
13 JUDGE KWON: If we can continue beyond the boundary -- beyond the
14 area of responsibility of Sarajevo-Romanija --
15 A. Yeah, sort of adopt that, yeah. Does that help?
16 JUDGE KWON: And to the northern direction?
17 A. Yeah, I'm not sure where the line -- I assume that the line
18 continues that way, but that would be a surmise.
19 JUDGE KWON: I'm a bit confused with the right -- the blue line
20 in the right part. How does it continue, out towards -- outside the
21 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps area of responsibility?
22 A. This map doesn't show. So the area, if you like, bounded by the
23 red line and inside the blue line where the Cyrillic SRK is shown is that
24 area actually occupied by the Sarajevo
25 necessarily have troops in every part of that, but that's where -- that's
1 the area of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that it covered. And this map
2 doesn't show the continuation of the lines in either direction.
3 JUDGE KWON: You have no knowledge about it?
4 A. No, I would be guessing, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Could you sign this document and today's
6 date is, I take it, the 16th of June.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance, the
8 circle drawn in here is the zone of exclusion of heavy weapons, so heavy
9 weapons within that circle were under the supervision of the UN, and if
10 the interpreter can translate that we have two exclusion areas, one
11 around Gorazde and one around Sarajevo
12 shown here.
13 JUDGE KWON: I was able to read from the title of this document
14 it's a mark of the 20-kilometre zone from the centre of Sarajevo
15 Whether or not it is the exclusion zone, do you agree with it,
16 Mr. Hayden?
17 MR. HAYDEN: Yes. This is the map post-dating the establishment
18 of the total exclusion zone.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 Thank you, Mr. Philipps. Unless there's any further questions,
21 that concludes -- that will be exhibited as Court exhibit?
22 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, that will be Exhibit C1.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 That concludes your testimony, Mr. Philipps. Thank you for your
25 coming to the Tribunal to give it, and now you're free to go.
1 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
2 [The witness withdrew]
3 JUDGE KWON: I take it, Mr. Tieger, there's no further
4 Prosecution witness for this week?
5 MR. TIEGER: That is correct, Your Honour. With the Court's
6 permission, I wanted to address two matters the Court raised yesterday,
7 and that was with respect to what the Court termed the subject of the
8 addition of the 65 ter exhibits, asking two questions about that. Number
9 one --
10 JUDGE KWON: I think we have received your filing already.
11 MR. TIEGER: But yesterday, Your Honour, you also asked about the
12 English translations --
13 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes, yes, thank you.
14 MR. TIEGER: -- I promised I would respond to that. And you also
15 asked about our position with respect to the exhibit and presumably the
16 translations too in connection with an upcoming witness. So I did want
17 to respond to both of those in addition to the submission.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 MR. TIEGER: First, with respect to the translation of that
20 proposed addition in its entirety, I did check for the most current
21 information. That projection is for the first week of July, and that's
22 the current information. We hope it turns out to be accurate, but it
23 certainly can provide the Court with a generalised indication.
24 Second, with respect to our position regarding translations in
25 connection with the upcoming witness, I would note that despite the fact
1 that the translation in its entirety is expected in the first week of
2 July, that those portions of the exhibit which relate to this particular
3 witness and to the time-period about which he's expected to give evidence
4 have been translated and disclosed. And so that -- that issue would
5 appear to have been resolved with respect to that particular witness.
6 I would also note, as the Court may have had an opportunity to
7 observe with respect to our submission today, that we were prepared to
8 identify for the Defence, to the extent we are aware, excerpts from the
9 proposed exhibit that refer to the witness or refer to meetings which the
10 witness attended. And in connection with that, I took a look at the
11 number of pages that seem to be implicated by that. I count a total of
12 approximately 21 pages. I would also note that because of the format of
13 the exhibit that the pages -- the number of words per page are far less
14 than you would normally see in a document, in a classical document like a
15 book or a report, perhaps 20 to 25 per cent, maybe a third. So it's even
16 a smaller number.
17 So while I don't want to be held to the precise number of pages,
18 I think that's a pretty fair indication of the limited amount of material
19 we're talking about with respect to that witness in particular or
20 meetings that witness attended. I thought that might be of assistance to
21 the Court.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll take that into account when
23 considering the motion.
24 As for the sitting schedule next week, we will be sitting only
25 for three days in that week?
1 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, that's correct.
2 JUDGE KWON: Albeit in one way or another in an extended format?
3 MR. TIEGER: That's my understanding.
4 JUDGE KWON: So we'll tell you how the Chamber is going to sit
5 during those three days on Monday, then that said, we'll --
6 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, one more matter, if I may, I'm
7 sorry, very quickly.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: I didn't mean to interrupt, I just thought you were
10 going to adjourn.
11 JUDGE KWON: No problem.
12 MR. TIEGER: I had indicated that we would get the list of
13 Assembly sessions to you this week. I'm sorry that for technical reasons
14 we did not. We have that ready now. I don't know how the Court wishes
15 to deal with that. Perhaps the most efficient way is for us to provide
16 those either between now and Monday or first thing Monday and then we can
17 go through the tendering process on Monday or at some convenient time.
18 But I just wanted to let the Court know that that hadn't slipped from our
19 memory and that we can submit that list at any time.
20 JUDGE KWON: I see no problem. Thank you.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: Then Monday, 9.00, we'll resume.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.24 p.m.
24 to be reconvened on Monday, the 21st day of
25 June, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.