1 Monday, 21 June 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody.
6 There's one matter to raise today before we start business today.
7 The Chamber would like to deal with the matter of the time for
8 cross-examination of John Wilson before he begins his testimony.
9 Mr. Karadzic, we noted that at the beginning of the Prosecution case that
10 we did not consider your estimate for the time you need to cross-examine
11 the upcoming Prosecution witnesses to be reasonable and that the Chamber
12 may have to consider imposing time constraints on your cross-examination.
13 Since then, we have given you considerable latitude in taking the
14 time you wanted for cross-examination. In so doing, we acknowledge that
15 you have not had previous experience in conducting cross-examination and
16 that latitude was required.
17 The Chamber has also given you advice on how to approach your
18 cross-examination, such as how to formulate your questions to witnesses,
19 to stop making comments, and to stop reading lengthy passages of
20 documents to witnesses, and it has, on multiple occasions, encouraged you
21 to move to more relevant lines of questioning and focus on the charges
22 against you.
23 As a result of finding that your estimate for the last witness,
24 Mr. Richard Philipps, was unreasonable, the Chamber decided it was
25 necessary to limit you to five hours, which proved to be certainly
1 sufficient time.
2 In light of the experience to date, the Chamber has determined
3 that it is now both necessary and justified to establish the time
4 available for your cross-examination of each witness. However, the
5 Chamber emphasises that this is for reasons of trial management and is
6 not to be regarded as a sanction.
7 In establishing the time available to you, we note that this is a
8 common practice in cases before the Tribunal and that the approach most
9 regularly applied is that of numerical equivalence between the parties.
10 However, in light of your status as a self-represented accused, and the
11 predominance of Rule 92 ter witnesses in the Prosecution's case, we will
12 instead be making our assessment based on a consideration of a number of
14 First and foremost, we will take into consideration your estimate
15 of the time you needed for the witness. The other factors we will look
16 at are: Prosecution's estimation of time for examination-in-chief, scope
17 of anticipated testimony, type of witness, which will in most instances
18 be Rule 92 ter, quantity and type of written evidence proffered for the
19 witness, number of associated exhibits tendered for witnesses, and length
20 of testimony and cross-examination in previous cases.
21 The Chamber will endeavour to inform you of the time you will
22 have for cross-examination sufficiently in advance of the witness
23 appearing before the Tribunal, which will generally be several days in
25 In setting time constraints, we remain amenable to giving you
1 additional time on a case-by-case basis if you make a reasonable request
2 for more time and the Chamber is satisfied that your cross-examination
3 has been generally effective and the evidence being elicited by you is
4 relevant to the case against you.
5 That said, following a consideration of the above-mentioned
6 factors, we've determined that you will have seven hours for
7 cross-examination of Mr. John Wilson.
8 That said, for the scheduling matter, we will sit today,
9 tomorrow, and the day after three 90-minute sessions, i.e., 9.00 to
10 10.30, 11.00 to 12.30, and 1.30 to 3.00.
11 We can bring in the witness.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
13 Before we do that, I actually have an oral motion I would like to
14 make concerning a Rule 68 violation, and this will be, I guess, our third
15 motion for disclosure violation. And it pertains to materials we just
16 received with respect to this witness, John Wilson.
17 It might be easier if I can provide to you, either by e-mail or
18 through some other means, the two documents that are in question, but on
19 the 17th of June we received two documents from the Prosecution which
20 they said were potentially Rule 68 material, but which had been withheld
21 from disclosure pursuant to Rule 70, and those two documents, in my view,
22 do constitute Rule 68 material. One document which -- they're both
23 authored by the witness. One of them is a memorandum in which he states
24 that Mladic does not always follow political directions. And in the
25 other document, which is an assessment of the different armies'
1 intentions at a certain point in time, he states that the Muslim side may
2 find it necessary to mount an offensive to obtain foreign intervention.
3 And those are two issues that we think are live issues in the case and
4 that these documents should have been disclosed to us at a more timely --
5 certainly, as soon as practicable, which is not on the eve of the
6 witness's testimony.
7 Dr. Karadzic has not had a chance to look at these documents yet
8 because of late disclosure, and so we would be asking as a remedy that he
9 be given additional time before beginning his cross-examination to deal
10 with the late disclosure of these materials.
11 So that's my submission at this time. Thank you.
12 JUDGE KWON: Can I ask you, for clarification, what do you mean
13 by "being given additional time for cross-examination"?
14 MR. ROBINSON: To commence his cross-examination -- we would like
15 some time, after the Prosecutor's direct examination has been completed,
16 before Dr. Karadzic has to commence his cross-examination, in order for
17 him to be able to review and assimilate these documents, if necessary,
18 into his cross-examination outline.
19 JUDGE KWON: Would he have difficulty in starting his
21 MR. ROBINSON: Perhaps he's better equipped.
22 JUDGE KWON: We'll consider the matter in due course.
23 Let's bring in the witness.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I say a few words?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, with respect to these
2 documents, there are a number of documents which the Prosecution is
3 interested in, and I was disclosed many documents last week which I'm
4 interested in, so I didn't have the time to look through them all.
5 Now, as far as your instructions and guide-lines go, I highly
6 appreciate all the suggestions and proposals you make, but my problem
7 with the witnesses is that I have a problem with these witnesses that are
8 bias and expand their story. They answer my question, but then add a
9 "but" and continue, so I have to challenge those additional things that
10 they state. So I'd like to ask the Trial Chamber to protect me in that
11 sense. When I'm asking for an answer, I don't want the witness to behave
12 as a Prosecutor. And there are witnesses that have even misled the
13 Prosecution, saying that they have a case against me. Donia did that,
14 too. He was fighting tooth and nail to portray the Prosecution in a good
15 light, so then I have to introduce new documents when the need arises
16 during the cross-examination and testimony of witnesses of that type.
17 So if I can count on your protection, when I say "thank you,"
18 that suffices, to protect the witness from expanding. Thank you.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, I appreciate your concerns. All
20 accused would have the same concerns. But rest assured that one of the
21 tasks of the Trial Chamber, consisting of experienced Judges, is to
22 filter out any obvious bias or prejudice. It's part of the fair trial
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 Finally, bring in the witness.
1 [The witness entered court]
2 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, General.
3 If you could take the solemn declaration, please.
4 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
5 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
6 WITNESS: JOHN WILSON
7 JUDGE KWON: Please make yourself comfortable.
8 Ms. Sutherland.
9 Examination by Ms. Sutherland:
10 Q. Good morning. Please state your full name. Good morning.
11 Please state your full name.
12 A. I am John Brian Wilson.
13 Q. And you're a retired brigadier general in the Australian Armed
15 A. Yes, I am.
16 Q. You testified previously in the Krajisnik case on the 17th and
17 18th of May, 2005, and in the Perisic case on the 3rd of November, 2008
18 is that correct?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Subsequent to that testimony, a statement was taken from you
21 which amalgamated evidence from your previous testimony and statements,
22 with some additional observations as well as references to certain
23 documents; is that right?
24 A. That's correct.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: With Your Honours' leave, I'll proceed with the
1 requirements of Rule 92 ter.
2 Q. On the 26th of March, 2009, you signed an amalgamated witness
3 statement, making handwritten corrections to paragraphs 49 and 81.
4 And if I could ask for 65 ter 22293 to be brought up on the
5 screen, please, Mr. Registrar.
6 Is that your signature at the bottom of page 1?
7 A. Yes, it is.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: And could you please go to page 2?
9 Q. Is that your initial at the bottom of the page?
10 A. Yes, it is.
11 Q. And did you initial each page?
12 A. I did.
13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Can you go to page 37, the last page, please,
14 Mr. Registrar.
15 Q. And that's your signature there under the witness acknowledgment?
16 A. Yes, it is.
17 Q. Have you had an opportunity to review the statement that you
18 signed on the 26th of March, 2009, and the exhibits referred to therein?
19 A. I have.
20 Q. Are there two corrections you wish to make?
21 A. Yes, there are.
22 Q. Is the first one a typographical error?
23 If we could go to page 18 of the statement, please.
24 Concerning the date in the first sentence of paragraph 76, the
25 "29th of May, 1995," should read "29th of May, 1992"?
1 A. That's correct.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if we could go to page 23 of the document,
3 Mr. Registrar.
4 Q. The second correction you wish to make was in relation to
5 paragraph 91. The first sentence, the words "the same day" should read
6 "the next day"?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. With these corrections, do you confirm that your amalgamated
9 statement accurately reflects your evidence and that you would provide
10 the same answers to questions if you were asked, under oath, about these
11 topics today?
12 A. I do.
13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, at this time I seek to have the
14 amalgamated witness statement 65 ter 22293 admitted into evidence.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P1029.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: With Your Honour's leave, I'll now read a brief
18 summary of the witness's evidence.
19 The witness, General John Wilson, is a retired career military
20 officer from the Australian armed forces, with 34 years of service.
21 During his career, he held numerous command positions in the Australian
22 Army. He was deployed to Vietnam
23 United Nations missions in Lebanon
24 General Wilson was seconded to the UN to serve in the former
1 February 1992, as the senior military liaison officer to the
2 United Nations Military Liaison Mission to the former Yugoslavia, he was
3 involved in negotiations regarding the deployment of UNPROFOR to the
4 former Yugoslavia
5 United Nations Military Observers, a subordinate part of the UNPROFOR
6 mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that capacity, he was involved in
7 various high-level negotiations with political and military
8 representatives of the warring factions, including negotiations to
9 evacuate JNA barracks in Sarajevo
11 negotiations to implement the no-fly zone over Bosnia. In December 1992,
12 General Wilson became the military adviser to Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen, and
13 the late ambassador -- and then later Ambassador Stoltenberg at the
14 international Conference for the former Yugoslavia, where he also served
15 as the UNPROFOR liaison officer to the conference. He remained in those
16 positions until December 1993.
17 General Wilson's written evidence describes the deployment of the
18 United Nations Military Observers in Bosnia and the work they and he
19 performed, observations relating to the shelling and sniping of civilians
20 in Sarajevo
21 about ethnic cleansing in Eastern Bosnia, descriptions of negotiations in
22 which he participated, and interactions he had with representatives of
23 the various parties engaged in the conflict, including the accused
24 Radovan Karadzic, General Ratko Mladic, Biljana Plavsic,
25 Slobodan Milosevic, and General Zivota Panic. He will discuss some of
1 these aspects in his oral testimony today.
2 General Wilson's written evidence describes complaints that
3 Lord Owen made directly to Bosnian Serb representatives during peace
4 negotiations about ethnic cleansing and military observations directed
5 against the civilian population. General Wilson recalls that
6 Dr. Karadzic's reaction was generally a restatement of the need to defend
7 the Serb people and the need for a Serb republic.
8 That concludes the brief summary of the witness's evidence.
9 Your Honour, before I proceed with examination, I seek leave to
10 add an exhibit to the Prosecution's 65 ter exhibit list. It's
11 65 ter 22854. This document is a protest letter dated the 2nd of June,
12 1992, from Sefer Halilovic, addressed to UNPROFOR, for the attention of
13 Colonel Wilson, as he then was. This document is relevant to notice and
14 crimes alleged in the Prijedor municipality. The document was identified
15 during a review of an additional ISU search relating to the witness. It
16 was disclosed to the accused as soon as it came to our attention. It was
17 disclosed on the 15th of June, 2010.
18 JUDGE KWON: Was it one of the items subject to the 18th of June
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour, it's listed as an additional
21 exhibit, the third-to-last -- the third-to-last exhibit on the 92 ter
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 Mr. Robinson.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honour. We're going to object to that.
1 We're having a lot of problems with late disclosure with respect to this
2 witness and an absence of showing why this couldn't have been disclosed
3 to us earlier. We object.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland, the Chamber is not satisfied why
6 this document could not have been disclosed to the accused earlier, and,
7 as such, we are not giving leave to this document to be added to the
8 65 ter list.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. General Wilson, you were chief of the United Nations Military
11 Observers from the 8th of March, 1992, until the 15th of November, 1992
12 Can you briefly explain for the Trial Chamber the UNMO's -- United
13 Nations Military Observers' mandate in Bosnia?
14 A. There were approximately 75 military observers when UNPROFOR was
15 first established. Their mission was to deploy to two areas within
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they were the Bihac area and the Mostar area.
17 And the reason for that was, under the Vance Plan, which is the basis for
18 UNPROFOR's deployment, there was some concern that there was growing
19 ethnic tension in those areas and there was a need to monitor what was
20 happening there; hence, the deployment of the military observers.
21 Now -- I'm sorry, if I can continue.
22 Q. Sorry.
23 A. It's important to realise at this stage that UNPROFOR, when it
24 deployed in March 1992, had no operational role and focus in Bosnia
25 whatsoever. It was deploying because of the conflict in Croatia
1 it's only with the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina that a
2 mandate emerged for UNPROFOR, and that became then the focus, really, of
3 most of UNPROFOR's operations for the next year or so or two years that I
4 was there.
5 The military observers, as part of UNPROFOR, received a number of
6 mandate enhancements during 1992, and eventually there were some 350 to
7 400 military observers as part of my group deployed mainly throughout
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but still approximately 60 in the UNPAs in Croatia
9 Q. Can you describe briefly their duties and responsibilities?
10 A. There were two types of military observers. Some were under the
11 direct command of sector commanders and some were under my direct
12 command. That defined their reporting channels. But, in essence, they
13 were there to facilitate communication between the parties, to acquire
14 information and report that back to the UN, and to lend their good
15 officers to perform any tasks that might assist the parties in resolving
16 the conflict; for example, exchanges of bodies or escorting and arranging
17 of humanitarian relief.
18 Q. At paragraph 56 of your statement -- maybe, Your Honour, can the
19 witness have a copy of his statement in front of him?
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: That's Exhibit P1029.
22 Q. You describe there your personal observations of shelling and
23 sniping within the city of Sarajevo
24 How did you have an opportunity to observe this?
25 A. I was actually living outside of the PTT building initially,
1 living in two apartments, so I was able to observe, I guess, a domestic
2 existence within UNPROFOR, certainly for the first month that I was down
3 there. In addition to that, I was residing later in the PTT and working
4 from there, and it was a building which afforded a broad observation of
5 that area of Sarajevo
6 what was happening in that part of Sarajevo
7 I have to say that in March, April, and May of 1992, Sarajevo
8 not a place that you wandered around idly out of tourist interest. It
9 was a very dangerous place, and one only travelled when it was absolutely
10 necessary. So the majority of my observations were confined to the city
11 centre and to the area around the PTT, Dobrinja, Nedarici, and perhaps
12 the airport.
13 Q. And can you give a brief description of what you observed?
14 A. Well, for the whole period I was there from the 22nd of March to
15 the 24th of June, with one short 10-day break, I observed that the city
16 was subjected to almost constant artillery fire. There was widespread
17 sniping. There was fighting going on in selected areas of the city,
18 heavy fighting. But I would say that a lot of the military activity
19 was -- a lot of the artillery fire and mortar fire was randomly
20 distributed around the city, and there were very few areas which escaped
21 at least some damage from this activity.
22 Q. I'd like to focus your attention on the latter part of
23 paragraph 56 of your statement, where it reads:
24 "On most days, for the six weeks I was in Sarajevo, artillery
25 fire was very heavy and directed virtually at the whole city, so it was
1 widespread. The attacks were intense. On some days, it would last 16
3 Are you able to comment on which force was involved in the
4 artillery fired that was directed at the whole city?
5 A. I am able to comment, and the answer is that the fire was
6 directed and produced almost exclusively by the Serb forces who were
7 investing the city. Presidency forces had very little in the way of
8 heavy armaments, so any artillery or mortar fire coming into the city was
9 virtually all initiated by the Serbs.
10 Q. Turning to paragraph -
11 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, General. What do you mean by "Presidency
13 THE WITNESS: I'm referring to the combined forces of the Muslim
14 and Croat forces who were residing within the city and who were
15 attempting to defend the city, and who were commanded by the government
16 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, led by President Izetbegovic.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 THE WITNESS: Though I must say there were also significant
19 members of Serb fighters fighting within that organisation also.
20 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND:
22 Q. Turning to paragraph 57 of your statement, you say that:
23 "I have been involved in conventional military operations as a
24 soldier, and I have never seen such weight of fire used, and particularly
25 not against civilian targets."
1 Can you describe your points of comparison?
2 A. Your Honours, as a young officer, I deployed to Vietnam for
3 12 months and fought there as an infantry officer. Certainly, in
4 comparison there and also in my later experience in Southern Lebanon,
5 when that area was occupied by Israeli forces, what I was able to observe
6 in Beirut
7 came close to the intensity of the fighting that took place in Sarajevo
8 in the six weeks or so that I was there in early 1992.
9 I have to say that the way that artillery, mortars, and other
10 heavy weapons were directed into the city impressed me as being random,
11 widespread, and inappropriate.
12 Q. To be clear, what forces were engaged in the weight of fire that
13 you've referred to?
14 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, Ms. Sutherland. Before you go on, can I
15 read that sentence again?
16 You read 57, para 57, didn't you?
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes.
18 JUDGE KWON: If I read it again:
19 "I have been involved in conventional military operations as a
20 soldier, and I had never seen such weight of fire used, and particularly
21 not against civilian targets."
22 Does that read well, General?
23 THE WITNESS: That's how it reads, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND:
1 Q. So, General, to be clear, what forces were engaged in the weight
2 of fire that you refer to in that paragraph?
3 A. The overwhelming weight of fire was produced by the Serb forces
4 investing the city.
5 Q. You mentioned in paragraph 83 of the statement that you recalled
6 the period between 14 May and late June as being one of constant daily
7 heavy bombardments, with only brief respites. Do you recall any times
8 where the Serb forces attacked -- where the Serb forces' attacks on
10 A. I remember the period from the 14th of May, three or four days,
11 in which there was heavy fighting in the vicinity of the PTT, Dobrinja,
12 Ilidza, that area that I was able to observe more closely, but also I was
13 generally aware of the noise of battle taking place in other parts of the
14 city. And then in the period of late May, there was very heavy fighting
15 taking place in the area of Grubaca [phoen], I think it's pronounced.
16 It's in the vicinity of the "Marsal Tito" Barracks. And that lasted,
17 really, until early June. And then there was a third series of heavy
18 fighting which was initiated or commenced immediately after the airport
19 agreement was signed or the day after the airport agreement was signed,
20 and that continued from the 6th of June until I left the city on the 24th
21 of June, with very little respite. The fighting was almost continuous
22 from the 14th of May until the 24th of June. There was the odd day of
23 respite. And on some occasions, there was absolute adherence to a
24 cease-fire so that something of mutual interest to the parties could take
25 place. For example, the evacuation of the Tito Barracks, the JNA forces
1 there, was affected under absolute quiet.
2 Q. General, if we could just go to the sentence that we referred to
3 in paragraph 57 that His Honour Judge Kwon drew your attention to. It's
4 perhaps the double negative.
5 Was the weight of fire used against civilian targets?
6 A. The weight of fire in Sarajevo
7 scale that I'd not experienced anywhere else in my operational
9 Q. Where was the Bosnian Serb military barracks located?
10 A. There were a number, Counsel. I'm not sure which one you're
11 referring to.
12 Q. Where did you have your meetings with General Mladic?
13 A. All my meetings with General Mladic were at the Lukavica JNA
15 Q. Was your travel in and around Sarajevo restricted in any way?
16 A. We were only -- from the 14th of May until the 24th of June, we
17 were only able to sensibly travel around the city in armoured vehicles.
18 And then on approximately 70 to 80 per cent of occasions, we would draw
19 fire from one or other of the parties. It would not be fair to accuse
20 any one party of attacking the UN. It was our belief that all parties
21 were actively engaged in the activity.
22 Q. And what, if anything, did you do about the firing on the UN
24 A. We had -- or I had arranged, very early in my stay there, after
25 the 14th of May, arranged for each of the parties to have a liaison
1 officer reside in our headquarters in the PTT to facilitate
2 communications, and we were able to use these liaison officers to protest
3 these attacks against UN forces. Also, after one particularly heavy
4 attack, I suspended UN operations for 24 hours and informed the parties
5 unless they could guarantee the safety of my forces, we would not be
6 resuming operations to assist them in their concerns. I also reported
7 formally these attacks to my superior officer, General Nambiar, who was
8 then located in Belgrade
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, can I please have 65 ter 31753 on
10 the screen.
11 Q. General, do you recognise this document?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. What is it?
14 A. It's a intercept communication between Colonel Cadjo, who was the
15 JNA liaison officer located in the PTT, and he's talking to
16 General Mladic about me travelling from the PTT to Lukavica for a meeting
17 with Mrs. Plavsic, and he's asking for safe -- my safe passage in the
18 armoured vehicles I was travelling in.
19 Q. And does he give --
20 A. He gives them assurance that we would be allowed to proceed
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, pursuant to earlier rulings in
23 relation to intercepts, I'd ask that this be marked for identification.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: MFI
1 JUDGE KWON: Did you know personally Colonel Cadjo at the time?
2 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did, Your Honour. He spent perhaps a week
3 or so residing in the PTT with us, and he was actively participating in
4 the negotiations for the withdrawal of the JNA from the barracks in
6 the JNA. I think he may have had previous UN experience himself. He was
7 quite a professional officer and tried to do the best he could.
8 JUDGE KWON: Was his name Cadjo or Cadjo.
9 THE WITNESS: C-a-d-j-o or something like that. I'm not sure,
10 Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 Ms. Sutherland.
13 MS. SUTHERLAND:
14 Q. If we can return to your statement at paragraph 73, you describe
15 a meeting between General Mladic and Mrs. Plavsic on the -- I'm sorry.
16 Before we leave this intercept, the date of the intercept in the B/C/S
17 version is the 25th of May, 1992; is that correct?
18 A. That's what it says on the Bosnian Serb translation or statement.
19 Q. Thank you. So in paragraph 73, you describe a meeting that you
20 had with General Mladic and Mrs. Plavsic on the 25th of May, 1992, where
21 General Mladic made a threat that if JNA personnel from Sarajevo barracks
22 were not evacuated within three days, General Mladic would engage the
23 city with heavy artillery fire?
24 A. Yes, that was the substance of the meeting, and I reported that
25 to my superiors in Belgrade
1 Presidency, through their liaison officer in the PTT.
2 Q. Do you recall what Mrs. Plavsic's response was?
3 A. She supported that position. She certainly didn't contradict
4 anything that General Mladic said. She was also anxious to see -- the
5 problem of the JNA being evacuated from the Sarajevo barracks, she wanted
6 to see it resolved as quickly as possible too. It seemed to me that with
7 the chief Serb military officer and a member of the Presidency passing
8 that information formally to me and asking me to relay that to other
9 parties, that it was a formal position of the Serb political leadership.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I can just correct myself, I referred to
11 paragraph 73. In fact, it's paragraph 72 and 73 of the statement.
12 Q. General, in paragraph 76, you refer to shelling by Serb
13 territorial forces on the night of the 28th of May, 1992. Do you recall
14 the shelling? And if so, can you please describe its intensity?
15 A. The shelling took place in the evening of the 28th of May, from
16 approximately at 5.00 in the evening until about 1.00 the next morning.
17 It was particularly heavy even by Sarajevo
18 It did not appear to be related to any conflict on the front-line. It
19 was in-depth and scattered around the city, although there appeared to be
20 particular emphasis on directing fire into the city centre. But even
21 around the PTT building there was a lot of artillery fire, mortar fire,
22 during that evening.
23 Q. And at the time of the shelling on the 28th, had the barracks
24 been evacuated?
25 A. No, the "Marsal Tito" Barracks were still occupied by the JNA. The
1 negotiations were not progressing very satisfactorily because
2 General Mladic was reluctant to meet Presidency demands to hand over a
3 quantity of small arms as part of the price of facilitating the release
4 of the JNA forces. He had a very firm position that that should not take
5 place, and this was, in effect, stalling the agreement to achieve the
7 Q. In paragraph 76 of your statement, you mention a meeting you
8 attended the next day, the 29th of May, 1992, with General Boskovic,
9 Colonel Cadjo, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jankovic. What did
10 General Boskovic tell you in relation to the attack the night before?
11 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
12 Before we -- before he answers that, I would like to just express
13 some concern by the way this statement is being used by this witness.
14 I think that it is not proper for the witness to be referring to his
15 written statement unless he needs to to refresh his memory, but each
16 question is directing him to the paragraph of the statement, he's then
17 looking at it and giving his answer, and I don't think that's a proper
18 way to proceed. So I think that we ought to proceed in the way in which
19 he answers the questions -- I think the reference to the statement is
20 helpful for the rest of us to follow, but he shouldn't be reviewing the
21 statement prior to giving the answer unless he needs to to refresh his
22 recollection. Thank you.
23 JUDGE KWON: General, if you can answer without referring to your
24 statement, that's possible. But if you need to, you can do so with our
1 THE WITNESS: I'll try and do that, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.
3 Let's proceed. Can you answer the question?
4 MS. SUTHERLAND:
5 Q. So what did General Boskovic tell you in relation to the attack
6 on the night of the 28th of May?
7 A. Well, that meeting was particularly notable, in that the
8 representatives from the Presidency brought to the meeting a tape of a
9 radio intercept of General Mladic directing the fire of his artillery
10 units the previous night, the night of the 28th. The tape was in
11 Serbo-Croat, so -- and I don't speak that language, so I don't know what
12 the exact contents of the tape were, other than what both parties, both
13 the Presidency and the JNA representatives, had told me. They told me
14 that it was Mladic directing fire against various parts of the city.
15 They intimated that there was no need for that sort of fire. They
16 thought that he was acting irresponsibly and that he was out of control.
17 They did not support his actions. General Boskovic apologised to me for
18 the behaviour of General Mladic and made it quite clear that the JNA did
19 not support these actions. It was quite clear to me that all members at
20 that meeting thought the shelling of the night before was quite
21 extraordinary and unacceptable.
22 Q. In paragraph 77, you mention a meeting with Mladic which occurred
23 on the following day, the 30th of May, 1992, wherein you conveyed the
24 Secretary-General's appeal to Mladic?
25 A. Yes, I had a meeting with General Mladic on that day. It was
1 part, I believe, of a multi-pronged effort to impress upon the Bosnian
2 Serbs the necessity to moderate their behaviour in regard to their
3 activity against Sarajevo
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, can I have 65 ter 09574 on the
5 screen, please.
6 THE INTERPRETER: The witness is kindly invited to sit closer to
7 the microphone.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND:
9 Q. Before that document comes up, what -- so the Secretary-General's
10 appeal to Mladic was to do what, in particular?
11 A. It was to moderate or to lessen the attacks against the city. It
12 called for restraint and was, I believe, followed up by a
13 Security Council resolution which called for an opening of the Sarajevo
14 Airport for the delivery of humanitarian supplies and demilitarisation of
15 parts of Sarajevo
16 Q. Do you recognise the document that's on the screen?
17 A. I do. It's a -- sorry.
18 JUDGE KWON: I should tell, for the record, Ms. Sutherland, it's
19 9574, the 65 ter number.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, Your Honour. That's what I thought
21 I'd said.
22 THE WITNESS: I don't think this is a document that I recognise.
23 This is not a document that I've seen before.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND:
25 Q. How did General Mladic respond when you spoke with him?
1 A. General Mladic was once again simply saying that this was simply
2 defending the Serb people, defending themselves against attack, and that
3 it was important to have the release of the JNA from the barracks. He
4 was -- as I understand it, at this meeting he was unaware or was not
5 prepared to acknowledge the fact that Mr. Karadzic may have made an
6 agreement to allow humanitarian aid to come in through a UN-controlled
7 airport in Sarajevo
8 Q. Do you know whether there was -- whether the Secretary-General
9 ever issued a press release in relation to his appeal?
10 A. No, I can't confirm that.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, can I have 65 ter 06219 on the
13 Q. General, do you recognise that document?
14 A. I do recognise it. That's the resolution I was referring to
15 which had motivated the meetings on the 30th of May.
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could go to page 2 of that document.
17 Q. If I can draw your attention to the paragraph starting:
18 "Deeply concerned that those UNPROFOR personnel remaining in
20 fire ..."
21 Is this consistent to what you had reported to your superiors?
22 A. Yes. As I indicated earlier, I had reported formally on my
23 command net to General Nambiar about the number of attacks that had been
24 directed against UN forces moving about the city, and this is a
25 reflection of the concern that he and UN New York felt about those
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1031, Your Honours.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND:
6 Q. General, I wish to turn to the topic of detention facilities
7 which is detailed in paragraphs 101 to 104 of your statement. In
8 paragraph 101, you stated that there were reports at the time that each
9 side was running their own detention camps. How did you receive this
11 A. I received that information from both parties, alleging
12 activities by the other party, and also formally in writing from the
13 Presidency, in the form of a list and a formal protest from
14 Mr. Halilovic, who was then the Presidency defence minister.
15 Q. You also state, in paragraph 101, that during the airport
16 negotiations, you raised allegations of large-scale detention of
17 civilians with Biljana Plavsic and that Radovan Karadzic was present
18 during this conversation. That's noted in paragraph 102. What
19 information did you provide to them about the allegations that you'd
21 A. I'd received an allegation from the Presidency representatives
22 that there was a tunnel somewhere to the south of Sarajevo which was
23 being used to hold a large number of non-Serb people, many of them women
24 and children, and the Presidency were concerned about the safety of these
25 people. And I had asked Mrs. Plavsic if this was true, and her response
1 was that, yes, it was, and that there were a number of detention camps,
2 but they simply held males of military age who were being taken out of
3 the -- out of circulation so they couldn't join the fighting. She said
4 that they were well treated and if I wished, I could go to the site and
5 visit that tunnel location at a later date.
6 I have to say that I followed up on that offer to go and visit
7 those people or to visit that site. However, when we were finally given
8 approval, we were told that it was some considerable distance out of
10 of our UN communications range and there was no possibility of being able
11 to assist any of my troops who were sent there, that there were plenty of
12 other activities for us to be involved in, in the end I did not send a
13 party down to visit that camp or that detention centre.
14 Q. If I can turn now to the airport negotiations.
15 In paragraph 90 of your statement, you stated that the airport
16 agreement was signed on the 5th of June, 1992. Who signed the agreement
17 for the Bosnian Serbs?
18 A. Mr. Karadzic signed.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, if I could have Rule 65 ter 08640
20 on the screen, please.
21 Q. Do you recognise this document?
22 A. I do. It's a document jointly drafted between myself and
23 Mr. Thornberry, the chief political officer of UNPROFOR.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if we can just go to the second page. And
25 the last page.
1 I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE KWON: This is the only original one? English is the
4 MS. SUTHERLAND:
5 Q. General?
6 A. Yes, it was all done in English. We had very limited interpreter
7 capability at that time.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1032, Your Honours.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND:
11 Q. And can you just explain to the Chamber, the fact that it has
12 Mr. Karadzic's signature on this document and Cedric Thornberry's
13 signature, but not the Bosnian government representative's signature, why
14 is that?
15 A. The Bosnian government's position, both in 1992 and 1993, was
16 that they would not meet directly with the Serb leadership. They
17 wouldn't be in the same room, they wouldn't sign the same document. So
18 it was necessary to use shuttle diplomacy and also to get them to sign
19 separate copies of the same document.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you. That document can be taken off the
22 Q. You have also mentioned, at corrected paragraph 91 of your
23 statement, that there was heavy shelling on the 6th of June, the day
24 after the airport agreement was signed. Can you briefly describe the
25 nature of this fighting?
1 A. The fighting was mainly concentrated around the airport,
2 Dobrinja, Nedzarici, that sort of area. It was very heavy fighting,
3 involving extensive use of artillery. By the sound of it, a lot of
4 infantry soldiers were involved. It appeared to be both sides attempting
5 to gain tactical advantage of ground which overlooked and perhaps
6 controlled the airport, now that it had been agreed that the airport
7 would pass to the control of the UN. That fighting continued more or
8 less unabated until the 24th of June, when I left the city. It was
9 General MacKenzie's position that before the airport agreement could be
10 implemented, there needed to be a period of 48 hours where the
11 cease-fire, which had been agreed by both parties, actually came into
12 effect. He was never successful in achieving that at least before the
13 24th of June.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, can I have 65 ter 10601 on the
15 screen, please.
16 Q. General Wilson, you authenticate this document, in paragraph 60
17 of your statement, as being authored by you. I'd like to direct your
18 attention to paragraph 9.
19 If we could go to the next page, please.
20 Note 9 says:
21 "Today there has been very heavy fighting in Sarajevo
22 estimates significant loss of life."
23 If we could just go back to the first page, I'm sorry, so we can
24 see the date of this document.
25 This is dated the 8th of June, 1992. So what did you mean in
1 that paragraph 9 by "significant loss of life"?
2 A. Firstly, if I can explain that this is a cable sent back to my
3 national authorities. I was required to do that on a weekly basis. It's
4 an administrative report which allows them to assess the security
5 situation there and the sensibility of leaving me there in UN service.
6 And I'm stating there that on the 8th of June, three days after the
7 airport agreement, there had been particularly heavy fighting around
9 significant loss of life.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P1033.
13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, can I have 65 ter 10603 on the
14 screen, please.
15 Q. General, again do you recognise this document?
16 A. It's another weekly sitrep dated the 23rd of June back to my
17 national authorities.
18 Q. And this is referred to in paragraph 60 of your statement.
19 If we can go to paragraph numbered 1, and this is dated the 23rd
20 of June, 1992; is that right?
21 A. It is.
22 Q. "This past week has been marked by heavy fighting in Sarajevo
23 Serb forces have continued to shell the city and, in particular, have
24 initiated a concentrated attack to capture the suburb of Dobrinja,
25 adjacent to the airport. The attack has been supported by artillery and
1 tanks. A mortar attack on a crowded old city street on the 22nd of June,
2 1992, resulted in 14 dead and 35 wounded."
3 Again, who was responsible for this concentrated attack?
4 A. You need to be more specific, counsellor. Which particular
5 attack are we talking about, the mortar attack, or are we talking about
6 the shelling of the city, or are we talking about --
7 Q. I'm sorry, in relation to the concentrated attack on the suburb
8 of Dobrinja.
9 A. That's hard to say exactly. It was my belief at the time that
10 the Serb forces were trying to clean out any Presidency forces that might
11 be in the vicinity of the airport so that they would be able to influence
12 the security and the tactical situation around the airport. However, you
13 could also say that the fighting may have been initiated by the
14 Presidency forces, who were attempting to achieve the same aim. It's
15 impossible to say who was responsible for the attack. Both of them
16 certainly participated most vigorously. But the great majority of
17 fire-power is in favour of the Serb forces.
18 Q. And do you recall now, in relation to the mortar attack on the
19 old city street, who was responsible for that attack?
20 A. This attack took place in the context of continued Serb mortar
21 fire into the city, Serb artillery fire into the city. I'm unaware of
22 whether a formal investigation was ever conducted into that unfortunate
23 incident and whether any attribution was made.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1034, Your Honours.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: And that document can be removed from the
4 Q. General, in your statement, at paragraph 43, you state that from
5 what you observed, the Presidency forces were armed only with small arms,
6 and, in paragraph 50, that the Presidency troops did not have a great
7 number of weapons. You have talked a little about it already, but can
8 you describe the disparity in terms of the calibre of weapons, the heavy
9 weapons between the Presidency forces and the Bosnian Serb forces?
10 A. The Presidency forces had only a small number of mortars, very
11 few artillery pieces, two or three tanks, to the best of my knowledge at
12 this time. The Serb forces investing the city, on the other hand, had a
13 large number of heavy weapons, many different varieties. My estimate
14 would be they had at least 200 barrels of mortars and artillery which
15 they could use against the city. We're talking about maybe a dozen heavy
16 weapons on the part of the Presidency forces, and 200 or more with the
17 Serbs, in my estimate.
18 Q. And, finally, in your professional opinion, were the Bosnian Serb
19 responses to threats posed by the BiH government forces proportionate?
20 A. They were, in my belief, disproportionate, widespread, and
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, that completes my
24 I seek to tender into evidence all of the remaining associated
25 exhibits listed in Appendix A to the Rule 92 notification.
1 JUDGE KWON: By way of example, some of them -- at least one of
2 them had been already admitted.
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour, that's the --
4 JUDGE KWON: The last item.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: The report, the analysis of the combat readiness
6 and activities of the Army of Republika Srpska in 1992. That's
7 Exhibit D325, so I don't seek to have that admitted.
8 JUDGE KWON: Are there any objections, Mr. Robinson?
9 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
10 With respect to the documents described in paragraph 79 through
11 82 of the statement, which is 65 ter 09573 and 01072, these are documents
12 that didn't involve the witness. But on paragraph 81, he commented by
13 saying that:
14 "I can state they appear to be typical UNPROFOR documents that
15 are consistent with events of that time."
16 They involve meetings at which he was not present, and we don't
17 think that those are appropriately admitted through this witness, nor do
18 they form an integral part of his evidence.
19 JUDGE KWON: But he referred to those documents in his statement,
20 didn't he?
21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, he referred to the documents in his
22 statement, but the only comment he had about them was that they appear to
23 be typical UNPROFOR documents and are consistent with the events of that
24 time. So you can take any witness and show him materials which he didn't
25 participate and had no personal knowledge, and he could say that's
1 consistent and that's a typical UNPROFOR document, but that doesn't make
2 the documents admissible, in my view.
3 In particular, he was talking about a meeting with
4 President Milosevic, where he wasn't present, and then another meeting
5 with Dr. Karadzic, where he wasn't present. And I simply don't think
6 there's a sufficient link between his testimony and knowledge and these
7 pieces of evidence that these should be admitted through his testimony.
8 JUDGE KWON: Then would you like the witness to go through those
9 two documents and then testify as to what he knows about those to
11 MR. ROBINSON: If he knows something more than what he's stated
12 in his statement, then maybe that would be useful for the Prosecution.
13 But if all he could say is there were typical UNPROFOR documents and
14 they're consistent with his opinion at the time, I don't think that's
15 relevant and doesn't add anything for the Chamber.
16 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland, do you have any observations?
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I can call the witness -- the
18 documents up and discuss them with the witness.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's do that, then.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter 09573 on the screen,
22 Q. Before that comes onto the screen: General, when you had your
23 meeting with General Mladic on the 30th of May, 1992, were you aware --
24 or was any other meeting going on with other leaders in relation to the
25 attacks on the city of Sarajevo
2 A. On the 30th of May, I was unaware of any other meetings taking
3 place on this matter. Subsequently, I became aware of them, because
4 Mr. Thornberry, when he arrived in Sarajevo on the 2nd of June, gave me
5 the background to the negotiations to which we were about to undertake
6 and the fact that there had been other meetings taking place in the past
7 few days. So in saying that I was familiar with this sort of document
8 that was shown to me by you, counsellor, I was aware of the general
9 content of them, but not the detail.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, has this -- in my view, a
11 sufficient nexus has been shown.
12 JUDGE KWON: The witness is aware of the situation, the content
13 is consistent with his knowledge, and he was aware of the document. We
14 admit it.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1035, Your Honour.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if I could have Rule 65 ter 01072 on the
18 screen, please.
19 Q. This is referred to in your statement at paragraph 80, General.
20 Are you able to give the Court any more insight into this document and
21 any knowledge that you may have had in relation to this meeting?
22 A. Can we screen down a bit more, please?
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if we could go to the next page.
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, it's a document I've previously been shown,
25 and it's -- once again, it's a report on the negotiations that
1 General Morillon was conducting. And, once again, I was briefed on the
2 general nature of these negotiations by Cedric Thornberry when he came
3 down so I could effectively participate in the negotiations for the
4 opening up of the airport.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1036, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE KWON: So that concludes your examination-in-chief,
9 Ms. Sutherland?
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: The other associated exhibit will be admitted, and
12 the Registrar, in due course, will assign the exhibit numbers and
13 circulate them to the parties.
14 Judge Morrison has a question for you, General, before
15 Mr. Karadzic starts his cross-examination.
16 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. No doubt, Dr. Karadzic may raise the same
17 question, but I just want to make sure it's answered before I forget it.
18 General, in respect of what you call the Presidency forces, you
19 said earlier in your testimony that they had maybe a dozen or so heavy
20 weapons. Were those weapons that you saw, yourself?
21 THE WITNESS: I did see some of those weapons later when they
22 were brought under observation of UNPROFOR as part of the
23 demilitarisation of the airport, but I'm really referring to my
24 observation of outgoing fire from the city which you could hear, and it
25 was very limited. You can hear the primary noise of a weapon being fired
1 out of the city, and there was very little evidence of that. I did see
2 there was a mortar position established near the PTT building one time by
3 the Presidency forces, who were using us as cover. I did see a mobile
4 mortar once. When I was visiting the Presidency, once I heard mortar
5 fire being fired out from the vicinity of there, but it was not a great
6 weight of fire, and that's why I say their capacity was very limited.
7 JUDGE MORRISON: You mention mortars. Could you assess the
8 calibre of the mortar?
9 THE WITNESS: I'm assuming they'd be 82-millimetre mortars.
10 JUDGE MORRISON: And any long-barrelled artillery?
11 THE WITNESS: I believe they had a few pieces of long-barrelled
13 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you very much.
14 JUDGE KWON: Given the time, shall we take the break now?
15 We'll have a break for half an hour.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I take it that you can start.
19 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Excuse me, Mr. President.
21 After I addressed you this morning, I uncovered yet another
22 disclosure violation of the material that Mr. Reid was kind enough to
23 send me by e-mail, and this is an October 11th, 2008, report of interview
24 with this witness that is clearly 66(A)(2) material which, by order of
25 the Trial Chamber, had to be disclosed to us by the 7th of May, 2009.
1 And we just received it -- I actually just received it this morning, but
2 it was apparently included in a CD that was given over on the 17th of
3 June to Dr. Karadzic. And so I think now we have three specific
4 violations of disclosure rules with respect to this witness. I would ask
5 that you make a ruling as to each of them and then give us some remedy.
6 Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: I was provided with the copy of that disclosure
8 batch, but could you identify what number it is, the statement?
9 MR. ROBINSON: It's included in Batch 287. There's two documents
10 in that. This is an information report. The ERN number is 0642-9017.
11 It's a three-page document dated the 11th of October, 2008.
12 JUDGE KWON: I was referring to 66(A)(2) material, the interview.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, that's what I've just -- that's exactly what
14 I've just described to you as the -- that 66(A)(2) material is in
15 Batch 287. It's an OTP information report dated the 11th of October,
16 2008, and it bears the ERN number that I've just read.
17 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, I couldn't find it. Do you have the
18 document with you?
19 MR. ROBINSON: I have it electronically. I could send it to you,
20 to Ram.
21 JUDGE KWON: Disclosure Batch 287. I was looking at Disclosure
22 Batch 289, I'm sorry.
23 MR. ROBINSON: I haven't even had a chance to look at 289 yet. I
24 note there's four items that are authored by the witness, but I haven't
25 had a chance to look at that yet. I'm now referring to this item that's
1 in batch 287.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I have a copy --
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Do you have the explanation, Ms. Sutherland?
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, I do, Your Honour.
5 It's unfortunate that this information report wasn't disclosed to
6 the accused earlier. However, the date of the information report is
7 subsequent to the information report being taken in October 2008. A
8 consolidated statement was taken from the witness in March 2009. The
9 information report that Mr. Robinson is referring to is contained on the
10 cover page of Mr. Wilson's statement, which is now P01029, and it's also
11 mentioned in paragraph 1 of that consolidated statement.
12 Paragraph 2 of his consolidated statement states that the
13 statement is a consolidation of the previous testimony and statements, as
14 well as additional observation and references. So the information that's
15 contained in the information report of October 2008 is, in fact, included
16 in another form in the consolidated statement which was taken from the
17 witness in 2009. So in my submission, the accused suffers no prejudice
18 from the non-disclosure or the late disclosure of the information report.
19 If Your Honour would like to see the information report, I have
20 it here, and a copy of the correspondence.
21 Your Honour, can I just add that we have put into train two
22 additional mechanisms, also following on from Your Honours' decision last
23 week, in order to capture any outstanding Rule 66(A)(2) materials in
24 relation to any of the forthcoming witnesses. Two separate but related
25 mechanisms have been put into place.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Sutherland.
2 Mr. Robinson and Mr. Karadzic, while we understand your concerns,
3 and the Chamber is also concerned about the late disclosure, but with
4 respect to this time, I don't think the disclosure of additional
5 documents would be such that would require the accused to postpone his
6 cross-examination at all. So the Chamber is of the opinion that the
7 accused can start his cross-examination now, and we can see, at the end
8 of his cross-examination, whether he needs additional time because of
9 this late disclosure.
10 That said, we'll start. Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning to everybody.
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
13 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning to you, General Wilson.
14 First of all, I'd like to express my gratitude to you for having
15 been so kind as to receive my dear pro bono associate,
16 Professor Kevin Heller, and to co-operate with the Defence, which
17 is certainly of assistance to us, and it is to your credit. So thank you
18 for that.
19 Now, General, sir, you were, well, as a colonel, in Sarajevo
20 during a very important time; isn't that right?
21 A. Certainly, a very interesting time, Mr. Karadzic.
22 Q. Thank you. Do you agree with me when I say that those first two
23 years, especially 1992, that that was the most intensive year in terms of
24 the number of events that took place?
25 A. Mr. Karadzic, I was only in Bosnia
1 the problem of the former Yugoslavia
2 I don't know, so I can't make that value judgement.
3 Q. Thank you. Today, you were among the first witnesses to talk
4 about the very heavy fighting and difficult fighting. Do you agree that
5 for heavy fighting to take place, you need two sides?
6 A. Yes, you do need two sides to have heavy fighting.
7 Q. Thank you. And would you also agree that apart from the forces
8 which the Muslim side had in town, that part of the 1st Corps was at
9 Mount Igman
10 A. I don't know what the 1st Corps is, Mr. Karadzic.
11 Q. Well, do you know that the Muslim forces in Sarajevo were called
12 the 1st Corps?
13 A. No, I didn't know that.
14 Q. Thank you. Now, you saw something of the weapons before they
15 came under the control of UNPROFOR, and you also saw some after UNPROFOR
16 took control. Is it possible that there were weapons which you did not
18 A. Yes, of course. The agreement -- the airport agreement was that
19 heavy weapons within range of the airport needed to be placed under
20 UNPROFOR control or observation, so it's quite possible that both parties
21 had weapons of different varieties outside range and they would not be
22 subject to the agreed regime.
23 Q. Thank you. You mentioned the fact that the Muslims in town had
24 mortars, I assume static ones, and you also mentioned having seen and
25 heard of mortars placed on trucks, flatbed trucks; is that correct? That
1 is to say, that at Serb positions and in the Serbian parts of town, they
2 opened fire from mortars placed on trucks?
3 A. In your question, you say that mortars are, by nature, static.
4 In fact, by nature, they're highly mobile. That's their great asset.
5 They can be moved quickly. So I can't say I ever saw any static mortars.
6 I did see mortars in different places and assumed they were being moved
7 about. And, yes, I did -- once a mortar mounted on the back of a truck,
8 I observed that from the PTT, I observed it fire two or three rounds, and
9 I saw the weight of fire that the Serb forces fired in response. That
10 fire was indiscriminate and disproportionate.
11 Q. Thank you. You confirmed, yourself, that the Muslim forces used
12 the presence or, rather, the installations and facilities of the
13 United Nations as a mask for opening fire; isn't that right?
14 A. That's correct. And when we raised our objections with the
15 appropriate authorities, those weapons were removed from the vicinity of
16 the PTT.
17 Q. And if I put it to you that this happened in 1993 and 1994 and
18 1995, would you accept that, that this would be repeated? They were
19 removed, but then they were positioned close to you afterwards?
20 A. I have no knowledge of what happened in 1994 or 1995, nor any
21 means of finding out. And I was well placed within the United Nations
22 reporting chain in 1993 to receive and be made aware of such reports, and
23 I have no recollection of a repeat of the Presidency forces placing
24 weaponry under the cover of the PTT building.
25 Q. Thank you. Do you know that they positioned their weapons near
1 the radar and other UN installations, and that the UN officers had to
2 protest because of that and to demand that they be moved to a distance of
3 at least 500 metres away?
4 A. No, I'm unaware of that, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have now called up on
6 e-court 1D01275, please. It's a document dated the 28th of August, 1992
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Do you know Mr. Hosen? Is he familiar to you?
9 A. No, I have no recollection of Mr. Hosen. It's got
10 "General Hosen" on the Serbian version.
11 Q. And what about General Siber; do you know him?
12 A. I have a vague recollection of Mr. Siber. Perhaps a member of
13 the Presidency forces.
14 Q. Thank you. Now, would you take a look at the contents of this
15 document in translation and tell me whether it corresponds to this
16 distance of 500 metres, or, rather, that General Hosen is demanding and
17 asking for co-operation and understanding that this be carried out? Is
18 that consistent with what you know about the positioning of those
19 artillery weapons close to your installations, artillery pieces?
20 A. The document certainly refers to the placing of weapons within
21 500 metres, but I'm unaware, sir, of this particular incident.
22 Q. And does that conform with what you know about the situation and
23 with what you said in connection with the PTT building?
24 A. Well, I already indicated to you, Mr. Karadzic, I'm unaware of
25 the situation, so I can't really comment upon it. I can simply confirm
1 that in 1992, there was an incident where the Presidency forces placed
2 a mortar position under cover of the PTT. They fired from there. When
3 we raised our objection with the relevant Presidency forces, they could
4 see that this was inappropriate action on behalf of -- on part of their
5 forces, and they effected the removal of it. We're talking about two
6 different incidents, one I have absolutely no knowledge of.
7 Q. Would you agree that Nedzarici is a purely Serb settlement?
8 A. I'm unaware of the ethnic distribution within Sarajevo.
9 Q. You lived near Nedzarici, opposite Nedzarici, in fact; is that
11 A. Yes, I did live in Nedzarici, but I didn't ask people what
12 ethnic -- of what ethnicity they were.
13 Q. But you do agree, don't you, that it was the Serbs who controlled
15 A. At what point of time are we talking about? I mean, the
16 possession of parts of Sarajevo
17 state a time-frame, I can give an opinion.
18 Q. But Nedzarici, from start -- from the beginning to the end, were
19 under Serb control, because it's a Serb settlement and it was held by the
20 inhabitants of Nedzarici, themselves. Do you agree with that?
21 A. I was unaware that it was a Serb settlement. And my
22 understanding was that the settlement of Nedzarici and, indeed, Dobrinja
23 was contested by both parties, and the confrontation line changed over
24 time in that area. It was one of the heavily contested parts of
1 Q. Thank you. Now, if we look at what it says here:
2 "Today, some three French soldiers were seriously wounded in
4 Is it reasonable to understand that somebody shot at Nedzarici,
5 as a Serb suburb, and that the French soldiers were wounded there?
6 A. Mr. Karadzic, I can't speculate what happened there because I
7 simply was not there. I have no recollection of this incident, nor am I
8 able to recall any reports about it. Perhaps it satisfies you for me to
9 say that there were many of these types of incident involving all three
10 parties during 1992 and, indeed, 1993.
11 Q. Thank you. However, you weren't in other places in town either,
12 whereas you say you know that there was shooting, and you even think that
13 they were civilians targets that were targeted. Now, do you think that
14 the Nedzarici settlement was a civilian target?
15 A. Nedzarici was -- in my belief, was a -- yeah, an urban area
16 consisting of apartment blocks where people resided and continued to
17 reside during 1992. There was fighting in the area, and both sides were
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'd like to tender this
20 document now, please.
21 JUDGE KWON: Having looked at the document, General, do you now
22 remember General Hosen?
23 THE WITNESS: No, I don't, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: We would object, Your Honour. There's no nexus
1 being shown to this document.
2 JUDGE KWON: The General didn't confirm anything about this
3 document, he's not aware of this document, so we'll not admit it.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But it says here -- well,
5 General Hosen mentions the incident. It says:
6 [In English] "Three days ago, some relation of 200 metres
7 distance from our facilities --"
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we gave our ruling, and you'll have
9 another opportunity to tender this document.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Then next time, before your ruling, I shall ask for the floor.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Now, did you know that the Muslim side used other facilities too
14 in order to make the Serb side respond, such as hospitals, for example?
15 A. You'll need to clarify the question for me, Mr. Karadzic. I'm
16 unclear as to what you mean by "used other facilities."
17 Q. Well, you confirmed yourself that during your visit to the
18 Presidency, there was fire coming from the vicinity of the Presidency
19 building; right?
20 A. Yes, that's correct.
21 Q. And if I tell you that that happened, for the most part, when
22 some high-ranking guests came to visit the Presidency to provoke a Serb
23 response, does that sound reasonable to you?
24 A. Yes, it does sound reasonable to me. And it was also very
25 successful, because it inevitably resulted in some response; heavy fire
1 from the Serb forces.
2 Q. So do you agree, and you mentioned this yourself, that the
3 mortars, placed on trucks, also provoked -- or, rather, fired at civilian
4 targets, because after the firing the truck was removed and then you
5 would have the Serb response, and it would appear that there were no
6 artillery pieces or weapons in the area when that response came?
7 A. It would not have been possible for me to know what the target of
8 outgoing Presidency mortar fire was because it was outside the city. I
9 could perhaps hear the primary sound of the round being fired, but I'd be
10 unaware of the target that it was actually hitting.
11 The second part of your question infers that it was done
12 deliberately to draw fire into civilian areas. I don't know what the
13 motive was of the Presidency forces. The reality is it did draw
14 disproportionate and widespread response from the Serb forces.
15 Q. Do you know that UNPROFOR was concerned because of the
16 positioning of Muslim artillery in the vicinity of the hospital, for
17 example, and that they protested?
18 A. Yes, I am generally aware of that.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 1D1854 called up on
20 e-court, please. I think that you've all received it. It was announced.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Would you take a look at this document now, please. It's a
23 letter from General Morillon to Mr. Izetbegovic, the president of the
24 Presidency or rump Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, the contents,
25 are they familiar to you, and does it comply with what you know about
1 shooting at sensitive targets close to?
2 May we take a look at the whole document? Could the general be
3 allowed to see the whole document? Thank you.
4 A. I have not seen this document before, and I would have no need to
5 see it in my position then in Geneva
6 some of the oral reports I received out of Sarajevo that this type of
7 activity took place from time to time. And --
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'd like to tender this
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. General, please continue.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.
12 And it does address an issue that was of concern to the UN, not
13 only in Sarajevo
14 by Presidency forces in areas prohibited under the Geneva Conventions.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Q. Now, do you remember whether you were aware of the fact -- well,
17 is this document admitted into evidence? Let me ask that first, please.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be admitted.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D328, Your Honour.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Q. Now, do you remember that you were conscious of the fact that the
22 Muslim side hoped there would be military -- international military
23 intervention, and do you agree that things like this could cause and
24 bring about a military intervention in their opinion?
25 A. I can't say what the wishes and hopes of the Presidency may have
1 been in regard to international intervention, whether it be military or
2 otherwise. Certainly, there was a -- in May and June of 1992, there was
3 a hope and a wish that the media attention that was given to the tragic
4 events in Sarajevo
5 for the Presidency.
6 Now, the issue here about placing weapons in an inappropriate
7 place or having roving mortars around the city ignores the fact that the
8 response that these provoked was entirely disproportionate. You might
9 have two rounds of mortar fire being directed out of the city, and there
10 would be 200 rounds of heavy-calibre artillery fired in response,
11 covering a large area. So it's important to understand that while
12 provocative conduct had been perhaps perpetrated by one side, the
13 response was entirely disproportionate to the threat that was engendered
14 by this activity.
15 Q. Well, the answer was a bit lengthier than I had expected, but
16 therefore the redirect is going to be shorter. So thank you, General.
17 When somebody declares war on you, is it legitimate to win?
18 A. One, of course, hopes to win, but it's legitimate to fight.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Can we have 1D1852, please.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. While we're waiting for that, tell me, General, what is the point
23 of a proportionate response? I'm not a soldier; I am -- actually, I
24 don't know anything about military institutions. But what is the point
25 of a proportionate response? Is it to keep the conflict going forever or
2 A. Proportionate response is in the context of the
4 collateral damage or civilian casualties, you have to be absolutely
5 certain that the amount of force and the type of force you're using is
6 proportionate to the threat and that it is also appropriate for those
7 particular circumstances. For example, there are other more accurate
8 means of fire that could have removed that threat of a roving mortar.
9 Anti-aircraft weapons used in a direct ground role are highly accurate,
10 and with the observation allowed to the Serb forces in the high ground
11 overlooking Sarajevo
12 weapons which are highly accurate to engage specific targets.
13 The other issue here, as a soldier, in my experience, if you are
14 going to be involved in conflict where there is a risk of collateral
15 damage or civilian casualties, then you would have with you a military
16 lawyer who is an expert in the Conventions and who would provide advice
17 to you on whether a target should be engaged and with what type of fire.
18 Whether the Serb forces took this precaution, I don't know. The evidence
19 is that they didn't.
20 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you from where you were observing these
21 incidents, this fire from the PTT building; right?
22 A. You could look out the window in some incidents. Otherwise, the
23 roof afforded quite a broad view of the terrain and the city around the
24 PTT, certainly more than a kilometre in each direction.
25 Q. How far away is the PTT building from the center of the city, if
1 we take Skenderija and the Hygiene Institute and perhaps Marin Dvor to be
2 the center?
3 A. Mr. Karadzic, I don't have a detailed knowledge of Sarajevo
4 indicated to you. I was there for some six weeks. We only ventured
5 outside the PTT on specific missions because of the security threat. I'm
6 more aware of the area around the PTT. I travelled often to the city. I
7 don't know exactly how far it is; some kilometres, certainly more than
8 you could observe from the PTT. If you're -- I simply do not have such a
9 detailed knowledge of the city that I can talk about specific suburbs.
10 Q. Thank you. Did you know what the deployment was of the Muslim
11 forces in town, itself?
12 A. No, I didn't. My belief at the time was they had such few forces
13 and, in particular, such few weapons that any military forces they had
14 would have needed to have been deployed on the confrontation line, that
15 they wouldn't have had spare forces to deploy in depth to thicken up
16 their defence. So my assumption was, other than some troops who may have
17 been resting or the odd logistic facility, all of their military forces
18 would have been deployed on the confrontation line.
19 Q. And if I tell you that only within the town itself they had two
20 or three times more soldiers than the Serbs did, would you accept that?
21 A. No, I find that hard to believe.
22 Q. All right. Do you agree that mortars and artillery were not kept
23 at the confrontation line, but further back?
24 A. By their nature, mortar and artillery are deployed in depth
25 behind the confrontation line.
1 Q. That's what you say of tanks as well; right?
2 A. Not necessarily. Tanks are a direct-fire weapon which need to
3 actually observe the target. And to fire directly, they can't fire over
4 buildings or over physical features, so they are quite often deployed
5 well forward or immediately behind the confrontation line.
6 Q. Could you please have a look at this document? At the time, you
7 were working for the conference as an adviser to the mediators; right?
8 A. In April 1993, yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down a bit? Can we
10 have a look at the lower part of paragraph 2?
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. General Mladic says:
13 [In English] "Importantly he stated during the discussions, that
14 the solution to the Serbian situation would be a political and not a
15 military one."
16 [Interpretation] Do you remember that Mladic was in favour of a
17 political solution for Srebrenica rather than a military one?
18 A. Can we scroll to the top of that document again, please?
19 When I look at this document, I can't recall that particular
20 meeting in Sarajevo
21 the UNPROFOR liaison officer in Geneva
22 information from Geneva
23 New York
25 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that we had stopped our
1 counter-offensive near Srebrenica and that that year we did not enter
2 Srebrenica at all?
3 A. I'm only vaguely aware of that, Mr. Karadzic.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 2, please, page 2
6 of this document, paragraph number 4.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Could I please ask you to read the beginning of paragraph 4?
9 A. "The force commander also believes that yesterday's --"
10 Do you want me to read aloud or --
11 "... yesterday's shelling of Srebrenica and Sarajevo
12 provoked by the Muslim forces."
13 Q. Could you please read on, if that's not a problem?
14 A. Of course:
15 "Given the apparent Muslim determination to ensure that the
16 cease-fire is not effective and to maintain Srebrenica in the world
17 headlines, it is hard to see how the force commander can successfully
18 bring the two sides together. The force commander has, at his level,
19 brought all appropriate pressure to bear on the Serb side, and has at
20 least been able to extricate a commitment for participation in military
21 talks. President Izetbegovic is apparently absent in Saudi Arabia
22 has not, therefore, been able to bring his influence to bear on his
23 military commander. The president's co-operation cannot, however, be
24 expected unless some pressure is brought to bear."
25 Q. The last sentence:
1 [In English] "The president's co-operation cannot, however, be
2 expected unless some pressure is brought to bear."
3 [Interpretation] Do you agree that this report also speaks of the
4 fact that pressure is being brought to bear only against the Serb side
5 and that nothing can be achieved if pressure is not exerted on the Muslim
6 side as well?
7 A. Mr. Karadzic, the whole point of this cable is to co-opt
8 Mr. Vance and Lord Owen into putting pressure on the Muslim side, to get
9 some agreement. That's the whole point of it, to bring pressure to bear
10 on the other party.
11 Q. Thank you. Was there any such pressure while you were in Bosnia
12 in 1992 and 1993? And while you were part of the conference, was there
13 equal pressure brought to bear against the Muslim side as well?
14 A. That's a very broad question. You'd need to be time specific.
15 My involvement in negotiating with senior political and military
16 leadership in 1992 was mainly in the period of May/June, and then
17 subsequently over Dubrovnik
18 1993 I was an observer in Geneva
19 that pressure was brought at the conference, internationally and in every
20 other way, on all three participants in the conflict in Yugoslavia
21 come to some sort of agreement. It was not just the Serbs who were being
22 pressured, but also the Croats and the Presidency of Bosnia.
23 Q. Thank you. Is this in line with what you had also noted; namely,
24 that the Muslim side is committed to ensuring that Srebrenica is in the
1 A. I'm not sure what that question means, Mr. Karadzic. Could you
2 rephrase it, please?
3 Q. Well, today you confirmed that they were interested in shooting
4 near the hospital and other facilities of yours so that they would win
5 sympathy and so that they would be on the front pages of world media.
6 Also, it says here in this document that cease-fires do not go on because
7 the Muslim side wants to be in the world headlines; right?
8 A. I don't know why the Muslim forces placed firing units near the
9 hospital or other facilities, as you allege. I can't look into their
10 motivation, whether it was to gain media attention or some tactical
11 advantage. It's impossible to sensibly comment upon that.
12 And with regard to cease-fires, I have to say that you can't
13 blame any particular side in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia for
14 breaking cease-fires. All three parties did it with gay abandon for the
15 two years that I was associated with the conflict there.
16 Q. Thank you. We'll get to that, because the United Nations
17 actually came to some different information. I'm interested in the
18 following now: Does this telegram confirm that their interest was, as
19 stated in paragraph 4, to remain in world headlines; Right?
20 A. That was the force commander's opinion, having met -- as a result
21 of that meeting, and I am simply passing that view on to the co-chairmen
22 in New York
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Can this document be admitted?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, but I was told that the previous document,
1 1D1854, which was admitted as D328, was identical to the last page of
2 Exhibit D99, so instead we'll use that number to this document. So this
3 document will be admitted as Exhibit D328 instead.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that that is not
5 correct. So far, we haven't shown Morillon's document. Oh, yes, that
6 does seem to be the case, actually. Thank you.
7 1D946, could we have that, please. I believe that there is a
8 translation of this document, so could we please have the English version
9 as well. Yes.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Could you please have a look at this document? I don't think
12 it's necessary for us to read it. This is a special combat report for
13 the 28th of July, 1993. The Command of Tactical Group Vogosca is
14 providing information to their superior commands as to what is happening.
15 Could you please cast a glance at this?
16 They say here that Miladin Cukovic, a well-known physician was
17 killed. All of Sarajevo
18 had discussed a moment ago?
19 A. I'm unaware of this incident, Mr. Karadzic.
20 Q. However, as something that had happened, as a phenomenon, does it
21 correspond to what you know had been going on?
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we do not need the speculation on the
23 part of the witness or his opinion. He said he didn't know about this
24 incident. Let's move on to your next topic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Then you're not going to admit this at all, if I understand
2 things correctly.
3 JUDGE KWON: I take it it has already been admitted. No, I was
4 confused with your numbering. You are correct.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Q. General, for starters, can we try to deal with things a bit more
7 concisely? Let us see what you could have known in Sarajevo. Could you
8 have known of certain things happening on both sides?
9 A. In July 1993, I received operational reports from UNPROFOR on
10 daily activities. I was also privy to all sensitive traffic, that's
11 message traffic, between New York
12 and most of the higher-level sensitive reporting within UNPROFOR. This
13 sort of incident would have probably been mentioned in the daily
14 operational report, but I have no recollection of it.
15 Q. That means that it would have been mentioned in the reports if
16 the reports were objective; right?
17 A. Well, there's a supposition there that the reports weren't
18 objective. The operational reports, in my view, were objective.
19 Q. Let us go back to that period, though. You came in the beginning
20 of March 1992; right?
21 A. Correct -- January 1992.
22 Q. Right, January. That's even better. Now, General, are you aware
23 of what had happened in that period of time up until the 24th of June,
24 when you left?
25 A. In what regard, Mr. Karadzic?
1 Q. For example, did you know that there was a conference on
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina that was underway?
3 A. Yes. I believe it was done under the auspices of the
4 European Union.
5 Q. That's right, that's right, it was the European Community at the
6 time. Do you know what was happening in the Neretva River Valley
7 time? Do you know that Serbs were the victims down there and that they
8 fled from the Neretva Valley
9 A. Are we talking about January 1992?
10 Q. No, no. February, March, up to April.
11 A. My understanding of the movement of ethnic communities within
13 out of Northern Bosnia. I'm unaware that any Muslim activity took place
14 in the -- you said the Neretva Valley
15 just unaware of that.
16 Q. All right. Do you know that 44.000 Serbs lived in the
17 Neretva Valley
18 A. No.
19 Q. And do you know that almost all of them were expelled and that
20 they all went to Nevesinje and other Serb areas, the so-called
21 High Herzegovina
22 A. No, I'm unaware of that.
23 Q. Do you know that before April, Serbs had fled from Livno, most of
24 the Serbs had fled from Livno?
25 A. No, I'm not.
1 Q. Do you know which armed incidents had occurred before the war
2 broke out? We're talking about Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3 A. Despite your plea for brevity, I have to now say that prior to
4 the 8th of March, 1992, the focus of my military liaison mission was on
6 aware of what was happening down in Bosnia
7 to -- or by the time I deployed to Sarajevo on the 22nd of March, it was
8 clear that there were ethnic tensions across Northern Bosnia.
9 Now, the directive that had been issued to the military
10 observers, as part of UNPROFOR, as I'd indicated earlier in my evidence,
11 was that they would deploy to the Bihac and the Mostar areas, which were
12 areas that had been noted as being particularly sensitive to -- or there
13 was potential for ethnic tension there, so I'm broadly aware that there
14 was some problems down in Mostar. And we did, in fact, during late
15 March, early April deploy observers down there for a short period, but
16 the fighting was so intense that we actually had to withdraw them after
17 only seven days or ten days, something like that. We actually had a
18 couple of our observers wounded, and they were unable to perform their
19 duties. So they were withdrawn for safety reasons.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Can we please look at 1D1308.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. And while we're waiting for it to appear on the screens: Since
24 you were in Croatia
25 that on the 3rd of March, the army moved from Croatia to Bosanski Brod,
1 killing some Serbs there?
2 A. Which army are we talking about?
3 Q. Well, I believe those were the Zengas, the National Guard Corps,
4 or other irregulars that existed in Croatia.
5 A. No, I'm unaware of that activity.
6 Q. Did you obtain your information only from your observers, and are
7 you aware only of the events that occurred in the areas that they
8 covered, or did you have other sources too?
9 A. We had a broad range of sources; media, other agencies operating
10 in the area, other elements of UNPROFOR, the local population. Each of
11 the parties would like to tell us what the other party was doing. There
12 were a broad range of sources of information available, Mr. Karadzic.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, can we please look at this document? This is a
14 letter sent by the late Professor Koljevic, who was a member of the
15 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and later on of Republika Srpska,
16 and he also became at one point the vice-president of Republika Srpska.
17 This is a letter penned by Professor Koljevic, addressed to
18 Ambassador Cutileiro. Could you please have a look at this letter?
19 Do you know that at that time, and at least from the 22nd of
20 February, we had already agreed on a declaration or a statement regarding
21 the principles for the solution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina
22 which later became what is known as the Lisbon Agreement?
23 A. No, Mr. Karadzic, I had no knowledge of the politics or events in
25 Observers' headquarters was deployed to Sarajevo, and I was not involved
1 in any of the negotiations between UNPROFOR and any of the parties until
2 the departure of UNPROFOR headquarters on about the 16th and 17th of May.
3 And I was certainly not in the information loop for whatever the
4 negotiators from the European Union may have been doing.
5 Q. But you did obtain some information. You knew where you were
6 going and you knew what was going on in that country to which you were
7 being sent; is that right?
8 A. Mr. Karadzic, it's very sad to admit, but I was not aware, nor do
9 I think the force commander, General Nambiar, was aware, nor the chief
10 political officer, Mr. Thornberry, were fully aware of what was about to
11 happen in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The focus of UNPROFOR, when it deployed to
12 the former Yugoslavia
13 observers who were deployed to Bihac and Mostar. That's the sad reality
14 of how the international community saw the situation prior to March 1992.
15 Q. But this is the 4th or the 5th of April, 1992, the 4th or the 5th
16 of April, and you can see that there are 2500 Serb refugees from Kupres,
17 and the events in Bijeljina had already happened, as had those in
18 Bosanski Brod. And Professor Koljevic is trying, in the face of all
19 those conflicts so that this is what he says:
20 "Despite the unfortunate conflicts, we would like to have some
21 peace -- to see a peaceful solution for the warring factions."
22 Do you see that? It's in the first sentence.
23 A. Yes, I can see that. And in April 1992, there was some limited
24 fighting taking place in Sarajevo
25 was ethnic cleansing taking place and that there was quite serious
1 conflict outside Sarajevo
2 UNPROFOR was concerned. UNPROFOR was suddenly having to negotiate with
3 members of the Bosnian political leadership, and I include Serb, Croats,
4 and Muslim parties in that, while the focus was meant to be on deploying
5 a force of 25.000 people to the UNPAs in Croatia. They were not in any
6 way involved in the political negotiations being run by the
7 European Union. I can't comment any more on this document --
8 Q. And do you see here that Professor Koljevic reminds -- or,
9 rather, informs Ambassador Cutileiro that the Muslim side has taken
10 measures to establish its own Territorial Defence, which has nothing to
11 do with the Yugoslav People's Army, and it was an unlegal
12 [as interpreted] move?
13 A. I'm not what you -- what you mean by an illegal move.
14 Q. Do you know that the Territorial Defence was subordinate to the
15 Yugoslav People's Army?
16 A. Yes, I do.
17 Q. Well, you see here that Professor Koljevic says that the Muslim
18 side, the Muslim side, despite the fact that there are three constituent
19 peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, you can see here in the penultimate
20 paragraph it says that they are trying to organise a nucleus of a new
21 Bosnian army while waiting for the recognition?
22 A. I can see it's written there under sub-point 3, in that
23 paragraph. Yes, I can see that.
24 Q. And do you see that Professor Koljevic is concerned that the
25 Serbs would not join the new force and that this was the situation?
1 A. I can see that Mr. Koljevic is trying to communicate that, yes.
2 But I'm not sure of the relevance of this.
3 Q. Well, the relevance is in the fact that you had come to the
4 country as a military expert, as a military observer, and these are
5 military activities, eminently so. Were you aware of those military
6 activities, and did you understand that these were, in effect,
7 preparations for a war?
8 A. Mr. Karadzic, I'll restate my evidence from earlier that
9 UNPROFOR's mandate, in March, April, and May of 1992, was in Croatia
10 that the headquarters was simply located in Sarajevo. The only people
11 who had a mission at all in Bosnia
12 not the business of the force commander to involve himself in these
13 matters. UNPROFOR did not get a mandate in Bosnia until the airport
14 agreement was effected. Prior to that, the military observers would
15 deploy people in Bihac and Mostar. What was happening in Sarajevo was
16 something that was imposed upon the force commander and his officers, and
17 they were trying to get some sort of understanding of what was happening.
18 They were unaware of the detail of what the three parties were doing,
19 whether they were raising forces or not.
20 I have said in my statement that I had received reports primarily
21 from Croatian military sources that the Serb authorities in Bosnia
22 January of 1992, were disarming the Muslims and arming the Serb elements
23 in Northern Bosnia
24 information we'd received, and that was, in part, confirmed by JNA
25 command, that this was happening. It seems to me that the only concrete
1 evidence that I have that people had been making military preparations
2 and raising military forces were the Serb side. I saw no evidence that
3 the Bosnian Presidency forces were ready for conflict in January or May
4 of 1992. I'd say clearly they were not ready. They were under armed,
5 they were disorganised. It was not until sometime late in May that I
6 actually met somebody who could call himself the minister of defence, and
7 that was Mr. Doko. They were clearly unprepared.
8 Q. Well, General, sir, does that mean that you are not here to
9 testify about anything that happened before June 1992? Does that mean
10 that your knowledge is not accurate? Well, you have testified about many
11 events here, after all.
12 A. I am testifying about events which I knew about. There are many
13 things that happened that I didn't know about. And I'm saying to you, in
14 regard to this exhibit that you have here, that I was totally unfamiliar
15 with any political negotiations which were taking place between the
16 European Union and the political parties in Bosnia.
17 Q. Thank you. And do you know that Jerko Doko became the defence
18 minister in January 1991, not in June 1992?
19 A. No, I was unaware of that.
20 Q. And do you know that the leadership of the Patriotic League
21 wanted the war against Serbs and the JNA in the summer of 1991 in order
22 to assist the Croats by doing that?
23 A. That's the first time I've heard of the Patriotic League.
24 Q. So you do not know that up until January of 1992, in 103
25 municipalities there were staffs and brigades of the Patriotic League,
1 the Muslim illegal army?
2 A. No, I was not aware of that.
3 Q. And you do not know that the Muslim forces in Sarajevo were
4 called the 1st Corps and that it consisted of three divisions, the 12th,
5 the 14th, and the 16th?
6 A. No, I didn't know that.
7 Q. And, General, do you know that there were some 15 brigades in the
8 town itself, in the town of Sarajevo
9 headquarters and their logistics bases and their artillery and tank and
10 mortar positions, and they actually constituted more than 300 legitimate
11 targets in the city of Sarajevo
12 A. No, I was unaware of the detail of that.
13 JUDGE KWON: What time-frame are we talking about, Mr. Karadzic,
14 in your last question?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Right from the beginning of the
17 JUDGE KWON: Very well. The witness has answered the question.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Q. But did you have any suspicions or any inkling of the fact that
20 the Croatian side might have been misinforming you about the acts of
21 the -- actions of the Serb side?
22 A. Mr. Karadzic, the nature of working in the former Yugoslavia
23 that one was very cautious about believing anything that anybody said to
24 you, and that you would always try and find supporting evidence for what
25 somebody had said, and that you would rarely take on face value what was
1 said to you.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What is going to be the fate of
4 this document that we have on our screens now, Your Honour?
5 JUDGE KWON: We'll not admit it.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Q. Now I would like to turn your attention to paragraph 95 of your
8 amalgamated statement, which pertains to your trip to Eastern Bosnia,
9 from Belgrade
10 En route from Belgrade
11 A. I believe so, although I don't have a detailed knowledge of the
12 geography of the area. We travelled on the most direct route from
14 went through the center of the town, I can't say.
15 Q. Yes. But here it says "Belgrade to Zagreb," which means that you
16 must have taken the motorway and you did not pass through Bijeljina?
17 A. Then that's an error that I hadn't picked up in my statement. It
18 should read "Belgrade
19 Q. Thank you. Do you see what you say here regarding Bijeljina,
20 that you saw -- perhaps we can see it on our screens, or I think all of
21 the parties have a hard copy. So it's paragraph 95. You say that you
22 saw some damage in Bijeljina. The suggestion in the report was that the
23 JNA would provide perimeter security, whilst the paramilitaries would go
24 in and commit crimes and initiate ethnic cleansing. There were also
25 reports that the paramilitaries would commit demonstration killings and
1 rapes; as examples, two villages: That they would meet --
2 [In English] "That they would meet the same fate unless they
3 left. Arkan and his men were mentioned in some of the reports."
4 [Interpretation] Is this, in your opinion, an accurate report?
5 Is this something that we should really trust? Is this based on your
6 knowledge or is this just an impression that you based on something?
7 A. On the physical observations around Bijeljina, they came from me.
8 I was physically there. I saw the war damage. I saw the militias
9 controlling movement. I saw the barracks. I saw houses which had been
10 destroyed, burnt, blown up. They're my physical observations.
11 Now, in regard to the reports, there were a large number of
12 reports coming into UNPROFOR in -- particularly in April of 1992 from the
13 ECMM, from various humanitarian agencies, from journalists who were able
14 to travel through Bosnia
15 Presidency. A broad range of reports were coming in which corroborated
16 each other in some way or other, which said that ethnic cleansing had
17 been taking place in Northern Bosnia. And the reports also suggested the
18 means by which this was achieved, and this is recorded in that paragraph.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the accused, please.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. And do you know whether the ECMM had its people there? Did they
22 have their people up there?
23 A. I don't know the detailed deployment of the ECMM. They had, my
24 understanding, people who certainly moved through that area regularly.
25 Whether they were permanently assigned there, I don't know, but we had
1 the benefit of daily exchange of information with the ECMM, and also
2 formally, on a weekly basis, I would meet with their senior management
3 for an exchange of information.
4 Q. Do you have any accurate official report about what had happened
5 in Bijeljina?
6 A. No, I don't keep reports, Mr. Karadzic, and I didn't raise
7 reports. I'm simply relating my recollection of written reports which
8 were being passed around within UNPROFOR headquarters during my time
9 there. As I said, I had a privileged position within the headquarters
10 that I had access to the most sensitive information. I was regularly
11 involved in small groups that made major decisions, and I had the
12 confidence of the force commander, so I was well informed. I'm simply
13 reporting my recollection of the type of information that was flowing
14 around UNPROFOR headquarters at that time in April 1992.
15 Q. Well, but if you were, indeed, kept well informed, and we will
16 have some use for your knowledge, but from what you say in paragraph 95,
17 I think that the only thing that we should take into account is that when
18 you were in Bijeljina, you saw some evidence of past fighting. Is that
19 right? All the rest is just impressions, things that you heard, but you
20 don't have any reports to that effect and you don't have any direct
21 knowledge of those events; is that right?
22 A. It's up to the Court, Mr. Karadzic, to take note of what they
23 wish, but I'm simply giving you the two types of information that I'm
24 recording. Paragraph 1 is actual physical observation. The other is a
25 summation of my observation of information that was flowing through the
1 headquarters. Now, I did not have a physical possession of reports, nor
2 would I expect to have them.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can we please look at 1D01247.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. General, do you understand that in matters of criminal law, we
7 cannot rely on impressions, but we can only rely on very specific
8 knowledge and evidence? Is that not so?
9 JUDGE KWON: It's not for the witness to answer the question.
10 Let's move on.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I merely wanted to explain to the
12 general why I am belabouring this point. I don't want him to take it
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. So could you please look at paragraph 3 of this document? And if
16 there's no translation, let me just tell you that this is the Command of
17 the 17th Corps, so this is still the JNA, and this is the daily
18 operational report sent to the command of the 2nd Military District in
20 It's the JNA corps from Tuzla
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: Excuse me. We have a duplicate of 65 ter 07089.
22 If we could call up the translation, please, Defence exhibit --
23 JUDGE KWON: Give the number again, please.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: 07089, D239. Yes, D239.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Could you please look at the entire document? Well, I would
4 recommend that we should all look at it, but item 3, in particular, is of
5 interest to us. It concerns the events on the 3rd of April.
6 Do you know that Korace is a Muslim village and that they
7 opened fire on the JNA?
8 A. No to both of those questions.
9 Q. Thank you. Can we please look at the next passage here. The
10 commander of the Operational Group 1 -- and can we all look at the end of
11 this passage, where it says:
12 "One of our soldiers was killed."
13 And then could you please look at paragraph 4, where it says, in
14 the second sentence:
15 "In Bijeljina, the situation is calmer a little bit, but there is
16 general chaos, anarchy, and panic in the town."
17 The exact number of those killed is unknown. The situation is
18 out of control, while parties leaders are incapable of ensuring peace and
19 preventing the anarchical behaviour of individuals and groups. Is that
20 what it says? Is this what General Jankovic says in his report?
21 A. That's what the translation says, yes.
22 Q. Now, if we go back to what you said in paragraph 95 of your
23 statement, somebody suggested to you, through their reports, that the
24 paramilitaries are working in collusion with the JNA, the JNA was
25 providing security while the paramilitaries were going in to kill and
1 rape people; is that so?
2 A. That's what I've testified, yes.
3 Q. So you still maintain what you said there, that your statement is
5 A. It is, but I don't think it should be applied to every situation
6 where there was ethnic cleansing. I'm not suggesting that this happened
7 in every village where ethnic cleansing took place. Simply, the threat
8 and the knowledge of what had happened in the area and other places is
9 enough to move people on. The report that I have noted in my evidence --
10 or the reports came from a wide variety of people, enough for me to
11 believe it to be true, so from several different sources.
12 Q. Thank you. Were any of those sources Serb?
13 A. Not to my knowledge.
14 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at the next page in the English
15 version where it says:
16 "The leaders -- the leaders of national parties are conducting
17 intensive preparations for new conflicts, weapons are being publicly
18 handed out to members of the SDA in many places. At 1500 hours on the
19 3rd of April, weapons were handed out to SDA members near the mosque in
20 the village of Ciljuge, the municipality of Zivinice
21 planned towards Bijeljina with this manpower on the 3rd and 4th of
23 Did you have any knowledge of what the other parties were doing,
24 apart from the Serbs, that is?
25 A. No, no, I didn't. I've related what I know about the activities
1 in Northern Bosnia in my evidence. I can't add to that.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we scroll down a
3 little bit, because I would like the general to look at paragraph 9,
4 forecasts offered by General Jankovic.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. So do you see here where he says:
7 "An even more difficult situation and combat activities are to be
8 expected in the coming period, especial until Bijeljina and along the
9 Bosanski Brod and Derventa line. It's possible that roadblocks will be
10 set up and that there would be provocations in the next zone."
11 JUDGE KWON: We lost the English translation. Yes, next page.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Yes, "... in the rest of the zone, including armed inter-ethnic
14 conflicts as well as attacks on the corps units."
15 Who was supposed to carry out this kind of combat activities in
16 the Bijeljina-Bosanski Brod-Derventa axis, General?
17 A. Which combat activities are we talking about, please,
18 Mr. Karadzic?
19 Q. Well, we see here that General Jankovic - I think he's
20 deceased - he is making some forecasts about what he expects to happen,
21 and he reports to his superior command that combat is expected in
22 Bijeljina and along the Bosanski Brod-Derventa axis. So who was supposed
23 to carry out those activities? Who was supposed to attack the units of
24 his corps in this area, the Bosanski Brod-Derventa axis? And there were
25 observers posted in Northern Bosnia at the time.
1 A. There were no UN observers posted there on the 3rd of April.
2 I can assure you of that, Mr. Karadzic. And I can't get inside the late
3 general's head. I don't know why he would be forecasting that. And you
4 obviously can't ask him, but I certainly can't comment on that.
5 Q. General, there were European Community monitors there, and if I
6 were to ask you now this: On the 3rd of March, the Croatian Army moved
7 into Bosanski Brod to kill Serbs. On the 26th of March, it crossed
8 and -- or, rather, on the 25th of March, it killed a father and a son
9 also crossing the river. And on the 26th of March, it went into the
10 village of Sijekovac, killing all the Serbs and all their cattle in the
11 village. If I were to tell you all that, whom does General Jankovic see
12 as the potential force that was to launch those military operations,
13 those combat activities in that area?
14 A. You would have to ask General Jankovic, if you could. I don't
15 know what he foresees.
16 Q. And if I tell you that they were the regular forces of Croatia
17 and the local Muslim paramilitaries, what would you have to say to that?
18 A. Well, I have no knowledge of the events up there, other than the
19 broad reports that there is inter-ethnic conflict going on, and the net
20 result of all that is that large numbers of Muslim refugees are being
21 produced. That's the substance of the evidence. The detail of what
22 happened in a particular village, there were, I suggest, hundreds of
23 villages at this time, Mr. Karadzic, that this sort of thing was going on
24 around the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only in -- just there in
25 Northern Bosnia
1 the 4th of April, I had left Sarajevo
3 fighting between the communities. It was widespread.
4 The particular paragraph you're referring to is are summation of
5 reports I had received about ethnic cleansing in Northern Bosnia.
6 Q. And who was cleansed at that time? At that time, who was
7 cleansed; that is to say, before April the 6th, the 10th, and so on? Who
8 was cleansed at that time? And if I put it to you that it was only the
9 Serbs who were cleansed and it was only the Serbs who were killed, what
10 would you say to that?
11 A. Well, I think the two conflicts are related, Mr. Karadzic. There
12 are a lot of Serb refugees produced by the conflict in Croatia, and they
13 had been forced into Bosnia
14 from that conflict. There were, as I say, reports that I had received
15 and been privy to suggesting that there was an orchestrated and
16 deliberate campaign to clear Muslim people out of Northern Bosnia, in
17 particular. And, of course, there's the conflict going down in Mostar at
18 that time which was primarily between the Croats and the Muslims. This
19 was quite a complex situation.
20 In paragraph 95, I'm talking about a specific area and a specific
21 time-frame, but much of that observation applies to all of Bosnia, and
22 there's no doubt that there were some Muslim refugees produced by the
23 conflict in Bosnia
24 leadership that their desire, and they said this during 1993, during the
25 negotiations in Sarajevo
1 fully integrated and could live together. They never provided any
2 evidence to me that their view was that the Serbs and the Muslims
3 couldn't live together. The political leadership was that they wished to
4 retain the political form of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if it is convenient, we'll have a
6 break now for an hour.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted,
8 because it's about Bijeljina and refers to the same things that the
9 general has been talking about?
10 JUDGE KWON: This has been already admitted through Mr. Colm --
11 I'm sorry, Mr. Colm Doyle.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D239, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break and resume at half past 1.00.
14 --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
17 MR. KARADZIC: Thank you.
18 Q. [Interpretation] General, did you know in what suburbs and
19 neighbourhoods of Sarajevo
20 were inhabited predominantly by Serbs?
21 A. No, I have no detailed knowledge of the ethnic distribution
22 within Sarajevo
23 Q. And did you know what neighbourhoods were held by Serbs?
24 A. No, because I don't know all of the suburbs.
25 Q. And do you agree, then, that it is quite difficult to say who's
1 firing on whom if you don't know who is holding what areas?
2 A. I agree it's difficult, but you can observe and you can listen.
3 You know the general area. By the weight of fire, you can -- when you
4 know the distribution of forces, you can determine who is making the
5 major effort. There are a variety of ways of determining what's
6 happening without, necessarily, close observation.
7 Q. Well, but if the shells are falling on a neighbourhood, why is it
8 then irrelevant whether this is a Serb or a Muslim neighbourhood?
9 A. I don't see the ethnic make-up of the neighbourhoods got terribly
10 much to do with it. The fact is that artillery -- heavy weapons fire is
11 being directed into an area occupied by civilians. That's the
12 significance of it, not their ethnicity.
13 Q. But are you trying to say that the Serbs would target Serb
15 A. I've already indicated I don't know which were Serb
16 neighbourhoods and which were not. I am saying that the Serbs were
17 firing heavy weapons, large quantities of it, into the urban areas of
19 Q. And how do you know those were Serbs?
20 A. Because it was a heavy weight of fire and only the Serb forces at
21 that time could produce that weight of fire.
22 Q. Are you trying to say that the Muslims did not have any Howitzers
23 in the city?
24 A. No, I'm not.
25 Q. Well, if they had Howitzers in the city, could they not have
1 opened such heavy fire, this kind of weight of fire, themselves?
2 A. No, they did not have enough barrels or weapons, if you wish, to
3 produce the weight of fire that I was able to observe.
4 Q. I can see from your statement that you toured the Serb positions.
5 Did you tour the Muslim positions too?
6 A. I'm not sure which positions we're talking about here and at what
8 Q. Well, right from the beginning, the front-lines in Sarajevo were
9 set up. Did you tour those, and were you aware of where the Muslim
10 positions were?
11 A. No, I did not tour the front-lines. I crossed the front-lines on
12 occasions, but I did not tour them. And I had a general idea of where
13 the front-lines were, and, of course, these changed from time to time
14 depending upon the fighting.
15 Q. But would you agree that it was only at Otes and at Zlatiste that
16 the front-lines shifted and that everywhere else for the most part the
17 front-lines remained the same?
18 A. No, you'll have to repeat that question, please.
19 Q. If I were to put it to you that the front-line in the city at the
20 beginning was 42 kilometres' long and that the Muslims extended it to 46
21 kilometres, so by 22 kilometres, would you agree that those lines were
22 relatively stable?
23 A. Your mathematics is out there, I think, Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Forty-six
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Yes, it's an interpretation
2 problem, not 46, but 64, 64.
3 Q. It's their data, the Muslim data. We can go into that tomorrow,
4 if you wish. So they extended the front-line by 22 kilometres. If we're
5 talking about urban warfare, would that be a relatively large expansion?
6 A. If I may return to your first question, I'm assuming you're
7 talking about in the period May/June, which is substantially when I'm
8 providing evidence on. No, I didn't know the length of the confrontation
9 line. As I'd indicated to you, I had a general idea. I'm also aware
10 that the line changed from time to time, so it is quite possible that the
11 confrontation line got longer.
12 Q. Did you cross the front-line anywhere in the city itself, in the
14 A. There were two crossing points that I was associated with. Well,
15 three. There was a movement route to Lukavica via the airport. There
16 was one which went past Nedzarici and Dobrinja. And there was a third
17 one which was opened in early -- in early June. Grabaca [phoen], I think
18 it's pronounced. Prior to that, when moving from Belgrade or Zagreb
19 entered the city from somewhere near Vogosca, I think. They were the
20 crossing points that I was familiar with.
21 Q. General, at those crossing points, how far apart were the
22 confrontation lines?
23 A. They were very close, some less than 100 metres.
24 Q. Thank you. And do you know who held the positions around the
25 hills around Sarajevo
1 A. It depends at what time -- time-frame we're talking about. But a
2 general answer is the high ground was held by the Serb forces and the
3 urban area was held by the Presidency forces.
4 Q. And if I were to tell you that there were Muslim positions on one
5 hill and Serb positions on another hill, and that that was the situation
6 right from the start until the very end, what would you say to that?
7 A. It depends which hills. But I've already indicated to you I
8 don't have a detailed knowledge of where the confrontation lines were,
9 just a broad indication, a general idea of where they were.
10 Q. Do you recall the Hum Hill? There was a major TV relay station
12 A. I'm aware of a hill which had a large TV tower on it, but I
13 didn't know what its name was.
14 Q. Do you agree that it was held by the Muslims throughout the war?
15 A. I don't know who held the hill.
16 Q. And if I were to tell you that the Hum Hill, its slopes go down
17 to the Velesice area and that there were Muslim artillery weapons
18 deployed all along that ridge, what would you say to that?
19 A. I have no knowledge of the geography of that area.
20 Q. Thank you. When you say "the Serb forces around Sarajevo
21 do you mean when you say that, when you say "the Serb forces"?
22 A. I mean forces who identified themselves as being Serb, who were
23 responsible to General Mladic, and who acknowledged the -- you as his
24 political boss.
25 Q. And do you make any distinction between those troops of the
1 Republika Srpska Army and the Yugoslav People's Army?
2 A. There was some overlap there, I understand, Mr. Karadzic. I was
3 never entirely convinced that the Yugoslav People's Army had totally
4 withdrawn from the conflict in Bosnia
5 suggest that the level of sophistication, the competence of the forces
6 deployed, the ability to sustain, logistically and in every other way,
7 quite complex operations, suggested to me that there was an organisation
8 that was supporting the Serb forces in Bosnia. There was not simply a
9 force which had emerged from local militias in the period March/April.
10 It was a highly-sophisticated military machine.
11 Q. Well, General, it is precisely because such facile opinions that
12 were put forward that sanctions were imposed on Yugoslavia in late May
13 1992. Do you know that the Yugoslav People's Army had already withdrawn
14 by the 20th of May, 1992, and that only those elements that had been
15 blocked in the barracks remained?
16 A. Mr. Karadzic, I find it very hard to believe that any general
17 would leave the field of battle and leave his troops behind in the
18 barracks without leaving some elements there to be able to support them
19 and to do something about it. I cannot believe that the leadership of
20 the JNA would leave behind young cadets and families in the barracks
21 while they scurried back to Serbia
22 any general would do that to his troops.
23 Whenever the JNA may have withdrawn their ground forces, it's my
24 firm belief it was certainly not before all the barracks were evacuated
25 sometime in early June; certainly not the 20th of May.
1 Q. Well, you said yourself that the only JNA presence had been with
2 General Boskovic, who had been in conflict with General Mladic because he
3 had brought with him 60.000 rifles to hand over to the Muslims; is that
4 not what you said, yourself?
5 A. I never said that General Boskovic was --
6 Q. 6.000, 6.000.
7 A. Yes. I never said that General Boskovic was the only JNA
8 presence. He was accompanied by other JNA officers, including the
9 commander of the JNA at one point, General Panic. I've certainly never
10 said that.
11 Q. Well, they had come in from Belgrade
12 stationed in Sarajevo
13 started to exist on the 20th of May? The decision was taken on the 12th
14 of May, but it came into existence on the 20th of May; yes or no?
15 A. No.
16 Q. And when did the Republika Srpska Army come into existence, then?
17 A. General Mladic turned up in the Sarajevo area around about the
18 20th of May, and he claimed to be the commander of the Bosnian Serb army
19 about that time. But I'm unaware of any declaration, signed documents,
20 or pronouncements about armies being raised on any particular dates. I'm
21 assuming the presence or the arrival of General Mladic in the Sarajevo
22 area marked some sort of evidence that there was then a local Serb army.
23 Q. General, sir, there are many things that you don't know, and it
24 is clear here that the Republika Srpska Army was created pursuant to a
25 decision taken by the Republika Srpska Assembly on the 12th of May, but
1 the decision was to come into effect on the day when the JNA pulled out,
2 and that is the 20th of May. So from the 1st of April until the 20th of
3 May, do you draw a distinction between the self-organised
4 Territorial Defence forces and the Yugoslav People's Army?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Thank you. General, let us look at what we wanted to do and what
7 you attributed to us.
8 Can we please look at 65 ter 30655.
9 Do you know that the conflict in Bijeljina happened on the 1st
10 and the 2nd of April?
11 A. You showed me an earlier document/report from the JNA general
12 reporting on the period about the 3rd of April. That's all I know about
13 the detail on that.
14 Q. And do you know that the conflict was initiated by the Muslim
15 extremists by throwing hand-grenades on a Serb cafe?
16 A. No, I don't.
17 Q. And do you know that quite a few Serbs were among those killed in
18 the incident?
19 A. No, I don't.
20 Q. Let's look at this document. It's a conversation between
21 Radovan Karadzic and the late Professor Koljevic on the 4th of April,
22 1992. General, did you know that Alija Izetbegovic declared a general
23 mobilisation on the 4th of April, 1992? You were there at the time.
24 A. Yes, but I couldn't put a date on such an event. But I would
25 believe that to be true.
1 Q. Could I please direct your attention to page 2 of this document.
2 We've looked at page 1, so can we now move on to page 2? Karadzic says:
3 "What's happened at the Presidency?"
4 And Professor Koljevic then goes on to recount that they were
5 demanding the mobilisation of the Territorial Defence, and, well, as you
6 can see yourself, he says -- well, Karadzic says:
7 "Did he give up after the Serb representatives opposed the
8 motion?" And Koljevic said: "No, no, it's been decided."
9 And then further down:
10 [In English] "But I told him that this is our proof the fact that
11 they are drawing the weapons first is no peaceful move."
12 [No interpretation]:
13 [In English] "Or they will stop political fights so that we can
14 fight for peace together or we shall continue the political fight."
15 [Interpretation] General, sir, do you see that the Serb members,
16 Nikola Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic, opposed the proposal that the people
17 should be mobilised, that there should be a general mobilisation?
18 A. I can see what's written in this translated document. Yes, I can
19 see that.
20 Q. You said that you were aware of the general mobilisation. Can
21 you see now that it was on the 4th of April?
22 A. No, no, I can't.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at page 1 so
24 that the general can see the date.
25 This is a conversation between myself and Professor Koljevic
1 which occurred after the Presidency session, so he's telling me what
2 happened at the Presidency session on the 4th of April. This was
3 recorded by the Muslim police. They intercepted it.
4 Can we please admit -- have this admitted into evidence? As an
6 JUDGE KWON: Did the general agree on anything in relation to the
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, he agreed -- he said that he
9 was aware that there was a general mobilisation. He didn't know the
10 date, but now he knows the date.
11 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: No objection, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. General, is it customary to recognise a country at the time when
17 it declares general mobilisation?
18 A. Mr. Karadzic, I was a soldier, not a politician or a diplomat. I
19 can't answer that.
20 Q. Thank you. But did you know at the time that the Serbs were in
21 favour of a political solution and peace and that this mobilisation had
22 been characterised as a call to war?
23 A. No, I didn't understand that to be the position.
24 Q. You did not know that at the time; is that so?
25 A. My understanding at the time, Mr. Karadzic, was that there was a
1 vote taken, and that was against the objection and boycotted by the
2 Serbs, as to whether Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain part of the former
6 of the position.
7 Q. Well, we have a problem with your understanding. Did you know
8 that we made a concession and that we recognised that there was -- that
10 essence of the Lisbon Agreement?
11 A. No, I didn't know that.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please look at
13 65 ter 30651, please. This is yet another conversation dated the 4th of
14 April between Jovan Tintor and Momcilo Krajisnik. And let me give you
15 some more information.
16 Q. Tintor was in Vogosca. Do you know where Vogosca is?
17 A. I know approximately where it is.
18 Q. It's to the north of Sarajevo
19 Mount Zuc
20 A. I don't know Mount Zuc
21 Q. Thank you. So:
22 [In English] "I hear you've been informed. Rajko has told me
23 about part -- that part. They are getting ready up there. Reportedly,
24 they are on the move already."
25 [Interpretation] And Krajisnik asks:
1 [In English] "Who is on the move?"
2 "Tintor: Well, the Muslims from Kobilja Glava."
3 [No Interpretation]
4 [In English] And then:
5 "They are on their way towards Grbavica, toward us. Zuc, and the
6 situation is intense. I think a conflict will break out up there."
7 [Interpretation] Now we have to move on the next page in the
8 English, and probably the Serbian too. In the Serbian version, it
9 says -- it's on the first page:
10 "It is my duty to notify you."
11 So could you please look at what Krajisnik is saying here:
12 [In English] "We need to try everything to calm the situation
14 [Interpretation] And then he goes on to say:
15 [In English] "That's the most important thing. Finally, the
16 people do need to organise themselves, but in no circumstances should we
17 look for trouble. It is very important to keep peace, you know."
18 [Interpretation] Do you know that Serbs really wanted to have
19 peace and that they did not favour any violent or armed solution to the
20 situation, least of all in Sarajevo
21 because they inhabited only some of the neighbourhoods of the city?
22 A. No, I didn't know that.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to have
24 this document admitted into evidence.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Did you know that a part of Vogosca is inhabited by Muslims and
2 that that's a part that the Serbs never controlled, and that included
3 Kobilja Glava, the area from which they attacked Vogosca?
4 A. No.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender that document,
7 JUDGE KWON: Speaking for myself, I have difficulty why this
8 should be admitted in relation to this witness, who said anything -- who
9 didn't say anything about this. I'll confer with my colleagues.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be allowed to say, it's
11 very important to me to hear what the witness does not know, because
12 there's some things he knows very well and that he can testify about very
13 well and other things his impression, and he gained the impression that
14 the Serbs were in favour of war and that it was the Serbs who generated
15 the crisis in Sarajevo
16 that that's not the case.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE KWON: The witness did not say a word about this intercept.
19 You'll have an opportunity to adduce this intercept into evidence, and
20 the witness's denial remains in the transcript. So we'll not admit it.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Q. Now, in paragraph 49 of your statement, you said:
23 [In English] "Targets hit by Serb forces included most of the
24 major buildings in the city. There did not appear to be any
25 restraint ..."
1 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.
2 Now, do you mean to say that the Serbs, for no reason at all,
3 shot at the large buildings and major buildings of Sarajevo, major
4 buildings, important buildings in Sarajevo?
5 A. It depends on the time-frame we're talking about, Mr. Karadzic.
6 Q. Well, let's start with the 5th of April, then.
7 A. The 5th of April, I was not in Sarajevo. I was in transit to
9 Q. Very well. Now, do you think that those buildings were not
10 legitimate targets?
11 A. I can't comment on the 5th of April, whether they were not -- I
12 was not in the city. I did not see the damage inflicted on that
13 particular date.
14 Q. Well, when did you see it? When did you see what it says there
15 in paragraph 49 of your statement?
16 A. Collectively, I saw it over a period from May -- from May 13, May
17 14, through until about September of 1993, because I continued to visit
19 other capacities and I saw the progressive damage to the city, and I
20 could see buildings that were quite clearly office buildings or
21 residential buildings that over time had sustained significant damage.
22 Q. May I help you out there? You're talking about the government
23 building at Marin Dvor; right?
24 A. Mr. Karadzic, I'm talking about the whole of Sarajevo that I was
25 able to observe, and in earlier evidence I've indicated the limit of my
1 movement around Sarajevo
2 time sustained significant damage from artillery fire. Some of it I
3 physically witnessed, I was there at the time. Other damage occurred
4 while I was not there. But by September 1993, there had been significant
5 damage done to buildings that had no apparent military value.
6 Q. Tell me, please, what do you understand when you say "major
7 buildings"? What does that mean to you?
8 A. I'm talking about a 10-, 15-storey apartment block, major
9 commercial buildings, various other government-type buildings which are
10 located in the centre of the city, including the library, the Presidency.
11 A whole range of facilities.
12 Q. And which residential building can you point to and say was
14 A. Well, there are a number of accommodation buildings in the
15 immediate vicinity of the PTT that were damaged. I saw them burning in
16 mid-May, for example.
17 Q. General, sir, we're now going to take a look at document 1D1093.
18 And while we're waiting for that to come up on our screens, let me tell
19 you that on the 4th of April -- between the 4th of April and the 5th of
20 April, in the morning, all the tall buildings in Sarajevo were taken over
21 by the Green Berets, all the roofs of the higher buildings were taken
22 over by the Green Berets, and there was shooting throughout the night,
23 and a Serb policeman was killed - his name was Petrovic, the late
24 Petrovic - while he was on duty at the police station. Did you know
25 about that?
1 A. Mr. Karadzic, I've already said in my evidence I left Sarajevo
2 the 4th of April to go to visit my military observers and the UNPAs. I
3 was gone for several days, so, no, I was unaware of what happened in
5 Q. But, General, in other situations you tell us about things you
6 heard. Did you not hear what happened on the 4th of April in the evening
7 in Sarajevo
8 A. Not that I recall.
9 Q. Well, I'm going to tell you now so that you can see how things
11 Look at this document now, please. It's an official note and
12 announcement of the police for the 4th of April, 1992, at around 2300
13 hours. It says that intensive preparations were underway by the Muslim
14 part of the former Ministry of Internal Affairs for the blocking and
15 overtaking of the Ministry of Internal Affairs building as well as the
16 Krtelji landmark in which the special unit was stationed.
17 And then a little further down, it says:
18 "In this action, the Green Berets appropriated all the weapons
19 and equipment and handed them out to Muslim citizens. At the same time,
20 the Green Berets, along with the active and reserve police formations of
21 Muslim nationality, took control of all the vital facilities in the city
22 of Sarajevo
23 the Green Beret controlled that area and occasionally entered the Public
24 Security Station," et cetera, et cetera.
25 Now, do you think that once they had taken control of those
1 facilities, they let go of them? Would that be military logic, if they
2 had taken control of these facilities, not to hold on to them throughout,
3 or is it logical that they would just leave them?
4 A. I don't know, Mr. Karadzic, whether they did seize the specific
5 facilities that you've nominated or that's contained in this document
6 here. But if you want me to comment on the sensibility of giving them
7 up, I agree that if you're starting a war or you're involved in a war,
8 and you seize an objective of some value, then you're not going to give
9 it up.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'd like to tender this
11 document into evidence now, please.
12 JUDGE KWON: I will not admit it. The general didn't confirm
13 anything about this.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I'd also note that the Prosecution
15 was not advised that this would be used. So in future, could that be
16 done, please?
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Sutherland.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the problem is that the
19 Prosecution witnesses tend to expand on the field of their testimony, and
20 that then requires me to come forward with new documents.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Anyway, General, you mentioned Dobrinja. You said that you knew
23 about Dobrinja and what was happening there; is that right?
24 A. That depends on what time-frame we're talking, Mr. Karadzic.
25 Q. Well, from the 5th of April until, let's say, the 22nd of May.
1 A. Yes, I'm broadly aware what was happening in that area in that
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we now have 1D1100
4 called up on e-court, please.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. This, once again, is an official note, and it says:
7 "By way of operative activities, on the 22nd of May, 1992, we
8 discovered that in Zikica Jovanovic Spanac Street, in Dobrinja," the
9 following numbers of the street, "that large concentrations were
10 discovered at the Green Berets, that they were located there, and that
11 two members of the Green Berets are located on each floor in order to
12 prevent the movement and communication between the residents, and that
13 three or four guards were stationed in front of each entrance ..."
14 And further down, it says:
15 "In the aforementioned street, the Green Berets are concentrating
16 strong forces. They're well armed with automatic rifles, machine-gun
17 snipers, hand grenades," and so on and so forth.
18 Now, did you know that Dobrinja was full of Green Berets?
19 A. No, I didn't.
20 Q. Do you deny it? Do you deny what it says in this document, then?
21 A. No, but your question was: Was Dobrinja full of Green Berets? I
22 would agree if you were to suggest that there were some Presidency forces
23 in there. But whether you describe it as full, I would say, no, it's not
24 full of Presidency forces, or Green Berets, as you call them.
25 Q. All right. So you agree that the Green Berets did seize Dobrinja
1 and controlled it; right?
2 A. I don't believe they controlled it. On the 14th of May, the day
3 after I arrived back in Sarajevo
4 fighting which started then and went through until early June, and I was
5 at that stage living in an area overlooking the Rainbow Hotel, which I
6 believe to be Dobrinja. And I observed the fighting that was taking
7 place in that area on the 14th, and that fighting continued through to
8 certainly the 22nd of May, to my knowledge. And I would say that the
9 Presidency forces did not dominate the area. That was a contested area,
10 and there was very heavy fighting in there, all the way through to the
11 24th of June, when I left. The detail of what happened there after the
12 24th of June, I don't know.
13 Q. And do you agree that the Serbs retained control over the airport
14 settlement linked to Dobrinja and certain sections of Dobrinja, but that
15 most of Dobrinja was controlled by the Muslim army?
16 A. I have no detailed knowledge of where the confrontation line was.
17 I would confirm my earlier statement that Dobrinja was a disputed area.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I tender this document
19 into evidence now.
20 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: No objection, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D330, Your Honours.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, do you know that I always did my best to avoid any kind
1 of dangerous situations, as far as the civilians were concerned, and any
2 suffering on the part of the civilians in Sarajevo?
3 A. No, I didn't.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we now have 30662
5 next, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. And do you consider that I did not invest any such effort, or,
8 rather, did you believe that I did not do my best to save and look after
9 the civilians? You believe the reverse? That's what I mean to ask.
10 A. Mr. Karadzic, I have two comments upon this. The first is that
11 on many occasions when the issue of the conduct of the war, the treatment
12 of civilians, et cetera, was raised with you, the way that your military
13 forces were being employed, for example, the way the city was being
14 shelled, your standard response was that you were either being provoked
15 or you were doing this for the defence of the Serb people. You didn't
16 deny the fact that these events were happening, and you didn't, on many
17 occasions, make any effort to stop that activity.
18 My second comment is that on a number of occasions, you were
19 asked to use your influence to make something happen to improve the lot
20 of civilians, and I remember a number of occasions in Geneva where you
21 were able to turn electricity on, or water supplies on, or stop a
22 military activity, so my answer is that from time to time you did
23 demonstrate a willingness and a desire to look after the welfare of the
24 civilian population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But as a general rule, your
25 response was that you were conducting operations for the defence of the
1 Serb people and the creation of the Serb republic.
2 Q. Very well, General. You must know this: What were the goals of
3 the Muslim army in Sarajevo
4 you out here. Did the Serbs have any ambitions of controlling the whole
5 of Sarajevo
6 A. I have no way of answering either of those questions. I have no
7 intimate knowledge of the strategic aims of either party or the way that
8 those aims may have been derived and agreed.
9 Q. And if I tell you that the Muslims did have ambitions to take the
10 whole of Sarajevo
12 A. I would say that the Serb -- the Bosnia Presidency position about
13 the whole of Bosnia
14 community with all ethnic communities living in harmony.
15 Q. And if I tell you, General, that it was exclusively the Muslim
16 forces that launched offensives in Sarajevo, who then was on the defence
17 and who then was on the attack? And if I put it to you that it was their
18 ambition to take control of every Serb settlement, and our intentions to
19 preserve those settlements, what would you say?
20 A. It's a very complex question, Mr. Karadzic.
21 Q. The simple question is: Who did the attacking and who defended
22 themselves? Do you know who launched the operation in Sarajevo to begin
24 A. With absolute certainty, no, I don't. But my professional
25 opinion is that both sides were responsible for launching offensive
2 Q. Well, what would the purpose be of our offensive actions? Where
3 was it that we launched an offensive action? Give me an example, if you
5 A. There's two parts to that question. I have no idea why you would
6 want to launch offensive actions. That's entirely up to the political
7 and military leadership of the Serbs. The second part is: If I should
8 give an example, then I would say the fighting around Grbavica in late
9 May was certainly an example of where the Serb forces had launched an
10 attack against the city, involved very heavy fighting over some number of
12 Q. Are you talking about Ilidza or what? What are you talking
13 about? Are you talking about the hotel at Ilidza called Toplica? Is
14 that what you mean?
15 A. No, I'm talking about Grabaca. I think it's spelled
16 G-R-A-B-A-C-A; something like that. It's in the vicinity of the
17 "Marsal Tito" barracks.
18 Q. Well, General, who lived at Grbavica and controlled it? Is it a
19 Serb settlement, under Serb control?
20 A. I've already indicated to you, Mr. Karadzic, I have no knowledge
21 of the ethnic composition of the city or distribution in the city.
22 Q. But do you know that the Serbs controlled Grbavica from the
23 beginning to the end?
24 A. I thought it was a disputed area.
25 Q. Well, it's disputed because they were attacking us. Had they not
1 been attacking us, it wouldn't have been disputed. You have to ask
2 yourself who was doing the defending and who was doing the attacking at
3 Grbavica, and throughout the war the Muslims tried to take control of
4 Grbavica. They did their best and failed until the Dayton Accords handed
5 it over to them. So are you aware that you cannot speak in generalised
6 terms and say somebody attacking somebody somewhere? We have to know
7 who's doing what and that what Mladic says and what Plavsic said, we were
8 defending Serb settlements and Serb areas, General.
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Could Mr. Karadzic put a question and not a
11 comment, please.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Well, I did ask a question, here it is: Do you know where it was
14 that we defended ourselves? If there was fighting at Grbavica, why would
15 we have attacked ourselves at Grbavica?
16 A. My understanding, Mr. Karadzic, at that time Grbavica was
17 important for the security of the "Marsal Tito" Barracks. My assessment at
18 that time was that General Mladic was trying to perhaps be able to
19 relieve the forces -- the JNA forces in the barracks without the need for
20 negotiation, and that was a Serb assault in that area to effect that.
21 That is my belief, and that's what I've said in evidence.
22 Q. Well, General Mladic was in Knin, when the borders were erected
23 and the front-lines in Sarajevo
24 in Sarajevo
1 A. I'm aware of comments at the time that barricades were erected
2 within Sarajevo
3 themselves. That was the --
4 Q. I'm not talking about the barricades in March. I'm talking about
5 the front-line that was established on the 5th of April. Do you know
6 that on the 5th of April, the local population established the front-line
7 and that it had no assistance whatsoever from the JNA?
8 A. I've already indicated to you, Mr. Karadzic, I wasn't there on
9 the 5th of April, so I don't know what happened. It was not reported to
10 me, what happened.
11 Q. And when did you go back to Sarajevo
12 A. Without referring to my notes, I don't know exactly, but I would
13 say about the 9th or 10th of April.
14 Q. On the 9th or 10th of April, when you arrived, did you find that
15 the city was divided by the confrontation lines?
16 A. I found that there was -- when I re-entered the city, that there
17 was occasional rifle fire about the area. It was reported to me by my UN
18 colleagues that there had been some fighting within the city, that there
19 was -- or there were barricades being put up, that it was very tense.
20 About this time, there was also the talk about the vote that was going on
21 about the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the former Yugoslavia
22 Q. When was the voting, General? Why wasn't it on the 28th of April
23 and 1st of March? I mean the 28th of February and the 1st of March. Was
24 the referendum on the 28th of February and the 1st of March, and were the
25 barricades erected on the 1st and 2nd of March? Now, we're talking about
1 the beginning of the war. The war broke out on the 5th or 6th of April.
2 Now, on the 10th of April did you come across a divided city, divided by
3 confrontation lines; yes or no?
4 A. Well, there are a number of questions. To the last part of your
5 question, when I returned to the city there were some parts of the city
6 that were affected by -- particularly affected by this erection of
7 barricades and some talk about an ethnic division taking place. It was
8 also very difficult at that time to -- and it was beginning to be
9 dangerous to drive around the city. The JNA were essentially confined to
10 their barracks. They couldn't really move out of there. They were
11 surrounded, barricaded in. That's what I found.
12 In regard to the -- you asked me for dates on, whether it was the
13 28th of February or the 1st of March, I already indicated in my evidence
14 that we didn't physically arrive in Bosnia until the 22nd of March, that
15 it was the 8th of March that I went to New York to receive briefings for
16 UNPROFOR. What was happening prior to the 8th of March, I was totally
17 focused on what was happening in the UNPAs in Croatia, and I had
18 absolutely no knowledge of what was happening in Bosnia at that time. So
19 I can't confirm the dates for you, Mr. Karadzic.
20 Q. General, you mentioned the voting. The voting wasn't in April;
21 it was in February. So I am interested in what you saw, not your
22 understanding of matters. I respect those, but in criminal law they
23 cannot be of assistance. So tell us, please, do you remember or did you
24 know about the settlement called Pofalici? Have you heard of Pofalici?
25 A. Vaguely.
1 Q. Do you know that it was a predominantly Serb settlement where, on
2 the 15th of May, the Muslims killed more than 200 Serbs before your very
4 A. I'm sorry, Mr. Karadzic, but nobody killed hundreds of people
5 before my very eyes at any time while I was there. It may be a figure of
6 speech, but I didn't witness that sort of behaviour.
7 Q. Well, I didn't mean you, personally. I apologise. I meant in
8 the eyes of the international community, in the presence of the
9 international community which was present in Sarajevo and receiving
10 information only from the Muslim side that was educating it and leading
11 it astray. So a dramatic event of this kind, was it noted by the
12 international community?
13 A. I've got no idea what the international community notes,
14 Mr. Karadzic, then or now.
15 Q. Did you include it in any of your reports, that there was this
16 slaughter of Serbs in Pofalici that had taken place?
17 A. The date again, please, Mr. Karadzic.
18 Q. The 15th of May. They kept attacking them, but they finished
19 them off on the 15th of May.
20 A. Well, firstly, I was unaware that that settlement was Serb, as
21 indeed I've said several times. I don't know what the ethnic
22 distribution was within Sarajevo
23 On the 15th of May, it was not within my mandate to be reporting
24 on what was happening in Sarajevo
25 force commander and the people working directly for him. My interest --
1 my responsibility on the 15th of May was two groups of military observers
2 in Bihac and Mostar and those military observers who were still in the
3 UNPAs. What was happening in Sarajevo
4 interest to me, but not of any formal responsibility, so, no, I did not
5 report that incident.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Do we have this
7 document on the screen, the one I requested? I think so. Yes.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Could I please ask you -- well, first of all, let us look at the
10 date. It's the 13th of April, a conversation between Radovan Karadzic
11 and Danilo Veselinovic. Can we please look at the very end, where
12 Veselinovic says: "We have just been running around."
13 Let me just tell you this. Veselinovic lived in Nedzarici, a
14 100 per cent Serb settlement, low-rise buildings there, one, two, three
15 stories, and it was protected by its inhabitants throughout the war,
16 defended by them. Let us look at what Mr. Veselinovic is saying:
17 [In English] "We have just been running around, and I shot a
18 sniper. He started shooting at my windows."
19 [Interpretation] There's a curse here.
20 And you can see it goes on to say, well, I ask and what was it
21 all about, and then he says, Well, from Vojnicko Polje, that's
22 the high rise buildings behind that settlement. Can we please move on to
23 the next page. They were shooting from those buildings at his windows.
24 And then Veselinovic, the third line, goes on to say:
25 [In English] "We now have this under control and are ready to
1 attack that one up there to Dobrinja."
2 [Interpretation] And here he asks if they are allowed to blow up
3 the depot and the headquarters of the Green Beret. You can see here.
4 Well, I don't have to read that. And then I inquire as to what is going
5 on there in the gym, in the sports hall, and he says that the looted
6 items are stored there, items looted from Serb apartments, and that this
7 is where they store their ammunition and weapons.
8 And then further down the page -- can we please scroll the
9 English version up a little bit. I say:
10 "It is very important that there should be no people there and
11 that no civilians should be killed."
12 And then we have to move on to the next page in the English
14 We can see here I ask:
15 "Who holds the airport, the army?"
16 And he says: "The army."
17 "And Dobrinja?"
18 And he says:
19 "Dobrinja has been cleansed now. Our people started from there,
20 they are fleeing from there."
21 So you can see that this is the situation.
22 We can now move on to the next page in English.
23 So did you know that on the 13th of April, there was such fierce
24 fighting around Nedzarici, General?
25 A. I wouldn't describe the activity at that time as fierce. I would
1 say certainly there was some shooting going on, some exchanges of fire.
2 Until I left Sarajevo
3 days, there was sporadic military activity, I would describe it as,
4 rather than intense military activity.
5 Q. Thank you. Well, and if I never boasted to you that I didn't --
6 that I cared about civilians, does that mean that I didn't care about
8 A. I note your comment in this translated document, Dr. Karadzic,
9 that you were asked to minimise casualties.
10 Q. Thank you. Do you see here I was asking whether the clinical
11 centre had also been taken, and he says: "Yes"? Do you see that part?
12 A. No, I don't.
13 Q. In the middle:
14 [In English] "They do screw us around, believe or not. That is
15 the atmosphere here. If they do not recall those snipers by tonight, if
16 they shoot people tonight, they will kill them all, believe me."
17 [Interpretation] And he is informing me that somehow the Muslims
18 should withdraw the sniper shooters. Otherwise, there's going to be a
19 conflict that will get out of control.
20 And further down, it says:
21 "They should be informed about it."
22 He is asking me to inform the Muslim side in some way to stop
23 killing the inhabitants of Nedzarici. Do you see that?
24 A. Yes, I do. I've got to say, Mr. Karadzic, that sniper fire in
25 that area was at that time was quite common. In fact, I enjoyed the
1 benefit of a sniper used to fire into my bedroom at that time, too, so
2 I'm fully familiar with what the situation was there and the fact that
3 all sides were involved in sniping. This is my belief, that the person
4 firing for my bedroom window was a Serb.
5 Q. You have no proof of that, General; right? That is what you
6 think, but you have no proof?
7 A. It's coming from -- the fire was coming from an area which the
8 local residents told me was a Serb area.
9 Q. And now all of a sudden you do know where Serbs live; right?
10 A. In that particular area, yes.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
12 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01270, could we have that,
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. You say, General, that they did not have any heavy weaponry, and
18 now we are going to see what it was that happened before the 19th of
19 April; specifically, during the night between the 18th and the 19th, and
20 the 17th and the 18th, so that is to say those nights. This is a letter
21 that is written by the commander of the military district,
22 General Kukanjac, to Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. You can see that for
23 yourself. There's no need for me to read it out. He says to him,
24 Mr. President, your Green Berets, in the course of the night between the
25 17th and 18th of April, carried out an attack on the factory in Vogosca.
1 Pretis is a military factory. It belong to the JNA; right? So you are
2 familiar with the results of that attack. They stole over 100 Golf
3 vehicles, and they stole some weaponry as well. And during the night
4 between the 18th and the 19th in Konjic, they blocked everything. All
5 telephones were cut off from military facilities. The Green Berets
6 occupied the military equipment factory Igman, and they took everything
7 that they needed. They never let that military industry get out of their
8 hands ever after that. And then also it says that the fate of
9 Major Ranko Kuljanin is unknown. It says:
10 "Mr. President, cease all attacks on military facilities; return
11 regular work to the factory; order the unblocking of military facilities,
12 Ljuta and Celebic. And if you do not do this, heavy consequences will
13 follow and you will be held responsible."
14 Can we have the next page, please? In English, it's still fine.
15 That will do:
16 "Do not forget we signed the peace agreement on the 12th of
17 April, 1992."
18 Do you remember that Ambassador Cutileiro and Mr. Vance were in
20 A. Mr. Karadzic, I don't remember an agreement being signed on the
21 12th of April. And as I indicated to you before, I had no operational
22 responsibility for what was happening in Sarajevo prior to the 13th of
24 Q. But that was in the media. It was a generally-known thing.
25 Mr. Vance was there and Ambassador Cutileiro, and a cease-fire agreement
1 was signed on the 12th of April. And do you remember that on the 12th of
2 April, after the cease-fire agreement was signed, the Muslim side issued
3 an order to blockade JNA barracks and obstruct roads and seize weapons?
4 A. No, I don't recall the peace agreement being signed on the 12th
5 of April. And I can't put a specific time-frame on the blockading of the
6 JNA, but I agree it was about that time.
7 Q. Thank you. That's what's written here:
8 "Mr. President, do not forget that we have signed a cease
9 agreement on the 12th of April, 1992, and on that very same day your
10 directive was issued declaring war on the JNA, and, of course, against
11 Serbs and other innocent citizens."
12 Also it says:
13 "Say that publicly, that you wish a war. And if you don't want a
14 war, then deny that by doing what needs to be done."
15 That was drastic, 4th of April mobilisation. And then between
16 the 4th and 5th, the Green Berets took control of Sarajevo, and then
17 there's a cease-fire on the 12th of April. And on the 12th of April,
18 there is a directive to launch a war.
19 Did you know about these crucial, important events, crucial for
20 the situation in Bosnia
21 A. No.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be
23 admitted into evidence? The general does know that the cease-fire
24 agreement was signed at the time.
25 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland?
1 THE WITNESS: Excuse me.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, General.
3 THE WITNESS: No, I don't know the cease-fire agreement was
4 signed on the 12th of April, sir.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, he hasn't spoken to anything in
6 this document that I'm aware of.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. General, do you agree that certain military facilities were taken
9 here and that obviously weapons had been taken out of there?
10 A. No, I don't know that, Mr. Karadzic.
11 JUDGE KWON: So it will not be admitted, along the same lines --
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Did you ever meet General Kukanjac, sir?
14 A. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 30714, can we have
16 that, please?
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. And in the meantime, General, do you know that out of 13
19 cease-fire violations, according to UN findings, 12 were committed by the
20 Muslim side in Sarajevo
21 A. Which 13 violations? There were thousands of violations,
22 Mr. Karadzic. Which ones are we talking about?
23 Q. The first 13 cease-fire agreements that had been signed in
25 United Nations registered that and reported about that. Were you aware
1 of that?
2 A. I'm unaware of such a report or, indeed, those statistics.
3 Q. I would like to draw your attention to this intercept of the 23rd
4 April. It is Radovan Karadzic and Radovan Pejic who are talking. Pejic
5 worked for the police then. Now, I called him, and he's answering the
6 phone, and I am asking him what the situation is like over there. And he
7 says that it is peaceful. And I repeat that, and he says:
8 [In English] "Except for the facts that we are in position
9 because there are some indications that they keep getting organised down
10 there in Grbavica."
11 [Interpretation] Next page, please, in English.
12 Further on, he says that there were attacks during the previous
14 [In English] " We are ready so that we can defend ourselves in
15 case they attack us again."
16 [Interpretation] Now, Grbavica, there is fighting around
17 Grbavica, and Karadzic says:
18 [In English] "Ah-hah, all right. We should sign the cease-fire
19 today, and therefore we should not -- we must not initiate any attack,
20 and they should not do so either."
21 [No interpretation]
22 [In English] "Mr. President, we are not leaving this position."
23 [No interpretation]
24 [In English] "Have you suffered any damage?"
25 [Interpretation] He said:
1 [In English] "Yesterday, our premises -- yesterday and the day
2 before yesterday."
3 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.
4 The last page now:
5 [In English] "We have no guarantees except for people who were
6 killed in the engagement in Ilidza."
7 [Interpretation] General, do you see that the Serbs are defending
8 themselves and they are bracing themselves for an attack?
9 A. I simply read this document. I have no understanding of the
10 background to it or the circumstances, so it's just prose to me. I can't
11 read anything into it, Mr. Karadzic.
12 Q. Thank you. This is the 23rd of April. Do you know that on the
13 22nd of April, I made an offer to stop the conflict?
14 A. No, I didn't, Mr. Karadzic.
15 Q. Thank you. You are referring to an intensive conflict that
16 started on the 14th of May. Do you know, General, that it's not that
17 that conflict came out of the blue; all of this was by way of preparation
18 for what had happened and what you had witnessed?
19 A. I can only observe what happened on the 14th of May. I was
20 unaware at the time of the causes or the justification.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be
23 JUDGE KWON: Next time. We'll not admit this intercept through
24 this witness, who confirmed nothing about it.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Do you know, General, where I was on the 14th and 15th of May?
2 A. I have no idea, Mr. Karadzic.
3 Q. Do you accept that I was with Ambassador Zimmerman, the US
4 ambassador, and that he actually wrote about that in his memoirs, in his
6 A. If you say so, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D57, could we have that, please.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. And do you know that towards the end of April, we attended
10 negotiations in Brussels
11 A. No, I don't.
12 Q. Do you know what happened in Sarajevo on the 2nd and 3rd of May?
13 A. I left Sarajevo
14 where my wife had been left behind in January, when I deployed to
16 arrived back in Sarajevo
17 happened between the 30th of April and the 13th of May.
18 Q. Had anyone told you about Dobrovoljacka, the massacre at
19 Dobrovoljacka Street, and the day before that the massacre of the
20 security detail of the military hospital?
21 A. I was aware of a firing upon the evacuation, the first JNA
22 barracks which I think you're referring to. I was certainly briefed on
23 that when I returned to Sarajevo
24 security detachment at a hospital being also killed --
25 Q. The 2nd of May, General, the security detail of the military
1 hospital went to the JNA centre to defend some young men. They were
2 killed, burned, and the commander, Lazarevic, committed suicide. You
3 didn't know about that?
4 A. This is the first I've heard of it.
5 Q. General, obviously the Muslims were informing you and they
6 omitted to tell you about this major crime of theirs. How is it possible
7 that you don't know about all of this? It wasn't that there was shooting
8 at the convoy on the 3rd of May. The column had been cut, and people
9 were killed and taken prisoner. That was only 10 days before --
10 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland, did you rise?
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Again, Your Honour, a comment, not question.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, make your question simple and direct.
13 You are prone to making lengthy comments, and you formulate your question
14 in such a lengthy way.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'd like to ask the general
16 how it is possible that he was not informed in detail about a major
17 crime, about the killing of such a large number of soldiers, after an
18 evacuation had been agreed upon.
19 THE WITNESS: I'd restate, Dr. Karadzic, that I was not there
20 during these events, and that when I returned on the 13th of May, I was
21 debriefed on what had happened and the events that flowed from that
22 unfortunate incident. Once again, I have to restate, Dr. Karadzic, that
23 my operational focus was not on Sarajevo
25 pursue these matters. These were matters that were being specifically
1 addressed by General MacKenzie, to a lesser extent General Morillon, and
2 General Nambiar and Mr. Thornberry. They were the people intimately
3 involved in this. When I was -- my first working day was the 14th of
4 May. Virtually nobody came to work that day because the fighting that
5 was going on in the city. It wasn't not until the 15th of May that I was
6 actually able to get into the PTT, because I was stuck in my apartment in
7 Dobrinja. And when the UN staff were able to return to the headquarters,
8 they did it basically to pack up and to move to Sarajevo -- move to
10 not my responsibility to be intimately involved in it. And there were
11 many other things happening at that time also.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Well, all right. But as a human being, you should have been
14 aware of that.
15 Let me ask you the following, General: Do you know what happened
16 on the 15th of May in Tuzla
17 A. No, I don't, Mr. Karadzic.
18 Q. Do you know that over there, there was also a JNA column whose
19 evacuation had been agreed upon, was totally destroyed, torched, they
20 were fired at from surrounding skyscrapers?
21 A. I do have a recollection of that, Mr. Karadzic.
22 Q. General, since you sometimes testify about things that you did
23 not see personally, I ask you sometimes about other things that have to
24 do with the Serb side and you say that you weren't there and that you
25 therefore don't know. As for Mladic's message regarding the evacuation,
1 do you see it in a different light now, knowing that on the 2nd, 3rd, and
2 15th of May, although evacuations had been agreed, soldiers of the JNA
3 had been trapped and killed?
4 A. Yes, I'm aware that that happened. That was part of my briefing
5 when I arrived back from my leave. I'm aware of that. And I thought at
6 the time it was a senseless loss of life. It was a demonstration of the
7 failure of all parties in the conflict, in my experience, who failed to
8 honour agreements. There were any number of cease-fires, Mr. Karadzic,
9 that people signed up for and agreed to and never honoured. There are
10 many declarations of support that never materialised.
11 Q. However, General, withdrawal had been agreed, and the army did
12 agree, and that is what one side did. And the other side was attacked in
13 a bloodthirsty manner. So it's not that there were mutual violations
14 coming from both sides. What could the other side do? General MacKenzie
15 supervised the withdrawal, and that's what was happening. Are you trying
16 to say that the Serb side did something wrong there?
17 A. Mr. Karadzic, I was not there at the time. I've told you that.
18 But I can tell you this: that I was responsible for the evacuation of the
19 next three barracks, and they were, with one exception, executed in a
20 very professional manner, and that there was no repetition of these
21 events partly because of the care taken by my staff and myself to make
22 sure that there were good and solid agreements.
23 The one incident, a barracks, the name I can't recall, became
24 Canadian Bear Camp, was evacuated against our specific advice. Too late
25 in the day, at twilight, they start packing up and moving. The person
1 who was leading the convoy out on the agreed route decided that he was
2 going to vary the route because he didn't trust the agreed plan, so he
3 took the convoy along another route. And, of course, they bumped into a
4 position unknown of nationality and there was an exchange of fire. There
5 was some 30 people lost through that. You might call that the fog of
6 war. But I have to say, Mr. Karadzic, that the UN did take great care in
7 trying to formulate sensible plans, and that it's in my experience in the
8 conflict that all parties violated agreements from time to time.
9 Q. Could I please ask you to have a look at this document? This is
10 the second directive to attack the JNA. The first one was earlier on,
11 and this one on the 29th of April. General, this is the basis for what
12 happened on the 2nd, 3rd, and 15th of May in Tuzla; isn't that right?
13 A. I've not seen this document before, and I don't -- [Overlapping
15 Q. However, you saw what happened on the basis of this document.
16 This is the foundation for what happened, what followed. That is what
17 happened. The 2nd and 3rd and 15th of May were inevitable, unavoidable,
18 after this kind of document was issued; right?
19 A. No, I can't agree.
20 Q. This is an aggressive document. Does this document order an
21 attack against the JNA?
22 A. My reading of this document, and in particular paragraph 3, says
23 that they are to prevent unannounced movements of people leaving
24 barracks. It doesn't say that, to attack. Military documentation is
25 usually very specific. I can't comment on people who were trained by the
1 JNA. But certainly in my military experience, it's quite specific, what
2 you're authorised to do and what you're not. There are things called the
3 rules of engagement. I don't see anything in this document that says
4 they are to be attacked. It says they are to be prevented, and there are
5 many ways of doing that without firing.
6 Q. What about number 4? Look at number 4, General:
7 "Hurriedly plan and begin combat operations in the whole
8 territory of Republic of BH
9 Territorial Defence staffs of regions, district and with the Republic of
11 Is this not an order to attack?
12 A. It's an order for combat operations in the whole of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, not necessarily JNA convoys.
14 Q. Who would be the enemy, then?
15 A. I have no idea. The drafter of this document would know that,
16 perhaps the recipient.
17 Q. Well, you could guess too, you could venture a guess.
18 Can we just have 1414, just one more document.
19 Let us see what the minister of the interior, the Muslim minister
20 of the interior, is saying to his Presidency, what they had done on the
21 basis of this directive. This is the 6th of May, the session of the
22 Muslim Presidency. There are some Croats and Serbs there who were not
23 asked anything, and -- actually, what about the other document; can it be
25 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland?
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Just a moment, Your Honour.
2 [Prosecution counsel confer]
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: No objection, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D332, Your Honours.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is it, the 6th of May, 1992
7 the session of the Presidency.
8 Can we have 271 in Serbian, and now let's see which page it is in
9 English. It could be the next page in English.
10 Now we have two pages in Serbian. It should have been the next
11 page in English.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Have a look at this. Mr. Delimustafic. Do you know the name of
14 Mr. Alija Delimustafic, the minister of the interior?
15 A. No, I don't.
16 Q. Let us see, in relation to the previous document, what
17 Delimustafic is saying in relation to that document:
18 "Both we and his ministry made mistakes. Like what Bakir did or
19 Avdo Hebib, when he ordered the war to start, people to open fire, occupy
20 the barracks. He sent the order to all centres without my knowledge. He
21 declared war. I told him to issue a statement to observe the proper
22 form. He never came to see me again, he doesn't speak to me."
23 Izetbegovic says: "Who did that?"
24 And Delimustafic says: "Avdo Hebib."
25 Izetbegovic: "What did he do?"
1 Delimustafic: "He declared war on the army."
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, Your Honour, can we know the
3 provenance -- the source of this document?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The distinguished Ms. Sutherland
5 was not here, but several times we identified this same compilation of
6 Tomo Simic, documents of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was
7 all right every time.
8 The session of the 17th of June has already been admitted into
9 evidence, and we're going to show it to the general tomorrow. This is a
10 compilation of documents of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 Tomo Simic had just collected it, compiled it, but everything is
13 Now, let's see what else he says.
14 Izetbegovic: "What did he do?"
15 Delimustafic: "He declared war on the army. Four points.
16 Signed the dispatch."
17 Izetbegovic: "In which capacity?"
18 Kljujic, Stjepan, realises that it is very dangerous. And he
20 "We have finished the recording. Don't record this."
21 Izetbegovic: "What does Avdo have --"
22 Delimustafic: "Copied it and sent to all centres in the
24 Izetbegovic: "Fine, so Avdo gave support only as a technical
1 Delimustafic: "Officially. Signed it and said: kill, steal,
2 attack barracks, item 4."
3 And Kljujic says: "Let's not talk about that now, please. We
4 can't deal with everything tonight," et cetera.
5 See, general, this Muslim minister of the interior realised that
6 war had been declared on the JNA.
7 A. I can't comment on that, Dr. Karadzic. I mean, I don't know the
8 events of what happened in April, the detail of it. I can't sensibly
9 comment on that.
10 Q. But, General, you're testifying about all sorts of other things,
11 but do you see what the basis of it all is and how the war actually
12 started, and who caused the war and led the war and declared the war? Do
13 you see that from this? If you didn't know then, do you realise that
14 now? But why didn't you know about it then?
15 A. If you're testing my English comprehension, I can read the
16 document, I think, successfully, but I can't comment on the background or
17 the accuracy of what's in there, or the likelihood of it being true.
18 JUDGE KWON: That will be it for today, Mr. Karadzic.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. All I want to do is test to see, General, whether you are able to
21 testify about the things that you are testifying about.
22 A. Well, I can't testify about this particular aspect then,
23 Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
25 It's linked to the one before, and that's the basis and groundwork for
1 all subsequent events.
2 JUDGE KWON: I will confer with my colleagues.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE KWON: We are unanimous in not admitting this.
5 We will resume tomorrow at 9.00.
6 [The witness stands down]
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.07 p.m.
8 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 22nd day of June,
9 2010, at 9.00 a.m.