1 Wednesday, 21 July 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning to you all.
7 We are sitting in a different courtroom, in the absence of
8 Judge Lattanzi and Mr. Harvey. Judge Lattanzi will not be with us today,
9 so we are sitting pursuant to 15 bis, and I take it Mr. Harvey's
10 attending another courtroom.
11 That said, let's continue, Mr. Karadzic. We'll give our ruling
12 after the first break.
13 WITNESS: HUSSEIN ABDEL-RAZEK [Resumed]
14 [Witness answered through interpreter]
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Good morning to all. Good morning, General.
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
18 Q. [Interpretation] Yesterday, General, we went through some
19 documents in relation to things that you participated in, yourself.
20 Today, we haven't really got much time, so I'd just like to deal with
21 some things very briefly; actually, certain documents concerning
22 phenomena that you are familiar with. Believe me, no objections are
23 being raised towards anyone. We simply want to paint a picture for the
24 Trial Chamber to see what we were up against and what we had to resolve
25 at the time.
1 I'd like to deal with the issue of water and power supply,
2 primarily of the city of Sarajevo
3 please. Oh, we've had that.
4 A. But there's no document on the screen.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the
7 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the number, Mr. Karadzic?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 193.
9 THE REGISTRAR: It has been admitted as Exhibit D453.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then we're not going to dwell on it
11 too long.
12 This is a government session of the 7th of August. I just wanted
13 us to see what the situation was like just before you arrived.
14 So could we please have the second page and 3. We're going to
15 see it in English as well, and 3. It's got to be the next page in
17 Can we scroll down a bit in English. Or, actually, is it the
18 page before this one? I assume it's got to be the page between this one
19 and the first one.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General --
22 JUDGE KWON: I just waited, but did the general attend that
23 government session? Is there any point of putting this document to the
24 witness? Or just you can ask the question.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, the government
1 charged its ministers with co-operating on matters that UNPROFOR was
2 interested in; Mrs. Plavsic, too.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. General, I don't really have to read all this out. It has to do
5 with power supply. It's not only a humanitarian thing; it's also a major
6 economic problem, and that is what it says here. The transmission lines
7 are down, and also since there is a war situation -- well, actually,
8 we're still dealing with this "AD-3," and it says:
9 [In English] "... the task ..."
10 [Interpretation] So the government had assigned that task to work
11 on these particular matters.
12 Can we have the next page in English and in Serbian.
13 General, I'd just like to show that when you arrived, those
14 problems were already there, and efforts were being made to overcome the
15 situation as it was.
16 AD-8, please, could we see that now. I'm sorry, it was somewhere
18 "The government asked the ministries to make sure that the
19 resources it has are not used as means of war, except that we will be
20 compelled to do that if the enemy side continues to behave the way they
21 have been behaving so far."
22 So this has been admitted.
23 Do you know, General, that Biljana Plavsic managed to get
24 constant support from the government, from the Ministries of Energy and
25 Water Management in order to keep her promise to you? I mean what she
1 promised to the United Nations. When I say "promised you," I mean, it's
2 not you, personally, it's the UN.
3 A. Sorry, when you talk about the government, what government do you
4 mean? Do you mean the Bosnian government or the Serbian leadership
6 Q. General, we, the Serbs in Bosnia, had an assembly and the
7 Presidency, and we had a government as the executive. Since Mrs. Plavsic
8 committed herself to various things when she had discussions with the UN,
9 then she presented that to the government, and then the Serb
10 government -- not the Presidency, not the Assembly. The Serb government,
11 that's a separate organ. She then -- well, she made an effort to carry
12 out everything that she had committed herself to. Do you know that?
13 A. I know for sure, as you mentioned, Mr. Karadzic, that when we
14 first started or work, the power was down, there was no -- there were no
15 water supplies and no services, and I know that those services are humane
16 in nature. I know that there were so many casualties receiving treatment
17 at the hospitals, and I -- and hospitals needed power supply urgently. I
18 personally -- along with my staff members, I said that we should try to
19 appease things, try to do some humanitarian work in order to restore
20 water and power. So we agreed, after long talks with both sides,
21 Mr. Ganic, Mrs. Plavsic, and the concerned ministers, we all agreed to
22 provide -- to set up what we call working group where technicians and
23 engineers could sit on, those who are experienced in restoring water
24 supplies and power supplies in the city. The working group met once at
25 the airport, and we were able, thanks to our co-ordination with this
1 group, with the members of the group - I'm talking about the technicians
2 and the engineers - we were able to restore the power supply, but only
3 for a day or a day and a half.
4 And I remember that we did celebrate the occasion at the
5 United Nations. We were extremely happy for the event. However, there
6 were some reparations in the area next to Litra [phoen], but that area
7 came under fire, the group came under fire, and they had to withdraw and
8 rush to the PTT building. They told me that they came under fire and the
9 area came under fire and there was a power failure once again.
10 So in terms of principle, yes, negotiations were fruitful and, as
11 I said, that we always came up with very hopeful -- with results that
12 provided grounds for hope. However, things were -- to me, were different
13 in the field. I know that I was met with understanding and with
14 co-operation from the officials at both sides, the Serbian side and the
15 Bosnian side. And as I said, the problem lies with the lower-rank
16 leaders or officials.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, General.
18 Since this has been admitted, could I now have 65 ter 202.
19 Actually, I just took an example of a government session prior to
20 your arrival, a session dealing with that, whereas this document is from
21 the 10th of October.
22 Could we have page 9 as soon as we actually get the document.
23 65 ter 202. Then AD-41, please.
24 JUDGE KWON: The document we are seeing is the 52nd session on
25 22nd of September. I think you got the number wrong.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 26th of September, the 52nd
2 session. Yes, 22.
3 Now this seems to be something different. Actually, 202, is that
4 it? 65 ter 202, that should be it. However, that's not what it says
5 here. We need 65 ter 202.
6 JUDGE KWON: This is it. Why don't we show the first page to the
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please identify the first
9 page. Oh, this is the 45th session. In Serbian, it's fine, but it's
10 wrong in English. In Serbian, it says --
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, 26th of September.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But on the other side we have the
13 8th of August, and we've dealt with that already. It's already been
14 admitted. Right now, we have the right page in English.
15 JUDGE KWON: But I remember you said "10th of October." Is this
16 the right document, Mr. Karadzic? Then move on.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, we have the right
18 document. Actually, it was written down -- the minutes were compiled on
19 the 10th of October, but see up here, the date, "Pale," the 10th.
20 Could we please have AD-41; page 9 in Serbian. Sorry, 42, 42.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. I would like to draw your attention, General, to 42. I'm also
23 drawing it to the attention of all the participants. However, the
24 English page will have to be changed in the meantime:
25 "The government described the drinking water supplies problem in
1 the municipalities of the Sarajevo
2 saying that measures should be taken to resolve the problem, especially
3 before the coming raining season:
4 "It has been concluded that resources should be provided for the
5 disinfection of reservoirs and the waterworks, particularly in relation
6 to the region of Igman."
7 As you know, Igman was under Muslim control at the time, but as
8 far as the water is concerned, the government is looking at the city as a
9 whole; isn't that right?
10 A. Yes, yes. When we were talking about restoring water and power
11 supplies, we were talking about the entire city and not about -- and the
12 entire region, Sarajevo
14 Q. Thank you. Yes, yes, you're right, the region of Sarajevo
15 also says that:
16 "It was concluded that the Main Staff of the Army of
17 Republika Srpska should be informed about this so that the army could
18 plan its military operations, while bearing in mind the problems
19 presented in the documents."
20 So this is from the government session.
21 Before your stay and as soon as you arrived, great attention was
22 paid to water supplies, not only for the Serb-held areas, but the general
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, unless it is objected to.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE KWON: That --
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D512, Your Honours.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Could I now please have 65 ter 204.
6 65 ter 204, this is a government session held on the 2nd of
7 October, so it's from the 2nd of October and the other one was the 26th
8 of September.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The microphone was off.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] AD-19. In Serbian, it's page 5,
11 and in English, it's either 5 or 6.
12 So when we see paragraph 19, we will realise -- I'll read it
13 again before we get the English:
14 "The government took note of the Information," with a capital I,
15 so I guess it's some kind of a document, "on supplying municipal centres
16 in Republika Srpska with drinking water, as well as prospects of
17 providing water to critical areas, with special attention being paid to
18 the region of Sarajevo
19 So it's basically at the very next session. Actually, that was
20 the 52nd session, and this is the 54th session.
21 The government assigned this to someone, and this someone
22 provided this document, acted upon it.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. So you see that the government is dealing with the issue of water
25 and electricity at each and every one of the sessions, and there is no
1 distinction made between the Serb-held areas and the Muslim-held areas?
2 JUDGE KWON: I take it -- I have to note that it was translated
3 in the English version as point reference 18. Can you confirm that?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Nineteen is missing in the English
6 JUDGE KWON: No, it isn't. It's translated as 18, point 18. If
7 you could read 18, then you could confirm that it is point 19 in B/C/S.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. You're right. It was
9 called 18 here. Actually, if we scroll down, we may see that there are
10 two paragraphs number 18.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. General, I'm not trying to say that the government could have
13 done all of this, but don't you agree that the government was paying
14 attention to this? You talked about the leadership. The government is a
15 bit below the Presidency, but you see that the government constantly had
16 this on its agenda?
17 A. Sir, I mentioned in my reports that we came to an agreement with
18 the parties concerned on the necessity to restore the infrastructure of
19 the city and the surroundings of the city. We came to an agreement on
20 that, and the other party -- or the parties expressed enthusiasm on
21 performing that.
22 But I once again say that we do come to an agreement with the
23 governments, with the delegations, with the leaders. However, when these
24 agreements are or were to be implemented on the ground, those agreements
25 were met with violence in the field. That was the situation all the
1 time. We came to agreements, there was positive atmosphere that
2 prevailed on the talks, the talks provided grounds for hopes, but when
3 the groups on the ground, those who were charged with the implementation,
4 used to come under fire and used to be compelled to withdraw, and we all
5 started -- we all the time started at scratch.
6 I do not deny that there was sincere desire expressed by the
7 parties to come to an agreement. We set up a working group composed of
8 specialists and experts, working alongside and along with experts from
9 the United Nations. However, the implementation of the agreements was
10 met with violence on the ground.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be
13 [French interpretation on English channel]
14 JUDGE KWON: We are tested as to our French proficiency, but
15 I think it's been sorted out.
16 We'll admit it.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D513, Your Honour.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now we are just going to look at
19 two very briefly, and perhaps we are going to tender as associated
20 exhibits other documents, if the Trial Chamber and the OTP allow that.
21 Could we now have 65 ter number 205. Yes, that's the document.
22 Could we please look at AD-40, AD-40. I would like to draw your
23 attention to AD-40.
24 I need the following page in the English version, please. The
25 top of the following page, please, the very top.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. "The government was briefed on the terms which have been required
3 regarding the demilitarisation of Sarajevo. These include supplying
4 electricity, water, gas, and PTT services to the city.
5 "The responsible ministries are due to name experts who would
6 assist Biljana Plavsic in negotiations mediated by UNPROFOR with the
7 opposite side."
8 This is in the Bileca region. In other words, Mrs. Plavsic
9 undertook all the necessary measures in order to receive the government's
10 support and experts who would be able to implement the project. Of
11 course, they could not always prevent fire being opened in the field, but
12 would you agree with me that at the government level, Mrs. Plavsic was
13 successful in securing the government's support for all that you had
14 previously agreed?
15 A. Sir, Mrs. Plavsic was enthusiastic in restoring the
16 infrastructure, and she said that that was in the very own interests of
17 her people. And, of course, she -- her position was positive on the
18 measures, and there was a joint working group that we set up alongside
19 with experts from UNPROFOR. I do not deny her enthusiasm. However, I
20 wasn't privy to her co-ordination with the government.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can the document please be admitted into evidence.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. General, thank you. I just want to demonstrate that we did not
25 make things more difficult intentionally. Our success, however, depended
1 on combat activities --
2 A. [No interpretation]
3 JUDGE KWON: General, do you --
4 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]
5 JUDGE KWON: We don't get the translation either.
6 So now do you follow me, General?
7 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
9 Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat your last question, or you can
10 continue your question.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Has the document been admitted, Your Honours?
13 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted as Exhibit D514.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Can the Court please produce 65 ter 212.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. While we are waiting, General: My intention is to demonstrate
18 that the system and the government never intentionally make things more
19 difficult. However, their success depended on the situation on the
20 ground and combat activities which were either under somebody's control
21 or totally out of anybody's control. Do you agree with me?
22 A. Sir, I stated that clearly, and I made my point clear to both
23 sides, the Serbs and the Bosnians. I said to both sides that, We have
24 excellent agreements here, we reached agreement on several issues, but
25 these agreements -- the instructions do not find their way to the foot
1 soldiers. Otherwise, why are we finding ourselves in this situation? We
2 can spend all our time exchanging pleasantries, drinking, eating, but, in
3 fact, nothing is being implemented on the ground, and that is affecting
4 the work of UNPROFOR.
5 Q. Thank you. We are looking at 65 ter 212, the 62nd session of the
6 government, held on the 26th of January.
7 Could the court please produce AD-19. In the Serbian version, it
8 will be on page 6.
9 JUDGE KWON: General, before we deal with the question by the
10 accused: You said that:
11 "... but, in fact, nothing is being implemented on the ground,
12 and that is affecting the work of UNPROFOR."
13 What do you think, General, was the reason for such
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at that specific point
16 in time, UNPROFOR was trying to help to restore basic necessities to the
17 city; water, electricity, gas. And that's what we tried to raise with
18 the leaderships from both sides. But all efforts to implement the work
19 were affected by military operations, sniping, shelling. It proved
20 practically impossible for technical teams to reach the locations. There
21 were maps of the locations that needed to be treated, where electricity
22 generators or transformers were located to be repaired. The problems
23 that we confronted were with the junior commanders, the commanders on the
24 ground. We -- I always made the point clear to the leaderships from both
25 sides that it does not serve the purpose to sit at meeting tables, have
1 pleasantries, and not be able to translate these actions into work on the
2 ground, and the world is watching us and criticising us for standing
3 idle, not doing anything.
4 JUDGE KWON: Can you tell us whether the leadership was
5 disingenuous or the subordinate commanders were not complying with orders
6 from the leadership?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as I said over and
8 over again, from day one after I arrived, the negotiations at the higher
9 levels, with Mr. Izetbegovic, with Mr. Ganic at other occasions, with
10 Mr. Karadzic, with his deputies and assistants, sometimes - I did not say
11 all times - I addressed them and underscored the importance of imposing
12 more control, more discipline, on the ground troops, because the ground
13 troops, the lower ranks and commanders and the foot soldiers, the
14 civilian militias, were aggressive, were hostile, and I had the feeling
15 at the time that these -- that the rank and file were not receiving clear
16 instructions, were not being disciplined and told what to do.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.
18 Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Q. And could I draw to your attention the fact that the record
21 states from 26 of January. You were still there. Under 16, you can see
22 that the government asked information and received information for direct
23 contribution of Republika Srpska and, in principle, supported all the
24 proposed measures. The government was of the opinion that supplying
25 electricity to the city is a priority task and that all measures should
1 be undertaken to resolve this problem as soon as possible. According to
2 the opinion of the government, transmission lines had to be built as a
3 priority, and especially those that provided supply of electricity to
4 Romanija, Krajina, and Posavina region, including Sarajevo. The
5 protection of transmission lines is also mandatory. The government also
6 imposed the need to carry out full co-operation between competent
7 republican bodies, organisation, municipalities, and --
8 JUDGE KWON: Please slow down in reading. Bear in mind that your
9 words should be interpreted into the Egyptian based upon the English
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.
12 I'm under the pressure of time. That's why I'm a bit --
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. In any case, General, do you see that the problem of supplying
15 this city with electricity, as well as supplying the city with water, is
16 present across the entire territory, both in Republika Srpska as well as
17 in the entire Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
18 A. Was that a question or what?
19 Sir, it was abundantly clear that the problem applied across the
20 board. But in my situation, I am in charge of the Sarajevo -- or I was
21 in charge of Sarajevo Sector, and when I met with leaderships from both
22 sides, we were trying to bring about a degree of calm to allow the
23 technical teams to restore the basic services, but that could not have
24 been done without starting by demilitarisation. And once that was
25 achieved in Sarajevo
1 was to start with Sarajevo
2 approach, the same model, could be applied -- could be extended to other
3 areas. That was the principle of the UNPROFOR objective or the principle
4 objective, and that was part of what was known as the Morillon Plan.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. My idea, General, sir,
6 was this: I wanted to present to everybody in the courtroom that the
7 problem was omnipresent, that it was not a problem that was confined to
10 Could the document please be admitted into evidence?
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D515, Your Honour.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Could the court please produce 1D2129. We will see what the
16 on the ground.
17 Could the court please produce just the first column. Can it be
18 blown up. I am going to be reading because we don't have a translation
20 This is the Sarajevo-based "Oslobodjenje," on the Muslim side.
21 There were actually two newspapers under the same name "Oslobodjenje."
22 And it says here:
23 "A message arrived from the War Presidency around 11.00 yesterday
24 at the address of the public company water supply and waterworks."
25 The letter was signed by Nedeljko Prstojevic, and in the letter
1 it is stated that:
2 "The commission has decided to discontinue the supply of water to
3 Ilidza and the city of Sarajevo
4 reason for that was the constant shelling of Ilidza and especially the
5 area of water supply, which caused major damage to the pumps and
7 It is also stated that:
8 "With this regard, the necessary measures were being undertaken
9 in order to protect people and facilities which are in the function of
10 water supply in the area."
11 Finally, there is also a promise:
12 "The water supply will be reinstated after all the damage has
13 been removed."
14 Predrag Lukac goes on to say how convincing the reasons are, and
15 so on and so forth.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Do you agree that the water supply depends on the electricity
18 supply and that the area of Bacevo was, indeed, under constant shelling
19 and under constant fire?
20 A. Sir, that's exactly what I said. We know fully well that the two
21 services, water and electricity, are interconnected. And if you remember
22 correctly, the meetings centered on these issues, and when you met with
23 technicians from the UN, in my premise, these were the issues that they
24 raised. But, again, when we reach agreement on what these teams should
25 do, once they go to the location intended for repair work, they end up --
1 they end up being shelled, snipers were all over the place, and these
2 teams found it impossible to work in these conditions. I called for
3 another meeting, and we sit down, re-discuss the issue, but then when it
4 comes to implementation, it becomes practically impossible.
5 Q. General, sir, you will still agree with me that Sarajevo did get
6 some water and some electricity with the UNPROFOR's assistance. You will
7 agree with me that there was, after all, some water and some electricity
8 at all times. Am I right?
9 A. I said we succeeded, and I remember that certain residential
10 areas of Sarajevo
11 the place. And, as I said, it was a big -- there was a big celebration.
12 The following day, other areas were intended do come in line for
13 repair work, and when the teams went there, they were targeted.
14 JUDGE KWON: General, you said, in the previous answer, that, I
16 "But, again, when we reach agreement on what these terms should
17 do, once they go to the location intended for repair work, they end up --
18 they end up being shelled, snipers were all over the place, and these
19 teams found it impossible to work in these conditions."
20 Did you know at the time or do you know now from which direction
21 those shells and snipings were coming from?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I go back to the
23 reports that we received from the military observers. We received
24 reports that the shelling or the sniping had come from this side or that
25 side. We have to bear in mind once there is shelling or sniping from one
1 side, then the other side will respond immediately, and we were caught in
2 the middle. We were on the front-line. And even the villages along the
3 front-line, have you one part of the village on the -- under the control
4 of the Bosniaks and the other side of the same village under the Serb
5 control. Therefore, once the shelling or the sniping starts from one
6 side, the other side starts responding, and that's -- that was -- that
7 represented the crux of the problem that we were dealing with. But then,
8 again, that was not the issue that I was trying to make here. The issue
9 I want to make reference to is that work -- repair work stops, and that's
10 why the problem -- that's the problem we had to deal with.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the document please be
13 admitted into evidence?
14 JUDGE KWON: It will be marked for identification.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour --
16 JUDGE KWON: Or you have your objection, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff?
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The only point that I would raise at this
18 point in time is that the witness spoke about the event in general terms.
19 He did not actually confirm the event that Prstojevic raised here, the
20 shelling on Ilidza. So he hasn't really dealt with the particular
21 document with this particular reference to the event that was discussed
22 in this first paragraph. That's my only observation.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE KWON: Do you like to respond, Mr. Karadzic?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The general did come to the Serbian
1 part of Ilidza. Hrasnica is also Ilidza, but it is the Muslim part. And
2 he sensed the mood of the people. They welcomed him. And even the
3 president of the municipality promises here that as soon as the damages
4 are repaired, there will be water supply. Maybe the general did not read
5 this copy of "Oslobodjenje," but we are talking about the same types of
6 incidents of the kind that are described in this newspaper article.
7 JUDGE KWON: The general didn't confirm anything specific which
8 is reflected in this news clipping, and you even didn't ask any question
9 about it. While the general agreed with you, in general terms, we'll not
10 admit this, based upon our consistent guide-line.
11 Let's move on to your next topic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 The position of the Defence is that the water supply was not shut
14 down intentionally. It was done because of the damages, which the
15 general confirmed.
16 JUDGE KWON: Is that your --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the court please produce
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. General, while we are waiting for the document: General, do you
21 agree with me that the lack of water and electricity was caused by
22 frequent damages on the infrastructure and installations? Why would
23 repair teams otherwise would have been sent there? Could you agree with
24 me that repair teams were sent to repair the facilities which were
25 damaged as a result of war activities?
1 A. Sir, as you know, there was a general agreement on the situation
2 in Sarajevo
3 warring parties in the Sarajevo
4 United Nations forces and their support services to allow them to
5 accomplish their duties. And there was an understanding that if there
6 was any military hostilities, then military hostilities should be
7 confined to the front-lines between the warring parties, and that the
8 United Nations would not be caught in the military operations.
9 In our case, we found ourselves caught in the situation, and we
10 found ourselves in confrontation with junior commands. And despite the
11 fact that all the time and effort that was put into trying to reach an
12 agreement with you, with Ms. Plavsic, on the need to restore all these
13 services, on the need for teams to continue their work. And we sat down,
14 we reached agreements, we signed documents, and we provide protection.
15 Before the movement of these teams, prior information is transmitted to
16 the warring parties to make sure that the work group will undertake
17 repair work; yet, we find out that there is an exchange of mortar shells,
18 there is an exchange of sniping, there is an exchange of shelling. But,
19 of course, the facilities -- water and electricity facilities were
20 extensively damaged as a result of the -- and we know that the movement
21 of tracked armour led to extensive destruction to the infrastructure --
22 to the piping system. This is a natural outcome of hostilities. What we
23 tried to do is to put an end to these military hostilities so that we can
24 provide the services to the Sarajevo
25 And it must be noted here that that was part of my mandate, and I
1 took the initiative to try and improve these facilities in that specific
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, General, sir.
4 Could the court please produce -- or, rather, will the
5 Trial Chamber change its decision now, at this moment, about the document
6 for admission?
7 JUDGE KWON: You mean to reconsider the non-admission of 1D2129?
8 I think you can do without the document.
9 Please continue.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Could the court please produce a short document, sent by
12 Colonel Davout, 1D2147. I'm sure that there must be a translation of
13 this document in existence, 1D2147. Thank you.
14 I don't know if we have an English translation. This is a
15 letter -- yes, there is.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. You knew Colonel Davout, did you not?
18 A. Yes. In fact, he was my deputy in the sector.
19 Q. Thank you. In this letter, he addresses Mrs. Plavsic, and the
20 subject is "Meeting with UNPROFOR engineers regarding gas":
21 "For a better understanding of all the problems you encounter
22 with regard to the transport and distribution of gas, UNPROFOR Sector
23 engineering is requesting a meeting with specialists from the area with
24 your government.
25 "This meeting could take place in Pale on the 24th or 25th of
1 November, 1992. UNPROFOR will be represented by Major Hebnes."
2 And so on and so forth, copied to Colonel Galic.
3 Obviously, at that level on your side and on the side of
4 Mrs. Plavsic, there was mutual understanding. You understood our
5 difficulties. Was this the customary way your services communicated with
6 Mrs. Plavsic?
7 A. Sir, any document that came my way would be signed by me. But if
8 we take this date, in particular, I was on leave, and Colonel Davout was
9 in the command at that -- took over the command at that time, and he
10 would continue to implement the policies related to the infrastructure.
11 We had a vision and we had a plan. Had I been there, I would be
12 supervising. However, if I was away, whether on leave or in meetings to
13 the leadership in Zagreb
14 This was our method of work. When we wanted to convene a meeting, we
15 would send a letter to that effect, and who would be representing us, and
16 asked the relevant parties to inform us who would be their
17 representative, and we would set the time and the date and the points to
18 be discussed at the meeting. This was the method we followed in
19 communication and co-ordination with the relevant parties.
20 JUDGE KWON: But I take it, General, you do not have any reason
21 to doubt the authenticity of this document signed by Colonel Davout.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, sir. This is a routine
23 procedure in communications with the relevant parties.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General, thank you.
25 Can this document be admitted?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D516, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure about the practice. I don't think
4 the -- can you keep those two documents as well? Okay. I don't think
5 those two documents are identical, in the sense that each version has its
6 own handwriting. This is the B/C/S version, without Colonel Davout's
7 signature, and this is English. But I take it both are identical, in
8 terms of its content. So can we --
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance.
11 This is a note jotted down by the person who received this
12 document in the Government of Republika Srpska, and he forwarded it
13 further on. I can't really read it, but it says:
14 "UNPROFOR, with regard to all questions, questions of
15 importance," I think.
16 This is a note jotted down by someone from the government who
17 received this and who obviously put it in the pipeline.
18 JUDGE KWON: So what I have to -- yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I think these are actually two
20 items that should be exhibited separately, because one is the letter
21 sent, and obviously the translation, and the other one is showing the
22 reception of that letter. So it should actually be two exhibits under
23 two different numbers.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that was my observation, or we can give some
25 branch number or not. I'll leave it in the hands of the Registry.
1 So we'll admit it as two original documents. The numbers will be
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibits D516 and D517, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, D517 being the B/C/S version.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, can I clarify
6 something here?
7 If they sent us a letter, such as is the case here, if we
8 received such a letter, there is a person who puts a sign or a signal on
9 it to forward it and to indicate to the senior officer what is the
10 procedure. These are internal procedures when we receive official
11 letters. This is always the case with these documents. When a certain
12 letter comes in a formal manner, we copy it, and the copy is signed by
13 the specialised person, indicating to the senior officer what is the
14 usual process in dealing with such a document.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 1D373, could we have that, please. There is an English version,
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. While we're waiting for that, General, let me introduce the
21 document to you. It is an agreement between the Serb commander,
22 General Mladic, and the Croatian chief of the Main Staff of the HVO, the
23 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, Brigade General Petkovic,
24 Milivoj Petkovic.
25 So do you remember?
1 [Defence counsel confer]
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon. The original is
3 in English and the translation is into Croatian or Serbian. So could we
4 have the English version as well, please.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you remember, General, that Serbs and Croats often managed to
7 reach an agreement, and they invited the third party to join in?
8 I would like to tell you that the last four pages of this
9 document are actually the English version of this document. So could we
10 have the English version on the other half of the screen. We've
11 up-loaded them together under the same number. This may be it, but we
12 need the fourth page -- no, the fifth page of this document. That's
13 where the English original starts. Thank you.
14 Could we have the Serbian translation on the other half of the
15 screen. No, it's not possible. Okay, then let's go on.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. That's the agreement. The original is in English, and it was
18 done through the mediation of the UNPROFOR Main Staff; right? Do you
19 agree that this is the usual facsimile, "Headquarters, BH Command"?
20 A. If we take the date of this document, we will find that it
21 indicates the peak of the meetings that took place at the airport between
22 the joint committees.
23 Now, for this document, I did not attend any co-ordination
24 meeting among the three parties; Serbs, Croats, and the Bosnian Muslims.
25 At such a level, a meeting was held, except in the joint military
1 committee. That was attended in its opening session by Mr. Mladic, and
2 later on Mr. Gvero was representing him there, and the formula was a
3 formula put in place by General Morillon so that the parties may agree to
4 it. And as you can see, it involved the Morillon Plan to demilitarise
5 the area of Sarajevo
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. First of all, let us establish that here, on the first page, we
9 see that General Mladic and General Petkovic signed the document. Right?
10 Did you notice, General, that General Mladic and General Petkovic had
11 signed that document on the first page? Did you notice that, that it had
12 been signed?
13 A. Yes, I did, yes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we scroll down a
15 bit so that we could see that it has to do with Morillon. No, we
16 actually want to scroll up.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Do you see this up here? Is this intended for Morillon, this
19 facsimile? Right? You see the handwritten words on the top.
20 A. This was the norm. When we sent letters, we addressed them to a
21 number of parties. And once any document was signed, we received a copy
22 of it at the United Nations. This was the agreement always. And you are
23 aware that the work of the United Nations is always documented, and we
24 have instructions from above to have documentation for all matters.
25 Q. [No interpretation]
1 THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, sir. I'm not receiving
3 JUDGE KWON: No. Could you repeat your question again?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I just wanted to draw the
5 attention of all participants to the essence of this document.
6 This is an agreement on the implementation of an area of
7 separation. Then there is a reference to cessation of hostilities
8 throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, freedom of movement, and also
9 renewing/restoring public utilities. Well, first it's the cessation of
10 hostilities, everything that should be done in that respect, then freedom
11 of movement.
12 Could we have the next page in English, please.
13 D. D says: "Restoration of civil utilities."
14 That meant that civil utilities would be restored as well.
15 Under "Cessation of hostilities," there was a reference to the
16 withdrawal of all heavy weapons. That was on the previous page, but I'm
17 sure that everybody saw that. Freedom of movement, restoration of civil
18 utilities. Then on this page, removal of heavy weapons:
19 "All heavy weapons will be withdrawn from the following
20 locations: Mojmilo, Dobrinja, Hrasnica, Butmir, Otes and Stup."
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. They were all under Muslim control; right?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. I forgot to mention Sokolac, Sokolovic Kolonija, Lukavac,
25 Gornji Kotorac, Vojkovici and Nedzarici are under Serb control; right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you. Also, there is a proposal to set up a joint
3 commission; right? Then this is my handwriting at the bottom of the
5 "Our people are sleeping on our side."
6 That is my handwriting. That's what it says. That means that
7 our participants in the work of this joint commission will be sleeping on
8 our side, will be spending the night on our side.
9 Could we now have the second page, please. The next page,
10 please. Control measures that we agreed upon, and the last
11 subparagraph (5):
12 [In English] "The joint commission will establish mixed patrols
13 not later than December 26th, 1992."
14 [Interpretation] Then, in my own hand, it says:
15 "The two in the jeep."
16 And the same thing in the Serbian:
17 "The two in the jeep."
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you remember that we were always prepared to have Serb
20 policemen on the Serb side, a Serb policeman and an UNPROFOR
21 representative, and on the Muslim side, a Muslim policeman and an
22 UNPROFOR representative?
23 A. What I recall well, sir, is that we used to be there as UNPROFOR.
24 General Morillon, and myself, and the chief of staff, and I think it was
25 Brigade General Thompson - he was British, I can't remember his name
1 well - and we would ask, What do you want the parties to do? And we
2 would put down all these points that are written in the document to ask
3 them to implement these and to agree on how implementation should take
4 place through the work of the joint commission. And then we would go
5 into details in our talks; how will we work on restoring the
6 infrastructure and to provide freedom of movement for the convoys. And
7 we would go into details; who would make up the guard group. We had no
8 reservations for representatives of UNPROFOR being there so that no party
9 would believe that other party is spying on their work. We wanted the
10 whole process to be a joint effort, without any suspicions prevailing in
11 the minds of any party.
12 I recall this document exactly, and the points mentioned are the
13 points that we brought up and insisted that they constitute the agenda of
14 the joint commission.
15 Q. Thank you. Do you agree, General, that the implementation of
16 this plan of General Morillon's or this UNPROFOR plan would have meant
17 the end of all the troubles of Sarajevo
18 A. Sir, we used to pray for this to happen.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
20 Can this document be admitted?
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Do you remember, General, that Izetbegovic -- or, rather, Ganic's
23 side did not sign this and did not accept this?
24 A. As I recall, we did face some difficulties in this matter.
25 First, Mr. Gvero did not issue his decisions directly. He had to return
1 to his leadership and then come back to us for signing. And then the
2 other party, represented by Colonel Siber, had some reservations on what
3 was in the text. I can't recall what, exactly, but he had some
4 reservations. He would say, Let us start by restoring the infrastructure
5 first, or, Let us start by stopping hostilities, or stopping the
6 shelling, or ending the siege, collecting -- gathering heavy arms under
7 the supervision of UNPROFOR, and then we will start addressing other
8 problems. As I recall, there was a problem as to the priorities, what
9 comes first.
10 JUDGE KWON: Before admitting this document, I would like the
11 general to see the entire document.
12 Can we see the next page, or page 9.
13 Do you remember this, General?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It seems to me it's a letter
15 addressed from General Philippe Morillon to Mr. Karadzic. It involved --
16 it addressed the shelling of the hospital.
17 And I want to clarify a point here. We were very moved --
18 shocked by this shelling. It was shameful to us all, and everybody in
20 shelled with children and nurseries involved. This was a letter of
21 protest, after we saw the results of the shelling and the sources of
22 this, as observed by the military observers. I did not see this letter,
23 but he told me -- General Morillon told me that he sent a letter of
24 protest to the Serb leadership.
25 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any idea, General, why this letter was
1 attached to the previous document, while they referred to different
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Our mistake.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do not see -- excuse me. I see
5 no link between this document and the document that came before it,
6 because this document is a very special case in an area that was the
7 center of attention to all parties. I do not believe it was attached in
8 any way to the former document that relates to the work of the joint
10 JUDGE KWON: If you agree, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff, this last page
11 is a separate matter, I will tell the Defence to delete this part.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour, that's --
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 We'll admit this.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D518, Your Honours.
16 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
17 JUDGE KWON: The first four pages are in B/C/S, which is also a
18 separate document, so we'll mark it for identification, pending
20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Serbian version is the
22 translated version, and the English is the original. Perhaps one number
23 can be assigned, or two. But, anyway, they should be separated.
24 JUDGE KWON: I was told the Court Deputy was referring to
25 Exhibit D517, which is a separate version in B/C/S of the previous
2 We'll admit this in full as Exhibit D518.
3 One more question and we'll have a break, Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just by way of information, this
5 letter, sent to me by Morillon, follows another letter, a different one,
6 in much harsher terms, sent to Izetbegovic, because they were provoking
7 Serbian fire. General Morillon liked to scold both sides, although you
8 could see who caused what.
9 Could we please have --
10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not catch the number.
11 JUDGE KWON: Would you repeat the number?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01187.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. General, if you recall, that agreement between General Mladic and
15 General Petkovic was signed on the 22nd of December, and this is what
16 happened on the 23rd of December. This is a report for that entire day
17 from 1800 hours. So let us focus our attention on where the enemy
18 artillery was operating from. It says:
19 "Strong attacks. Fierce offensive activity on the north and
20 western sector of the front."
21 And then it says 110 shells on the Hadzici area, 60 shells on the
22 Ilidza area, around 50 shells on the Rajlovac area, 120 shells on Vogosca
23 and Semizovac, and 70 on Ilidza.
24 I would like to draw your attention to number 3:
25 "Four civilians were killed and three were wounded by enemy
1 artillery fire. Great material damage was caused to civilian facilities
2 in the areas of Hadzici, Ilidza, Rajlovac, Vogosca and Ilijas."
3 Do you agree, General, that this was no contribution to peace?
4 As a matter of fact, this was some kind of response to that agreement
5 that had been reached on the previous day? This made it obvious that
6 nothing would come out of that agreement?
7 A. Sir, I recall well that after this agreement was signed, and in
8 the next meeting there was early shelling since early hours of the
9 morning, and I and General Morillon were waiting for the delegations, and
10 he laughed and said, This is how agreements are implemented. He was
11 being cynical.
12 I repeat, I do not know now exactly which party started with the
13 shelling or what's the number of those killed or wounded on this side or
14 that, but all I can say is, and I'll repeat this once again, whenever we
15 met, there were fine words about peace and the desire for co-operation
16 and for leading UN operations to success. We heard fine words from
17 leaders, and I'm repeating this again. I seem to be repeating myself
18 over and over. Nice words from the leaders. We agree on points. Yes,
19 they say they want to achieve this, they want to help us in achieving
20 this. Then we come to the ground and we find something totally
21 different, and this was always the problem. Your Honour, this was always
22 the problem. And this is not what I say only, but all those who worked
23 with me have the same to say.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page, just to
25 see the signature and the losses sustained.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. We see that four civilians got killed, three were wounded. Less
3 combatants were killed or wounded. This is a document of
4 General Galic's.
5 However, General, do you agree that it wasn't the Croats that
6 violated the cease-fire? This fire came from Izetbegovic's positions,
7 the positions of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Halilovic's
9 A. His name is Mustafa Halilovic.
10 Q. Mustafa was Hajrulahovic.
11 A. [In English] Hajrulahovic, I know him.
12 [Interpretation] I am going to repeat what I have already said.
13 We do agree, and then there is fire, and we receive reports about the
14 source of their fire. We tell them that, You were the source of fire,
15 and that was according to the reports of the observers. But they denied
16 the reports. They would say they were not the side that fired the
17 shells. So the question was always being asked, Who was -- who was
18 starting? That was the situation all the time.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Can the document please be admitted into evidence?
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It will be admitted as Exhibit D519.
24 And we'll have a break for 30 minutes. We'll resume at five past
1 --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.
2 [The witness stands down]
3 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.
4 JUDGE KWON: We're glad to see you back, Mr. Harvey.
5 MR. HARVEY: Much happier here, thank you, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: I heard that, Mr. Karadzic, you have something to
7 raise some the absence of the witness, or Mr. Robinson.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I will raise the
10 I am concerned that we have a witness through whom I would like
11 to present some very valuable documents, and I don't have enough time to
12 clarify with the witness what he meant when he issued certain oral
13 statements. I have to kindly request to be given one whole session. I
14 did not cover the whole ground and, of course, I cannot recall this
15 witness, I'm sure.
16 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, I don't follow you.
17 When you said you cannot recall this witness, what did you mean?
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE KWON: Ah, recalled.
20 Madam Uertz-Retzlaff, how much would you need, albeit
21 prematurely, for your redirect examination?
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, if nothing else for redirect
23 arises, I would have only to address one particular small matter, and it
24 relates to the letter that Monsieur Morillon sent on the 31st of January.
25 And it's rather more a formality because the witness has dealt with this
1 particular document, responded to it. Therefore, the Prosecution would
2 like to have that exhibited separately. That's the only matter that I
3 have at the moment. Otherwise, no redirect so far.
4 But I just want to mention one point. The consistent feature of
5 the witness was -- all over the days now was is that he had to say, As I
6 have said already, and, I repeat myself, and, Again I repeat myself. A
7 lot of time was wasted asking the same issues over and over again.
8 That's just an observation.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: Dr. Karadzic, you have had four hours and 40 minutes
12 so far with this witness. So, accordingly, you would have 20 minutes
13 left for your cross-examination. But given the situation, and technical
14 difficulties we have had, and translation as well, we'll give you an hour
15 from now. So please try your best to conclude your cross-examination in
16 an hour's time from now.
17 Taking advantage of the absence of the witness, the Chamber is
18 minded to issue its ruling regarding the request made yesterday, on
19 behalf of Mr. Karadzic, to postpone the cross-examination of the next
20 witness, Mr. Suljevic, until after the recess in order to allow him to
21 prepare. This request was based, firstly, on the recent disclosure of
22 certain documents relevant to the witness, pursuant to a Rule 66(B)
23 request, and on the fact that the Prosecution has recently indicated that
24 it would seek to tender 45 documents through the witness by way of an
25 additional recently-prepared Rule 92 ter statement.
1 The Chamber notes, once again, that when Rule 66(B) requests are
2 made relatively close in time to the testimony of a particular witness,
3 the accused cannot use the subsequent disclosure of Rule 66(B) material
4 in accordance with that request as a basis for requesting the
5 postponement of the testimony or of the cross-examination of that
6 witness, when the Prosecution has responded to the Rule 66(B) request in
7 a timely manner.
8 Nonetheless, if the documents in question are important to the
9 testimony of a particular witness, there may be circumstances in which
10 the Chamber would grant more time to the accused to prepare for his
12 The Chamber also notes that Mr. Karadzic was put on notice that
13 the 45 documents in question were intended to be used with Mr. Suljevic
14 during his statement -- during his testimony in early June 2010. What is
15 new, however, is the statement produced by the Prosecution in which the
16 witness describes or comments on each of those documents. The
17 Prosecution has indicated that it would seek to tender this statement and
18 the exhibits in lieu of asking the witness about the exhibits in the
20 This statement was only provided to the accused and the Chamber
21 on 19th July 2010
22 statement to the accused, the Chamber has decided that it will not be
23 admitted, and the Prosecution should rather address the documents
24 described in it with the witness in the courtroom during his direct
25 examination, and seek to tender those it considers necessary in this
2 That said, Mr. Karadzic, given the Chamber will not be admitting
3 this new statement describing the 45 documents in lieu of oral testimony
4 from the witness in relation to them, we do not consider it necessary to
5 postpone your cross-examination of Mr. Suljevic. We also consider it
6 unnecessary at this stage to grant additional time for your
7 cross-examination, as the number of documents being tendered through this
8 witness, whether pursuant to Rule 92 ter or otherwise, was taken into
9 consideration by the Chamber in determining the time available to you for
10 your cross-examination. But we will keep this matter under review as we
11 hear his evidence.
12 We note, in this regard, that it may not be possible, given the
13 remaining time available today and tomorrow, to finish your
14 cross-examination of Mr. Suljevic before the recess. You would, in that
15 event, have time over the recess to prepare the remainder of your
17 We'll bring in the witness.
18 Mr. Robinson.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
20 While we're doing that, I could indicate that we won't have any
21 objection to the 31st of January, 1993, letter. So if the Prosecutor
22 just wants to have that admitted without asking any further questions,
23 I think that would be appropriate.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we have up-loaded this document
25 separately just now into e-court, and it would have the 65 ter number
1 90184, and that's the exact document. And I ask for admittance.
2 JUDGE KWON: You have no objection to the suggestion by
3 Mr. Robinson?
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, I think that's the most practical way.
5 JUDGE KWON: They will be admitted as Prosecution exhibit.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1275, Your Honours.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With your leave, I would recommend
8 or suggest to the Chamber that the document is associated with the D351.
9 The source was the same, and that was an attempt by General Morillon to
10 strike a balance. It's about the same incident, and the letters were
11 sent to two different addressees.
12 [The witness takes the stand]
13 JUDGE KWON: I have no doubt you'll have another opportunity to
14 tender that document through proper witnesses or through Bar table
16 Apologies for your inconvenience, General. We had some
17 administrative matters to deal with in your absence. We'll try our best
18 to conclude your examination in an hour's time from now.
19 Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Could the Court please produce 1D2123, 1D2123.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. And while we are waiting for the document to be produced,
24 General, sir, let me tell you something about the contents of the
25 document. I suppose that the document originates from you and describes
1 your meeting with myself and Colonel Siber.
2 Do you agree, General, that you reached the Serbian leadership in
3 an easier way than the top leadership of the Muslims? Colonel Siber was
4 not my par on the Muslim side, was he, or was he not?
5 A. Sir, according to my experience in dealing with the parties, you
6 were the party that we dealt with in most matters. And, frankly
7 speaking, we did have some difficulty in talking with General Galic in
8 some civilian affairs. On the other side, we did meet to discuss civil
9 matters with what is called the Presidency, represented by
10 Mr. Gubovic [phoen] or Mr. Ganic. As for military matters, we used to
11 refer to Colonel Siber, and I think he was mandated by the Presidency to
12 negotiate with us on the details of things concerning the shelling, the
13 weapons, and the roadblocks, et cetera, et cetera. But I didn't have any
14 problem reaching an understanding or communicating with any party. Just
15 upon a short notice, we would determine -- set a date for the meeting,
16 and we would meet easily.
17 Q. Thank you. I'm convinced that the document will show that you
18 were more successful with the Serbs than with the federation.
19 Could you please look at the document. The document describes
20 your meeting with me and then with Colonel Siber on the 13th of December,
21 1992, which means three weeks after your arrival; right?
22 A. In light of the date of the document, yes, you're right.
23 Q. Thank you. Let's try and just provide yes-and-no answers.
24 Does it say here that you were reporting back to the Main Staff
25 of UNPROFOR and General Nambiar that I had confirmed that all the heavy
1 weaponry was deployed at 11 locations around Sarajevo? You insisted that
2 that included 120-millimetre mortars, and that I was agreeable to that,
3 or, rather, 82, although I thought that the 82-millimetre mortars, as
4 well as the 60-millimetre mortars, were infantry weaponry, rather than
5 artillery. I also accepted your proposal that armed infantry should
6 observe the artillery weapons and locations, but I was also of the
7 opinion that Egyptian soldiers, for their own safety rather than for our
8 own prejudices, because we did not have any prejudices against you, that
9 they shouldn't be deployed there. You can see all that. And will you
10 agree with me that I offered "kiseonik" [phoen] or, rather, oxygen to be
11 delivered to hospitals via the UNPROFOR?
12 A. Yes, yes, I did report to headquarters, in details, the contents
13 of our talks, and everything mentioned in this document was reported
14 according to what you said to me in details.
15 Q. Do you agree in the original document, drafter by Minister Hogg,
16 Douglas Hogg, the word used was "supervision," and not "control," and
17 that you agreed for all that to be supervision, rather than control?
18 That's bullet point 2.
19 A. No. If you do remember, sir, that I -- that my position was
20 specific. I told you that I was expert on verification. I was part of a
21 mission for a year in Angola
22 to raise too many technical points, in terms of definitions, whether
23 you're talking about supervision or control. So all what we meant and
24 all what was understood from your statements and declarations that were
25 reported to me, that I verified, myself, in the media, that you were
1 ready to collect such weapons under the control or the monitoring of
2 United Nations forces.
3 So, for me -- control for me, in order to be successful, was to
4 collect the heavy weapons where they were deployed in the 11 positions,
5 and to take them to specific areas so that they can be monitored or
6 controlled by the United Nations.
7 So it was difficult for us to deploy forces all over the
8 positions, to monitor firing from all positions. That was impossible.
9 So the interpretation of those terms meant to collect those
10 weapons in 11 positions, and that those arms should continue to be under
11 Serb control. But I was saying that they should be gathered in 11
12 positions where cease-fire was observed to make it easier for us to
13 control them and monitor them. So my opinion on that matter was that we
14 would not practically be able to see through to that agreement because
15 the number of observers was very limited. So, as I told you, we used
16 soldiers from the battalions, that we used to train them for a number of
17 weeks on monitoring and controlling matters, and they were assigned to
18 control the various positions.
19 Q. Thank you. That is precisely so. However, I did not question
20 the UNPROFOR's position. I just wanted to remind you that the other side
21 wanted UNPROFOR to control, rather than to supervise, and our soldiers
22 wouldn't accept that. And that's why all agreed that the control would
23 be Serb and that supervision would be yours; am I right, sir?
24 And can we move on to the second page?
25 A. Yes, yes, that's what I exacted said. We were not to assume
1 control -- a control mission of all the weapons, because that needed our
2 many experts, but we wanted for these weapons to be collected or gathered
3 in some specific areas so that we -- our mission to control them would be
4 facilitated and to prevent -- or to see to it that those weapons were not
5 used to fire shells against the city of Sarajevo.
6 Q. Can I draw your attention to bullet point 5, describing your
7 meeting with Colonel Siber? Everybody can read, so I don't want to read
8 myself. However, my point of concern is this:
9 [In English] "... the possibility of heavy fighting near the
10 airport in the next days."
11 [Interpretation] How did Colonel Siber know that there might be
12 fighting if the situation was not under his control?
13 A. As you can see, sir, I'm not talking about the intentions here.
14 I report to my headquarters what the parties have said. I am not
15 discussing the question of intentions. I sincerely report what happened
16 to me, word for word, to my headquarters.
17 Q. Thank you. This is precisely what I meant. Your reporting was
18 fair. However, I'm concerned with the fact that he knew in advance that
19 there would be fighting. I, myself, never knew that.
20 Can we look at bullet point 8, where he informed you that what
21 you had discussed would be considered at a higher -- or, rather, at the
22 highest level.
23 You see, you had much more success with the Serbs. You were
24 received by the highest level immediately, whereas Colonel Siljeg [as
25 interpreted] had to go to a higher level after your initial meeting.
1 Just yes or no. He did not have the final say; am I right?
2 A. Yes, yes, and that goes for Mr. Galic. That was a major problem.
3 That's why I always asked to meet the higher leadership. You were always
4 busy, and Mrs. Plavsic was always there.
5 On the other side, I didn't want to waste my time with the
6 leaders on the ground. Of course, they were well-intended, but they had
7 so many complaints and so many allegations and we wasted our time
8 discussing such claims. We had specific targets behind our talks.
9 That's why we came to you, personally. And when you were present, you
10 did receive us, and when you were not there, you were represented by
11 Mrs. Plavsic --
12 THE INTERPRETER: And someone else that the interpreters did not
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And as for Colonel Siber, I think
15 you were aware of the system there. They would receive the points on
16 military affairs raised by us. They would take these points to their
17 headquarters. I don't think there are officers who are fully mandated to
18 take decisions concerning strategic or political affairs, and that is the
19 case everywhere.
20 Q. Thank you. During the interview, we agreed did we not, that the
21 civilian authorities also had to consult their military structures as to
22 what was acceptable and what was unacceptable from the point of view of
23 security. And do you agree, in that sense, since I was a civilian
24 physician, I also had to consult with my Main Staff and ask them whether
25 a proposal was acceptable from the point of view of security for our
1 troops? Can you please say just yes or no? I'm sure that you can answer
2 by just say yes or no.
3 A. Yes, yes, of course, you have all the right to do so. I know
4 that things happened that way, that civilian or political leaders would
5 consult with their military structures, or economic structures, or any
6 other matter. You have the right to do so, sir.
7 Q. Thank you. And now bullet point 7. Could you please confirm
8 that Mr. Siber accepted my offer for oxygen to be transported to
10 A. Yes, we accepted that, but I don't recall that we transported
11 oxygen to Sarajevo
12 anything that we agreed upon on that matter was implemented in conformity
13 with what was agreed upon during the meetings.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. You will see that
15 things were implemented, and you will see how they were implemented.
16 But before that, could the document please be admitted into
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, this is already in evidence.
19 It's P1261.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce
23 The date is 24 January. I don't know whether the document is in
24 evidence. 24 January, and the entire document describes a rather
25 peaceful period.
1 Yes, that's it.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Could you please look at the part that I am going to read, which
4 is the end of bullet point 1, entitled "General Situation." Lima
5 observers on the Serbian side; right?
6 A. Yes, yes.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 [In English] "Lima
9 to witness that two of the oxygen bottles delivered by the UNHCR were
10 found to contain gunpowder. Once confirmed, this matter was turned over
11 to CIVPOL."
12 [Interpretation] Was that a normal method or normal procedure,
13 meaning when something was observed, monitors were called to the scene to
14 confirm the matter?
15 A. Sir, you know that transporting all this material was the
16 responsibility of UNHCR, not the UNPROFOR. They were concerned with
17 transporting humanitarian aid from all the parties and from the
18 warehouses of the United Nations. I do not really remember what
19 happened, because that was up to them to say what they -- what they found
20 in those bottles or what was presented to them. I wasn't really aware of
21 this situation.
22 Q. However, that was a very ordinary telegram, was it not?
23 A. Yes, the content of the telegram seems to be ordinary.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Can the document please be admitted?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D520, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce
5 The date is 19 January. The time is 1815 hours.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Could you please look at the document and tell me whether you
8 agree that the topic is "Alleged illegal trade and smuggling on the part
9 of the Ukrainian Battalion"? And somebody issues an order here:
10 [In English] "Please advise this office of the result of your
12 [Interpretation] An order was issued for an investigation to be
13 carried out, and somebody here asks for the feedback on the
14 investigation; right? You did mention that you had problems with some
15 battalions. Could you please enlighten us? What is this all about?
16 A. Sir, what I was informed about by the military police, that there
17 were rumours of illegal trade in fuel exercised by the
18 Ukrainian Battalion. Fuel was being transported to Kiseljak and
19 surrounding areas in exchange for cigarettes and other items. It was a
20 disciplinary issue, and I summoned the commander of the
21 Ukrainian Battalion, and I asked that his deputy be removed from his
22 post, if I remember correctly. It was a disciplinary issue, an internal
23 issue, and you know that officers and soldiers tend to commit stupid
24 mistakes in situations like this. I have taken the necessary action, and
25 disciplinary action was taken against those who were involved in the
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the document please be
3 admitted into evidence?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D521, Your Honour.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce
7 1D2141. The date is 9 January 1993
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. General, sir, you were still there at the time. The document
10 describes an incident that you, yourself, mentioned; the killing of
11 Mr. Hakija Turajlic. We will briefly look at the document.
12 Under bullet point 1, you or somebody reports from Sarajevo
13 lieutenant-colonel -- colonel reports to the Main Staff in Zagreb
14 "On January 8, 1993
15 could hear through the radio net IC that a convoy of armoured vehicles
16 had been stopped at the Serbian check-point in Nedzarici because one
17 passenger was not able to produce a regular pass or a UN ID card."
18 Can we move on to the second page of the same document and look
19 at bullet point 5.
20 Bullet point 5 describes the unfortunate incident, and you can
21 see clearly that the person questioned was nervously distraught. It
23 [In English] "The tension was also down, and the CO just about
24 --" commanding officer, probably, "just about to negotiate about closing
25 the APC
1 commanding officer away from the entrance, the Serbian commander stopped
2 them. One of them, realising that he would not succeed, stepped back,
3 held a gun, and shot above the commanding officer's shoulder, at
4 Mr. Hakija Turajlic, crouching in the front part of the APC. Pulled back
5 by his commander, he got released and fired several bullets."
6 [Interpretation] Do you remember the incident?
7 A. Yes, I do. That incident took place as described in the
8 document. If an official from the Presidency wanted to move to the
9 airport, it was our duty and we were asked to provide an armoured vehicle
10 with an escort. Our understanding was that person would be a minister,
11 for example, to travel to -- for an international meeting or to discuss
12 relief operations. I, personally, was in charge of providing a number of
13 escorts and security operations for the transport of Mr. Izetbegovic, and
14 one day the Presidency asked us for an APC to accompany or to transport
15 an official from the Presidency. It was mentioned it would be a minister
16 or some high-ranking official.
17 However, after the incident we realised it was a government
18 delegation going to the airport to negotiate with a Turkish delegation
19 that arrived on a relief plane to Sarajevo Airport. We wanted to be
20 careful about that, and we knew that the presence of Turkish delegations
21 could provoke the Serb side. And we wanted to ensure that would not be a
22 cause for provocation, and we advised them that if they wanted to meet a
23 Turkish delegation, that they should seek a different location.
24 What happened? That delegation went to the airport and conducted
25 the negotiations, and, of course, the Serb liaison officer at the airport
1 reported to his superiors. And as Colonel Sartre of the French Battalion
2 pointed out and described the incident by saying that the killing was
3 intentional, was premeditated, because he was inside the armoured
4 personnel carrier. We launched an inquiry, and we were told that a
5 senior A2, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, would conduct the
6 investigation. And we had that person, and we explained the sequence of
8 At the time, we were criticised by the Presidency for our role,
9 but we made it clear to them that, You did not conform to the agreement
10 that we had, you did not tell us that -- what was the purpose of the
11 trip. There was no escort. You did not ask for an escort. You just
12 wanted an armoured personnel carrier, because always there was negligence
13 on the part of the government to provide accurate information about who
14 was travelling. We were not able to provide the requisite protection,
15 and the outcome was the killing of this moderate member of the
17 However, I'd like to reiterate what Colonel Sartre said; that the
18 person was shot intentionally, and the person who shot that individual
19 knew what he was doing, and that that person was mentally disturbed, had
20 a mental problem. And that's how I understood the situation to be.
21 Q. Thank you. It seems that you understood this well.
22 Have you heard that the International Court, with international
23 judges and international prosecutors, set this soldier free after the
24 war? A trial was held in Sarajevo
25 basis of his mental status. Just yes or no. Have you heard about this?
1 A. No, I did not follow what happened, because in the wake of the
2 inquiry I was getting ready to leave my post in Sarajevo. But I remember
3 I was told that the person who committed the killing was mentally
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can this document be admitted?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D522, Your Honour.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Can we have 1D2142.
11 This is also the 10th of January. Obviously, as the general
12 assessment says, it was a relatively quiet period of time.
13 Now, we see, under number 2, that 227 people, including 207 men,
14 were stopped and turned back by your forces while trying to cross the
15 runway. It says here:
16 "Egyptian Battalion, relatively quiet.
17 "French Battalion, relatively quiet.
18 "Ukrainian Battalion, quiet. One convoy was escorted."
19 And so on.
20 Can we have the next page, please. Paragraph 8, please. That's
21 at the bottom of the page. I would like to present the first part of
22 this paragraph briefly:
23 [In English] "The nightly airport crossings are becoming an
24 increasing problem. Larger numbers of people (now mostly men) are
25 crossing. Dense fog and a new tactic of crossing in larger groups result
1 in more people slipping past French Bat soldiers who are being
2 overwhelmed. The danger is that as more men slip from the side to the
3 other, the Serbs may decide that UNPROFOR is unable to stop the flow of
4 potential fighters and intervene with the fire ..."
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. So do you agree that your officer also assessed that Serbs could
7 worry if so many men are being taken across the runway and that this may
8 be a question of manoeuvres by future combatants?
9 A. Sir, to my exact and accurate knowledge, that families were split
10 up and there were attempts to reunite themselves with other members of
11 their families on the other side of the dividing line. And I raised that
12 issue with General Galic. He told me that if this were to continue, the
13 crossing attempts were to continue, then UNPROFOR should take the
14 appropriate measures to prevent that from happening, and that if the
15 crossings continued, he would find himself in a position to continue to
16 fire. And that's what he told me. So I conveyed that view to the
17 Presidency, and I told them that there is a need for the Presidency to
18 take strict measures. I made them aware that this is causing problems
19 with the other side and is endangering the lives of those who are trying
20 to cross. And there were several civilians. I remember there was a lady
21 with a baby met her death on the tarmac of the airport, and this
22 understandable in a hostile environment like this. I know that the
23 French Battalion took the brunt of these crossings, and I told the
24 Presidency that it is difficult to tell whether those who are trying to
25 make the crossing are civilians or military personnel and they were
1 trying to get to -- in the direction of the Butmir area. And I remember
2 I spoke with the commander on the -- in the Butmir area, and I believe at
3 one point we managed to put an end to these crossings.
4 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that it was possible for civilians to
5 cross over to the other side, provided there was notification given, and
6 with the assistance of UNPROFOR? However, so many people crossing,
7 almost 300, and under foggy conditions, that seemed to be different. Do
8 you agree that UNPROFOR often provided security for convoys going to
9 Split and to Belgrade
10 if they applied a different procedure?
11 A. Sir, we did not evacuate any civilians from Sarajevo to Split
12 except for the students, foreign students, who were -- who found
13 themselves trapped in Sarajevo
14 help. As far as other civilians, we did not have the authority. We did
15 not have any instructions to move people from one area to the other. We
16 did not -- we were not involved. We were not implicated in any such
17 operations, but I know that both sides were accusing us of doing this.
18 But I can assure you what we did was we undertook to evacuate foreign
19 students trapped in Sarajevo
20 asked us to help with their evacuation.
21 At the time, General Nambiar asked me to contact the various
22 parties, the various sides, to secure the evacuation of those foreign
23 students. I did that. I met with Ms. Plavsic, and she gave the
24 authorisation for the evacuation move. And we used a private company, in
25 co-ordination with the government, to provide coaches to transport the
1 students with UN escorts. And upon the return of the escort force, they
2 reported to me that the three drivers of the three coaches were removed
3 from the driver's seat by Serb forces and they were asked -- and Serb
4 drivers -- or the three different drivers were driving the coaches. We
5 could not trace of three drivers. And you remember very well that we
6 raised the issue with you and with Ms. Plavsic, and we never got a
7 clear-cut response. And the last time I met with Ms. Plavsic, she told
8 me, General, you're talking about three drivers, and I am talking about
9 hundreds of my people. Why so much emphasis on the three drivers? And I
10 said to her, Madam, we are looking at drivers who were under the
11 escort -- under the protection of the united force. I will note down
12 what you tell me and I will take that to my superiors. But she did not
13 give me an indication of the whereabouts or the fate of the drivers.
14 I have an addition also to make, Mr. Karadzic.
15 You told me that these individuals were fighting in Igman, and
16 you told me they have gone to Split
17 of that.
18 Q. As far as I remember that, General, they had been captured in
19 reconnaissance operations, and later on they were exchanged for Serb
20 combatants. However, they were asked to leave Bosnia so that they would
21 not go back to fighting.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D523, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D369, could we have that briefly,
1 please, just to see this letter of mine to General Morillon from December
2 1992 that pertains to these requests to release civilians. Therefore,
3 we're not going to dwell on the letter for a very long time, because it's
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you see this? It's the 6th of December, 1992. This is what I
7 say in the first paragraph:
8 [In English] "During last weeks, the ill-treatment has received
9 such a form and degree that the Serbian young men are being forced, by
10 brutal means or physical violence, to joint the Muslim Army."
11 [Interpretation] The second paragraph:
12 [In English] "No more than 100.000 Serbs have been ethnic
13 hostages in the cities or town under the Muslim authorities."
14 [Interpretation] And there's a description of all the things
15 that they were experiencing.
16 Could we have the next page, please. It's the second paragraph
17 on the second page. I am recalling the agreement that we had signed in
19 [In English] "In agreement on free circulation of civilians
20 (which is provided by the Geneva Conventions) was reached at the
21 London Conference, and all three sides signed it in Geneva on October the
22 2nd, 1992. But it has not been respected so far ..."
23 [Interpretation] And so on. And further down, it says:
24 [In English] "The Presidency and the government of
25 Republika Srpska brought a decision on December the 1st, 1992, to present
1 you a demand for the urgent and obligatory rendering possible for all
2 those who wish it, regardless of nationality, to cross to the Serbian
3 territory - Grbavica ..."
4 And so on and so on.
5 [Interpretation] Do you remember that we kept asking for that all
6 the time; namely, that civilians from Sarajevo be allowed to leave the
7 city if they so wish, and that we opened corridors for Slovenes, Jews,
8 Muslims, who crossed our territory in order to reach Serbia?
9 A. Sir, you know the problem of the United Nations in this matter.
10 We were not allowed at all to cater to such a request. It was very
11 clear, and you did not bring this up, that this is ethnic cleansing. But
12 how does the world understand it? How do we understand it? If you ask
13 that the Serbs move out from inside Sarajevo
14 this is so that you will destroy the city, with all those who remain in
15 it after you evacuate the city. So there is a case of uncertainty on the
16 other side, in the adversary. Therefore, everybody was highly tense, and
17 we were trying to ask them to stop the firing first and then we will
18 decide who goes where. Stop the shelling of civilians first. This is
19 what concerned us first and foremost, as well as the international
21 Freedom of mobility was for people -- was it for people to move
22 according to ethnic divisions? This is what Ms. Plavsic asked me, for
23 the evacuation of 500 people. I told her, Please don't ask us for such
24 requests. I do not have the mandate for this. Please drop this point.
25 Let us not raise it again. We are not in a situation to do so. Yet I
1 noticed that within Sarajevo
2 people, and there were relations of fear among others. There are those
3 who were afraid, and they came to the UN headquarters to seek protection.
4 And we would tell them, We do not have the mandate to do this. And we
5 were accused by the Bosnian government to be overseeing the ethnic
6 cleansing process, and we told them, No, these people are in fear, and we
7 are allowing them -- am I too quick and are the interpreters able to
8 catch up with me or not?
9 JUDGE KWON: We are very fortunate to be able to follow, General.
10 THE WITNESS: Okay, okay, sir.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thanks to the excellence of our interpreters.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Q. But in this document, General, you do see that I said "regardless
14 of nationality," and sometimes, say, Macedonians and Slovenes asked to
15 move out collectively, the Jewish organisation, this British Jewish
16 organisation, had signed an agreement with me to make it possible for
18 Do you agree with me, General, that the Geneva Convention
19 prohibits ethnic cleansing, but also the taking of ethnic hostages; that
20 is to say, prohibiting the freedom of movement of civilians? I just need
21 a yes or no on that.
22 A. Of course -- as far as the Geneva Conventions, of course, ethnic
23 cleansing is completely prohibited in all these conventions. However, on
24 the freedom of mobility under war conditions, we noted that what was
25 needed here was mobility on ethnic grounds, and this is what we refused.
1 And this is the detail I wanted to clarify.
2 Q. Thank you, General. These are absolutely -- this is absolutely
3 not criticism of UNPROFOR, but the other side that kept Serbs and others,
4 including Muslims, as you wrote in your reports, or your people wrote in
5 these reports, that what was there was the promotion of a siege
6 mentality. That's the picture they were trying to create. And I called
7 these civilians who are being kept there ethnic hostages. Do you
8 remember that I talked about that all the time, that it's much better to
9 be an ethnic refugee than an ethnic hostage, because a refugee is at
10 least temporarily safe, whereas hostages were always faced with the
11 danger of something happening to them? Do you remember that in addition
12 to ethnic refugees, I introduced this term "ethnic hostages," and that I
13 thought that that was just as impermissible as ethnic cleansing was?
14 A. Sir, what I recall is that the movement of certain ethnic groups,
15 though the request was put on humanitarian grounds, but I told you,
16 Please appreciate our position. We are acting under the eyes of the
17 whole world, and our guide-lines, our regulations, do not allow us.
18 Perhaps this is an exceptional situation that relates to the particular
19 situation in Bosnia
20 guarantees freedom of mobility, but not under conditions of war, when the
21 situation is as it was in those days. Such mobility -- such a
22 displacement would bring danger upon them and would undermine the
23 credibility of the United Nations, as well as increasing the tensions of
24 hostilities in the crisis zones, to perpetuate them and to make them even
25 more hotter and more undermining of international security.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you will have 10 minutes to conclude
2 your cross-examination.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Didn't you say until 1.00 p.m.
4 JUDGE KWON: I gave you an hour.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then that's the interpretation I
6 received, until 1.00 p.m.
7 Can this be admitted?
8 So that is what I expected.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D524, Your Honours.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Q. General, since I have only 10 minutes left, could I ask you for a
13 brief clarification of certain concepts so that the Trial Chamber would
14 understand what we mean when we say certain things. Can we spend these
15 10 minutes just having yes-or-no answers.
16 Do you agree that your reports to the UN were accessible to the
17 co-chairman on the Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina; one of the
18 co-chairman was always there on behalf of the Secretary-General?
19 A. Not my own reports, in particular, but the reports of the higher
20 leadership in Zagreb
21 areas, these were drafted into the overall report.
22 Q. Thank you. That is what I had assumed. So it was a synthetic
23 report, as it were, that was sent to the United Nations and was
24 accessible to all.
25 Do you agree that before the war and during the war, we were
1 involved in a peace process at some international conference, one or
3 A. Yes, yes.
4 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that you mentioned that we also
5 handed over some maps to you, maps that explained what was acceptable to
6 us as a political solution, especially with regard to territories?
7 A. Yes, yes, such a map was there at the meetings of Mr. Nambiar
8 with the sector command, and we believe they did not reflect our point of
9 view. They did reflect your point of view.
10 Q. I agree with you, our point of view. Do you agree that we were
11 under constant pressure to accept solutions that we fought against, and
12 they were not favourable for us, in the territorial sense, and also in
13 the sense that they envisaged a very strong central government?
14 A. Sir, you are dragging me into a political discussion. Now, what
15 I know, from my experience, is that if there is a true desire for peace,
16 then the parties have to meet in the middle of the way. Nobody gets all
17 that he wants.
18 Q. I agree concessions have to be made. I don't want to drag you
19 into a political discussion. I just wish to inform the OTP and the
20 Trial Chamber that when we talked to you, we hoped that the synthetic
21 reports from Zagreb
22 co-chairman would suggest solutions that we would not be able to accept
23 for the reasons of territories and the constitutional reasons. We
24 opposed to those solutions. And the way you portrayed it was that we
25 were constantly opposed to the central government. Do you remember that;
1 yes or no? I'm sure that you will remember.
2 A. Yes, yes, I do.
3 Q. Thank you. General, sir, will you allow for the possibility that
4 we may have not been clear enough, and thus we contributed to the
5 confusion and to the misunderstanding of the sentence, We cannot live
6 with the Croats and the Muslims? Do you accept that what we meant to say
7 was that we could not live under the Croats and Muslims or, rather, under
8 the central or centralised unitarian government which was under the
9 control of the Muslims?
10 A. Sir, I remind you of the fine meeting we had at Christmas, and I
11 asked you, What's your bottom line? And you said, and this was a side
12 talk -- we were not in a professional meeting, I was not on a
13 professional mission. It was a social and humanitarian occasion. And I
14 heard from you and your members this particular expression, We cannot
15 living together anymore. They said this. And they said, Why not? Get
16 your lessons from the world. Germany
17 today they are members, and the same thing in the Middle East. Between
18 us and Israel
19 here we are living and we hope that the future will be good so people do
20 not stop at one stage and life goes on. I said this, and perhaps you
21 recall. I hoped that you would find a certain way to do it, and I said,
22 You have to have the political will to do so. You know that I write my
23 diaries and I have written down such things in detail. I told you, You
24 need the political will to do so, and then you will live together,
25 ultimately, because there is nowhere else for you to go to.
1 I only want to clarify my own point of view through the
2 discussion that took place on that occasion.
3 Q. Thank you. Do you remember, General, sir, that there were little
4 villages and little towns in Republika Srpska which were purely Muslim,
5 and they remained intact until the very end of the war; for example,
6 Janja and Biljana, some villages on Mount Romanija, and so on and so
7 forth? Do you remember that there were such villages? Those villages
8 that did not get involved in the fighting remained intact until the very
9 end of the war? Just yes or no to the question. Whether you remember
10 that there were such villages?
11 A. Yes, yes, yes, and I underline this.
12 I want to clarify a matter.
13 When we would discuss the conditions in Zagreb, the hot spots or
14 the hot places where clashes were taking place were defined, as well as
15 the peaceful places, and then each sector commander would clarify the
16 situation. In fact, there were some safe areas where there were no
17 problems that the United Nations had to deal with.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, General, sir.
19 I wish I'd been clear when it came to explaining our position. When I
20 said that we could not live together, I meant that we could not live
21 under the central government. But I believe that I've rectified that.
22 Your Excellencies, I have finished my cross-examination. If the
23 OTP does not object to the associated documents of the United Nations, I
24 would like to tender those into evidence as well.
25 Thank you very much.
1 JUDGE KWON: Associated with what, Mr. Karadzic; with his
2 amalgamated statement or what else document you are referring to?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I primarily mean the United Nations
4 document from that period, the original telegrams, or our letters to them
5 covering the topics that the general testified about in the courtroom.
6 We would like to be given the possibility to use associated documents
7 which are not in dispute, without having to waste any courtroom time on
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
10 Speaking for myself, those are proper -- an appropriate subject
11 for a Bar table motion, but we'll consider whatever motions will be filed
12 from you, Mr. Karadzic.
13 And before I give the floor to you, the Chamber has some
14 questions for the witness, starting from Judge Baird.
15 Questioned by the Court:
16 JUDGE BAIRD: General.
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes. I should like to take you back to the
19 evidence you gave yesterday, and we would like certain areas to be
20 clarified. What I shall do is to read a portion of the testimony to
21 assist you in putting it in context.
22 Now, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff and Dr. Karadzic, this is page 5537 of
23 yesterday's transcript, lines 8 to 14.
24 Now, General, in answer to Dr. Karadzic, you said:
25 "I said that that was my personal feeling. Nobody prompted me or
1 nobody alluded to me about that. So with all the shelling and the
2 deprivation the civilians were facing, and not seeing any glimmer of hope
3 after the presence of the UN forces, that led me to the conviction or to
4 the belief that the civilians wanted international intervention, wanted
5 the international community to step in. Nobody told me this, but that
6 was how I felt."
7 Now, who wanted the international community to step in, the SDA
8 leadership or the civilians?
9 A. Thank you, Your Honour. I said this was my personal feeling.
10 Nobody talked with me about their desire in any formal way for an
11 international intervention. Nobody said this to me, but I -- due to the
12 fact that I was present, I had lots of contacts and discussions; many
13 people, journalists, officials, and ordinary people, even, came to the
14 PTT building, or when I met them while I was on a visit here or there.
15 We would sit and talk in order for me to discover what were the feelings
16 of people. And people found out that we were under attack, just as the
17 civilians were. They did not find, in the presence of the
18 United Nations, sufficient protection. We did not provide them with
19 sufficient protection from shelling, or we did not provide them with the
20 necessities of life. And the media conducted a vicious campaign against
21 us, and they accused us of this. They said we were not qualified, and
22 unable to move, and they considered us to be victims. And we considered
23 ourselves, as well, to be victims. And in my reply to them, I said, Yes,
24 we are suffering. We left our beautiful and calm and good lives in our
25 countries and came here and we live under the same situation.
1 So this was my personal feeling. I felt they wanted something
2 else, something more effective, something that would bring them security
3 and safety and put an end to this situation, this inhumane situation full
4 of bloodshed and killing. This was the feeling I got, and I -- in my
5 meeting with the Secretary-General, I told him that this was the feeling.
6 I told him, People are desperate here and they believe we are not
7 effective, not efficient. And I believe there was a need for
8 international pressures in order to arrive at a political solution, for
9 with the shelling going on, we would not reach a solution at all.
10 JUDGE BAIRD: I thank you very much, indeed, for that, General.
11 Now, Ms. Retzlaff, Dr. Karadzic, I now refer to page 5575, lines
12 4 to 19.
13 Now, General, again yesterday Dr. Karadzic said:
14 "In conversation, the French officers emphasised that Muslim
15 forces have been responsible for many attacks on UN forces in Sarajevo
16 They also claim that the Bosnian leadership keeps water supplies limited
17 to strengthen the siege mentality and to make the city the focus of
18 international attention."
19 And Dr. Karadzic asked you:
20 "Do you remember that this is what we were saying all along, and
21 that we were disbelieved until the representatives of the international
22 community saw this for themselves?"
23 You asked for a bit of clarification, and then he continued:
24 "Well, the question -- we were saying that the Muslims were
25 playing tricks on us and that they wanted us to be accused of victimising
1 the city, as the French people say here, to strengthen the siege
2 mentality. However, we were not believed until the foreigners
3 experienced this themselves."
4 Now, you did answer the question, General, but can you, please,
5 for my benefit -- do you remember that this was what the Serb side was
6 saying all along, that they were disbelieved until the representatives of
7 the international community saw it for themselves?
8 A. Your Honour, answering that question, I would say that we used to
9 deal with things case by case, as United Nations, so we would take the
10 claims of the Serbian side to the other side and discuss it over with
11 them. And as I said, all sides denied what they -- all the violence that
12 they committed, and they accused the other side of starting the violence
13 and that what they did was retaliation in order to stop the violence of
14 the other side. We, as the United Nations -- and that is why I called
15 the entire situation as a war game, because that war game was not
16 conducted in compatible of warfare rules. It was a civil war.
17 Neighbours fought their neighbours, civilians fought other civilians.
18 So I knew the nature of the situation that I was going to be
19 faced with, so when I went to the meetings, I had a previous knowledge of
20 what was going to be said to me during the meetings. So if there are
21 some facts concerning offensive acts by the Muslim side, I think I --
22 that would -- must have been mentioned in my reports and to the other
23 side. I mean, that happened with the Serbian side, that I respected
24 them, because I knew that General Galic was a soldier who acted upon
1 Of course, leaders would like to seem cooperative and would like
2 to give a positive image of themselves, but they lacked the control.
3 I think the first thing a leader should do or a commander should do, that
4 a commander should exercise total control of his or her subordinates.
5 Otherwise, there is some kind of malfunction in their duties.
6 I hope I have answered your question, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE BAIRD: You have, and I thank you.
8 I have one final question for you, General. And Ms. Retzlaff and
9 Dr. Karadzic, this is at page 5583, lines 5 and 6.
10 Now, in answer to Dr. Karadzic, General, you said:
11 "The bars was not from the media. The media was able to move
12 very freely in the region. They followed events and developments."
13 Now, General, are you saying that the media did not encounter any
14 sort of restrictions or inhibitions in their movements in the region at
15 any time at all?
16 A. Your Honour, you know how the media correspondents worked. They
17 are adventurers. They carry around their cameras and they receive high
18 salaries for their work, and I think the same goes for any other place in
19 the world where there's a conflict. So they take pictures. I raised the
20 question with Mr. Karadzic. I told him that, You were bringing damage
21 and prejudicing your own cause. What you're doing is before the eyes and
22 ears of the entire world. The media correspondents are everywhere, and
23 they convey that image to the world. And I think the media has a strong
24 impact on developments. They have strong weapons to do so. And I told
25 the Serbs that they failed in their mission to change their image.
1 I apologise. I -- Christiane Amanpour approached me for an
2 interview. I said, Well, accepting or giving interviews to media was
3 contrary to the rules observed by the United Nations. And she asked for
4 an interview with Mr. Karadzic. I facilitated her transport, and she
5 could communicate with him. I also asked her to interview Mr. Ganic.
6 Mr. Izetbegovic was out of town.
7 So nobody can question the role of media. We, as commanders,
8 cannot stand in their way, so we wouldn't cause any hindrance to the
9 movement of CNN correspondents, for example, who carried cameras around.
10 They also have their own bypass -- bypasses where they can get to their
11 objective according to their own methods. I personally received some
12 training, media training.
13 So if you are asking the question whether the media has an impact
14 on the world public opinion, I say, Yes. So why would the media focus on
15 the Serbian party? I think it is their own choice, their own affair. So
16 I think that we know we are all -- we are all influenced by the media.
17 Some people would use the media to diffuse reports or to broadcast
18 reports, but we do not follow the media. We have our own monitors, who
19 would report on the situation on the ground, and we report the events to
20 our leadership and our headquarters.
21 JUDGE BAIRD: I thank you. I wasn't targeting the influence of
22 the media. But in answering the question, you gave me what I was after,
23 and I thank you very much, indeed. Thank you.
24 JUDGE KWON: Judge Morrison has a further question.
25 JUDGE MORRISON: General, as a very senior officer, you would
1 have seen both success and failure in terms of command and control, in
2 the military sense.
3 You said, in your evidence, that subordinate officers in the
4 field didn't comply with the aspirations of the commanders when you had
5 talked to them face to face, and you said that, effectively, on a number
6 of occasions. Bearing in mind your own experience as a senior officer,
7 and your specific experience in Sarajevo
8 deliberate failure of goodwill by the subordinates or a lack of effective
9 command and control through the military chain of command?
10 A. In order to assess that situation from a professional standpoint,
11 I think we -- we can accept both possibilities. I know that there are
12 militias -- there are civilians who work alongside the military, who are
13 trained how to use a gun and how to fire a gun. But as for the
14 discipline and rules of engagement that should be observed by the
15 subordinates, and their obeying of the orders, I think that was loose on
16 the ground.
17 In my talk with the leadership, with the commanders, I urged them
18 to make more efforts to that direction. If that happened, I think many
19 achievements could have been made, and, I know that have you a good
20 intention to co-operate with the United Nations, but you have failed to
21 control your subordinates. And I know the situation was of a civil war.
22 There were militias, there were soldiers, there were civilians who
23 carried weapons and who were armed with strong passions, and were urged
24 to fight side by side their soldiers, so I think those people were not
25 trained on the rules of engagement. I think there was some failure in
1 the communications system or some failure in the chain of command.
2 So I think in order to evaluate the situation, I think there was
3 a lack of control by the central command and that there was no full
4 co-ordination between the leadership and the higher command and the
5 subordinates on the ground.
6 JUDGE MORRISON: [Arabic spoken]
7 THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Retzlaff, do you have some questions for the
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, actually I do have a question in
11 relation to an answer that was given on page 56 -- sorry, 57, the last
12 bit from line 16 onwards.
13 Re-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:
14 Q. General, in relation to the discussion of whether people in
16 following answer:
17 "I noticed that within Sarajevo
18 some people and there were relations of fear among others. There are
19 those who were afraid, and they came to the UN headquarters to seek
21 General, those that came to the UN headquarters to seek
22 protection, what were they afraid of?
23 A. Dear madam, I think the continued shelling of the city, the
24 sniping -- continued sniping, lack of supplies, I think all those factors
25 led those people -- well, of course, the endurance can be relative. So
1 I think those were the reasons that determined the morale of the
2 population. So people did not have any problem of living together. They
3 wanted the United Nations to bring about a cessation -- a cessation of
4 hostilities. And I can say that we hired the services of civilians and
5 those to help us with our mission, and the civilians were a mixture of
6 Croatians, Serbians, and Bosnians. We used to throw parties in the
7 presence of all these ethnic representatives of the ethnic groups. So
8 the overall feeling among those people was their will to bring about a
9 cessation of hostilities.
10 So I wanted to bring about the full implementation of the
11 agreements that were reached with the parties. I know that the people of
13 said that I asked Ms. Plavsic not to ask me to help to displace
14 individuals on ethnic basis, and that shouldn't be -- and the
15 United Nations shouldn't be asked to do so.
16 I hope I have been clear enough on that particular point.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, yes. Thank you, General.
18 Your Honour, no further questions.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
20 There's just one issue that came up during the last portion of
21 his testimony that I'd like to bring to the attention of the Chamber.
22 I'm sorry to prolong the proceedings at this point.
23 On page 62, and lines 15 and 16, he said:
24 "You know, I have my diaries, and I have written things down in
1 In response to a question about a meeting he had at Christmas
2 with Dr. Karadzic. And I was wondering if the Chamber would be willing
3 to inquire of the general whether, after redacting any personal
4 information, he would be willing to make those diaries, for this period
5 that he served in Sarajevo
6 parties in obtaining further details that might assist us in coming to
7 the truth in this issue.
8 Thank you.
9 JUDGE KWON: General, do you have any observation to this
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sir, if you want me to send to you
12 a diary, I think there are notes about so many years contained in that
13 diary -- I always write down what happens in the world, and I noted down
14 everything that happened. From a military point of view, I note down
15 articles, press articles, and other things. And I can assure you that I
16 published a number of articles. I never talked about the situation
17 there. I would talk about the military difficulties that I would be
18 faced with, so those -- that is the kind of articles I would publish. If
19 you want me to give you that, a copy of that, I would go to my library
20 and make a collection of those articles and send you those articles.
21 I told you that I talked about a particular document. I
22 commented a particular document that was shown on the screen. All what I
23 mentioned in that diary was compatible about what was shown on the
24 screen. I have no problem in sending you that diary. You would find
25 notes about my mission in Angola
1 Angolan president or the commander of the UNITA movement. I would
2 scribble some notes about those meetings that I attended.
3 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I just wanted to clarify that,
4 actually, we would just be asking for this time-period that he was in
6 nature. So it could be very limited.
7 JUDGE KWON: I'm noting the time. I leave it at that.
8 So I would like to advise the parties, if necessary, to liaise
9 with the Victim and Witness Section, to contact with the witness, whether
10 he would be willing to copy those parties, redacting those unnecessary
11 parts, and pass it on to the other parties.
12 Thank you, General. This concludes your evidence, and the
13 Chamber wishes to express gratitude to you for your coming to give it.
14 Now you are free to go.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I thank you, Mr. President. And I
16 thank all the parties, and I wish you all success.
17 [The witness withdrew]
18 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for half an hour.
19 --- Recess taken at 12.48 p.m.
20 [The witness entered court]
21 --- On resuming at 1.21 p.m.
22 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Mr. Suljevic.
23 If you could take the solemn declaration, please.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
25 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 WITNESS: EKREM SULJEVIC
2 [Witness answered through interpreter]
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please be seated.
4 Mr. Karadzic, you have a new member or an expert to introduce to
5 the Bench?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Thank you for giving me
7 this possibility to introduce Zorica Subotic from Belgrade. She's the
8 Defence expert for this particular area, this segment.
9 JUDGE KWON: Welcome, Madam Subotic.
10 Mr. Gaynor, now it's your witness.
11 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Examination by Mr. Gaynor:
13 Q. Sir, could you state --
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 MR. GAYNOR:
16 Q. Sir, could you state your full name, please?
17 A. Ekrem Suljevic.
18 Q. On the 9th of February, 2010, you signed an amalgamated witness
19 statement; is that correct?
20 A. That's correct.
21 MR. GAYNOR: Could 65 ter 22267 be brought up, please.
22 Q. Mr. Suljevic, yesterday the statement was read to you in its
23 entirety in your language, and you looked at the underlying documents; is
24 that correct?
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. During your review, you noted one or two minor errors and a
2 couple of minor clarifications which you wished to make; is that correct?
3 A. That's correct.
4 MR. GAYNOR: Now, Your Honours, I simply propose to read the six
5 minor corrections to the consolidated statement and ask the witness to --
6 if he agrees with that.
7 In paragraph 1, change "Stanislav Galic" to "Dragomir Milosevic."
8 In paragraph 8, line 2, move the words "Mirza Jamakovic" to, after the
9 words "the head of our department." In paragraph 17, line 5, delete the
10 words "and the flight." Paragraph 17, line 7, insert the words "the
11 location from which the projectile had been fired," after the word
12 "observed." In paragraph 48, at the last line, change the word "shell"
13 to "primary charge." The heading before paragraph 49, the date should
14 read "24th of May," not "26th of May." And the document referred to in
15 paragraph 58 should be "65 ter 09796," rather than "09818."
16 Q. Now, subject to those corrections, Mr. Suljevic, do you confirm
17 that your amalgamated statement accurately reflects your evidence and
18 that you would provide the same answers to questions if you were asked,
19 under oath, about those topics today?
20 A. Yes, fully, to the best of my knowledge and my recollection.
21 MR. GAYNOR: At this time, Your Honours, I seek to have the
22 amalgamated statement admitted in evidence.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1276, Your Honours.
25 MR. GAYNOR: And I propose to read a brief summary of the
1 witness's evidence set out in that statement.
2 Ekrem Suljevic is a mechanical engineer and was an investigator
3 for the Counter Sabotage Protection Unit, or the KDZ, of the Ministry of
4 the Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the RBiH MUP,
5 which was tasked with the investigation of serious shelling incidents at
6 civilian locations during the siege of Sarajevo. He participated in the
7 investigation of 50 to 60 such incidents. In his amalgamated statement,
8 he discusses reports by the RBiH MUP KDZ and the Sarajevo Security
9 Services Centre, or CSB
10 incidents in Sarajevo
11 methodology of the RBiH MUP KDZ when investigating shelling incidents,
12 including determining the direction of fire and the collection and
13 analysis of projectile fragments. He explains the markings on projectile
14 fragments which indicate the year in which they were manufactured and the
15 location of manufacture, which in many cases was the Krusik factory in
16 Valjevo in Serbia
17 air-bombs, which were bombs designed to be dropped from aircraft which
18 were crudely modified in order to be delivered by a rocket system and
19 were, therefore, highly inaccurate weapons.
20 That ends the summary.
21 Q. Now, Mr. Suljevic, during the period you were working in the KDZ
22 in 1994 and 1995, could you describe briefly, in general terms, the level
23 of intensity of shelling in Sarajevo
24 A. Sarajevo
25 relative lull. While we worked, we were actually over-worked in the
1 beginning, because the CSB
2 were investigations of incidents that were caused by projectiles falling,
3 regardless of whether there were any casualties involved. Sometimes, we
4 could not even take part in this because we were so busy. After that, it
5 was suggested, or agreed, if I can put it that way, that our employees
6 should be called by the CSB
7 casualties involved when a projectile exploded.
8 Q. Now, Mr. Suljevic, in your statement you've described, and that's
9 at paragraphs 37 to 40, the concept of modified air-bombs. Just briefly
10 summarise what a modified air-bomb consisted of.
11 A. Briefly, a modified air-bomb - that's what we called it, at
12 least - is a structure that consists of an air-bomb that is intended, as
13 the name says, itself, for aircraft use. It was propelled by rocket
14 engines, and these two parts are connected through an adapter, so that it
15 would be a compact whole.
16 Q. Now, you've also referred in your statement, paragraph 29, to the
17 fact that your unit collected unexploded projectiles which had been fired
18 upon Sarajevo
19 few examples of the kinds of projectiles which your unit collected and
21 A. Well, in principle, we were not involved in collecting them. But
22 when we would learn of such projectiles, our unit would remove them. The
23 explosive charge would be removed, and the remaining parts of the
24 projectiles would be left as samples in order to compare the traces that
25 we saw during investigations after explosions. So -- well, I haven't
1 been in that department since 2003, but to this day there are such
2 samples in that department, from the very smallest ones, 60-millimetre
3 mortar projectiles, to 155-millimetre projectiles. Also, there are
4 samples of fuses.
5 I actually found this when I came to the department. I think
6 that as the JNA was leaving the barracks and the school centre there,
7 I think that that's when those samples were brought in. That's where I
8 found them, and they are there to this day.
9 Q. From your statement, Mr. Suljevic, it appears that you're
10 familiar with projectiles such as 120-millimetre and 82-millimetre
11 mortars, 76-millimetre artillery projectiles, and 155-millimetre Howitzer
12 shells, just by way of example; is that right?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Now, Mr. Suljevic, on Monday, as you'll remember, I showed you 45
15 documents, and you provided observations on those documents. Now, I
16 propose to take you very swiftly through those documents and to ask you
17 to tell the Court your observations on those documents as concisely as
18 you possibly can, please.
19 And so we'll start.
20 If I could ask that 65 ter 06923 be brought up?
21 Now, Mr. Suljevic, you'll remember, if we just pass quickly to
22 pages 2 and 3 of this document in the B/C/S version - there's just one
23 English translation - now you'll remember that essentially the content of
24 all three documents are the same. So if we just focus on the one that's
25 on your screen now, could you just quickly describe what that document
1 is, as far as you can tell?
2 A. This is a telefax message that was sent by the director of
3 Pretis, a company that is in Vogosca. Throughout the war, it was under
4 the control of the Army of Republika Srpska. The director is asking the
5 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska to speak to the chief of
6 General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia so that he can receive 1.000
7 rocket engines, 122, for -- Grad, and that that be sent to the Army of
8 Republika Srpska.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other
10 microphones be switched off when the witness is speaking. Thank you.
11 MR. GAYNOR:
12 Q. Now, Mr. Suljevic, the reference to 122-millimetre Grad rockets
13 there appears to coincide with references in paragraph 51 and 53 of your
14 statement to the use of 122-millimetre Grad rockets for the delivery of
15 modified air-bombs. Does this appear to be the same kind of rocket as we
16 see in this document?
17 A. I think that it's the same rocket engines, 122 millimetres. It's
18 called "Grad."
19 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.
20 Can we move to the next document, which is 07123.
21 Q. Now, if you can read that, Mr. Suljevic. And can you just
22 briefly tell us what that is?
23 A. The commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, Dragomir Milosevic,
24 is sending a document to some brigade, some 3rd Brigade. Pursuant to the
25 order of the chief of General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, the
1 following is ordered: Out of the total of 2.648 rounds of 82-millimetre
2 mortar which came from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the
3 27th Logistics Base, probably, should return 1.000 rounds of
4 82-millimetre mortar shells.
5 Q. And the 82-millimetre mortar, is that the same kind of projectile
6 that you've described in your statement as being one of the kinds used in
7 shelling incidents which you investigated as part of your work for the
9 A. Well, in every report that involved 82-millimetre shells, it was
10 those shells. I don't know which shells you are referring to
11 specifically, but there were reports that pertained to 82-millimetre
12 shells because there are no other shells for 82-millimetre mortars.
13 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. Suljevic.
14 If we can have the next document, which is 07239.
15 At this stage, Your Honours, I'd like to request if you'd prefer
16 if I tender each document individually or if I tender them when I've
18 JUDGE KWON: I think it would be okay, given the situation, to
19 tender them comprehensively at the end of your examination.
20 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
21 Q. Now, this document, Mr. Suljevic, if you can focus not -- just on
22 the opening words of the document and then, for example, on the items
23 described in numbers 9, 10, and 11. Tell us briefly what this document
25 A. This document, issued by the commander of the Sarajevo
1 Drina Corps, was sent to the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army,
2 asking them to refer to the Army of Yugoslavia with a request for a
3 further batch of weapons and ammunition. Under numbers 10, 11 and 12:
4 200 shells for 120 mortars; 76-millimetre shells for M42 ZIS gun;
5 82-millimetre shells for MB; and, finally, 300 rounds of 155-millimetre
6 shells for M1 Howitzer.
7 Q. And do these coincides with the kinds of projectiles which you or
8 your unit recovered from locations in Sarajevo following their firing
9 upon Sarajevo
10 A. Yes, all those three types of projectiles were kept in our
11 department as samples.
12 MR. GAYNOR: Now I'd like the next document to be brought up,
13 please. That's 07403.
14 Q. Could you tell us briefly what this document is about?
15 A. This is a notification signed by Zarko Ljubojevic, who was
16 authorised by the head of the Logistics Sector, or, rather, its technical
17 department. And in this notification, we see that the following types
18 and quantities of aerial bombs will be given for completion: 15 pieces
19 of FAB
20 rocket, a total of 57 pieces, plus three handwritten [as interpreted],
21 which amounts to the grand total of 60 pieces. And further on, it
22 says -- or, rather, there are instructions as to how the aerial bombs
23 should be completed, and it says here that FAB-100 should be completed
24 with one motor each, whereas FAB
25 motors each.
1 Q. What do you understand the term "completed" means in this
3 A. Within this context, this means to make a modified aerial bomb
4 which will have the explosive charge of an aerial bomb, and that it will
5 be adapted to include a motor which will carry the charge from the moment
6 the bomb is launched to the moment it lands at its target.
7 MR. GAYNOR: Could I have 08136, please.
8 Q. Mr. Suljevic, focusing, really, just on the first paragraph of
9 this document, as well as its header, just tell us what this one's about.
10 A. The Technical Overhaul and Repairs Institution, based in Hadzici,
11 which was under the control of the VRS Army throughout the entire war,
12 sent a request to the Ilijas Ironworks and refers to an order of the
13 Main Staff of the VRS, and the request is for six pieces of
14 six-metre-long launchers, and the launchers will be used to produce
15 launchers for the modified aerial bombs.
16 Q. Could you explain how you deduced that they'll be used for
17 modified air-bombs?
18 A. They will not be used for the aerial bombs or modified aerial
19 bombs. They will be used for the launching pads for such aerial bombs.
20 From those pads, modified aerial bombs would be launched or fired in the
21 direction of a target.
22 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have 08146, please.
23 Q. Now, Mr. Suljevic, focusing your attention, really, on the last
24 sentence of the first paragraph, as well as on items 3, 6, 7, and 8,
25 could you tell the Court what this document is about?
1 A. The Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps requests from the
2 Main Staff of the VRS to prepare an approval, and that approval would be
3 taken by their representative to the Main Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia
4 in order to obtain the following ordnance. And the ordnance includes:
5 Mortars, 120-millimetre mortars, 10 pieces; 76-millimetre shells for the
6 ZIS gun, 1.000 pieces; 800 shells for 128 millimetre; and, finally,
7 120-millimetre shells for a -- mortar shells.
8 Q. Just focusing on the last couple of words of the first paragraph,
9 could you tell the Court what you understand those to refer to?
10 A. It says here that the ordnance is indispensable:
11 "... for combat activities, especially for strengthening our
12 front on the inner and outer rings."
13 And since we are talking about the Sarajevo and Romanija Corps, I
14 believe that the needs concerned combat activities on the inner and outer
15 rings of the city of Sarajevo
16 MR. GAYNOR: Can we have document 0484 -- pardon me, 08223,
18 Q. And this one, Mr. Suljevic, could you tell us what the document
19 is? And focus on item 1 of the listed items.
20 A. [No interpretation]
21 JUDGE KWON: Are we getting the translation?
22 MR. GAYNOR: No, I'm not receiving it either, Mr. President.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can you hear me now?
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Suljevic, if you could repeat your answer.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In this document, the commander of
1 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps submits information to the Main Staff of the
2 Army of Republika Srpska, referring to a document issued by the
3 Main Staff of the VRS in which they probably had requested certain
4 information, and he also submits information about the available ordnance
5 and equipment.
6 Under 1, he says that they have four pieces of launchers for
7 aerial bombs of 105, 200, and 250 kilograms.
8 MR. GAYNOR: Could we have 04080, please.
9 Q. Could you tell us what this document is, Mr. Suljevic?
10 A. In this document, the Technical Department of the Logistics
11 Sector of the Main Staff of the VRS informs the Command of the
12 35th Logistics Base, as well as the Command of the 27th Logistics Base, I
13 suppose, and also the company Pretis for information only, and it says
14 that the 35th Logistics Base will transport, by their own transport
15 means, and deliver to Pretis for completion the following types and
16 quantities of aerial bombs: FAB
17 That's FAB
18 pieces. What follows are instructions as to how to complete or, rather,
19 how to construct modified aerial bombs.
20 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have 09095, please.
21 Q. With this document, Mr. Suljevic, could you concentrate and tell
22 us briefly what it is? And focus on the first item listed only. Thank
24 A. In this document, the chief of artillery sent information to the
25 Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps -- or, rather, he requests
1 information about the number of launchers for aerial bombs and
2 description as to what types of bombs each of them could launch.
3 MR. GAYNOR: Could I ask for the next document, which is 09102.
4 Q. Could you comment on this document, please?
5 A. The Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps requests from the
6 Main Staff of the Yugoslav Army to send them aerial bombs, because they
7 needed them to enhance the combat readiness of the
8 Sarajevo Romanija Corps units. They requested 100 pieces of FAB-100
9 aerial bombs as well as 100 pieces of aerial bomb FAB-250.
10 Q. And could you comment on the location named there in the next
12 A. It says here that:
13 "We inform you on this occasion that we will provide for the
14 return of the approved assets through company Krusik-Namenska, Valjevo,
15 through our previous financial regulations of relations with the
16 mentioned company and their possibilities to supply the aforementioned."
17 Q. Now, in your amalgamated statement, you've referred to Krusik,
18 Valjevo, in another context. What context was that?
19 A. Valjevo-based Krusik was often found as marks on the remains of
20 projectiles, which indicated that the devices had been produced in the
21 Valjevo-based Krusik company. As far as I know, the same company,
22 Krusik, developed and manufactured rockets, projectiles, before the war.
23 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have 09115, please.
24 Q. Could you focus, really, on paragraph 2 of this one, please,
25 Mr. Suljevic? The original is -- if we just wait a moment, the original
1 will be on your screen.
2 If you look at paragraph 2 of this document and the header, just
3 tell us what this document is about.
4 A. I don't think that we have the English match.
5 The Logistics Sector of the Main Staff of the VRS refers to an
6 order of the commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, and sends this
7 document to the Commands of the 27th Logistics Base and the
8 35th Logistics Base, as well as Pretis company, for the information of
9 the last two. And it says here that the 27th Logistics Base will collect
10 and transport 30 pieces of FAB
11 M79 aerial bombs from the 35th Logistics Base. After the collection, the
12 bombs, together with the corresponding number of rocket-launchers, are to
13 be transported and delivered to Pretis HD for completion. In this case,
14 I believe that this means completion and production of the corresponding
15 number of modified aerial bombs.
16 And further on, we see instructions as to how the bombs should be
17 completed and how many engines should be -- or motors should be attached
18 to each of them.
19 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.
20 Can I have document 09162, please.
21 Q. It's a fairly short one, Mr. Suljevic. If you'd just describe
22 briefly -- no read to read it out. Just describe, briefly, what it is.
23 A. This is just a response from one of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps
24 units, or, rather, a report on the situation with regard to aerial bomb
25 launchers, and they say that they have just one air-bomb launcher in
1 their possession.
2 MR. GAYNOR: Number 09185, please.
3 Q. Would you tell us what this document is about? You can
4 concentrate on the typewritten text, please.
5 A. The Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps sends this document to
6 the commander. This is a document in which they inform him that in
7 Hadzici, the aerial bomb-launcher for bombs up to 500 kilometres
8 [as interpreted] was manufactured in Hadzici of a much higher quality
9 than any of the previous ones, which means that there were launchers
10 before; that the launcher was mounted on a vehicle, and that a commission
11 should be set up to carry out the testing of the technical performances
12 of that launcher.
13 Q. And, Mr. Suljevic, the interpretation I heard said "500
14 kilometres." Was that what you intended or it might have been an
15 interpretation error?
16 A. No, I said "500 kilograms." Aerial bombs of up to 500 kilograms.
17 If I said "kilometres," it was an error, I misspoke.
18 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you for the clarification.
19 Could I have 09186.
20 Q. This is -- again, this is a similar notification as you've
21 described earlier. Just briefly describe what it is, please.
22 A. The assistant commander for logistics submits the requested data
23 to the Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps about the equipment in
24 their possession, including the information about aerial bomb launchers.
25 MR. GAYNOR: Could I have 09218, please.
1 Q. Could I ask you to describe, just briefly, who this is to and
2 from. And focus on the first of the four points listed in this document.
3 A. This is an order issued by the chief of artillery, whose name is
4 Tadija Manojlovic, for the Command of the 1st Sarajevo Motorised Brigade.
5 It is supposed to carry out all preparations for the manufacture of one
6 launcher by securing vehicles, rails, cranes, and other necessary means
7 for the development of that piece of equipment, and that should be done
8 in the Maintenance and Repairs Depot in Hadzici.
9 MR. GAYNOR: Next document, please, which is 09227.
10 Q. Could you just describe what this document is, please,
11 Mr. Suljevic?
12 A. The document was sent by the commander of the Sarajevo
13 Romanija Corps to the 27th Logistics Base, and we can see in this
14 document that the issuing of 30 aerial bombs of 105 kilograms and 200 [as
15 interpreted] pieces of 250-kilogram aerial bombs has been approved. And
16 we can see how the completed aerial bombs -- or, rather, modified aerial
17 bombs should have been distributed across the units of the
19 MR. GAYNOR: That's sufficient, thank you.
20 Next document, which is --
21 JUDGE KWON: Witness, Mr. Suljevic, did you say 200 pieces of
22 250-kilogram aerial bombs or 20?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Twenty pieces.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Then line 2 of page 89 should read "20."
25 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 The next document, Mr. Suljevic, is 09241. Again, somewhat
2 similar to a couple of previous notifications that you've described.
3 Q. Just tell us, briefly, what it is. It will be on your screen in
4 just a second.
5 A. One of the units of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps is providing
6 requested information to the command. Inter alia, they say that they
7 have a launcher for air-bombs of 100 and 250 kilograms.
8 MR. GAYNOR: The next document is 09267.
9 Q. Could you read this document and tell us your -- what you
10 consider it to be?
11 A. In my view, this is a kind of warning of the chief of the
12 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. It is sent to the Command of
13 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and it says that lower-ranking units are not
14 allowed to address them directly. That is to say, they are not allowed
15 to address the Main Staff directly, but all this has to be done through
16 the Command of the Sarajevo
17 the Ilijas Brigade directly addressed the Main Staff of the Army of
18 Republika Srpska to take air-bombs from the Pretis company, and they did
19 not go through the Sarajevo Romanija Corps when they did that.
20 MR. GAYNOR: Very well. The next document is 09273.
21 Q. Could you tell us what this is? And also just focus on the last
22 sentence in the order.
23 A. The commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps is writing to the
24 Command of the Ilidza Brigade, and it is hereby ordered: that this
25 brigade prepare a launcher with at least five aerial bombs; that the
1 launchers be directed at the airport; and that they be ready to open fire
2 at the command of the commander, Dragomir Milosevic. This same document
3 strictly forbids the use of these weapons without the order of the
4 commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
5 MR. GAYNOR: The next document is 09313.
6 Q. Now, in this document, if you can tell who it is addressed to, to
7 the best of your knowledge, please say so.
8 A. As far as I can see, and in my view, the Main Staff of the
9 Army of Republika Srpska is sending this document to the commands of
10 different corps. I don't know exactly what all of these abbreviations
11 stand for. "KK," may that be the Krajina Corps, perhaps? I'm just
12 guessing. I see here it says "SRK," which is probably the
13 Sarajevo Romanija Corps and some other units as well.
14 Q. Focusing on the first of the four items in respect of which they
15 are requesting information, what does it refer to there?
16 A. What is indispensable is information, so they are requesting
17 information concerning the number of aerial bomb launchers; by type of
18 launcher, that is.
19 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have the next document, please, which is
21 Q. This is somewhat similar to a document that you commented on
22 earlier. Could you tell us, briefly, what this one is?
23 A. This is a document that refers to an order issued by the
24 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, and it says that the chief
25 had regulated the transfer of aerial bombs to the Pretis company for
1 their completion.
2 Q. Further down the document, can you -- is there any information
3 there which enlightens you as to what "completion" means?
4 A. Completing rocket bombs with, well, these modified air-bombs that
5 we referred to at some point when we started.
6 MR. GAYNOR: The next document is document 09337.
7 Q. Quite similar to notifications you've commented on earlier. Tell
8 us, briefly, what it is when it comes up.
9 A. As was stated a moment ago, this is a response to a request to
10 provide information about resources available, inter alia, where
11 launchers for aerial bombs are referred to. The 1st Romania
12 Infantry Brigade Command is saying that they don't have a single
13 rocket-launcher yet, but the manufacture of one is underway. It has to
14 do with air-bomb launchers, therefore.
15 Q. And they are providing that information to who?
16 A. This is a response to the Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
17 In the previous document, we saw that request of the
19 is actually asking their subordinate units for information about
20 available resources.
21 MR. GAYNOR: The next document is 09383.
22 Q. When it comes up, could you tell us who it is from, who it is to,
23 and what it concerns?
24 If the last line of the document could just be made visible to
25 the witness. Thank you.
1 A. This is a document from the commander of the Army of
2 Republika Srpska. He is sending it to the Command of the Sarajevo
3 Romanija Corps. It is being sent directly to the commander. He is
4 informing them that the request of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps is
5 justified concerning the 100- and 250-kilogram aerial bombs. In a way,
6 he is cautioning the commander that it is his duty to take all necessary
7 security measures, to store this equipment, and to make sure that a
8 minimal number of people know about the equipment and the purpose for
9 which it is to be used.
10 Q. Were you able -- I'll move on, Mr. Suljevic.
11 Could I have 09399, please.
12 In this document, you'll see, again, reference to the word
13 "completed." Could you just comment on that?
14 A. It's similar to the previous one. The Logistics Sector of the
15 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska is writing to the
16 Sarajevo Romanija Corps and informing them that the Command of the
17 Sarajevo Romanija Corps will organise the take-over and transportation of
18 four 250-kilogram air-bombs from the Kotorac, probably, Barracks to the
19 Pretis company so that they could be inspected, completed, and prepared
20 for use. After that, this will be taken over and stored by the 27th,
21 well, Logistics Base, probably.
22 Q. Just comment on the words "completion" and "completed" there.
23 A. In my view in this case as well, it has to do with the
24 manufacture or completion of a modified air-bomb that would be ready for
25 launching from those launchers that had also been referred to.
1 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have 09640.
2 Q. This document, could you tell us who it is from, and who it is
3 to, and what it's about?
4 We just need to scroll down to see who it's from. Thank you.
5 A. The document is being sent -- well, could we have a look further
6 down to see who it's from?
7 It's the commander of the Army of Republika Srpska that is
8 sending this document to the Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, or,
9 rather, to the commander, personally, and it says that the Army of
10 Republika Srpska, that is to say, the commander, rather, the Main Staff
11 of the Army of Republika Srpska, has some information to the effect that
12 on the 26th of April, 1995
13 use of two air bombs is being planned against enemy targets and
14 neighbourhoods in the area of Sarajevo
15 asking the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps to inform him as to
16 whether this is correct and for what purposes this is being planned.
17 Does it have to do with retaliation or something like that? Also, it
18 says that if the Supreme Command issued an order to them to start combat
19 operations and use heavy weaponry, that it is their duty to inform
20 Commander Mladic about that; that is to say, to inform him, the
21 signatory, Commander Mladic. However, before combat operations start in
22 the area of Sarajevo
23 plans, objectives, and targets so that the Main Staff of the Army of
24 Republika Srpska could make an assessment thereof.
25 MR. GAYNOR: Could I have document 10693, please.
1 Q. It's quite a short document. If you can just indicate who it's
2 from and what is being ordered.
3 A. This document that I saw over the past two days, like all the
4 other documents that we've been looking at today, well, I mean, I am
5 simply speechless. But this is what I have to say: The commander of the
6 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, Dragomir Milosevic, is sending an order to the
7 Ilidza Brigade to prepare a launcher with an aerial bomb and to prepare
8 the bomb for launching; to select a target either in Hrasnica or
9 Sokolovic Kolonija, that is to say, the most profitable target where the
10 greatest casualties and material damage would be inflicted. And then he
11 also says that as for the implementation of this task, that
12 Dragomir Milosevic should be informed personally.
13 Q. Now, at this time in April 1995, where were Hrasnica and the
14 Sokolovic Kolonija, and what were they?
15 A. Hrasnica and Sokolovic Kolonija are neighbourhoods that were out
16 of Sarajevo
17 mean, they're parts of the town of Sarajevo
18 belongs to the municipality of Ilidza
19 side of the runway. Sarajevo
20 this tunnel that had been built underneath the runway in the previous
22 Q. And are you able to comment as to what kind of settlements were
23 there? What kind of -- what was the nature of the people who were in the
25 A. Well, these were settlements that were under the control of the
1 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout. The majority population was
2 Muslim, at least at that time.
3 Q. Are you in a position to comment in any way as to whether they
4 were predominantly a military population or predominantly a civilian
6 A. These were civilian settlements.
7 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have the next document, please, which is
9 Q. This document, could you just tell us who it's from? And focus
10 on the first -- in fact, you can focus on the whole document. Thank you.
11 A. In this document, the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps
12 issues an order for aerial bombs weighing 105 and 250 kilograms, as it is
13 stated in the document. The ordnance should be issued to Major Simic by
14 units of the Sarajevo
15 more bombs from the corps reserves to another brigade, and also two other
16 bombs should be taken over from Pretis. All of that should be done with
17 a view to preparing a plan for the use of an air-bomb launcher. And,
18 generally, it has to do with preparations for this action called "Talas."
19 I don't know what action or operation that was, Talas 1.
20 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have 10932, please.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gaynor, I'm noting the time. You have still
22 18-odd documents or so. How much longer would you need for your
23 redirect -- no, I'm sorry, for your direct examination?
24 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, I'm trying to get through them as quickly as
25 possible. I suppose I would need about one more hour.
1 JUDGE KWON: One more hour?
2 MR. GAYNOR: Yes.
3 JUDGE KWON: Then there's no need -- it's impossible to conclude
4 today, then.
5 MR. GAYNOR: Yes.
6 JUDGE KWON: We'll continue tomorrow.
7 MR. GAYNOR: Very well. Thank you, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Suljevic, we'll adjourn for today, and we will
9 continue from 9.00 tomorrow. But, in the meantime, please do not discuss
10 your evidence with anybody until it is concluded.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE KWON: We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.
13 [The witness stands down]
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.37 p.m.
15 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 22nd day of July,
16 2010, at 9.00 a.m.