Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 5880

 1                           Wednesday, 18 August 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everybody.

 7             Good morning, Colonel Mole.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

10                           WITNESS:  RICHARD MOLE [Resumed]

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             Good morning to all.  Good morning, Colonel.

13             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

14                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   You confirmed yesterday your disagreement with media reporting,

17     and I would like to remind you, in this context, of an officer whom you

18     held in high esteem and you suggested him for promotion,

19     Peter [as interpreted] Henneberry, and in his diary you will agree that

20     there are many examples of his own disagreement with media reporting;

21     correct?

22        A.   The diary you refer to was made available to me earlier this

23     week.  This was my first opportunity to look through it, and I understand

24     what you're saying, yes.

25        Q.   Would you agree that both your observation and the observation of

Page 5881

 1     General Morillon and Mr. Henneberry was aimed, in fact, at achieving a

 2     balanced relationship, because these biased positions were a hindrance to

 3     peace?

 4        A.   These opinions of which you speak which were held by the press,

 5     from our perception, certainly made it extremely more difficult for us to

 6     fulfill our mission, the details of which I'm sure you're aware, and will

 7     have made it difficult for the warring factions to proceed when their

 8     intentions, certainly from the Serb side, seemed to be warped and twisted

 9     by press reports.

10        Q.   Thank you.  You told us yesterday that you did not receive

11     information from the reporters who had crossed over or visited our side,

12     and you, yourself, were wary of being perceived as a spy.  Does that

13     imply that spying would imply gaining some knowledge about the Serbian

14     side and then conveying that information to someone else?

15        A.   Absolutely, you make a very valid point, one which we were

16     extremely aware of.  As a consequence of that concern, the UNMO Group

17     worked to ensure that should you serve on the Presidency side in

18     Sarajevo, you never served on Lima side, and vice versa.  The only person

19     who transited between the two warring factions in the Sarajevo situation

20     was myself, and I was extremely conscious to express to all to whom I

21     spoke that any information I required, I required it purely to fulfill my

22     mission.  And I hoped I'd explained that mission clearly to the people to

23     whom I spoke.  I wanted them to have the confidence to talk to me with

24     regard to purely the mission which I had to fulfill.  I was not there

25     personally to take one side nor the other, for the humanitarian elements

Page 5882

 1     of my mission were my primary concern.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And from your communications and your achievements

 3     and successes with the Serbian side where you were able to get everything

 4     you wanted at the highest level and most of what you wanted at lower

 5     levels, and also from the diary of Mr. Henneberry, we can see that there

 6     was a considerable level of trust and good relations between the Serbian

 7     side and the UNPROFOR.  You also confirmed that you were not receiving

 8     information from foreign reporters who were coming back from the Serb

 9     territory.  If they had given to you or anyone else any information they

10     had gained on the Serbian side, would that have constituted spying, in

11     the sense that we were discussing?

12        A.   I think one must qualify what information any news agency could

13     give to me before one could decide whether that information was useful in

14     such activity as you suggest.  I never considered that the news agencies

15     had better information than I did.  I had a network which allowed me to

16     get a much broader perspective on events throughout Bosnia, and

17     specifically in Sarajevo.

18             I have to explain to you that before I came to Sarajevo I was the

19     chief operations officer for the complete group of UNMOs, and, therefore,

20     I had responsibilities throughout the region.  That includes Serbia,

21     Croatia, and Bosnia.  So I had a very broad background of knowledge

22     which, without being too arrogant, I think the press would have gained

23     more by a discussion with me than I would by having a discussion with

24     them.  Consequently, I don't foresee the suggestion you make, that they

25     could give me information that would be useful for spying, to be a

Page 5883

 1     pertinent point because I probably possessed that information and better.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I'm really not questioning the conduct of

 3     UN officers.  I'm speaking more from the viewpoint of the Serbian side,

 4     and I'm dealing with the conduct of parties to that war.  If

 5     correspondents from our side, for instance, gained, by accident, some

 6     information and conveyed it to someone secretly rather than publishing

 7     it, would that have caused the Serbian side to be more concerned, more

 8     wary of such persons who were involved in this activity?  I'm not talking

 9     now about the United Nations personnel, but about the press, if a press

10     representative were to convey secretly their own information to someone.

11     If you can just say yes or no.

12        A.   I certainly understand --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I was hesitating.

14             Yes, Mr. Hayden.

15             MR. HAYDEN:  The question that Mr. Karadzic has posed is asking

16     the witness to speculate on how the Serbian side might feel, which is

17     something that I don't believe he's in a position to do.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I agree.  It is not for the witness to speculate,

19     Mr. Karadzic.  What is your real question?  Put your question to the

20     witness.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm very appreciative and very

22     admiring of the position of Colonel Mole and his co-workers who were

23     trying not to even be perceived as spies, and conveying whatever they

24     learned from us would have constituted spying.  They are justified in

25     their position.  And I just wonder if the others acted the same.  Does

Page 5884

 1     that constitute --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, instead of making submissions, put

 3     your question.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Is it fair play if you learned something from your contacts with

 6     us, not only you, but anyone else, if they conveyed such information to a

 7     third party?

 8        A.   I'm sorry, but I don't really comprehend the "is it fair play"

 9     aspect of the question.

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Colonel Mole, you were obviously reporting

11     further up the chain of command.

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  So the information that you gleaned was

14     inevitably passed to some third parties.  I think what Dr. Karadzic is

15     asking is whether or not it would have been regarded as part of -- any

16     part of your mandate to pass information on to the other side, as it

17     were, in the military conflict, which I think you've already answered

18     that it's something that you didn't do and were very much hoping that you

19     weren't perceived to be doing.  Is that correct?

20             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  Then I think I can answer.

21             The information I received from all parties I achieved by

22     creating a relationship which ensured that people trusted me, and I used

23     that information personally for the benefit of myself and my officers and

24     my mission, but I was just as selective about who I passed that

25     information to.  I learnt a lot that other UNMOs never knew about.  I

Page 5885

 1     learnt a lot that I never passed up the chain of command, because I used

 2     it locally for my own objectives, which were the UN military observer

 3     objectives.  So that's why I struggle with the question, because that

 4     wasn't the way I used the information.  Maybe that's the answer to the

 5     question.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And now if I can follow up on this helpful

 8     intervention by Judge Morrison.  You were not involved in this sort of

 9     activity, but if someone else were, if someone else had been, would that

10     have been spying?

11             JUDGE KWON:  It's not for the witness to speculate.  Ask specific

12     questions, Mr. Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Would you agree that the Muslim side targeted their own side of

16     the city, that there were shells directed at their own neighbourhoods,

17     their own citizens, with the aim of causing them to be perceived as

18     victims and thus inviting international sympathy, compassion, and, of

19     course, the military intervention that you mentioned?

20        A.   You raise a very good but controversial issue here.  I've

21     already, in my testimony, tried to explain that when incidents are

22     investigated, because we were not in a cease-fire situation but were

23     still engaged in a war, full forensic analysis of all incidents, such as

24     those you've already seen on the incident reports which we discussed

25     yesterday, are such that individual assessment was impossible.  On top of

Page 5886

 1     what I've just said, there was suggestion and there were sufficient

 2     unknowns for members of UNPROFOR to be reasonably sure that what you have

 3     stated is true.  I would not, because of what I've just said, be able to

 4     tell you of specific incidences because I would deny anybody in the

 5     environment which we lived to have the ability to conclude a satisfactory

 6     forensic investigation to prove whether what you have suggested was true

 7     or not.  So all I can suggest to you was that we, as UNMOs, were

 8     uncomfortable about that question because we sensed that what you say may

 9     have been true.  But there are a lot of riders to what I've just said.

10     It can't be determined that it's a fact, but there were very strong

11     suspicions.

12        Q.   Thank you.  In your amalgamated statement, paragraph 121, you

13     expressed some of that thinking; namely, that there were incidents you

14     inquired into and that inspired in you certain suspicions as to who had

15     actually fired.  And in your 1997 statement, on page 12, you said that

16     the Muslims used Sarajevo to perpetuate their victim status --

17             [In English] " ... sometimes caused that perpetuation ..."

18             [Interpretation] Whereas Mr. Henneberry in the Galic case said

19     that investigations into incidents carried out by the United Nations made

20     him believe that for political reasons it was not emphatically said that

21     the Muslims had bombed their own people, but he, himself, had such

22     information that was collated among other people among UNMOs, that facts

23     strongly pointed to the Muslims as shooters and that on some occasions

24     they also bombed their own people.  He says that in his Galic evidence of

25     22nd May, 2002, on page 80734 and 35.  Is his information compatible or

Page 5887

 1     consistent with yours?

 2        A.   From what you've just read to me, from my personal relationship

 3     with the officer concerned, what he has said reflects very similar views,

 4     I would suggest, to those that I have just described.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2226 is the next document I would

 6     need, please, in e-court, page 8734 and 8735, just to glance briefly at

 7     the passage Colonel Mole confirmed:

 8             [In English] "Speaking specifically to funerals, I don't recall.

 9     The incidents were investigated.  And I believe, for political reasons,

10     no public categorical statement that the Muslims were shelling their own

11     was made.  However, it was, if I can use the term, 'common knowledge,'

12     that the investigations strongly pointed to the fact that the Muslim

13     forces did, on occasion, shell their own civilians."

14             [Interpretation] Could this be admitted?  We could also take a

15     look at the next page.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Before we do that, yes, Mr. Hayden.

17             MR. HAYDEN:  And I don't believe it's appropriate to admit an

18     extract from another witness's testimony.  There's provisions in the

19     Rules for the admission of written evidence of witnesses.  The relevant

20     portions have been now read into the transcript.

21             MR. TIEGER:  And, Your Honour, if I may remind the Court, I think

22     we crossed this bridge or at least approached it earlier, and the Court

23     determined that, in that instance, that it would permit the accused to

24     refer to the prior testimony in asking the question, but not admit the

25     testimony itself.

Page 5888

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  What is confirmed by Colonel Mole is already in the

 4     record.  I don't see the need to admit it separately.  We agree with the

 5     observation by Mr. Tieger and Mr. Hayden.

 6             Let's proceed.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I agree, too.  The transcript is

 8     evidence as well, isn't it?

 9             Could we have the next page -- or, rather, the previous page.

10     Just a moment, please.  Sorry.  It's the previous page, I think.

11             JUDGE KWON:  I have to clarify.  This page of the transcript is

12     not in evidence in this case.  There's a separate procedure to tender

13     that into evidence in this case.

14             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, I think what you meant was that

15     the transcript in this trial is evidence.  Am I correct in that?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes.  What is reflected

17     in the transcript, what was confirmed by the witness.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Of course.  Let's proceed.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that it's on the this

20     page, too, but we have to find the exact section.  No, this is 34.  We

21     were on this page.  Then we need 35.  Sorry.  Could we have 35, the next

22     page.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Let's have a look at this page:

25             [In English] "The market-place and gathering points were common

Page 5889

 1     target areas where people were queuing for water, United Nations' aid, or

 2     buying what little there was available in the markets.  Those were common

 3     areas."

 4             [Interpretation] Then:

 5             [In English] "Off the top of my head, I can recall four that I

 6     believe stated that the shells were fired by the Bosnian Muslims on their

 7     own people."

 8             [Interpretation] And the last answer on this page:

 9             "All the incidents I'm talking about were generally inside, well

10     inside the city boundary of Sarajevo and well inside the known line of

11     confrontation inside the" -- excuse me -- "the Muslim area.  I cannot

12     provide address at the moment.  I simply have forgotten details."

13             [Interpretation] That is what Mr. Henneberry is saying, and that

14     is consistent with your knowledge; right?

15        A.   It is.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  We can remove this document now.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Do you agree that certain insights and investigations, from a

20     military point of view, were not quite satisfactory from the point of

21     view of criminal law?

22        A.   Can we be specific about your question?  You say "certain

23     insights and investigations, from a military point of view."  Please,

24     could you explain which military, which investigations, before I answer

25     whether they were satisfactory or not?

Page 5890

 1        Q.   Yes, I will.  Thank you.

 2             Yesterday, we saw that the job of the observers was basically to

 3     record the number of explosions.  It was impossible to establish who was

 4     firing and where the shells landed.  Also, we see that there were quite a

 5     few cases where on-site investigations, insight with regard to particular

 6     incidents, showed ultimately that it could not be established where

 7     shells had come from.  That's what I meant.  These military insights into

 8     the situation, did they meet that particular criterion, or was it

 9     somewhat different, that particular insight?

10        A.   There are a number of issues you've raised there which some I've

11     tried to explain.  Perhaps I haven't done so clearly.

12             The UNMO mission was not there to count shells in and out.  It

13     was there to assess situations, provide humanitarian support, and the

14     other tasks that I've already outlined, part of which would be observing

15     the conflict as it developed.  It was not within the remit of the

16     UNMO Group to investigate all rounds that were fired, impact areas, and

17     so on, nor was it the UNMOs' task to assess the rights or wrongs of

18     conflict on the front-line.

19             So you're making the assumption, I think, that the UNMOs and/or

20     UNPROFOR had the capability to investigate every incident.  That was not

21     the case.  If people had lived in the city, like I did -- excuse me.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I believe that that will do.  Could I ask you,

23     Colonel, would you agree that there were, indeed, cases when the Muslims

24     abused Serb prisoners in order to get the bodies of their own dead out?

25     You refer to that in your statement of 1997, page 17.  We don't have to

Page 5891

 1     go into detail.  Can you confirm that?  Can you confirm that you

 2     characterised it then or understood it to be criminal behaviour, this

 3     abuse of prisoners for those purposes?

 4        A.   During an exchange of bodies, the Presidency side were required

 5     to exchange two particular bodies.  In the instant to which I believe you

 6     refer, the individuals had been buried for a period of time.  They were

 7     brought to the PTT building, where I controlled the body exchange.

 8     During the course of that body exchange, prisoners were used to move the

 9     bodies of -- that were being returned to the Serb side.  I did watch the

10     event.  I made observations and objections to it to those on the

11     Presidency side.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree, and you did speak about that in your

13     amalgamated statement in paragraph 122 and then paragraph 128 and then

14     when you testified in the Galic case on the 3rd of July, 2002, on

15     page 11.109, that the Muslims, the Muslim Army, often abused civilian

16     locations in order to place their own artillery pieces there?  This also

17     pertains to the Kosevo Hospital.  It's in your amalgamated statement,

18     paragraph 123, and also in your statement from 1997, on page 12.  That's

19     what you say.  The purpose of that was to attract Serb fire in order to

20     have the Serbs accused.  And then in your reports from October and

21     December 1992, you confirmed that your observers inspected the damage in

22     two hospitals, and you said that you were not satisfied with that kind of

23     behaviour, when artillery pieces, armoured vehicles, et cetera, are being

24     placed within the zone of a hospital.  And you say that that is something

25     that did, indeed, occur; isn't that right?

Page 5892

 1        A.   That's correct.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]

 4             Can we have -- I believe that the Prosecutor already had this as

 5     an associated exhibit.  10864 is the 65 ter number, and then let's have

 6     10865 just to gain further insight.

 7             Actually, have these documents already been admitted as

 8     P documents?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.  Since we've received

11     confirmation, we don't need to call up those documents.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Do you agree with that?  Also, do you agree that in your

14     amalgamated statement, in paragraphs 125 and 126, you confirmed that the

15     hospital was often hit by return fire, as it were?

16             Now, there is something I'd like to clarify with you:

17             [In English] "... rather than a military response, because the

18     mobile mortar was gone soon after it fired."

19             [Interpretation] Do you agree that the side that is responding,

20     in this case the Serb side, does not necessarily have to know that the

21     mobile mortar had left; so from that point of view that could have been

22     military response rather than retaliation?

23        A.   If one side in a conflict perceives that they need to respond to

24     a military action such as the engagement of, let's take, for example,

25     mortars from a particular location.  If, in response to that, you apply

Page 5893

 1     force which is in extreme excess to what would be required to destroy the

 2     target, if the fall of shot is such that it is so general that you've

 3     taken into account the source of the fire against you to very little

 4     effect, those would be the reasons I would perceive that there was often

 5     an over-reaction, and the time lapse between the initial contact and the

 6     response was such that the possibility of the originating units being in

 7     the same place were not high.

 8             As a commander, I would probably temper my response for a number

 9     of reasons.  They would be:  Saving ammunition, unnecessary collateral

10     damage.  Because unless you're trying to destroy the enemy, you'd be

11     really on a pointless mission responding with fire.  So it is these

12     balances which we were able to watch and make judgements on.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Do you believe that abuse of civilian locations for

14     these purposes constitutes a crime?

15        A.   I believe that that particular tactic was used within Sarajevo,

16     yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Also, you confirmed in your amalgamated statement,

18     and afterwards in the November and December reports that have already

19     been admitted as Prosecution exhibits, that the Muslim army abused the

20     proximity of the UN forces in order to act against the Serb side and

21     attract Serb fire as a response vis-à-vis these UN installations.  Also,

22     you confirmed, in paragraph 68 of your amalgamated statement, that

23     sometimes they would even intentionally target a building using tanks,

24     and it was only the Muslims that had tanks in that area.

25             Do you agree that on several occasions you and other

Page 5894

 1     representatives of UNPROFOR asked the Muslim side to move their artillery

 2     pieces at least 500 metres away from UN installations?

 3        A.   I had personal experience of the situations you describe, and we

 4     did, on numerous occasions, ask the Presidency side, should they wish to

 5     engage the Serb side, if they would be kind enough to do it further away

 6     from the UN installations.  Yes, I had personal experience of that.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  In Mr. Henneberry's diary, on page 1060853, he said:

 8             [In English] "That firing on PTT building came from Papa 4

 9     position."

10             [Interpretation] Do you agree with this conclusion?  It is in

11     Mr. Henneberry's statement -- or, rather, diary.  And in the December

12     1992 report, this is a report that was tendered by the Prosecution, it

13     says that on the 18th of December, 1992, fire was opened at a vehicle

14     that belonged to the observers, mortar fire, and, therefore, there was a

15     traffic accident and that the Serb driver had also been hit.  Do you

16     remember that?

17        A.   I do recall the incident, but I have to make some fairly

18     significant corrections here.

19             If one looks at the map, Papa 4 is located in such a position as

20     I don't believe it could see the PTT building or its surroundings.  The

21     officer whose diary you quote from was on Lima side.  He was, therefore,

22     on Serb side, outside the city.  So where he assumed the information

23     you've read to me, I have no idea.  There is also, from what I recall, no

24     record from Papa 4, who would have certainly known of outgoing rounds,

25     saying that those rounds were aimed at or impacted anywhere near the PTT.

Page 5895

 1     So I can't accept the statements made by that officer in his diary or his

 2     submissions as being truthful.

 3        Q.   But what is contained in your December reports, your reports from

 4     December 1992, and that is recorded in Henneberry's diary on

 5     page 01062856 in relation to the targeting of the observers' vehicle,

 6     which led to a traffic accident involving a Serbian vehicle; you confirm

 7     that, don't you?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Hayden.

 9             MR. HAYDEN:  If we can just be clear for the record here.

10     I think we're talking about two separate incidents.  Colonel Mole was

11     responding to the first one, and now Dr. Karadzic is asking about the

12     second.  If that distinction can be made clear.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Hayden.

14             With that caveat, can you answer the question, Colonel Mole?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             I think I've answered the question relating to the outgoing round

17     from the Papa 4 location.

18             If a traffic accident occurs by virtue of a close impact to a

19     vehicle, I would put it to you nobody would know the origin of the rounds

20     concerned.  Certainly, if you were in the vehicle, that's unlikely to be

21     your major interest.  You've got to assume, therefore, that somebody was

22     watching that particular incident, as opposed to any other.  I've tried

23     to explain the military activity, and impacts that went on on a daily

24     basis were such that to focus on one incident, such as this, and attempt

25     to determine the source of a round, if I can invite you to imagine what

Page 5896

 1     it was like within the circumstances we're trying to describe, would be

 2     completely irrelevant and impossible.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 4        Q.   Thank you.  However, that vehicle of yours was on the Serb side.

 5     I think it was in Nedzarici.  And your report for December 1992 suggests

 6     that the fire came from the Muslim side, because Serbs did not shell Serb

 7     neighbourhoods; isn't that right?

 8        A.   I stand by what I've just said.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Colonel, I'd like to come back a little to

11     clarify a point for me, for the Tribunal.

12             You've talked about seeing mortars being used by the Presidency

13     side, mobile mortars.  Were there any embedded fixed-plate positions that

14     were being used, to your knowledge, where mortars were fired from on a

15     regular basis?

16             THE WITNESS:  That tended not to be the case, because if I might

17     take you back to the airport agreement, if any mortars were used on fixed

18     locations, depending on their size, of course, but fixed locations would

19     indicate they would be the larger-calibre mortars, then clearly they

20     would have been included within the airport agreement and we would have

21     monitored those weapons.  So in answer to your question, I don't have any

22     personal recollection of the situation you describe, and the mortar

23     attacks I was aware of tend to be smaller calibre and more mobile.

24             JUDGE MORRISON:  And as a supplementary question:  Did you

25     observe any long-barrelled artillery?  I'm not talking about tanks.  I'm

Page 5897

 1     talking about either self-propelled guns or long-barrelled artillery

 2     weapons being used by the Presidency side.

 3             THE WITNESS:  I had personal experience of anti-aircraft weapons

 4     being used in the direct-fire mode.  My understanding was that the heavy

 5     weapons, although they're monitored, of course, as they were on the Serb

 6     side, didn't prevent their use.  It meant that we monitored them.  We

 7     knew where they were, and they should have remained within a geographical

 8     area.  That's not quite the way it worked out.  It ended up that we, as

 9     monitors, watched the war with more convenience by virtue of collections

10     of weapons, which made the job easier for the UNMOs, but it didn't cause

11     the weapons to be taken out of the engagement.

12             I think there is a common misconception that because weapons were

13     monitored they were not engaged in the warfare.  That is not the case, as

14     we know from the Serb side.  So exactly the same applied on the

15     Presidency side as well.

16             Does that answer your question?

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, it does, thank you.

18             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much for these

20     clarifications.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

22        Q.   In your statement of 1997, on pages 11 and 12, you say that you

23     observed the following on Mount Igman: one APC, two Howitzers, two

24     122-millimetre Howitzers, four 105-millimetre guns, and six

25     120-millimetre mortars.  Do you remember that all of this equipment was

Page 5898

 1     used from Mount Igman and that every Serb-held part of Sarajevo could be

 2     targeted from Mount Igman, broadly speaking?

 3        A.   If I may answer the last question first.  Yes, the weapons on

 4     Mount Igman could have direct effect on any of the units around Sarajevo.

 5     The exact composition of the Presidency forces on Mount Igman was an

 6     assessment at any one time.  Amongst the UNMOs, we had some very

 7     experienced artillery officers, and they were able to make those

 8     assessments.  But it would be a mistake to specify exactly what was on

 9     Igman at any one time.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you have 15 minutes to conclude your

11     cross-examination.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  With the assistance and

13     the courtesy of Colonel Mole, if I manage to ask questions that can be

14     answered with a yes or no, I will perhaps make it.  But it will be a pity

15     if this witness goes away without giving us a full picture.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   You said in your amalgamated statement that the Muslims had two

18     T-54 tanks, they had also anti-aircraft weapons that they used as

19     direct-fire weapons, and again in the Galic case, on the

20     3rd of July, 2002, on page 11097, you also testified that the Muslims

21     shelled the airport from Butmir.  Can you confirm that here?

22        A.   I haven't the statement in front of me.  But if that's what the

23     statement says, I stand by it.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Then in your amalgamated statement, paragraph 104,

25     you confirmed that on the 26th November, 1992, you reported that the

Page 5899

 1     Muslims used mortars to shell the transformer station in Blazuj,

 2     resulting in an interruption of the water supply, which was their

 3     response to the fact that the Serbs cut off the water supply to Hrasnica.

 4     Do you agree that that transformer station and the availability of

 5     electricity was crucial to the water supply for Sarajevo?

 6        A.   When we arranged utility missions - you'll forgive me, but I'm

 7     not an electrician, and I took, as read, what the utility missions were

 8     there to achieve from the engineers within UNPROFOR, within the sector

 9     headquarters, so I can't pass comment about what the transformer station

10     provided in the way of power to whom.

11        Q.   That is in your amalgamated statement, paragraph 104.  If you

12     remember Bacevo, the main source of water supply was on the Serb side,

13     and it was receiving electricity from the transformer station.  And if

14     the Muslims targeted and hit that particular transformer station, then

15     the water supply would be cut off.  Do you remember that?

16        A.   If it's in the statement, then that's as I stand by it, yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  In your amalgamated statement, paragraphs 131 and

18     132, you said the Muslims took advantage of Sarajevo's situation to

19     elicit sympathy, and for that purpose they restricted the movement of

20     civilians and they kept their population in Sarajevo for that purpose.

21     That's in those two paragraphs.  Do you agree?

22        A.   Yes, I have those two paragraphs in front of me.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that at the time when you were there,

24     there were about 60.000 Serbs in a part of Sarajevo controlled by the

25     Muslims, and that we, through General Morillon, through public appeals,

Page 5900

 1     tried to ensure the freedom of movement of civilians and give them the

 2     right to move to a territory where they would feel safer?

 3        A.   Within Sarajevo, there was a considerable ethnic mix.  The

 4     numerics I can't recall, unless I stated them in previous dispositions.

 5     But, yes, there were a considerable number of Serbs within Sarajevo.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  In certain passages, you confirmed that the 1st Corps

 7     was in Sarajevo, that out of the 70.000 members of the 1st Corps

 8     approximately a half were within the inner city.  You confirmed that you

 9     had heard of Juka Prazina and other criminals who had their own brigades.

10     Is that right?

11        A.   That's correct.

12        Q.   Do you agree that all these things put together, provoking fire

13     from the other side, the media pressure on the Serbs, the biased attitude

14     of the reporters and even some politicians who were effectively

15     anti-Serb, all these things removed us further and further away from

16     peace?  Can you name today a politician whose attitude, whose position,

17     really grated on your ears?

18        A.   As a soldier and even as a retired soldier, I'm not very

19     comfortable about answering that question.

20        Q.   All right.  We can do without.  But I do want to note that you,

21     yourself, noted such things.

22             You said in your statement --

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get 1D2227.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   You said that there were clear indications --

Page 5901

 1             [In English] " ... clear indications that there is not a

 2     well-co-ordinated and unified command structure on either side."

 3             [Interpretation] It's 1D2227.  We discussed it a little

 4     yesterday.

 5             Do you agree that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps had inherited

 6     territorial and municipal armies that were already in existence, and

 7     everyone, from General Sipcic to General Milosevic, had great problems

 8     establishing a unified command structure over these local units?

 9        A.   It was certainly a significant difficulty which I observed that

10     both sides had.  This was not a unique experience from the Serb side.  So

11     I understand what you're saying.  I was sympathetic to that situation,

12     and I agree with your overall assessment.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Can this document be admitted?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Unless it has been admitted so far, we'll admit it.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D540, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now call up 65 ter 11575.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   This is from the time of General Sipcic -- no, it was already

20     General Galic.  Colonel Marcetic writes here that local leaders and their

21     supporters are out of control in certain areas, and these difficulties

22     are encountered all the time, starting with Sipcic who found the worst

23     situation because it was early days, the VRS had just been set up.  But

24     even in November the corps command is encountering the same problem.  Is

25     this consistent with what you confirmed earlier?

Page 5902

 1        A.   Thank you.  I've never seen the document, obviously, but it's

 2     fully in accord with what we understood to be the case.  So, yes, I

 3     understand your point.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             Can this document be admitted?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Why do we have only a partial translation of this

 7     document?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the translation from the

 9     Galic case.  We did not have our own resources to translate the entire

10     document ourselves, but we don't mind if a translation is possible.

11             JUDGE KWON:  If, Mr. Hayden, you are happy with this translation,

12     we'll admit it.  Otherwise, we can put it being marked for

13     identification.

14             MR. HAYDEN:  If it can be marked for identification.  We'll get

15     back to you, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll mark it for identification, pending full

17     translation.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D541, marked for identification,

19     Your Honours.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   So in these circumstances, when the Serb side was under pressure

23     from many sides in many ways and a complete lack of a single command, is

24     it implied that firing rounds or even shells did not necessarily mean

25     that the Serb authorities, starting from higher commands, ordered or

Page 5903

 1     instigated certain incidents?  Do you agree that it would be quite

 2     unreasonable, incomprehensible, and implausible that the Serb side, with

 3     all its trained officers that it had, should go on shooting in its own

 4     foot day after day?

 5        A.   This is definitely a question which does not get answered by a

 6     yes or a no.  You state that the Serb side had a complete lack of a

 7     single command.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  Any military

 8     formation which can bring a fire mission down on a concentrated area,

 9     such as Otes, from a disparate group, geographically spread of heavy

10     weapons, throughout the city cannot possibly portray a lack of single

11     command.  Therefore, if you remove that part of the comment from your

12     statement, the rest of what you said there I can't agree with.

13        Q.   I agree with you as far as operations are concerned, but perhaps

14     I wasn't clear enough.  I meant to ask about incidents.  You intervened

15     in certain incidents, and the higher command redressed the situation

16     immediately in every case.  But concerning shooting, do you agree that

17     there were altogether too many weapons in Bosnia in private hands, it was

18     available for purchase, and just before the war and during the war huge

19     amounts of weapons were stolen?  I'm talking about privately-owned

20     weapons, I'm talking about poor control by local units, regarding

21     incidents, not regarding well-planned operations.  Do you agree that

22     there is a distinction?

23        A.   Two parts to answer there.

24             There was a war.  A war is a continuum.  The incidents all joined

25     up.  They were not divisible so that you could suggest that that

Page 5904

 1     particular incident was caused by a certain set of events.  It isn't that

 2     straightforward.  I can't explain to you, if you're not a soldier and you

 3     haven't been engaged in such activities, any clearer than I have tried

 4     to, that this was not a controlled situation; this was a war in progress.

 5     The incidents all joined together.  They were not divisible.  You could

 6     not apply blame to one as opposed to another, nor was the ability of the

 7     UN to attempt to explain, as you are trying to explain, the difficulties

 8     which were experienced by the combatants.

 9             As for your comment about privately-owned weapons, yes, of course

10     there were, but let's be totally clear.  There were not privately-owned

11     heavy weapons.  All the heavy weapons around Sarajevo that we either saw

12     or monitored were not owned by individuals.  They were part of the

13     structure of the Serb forces around Sarajevo.

14             But your point about the difficulty of command and control, as

15     opposed to the attempt at command and control, is a good one.  There were

16     geographical difficulties.  There were structural difficulties.  There

17     were personality conflicts.  There was history which you have alluded to

18     by suggesting that certain areas had been defended by local people who

19     had then become absorbed within the Serb military structure.

20             I hope I've explained it the way you would like it to be

21     explained in that regard.

22             So we were fully conversant with the difficulties and the

23     structure, but I do have to correct you on the items that I started my

24     response with there that relates to the command and control and private

25     weapons.

Page 5905

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Your last question, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How about two, Your Excellencies?

 3     I just wanted to ask the colonel:

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Did you have insight into this UK Military Manual, Colonel, and

 6     do you agree that this is something that every army should have, every

 7     army should follow such rules?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] During the interview we had with

10     the colonel, we gave him excerpts from the military manual of the UK that

11     we will use later in this trial, and these experts explain these terms;

12     military targets, sniping, legitimate targets, et cetera.  I just wanted

13     to ask the colonel if he is familiar with this manual and if it forms a

14     basic set of regulations for the conduct of the UK army.  And then I'll

15     ask my next question.

16             THE WITNESS:  Could I clarify the document you're speaking of?

17     Is that Rules of Conflict, or Manual of Military Law, or what would that

18     be?  I've read a lot of books when I did staff jobs.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   This is Chapter 5 of the UK Military Manual that we have given

21     you, if you remember.  In fact, we gave you some excerpts from the

22     UK Military Manual.  Do you agree that this is a basic set of rules for

23     any army to follow, a good basis for any army to follow?

24        A.   Thank you.  Yes, now I understand the book to which you refer.

25     Yes, the one we discussed I have had sight of, yes.

Page 5906

 1        Q.   On page 25, line 5 -- in fact, it's page 24.  Page 24, line 5.

 2     There seems to be an error in the transcript.  I think you said in your

 3     answer, "I can agree," and it's recorded as "I can't agree."

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could that please be corrected in

 5     the record.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   And my last question:  In your 1997 --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think Colonel Mole is able to scroll back

 9     the transcript.  I heard that with care, but I'm confident the colonel

10     said, "I can't agree."  If I can tell you, it's a question about -- that

11     you answered with:  "Nothing could be further from the truth," as regards

12     the complete lack of a single command.  At the end of your answer, did

13     you say or not:

14             "Therefore, if you remove that part of the comment from your

15     statement, the rest of what you said there I can't agree with"?

16             THE WITNESS:  That's what I meant, sir, thank you.

17             JUDGE KWON:  That's what he said.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understood that if we removed

19     that part of the comment, you can agree with the rest.  But it must be

20     the language barrier that we have between us.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Now, in your statement from 1997, on page 14, you said that you

23     had never had the feeling that Karadzic or Mladic had a direct

24     involvement in day-to-day events in Sarajevo:

25             [In English] "... day-to-day events in Sarajevo."

Page 5907

 1             [Interpretation] That we never had a direct hand in the daily

 2     events in Sarajevo, in view of all our work, contacts with foreigners,

 3     travel, et cetera.  Is that was said in your statement?

 4        A.   Yes, and it makes perfect sense.  That's why General Galic

 5     commanded the corps, and that's why you did the job you did.  Of course,

 6     the impact from outside that General Galic responded to would have been

 7     political pressure and, from General Mladic, presumably, military

 8     pressure or direction as determined by others above him.  But, quite

 9     right, on a day-to-day basis, that was the task of the Romanija Corps.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Colonel.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Hayden, I think you can go on.

13             MR. HAYDEN:  We have time before the break, Mr. President?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Or if you have --

15             MR. HAYDEN:  It won't be longer than five minutes, under ten.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Let's proceed and have a break afterwards.

17             MR. HAYDEN:  Thank you, Mr. President.

18                           Re-examination by Mr. Hayden:

19        Q.   Colonel Mole, this morning we spoke about the testimony --

20     observations of Captain Patrick Henneberry.  You noted at transcript

21     page 15 that he, at least at the 8th of December, was working on the Lima

22     side or the Bosnian Serb side.  During your tour, did he ever work on the

23     Papa side?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   And why was that the case?  Why can you be sure that if he worked

Page 5908

 1     on the Lima side on the 8th of December, he never worked on the Papa

 2     side?

 3        A.   As I explained before, that when you were, as a UN military

 4     observer, designated to go to Sarajevo, the last time that you saw the

 5     people with whom you arrived in Sarajevo, if they were on the other side,

 6     was as you left the overall briefing in the PTT building.  And then once

 7     you went to Lima side or once you stayed within the city, that was where

 8     your tour of duty continued until its completion.

 9        Q.   Would Captain Henneberry or officers on the Lima side be involved

10     in investigations conducted on the Papa side by UNMOs?

11        A.   Absolutely not.  No, sir.

12        Q.   And would they be privy to official communication emanating from

13     the Papa side?

14        A.   There is one rider to my answer of no, in that we had an open

15     radio network, so everybody could hear what was going on from one side to

16     the other.  But remember that the open radio network was one that

17     responded and was used for everyday physical activity, as opposed to

18     policy or any other decision.

19             Does that answer your question?

20        Q.   Thank you.  If an observation post observed a -- for example,

21     Muslim fire onto the PTT building in the city, for example, would that

22     have been recorded in the daily situation report that you authored?

23        A.   Yes, it would, sir, yeah.

24        Q.   Colonel, at paragraph 39 of your amalgamated statement, you

25     discuss the weaponry that you observed the Presidency to have on the Papa

Page 5909

 1     side.  Yesterday, we were -- you were describing the widely-dispersed or

 2     heavy bombardment of the city.  To your knowledge, was the weaponry

 3     described in paragraph 39 capable of being responsible for such

 4     widely-dispersed attacks on the city of Sarajevo?

 5        A.   No, the only equipment within range of the city that could

 6     perform the sorts of fire missions and other high-explosive events that

 7     occurred within the city belonged to those outside the city.

 8             MR. HAYDEN:  If I can ask Mr. Registrar for D537.

 9        Q.   Colonel Mole, this is the map that you marked yesterday in

10     cross-examination at the request of Dr. Karadzic.  And do you recall

11     marking "3" where Ilidza was, or the Serb part of Ilidza was?

12        A.   Yes, I do, sir, yeah.

13        Q.   Now, yesterday, at transcript page 5833, Dr. Karadzic drew your

14     attention to paragraph 84 of your statement, where you discuss the Otes

15     offensive, and you state that:

16             "In addition to the Otes offensive, shells were landing elsewhere

17     in the city."

18             And then two pages on at T-5835, Dr. Karadzic discussed the

19     contents of a newspaper article with you from AFP, and that was tendered

20     as Exhibit D535.  And if I can just refresh your memory as to the portion

21     of that article he drew your attention to.  It stated that:

22             "Tuesday's fighting around the airport started when Bosnian

23     infantry units attacked Serbian forces stationed in the village of

24     Ilidza, which borders the airport.  The Serbs responded with intense

25     artillery fire that shook the entire sector.  Commander Barry Frewer, a

Page 5910

 1     spokesman for the UN troops in Sarajevo, said Wednesday."

 2             Dr. Karadzic asked you if you knew who Commander Frewer was, and

 3     then said to you:

 4             "Would you agree that in parallel with the fighting for Otes and

 5     Zuc, there was fighting in other parts of the city as well?"

 6             And you said you noticed no variation in what we would perceive

 7     as the normal front-line activities elsewhere.

 8             Now, Colonel Mole, accepting that what was reported in the

 9     article was true, that is, that there was fighting occurring in Ilidza

10     that was started by a Bosnian offensive, would that account for or

11     explain the shells that you say in your statement were, quote, "landing

12     elsewhere in the city"?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.

14             JUDGE KWON:  What is your objection, Mr. Karadzic?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that would be speculation.

16     It would be a leading question, rather, and speculation as well.  The

17     witness cannot speculate about intentions and the origins of that fire,

18     and he cannot tie it to this, although Colonel Mole had said that war is

19     an entity.  So we're not only talking about Sarajevo, but the whole of

20     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  But I think this question is wrong.

21             JUDGE KWON:  No, I don't agree with you, Mr. Karadzic.  It's

22     triggered from your question, and it does not call for Colonel Mole's

23     speculation.

24             Did you conclude your question, or are you able to answer the

25     question, Mr. Mole?

Page 5911

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, I think so, yes.

 2             Could I go back to the map, please?  Would that be acceptable?

 3             MR. HAYDEN:  That was D537.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 5             If one considers the location marked to, which was the target of

 6     the Serb forces to take away what they considered a considerable threat

 7     in the area of Otes -- and may I mark that map?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, you can mark it separately, and we can keep it

 9     separate.

10             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Could you wait a minute.

12             THE WITNESS:  Oh, yes.

13             JUDGE KWON:  So we can use a blue colour.

14             THE WITNESS:  I'm colour-blind, so ...

15             If I mark the map in that line there [marks], from my

16     understanding, the intentions of the Serb side was to remove the

17     Presidency side in the area marked "2," that enclave, back to that

18     particular line, which would allow them, as you can see from the map, a

19     geographical line from the airport area or Ilidza or "3" up the road to

20     where I've just marked in blue and around to - I'll continue with my

21     blue - around here [marks].  Besides the obvious problem that the Serbs

22     perceived they had in Otes as a threat to Ilidza, that was also a

23     significant, sort of, tactical objective.

24             So, now, to come back to the question.  It's important, I think,

25     that any action that occurred in that zone of "2" would have immediate

Page 5912

 1     repercussion within the immediate area, so any attack, say, from Butmir

 2     to Ilidza, or from anywhere else on Ilidza, would be an understandable

 3     response to what went on in the area of Otes.

 4             What I'm referring to in the answer to Dr. Karadzic's question as

 5     to the level of activity elsewhere in the city, and which I believe

 6     you're asking, I am considering elsewhere beyond to the east of those

 7     areas that I've marked out.  Therefore, the front-line which

 8     circulates -- goes completely around Sarajevo, there was a little

 9     increase in tension, of course, but there was considerable incoming

10     high-explosive rounds into the city which we saw no connection with the

11     events that I've just tried to describe.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Colonel.

13             If you could kindly put your signature and date again.

14             THE WITNESS:  Right.  [Marks]

15             MR. HAYDEN:  No further questions, Mr. President.

16             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit this map again.  This will be a new

17     P exhibit.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P1436, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             Yes, Judge Morrison has some further questions for you.

21                           Questioned by the Court:

22             JUDGE MORRISON:  Just one thing, Colonel Mole.

23             The radio net that was common to Papa and Lima positions, was

24     that encrypted or was that an open?

25        A.   It was an open net, sir, available to everybody.  Indeed, so open

Page 5913

 1     that we gave hand-sets on the same frequency to Serb liaison officers

 2     with us in the PTT and to Presidency liaison officers available to us as

 3     well, the intention being to show that our activities were completely

 4     open.

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you very much.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Your evidence has been concluded.  Thank

 7     you very much for your coming to The Hague to give it.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Now you are free to go.

10             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

11                           [The witness withdrew]

12             JUDGE KWON:  We will have a break for a bit more than 20 minutes.

13     We'll resume at 11.00.

14                           --- Recess taken at 10.40 a.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning to you, Mr. Gaynor and Dr. Subotic.

17             I take it the next witness is Mr. Higgs.

18             MR. GAYNOR:  That's correct, Mr. President.

19             JUDGE KWON:  As for the time for cross-examination, the

20     Trial Chamber advised the parties yesterday that Mr. Karadzic would have

21     three hours for his cross-examination of Mr. Higgs.  The Chamber's

22     determination that three hours is a reasonable time for cross-examination

23     of Mr. Higgs was made on the basis of the criteria that we have

24     previously set out, and particularly in light of the fact that

25     Mr. Higgs's evidence is of a limited nature.  He did not conduct the

Page 5914

 1     original investigation into the various shelling incidents discussed in

 2     his expert report, but, rather, provides analysis and his own conclusions

 3     based upon his review of those reports and observation that he made

 4     substantially after the incidents in question.  The Chamber considers

 5     that three hours is ample time for the accused to cross-examine him on

 6     his methodology in reviewing the original investigations and in reaching

 7     his conclusions and to challenge him on those conclusions.

 8             However, as we have previously stated, should the accused

 9     demonstrate, in the course of his cross-examination, that additional time

10     is warranted, the Chamber will consider the matter further.

11             Unless there's other procedural matters, we'll bring in the

12     witness.

13             Mr. Gaynor.

14             MR. GAYNOR:  Yes, there is one procedural matter on which the

15     Defence and Prosecution have reached agreement, and that concerns part of

16     the report of Mr. Higgs which concerns Incident G-16, which appears on

17     page 12 of the report and goes on --

18             JUDGE KWON:  13 to 17?

19             MR. GAYNOR:  Yes.

20             Now, the Defence were going to make a motion for the exclusion of

21     that part of the report.  Our position is that we agree that that part of

22     the report need not be admitted in evidence as part of the evidence of

23     Mr. Higgs.

24             However, we do wish to preserve the position which we set out in

25     our submission of the 31st of August, 2009, and which we repeated in the

Page 5915

 1     notification which accompanied the marked-up indictment in this case,

 2     that it will be in the interests of justice in certain instances, in our

 3     submission, that the Trial Chamber should hear evidence on incidents

 4     which have been removed from the indictment pursuant to Rule 73 bis.  And

 5     we'll be relying, among other things, on the Appeals Chamber's decision

 6     in the Seselj case on the 9th of January, 2008.  So I won't say anything

 7     more about that at the moment.  We do wish to reserve our position in

 8     that respect.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             In any event, those parts which will not be admitted into

11     evidence will be redacted?

12             MR. GAYNOR:  We haven't yet taken that step, but --

13             JUDGE KWON:  But we'll take that step.

14             MR. GAYNOR:  Yes.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Thank you for the agreement.

16             Let's bring in the witness.

17                           [The witness entered court]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, Mr. Higgs.

19             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

20             JUDGE KWON:  If you could kindly take the solemn declaration,

21     please.

22             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

23     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

24                           WITNESS:  RICHARD HIGGS

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please make yourself comfortable.

Page 5916

 1             Mr. Gaynor.

 2             MR. GAYNOR:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3                           Examination by Mr. Gaynor:

 4        Q.   Could you state your full name for the record, please?

 5        A.   Mr. Richard James Higgs.

 6        Q.   You are of British nationality?

 7        A.   Yes, I am.

 8        Q.   You served in the British Army for 22 years, from 1980 to 2002;

 9     is that right?

10        A.   That is correct.

11        Q.   Just taking you to the position from 1987 to 2002, could you give

12     the Court a general overview of what the nature of your duties was during

13     that period?

14        A.   From 1987 onwards, I worked specifically with mortars.  I started

15     with working within a training establishment, teaching mortars, various

16     levels of degrees of expertise, to soldiers in the British Army and also

17     to international students, teaching the operational deployment, technical

18     information, tactical information, and ballistic knowledge at that time.

19             I then moved into a advisory role with our forces based in

20     Germany, where I was responsible for all their training, advising again

21     on all technical, tactical, and ballistical information, and assisting

22     them should there be any safety-type incidents or anything that needed

23     investigating with mortars.  I would then manage that on their behalf,

24     advise them accordingly to make sure everything was done correctly, to

25     find out if anything happened, why it happened, and so on.

Page 5917

 1             I then moved into a similar role, but this time working globally,

 2     advising not only British Army but foreign armies on the use of, again,

 3     mortars operationally and their technical and ballistic capabilities, and

 4     also moving into the development of mortars.  And then my final role was

 5     as the divisional instructor for the British Army, which is the

 6     subject-matter expert of mortars on behalf of the whole British Army.  So

 7     I was seen as the technical expert on mortars.  And within that role I

 8     advised the British Army, again, during all their training, operational

 9     and tactical requirements, but I led on the ballistical safety

10     information which I, again, taught, and my responsibilities were to

11     ensure that all firings were carried out safely and in accordance, of

12     course, with methodologies.  And I also advised, during this time,

13     various overseas countries in the same areas.

14        Q.   Now, you've, no doubt, attended a great number of live-firing

15     exercises.  Could you just give the Court an overall view of the number

16     of live-firing exercises you've attended?

17        A.   Difficult to give an exact number.  But during the period

18     especially where I was delivering training, we would be live firing

19     sometimes three to four times a week, for weeks on end.  And during my

20     advisory role when I was based in Germany, again, I would be sometimes

21     visiting live firing probably, again, three to four days a week, with

22     hundreds if not thousands of rounds being fired on each of those days.

23        Q.   Similarly, could you give the Court an overall picture of the

24     number of crater analysis exercises you would have participated in?

25        A.   During the training part of my activities, we teach one part

Page 5918

 1     which is identification of a direction of what's called hostile battery,

 2     which is where the rounds may be seen to be coming from.  As part of

 3     that, I have probably looked at many hundreds of different craters, as

 4     part of that training.  As far as investigations are concerned where an

 5     incident has occurred, again, difficult to give precise numbers, but many

 6     tens if not into the hundreds, even, of those.

 7        Q.   Now, in your report, you've referred to, on a number of

 8     instances, to the concept of prerecorded targets.  I would just like you

 9     to explain briefly how you understand prerecording of targets works in an

10     extended siege situation of a specific town or city.

11        A.   To make the firing of mortars more accurate, to save them having

12     to waste time and ammunition with trying to adjust or move the rounds

13     onto the target, it will save time if the targets are what is known as

14     prerecorded.  This can be done in a number of ways.  But by prerecording

15     a target, the mortar position will know the correct bearing, elevation,

16     and information they put on a mortar to hit that target with a higher

17     degree of accuracy the first time.  The longer you are in a position, so

18     if mortars are in a position for extended periods of time, they can build

19     up lists of prerecorded targets over a wide area, which will then mean

20     that if they have to engage a target anywhere within that area, they will

21     have a higher degree of hitting that target without first adjusting it.

22        Q.   You've previously testified at the Tribunal in -- at this

23     Tribunal in the trial of Dragomir Milosevic and the trial of

24     Stanislav Galic.

25        A.   That is correct.

Page 5919

 1        Q.   And you have prepared a consolidated report containing

 2     information relevant to incidents which are relevant to this particular

 3     case; isn't that right?

 4        A.   Yes, I have.

 5             MR. GAYNOR:  Could I have 65 ter 11144, please.

 6        Q.   On the screen in front of you, you see a document.  Is that the

 7     report which you've prepared for this case?

 8        A.   Yes, it is.

 9        Q.   And you've had the opportunity to review that report over the

10     past few days?

11        A.   I have.

12        Q.   Do you wish to make any corrections or amendments to it?

13        A.   No.

14        Q.   And do you adopt it as part of your evidence in this case?

15        A.   Yes, I do.

16             MR. GAYNOR:  Your Honour, I'd like to tender the report at this

17     stage for admission, subject to the redaction of the part of the report

18     concerning G-16, as indicated.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1437, Your Honours.

21             MR. GAYNOR:  Now, Your Honours, I propose to take the witness to

22     12 documents and 1 video, which are only some of the documents referred

23     to in this report.  And I'd like 65 ter 18178 to be brought up, please.

24        Q.   Now, Mr. Higgs, at page -- I'll move on to the next document.

25             MR. GAYNOR:  Could I have document 11378, please.

Page 5920

 1        Q.   Now, Mr. Higgs, on the left-hand side of the screen in front of

 2     you, you see a document which is addressed to HQ UNPROFOR, Zagreb, and

 3     which is -- could you confirm that this is the document referred to in

 4     your report concerning an incident which took place on the

 5     12th of July, 1993?

 6        A.   Yes, it is.

 7        Q.   Now, if we just go to the third page of that document, as you can

 8     see, on the last paragraph on the left-hand side of your screen, you see

 9     the words:

10             "This shell could have been shot from corridor

11     Nedzarici-Ilidza Nord."

12             You can see those words?

13        A.   Yes, I can.

14        Q.   Now, do you have any observations to make about that?

15        A.   From this particular incident, from the evidence I've seen, from

16     the incident reports, including this one, the way in which the round

17     landed, it was not possible to come up with a definite range or even a

18     confirmed direction.  So both the reports, as best as possible with the

19     information they had, came up using the information gathered at the scene

20     with an approximate direction from which the rounds came, and that is the

21     area stated there in that report.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. GAYNOR:  I'd now like document 11394 to be brought up.  I'm

24     informed this is an alternative number for the document we were trying to

25     look at a moment ago.

Page 5921

 1             That document, in fact, we'll come to later, if that's -- sorry.

 2             Sorry, we'll -- if we could move to the third page of that

 3     document in the English language.  There should be an English translation

 4     there.

 5        Q.   Now, we see the reference in that document.  Do you -- can you

 6     confirm that that is a document which you used in compiling your report?

 7        A.   Yes, it is.

 8        Q.   Now, on the left-hand side, it's quite difficult to see, but you

 9     can see, towards the end of the document, the words:

10             "The ballistic expert found remnants of an artillery shell, most

11     probably an 82-millimetre mortar shell; most probably fired from

12     direction Nedzarici."

13             Do you have any observations about that?

14        A.   Again, because of the poor, if you like, data at the scene,

15     because this round impacted within a person, all they could do was

16     confirm the calibre of the weapon, in this case an 80-millimetre, and an

17     approximate direction.  And the direction stated in this document is the

18     same as the one we saw in the previous document, that area of Nedzarici.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. GAYNOR:  I'd like to move now to the next document, which is

21     15051.  This concerns Incident G-6.

22        Q.   Now, in your report on Incident G-6, Mr. Higgs, you refer to some

23     differences in the reports you've seen concerning this incident, and I'd

24     just like to explore those with you.

25             MR. GAYNOR:  If we could go to the second page of the English

Page 5922

 1     translation.

 2        Q.   You see that this is a compilation of a number of different

 3     documents; is that correct?

 4        A.   Yes, it is.

 5             MR. GAYNOR:  If we could go to the next page of this document.

 6        Q.   Now, in the second-last paragraph, towards the end, we see the

 7     words:

 8             "Type of destruction of the explosion site indicates that the

 9     shell was an 82-millimetre mortar shell, fired from the west, where the

10     enemy position is located at the Institute for the Blind at Nedzarici.

11     Shell stabiliser was not found at the explosion site."

12             And on the following page, the third paragraph down, we see the

13     words -- again, a reference:

14             "The type of destruction at the explosion site indicates that the

15     shell was an 82-millimetre shell, fired from the west, where the enemy

16     position is located at the Institute for the Blind at Nedzarici.  A

17     120-millimetre shell stabiliser was found near the explosion site."

18             Do you provide any observations about that?

19        A.   Obviously, this is from the initial investigation from the scene

20     which these -- this team attended first.  They ascertained from the

21     damage and the materials at that scene that the 82-millimetre rounds were

22     the rounds that landed in the street and that the tail-fin, from their

23     examination, was not part or had anything to do with those two rounds, as

24     they concluded it fell sometime earlier.  And this report also alludes to

25     the firing of a 120-millimetre round which landed in a different

Page 5923

 1     location, where no casualties were caused.

 2             MR. GAYNOR:  The next document, please, which is 19725.

 3             Can you see the first pages of this are the French original, and

 4     on the fifth page the English translation exists?

 5             If we could move to the fifth page of this document, please.  Go

 6     on to the next page, please.

 7        Q.   Now, do you recognise this document, Mr. Higgs?

 8        A.   Yes, I do.

 9        Q.   What is this document?

10        A.   This is the consolidated report from -- that was produced by the

11     French officer, Verdy, the day after the incident.

12        Q.   Now, if we can move a little further down the screen there, we

13     see the words:

14             "In my estimation, the strikes were probably launched from a zone

15     under the control of the Bosnian Serbs."

16             Do you have any reason to -- did you have any observations about

17     that sentence?

18        A.   To come up to this estimation from the reports, they're using,

19     obviously, the estimated direction, which is from the west, which puts it

20     into that area of Nedzarici, which is under the control of the

21     Bosnian Serbs.  So that is where they're getting this estimation from.

22        Q.   Do you have any reason to disagree with that assertion?

23        A.   From the evidence seen in both reports, no, I don't.

24             MR. GAYNOR:  Now, if we could move to the next page, please.

25        Q.   Now, under item E, the report states:

Page 5924

 1             "Type of ammunition:  Mortar, 120 millimetres."

 2             And under D it says that there were three hits.  Do you have any

 3     comment about that?

 4        A.   This is where, as I mentioned in my report, it differs from the

 5     initial forensic examination, as they came to the conclusion of one

 6     120-millimetre and two 82-millimetre.  The problem that Captain Verdy has

 7     is this investigation was carried out a day later and he was not

 8     available to have all the evidence of the investigation team who carried

 9     out the investigation on the day.  That is probably the reason why he has

10     assumed they were all 120 millimetres.

11        Q.   Which of the two reports do you think is more accurate?

12        A.   I would have a tendency to believe the report that was conducted

13     on the day, as the best way of conducting any incident of this manner is

14     as soon as possible.

15             MR. GAYNOR:  All right.  Can I have document 09623, please.

16     We're moving on to a different incident.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Could you give the number again?

18             MR. GAYNOR:  The number is 09623.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             MR. GAYNOR:

21        Q.   As we'll see in a moment, this concerns the shelling of the

22     Markale Market-Place which took place on the 5th of February, 1994,

23     sometimes referred to as "Markale I."

24             Now, once again, is this one of the documents you used in

25     compiling your report?

Page 5925

 1        A.   Yes, it was.

 2             MR. GAYNOR:  If we could take the next page, please.

 3        Q.   Now, as you can see from the third paragraph, Mr. Higgs -- sorry,

 4     the last paragraph on that page, there is a reference to "the transverse

 5     axis of the ellipse was north-north-east."  What does that mean?

 6        A.   When they were looking at the shape of the crater on the ground,

 7     they could see that it was pointing towards that north-north-east

 8     direction.  And later in the report, they actually measured that and came

 9     up with an angle.

10             MR. GAYNOR:  We can move to the next page, please.

11        Q.   Now, at the end of the first paragraph on that page, we see the

12     words stating:

13             "It was an 18-degree angle from north to east, with a plus or

14     minus 5-degree tolerance added to the angle difference value."

15             Can you explain what that is?

16        A.   Yes.  Having had a look at the shape of the crater on the ground,

17     they have then conducted their examination and calculated that the

18     direction from the point of ground where the round hit, from whence the

19     round came, is a bearing of 18 degrees, obviously plus or five [sic] the

20     5-degrees tolerance.

21        Q.   Now, the report makes a conclusion that this was what kind of

22     projectile?

23        A.   It was a 120-millimetre projectile, which in this case could be

24     proven because the tail-fins of the round were still in the crater and

25     could be used for investigation purposes.

Page 5926

 1        Q.   Does this report make any conclusions concerning the range, which

 2     is to say the distance the projectile travelled?

 3        A.   No, it doesn't.

 4             MR. GAYNOR:  If I could move to the next document, please, which

 5     is 09630.

 6        Q.   Now, in your expert report, Mr. Higgs, you've said that the

 7     UNPROFOR report at Reference B just goes back up the report -- just - I

 8     beg your pardon - just goes to back up the report at Reference A with the

 9     same findings.  There's only one piece of information that does not tie

10     up - this is some of the points made by Captain Verdy - but these are

11     rectified further on in the report.

12             And I want to ask you a few questions to explore that point.

13     Now, on the page in front of you, what do you see there?

14        A.   This is a part of the report from Captain Verdy.

15             MR. GAYNOR:  Now, I want to move to page 8 of this.

16        Q.   If we could go on.  This is a cover fax.  And on the next page we

17     see a document headed "UNPROFOR Investigation Report, Sarajevo Market

18     Explosion of 5th of February, 1994."  This is the report which you

19     examined in compiling your own report?

20        A.   Yes, it is.

21        Q.   And if we could move to not the next page, but two pages on.  At

22     the bottom of paragraph 17 it says:

23             "There is insufficient physical evidence to prove that one party

24     or the other fired the mortar bomb.  The mortar bomb in question could

25     have been fired by either side."

Page 5927

 1             Do you have any comments about that?

 2        A.   When they carried -- conducted the crater examination, they were

 3     able to conduct the bearing from which the round came, and they were able

 4     to determine an approximate angle at which the round hit the ground.  The

 5     problem we have with mortars is that they have a number-charged system,

 6     and all the charges could deliver that same angle when the round hits the

 7     ground, so, therefore, it gives you a large parameter, from a reasonably

 8     close range up to the maximum range, where the round could have been

 9     fired from.  That is the reason why they put that statement in, because

10     at the time that this report was produced, that's as much as they could

11     confirm.

12             MR. GAYNOR:  I'd like to move to another part of this report,

13     which is another nine pages on.

14        Q.   You see the reference under Conclusion C.  It says that:

15             "The bomb impacted, having approached at a bearing of between

16     0330 and 0420 mils," and then three letters which are not legible.

17             Do you have any observations about that?

18        A.   This particular incident was investigated by many teams.  I think

19     10 teams, in total, produced reports.  The forensic team used degrees,

20     and as we have already mentioned, they came to a bearing of 18 degrees.

21     Eighteen degrees is approximately 320 mils, so you can see that it aligns

22     with many of these other reports where they get a bearing between about

23     0320 and 0420.

24             MR. GAYNOR:  I'd like to go to a table which is on five pages

25     previously to this, please.

Page 5928

 1        Q.   We can see, under part 2, it says there were a total of 10 crater

 2     analyses conducted on the crater.

 3             MR. GAYNOR:  And if we could look at the next page, please.

 4        Q.   Now, see the paragraph marked "Bearing."  In the final part of

 5     that paragraph, it says -- it's referring here to Captain Verdy:

 6             "However, based on his note, he appears to have made a

 7     mathematical error which led to an incorrect final back-bearing.

 8     Therefore, although his method may have been sound, based on the figures

 9     he used, his results were flawed."

10             Could you comment on that?

11        A.   Yes.  There were 10 examinations carried out, but for some reason

12     the one that Captain Verdy did came up with different information.

13     Obviously, the investigating team at the time have looked at that and

14     have decided that he must have made some form of mathematical error to

15     come up with information completely different to the other eight reports.

16             MR. GAYNOR:  Could we look at the next page, please.

17        Q.   All right.  If you could look at the table of results and just

18     explain briefly to the Court what your analysis of that table is.

19        A.   You can see there the list of all the 10 sets of information that

20     were taken from the various investigations taking place.  The top two, or

21     the two that were -- have been kind of questioned in the report, that

22     we've just seen with the French team with Captain Verdy, have come up

23     with different information.  The other eight, from Major Russell down to

24     the bottom, you can see that their results are all very similar in their

25     findings, and those results also agree with the 18 degrees found by the

Page 5929

 1     investigation -- the CSB investigation team.

 2        Q.   For the record, could you tell us what 18 degrees is

 3     approximately equivalent to in the mils measurement system?

 4        A.   It's approximately 320 mils.

 5        Q.   So the report conducted by the Bosnian authorities is consistent

 6     with eight of the results in front of you; is that right?

 7        A.   Yes, it is.

 8             MR. GAYNOR:  I'd like to move now to 11333, please.  I'm moving

 9     on to another incident.  This is the incident known as Markale II.

10        Q.   Now, in your report, under Incident G-19, Mr. Higgs, you have

11     relied on a considerable number of documents in your analysis concerning

12     this incident.  I just want you to confirm that the documents, as they

13     come up, are the documents which you relied upon.

14             Now, the document in front of you is obviously an UNMO daily

15     sitrep.

16             MR. GAYNOR:  I'd like to go to page 20 of this document, please.

17        Q.   As we see towards the end of the document - if we could scroll

18     down a little bit - this is a description of an incident which took place

19     at the market-place and includes the words:

20             "One projectile was fired from 170 mag deg, killed 33 TBC people

21     (UNMO confirmed 31 killed) and wounded 79."

22             Focusing on that sentence, what are your comments?

23        A.   This is relating to the round that fell in the road, and it's

24     just confirming that the bearing from which, again, was measured on the

25     day for the direction at which the round came from was 170 degrees.

Page 5930

 1        Q.   On the next page, at the top, we see in the second paragraph the

 2     words:

 3             "Two of the remaining four impacts caused 07 injuries (not

 4     confirmed).  These four rounds were fired from a different bearing (220

 5     to 240 mag deg) and impacted 300 metres further south from the above

 6     projectile."

 7             This is an issue which you've referred to in your report.  Could

 8     you explain what those words mean?

 9        A.   Obviously, the same day as the previous round or the previous

10     incident happened, there were four other impacts from 120-millimetre

11     mortar, as referred to here, which landed at approximately 300 metres

12     away, and their investigation found that the direction of those was 220

13     to 240.  At this moment in time, they're being seen as separate

14     incidents.  But as the investigation proceeded, many assumptions were

15     made that these were part of the same firing, and that's what led to some

16     confusion and assumptions being made in some of the future information.

17        Q.   And is it correct that from this sitrep the fatal round is

18     recorded as coming from 170 degrees?

19        A.   That is correct.

20             MR. GAYNOR:  If we could move now to 09917.

21        Q.   Now, on the left-hand part of the screen in front of you,

22     Mr. Higgs, you can see, from the first paragraph, that this is a cover

23     sheet to which is attached the final and comprehensive report on the

24     Sarajevo mortar incident of 28th August, 1995.

25             MR. GAYNOR:  If we could move now to two pages further on.  In

Page 5931

 1     fact, we can move to the next page, please.  And if we could scroll

 2     slightly to the left at the bottom.

 3        Q.   The report refers to "Key Evidence," and then on the next page,

 4     please, we see what that key evidence is, in summary -- what the key

 5     evidence is, in summary, followed by a summary of this report.

 6             So I'd just like to you explain to Their Honours in a little bit

 7     of detail the criteria which you would take into account in determining

 8     the origin of fire of the fatal projectile.  So if we can start with the

 9     first point, please.

10        A.   In paragraph 3, it talks us through the impact analysis.  There,

11     it confirms the fine-point investigations.  The French engineer report

12     came to 2850 mils, which, again, converted into degrees is approximately

13     170, and that the UNMO report -- the initial UNMO report also got

14     170 degrees.  It also then confirms that the other four impacts produced

15     bearings of 220 to 240 degrees.  It then starts to make assumptions with

16     the next sentence, where it says:

17             "The follow-on investigation sought to clarify this apparent

18     discrepancy."

19             So somebody thought at this stage that the rounds were connected,

20     even though they landed 300 metres apart, which, for mortars firing in

21     this scenario, is a huge distance apart.  This assumption, then, did

22     affect some of their thinking, as you'll see a bit later on.  The --

23        Q.   Sorry.  If I can stop you on that point.  Can you explain why it

24     is not possible, in your view, that the four impacts came from the same

25     location as the fatal impact?

Page 5932

 1        A.   If -- when a mortar engages a target, you have a bearing or a

 2     line from that mortar to where the round landed on the ground, which you

 3     can then trace back.  Because the other round landed 300 metres apart, if

 4     you then traced back a line with the same bearing from that point

 5     backwards, it would come to a point 300 metres different where the mortar

 6     was to the first one.  So for the same mortar to have fired both, it

 7     would have had to have fired the one of the four rounds, then in very

 8     quick succession quickly pack up, move 300 metres across to one side, set

 9     up again, and then fire the other round to give you the same bearing back

10     to the same mortar position.

11             The other problem which is mentioned in this paragraph, which is

12     the next sentence where it says they have used the fused furrow for

13     calculating the bearing, using correct mortar methodologies for

14     investigation, you do not use fused furrows for calculating bearing

15     because they are prone to error.  An experienced investigator would not

16     use a fused furrow unless the fuse furrow was of excellent quality.  And

17     I mention what that is in, I believe, para 10 of my report.

18        Q.   Now, do you discount the possibility of a ricochet by the fatal

19     projectile, which is alluded to in the final sentence of that paragraph?

20        A.   There is no evidence I have seen to confirm that a round has

21     struck a building first.  If it did, it could well have exploded on

22     impact.  If they believe that a round had struck a building first and

23     moved it bearing-wise away from where it has come from, then it does not

24     make sense why you would then use the crater fuse-furrow examination to

25     work out the back-bearing, knowing that it's hit a building first.  So,

Page 5933

 1     no, I don't believe that this round hit a building first.  There's no

 2     evidence to prove that.

 3        Q.   You're familiar with the Cymbeline radar system?

 4        A.   Yes, I am.

 5        Q.   Could you explain briefly what it is?

 6        A.   The Cymbeline is a mortar-locating radar.  It projects radar

 7     beams into the sky which can then pick up projectiles passing through

 8     those radar beams to determine where the round has been fired from.

 9        Q.   Now, just looking at the report, had this fatal projectile been

10     fired at a range of 950 metres or less, what would have happened?

11        A.   As you can see from the Cymbeline report, if the mortar had been

12     fired at a very close distance to the incident, then, because of the high

13     trajectory required, the Cymbeline would have detected it.

14        Q.   Moving to paragraph 5 on the page in front of you, there is a

15     reference to UN observation posts.  I want you to describe to

16     Their Honours why this is relevant, the auditory element.

17        A.   From reading this report and others, there was no reported sound

18     of the mortar firing from any of the observer positions.  But they did

19     hear the rounds falling, which would indicate that from wherever the

20     mortar was fired, that probably because of something, either buildings or

21     hill-side, were possibly in the way, preventing them hearing the rounds

22     being fired.

23        Q.   Now, in your report, at page 33, you have identified four

24     possible ranges from which the projectile could have been fired if it

25     were to approach at an angle of 70 degrees, which we'll get to.  The

Page 5934

 1     ranges you give are:  with a charge 1, 900 metres; with a charge 2,

 2     1600 metres; with a charge 3, 2.400 metres; and with a charge 4,

 3     3.000 metres.  In respect of the fatal projectile fired on the

 4     market-place, which of those four ranges do you believe to be the most

 5     likely, and on what basis do you reach that conclusion?

 6        A.   From the evidence received from examining the crater, as we get

 7     an angle out of which the round could have coming in at, which then gives

 8     us those possible ranges when looking at the range tables, at the close

 9     of distance of 900, that would put the mortar inside the confrontation

10     line and also within earshot of the closest UN observer.  At 1600 metres,

11     that puts the mortar very close to the confrontation lines and also

12     within earshot of the UN observer.  When you go back to charges 3 and 4,

13     it is now placing the mortar beyond the confrontation line, into the

14     hills or surrounding country-side overlooking Sarajevo.

15             Because we heard no sound, and the Cymbeline radar, for the

16     reasons in the report, didn't pick up any angle of the mortar travelling,

17     that would indicate that 900 metres is not the preferred option.  At

18     1600 metres, again, not hearing any sound and because of very poor

19     tactical deployment by putting a mortar right on the confrontation line,

20     would tend to rule out it was fired from 1600 metres.  Again because the

21     Cymbeline suggests that it was fired from probably more of a medium

22     charge, those of charges 3 or 4, so it would fire under the radar, and

23     that no sound of the firing was heard, may indicate that the mortar

24     actually was located in the hill-sides overlooking Sarajevo, which would

25     indicate either fired on charges 3 or 4, which would then place it beyond

Page 5935

 1     the confrontation line, into Serb-held territory.

 2        Q.   At this point, could you just explain the concept of charge 1,

 3     charge 2, charge 3, charge 4, in the use of a mortar?

 4        A.   The propellant of a mortar can be removed to give you different

 5     ranges.  They are like plastic wedges or cheeses, as they are called,

 6     that go around the tail-fin of a mortar, and most mortars have six of

 7     them.  And if you only want to fire at close range, you can just put one

 8     or two on.  If you want to fire at longer ranges, you can put as many as

 9     you want on, up to six.  But normally with mortars you try and fire at

10     the minimum charge you can to hit the target, because that is more

11     accurate, to fire on the minimum charge; you have less time of flight,

12     and less chances of piece of equipment, like Cymbeline, detecting the

13     round once fired.

14             MR. GAYNOR:  Thank you.  We're going to have to move on, I'm

15     afraid.

16             Could I have document 15059.

17        Q.   This is an UNMO daily sitrep which is referred to in your

18     statement.  I'd just like you to confirm that that is the document to

19     which you referred; is that correct?

20        A.   Yes, it is.

21             MR. GAYNOR:  Now, the next document, please, which is 15060.

22        Q.   This document -- first, the document is a document from G2 to the

23     commander of UNPROFOR, dated the 8th of September, 1995, concerning the

24     Markale II incident, and it describes in some detail the Cymbeline point.

25             MR. GAYNOR:  And if we could go to the next page, please, under

Page 5936

 1     point C.

 2        Q.   It says that:

 3             "A mortar fired from middle to long range would have a lower

 4     trajectory and equates to a firing position on Bosnian Serb territory.  A

 5     lower trajectory round would have been passed under the Cymbeline radar's

 6     beam."

 7             Do you agree generally with that analysis?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   I'd like to take you to 15061, please.  This is a set of

10     photographs taken following the Markale II incident.

11             MR. GAYNOR:  If we could go to page 10 when it arrives.  In fact,

12     if we could take the next page, please.

13        Q.   What do you see there, Mr. Higgs?

14        A.   This is a photograph taken looking down on the mortar crater.

15        Q.   Can you just make any comments about the origin of fire and --

16     yeah, origin of fire, first of all?

17        A.   From looking at the mortar crater, the experienced eye can see

18     that the majority of the shrapnel marks in the tarmac are between the

19     point of burst on the ground and the pavement, so it gives an indication

20     that this round has come from over the building and that the direction of

21     fire is approximately from where you can see that crater on the ground

22     towards the building.

23        Q.   How is the angle of impact of the projectile calculated?

24        A.   In this case here, none of the investigating teams attending on

25     the first day found a fuse furrow, which is the hole you get in the

Page 5937

 1     center of the crater, good enough to use for calculations of angle.

 2     Therefore, they conducted a mathematical calculation using measurements

 3     measured from the crater to the building and the height of the building

 4     to find out what the minimum elevation would have to be to clear the

 5     building.  And in addition to that, the Bosnian investigation team

 6     conducted ballistic calculations on the explosion to give them an

 7     approximate angle of decent.

 8        Q.   What was that angle?

 9        A.   From the ballistic calculation, they came up with 70 degrees, and

10     the mathematical calculation to the roof gave them a minimum angle of

11     67 degrees.

12             MR. GAYNOR:  I'd like to take to you the next document, which is

13     15062.  This document is an official report of Sarajevo CSB, dated the

14     29th of August, 1995.

15             Sorry, could we try 11404, please.

16        Q.   The document that's coming up, Mr. Higgs, is, I believe, the

17     Sarajevo CSB report which you referred to in --

18             MR. GAYNOR:  Sorry, that's not the correct document.  Sorry,

19     could I have 11404.  I'll move on to the next document.

20        Q.   Mr. Higgs, I'd like to take you to 15062.  I apologise.  On the

21     form, it's 14404.

22             MR. GAYNOR:  My apologies to the Court.

23        Q.   Mr. Higgs, you see this is a CSB Sarajevo report, dated

24     29th of August, 1995?

25        A.   Yes, I do.

Page 5938

 1        Q.   And further down, it refers to the involvement of a Captain Higgs

 2     from Great Britain.  That is not, in fact, you, is it?

 3        A.   No, it's not.

 4        Q.   Now, on the next page, please, we see a reference to a

 5     120-millimetre shell, KB 9307, and MK M974.  Is it -- you agree that it's

 6     possible to take those kind of data from a stabiliser?

 7        A.   Yes, this information was taken from the tail-fins or the

 8     stabiliser of the round and can be seen in some of the photographs taken

 9     by the investigation teams.

10        Q.   Now, under point number 2, it says:

11             "The shell was fired from the south.  Its azimuth of 170 degrees,

12     plus or minus 5 degrees, corresponds to aggressor positions at the

13     Trebevic area."

14             Ignoring the reference to aggressor positions, do you have any

15     comment about the 170 degrees?

16        A.   Now, this is the reading they got from their examination, and

17     I've got no reasons to not believe that.

18             MR. GAYNOR:  There are a couple of diagrams which appear at the

19     very end of this document, four pages from the end.  If we could go

20     there, please.

21             We'll leave that document for the moment.

22             Could I ask for Video 40221 to be played, please.  I'm informed

23     we need to switch to Sanction for this.

24                           [Video-clip played]

25             MR. GAYNOR:  We could just pause there briefly.

Page 5939

 1        Q.   Now, based on your knowledge of the 120-millimetre mortar system,

 2     is the damage we've seen there consistent with a single round?

 3        A.   Yes, it is.

 4             MR. GAYNOR:  That comment was made at 1 minute and 25 seconds.

 5             If we could play on, please.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             MR. GAYNOR:  Now, if we could pause there, please, pausing at

 8     1 minute and 43 seconds.

 9        Q.   What is the location depicted in this video?

10        A.   The video shows an area just outside a building where I'm

11     informed contained within is a market.

12        Q.   How far is this from the open-air market?

13        A.   It is a short distance down the road.  I have not accurately

14     measured it, but between 50 and 100 metres.

15        Q.   And the open-air market is where the Markale I projectile

16     exploded; is that right?

17        A.   That's correct.

18        Q.   And this is the location where the Markale II projectile

19     exploded; correct?

20        A.   Correct.

21             MR. GAYNOR:  If we could play on, please.

22                           [Video-clip played]

23             MR. GAYNOR:  If we could pause there, please.  We're pausing now

24     at 3 minutes and 43 seconds.

25        Q.   What do you see in front of you at this point, Mr. Higgs?

Page 5940

 1        A.   The video is now showing the arrival of the French investigation

 2     team.

 3             MR. GAYNOR:  Could you play on, please.

 4                           [Video-clip played]

 5             MR. GAYNOR:  If we could pause there, please.  We're at 4 minutes

 6     and 37 seconds.

 7        Q.   What appears to be taking place at this point in the video?

 8        A.   The team are now taking the measurements from the shell crater to

 9     the edge of the building.  These measurements are then used when they

10     calculate the height of the building and then work out the minimum angle

11     that the round must have had to clear the building.

12        Q.   Just to clarify your answer there, they're measuring the distance

13     from the crater to the edge of the building, and then what other

14     measurements would they need to take?

15        A.   They'll then take the measurement of the height of the building.

16     And then by using mathematical calculations, they can calculate the

17     angle.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             MR. GAYNOR:  Could we play on, please.

20                           [Video-clip played]

21             MR. GAYNOR:  Pause there, please.  We're at 5 minutes and

22     32 seconds.

23        Q.   What is taking place at this point of the video?

24        A.   From the shape of the shrapnel marks in the tarmac, this soldier

25     is now looking at the direction from which the round has come and now

Page 5941

 1     taking his bearing using the compass.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And we are -- would you agree that this isn't

 3     necessarily a video of the entire investigative process, taking the

 4     direction or taking the height?

 5        A.   It doesn't seem to be.  This video only captures, obviously,

 6     certain parts of the total investigation.

 7             MR. GAYNOR:  Could we play on, please.

 8                           [Video-clip played]

 9             MR. GAYNOR:  If we could pause there, please.  We're at 6 minutes

10     and 28 seconds.

11        Q.   What is taking place at this stage?

12        A.   They're now doing a preliminary investigation on the tail-fins

13     from the round.  This is where they can find certain information.  You

14     can just see it in the video, where the mark and batch number are stamped

15     on the rear.  And they have laid the tape measure down to measure the

16     distance across the fins just to confirm the calibre of the mortar.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MR. GAYNOR:  We can play on, please.

19                           [Video-clip played]

20             MR. GAYNOR:  We can stop the video at this stage.  Thank you.

21             I have no further questions in examination-in-chief.

22             I was going to seek the admission of the documents as well as the

23     video at this stage, or I can do that at the end of the evidence of the

24     witness, as Your Honours wish.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

Page 5942

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

 2             We have no objection to the admission as source documents,

 3     pursuant to the Trial Chamber's decision on the Prosecution's submission

 4     on the relevancy of certain documents relating to the testimony of

 5     Richard Philipps on the 9th of July, 2010.  But as you noted in

 6     paragraph 11, the substance of those documents should not be considered

 7     by the Chamber, only to the extent of assisting the Chamber in assessing

 8     the probative value of the expert testimony.

 9             MR. GAYNOR:  Mr. President, we're tendering these documents to be

10     admitted for all purposes, in accordance with the guidance which is set

11     out in the decision that Mr. Robinson has referred to.  These are not

12     merely admitted as source documents.  The witness has had an opportunity

13     to comment upon them, to explain their relevance to the Chamber.  And in

14     the same way as Your Honours admitted for all purposes documents admitted

15     through Expert Donia, we are tendering these documents for all purposes.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, the problem that -- I think we, in

17     principle, could understand to have these documents admitted for all

18     purposes if we had the opportunity for a robust cross-examination of all

19     of these incidents.  But given the time that the Chamber has allowed for

20     cross-examination, to have documents admitted as to the substance of the

21     investigation, without having the ability to question those people who

22     conducted the investigation, would really prejudice us, given the time.

23     However, if we have enough time for a robust cross-examination of each of

24     these incidents, then we really wouldn't mind the documents, themselves,

25     being admitted.  But given the Chamber's philosophy towards the evidence

Page 5943

 1     of this witness, as reflected in the time allowed for cross-examination,

 2     we don't feel that it would be fair to admit these for all purposes.

 3             Thank you.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 5             We'll have a break for half an hour, and we'll give our ruling

 6     afterward.

 7                           [The witness stands down]

 8                           --- Recess taken at 12.25 p.m.

 9                           --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.

10             JUDGE KWON:  This is our ruling:

11             The Chamber has considered the arguments put forward by

12     Mr. Robinson as to why the underlying investigatory reports and other

13     material reviewed by Mr. Higgs, in reaching his conclusions and preparing

14     his report, should be admitted as source documents rather than for all

15     purposes, as the Prosecution wishes.  However, as this underlying

16     material was referred to by the witness in the course of his testimony,

17     the situation differs from that of Mr. Philipps and the source material

18     that was only referenced in his expert report and not discussed in the

19     courtroom with him.

20             Having said that, as we indicated in our ruling on the time for

21     cross-examination of Mr. Higgs, the Chamber is of the view that his

22     evidence is of a limited nature, as he could only comment, on the basis

23     of his expertise, on the investigations conducted by others and the

24     conclusions reached by them.  This has an effect on the weight which the

25     Chamber can ascribe to those underlying reports and other materials, and,

Page 5944

 1     indeed, there would need to be further evidence brought to support them

 2     before the Chamber could reach conclusions based thereon.

 3             As he's not the author of these underlying reports, additional

 4     time to cross-examine this witness about them would be of limited

 5     purpose, and the Chamber remains of the view that three hours is

 6     sufficient.

 7             With these comments, the Chamber will admit the documents

 8     commented upon by the witness in the course of his testimony and upon

 9     which he based his expert report.

10             That was the ruling, and I was told that there's something to be

11     raised by Mr. Gaynor or Mr. Tieger.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13             I wanted to raise one scheduling issue that I had an opportunity

14     to speak with the Defence about.

15             The Court will be aware that there were three witnesses scheduled

16     for this week.  A look at the allotted -- the cross-examination times

17     consumed and allotted thus far suggests the possibility that we may

18     complete the testimony of those three witnesses before the completion of

19     the week.  It remains the expectation and certainly the preference,

20     strong preference, to the parties, as I gleaned during the course of a

21     discussion during the recess, to maintain the existing schedule, that is,

22     three witnesses this week, and then commence with KDZ-088 on Monday.

23             I see the Court may be in agreement with that, and I won't

24     continue if that's the case, but I wanted to alert the Court to that

25     position so that the Bench was as aware of the circumstances as possible

Page 5945

 1     and could provide whatever relevant feedback it shows so there'd be as

 2     much certainty possible.

 3             Thank you, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.  Give me a minute.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.  Thank you for the

 7     information.

 8             What I wanted to tell you is that not to make the final

 9     arrangement to call KDZ-88 on Monday.  The reason will become apparent by

10     the course of today.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Understood, Your Honour.

12             And may I take this opportunity to raise a related matter, and

13     that would be to encourage the Court, to the extent it may be possible,

14     to provide the parties with as much advance notice of allotted -- of

15     cross-examination time to be allotted as it can.  And that means, if

16     possible, as many witnesses ahead as possible.  The reasons are obvious.

17     I appreciate the burdens involved, but it would be of great benefit to

18     the parties.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll do so.

20             Let's bring in the witness.

21             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Although the Trial Chamber

23     concluded that the evidence provided by Mr. Higgs does require further

24     testimony, I'm afraid that through his testimony these reports are being

25     legitimised to a considerable degree.  I kindly ask you to consider the

Page 5946

 1     necessity of having more time before KDZ-88 arrives.  I would like to

 2     deal with 80 incidents that Mr. Higgs dealt with, major incidents, at

 3     that.  We will not have a better opportunity of clarifying the matter

 4     than the opportunity that is at hand now.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber gave its ruling, and we are not minded

 6     to revisit the issue.  Read again the ruling we gave, and comply with it

 7     as much as possible.

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Let's begin your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

12        Q.   [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Higgs.  I'd like to express to you

13     my gratitude for meeting with the Defence team and also for your promise

14     that you would give us a list of your previous testimony and involvement

15     in criminal cases in the UK and other countries.  We will ask to refer to

16     some of these cases to understand your method of work.

17             Do you agree that your expertise is, in fact, a report on the

18     work of other investigative teams, not an inquiry into the incidents

19     themselves?

20        A.   In these cases, my reports are based on the investigations

21     carried out by others.

22        Q.   Thank you.  But in the course of our interview, you said, I have

23     to believe that -- [In English] that I based my opinion on -- through ...

24     [Interpretation] And you said that one must hope that they are correct.

25        A.   Yes, I must believe what was written in those investigations was

Page 5947

 1     done correct at the time.

 2        Q.   Therefore, you would agree, wouldn't you, that in order for us to

 3     check the veracity of your own conclusions, whereby you lend credibility

 4     to their findings, we have only one course of action open, and that is to

 5     clear up these incidents, themselves, with your assistance here; correct?

 6        A.   Yes, I can give you my opinion on each of these incidents here to

 7     enable them to be cleared up.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  May I now ask for the video,

10     65 ter 40221.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Do we need to switch to Sanction again?  Yes.

12                           [Video-clip played]

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need the sequence of minute and

14     25 seconds.  Rewind a little, please.  One minute, 20.  1:25.  1:25.  Can

15     you freeze there.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Higgs, that in a human body there is more than

18     two-thirds of liquid; blood, lymph, et cetera?

19        A.   I'm obviously no doctor.  I'm led to believe that, but I

20     obviously could not give a definite answer on that.

21        Q.   All right.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Can we get that picture back?

23     Where is that picture?

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Can you explain how this body found itself there and how these

Page 5948

 1     wounds were inflicted?

 2        A.   Difficult to confirm exactly how it ended there, as I can only

 3     see the pictures as you can.  It would look like this person has been

 4     caught within the blast or shrapnel of the round, causing the injuries,

 5     and then pushing -- the blast pushing the individual over the barrier.

 6        Q.   Can you explain where are his bodily fluids that must have flowed

 7     out of the body with an injury like this?  Where are they?

 8        A.   Well, all I can see on this picture is, as you can, where the

 9     blood-stains are on the side of the body.

10        Q.   Can we agree that the asphalt below the body is dry?

11        A.   From the quality of the picture, I cannot see large quantities,

12     but I couldn't rule out there being some.

13        Q.   Do you notice the shadow of the body?

14        A.   Yes, I can see the shadow.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Can we now call -- can we now see

17     the sequence of 3:43, the arrival of the French team.  Is this it?

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   That's the French investigative team, isn't it?

20        A.   Yes, that's correct.

21        Q.   Was that the first team to appear on the scene?

22        A.   I don't know if these were the first.  The video doesn't either

23     confirm or deny that.

24        Q.   During our interview, you confirmed that the best time to

25     investigate an incident is immediately after it occurred; correct?

Page 5949

 1        A.   That's correct.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 4:37.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Are these members of the French Battalion measuring the crater?

 5        A.   No, they're not measuring the crater.  They're measuring the

 6     distance from the crater to the building.

 7        Q.   Yes.  They're measuring the position relative to the building?

 8        A.   Correct.

 9        Q.   Do we see here a clear image of the crater?

10        A.   Not in this image, no.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we rewind a few seconds.  We

12     can play the footage now.

13                           [Video-clip played]

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Is this a better picture?

16        A.   It is, but it still does not show the crater in any great detail.

17        Q.   Can it be seen that the crater, the traces, are marked by chalk?

18        A.   It's not clear to see, from the picture, whether or not they are

19     marked by chalk or whether that is just white edges to the splinters in

20     the tarmac.

21        Q.   Very well.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Can we play the film now.

23                           [Video-clip played]

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us listen carefully to what

25     this man using the compass will say.  You can play it back.

Page 5950

 1                           [Video-clip played]

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's freeze here.  This French

 3     officer, did he say "2.100"?  Can the French interpreters help us?  Did

 4     the French officer say "2.000 1.000 parts"?

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  The French interpreters believe they heard

 6     "2.800 thousandths."

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]

 8     ... the officer said "2.000 1.000 parts."

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I was advised by the interpreter that the French

10     booth believes that they heard "2.800 --" "2.800 thousandths."

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we rewind again and listen once

12     again carefully to what the officer said?

13             JUDGE KWON:  And if the French interpreters could interpret what

14     they hear in French.

15                           [Video-clip played]

16             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Please write down, Cherry.  Are you

17     there?  Note down bearing 2.800 thousandths."

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

19             Can we now move to 6:28.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Higgs, that on this stabiliser there is no --

22     no ignition device, detonator?

23        A.   The ignition device for this tail-fin, you can clearly see it's

24     in the picture.  It is in the center.  That is a percussion cap that is

25     in the center of the tail-fin, which fires the round.  Obviously, if

Page 5951

 1     you're referring to the fuse, of course, that would be on the opposite

 2     end of the round, which detonates on impact.

 3        Q.   But if we look at the place where a brass cap should be, the one

 4     that activates the motor, not the shell, it activates the charge, and

 5     it's made of brass or at least it's the colour of brass, made of a soft

 6     material?

 7        A.   Not on all mortar rounds the percussion caps are made of brass or

 8     copper.  Sometimes they are made of a silver-coloured alloy.  It would

 9     depend on the type and batch of ammunition.  And sometimes these can even

10     be displaced after firing.

11        Q.   We accept, don't we, that it's missing here in this picture?  It

12     had been released earlier or it's missing.  But do you know from what

13     material Yugoslav-made detonator caps are made; a coloured metal or a

14     colourless metal?

15        A.   Two questions there.  The first one regarding it being missing:

16     No, I can't confirm that because it could be -- still be in place.  This

17     photograph is not clear enough to show that.

18             Regarding the colour and this type of batch of ammunition:  No, I

19     have not got that detail information.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Continue with the play-back,

22     please.

23                           [Video-clip played]

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Freeze.

25             We had a sharper picture of the body of the stabiliser a moment

Page 5952

 1     ago.  Can we rewind a few seconds, perhaps.  There it is.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   What would you say about the body of this stabiliser?  Are these

 4     traces of explosion?

 5        A.   The stabiliser shows the damage that would be consistent with

 6     being fired, as you can see from the end of the stabiliser nearest to the

 7     right-hand edge of the screen, where it has been peeled back from firing.

 8     And the tail-fins represent a tail-fin that has, since the explosion, hit

 9     something and, therefore, caused damage to the fins.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Do you see that the emplacement of the detonator cap

11     is empty?  Can you see that now?

12        A.   Again, I'm not really clear enough to see that, because on firing

13     they will be pressed in by the firing pin.  So this is not clear enough

14     to either confirm or disagree with that.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Has this video been admitted into

17     evidence?  Wasn't it tendered by the Prosecution?

18             MR. GAYNOR:  Yes, our understanding is that it's been admitted

19     into evidence.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Why does it bear this different number?

21             MR. GAYNOR:  Sorry.  The video has been admitted in evidence.

22     The stabiliser --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yeah, the video you played is numbered as 40310, and

24     this one was referred to as 40221.

25             MR. GAYNOR:  I'm informed that they are duplicates of each other

Page 5953

 1     and this is the correct number.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  What is the correct number?

 3             MR. GAYNOR:  40221.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             MR. GAYNOR:  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  That one has been already admitted, and the exhibit

 7     number will be assigned by the Court Deputy in due course.  I take it it

 8     should be probably P1450.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now get 1D2253.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we switch to e-court from Sanction?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the photograph I wanted.

12     Can we restore it?

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you agree that this is a photo of the Markale Market-Place?

15     This is a freeze taken from pre-war video footage shown on TV.  And do

16     you agree that this is the Markale Market, covered by some sort of

17     roofing plates that almost -- that are almost joined together, almost

18     touch each other?

19        A.   From the picture, it does appear to be the market.  However,

20     obviously, I cannot definitely confirm that without seeing a bigger

21     picture.  But, yes, it does appear to be the Markale Market.

22        Q.   You see the rails towards the bottom of the picture.  Now, when

23     you look at this photo and these big roofing plates, do you still stand

24     by your finding, based on previous investigations, that it's possible,

25     with one hit of this market, to land a shell without having the shell

Page 5954

 1     activate on the roofing plates?

 2        A.   Yes, that is possible, because on the day of firing, of course,

 3     we do not know the position of these roofing plates, and the round could

 4     have quite easily passed in a gap between them.  I obviously have no

 5     evidence or information to that fact.

 6        Q.   Well, as you were probably able to see in the material that the

 7     Muslim side gave you, it was the same location, the market looked the

 8     same, and it's documented in many photographs of Markale with covered

 9     stalls.  Did you see such material?  Did they give you all the background

10     material you needed for your findings?

11        A.   The findings, obviously, are based on the reports which are

12     obviously in evidence.  At no time I'm aware that they reported a round

13     had passed through or hit one of these roofing covers.  There was mention

14     that it had, I think, hit a table on the way through, but I've got no

15     evidence that I have seen which relates to these -- these covers.

16        Q.   To make it quite clear for the participants in these proceedings,

17     we're now talking about Markale I?

18        A.   Correct.

19        Q.   Would a shell hitting these covers activate?

20        A.   Depending on what these covers are made of, how substantial they

21     are, then, yes, it could.

22        Q.   You said, and we could see it in one UN report, that the shell

23     hit a stall.  Would it activate hitting a stall?

24        A.   It depends on, of course, how it hit the stall and which part,

25     but a stall could detonate it if it was hit correctly and with enough

Page 5955

 1     force.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Can we now call up 65 ter 10083.

 4             Before that, may I tender this document.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Unless it is objected to, we'll admit this picture.

 6             Mr. Gaynor.

 7             MR. GAYNOR:  Subject to the observation that we don't have any

 8     information as to when that photograph --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  It was before the incident.

10             MR. GAYNOR:  True.  But beyond that, we're not given a year at

11     all as to when that photograph might have been taken.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Can you help us in that regard, Mr. Karadzic?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I lived 50 years in this city, and

14     I know it very well.  This is what the Markale Market looked before --

15     just before the war and earlier, and this is a freeze from video footage

16     shown on TV.

17             JUDGE KWON:  When?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just before the war.

19             JUDGE KWON:  That's all you can tell us?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

21             JUDGE KWON:  With that caveat, we'll admit this.

22             MR. GAYNOR:  Very well, Mr. President.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  This will be Exhibit D542, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get 65 ter 10083.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 5956

 1        Q.   It's a part of your report, after touring the positions around

 2     Sarajevo, and this refers to your visit to Mrkovici village, located

 3     outside on the front-lines, behind the confrontation line on the Serbian

 4     side.  Is that so?

 5        A.   I'm sorry, which part of the report are you referring to?

 6        Q.   The pages -- it's the last page:  "I visited the area of

 7     Mirkovci ..."  0303-7515.  Yes:  "I have visited ..."  Top of the page.

 8        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 9        Q.   What did you mean by saying that there are several locations in

10     Mrkovici that lend themselves to the placing of mortars, and there are

11     access roads that can be used to transport them into Mrkovici?

12        A.   I was trying to establish all the possible locations where the

13     round could have been fired from.  With the 120-millimetre mortar, it is

14     a heavy piece of equipment, a large piece of equipment, and certain areas

15     then may not be suitable for the firing of that weapon system.  So I was

16     taken around to see different sites to see the possibilities of where it

17     could have been located.

18        Q.   But during our interview you said that a mortar of

19     120 millimetres can be disassembled, shipped, and assembled again; is

20     that right?

21        A.   Yes, that's correct.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Did you find, in Mrkovici, any sites where this heavy

23     120-millimetre mortar was dug in?

24        A.   Not sites that -- where it was dug in.

25        Q.   Thank you.  And did you tour all the sites on that bearing

Page 5957

 1     between Mrkovici and Markale?  Did you tour other places to see if there

 2     were any suitable sites for a mortar?

 3        A.   We looked at all the area along that bearing line and identified

 4     the suitable places, yes.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly look at the Map 02

 6     from this special binder.  That's the 02 from the Sarajevo special

 7     folder.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I don't remember the 65 ter number of this, this

 9     picture, aerial image.

10             MR. GAYNOR:  We're just getting it right now, Your Honour.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

12             MR. GAYNOR:  I'm told it's 11790, Your Honour.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's the map.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Can you show us Mrkovici on this map?

16        A.   Purely from this map -- obviously it's been some time since I

17     have been there.  I'm obviously now no longer really familiar with the

18     named areas.  So it would really be not accurate for me now trying to

19     determine which -- where exactly this area is on this particular aerial

20     photograph.

21        Q.   Perhaps it's easier in the lower part of the city.  Can you show

22     Markale on this picture?

23        A.   Well, the lower part of the city, of course, shows here where the

24     airport is.  Of course, Markale is at the other end of the city.

25        Q.   In the eastern part of the city, this narrowest part of the city,

Page 5958

 1     do you see the main street winding through the old town?

 2        A.   Not clearly on this photograph, no.

 3        Q.   Do you agree that Markale are in the old town?

 4        A.   Yes, they're in the old town.

 5        Q.   And do you agree that when you go from the old town towards the

 6     top, towards this mountain, that Mrkovici are behind the confrontation

 7     line, to the north of the confrontation line?

 8        A.   Without checking that against a map showing the areas with the

 9     names on, obviously, I cannot show it on this picture.

10        Q.   We'll show that map later as well.  But do you agree that the

11     confrontation lines are very close together in this section?

12        A.   Yes, that picture does show the confrontation lines are very

13     close together.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, that will be it for today.

15             So we'll rise, and we'll resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.

16             Mr. Higgs, probably you will know very well that during the

17     course of your testimony, you are not supposed to discuss your evidence

18     with anybody else.

19             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE KWON:  See you tomorrow morning.

21                           [The witness stands down]

22                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

23                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 19th day

24                           of August, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.