1 Wednesday, 18 August 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody.
7 Good morning, Colonel Mole.
8 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
10 WITNESS: RICHARD MOLE [Resumed]
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Good morning to all. Good morning, Colonel.
13 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. You confirmed yesterday your disagreement with media reporting,
17 and I would like to remind you, in this context, of an officer whom you
18 held in high esteem and you suggested him for promotion,
19 Peter [as interpreted] Henneberry, and in his diary you will agree that
20 there are many examples of his own disagreement with media reporting;
22 A. The diary you refer to was made available to me earlier this
23 week. This was my first opportunity to look through it, and I understand
24 what you're saying, yes.
25 Q. Would you agree that both your observation and the observation of
1 General Morillon and Mr. Henneberry was aimed, in fact, at achieving a
2 balanced relationship, because these biased positions were a hindrance to
4 A. These opinions of which you speak which were held by the press,
5 from our perception, certainly made it extremely more difficult for us to
6 fulfill our mission, the details of which I'm sure you're aware, and will
7 have made it difficult for the warring factions to proceed when their
8 intentions, certainly from the Serb side, seemed to be warped and twisted
9 by press reports.
10 Q. Thank you. You told us yesterday that you did not receive
11 information from the reporters who had crossed over or visited our side,
12 and you, yourself, were wary of being perceived as a spy. Does that
13 imply that spying would imply gaining some knowledge about the Serbian
14 side and then conveying that information to someone else?
15 A. Absolutely, you make a very valid point, one which we were
16 extremely aware of. As a consequence of that concern, the UNMO Group
17 worked to ensure that should you serve on the Presidency side in
19 who transited between the two warring factions in the Sarajevo situation
20 was myself, and I was extremely conscious to express to all to whom I
21 spoke that any information I required, I required it purely to fulfill my
22 mission. And I hoped I'd explained that mission clearly to the people to
23 whom I spoke. I wanted them to have the confidence to talk to me with
24 regard to purely the mission which I had to fulfill. I was not there
25 personally to take one side nor the other, for the humanitarian elements
1 of my mission were my primary concern.
2 Q. Thank you. And from your communications and your achievements
3 and successes with the Serbian side where you were able to get everything
4 you wanted at the highest level and most of what you wanted at lower
5 levels, and also from the diary of Mr. Henneberry, we can see that there
6 was a considerable level of trust and good relations between the Serbian
7 side and the UNPROFOR. You also confirmed that you were not receiving
8 information from foreign reporters who were coming back from the Serb
9 territory. If they had given to you or anyone else any information they
10 had gained on the Serbian side, would that have constituted spying, in
11 the sense that we were discussing?
12 A. I think one must qualify what information any news agency could
13 give to me before one could decide whether that information was useful in
14 such activity as you suggest. I never considered that the news agencies
15 had better information than I did. I had a network which allowed me to
16 get a much broader perspective on events throughout Bosnia
17 specifically in Sarajevo
18 I have to explain to you that before I came to Sarajevo I was the
19 chief operations officer for the complete group of UNMOs, and, therefore,
20 I had responsibilities throughout the region. That includes Serbia
22 which, without being too arrogant, I think the press would have gained
23 more by a discussion with me than I would by having a discussion with
24 them. Consequently, I don't foresee the suggestion you make, that they
25 could give me information that would be useful for spying, to be a
1 pertinent point because I probably possessed that information and better.
2 Q. Thank you. I'm really not questioning the conduct of
3 UN officers. I'm speaking more from the viewpoint of the Serbian side,
4 and I'm dealing with the conduct of parties to that war. If
5 correspondents from our side, for instance, gained, by accident, some
6 information and conveyed it to someone secretly rather than publishing
7 it, would that have caused the Serbian side to be more concerned, more
8 wary of such persons who were involved in this activity? I'm not talking
9 now about the United Nations personnel, but about the press, if a press
10 representative were to convey secretly their own information to someone.
11 If you can just say yes or no.
12 A. I certainly understand --
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I was hesitating.
14 Yes, Mr. Hayden.
15 MR. HAYDEN: The question that Mr. Karadzic has posed is asking
16 the witness to speculate on how the Serbian side might feel, which is
17 something that I don't believe he's in a position to do.
18 JUDGE KWON: I agree. It is not for the witness to speculate,
19 Mr. Karadzic. What is your real question? Put your question to the
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm very appreciative and very
22 admiring of the position of Colonel Mole and his co-workers who were
23 trying not to even be perceived as spies, and conveying whatever they
24 learned from us would have constituted spying. They are justified in
25 their position. And I just wonder if the others acted the same. Does
1 that constitute --
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, instead of making submissions, put
3 your question.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Is it fair play if you learned something from your contacts with
6 us, not only you, but anyone else, if they conveyed such information to a
7 third party?
8 A. I'm sorry, but I don't really comprehend the "is it fair play"
9 aspect of the question.
10 JUDGE MORRISON: Colonel Mole, you were obviously reporting
11 further up the chain of command.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes.
13 JUDGE MORRISON: So the information that you gleaned was
14 inevitably passed to some third parties. I think what Dr. Karadzic is
15 asking is whether or not it would have been regarded as part of -- any
16 part of your mandate to pass information on to the other side, as it
17 were, in the military conflict, which I think you've already answered
18 that it's something that you didn't do and were very much hoping that you
19 weren't perceived to be doing. Is that correct?
20 THE WITNESS: Thank you. Then I think I can answer.
21 The information I received from all parties I achieved by
22 creating a relationship which ensured that people trusted me, and I used
23 that information personally for the benefit of myself and my officers and
24 my mission, but I was just as selective about who I passed that
25 information to. I learnt a lot that other UNMOs never knew about. I
1 learnt a lot that I never passed up the chain of command, because I used
2 it locally for my own objectives, which were the UN military observer
3 objectives. So that's why I struggle with the question, because that
4 wasn't the way I used the information. Maybe that's the answer to the
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Thank you. And now if I can follow up on this helpful
8 intervention by Judge Morrison. You were not involved in this sort of
9 activity, but if someone else were, if someone else had been, would that
10 have been spying?
11 JUDGE KWON: It's not for the witness to speculate. Ask specific
12 questions, Mr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Would you agree that the Muslim side targeted their own side of
16 the city, that there were shells directed at their own neighbourhoods,
17 their own citizens, with the aim of causing them to be perceived as
18 victims and thus inviting international sympathy, compassion, and, of
19 course, the military intervention that you mentioned?
20 A. You raise a very good but controversial issue here. I've
21 already, in my testimony, tried to explain that when incidents are
22 investigated, because we were not in a cease-fire situation but were
23 still engaged in a war, full forensic analysis of all incidents, such as
24 those you've already seen on the incident reports which we discussed
25 yesterday, are such that individual assessment was impossible. On top of
1 what I've just said, there was suggestion and there were sufficient
2 unknowns for members of UNPROFOR to be reasonably sure that what you have
3 stated is true. I would not, because of what I've just said, be able to
4 tell you of specific incidences because I would deny anybody in the
5 environment which we lived to have the ability to conclude a satisfactory
6 forensic investigation to prove whether what you have suggested was true
7 or not. So all I can suggest to you was that we, as UNMOs, were
8 uncomfortable about that question because we sensed that what you say may
9 have been true. But there are a lot of riders to what I've just said.
10 It can't be determined that it's a fact, but there were very strong
12 Q. Thank you. In your amalgamated statement, paragraph 121, you
13 expressed some of that thinking; namely, that there were incidents you
14 inquired into and that inspired in you certain suspicions as to who had
15 actually fired. And in your 1997 statement, on page 12, you said that
16 the Muslims used Sarajevo
17 [In English] " ... sometimes caused that perpetuation ..."
18 [Interpretation] Whereas Mr. Henneberry in the Galic case said
19 that investigations into incidents carried out by the United Nations made
20 him believe that for political reasons it was not emphatically said that
21 the Muslims had bombed their own people, but he, himself, had such
22 information that was collated among other people among UNMOs, that facts
23 strongly pointed to the Muslims as shooters and that on some occasions
24 they also bombed their own people. He says that in his Galic evidence of
25 22nd May, 2002, on page 80734 and 35. Is his information compatible or
1 consistent with yours?
2 A. From what you've just read to me, from my personal relationship
3 with the officer concerned, what he has said reflects very similar views,
4 I would suggest, to those that I have just described.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2226 is the next document I would
6 need, please, in e-court, page 8734 and 8735, just to glance briefly at
7 the passage Colonel Mole confirmed:
8 [In English] "Speaking specifically to funerals, I don't recall.
9 The incidents were investigated. And I believe, for political reasons,
10 no public categorical statement that the Muslims were shelling their own
11 was made. However, it was, if I can use the term, 'common knowledge,'
12 that the investigations strongly pointed to the fact that the Muslim
13 forces did, on occasion, shell their own civilians."
14 [Interpretation] Could this be admitted? We could also take a
15 look at the next page.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Before we do that, yes, Mr. Hayden.
17 MR. HAYDEN: And I don't believe it's appropriate to admit an
18 extract from another witness's testimony. There's provisions in the
19 Rules for the admission of written evidence of witnesses. The relevant
20 portions have been now read into the transcript.
21 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, if I may remind the Court, I think
22 we crossed this bridge or at least approached it earlier, and the Court
23 determined that, in that instance, that it would permit the accused to
24 refer to the prior testimony in asking the question, but not admit the
25 testimony itself.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE KWON: What is confirmed by Colonel Mole is already in the
4 record. I don't see the need to admit it separately. We agree with the
5 observation by Mr. Tieger and Mr. Hayden.
6 Let's proceed.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I agree, too. The transcript is
8 evidence as well, isn't it?
9 Could we have the next page -- or, rather, the previous page.
10 Just a moment, please. Sorry. It's the previous page, I think.
11 JUDGE KWON: I have to clarify. This page of the transcript is
12 not in evidence in this case. There's a separate procedure to tender
13 that into evidence in this case.
14 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, I think what you meant was that
15 the transcript in this trial is evidence. Am I correct in that?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes. What is reflected
17 in the transcript, what was confirmed by the witness.
18 JUDGE KWON: Of course. Let's proceed.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that it's on the this
20 page, too, but we have to find the exact section. No, this is 34. We
21 were on this page. Then we need 35. Sorry. Could we have 35, the next
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Let's have a look at this page:
25 [In English] "The market-place and gathering points were common
1 target areas where people were queuing for water, United Nations' aid, or
2 buying what little there was available in the markets. Those were common
4 [Interpretation] Then:
5 [In English] "Off the top of my head, I can recall four that I
6 believe stated that the shells were fired by the Bosnian Muslims on their
7 own people."
8 [Interpretation] And the last answer on this page:
9 "All the incidents I'm talking about were generally inside, well
10 inside the city boundary of Sarajevo
11 confrontation inside the" -- excuse me -- "the Muslim area. I cannot
12 provide address at the moment. I simply have forgotten details."
13 [Interpretation] That is what Mr. Henneberry is saying, and that
14 is consistent with your knowledge; right?
15 A. It is.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can remove this document now.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you agree that certain insights and investigations, from a
20 military point of view, were not quite satisfactory from the point of
21 view of criminal law?
22 A. Can we be specific about your question? You say "certain
23 insights and investigations, from a military point of view." Please,
24 could you explain which military, which investigations, before I answer
25 whether they were satisfactory or not?
1 Q. Yes, I will. Thank you.
2 Yesterday, we saw that the job of the observers was basically to
3 record the number of explosions. It was impossible to establish who was
4 firing and where the shells landed. Also, we see that there were quite a
5 few cases where on-site investigations, insight with regard to particular
6 incidents, showed ultimately that it could not be established where
7 shells had come from. That's what I meant. These military insights into
8 the situation, did they meet that particular criterion, or was it
9 somewhat different, that particular insight?
10 A. There are a number of issues you've raised there which some I've
11 tried to explain. Perhaps I haven't done so clearly.
12 The UNMO mission was not there to count shells in and out. It
13 was there to assess situations, provide humanitarian support, and the
14 other tasks that I've already outlined, part of which would be observing
15 the conflict as it developed. It was not within the remit of the
16 UNMO Group to investigate all rounds that were fired, impact areas, and
17 so on, nor was it the UNMOs' task to assess the rights or wrongs of
18 conflict on the front-line.
19 So you're making the assumption, I think, that the UNMOs and/or
20 UNPROFOR had the capability to investigate every incident. That was not
21 the case. If people had lived in the city, like I did -- excuse me.
22 Q. Thank you. I believe that that will do. Could I ask you,
23 Colonel, would you agree that there were, indeed, cases when the Muslims
24 abused Serb prisoners in order to get the bodies of their own dead out?
25 You refer to that in your statement of 1997, page 17. We don't have to
1 go into detail. Can you confirm that? Can you confirm that you
2 characterised it then or understood it to be criminal behaviour, this
3 abuse of prisoners for those purposes?
4 A. During an exchange of bodies, the Presidency side were required
5 to exchange two particular bodies. In the instant to which I believe you
6 refer, the individuals had been buried for a period of time. They were
7 brought to the PTT building, where I controlled the body exchange.
8 During the course of that body exchange, prisoners were used to move the
9 bodies of -- that were being returned to the Serb side. I did watch the
10 event. I made observations and objections to it to those on the
11 Presidency side.
12 Q. Thank you. Do you agree, and you did speak about that in your
13 amalgamated statement in paragraph 122 and then paragraph 128 and then
14 when you testified in the Galic case on the 3rd of July, 2002, on
15 page 11.109, that the Muslims, the Muslim Army, often abused civilian
16 locations in order to place their own artillery pieces there? This also
17 pertains to the Kosevo Hospital
18 paragraph 123, and also in your statement from 1997, on page 12. That's
19 what you say. The purpose of that was to attract Serb fire in order to
20 have the Serbs accused. And then in your reports from October and
21 December 1992, you confirmed that your observers inspected the damage in
22 two hospitals, and you said that you were not satisfied with that kind of
23 behaviour, when artillery pieces, armoured vehicles, et cetera, are being
24 placed within the zone of a hospital. And you say that that is something
25 that did, indeed, occur; isn't that right?
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]
4 Can we have -- I believe that the Prosecutor already had this as
5 an associated exhibit. 10864 is the 65 ter number, and then let's have
6 10865 just to gain further insight.
7 Actually, have these documents already been admitted as
8 P documents?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Since we've received
11 confirmation, we don't need to call up those documents.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do you agree with that? Also, do you agree that in your
14 amalgamated statement, in paragraphs 125 and 126, you confirmed that the
15 hospital was often hit by return fire, as it were?
16 Now, there is something I'd like to clarify with you:
17 [In English] "... rather than a military response, because the
18 mobile mortar was gone soon after it fired."
19 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the side that is responding,
20 in this case the Serb side, does not necessarily have to know that the
21 mobile mortar had left; so from that point of view that could have been
22 military response rather than retaliation?
23 A. If one side in a conflict perceives that they need to respond to
24 a military action such as the engagement of, let's take, for example,
25 mortars from a particular location. If, in response to that, you apply
1 force which is in extreme excess to what would be required to destroy the
2 target, if the fall of shot is such that it is so general that you've
3 taken into account the source of the fire against you to very little
4 effect, those would be the reasons I would perceive that there was often
5 an over-reaction, and the time lapse between the initial contact and the
6 response was such that the possibility of the originating units being in
7 the same place were not high.
8 As a commander, I would probably temper my response for a number
9 of reasons. They would be: Saving ammunition, unnecessary collateral
10 damage. Because unless you're trying to destroy the enemy, you'd be
11 really on a pointless mission responding with fire. So it is these
12 balances which we were able to watch and make judgements on.
13 Q. Thank you. Do you believe that abuse of civilian locations for
14 these purposes constitutes a crime?
15 A. I believe that that particular tactic was used within Sarajevo
17 Q. Thank you. Also, you confirmed in your amalgamated statement,
18 and afterwards in the November and December reports that have already
19 been admitted as Prosecution exhibits, that the Muslim army abused the
20 proximity of the UN forces in order to act against the Serb side and
21 attract Serb fire as a response vis-à-vis these UN installations. Also,
22 you confirmed, in paragraph 68 of your amalgamated statement, that
23 sometimes they would even intentionally target a building using tanks,
24 and it was only the Muslims that had tanks in that area.
25 Do you agree that on several occasions you and other
1 representatives of UNPROFOR asked the Muslim side to move their artillery
2 pieces at least 500 metres away from UN installations?
3 A. I had personal experience of the situations you describe, and we
4 did, on numerous occasions, ask the Presidency side, should they wish to
5 engage the Serb side, if they would be kind enough to do it further away
6 from the UN installations. Yes, I had personal experience of that.
7 Q. Thank you. In Mr. Henneberry's diary, on page 1060853, he said:
8 [In English] "That firing on PTT building came from Papa 4
10 [Interpretation] Do you agree with this conclusion? It is in
11 Mr. Henneberry's statement -- or, rather, diary. And in the December
12 1992 report, this is a report that was tendered by the Prosecution, it
13 says that on the 18th of December, 1992, fire was opened at a vehicle
14 that belonged to the observers, mortar fire, and, therefore, there was a
15 traffic accident and that the Serb driver had also been hit. Do you
16 remember that?
17 A. I do recall the incident, but I have to make some fairly
18 significant corrections here.
19 If one looks at the map, Papa 4 is located in such a position as
20 I don't believe it could see the PTT building or its surroundings. The
21 officer whose diary you quote from was on Lima side. He was, therefore,
22 on Serb side, outside the city. So where he assumed the information
23 you've read to me, I have no idea. There is also, from what I recall, no
24 record from Papa 4, who would have certainly known of outgoing rounds,
25 saying that those rounds were aimed at or impacted anywhere near the PTT.
1 So I can't accept the statements made by that officer in his diary or his
2 submissions as being truthful.
3 Q. But what is contained in your December reports, your reports from
4 December 1992, and that is recorded in Henneberry's diary on
5 page 01062856 in relation to the targeting of the observers' vehicle,
6 which led to a traffic accident involving a Serbian vehicle; you confirm
7 that, don't you?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
9 MR. HAYDEN: If we can just be clear for the record here.
10 I think we're talking about two separate incidents. Colonel Mole was
11 responding to the first one, and now Dr. Karadzic is asking about the
12 second. If that distinction can be made clear.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Hayden.
14 With that caveat, can you answer the question, Colonel Mole?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 I think I've answered the question relating to the outgoing round
17 from the Papa 4 location.
18 If a traffic accident occurs by virtue of a close impact to a
19 vehicle, I would put it to you nobody would know the origin of the rounds
20 concerned. Certainly, if you were in the vehicle, that's unlikely to be
21 your major interest. You've got to assume, therefore, that somebody was
22 watching that particular incident, as opposed to any other. I've tried
23 to explain the military activity, and impacts that went on on a daily
24 basis were such that to focus on one incident, such as this, and attempt
25 to determine the source of a round, if I can invite you to imagine what
1 it was like within the circumstances we're trying to describe, would be
2 completely irrelevant and impossible.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
4 Q. Thank you. However, that vehicle of yours was on the Serb side.
5 I think it was in Nedzarici. And your report for December 1992 suggests
6 that the fire came from the Muslim side, because Serbs did not shell Serb
7 neighbourhoods; isn't that right?
8 A. I stand by what I've just said.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 JUDGE MORRISON: Colonel, I'd like to come back a little to
11 clarify a point for me, for the Tribunal.
12 You've talked about seeing mortars being used by the Presidency
13 side, mobile mortars. Were there any embedded fixed-plate positions that
14 were being used, to your knowledge, where mortars were fired from on a
15 regular basis?
16 THE WITNESS: That tended not to be the case, because if I might
17 take you back to the airport agreement, if any mortars were used on fixed
18 locations, depending on their size, of course, but fixed locations would
19 indicate they would be the larger-calibre mortars, then clearly they
20 would have been included within the airport agreement and we would have
21 monitored those weapons. So in answer to your question, I don't have any
22 personal recollection of the situation you describe, and the mortar
23 attacks I was aware of tend to be smaller calibre and more mobile.
24 JUDGE MORRISON: And as a supplementary question: Did you
25 observe any long-barrelled artillery? I'm not talking about tanks. I'm
1 talking about either self-propelled guns or long-barrelled artillery
2 weapons being used by the Presidency side.
3 THE WITNESS: I had personal experience of anti-aircraft weapons
4 being used in the direct-fire mode. My understanding was that the heavy
5 weapons, although they're monitored, of course, as they were on the Serb
6 side, didn't prevent their use. It meant that we monitored them. We
7 knew where they were, and they should have remained within a geographical
8 area. That's not quite the way it worked out. It ended up that we, as
9 monitors, watched the war with more convenience by virtue of collections
10 of weapons, which made the job easier for the UNMOs, but it didn't cause
11 the weapons to be taken out of the engagement.
12 I think there is a common misconception that because weapons were
13 monitored they were not engaged in the warfare. That is not the case, as
14 we know from the Serb side. So exactly the same applied on the
15 Presidency side as well.
16 Does that answer your question?
17 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, it does, thank you.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much for these
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
22 Q. In your statement of 1997, on pages 11 and 12, you say that you
23 observed the following on Mount Igman
24 122-millimetre Howitzers, four 105-millimetre guns, and six
25 120-millimetre mortars. Do you remember that all of this equipment was
1 used from Mount Igman
2 targeted from Mount Igman
3 A. If I may answer the last question first. Yes, the weapons on
4 Mount Igman
5 The exact composition of the Presidency forces on Mount Igman
6 assessment at any one time. Amongst the UNMOs, we had some very
7 experienced artillery officers, and they were able to make those
8 assessments. But it would be a mistake to specify exactly what was on
9 Igman at any one time.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you have 15 minutes to conclude your
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. With the assistance and
13 the courtesy of Colonel Mole, if I manage to ask questions that can be
14 answered with a yes or no, I will perhaps make it. But it will be a pity
15 if this witness goes away without giving us a full picture.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. You said in your amalgamated statement that the Muslims had two
18 T-54 tanks, they had also anti-aircraft weapons that they used as
19 direct-fire weapons, and again in the Galic case, on the
20 3rd of July, 2002, on page 11097, you also testified that the Muslims
21 shelled the airport from Butmir. Can you confirm that here?
22 A. I haven't the statement in front of me. But if that's what the
23 statement says, I stand by it.
24 Q. Thank you. Then in your amalgamated statement, paragraph 104,
25 you confirmed that on the 26th November, 1992, you reported that the
1 Muslims used mortars to shell the transformer station in Blazuj,
2 resulting in an interruption of the water supply, which was their
3 response to the fact that the Serbs cut off the water supply to Hrasnica.
4 Do you agree that that transformer station and the availability of
5 electricity was crucial to the water supply for Sarajevo?
6 A. When we arranged utility missions - you'll forgive me, but I'm
7 not an electrician, and I took, as read, what the utility missions were
8 there to achieve from the engineers within UNPROFOR, within the sector
9 headquarters, so I can't pass comment about what the transformer station
10 provided in the way of power to whom.
11 Q. That is in your amalgamated statement, paragraph 104. If you
12 remember Bacevo, the main source of water supply was on the Serb side,
13 and it was receiving electricity from the transformer station. And if
14 the Muslims targeted and hit that particular transformer station, then
15 the water supply would be cut off. Do you remember that?
16 A. If it's in the statement, then that's as I stand by it, yes.
17 Q. Thank you. In your amalgamated statement, paragraphs 131 and
18 132, you said the Muslims took advantage of Sarajevo's situation to
19 elicit sympathy, and for that purpose they restricted the movement of
20 civilians and they kept their population in Sarajevo for that purpose.
21 That's in those two paragraphs. Do you agree?
22 A. Yes, I have those two paragraphs in front of me.
23 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that at the time when you were there,
24 there were about 60.000 Serbs in a part of Sarajevo controlled by the
25 Muslims, and that we, through General Morillon, through public appeals,
1 tried to ensure the freedom of movement of civilians and give them the
2 right to move to a territory where they would feel safer?
3 A. Within Sarajevo
4 numerics I can't recall, unless I stated them in previous dispositions.
5 But, yes, there were a considerable number of Serbs within Sarajevo
6 Q. Thank you. In certain passages, you confirmed that the 1st Corps
7 was in Sarajevo
8 approximately a half were within the inner city. You confirmed that you
9 had heard of Juka Prazina and other criminals who had their own brigades.
10 Is that right?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. Do you agree that all these things put together, provoking fire
13 from the other side, the media pressure on the Serbs, the biased attitude
14 of the reporters and even some politicians who were effectively
15 anti-Serb, all these things removed us further and further away from
16 peace? Can you name today a politician whose attitude, whose position,
17 really grated on your ears?
18 A. As a soldier and even as a retired soldier, I'm not very
19 comfortable about answering that question.
20 Q. All right. We can do without. But I do want to note that you,
21 yourself, noted such things.
22 You said in your statement --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get 1D2227.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. You said that there were clear indications --
1 [In English] " ... clear indications that there is not a
2 well-co-ordinated and unified command structure on either side."
3 [Interpretation] It's 1D2227. We discussed it a little
5 Do you agree that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps had inherited
6 territorial and municipal armies that were already in existence, and
7 everyone, from General Sipcic to General Milosevic, had great problems
8 establishing a unified command structure over these local units?
9 A. It was certainly a significant difficulty which I observed that
10 both sides had. This was not a unique experience from the Serb side. So
11 I understand what you're saying. I was sympathetic to that situation,
12 and I agree with your overall assessment.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
15 JUDGE KWON: Unless it has been admitted so far, we'll admit it.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D540, Your Honours.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now call up 65 ter 11575.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. This is from the time of General Sipcic -- no, it was already
20 General Galic. Colonel Marcetic writes here that local leaders and their
21 supporters are out of control in certain areas, and these difficulties
22 are encountered all the time, starting with Sipcic who found the worst
23 situation because it was early days, the VRS had just been set up. But
24 even in November the corps command is encountering the same problem. Is
25 this consistent with what you confirmed earlier?
1 A. Thank you. I've never seen the document, obviously, but it's
2 fully in accord with what we understood to be the case. So, yes, I
3 understand your point.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Can this document be admitted?
6 JUDGE KWON: Why do we have only a partial translation of this
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the translation from the
9 Galic case. We did not have our own resources to translate the entire
10 document ourselves, but we don't mind if a translation is possible.
11 JUDGE KWON: If, Mr. Hayden, you are happy with this translation,
12 we'll admit it. Otherwise, we can put it being marked for
14 MR. HAYDEN: If it can be marked for identification. We'll get
15 back to you, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll mark it for identification, pending full
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D541, marked for identification,
19 Your Honours.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. So in these circumstances, when the Serb side was under pressure
23 from many sides in many ways and a complete lack of a single command, is
24 it implied that firing rounds or even shells did not necessarily mean
25 that the Serb authorities, starting from higher commands, ordered or
1 instigated certain incidents? Do you agree that it would be quite
2 unreasonable, incomprehensible, and implausible that the Serb side, with
3 all its trained officers that it had, should go on shooting in its own
4 foot day after day?
5 A. This is definitely a question which does not get answered by a
6 yes or a no. You state that the Serb side had a complete lack of a
7 single command. Nothing could be further from the truth. Any military
8 formation which can bring a fire mission down on a concentrated area,
9 such as Otes, from a disparate group, geographically spread of heavy
10 weapons, throughout the city cannot possibly portray a lack of single
11 command. Therefore, if you remove that part of the comment from your
12 statement, the rest of what you said there I can't agree with.
13 Q. I agree with you as far as operations are concerned, but perhaps
14 I wasn't clear enough. I meant to ask about incidents. You intervened
15 in certain incidents, and the higher command redressed the situation
16 immediately in every case. But concerning shooting, do you agree that
17 there were altogether too many weapons in Bosnia in private hands, it was
18 available for purchase, and just before the war and during the war huge
19 amounts of weapons were stolen? I'm talking about privately-owned
20 weapons, I'm talking about poor control by local units, regarding
21 incidents, not regarding well-planned operations. Do you agree that
22 there is a distinction?
23 A. Two parts to answer there.
24 There was a war. A war is a continuum. The incidents all joined
25 up. They were not divisible so that you could suggest that that
1 particular incident was caused by a certain set of events. It isn't that
2 straightforward. I can't explain to you, if you're not a soldier and you
3 haven't been engaged in such activities, any clearer than I have tried
4 to, that this was not a controlled situation; this was a war in progress.
5 The incidents all joined together. They were not divisible. You could
6 not apply blame to one as opposed to another, nor was the ability of the
7 UN to attempt to explain, as you are trying to explain, the difficulties
8 which were experienced by the combatants.
9 As for your comment about privately-owned weapons, yes, of course
10 there were, but let's be totally clear. There were not privately-owned
11 heavy weapons. All the heavy weapons around Sarajevo that we either saw
12 or monitored were not owned by individuals. They were part of the
13 structure of the Serb forces around Sarajevo
14 But your point about the difficulty of command and control, as
15 opposed to the attempt at command and control, is a good one. There were
16 geographical difficulties. There were structural difficulties. There
17 were personality conflicts. There was history which you have alluded to
18 by suggesting that certain areas had been defended by local people who
19 had then become absorbed within the Serb military structure.
20 I hope I've explained it the way you would like it to be
21 explained in that regard.
22 So we were fully conversant with the difficulties and the
23 structure, but I do have to correct you on the items that I started my
24 response with there that relates to the command and control and private
1 JUDGE KWON: Your last question, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How about two, Your Excellencies?
3 I just wanted to ask the colonel:
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Did you have insight into this UK Military Manual, Colonel, and
6 do you agree that this is something that every army should have, every
7 army should follow such rules?
8 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] During the interview we had with
10 the colonel, we gave him excerpts from the military manual of the UK that
11 we will use later in this trial, and these experts explain these terms;
12 military targets, sniping, legitimate targets, et cetera. I just wanted
13 to ask the colonel if he is familiar with this manual and if it forms a
14 basic set of regulations for the conduct of the UK army. And then I'll
15 ask my next question.
16 THE WITNESS: Could I clarify the document you're speaking of?
17 Is that Rules of Conflict, or Manual of Military Law, or what would that
18 be? I've read a lot of books when I did staff jobs.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. This is Chapter 5 of the UK Military Manual that we have given
21 you, if you remember. In fact, we gave you some excerpts from the
23 any army to follow, a good basis for any army to follow?
24 A. Thank you. Yes, now I understand the book to which you refer.
25 Yes, the one we discussed I have had sight of, yes.
1 Q. On page 25, line 5 -- in fact, it's page 24. Page 24, line 5.
2 There seems to be an error in the transcript. I think you said in your
3 answer, "I can agree," and it's recorded as "I can't agree."
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could that please be corrected in
5 the record.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. And my last question: In your 1997 --
8 JUDGE KWON: I don't think Colonel Mole is able to scroll back
9 the transcript. I heard that with care, but I'm confident the colonel
10 said, "I can't agree." If I can tell you, it's a question about -- that
11 you answered with: "Nothing could be further from the truth," as regards
12 the complete lack of a single command. At the end of your answer, did
13 you say or not:
14 "Therefore, if you remove that part of the comment from your
15 statement, the rest of what you said there I can't agree with"?
16 THE WITNESS: That's what I meant, sir, thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: That's what he said.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understood that if we removed
19 that part of the comment, you can agree with the rest. But it must be
20 the language barrier that we have between us.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Now, in your statement from 1997, on page 14, you said that you
23 had never had the feeling that Karadzic or Mladic had a direct
24 involvement in day-to-day events in Sarajevo:
25 [In English] "... day-to-day events in Sarajevo."
1 [Interpretation] That we never had a direct hand in the daily
2 events in Sarajevo
3 travel, et cetera. Is that was said in your statement?
4 A. Yes, and it makes perfect sense. That's why General Galic
5 commanded the corps, and that's why you did the job you did. Of course,
6 the impact from outside that General Galic responded to would have been
7 political pressure and, from General Mladic, presumably, military
8 pressure or direction as determined by others above him. But, quite
9 right, on a day-to-day basis, that was the task of the Romanija Corps.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Colonel.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden, I think you can go on.
13 MR. HAYDEN: We have time before the break, Mr. President?
14 JUDGE KWON: Or if you have --
15 MR. HAYDEN: It won't be longer than five minutes, under ten.
16 JUDGE KWON: Let's proceed and have a break afterwards.
17 MR. HAYDEN: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 Re-examination by Mr. Hayden:
19 Q. Colonel Mole, this morning we spoke about the testimony --
20 observations of Captain Patrick Henneberry. You noted at transcript
21 page 15 that he, at least at the 8th of December, was working on the Lima
22 side or the Bosnian Serb side. During your tour, did he ever work on the
23 Papa side?
24 A. No.
25 Q. And why was that the case? Why can you be sure that if he worked
1 on the Lima
3 A. As I explained before, that when you were, as a UN military
4 observer, designated to go to Sarajevo
5 people with whom you arrived in Sarajevo
6 was as you left the overall briefing in the PTT building. And then once
7 you went to Lima
8 your tour of duty continued until its completion.
9 Q. Would Captain Henneberry or officers on the Lima side be involved
10 in investigations conducted on the Papa side by UNMOs?
11 A. Absolutely not. No, sir.
12 Q. And would they be privy to official communication emanating from
13 the Papa side?
14 A. There is one rider to my answer of no, in that we had an open
15 radio network, so everybody could hear what was going on from one side to
16 the other. But remember that the open radio network was one that
17 responded and was used for everyday physical activity, as opposed to
18 policy or any other decision.
19 Does that answer your question?
20 Q. Thank you. If an observation post observed a -- for example,
21 Muslim fire onto the PTT building in the city, for example, would that
22 have been recorded in the daily situation report that you authored?
23 A. Yes, it would, sir, yeah.
24 Q. Colonel, at paragraph 39 of your amalgamated statement, you
25 discuss the weaponry that you observed the Presidency to have on the Papa
1 side. Yesterday, we were -- you were describing the widely-dispersed or
2 heavy bombardment of the city. To your knowledge, was the weaponry
3 described in paragraph 39 capable of being responsible for such
4 widely-dispersed attacks on the city of Sarajevo?
5 A. No, the only equipment within range of the city that could
6 perform the sorts of fire missions and other high-explosive events that
7 occurred within the city belonged to those outside the city.
8 MR. HAYDEN: If I can ask Mr. Registrar for D537.
9 Q. Colonel Mole, this is the map that you marked yesterday in
10 cross-examination at the request of Dr. Karadzic. And do you recall
11 marking "3" where Ilidza was, or the Serb part of Ilidza was?
12 A. Yes, I do, sir, yeah.
13 Q. Now, yesterday, at transcript page 5833, Dr. Karadzic drew your
14 attention to paragraph 84 of your statement, where you discuss the Otes
15 offensive, and you state that:
16 "In addition to the Otes offensive, shells were landing elsewhere
17 in the city."
18 And then two pages on at T-5835, Dr. Karadzic discussed the
19 contents of a newspaper article with you from AFP, and that was tendered
20 as Exhibit D535. And if I can just refresh your memory as to the portion
21 of that article he drew your attention to. It stated that:
22 "Tuesday's fighting around the airport started when Bosnian
23 infantry units attacked Serbian forces stationed in the village of
24 Ilidza, which borders the airport. The Serbs responded with intense
25 artillery fire that shook the entire sector. Commander Barry Frewer, a
1 spokesman for the UN troops in Sarajevo
2 Dr. Karadzic asked you if you knew who Commander Frewer was, and
3 then said to you:
4 "Would you agree that in parallel with the fighting for Otes and
5 Zuc, there was fighting in other parts of the city as well?"
6 And you said you noticed no variation in what we would perceive
7 as the normal front-line activities elsewhere.
8 Now, Colonel Mole, accepting that what was reported in the
9 article was true, that is, that there was fighting occurring in Ilidza
10 that was started by a Bosnian offensive, would that account for or
11 explain the shells that you say in your statement were, quote, "landing
12 elsewhere in the city"?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
14 JUDGE KWON: What is your objection, Mr. Karadzic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that would be speculation.
16 It would be a leading question, rather, and speculation as well. The
17 witness cannot speculate about intentions and the origins of that fire,
18 and he cannot tie it to this, although Colonel Mole had said that war is
19 an entity. So we're not only talking about Sarajevo, but the whole of
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina. But I think this question is wrong.
21 JUDGE KWON: No, I don't agree with you, Mr. Karadzic. It's
22 triggered from your question, and it does not call for Colonel Mole's
24 Did you conclude your question, or are you able to answer the
25 question, Mr. Mole?
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I think so, yes.
2 Could I go back to the map, please? Would that be acceptable?
3 MR. HAYDEN: That was D537.
4 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
5 If one considers the location marked to, which was the target of
6 the Serb forces to take away what they considered a considerable threat
7 in the area of Otes -- and may I mark that map?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, you can mark it separately, and we can keep it
10 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: Could you wait a minute.
12 THE WITNESS: Oh, yes.
13 JUDGE KWON: So we can use a blue colour.
14 THE WITNESS: I'm colour-blind, so ...
15 If I mark the map in that line there [marks], from my
16 understanding, the intentions of the Serb side was to remove the
17 Presidency side in the area marked "2," that enclave, back to that
18 particular line, which would allow them, as you can see from the map, a
19 geographical line from the airport area or Ilidza or "3" up the road to
20 where I've just marked in blue and around to - I'll continue with my
21 blue - around here [marks]. Besides the obvious problem that the Serbs
22 perceived they had in Otes as a threat to Ilidza, that was also a
23 significant, sort of, tactical objective.
24 So, now, to come back to the question. It's important, I think,
25 that any action that occurred in that zone of "2" would have immediate
1 repercussion within the immediate area, so any attack, say, from Butmir
2 to Ilidza, or from anywhere else on Ilidza, would be an understandable
3 response to what went on in the area of Otes.
4 What I'm referring to in the answer to Dr. Karadzic's question as
5 to the level of activity elsewhere in the city, and which I believe
6 you're asking, I am considering elsewhere beyond to the east of those
7 areas that I've marked out. Therefore, the front-line which
8 circulates -- goes completely around Sarajevo, there was a little
9 increase in tension, of course, but there was considerable incoming
10 high-explosive rounds into the city which we saw no connection with the
11 events that I've just tried to describe.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Colonel.
13 If you could kindly put your signature and date again.
14 THE WITNESS: Right. [Marks]
15 MR. HAYDEN: No further questions, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit this map again. This will be a new
17 P exhibit.
18 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P1436, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 Yes, Judge Morrison has some further questions for you.
21 Questioned by the Court:
22 JUDGE MORRISON: Just one thing, Colonel Mole.
23 The radio net that was common to Papa and Lima positions, was
24 that encrypted or was that an open?
25 A. It was an open net, sir, available to everybody. Indeed, so open
1 that we gave hand-sets on the same frequency to Serb liaison officers
2 with us in the PTT and to Presidency liaison officers available to us as
3 well, the intention being to show that our activities were completely
5 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you very much.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Your evidence has been concluded. Thank
7 you very much for your coming to The Hague to give it.
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
9 JUDGE KWON: Now you are free to go.
10 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
11 [The witness withdrew]
12 JUDGE KWON: We will have a break for a bit more than 20 minutes.
13 We'll resume at 11.00.
14 --- Recess taken at 10.40 a.m.
15 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
16 JUDGE KWON: Good morning to you, Mr. Gaynor and Dr. Subotic.
17 I take it the next witness is Mr. Higgs.
18 MR. GAYNOR: That's correct, Mr. President.
19 JUDGE KWON: As for the time for cross-examination, the
20 Trial Chamber advised the parties yesterday that Mr. Karadzic would have
21 three hours for his cross-examination of Mr. Higgs. The Chamber's
22 determination that three hours is a reasonable time for cross-examination
23 of Mr. Higgs was made on the basis of the criteria that we have
24 previously set out, and particularly in light of the fact that
25 Mr. Higgs's evidence is of a limited nature. He did not conduct the
1 original investigation into the various shelling incidents discussed in
2 his expert report, but, rather, provides analysis and his own conclusions
3 based upon his review of those reports and observation that he made
4 substantially after the incidents in question. The Chamber considers
5 that three hours is ample time for the accused to cross-examine him on
6 his methodology in reviewing the original investigations and in reaching
7 his conclusions and to challenge him on those conclusions.
8 However, as we have previously stated, should the accused
9 demonstrate, in the course of his cross-examination, that additional time
10 is warranted, the Chamber will consider the matter further.
11 Unless there's other procedural matters, we'll bring in the
13 Mr. Gaynor.
14 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, there is one procedural matter on which the
15 Defence and Prosecution have reached agreement, and that concerns part of
16 the report of Mr. Higgs which concerns Incident G-16, which appears on
17 page 12 of the report and goes on --
18 JUDGE KWON: 13 to 17?
19 MR. GAYNOR: Yes.
20 Now, the Defence were going to make a motion for the exclusion of
21 that part of the report. Our position is that we agree that that part of
22 the report need not be admitted in evidence as part of the evidence of
23 Mr. Higgs.
24 However, we do wish to preserve the position which we set out in
25 our submission of the 31st of August, 2009, and which we repeated in the
1 notification which accompanied the marked-up indictment in this case,
2 that it will be in the interests of justice in certain instances, in our
3 submission, that the Trial Chamber should hear evidence on incidents
4 which have been removed from the indictment pursuant to Rule 73 bis. And
5 we'll be relying, among other things, on the Appeals Chamber's decision
6 in the Seselj case on the 9th of January, 2008. So I won't say anything
7 more about that at the moment. We do wish to reserve our position in
8 that respect.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 In any event, those parts which will not be admitted into
11 evidence will be redacted?
12 MR. GAYNOR: We haven't yet taken that step, but --
13 JUDGE KWON: But we'll take that step.
14 MR. GAYNOR: Yes.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Thank you for the agreement.
16 Let's bring in the witness.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Higgs.
19 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
20 JUDGE KWON: If you could kindly take the solemn declaration,
22 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
23 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
24 WITNESS: RICHARD HIGGS
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please make yourself comfortable.
1 Mr. Gaynor.
2 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Examination by Mr. Gaynor:
4 Q. Could you state your full name for the record, please?
5 A. Mr. Richard James Higgs.
6 Q. You are of British nationality?
7 A. Yes, I am.
8 Q. You served in the British Army for 22 years, from 1980 to 2002;
9 is that right?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. Just taking you to the position from 1987 to 2002, could you give
12 the Court a general overview of what the nature of your duties was during
13 that period?
14 A. From 1987 onwards, I worked specifically with mortars. I started
15 with working within a training establishment, teaching mortars, various
16 levels of degrees of expertise, to soldiers in the British Army and also
17 to international students, teaching the operational deployment, technical
18 information, tactical information, and ballistic knowledge at that time.
19 I then moved into a advisory role with our forces based in
21 on all technical, tactical, and ballistical information, and assisting
22 them should there be any safety-type incidents or anything that needed
23 investigating with mortars. I would then manage that on their behalf,
24 advise them accordingly to make sure everything was done correctly, to
25 find out if anything happened, why it happened, and so on.
1 I then moved into a similar role, but this time working globally,
2 advising not only British Army but foreign armies on the use of, again,
3 mortars operationally and their technical and ballistic capabilities, and
4 also moving into the development of mortars. And then my final role was
5 as the divisional instructor for the British Army, which is the
6 subject-matter expert of mortars on behalf of the whole British Army. So
7 I was seen as the technical expert on mortars. And within that role I
8 advised the British Army, again, during all their training, operational
9 and tactical requirements, but I led on the ballistical safety
10 information which I, again, taught, and my responsibilities were to
11 ensure that all firings were carried out safely and in accordance, of
12 course, with methodologies. And I also advised, during this time,
13 various overseas countries in the same areas.
14 Q. Now, you've, no doubt, attended a great number of live-firing
15 exercises. Could you just give the Court an overall view of the number
16 of live-firing exercises you've attended?
17 A. Difficult to give an exact number. But during the period
18 especially where I was delivering training, we would be live firing
19 sometimes three to four times a week, for weeks on end. And during my
20 advisory role when I was based in Germany
21 visiting live firing probably, again, three to four days a week, with
22 hundreds if not thousands of rounds being fired on each of those days.
23 Q. Similarly, could you give the Court an overall picture of the
24 number of crater analysis exercises you would have participated in?
25 A. During the training part of my activities, we teach one part
1 which is identification of a direction of what's called hostile battery,
2 which is where the rounds may be seen to be coming from. As part of
3 that, I have probably looked at many hundreds of different craters, as
4 part of that training. As far as investigations are concerned where an
5 incident has occurred, again, difficult to give precise numbers, but many
6 tens if not into the hundreds, even, of those.
7 Q. Now, in your report, you've referred to, on a number of
8 instances, to the concept of prerecorded targets. I would just like you
9 to explain briefly how you understand prerecording of targets works in an
10 extended siege situation of a specific town or city.
11 A. To make the firing of mortars more accurate, to save them having
12 to waste time and ammunition with trying to adjust or move the rounds
13 onto the target, it will save time if the targets are what is known as
14 prerecorded. This can be done in a number of ways. But by prerecording
15 a target, the mortar position will know the correct bearing, elevation,
16 and information they put on a mortar to hit that target with a higher
17 degree of accuracy the first time. The longer you are in a position, so
18 if mortars are in a position for extended periods of time, they can build
19 up lists of prerecorded targets over a wide area, which will then mean
20 that if they have to engage a target anywhere within that area, they will
21 have a higher degree of hitting that target without first adjusting it.
22 Q. You've previously testified at the Tribunal in -- at this
23 Tribunal in the trial of Dragomir Milosevic and the trial of
24 Stanislav Galic.
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. And you have prepared a consolidated report containing
2 information relevant to incidents which are relevant to this particular
3 case; isn't that right?
4 A. Yes, I have.
5 MR. GAYNOR: Could I have 65 ter 11144, please.
6 Q. On the screen in front of you, you see a document. Is that the
7 report which you've prepared for this case?
8 A. Yes, it is.
9 Q. And you've had the opportunity to review that report over the
10 past few days?
11 A. I have.
12 Q. Do you wish to make any corrections or amendments to it?
13 A. No.
14 Q. And do you adopt it as part of your evidence in this case?
15 A. Yes, I do.
16 MR. GAYNOR: Your Honour, I'd like to tender the report at this
17 stage for admission, subject to the redaction of the part of the report
18 concerning G-16, as indicated.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1437, Your Honours.
21 MR. GAYNOR: Now, Your Honours, I propose to take the witness to
22 12 documents and 1 video, which are only some of the documents referred
23 to in this report. And I'd like 65 ter 18178 to be brought up, please.
24 Q. Now, Mr. Higgs, at page -- I'll move on to the next document.
25 MR. GAYNOR: Could I have document 11378, please.
1 Q. Now, Mr. Higgs, on the left-hand side of the screen in front of
2 you, you see a document which is addressed to HQ UNPROFOR, Zagreb
3 which is -- could you confirm that this is the document referred to in
4 your report concerning an incident which took place on the
5 12th of July, 1993?
6 A. Yes, it is.
7 Q. Now, if we just go to the third page of that document, as you can
8 see, on the last paragraph on the left-hand side of your screen, you see
9 the words:
10 "This shell could have been shot from corridor
11 Nedzarici-Ilidza Nord."
12 You can see those words?
13 A. Yes, I can.
14 Q. Now, do you have any observations to make about that?
15 A. From this particular incident, from the evidence I've seen, from
16 the incident reports, including this one, the way in which the round
17 landed, it was not possible to come up with a definite range or even a
18 confirmed direction. So both the reports, as best as possible with the
19 information they had, came up using the information gathered at the scene
20 with an approximate direction from which the rounds came, and that is the
21 area stated there in that report.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. GAYNOR: I'd now like document 11394 to be brought up. I'm
24 informed this is an alternative number for the document we were trying to
25 look at a moment ago.
1 That document, in fact, we'll come to later, if that's -- sorry.
2 Sorry, we'll -- if we could move to the third page of that
3 document in the English language. There should be an English translation
5 Q. Now, we see the reference in that document. Do you -- can you
6 confirm that that is a document which you used in compiling your report?
7 A. Yes, it is.
8 Q. Now, on the left-hand side, it's quite difficult to see, but you
9 can see, towards the end of the document, the words:
10 "The ballistic expert found remnants of an artillery shell, most
11 probably an 82-millimetre mortar shell; most probably fired from
12 direction Nedzarici."
13 Do you have any observations about that?
14 A. Again, because of the poor, if you like, data at the scene,
15 because this round impacted within a person, all they could do was
16 confirm the calibre of the weapon, in this case an 80-millimetre, and an
17 approximate direction. And the direction stated in this document is the
18 same as the one we saw in the previous document, that area of Nedzarici.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. GAYNOR: I'd like to move now to the next document, which is
21 15051. This concerns Incident G-6.
22 Q. Now, in your report on Incident G-6, Mr. Higgs, you refer to some
23 differences in the reports you've seen concerning this incident, and I'd
24 just like to explore those with you.
25 MR. GAYNOR: If we could go to the second page of the English
2 Q. You see that this is a compilation of a number of different
3 documents; is that correct?
4 A. Yes, it is.
5 MR. GAYNOR: If we could go to the next page of this document.
6 Q. Now, in the second-last paragraph, towards the end, we see the
8 "Type of destruction of the explosion site indicates that the
9 shell was an 82-millimetre mortar shell, fired from the west, where the
10 enemy position is located at the Institute for the Blind at Nedzarici.
11 Shell stabiliser was not found at the explosion site."
12 And on the following page, the third paragraph down, we see the
13 words -- again, a reference:
14 "The type of destruction at the explosion site indicates that the
15 shell was an 82-millimetre shell, fired from the west, where the enemy
16 position is located at the Institute for the Blind at Nedzarici. A
17 120-millimetre shell stabiliser was found near the explosion site."
18 Do you provide any observations about that?
19 A. Obviously, this is from the initial investigation from the scene
20 which these -- this team attended first. They ascertained from the
21 damage and the materials at that scene that the 82-millimetre rounds were
22 the rounds that landed in the street and that the tail-fin, from their
23 examination, was not part or had anything to do with those two rounds, as
24 they concluded it fell sometime earlier. And this report also alludes to
25 the firing of a 120-millimetre round which landed in a different
1 location, where no casualties were caused.
2 MR. GAYNOR: The next document, please, which is 19725.
3 Can you see the first pages of this are the French original, and
4 on the fifth page the English translation exists?
5 If we could move to the fifth page of this document, please. Go
6 on to the next page, please.
7 Q. Now, do you recognise this document, Mr. Higgs?
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 Q. What is this document?
10 A. This is the consolidated report from -- that was produced by the
11 French officer, Verdy, the day after the incident.
12 Q. Now, if we can move a little further down the screen there, we
13 see the words:
14 "In my estimation, the strikes were probably launched from a zone
15 under the control of the Bosnian Serbs."
16 Do you have any reason to -- did you have any observations about
17 that sentence?
18 A. To come up to this estimation from the reports, they're using,
19 obviously, the estimated direction, which is from the west, which puts it
20 into that area of Nedzarici, which is under the control of the
21 Bosnian Serbs. So that is where they're getting this estimation from.
22 Q. Do you have any reason to disagree with that assertion?
23 A. From the evidence seen in both reports, no, I don't.
24 MR. GAYNOR: Now, if we could move to the next page, please.
25 Q. Now, under item E, the report states:
1 "Type of ammunition: Mortar, 120 millimetres."
2 And under D it says that there were three hits. Do you have any
3 comment about that?
4 A. This is where, as I mentioned in my report, it differs from the
5 initial forensic examination, as they came to the conclusion of one
6 120-millimetre and two 82-millimetre. The problem that Captain Verdy has
7 is this investigation was carried out a day later and he was not
8 available to have all the evidence of the investigation team who carried
9 out the investigation on the day. That is probably the reason why he has
10 assumed they were all 120 millimetres.
11 Q. Which of the two reports do you think is more accurate?
12 A. I would have a tendency to believe the report that was conducted
13 on the day, as the best way of conducting any incident of this manner is
14 as soon as possible.
15 MR. GAYNOR: All right. Can I have document 09623, please.
16 We're moving on to a different incident.
17 JUDGE KWON: Could you give the number again?
18 MR. GAYNOR: The number is 09623.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 MR. GAYNOR:
21 Q. As we'll see in a moment, this concerns the shelling of the
22 Markale Market-Place which took place on the 5th of February, 1994,
23 sometimes referred to as "Markale I."
24 Now, once again, is this one of the documents you used in
25 compiling your report?
1 A. Yes, it was.
2 MR. GAYNOR: If we could take the next page, please.
3 Q. Now, as you can see from the third paragraph, Mr. Higgs -- sorry,
4 the last paragraph on that page, there is a reference to "the transverse
5 axis of the ellipse was north-north-east." What does that mean?
6 A. When they were looking at the shape of the crater on the ground,
7 they could see that it was pointing towards that north-north-east
8 direction. And later in the report, they actually measured that and came
9 up with an angle.
10 MR. GAYNOR: We can move to the next page, please.
11 Q. Now, at the end of the first paragraph on that page, we see the
12 words stating:
13 "It was an 18-degree angle from north to east, with a plus or
14 minus 5-degree tolerance added to the angle difference value."
15 Can you explain what that is?
16 A. Yes. Having had a look at the shape of the crater on the ground,
17 they have then conducted their examination and calculated that the
18 direction from the point of ground where the round hit, from whence the
19 round came, is a bearing of 18 degrees, obviously plus or five [sic] the
20 5-degrees tolerance.
21 Q. Now, the report makes a conclusion that this was what kind of
23 A. It was a 120-millimetre projectile, which in this case could be
24 proven because the tail-fins of the round were still in the crater and
25 could be used for investigation purposes.
1 Q. Does this report make any conclusions concerning the range, which
2 is to say the distance the projectile travelled?
3 A. No, it doesn't.
4 MR. GAYNOR: If I could move to the next document, please, which
5 is 09630.
6 Q. Now, in your expert report, Mr. Higgs, you've said that the
7 UNPROFOR report at Reference B just goes back up the report -- just - I
8 beg your pardon - just goes to back up the report at Reference A with the
9 same findings. There's only one piece of information that does not tie
10 up - this is some of the points made by Captain Verdy - but these are
11 rectified further on in the report.
12 And I want to ask you a few questions to explore that point.
13 Now, on the page in front of you, what do you see there?
14 A. This is a part of the report from Captain Verdy.
15 MR. GAYNOR: Now, I want to move to page 8 of this.
16 Q. If we could go on. This is a cover fax. And on the next page we
17 see a document headed "UNPROFOR Investigation Report, Sarajevo Market
18 Explosion of 5th of February, 1994." This is the report which you
19 examined in compiling your own report?
20 A. Yes, it is.
21 Q. And if we could move to not the next page, but two pages on. At
22 the bottom of paragraph 17 it says:
23 "There is insufficient physical evidence to prove that one party
24 or the other fired the mortar bomb. The mortar bomb in question could
25 have been fired by either side."
1 Do you have any comments about that?
2 A. When they carried -- conducted the crater examination, they were
3 able to conduct the bearing from which the round came, and they were able
4 to determine an approximate angle at which the round hit the ground. The
5 problem we have with mortars is that they have a number-charged system,
6 and all the charges could deliver that same angle when the round hits the
7 ground, so, therefore, it gives you a large parameter, from a reasonably
8 close range up to the maximum range, where the round could have been
9 fired from. That is the reason why they put that statement in, because
10 at the time that this report was produced, that's as much as they could
12 MR. GAYNOR: I'd like to move to another part of this report,
13 which is another nine pages on.
14 Q. You see the reference under Conclusion C. It says that:
15 "The bomb impacted, having approached at a bearing of between
16 0330 and 0420 mils," and then three letters which are not legible.
17 Do you have any observations about that?
18 A. This particular incident was investigated by many teams. I think
19 10 teams, in total, produced reports. The forensic team used degrees,
20 and as we have already mentioned, they came to a bearing of 18 degrees.
21 Eighteen degrees is approximately 320 mils, so you can see that it aligns
22 with many of these other reports where they get a bearing between about
23 0320 and 0420.
24 MR. GAYNOR: I'd like to go to a table which is on five pages
25 previously to this, please.
1 Q. We can see, under part 2, it says there were a total of 10 crater
2 analyses conducted on the crater.
3 MR. GAYNOR: And if we could look at the next page, please.
4 Q. Now, see the paragraph marked "Bearing." In the final part of
5 that paragraph, it says -- it's referring here to Captain Verdy:
6 "However, based on his note, he appears to have made a
7 mathematical error which led to an incorrect final back-bearing.
8 Therefore, although his method may have been sound, based on the figures
9 he used, his results were flawed."
10 Could you comment on that?
11 A. Yes. There were 10 examinations carried out, but for some reason
12 the one that Captain Verdy did came up with different information.
13 Obviously, the investigating team at the time have looked at that and
14 have decided that he must have made some form of mathematical error to
15 come up with information completely different to the other eight reports.
16 MR. GAYNOR: Could we look at the next page, please.
17 Q. All right. If you could look at the table of results and just
18 explain briefly to the Court what your analysis of that table is.
19 A. You can see there the list of all the 10 sets of information that
20 were taken from the various investigations taking place. The top two, or
21 the two that were -- have been kind of questioned in the report, that
22 we've just seen with the French team with Captain Verdy, have come up
23 with different information. The other eight, from Major Russell down to
24 the bottom, you can see that their results are all very similar in their
25 findings, and those results also agree with the 18 degrees found by the
1 investigation -- the CSB
2 Q. For the record, could you tell us what 18 degrees is
3 approximately equivalent to in the mils measurement system?
4 A. It's approximately 320 mils.
5 Q. So the report conducted by the Bosnian authorities is consistent
6 with eight of the results in front of you; is that right?
7 A. Yes, it is.
8 MR. GAYNOR: I'd like to move now to 11333, please. I'm moving
9 on to another incident. This is the incident known as Markale II.
10 Q. Now, in your report, under Incident G-19, Mr. Higgs, you have
11 relied on a considerable number of documents in your analysis concerning
12 this incident. I just want you to confirm that the documents, as they
13 come up, are the documents which you relied upon.
14 Now, the document in front of you is obviously an UNMO daily
16 MR. GAYNOR: I'd like to go to page 20 of this document, please.
17 Q. As we see towards the end of the document - if we could scroll
18 down a little bit - this is a description of an incident which took place
19 at the market-place and includes the words:
20 "One projectile was fired from 170 mag deg, killed 33 TBC people
21 (UNMO confirmed 31 killed) and wounded 79."
22 Focusing on that sentence, what are your comments?
23 A. This is relating to the round that fell in the road, and it's
24 just confirming that the bearing from which, again, was measured on the
25 day for the direction at which the round came from was 170 degrees.
1 Q. On the next page, at the top, we see in the second paragraph the
3 "Two of the remaining four impacts caused 07 injuries (not
4 confirmed). These four rounds were fired from a different bearing (220
5 to 240 mag deg) and impacted 300 metres further south from the above
7 This is an issue which you've referred to in your report. Could
8 you explain what those words mean?
9 A. Obviously, the same day as the previous round or the previous
10 incident happened, there were four other impacts from 120-millimetre
11 mortar, as referred to here, which landed at approximately 300 metres
12 away, and their investigation found that the direction of those was 220
13 to 240. At this moment in time, they're being seen as separate
14 incidents. But as the investigation proceeded, many assumptions were
15 made that these were part of the same firing, and that's what led to some
16 confusion and assumptions being made in some of the future information.
17 Q. And is it correct that from this sitrep the fatal round is
18 recorded as coming from 170 degrees?
19 A. That is correct.
20 MR. GAYNOR: If we could move now to 09917.
21 Q. Now, on the left-hand part of the screen in front of you,
22 Mr. Higgs, you can see, from the first paragraph, that this is a cover
23 sheet to which is attached the final and comprehensive report on the
25 MR. GAYNOR: If we could move now to two pages further on. In
1 fact, we can move to the next page, please. And if we could scroll
2 slightly to the left at the bottom.
3 Q. The report refers to "Key Evidence," and then on the next page,
4 please, we see what that key evidence is, in summary -- what the key
5 evidence is, in summary, followed by a summary of this report.
6 So I'd just like to you explain to Their Honours in a little bit
7 of detail the criteria which you would take into account in determining
8 the origin of fire of the fatal projectile. So if we can start with the
9 first point, please.
10 A. In paragraph 3, it talks us through the impact analysis. There,
11 it confirms the fine-point investigations. The French engineer report
12 came to 2850 mils, which, again, converted into degrees is approximately
13 170, and that the UNMO report -- the initial UNMO report also got
14 170 degrees. It also then confirms that the other four impacts produced
15 bearings of 220 to 240 degrees. It then starts to make assumptions with
16 the next sentence, where it says:
17 "The follow-on investigation sought to clarify this apparent
19 So somebody thought at this stage that the rounds were connected,
20 even though they landed 300 metres apart, which, for mortars firing in
21 this scenario, is a huge distance apart. This assumption, then, did
22 affect some of their thinking, as you'll see a bit later on. The --
23 Q. Sorry. If I can stop you on that point. Can you explain why it
24 is not possible, in your view, that the four impacts came from the same
25 location as the fatal impact?
1 A. If -- when a mortar engages a target, you have a bearing or a
2 line from that mortar to where the round landed on the ground, which you
3 can then trace back. Because the other round landed 300 metres apart, if
4 you then traced back a line with the same bearing from that point
5 backwards, it would come to a point 300 metres different where the mortar
6 was to the first one. So for the same mortar to have fired both, it
7 would have had to have fired the one of the four rounds, then in very
8 quick succession quickly pack up, move 300 metres across to one side, set
9 up again, and then fire the other round to give you the same bearing back
10 to the same mortar position.
11 The other problem which is mentioned in this paragraph, which is
12 the next sentence where it says they have used the fused furrow for
13 calculating the bearing, using correct mortar methodologies for
14 investigation, you do not use fused furrows for calculating bearing
15 because they are prone to error. An experienced investigator would not
16 use a fused furrow unless the fuse furrow was of excellent quality. And
17 I mention what that is in, I believe, para 10 of my report.
18 Q. Now, do you discount the possibility of a ricochet by the fatal
19 projectile, which is alluded to in the final sentence of that paragraph?
20 A. There is no evidence I have seen to confirm that a round has
21 struck a building first. If it did, it could well have exploded on
22 impact. If they believe that a round had struck a building first and
23 moved it bearing-wise away from where it has come from, then it does not
24 make sense why you would then use the crater fuse-furrow examination to
25 work out the back-bearing, knowing that it's hit a building first. So,
1 no, I don't believe that this round hit a building first. There's no
2 evidence to prove that.
3 Q. You're familiar with the Cymbeline radar system?
4 A. Yes, I am.
5 Q. Could you explain briefly what it is?
6 A. The Cymbeline is a mortar-locating radar. It projects radar
7 beams into the sky which can then pick up projectiles passing through
8 those radar beams to determine where the round has been fired from.
9 Q. Now, just looking at the report, had this fatal projectile been
10 fired at a range of 950 metres or less, what would have happened?
11 A. As you can see from the Cymbeline report, if the mortar had been
12 fired at a very close distance to the incident, then, because of the high
13 trajectory required, the Cymbeline would have detected it.
14 Q. Moving to paragraph 5 on the page in front of you, there is a
15 reference to UN observation posts. I want you to describe to
16 Their Honours why this is relevant, the auditory element.
17 A. From reading this report and others, there was no reported sound
18 of the mortar firing from any of the observer positions. But they did
19 hear the rounds falling, which would indicate that from wherever the
20 mortar was fired, that probably because of something, either buildings or
21 hill-side, were possibly in the way, preventing them hearing the rounds
22 being fired.
23 Q. Now, in your report, at page 33, you have identified four
24 possible ranges from which the projectile could have been fired if it
25 were to approach at an angle of 70 degrees, which we'll get to. The
1 ranges you give are: with a charge 1, 900 metres; with a charge 2,
2 1600 metres; with a charge 3, 2.400 metres; and with a charge 4,
3 3.000 metres. In respect of the fatal projectile fired on the
4 market-place, which of those four ranges do you believe to be the most
5 likely, and on what basis do you reach that conclusion?
6 A. From the evidence received from examining the crater, as we get
7 an angle out of which the round could have coming in at, which then gives
8 us those possible ranges when looking at the range tables, at the close
9 of distance of 900, that would put the mortar inside the confrontation
10 line and also within earshot of the closest UN observer. At 1600 metres,
11 that puts the mortar very close to the confrontation lines and also
12 within earshot of the UN observer. When you go back to charges 3 and 4,
13 it is now placing the mortar beyond the confrontation line, into the
14 hills or surrounding country-side overlooking Sarajevo.
15 Because we heard no sound, and the Cymbeline radar, for the
16 reasons in the report, didn't pick up any angle of the mortar travelling,
17 that would indicate that 900 metres is not the preferred option. At
18 1600 metres, again, not hearing any sound and because of very poor
19 tactical deployment by putting a mortar right on the confrontation line,
20 would tend to rule out it was fired from 1600 metres. Again because the
21 Cymbeline suggests that it was fired from probably more of a medium
22 charge, those of charges 3 or 4, so it would fire under the radar, and
23 that no sound of the firing was heard, may indicate that the mortar
24 actually was located in the hill-sides overlooking Sarajevo, which would
25 indicate either fired on charges 3 or 4, which would then place it beyond
1 the confrontation line, into Serb-held territory.
2 Q. At this point, could you just explain the concept of charge 1,
3 charge 2, charge 3, charge 4, in the use of a mortar?
4 A. The propellant of a mortar can be removed to give you different
5 ranges. They are like plastic wedges or cheeses, as they are called,
6 that go around the tail-fin of a mortar, and most mortars have six of
7 them. And if you only want to fire at close range, you can just put one
8 or two on. If you want to fire at longer ranges, you can put as many as
9 you want on, up to six. But normally with mortars you try and fire at
10 the minimum charge you can to hit the target, because that is more
11 accurate, to fire on the minimum charge; you have less time of flight,
12 and less chances of piece of equipment, like Cymbeline, detecting the
13 round once fired.
14 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you. We're going to have to move on, I'm
16 Could I have document 15059.
17 Q. This is an UNMO daily sitrep which is referred to in your
18 statement. I'd just like you to confirm that that is the document to
19 which you referred; is that correct?
20 A. Yes, it is.
21 MR. GAYNOR: Now, the next document, please, which is 15060.
22 Q. This document -- first, the document is a document from G2 to the
23 commander of UNPROFOR, dated the 8th of September, 1995, concerning the
24 Markale II incident, and it describes in some detail the Cymbeline point.
25 MR. GAYNOR: And if we could go to the next page, please, under
1 point C.
2 Q. It says that:
3 "A mortar fired from middle to long range would have a lower
4 trajectory and equates to a firing position on Bosnian Serb territory. A
5 lower trajectory round would have been passed under the Cymbeline radar's
7 Do you agree generally with that analysis?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. I'd like to take you to 15061, please. This is a set of
10 photographs taken following the Markale II incident.
11 MR. GAYNOR: If we could go to page 10 when it arrives. In fact,
12 if we could take the next page, please.
13 Q. What do you see there, Mr. Higgs?
14 A. This is a photograph taken looking down on the mortar crater.
15 Q. Can you just make any comments about the origin of fire and --
16 yeah, origin of fire, first of all?
17 A. From looking at the mortar crater, the experienced eye can see
18 that the majority of the shrapnel marks in the tarmac are between the
19 point of burst on the ground and the pavement, so it gives an indication
20 that this round has come from over the building and that the direction of
21 fire is approximately from where you can see that crater on the ground
22 towards the building.
23 Q. How is the angle of impact of the projectile calculated?
24 A. In this case here, none of the investigating teams attending on
25 the first day found a fuse furrow, which is the hole you get in the
1 center of the crater, good enough to use for calculations of angle.
2 Therefore, they conducted a mathematical calculation using measurements
3 measured from the crater to the building and the height of the building
4 to find out what the minimum elevation would have to be to clear the
5 building. And in addition to that, the Bosnian investigation team
6 conducted ballistic calculations on the explosion to give them an
7 approximate angle of decent.
8 Q. What was that angle?
9 A. From the ballistic calculation, they came up with 70 degrees, and
10 the mathematical calculation to the roof gave them a minimum angle of
11 67 degrees.
12 MR. GAYNOR: I'd like to take to you the next document, which is
13 15062. This document is an official report of Sarajevo CSB, dated the
14 29th of August, 1995.
15 Sorry, could we try 11404, please.
16 Q. The document that's coming up, Mr. Higgs, is, I believe, the
17 Sarajevo CSB
18 MR. GAYNOR: Sorry, that's not the correct document. Sorry,
19 could I have 11404. I'll move on to the next document.
20 Q. Mr. Higgs, I'd like to take you to 15062. I apologise. On the
21 form, it's 14404.
22 MR. GAYNOR: My apologies to the Court.
23 Q. Mr. Higgs, you see this is a CSB Sarajevo report, dated
24 29th of August, 1995?
25 A. Yes, I do.
1 Q. And further down, it refers to the involvement of a Captain Higgs
2 from Great Britain. That is not, in fact, you, is it?
3 A. No, it's not.
4 Q. Now, on the next page, please, we see a reference to a
5 120-millimetre shell, KB 9307, and MK M974. Is it -- you agree that it's
6 possible to take those kind of data from a stabiliser?
7 A. Yes, this information was taken from the tail-fins or the
8 stabiliser of the round and can be seen in some of the photographs taken
9 by the investigation teams.
10 Q. Now, under point number 2, it says:
11 "The shell was fired from the south. Its azimuth of 170 degrees,
12 plus or minus 5 degrees, corresponds to aggressor positions at the
13 Trebevic area."
14 Ignoring the reference to aggressor positions, do you have any
15 comment about the 170 degrees?
16 A. Now, this is the reading they got from their examination, and
17 I've got no reasons to not believe that.
18 MR. GAYNOR: There are a couple of diagrams which appear at the
19 very end of this document, four pages from the end. If we could go
20 there, please.
21 We'll leave that document for the moment.
22 Could I ask for Video 40221 to be played, please. I'm informed
23 we need to switch to Sanction for this.
24 [Video-clip played]
25 MR. GAYNOR: We could just pause there briefly.
1 Q. Now, based on your knowledge of the 120-millimetre mortar system,
2 is the damage we've seen there consistent with a single round?
3 A. Yes, it is.
4 MR. GAYNOR: That comment was made at 1 minute and 25 seconds.
5 If we could play on, please.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 MR. GAYNOR: Now, if we could pause there, please, pausing at
8 1 minute and 43 seconds.
9 Q. What is the location depicted in this video?
10 A. The video shows an area just outside a building where I'm
11 informed contained within is a market.
12 Q. How far is this from the open-air market?
13 A. It is a short distance down the road. I have not accurately
14 measured it, but between 50 and 100 metres.
15 Q. And the open-air market is where the Markale I projectile
16 exploded; is that right?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. And this is the location where the Markale II projectile
19 exploded; correct?
20 A. Correct.
21 MR. GAYNOR: If we could play on, please.
22 [Video-clip played]
23 MR. GAYNOR: If we could pause there, please. We're pausing now
24 at 3 minutes and 43 seconds.
25 Q. What do you see in front of you at this point, Mr. Higgs?
1 A. The video is now showing the arrival of the French investigation
3 MR. GAYNOR: Could you play on, please.
4 [Video-clip played]
5 MR. GAYNOR: If we could pause there, please. We're at 4 minutes
6 and 37 seconds.
7 Q. What appears to be taking place at this point in the video?
8 A. The team are now taking the measurements from the shell crater to
9 the edge of the building. These measurements are then used when they
10 calculate the height of the building and then work out the minimum angle
11 that the round must have had to clear the building.
12 Q. Just to clarify your answer there, they're measuring the distance
13 from the crater to the edge of the building, and then what other
14 measurements would they need to take?
15 A. They'll then take the measurement of the height of the building.
16 And then by using mathematical calculations, they can calculate the
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. GAYNOR: Could we play on, please.
20 [Video-clip played]
21 MR. GAYNOR: Pause there, please. We're at 5 minutes and
22 32 seconds.
23 Q. What is taking place at this point of the video?
24 A. From the shape of the shrapnel marks in the tarmac, this soldier
25 is now looking at the direction from which the round has come and now
1 taking his bearing using the compass.
2 Q. Thank you. And we are -- would you agree that this isn't
3 necessarily a video of the entire investigative process, taking the
4 direction or taking the height?
5 A. It doesn't seem to be. This video only captures, obviously,
6 certain parts of the total investigation.
7 MR. GAYNOR: Could we play on, please.
8 [Video-clip played]
9 MR. GAYNOR: If we could pause there, please. We're at 6 minutes
10 and 28 seconds.
11 Q. What is taking place at this stage?
12 A. They're now doing a preliminary investigation on the tail-fins
13 from the round. This is where they can find certain information. You
14 can just see it in the video, where the mark and batch number are stamped
15 on the rear. And they have laid the tape measure down to measure the
16 distance across the fins just to confirm the calibre of the mortar.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. GAYNOR: We can play on, please.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 MR. GAYNOR: We can stop the video at this stage. Thank you.
21 I have no further questions in examination-in-chief.
22 I was going to seek the admission of the documents as well as the
23 video at this stage, or I can do that at the end of the evidence of the
24 witness, as Your Honours wish.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
2 We have no objection to the admission as source documents,
3 pursuant to the Trial Chamber's decision on the Prosecution's submission
4 on the relevancy of certain documents relating to the testimony of
5 Richard Philipps on the 9th of July, 2010. But as you noted in
6 paragraph 11, the substance of those documents should not be considered
7 by the Chamber, only to the extent of assisting the Chamber in assessing
8 the probative value of the expert testimony.
9 MR. GAYNOR: Mr. President, we're tendering these documents to be
10 admitted for all purposes, in accordance with the guidance which is set
11 out in the decision that Mr. Robinson has referred to. These are not
12 merely admitted as source documents. The witness has had an opportunity
13 to comment upon them, to explain their relevance to the Chamber. And in
14 the same way as Your Honours admitted for all purposes documents admitted
15 through Expert Donia, we are tendering these documents for all purposes.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, the problem that -- I think we, in
17 principle, could understand to have these documents admitted for all
18 purposes if we had the opportunity for a robust cross-examination of all
19 of these incidents. But given the time that the Chamber has allowed for
20 cross-examination, to have documents admitted as to the substance of the
21 investigation, without having the ability to question those people who
22 conducted the investigation, would really prejudice us, given the time.
23 However, if we have enough time for a robust cross-examination of each of
24 these incidents, then we really wouldn't mind the documents, themselves,
25 being admitted. But given the Chamber's philosophy towards the evidence
1 of this witness, as reflected in the time allowed for cross-examination,
2 we don't feel that it would be fair to admit these for all purposes.
3 Thank you.
4 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
5 We'll have a break for half an hour, and we'll give our ruling
7 [The witness stands down]
8 --- Recess taken at 12.25 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.
10 JUDGE KWON: This is our ruling:
11 The Chamber has considered the arguments put forward by
12 Mr. Robinson as to why the underlying investigatory reports and other
13 material reviewed by Mr. Higgs, in reaching his conclusions and preparing
14 his report, should be admitted as source documents rather than for all
15 purposes, as the Prosecution wishes. However, as this underlying
16 material was referred to by the witness in the course of his testimony,
17 the situation differs from that of Mr. Philipps and the source material
18 that was only referenced in his expert report and not discussed in the
19 courtroom with him.
20 Having said that, as we indicated in our ruling on the time for
21 cross-examination of Mr. Higgs, the Chamber is of the view that his
22 evidence is of a limited nature, as he could only comment, on the basis
23 of his expertise, on the investigations conducted by others and the
24 conclusions reached by them. This has an effect on the weight which the
25 Chamber can ascribe to those underlying reports and other materials, and,
1 indeed, there would need to be further evidence brought to support them
2 before the Chamber could reach conclusions based thereon.
3 As he's not the author of these underlying reports, additional
4 time to cross-examine this witness about them would be of limited
5 purpose, and the Chamber remains of the view that three hours is
7 With these comments, the Chamber will admit the documents
8 commented upon by the witness in the course of his testimony and upon
9 which he based his expert report.
10 That was the ruling, and I was told that there's something to be
11 raised by Mr. Gaynor or Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 I wanted to raise one scheduling issue that I had an opportunity
14 to speak with the Defence about.
15 The Court will be aware that there were three witnesses scheduled
16 for this week. A look at the allotted -- the cross-examination times
17 consumed and allotted thus far suggests the possibility that we may
18 complete the testimony of those three witnesses before the completion of
19 the week. It remains the expectation and certainly the preference,
20 strong preference, to the parties, as I gleaned during the course of a
21 discussion during the recess, to maintain the existing schedule, that is,
22 three witnesses this week, and then commence with KDZ-088 on Monday.
23 I see the Court may be in agreement with that, and I won't
24 continue if that's the case, but I wanted to alert the Court to that
25 position so that the Bench was as aware of the circumstances as possible
1 and could provide whatever relevant feedback it shows so there'd be as
2 much certainty possible.
3 Thank you, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. Give me a minute.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. Thank you for the
8 What I wanted to tell you is that not to make the final
9 arrangement to call KDZ-88 on Monday. The reason will become apparent by
10 the course of today.
11 MR. TIEGER: Understood, Your Honour.
12 And may I take this opportunity to raise a related matter, and
13 that would be to encourage the Court, to the extent it may be possible,
14 to provide the parties with as much advance notice of allotted -- of
15 cross-examination time to be allotted as it can. And that means, if
16 possible, as many witnesses ahead as possible. The reasons are obvious.
17 I appreciate the burdens involved, but it would be of great benefit to
18 the parties.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll do so.
20 Let's bring in the witness.
21 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Although the Trial Chamber
23 concluded that the evidence provided by Mr. Higgs does require further
24 testimony, I'm afraid that through his testimony these reports are being
25 legitimised to a considerable degree. I kindly ask you to consider the
1 necessity of having more time before KDZ-88 arrives. I would like to
2 deal with 80 incidents that Mr. Higgs dealt with, major incidents, at
3 that. We will not have a better opportunity of clarifying the matter
4 than the opportunity that is at hand now.
5 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber gave its ruling, and we are not minded
6 to revisit the issue. Read again the ruling we gave, and comply with it
7 as much as possible.
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 JUDGE KWON: Let's begin your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
12 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Higgs. I'd like to express to you
13 my gratitude for meeting with the Defence team and also for your promise
14 that you would give us a list of your previous testimony and involvement
15 in criminal cases in the UK
16 some of these cases to understand your method of work.
17 Do you agree that your expertise is, in fact, a report on the
18 work of other investigative teams, not an inquiry into the incidents
20 A. In these cases, my reports are based on the investigations
21 carried out by others.
22 Q. Thank you. But in the course of our interview, you said, I have
23 to believe that -- [In English] that I based my opinion on -- through ...
24 [Interpretation] And you said that one must hope that they are correct.
25 A. Yes, I must believe what was written in those investigations was
1 done correct at the time.
2 Q. Therefore, you would agree, wouldn't you, that in order for us to
3 check the veracity of your own conclusions, whereby you lend credibility
4 to their findings, we have only one course of action open, and that is to
5 clear up these incidents, themselves, with your assistance here; correct?
6 A. Yes, I can give you my opinion on each of these incidents here to
7 enable them to be cleared up.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now ask for the video,
10 65 ter 40221.
11 JUDGE KWON: Do we need to switch to Sanction again? Yes.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need the sequence of minute and
14 25 seconds. Rewind a little, please. One minute, 20. 1:25. 1:25. Can
15 you freeze there.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Higgs, that in a human body there is more than
18 two-thirds of liquid; blood, lymph, et cetera?
19 A. I'm obviously no doctor. I'm led to believe that, but I
20 obviously could not give a definite answer on that.
21 Q. All right.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get that picture back?
23 Where is that picture?
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Can you explain how this body found itself there and how these
1 wounds were inflicted?
2 A. Difficult to confirm exactly how it ended there, as I can only
3 see the pictures as you can. It would look like this person has been
4 caught within the blast or shrapnel of the round, causing the injuries,
5 and then pushing -- the blast pushing the individual over the barrier.
6 Q. Can you explain where are his bodily fluids that must have flowed
7 out of the body with an injury like this? Where are they?
8 A. Well, all I can see on this picture is, as you can, where the
9 blood-stains are on the side of the body.
10 Q. Can we agree that the asphalt below the body is dry?
11 A. From the quality of the picture, I cannot see large quantities,
12 but I couldn't rule out there being some.
13 Q. Do you notice the shadow of the body?
14 A. Yes, I can see the shadow.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now call -- can we now see
17 the sequence of 3:43
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. That's the French investigative team, isn't it?
20 A. Yes, that's correct.
21 Q. Was that the first team to appear on the scene?
22 A. I don't know if these were the first. The video doesn't either
23 confirm or deny that.
24 Q. During our interview, you confirmed that the best time to
25 investigate an incident is immediately after it occurred; correct?
1 A. That's correct.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 4:37.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Are these members of the French Battalion measuring the crater?
5 A. No, they're not measuring the crater. They're measuring the
6 distance from the crater to the building.
7 Q. Yes. They're measuring the position relative to the building?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. Do we see here a clear image of the crater?
10 A. Not in this image, no.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we rewind a few seconds. We
12 can play the footage now.
13 [Video-clip played]
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Is this a better picture?
16 A. It is, but it still does not show the crater in any great detail.
17 Q. Can it be seen that the crater, the traces, are marked by chalk?
18 A. It's not clear to see, from the picture, whether or not they are
19 marked by chalk or whether that is just white edges to the splinters in
20 the tarmac.
21 Q. Very well.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we play the film now.
23 [Video-clip played]
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us listen carefully to what
25 this man using the compass will say. You can play it back.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's freeze here. This French
3 officer, did he say "2.100"? Can the French interpreters help us? Did
4 the French officer say "2.000 1.000 parts"?
5 THE INTERPRETER: The French interpreters believe they heard
6 "2.800 thousandths."
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]
8 ... the officer said "2.000 1.000 parts."
9 JUDGE KWON: I was advised by the interpreter that the French
10 booth believes that they heard "2.800 --" "2.800 thousandths."
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we rewind again and listen once
12 again carefully to what the officer said?
13 JUDGE KWON: And if the French interpreters could interpret what
14 they hear in French.
15 [Video-clip played]
16 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Please write down, Cherry. Are you
17 there? Note down bearing 2.800 thousandths."
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
19 Can we now move to 6:28
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Higgs, that on this stabiliser there is no --
22 no ignition device, detonator?
23 A. The ignition device for this tail-fin, you can clearly see it's
24 in the picture. It is in the center. That is a percussion cap that is
25 in the center of the tail-fin, which fires the round. Obviously, if
1 you're referring to the fuse, of course, that would be on the opposite
2 end of the round, which detonates on impact.
3 Q. But if we look at the place where a brass cap should be, the one
4 that activates the motor, not the shell, it activates the charge, and
5 it's made of brass or at least it's the colour of brass, made of a soft
7 A. Not on all mortar rounds the percussion caps are made of brass or
8 copper. Sometimes they are made of a silver-coloured alloy. It would
9 depend on the type and batch of ammunition. And sometimes these can even
10 be displaced after firing.
11 Q. We accept, don't we, that it's missing here in this picture? It
12 had been released earlier or it's missing. But do you know from what
13 material Yugoslav-made detonator caps are made; a coloured metal or a
14 colourless metal?
15 A. Two questions there. The first one regarding it being missing:
16 No, I can't confirm that because it could be -- still be in place. This
17 photograph is not clear enough to show that.
18 Regarding the colour and this type of batch of ammunition: No, I
19 have not got that detail information.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Continue with the play-back,
23 [Video-clip played]
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Freeze.
25 We had a sharper picture of the body of the stabiliser a moment
1 ago. Can we rewind a few seconds, perhaps. There it is.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. What would you say about the body of this stabiliser? Are these
4 traces of explosion?
5 A. The stabiliser shows the damage that would be consistent with
6 being fired, as you can see from the end of the stabiliser nearest to the
7 right-hand edge of the screen, where it has been peeled back from firing.
8 And the tail-fins represent a tail-fin that has, since the explosion, hit
9 something and, therefore, caused damage to the fins.
10 Q. Thank you. Do you see that the emplacement of the detonator cap
11 is empty? Can you see that now?
12 A. Again, I'm not really clear enough to see that, because on firing
13 they will be pressed in by the firing pin. So this is not clear enough
14 to either confirm or disagree with that.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Has this video been admitted into
17 evidence? Wasn't it tendered by the Prosecution?
18 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, our understanding is that it's been admitted
19 into evidence.
20 JUDGE KWON: Why does it bear this different number?
21 MR. GAYNOR: Sorry. The video has been admitted in evidence.
22 The stabiliser --
23 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, the video you played is numbered as 40310, and
24 this one was referred to as 40221.
25 MR. GAYNOR: I'm informed that they are duplicates of each other
1 and this is the correct number.
2 JUDGE KWON: What is the correct number?
3 MR. GAYNOR: 40221.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: That one has been already admitted, and the exhibit
7 number will be assigned by the Court Deputy in due course. I take it it
8 should be probably P1450.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now get 1D2253.
10 JUDGE KWON: Shall we switch to e-court from Sanction?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the photograph I wanted.
12 Can we restore it?
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you agree that this is a photo of the Markale Market-Place?
15 This is a freeze taken from pre-war video footage shown on TV. And do
16 you agree that this is the Markale Market, covered by some sort of
17 roofing plates that almost -- that are almost joined together, almost
18 touch each other?
19 A. From the picture, it does appear to be the market. However,
20 obviously, I cannot definitely confirm that without seeing a bigger
21 picture. But, yes, it does appear to be the Markale Market.
22 Q. You see the rails towards the bottom of the picture. Now, when
23 you look at this photo and these big roofing plates, do you still stand
24 by your finding, based on previous investigations, that it's possible,
25 with one hit of this market, to land a shell without having the shell
1 activate on the roofing plates?
2 A. Yes, that is possible, because on the day of firing, of course,
3 we do not know the position of these roofing plates, and the round could
4 have quite easily passed in a gap between them. I obviously have no
5 evidence or information to that fact.
6 Q. Well, as you were probably able to see in the material that the
7 Muslim side gave you, it was the same location, the market looked the
8 same, and it's documented in many photographs of Markale with covered
9 stalls. Did you see such material? Did they give you all the background
10 material you needed for your findings?
11 A. The findings, obviously, are based on the reports which are
12 obviously in evidence. At no time I'm aware that they reported a round
13 had passed through or hit one of these roofing covers. There was mention
14 that it had, I think, hit a table on the way through, but I've got no
15 evidence that I have seen which relates to these -- these covers.
16 Q. To make it quite clear for the participants in these proceedings,
17 we're now talking about Markale I?
18 A. Correct.
19 Q. Would a shell hitting these covers activate?
20 A. Depending on what these covers are made of, how substantial they
21 are, then, yes, it could.
22 Q. You said, and we could see it in one UN report, that the shell
23 hit a stall. Would it activate hitting a stall?
24 A. It depends on, of course, how it hit the stall and which part,
25 but a stall could detonate it if it was hit correctly and with enough
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now call up 65 ter 10083.
4 Before that, may I tender this document.
5 JUDGE KWON: Unless it is objected to, we'll admit this picture.
6 Mr. Gaynor.
7 MR. GAYNOR: Subject to the observation that we don't have any
8 information as to when that photograph --
9 JUDGE KWON: It was before the incident.
10 MR. GAYNOR: True. But beyond that, we're not given a year at
11 all as to when that photograph might have been taken.
12 JUDGE KWON: Can you help us in that regard, Mr. Karadzic?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I lived 50 years in this city, and
14 I know it very well. This is what the Markale Market looked before --
15 just before the war and earlier, and this is a freeze from video footage
16 shown on TV.
17 JUDGE KWON: When?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just before the war.
19 JUDGE KWON: That's all you can tell us?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
21 JUDGE KWON: With that caveat, we'll admit this.
22 MR. GAYNOR: Very well, Mr. President.
23 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit D542, Your Honours.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get 65 ter 10083.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. It's a part of your report, after touring the positions around
3 outside on the front-lines, behind the confrontation line on the Serbian
4 side. Is that so?
5 A. I'm sorry, which part of the report are you referring to?
6 Q. The pages -- it's the last page: "I visited the area of
7 Mirkovci ..." 0303-7515. Yes: "I have visited ..." Top of the page.
8 A. Yes, that's correct.
9 Q. What did you mean by saying that there are several locations in
10 Mrkovici that lend themselves to the placing of mortars, and there are
11 access roads that can be used to transport them into Mrkovici?
12 A. I was trying to establish all the possible locations where the
13 round could have been fired from. With the 120-millimetre mortar, it is
14 a heavy piece of equipment, a large piece of equipment, and certain areas
15 then may not be suitable for the firing of that weapon system. So I was
16 taken around to see different sites to see the possibilities of where it
17 could have been located.
18 Q. But during our interview you said that a mortar of
19 120 millimetres can be disassembled, shipped, and assembled again; is
20 that right?
21 A. Yes, that's correct.
22 Q. Thank you. Did you find, in Mrkovici, any sites where this heavy
23 120-millimetre mortar was dug in?
24 A. Not sites that -- where it was dug in.
25 Q. Thank you. And did you tour all the sites on that bearing
1 between Mrkovici and Markale? Did you tour other places to see if there
2 were any suitable sites for a mortar?
3 A. We looked at all the area along that bearing line and identified
4 the suitable places, yes.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly look at the Map 02
6 from this special binder. That's the 02 from the Sarajevo special
8 JUDGE KWON: I don't remember the 65 ter number of this, this
9 picture, aerial image.
10 MR. GAYNOR: We're just getting it right now, Your Honour.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
12 MR. GAYNOR: I'm told it's 11790, Your Honour.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's the map.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Can you show us Mrkovici on this map?
16 A. Purely from this map -- obviously it's been some time since I
17 have been there. I'm obviously now no longer really familiar with the
18 named areas. So it would really be not accurate for me now trying to
19 determine which -- where exactly this area is on this particular aerial
21 Q. Perhaps it's easier in the lower part of the city. Can you show
22 Markale on this picture?
23 A. Well, the lower part of the city, of course, shows here where the
24 airport is. Of course, Markale is at the other end of the city.
25 Q. In the eastern part of the city, this narrowest part of the city,
1 do you see the main street winding through the old town?
2 A. Not clearly on this photograph, no.
3 Q. Do you agree that Markale are in the old town?
4 A. Yes, they're in the old town.
5 Q. And do you agree that when you go from the old town towards the
6 top, towards this mountain, that Mrkovici are behind the confrontation
7 line, to the north of the confrontation line?
8 A. Without checking that against a map showing the areas with the
9 names on, obviously, I cannot show it on this picture.
10 Q. We'll show that map later as well. But do you agree that the
11 confrontation lines are very close together in this section?
12 A. Yes, that picture does show the confrontation lines are very
13 close together.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, that will be it for today.
15 So we'll rise, and we'll resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.
16 Mr. Higgs, probably you will know very well that during the
17 course of your testimony, you are not supposed to discuss your evidence
18 with anybody else.
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE KWON: See you tomorrow morning.
21 [The witness stands down]
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.
23 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 19th day
24 of August, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.