1 Wednesday, 6 October 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.29 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, everybody. Good afternoon, General.
7 WITNESS: MICHAEL ROSE [Resumed]
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Excellency.
10 Good afternoon to all.
11 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Good afternoon. I hope that you will understand that the
14 documents that pertain to the period of your command in Bosnia, as well
15 as your book, and my correspondence with your political chief,
16 Mr. Akashi, and your correspondence with Mladic and other officers of
17 ours, is of key importance for understanding the entire situation as it
18 was. Would you agree with that?
19 A. I would.
20 Q. Thank you. You had rather fair and critical assessments of the
21 Western governments, in view of understanding the situation in
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?
23 A. I felt that the Western governments had a confused strategy with
24 regards to the resolution of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina during
25 my period in command there in 1994, that is correct.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Can we call up page 3 of the book, General Rose's book, that is,
3 1D1037. Page 3 of the book, rather.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
5 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, if I may, I note that General Rose
6 has just reached for his paperback version of his book, which I noticed
7 yesterday isn't the same version as we have in e-court. And I wonder,
8 subject with Your Honours' leave and, of course, Dr. Karadzic's, if we
9 might be able to provide him with a copy that, in fact, is the scanned
10 copy that appears in e-court, and that way he would be able to find the
11 pages more easily himself.
12 JUDGE KWON: That would be very helpful. Thank you,
13 Ms. Edgerton.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
15 JUDGE KWON: If the usher could pass the book along to the
17 MS. EDGERTON: And there is -- of course, the only marking in
18 that is the name which appears inside the front cover, which is my own,
19 which is the same as what appears in e-court.
20 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: I don't think that the Defence would mind that.
22 In the meantime, can you --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we have it now in e-court.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we take a brief look at a
1 paragraph on page number 3, where you said that the Western coalition,
2 led by America
3 you said that it wasn't all that simple because, quite simply, it wasn't
4 that one country invaded another country.
5 We have to find --
6 [In English] "... pointed out that the international coalition
7 led by America
8 [Interpretation] Towards the bottom. We can't see that paragraph
9 yet. Could you scroll down a bit more.
10 We see the first sentence only:
11 "Bosnians frequently pointed out ...," et cetera.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. So this is your observation and your position; isn't that right?
14 It's that first paragraph down there.
15 A. I found the paragraph. And your question?
16 Q. Is that what I said, that that was an observation of yours, that
17 there was a lack of understanding among Western governments, in terms of
18 the nature of the conflict?
19 A. That is true.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Excellencies, later on I would like to tender these pages, once
22 we are done with all of them. So it's this paragraph, starting with:
23 "Bosnians frequently ..." et cetera, going all the way down to: "...
25 Could we now have page 59.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Do you agree that Western diplomats, primarily American
3 diplomats, came with some prejudice or with some tasks that were
4 dissonant from the situation on the ground, and that that constituted a
5 problem for you as well?
6 A. Are you referring to any specific paragraph on page 59?
7 Q. Well, once I see it --
8 [In English] "... Ambassador Charles Redman, President Clinton's
9 special envoy."
10 A. I find the paragraph.
11 Q. It's this paragraph: "Not to be outdone ..."
12 And then further on, it says, "Bosnian Serbs," et cetera,
13 "congressional elections." I would like to indicate this sentence: "I
14 explained --"
15 [In English] "... to be more than happy to stop the fighting
16 while they are ahead, and that it had been the Muslims who had tried to
17 renege from the meeting at the airport."
18 [Interpretation] Further on, you say that Redman repeated that
19 the Serbs should not be allowed to benefit from their aggression and that
20 nothing would stop America
22 Western diplomats came there with a ready-made agenda, regardless of what
23 was happening on the ground; right?
24 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, before there's an answer, what was
25 translated from what Dr. Karadzic said was not quite what the paragraph
1 on the screen reads from the book. And, of course, it was a compound
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The interpretation was
4 exactly what Dr. Karadzic said.
5 JUDGE KWON: So we have the paragraph of the book in front of us.
6 Mr. Karadzic, what is your question?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question for General Rose, who
8 had observed this, is -- is whether they came there with an agenda that
9 was not made on the basis of the situation on the ground but, rather, on
10 the basis of their own internal political needs, as you had observed in
11 this paragraph.
12 THE WITNESS: My reply is their agenda, when I spoke to
13 Mr. Redman, as I understood it, was different from that of the United
14 Nations Protection Force at the time, certainly in terms of the
15 priorities that were established by the United Nations. Their goal was a
16 just solution and a just peace, whereas the United Nations' first
17 priority was the continued delivery of humanitarian aid, and only second
18 to that would have been the pursuit of a just peace. It was a question
19 of priority, not necessarily a different agenda.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. But you do recall that the Christian majority, consisting of the
22 Serbs and Croats, did not accept a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, right, and
23 that the creation of a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina would not have been a
24 just solution? And it hasn't worked to this day. Also, this was the
25 main cause of the war.
1 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I counted three questions and a
2 statement in there.
3 JUDGE KWON: However, I let it go because I believe the general
4 could -- would be able to deal with this question.
5 THE WITNESS: There was a great debate at the time partly between
6 the United Nations and the warring parties. It continued with the
7 contact group and other interested parties about how best to bring about
8 a peaceful resolution of the problem, and most of the suggested solutions
9 certainly involved a redistribution of the territory of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina amongst the warring parties. But that re-division of
11 territory generally was supposedly a temporary arrangement, not a
12 permanent one. People still had the goal that Bosnia should ultimately
13 return to its unitary state, I think. But I was a military man on the
14 ground, with a limited knowledge of the political debates that were going
15 on around me and above me.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, as Ms. Edgerton advised you, you would
17 be better off if you would make your question one by one, more simple and
18 direct. Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Q. Then I'm going to move on from political questions and get closer
21 to issues related to peace and humanitarian issues.
22 Was your position and was it your observation that the full
23 demilitarisation of Sarajevo
24 the Bosnians and Muslims, that was a problem for several reasons, because
25 they would have to leave Sarajevo
1 leave it, and ours would have to leave it, too, but the problem was that
2 the financial gains from the control of movement would have gone down.
3 So from that point of view, was your conclusion that the extremists and
4 the SDA believed that it would be better to have shells and bombs fall
5 rather than to demilitarise Sarajevo
6 A. I have no knowledge of any financial gains or losses that could
7 be made by either side, and certainly I discussed with many parties and
8 none of them said to me that it would be better to continue having shells
9 fall on Sarajevo
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 45 of the book.
12 45 of the book.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. May I draw your attention to this paragraph:
15 "Full demilitarisation of Sarajevo ..."
16 [In English] "... for the Bosnians or all Bosnian army units.
17 For the Bosnian Government, this was a step too far, and as it would mean
18 that they were no longer sovereign in their own capital. Handing over
19 the security of Sarajevo
20 any financial gains that control of all movements in and out of the city
21 generated for the party leaders. In the view of some extremists of the
23 in the hope that the US
24 to conceal this inhumane strategy; they continued to blame the world for
25 allowing slow-motion genocide to take place in their country."
1 A. My words written in that paragraph were written two or three
2 years after I'd left Bosnia
3 I repeat, no one during my time in Bosnia
4 or loss to me, or, indeed, advocated the continual shelling of Sarajevo
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The transcript may be saying "SDS
6 but it is actually the SDA extremists and party leaders who were -- I
7 mean, who had an interest in not establishing peace.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Did you have any knowledge to that effect; namely, that Ganic and
10 other extremists were not in favour of peace?
11 A. As I explained yesterday, it was not in the strategic interests
12 of the Bosnian Government at that time in 1994 to bring about a cessation
13 of hostilities which might result in a permanent peace; a Cyprus-isation
14 as they called it, of the situation, which would end up having an unfair
15 division of territory.
16 Q. General, with all due respect, the first part of your knowledge,
17 as it were, is quite understandable for me, but the second part is an
18 interpretation, as if that would be the case, et cetera. But don't you
19 see that at the conference we practically lost all of the Serb Sarajevo
20 and the territorial questions could not have been resolved by military
21 means but only at the conference, and that perhaps there was another
22 reason involved; namely, why they didn't want to have the war brought to
23 an end?
24 A. I have no knowledge of the debate that occurred at the
25 Dayton Conference, which is presumably the conference you're referring
2 Q. But do you recall that it was clear, invariably, that there would
3 be a political assessment found at a conference, not a military solution?
4 We held all of the surrounding area of Sarajevo, and we lost all of it,
5 but at the green table, not in the battle-field, so we have to look at
6 other reasons why Muslims -- or at least Muslim extremists in the
7 Presidency did not want peace. That is why I'm drawing your attention to
8 this, to see whether there were other reasons, too, not this one. This
9 one clearly cannot be accepted, because it was obvious that a
10 fait accompli would not be accepted.
11 A. I cannot make any comment of any value at all to this Court about
12 subjects which occurred outside my period of command in 1994.
13 Q. Thank you. I was just referring to two parts of the position you
14 expressed. The first part is that you say that they didn't want to, and
15 the second part is why. I mean, that doesn't seem convincing to me, and
16 we have evidence to the effect that things were different.
17 However, you have clearly seen for yourself hundreds of times --
18 or I don't know how many times, but you have seen the Muslim side firing
19 at the UN, and at NATO aircraft, and at their own people, and at the Serb
20 side, in order to cause a Serb response and to create an image of
21 constant warfare and constant suffering; right?
22 A. I would not say hundreds of times. The occasions which we
23 suspected this was happening were very few, indeed, in terms of evidence
24 that was produced mainly, of course, by Sector Sarajevo.
25 Q. But you will agree that even the best crime police in the world
1 catches only 5 or 10 per cent of all perpetrators and the rest just get
2 away. What I would like to present to the Trial Chamber is the pattern
3 that we had to deal with.
4 So now I would like to ask for page -- well, actually, let us
5 have a look at this, what you talked about just now, page 197 and 198,
6 where you presented a perfectly clear view that firing at one's own
7 civilians in order to provoke Serb fire is practically one and the same
8 thing; right?
9 A. Which paragraph are you referring to, Dr. Karadzic, on that
10 page 197?
11 Q. [In English] "More serious were reports we started to receive
12 from the French in the city that the Bosnian forces were sometimes firing
13 on their own citizens. In one such incident, a tram had been fired on
14 from a building of the Bosnian side of the conflict line, normally
15 occupied by paramilitary police. In another incident following a mortar
16 attack near the Presidency that killed two children, two more shells had
17 been fired at the same location while a French Army team was
18 investigating the first incident. This secondary shot should [sic] only
19 have come from the Bosnian side of the firing line. On the other side of
20 the city, on several occasions, UN and NATO aircraft at Sarajevo Airport
21 had been fired at from the Muslim-held suburb of Butmir."
22 A. That was certainly my view at the time, this is what had
24 JUDGE KWON: The transcript should read "the secondary shots
25 could only have come from" instead of "should only have come from."
1 Continue, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: "Could only have."
3 [Interpretation] "Could only have."
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Let's just finish with this part, the other part: "The Bosnian
6 Government," and then we'll go back -- let's look at all of it.
7 [In English] "Nevertheless, in my view, the moral distinction
8 between Bosnian forces firing at the Serbs, with the intention to provoke
9 retaliation against civilians, and the Bosnians themselves firing on
10 their own people, is a fine one."
11 [Interpretation] So that is your position, and that is what I
12 meant a few moments ago.
13 A. That is my position.
14 Q. Thank you. We share that position. Now, do you know that often
15 the tram was fired at in order to have the Serb side accused, and that
16 these were not only allegations, there was clear evidence provided for
18 A. Your -- whenever we protested about the firing on the trams, the
19 reply from the Bosnian Serb side always was that it was done by the
20 Bosnian Government forces in order to discredit the Bosnian Serb side.
21 I think there was one occasion, and in many instances this happened,
22 where evidence was produced by the French Sector, showing that this may,
23 indeed, have been the case. One incident.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Can we have 1D2945. We'll go back to the book later.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Do you remember the incident that you referred to, the incident
3 when the French caught the perpetrators?
4 A. Are you referring to a paragraph in the book, Dr. Karadzic?
5 Q. You mentioned that there were incidents when the tram was shot at
6 from the Muslim side. Do you remember when that particular incident
7 occurred, the one that was investigated by the French?
8 A. You'll have to give me a reference in the either book or the
9 witness statement I made that you have a copy of.
10 JUDGE KWON: He seems to be calling up a document, 1D2945. Is
11 that the document?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure about the number.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. But, anyway, General, while the book is still here, have a look
15 at this; that there was firing --
16 [In English] "... such incident. A tram had been fired on from a
17 building on the Bosnian side of the conflict line normally occupied by
18 paramilitary police."
19 [Interpretation] Do you remember when that particular incident
20 with the tram occurred?
21 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, could you go back to page 197 and the
22 image that's on the screen?
23 JUDGE KWON: The paragraph we saw earlier on.
24 THE WITNESS: I think we need to cross-reference - it would be a
25 witness statement that I made - in order to identify the date.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is it.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. You are aware of at least one such incident. You are aware of
4 the pattern or the phenomenon:
5 [In English] "... a tram had been fired from the building on the
6 Bosnian side."
7 [Interpretation] What I would like to know now is whether you
8 know when this particular incident had occurred, the incident regarding
9 which you had received information from the French stating that Muslim
10 perpetrators had been caught.
11 A. It's quite clear I can't remember the date. I'm looking for it
12 in the witness statement. It was over 15 years ago.
13 Q. Thank you. I wasn't dealing with the statement. I was dealing
14 with the book.
15 But let us look at 1D2485. Could we have that in e-court,
17 Yes, that's the document, an UNPROFOR document from the 27th of
18 October, 1994. Right? Do you agree that this is an assessment regarding
19 problems concerning the airport, Civilian Affairs, and the importance of
20 Igman? If you remember, we had been forced to leave Igman because of
21 this ultimatum of NATO.
22 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry. Could you scroll down the document so
23 we can see the whole document.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the first page. We're
25 actually interested in the second page. I just wanted General Rose to
1 confirm that it says:
2 "The importance of Igman is well known ...
3 [In English] "... and they may not agree on the shooting of
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. You do recall, don't you, that Muslims were partly on Igman and
7 we partly handed over to you, the UN, or, rather, General Briquemont, the
8 part that we had held? The Muslims were still firing at us, but we were
9 prevented from firing at Igman. Remember that?
10 A. The NATO ultimatum required the Serb forces to move off
11 Mount Igman
12 advance from where their positions were. And that was the position I
13 inherited in 1994; that is so.
14 JUDGE KWON: Can you answer the question, General, regarding the
15 Muslims were still firing at them and they were prevented from firing at
17 THE WITNESS: What happened on Mount Igman was that the Bosnian
18 Government forces started to launch attacks across Mount Igman
19 the demilitarised zone, at the Serb positions on the other side of the
20 demilitarised zone, and NATO, who was responsible for enforcing the
21 demilitarised of that area -- the demilitarisation of that area, had
22 failed to take action against the Bosnian Government forces. In spite of
23 the fact we had protested to the Bosnian Government that they should
24 cease doing this, they continued to do so. When we asked NATO to take
25 action against them whenever they did make incursions, NATO refused to do
1 so. That is the case.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Can we please go to the next page of the document, page 2.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. We can see here "1735 hours, 25th October." It is probably
6 "Fraternity and Unity Bridge
7 [In English] "... investigation, see report conclusion."
8 [Interpretation] And then the last bullet in the conclusions:
9 [In English] "All evidence and corroboration by Bosnian officials
10 indicate shots came from Bosnian-held territory."
11 [Interpretation] Was that the incident that you were referring to
12 or was that a totally different incident?
13 A. Without any particular knowledge of whether it was that incident,
14 I suspect it was.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 I would like to tender the document into evidence, please.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I see the document notes "map should
19 be attached," the paragraph in bold on the page in front of us.
20 JUDGE KWON: Which is missing. With that noting, we'll admit
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D681, Your Honours.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Since we are talking about this, General, do you remember that
25 Ejub Ganic had organised secret police that snipe the trams in Sarajevo
1 and all those incidents were supposed to be assigned to the Serbian side;
2 the Serbs were to be blamed for all those?
3 A. Well, as I explained before, we had no intelligence-gathering
4 capability, so I wouldn't be -- have been at the time able to confirm or
5 deny such an allegation, and I certainly can't do so today.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now draw the participants'
7 attention to the information report, [In English] 28th of August, 2003.
8 [Interpretation] 1D2475, can we have this brought up in e-court.
9 Could we please see page 3.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. You see you are not pro-Serbian, General, sir. You say here:
12 "But it must be a different thing."
13 Number 3 in the document, you say here:
14 [In English] "I'm sure that the Serbs were firing at the tram,
15 but I believe Ganic also organised his secret police to snipe tram. His
16 sniper units sniped so that the angle of the shot matched the direction
17 from the Serb line. During the long cease-fire, I think that Ganic and
18 the Muslims were responsible for breaking the cease-fire. This kept the
19 tensions ...," and so on.
20 [Interpretation] How could you be so sure about the Serbs and you
21 believed about Ganic? Wouldn't we have been complete imbeciles if we had
22 fired in front of Holiday Inn, in view of everybody who was there; the
23 journalists, the observers, and everybody else?
24 A. As I say, we had no intelligence-gathering capability, and so I
25 would -- although there were suspicions that that was happening at the
1 time and there was some evidence which we referred to, I can make no
2 further comment than that.
3 Q. But you agree with me that as soon as something like that
4 happened, that would have called for a complete and thorough
5 investigation; right? And you did not have any capabilities to
6 investigate; therefore, you didn't investigate, did you?
7 A. If you're referring to Sector Sarajevo and the French Command,
8 they investigated every incident, as, indeed, did the United Nations
9 Military Observers. I got the reports from Sector Sarajevo as to what
10 might or might not have happened on the ground; I did not get the reports
11 from the United Nations Military Observers.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 JUDGE KWON: General, you can confirm what is stated in this
14 information sheet; i.e., that you believe Ganic organised his secret
15 police to snipe trams?
16 THE WITNESS: That was certainly our belief at the time, sir,
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 And can we now look at pages 79 and 80 in the book. Since we're
21 talking about Ganic, let's shed some more light on his significance. 79
22 and 80 in the book.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. In your view, was Ganic rather extreme and a major hindrance when
25 it came to establishing peace?
1 A. That was often the case, yes.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down, where it says:
3 "In Washington
4 agreed that the airport in Tuzla
5 on the agreement and demanded that the Fraternity and Unity Bridge
6 be reopened, and then from there we have to go to the following page,
7 where it says: "On the other hand --"
8 [In English] "Ganic, on the other hand, who was responsible for
9 the Bosnian armed forces and the paramilitary police, had become even
10 more powerful. He remained close to President Izetbegovic, and by the
11 end of 1994 he was the main point of contact between the UN and the
12 Bosnian Government. As a member of the inner cabinet, he also controlled
13 the Bosnian press, radio and television."
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Do you remember, General, sir, that we accepted that the airport
16 in Tuzla
17 officer there who will monitor the situation and see whether weapons were
18 being off-loaded there?
19 A. I remember that being the situation very well.
20 Q. And you remember that the Muslim side persisted on not allowing
21 any control of any of the transports at that airport?
22 A. If by "control," you mean inspection, that is so.
23 Q. Precisely. We just wanted to see or observe or just be able to
24 tell whether weapons were being off-loaded there, that's all. Do you
25 remember that that was not allowed, that we were not even allowed to
1 inspect, the Serbs were not even allowed to inspect?
2 A. That they were not allowed to station an inspectorate at Tuzla
3 Airport in the case that the UN could fly a direct at Tuzla, that is so.
4 Q. Did you hear or see or learn that the airport at Tuzla was the
5 place where a lot of weapons entered Bosnia
7 A. The only transports into Tuzla
8 humanitarian aid transports, and they certainly didn't contain any
10 Q. Very well, General, sir. We will show documents - maybe not
11 during your cross-examination - that there were night flights and landing
12 of unidentified aircraft that brought weapons in, but we will leave that
13 until later.
14 General, sir, immediately after your arrival, a major incident
15 took place at the Markale Market; is that correct?
16 A. That is correct.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 48 in the
18 book, in your book. We just want to look at one paragraph, and we will
19 move on to other documents after that.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. While we are waiting for the page to be displayed: Did you read
22 "Balkan Odyssey" by Lord Owen?
23 A. I did.
24 Q. Thank you. Can I draw your attention to the paragraph starting
25 with the following words:
1 "... had now agreed virtually everything ..."
2 [Interpretation] Scroll down, scroll down to the bottom of the
3 page. Thank you.
4 I don't want to read. I would like the participants to notice
5 that the gist of the passage is that the Serbs, after that incident,
6 accepted everything that had been requested by the Bosnian Government,
7 but the Bosnian Government still was not willing to sign a peace
8 agreement and accept the UN proposals. In any case, the UN proposals
9 were not dealing with a long-term solution, and they were very angry
10 about the strategy of -- was not successful. Is that correct?
11 A. I think you may have to be more precise in your question,
12 Dr. Karadzic.
13 Q. Well, you can read, all of the Serb --
14 [In English] "... had now agreed virtually everything the
15 Bosnians had asked for, Divjak was reluctant to sign up to a cease-fire,
16 once again on the grounds that the UN proposal was not linked to any
17 long-term political settlement. I told him that the people of Sarajevo
18 would at that moment certainly settle for something short of this, just
19 to be able to live in peace. He still would not agree. At this point, I
20 sprang a nasty surprise on him. I told him that the first UN examination
21 of the bomb crater in the Markale marketplace indicated the bomb had been
22 fired from the Bosnian side of the battle lines. The room went deadly
23 silent and Hajrulahovic looked anxious. He coldly asked me to explain.
24 I told him that the angle of the trajectory of the mortar bomb suggested
25 that it had been fired at extremely short range from their side of the
1 lines or perhaps detonated in-situ. It was difficult, I said, to be
2 precise when only one bomb had been fired and also because the Bosnian
3 Army had removed some of the important forensic evidence before the UN
5 A. And your question?
6 Q. [Interpretation] The question is this -- the first one is this:
7 After the incidents, did the Serbs mostly accept all Muslim proposals,
8 but they, on the other hand, still did not agree to sign up to a
9 cease-fire? That's what you write in this passage.
10 A. As you know, at the meeting at the airport the next day, an
11 agreement was reached between Ganic -- between Delic and Mladic that
12 there should be a cease-fire, leading to a withdrawal of heavy weapons
13 from around Sarajevo
14 Q. Well, I agree that you managed to mediate in that cease-fire, but
15 it says here that at first they didn't accept that.
16 My second question is this: Is it correct that they changed the
17 position where the bomb had been detonated and that they had presented a
18 certain forensic evidence in order to further aggravate the work of the
19 investigators who wanted to establish the responsibility for the
21 A. It's impossible to answer that question in -- without putting it
22 into context. What happened was the initial inspection was as described
23 in the paragraph you have read out, that a subsequent inspection changed
24 the view and made it more likely that the bomb had been fired from the
25 Serb side. So the initial, immediate inspection was as in the paragraph,
1 that it was likely to have been fired from the Bosnian side, which is why
2 I made the point to the Bosnian Government people, but the subsequent
3 examination showed another possibility, that it had come, i.e., from the
4 Bosnian Serb side. But, of course, as I explained previously, crater
5 analysis is a very inexact science.
6 Q. Very well. However, in your view, what was the best moment, or
7 in general terms, what is the best moment to investigate an incident and
8 provide an expert report? Would it be best to do it immediately after
9 the incident or some time later?
10 A. Well, assuming the technical advice was available immediately
11 after the incident, that, surely, would be the best time to conduct a
12 forensic examination.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 65 ter 06285 is the next document, and then page 116 [as
15 interpreted] in e-court. This is Lord Owen's book, "The Balkan Odyssey."
16 Page 160 is the page I would like to be brought up in e-court. That was
17 not properly recorded the first time 'round.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you agree that any intervention at the place of the incident
20 unables [as interpreted] or at least makes any forensic examination more
22 It seems I was wrong. The document in e-court is page 160.
23 That's the e-court page. And in the book, itself, the page number is
25 In other words, General, sir, is it allowed to change the place
1 of an incident and then undertake a new forensic examination?
2 A. Well, if evidence has been interfered with on the ground, then,
3 of course, the subsequent investigation may be less than perfect. But
4 I think you're referring to the removal of a tail-fin which identified
5 the type of mortar that had been fired, and, of course, the removal of
6 the tail-fin doesn't necessarily change the shape of the crater. And it
7 was crater analysis that was being examined as a part of the procedure,
8 not necessarily just identifying the form of weapon that had been used.
9 But there were two investigations, one an immediate one by French
10 engineers, and then subsequently by a technical team that came from
12 Q. And that team came from where? The second team, whose team was
14 A. It came from the UN.
15 Q. Very well. We'll see later -- or, rather, first we will see how
16 important it is where the tail was, and we'll see that the crater had
17 been changed.
18 May I draw your attention to this passage:
19 "On Tuesday, 8 February ..."
20 [In English] "... querying the UN objection to demilitarisation
21 and arguing for an exclusion zone smaller than the 30-kilometre radius
22 advocated by the French and accompanied by the confidence-building
23 measures. The Bosnian Government delegation which was due to negotiate
24 did not, however, turn up at the Sarajevo Airport
25 session that morning. General Rose was reportedly furious and went to
1 the Bosnian Presidency to persuade President Izetbegovic and his military
2 chief, General Delic, to attend."
3 [Interpretation] Is this true, what is written in here?
4 A. Well, I guess Lord Owen was using that paragraph in my book that
5 we've already referred to, and to that extent, yes, it was true.
6 Q. Thank you. And further on, it says:
7 [In English] "And now General Rose had never made a secret of the
8 fact that at that meeting he told the Bosnian Muslim leaders that he had
9 just received technical information which pointed to the mortar bomb
10 having come not from Serb-controlled areas but from a Muslim-controlled
11 area. If this information were made available, there would be a very
12 different outcome of the NATO meeting, and if Izetbegovic tried to stall
13 the UN negotiations ..."
14 [Interpretation] Can we have the following page:
15 [In English] "... in order to wait for the NATO meeting, he,
16 Rose, would feel obliged to release the preliminary evidence of the UN
18 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the Muslim side was afraid at
19 what you had found out?
20 A. As I say, the preliminary investigation was followed by a more
21 detailed subsequent investigation with a higher technical level of
22 competence, and the position of the United Nations changed from the
23 immediate thought that it could have come from the Bosnian Government
24 side to it having more likely come from the Bosnian Serb side. I also
25 said at the time, to the media, that given the four mortar bombs that had
1 been fired a day or two before at the UN aid queue in Dobrinja, which had
2 definitely come from the Serb side, then it was most likely that the
3 market-place bomb had also come from the Serb side, but people would have
4 to draw their own conclusions about that. I made that statement to the
5 press prior to the second UN investigation.
6 Q. Thank you. We will be dealing with another investigation, too,
7 but let us see what Lord Owen says:
8 [In English] "... would have been more circumspect about what
9 happened at this meeting, but I know that he had sent, on Tuesday, a
10 report that said the mortar shell might have been launched by the Bosnian
11 Army side and that they were continuing their investigation. In
12 addition, a senior ballistics expert in Zagreb had studied a map of
13 likely trajectory patterns produced by UN investigators in Sarajevo
14 believed the angle at which the mortar had hit the roof of the market
15 stall indicated that the firing point was more likely to be 1.100 to
16 2.000 metres from the impact than 2.000 to 3.000 metres, and that this
17 would tend to indicate that the mortar had been fired from a Bosnian Army
18 position. When this highly-charged information reached the UN in New
20 people who saw it so as to reduce the chance of a press leak."
21 [Interpretation] So, General, there were a great many of them who
22 were involved in this clamp-down on the possible leak regarding this
23 first on-site investigation just so that the Serbs would remain accused;
25 A. I wouldn't be able to -- I'm not in a position, Dr. Karadzic, to
1 say more than I've already said, and that is that Lord Owen referred, in
2 the paragraph you just read out, to the report I sent based on the
3 initial French engineers' report. What happened subsequently to that
4 report and other comments that may have been made, either in Zagreb
5 New York
6 he is now, if he attends this Court. I can't make any comment.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page. I mean,
8 it's the same page, but just the other half, as it were, of this page.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. General, the first findings had -- the first findings stated that
11 in all likelihood it was the Serb side that had fired. That would have
12 been made public straight away. Why was that not done in this case, when
13 the Muslim side was initially blamed?
14 A. Could you just repeat that question?
15 Q. Do you agree that invariably, in similar situations, when there
16 was even the slimmest of chances that the Serbs had done something, that
17 was made public immediately, whereas in this case the first investigation
18 had established that it was done by the Muslims? Why was that concealed
19 from the media?
20 A. I don't think any effort was made by the United Nations to
21 conceal any of the reports at my level. If attempts were made elsewhere,
22 I have no knowledge of that. Certainly, after every incident, an
23 examination was made, and press queries were answered to the best of our
24 ability. We were, after all, peacekeepers working with parties to try
25 and bring about a peace. We were not parties to that conflict,
1 ourselves, and had no secrets to hide, therefore.
2 Q. I'm afraid that from time to time, you were a warring party as
3 well, but we'll get to that.
4 But look at what Lord Owen says. He said in dramatic terms
5 everything was done in New York
6 persons know about this so it would not be leaked to the media. Lord
7 Owen should be trusted, and I fully trust him at this point in time;
8 namely, that everything possible was done in order to prevent this from
9 leaking out. How do you explain that, that it was not leaked out
10 immediately? Why did one have to dig in order to get that report?
11 JUDGE KWON: Questioned and answered. Move on to your next
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Q. Let's have a look at this on this page. Can you see on this page
15 that the Serbs were in favour of an investigation, and then Lord Owen
17 [In English] "If we knew that the Bosnian Serbs got a negative
18 response in establishing an inquiry, the Geneva talks would collapse.
19 Our dilemma was acute, for if the slightest hint that the Muslims were
20 thought to be responsible came out of the ICFY in Geneva, the Bosnian
21 Muslims would not attend. NATO, having just taken its decision, would
22 also be in disarray if the public perception of the Serbs being
23 responsible for the market-place bomb were suddenly shattered. What was
24 needed was a little news management of the sort that international
25 organisations are not very good at; above all, the United Nations in New
2 and I arranged quietly that this was done. I did not feel it was right
3 for me to do anything more than this. I was in receipt of privileged
4 information from the UN. I could not allow a cover-up, but equally it
5 was not for me to break the story."
6 [Interpretation] General, do you agree that ruses of war are a
7 customary thing, ascribing something to the enemy?
8 A. Dr. Karadzic, as I've said before, with regards to Lord Owen's
9 book, I can only comment on my personal dealings with him and the reports
10 that I may have made that he was in receipt of. I cannot comment on
11 anything else with any value.
12 Q. But my question was whether ruses of war are customary; namely,
13 that one side does something in order to blacken the other side, as it
14 were. Does something like that happen in war? All is fair in love and
15 war, isn't it?
16 A. Well, propaganda certainly is in war.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's time to have a break now.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one question.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Can that propaganda turn up before a court of law, General? Can
21 that kind of propaganda aspire to be the truth, and before the highest
22 international court of law, at that?
23 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, that's just a speculative
24 statement that the witness can't possibly answer.
25 JUDGE KWON: We'll break for 25 minutes and resume at 4.00.
1 General, I forgot to mention to you yesterday, but you must be
2 well aware of it, that during the break or the adjournment, you are not
3 supposed to discuss your evidence with anybody else.
4 THE WITNESS: Indeed, sir.
5 --- Recess taken at 3.38 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 4.04 p.m.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Now I would like to tender those pages from Lord Owen's book,
10 page 279 from the book, and 280 and 281, the ones that we quoted from
11 here. Could that be admitted?
12 JUDGE KWON: So you would like to tender only those three pages?
13 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
14 THE ACCUSED: It is already an exhibit, but --
15 JUDGE KWON: I think we admitted one or two pages so far. And
16 you are -- you went through a lot of pages, but you are tendering -- my
17 question is whether you are minded to tender only those three pages
18 referred to; i.e., page 279 to 281?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Lest I create any confusion, I'm
20 talking about Lord Owen's book, not Sir Michael's book.
21 JUDGE KWON: I was confused, yes. My apologies.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So it's from Lord Owen's book that
23 I'm tendering these three pages, 279, 280, and 281, along with --
24 JUDGE KWON: I note that the general couldn't confirm some parts
25 of it. But I'd like to ask Ms. Edgerton as to your position.
1 MS. EDGERTON: I only note that, as far as what I can see on the
2 screen and what I'm able to review on the transcript, we never saw
3 page 281 nor did we discuss page 281. It's --
4 JUDGE KWON: We read some part of 281.
5 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: The right bottom part.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, and my apologies.
8 THE ACCUSED: No objection?
9 MS. EDGERTON: No, no objection, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that part will be added to the exhibit which
11 was already admitted. Can I be reminded of the exhibit number?
12 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. That was Exhibit P799.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: Just to be easier to everyone.
15 [Interpretation] Lord Owen says what happened in New York
16 basis of General Rose's report, so, indeed, we should be happy that this
17 has been admitted.
18 Can we now have 65 ter 9630.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. General, the United Nations dealt with Markale far more in depth
21 than you had been aware of. We're now calling up that UN document. It's
22 the first page, actually.
23 Can we now have page 19 in e-court.
24 The entire document is actually an analysis by Captain Verdy and
25 other participants on behalf of the UN. It's an analysis of what had
1 happened at Markale.
2 MS. EDGERTON: It's actually P1441, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. It was noted in his list as well.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I now have page 19 in e-court.
5 Yes, that's the page.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Now, General, let us have a look at this. I would actually like
8 to recommend this paragraph A, "Estimate," to all. Let's look at the
9 next one, though:
10 "By the time ..."
11 [In English] "... the team conducted its analysis, six days had
12 elapsed since the explosion. It is reasonable to suspect that the crater
13 was totally excavated by the local authorities during that period.
14 Hence, the angles measured on 11th of February are not beyond suspicion."
15 [Interpretation] So they were rigging this, the crater. The
16 local authorities were rigging the crater in order to direct all
17 suspicions against the Serbs. These UN findings say that this subsequent
18 measuring is the one that's suspicious, not the first one. Is that what
19 it says here, General?
20 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer: Ms. Edgerton.
21 MS. EDGERTON: It was a request for a clarification that may
22 already be there in Dr. Karadzic's question, whether or not this page
23 that's currently displayed refers to the first analysis conducted or the
24 second analysis conducted and in what regard Captain Verdy was involved.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is clear here that the
1 investigator is referring to the investigation carried out on the 11th,
2 that is to say, five days after the explosion. In the meantime, it's not
3 only that the site -- the point of impact had deteriorated in its own
4 right, but it had been tampered with by the local authorities.
5 Now, this second analysis is the one that is being brought into
6 question by this UN investigator, not the first one.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Right, General?
9 A. As I say, no, I'm not in a position to make any comment on this
10 report. I'm not a technician, I was not involved in the writing of this
11 report; therefore, I can make no valuable comment on it.
12 Q. But, General, on the basis of what did you trust the second
13 findings? You stated your views on that here, not the first findings.
14 When your own services, those of the UN, state that it is the second
15 round of findings that is suspicious, don't you agree with that? It says
16 here that it had been tampered with, excavated; that is to say, that they
17 had been doing some digging there in the meantime, et cetera.
18 A. My comment is that the wording actually is:
19 "It is reasonable to suspect that the crater was thoroughly
20 excavated by the local authorities during that period."
21 I've got no means of knowing whether that suspicion is right or
23 Q. Then your own assertion does not stand, that the second
24 investigation was more thorough and that it concluded that it was the
25 Serbs that were the culprits; right?
1 A. The second investigation certainly replaced the first
2 investigation, in terms of its findings.
3 Q. However, the second investigation -- this is the second
4 investigation, and this is a Prosecution exhibit. And that second
5 exhibit asserted that the place had been tampered with and it is
6 reasonable to suspect the angle that would be determined on the basis of
7 the alterations that had been made to the crater.
8 A. All I can remember at the time is that I went along with the
9 second investigation, and it confirmed very much the public statement
10 that I already made, which compared the shelling of the UN aid queue in
11 Dobrinja with the shelling in the market-place. And I allowed people to
12 draw their own conclusions, but I said that my suspicion was it had been
13 done by the Serb side. The second investigation tended to confirm that
14 view. Now, whether you think the second investigation was flawed or not
15 is up to you. I made no assessment at the time of that nature. I
16 accepted the official version.
17 Q. Well, this is precisely what I meant to ask you. Why did you
18 correct your initial position, which was that that had been done by the
19 Muslims, and you communicated that to Muslim officers? Why did you say
20 not only that it was not certain who had done it, but also that it was
21 most probable that it had been done by the Serbs? What made you change
22 your opinion? Was it the second investigation?
23 A. I'd already made the assertion before the second investigation
24 that because the Serbs had undoubtedly done the shelling in the
25 market-place two days -- the shelling in the -- against the bread queue
1 two days before in Dobrinja, it was most likely that Serbs had done the
2 shelling in the market-place, since technical analysis was unable to say.
3 The second investigation confirmed that position that I had originally
5 Q. How far is Dobrinja from Markale, General?
6 A. You, sir, would know better than I, but I would think two miles.
7 Q. I would say 10 miles, or 15 kilometres, General. And if we used
8 the analogy and if we say that the Serbs had shot from there - and they
9 didn't, we'll establish that - how can we determine that one or two days
10 before, they fired one shot and managed to hit Markale? What was it that
11 made you change your opinion even before the second investigation?
12 A. This first investigation was indeterminate. The second one was
13 much clearer. As I said, because the first one was indeterminate, and it
14 was stated to me that it was indeterminate, I took the position that
15 because there had been a shelling of the bread queue, the UN aid queue in
16 Dobrinja, it was most likely the Serbs had done the second shelling in
17 Markale. This was confirmed, as I say, by the second report.
18 Q. We will see that that was not the case, General. It was just the
19 contrary. The first conclusion was that it was the Muslims who had
20 fired, and the second was indeterminate, that it could not be
21 established, and I'm holding the second conclusion right in front of me.
22 Can we now see page 36 in e-court.
23 According to our information, there are as many as eight
24 investigations. The first had established that it was the Muslims, and
25 that was sent to the United Nations. Lord Owen testified that there was
1 a great deal of concern about possible leaks to the media. And the
2 investigation that was undertaken on the 11th of February, that was
3 carried out by the United Nations team. A lot of people, experts,
4 concluded that it was inclusive. So the first one ascribed the event to
5 the Muslims, the second was inclusive. In any case, it was exculpatory
6 for the Serbs. However, you, as a pro-Serbian officer -- a pro-Serbian
7 officer, are unwilling to accept that. We see that it was quite
8 unjustified when you were accused of being pro-Serbian.
9 A. Well, as I've explained, I was part of the United Nations
10 Protection Force that was impartial in our dealings with the warring
11 parties, although, of course, we were not exactly neutral in terms of our
12 wish for a just and peaceful solution to the conflict. I can add no more
13 than I've said on the subject of the Markale bombing.
14 Q. Thank you. And we will show, General, that the Serbs considered
15 you quite anti-Serb and that your today's testimony confirms that. I
16 didn't want to say that, but many Serbs were of that opinion.
17 Can we now see page 17, and let's see the number of --
18 JUDGE KWON: Your question is just unhelpful at all. Whether
19 pro-Serb, anti-Serb, it's nothing to do with this case.
20 Ms. Edgerton.
21 MS. EDGERTON: I was rising with an objection with respect to
22 that comment, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE MORRISON: I think you were about to observe that it was a
24 comment and not a question, in any event, Ms. Edgerton.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Quite so, sir.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm going to put my question to the
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. If you had been either pro-Serb or anti-Serb, if you were either
5 anti-Serb or pro-Serb, would that have any impact on your testimony
6 today? Would you still be objective in providing your answers today?
7 A. I've already sworn to tell the truth and the whole truth, nothing
8 but the truth.
9 Q. Very well, Sir Michael. I know you have been knighted and you
10 are a decorated officer. Let's stick to that.
11 Let's now see page 17, and let's hope that your knight's honour
12 will compel you to tell the truth.
13 General, sir, here you have a list of all the investigations
14 which were carried out by a French team on the 5th February, then Captain
15 Verdy on the 5th of February, Major Russell on the 5th of February,
16 Major Khan on the 11th of February. Look at the list --
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Just to be fair to the witness and everyone, I'd
19 like to make it clear that this page represents one of the annexes to the
20 second investigation, or a page extracted from one of the annexes to the
21 second investigation.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. General, sir, do you see this list containing as many as 10
24 different investigations?
25 A. I see exactly what you see, Dr. Karadzic.
1 Q. Do you know that none of them established beyond a reasonable
2 doubt that the shell came from the Serbian side, that it was not
3 established even with a certain degree of reasonable doubt?
4 A. As I say, crater analysis is an inexact science, particularly
5 when it relates to only [Realtime transcript read in error "any"] one
6 crater. "To only one crater," that should read.
7 Q. What method could be used in order to establish who fired? Let's
8 not talk about any scientific methods. Just tell us: Which method could
9 be used in order to determine the culprit for the firing of that shell?
10 A. The only 100 per cent accurate way of identifying the firing
11 point of a single mortar bomb would be from mortar radar, which we didn't
12 have at the time.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can we look at page 41 in the same document. This is in e-court.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Can I draw your attention to bullet points 4 and 5. In bullet
17 point 4, it says:
18 [In English] "The Bosnian Serbs are close to the directional
19 bracket is controlled by Kosevo Brigade. FreBat 4 MIO confirms the
20 existence of a 120-millimetre mortar position at GR BP 922642, which is
21 outside the directional bracket. Colonel Cvjetkovic, BSA Artillery
22 Regiment commander, stated that Kosevo Brigade has mortar positions
23 (including 120-millimetre mortar) in the Mrkovici area. These positions
24 have not been visited by UN personnel in at least four months ..."
25 [Interpretation] And bullet 5 says:
1 [In English] "Shoot reps from the BSA Kosevo Brigade."
2 [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page.
3 There were no reports about the shooting from the Kosevo Brigade
4 of the Serb army. The Kosevo Brigade area --
5 [In English] "-- on 5th of February. The explosion in the market
6 was recorded as an incoming round from UNMOs on the BH side, but with no
7 indication of the origin of fire."
8 [Interpretation] In the conclusion, it says:
9 [In English] "... mortars easy to hide and equally easy to move.
10 From Appendix 1, it can be seen that the Serb position at Mrkovici is the
11 nearest known position to the directional bracket. However, there could
12 be any number of well-concealed 120-millimetre mortar positions which are
13 unknown to UNPROFOR personnel on either side of the confrontation line
14 within the estimated range bracket. It can only be concluded from this
15 assessment that, in theory, the fire could have originated from either
16 side of the confrontation line."
17 [Interpretation] The first investigation says it was the
18 Muslims, the second investigation says it could be both, and the
19 investigation that you are referring to, General, what is your comment?
20 A. What you've been reading is a series of technical assessments
21 from a technical document. I don't have any technical knowledge of the
22 subject. I can only say what I've already said and repeat myself: My
23 view at the time was that it was most likely fired from the Bosnian Serb
25 Q. And you're basing that on what? Give us some grounds. Here, we
1 can see the investigation that you're referring to, and the results are
2 different. The first investigation results that you communicated to the
3 Muslim officers that gave them a fright was that it was their fault. The
4 second investigation was inclusive. Now, what makes you say that it was
5 the Serbs? What do you base that on?
6 A. You're asking me to try and recall the various elements which led
7 to my statement to the press at the time. That was some 15 years ago. I
8 have no memory of what those elements were; partly made up from technical
9 reports, no doubt, partly my own observations of what had happened at
10 Dobrinja two days before. That was my position then, that is my position
11 now. It was most likely fired by the Serb side, with regards to the bomb
12 in the Markale market-place. I can add no more to the discussion than
14 JUDGE KWON: Before moving further, Ms. Edgerton, I note this is
15 a document of 64 pages, but do you agree that this part at page 42 in
16 e-court is the conclusionary part of the second investigation, so to
18 MS. EDGERTON: Not immediately, because I've seen another
19 paragraph titled the same way. If I could find that and have a look, I
20 could advise you.
21 JUDGE KWON: I saw the same formulation in page 60, yes.
22 Please move on, Mr. Karadzic.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. General, sir -- General, sir, please understand me. Not only was
25 a general convicted to a lifetime prison sentence for this, but also
1 there cannot be a reconciliation it was us who fired at Markale, and we
2 didn't. I say so.
3 Look at page 48. And while we're waiting for that page to be
4 produced, do you agree that apart from the technical means and radars,
5 there's no other means or ways to establish the origin of that shell? Am
6 I right?
7 A. The only way of establishing the location of a firing point
8 beyond all reasonable doubt is either from direct observation by the UN
9 Military Observers, which was not the case, or by mortar radar, which we
10 didn't have at the time, so the conclusions from crater analysis will
11 never be technically 100 per cent accurate.
12 Q. Thank you. And now let's see what the general conclusion says:
13 [In English] "It is to be noticed that during the whole meeting,
14 Bosnian declarations were aggressive at UNPROFOR general policy, blaming
15 for its incompetence and lack of abilities of its members and accusing at
16 several times that UN or UNPROFOR members often stated on Bosnian
17 responsibility in the market shelling."
18 [Interpretation] The general conclusion was that they were rather
19 nervous, and we can also see that on several occasions representatives of
20 UN and UNPROFOR stated Muslim Bosnian responsibility for the shelling of
21 their own people, and after that, everything was done -- all different
22 means were used in order to ascribe the incident to Serbs.
23 Were you familiar with this conclusion, General?
24 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, just before there's an answer on
25 that: With respect to your query to me, the general conclusions to this
1 report are found at e-court page 10, actually -- page 11, pardon me.
2 JUDGE KWON: General conclusion of ...?
3 MS. EDGERTON: This second technical analysis. That's what I
4 understood your question to be, Your Honour. And these documents we've
5 been going back to, I note, with the same questions over and over and
6 over again are derived from annexes to that report.
7 JUDGE KWON: You refer to this page, what we are seeing now?
8 MS. EDGERTON: Correct.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, let's look at page 11. Can
10 we please produce page 11 in e-court.
11 It's already there. Okay, very well. Let's look at the
13 [In English] "Time and location of the explosion. Based on
14 witness testimony, it can be concluded that the explosion occurred
15 between 1210 and 1215 hours on 5th of February, 1994 ..."
16 JUDGE KWON: We all can read the document.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What I'd like to point out is the
18 fact that the witness said that the empty market was overcrowded. We saw
19 in the clip that there were no guards, and there's no chance that there
20 were so many people there, but let's look at the bottom of the page,
21 where it says "Culpability."
22 [In English] "There is sufficient physical evidence to prove that
23 one party or the other fired the mortar bomb. The mortar bomb in
24 question could have been fired by either side."
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Move on to your next question.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Have we completed the subject of
2 Markale? If the Trial Chamber understands not only that it was
3 established beyond any reasonable doubt that it was not the Serbs but the
4 Muslims, it's very important and it's very important for the
5 reconciliation. If you want to look at the diametre of the crater, once
6 again, we have UN reports about the crater.
7 Maybe, before we move on, maybe we could look at page 26.
8 Page 26, please, and then 27. Page 26 in e-court, please.
9 This is an analysis, Jose Grande [phoen]:
10 [In English] "On 10th February 1994, I was instructed ..."
11 And so on and so forth.
12 [Interpretation] He analysed and he established that the weapon
13 was a 120-millimetre mortar:
14 [In English] "... gave bearing of the firing position, 420 mils
15 and possible range 800 to 5.000 metres."
16 [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page.
17 Let's look where it says "Possible Range," and let's look at the
18 second paragraph, where he says:
19 [In English] "... had been excavating and slightly enlarged that
20 have been inspected by the previous analysis team."
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. This means that after the second analysis, General, which pointed
23 to the Muslim origin of the fire, between the first and the second
24 analysis somebody had been excavating, digging, and enlarged the crater;
25 ever so slightly, however. Does this not point to the fact that the
1 first investigation and results were more accurate?
2 A. I've already given you my view of events, and I can add nothing
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, let's see what --
6 JUDGE KWON: I remember you were on page 48 before we moved on to
7 page 11.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Ms. Edgerton called up page 11, so
9 I wanted to help her with that. And now we will hopefully see 48. Oh,
10 we've already done 48. I don't have anything to show from this document.
11 I believe that the entire document has been admitted.
12 JUDGE KWON: You didn't ask a question about page 48 after
13 reading out some passage. What was your question? Then if you don't
14 need to ask a question, we can move on.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked the general whether he was
16 familiar with this conclusion. That's what I asked the general.
17 THE WITNESS: I remember the conclusion of the second report,
18 saying that it could have come from either side. But as I've said
19 already, come to the conclusion that it was most likely to have come from
20 the Serb side -- and I've already made a statement to the media to that
21 effect, and I've given you my reasons, as best I recall them, for having
22 made that statement to the press. I can add nothing further to the
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. So how did I conclude that it was from the Serbian side? It was
1 totally excluded from the first investigation, and in the second
2 investigation there was a reasonable -- there was reasonable doubt or,
3 rather, there was no conclusive conclusion, or maybe the interpretation
4 I'm receiving is wrong.
5 General, we have the analysis here. What is the grounds for you
6 persisting --
7 JUDGE KWON: That is asked and answered several times.
8 Ms. Edgerton.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, Your Honour. He's -- Dr. Karadzic is arguing
10 with General Rose.
11 JUDGE KWON: Quite true.
12 Move on to your next topic, Dr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 1D2448 is the next document I would like to call. 1D02448, yes,
15 that's the document. And can we look at page 4.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. General, do you agree that this was issued on the 7th of
18 February, 1994, and that this is a UN report; right?
19 I would like to draw your attention to the first lines of the
20 Monday chapter:
21 [In English] "The media reported General Rose's statement that it
22 was not known who fired, as the shell had first hit some stalls and
23 changed its trajectory."
24 [Interpretation] So you knew more then than you do now; right?
25 A. I'm not sure which this newspaper report is referring to, in
1 terms of statements I made. If it's my major statement to the press
2 about the market-place bombing, then it is an incomplete report of my
3 statement, because I went on to say that it was not possible to say,
4 particularly, specifically who had fired the bomb, but in my opinion it
5 was most likely to have been fired by the Serbs because of the events two
6 days before at the Dobrinja bread queue and UN aid queue.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a UN report dated 7
8 February. This report conveys the way you were quoted by the media. I
9 can't be more precise than that.
10 Could this document be admitted, please?
11 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll admit this.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D682, Your Honours.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D02446, please, could I have that
14 now. We don't have a translation here, regrettably. This is a
15 transcript of the MUP. It was the Muslim police that recorded
16 General Ramsey's conversation with General Milovanovic.
17 Yes, that's it, that's it. May I read a portion of it. It says:
18 "The MUP of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the State
19 Security Service," and so on and so forth, "on the 5th of February,
21 So that is that very day. It's around 1500 hours.
22 General Ramsey called General Milovanovic because he had been
23 told that Milovanovic had wanted to speak to him. Milovanovic wanted to
24 talk to General Rose, but Ramsey responded that Rose is in Mostar, and he
25 offered to speak to him, himself.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Were you in Mostar on that day, General?
3 A. I was in Mostar on the day of the bombing of the market-place.
4 Q. Thank you. Milovanovic then conveyed a message for General Rose
5 orally, and it says here:
6 "On the basis of an awareness that the Muslim side had accused
7 the Army of Republika Srpska for activities within the inner part of
8 Sarajevo," that is to say, the city, itself, "today, at around 1220
9 hours, an incident occurred that resulted in a large number of
11 And then it says further on:
12 "With the intention of establishing all the relevant facts and
13 establishing the truth, this is what I request: that a mixed military
14 commission be established consisting of representatives of UNPROFOR,
15 representatives of the VRS, and the so-called ARBiH, that would prepare a
16 report by tomorrow morning at 8.00, at the latest, and which would
17 investigate all the circumstances that led to this unfortunate incident.
18 That means that this investigation would be completed by tomorrow morning
19 at 8.00 a.m.
20 which includes recording, using cameras, TV cameras, and the like."
21 Tell us, General, was this conveyed to you, this request of
22 General Milovanovic's, to establish a mixed military commission for this
24 A. I cannot recall, but it may have been, should have been. And I
25 would have certainly forwarded it, in that case, to Mr. Akashi in Zagreb,
1 who I know had already started to assemble an investigation.
2 Q. Do you remember why Serb participation was not accepted, or,
3 rather, this joint commission?
4 A. No, I don't --
5 Q. Thank you. Number 3 says:
6 "Once the professional mixed military team completes its task,
7 the international public should be made aware of the result, regardless
8 of whose fault the incident is."
9 That is paragraph 3 of General Milovanovic's request.
10 Can we now have the next page, please.
11 See this here? General Ramsey says:
12 "All right. That case is going to be investigated in detail. As
13 always, it will be done by UNPROFOR."
14 And then Milovanovic, M, says:
15 "But not in the way in which the Dobrinja case was investigated.
16 I do not acknowledge or accept the investigation that was carried out in
17 that way. Why is Mr. Ramsey avoiding the establishment of a joint
19 He's saying this in the third person because they're speaking
20 through an interpreter. And General Ramsey says:
21 "Because I cannot guarantee security in the case of such an
23 Do you know that the Serb side challenged the findings in
24 Dobrinja? That is what Milovanovic is saying to Ramsey.
25 A. I may have known at the time -- I may have known at the time, but
1 I certainly can't recall it now.
2 Q. Thank you. Let us go on. Milovanovic says:
3 "The only thing that I'm asking you to do is to establish a mixed
4 commission consisting of representatives of the warring parties under
5 UNPROFOR protection."
6 And Ramsey says:
7 "General, I suggest that you be a member of that commission."
8 Milovanovic says:
9 "Yes, if General Ramsey is a member of the commission, himself."
10 And so on and so forth.
11 So, General, from the first moment onwards, the Serb side is
12 clearly stating that they request an investigation. They want proper
13 insight and they want to participate in the investigation. Was the Serb
14 side allowed to do that?
15 A. Well, certainly the team that was formed did not include the Serb
16 side, and I have no memory or recall as to why that was the case. The
17 team was put together - second team, I'm talking about - in Zagreb
18 Mr. Akashi. Why it was decided there should not be a representative from
19 the Bosnian Serb side, I have no idea.
20 Q. Thank you. You know that the local police did something or the
21 other over there as well, so one warring party was enabled to do this and
22 the other one was not; right?
23 A. The Bosnian Government forces, of course, were on site at the
24 time, and they were able, I think, to carry out an investigation of their
25 own, as the French investigation team derived. They were second on the
1 scene. So the first people on the scene were the Bosnian state
2 authorities, the second on the scene were the French UN team.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect, the Bosnian
4 authorities had already been there. The explosives experts had already
5 been there, and we have that on film.
6 Can this be admitted; marked for identification, that is?
7 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any observation in marking this for
8 identification, Ms. Edgerton?
9 MS. EDGERTON: I take it Dr. Karadzic is asserting that this
10 intercept, prepared by the Bosnian authorities, is authentic.
11 JUDGE KWON: I take it he is.
12 MS. EDGERTON: On that basis, I'd simply request it be
14 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification, pending
16 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Just for the sake of clarification, we are challenging the
19 legality and legitimacy of peace time intercepts, when our partners in
20 government had no right to wire-tap our communications, whereas this is
21 an intercept of two different parties.
22 Could we now have 65 ter --
23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note it was too fast.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In addition to that, the intercept,
25 itself, has been corroborated by all the other documents.
1 The 65 ter number is 19612.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. General, do you remember that the chief of staff - in the
4 translation, there is no name, but it's probably a brigadier
5 general - that he sent you a letter on the 5th of February, 1994, and it
6 was addressed to you personally? It was sent to Kiseljak.
7 19612 is the 65 ter number, or actually it's 686, perhaps.
8 JUDGE KWON: 6846.
9 THE REGISTRAR: This is in evidence as Exhibit P1652, Your
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this technical time not be
13 taken away from my very own time?
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Do you remember this letter that General Milovanovic sent to you?
16 In the Serbian version, it is one page, and in English it is two pages.
17 On the same day, Milovanovic asks, in writing, the same thing that he
18 asked General Rasek [phoen] to do, or, rather, Ramsey over the telephone.
19 Please cast a glance at this letter and tell us whether it was
20 delivered to you. It says up here that it was received.
21 A. I certainly don't remember the letter, receiving it, but it looks
22 entirely possible that I should have or would have done. Can we see the
23 second page of it, please, on the English version?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the second page in
25 English, please.
1 THE WITNESS: All right.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So it's General Milovanovic
3 asking, in five paragraphs, for the same thing that we had already heard
4 him asking from General Ramsey over the telephone.
5 Can this document be admitted? Thank you, it has been admitted
7 Is this the time for the break or should I go on? Should I move
8 on to a new topic?
9 JUDGE KWON: We have about 20 minutes more before the second
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. General, we both remember the Gorazde crisis full well, don't we?
13 A. We do.
14 Q. I have to say, for the record, that the learned Ms. Edgerton, as
15 she explained why this material of yours should be kept, she said that I
16 mentioned the third strategic objective, that the Drina should not be a
17 border between Serbs. I have to repeat all the time that Drina
18 not be a border between two worlds, the East and the West, and that is
19 exactly what the record of the Assembly says. And I don't admit to
20 anything else.
21 Now we are opening the subject of Gorazde. General, do you
22 remember that you were exerting considerable pressure at me to allow
23 eight of your observers to enter Gorazde?
24 A. I do.
25 Q. Do you recall that I relented and that they, indeed, came to
2 A. They did.
3 Q. Did I make a mistake, General?
4 A. That would be for -- up to you to decide, but I think visibility
5 was no bad thing from both points of view, as to what was happening on
6 the ground.
7 Q. Thank you. Now you're going to see that I did, indeed, make a
9 1D -- actually, 1D -- oh, it's already been admitted. D137,
10 that's it.
11 We shouldn't be confused by the date. This is a retrospective
12 analysis of Joint Operations Centre of Land Operations in Zagreb. We
13 just have it in the English. That's the document, yes. So although the
14 date is 1995, this is a retrospective analysis.
15 Can we have page 6 of this document, please.
16 At the time, General Janvier was the commander; right?
17 A. I have no idea. I was out of the country by then. I had not
18 been in the country for six months, and I don't know when he handed
19 over -- when General De Lapresle, who was my military boss in Zagreb
20 handed over to General Janvier.
21 Q. Thank you. May I draw your attention to this paragraph:
22 "The B and H will continue ..."
23 [In English] " ... to try to block DutchBat in their OPs or in
24 positions in front of the B and H. This will involve the use of force.
25 They can co-locate within UN positions to use them as human shields.
1 This might provoke a reaction from the Bosnian Serb Army, with a risk for
2 UN personnel to get caught in cross-fire between both factions. The BH
3 is likely to attempt to capture weapons and vehicles from DutchBat to
4 compensate for their lack of armament."
5 [Interpretation] Do you remember that the Muslim side actually
6 drew your observers in near Gorazde, and that is where they were caught
7 in this cross-fire?
8 A. I don't see the connection between a document written a year and
9 a half later -- or a year and a quarter later, to what we're discussing
10 at Gorazde.
11 Q. General, this is what the link is: It's the pattern. First of
12 all, the Muslim side counted on arms smuggling, but it also counted on
13 seizing weapons from the UN forces. That can be seen from this official
14 paragraph of the UN analysis. Don't you see why the Serb side said that
15 you should not bring weapons into the enclaves, weapons that you did not
16 need? First of all, do you see that quite evidently from this portion?
17 A. I cannot comment on anything that happened outside my tour of
18 duty in Bosnia
19 weapons from the UN, to the best of my knowledge, were the Serbs. The
20 Bosnian state forces did not take weapons from the UN forces during my
21 time, as far as I can remember.
22 Q. You will see that that was the case. But I'm going to ask you,
23 here and now, about getting the UN in as a human shield and getting them
24 caught up in cross-fire. That is one thing. And the other thing was the
25 danger that the UN was aware of; namely, that the Muslim side could seize
1 weapons from them.
2 Let us skip one paragraph and move on to the next one:
3 [In English] "Similar to what happened in Gorazde spring 1994,
4 the BiH can attempt to draw UNPROFOR, including the rapid reaction forces
5 or NATO, into the conflict on BH side. Sudden abandoning of positions
6 along the confrontation line, the simulation of a collapse of the enclave
7 or alarming reports from Bosnian side on the situation in the enclaves
8 will be indicators for this. A stronger involvement of the international
9 community could be interpreted by the BSA as an incentive to step up
10 operations and try to eliminate the enclave, as well as retaliate against
11 UN forces."
12 [Interpretation] This is a UN document, General, and you were a
13 UN commander. The reference here is to the situation in Gorazde while
14 you were commander. We're trying to establish a pattern here, the
15 pattern of behaviour of the Muslim side. And the UN was aware of that
17 A. We certainly formed a view, in 1994, during the events in
18 Gorazde, that the forces there tried to draw NATO in further to the
19 conflict by withdrawing their forces from their defensive positions in
20 order to require greater assistance from NATO air support. And on one
21 occasion, certainly, we saw them move back, which left our observers
22 exposed, and it was during that period that we had one observer killed
23 and one injured. It's an event which we discussed yesterday. Now,
24 whether that was a result of deliberate policy or whether that was a
25 result of a military decision brought about by the pressure your forces
1 were bringing to bear on the Muslims, it is difficult to say, but we
2 certainly formed the impression that they were trying to involve NATO in
3 their war.
4 Q. Thank you. This has already been admitted, this document, I
5 mean, and it shows that your highest ranking command in Yugoslavia
6 believes that this is a pattern of behaviour of the Muslim side.
7 1D2509, could we have that document now, please.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, refrain from making comments, which is
9 not helpful at all.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just agreed with the general.
11 Can we have 1D2509.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. General, you also do remember - you were a participant and a
14 witness - that the games around Gorazde were massive and aimed at
15 accusing the Serbs. Do you recall that in addition to this abrupt
16 withdrawal, leaving your people at these forward positions, there was
17 also propaganda involved with regard to the level of destruction, the
18 number of fatalities, and so on?
19 A. That is true.
20 Q. Thank you. This is an analysis of a team on terrorism and
21 unconventional warfare. It's from the US Congress, and it's in the club
22 of Republican representatives in the US Congress.
23 Can we scroll down so that we can see all of this paragraph that
24 starts with: "The roots ...," et cetera.
25 It's May 1994, so it's right after the crisis in Gorazde; right?
1 A. Right.
2 Q. Thank you. Now, this commission says:
3 [In English] "The roots of this situation derived from the events
4 of the fall of 1992, at a relatively early stage of the war in
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. At that time, the Gorazde area was one of the first
6 places where Islamist guerrillas - a combined force of Afghan volunteers
7 (mainly Arab Afghans) and Bosnian Islamists - had embarked on a
8 systematic campaign against the local Christian population in order to
9 secure a predominant military position."
10 [Interpretation] You were aware of the fact that the Muslim Army
11 had expelled Serbs, and killed quite a few, at that, and they burned
12 their houses in and around Gorazde. You saw the houses, didn't you?
13 A. I did.
14 Q. Thank you. I'm not going to read all of it:
15 [In English] "The growing frequency of these ambushes, many
16 committed against Serb civilians, made them a dominant feature of the
17 civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina."
18 [Interpretation] So it's not that these Serbs in the surrounding
19 villages were victims before, but they continued to be victims. Do you
20 know that very often the Muslims left town and went on a rampage around
21 these villages?
22 A. As you know, we had very limited observation in Gorazde prior to
23 the deployment of the JCOs, to which we've already referred, and,
24 therefore, we did not receive reports. And before the attack on Gorazde,
25 there had been a repetition of what had happened in 1992 and 1993.
1 Q. You're referring to Muslim attacks against Serbs; right?
2 A. Sorry, one point: It would be helpful to know the origin of the
3 document that is on the screen, to which my attention has been drawn.
4 I can see a letterhead at the top, but not much more than that.
5 JUDGE KWON: Can you see the bottom of the page?
6 THE WITNESS: I can see the bottom, and now I can see the top as
7 well, sir. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. This is the US Congress, House Republican Research Committee in
11 the Congress of the United States. That is to say, it's the Republican
12 Party. It is their research committee. And we see here who the heads of
13 that committee are. Does that satisfy your curiosity?
14 A. Thank you for that.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page:
16 [In English] "It was at this point in early 1993 that the Bosnian
17 Muslims began rebuilding Gorazde as a military centre."
18 [Interpretation] Let me not read the entire passage. I'm kindly
19 asking the participants to read it for themselves, and that includes you,
20 General, sir. You will see how things transpired immediately before your
21 arrival in Bosnia
22 invite your comments.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you see the sentence in which it says that that was possible:
25 [In English] "This was possible because UNHCR demanded that the
1 Bosnian Serb forces withdraw from the immediate road between Sarajevo
2 Gorazde in order to assure that there would be no interference with its
3 humanitarian work. Consequently, the flow of Bosnian Muslim military
4 supplies increased to the point that, by the end of April 1993, the
5 Muslim forces had effectively relieved the siege of Gorazde."
6 [Interpretation] Do you see that this commission found that the
7 removal of the siege of Gorazde did not improve the humanitarian
8 situation, but, rather, to the increase of the military power of the
9 military force in Gorazde; am I right?
10 A. Well, I really can't comment on anything that happened prior to
11 my period of command. This is referring to something that happened --
12 events that may or may not have happened in 1993.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we then go to the next page.
14 And that was already at the time when you were there. The following page
15 in the same document, please.
16 It says:
17 [In English] "Also on 6th of April, the double character of
19 it was presenting an impression to the Western media that a near
20 defenceless Gorazde, full of civilians and innocents, was on the brink of
21 collapse. On the other hand, the government propaganda depicted for
22 domestic consumption a case of heroic and successful combat by the Muslim
23 troops defending Gorazde against a Serb offensive."
24 [Interpretation] And then somewhat lower:
25 [In English] "... meeting the collapse of certain defence lines,
2 inflicting heavy losses on the Serbs."
3 [Interpretation] And then further on it says that the propaganda
4 in Sarajevo
5 the United States of America
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Do you agree with all that?
8 A. It's very much in line with the position I've already taken. And
9 what I read here reflects very much my memory of the time.
10 Q. Now you will see how wrong I was to accept your pressures and
11 allow the eight observers to enter. It says here:
12 [In English] "... intervention because it already knew that the
13 US, UNPROFOR, and NATO had decided to create in Gorazde circumstances
14 admitting NATO air-strikes within a confine of the existing UN resolution
15 and guide-lines. Thus, on April 7 the UN deployed eight soldiers to
16 Gorazde in order to give itself a legal pretext for its planned
18 [Interpretation] Further on, it says -- or, rather, quotes the
20 [In English] "... the UN belonged to the British elite SAS who
21 were qualified and specially equipped to call in and direct air-strikes.
22 In other words, UNPROFOR deployed at one stroke both the excuse and the
23 means to deliver air-strikes against Bosnian Serbs."
24 A. I would absolutely deny that there was any predetermination or
25 intention UNPROFOR or any member of the United Nations to create in
1 Gorazde circumstances permitting NATO air-strikes. That is just not the
2 case. The fact that the JCOs were sent there was a result not of a wish
3 to call air-strikes, but to get greater visibility on the ground as to
4 what was happening, the resident UNMO proving not to be as reliable as we
5 had hoped in his reporting. There was no intention to create a situation
6 there, from the UN perspective, where it would be inevitable that
7 air-strikes would happen. That was the decision of last resort, as far
8 as we were concerned, if we decided that the enclave was under
9 sufficiently heavy attack from the Bosnian Serbs. It was not a
10 predetermination to do that, come what may, and as a result of the
11 pressure that the Bosnian Serbs began to bring to bear on the civilian
12 community in Gorazde.
13 Now, what -- whether the US
14 you would have to ask them.
15 Q. Is it, therefore, possible that behind your back NATO had planned
16 and misused you, who talked me into allowing the JCOs to enter to help
17 the SAS? It was not the UN, but it may have been NATO?
18 A. Not possible.
19 Q. So you're sure that NATO did not plan it either, or you don't
20 know what they planned. You said a while ago that you don't know what
21 the United States and NATO had in plan, what did they preconceive.
22 A. That is correct, but I do know the decision to deploy the JCOs
23 was entirely my decision and my decision only. I was under no pressure
24 from anyone. In fact, I doubt if the US or NATO even knew that we had
25 decided to deploy JCOs to Gorazde. It was a UN matter, nothing to do
1 with NATO or the United States. [Overlapping speakers].
2 The fact that we had to call air-strikes, I'm afraid, was a
3 consequence of your actions, not of NATO's.
4 Q. We will see that in the course of your cross-examination.
5 However, do you agree with me -- are we coming to the next break,
6 Your Honours?
7 JUDGE KWON: This is the time. If it is convenient, we will have
8 a break for 25 minutes, resuming at quarter to 6.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 5.23 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 5.49 p.m.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Q. We left it off with JCOs. Allow me to say that I am not saying
14 that you were aware about those back-hand games by NATO and others. When
15 it comes to the eight soldiers that I allowed to enter Gorazde, were they
16 all forward air controllers?
17 A. The soldiers that were deployed to Gorazde were military
18 observers. They had the ability to call in air-strikes if the need
19 arose. They were certainly not all forward air controllers.
20 Q. Did they report correctly about what they had observed and what
21 they attended?
22 A. They did.
23 Q. On the other hand, in your statement dated 13 January 2009, when
24 you spoke about UNMOs that you were not responsible for, right, you state
1 [In English] "... inaccurate reporting from Gorazde. I told him
2 that misleading reports had done great damage to the credibility of the
3 United Nations mission."
4 [Interpretation] Is that so?
5 JUDGE KWON: Can you identify the para number, Mr. Karadzic?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Paragraph 103, the statement dated
7 13 January 2009
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. UNMOs, the ones in question, were not the ones who you introduced
10 to Gorazde, the eight men that were deployed in Gorazde; right?
11 A. Right. The UNMOs referred to here were the resident UNMOs who
12 were, as I suggested in this statement, misreporting, gave a false
13 impression as to the realities on the ground, and that did not help the
14 UN position.
15 Q. Can we agree that all those reports that they sent were damaging
16 to the Serbs?
17 A. I certainly didn't read all their reports verbatim, but the ones
18 I did read exaggerated the damage that was being done by the Serb side
19 with regards to the buildings in Gorazde.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we see the
21 following page of the same document that is now in e-court.
22 I would like to draw everybody's attention to the paragraph which
23 starts with the words:
24 [In English] "The Bosnian Serb forces advancing from the east
25 were finally able to reach and seize a strategic plateau overlooking
1 Gorazde called Mount Gradina
2 from there into Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs did not show any inclination
3 to continue into the city itself."
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. That was your assessment also. You believed that the Serbs had
6 no intention to take Gorazde itself; right?
7 A. At the time, that was, indeed, my conclusion.
8 Q. Thank you. Obviously, this text also says -- later on you
9 continued to believe the same. We have a document that we are going to
10 show, but let's take another look at the page to see --
11 [In English] " ... Bosnian Serb positions, instigating a Bosnian
12 Serb shelling. This incident was depicted by the Western media in
14 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please indicate the portion
15 he's reading.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters couldn't follow you.
17 Could you indicate what part you are reading from?
18 THE ACCUSED: This is the part that starts: "On 9th of
19 April ...," and in the middle of this: "This was depicted --" I think
20 cursor is showing:
21 "Indeed, special attention was paid to the frequent fire aimed at
22 the hospital - which was also the main Muslim observation and battle
23 management post - to drum up support for Western actions against the
24 Serbs. Subsequently, the UN and NATO were asked to launch air-strikes in
25 order to protect the UN troops that had been inserted into Gorazde."
1 [Interpretation] And then the following paragraph says that on
2 the 10th of April, the Bosnian Serb forces continued to advance slowly.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you agree, General, that this report suggests that NATO was
5 invited as close-air support to save the United Nations and not to attack
6 the Serbs because they had attacked Gorazde? Close-air support is a
7 legitimate thing, something that we accepted; right?
8 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
10 MS. EDGERTON: I don't see how General Rose can be asked to
11 comment on a document that is as thick as this one, that he has only --
12 he's not had an opportunity to see in full, and he's only been asked
13 questions about specific passages. In fact, General Rose has been at
14 pains, at one point in time, to refute passages of this document.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't agree that --
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Karadzic. What was your last
17 question, whether the general would agree that this report suggested NATO
18 is invited as close-air support to save the United Nations? Can you
19 answer the question?
20 THE WITNESS: I can, sir.
21 Whatever the report may or may not allege, the grounds for
22 calling in close-air support was not to protect the UN personnel there;
23 it was to deter further attacks against the civilian population of
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 The general fully understands what I'm on about because we were
2 there at the same place, both of us, and Ms. Edgerton obviously does not
3 share that knowledge.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. "Close-air support" means support for UN troops which are in
6 danger; right?
7 A. "Close-air support" is a technical term for the capability of the
8 aircraft of a specific sort. It is not air defence. Close-air support
9 is support given by specially-equipped aircraft to troops on the ground
10 or, in this case, to support the UN mission in its efforts to deter
11 further attacks against the civilian population. Close-air support is
12 designed to attack tanks, artillery, and other military installations on
13 the ground. It is a technical expression, without any political
14 connotation at all.
15 Q. But, General, sir, there is a difference between two aspects of
16 air support. One is close-air support to help UN troops under attack,
17 and the second is involvement in war developments, with a view to
18 changing the situation in the theatre of war. In other words, that
19 attack in Gorazde was not to assist UN troops but, rather, to alter the
20 situation on the ground and to influence the developments on the ground;
22 A. I think you have to differentiate between a technical capability
23 and the purpose for which it is used. Certainly, the United Nations
24 limited the use of close-air support on this occasion to deterring
25 attacks against the civilian population of Gorazde. There may or may not
1 have been elsewhere a desire to raise that level of attack and go for
2 more strategic or operational-level targets for political reasons, but
3 that was something which I have no knowledge of and which we would not
4 have accepted, had that been suggested to us, that we go to another level
5 of attack.
6 Q. Is it correct that you, Mr. Akashi, and other officers literally
7 begged them not to try and involve you into that war on the side of any
8 of the warring parties, right, and that you claimed that any operative or
9 strategic involvement or air-strikes would make you -- or, rather, turn
10 you into one of the warring parties? We could read that in your
11 statements, in your telegrams, in your letters; right?
12 A. There was certainly a debate at a higher level between NATO and
13 the United Nations as to whether NATO support should be widened to bring
14 political pressure on the Bosnian Serb side. It was something the United
15 Nations rejected as a possible way ahead.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Can we now look at this same page, which needs to be scrolled
19 [In English] "It was at this point that UNPROFOR arranged for
20 another cease-fire on April 11th. At first, the Bosnian Serb artillery
21 honoured the cease-fire, and UNPROFOR acknowledged that the Bosnian Serbs
22 were holding their fire. However, soon afterwards ..."
23 [Interpretation] Scroll down a little, please, for the benefit of
24 the interpreters. Oh, well, we have to go to the next page. The next
25 page, please. It has to be the next page. The next page in English,
1 yes. We see: "On the 11th of April ...," where the cursor is at the
3 [In English] "However, soon afterwards several Muslim raids were
4 finally answered by the Bosnian Serbs. A clash ensued and quickly
5 escalated into a fire-fight that included the use of artillery and
6 mortars on both sides."
7 [Interpretation] Then a further bit down, it says:
8 [In English] "... mortar fire from inside Gorazde."
9 [Interpretation] And now at the very bottom of the page:
10 [In English] "The UN ground commander asked the Muslims 'to stop
11 their provocations in Gorazde.'"
12 Q. [Interpretation] Do you agree with this, and do you remember that
13 you stated this?
14 A. No, I don't remember making that request.
15 Q. It says here:
16 [In English] "Indeed, in an interview with French TV TF1, on
17 April 12th General Rose acknowledged ..."
18 Next page in English, please.
19 "... that the Muslims 'shoot on the Serbs to step up the pressure
20 and obtain a fresh intervention from NATO.'"
21 [Interpretation] Did you state that for the French television?
22 A. I can't remember whether I stated that or not to the French
23 television, but we've already agreed that it was a general policy of the
24 Bosnian Government to try and draw NATO forces in to help them in their
25 war against the Bosnian Serbs.
1 Q. May I draw attention to the middle of the following paragraph.
2 Let me invite everybody to read this. And it says that they concentrated
3 their weapons around the Red Cross building, which was marked. And from
4 there, they opened fire against the Bosnian Serbs, and the Bosnian Serb
5 forces were advancing towards the banks of the Drina River
6 fighting --
7 [In English] "-- and clashes soon expanded along the entire
8 front-line east of Gorazde. Needless to say, it did not take long for
9 the Bosnian Serbs to react to this action."
10 [Interpretation] Do you remember that the Muslims employed that
11 tactic, that they deployed their weapons around the hospital and the
12 Red Cross facility, and from there they opened fire on the Serbs? Do you
13 remember that?
14 A. I don't remember that at all. I wasn't there. You say you were
15 there. I was where I should have been, which was in my headquarters in
17 level forward. We only had, as I pointed out, some observers there, be
18 it from the JCO and from the United Nations Military Observer unit.
19 If it's any reassurance to you, I visited shortly afterwards and
20 found that the hospital, if that's the building you're referring to, had
21 only been hit by one shell which had hit right up on the top and,
22 according to the doctor at the time, hadn't caused any casualties. Of
23 course, if you had been aiming at it continuously, then there may be some
24 lack of reassurance to you in terms of the accuracy of your own
1 Q. Thank you. Or perhaps we didn't want to target the hospital.
2 Would that be a possible explanation, General?
3 A. That would have been an explanation.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can I draw everybody's
5 attention to this: We can see that this is Muslim propaganda in action
6 at the end of the paragraph, "Before the 15th of April ..." that's one
7 part of the tactic.
8 And can we now go to the following page.
9 It says here: "In mid-April ..."
10 [In English] "In mid-April, with Gorazde seemingly on the verge
11 of collapsing, NATO air operations and related military activities
12 intensified. The British SAS team significantly expanded the zone of the
13 infiltration activities in order to identify, locate, and mark Bosnian
14 Serb targets for subsequent air attack."
15 [Interpretation] And it says that one of the SAS troops was
16 killed and another wounded in the ensuing fire-fight. And at the end of
17 the paragraph, you can read:
18 [In English] "Meanwhile, UN observers were randomly deployed in
19 forward Bosnian Muslim positions, at times only 500 metres from the
20 front-line, without any advance warning to the Bosnian Serb side.
21 Consequently, UNPROFOR personnel would suddenly appear in the Bosnian
22 Muslim position in the middle of the fire-fight, demanding that Bosnian
23 Serbs hold their fire or else risk NATO air-strikes."
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. And then they withdrew suddenly and left you people out in the
1 cold; right?
2 A. As I've already said, the JCO observers were positioning
3 themselves to get best visibility of what was happening on the ground,
4 and at one point they got caught, after the Bosnian Government forces
5 withdrew, in a cross-fire between the Bosnian Government forces and the
6 Bosnian Serb forces, and, tragically, one of them was killed and another
7 injured. I've already explained that.
8 Q. Thank you. Can we go to the next page, please, where it says:
9 "The 17th of April ..." We can see that the Bosnian Serbs withdrew their
10 main tanks and guns to a distance of three kilometres on the 17th of
11 April, and the Bosnian Muslim forces exploited the absence of the heavy
12 guns and opened fire on the Bosnian Serb positions."
13 And further on it says:
14 [In English] "With the Bosnian Muslims complaining on the
15 ammunition shortage, the Bosnian Serbs insisted on thorough inspection of
16 all the humanitarian convoys because they were allowed to go to Gorazde
17 through Bosnian Serb lines. Considering that the UN had been
18 instrumental in building the Bosnian Muslim forces in Gorazde, it was not
19 an illogical demand."
20 [Interpretation] And further on it says:
21 "On the 18th of April ..."
22 [In English] "... Karadzic promised to implement yet another
23 unilateral cease-fire and withdrew some of his heavy weapons three
24 kilometres away from the outskirts of Gorazde as the first phase of a
25 regional cease-fire. Once again, soon after the Bosnian Serbs withdrawal
1 began, the Bosnian Muslims forces opened fire on the Bosnian Serb
2 positions, and again the Bosnian Serbs turned around and resumed their
3 shelling. On the 18th of April, the Bosnian Muslims established a new
4 long-range fire position ..."
5 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. And:
6 [In English] "Indeed, the UN was still using the fifth floor
7 facility while the Bosnian Muslims fortified the third and fourth floor."
8 [Interpretation] So they are nicely leading us to NATO aircraft,
9 and we have no way of avoiding that. As soon as we turn our backs, they
10 start firing at us.
11 General, did you ever see anyone wage warfare under such
12 difficult conditions like the Serbs? The entire world is against us, and
13 also there are cheap tricks being played by the Muslims, and NATO accepts
14 that and firmly stands on their side.
15 A. I make no comment on that.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Could we have the next
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Then came the bombing; right, General? The bombing started on
20 the 10th, and you very chivalrously accepted that you had called those
21 aircraft in and that they bombed the Serbs; right?
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. Let us see what your men were doing.
24 Let us look at page 114 of the book.
25 I beg your pardon. Yes, yes, you're right, it's 1D1 -- 1D10137
1 [as interpreted]. For the moment, we have to get rid of this document,
2 and then we'll have it called back after a while, but now let's look at
3 General Rose's book. It is page 114 in the book, itself.
4 JUDGE KWON: 1D1037, the general's book, yes.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. I would like to draw your attention to your own words:
7 [In English] "On the fourth pass over Gorazde, the lone Sea
8 Harrier was shut down. The incident happened within sight of a forward
9 air controller who was at the time talking to the headquarter in
11 tank along the road. We now have communications with the aircraft, and
12 we are directing it on the tank. The aircraft now can see the tank. He
13 got -- he's got it visual. The aircraft has been hit and is on fire.
14 It's going down. I think the pilot has ejected. I can see a
16 [Interpretation] Could you please explain to the Trial Chamber
17 what a forward air controller is.
18 A. A forward air controller is somebody who is trained to call in
20 Q. Does he target?
21 A. That is his specific role, to target enemy objectives on the
22 ground, yes.
23 Q. Is it done by a laser or what?
24 A. The technical capabilities have changed much over the years.
25 Q. So if there are two who are taking part in the firing, if there
1 is one gunner and -- if there is one in the aircraft and the other one on
2 the ground, there is two of them; right?
3 A. A forward air controller would not be firing at a target,
4 himself, when calling in aircraft.
5 Q. Probably what I said was misinterpreted. If there are two who
6 are firing, there is one who is setting the sights, the one on the
7 ground, the one that I allowed into Gorazde, and the one who is actually
8 firing is the one in the aircraft; right?
9 A. The one on the ground is targeting the aircraft, that is correct.
10 Q. Thank you. Don't you think that that turns him into a combatant?
11 A. It depends on the level of force used. In this case, it most
12 certainly did not turn the UN into one of the combatants. He was merely
13 being used in support of the resolution which called on us to deter all
14 attacks against the safe area using all means possible. Had the United
15 Nations accepted a higher level of force and agreed to strategic-level
16 targets, then there may be an argument for stating that. But it is not
17 the case, during 1994, that we ever went down that route.
18 Q. General, with all due respect, as for the young men who were in
19 the tank and who were hit, that was 100 per cent use of fire. It wasn't
20 tactical, operative, strategic. It was very specific. For my small
21 army, that was a very significant strike, wasn't it? Didn't you turn
22 these young men into combatants because you called in aircraft, and also,
23 in the process, they were the ones who were setting the sights; right?
24 A. You have to distinguish between a peacekeeper, who's either
25 defending himself or carrying out his role under a United Nations
1 Security Council resolution which has been passed in support of a
2 peacekeeping mission, without a war fighting. The United Nations'
3 actions were those of peacekeepers, not war fighters, and a clear
4 distinction should be made.
5 Q. I think, General, that at the time you were far more critical of
6 NATO, who had abused you.
7 Let us see what Admiral Leighton Smith said. He gave up on
8 further UNPROFOR and NATO engagement, in view of -- in view of the
9 downing of this aircraft. You should know, General, that it was not easy
10 at all for the Serbs to down friendly aircraft that were directed by NATO
11 to turn into hostile aircraft. What do you say to that?
12 A. I'm not sure which paragraph you're referring to.
13 Q. On this page here, where you're conveying the transcript of the
14 radio communication with the forward air controller who had targeted our
15 tank. One or two tanks were destroyed, and also an ambulance was
16 destroyed. Then there is a photograph of that vehicle that you kept in
17 your officers. And underneath it, it says "Bravo, NATO." So this was
18 criticism against NATO; right?
19 A. I did not have a photograph in my office with a sign under it
20 saying "Bravo, NATO."
21 Q. I think that that was the case. Did you have a photograph of the
22 ambulance that NATO had hit in Gorazde?
23 A. I did. There's a copy of it on the back of the book, but it did
24 not have --
25 Q. Thank you.
1 A. -- "Bravo, NATO" written on it.
2 Q. Very well. But after at least one tank had been hit, and an
3 ambulance, too, the next aircraft had been downed; right?
4 A. I don't remember the precise sequence of events, but certainly
5 one Sea Harrier was shot down.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 As for this page, we would like to tender it.
8 Could we now have 1312. That's the 65 ter number.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. You know, General, that our relations were chilled on several
11 occasions, especially your relations with my officers, my generals,
12 because our position was that you were free to shoot if anyone opened
13 fire at your soldiers. But if you call NATO in to change the balance of
14 forces on the ground, we believed that you were turning into combatants
15 on one particular side. Do you remember that break in our relations?
16 A. I remember that when we went to Geneva for peace discussions,
17 your military side refused to talk to me. That's all I remember. As far
18 as we were concerned, we had done the minimum use of force possible in
19 the circumstances, and that we were continuing in our primary role of
20 attempting to deliver humanitarian aid to the people of Bosnia
21 Q. All right. But they did not speak to you; however, that was not
22 personal. But you simply turned into our enemy. You turned into a
23 combatant against us when you called in air-strikes. Did you become
24 engaged? That's the word. Didn't you become a warring party, as it
1 A. I've already explained that we did not.
2 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, this is a question that's been
3 asked of the general and answered in the most straightforward terms.
4 You're simply repeating it, which is a waste of the limited time that you
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Can we have a look at this telegram now that was sent to the
8 Secretary-General by Mr. Akashi from Zagreb on the 24th of November.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. In the second paragraph, he says:
11 "General Rose ..."
12 [In English] "... has met with Dr. Karadzic and stated that the
13 Serbs must withdraw from the area or UNPROFOR will be obliged to
14 resort ..."
15 [Interpretation] And so on.
16 [In English] "Karadzic has stated that we will not attack
17 civilians, but he firmly intends to enter the town to destroy the 5th BH
19 [Interpretation] The translation is wrong:
20 [In English] "Karadzic stated that he firmly intends to enter the
21 town to destroy 5th BH Corps. It is our military judgement that such
22 action will result in civilian casualties."
23 [Interpretation] And then it says that he and you, General Rose:
24 [In English] "... have also been in contact with Vice-President
25 Ganic --"
1 [Interpretation] And so on.
2 [In English] "Karadzic's principal demand is for a general
3 cease-fire. We are convinced that he will settle for nothing less and
4 that there is a real possibility that the Serbs will pursue 5th BH Corps
5 into the town. The consequence of the action we would be required to
6 take in that event requires your decision. The area strikes will require
7 attacks on a number of air defence systems and fixed installations, as it
8 is not possible to employ aircraft against Serb infantry in a populated
9 area. The advantage of this option is its demonstration of United
10 Nations' resolve. The Serbs will also be seen to have paid some price
11 for violation of safe area and may, if strikes are extensive enough, be
12 deterred from further transgressions. This option transforms UNPROFOR
13 into a combatant and will require withdrawal under adverse conditions."
14 [Interpretation] And so on.
15 So Mr. Akashi
16 bombed, that turns the UN into a warring party; right?
17 A. Which paragraph, precisely, were you referring to in that last
18 question, Dr. Karadzic?
19 Q. The third line from the bottom:
20 [In English] "... UNPROFOR into a combatant."
21 A. I think he said if strikes are extensive, which is the point
22 which I was making, he, like I, were reluctant or, in fact, refused to
23 accept a higher level of targeting and was commensurate with
24 peacekeeping. And that -- I think his letter reflects that point of
25 view --
1 Q. And do you remember, General, that the 5th Corps had attacked us
2 from the zone of Bihac and had reached almost Bosanski Petrovac? They
3 took 300 kilometres of purely Serb land, purely Serb villages. They
4 killed whoever they found and they torched everything.
5 A. I certainly don't remember that being the case. When I arrived
6 in 1994, Bihac was an enclave which was subject to United Nations
7 Security Council resolutions regarding the security of those enclaves,
8 and the sequence of events on the ground which led to the Serb attack
9 into that area in November is something that I have no knowledge of.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, we'll get to that.
11 Can we admit this document? It's a telegram of Mr. Akashi's.
12 JUDGE KWON: I think it has already been admitted as
13 Exhibit P1681.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Can we now have 1D2509 once again, the last page.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. We're still dealing with Gorazde a bit. We are going to conclude
18 with Gorazde, and then we are going to move on to Bihac.
19 General, would you agree that out of the six safe protected
20 areas, only two were delimited or, rather, it is only Srebrenica and Zepa
21 that had boundaries that were set between the warring parties?
22 A. I think Sarajevo
23 safe areas, had pretty clear boundaries in terms of the line of conflict.
24 Q. I agree as far as the line of conflict is concerned. However, if
25 you remember, when the safe areas were declared as such, an agreement was
1 reached, stating where the boundary of the area is. That is what your
2 documents -- UN documents also say, that the main problem was that these
3 boundaries had not been established. That is one problem. And then
4 there's this other problem that none of the safe areas had been
5 demilitarised. Is that right?
6 A. It is certainly the case that there was no clear boundaries
7 marked around the safe areas, all the safe areas. Secondly, there was no
8 requirement, as we've already discussed, by the Bosnian Government forces
9 to demilitarise those safe areas. That was never a requirement put on
10 them by a United Nations Security Council resolution, for the obvious
11 reason that that was their sovereign territory.
12 Q. Thank you, thank you. Let us have a look at this, where it says:
13 "The 28th of April ..." We're still dealing with Gorazde:
14 [In English] "The 28th of April, General Rose went on an
15 inspection tour of the Gorazde enclave. He returned full of criticism of
16 the Bosnian Muslims, adding that they had exaggerated the number of
17 wounded and the damage done to the town in the Bosnian Serb offensive in
18 order to instigate NATO's military intervention. General Rose stated,
19 'The situation was a lot better than I had been led to believe. One can
20 only be pleased at that.'"
21 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.
22 Do you remember that?
23 A. I do.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this document?
25 [In English] The document Task Force on Terrorism and
1 Unconventional Warfare is from --
2 [Interpretation] It's from the US Congress.
3 JUDGE KWON: What part of the US Congress, Mr. Karadzic? I note
4 that it's downloaded from a site which is called
5 "serbianlinksfreehosting.net." And I find --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it was just published there,
7 but this was presented at this Republican --
8 [In English] "The Task Force of Terrorism and Unconventional
9 Warfare, the House of Republican Research Committee, US
11 [Interpretation] So it's a Republican committee, a committee of
12 Congressmen. Anybody can publish it now. Wherever you find it, you can
13 use it, you can get it off any web site.
14 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
15 MS. EDGERTON: On this one, Your Honours, I wouldn't agree.
16 I think that this is a document that has absolutely no hallmarks of
17 reliability. It's clearly a partisan document, and General Rose on
18 several occasions has spoken about the extent to which he disagrees with
19 it. And, frankly, I don't think it's added a single thing to the written
20 and oral evidence he's already given, in any case.
21 JUDGE KWON: Speaking for myself, Mr. Karadzic, I'm not sure
22 about the foundation of this document. It says it's an executive
23 summary, but executive summary of what? Who's the author? And anybody
24 can turn in papers to a committee of a party. And it has no reference at
25 all, and so at this moment -- I have to consult with my colleagues, but
1 speaking for myself, I'm not satisfied that --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I respond before that?
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond before you take your
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This document was sent to the
8 United Nations. The next document we will show will show that Mr. Akashi
9 studied it and stated his views on it. This is a research committee of
10 one political party in Congress. It has to do with the study of
11 conventional warfare. If Ms. Edgerton thinks that we should first study
12 the objectivity of each and every document we deal with, then every one
13 of her documents would have to be rejected before we assess these
14 documents. That would be a court within a court.
15 It is for you to adjudicate, ultimately, what is to be decided.
16 However, we can call a document up, and it will show that this document
17 had been shown to the UN.
18 1D2508, could we have that for a moment, and then you will see
19 what that says.
20 Also, there are some objections with regard to objectivity, but
21 there are certain things here that have been stated correctly. No doubt
22 about that.
23 JUDGE KWON: I think we have that document you referred to. So
24 what is your point, Mr. Karadzic?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, in this telegram, it says:
1 [In English] "As requested at your fax of 25th June 1994, we have
2 reviewed the US House Republican Research Committee report of 4 May 1994
3 on Gorazde. We find the paper lacks objectivity.
4 "Our remarks are based on the examination of our daily records,
5 and the comments of UNMOs who were in Gorazde at the time."
6 [Interpretation] So Mr. Akashi
7 Observers have been accused in an unjustified manner. However,
8 General Rose said, no, it was the reports that were wrong:
9 [In English] "It must, however, be borne in mind that our
10 observers in Gorazde were limited in numbers, unable to range widely
11 through the area, and confined to their shelters as the conflict
13 [Interpretation] In a word, Mr. Akashi is defending his
14 observers, and he is not challenging the authenticity of the document.
15 Does anyone in this courtroom challenge the authenticity of this
16 document? It is for the Trial Chamber to see what its value is.
17 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE KWON: In order to properly assess and determine the
20 probative value of this document, the Chamber should know the members of
21 this committee, as well as who authored or who did the research in
22 relation to this. So on that basis, we'll mark this document for
23 identification, pending -- we are pending until the Chamber is satisfied
24 with its foundation. We'll give it a number, an MFI D number.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this telegram be admitted, this
2 telegram to Akashi
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.
4 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D685, Your Honours.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 And can we now briefly look at D135 that has been admitted
8 already, D135, about the demilitarisation of protected areas.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. While we are waiting, General: Do you agree that it should not
11 have been allowed to the Muslim forces to be inside the protected areas,
12 and to attack the surrounding Serb villages from those protected areas,
13 and be protected while in there?
14 A. As I've already explained, these enclaves were sovereign
15 territory of the Bosnian Government, and they had every right to locate
16 their forces there.
17 Q. Excellent. But then they were not protected areas, because the
18 neighbouring village was my sovereign territory, and they launched
19 attacks at it and slaughtered civilians, and you protected them in that
20 criminal activity. Do you agree that they should not have attacked the
21 Serb territories from the protected areas, or do you perhaps think that
22 they could and they should have?
23 A. Well, without agreeing to any of your preamble to that question,
24 I agree that it was unhelpful to the peace process that they -- the
25 Bosnian state forces attacked from those enclaves. That much, I do
2 Q. Can you explain to the Trial Chamber the meaning of a protected
3 area which is full of troops? The Secretary-General said that those were
4 not protected areas but, rather, armed strongholds, that they were
5 strongholds, armed strongholds belonging to the Muslim Army. How can we
6 reconcile the words of the Secretary-General with the term "protected
7 areas"? What constituted a protected area if that area was full of
8 troops that killed people from within that area?
9 A. The concept of a safe area or a sanctuary is as old as war,
10 itself, and it depends on the willingness of both parties to a conflict
11 not to use that safe area for their own military purposes, either
12 attacking into or attacking from within outwards. And it is a matter of
13 regret to the United Nations that the Bosnian state forces did attack
14 from within those safe areas outwards, because it was not helpful to the
15 peace process. That much, I can say.
16 Q. Thank you. In other words, the status of a protected area is
17 based on the agreement of the warring parties; right?
18 A. An agreement had certainly been made before my time, and from
19 what I understood between the Bosnian forces and the Bosnian Serbs in the
20 matter of Srebrenica, at the time when General Morillon was the commander
21 of the UNPROFOR. But the overall United Nations Security Council
22 resolutions which flowed from that agreement were somewhat different in
23 their wording, what it might have been agreed then, and limited the
24 actions of the United Nations to deterring all attacks against, but not
25 using the word "protection" or "defend," because, of course, those are
1 military activities, war-fighting activities which peacekeepers are
2 unable to assume.
3 Q. Thank you. We can see here an agreement on demilitarisation made
4 between General Mladic and General Halilovic made on the 8th of May 1993
5 in the presence of General Morillon.
6 Can we please go to the second page of the same document.
7 Let's look at the first paragraph:
8 [In English] "Every military or paramilitary unit will have
9 either to withdraw from the demilitarised zone or submit/hand over their
10 weapons. Ammunition, mines, explosives, and combat supplies in the
11 demilitarised zones will be handed over/submitted to UNPROFOR.
12 "After submission/hand-over of all weapons, ammunition, mines and
13 combat supplies in the demilitarised zone, the contracting parties will
14 declare that the demilitarisation is complete.
15 "Submitting/hand-over will be completed:
16 "A. In Srebrenica by Monday, 10th of May, 1993, by 17 [sic]
18 "In Zepa, by Wednesday, 12th of May ..."
19 And so on.
20 [Interpretation] Can we see the end of the document, and can we
21 see General Mladic's and General Halilovic's signatures on the last page.
22 Here are the signatures. Do you agree that these are the
23 signatures of all the three generals? Was that the basis for the
24 demilitarisation, and not the sovereignty that all of us shared? We were
25 also sovereign in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Was this the basis for the
1 demilitarisation and the protection of those protected areas?
2 A. I was obliged to conform to the United Nations Security Council
3 Resolutions 824 and 836, and the wording of those two Security Council
4 resolutions do not reflect what was agreed locally in 1993, before those
5 two resolutions were passed, in any way at all regarding
7 Q. However, the International Law of War does recognise the
8 agreements on the demilitarisation of certain zones or agreements on not
9 attacking such zones; right?
10 A. I'm no expert on international law.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go back to the first page of
12 the document, please.
13 Article 2:
14 [In English] "On the ground of the demilitarised zone shall be
15 marked by UNPROFOR by means of boards on which is stated in English,
16 Serbian and Bosnian, in Cyrillic ..."
17 And so on and so forth:
18 [In English] "... any military operation is strictly forbidden
19 (Article 60, Protocol 1, Additional to the Geneva Conventions)."
20 [Interpretation] In other words, this arises from the
21 International Law of War and the Geneva Conventions as an integral part
23 Are you saying, General, that we were not allowed to defend
24 ourselves from attacks coming from the demilitarised zones, and they, in
25 their turn, were allowed to launch those attacks against us? Just say
1 yes or no.
2 A. I can only reply by saying that I was bound by Security Council
3 Resolutions 824 and 836, and what may have occurred before in 1993 was
4 something which I had no knowledge of. It is certainly the case that the
5 Bosnian Government forces continued -- did not demilitarise and continued
6 to attack outwards in spite of the protests we raised from time to time
7 with them. That is true.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Just a correction in the transcript. We were not allowed to
10 defend ourselves from attacks, and not to launch attacks against the
11 demilitarised zone.
12 Can the Court please produce 1D1408. It's a video-clip, and I'm
13 sure you're going to recognise a young man in it. Can we watch from
14 1:45:33 to 1:46:43.
15 [Video-clip played]
16 "As he flew by helicopter into Gorazde following the fighting,
17 Rose was asked about US satellite reports that nearly every house in
18 Gorazde was damaged.
19 "Yes, practically every house in Gorazde has been damaged, but
20 most of the damage to Gorazde was done in the fighting that had taken
21 place some two years before, when the Bosnian Government forces drove the
22 Serbs from this town, and there were 12 and a half thousand Serbs at that
23 time living here and they were all driven off. The way to distinguish a
24 house that has been damaged by fighting, where a shell has hit it and a
25 house that's been damaged by ethnic cleansing is if it's got no roof, no
1 doors, no window frames, and nothing in the house at all, and there are
2 burn marks and bullets spread around the walls, that is the house that
3 has been damaged by ethnic cleansing. A house that's been damage by
4 shelling has a shell hole in it and there are still people trying to live
5 in that building with their furniture because they've got nowhere else to
6 go. That's something you can't see from satellites, and of course at
7 that time the international image of what had happened in Gorazde was
8 very different from the reality. What was dangerous was that policies
9 were going to be put together on both sides of the Atlantic about what we
10 should do in Gorazde, but these policies had been put together on totally
11 flawed information."
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do you remember this interview, General?
14 A. I remember very well making that interview, yes.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Can this video-clip be admitted. It already has a number. The
17 title of the clip is "A war that could be avoided," but from 1:45:43
19 have admitted.
20 JUDGE KWON: It shall be admitted.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D686, Your Honours.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And before we break off for the
23 day, can we look at 65 ter 7228. 7228.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. While we are waiting: General, yesterday you estimated quite
1 rightly that Mladic's remark was in respect of the Herzegovina Corps, and
2 it was on the right bank of the Drina River
3 should not stay there, because on the right bank of the Drina River
4 villages were Serb, and you said it rightly yesterday.
5 A. I fail to understand the question, Dr. Karadzic.
6 Q. Well, the document referred to the Herzegovina Corps. In
7 Gorazde, on the right bank of the Drina
8 and on the left bank of the Drina River
9 there was the Drina Corps; right?
10 A. As I say, I don't have any knowledge of the military deployments
11 amongst any of the warring parties.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. However, my learned
13 friend Ms. Edgerton showed you a document in which Mladic issued an order
14 to the Herzegovina Corps to liberate the right bank, and that was
15 portrayed as Mladic asking for Muslims to be expelled from Gorazde. And
16 your understanding was about the Serbs on the right bank. It was not
17 ordered to the Drina Corps, but rather to the Herzegovina Corps, because
18 that's how they were deployed. But if you don't know, you don't know.
19 It's not a problem.
20 Can we look at document 7228. That's not a document I wanted.
21 65 ter 7228. Yes, it could be that, yes. Yes, it is.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this has been admitted as
23 Exhibit P1658.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Even better.
25 Let's look at the first paragraph and the last paragraph.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Here, General Major Milovanovic, deputy commander, sends
3 information to the Herzegovina Corps at the Forward Command Post, the
5 units, and he says:
6 "At the joint meeting of the warring parties and representatives
7 of UNPROFOR, the observers reported that they had informed the UN that
8 the Army of Republika Srpska had to date not fired on the town of Gorazde
9 itself, and that operations were generally occurring at the line of
10 conflict and in the surrounding villages behind the line of conflict.
11 Such a report is advantageous to the Republika Srpska and has prevented
12 unfavorable resolutions being adopted by the Security Council."
13 And the last paragraph reads:
14 "The decision of the supreme commander and the commander of the
15 Main Staff of the army is to continue energetically conducting the
16 planned combat operations, but to avoid opening artillery fire on the
17 town of Gorazde itself at all costs (as has mostly been respected so
18 far) --"
19 JUDGE KWON: We can all read.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] My question:
21 Q. General, did you, yourself, arrive at the conclusion that most of
22 the fire, which is what you stated in your reports, was on the separation
23 lines and not on the town of Gorazde
24 reported by the Muslim side?
25 A. I would not agree to that. There was definitely the -- the main
1 effort of the Bosnian Serb side seemed to be on the right bank of the
3 the enclave by the Bosnian forces. I'm sure that was the situation by
4 the 8th of April, although I cannot be certain. The enclave was under
5 attack from the Bosnian Serb forces, albeit the main effort may have been
6 on the right bank, as you suggest.
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll now take the adjournment until tomorrow
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more question, if I may.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. General, sir, if we agree that Serb villages were on the right
13 bank, and as we could see in that video-clip, the Muslims had cleansed
14 them ethnically in 1992, and if Mladic wanted to liberate them, obviously
15 he had to tie up the Muslim forces on the other side. As an officer, you
16 wouldn't allow the Muslims to deploy all of their forces on the right
17 bank. How would you have liberated that bank if you had not deployed
18 your troops everywhere? Do you agree with me that it was a logical
19 military decision?
20 A. Well, it's a hypothetical question which I cannot answer.
21 JUDGE KWON: We'll resume tomorrow afternoon at 2.15.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.05 p.m.
24 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 7th day of
25 October, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.