Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 7411

 1                           Thursday, 7 October 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 2.24 p.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon.

 7             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President, and good afternoon.

 9             I'll be very brief.  I wanted to raise one quick matter,

10     reflected in the Trial Chamber's decision of the 29th of September

11     regarding the materials seized from the Bukanjac [phoen] premises,

12     including the DVDs and the hard-drive materials.

13             As the OTP indicated in its submission of the 20th of September,

14     the review and indexing of the hard-drive materials, in contrast to the

15     DVD materials, has been ongoing due to the circumstances referred to in

16     the confidential annex.  The bulk of those materials will be disclosed

17     early next week, and the remainder of the materials the week following.

18     I simply raise that because we noted that the Trial Chamber's decision

19     appeared to reflect a misapprehension that the hard-drive materials, in

20     addition to the DVD materials, were disclosed on the 31st of August, and

21     I wanted to clarify that.

22             Thank you, Mr. President.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Actually, Mr. President, that was also my

24     misapprehension.  I'm hearing for the first time today that there are

25     undisclosed materials from that January 2010 -- or December 2009 search,

Page 7412

 1     and that may cause us to seek another suspension of the proceedings if a

 2     first glance of that undisclosed material indicates that it's anything

 3     like the material that has been disclosed to us.  So I also want to put

 4     that on record at this point, and we'll simply await the material to see

 5     what has to be done next.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Well, if I may, Mr. President, and no point in any

 7     extended discussion or argument now, but the submission makes clear, as I

 8     noted, what the status was with respect to the hard-drive materials.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Your submission is well noted.  We'll see what we

10     need to do.

11             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, let's continue your cross-examination.

12                           WITNESS:  MICHAEL ROSE [Resumed]

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.

14             Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom.

15                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Good afternoon, General.  Do you agree with me that UNPROFOR

18     faced a lot of difficulty due to the undefined status of the protected

19     area, the fact that the demilitarisation process was not resolved, and,

20     generally speaking, with the situation in which they didn't know how to

21     treat such zones?

22        A.   There were certainly difficulties with the lack of definition of

23     the boundaries and the fact that one of the parties to the conflict had

24     not demilitarised the safe areas.

25        Q.   And it would be the Muslim side, of course, that had its troops

Page 7413

 1     in the zones; right?

 2        A.   I think we discussed that previously, and the status was

 3     different for the Bosnian Government side than it was for the Bosnian

 4     Serb side.

 5        Q.   Well, we refuse to accept that, General.  Before the conflict and

 6     during the conflict, we fought and finally achieved an equal status.  Who

 7     was it who suggested to you that we should be treated as rebels or, in

 8     other words, in any way different than the Muslim government?

 9        A.   The Bosnian nation was a recognised member of the United Nations.

10     The Republika Srpska had not yet been recognised by any entity at all,

11     other than the Serb side.

12        Q.   With all due respect, General, Caligula proclaimed his horse as

13     senator, but he wasn't a senator.  Over 70 per cent of the territory was

14     in our hands.  What did we care that nobody recognised us?  We were part

15     of that Bosnia, one of the three sides, and you treated us as rebels.  I

16     don't mean you, personally, but a large majority of the international

17     community treated us as rebels, as an illegal entity, and that's why

18     we're all here today.  Right?

19        A.   As I said before, the United Nations Protection Force were acting

20     as mediators in a conflict which they were trying to bring to an end

21     through peaceful means, and their approach to the three warring parties

22     was impartial, although, of course, they didn't remain neutral in terms

23     of the final outcome.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             1D291 is the next document I would like to call, and you will see

Page 7414

 1     how the Serbs and Croats perceived that matter at the time.  And I'm

 2     talking about a majority of the population, the Christian part of the

 3     population composed of Croats and Serbs who made up over 50 per cent, and

 4     well over the 70 per cent of the territory belonged to those two peoples.

 5     And according to the International Pact on Human Rights, the resources in

 6     a territory belong to the people who resided in the territory.

 7             Here, General, Kresimir Zubak and Nikola Koljevic on the 10th of

 8     February, 1994, immediately after your arrival -- please look at bullet

 9     point 6.  That's the only one.  They achieved an agreement on the nature

10     of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

11             [In English] "An absolute majority of the population on the

12     territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina opt for peace and ask the Muslim

13     people to agree with this decision."

14             [Interpretation] Therefore, it would be much easier for all of

15     us -- it would have been easier if the international community had

16     treated us as one of the three sides and not as rebels, and the OTP has

17     incriminated even the setting up of our parties.

18             Can this be admitted, Your Excellency?

19             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The general has already answered

21     the question and said that we were treated as three equal sides, and you

22     can see here that all the three equal sides, the Serbs and the Croats,

23     constituted a majority.  Look at bullet point 3:

24             [In English] "The so-called Presidency and Government of Bosnia

25     and Herzegovina do not represent --"

Page 7415

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, this is not a forum for you to make a

 2     speech.  Ask a question to the witness.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, sir, do you know that the Presidency of Yugoslavia that

 5     was left by Croats and Serbs was often referred to as a rump presidency?

 6        A.   No, I did not.

 7        Q.   However, if that is correct, by the analogy, would the Muslim

 8     Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina also be rightly called a rump

 9     presidency?  Look at bullet point 3, where the Croatian and Serbian

10     representatives denied the Presidency the right to represent the Croatian

11     and Serbian people.  It is not even a rump presidency; it is just a

12     presidency constituted of the representatives of only one ethnic group.

13     Right?

14        A.   As I've explained, Dr. Karadzic, as an officer of the United

15     Nations, I could only work within the rules that had been laid down by

16     the United Nations for that mission.

17        Q.   I'm not attacking you.  I'm just asking you to either agree with

18     me or deny the fact that there were three equal sides and that the three

19     sides constituted Bosnia.  Is that correct, those were three equal sides?

20     It was not like they were Bosnia and the rest of us were rebels.

21             JUDGE KWON:  I think the witness has answered that question.  I

22     will tell you to move on to your next question.

23             Ms. Edgerton, do you object to the admission of this document?

24     I'm not sure whether this is signed or not, Mr. Karadzic, before it is to

25     be admitted at all.

Page 7416

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, there was an

 2     agreement about that document.  However, Mr. Tudjman did not want the

 3     document to be signed.  There may even be a signed version, but Tudjman

 4     asked for the document not to be publicised; therefore, not to be signed.

 5     He just wanted the Muslims to be orally informed about its contents.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, we know absolutely nothing about this

 8     document and the provenance, its authenticity.  I'd object to it.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  We'll wait for another witness to admit this.  So

10     we'll not admit this at this time, Mr. Karadzic.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             Can we then call 65 ter 10689.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   General, in view of the fact that you didn't know -- or, rather,

15     you did not have the boundaries for the protected zones, you didn't have

16     the agreement on the contents of the Gorazde zone, would you perhaps

17     agree with me that there was no legal grounds to call for NATO

18     air-strikes?

19        A.   No, I would not agree with you.  The United Nations Security

20     Council resolution was quite plain, that is, 824 and 836, that the United

21     Nations should use all means possible to deter attacks against the

22     enclaves.

23        Q.   However, if you didn't know what the enclave was, how did you

24     know that it came under attack?  You didn't have boundaries.  The zone

25     was not demilitarised.  How were you able to know when the boundaries of

Page 7417

 1     the enclave were over-stepped if there were no boundaries at all, to

 2     speak of?

 3        A.   It was self-evident when the civilian populations in these

 4     enclaves came into danger, either from the point of view of their own

 5     lives or their property.  That was the moment at which the United Nations

 6     decided to take action.

 7        Q.   Do you agree with me that the side that had brought the civilians

 8     in danger should be bombed?  Yes or no.  And then later we will show who

 9     it was who actually brought them into a dangerous position.

10        A.   Certainly, those who were shelling the civilian populations were

11     liable -- in those enclaves were liable to have action taken against them

12     under the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

13        Q.   Is it correct that you exerted a certain caution because the NATO

14     commands, and especially Admiral Smith and Admiral Burda, were prone to

15     be trigger-happy, as it were, and that you tried hard to avert the NATO

16     actions?

17        A.   We saw the use of NATO air-strikes as a measure of last resort.

18     We did not see ourselves as part of the conflict between the warring

19     parties.  And as long as the conflict was not endangering the lives or

20     the property of the civilians within the safe areas, then we took no

21     action, other than to report it.

22        Q.   I'm not complaining against the United Nations.  Were the United

23     Nations afraid of the over-zealousness of NATO commanders to open fire on

24     Serbs?

25        A.   There was a continual debate between the United Nations and NATO

Page 7418

 1     about the level of force to be used, and the United Nations never changed

 2     their position that they could not embark on war-fighting levels of

 3     force.  They had to restrict themselves to those that were compatible

 4     with a peacekeeping mission.

 5        Q.   Very well.  You are avoiding to tell me what the NATO position

 6     was, but we'll come to that with the help of documents.

 7             Look at this document.  Is this a telegram sent by your assistant

 8     for Civilian Affairs, Viktor Andreev, to Ambassador Akashi?  And the date

 9     of the document is 14 April 1994 -- or, rather, the 18th of April.  I

10     apologise.  That was in the middle of the crisis, eight days after the

11     bombardment.  Could you please say your answer for the record?

12        A.   The question?

13        Q.   Is this a telegram, dated 18 April, sent by Andreev to Akashi?

14        A.   It certainly is.  I can't see, incidentally, the bottom of that

15     document, but I recognise the top half of it, certainly.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the second page.  We

17     can't see the whole document at a time, although we would like to draw

18     everybody's attention to the entire document.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Let's look at bullet point 10, first of all:

21             [In English] "The council must clarify the concept of the safe

22     area --"

23             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

24             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Well, we could actually have the document made

Page 7419

 1     just a little bit smaller so we could all see the whole document on one

 2     page.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I thought he was referring to three pages.  Yes,

 4     let's move on.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it does have three pages.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Can I draw your attention to paragraph 10:

 8             [In English] "The council must clarify the concept of the safe

 9     areas as soon as possible.  Until now, they have never been

10     geographically defined, and it has never been clear how UNPROFOR was

11     meant to deter attacks on them, or whether, indeed, UNPROFOR should have

12     tolerated their use by the Bosnian Army for military purposes.  If the

13     council decided to continue with the concept, it must be willing to give

14     the resources and the political commitment necessary to do so.

15     Otherwise, we invite conflict with the Serbs for the benefit -- for no

16     benefit to anyone."

17             [Interpretation] So the 10th of April bombing had to happen in

18     order for this telegram to be sent.  It says here, We don't know what a

19     protected zone is, and if this continues, we will have a conflict with

20     the Serbs on our hands; right?

21        A.   You must understand, Dr. Karadzic, that the United Nations and

22     NATO were moving into new territory when it came to the employment of

23     NATO air-strikes on a peacekeeping mission.  This had never happened

24     before, and the United Nations Security Council resolutions that were

25     passed reflect very much the ongoing debate about what the levels of

Page 7420

 1     force should be used in a peacekeeping mission.  On the ground, we were

 2     quite clear that they could not go beyond what we deemed to be

 3     appropriate to a peacekeeping mission, and that was the minimum use of

 4     force to achieve a specific aim, whether that be to deter attacks against

 5     a safe area, or to enforce the passage of a convoy, or to defend the

 6     lives and property of the UN peacekeepers, themselves.

 7             What you're seeing in this telegram is an element to debate as

 8     the two organisations were moving into new territory.

 9        Q.   Objection, General.  Was an additional purpose of the attack, and

10     that was to save the army from defeat?  After having attacked us, when we

11     engaged in a counter-attack, you came in -- or, rather, NATO came in to

12     save it.  But look at bullet point eight, please:

13             [In English] "The question of air power must be treated with the

14     utmost gravity.  As the Serbs showed this week, they are prepared to run

15     the risk of escalation.  If the international community is not similarly

16     committed, it should realise that limited close air support will engage

17     the Serbs, provoking a back-lash against the UN personnel on the ground."

18        A.   Clearly, that was one of the possibilities that had to be

19     considered, particularly as our main job was to deliver humanitarian aid

20     to the people who needed it, some 2.7 million people in Bosnia at that

21     time, including 600.000 Serbs.  And had the Serb side, who, as we've

22     already explained, dominated most of the territory and, therefore, most

23     of the routes used for the delivery of humanitarian aid, blocked all

24     those with military force, there was little that the United Nations, as

25     peacekeepers, could do to deliver that aid.  Therefore, the use of force

Page 7421

 1     and the levels of the use of force were under continual scrutiny and

 2     debate, as you well know.

 3        Q.   [Interpretation] General, bullet point 10 shows that there are no

 4     grounds to aid the BiH army, because that would, indeed, have been aid

 5     administered to the army and a signal to the BH Army to abuse the

 6     protected zone.  But when you're talking about the blockade of roads,

 7     let's look at the following page and see what the cause is and what the

 8     consequences were.  Let's see whether the Serbs deserved to be attacked

 9     because they had blocked the roads, or was it the other way around?  Did

10     perhaps the Serbs block the roads because of the attack?

11             Let's look at bullet point 11:

12             [In English] "... the Serbs --"

13             JUDGE KWON:  Excuse me.  Could you read the English part again?

14     If you change your language from Serbian to English, you need to wait.

15             THE ACCUSED:  I see.

16             Point 11:

17             "UNPROFOR's mandate has pushed it into low-level conflict with

18     the Serbs.  As a result, Sarajevo --" I repeat:  "As a result, Sarajevo

19     is blockaded, its airport is closed, food stocks are declining.  Our

20     mandate must either be one within which we are able to have a

21     co-operative relationship with the Serbs, or it must be one in which we

22     have the force to impose our will.  It cannot be, as it is now, somewhere

23     in between."

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   I would like us to determine whether the Serbs were evil and

Page 7422

 1     that's why blocked the roads with no reason at all, or whether the

 2     blocking of the roads and the harsh letter by General Milovanovic were

 3     all provoked by something.  Were we provoked into acting the way we did

 4     or did we do all those things out of the blue?

 5             Bullet point 11 shows that the cause was pushing UNPROFOR into a

 6     low intensity conflict with the Serbs, and the consequence was the

 7     intensification of the situation and the tensions with the Serbs.  And if

 8     we add to that, General, that we had a reason to doubt the sincerity of

 9     the lower levels of command and that they were smuggling weapons and fuel

10     to the Muslims, then you can obviously see why we thought that the United

11     Nations were working to our detriment.

12        A.   Until the NATO bombing --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Excuse -- please carry on.

14             THE WITNESS:  Until the NATO bombing, the blocking of the routes

15     by the Serb side was both systematic and frequent, but not complete.

16     After the bombing and air-strikes took place, for a period of time the

17     blocking of the roads was 100 per cent throughout the country.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document --

20             JUDGE KWON:  -- the last question of yours was rather a

21     statement.  In the future, I may cut off you in the middle.  Just refrain

22     from making a speech.

23             We'll admit this.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D687, Your Honours.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 7423

 1             Can the Court please produce D143, just to show you, General, the

 2     reasons that existed before the bombing for controls and blockades.  The

 3     document number is D143.

 4             Please do not think that I am attacking either you, or the United

 5     Nations, or Great Britain, or any of the higher commands.  However, this

 6     doesn't change the fact that we had good reasons, and you will see them

 7     in the document.  And we're waiting for the document to be displayed on

 8     the screen.

 9             Here you have it.  "Movement by convoys, teams and individuals

10     from UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations."  Everybody please look at

11     how convoys moved and how many convoys there were, and how were checks

12     and controls carried out.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Is there a date to this document so that we can

14     have it in some measure of context?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is an overview for the year

17     1994.  In the document, we will see this is an overview for the year

18     1994, segregated by month.  In paragraph 1, it says in the course of

19     1994, convoys passed every day.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, for seven or eight months --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Can we see page 5.  Page 5.  It says

23     it's a table reflecting the year of 1994.

24             Is it fine, Ms. Edgerton, now?

25             MS. EDGERTON:  On the question of the timing, yes.  I have no

Page 7424

 1     idea what the source of the document is, though, by who it might have

 2     been generated.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We'll see.

 4             Let's carry on, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go back to the first page,

 6     and let's look how things were.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Just one corps, the Drina Corps, is sending its report in the

 9     first part, and they are reporting about the movement of humanitarian aid

10     and UNPROFOR across its territory.  And it says in the first paragraph:

11             "They moved about on a daily basis during 1994 using the

12     following roads:"

13             And then the following passage:

14             "The entry and exit of convoys was controlled at seven

15     check-points ..."

16             And those check-points are then listed.  And then:

17             "Entry controls and inspection of persons, weapons, vehicles,

18     loads and documentation are conducted at check-points by members of the

19     civilian police and by teams generally made up of personnel who have been

20     working at this task since August 1993 ...," and so on and so forth.

21     "... who have attained sufficient experience ..."

22             And so on and so forth.

23             Can we go on to the following page.  Bullet point C, I believe

24     you will see it:

25             "Behaviour and abuse of mandate by UNPROFOR and humanitarian

Page 7425

 1     organisations."

 2             Here you have it.  Let's go to the third paragraph immediately:

 3             "In 1994, as previously, checks mostly revealed the following

 4     attempts at abuse:

 5             "Transport of goods which are not permitted at all in UNPROFOR

 6     convoys;

 7             "Transport of goods which do not constitute humanitarian aid - in

 8     convoys of humanitarian organisations;

 9             "Transport of goods in quantities greater than those permitted."

10             And then the last paragraph on the same page:

11             "Understandably, most cases of attempted smuggling of goods were

12     in the convoys for Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde, which had the least

13     opportunity to obtain goods outside of humanitarian goods.  The following

14     goods were mostly smuggled:  Video cameras, photographic cameras, films,

15     weapons, radio sets, satellite equipment --"

16             JUDGE KWON:  Can we see the next page in English.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is the following page.  It

18     starts with:  "Understandably, in most cases ..."

19             And that's on the top of that page, "smuggling" -- or "smuggled,"

20     actually.  We can see what things were smuggled: antennas, signal

21     devices, optical devices, night vision apparatus, Motorolas, various

22     parts for devices, antifreeze, chemical manure, oxygen cylinders,

23     flak-jackets, helmets, sleeping bags, military apparel and -- can we have

24     the following page in the Serbian language -- and different food stuffs.

25     Yes, that's it.

Page 7426

 1             I'll skip one part:

 2             "There's no doubt that there would have been very few attempts to

 3     smuggle non-permitted goods if these had been confiscated permanently at

 4     the check-points, because temporary confiscation merely enforces delay

 5     and leaves the actors the hope that they will succeed in getting them to

 6     their destination at the next attempt ...."

 7             Which means that the goods were temporarily seized, and when the

 8     convoy returned, they were returned to them:

 9             "When representatives of UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations

10     complained about the procedure of the organs at the check-points --"

11             JUDGE KWON:  Now that we've read that paragraph, come to your

12     question.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   General, despite the fact that you brought a lot of peace to the

15     theatre of war, and especially in Sarajevo, you pacified it, would you

16     agree that those were the reasons why Serbs had to be cautious with

17     regard to the convoys?  And since we were three times under-powered,

18     there was an imminent danger that we would finally be defeated because

19     our enemy was helped in this particular way?

20        A.   Well, first, I would absolutely deny that the United Nations

21     facilitated or, indeed, took part in the smuggling of any weapons or

22     other military equipment to the other side.

23             Secondly, all three parties to the conflict had signed, when the

24     United Nations Protection Force first deployed into Bosnia, an agreement

25     that there would be free movement of all convoys.  The performance on the

Page 7427

 1     ground by the three warring parties fell far short of that, particularly

 2     the blocking of convoys by the Serb side.  For example, in February 1994,

 3     looking at the World Health Organisation figures, less than 50 per cent

 4     of goods were delivered to the people who needed it, and, of course,

 5     without that, they were suffering greatly, without that aid.

 6        Q.   General, how could the Muslims block that when Serbs and Croats

 7     were around them?  They could have only got all of that from the

 8     territory held by Serbs and Croats.  That is why you proportionately had

 9     more problems with the Serbs, because it was only through Serb-held

10     territory that you could have supplied humanitarian aid to the Muslims;

11     right?

12        A.   I've already explained that because the Serbs controlled

13     70 per cent of the territory of the country in 1994, it was inevitable

14     that most of the routes for the delivery of humanitarian aid ran through

15     territory controlled by the Bosnian Serb side.  That is correct.

16        Q.   Just one more question.  You see what my point is, General.  This

17     shows that the Serbs had reason to thoroughly check the convoys because

18     there was the danger of their defeat, because in some convoys -- I mean,

19     I'm not accusing the UN or command, but from somewhere goods were

20     smuggled that presented a danger to us, and they were a danger to us.

21     Was this done only because Serbs were evil, as such, or were they afraid

22     of being defeated?

23        A.   All I can say -- I have no idea what the motivation may have

24     been, but all I can say is that the majority of the blocking of the

25     convoys, for the reasons we've already discussed, came from the Serb

Page 7428

 1     side.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  General, whether you can remember the degree of that

 3     control over a convoy varied, depending upon the content of it, i.e.,

 4     whether it's an UNPROFOR convoy or it was a humanitarian convoy?

 5             THE WITNESS:  Sir, most of the convoys through the Serb side were

 6     escorted by the UNPROFOR.  There were two parts to the mission.  UNHCR

 7     provided the lorries, the drivers, and the goods, in terms of

 8     humanitarian aid, and the United Nations Protection Force escorted them

 9     where it was decided that escorts were required.  On some occasions, they

10     ran without escorts.  On other occasions, they needed the UN to help them

11     move their convoys, both from the point of view of control and also to

12     deter any blocking.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             THE WITNESS:  The second category of convoy, of course, was the

15     military convoys which UNPROFOR ran in order to supply their own forces

16     in the enclaves, and, of course, Sarajevo was an enclave.

17             JUDGE KWON:  So if it was a military convoy, a different rule

18     must have been applied?

19             THE WITNESS:  Clearly, we didn't have participation from UNHCR on

20     those convoys; we merely ran them ourselves.  But they were equally

21     subject to the inspection and control procedures by the warring parties.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

23             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             This document has already been admitted, so now we're going to

Page 7429

 1     ask for 1D1692.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   But you do agree, don't you, General, that you, yourself, said in

 4     your book that the Serbs took their time as they were conducting the

 5     checks, but the flow of humanitarian aid went on, and the interruptions

 6     were never such that they required NATO intervention.  There is a

 7     sentence to that effect in your book; right?

 8        A.   Well, you'd have to remind me as to what that sentence was.  But

 9     it is certainly the case that the UN managed to maintain a level of flow

10     of humanitarian aid throughout the war, in spite of all the difficulties

11     that were placed in front of it.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Have we got the document?  Yes.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Now, "Activities of UNPROFOR," that's what it says down here.  Do

16     we have a translation?  No, we do not have a translation:

17             "3.  Situation in the territory.

18             "A.  Activities of UNPROFOR."

19             And then the first bullet point says:  "Military observers," and

20     then the second one:  "Convoy Premijer-Urgence passed through the airport

21     from Igman towards Sarajevo.  They were taken to the check-point Ilidza,

22     and according to the first information we received, in addition to food,

23     they transported ammunition as well.  Details are being checked."

24             Do you remember that that happened several times at the airport,

25     that goods were found of this nature that were being sent to our enemies?

Page 7430

 1        A.   No, I do not.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Let us look at paragraph 10 down there:

 5             "From the check-point MC Betanija, UNPROFOR withdrew their forces

 6     for reasons unknown."

 7             And then it says:

 8             "Around 2030 hours on the 8th of April, a humanitarian aid convoy

 9     was checked that was being sent to the city of Sarajevo, seven trucks and

10     one jeep.  A large quantity of ammunition for a Browning and sanitary

11     material was found, and that was not on the list of goods that were being

12     transported.  All of the vehicles were seized, and the goods were stored

13     at the warehouse of the Ilidza Brigade, and the persons involved, drivers

14     and escorts, were sent to the Command of the SRK for further

15     examination."

16             This is a regular report for the 8th of April, and it shows

17     clearly that ammunition was found for a Browning that would have killed

18     our soldiers.  Were you aware of that?

19        A.   I have absolutely no knowledge of any such incident taking place.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Obviously, our PR people didn't

21     manage to get this through to the media.  However, this is a regular

22     report.

23             So can it be admitted?  And let's move on.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Only on the basis of its authenticity.

Page 7431

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  The authenticity of this document is not disputed,

 3     and it covers the issue which is relevant to one of the topics the

 4     witness has dealt with.  So on that basis, we'll admit it.  But we'll

 5     mark it for identification, pending translation.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D688, Your Honours.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             P1859 [as interpreted], I'd like to have that document called up

 9     now so the general can see it.  P859.  This is a telegram.

10             Can we see it?  No, we cannot.  Oh, yes, we can now.

11             P859, fine.  That's the 26th of July, 1994, and it says here

12     "Message."

13             [In English] "The Bosnian Serbs have announced that they are

14     denouncing part of the agreement of freedom of movement for the Sarajevo

15     area of 17 March 1994, which will effectively cut off the life-lines

16     route that links Sarajevo to the outside world.  The routes affected will

17     be those which cross the airport (Dobrinja-Butmir and Lukeska-Ilidza).

18     The Bratstvo-Jedinstvo Bridge and the route Sarajevo-Visoko (via Vogosca)

19     will remain open."

20             [Interpretation] Later on, it says:

21             [In English] "Dr. Karadzic yesterday wanted to speak to HCR to

22     convey this message to him personally.  Finally, I was called and was

23     handed the attached letter.  This is the only non-Serb-controlled route

24     between Sarajevo and all other destinations.

25             "The Serbs give four reasons for breaking with the freedom of

Page 7432

 1     movement agreement of 17th March:

 2             "1.  The smuggling of weapons;

 3             "2.  Sniper activities;

 4             "3.  Prisoner exchange; and

 5             "4.  Cease-fire violation."

 6             Can we have the second page.

 7             The second page is an addendum to the telegram.  It's my letter

 8     sent to Sergio de Mello and to Viktor Andreev.  You see all the things

 9     that I say in that letter, and the last sentence reads.

10             "Humanitarian convoys are free to utilize the earlier routes

11     across our territory."

12             [Interpretation] However, these routes where the smuggling had

13     taken place were closed.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Do you agree, General, that this was not done without a reason?

16     Very specific reasons were mentioned, as a matter of fact.

17        A.   I certainly remember you raising those issues with us.

18        Q.   However, do you agree that we only closed those routes where

19     smuggled goods had been seized, and that the other routes remained

20     opened?

21        A.   I don't agree, because I can't know what your motivation was.

22     Our general view was that the Bosnian Serb side were using the closure of

23     routes as a means of levering the Bosnian Government into accepting peace

24     on their terms, and they would use all sorts of reasons for closing these

25     routes, including the ones that you outlined in your letter.

Page 7433

 1        Q.   Please have a look at this letter.  It says this very clearly.

 2     It's only the routes where we caught the smugglers are being closed:

 3             [In English] "Of course humanitarian convoys are free to utilise

 4     the earlier routes across our territory."

 5             [Interpretation] General, this is not pressure against the Muslim

 6     side in order to achieve something, politically speaking, although the

 7     international community had imposed sanctions on the Serbs, and that was

 8     pressure.  However, we did not close all routes.  We only closed those

 9     routes where there had been smuggling.  That is quite clear.  The

10     telegram and the letter state that very clearly, that the routes via the

11     airport are being closed, because that's where the smuggling had taken

12     place, whereas the route via Vogosca remained open; right?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton?

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, again Dr. Karadzic is arguing with

15     General Rose, which he has been doing since we began this session.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I think the witness has answered the question,

17     unless you have something to add to that.  But please move on,

18     Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Since this has already been admitted, now I'd like to ask for

21     9117.  That's the 65 ter number of the document I'd like to see now.  Let

22     us see what happened in February, what you've been saying.  559117 [as

23     interpreted].

24             I don't know whether we have a translation.  I'm going to tell

25     what this document is.  It's the Main Staff of the Army of

Page 7434

 1     Republika Srpska writing to the commands of all corps.  This is an order

 2     of Milovanovic, the chief of staff, and I'm just going to read

 3     paragraph 3 to you.  You can see the rest:

 4             "All check-points should be reinforced with select personnel that

 5     will display a higher level of professional kindness, co-operativeness,

 6     and simplify procedures involved when examining convoys.  Avoid conflict

 7     situations and notify the Operative Centre of the Main Staff of the Army

 8     of Republika Srpska by telephone if any occur."

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Do you remember, General, that the main cause of

11     misunderstandings at check-points were misunderstandings?  Either goods

12     appeared that were not on the lists, or persons who were not on the

13     lists, or even extra trucks would appear, two or three extra trucks?  Do

14     you remember that that was the main reason why convoys were being

15     detained?

16        A.   Well, certainly I remember that there was an undue bureaucratic

17     level that was employed against us, or employed -- more accurately, put

18     -- against the running of the convoys.  As I say, all sorts of reasons

19     were employed, including the failure to comply 100 per cent to the

20     checklist or the manifest on a particular vehicle.  That is certainly the

21     case.

22        Q.   General, a soldier of yours who receives information to the

23     effect that a convoy is going to appear at his check-point, does he have

24     relative freedom to let something pass that had not been declared or does

25     he have to ask you for extra permission?

Page 7435

 1        A.   You, sir, or one of your representatives had already signed a

 2     document agreeing to the full and free running of convoys, which, of

 3     course, should not have included inspections.  But by the time I arrived

 4     in 1994, that practice had already started, regrettably, and continued,

 5     in spite of efforts to stop it.  In theory, those convoys should have run

 6     without being stopped or checked at all.

 7        Q.   No, General, we never accepted running convoys unchecked.  That

 8     can only happen in an occupied country.  Where you came, with our

 9     consent, we had the right to see whether what is contained is what you

10     had declared.  If that is not the case and if you are helping our

11     enemies, then it is our right to check that.  Would you allow that kind

12     of thing to happen in your own country, to let someone drive something

13     around without any checks?

14        A.   All I can say, there was an agreement.  Because, of course, the

15     populations of all three sides were suffering from the conflict, an

16     agreement had been signed before I arrived in Bosnia; I think in 1992.

17     Certainly I can remember seeing that document, saying that all parties to

18     the conflict agreed to the free running of humanitarian aid convoys.

19     Sadly, that was not to be.

20        Q.   Do you think that free running of convoys excludes the right to

21     checks?

22        A.   I believe it should do.  But by the time I arrived, as I say,

23     that certainly wasn't the case, and it was impossible, therefore, to go

24     back to the status quo ante, which should have been the case.

25        Q.   General, no one can pass through a war zone without any checks.

Page 7436

 1     You know that full well.  We had the right to inspect this, and we did

 2     so.

 3             Look at this sentence:

 4             "In depth, we should have forces that can prevent the forceful

 5     entry of UNPROFOR."

 6             You were there with our consent and with certain regulations

 7     involved.  You were not an occupying army, and you did not aspire to be

 8     one; right?

 9        A.   The status of the United Nations was that it was a peacekeeping

10     mission, facilitating the humanitarian -- the delivery of humanitarian

11     aid with the consent of the warring parties.  That was its status.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Look at the last sentence and let's

13     be done with this document.  General Milovanovic is issuing the following

14     order:

15             "All planned and approved convoys should be allowed to cross the

16     territory of Republika Srpska once they are inspected."

17             So he says that it should be done simply, professionally, with

18     appropriate kindness.  So all planned and approved convoys.  There was a

19     procedure involved once all the goods contained in the said convoys had

20     been inspected.

21             Can this be admitted?

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Was there a question?

23             JUDGE KWON:  So what was your question?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question is whether the general

25     knows that we had the right to inspection and that our commands had

Page 7437

 1     ordered professional, speedy, and proper checks.  So there is no doubt

 2     that there should have been checks.  There should have been checks.  So

 3     what General Milovanovic is writing here is what the Serbian Army

 4     actually did.

 5             The general had said that in February we had prevented convoys

 6     from passing through, and this is a document from February showing that

 7     we were not preventing the convoys from running in any way, but we just

 8     wanted to have proper checks and to have them inspected.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  All repetition.  I think the general has answered

10     all those questions.

11             We'll mark for identification this document, pending translation.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D689, Your Honours.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             Can we have 13354, 65 ter number.  13354, that's a document --

15     yes, this is the translation.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   This is a document that was in force when you arrived.  It had

18     been issued a month prior to your arrival.  So this is a document that

19     was issued by the president of the republic.  Yours truly, that is.  So

20     this is what it says:

21             "With a view to securing normal functioning of humanitarian

22     organisations --"

23             Sorry, let me just say something else before that.  It's sent to

24     the Government of Republika Srpska, the Supreme Headquarters of the Army

25     of Republika Srpska, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health,

Page 7438

 1     and the Government Co-ordination Body for Co-operation with UNPROFOR and

 2     International Organisations.

 3             So this is what the first paragraph says:

 4             "With the aim of securing normal functioning of humanitarian

 5     organisations, it is necessary that you provide undisturbed passage of

 6     all convoys of the humanitarian aid going along the roads and corridors

 7     of Republic of Srpska, and which are organised by the UNHCR, the

 8     International Committee of the Red Cross, Medecins Sans Frontieres,

 9     Handicap-International, the World Health Organisation, the International

10     Committee of Salvation."

11             Were these organisations present, and did you know that we had

12     authorised their presence, as such?

13        A.   I'm well aware that those organisations were present in Bosnia,

14     and they were there with the agreement of the warring parties; that is

15     correct.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have a look at

17     the next page of this presidential document.  Yes, the second paragraph

18     here.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   After opinion was obtained, the committee gives its consent for

21     the movement of convoys, and all persons manning check-points have to

22     abide by this, et cetera, et cetera.  Do you remember that

23     Professor Koljevic, one of the top officials of Republika Srpska, the

24     vice-president of the republic, headed the committee for humanitarian

25     issues, or, rather, for co-operation with you and humanitarian

Page 7439

 1     organisations?

 2        A.   I certainly remember Professor Koljevic.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Do we have the second page of this document in

 4     English?  What we have is only one page.  I just noted -- let's carry on.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure where that part is.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   "As for checking the contents of the convoy --" that's the second

 8     paragraph in Serbian -- "and its vehicles shall be carried out by joint

 9     military and police patrols when entering Republika Srpska, and from the

10     point where they're unloaded or where they're crossing the territory or

11     other parts of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, convoys shall be

12     escorted by police patrols.  What is prohibited is stopping convoys and

13     re-inspecting them, and especially the unauthorised seizure of goods that

14     had already undergone appropriate procedures."

15             I don't have to read out the whole thing:

16             "Once consent is received for the passage of convoys through the

17     territory of Republika Srpska, all concerned have to unequivocally

18     observe the regulations involved, and they should abide by these

19     instructions with a view to enriching co-operation with humanitarian

20     organisations and all other protagonists of humanitarian aid in order to

21     enhance the reputation of Republika Srpska at humanitarian level."

22             My question, General:  There's so many convoys, and some parts of

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina could receive this humanitarian aid only through

24     Serb-held territory.  Why -- why is it being repeated time and again that

25     convoys were stopped when a vast majority of them managed to get through?

Page 7440

 1        A.   The flow of convoys, as I've already said, was intermittent and

 2     not -- did not in any way achieve the targets or goals set by the World

 3     Health Organisation.  The management of the convoys on the United Nations

 4     Protection Force side was done between the UNHCR and the chief of staff

 5     of the United Nations Protection Force; first of all, Brigadier

 6     General Ramsey, and Brigadier General van Bos [phoen] and

 7     Brigadier General Brinkman.  They would come and brief me when there were

 8     major hold-ups or obstructions taking place.  I did not have a detailed

 9     knowledge of every single convoy running in Bosnia throughout 1994, and

10     therefore I suggest that your question would be better posed in detail to

11     them, rather than to me, assuming they appear here as witnesses.  I can

12     only cover the general position, and that is that, because of

13     obstructions, the delivery of aid did not achieve its targets,

14     particularly at the start of 1994.  There were periods when we were able

15     to do so, but there were many periods when we could not.

16        Q.   Apologies.  Please continue.

17        A.   I remember one particular incident, if it's of any use to you,

18     in, I think, January, when a convoy was blocked coming in from Kiseljak.

19     We summoned NATO air-strikes, and the Serb block withdrew before the NATO

20     air-strikes were used.  That was the sort of thing we were having to do

21     to run convoys.  On another occasion, we employed Danish Leopard tanks to

22     engage Bosnian Serb tanks in order to facilitate the passage of a convoy

23     bearing refugees from Zvornik.  They were extreme examples which I was

24     aware of, but the daily routine running of convoys was not my business.

25     It was the chief of staff of UNPROFOR's business.

Page 7441

 1        Q.   And thank you.  Let me just say this:  I'm going to share a

 2     statement with you, and then we'll compare percentages.  I'm saying that

 3     3 to 5 per cent of convoys, at the most, faced any difficulties, and what

 4     would you say?  What was the percentage, in your view?

 5        A.   I think it's a question that is meaningless, because if the

 6     United Nations Protection Force was having to employ force or threaten

 7     the use of force and was having to deal with obstructive bureaucratic

 8     procedures in order to ensure the passage of convoys, then one could not

 9     say other than the United Nations was continually facing difficulties.

10     It may have achieved more than 50 per cent of its targets by the time the

11     year ended, but, of course, that includes periods when there was, for

12     example, into Sarajevo, the open running of civilian convoys into

13     Sarajevo during the summer of 1994.  And that, of course, distorted the

14     overall tonnages and figures.  So if you approached it from a statistical

15     point of view, it is meaningless saying it's this percentage or that

16     percentage.  All I know - and this is using World Health Organisation

17     figures - is that because of the obstructions mainly from the Serb side,

18     it was not possible to achieve the targets that had been set for the

19     United Nations.

20        Q.   General, just one more question with this regard.  When it comes

21     to the situation in the theatre of war, combats, or cease-fires, did all

22     that have any impact on the passage of the convoys?

23        A.   Of course, if a high level of conflict was taking place along a

24     certain part of the front-line, then it would not be possible to run

25     convoys across the routes that lay in that part of the line.

Page 7442

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Can this document be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification, pending -- until

 4     the time we get the full translation.

 5                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I was advised it is being up-loaded.

 7             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  If I can just add to that, Your Honour.

 9             The original of this document is -- because I think the one you

10     see before you has been taken from a book, the original of this document

11     has otherwise been contained at 1D00276, and there is a Defence team

12     translation that's complete of that one.  And the translation that was

13     accompanying the one that's on the screen in front of you comes from a

14     book, and, to be quite honest, neither English translation is consistent.

15             JUDGE KWON:  But all the translation will be checked by the CLSS

16     later on.  On that basis, we'll admit that.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D690, Your Honours.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D02444 is the next document I

19     would like to bring up.  This is a daily report dated 31st January -- or,

20     rather, 30 January 1994, when our co-operation first started, General.

21     And the report was sent after our meeting.  1D0 -- yes, that's it.

22             Can this be zoomed in.  I don't believe that we have a Serbian

23     translation:

24             [In English] "I express my gratitude to President Karadzic for

25     his help and co-operation of ensuring unhindered deliveries of

Page 7443

 1     humanitarian aid by land corridors passing across this territory.

 2     British General Michael Rose -- Major Michael Rose, the newly-appointed

 3     UNPROFOR commander ... said after his meeting today with Radovan

 4     Karadzic ..."

 5             And so on.

 6             [Interpretation] But look at the bottom of the page.  I am saying

 7     my impression is --

 8             [In English] "... that regardless of where they come from,

 9     high-ranking officers are the ones least prejudiced.  Such was the case

10     with all former UNPROFOR commanders, and so it is with General Rose who

11     is willing to examine the situation as a whole and take an unbiased

12     stand, which the United Nations personifies.  We have always been

13     satisfied with the UN high commands and have never had any objections to

14     their works, the Srpska Republika president said."

15             [Interpretation] Here you can see that we -- or that I exculpated

16     higher commands and that we say to the general public that they should be

17     respected.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Do you remember that on several occasions we issued public

20     positive statements about UNPROFOR in order to have common citizens

21     receive them with a lot of understanding and extend welcome to them?

22        A.   I don't remember you issuing particular statements, and I

23     certainly cannot remember, looking at that document, expressing

24     satisfaction about the safe passage of convoys across Serb territory.

25        Q.   And in the following paragraph, you say -- and let me not read

Page 7444

 1     for everybody.  Everybody can read it for themselves.  You express your

 2     satisfaction with the passage of a convoy through the Serbian territory

 3     and a lower intensity of military operations or reduced volume of

 4     military operations.  And it is obvious that you could see a link between

 5     the reduced volume of military operations and the increased level -- or,

 6     rather, number of the humanitarian convoy passages.  That's what you just

 7     said a little while ago.  If there is a higher intensity of fighting,

 8     there are fewer conveys, and vice versa.  Do you see the passage?

 9        A.   I can -- I can agree that if there's a higher level of conflict,

10     then there would be a lower level of the delivery of humanitarian aid.

11     That's entirely logical.  But as I say, I cannot remember ever making a

12     statement expressing satisfaction with the safe passage of convoys,

13     particularly, when I check the table for January, we were running just

14     over half only of the convoys required, so it was most unlikely I would

15     have made a statement of satisfaction.  I can't see who else was at the

16     meeting, but had it been a member of the United Nations High Commission

17     for Refugees present, or even Sergio Viera de Mello who previously worked

18     for the UNHCR, he would certainly have made me withdraw that statement,

19     given the reality on the ground.

20        Q.   General, I'm sure that I didn't write this.  And further on, it

21     says that I said that in a discussion with General Rose, we tackled our

22     different issues, some of them being incidents and provocations of Muslim

23     forces with regard to NATO, and that we also agreed that every incident

24     should be investigated.  And then on the following page, your words are

25     quoted.

Page 7445

 1             Can we go to the following page, to page 2.

 2             In quotation, we can see your words:

 3             [In English] "'The protection of humanitarian aid routes is

 4     within the mandate of the peace forces, and we are aware of the

 5     difficulties and traps which can present themselves, but we will conduct

 6     an investigation in every case, and I therefore stress the importance of

 7     the deliveries of humanitarian aid across these areas,' ..."

 8             [Interpretation] You were aware at the time that what was going

 9     on was a civil war, and you were aware of all of the difficulties and

10     traps?

11        A.   I was, indeed.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Can the document be admitted?

14             JUDGE KWON:  You said this is a daily report.  I take it it is

15     one of the news agencies' report, "Tanjug."

16             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  No objection.

18             JUDGE KWON:  It will be admitted.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D691, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D02443 is the next document I

21     would like to call up.  1D02443.  Do you remember --

22             JUDGE KWON:  If it is convenient, shall we take a break?

23             We'll have a break for 25 minutes.  We'll resume at five past

24     4.00.

25                           --- Recess taken at 3.42 p.m.

Page 7446

 1                           --- On resuming at 4.10 p.m.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4        Q.   Do you agree with me, General, that the 16 years that have lapsed

 5     have had an impact and that we need documents in order to jog our memory

 6     of all those events; right?

 7        A.   Certainly; one's memory starts to fade, and documents are of a

 8     help.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I ask the Court to produce

10     P1485, which is Mladic's diary.  I would like to ask for English page 90

11     and the Serbian typed page 91.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Just a while ago, General, we saw a "Tanjug" report from our

14     press conference after the meeting.  We obviously appeared before the

15     journalists after that meeting, you and I, and here we have your

16     conversation with General Mladic.

17             Can we also see the Serbian typed version, page 91.  Not

18     handwritten version, typed version, if that helps.

19             In any case, we can use the English version, and this is what

20     Mladic wrote down.  We have both versions now.  Mladic says:

21             "I am glad that convoys are going through without problems."

22             This is, according to Mladic, what you said:

23             "We have problems, maybe we will have, but it is best that

24     convoys go.

25             "Life in Sarajevo has been more peaceful in the past seven days."

Page 7447

 1             You express your regret, and you say that:

 2             "It is regrettable that journalists are attacking only the

 3     Serbian side, and the Serbs are not the only ones to blame."

 4             In this conversation, reference is made to the convoy, and at

 5     that moment you were satisfied with the passage of convoys; right?  And

 6     the convoys are mentioned both in the conversation with Mladic as well as

 7     in the conversation with me that we saw a while ago.

 8        A.   Well, I can't remember making these comments at all.

 9        Q.   And that's why we have mementos.  This is General Mladic's

10     memento.  He said that you had said this.  And then you went on to say

11     that:

12             "People in New York think that you are blocking the convoys and

13     UN forces, which is not true."

14             In this case, "you" is actually us, the Serbs.  This is

15     apparently what you said to General Mladic on that same day.  I

16     understand that a lot has been forgotten.  However, it seems to me -- or,

17     rather, I'm even convinced that at that time, you were happier with all

18     that than you are today.

19             Do you agree that both in "Tanjug"'s report about our meeting, as

20     well as in Mladic's notes about your meeting, we can see that you were

21     rather satisfied both with the convoys and the pacification of the

22     situation in Sarajevo?

23        A.   Well, clearly that was the interpretation you put into whatever

24     remarks you chose to record.  Whether that was the case or not, it would

25     be impossible to say today.  I would have to get a copy of the record of

Page 7448

 1     the meeting that was always kept by the civil adviser of every discussion

 2     we had to see whether his notes matched those of yours or General Mladic.

 3     But at the moment, it's impossible to say one way or the other.

 4        Q.   Can we get the record made by your civilian administration?  Why

 5     shouldn't we be able to see for ourselves?  But as far as this document

 6     is concerned, these are General Mladic's notes, and the previous document

 7     was a report from our press conference, after our meeting.  I'm not the

 8     author of any of them.  And this document is self-explanatory.  These are

 9     your words, both in the newspapers and in Mladic's diary.  On the same

10     day, you spoke along the same lines to the both of us; right?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, there's no point of repeating the same

12     question.  You made the point, and the general has answered his answer.

13     Let's move on.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to correct the

15     general and say that neither were my notes -- neither the news report nor

16     Mladic's diary.

17             Can this be admitted?  I believe that we have to admit parts of

18     Mladic's diary because not the entire document has been admitted.  I

19     don't know what the procedure is with the diary parts that we are

20     tendering for admission.

21             JUDGE KWON:  I'm concerned you have been already exhausted.  We

22     admit it in its entirety.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             1P -- or, rather, the same document, English page 109, and the

25     Serbian 110, again the typed version.  Page 110 and 111.  Let's start

Page 7449

 1     with 110.  I'm talking about the same document.  Can the Court please

 2     produce that.  This is 15 days later, General.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   On the 15th of February, a meeting with General Cot and

 5     General Rose, and again these are Mladic's notes.  He had met up with

 6     Generals Cot and Rose.

 7             Let's look at the page.  A meeting with General Cot, and

 8     General Cot says, I've planned a meeting.

 9             Can we move on to the following page in the English version as

10     well as in the Serbian version.

11             And he says that he had planned a meeting with General Delic and

12     that he had met Ganic, and he had told me that General Delic was in

13     Central Bosnia, and so on and so forth.  And then General Rose is quoted

14     as saying this:

15             "Since we met General Milovanovic, we have had full

16     co-operation."

17             And then he goes -- or, rather, you go on to say:

18             "There's no difference between us and NATO.  There will be no

19     air-strikes before I order them."

20             And then you suggest a visit to the weapons collections, and you

21     are asking for guarantees for all weapons to be under control.

22             Do you remember that meeting which was attended by you and

23     General Cot?  That meeting was with General Mladic.  Do you remember that

24     meeting?

25        A.   I remember the meeting.  And I repeat that I have no record in

Page 7450

 1     front of me of the meeting taken by the civil adviser, so I can't make

 2     any comment as to the accuracy of your account of the meeting.  I'm not

 3     saying it's inaccurate, I'm merely saying I can't make a comment on it.

 4     It's certainly selective in what is written down.  It's certainly not

 5     comprehensive, your note.  For example, it doesn't say that

 6     General Mladic flew into a rage and stated that no one can threaten a

 7     Serb and live, which is a note that I took from the meeting.  That's not

 8     included in these notes, so it is selective.

 9        Q.   Have you kept any notes from that meeting?  Do you have any notes

10     of that meeting?

11        A.   I don't have notes, but the United Nations certainly kept a

12     record of all the meetings that we had.

13        Q.   We'll find something about that meeting, sir.

14             65 ter 318 is the next document I would like the Court to

15     produce.

16             General, in Britain you would also say nobody can threaten Great

17     Britain and remain standing; right?  For example, that's what happened at

18     the Falkland Islands, and I congratulate you on that.  But I would also

19     say that even small nations have the right, they are entitled to keep

20     their dignity.  Do you agree with me?

21        A.   I'm not sure which part of the statement you want me to agree

22     with.  Nations under the United Nations Charter 7 -- under United Nations

23     Charter Article 7 -- Charter 7, have the right to self-defence.  That's

24     certain.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 12318, please.  This is not the

Page 7451

 1     document that I had called up.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   My question was this:  You said that General Mladic had told you

 4     that nobody had the right to threaten the Serbs.  Would you not agree

 5     that nobody has the right to threaten anybody?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just move on to your next question.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  10785, my mistake, I

 8     apologise.  65 ter 10785.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Please look at paragraph 2.  This is a telegram sent by

11     Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan, or, rather, from Ambassador de Mello to Akashi,

12     copied to Annan.  Paragraph 2:

13             [In English] "Humanitarian convoys, Rose said, should be allowed

14     to move freely after agreed clearance procedure - including routes - has

15     been complied with."

16             [Interpretation] The first sentence says that a clearance

17     procedure was agreed, agreed clearance procedure, and that it had to be

18     complied with.

19             Further on, it says -- just a moment.  Bear with me, please.  You

20     can see the entire paragraph, but look at this:

21             "Later with Mladic --"

22             [In English] "-- Rose again expressed satisfaction at the general

23     improvement in terms of convoy movements and hoped this would be

24     maintained.  Procedural requirements should not become bureaucratic

25     harassment."

Page 7452

 1             [Interpretation] In other words, the procedure did not mean

 2     hindrance.

 3             [In English] "Serbs must respect you.  Not one finger will be

 4     raised against the UN.  Not one UNPROFOR soldier has died on the

 5     Republika Srpska territory.  His side had had some problems with members

 6     of humanitarian organisations.  UNPROFOR convoys would have no problems,

 7     other than weather.  Some equipment (detectors) could, however, be

 8     provided to speed up clearance procedures."

 9             [Interpretation] Do you see that even Ambassador de Mello, may

10     God rest his soul, reported exactly in the same way as "Tanjug" reported

11     and in the same way as Mladic had noted it down in his diary?

12        A.   Certainly, elements of what was reported in the first and second

13     documents you showed me are borne out by Mr. de Mello's record of the

14     meeting.  And my own memory suggests that Mr. de Mello's record there is

15     accurate, so far as I remember.  It's certainly not comprehensive, but

16     it's accurate.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And now, General, you will see that Mladic was true

18     to his word.

19             Let's look at 1D02443.  We will come back to this document, and

20     we will tender it for admission later.  And now I would like the Court to

21     produce 1D02443.

22             Yes, that's the document.

23             Can I draw your attention to the third bullet point, where it

24     says:

25             [In English] "...have arrested three persons for firing on UN

Page 7453

 1     aircraft near Sarajevo last week and have issued warrants for the arrest

 2     of a further five."

 3             [Interpretation] That was in January 1994.  There had been an

 4     incident, and Serbs arrested and issued warrants for the arrest of

 5     others.

 6             And look at the last paragraph here:

 7             [In English] "The air-lift continues.  Three UNPROFOR and 20

 8     UNHCR flights landed at the airport yesterday.  Following up last week's

 9     incidents of small-arms fire against flights into Sarajevo, the BH -- BSA

10     have arrested three men and have issued warrants for the arrest of a

11     further five."

12             [Interpretation] This is your press release, or, rather,

13     UNPROFOR's daily press release for that particular day.

14             Do you remember this particular incident or --

15        A.   I was not in the country at the time.  I took over on the 30th of

16     January, if I remember right, or shortly before that.

17        Q.   But do you see that this is consistent with Mladic's position --

18        A.   [Previous translation continues] ... very much so.  I arrived on

19     the 23rd of January, so I was in the country at the time, but I don't

20     remember that incident.

21        Q.   Is this consistent with Mladic's position, which was that the

22     United Nations will come in no harm's way, that nobody will as much as

23     raise a finger against them?

24        A.   Well, that certainly seems to be what he said at the time.  The

25     fact that the performance on the ground subsequently didn't match up to

Page 7454

 1     that promise is an extremely regrettable thing from all perspectives.

 2        Q.   General, sir, if we expand this, or if you expand this, we're

 3     going to have to seek proof.  And we see here that if you don't do

 4     anything, the Serbs don't do anything against you, so we see here that it

 5     is the perpetrators that are being punished.

 6             Can this document be admitted?

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  It's not complete, Your Honour.  That's a

 8     multi-page document.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't mind having all of it

10     admitted.

11             JUDGE KWON:  So do we have the entire part -- all parts of this

12     document?  Do we need to mark it for identification, pending until the

13     time we get all of it?

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Please.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll do that.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be MFI D692.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18        Q.   General, did you know that we had offered the doubling of the

19     capacities of land corridors between Belgrade and Tuzla and that we

20     offered that the Banja Luka Airport be opened for humanitarian aid

21     purposes?

22        A.   I don't have any particular memory of that proposal or those

23     proposals.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D2535.

25     1D2535.  It's a letter of mine, actually, written to Ambassador Akashi a

Page 7455

 1     day after you took up your duties.

 2             Here's the letter:

 3             [In English] "My meeting with Miss Sadako Ogata on 19th of

 4     January, I offered to widen the land corridor for the flow of

 5     humanitarian aid from Belgrade to Tuzla, whereby the quantity of aid

 6     would be doubled.  Not only would aid be expanded but I also promised to

 7     facilitate its flow through the proposed Belgrade-Tuzla land corridor.

 8     This would accordingly obviate any need for the opening of Tuzla Airport.

 9     The Serbian side has legitimate fears that the Muslims wish to smuggle

10     arms through Tuzla Airport, and we are also fearful that they might

11     provoke incidents such as shooting down the aircraft, for which they

12     would blame the Serbs.

13             Ms. Ogata has accepted our offer regarding the expansion of the

14     Belgrade-Tuzla route.  Once the peace agreement is concluded, the airport

15     at Tuzla can, of course, be opened, along with several other airports in

16     the former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

17             [Interpretation] Do you agree that this is a fair humanitarian

18     offer?

19        A.   It certainly seems to be an offer which I think Mr. Akashi at the

20     time progressed.  Why it never happened, I don't know.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we'll see whether it ever

22     happened.

23             But can this be admitted now?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D693, Your Honours.

Page 7456

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 6842.  6842

 2     is the 65 ter number.

 3             Let us look at the first page and identify what this is all

 4     about, and then let's move on to the second page.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this has been admitted as

 6     Exhibit P1650.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So much the better.

 9             Let's move on to the second page.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   General, let us focus on paragraph 6 "Tuzla Airport."

12             [In English] "Rose commended Karadzic's decision to double

13     quantities of assistance flowing by road, which, if implemented, would

14     reduce the urgency to use the airfield for humanitarian purposes.

15     However, the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security

16     Council (which Karadzic had 'read very carefully') made no secret about

17     the imperative need for UNPROFOR to reopen that airport, while taking

18     Bosnian Serb legitimate concerns into account."

19             [Interpretation] This telegram shows that you fully took part in

20     this and that you supported my offer.

21             Now you see paragraph 7.  You see this telegram of the UN, dated

22     the 31st of January:

23             [In English] "Karadzic said it would be very difficult for him to

24     agree.  He was certain that 'Muslims' intended to shoot down the UN

25     aircraft (he recalled the Italian plane crash, saying, 'They shoot it

Page 7457

 1     down and we got the no-fly zone') so as to put the blame on the Serbs."

 2             [Interpretation] Do you now remember that you were fully aware of

 3     this?

 4        A.   I think you're referring to the meeting on the 30th of January,

 5     when the subject of the opening of the airfield was raised by Mr. Akashi,

 6     and I do remember the discussions which surrounded that proposal.

 7        Q.   I don't know whether Mr. Akashi was there.  This seems to have

 8     been a meeting between you and me.

 9             Actually, do you know these people, Yolanda Auger, who is writing

10     from Zagreb, Lee Trung Zhang [phoen], the civilian chief from Belgrade?

11     Do you know these UN officials?

12        A.   No, I didn't.  And I may have conflated a subsequent discussion I

13     had with Mr. Akashi about the opening of the airfield.  Certainly, I

14     remember him raising it with you on a subsequent occasion, if it

15     wasn't -- as it looks as though it wasn't on the 30th of January.

16        Q.   The entire document is most interesting.  Since it's been

17     admitted, we can move on.

18             1D2532, can we have that now, please.  It's a letter of mine to

19     His Excellency Mr. Akashi on the 23rd of April, 1994.  It relates to the

20     Tuzla airport, and it's also his letter to me on the 21st of March.  In

21     the second paragraph, it says:

22             "He demonstrated enormous understanding and flexibility by

23     agreeing that the Tuzla airport be reopened, in the first place, much

24     against our better judgement.  However, as in the case of Sarajevo

25     Airport, we decided to accommodate the demands on us in the interests of

Page 7458

 1     bringing humanitarian aid to civilians, even though, as you know well,

 2     such aid is also being used by the Muslim military and sustains their war

 3     efforts against us.  I reiterate on this occasion that the modalities of

 4     reopening the Tuzla Airport must be in line with the conditions we have

 5     agreed with President Yeltsin's emissary."

 6             I don't have to read all of it:

 7             [In English] "Any forceful scenario for starting the aid flights

 8     will, of course, reveal that the international community is not

 9     interested in negotiations and agreements, and that the Muslims are

10     dictating to the Serbs side through the UN and others."

11             [Interpretation] So, General, sir, do you not see that we were

12     never opposed to humanitarian aid, even in situations when it exposed us

13     to danger?  Our fears were legitimate, weren't they, as stated by the

14     Secretary-General of the UN in the previous document?

15        A.   Well, certainly in a matter -- in the matter of theory, you were

16     not opposed to the delivery of humanitarian aid.  But, of course, in

17     practice, as I've explained previously, it was the Serb side that did

18     most of the blocking of the aid convoys.  As a matter of point of

19     accuracy, I notice your letter's dated the 23rd of April, but actually

20     there's a time stamp on the letter from the UN Communications Centre

21     which is dated the 23rd of March.  I guess your letter should have read

22     "23rd March."

23        Q.   Possibly, because I'm referring to the letter of His Excellency

24     Mr. Akashi, dated the 21st of March.  I certainly would not have waited

25     for over a month to reply.  I assume that these numbers are more correct,

Page 7459

 1     after all.  But basically it's one-and-the-same thing.

 2             General, since you're saying that, I have to go back to something

 3     else.  What is the percentage of convoys that did not pass through?  But

 4     never mind, General.

 5             Do you agree with the Secretary-General when he says that our

 6     concerns were legitimate?  I have to present this to the Trial Chamber.

 7     Were we evil, just like that, for no reason whatsoever, or were we

 8     cautious, as regards humanitarian aid, so that we would not endanger

 9     ourselves?

10        A.   Well, clearly, you were right to be nervous about the possibility

11     that humanitarian aid could be used to smuggle weapons to the opposing

12     side in the conflict.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  You will see, General,

14     that the Tuzla Airport was widely abused for arming the Muslims.

15             Can this letter be admitted?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D694, Your Honours.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D346, can we have that, please.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   General, once again I would like to ask you to take into account

21     the fact that I'm not accusing any nation or any higher command or

22     civilian structure of the UN.  However, from this document, you will see

23     proof coming from the Muslim side showing that convoys are being abused.

24     So this is the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Without your opposing to his making comments?

Page 7460

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Actually, no, Your Honour.  This is at least the

 2     fourth document this afternoon that we've received no notification on, so

 3     I thought by this time it might be worth rising to make that point.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I have difficulty following the last three

 5     documents from his list of documents to be used with this witness.  So

 6     what happened, Mr. Karadzic?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that we had shown it a long

 8     time ago.  I think that it had been displayed a long time ago.  But,

 9     nevertheless, we do apologise, we ask for your understanding, because in

10     their statements, witnesses often expand the subject involved and then we

11     have to deal with it.  Also, we are very flexible when the Prosecution

12     brings documents out of the blue.

13             This document dates back to the time just prior to your arrival,

14     the 24th of December, 1993.  It's the Muslim command and their military

15     security.

16             Could we have page 3 of this document.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I will tell you to be more cautious when you are

18     going to use the document for which we don't have a translation.  You

19     should understand the difficulty of the Prosecution to deal with such

20     matters.

21             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Well, in fact, Your Honour, this is a violation of

23     the guide-lines, and it's repeated, and I have particular concern with

24     these multi-page documents in languages that we don't understand, that

25     the witness doesn't understand, where provisions are frequently -- or

Page 7461

 1     passages are frequently extracted from those documents and put to

 2     witnesses without having the context of the documents explained or

 3     properly articulated.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  That noted, why don't we get on with the evidence.

 5     So bear that in mind, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             The entire document is going to be quite interesting, once we

 8     have it translated.  But as for this witness, it is only one paragraph

 9     that we would like to deal with:

10             "Sector of the Military Security Service of the 1st Corps learned

11     over the past few days that at the PTT building -- PTT engineering

12     building, because of the Christmas holidays, UNPF members have relaxed

13     highly, so they focus very little on their regular tasks."

14             Now, look at this:

15             "In addition to that, because the aggressor has refused to allow

16     logistic convoys for the UNPF into town, there is a considerable shortage

17     of food and oil.  Since your oil is not getting in, and that is why the

18     Bosnian Muslim Army doesn't have any oil."

19             See, this is evidence, General.  This is proof that we allowed

20     you to import oil for yourselves, and you gave it to them.

21             THE WITNESS:  Under no circumstances did the United Nations ever

22     give oil to the -- or fuel to the military forces of the Bosnian

23     Government.  There was a certain amount of stealing of fuel that took

24     place, and in some cases, regrettably, a number of soldiers individually

25     sold fuel from their lorries to all three sides, depending on who was

Page 7462

 1     offering the most money.  But it was neither systematic nor deliberate, a

 2     matter of policy of the UN, to sell fuel to any side, combat forces.  All

 3     fuel that was passed across was for humanitarian purposes, in principle.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before this document was shown, I

 5     said that I'm not attacking higher commands.  But it's all the same, as

 6     far as we're concerned, how they got this fuel and how they waged war

 7     against us.  From our point of view, it's one-and-the-same thing, who

 8     sold fuel or whatever, but the fact remains that the more fuel you get

 9     into a particular zone, our army is suspicious that that fuel will end up

10     in Muslim tanks or APCs.

11             Can this document please be admitted?

12             THE WITNESS:  The quantities of fuel that were stolen from the

13     United Nations or illegally sold by individual soldiers would have been

14     very small and, I suspect, would have more likely gone to civilians

15     rather than the military.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, marked for

17     identification.

18             JUDGE KWON:  You'll have another opportunity to tender this,

19     Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I would like us to note for the

21     record that the general rejected the possibility of having -- the higher

22     commands have done this, and also he said that it was soldiers at lower

23     levels that sold this.

24             1D02538 [as interpreted], can we have that, please.  1D02528.

25     The original is in English, so it's going to be easier for us.  Yes.

Page 7463

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Do you agree, General -- or, rather, would you agree to have a

 3     look at this letter?  I wrote to Mr. Akashi on the 24th of June.  I thank

 4     him for his letter dated the 23rd of June, that is to say, the previous

 5     day.  And in that letter, he describes the increased difficulties that

 6     UNPROFOR BH Command is experiencing with regard to freedom of movement

 7     and communication.  And then I say:

 8             [In English] "Put current methods into some perspective."

 9             [Interpretation] Further down, I say:

10             [In English] "I remind you that the recent Geneva Agreement has

11     provided for a cessation of hostilities and exchange of prisoners.  The

12     Muslims are completely ignoring their signature over this agreement."

13             [Interpretation] And then a bit further down:

14             [In English] "UNPROFOR forces take little notice of the agreed

15     procedure (for example, undeclared goods and equipment) and display

16     unacceptable behaviour, as if they are an army of occupation.  That is

17     even worse -- what is even worse, UNPROFOR is allowing the Muslims to use

18     its observation posts, and there have been many occasions when the blue

19     helmets have used artillery to fire at Serb positions."

20             [Interpretation] Further on, I ask his Excellency, Mr. Akashi, to

21     bring his own influence -- or, rather, to change the manner of action

22     that would actually enhance the Serbs' trust of UNPROFOR.

23             Do you remember this document, General?

24        A.   I've never seen it before.  And I would have taken grave

25     exception to it, had I seen it, and I'm sure that Mr. Akashi would have

Page 7464

 1     done the same.  There was no case ever of the United Nations allowing its

 2     positions to be used by any of the warring parties to prosecute the war,

 3     nor, indeed, did the United Nations fire artillery at anybody, other than

 4     those people who were trying to obstruct the passage of convoys or in

 5     self-defence.

 6        Q.   Is it possible that you did not know absolutely everything that

 7     was going on, General?

 8        A.   Of course.

 9        Q.   And that there may have been violations or abuses that you have

10     not been aware of?

11        A.   Not at the level you suggest in this letter to Mr. Akashi.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to draw your attention

13     to this sentence:

14             [In English] "But I shall do everything in my power to remove an

15     obstacle to the freedom of movement ..."

16             [Interpretation] And so on and so forth:

17             [In English] "Equally, as we are in a very delicate phase, I

18     would like you to ask to try to ensure that no unnecessary problems are

19     being created by UNPROFOR."

20             [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?  And then let's

21     move on to another exhibit.

22             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, what was your question in respect

23     to the last quotation?  I mean, this is a self-serving statement.  What

24     was your question to the general?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question was whether it was

Page 7465

 1     possible that the general, Sir Michael Rose, did not know everything that

 2     was referred to in this letter.  I am writing to General Rose's boss,

 3     because a day before that Mr. Akashi had written to me about

 4     difficulties.  My question was:  Does this letter not show that we have a

 5     problem with UNPROFOR?  General Rose allowed for the possibility of him

 6     not knowing about each and every incident, although he thought that he

 7     had to know about major incidents.

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  That seems to be a complete non-sequitur, and

 9     you're far better employed by moving on to something that the general can

10     answer.

11             JUDGE KWON:  You just read out the last paragraph of this

12     document without asking a question to the witness.  That's a totally

13     unnecessary waste of time.

14             Let's move on.

15             We'll admit this.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             I thought that that was the question.  I thought --

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Well, did you see that I made efforts to make it easier for

20     UNPROFOR to move about?  And you commended me on that note several times,

21     General.

22        A.   Where exactly did I commend you?

23        Q.   Well, you'll see.  There are quite a few documents in which you

24     expressed your gratitude for my co-operation; for example, this document

25     that we saw a few moments ago, 65 ter 6842.  It's a Prosecution exhibit,

Page 7466

 1     actually:

 2             "In Tuzla Rose commended Karadzic's decision to ..."

 3             And so on.

 4             [Interpretation] And then --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  It was referring to the minutes of the Pale meeting.

 6     So why don't we move on?

 7             Have we given the number for this?

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  No, Your Honour.  That will be Exhibit D695.

 9     That's 1D2528.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             1D02471, can we have that, please.  1D02471.  It's an UNPROFOR

13     document dated the 8th of November, 1994.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Do you think, General, that although you were not aware of this,

16     there wasn't any abuse of UN equipment and insignia by the Muslim Army?

17     This may jog your memory:  A few moments ago, you said that you think

18     that that was not the case, but see here, you did know about it.

19             If I have to read it, all right, I will, only part of the first

20     paragraph:

21             [In English] "The BiH have been observed in Sector North-East

22     using UN patches and UN coloured headgear.  They have also been observed

23     using white coloured vehicles, and on one occasion, on September 13th,

24     1994, the vehicle being used was a weapons carrier.  This incident was

25     formally protested by Lieutenant General Rose, and photographic evidence

Page 7467

 1     was produced for this protest."

 2             [Interpretation] This is what you caught, and I'm sure there was

 3     a lot of those things that you didn't manage to catch.

 4        A.   I think you're confusing two issues.  One was the wearing of

 5     uniforms or passing off by the Bosnian Government forces as UN.  And

 6     certainly, as you observed from that letter, we've noticed this happened

 7     from time to time and entered protests.  That is not the same as saying

 8     that the UN allowed the Bosnian Government forces to use their positions

 9     or, indeed, that the UN, themselves, fired their artillery, the inference

10     being that we were fighting on behalf of the Bosnian Government forces.

11     Completely false suggestion.  It was an illegal act by the Bosnian

12     Government forces to pass themselves off as the UN, and it stopped

13     whenever we protested.

14        Q.   Again, that was important for you.  But for us, it wasn't

15     important who's shooting us if somebody opened fire from a white vehicle

16     and shot our soldier.

17             Mr. Thomas testified here and said that he had to come closer to

18     a distance of three metres to establish that those were not French

19     soldiers, but, rather, Muslim soldiers masked as French soldiers.

20             General, what I'm trying to present to the Trial Chamber is that

21     our concerns and caution were justified; not by the behaviour of higher

22     commands, but by the conduct of soldiers on the enemy side who pretended

23     to be UN soldiers, wearing UN uniforms and patches.  Do you appreciate

24     that?  Do you understand me?

25        A.   I think I've already said once before that I can understand that,

Page 7468

 1     as one side or party to the conflict, you wouldn't want these prefaces to

 2     happen.  That is understood.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             Can this document be admitted, if it is not in evidence already?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  It will be done.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D696, Your Honours.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce

 8     1D02529.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   If I may remind you, this is my letter dated 22nd June.

11     Obviously, I wrote to Ambassador Akashi on the 22nd of June.  He replied

12     on the 23rd, and then I wrote back on the 24th; three days in a row.  And

13     you see what I'm writing?

14             "May I draw your attention to a matter of utmost importance,

15     which requires your urgent attention.  Over the past few days, Muslim

16     forces in the Tuzla region have been painting over in white many vehicles

17     and giving them UN markings.  These vehicles, so painted and marked, have

18     been used for the transport of troops, weapons, ammunition and equipment

19     to the front-lines.  Our soldiers on the first lines of defence have

20     clearly observed Muslim soldiers as they got off these vehicles, taking

21     off their weapons and equipment.  Thanks only to the maximum restraint

22     exercised by our officers, Serb soldiers have not yet shot at the Muslims

23     operating under UN cover."

24             I don't want to go on reading everything else.  And the last

25     sentence:

Page 7469

 1             [In English] "If nothing is done, we cannot be held responsible

 2     for any mistakes and the consequences thereof."

 3             [Interpretation] It didn't happen just once.  The Muslim side

 4     often resorted to those kinds of behaviour, and approached our lines, or

 5     carried out manoeuvres or different actions right before our eyes, and we

 6     had to engage in a guessing game as to whether that was them or UN

 7     soldiers.

 8             Would you agree with me that that was just one of the reasons

 9     that made us be more cautious and step up our controls and checks?

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I ask for a reformulation, Your Honour?

11     This is a compound question.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I think the general can deal with it.

13             THE WITNESS:  As you know, the procedures were quite clear,

14     Dr. Karadzic, about the movement of convoys.  Notification was given

15     24/48 hours ahead, giving the routes and timings.  No other movements

16     took place without that notification, other than myself, for example,

17     that had the need to visit units without warning.  But even then, we

18     tried to pass the message if we were crossing on your side.  I agree that

19     you had to be careful that the vehicles that you saw painted in white

20     were not the Bosnian Army, who'd camouflaged themselves to look like UN.

21     That is so.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             Can the document be admitted?

24             JUDGE KWON:  One part of the question might have been this:

25     whether this instance had anything to do with tightening the control over

Page 7470

 1     convoys at all.

 2             THE WITNESS:  It would have not excused the stopping of convoys,

 3     the searching of the convoys, because, of course, you knew that -- when

 4     we were coming and along which routes we were coming.  And, therefore,

 5     other movements which were not to do with us, clearly, you had a right to

 6     stop and inspect.  But as I said earlier, us having gained clearance for

 7     the passage of a convoy from you, there was no need after that for you to

 8     stop and inspect.  And when I say "inspect," I don't mean just asking for

 9     the driver for his identity card to make sure he was a genuine United

10     Nations driver; I mean getting in the back of the vehicle and inspecting,

11     at an unnecessary and absurd level, all the items within that vehicle

12     against a manifest which may have been made up, as I say, some 24 or 48

13     hours before.  That it was not compatible and could not be excused by

14     your need to be careful about the passing off, by the Bosnian Government

15     forces, of themselves as UN.

16             JUDGE KWON:  The document will be admitted as Exhibit D697.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   General, sir, do you agree with me that the procedure envisaged

19     not only the reading of declarations, but also the inspection, so as to

20     make sure that the declarations matched the contents of the convoys;

21     right?  Can you say yes or no?

22        A.   I've already said that I did not think that was compatible with

23     the agreement that had been made that we should have full and free

24     movement across the territories.  Notification of the passage of a convoy

25     and the number of vehicles was sufficient, in my estimation.  And it was

Page 7471

 1     regrettable, as I said already, to me that by the time I arrived, a

 2     practice had been embarked upon where parties to the conflict were

 3     permitted to go and search vehicles.  In my view, and it still remains,

 4     that is wrong.

 5        Q.   Well, General, all of the documents show that we did not have to

 6     trust you; not you, personally, but your soldiers.  Declarations were

 7     produced to show what was supposed to be in the lorries, and then lorries

 8     would be opened to see whether the contents of the lorries matched the

 9     declarations.

10             Do you agree that a passage through a country at war allows

11     somebody who has proved something to inspect whether the lorry contained

12     only what was approved and nothing else?  Why was that a problem if

13     nothing was being smuggled?

14        A.   I think we've already answered that question, Dr. Karadzic.

15        Q.   Thank you.  General, do you remember where Sepak is and where

16     Karakaj is, both on the Drina?

17        A.   I have no idea.

18        Q.   Karakaj is close to Zvornik, and Sepak is down the stream.  Do

19     you agree that if a license is issued for Sepak, a convoy should not

20     appear at Karakaj, because the crew at Karakaj didn't have a clue that a

21     convoy might be arriving there?

22        A.   Well, without knowing the details, I would agree that a UN

23     humanitarian aid convoy should follow the route that had been agreed

24     previously with the warring parties.  That is obvious, from the point of

25     view of security and other aspects.

Page 7472

 1        Q.   We're going to show two more documents about this topic.  And do

 2     you agree that if a declaration says there would be 10 lorries and 11

 3     appear, that a soldier in charge should not let any of them through until

 4     he receives his orders, a new approval for their passage?

 5        A.   Well, that seems common sense.  But, of course, there are

 6     telephones and communications available, and it would not take long to

 7     get permission to add one more vehicle to a convoy if that had become

 8     necessary.  But as I say, I was not responsible for the detailed running

 9     of convoys; the chiefs of staff of the UN Protection Force were doing

10     that.  And detailed questions of this nature should be directed at them,

11     presuming they appear as witnesses, because I can't make detailed

12     comment.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             Can the Court please produce 1D00277.  We have a draft

15     translation done by my team.  Therefore, we have an English version as

16     well.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   This is a letter of mine to the MUP of Republika Srpska; in other

19     words, the Ministry of the Interior.  We can all see both the Serbian and

20     English versions.  The date is 7 August 1994.  And in this letter, I

21     issue an order to all MUP organs and all centres of Public and State

22     Security, police stations, check-points, and so on and so forth, which

23     are in direct contact with UNPROFOR and the UNHCR, should try to enhance

24     their relations with those and any other international organisations.

25     And in the following passage, I say that:

Page 7473

 1             "Irrespective of frequent cases of abuse and dishonest activities

 2     by these organisations, by which they're putting themselves on the side

 3     of our enemies, and thus they lose the symbols of neutrality, we must

 4     keep improving communications with these organisations ..."

 5             And then I say:

 6             "When abuses and machinations are detected and corrected

 7     according to the rules, and report the cases to the authorise organs of

 8     UNPROFOR and UNHCR and organise meetings to shed light on those

 9     incidents."

10             General, do you see that we are not actually suspicious of the

11     highest level?  What we are saying here is that the higher levels of

12     UNPROFOR and the UNHCR should be notified as to what their soldiers may

13     be engaged in in the field?

14        A.   If the question is should, if you find an infraction in the

15     running of convoys, the UNHCR or the UN Protection Force be informed,

16     well, that is so.  In regards to this -- the text of this particular

17     letter, I endorse what you say, in terms of the need to -- at that time

18     to improve the relationships between the two sides, i.e., the UN side and

19     the Bosnian Serb side.  I suppose your view, in effect, in regards to

20     this instance.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Can it be admitted?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D698, Your Honours.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce

Page 7474

 1     1D2495.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   I'm repeating, General, I'm not accusing anybody, I'm just trying

 4     to explain the motives for caution on the Serbian side.  This is the long

 5     and the short of it.

 6             You see that Ambassador Akashi wrote to Annan on the 22nd of

 7     July, 1994, about the Iranian flight to Zagreb:

 8             [In English] "As you indicate, it is not within our mandate to

 9     monitor the arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia.  We are, therefore,

10     not in a position to have our personnel inspect these planes to verify

11     that their cargo is of humanitarian goods."

12             [Interpretation] And a bit further down in the second paragraph:

13             [In English] "United Nations military observers at Pleso Airport

14     monitoring the enforcement of the no-fly zone, they have been asked to

15     report if they should observe anything which could indicate a violation

16     of the arms embargo by this flight."

17             [Interpretation] You see, General, sir, that Mr. Annan, Mr.

18     Gharekhan, Mr. Stoltenberg were informed by Mr. Akashi that there was,

19     indeed, correspondence relative to the landing of this Iranian aircraft

20     at Pleso Airport in Zagreb.  Did you know about that?

21        A.   I certainly knew there were Iranian aircraft landing at Zagreb

22     Airport.  I saw them myself.  I was also aware that some correspondence

23     had taken place at the time about this.  But I think, as I explained

24     earlier on, we were not in a position to observe whether the embargo was

25     being broken.  That was the responsibility of NATO and the European

Page 7475

 1     Union, not the United Nations, as Mr. Akashi says in this letter.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             Can this be admitted as well?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D699, Your Honours.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Can I remind you that in your book, on page 292, as well as in

 8     the statement provided on the 13th of January, 2009, on page 42, you

 9     stated that despite the arms embargo, weapons were flowing into

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and President Clinton's decision not to impose an

11     embargo on arms gave a new meaning -- or, rather, gave a new sense of

12     urgency to the Serbs.  This is your statement, dated 13 January 2009,

13     page 42, paragraph 170, as well as a passage in your book "Fighting For

14     Peace," page 292.  At that time, you showed full understanding for us,

15     General; right?

16        A.   I can't quite see the paragraph you're referring to on page 42 of

17     the hard-back version of the book.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Page 42 of your statement; page 292 of the book.

19     It's paragraph 170.

20             THE WITNESS:  170.  Thank you, sir.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The statement will be enough,

22     paragraph 170.  I may have quoted a wrong page for the book, because I

23     don't know what edition has been taken into account.

24             THE WITNESS:  And your question, Dr. Karadzic?

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 7476

 1        Q.   Do you agree that at that time you understood our concerns about

 2     the illegal arming of the Muslim side?

 3        A.   At the time, of course, we had no knowledge whether the arms

 4     embargo was being broken or not.  Specific incidents did not get reported

 5     to us.  There was a suspicion this was happening because, as I explained

 6     before, the Bosnian Government forces started to appear in new uniforms.

 7     And when General Mladic challenged General Clark, at a meeting in

 8     Gornji Vakuf, that the American uniforms were beginning to appear, and no

 9     doubt other items of military equipment, General Clark did not deny it.

10             However, as I also have explained, the United Nations' principal

11     job was the delivery of humanitarian aid.  We had no

12     intelligence-gathering capability, and so the suspicion remained

13     suspicion.  Post facto, of course, 15, 16 years on, it appears that there

14     was an active programme to break that arms embargo by different countries

15     around the world.

16        Q.   Do you agree, General, sir, that from Pleso Airport, that

17     armament -- those weapons had to pass through a corridor to the Muslim

18     territory, that some vehicles had to be used to haul those weapons to

19     them?

20        A.   I'm not sure where you're inferring these weapons are going to.

21     They're going from Zagreb Airport, in your view, to where?  To Bihac, or

22     to Sarajevo, or throughout Bosnian Government territory?  And, of course,

23     by then Croatia because it was -- a federation had been formed.  But I

24     didn't quite get the point of your question.

25        Q.   Well, I'm referring -- or, rather, the purpose of my question,

Page 7477

 1     General, sir, is to show to this Trial Chamber why we were cautious about

 2     the convoys, what caused that caution.  It was not any ill will on the

 3     Serb side, but the fact that new uniforms, new explosives, new weapons,

 4     were arriving, and we didn't know how.  We knew that aircraft were

 5     landing in Zagreb from Iran and that those weapons were being hauled by

 6     convoys, and that was the reason for our concern, and not our ill will

 7     against either UNPROFOR or any humanitarian organisations.

 8             Do you agree that those weapons had to travel by land and go

 9     through certain corridors in order to reach the Muslims?

10        A.   Well, it was certainly not being transported through the officers

11     or the transports of the United Nations elements deployed.  Of course,

12     there was a perfectly good sea route and land route through Croatia.  And

13     where the last link occurred, I don't know.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Time to have a break, Mr. Karadzic, unless you

15     have --

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Okay, okay.

17             JUDGE KWON:  You said you would come back to the document 10785,

18     which is de Mello's cable to Mr. Akashi.  Take a look during the break.

19             We'll have a break for 25 minutes, and we'll resume at 10 to

20     6.00.

21                           [The witness stands down]

22                           --- Recess taken at 5.26 p.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 5.57 p.m.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 7478

 1             I would actually like us to clarify the question of time now.  I

 2     asked for 30 hours with this witness, who's a participant and a very

 3     important one, at that.  I got only 10 hours.  Even with the best efforts

 4     to be made by the Defence, there is no way that we can treat all the

 5     subjects that the Prosecution dealt with with this witness, or the

 6     documents that are relevant as far as this witness is concerned, so would

 7     you please reconsider?  I do understand that sometimes I make a comment

 8     or two and that I waste a little bit of time that way, but you will see,

 9     yourselves, from the transcript that that is minor.

10             If the assertions made by this witness stand, they are

11     conditioned by something else now and they're somewhat different from

12     what they were at the time.  Therefore, the Defence cannot believe that

13     they have successfully completed their work here if we do not have enough

14     time to deal with.

15             I believe that we will complete our examination of this witness

16     by Monday, especially if the Prosecution doesn't need too much time.  We

17     will make every effort to do so.

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, do you have any observation?

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Actually, Your Honour, I think Dr. Karadzic has

21     made a rather disingenuous characterisation of his cross-examination.

22     It's been filled with argument.  Whole documents have been read into

23     evidence, documents that, in fact, sometimes replicate passages of the

24     witness's statement, and I wouldn't think an extension of time would be

25     appropriate.

Page 7479

 1             JUDGE KWON:  How long do you expect your re-examination to be?

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  At this stage, 20 minutes, at the outside,

 3     Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Can I confirm with you, just to be correct, the

 5     order of witnesses as it stands now?  Do we need to go into private

 6     session?

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Not if we use the KDZ numbers, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  The next witness will be ...?

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  KDZ369 will be the next witness.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before the decision, if I may --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry I interrupted

13     Ms. Edgerton.

14             Before the decision, if I may, I would like to remind you of all

15     the things we still have to deal with with this witness.  It's the total

16     exclusion zone that we have to deal with, then the demilitarised zone at

17     Igman, Bihac, which was brought into the picture against our will, and

18     then we have to finish Gorazde and ethnic cleansing.  These are major

19     topics, and we certainly need two days for that.

20             JUDGE KWON:  My question was rather -- concerned about the fact

21     whether we have a witness who should testify on specific dates.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for just a moment.

23             Yes, we have one, but he -- and that's KDZ280.  But according to

24     the calender, I think he would not be implicated until the week after

25     next.

Page 7480

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I was referring to KDZ310, who was subject to court

 2     order.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I think -- first of all, I think that's

 4     a fair question.  I would ask, and I've just sent an e-mail to that

 5     effect, to determine whether or not that is, if not technically the case,

 6     and I believe in one sense it is, to be the case de facto, and any

 7     movement would create a problem.

 8             I might add that I had the same concern for other witnesses

 9     who -- for whom a similar problem may arise for various other scheduling

10     reasons that were not necessarily brought to the Court's attention by way

11     of specific scheduling, but may have been brought about by virtue of

12     repeated scheduling of that witness or because of the witness's

13     particular circumstances that happened to work out for this particular

14     arrangement, but will be extremely disruptive if altered.  So if the

15     Court will give us a moment to check on that, I think we'll be able to

16     provide you with a much more accurate answer.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber is of the view that you

20     should be able to finish your cross-examination by the end of tomorrow.

21     So you will have time, for the purpose of the cross-examination of this

22     witness, until the end of tomorrow.

23             Let's bring in the witness.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, we would like to tender 65 ter

25     10785.

Page 7481

 1             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted as Exhibit D700.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  That's correct, Your Honour, Exhibit D700.

 3                           [The witness takes the stand]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I apologise for your inconvenience.  It is our

 5     practice to deal with the matters related to the witness in the absence

 6     of the witness.

 7             During your absence, we told the accused to finish his

 8     cross-examination by the end of tomorrow.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             Can I ask for document 1D00278 in e-court.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   While we're waiting for it, General, I would like to put

15     something to you, or, rather, to the Trial Chamber, first and foremost,

16     our efforts for the humanitarian aid and everything else to flow

17     unhindered, without us suffering any kind of damage, military damage,

18     that is, and without having the other side gain an advantage.

19             Or, actually, would you agree that if warring parties agree to

20     something, not a single one of these warring parties should gain any

21     advantage from that kind of agreement?  What do you say to that?

22        A.   Well, it's a hypothetical question.  I'd have to have a specific

23     case that you would quote that I could refer to.

24        Q.   Thank you.  I meant whether it was legitimate to make sure that

25     the other side does not gain an advantage on the basis of the goodwill

Page 7482

 1     expressed by the first side.  If you couldn't glean that much, let's deal

 2     with the document.

 3             This is my letter from the 17th of August.  Do you remember that

 4     in August there was that letter of mine about improvement of relations

 5     with UNPROFOR, and a few other letters?  And now we see the 17th of

 6     August.  This is an order of mine.  It is being sent to

 7     Professor Koljevic, as the person chairing the body for co-operation,

 8     also to the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, the Ministry of

 9     Internal Affairs, and the Co-ordination Committee for Humanitarian Aid.

10     Do you agree that this document is being sent to the aforementioned

11     persons?

12        A.   I guess it is, yes.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please look at the first order:

14             "Convoys and official personnel of humanitarian organisations may

15     move in the territory of Republika Srpska only with authorisation of the

16     Co-ordination Committee of the Government for Humanitarian Relief of

17     Republika Srpska.

18             "The head of the State Committee for Co-operation with UNPROFOR

19     shall pass a regulation for a method of issuing permits for the movement

20     of convoys and officials of international humanitarian organisations in

21     the territory of Republika Srpska."

22             Do you agree that this is a rather high level?  The

23     vice-president of the republic heads the team that is supposed to

24     co-ordinate co-operation with you with regard to humanitarian issues?

25        A.   I was aware that Mr. Koljevic was the person on the Bosnian Serb

Page 7483

 1     side with whom we dealt on the passage of convoys.  That is so.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I have the second page in

 3     Serbian.  For the time being, the English is all right.  It's the third

 4     paragraph.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Paragraph 3 in Serbian and in English:

 7             "From the check-point, according to the estimate of the

 8     authorised public safety official, to the place of unloading or passing

 9     to a territory of other parts of the former BiH, the convoy shall be

10     escorted by a police patrol."

11             It should say "patrol," actually.  That's the word that should be

12     used, "patrol," rather than "escort."  So all humanitarian activities in

13     the territory of Republika Srpska should be carried out in accordance

14     with International Humanitarian Law.

15             Do you agree, General, that, as you had put it yourself, I had

16     1.600 kilometres of a front-line?

17        A.   I think we discussed that, yes.

18        Q.   Do you agree that I was very busy with political negotiations

19     with the entire international community?

20        A.   I assume that was the case.

21        Q.   If you know Serbs well enough, you will agree that it's very hard

22     to reach concord among Serbs within the country among 60 municipalities

23     so that everything can work properly.  In spite of all this hard work,

24     would you agree that the highest authorities of Republika Srpska are

25     making every effort to improve co-operation with UNPROFOR, especially

Page 7484

 1     with regard to humanitarian issues?  Regardless of the results, to the

 2     best of your knowledge, were efforts being made?

 3        A.   I think you have to set your question in context, Dr. Karadzic.

 4     At the start of my period in Bosnia, the flow of aid, as we've seen from

 5     my comments, was clearly not too bad.  Following the agreement to

 6     withdraw heavy weapons from around Sarajevo, which took place at the

 7     beginning of February, the flow of aid improved immensely across Bosnian

 8     Serb territory, until the attack was launched into Gorazde and the

 9     subsequent air-strikes that took place as a result of that attack.  There

10     was then a complete halting of all the aid.  Fortunately, we were able,

11     through discussion, to restore that aid, and between April and September

12     of that year the flow of aid continued more or less unblocked, certainly

13     into Sarajevo, although it still remained difficult to get aid through to

14     Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde, although that did occur from time to time.

15     We had enforced the passage of a convoy to Maglaj another enclave, and

16     the convoys in and out of Bihac remained patchy, but did flow.

17             Following the attack by the Bosnian Government forces against the

18     Bosnian Serb side in Sarajevo in the middle or towards the end of

19     September, then the aid flow started to be interrupted by the Bosnian

20     Serb side, and it wasn't until January of that next year that we came to

21     a final agreement on the passage of -- uninterrupted passage of aid into

22     Sarajevo, in particular.

23             So the situation came and went with regard to the flow of

24     humanitarian aid.  The end result of all our efforts to deliver aid to

25     the people who needed it in Bosnia, as I say, never -- rarely met the

Page 7485

 1     objectives of the World Health Organisation.  That is the general picture

 2     which you can set in context any period of time you like, and you will

 3     see whether the aid was flowing at that particular moment in time or not.

 4             In August, there was quite good flow of aid, particularly after

 5     the sniper agreement, I seem to remember.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  General, if you remember, it was your very own

 7     estimate that that period had a significant decline in the number of

 8     casualties as well; right?

 9        A.   There was a considerable reduction in the number of casualties in

10     the war in Bosnia throughout 1994, that is correct.

11        Q.   Would you agree, then, General, that in a conflict, there are two

12     parties, and that both should agree to have peace established, or,

13     rather, that the behaviour of one side considerably depends on the

14     behaviour of the other side too?

15        A.   Inevitably so.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             Can we have this document admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D701, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE KWON:  General, you stated these are dealt with by the

21     chiefs of staff, but can you see the para 1?  Para 1 says --

22             THE WITNESS:  Not at the moment.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it will be coming.

24             Para 1 seems to refer to two entities, one being the

25     Co-ordination Committee of the Government for Humanitarian Relief, the

Page 7486

 1     other being State Committee for Co-operation with UNPROFOR.  Do you

 2     remember such entities?

 3             THE WITNESS:  No, I don't, sir.  I mean, maybe the chiefs of

 4     staff knew the distinction, but I certainly did not.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Can we have 1D02453.  1D02453.  Yes, we have it in English.  I

 9     believe we don't have it in Serbian.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   As you can see, this is a document --

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't think this document should be broadcast.

15     Could I just have your indulgence for a moment?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  I was just looking at the provider, Your Honour.

18     Your indulgence, please.

19             Until I'm certain, and out of an abundance of caution, do you

20     think we could possibly deal with this document in private session,

21     please, Your Honour?

22             JUDGE KWON:  What we are seeing now in Serbian seems to be a

23     document originating from Republika Srpska.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the previous document.

25     This is the previous document.  It's the Serbian version.  The other

Page 7487

 1     document was removed from the screen.  I am sorry, there is no reference

 2     to Rule 70, and that's why I simply asked for it.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  So we shall go into private session, Ms. Edgerton,

 4     or is it safe, unless we are broadcasting this document?

 5                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I was advised we can go without broadcasting this

 7     document.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Perfect, thank you.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  But I leave it in your hands because I'm not aware

10     of the situation.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  It's just been confirmed to me it's definitely a

12     document we should deal with in private session, actually, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We go into private session.

14                           [Private session]

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 7488











11  Page 7488 redacted. Private session.















Page 7489

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13                           [Open session]

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Continue, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D02527.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   As we can see, this is my letter to His Excellency Mr. Akashi on

18     the 5th of September, in response to his letter of the 3rd of September.

19     He mentions parts of some speech of mine out of context, and then I say:

20             [In English] "We do not, at present, intend to impose any

21     sanctions against the Muslims.  A decision to introduce such sanctions,

22     moreover, would not affect normal humanitarian aid provided that the

23     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not blocking humanitarian aid destined

24     for the Republic of Srpska."

25             [Interpretation] And then further down:

Page 7490

 1             [In English] "Since Yugoslavia is imposing economic sanctions

 2     against us, we feel entitled to continue commercial sanctions against

 3     Muslims.  As you know, however, this policy does not cover gas, water,

 4     and electricity supplies to the Muslims.  You are, of course, aware that

 5     the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo is openly delighted at the recent turn

 6     of events in the relations between Yugoslavia and the Republic of Srpska.

 7     This being the case, they should not complain if, given the genocidal

 8     sanctions against us, we impose some limited sanctions on them.  I am

 9     sure, Excellency, that you can see our point of view?"

10             [Interpretation] Do you agree, General, that we were under

11     sanctions imposed by the entire world, and from the 4th of August

12     onwards, under sanctions imposed by Yugoslavia as well?

13        A.   I had some vague knowledge that sanctions had been imposed, but I

14     was focused on what was happening in Bosnia, not outside Bosnia.

15        Q.   But you do recall that those sanctions were imposed upon us to

16     force us to accept the contact group plan; right?

17        A.   I certainly wouldn't be able to comment on that.

18        Q.   Thank you.  However, we can see, both from the previous document

19     and from this document, that we make a distinction between commercial

20     convoys that may be subject to sanctions, although we had not decided to

21     do that, and humanitarian convoys that are not subject to any sanctions;

22     am I right?

23        A.   That appears so from your letter to Mr. Akashi.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             Can it be admitted?

Page 7491

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D703, Your Honours.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce

 4     1D0245 [as interpreted].  02459, 1D02459.

 5             This is a summary of a meeting with me at Pale on the 19th of

 6     August, 1994.  And in the first paragraph, we can read:

 7             [In English] "Together with DFC General Crabbe, HCA de Mello,

 8     General Rose, CAC Andreev and others, I held a meeting with Dr. Karadzic

 9     in Pale at 12.30.  Also present from the Serb side were Generals Mladic

10     and Tolimir, Koljevic, Krajisnik and Buha."

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Do you recall that, or do you have anything about that in your

13     notes, or do you still recollect that meeting?

14        A.   I don't recollect it, but I can remind myself by reading the

15     letter or the document on the screen and the extract from my book.

16        Q.   If needed -- actually, we will go swiftly through the document.

17             You can see, for example, in paragraph 4, that Karadzic

18     completely agreed with the necessity of a diplomatic alternative with

19     regard to the contact group plan.  And then, paragraph 6, with regards to

20     relations with UNPROFOR, Dr. Karadzic said that the Serb side fully

21     appreciated the United Nations efforts, although their presence had saved

22     the Muslims from complete defeat.

23             [In English] "The Serb objective was, he said, to separate the

24     societies in which -- in B and H, much like had happened in Scandinavia

25     in 1905, and between India and Pakistan following World War II.  While it

Page 7492

 1     was the intention of his side to become 'good neighbours' and while the

 2     Bosnian Serbs ..."

 3             [Interpretation] Next page:

 4             [In English] "... were not planning to take any new

 5     territory ..."

 6             [Interpretation] And so on.  And further on we talk about the

 7     total exclusion zone.

 8             Can we go one page ahead.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, the general asked for an opportunity

10     to review the document and the excerpt from his book.  I just wonder why

11     he shouldn't be allowed to have that opportunity, rather than to have us

12     hear passages of this document read into the record again.

13             JUDGE KWON:  General, have you done with the second page?

14             THE WITNESS:  I've read them all now, thank you.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Do you like to see the third page?  I think it's a

16     four-page document.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this is exactly what I wanted

18     us to do, to go swiftly through the document.  And if the general needs

19     to take some time to read the document -- it says here:

20             [In English] "Dr. Karadzic further stated that the roads had not

21     been closed to humanitarian aid --"

22             JUDGE KWON:  No, you don't have to read that.

23             Let us know when you've done with that.

24             THE WITNESS:  I've done with it -- [Overlapping speakers]

25             JUDGE KWON:  Okay.  What is your question?  What is your

Page 7493

 1     question, Mr. Karadzic?

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Do you remember that on that occasion I stated that humanitarian

 4     convoys, as it says here, were not closed, that all that was closed were

 5     opportunities for the black market to thrive and for weapons to be

 6     brought in?  Perhaps you can see that sentence, and do you agree with me?

 7        A.   I can't see the sentence.  Which one is it?  Which paragraph?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Third line from --

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The third line from the top of the

10     page.

11             THE WITNESS:  It would be the third line from the bottom of

12     paragraph 11, would it?  That's the one I've got on the screen.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The third line from the very top of

14     the page.  The sentence starts with:  "Dr. Karadzic further stated ..."

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Do you remember and do you agree that our position was that the

17     only restrictions applied to the black market and weapons, and that we

18     subscribed to anything else?

19        A.   I think at that time the humanitarian aid convoys were flowing,

20     yes.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Let's look at bullet point E in the 12th paragraph.

22             Can we scroll up the page a little.

23             Would you please look at bullet point E, and everybody can read

24     for themselves, so as to prevent me from reading it aloud.

25             This is about human rights in Banja Luka/Bijeljina, and it says

Page 7494

 1     here that:

 2             "Dr. Karadzic shared your concerns over the abuse of human rights

 3     and that the authorities were trying to control extremists in those

 4     areas.  In Bijeljina, the authorities intended to soon replace the chief

 5     of police as the level of security he was providing to the population was

 6     unsatisfactory."

 7             I also said that Bijeljina was the 'Hong Kong' of the Serb

 8     republic, and so on and so forth.

 9             "In some cases, some residents had voluntarily asked to leave for

10     Tuzla, and on arriving in Tuzla, had claimed that they had been

11     expelled."

12             [Interpretation] Do you remember, General, sir, when it came to

13     refugees, that refugees enjoyed one kind of benefits and social

14     contributions, and when people voluntarily crossed over, they did not

15     enjoy those same benefits?

16        A.   I don't think the United Nations distinguished between refugees

17     and voluntary refugees, if that's how you would describe them.  People

18     who were in need were in need.  Whatever their antecedence were didn't

19     concern the United Nations.  And as you'll remember, the United Nations

20     Protection Force had no representatives in Banja Luka or in the

21     neighbouring regions, and these reports came from UNHCR observations, not

22     from the protection force.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             Can we go to the next page.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 7495

 1        Q.   At the very bottom of that page were some other concerns of ours

 2     mentioned:

 3             [In English] "Dr. Karadzic's response was that while UNPROFOR was

 4     welcome to stay, the international community's attempt to scare them with

 5     threats of its withdrawal would not work, stating that, 'We would not

 6     object to your departure.  We would divide Bosnia into two with the

 7     Croats, and there would be no Muslim state' ..."

 8             [Interpretation] There's a threat of ours.  And then it goes on

 9     to say:

10             [In English] "Dr. Karadzic asked if this was what the

11     international community really wanted.  He said that while the Muslim

12     people were for peace, their leaders were not, and if their offensives

13     continued, the Serbs would launch a counter-offensive 'and humiliate

14     them.'  Both Karadzic and Mladic warned against UNPROFOR leaving weapons

15     for the Bosnian side if it withdrew.  I told them that we had no

16     intention of doing this, and disassociated the force from remarks made by

17     certain troop-contributing nations, i.e., Malaysia, in this vein."

18             [Interpretation] Do you remember that some battalions [Realtime

19     transcript read in error "Italians"] coming from some contributing

20     nations did not behave fairly and that they expressed their friendship by

21     helping the Muslim side, by even giving them weapons?

22        A.   No, I have no knowledge, and I refute the allegation that the --

23     any United Nations element was giving weapons to the Bosnian Government

24     forces.  I think you're referring in this -- or Mr. Akashi is referring

25     in this to an unfortunate statement made by one of the Malaysian press

Page 7496

 1     offices, for which I think he was duly reprimanded, but I don't remember

 2     the detail.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             Can the document be admitted?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  To be clear:  General, is this the document authored

 6     by Mr. Akashi?

 7             THE WITNESS:  I think it's a document authored by Mr. Akashi, but

 8     I'd have to scroll back to the start, sir, to see that.  But it certainly

 9     would have been the result of him asking his secretary to put this

10     memorandum together.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             That will be admitted ...?

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D704.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  In fact, in paragraph 142 of the general's

15     statement, he refers to a meeting on this date involving Mr. Akashi,

16     Mr. de Mello, General Crabbe and himself, so I would think that the

17     general's conclusion is entirely accurate.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             And line 21 of page 84 should refer to "internationals" instead

20     of "Italians."  That could be checked out.

21             THE INTERPRETER:  The word was "battalions," Your Honour.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

23             Please continue.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             Has this been given a number?

Page 7497

 1             Can the Court please produce 65 ter 11048.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Do you remember, General, sir -- I checked, and indeed the chief

 4     of police in Bijeljina had been removed.  Do you remember that I orally

 5     reported to you about that because the level of security was not

 6     satisfactory in Bijeljina, people did not feel safe there?

 7        A.   As I said, I had no knowledge of what was happening in an area

 8     where we didn't have any United Nations representation from the

 9     Protection Force side, so I can't make comment on that.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Here we have another telegram sent by

11     Ambassador Akashi to Annan, Gharekhan and Stoltenberg in Geneva.  If we

12     have agreed on that, can we now go to page 3.

13             This is a report on a meeting between General Lapresle and

14     Ambassador Akashi with me at Pale.  Let's look at paragraph 10:

15             [In English] "In response to my request that the ICRC be allowed

16     to evacuate Muslims from Prijedor, Dr. Karadzic said that the situation

17     in Prijedor was an unfortunate development for the Serbs.  While he

18     accepted that the situation could have been predicted (he noted that

19     civilians in the town had, at the beginning of the war, slaughtered each

20     other), he maintained that the present situation had been prompted by a

21     Muslim massacre of six Serb policemen from the town.  Currently,

22     additional forces had been sent to the town to stabilise the situation,

23     and he had initially agreed to the ICRC request to evacuate individuals

24     who feared for their lives, based on the belief that the numbers

25     concerned were minimum.  However ..."

Page 7498

 1             [Interpretation] Next page:

 2             [In English] "... the ICRC --" next page, please:  "... had

 3     indicated they intended to evacuate 80 truckloads of people at one go and

 4     this was unacceptable.  He had no objection to them evacuating up to five

 5     trucks of people a day (approximately 100 people), as this would allow

 6     those left behind to reconsider their situation in light of the

 7     stabilised conditions in the town."

 8             [Interpretation] Therefore, do you remember, General, sir, that

 9     at that time the International Red Cross put a lot of pressure on me, and

10     you can see that they even resorted -- or, rather, they asked

11     General Lapresle and Akashi -- they put a lot of pressure on me to allow

12     them to take people from Banja Luka and Prijedor to third countries, and

13     here a reference is made to Prijedor, although I believe that that should

14     not be done?  And if, indeed, that had to be done, it had to be done

15     gradually so as to show people that there was no reason at all for them

16     to leave?

17        A.   No, I wasn't party to that discussion and have no record of it.

18     And as I've already said, we didn't have people deployed on that side of

19     Bosnia.

20        Q.   I respect that, General, sir.  But you did say after 1994, and

21     especially after the Markale incident and other such incidents, the Serbs

22     had stepped up their ethnic cleansing in Bosnian Krajina.  However, my

23     thesis is this:  The International Red Cross had invested a lot of effort

24     to take away a huge number of Muslims and Croats from that same Krajina,

25     whereas I, myself, was greatly opposed to that.  I have a lot of evidence

Page 7499

 1     to prove that, and one piece of evidence is this meeting between

 2     General Lapresle and Akashi with me.  What I'm trying to do is establish

 3     whether you were misinformed, whether you thought that that evacuation

 4     actually -- what was an evacuation was about ethnic cleansing.

 5        A.   I think you would have to point out where I allegedly said that

 6     after the bombing in the market-place, the Serbs had stopped their ethnic

 7     cleansing in Bosnian Krajina, because, of course, that was not within my

 8     area of responsibility.  And as regards the rest of your comment, I can't

 9     make a comment because, as I've said, I was not party to that discussion.

10        Q.   Thank you.  It was just an off remark in the

11     examination-in-chief, but it may be detrimental to the Defence, and

12     that's why we have to deal with the issue.

13             Could you please look at paragraph 12 and see what it says there:

14             [In English] "Turning them to the issue of ethnic cleansing and

15     the violation of human rights in Banja Luka and the need to halt this

16     practice, I suggested that I visit the area towards the end of next week.

17     I further requested the UNPROFOR --"

18             JUDGE KWON:  What's the point, Mr. Karadzic, of going further,

19     after having heard from the witness here, that he's not aware of this

20     document?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I believe that the document

22     will jog the general's memory, because both Lapresle and -- as the chief

23     commander, and Akashi, as the civilian chief, tried to look at the

24     situation and deploy UN troops in Banja Luka.  But one thing is certain,

25     and I'm sure that General Rose is familiar with that, if we move on to

Page 7500

 1     paragraph 16, which is on the following page -- I'm moving through the

 2     document very slowly, and you will see that there is a reason for that.

 3             In paragraph 16, please.

 4             You see that General De Lapresle briefed Karadzic about the use

 5     of close air support to defend UNPROFOR troops under attack, and

 6     requested the VRS Army co-operation, ensuring that there were no actions

 7     that could lead to its use:

 8             "Dr. Karadzic said that the VRS had no intention of attacking

 9     UNPROFOR troops and that the unfortunate incident surrounding the Maglaj

10     convoy was an aberration and that that would be dealt with."

11             And now, sir, you see here:

12             [In English] "I emphasise the distinction between close air

13     support as an act of self-defence and air-strikes as an offensive or

14     punitive action."

15             [Interpretation] This was something that I wanted to present to

16     the witness when we were talking about the attacks primarily against

17     Gorazde and later on when the general had already left, and it was then

18     explained to me that close air support was something that was a defence

19     mechanism, something to defend UNPROFOR troops, and we always gave you

20     the right to shoot if you were attacked; whereas, by contrast,

21     air-strikes are punitive and offensive measures.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Right?

24        A.   Well, that was clearly the view of the author of this document,

25     but certainly it wasn't my view.  And I think I explained it, at a

Page 7501

 1     technical level, the difference.  The subject of close air support or the

 2     expression "close air support" covers the general support which ground

 3     troops can expect from the air.  Air-strikes are a specific use.  The

 4     offensive or defensive element in that technical analysis is not there.

 5     It could be used either way.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  However, on the 7th of April, Mr. Akashi informed me

 7     that there was a difference, and you know that Mladic always said, If our

 8     troops attack you, shoot, nobody will hold it against you.  Mr. Akashi,

 9     in the presence of General De Lapresle, said that close air support was,

10     as it says here, self-defence and that air-strikes are an offensive or

11     punitive measure.  Did you call for a close air support or air-strikes in

12     Gorazde?

13        A.   Well, as I've explained to you, the presence of the NATO aircraft

14     over Bosnia was in the nature of close air support.  I certainly called

15     air-strikes on the tanks and artillery that were attacking Gorazde.  Now,

16     you can decide whether that was defensive or offensive.  In my book, it

17     was a defensive action taken under the United Nations Security Council

18     Resolution 824 and 836.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Can we go to the following page.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   But General, sir, you did not come under attack in Gorazde.  It

23     was two forces that were fighting in Gorazde, and NATO put itself on one

24     side.  That was the Serb perception, that NATO sided with one of those

25     two warring parties.

Page 7502

 1             Can we go to the following page:

 2             [In English] "In terms of punitive and offensive action --"

 3             [Interpretation] Please, paragraph 20:

 4             [In English] "On Gorazde, he expressed concern that the reports

 5     of the UNMOs in the pocket did not tally with the Presidency reports of

 6     mass destruction and killing and requested clarification on this

 7     discrepancy.  He also said that it was time for the Security Council to

 8     take more decisive action on the opening of Tuzla Airport for

 9     humanitarian flights."

10             [Interpretation] That was part of that meeting with Izetbegovic.

11     Do you see how the situation developed?  And we're talking about the 7th

12     of April here.

13        A.   I remember reasonably well how the situation developed because,

14     of course, that was the time at which we were having to deal with the

15     Bosnian Serb side to try and deter them from attacking any further into

16     the enclave of Gorazde.  At the same time, we were having to reassure the

17     Bosnian Government side, in particular Mr. Silajdzic and President

18     Izetbegovic, that the casualties rates which they were describing were

19     nowhere near the truth.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             Can the document be admitted ?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, may I just make one submission in

24     this regard.

25             This is a document that could very easily have been dealt with by

Page 7503

 1     way of written motion.  It's of that category of document.  But we've

 2     spent some time now with the general repeatedly having to affirm that he

 3     can't comment on this document, rather than actually get to the point.

 4     It seems to me there could be a more efficient way of spending the time

 5     that we have here, but we have no objection to the document going in.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D705.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more document about that

 9     same topic.  I believe we have time, a short passage.

10             65 ter 8 --

11             JUDGE KWON:  I was about to say that I agree with Ms. Edgerton's

12     observation.  And in such circumstances, you can't complain about

13     shortage of time.  Bear that in mind.

14             We have only two minutes.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 8025.

16             With all due respect, Your Excellency, we have a problem with the

17     general's memory.  I would like to jog the general's memory about what he

18     said during his chief examination, and the difference between that and

19     what he wrote in his documents at the time, and I can't do it in writing.

20     The Trial Chamber will then have an opportunity to contrast the two and

21     maybe render a decision at my detriment, perhaps.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   General, sir, this is the 11th of April, 1994, sent to the

24     president of Republika Srpska, the chief of staff, and so on and so

25     forth, and that was sent by the Main Staff of the Army of

Page 7504

 1     Republika Srpska, signed by Manojlo Milovanovic.

 2             Can we please see the third page of the same document, the

 3     paragraph that concerns Gorazde.  Page 3, Article A, bullet point 2 "The

 4     Herzegovina Corps."  Bullet point E:

 5             "Throughout the day in the general area of Gorazde, the NATO air

 6     forces carried out a reconnaissance and engaged in provocations by

 7     launching mock attacks on VRS units.  Between 1500 hours and 1545 hours,

 8     while the Muslim forces were conducting a synchronised attack on the left

 9     bank of the River Drina, the enemy attacked units of the Herzegovina

10     Corps, killing three (one officer - physician) and nine wounded soldiers.

11     Two medical vehicles, one PAT," and so on and so forth, "were destroyed."

12             Do you agree, General, sir, that the Serbian perception of this

13     co-operation between NATO aviation and the Muslim infantry must have

14     looked terrifying?

15        A.   There was no co-operation at all between the Bosnian Government

16     forces and NATO, and any interpretation on your side that that was the

17     case was wrong.

18        Q.   However, the Muslim infantry exploited the effects of NATO

19     air-strikes.  They launched simultaneous attacks while we were being

20     stricken by the NATO aviation, while our facilities were being pounded.

21             Can this document be admitted?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Was that a question, Mr. Karadzic?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I would like the general

24     to -- I'm not saying that the United Nations had anything to do with

25     that.  It was NATO that attacked us, and the Muslim side exploited the

Page 7505

 1     results of that attack and launched their infantry attack.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   And that's what I'm asking you, General, sir.  I'm not saying

 4     that that was the case.  I'm not saying that you approved that or not.  I

 5     am saying that the Muslims benefitted from the NATO punitive expedition.

 6        A.   That may well have been so, but it certainly wasn't the result of

 7     any co-ordination between NATO and the Bosnian Government forces.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I take it there's no objection to the admission of

 9     this document.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  It's already an exhibit, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P1662, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, once you've heard the answer from the

14     witness, just move on to your next question without making any

15     statements.

16             We'll resume tomorrow at 2.15.

17                           [The witness stands down]

18                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.04 p.m.,

19                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 8th day of October,

20                           2010, at 2.15 p.m.