1 Monday, 18 October 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Just for your information, we'll be sitting today until 2.30,
8 with two half-an-hour breaks.
9 Good morning to you, General.
10 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
11 JUDGE KWON: If you could take the solemn declaration, please.
12 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
13 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
14 WITNESS: DAVID FRASER
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 If you could make yourself comfortable.
17 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
18 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Examination by Mr. Tieger:
20 Q. Good morning, sir.
21 A. Good morning.
22 Q. Can we begin by having you state your name and your current
23 position, please.
24 A. I am Major-General David Fraser, the commander of the 1st
25 Canadian Division in Canada
1 Q. General Fraser, you have testified here at the Tribunal before,
2 and that was in the case of Prosecutor versus Galic, in July of 2002, and
3 in the case of the Prosecutor versus Dragomir Milosevic, in February of
4 2007; is that correct?
5 A. Yes, it is.
6 Q. Is it also correct that in 1997, in November of that year, you
7 provided a statement to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY?
8 A. Yes, it is.
9 Q. Have you had an opportunity to review an amalgamated statement
10 which represented excerpts from those previous testimonies and statement?
11 A. Yes, I have.
12 MR. TIEGER: And can we call up 65 ter 90196, please.
13 Q. General Fraser, do you recognise that, which bears your
14 signature, as an electronic copy of the amalgamated statement which you
15 indicated you had the opportunity to review?
16 A. Yes, I do.
17 Q. Does that statement accurately reflect your previous statements
18 and testimony, or those portions of the previous statement and
20 A. Yes, it does.
21 Q. And if you were examined in court today on the same subjects,
22 would you provide the same information to the Court in response to those
24 A. Yes, I would.
25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
1 Your Honour, I would tender for admission 65 ter 90196, the
2 amalgamated statement.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P1762.
5 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, we would also be seeking the
6 admission of the associated exhibits. I would note, for the Court's
7 information, that with the exception of 65 ter 01302, a letter dated 9
8 October 1994, all of the documents that were indicated as previously
9 admitted into evidence were. That document has been since admitted into
10 evidence as P1644, and I think that updates the admission of the
11 associated exhibits.
12 JUDGE KWON: The only question from me is whether 11067 has been
13 up-loaded. Otherwise, unless they are objected to, they will be
14 admitted, and we'll give them an exhibit number in due course by the
15 Court Deputy.
16 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 With the Court's permission, then, I would read a short summary
18 of the statement -- the amalgamated statement and the witness's
20 Major-General David Fraser was the military assistant to
21 UNPROFOR's Sector Sarajevo commander from April 1994 to May 1995. He is
22 a serving commander with the Canadian Armed Forces, with over 30 years of
23 experience, experience which includes command of mortar platoons and
24 military formations with snipers.
25 As military assistant, General Fraser accompanied the sector
1 commander in his daily tasks, including meeting with leaders of the
2 warring factions at the corps level. General Fraser observed that both
3 General Galic and General Milosevic enjoyed effective command and control
4 over the Sarajevo
5 incidents, Sarajevo
6 period. General Fraser also concluded that the corps commanders were
7 effectively subordinated to their higher military authorities and that
8 policies, such as freedom of movement of UNPROFOR, were controlled at a
9 higher level than the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
10 General Fraser observed that the objective of the Bosnian Serbs'
11 siege of Sarajevo
12 take the city itself. Means used included controlling movement,
13 modulating the amount of humanitarian aid allowed in, and employing
14 sniping and shelling.
15 The shelling employed by the Bosnian Serbs was indiscriminate;
16 for example, UNPROFOR observed shelling in the city where there was no
17 military target they could identify. Often, the Bosnian Serb forces
18 disproportionately retaliated to Muslim provocations. In one instance,
19 General Fraser recalled the Muslims firing on Lukavica, which provoked a
20 "huge barrage" on the city in response.
21 The Bosnian Serbs employed professional snipers who did not
22 discriminate between military targets and civilians. In response to the
23 sniping of civilians, barriers were placed throughout Sarajevo
24 civilians, and UNPROFOR established an anti-sniping task force.
25 In these circumstances, General Fraser recalls that the civilians
1 he met expressed to him the uncertainty and terror of never knowing what
2 was going to happen next, and he observed that civilians he met were
3 "visibly traumatised."
4 Incidents of sniping and shelling were protested to both warring
5 factions based on information obtained through crater analyses, by the
6 Anti-Sniping Task Force, and other investigations.
7 General Fraser recalls that toward the end of his tour, the
8 Bosnian Serbs began to employ air-bombs in Sarajevo, a weapon he
9 describes as a "make-shift apparatus with no guidance system." He did
10 not observe such weapons on the Bosnian Government side. In
11 General Fraser's opinion, these weapons had no military value. He
12 recalls that the advent of the use of these weapons "sent shudders
13 through all of us."
14 Your Honour, that concludes the summary.
15 And before I proceed, Mr. President, I would note that 65 ter
16 11067 is up-loaded and has been released.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. General Fraser, let me first turn our attention to the issue of
20 shelling, and I wanted to ask you a bit more about some of the shelling
21 you observed and mentioned in your statement.
22 Now, you referred in your statement, at page 52, to the targeting
23 of civilian areas and, on page 53 of your statement, to shelling in which
24 no distinction was made between military targets or civilians. Now, with
25 respect to military targets, let me ask you this: First of all, however
1 obvious this question may seem, were you aware that there were soldiers
2 and military units in Sarajevo
3 A. Yes, I was.
4 Q. And were you aware that there were headquarters of various units
5 in the city of Sarajevo
6 A. Yes, I was.
7 Q. In that connection, what was the major headquarters, the prime or
8 corps -- highest-level headquarters of the Bosnian Serb forces in the
10 A. There was the Bosnian Muslim 1st Corps headquarters in the city,
11 the Serbian Romanija Corps headquarters just on the outskirts of the
12 airport, and there was the defence headquarters down-town, for the
14 Q. Now, would those corps headquarters -- the 1st Corps headquarters
15 and the Sarajevo Romanija Corps headquarters, would those have
16 represented the major or ultimate or most significant military targets in
17 that area?
18 A. They would have represented the command and control for all the
19 military forces in this region. They would have been the key -- keynotes
20 in that area, yes.
21 Q. And can you tell the Court how frequently or how often those
22 military targets were shelled?
23 A. Throughout my entire time that I was there, neither one, with the
24 exception of one case, were those headquarters engaged, and the only time
25 was late in my tour in 1995 when, in fact, the Muslims fired at the
1 Lukavica Barracks, when we received a report from our own people there,
2 which we found quite shocking, and it resulted in a very large barrage
3 coming back from the Serbs against the city.
4 Q. Do you recall the -- you alluded to it, but do you recall the
5 nature of the shelling of Lukavica by the Bosnian forces, the type of
6 weaponry and the amount, on that occasion?
7 A. The Muslims fired at Lukavica with mortars. And in -- we
8 protested the Muslim forces for doing that because of our concern with
9 the reaction which followed through, which was both a heavy artillery
10 barrage with heavy-calibre weapons back at the city.
11 Q. And when you say "back at the city," was the shelling by the
12 Bosnian Serb forces, following the mortar shelling of Lukavica, directed
13 at the Bosnian 1st Corps headquarters or was it directed elsewhere?
14 A. The shelling did not come back at the Bosnian Corps headquarters.
15 It seemed to be indiscriminate across the city.
16 Q. And how extensive was it?
17 A. It was disproportional. There were -- where there were a few
18 rounds fired at the Serbs, there were at least 20-plus rounds coming
19 back, if not more, from my recollection. But it was a substantial reply
20 back from the Serbs.
21 Q. Now, let me ask you about some of the weapons systems used during
22 or in the course of the shelling. First of all, you referred to mortars,
23 and I know you commanded mortar platoons. For what purposes are mortars
24 normally used? Are they directed at military structures, directed at
25 military personnel? What's the primary use of mortars?
1 A. The principal use of mortars would be in support of infantry
2 operations. They are most effective with dismounted people in the open,
3 and they have limited value against any infrastructure or building.
4 Q. Are they a precision-targeting system or an area weapons system?
5 A. They are an area weapons system with a high trajectory, with
6 quite a large beaten zone.
7 Q. Are they capable of pin-pointing particular targets, particularly
8 in densely-populated areas?
9 A. They are not a very good weapons system nor one that most
10 commanders would use in a heavily urban, densely-populated area. They
11 are better used out in the open.
12 Q. And, General, I noted that you -- in one of your responses, you
13 indicated, "They are an area weapons system with a high trajectory, with
14 quite a large beaten zone." Could you explain the term "beaten zone."
15 A. Indirect fire weapons, like mortars or artillery, for the most
16 part, do not have a guidance system on the warhead. It is a weapon that
17 is fired using tables that, depending on the trajectory, it has a
18 probability of landing in an area that can be calculated through tables
19 which we'll use, weather/distance trajectory. Therefore, because we
20 employ them as area weapons system, we use a box, a beaten zone where we
21 think that the rounds will land and we don't use them as a
22 precision-guided weapon, like a rifle or a tank. They are designed to
23 provide area coverage, not pin-point coverage.
24 Q. Well, let's assume, for the purposes of this question, that
25 a mortar round lands on a particular building within a densely-populated
1 civilian area. Say it lands on, in fact, a military facility within
2 that --
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is leading the witness to
6 guess-work and speculation. Why should an examination-in-chief be
7 conducted in such a manner?
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE KWON: I think, Mr. Tieger, you can reformulate your
11 MR. TIEGER: I'm not seeking any speculation, Your Honour. I'm
12 about to ask the witness what the effect of a mortar round on a building
13 is going to be. And there was no prospect, I think --
14 JUDGE KWON: Not in relation to speculation, but there was some
15 part of your question which may be said to be leading, to a certain
17 MR. TIEGER: I'll reformulate the question, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. General, I was about to ask you: If a mortar round lands on a
21 building or hits a building, what's the effect on that building and the
22 people inside that building going to be? And I'd like you to
23 particularly refer to the types of buildings in which any of the various
24 units of the Bosnian Muslim Army might have been headquartered.
25 A. The buildings that we saw in and around Sarajevo were principally
1 constructed of concrete, and any buildings that might have had Bosnian
2 Muslim Army units inside them were inside these buildings. And the
3 mortars that would be fired at these buildings would have little to no
4 effect because of the construction of the building and the size of the
5 mortars, which were either -- for the most part, around 82 millimetres;
6 they were just too small.
7 Q. What's the effect going to be on persons in the beaten zone,
8 where the mortar might land; for example, civilians who are in the area
9 and exposed to that fire?
10 A. Mortars fired at buildings would have little effect, but they
11 would be effective for any unprotected people in the open.
12 Q. General, you indicated in your statement that toward the latter
13 part of your tour of duty in Sarajevo
14 employ air-bombs, which you described as a bomb that has -- I'm referring
15 to page 63 of your statement now -- that has some sort of make-shift
16 apparatus so that it can be used as a vehicle that can fly, but has no
17 guidance system. And I think you said:
18 "You just aim it, you launch it, and it will go wherever the
19 ballistics capabilities and the aerodynamic capabilities of this
20 improvised device are, and it lands based on if it runs out of fuel or,
21 more likely, the aerodynamics of it are it just flops down."
22 General, what's the military value of such a weapon?
23 A. In my opinion, there is no military value of this type of weapon
24 inside an urban area.
25 Q. And so what's the purpose, in your view, of launching such a
2 A. This type of weapon would be an indiscriminate use of a weapons
3 system that would have more detrimental effects on non-combatant
4 civilians and infrastructure.
5 Q. General, I'd like to direct your attention to a document. That
6 would be 65 ter 10691. It's a document dated 7 April 1995, and it's a
7 regular combat report of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps Command by
8 General Milosevic.
9 And, General, if I could turn your attention, please, to page 2
10 of the English and also page 2 of the B/C/S. And, in particular, if I
11 could turn your attention to the passage in the middle of the page that
13 "In Ilidza PBR
14 250-kilogram aerial bomb was launched at the center of Hrasnica.
15 According to the interception centre, the Muslims claimed that the 'Luna'
16 rocket had landed."
17 General, is this a reference to one of the aerial bombs that you
18 mentioned in your statement?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And what kind of area was Hrasnica?
21 A. Hrasnica was essentially a civilian area just at the foot of the
22 Igman Mount.
23 Q. And if I could quickly direct your attention also to a passage at
24 the top of page 3 of the English, and I believe that's still page 2 of
25 the B/C/S, and that refers to an incident involving fire between the
1 Bosnian Serb forces and UNPROFOR. We may have occasion to refer to that
2 later, but I wondered if you remembered that incident.
3 A. I remember it very well.
4 Q. And can you tell us quickly what happened on that occasion?
5 A. The Igman Mount route was being used by civilians to go in and
6 out of the town. The Serbs had been engaging the route. We had
7 protested against the Serbs from engaging that route. It resulted in us
8 placing UN soldiers on the route to protect it. And notwithstanding
9 that, the Serbs continued to fire not just at the route, but, in fact,
10 firing at us. And, in fact, it got to the point where they had literally
11 out-gunned us with -- our weapons systems could not effectively reply to
12 the systems that they were firing at us with.
13 Q. Thank you, General. I was asking principally about the issue of
14 air-bombs, and --
15 A. Oh.
16 Q. No, no, you answered my question. I just want to return us to
17 what I had been focusing on previously.
18 And in that connection, if I could ask you to direct your
19 attention to another document, and that is P1201. That's a document of
20 April 6th, and that will be coming up on screen shortly, General.
21 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
22 JUDGE KWON: Has the previous document been admitted, Mr. Tieger?
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. It has not, and I would
24 move it into admission at this point.
25 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1782, Your Honours.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. General Fraser, P1201 is an order from the Sarajevo Romanija
4 Command, from General Milosevic. It states that:
5 "The Ilidza Brigade will immediately prepare a launcher with an
6 aerial bomb and transport the bomb for launching.
7 "The most profitable target must be selected in Hrasnica or
8 Sokolovic Colony, where the greatest casualties and material damage would
9 be inflicted.
10 "Inform me personally of readiness for implementation of this
12 First of all, General, although -- well, let me ask you: Is
13 there, in your view, a relationship between this order of April 6th and
14 the combat report of April 7th that you saw just a moment ago?
15 A. There seems to be a correlation between the two, yes.
16 Q. And in your experience, what is this order tasking the
17 Ilidza Brigade to do?
18 A. From my reading of the order, I would say that they are asking
19 the Serb forces to fire at a, essentially, civilian population and not at
20 the route or the UN forces.
21 Q. And is that an order of the type that you have -- that would be
22 issued by you or that you would permit to be issued by a subordinate?
23 A. From my read of this order, I would see it as a manifestly
24 unlawful order. And as a recipient of this order, I would actually not
25 abide by it because of the not addressing a target that was legitimate
1 and principally a target that was civilian and that would inflict
3 Q. And, General, let's assume for the moment -- or let me ask you
4 this: What if there was a unit of the Bosnian Muslim Army in Hrasnica or
5 Sokolovic Colony? Would that change the illegal nature of launching an
6 air bomb, as specified in this order?
7 A. The air-bomb would be a completely inappropriate weapon to fire
8 at a military target in an area that is as densely populated as this
10 Q. General, you indicated what you learned about the command and
11 control of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps with respect to shelling and
12 sniping and other issues during the course of your tour of duty. In your
13 assessment, what level of command would have been in a position to
14 authorise or ratify the use of air-bombs in Sarajevo?
15 A. My assessment was that the corps commander of the Sarajevo
16 Romanija Corps had direct control over the use of shelling and sniping
17 inside and around Sarajevo
18 Q. And let me ask you to look at another document. That's P1294,
19 and that's a document of 12 June 1994
20 General, this is an order forwarded to the Sarajevo
21 Romanija Corps from the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska on 12
22 June 1994. It refers to the Ilijas Infantry Brigade's letter directly to
23 the Main Staff, requesting that aerial bombs be issued by the Vogosca
24 Pretis, and then provides, in the second paragraph, that:
25 "The VRS Main Staff decides on the use of aerial bombs and
1 possibly a corps, if the VRS Main Staff approves so, and not a brigade
2 according to its own plan."
3 General, is this document consistent with your observations
4 during the course of your tour of duty, your communications with
5 Bosnian Serb military leaders, and the situation on the ground as you
6 understood it?
7 A. This document confirms our assessment at the time that the corps
8 was in control of all forces on the ground and they were operating under
9 the direction of their higher headquarters.
10 Q. General, I'd like to ask you a few questions about the sniping of
11 civilians, to which you've referred in your statement. And at page 24 of
12 your statement, General, you stated that the sniping on civilians was a
13 matter of concern throughout your tour of duty, and further indicated
14 that sniping of civilians took place by both sides, but mostly by the
15 Serb side. And that would be found at page 24. Is that roughly
16 accurate, General?
17 A. Yes, it is.
18 Q. First of all, I'd like to ask you how you were able to determine
19 which side was responsible -- on a given occasion or over the course of
20 your tour of duty, which side was responsible for sniping incidents?
21 Were there specific investigations? Did you have groups dedicated to the
22 process? Through what sources did you determine responsibility for the
23 sniping of civilians?
24 A. The UN was tasked to ensure that we did not get involved between
25 the confrontations between the two warring parties. Therefore, we took
1 great care to determine whether or not that any sniping incident was
2 between two warring factions. If so, we would stay out of it. But when
3 it came to non-combatant civilians, we would engage with a protest, and
4 we ensured that the protest was lodged to the right faction. And because
5 of the urban terrain, we took particular care to determine which side
6 fired the shot against a non-combatant. What we did was, for any
7 incident, we would convene an investigation, either at the battalion or
8 at the sector level, to determine whether or not the incident was fired
9 at a civilian, which side fired the shot, and then we would protest to
10 the applicable side. We had battalions on the ground responsible for
11 looking at all these incidents. In addition, along the route commonly
12 referred to as Sniper Alley, we had established an anti-sniping force
13 which was designed to observe potential sniping positions, engage in
14 those -- at those positions for snipers who were firing at civilians.
15 And in addition to that, we had, as part of that task force, put into
16 place passive barriers to protest civilians.
17 Q. General, with respect to the Anti-Sniping Task Force, let me ask
18 you first: What prompted the establishment of a special task force
19 developed to -- dedicated to anti-sniping?
20 A. The amount of incidents in the city, in the area of Sniper Alley,
21 against civilians necessitated that we create this task force, with
22 specialised troops with reconnaissance/surveillance capabilities, to
23 determine potential sniper positions. We had photographed and drawn out
24 all the potential areas, in addition to having shooters to reply to these
25 snipers, all designed to protect the citizens of Sarajevo. And certain
1 areas, as I say, which were particularly open to snipers were enhanced
2 with passive protection, but this was in response to the sniping being
3 conducted in the city against civilians on trams and walking through the
4 open areas of town.
5 Q. And did the Anti-Sniping Task Force become pretty familiar with
6 where the snipers were positioned and -- where the snipers were and where
7 they were firing from?
8 A. Yes, the task force was very familiar with the sniper positions.
9 On at least one occasion, I visited one of these positions with my French
10 boss. And both warring factions knew where the Sniper Task Force was
11 deployed because we were out in the open, and, in fact, we actually had
12 UN soldiers shot and killed by snipers along this area.
13 Q. General, you mentioned investigations, you mentioned the work of
14 and observations of the Anti-Sniping Task Force, and you also mentioned
15 discussions with Bosnian Serb military leaders. As far as the latter is
16 concerned, I'll be asking you some questions about that in a moment, but
17 let me ask you a couple of questions about the investigations and the
18 Anti-Sniping Task Force.
19 First, I wanted to ask you: With respect to your level of
20 certainty regarding responsibility of one side or the other for
21 individual sniping incidents -- and I'm going to ask you first about
22 individual incidents, and I'm going to ask you about the totality of the
23 sniping activities that were taking place. But, first, with respect to
24 any individual incident, what was the level of certainty regarding
25 responsibility, based on investigations or the input from the
1 Anti-Sniping Task Force?
2 A. The Anti-Sniping Task Force were very good in determining the
3 point of origin for specific incidents. And where they were able to,
4 they would reply in kind back to the sniper. In the event that they
5 could not, notwithstanding they might have replied, that information
6 would have been sent up to the battalion and to the sector level, where
7 in all cases we would have protested for each individual incident.
8 Q. And based on all the information that was available to you from
9 the Anti-Sniping Task Force, from specific investigations, from your
10 discussions with Bosnian Serb military leaders, what was the level of
11 certainty that Bosnian Serb forces were or were not engaged in ongoing
12 sniping attacks against civilians?
13 A. We were certain that the Bosnian Serbian forces were engaging
14 against civilians. We had countless engagements with the corps commander
15 to discuss sniping, and implored them to stop the sniping against
16 civilians. And these discussions at the corps level, for the most part,
17 would have some positive effect for a while, but it was only a temporary
18 effect, and there was a constant cycle of situations getting worse, then
19 getting a little bit better, and then getting worse.
20 Q. And with respect to that temporary positive effect, what, if
21 anything, did that indicate to you about the command and control of the
22 corps commander and of the Bosnian Serb military leadership of the
23 sniping against civilians?
24 A. It was our assessment that sniping was an activity that was
25 controlled and regulated at the corps level.
1 Q. Let me ask you, then, about some of the other factors relating to
2 command and control over sniping activities, particularly those against
3 civilians that you referred to in your statement.
4 And first let me ask you about the nature of snipers. I think
5 you indicated, at page 31, that sniping is very specialised, involving a
6 highly-skilled shooter who can move in and out of places without being
7 seen and fire at targets of high value. Can you explain the relationship
8 between the nature of a sniper, and a sniper's particular or unique
9 expertise and value, and command and control?
10 A. Snipers are a very specialised skill that is taught to very few
11 individuals, the best individuals. You have a combination of shooting
12 and tactical skills to move on the battle-field without being seen.
13 Because there are so few of them, they are traditionally maintained at
14 the highest level for targets that are of particular importance to the
15 commander on the field, and they are not to be wasted because of -- on
16 any given target. They are designed to do something to inflict -- taking
17 off and decapitating, metaphorically speaking, the command and control by
18 taking out a commander or by instilling a disruptive effect on the enemy.
19 But they are a very specialised skill that is judiciously used.
20 Q. And you referred to a very specialised skill. Is that -- and how
21 did you assess the skill level of the Bosnian Serb snipers in Sarajevo
22 during the course of your tour of duty?
23 A. We had snipers within the UN that were designed to find other
24 snipers across -- on the Serbian side. They assessed that they were
25 dealing with a very professional force, because amateurs are killed very
1 quickly, easily found, easily dealt with, and the people that we were
2 looking for and were engaging in sniping against civilians were hard to
3 find. They fired through buildings, which is a demonstration of a level
4 of capability that not just an average shooter can do, and our snipers
5 just had a really hard time to find these people. So, I mean, there was
6 an assessment that these people were professionals.
7 Q. General, I want to ask you to look at three documents, all
8 bearing on the same subject. So before I solicit any comment in
9 response, I'll just give you an opportunity to quickly look those over.
10 The first is 65 ter 15725, and that's a report of the 1st Ilijas
11 Infantry Brigade to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps Command, dated 13 January
12 1995, pursuant to a training order with proposals.
13 And if I could ask you to direct your attention to page -- first,
14 page 2 of the English and page 3 of the B/C/S, and that's in the middle
15 of the page. There's a reference to:
16 "For instructors, those doing the training and physical training
17 of snipers, who are going to attend a court," which I presume is
18 "course," "by the end of January this year, we recommend the following
19 people from our brigade:"
20 And then if I could ask you quickly to direct your attention to
21 page 3, also in the middle of the page, in English:
22 "We recommend the following improvements and changes to the
24 "Sniper course: Number of classes for topic 3 to be increased to
25 15 from 13; the number of practices, 6."
1 And next I would ask you to turn your attention to document
2 65 ter 15507.
3 And I'll be asking the General to look quickly at page 4 of the
4 English and page 4 of the B/C/S.
5 This is a report from the Command of the 3rd Sarajevo
6 Infantry Brigade to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps Command, and it's a
7 report pursuant to a strictly-confidential order of January 5th. And as
8 I indicated, I wanted to ask you to turn your attention to a portion on
9 page 4, stating that:
10 "We would recommend the following for training as snipers:"
11 And then listing the names and indicating:
12 "We recommend Lukavica as the location for training."
13 And, finally, one last document in that connection, General, and
14 that is P1613. This is an order from General Milosevic, from the Command
15 of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, dated 19 January 1995, regarding the
16 detachment and transfer of sniper instructors to conduct training in the
17 Jahorina Barracks, pursuant to the instruction and training of the VRS
18 Main Staff. And if you just look at that quickly, General, you'll see
19 the order specifies the date and time of transfer of sniper instructors
20 to the sector of the Jahorina Barracks, and other information regarding
21 that training, and specifies that the order must be carried out in full
23 "... I shall hold the brigade commanders personally responsible."
24 General Fraser, having looked at those orders, can you tell us
25 whether -- those orders and reports, can you tell us whether those are
1 consistent or inconsistent with your assessment of the capabilities and
2 professionalism of the snipers engaged in Sarajevo on the Bosnian Serb
3 side during the course of your tour of duty?
4 A. The orders and reports are indicative of the Serbs -- the
5 importance they played on to training, and within the training, the
6 importance within that of snipers is evident by the explanation in each
7 one by name, of what snipers have a predominant mention in these training
8 reports, and the last report confirms, in fact, our initial assessment
9 when I was there, that this was a corps asset, personally controlled by
10 the corps commander with this corps order that orders snipers and fuel
11 and the transfers and holding brigade commanders personally responsible.
12 You can't get much more specific than this that this is a corps
13 commander's priority and his asset that he is controlling personally.
14 Q. General, in your amalgamated statement, you also indicated other
15 factors that related to the command and control by the Bosnian Serb
16 military leadership over snipers. One of them is found on page 25, where
17 you state:
18 "It is my opinion that these snipers were acting on orders from a
19 higher organisation than the areas, because the three areas that I
20 described, Sedrenik, Sniper Alley, and the airport, crossed across a
21 number of different Serbian brigades."
22 Can you tell the Court about the significance of the fact that
23 sniping was taking place in various areas where various lower-level units
24 were deployed?
25 A. The sniping activity in the city seemed to have a pattern
1 throughout the city which, when you looked at the division of brigades,
2 it appeared to us at the time that there was somebody thinking and
3 enacting a plan that was controlling the activity over the city and not
4 just three independent brigades doing their thing. The fact that snipers
5 are highly-specialised individuals, the pattern of activities, we just
6 had the assessment that this was being co-ordinated at a higher level.
7 The documents I've just read actually confirm our assessment at the time
8 that this was actually a corps-driven asset and plan.
9 Q. General, you referred earlier to meetings that you and other UN
10 military officials had with Bosnian Serb military leaders to protest the
11 sniping against civilians, and indicated that there would be at least a
12 temporary decrease in sniping activity thereafter.
13 At page -- I want to ask you about one other aspect of those
14 meetings. I think at page 22 of your statement, you indicated the
16 "I can characterise meetings with him starting off by being
17 lectured, a denial of what it was we were trying to discuss. However,
18 there was some acknowledgment about sniping around the city."
19 And a general consensus that it would be nice if they had an
20 anti-sniping agreement. And that was with respect to meetings with
21 General Galic.
22 Let me ask you to turn your attention, in that connection, to
23 another document, document 65 ter 19248.
24 And, Your Honour, before I move on to that document, if I may
25 move into admission the two of the training-related documents referred to
1 earlier. That's 65 ter 15725 and 65 ter 15507.
2 JUDGE KWON: They will be admitted.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibits P1783 and P1784 respectively, Your
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. General, 65 ter 19248, now on the screen, is a report on a
7 meeting of June 24th, 1994
8 meeting. And if I can direct your attention to the passage that begins
9 toward the bottom portion of the page, after "Discussions and
10 Conclusions," it states:
11 "General Soubirou spoke about human aspect of the agreement on
12 the cessation of the use of sniper arms. General Galic agreed that the
13 use of snipers is inhuman, adding he opposed partial agreements, but
14 stressed that a general agreement was possible."
15 Then it goes on in the first person:
16 "I accepted the explanation, but I underscored that the agreement
17 signed on February 9th, 1994, included this problem as well. I
18 especially stressed that the hitherto agreement has not been respected by
19 the Muslim side, and that UNPROFOR has not done anything to make them
20 respect the agreement."
21 First of all, General, this is -- in this meeting between
22 General Galic and General Soubirou, do you recall, at this point, whether
23 you were present at that meeting or not?
24 A. I believe I was there.
25 Q. And does the -- well, first of all, is the account provided for
1 in this report generally consistent with your recollection of how these
2 meetings would -- how this particular meeting took place, and, more
3 generally, how these meetings would proceed with respect to protests by
4 the -- and expressions of concern by UNPROFOR and reactions by the
5 Bosnian Serb military leadership?
6 A. This is typical for how meetings were conducted by the Serb corps
8 Q. Was the subject of the discussion sniping on civilians by both
9 the Bosnian Serb forces and the Bosnian Muslim forces?
10 A. We did talk about the subject of sniping against civilians with
11 both sides. We implored both sides to stop this activity because it was
12 inhumane and it was not in accordance with any rules of armed conflict.
13 Q. And did General Galic deny that the Bosnian Serbs were engaged in
14 sniping on civilians or did he protest that the Bosnian Muslims were also
15 engaged in sniping on civilians?
16 A. Traditionally, he would lecture and deny it at the beginning, and
17 then over the course of the conversation would acknowledge that some of
18 this was happening. He would blame the other side for this action. But
19 normally after these meetings, there would be a slight amelioration in
20 the situation. So from our inference, he would take note, and somewhere
21 people would listen to him to improve the situation against civilians.
22 But it was a temporary effect.
23 Q. General, in your amalgamated statement, you spoke about the
24 Bosnian Serb effort to maintain control over the city through, among
25 other things, restrictions on the amount of humanitarian aid. I believe
1 that's found at page 5 of your statement, including keeping pressure on
2 the city by controlling humanitarian aid. Was that a problem throughout
3 the course of your tour of duty?
4 A. It was, indeed. They were very good at determining how much aid
5 we had coming into the city, how much aid we had stockpiled in the city,
6 and they regularly controlled that by either slowing down or stopping
7 convoys. And at one stage, I do recall we ate -- we had no fresh food
8 for 20 days.
9 JUDGE KWON: Do you like to tender that report?
10 MR. TIEGER: Oh, yes, Your Honour. Thank you very much.
11 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1785, Your Honours.
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. General, I asked you about command and control over other aspects
15 of what was happening in Sarajevo
16 forces in Sarajevo
17 over restrictions on humanitarian aid.
18 And in that connection, if I could ask you to turn to 65 ter
20 General, this is a report of the Main Staff of the Army of
21 Republika Srpska, dated 14 April 1994
22 Republika Srpska, the Commands of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, the
23 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and to other corps, as well as to the Main Staff
24 of the Yugoslav Army. And if I could direct your attention to three --
25 two portions toward the latter part of the report, found at the bottom of
1 page 3 in English, first, and page 3 of the B/C/S, which states as
3 "Situation in the territory:
4 "During the day, there were no movements of teams and convoys of
5 UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations across the territory of
6 Republika Srpska. The decision made by the Supreme Command on
7 restriction of movement is being implemented."
8 And, similarly, if I could ask you to turn to the very end of the
9 document, which states:
10 "To continue with the consistent implementation of the decision
11 of the Supreme Command on the suspension of relations with UN Forces
12 Command and the restriction of movement for the teams and convoys of
13 UNPROFOR and the humanitarian organisations."
14 And, General, is this document consistent or inconsistent with
15 your assessment of who controlled restrictions on humanitarian assistance
16 during the course of your tour of duty in Sarajevo?
17 A. This document is consistent with our assessment that humanitarian
18 aid and our freedom of movement was being controlled by the Serbs.
19 Q. General, I want to ask you about two more documents related to --
20 Your Honour, before you have to ask me that, I would move this into
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1786, Your Honours.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. I want to direct your attention to two more documents related to
1 pressure on -- maintaining pressure on the city, as you mentioned at
2 page 5, through pressure on humanitarian organisations and UNPROFOR. The
3 first document is 65 ter 1331 [sic]. I'm sorry, that document should be
5 General, we had an opportunity earlier to look at the event that
6 happened on April 7th, 1995
7 General Milosevic of 26 November 1994
8 Infantry Brigade, that states:
9 "Following the oral order of the VRS Main Staff commander,
10 immediately repeat the task according to my order Strictly
11 Confidential ... from November 24th, 1994:
12 "Pay attention to the consumption of ammunition.
13 "I am to be personally informed about the completion of the task.
14 "You are to fire at the center of deployed UNPROFOR forces."
15 General, is this document consistent or inconsistent with your
16 assessment, during the course of your tour of duty, of pressures placed
17 on UN forces, including attacks on UN forces and the level of
18 responsibility and command and control for those efforts?
19 A. This document is consistent with our assessments during the time
20 I was there. It is also consistent with the attacks on our own UN
21 forces, and it confirms that this was a direct contravention of the
22 rules, of the corps commander directing his troops to fire upon the UN,
23 and we were not at war or in conflict with the Serbian forces. Quite
24 frankly, it disgusts me.
25 Q. One more document, General, and that is 65 ter 19250. General,
1 this is an order from the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska,
2 dated 13 April 1994
3 organisations in the territory of Republika Srpska. And it's an order
4 from General Mladic sent out to various command headquarters, and it
5 states, in part:
6 "UN Military Observers and the members of the UNPROFOR are to be
7 accommodated in appropriate premises outside of the facilities where they
8 had been stationed to date; that is, in the military facilities which are
9 a potential target of the NATO Air Force, as per your choice."
10 And then it goes on to specify that the -- that these UN Military
11 Observers and members of UNPROFOR are to be forbidden phone and
12 communication contact and prevented from contact with others, and to
13 remain in isolation.
14 Again, General, is this order from General Mladic consistent or
15 inconsistent with your assessment at the time, based on your experiences
16 on the ground, your military experience, your contacts with Bosnian Serb
17 military leaders, and all the other factors available to you, about
18 command and control over actions directed against UN forces?
19 A. This document is consistent with our experiences with the Serbian
20 forces on the ground. It is evident of a very effective
21 command-and-control system by General Mladic to his forces, who executed
22 these conditions, I would say, and treated UN soldiers as prisoners of
23 war even though we were not combatants in this faction.
24 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, I would move into evidence this
25 document and the previous document.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, both of them will be admitted.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter 11331 will be Exhibit P1787,
4 and 65 ter 09250 will be Exhibit P1788.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. And finally, General, I wanted to turn your attention to one
7 other portion of your amalgamated statement and just clarify that
9 You stated at page 73 of your statement that you spent a lot of
10 time -- you and other UN officials spent a lot of time moving around the
11 city and talking to people, including local residents who worked for the
12 UN. And during the course of that, you would ask them what life was
13 like, and you said:
14 "In all cases, they expressed the uncertainty and terror of never
15 knowing what was going to happen next."
16 And you could see that they were "visibly traumatised."
17 This question was not explicitly asked, although given the
18 context in which you're discussing it, so I just wanted there not to be
19 any ambiguity about that. In respect of what caused this terror, what
20 was it?
21 A. This terror was the result of a number of different factors. The
22 city was at -- sieged. Their humanitarian aid was being controlled by
23 the Serbs. They were being shelled, they were being sniped at, and
24 residents of the city never quite knew what was going to happen to them
25 when they walked outside the door. And, therefore, every time they
1 walked outside the door, they were taking their lives into their own
2 hands. And as some of them said to me, and I will never forget it, in
3 the 1940s, under the German regime, life was a lot better than it was
4 during the Bosnian civil war, which is not a good thing to say. But in
5 comparison, it just puts into context for me that it was absolutely the
6 worst conditions for anybody to live in was in Sarajevo during this
7 period of time.
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, General.
9 That concludes my examination-in-chief, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
11 Shall we have a break before you start your cross-examination,
12 Mr. Karadzic?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I agree, Your Excellency.
14 JUDGE KWON: We'll take the break for half an hour, and we'll
15 resume at five to 11.00.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 If I may be allowed to reiterate once again that the time
21 allocated to me for this important witness will not be sufficient,
22 particularly since Mr. Tieger dealt with this witness in a very ambitious
23 way, which provided us with a huge number of general statements. And
24 with kind assistance of General Fraser, we will need to clarify those in
25 order to make them objective and reliable.
1 Good morning to everyone.
2 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Good morning, General Fraser.
5 A. Good morning.
6 Q. First of all, I would like to thank you for your kindness and
7 your communication, via videolink, with the Defence team, and I believe
8 that we agreed on certain things that we are going to confirm and repeat
9 here today.
10 Would you agree with me that the Trial Chamber should disregard
11 those portions of your statement that pertain to the periods when you
12 were not stationed there?
13 A. I'm not sure that's up to me to say.
14 Q. But you would agree that there are portions relating, for
15 example, to Gorazde during the period while you were not there?
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'd like to advise you to move on to
17 your next topic. It's not for the witness, as he indicated.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Q. You said that the Serbs did not seek assistance from the United
20 Nations, while, on the other hand, the Muslims protested and asked for
21 assistance. Can you please tell us: What kind of sources did you use as
22 sources of information while stationed in Sarajevo?
23 JUDGE KWON: Probably you are seeking a reference.
24 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, Your Honour. Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: Could you indicate the reference you are citing
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm referring to one portion of the
3 statement. Now I have to find this particular part in the general's
4 statement, and it will take a little time.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you recall saying something like that?
7 A. No, sir, I don't recall. You'll have to be more specific.
8 JUDGE KWON: By my mistake, I read your statement of 1997, which
9 I thought it was -- which was an amalgamated statement. On page 11 of
10 that statement, there's a similar passage which goes to the effect that:
11 "In fact, the Serbs never asked for our help. They had a
12 fatalistic attitude and used as being the underdogs as part of their
14 Do you remember that kind of a passage?
15 THE WITNESS: I do recall something like that, yes, sir.
16 JUDGE KWON: Were you referring to that, Mr. Karadzic?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency. Thank you.
18 But I wanted to ask the general to tell us and name the sources of his
19 information, since the Serbs were not whining a lot, were not asking for
20 assistance, et cetera.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
22 Q. Can you please tell us: Which particular sources of information
23 did you use during your tour of duty?
24 A. We would speak to the Serbian corps commander, and that's where
25 my experience was limited with the engagements between my commander and
1 the Serbian corps commander. We would engage on the Muslim side equally
2 with the Muslim corps commander. In addition, my commander would engage
3 with the leadership of the Muslim government and, on the odd occasion,
4 would accompany General Rose to engage other Serbian leadership. So the
5 source of our information was from Muslim or Serbian leaders, in addition
6 to our own reports from our units from throughout Sector Sarajevo.
7 Q. Thank you. Do you mean, by that that you used government reports
8 or government agency reports produced by the government in Sarajevo?
9 A. I don't recall ever using government reports.
10 Q. Thank you. During our conversation, and also in your statements,
11 you said that you had certain reservations concerning reports by military
12 observers who were embedded with you but were unreliable and sent their
13 reports first to Zagreb
14 statement given on page 0055-5094, given between the 15th and 18th
15 November 1997. Would you agree with that?
16 A. I do agree that I made comments about the utility of UNMOs. They
17 were dependent -- their reliability was dependent on which nation they
18 came from. And their reporting chain did go back to Zagreb, which made
19 getting timely information from them difficult.
20 Q. Thank you. Are you trying to say that the nationality of an UNMO
21 and certain battalions did have a certain impact on reliability?
22 A. That's what I said.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have this page of the
24 statement, number 0055-5094, 65 ter 11709 [as interpreted]. 11079.
25 JUDGE KWON: If you'd like to refer to this document later on, it
1 may be a good idea to give a hard copy to the general in advance, if that
2 can be arranged.
3 I don't think this is -- I thought Mr. Karadzic referred to his
4 earlier statement of 1997. Could you check the 65 ter number.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 11079, that's the statement, and we
6 need page 14, the ERN number is 0055-5094. This is not the document that
7 I'm looking for. If we can kindly ask the Prosecution to provide the
9 JUDGE KWON: I checked the filing from the Prosecution, and the
10 65 ter number is noted as 11079. Yes, it's coming.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Can you please confirm that this is your statement from 1997?
13 And then we need page 14. Can you please focus on the paragraph entitled
14 "UN Military Observers."
15 If you agree, sir, it says here that all of them, more or less,
16 with the exception of certain individuals that you described as positive
17 examples, the rest of them were rather unreliable and their reports were
18 useless; in other words, that UNPROFOR commanders had to resort to using
19 their own sources; is that correct?
20 A. What I said was that they were inconsistent, unreliable. The
21 reporting chain was up to Zagreb
22 that for timely information we did rely on our own resources. And as
23 part of a normal military chain, we would use multiple sources to try to
24 corroborate information on the ground.
25 And I just want to clarify. You said "battalions" earlier in
1 your question. I'm just limiting my comment to UNMOs, United Nations
2 Military Observers, as stated here.
3 Q. All right. We'll later deal with the difference between various
5 [In English] "They were inconsistent, unreliable and in fact they
6 reported first to Zagreb
7 [Interpretation] You can confirm this sentence that I have just
8 read out to you.
9 A. Wasn't of such use to us, yes, but wasn't completely dismissed.
10 But they were unreliable, inconsistent, and we relied on other sources to
11 put together the missing pieces or to corroborate what they were saying.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Can we now see the previous page, which will hopefully shed some
14 light on the structure and organisation of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo,
15 ERN 5083. The previous page.
16 JUDGE KWON: 93, then, page 13.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, sorry, 83. 0055-5083. That's
18 page 3 of the document.
19 JUDGE KWON: Correct. If Mr. Karadzic does not need the B/C/S
20 page, we can collapse that part so that the general can see the more
21 zoomed-in page.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps it would be useful to the
23 interpreters, but anyway:
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Would you agree that here you established the existence of
1 certain differences on the basis of nationality? For example, when you
2 mentioned General Soubirou and Gobillard, these ADCs who were autonomous,
3 to a certain extent, it says:
4 [In English] "... the French sitreps and intelligence reports
5 which Soubirou did not want any non-French person to read."
6 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I think we'll need to scroll down to
7 find the reference that was just made. Sorry, and if it's helpful, we
8 have a hard-copy version.
9 JUDGE KWON: Could that be handed over to the general. I take it
10 there's no objection from the Defence. Yes, that's page 3, General.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Can you confirm this, this part of your statement?
14 A. The French did write reports that went back up their own national
15 chain, and they kept those pretty much to themselves. I was not privy to
16 everything that they wrote, and my duties were principally for the UN
17 portion. And what they wrote from a French point of view was for French
18 eyes only. But the fact that I was the military assistant did not
19 prevent me from doing my jobs -- doing my job as a Canadian.
20 Q. But do you agree that it would have been helpful if you could
21 impart on us what was it that they wrote in their reports, although you
22 didn't have access to those reports?
23 A. As I said in my last sentence in the fourth paragraph, I had a
24 look at them a couple of times, but there was nothing particularly
25 striking in them. So it was essentially mainly reporting back
1 information that was going back up UN channels. And under coalition
2 operations, it is typical for nations to report back, up their own
3 channels, what was going on on the ground.
4 Q. Was the same practice pursued by other national contingents?
5 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.
6 Q. Do you remember that we gave approval for the presence of the UN,
7 but we did not give our approval for the presence of any national forces?
8 A. The fact that I was there under the UN auspices meant you were
9 inviting Canada
10 say you approved both.
11 Q. But do you agree that the Serbian side had its specific reasons
12 to be suspicious of individual national contingents with regard to their
13 impartiality, and that in that respect we preferred to rely on the UN
14 rather than on individual national contingents, particularly those from
16 A. When I was the -- I do not agree with you on that statement,
17 because everybody who was wearing the blue beret was there under the UN
18 auspices, we were there under a UN mandate, and notwithstanding that
19 certain countries might have belonged to NATO, we were not there as NATO
20 partners there, we were there as UN forces, and my commander took
21 particular care to make sure that all the troops under his command acted
22 in an impartial way to all of the warring parties.
23 Q. Thank you. Nevertheless, in your statement you say that to you
24 it was more important who the commander was, whereas other officers in HQ
25 were just a sort of window dressing; is that correct?
1 A. Can you indicate where I said that?
2 Q. Can you please confirm if you said that, and then we'll find it.
3 A. I would have to read my statement.
4 Q. It's on the next page.
5 Can we please have the next page.
6 JUDGE KWON: Third paragraph.
7 THE WITNESS: In the third paragraph, I do say that:
8 "The UN officers in the headquarters were essentially 'window
10 That said, the French did the majority of the work, the
11 meaningful work, and it was among -- it was a matter of efficiency that,
12 to get things done, you leaned on those people within the headquarters
13 that could get the work done, because we were talking about protecting
14 and executing the UN mandate. It's in that context that I said that, I
15 made that statement.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Q. Do you agree that you said that, for example, General Soubirou
18 received instructions from Generals Rose or Smith, but that basically he
19 operated on the basis of consultations with his home country, which is
21 A. General Rose and General Smith were General Soubirou's immediate
22 superiors, and he would take orders from them. But in all coalition
23 operations, we all come from various nations, and we take instructions
24 and consultations from our respective nations. It's a function of
25 coalition operations.
1 Q. Thank you. During our videolink conference, you confirmed that
2 you were aware of the fact that the UN shared its information with NATO
3 and that it was mainly done between General Rose and
4 Admiral Leighton Smith; is that correct?
5 A. I said I listened to several conversations on the phone between
6 Rose and Smith.
7 Q. Thank you. You also confirmed your belief that UN sitreps and
8 other sources of information had also been passed on to NATO.
9 A. I don't recall that I confirmed that the UN sitreps were passed
10 on to NATO. I do confirm that Rose tried to explain the situation to
11 NATO, and in many cases to explain the UN position on the ground, given
12 the circumstances that the UN was facing.
13 Q. Thank you. We have agreed -- or, rather, you have confirmed that
14 General Rose brought in JCOs into Bosnia
15 independent and reliable sources of information. Those were, in fact,
16 British soldiers that he could trust, and they were deployed in Gorazde,
17 among other places, as members of the SAS; is that correct?
18 A. General Rose did bring in the JCOs as another source of
19 information. What they did in Gorazde, you would have to ask him. And
20 they came from the British Army, and some of the soldiers were SAS, but
21 not just exclusive to SAS, from my knowledge.
22 Q. Thank you. In our conversation, you confirmed that you had
23 knowledge -- or, rather, the UN had knowledge about the existence of the
24 black market and the involvement on UN personnel in such transactions,
25 and that there were even some investigations carried out about that.
1 A. The UN were conducting investigations of allegations of
2 black-marketeering by the UN, and this was taken very seriously and
3 investigated by a task force that came out of Zagreb.
4 Q. There were even criminal vehicles that were blown up illegally,
5 and those were vehicles [as interpreted] by those who were trying to
6 prevent this. A French officer who was trying to prevent this was blown
7 up; isn't that right?
8 Let me rephrase this question. Is it correct that a vehicle of
9 the commander of a French platoon, who was trying to prevent this
10 black-marketeering, was blown up, and that this had to do with his
11 activities aimed at countering the black-market activities?
12 A. There was a French military police platoon commander who had his
13 vehicle booby-trapped with a bomb. He was in the process of
14 investigation -- investigating black-marketeering, and he did come to us
15 and we put him and the proper police authorities on to the allegations of
16 black-marketeering that he was looking into.
17 Q. At our meeting, you claimed that the booby-trapping of this
18 vehicle could have to do possibly with his activities against
19 black-marketeering; is that correct?
20 A. That's what I said, yes.
21 Q. Thank you. There was also UN personnel that was involved in
22 prostitution rings in Sarajevo
23 A. I've heard of those allegations, and any -- any allegations that
24 we would have heard about, we would have brought the proper investigative
25 authorities in to address those allegations.
1 Q. Thank you. You said, during our conversation, that the UN CivPol
2 carried out a major investigation into the smuggling activities involving
3 ammunition, weapons, vehicles, fuel, people, identity cards, and alcohol;
4 is this correct?
5 A. There was -- this was part of the UN task force on
6 black-marketeering, and the sector conducted at least one major
7 investigation on allegations of black-marketeering.
8 Q. And this had to do with the smuggling of the articles that I just
9 referred to and that you also referred to during our conversation; is
10 that correct?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. Thank you. You also agreed that because of this, Serbs did have
13 reason to be cautious in approving the entry of convoys into Sarajevo
14 light of this black-marketeering; is that correct?
15 A. I did not agree to that. I would say that, in fact,
16 black-marketeering was an issue that all warring factions had to deal
17 with. And the UN took it very seriously and dealt with it, and we raised
18 those issues with the appropriate side.
19 Q. But you would agree, would you not, that the Serbs had reasons
20 for increased caution and control of everything that was coming into
22 A. I would not agree that the Serbs had to have increased control.
23 I would say that the Serbs, in co-operation with the UN, should have
24 looked at black-marketeering and to respect the UN mandate for freedom of
1 Q. Thank you. During our conversation, I asked you to be more
2 precise about freedom of movement. In your opinion, freedom of movement,
3 especially for humanitarian convoys, would that imply the absence of
5 A. No, there has to be an element of control, but not to the point
6 of restricting humanitarian convoys from reaching their destination.
7 Q. And the force that issues permission for the passage of
8 humanitarian convoys, does that force have any right to pose certain
9 conditions on the passage; for example, some technical conditions, things
10 like that? Technical conditions.
11 A. Control would include technical conditions. But for the
12 inference you say, the force that issues permission for the passage of
13 humanitarian convoys, we weren't asking for permission, we were informing
14 the Serbs that humanitarian supplies were coming into the city for
15 humanitarian purposes, and just proper control measures should be taken
16 to make sure that they got there, not to restrict them.
17 Q. And now we are going to come to a certain misunderstanding, in
18 the legal sense.
19 Do you know, General, sir, that for the first time in the history
20 of warfare, in the Serbian-Bulgarian War the Serbian military ceased
21 their activities in order to allow humanitarian assistance for the
22 Bulgarians to pass, and this then actually assisted the founder of the
23 Red Cross to set this as a norm? Did you know that?
24 JUDGE KWON: What relevance does it have, Mr. Karadzic? Let's
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, there are so many bad
2 things heard about Serbs, it's not a bad thing to hear something good.
3 It was the Serbs who established this rule of allowing passage to
4 humanitarian aid in the 19th century, and the Red Cross founder took that
5 as the grounds for that particular norm.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. But in any case, General, can we now look at 1D2612 so that we
8 can clarify what are the rights of the parties. 1D2612.
9 This is the 4th Convention that relates to the protection of
10 civilian persons in time of war.
11 Can we now look at page 23, please. I'm sorry, page 9,
12 Article 23.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, Your Honour.
15 Just as a housekeeping matter - I'm not objecting to the use of
16 this document - I understand the documents may surface during the course
17 of cross-examination that were not notified. It's a little unusual. The
18 first one is in that category. But, in any event, if Dr. Karadzic could
19 just advise us if he's using a document that has not been notified to the
20 Prosecution so that we can -- it's not that -- so we don't go through the
21 searching process to try to find it.
22 JUDGE KWON: The Geneva Convention is not the sort document that
23 is usually admitted during the course of examination, but your submission
24 must have been noted by the Defence.
25 Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will do our best, of course.
2 The need for this arises from our differing understanding of the
3 rights of parties to the conflict.
4 Q. According to Article 23, if you agree -- could you please look at
5 it and see what the rights of the parties are. And then there is the
6 place which says:
7 "The power which allows the passage of the consignments indicated
8 in the first paragraph of this article ..."
9 [In English] "... may take such permission conditional on the
10 distribution to the persons benefitted, thereby being made under the
11 local supervision of the protecting powers.
12 "Such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible, and
13 the power which permits this free passage shall have the right to
14 prescribe the technical arrangements under which such passage is
16 [Interpretation] How was it possible for the Serbian side,
17 General, to stop being one of the parties, and is no longer being asked
18 for permission but is only being informed of matters?
19 A. All I can say is that I've read now this, and it states very
20 clearly in the first paragraph. And I guess my going -- question back
21 would be: Understanding what this says, why is it that I went 20 days
22 without having fresh food? Because in accordance with this, it should
23 have been -- the food materials should have been provided as quickly as
25 I will not object, you know, for the -- what it states in here,
1 for power which allows the passage, that's the third-last paragraph, I
2 get that, but the intent of the first paragraph is very clear, is to
3 deliver the humanitarian aid and the materials as soon as possible.
4 Q. I agree. But do you note that the party gives permission, is not
5 informed, that party has the right to set conditions?
6 I would like you now to please look at item C, that:
7 "A definite advantage ..."
8 [In English] "... may accrue to the military efforts or economy
9 of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments
10 for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy
11 through the release of such materials, services, and/or facilities, as
12 would otherwise be required for the production of such goods."
13 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the party which provides
14 permission for the passage of a convoy is authorised to assure that the
15 other side does not draw any kind of military benefit from that?
16 A. The UN was aware of this provision, and the UN -- my commander
17 took particular care to make sure that -- within his powers, that the aid
18 that was coming in was going to civilians. And in those cases, we would
19 talk to the corps commander about the freedom of movement, understanding
20 this document and this Article 23.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Since this is not going to be admitted because the Geneva
23 Conventions are part of the jurisprudence, can we now look at 1D1724,
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. And while we're waiting: General, sir, my learned friend
2 Mr. Tieger very skillfully and successfully created the impression that
3 Mladic forbade something -- or, rather, how Mladic confirmed that the
4 freedom of movement was suspended, and then we did look at this document.
5 This is P1786, but let's look at this document first. Allow me to read
6 it, because I'm not sure if we have a translation of it.
7 This is a regular combat report with the status at 1700 hours on
8 the 12th of May, 1994. This is the Sarajevo Romanija Corps reporting to
9 the Main Staff. And then down there in the last paragraph, it says:
10 "At the check-point in Kasindolska Street, an armoured vehicle of
11 the French Battalion was stopped, and during inspection it was
12 established that the same is transporting seven boxes of mines for an
13 82-millimetre mortar, allegedly for their unit in Rajlovac."
14 Can we now look at the next page, please:
15 "An inspection established that these were not indicated as being
16 among their arsenal of weapons of said calibre, and the resolution of
17 this problem is underway.
18 "In the area of responsibility of the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry
19 Battalion, we had the willful movement of true members of the UNPROFOR
20 with an all-terrain vehicle in the direction of Kosevo, towards
21 Visojevici, from where they were turned back."
22 General, do you agree that transporting ammunition to the other
23 side gives us the right to be cautious?
24 A. First of all, I have no knowledge of this particular incident,
25 and it was not my understanding and my duties, as military assistant to
1 the sector commander, that we were aiding any particular side.
2 Q. I can agree that there was no such assistance at higher levels,
3 but this does not change the fact that at some lower levels, our enemies
4 were supplied with weapons by passing through our lines, which did give
5 us the right to be cautious and to step up inspections.
6 Do you agree that if the other contracting party does not stick
7 to the agreed rules and procedures, our party had the right to suspend a
8 particular programme?
9 A. You're asking me a hypothetical question and/or you're asking me
10 to make a comment on a document which I haven't been able to verify the
11 details of that statement, so I feel that I can't really answer that
12 question professionally.
13 Q. But, General, sir, this indicates something about an occurrence
14 which you also spoke about, that there was a disruption or obstacles
15 placed on the freedom of movement of convoys, and now I am speaking about
16 the reasons for heightened control. This is not an attack on you or the
17 UN, as a whole. All I would like to do is to throw some light on the
18 reasons for heightened control on the part of the Serbian side and for
19 need for more care. It's not that the Serbs were doing this because they
20 were evil, but that they were taking measures in order to prevent
21 themselves being used in the arming of their enemies.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to
23 tender this document.
24 JUDGE KWON: Before we deal with this, I would tell you again to
25 refrain from making comments. The last point is just a statement on your
2 Mr. Tieger, separate from the issue of translation, would you
3 object to the admission of this document?
4 MR. TIEGER: It's going to be MFI'd, in any event. I don't see
5 anything at this point on which to object, but we'll have an opportunity
6 to see if we can learn anything additional. But otherwise, no.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll mark it for identification.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I feel the need to clarify why I
10 made this comment. Well, it's not a comment. I would just like to
11 inform the general that I --
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, just ask questions to the witness.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Q. General, sir, in your statement of the -- actually, while we're
15 looking for it: Are you aware that the Muslims or the Muslim Army used
16 Unis's high-rise building, and the high-rise building of the Executive
17 Assembly, and some other high buildings as sniper emplacements?
18 A. Yes, we were aware.
19 Q. Thank you. My learned friend Mr. Tieger, on pages 23 to 25,
20 asked you -- suggested that General Galic acknowledged that there were
21 sniper actions throughout the town, but in the question it was
22 acknowledged that General Galic admitted that there was sniper action
23 against civilians. Did General Galic ever admit that there was sniper
24 action against civilians?
25 A. It seemed very clear, in the notes from that meeting, he was --
1 he was acknowledging that.
2 Q. Are civilians mentioned anywhere?
3 A. Not specifically, but I did understand the sense of this
4 statement from his own notes.
5 Q. Do you have notes from that meeting that would confirm that this
6 referred to civilians?
7 A. I do not have notes from that meeting.
8 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that different anti-sniper agreements
9 were reached?
10 A. I do remember that we worked with both warring factions in
12 factions was the same: to not engage civilians, and we would take actions
13 against whatever warring faction did.
14 Q. Do you remember, General, sir, that these anti-sniping agreements
15 implied also a ban on sniper action in town against legitimate targets,
16 not only against civilians; that this was a ban on sniper action in
18 A. I need to refer back to the agreements, but my understanding was
19 that military actions against the other warring faction's military was
20 the purview of the two warring factions. Where the UN engaged was when
21 those military actions spilled over into the civilian community.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Can I now have P1208, please - this is a Prosecution document,
24 P1208 - so that we can be reminded how, before this anti-sniping
25 agreement was signed, one commander issued orders.
1 One of these is unnecessary.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Can I please draw your attention to paragraph 3. Would you agree
4 that here targets for snipers are being indicated quite precisely as
5 being officers and soldiers?
6 A. Yes, those instructions are clear, not to engage civilians,
7 children, on roads or buses. Yes, that's very clear there.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 This has already been admitted. We don't need to tender it.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Do you recall having information about how the French had video
12 footage showing Muslim snipers firing at their own people and how they
13 were preparing this? Actually, the French had this footage; is that
15 A. I had heard those stories, but I had never seen the footage.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at 65 ter 09664.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Well, you may not have seen the footage, but you did hear that
19 such footage exists; is that correct?
20 A. I had heard the stories.
21 Q. Do you agree that you also heard from the French that the Muslims
22 filmed such attacks on children in order to broadcast it on TV and
23 thereby blemish the Serbs?
24 A. I heard those stories, and -- yeah, I heard those stories too.
25 Q. Thank you. Can you please now look at this text, and let's try
1 to identify it. This is an anti-sniping summary of FrenchBat 2, 23rd
2 September 1994. This is the period while you were there; is that
4 A. Yes, it is.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at the next
6 page. We do not need the Serbian version.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Let's look at item H, which says "Location," and then point 7,
9 which reads as follows:
10 [In English] "According to a Bosniak --"
11 JUDGE KWON: Bottom of the page. Just a second. Yes.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. She confirmed -- this Muslim woman confirmed to the French that
14 the fire had come from the Bosnian Muslim side, opposite the PTT
15 building; is that correct?
16 A. Well, that's what this sentence says on this document. What --
17 I'm just trying to figure out: What is this document? The previous one
18 was a Frebat 2 document. Is this --
19 JUDGE KWON: Shall we show the witness the first page?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is an official report compiled
21 by Captain Chassang. I apologise for my non-existent knowledge of
22 French. It relates to an investigation of sniping incidents that was
23 carried out by French Battalion 2, and the investigation concluded that
24 the shots came from the Muslim-held building opposite the PTT. So as I
25 say, this is an official report, provided by the French Battalion.
1 JUDGE KWON: Do we not have the original French version in our
2 e-court? It has the certain ERN number. I wonder whether we can show it
3 to the witness.
4 THE WITNESS: If I could see the second page, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, thank you.
6 THE WITNESS: Okay, Your Honour, I'm okay with this document.
7 It's not normal that I would read this level of documentation,
8 which is below -- it took me a while to catch up to where I was back
9 then. Yes, I acknowledge the observations of -- in paragraph 7.
10 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I surely accept that
12 you haven't read it, but we are just talking about a phenomenon. That
13 was the reason I asked you the question.
14 Can we please tender this document into evidence?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D770, Your Honours.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Sir, from whom did you hear about the filming of sniping attacks
19 on the children in order to tarnish the reputation of the Serbs? Were
20 these just rumours or were you informed of that, and by whom?
21 A. It would have come from the UN -- our UN soldiers, and I seem to
22 recall that a protest was lodged against the Muslims for these types of
24 Q. Thank you. Had you ever heard or had you ever received any
25 information to the effect that the Serbs would shoot at their own
1 civilians in order to lay blame on the other side?
2 A. I did not ever recall that.
3 Q. Thank you. During our interview, you said that you had
4 information about the Muslims' desire to provoke a foreign military
5 intervention, but that you were not sure whether this sniping of their
6 own people served that purpose. However, you did say that they had
7 professional marksmen and snipers and that there were not at all any
8 renegade elements. The sniping targeting their own civilians was a sort
9 of military policy; is that correct?
10 A. I just want to answer all of the points of your question.
11 Our assessment was that the Muslim authorities were interested in
12 keeping the UN engaged with the operations, and, by extension, the
13 international community.
14 Secondly, I don't -- I don't recall ever saying that there was a
15 military policy targeting their own civilians. I did say that the
16 Muslims were guilty of targeting civilians, and we protested against them
17 as we did protest against Serbs who fired against civilians.
18 And the Muslims had their own professional marksmen and snipers,
19 as did the Serbs.
20 Q. Thank you. During our conversation, you also confirmed that UN
21 officers had conducted investigations of the incidents in which members
22 of the UN were the targets, and that in such instances, evidence was
23 collected and a full investigation was carried out. On the other hand,
24 when this involved civilians as being the target of fire, the UN
25 conducted certain investigations with respect to the origin of fire but
1 that the evidence was collected by the local police. Is that correct?
2 A. That's correct, and we tried to get information from whichever
3 faction was conducting their own investigation so we could complete our
4 reports. And we were, to a greater or lesser degree, successful in
5 getting the information to complete a thorough report, depending on what
6 warring factions or parties were prepared to share with us.
7 Q. Thank you. But we both agree that in the criminal and legal
8 sense, the targeting of civilians in Sarajevo was investigated by the
9 local police?
10 A. What I said was that where civilians were engaged, the UN would
11 conduct its investigation, local authorities did what they did under
12 their own national direction, and we tried to obtain information to
13 complete our investigation.
14 Q. Did you conduct criminal investigations? Who collected the
15 evidence? And I'm talking in the legal sense of the word. Was that the
16 local police or was it the UN?
17 A. We did not conduct criminal investigations. We conducted simply
18 an investigation to ascertain the facts and to determine which side was
19 responsible for those incidents. In the event that any criminal activity
20 was -- had occurred, we would bring in our own military police to conduct
21 criminal investigations, but that was mainly pertaining to internal
22 matters. When it came -- pertaining to sniping or shelling, that was
23 just done by the UN troops on the ground, and the investigations were
24 sent up the chain of command with their results.
25 Q. Thank you. Were you aware that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina
1 shelled Sarajevo
2 A. In one case, we were aware of that. We conducted a joint
3 investigation with the Muslim authorities. This was as a result,
4 initially, by an attack that came from the Serb side. But in the course
5 of our investigations, a second incident on the same position concluded
6 that the second mortar attack came from the Muslim side. That
7 information was provided back to the Muslim authorities.
8 Q. According to your conclusions, what was the purpose of that
9 second shell that was fired from a Muslim position? More precisely, was
10 that an attempt to increase the number of casualties in order to accuse
11 the Serbian side even more seriously?
12 A. The conclusions of our report was: First, that it was an attack
13 from the Serbian side, which we protested back to the Serbs for attacking
14 a civilian position. The second was that it was an attack on a civilian
15 [Realtime transcript read in error "Serb"] position by Muslims, which we
16 protested back to them. And we provided information to both warring
17 parties and had a press conference about it to explain to them how we
18 conducted the investigation, using the information back from the Muslim
19 side, and we just presented our facts, indicating that both parties were
20 at fault.
21 JUDGE KWON: The question was whether you were able to answer --
22 gather the purpose on the Muslim side.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
24 It would appear that the intent of the Muslims was to incite more
25 casualties and put blame on to the Serbs for this attack.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Q. Do you remember in which particular part of the town that
4 A. You are now taxing my memory on that one.
5 Q. Do you recall when it happened?
6 A. I would have to go back through my notes, but I seem to recall it
7 happened probably just west of Skenderija, in that area there on the
8 Muslim side, near the market. But I'm really taxing my memory right now.
9 Q. Now, I have to remind you that in our earlier interview you
10 mentioned your notes. Is there any way in which we can have access to
11 these notes?
12 A. In 1997, when I provided my comment -- my report, whatever I had
13 then was given, and I'm on record now as what I've said then, and I --
14 you know, all my subsequent comments have been based on that statement,
15 and I have no idea where whatever information I had they used for that
16 statement is today. So whatever documentation I had then is not -- I
17 don't know where those notes are, other than what has been entered into
18 evidence of my notes that I wrote up and the UN documents which I've seen
19 referred to frequently.
20 Q. Did you hand these notes over to the OTP personally?
21 A. Again, I just recall that whatever I had in 1997 was shared, it
22 was the subject of how my report was produced, and I can't remember what
23 happened to whatever I had back then. I don't have it today.
24 Q. Thank you. My learned friend Mr. Tieger advised us that they
25 failed to locate it, which does not mean that we should refrain from
1 trying to have them located and made available. And if the Trial Chamber
2 could be of assistance, that would be very useful.
3 You mentioned that Ganic was confronted with a number of your
4 findings --
5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I don't think the witness can see --
6 can scroll back the transcript. But for the purpose of the record, it's
7 page 56, lines from 8 -- that should be a typo. If I can read it to you,
8 could you confirm that it's a typo:
9 "The conclusions of our report was: First, that it was an attack
10 from the Serbian side ..."
11 We are referring to the second attack from the Bosnian side. And
12 then the transcript reads, I quote:
13 "The second was it was an attack on Serb positions by Muslims,
14 which we protested back to them."
15 I take it "the Serb positions" should read "civilian positions."
16 THE WITNESS: That's right, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that the Trial Chamber has
20 taken note of our appeal for the notes to be found and made available,
21 and that we shall have their support in our efforts.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, Mr. Robinson is certainly aware, and I
24 believe the accused should be aware, that we were apprised of this
25 situation before. Because of the potential ambiguity associated with
1 that, we looked for the notes based on the representations made by
2 Mr. Robinson. We have no indication that the notes were ever taken by
3 the OTP and certainly no indication that we have those notes, despite an
4 exhaustive search based on what we understood to be the premise that we
5 had, in fact, been given the notes. As I understand it now, that's not
6 the case. It's just no one knows what happened to them. But we would,
7 in the normal course of business, of course, have recorded the receipt of
8 those things, and there's no such indication.
9 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, if I could just elaborate on that
10 for a minute, not take very much time.
11 JUDGE KWON: Is this something we need spend some time on that?
12 We heard what the general said about this.
13 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
14 MR. ROBINSON: That's okay, we can deal with it in some other
15 form. Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you agree that at least on one occasion, Ejub Ganic was
20 speechless when you confronted him with the account of the conduct of the
21 Muslim side towards their own citizens?
22 A. He was speechless and not very happy.
23 Q. Do you know that General Rose was convinced that Ganic had his
24 own sniper detachment which was used for killing their own people around
1 A. I'm not aware of that.
2 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that, according to the
3 Geneva Conventions, and in this portion that we read today, number 4,
4 Part 2, inter alia, hospitals should not be converted into military
5 facilities and that they can only enjoy protection provided they're not
6 used for military purposes?
7 A. That's in accordance with the Geneva Convention, yes.
8 Q. Did the Muslims open fire, from the Kosevo Hospital
9 the Serbian positions?
10 A. I can't recall.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we then please have your
12 statement, 11079, from 1997, and we need page 0055-5101. I think it's
13 page 21.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Can I draw your attention to the last paragraph, which reads:
16 [In English] "Mortars fired from Kosevo Hospital
18 [Interpretation] Does this refresh your memory about the abuse of
19 the Kosevo Hospital
20 A. I'll stand by my statement that I made in 1997. As I say, time
21 has dulled my details. I do remember the missiles hitting the
22 Presidency, and that I stand by the mortars were fired from the Kosevo
23 Hospital and from the weapon collection point at Ilidza. But to your
24 question about was this multiple times, I can only go by what my
25 statement says here.
1 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that the Muslim side frequently used
2 this tactic of shooting from the vicinity of UN installations, PTT
3 buildings, and other facilities in order to attract a response from the
4 Serbian side, and that because of that, the UN often lodged protests to
6 A. It is correct that the Muslims did this, and we did lodge
7 protests back to the corps. I'm not saying just to Izetbegovic, but we
8 did protest against the Muslim corps.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Do we still have time before the break, Your Excellency, for a
11 new subject?
12 JUDGE KWON: Then that being the case, we'll take the break now
13 for half an hour, and we will resume at five to 1.00.
14 --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Very briefly, I just wanted to take this opportunity to confirm
19 our understanding that videolinks have been set up and scheduled for the
20 1st and 2nd of November for Witnesses KDZ476, 244, and 130.
21 JUDGE KWON: Whatever the court schedule might be, we'll stick to
22 those dates for those three videolink witnesses.
23 MR. TIEGER: And that was my understanding as well.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for your notice.
25 Yes. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Q. General, sir, I would like to remind you of your kind answers
3 during our videolink meeting, when you confirmed that a siege can be a
4 legitimate military tactic as long as it is not calculated to starve the
5 civilian population. Is that correct?
6 A. It is a tactic, yes.
7 Q. Thank you. Also, we agreed that it was a legitimate Serbian
8 military target to encircle Sarajevo
9 Muslim Army in town and preventing it being used in fighting throughout
11 A. I would agree that it's legitimate for the Serbian military to
12 encircle the Muslim forces inside of Sarajevo.
13 Q. Thank you. We also agreed that it was legitimate to use heavy
14 artillery in order to:
15 [In English] "... repel attack by the other side."
16 [Interpretation] Use of heavy artillery in order to attack --
17 repel the attack by the other side, and that the Muslim side was superior
18 in numbers, and that is why heavy weaponry was the Serbian element of
19 some kind of strategic balance; is that correct?
20 A. I would agree that the use of artillery against Muslim forces,
21 military forces, would be an appropriate strategy.
22 Q. Thank you. We agreed that the Muslim Army used mobile mortars to
23 fire at Serbian positions, and that from time to time these mobile
24 mortars were positioned near sensitive spots, such as UN headquarters and
25 civilian zones, and so on and so forth, in order to draw a fire response
1 from the Serbian side; is that correct?
2 A. Muslim forces did do that. We protested against them for using
3 such tactics. And it was done in order to draw a response from the
4 Serbs, but the Serbs had the choice of not to fire.
5 Q. We will come to that. Whenever they could, they did not fire.
6 We have documents about that. We also agreed that --
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, that's a typical type of your
8 statement. You don't have to make such a statement. Just ask questions.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I withdraw that. I apologise.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Also, we agreed that soldiers, fighters -- actually, that it was
12 legitimate always to attack enemy fighters, regardless of where they
13 happened to be, even when they are organising a football match near the
14 front-line; is that right?
15 A. Engaging soldiers on either side was a legitimate activity, even
16 if those soldiers were conducting sports.
17 Q. Thank you. And if you remember, we agreed that all military
18 headquarters, offices at all levels from company up to the corps, were
19 legitimate targets, even when they were located further away from the
20 line of separation or the front-line; is that correct?
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Your Honour.
23 I believe I've made this objection before. Maybe this is a good
24 context in which to raise it. The question of military targets versus
25 legitimate military targeting under circumstances are two different
1 things, and the witness should be -- if it's a question of whether a
2 particular military facility is legitimately targeted, then the witness
3 has to be advised of the circumstances; place, location, type of
4 weaponry, and so on.
5 JUDGE KWON: I'm confident the general would be able to deal with
6 this question.
7 Could you answer the question, General?
8 THE WITNESS: Military headquarters are legitimate military
9 targets by themselves.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Q. Just for the purposes of information, this is the basis for
12 specific questions that I mean to put on the basis of our interview.
13 Also, depots are places where military supplies are obtained,
14 where equipment is held, are also legitimate targets even if they are
15 located in the depth of territory behind the front-lines; is that
17 A. Military depots and military supplies are legitimate targets.
18 Where they are located provides a complicating factor, what you do with
19 that military target. Now we're getting into an area of discernment for
21 Q. Thank you. We also agreed that means of communication, vehicles,
22 military transporters, transporters for equipment, public routes,
23 factories for the production of military resources, are all also
24 legitimate targets; is that right?
25 A. Military transports, transports for military equipment, factories
1 producing military resources, are targets. Public routes,
2 communications, vehicles that are not specified to be military, are not.
3 It would have to be assigned to be military in purpose.
4 Q. I didn't mean public routes. I meant military routes. Probably
5 something was wrongly interpreted. Military routes. But we agreed that
6 civilian commands, commands from where -- civilian commands or civilian
7 heads of the military, such as the Presidency and similar bodies, can
8 also constitute legitimate military targets, is that right, meaning
9 locations of the civilian command and locations of the civilian heads of
10 the military?
11 A. To identify a military route would take an awful lot of
12 explanations, so I would -- I'm not sure I've ever seen a purely military
13 route in my life. Civilian commands or civilian heads of the military
14 provides a somewhat nebulous area of -- for targeting, and that would
15 require an awful lot of engagement with my -- with applicable legal staff
16 to define if that was a legitimate target. I think that's the best way
17 I can answer your question.
18 Q. Thank you, General. I would now like to touch upon a set of
19 questions relating to the proportionality and discriminatory fire, in
20 view of your experience as a UN staff member, relating to the fighting in
22 shelling is talked about. I would like to be more precise about this.
23 Did you know precise positions of the Army of Bosnia and
1 A. I knew where the Presidency was, the corps headquarters, and
2 generally where the two confrontation lines were in Sarajevo.
3 Q. Did you know the disposition of the units that were both along
4 the front or in the depth of the territory in Sarajevo?
5 A. I did not have detailed information of every unit. That would
6 have been known by the UN forces in the applicable areas. I dealt with
7 the corps on both sides.
8 Q. Can we agree that the Sarajevo
9 of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that that's where the 1st Corps
10 was deployed?
11 A. It was in the Sarajevo
12 Q. Did you have any information about the size or the strength of
13 that corps?
14 A. We had assessments of size/strength of that corps within our own
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Can we now look at 1D406, please.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. While we are waiting: Did UNPROFOR have its own intelligence
21 A. We had our own information services. Because we were the UN, we
22 did not conduct intelligence; we conducted information-gathering.
23 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that for purposes of assessing who was
24 firing from where, it would be necessary to know who was deployed where,
25 which forces were occupying which locations?
1 A. That was important, and, therefore, we would always ask our own
2 UN forces in the area to conduct the investigation and determine, based
3 on their knowledge of the warring factions, what happened on the ground
4 and who was where.
5 Q. Thank you. In your amalgamated statement, on page 51, you say,
6 and I can quote:
7 [In English]
8 "Q. Very well, Colonel. You said earlier -- or not earlier,
9 but, rather, yesterday, asked by the Prosecution, your answer that, in
10 fact, in Sarajevo
11 Do you remember that?
12 "A. When I said -- what I said was in specific areas, yes, there
13 are civilians and the UN. There were -- the BH Army were along the
14 confrontation line. They had their own headquarters, but there were
15 other military targets. I mean, it is a big city. You have to be a
16 little more specific."
17 [Interpretation] Do you remember that?
18 A. I'll take it for granted that that's what I said because it's on
19 my statement. I can't say I remember saying those exact words, but
20 that's my statement. I stand by it.
21 JUDGE KWON: Can you locate the part of that statement? You said
22 page 51, but I couldn't find it.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down. I mean, if
24 this is page 51, then -- can we look at the page before that. Yes, just
25 one moment. We will look for the place. Perhaps the page is in e-court.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. While we're waiting: General, sir, would you agree that an
3 army - I'm sorry, this is on page 75, page 75 - that an army is obliged
4 to place insignia on their soldiers and in that way make them look
5 different from civilians? Do you agree that it is the obligation of each
6 army to distinguish its soldiers and to place insignia and markings on
7 the uniforms?
8 A. It's a normal convention for armies to wear uniforms.
9 Q. Are you aware that, according to information and statements and
10 information from Muslim generals, that in the beginning as many as
11 85 per cent of fighters fought while wearing civilian clothing? Later,
12 this percentage was much smaller, but, nevertheless, completely identical
13 to civilians.
14 A. I can tell you, as a professional soldier, that if an army has
15 85 per cent of its fighters wearing civilian clothing, that any
16 engagement of those apparently civilians would necessitate a decision
17 whether or not to shoot or not shoot based on the fact are they carrying
18 a weapon, are they a threat to you? And I will tell you, from my
19 experiences since then, our soldiers are taught that in the event that
20 you're faced with potential combatants who are wearing civilian clothing,
21 you would defer from shooting if they don't provide a threat to you.
22 That is just one of the -- the fog of war that soldiers have to deal with
23 every day, especially if you have 85 per cent of your fighters not --
24 wearing civilian clothing. That would just make it harder for commanders
25 to engage them.
1 Q. Thank you. And let's finish with this statement. Do you see
2 this part where it says: "Very well, Colonel," that part? Would you
3 agree that that is a part of your statement where you talk about how --
4 JUDGE KWON: Let's wait. At page 75? Yes, we have it.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have it on the screen.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. My question, General, would be: Would you agree -- since you're
8 expecting a more specific question here, do you agree that there was no
9 neighbourhood in Sarajevo
10 were no soldiers, no military elements, military installations, military
11 buildings? Would you agree that each neighbourhood, all over town, there
12 were military facilities?
13 A. I would not agree that each neighbourhood had military facilities
14 in it. The city had an awful lot of civilians, and there were military
15 units scattered throughout. But the inference that it was all military,
16 no, I would not agree with that.
17 Q. Thank you. And could you state -- I mean, if necessary, we can
18 show you a map, but perhaps you can say on the basis of your
19 recollection, what part of Sarajevo
20 where there were no military installations at all?
21 A. Well, Sarajevo
22 question which part of the city was purely civilian. My knowledge of
24 whatnot, so I could give you a general interpretation. I could show you
25 briefly -- I have seen where the confrontation lines were, but I don't
1 think I could properly answer your question.
2 Q. Thank you. I hope that you understand that I have to be specific
3 about any kind of general statement, because in the legal criminal sense,
4 they cannot remain non-specific.
5 Can we scroll this page down so that we can look at another
6 question and answer related to this particular topic.
7 "Very well. Colonel ..."
8 Could you please look at this question and this answer. Does it
9 not state here that you did not know about the disposition of these units
10 and that you only dealt with the corps headquarters and with government
12 A. I did not know where the brigades were. That was the
13 responsibility of the other UN battalions in the area. I limited my
14 exposure to the corps headquarters.
15 Q. Thank you. Would you, nevertheless, agree that it is quite
16 legitimate for the Serbian Army to fire on legitimate military targets
17 within the city, itself?
18 A. I would agree that it's legitimate to fire against military
19 targets, but with the Serb weapons systems they had, I would not have
20 done it, as a Serbian commander, because I could not guarantee the effect
21 of that weapons system against the target that it was going after.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 77 of this
23 statement, please, two pages later.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. This answer that we can see here:
1 "If there was a military target in the city, the Serbs had a
2 right to go after the military target, and the UN would not protest that
3 because that was within the rules of engagement."
4 Do you agree, General, sir, that it was necessary to know
5 completely the disposition or the distribution of the military targets
6 within the town in order to be able to take a position? The United
7 Nations should have taken a position in relation to any kind of firing
8 event by the Serbian side, based on this answer that you gave here.
9 A. And the UN position was, based on the detailed knowledge of the
10 soldiers in the area, that if military targets were identified and
11 engaged, we would not protest. But in those cases where they were not,
12 we would protest. So I may not have the specific details. The question
13 of specific military targets could be posed to those people who were in
14 the areas that had that detailed knowledge.
15 Q. Thank you. Let's deal a little bit with the subject of
16 proportionality and indiscriminate fire, or discriminate fire.
17 In the Galic case, did you address the issue of proportionality
18 and other related issues? In order to make it easier for you, let's look
19 at page 81. Page 81:
20 [In English] "Yes, I do understand."
21 [Interpretation] Judge Orie:
22 "Yes, I do understand."
23 Could you please look at the question and the answer that you
25 Have you read this? This was your view; is that right?
1 A. Yes, it was.
2 Q. If we were to suppose that a Serb Army position was attacked from
3 mortars or other heavy weapon from a building --
4 JUDGE KWON: General, do you like to see the rest of the page?
5 THE WITNESS: That would be helpful, sir. Okay.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. So if the Serb Army positions came under attack from a mortar or
8 any other heavy weapon from a building in a built-up area, would you
9 counter this fire by using a sniper or would you use something else?
10 A. You would use the weapons system to deal with the weapon that
11 got -- that fired at you. And if you didn't have a weapons system that
12 could deal with it, you wouldn't fire back. And I will refer you back to
13 the UN position on the Igman Mount, where, in fact, our weapons systems
14 were incapable of engaging the Serbs who were firing at us; therefore, we
15 did nothing in reply. So to answer your question: If you are mortared
16 and you can't fire back to engage the mortar, probably the decision is
17 you just don't fire back.
18 Q. So if, for example, mortar is being fired from a truck and
19 inflicts losses on us, is it legitimate to return fire by using mortar as
21 A. No. In the scenario that you've painted, because it's a mobile
22 system, you probably don't have a weapons system to be able to go after
23 that mortar because you don't know where it's firing from.
24 Q. But, General, you would agree with me that we cannot see that
25 it's coming from a mobile weapon; we only see that we are suffering
1 losses. In this scenario, what should an army do?
2 A. Well, unfortunately, the Serbs made the decision to surround
4 firing is coming from, your only remit is to fire against the known
5 military positions that are on the confrontation line, but not into the
6 city, where the fire might be coming from. It's a soldier's dilemma.
7 Q. But if we do know where the fire is coming from and we can see
8 it, is it a legitimate move to neutralise it? How can we eliminate the
9 threat from a massive attack by mortars or any other weapons inflicting
10 losses on us? If they're firing from -- at us from Golo Brdo or from a
11 Howitzer near a military hospital, why should we be firing at Igman, at
12 other locations, if the threat is coming from the former locations that I
13 mentioned? So we should try and pre-empt or eliminate the threat -- the
14 possible threat of us being attacked by mortars or perhaps some heavier
16 A. If the Howitzer is firing at you which is located -- and that
17 Howitzer is near a military hospital, if you've got a weapons system to
18 take out the Howitzer, but, quite frankly, because it's beside a military
19 hospital, you don't fire. Geneva Convention.
20 Q. And who was responsible for it being close to the military
21 hospital; on the part of the Serbs or the Muslims?
22 A. The Muslims were responsible for firing the weapon, and we would
23 protest against the Muslims for firing weapons near places like hospitals
24 or the use of mobile systems, because it was trying to solicit a response
25 not against the target, itself, but the collateral damage, and that was
2 Q. Thank you. Let's see now how you explain this on a concrete
4 Can we have page 52 of the amalgamated statement, please.
5 This portion that refers to Lukavica, can you please look at it
6 from the beginning 'til the end.
7 A. Okay, I've read that now.
8 Q. Do you agree that if, for example, fire was being opened at the
9 Serbs from Debelo Brdo -- and you know that Debelo Brdo was under the
10 control of the Muslim Army; is that right?
11 A. Parts of it were. There was a UN post there, too.
12 Q. Yes. Do you agree, then, that there were no civilians at
13 Debelo Brdo?
14 A. There was a confrontation line there, yes, we acknowledged that,
15 where there were no civilians probably within 100, 200 metres of it.
16 Q. If fire was opened at Debelo Brdo, for example, those who were
17 counting the number of shells, would these shells fired at Debelo Brdo be
18 taken into account with respect to the total number of shells falling on
20 A. I'm not -- I'm not quite sure that -- how to -- we counted
21 numbers. I'm not quite sure if we counted the numbers that were fired on
22 the confrontation line on Debelo Brdo on whatever day you're talking
24 Q. You cited Debelo Brdo as an example of disproportionate fire.
25 Can we now briefly have Exhibit P1782. It's been admitted today
1 into evidence.
2 JUDGE KWON: Do you like to comment upon Mr. Karadzic's last
3 comment, being that you cited Debelo Brdo as an example of
4 disproportionate fire?
5 THE WITNESS: I will say that when the Muslims fired at Lukavica,
6 we protested the Muslims firing because we knew they were trying to
7 incite a response from the Serbs. That was the first point.
8 The second point, that in the area around Debelo Brdo there were
9 military positions there, but there were also civilians, and the
10 artillery rounds were going into civilian areas, at which point we
11 protested, again, against the Serbians for firing those weapons systems
12 into civilian targets. And, again, it's just a function of what weapons
13 system were they using, and their firing was significantly greater than
14 just defending themselves, but it was making a point, and there was
15 extensive firing throughout that day, as I recall, and not just limited
16 to the confrontation lines but actually going into civilian areas, which
17 we had an obligation to report and stop. And that's what we tried to do.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. We'll go back to your page 52, and kindly understand that I
21 really cannot leave any statement of yours as general as it is. We have
22 to be precise.
23 Look at the last sentence in paragraph 1, which reads --
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
25 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, Your Honour. I thought we were returning
2 to the amalgamated statement, and in that connection I have a clean
3 copy -- hard copy that might be of benefit to the witness.
4 JUDGE KWON: It would be maybe a good idea for the general to
5 have it in front of him, just in case.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we can go back to the
7 statement immediately.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
9 Q. Can you please find page 52, where you say that the Muslims had
10 fired at the Serbs and the Serbs returned fire. According to your
11 statement, let's see which targets the Serbs engaged in firing back.
12 Here, it says that the Serbs were firing at the city. Let's see
13 exactly where at the city. They returned fire at Debelo Brdo and the
14 zone immediately next to the River Miljacka on the Muslim side.
15 Can you see here that fire was opened at Debelo Brdo, and do you
16 agree that there is not a single civilian facility at Debelo Brdo?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
18 MR. TIEGER: I'm pretty sure that's just been asked and answered.
19 JUDGE KWON: At one point in time, the general answered that
20 there was a confrontation line there, and as he said, We acknowledge that
21 where there were no civilians probably within 120 metres of it. And
22 later, General, you said that certain fire went beyond that. So this may
23 be a good opportunity to clarify, General.
24 THE WITNESS: I would agree that the engagement was started maybe
25 at the Debelo Brdo confrontation line. We were very careful that day
1 because we had our own UN post there, and one round that hit the UN post
2 would have violated the agreement, and we would have protested and
3 defended ourselves. In addition to that, the reports were that it
4 extended past the confrontation line, it was going into the civilian
5 communities, because the confrontation lines were within hundreds of
6 metres of civilians.
7 And, again, I would, you know, state for the record that firing
8 artillery against confrontation lines in an urban environment is going to
9 cause a violation somewhere. It's an area weapons system, it's not the
10 best weapons system to use against combatants in that scenario of an
11 urban environment. So hopefully that, you know, elaborates on my
12 statement there and answers the question.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 15 in
15 e-court, and could you also please look at it, the response which starts:
16 "The Muslims had their positions just below --"
17 [In English] "... called Debelo Brdo. The UN were right on the
18 top of it and the Muslim trenches were just below it. And if I could
19 also say, then, the Serbs were just to the south of a higher piece of
20 ground that looked down onto Debelo Brdo."
21 THE WITNESS: That's correct.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Q. Would you like now to see a map or a photograph of Debelo Brdo,
24 which shows that there are no civilian objects or facilities within at
25 least 200 or 300 metres? Or maybe we can rely on your memory; therefore,
1 we shouldn't resort to using a map or a photograph.
2 A. I've acknowledged that there were no civilians within probably
3 100 or 200 metres of the Muslim confrontation line or between the Muslims
4 and the Serbs that dominated the high ground.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can we now have again Exhibit P1782. 1782. In English is fine.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Can you please look at the last sentence of the first paragraph,
9 which says that one Famos employee was killed, and two women and one
10 civilian were wounded, and then the last sentence in paragraph 3, which
11 says that one girl and one woman, civilian woman were wounded.
12 You may have noticed that this is a report from the Sarajevo
13 Romanija Corps, addressed to the Main Staff, and reported here is the
14 type and number of casualties and damage sustained by the Serbian Army
15 from the Muslim side.
16 Can we now look at the next page.
17 Item 3, "Situation in the territory." The next page, please.
18 Can you scroll down a bit, where it says:
19 "At the time during the shooting and injuring of a child, the UN
20 members of Debelo Brdo took shelter, and immediately after they came out,
21 preventing our units from firing back. The UN members on Debelo Brdo
22 conducted improperly even before, showing sympathy for the Muslim side.
23 In particular, they supported the Muslim side in constructing shelters
24 and moving towards our positions. The UN monitors were transferred to
25 the security organ at the Slavisa Vajner Cica Barracks ..."
1 Can we now look at the beginning of item 3, which reads:
2 "Problems with the UNPROFOR ..."
3 I believe you can see this first sentence:
4 "Problems with the UNPROFOR in the Ilidza Infantry Brigade arose
5 around 2115, when the UNPROFOR fired at our position in the area of the
6 Forestry School
7 General, can you see that this is about our responses to the fire
8 coming from the Muslims, but, admittedly, also from the UNPROFOR, and
9 that we are being fired at when we engage legitimate targets, and there's
10 a shelter provided for the Muslim forces at Debelo Brdo which prevented
11 us from responding appropriately?
12 A. Let me answer your question. UNPROFOR fired at the Serbian
13 position in response to Serbs firing at us. We did not engage -- start
14 that engagement; the Serbs did.
15 Serbs had the right to respond to Muslim firing at them with the
16 appropriate weapons systems, taking into account collateral damage. We
17 did not debate that, but when it entered into the civilian realm, we did
18 have issues with that.
19 At no time am I ever aware that the UN ever assisted either
20 warring faction, and in Debelo Brdo, not the Muslims factions, helping
21 them dig their trenches. We don't do that. That was between Muslims and
22 Serbs, fighting themselves. The UN forces in Debelo Brdo did go into
23 cover to defend themselves, and we were in contact with them all day.
24 And if they thought their lives were in danger, they had the right of
25 self-defence, to fire back. But we did not initiate that engagement.
1 Q. Thank you. General Milosevic reports that the Ilidza Brigade
2 fired at Hrasnica-Igman road. This is a supply route for the Muslim Army
3 in Hrasnica and Sarajevo
4 Forestry School
5 and then the UN forces went to Debelo Brdo in order to provide protection
6 for the Muslim unit, which prevented us from responding.
7 Now, can we go back to page 52 to look at another location in the
8 town where we returned fire.
9 JUDGE KWON: Again, you made an unhelpful statement. Refrain
10 from making a speech.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I can put a question.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. General Milosevic is informing his main commander that the
14 brigade fired at the Hrasnica-Igman road, after which UNPROFOR became
15 involved, or do you believe that General Milosevic's report was
17 A. General Milosevic can have his opinion, but we had troops on the
18 Igman road, they were fired at, and they replied in defence of their own
19 position. We were not the combatants here, not part of the warring
20 factions; we were the peacekeepers.
21 Q. Can you please now look at the second location in the city where
22 we fired back. The first one was Debelo Brdo, and the other one was the
23 River Miljacka on the Muslim side.
24 Do you agree that the River Miljacka in this particular section
25 was a separation line? Do you agree that there were Serb and Muslim
1 trenches on both riverbanks, and do you agree that on the Muslim side of
2 the river there was a proper military fortification?
3 A. I agree that the river was the separation between the Muslim and
4 Serbian forces, and it was interspersed with civilians throughout the
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: In this answer, General, you didn't mention the
8 firing going beyond the confrontation line, to the effect of engaging
9 civilian elements.
10 THE WITNESS: Sir, could you direct me which answer to the
11 question or is there a document I should be looking at now?
12 JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated]
13 THE WITNESS: Okay.
14 JUDGE KWON: "It was just fired at the city. In fact, it was
15 firing around Debelo Brdo and the area just around Miljacka River
16 Muslim side. It was -- it was intense."
17 Not referring to this civilian element. If you could clarify,
19 THE WITNESS: The firing around Debelo Brdo, for the most part,
20 was against the factions, the warring -- the front-line. But when it
21 went down into the Miljacka River
22 down there. There was no 100-, 200-metre separation between lines and
23 civilians; they were interspersed.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. But, General, do you agree that both riverbanks, one or two
2 metres from the river, there were trenches there, and that the
3 neighbouring buildings were also used to defend this line? This was
4 confirmed here by Mr. Sabljica as well. So we have trenches on both
5 riverbanks, whereas on the other side there were fortifications occupied
6 by the defender of the line?
7 A. I don't debate that there were defenders on both sides of the
8 river and in buildings.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Can we look at 1D1758, please. 1D1758.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. This is also a report by the Sarajevo Romanija Corps Command to
13 the Main
14 Could we scroll up a little bit. If we don't have the
15 translation, I would like to read the third paragraph, if I may.
16 It's right there:
17 "Engineering works are continuing in the area of responsibility
18 of the 1st Sarajevo Motorised Brigade, in the sector of the 2nd Infantry
19 Battalion near Kudrine Kuce, and across from the Elektroprivreda, along
20 the River Miljacka, where the entrenchment was carried out in the
21 presence of UNPROFOR and in the area of responsibility of the 3rd
23 were being dug. The digging was being carried out together by the
24 soldiers of UNPROFOR and the Muslim soldiers, so we could see that along
25 the Miljacka River
1 Elektroprivreda, the fortification of lines was being carried out,
2 although the shells were falling -- and if shells were falling along that
3 particular sector of the Miljacka River
4 A. If the question is -- well, first of all, UN assisting Muslims
5 with defensive works; no, we didn't do that. To have shells fired along
6 the river, is that legitimate? In my understanding, no, because the
7 proximity of civilians, buildings, the weapons systems, themselves, it
8 just -- firing artillery in that proximity of the line is not an
9 effective system. It is just too imperfect. You can't get the
10 trajectories coming down onto the target; no. Use machine-guns, use
11 rocket-launchers, use direct-fire weapons where you can put the weapon
12 onto the enemy position, but indirect fire down there is not a good,
13 legitimate target.
14 Q. I just want to establish whether the Miljacka River
15 at Kudrine Kuce and that that location was a section of that line. Also,
16 General, sir, who is responsible for placing installations in a civilian
17 zone? Is that our responsibility or theirs? Are they permitted to use
18 civilian neighbourhoods as protection from retaliatory fire? Would that
19 constitute a violation of the Geneva Conventions?
20 A. Using civilians at shields is illegitimate. Either party doing
21 defensive works along there, it's well within their prerogative to do so.
22 But that said, they cannot use civilians as part of their defensive
23 works, and they have an obligation to get the civilians out of the area
24 to allow the combat to go on with legitimate combatant parties. To allow
25 the civilians to stay there is an abrogation of the responsibility of the
1 respective commanders, and they will be held accountable in accordance
2 with the Geneva Convention.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: -- can I remind you that at one point in time, you
6 wanted to show the general 1D406, which is referring to a list of units,
7 but you skipped it to show the general his statement. It's up to you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will come to that document,
9 certainly. It shows the forces of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Army in
10 town and around town.
11 But I would like to tender the document that we were just looking
12 at on the screen, please. And if there is no translation, then could it
13 be marked for identification?
14 JUDGE KWON: Shall we mark it for identification, pending
15 translation, Mr. Tieger?
16 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE KWON: That will be done.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D771.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Q. General, sir, do you agree that Muslim forces, by firing at
21 Lukavica, also fired at an area where there were houses, a residential
23 A. Firing at Lukavica, at the corps headquarters, would be a
24 legitimate target; firing at residential areas would not.
25 Q. Lukavica was a residential zone; isn't that right?
1 A. But it was also the corps headquarters, and we have to delineate,
2 what were they shooting at?
3 Q. Is there a difference, then, between Sarajevo and Lukavica, or
4 there is some advantage being given to the Muslims?
5 A. Any engagement of Sarajevo/Lukavica would have been investigated
6 to make sure that the targets being engaged were military targets, and I
7 do not see any advantage being given to the Muslims. Both factions were
8 treated fairly by the UN.
9 Q. Can we look at page 60 of your statement, please, and I would
10 like to have your answer, if there is any, about whether there is any
11 difference between Lukavica and Sarajevo
12 speaking about.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, what's the point of this? You are
14 admitting that Serbs violated Geneva Conventions by locating its
15 headquarters in the residential area? Let's move on.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, all I want to do is to
17 see how the sides are being treated in the conflict by the international
18 community or representatives of the United Nations.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. And do you see this answer of yours here -- question and your
22 [In English] "Let's move on to talk about the specific example,
23 Lukavica Barracks. Did you know that Lukavica was a residential area in
25 [No interpretation]
1 [In English] "Yes, I did."
2 [Interpretation] You considered that firing at Lukavica was a
3 legitimate action; is that correct?
4 A. I said firing at Lukavica Barracks was a legitimate action.
5 Firing at Lukavica, a residential site, would not.
6 Q. Thank you. And regardless of the fact that it was surrounded by
7 a residential area, you, nevertheless, considered it legitimate; is that
9 A. The barracks is legitimate, but we did protest against the
10 Muslims for firing at the corps headquarters because of the reaction that
11 that would have instilled. I've said that to you before. And if it hit
12 the barracks -- if it hit the city, where the civilians were, the UN was
13 consistent in its protest to whichever warring faction, and the Muslims
14 would have been protested against firing against Serbian civilians.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 58 of this
16 statement, please. It's at the bottom of the page, where we have a
17 question. There is your:
18 "Okay. Let me just rephrase ..."
19 And then there is a question by Judge Harhoff, and then your
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Can you please look at it. That was your answer at the time; is
23 that correct?
24 A. I stand by the statement that firing at Lukavica Barracks was a
25 legitimate target, and there was no indication from our troops on the
1 ground that anything else but a military target was being engaged at that
2 moment in time.
3 Q. General, sir, would you not then have to know the complete
4 disposition of Muslim forces in the Muslim area of Sarajevo, in the
5 civilian zones, in order to be able to characterise Serbian fire?
6 A. The UN battalions and forces that were in Sarajevo were tasked to
7 understand where the Muslim forces were so that when reports came back to
8 us, we could properly report them and also, where necessary, apply the
9 right protest. This was just a normal part of the UN reporting was to
10 determine -- making sure that actions between warring factions was
11 allowed to go on within those confines. But when outside that envelope,
12 we had to intercede.
13 Q. But it is your position that striking at military installations
14 or troops that happened to be in a civilian zone does not change the
15 nature of that military target; is that correct? For example, that's how
16 it was in Lukavica. Would that same thing apply to the Muslim
17 installations in the town?
18 A. Striking military installations or troops is legitimate. Troops
19 that happen to go in -- in accordance with your question, that happen to
20 be in a civilian zone does change the nature of the target; that we will
21 then start to decide whether you can engage the military aspect. If --
22 if you are in a civilian zone, you would probably stop it because of
23 danger to the civilians. The report back for Lukavica -- Lukavica
24 Barracks was that the French soldiers on the site said the rounds were
25 hitting the headquarters. And while that is a problem for our own UN
1 troops, because they were co-located, the fact that the headquarters was
2 being engaged, well, that's just part of war.
3 Q. General, sir, perhaps I put a confusing question. The question
4 is this: The headquarters is in Lukavica, in a residential zone, just
5 like all the Muslim military installations are located in Sarajevo in
6 residential zones. Striking Lukavica in a residential zone, precisely or
7 imprecisely, is legitimate. Is striking at Muslim military installations
8 something that would have the corresponding status or is there any
9 difference there? Yes or no. Would Serbian military installations
10 located in a residential zone have the same status as Muslim military
11 installations in residential zones?
12 A. Serbian military installations located in a residential zone have
13 the same status of Muslim military installations in a residential zone.
14 I agree with that statement.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Can we look at 1D406, which I asked for earlier. I hope that
17 there could also be a translation there. This is a document by the Army
18 of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its General Staff, and the
19 document talks about the forces in Sarajevo.
20 If there is no translation, let's just identify the document.
21 The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Army
22 General Staff, Headquarters of the Army Administration for Organisational
23 and Mobilisation. And it states at the bottom:
24 "We are attaching an overview of new establishment titles and
25 numbers of the VJ.
1 "The information is to be used for internal purposes only, and it
2 should not be copied."
3 Could we look at the next page, please.
4 And we have the 1st Corps here. First we have the General Staff
5 of the Army, and then the Supreme Command Staff.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. This is located in Sarajevo
9 A. If you're asking me the question, I can't tell from this
10 document. If it says it's the organisation of the Muslim forces, I'll
11 take it for -- for what it is.
12 Q. But in your experience, do you recall that the General Staff of
13 the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Supreme Command Staff were
14 located in the very center of Sarajevo
15 A. I'm aware of that, yes.
16 Q. Thank you. And would you agree that the 1st Corps Command and
17 the staff units were also located in the center of Sarajevo?
18 A. Yes, they were.
19 Q. Can I please now direct you to 5667 on this page. That relates
20 to the 1st Corps. Could you please look at that. And it states there:
21 "BVP of the 1st Corps," and then: "5114: Battalion of DB, Battalion
22 DB." Then the 1st LAR DPVO, then the 1st Engineers Battalion, and then
23 the 1st LOB of the corps, then the 1st Medical Battalion.
24 Can we look at the following page, please.
25 And we can see here the 141st LBR, 104th, 145th, 146th, and then
1 the Kralj Tvrtko Croatian Brigade in the town, itself, then the first
2 map, the first MAD
3 then the NRC of the 1st Corps, then the Command of the Sarajevo Garrison,
4 then the Command of Novo Sarajevo, then the Command of Vogosca, then the
5 Command of Novi
6 Command of Hadzici.
7 Can we look at the following page.
8 And then from 5454, we're looking at the 1st Corps again, 105th
9 Motorised Brigade, 102nd Motorised Brigade, 105th Motorised Brigade,
10 111th probably Vitez Mountain Brigade, 112th Vitez Motorised Brigade,
11 115th Motorised Brigade, 152nd Motorised Brigade, 155th Motorised
12 Brigade, Motorised Brigade, and 143rd Motorised Brigade.
13 Would you agree, General, sir, that there were some 60 battalions
14 in Sarajevo
15 or independent battalions, or companies and other units numbering around
16 150 companies and 60 battalions; would you agree with that?
17 A. I acknowledge that there was a 1st Muslim Corps inside Sarajevo
18 I cannot attest to the number of companies or battalions, but I'm not
19 debating there wasn't a corps in there.
20 Q. Can you see here, in the column "5063": "104th Vitez Motorised
21 Brigade in Hrasnica"? Do you know the strength of the 104th Brigade in
22 Hrasnica and its installations in Hrasnica, itself?
23 A. No, I do not.
24 Q. Thank you. Can you please look at 5453: "155th Motorised
25 Brigade." Would you agree that the 155th Motorised Brigade was deployed
1 in Dobrinja and that it had around 5.000 soldiers? And one witness said
2 that he believed that they even had more. It's such a small area. You
3 know the size of Dobrinja, don't you? Do you know where Dobrinja is?
4 A. I do. I can't attest that they had 5.000 soldiers, but I know
5 the area.
6 Q. Would you agree that the 155th Mountain Brigade's area of
7 responsibility was in Dobrinja?
8 A. I'll take your word for -- for that. I don't know the actual
9 brigade, but there were troops throughout Sarajevo, yes.
10 Q. Thank you. The new names are in the left-hand column, and the
11 old names are in the right-hand column, for purposes of orientation.
12 They were given new names, so this is what the change is.
13 Can you see here that Pazaric is also under the responsibility of
14 the 1st Corps? Do you recall that the 14th Division was there? The 12th
15 was in the town, and in Tarcin and Pazaric, the 14th Division of the
16 1st Corps was located?
17 A. That's a level of detail I do not recall, no.
18 Q. Thank you. Do you agree, for example, that if a brigade has from
19 three to five
20 that that is a large number of command posts, substantial logistics of
21 many forward command posts, and that the town of Sarajevo was chock full
22 of installations that were required for this number of units?
23 A. That's a fair -- a fair comment.
24 Q. And did you hear that Muslims were able to and did manufacture
25 weapons, even new mortars as well as mortar shells, in the very center of
2 A. I did know that there were factories in the area.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 I would like to tender this document, please.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: No, I don't have any objection, Your Honour. I --
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that we have time. Do we
10 have time for just one more brief document?
11 JUDGE KWON: We have five minutes.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D02498, please.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. And while we're waiting, I would just like to acquaint you with
16 the document. This is a statement by Vahid Karavelic, whom you knew.
17 Who was Vahid Karavelic?
18 A. Karavelic, the 1st Muslim Corps commander, is that the same
19 person we're talking about? I don't read -- I don't read these documents
20 very well.
21 Q. Yes, he was the commander of the 1st Corps. I just wanted to
22 look at one part of this statement of his so that we could see how he, as
23 our direct opponent in war, views the artillery tactics of the Sarajevo
24 Romanija Corps. This is on page 13. I think it's perhaps on page 14.
25 Maybe it's on page 13, because the first page is numbered as well. But
1 there is a translation of this statement, there is a translation.
2 While we're waiting for this -- there is a translation. I'm sure
3 that there's a translation. I would like to read it, though.
4 Can we look at the top of this document "Artillery Tactics,"
5 "Artillery Tactics of the SRK
6 Page 13, middle of page 13. No, no, the middle of the page, the
7 subheading in the middle of the page.
8 I'm going to read until we get the translation:
9 "It seems that the SRK
10 waves of fire, protective fire, selective fire, and concentrated fire. I
11 did not notice a lessening of the artillery fire intensity during --"
12 We have Mr. Tieger on his feet, so I'm going to wait.
13 MR. TIEGER: We might be able to move quicker. It's 11377. We
14 might find the English as well.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be the last question.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the English
17 translation as well so everybody can follow more easily.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. So our direct enemy in war is providing the characteristics of
20 the artillery fire of the Sarajevo
21 JUDGE KWON: We locate the relevant page, and the general can
22 read it, and you can ask the question. Yes, that part. What is --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is that.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. I would just like you to look at this passage. My question is:
1 Do you agree that General Karavelic knew the disposition of his forces in
3 artillery by the Sarajevo Romanija Corps is based on his knowledge of his
4 own force's disposition, and that there is nothing illegal in this
6 A. First of all, I know that General Karavelic knew the disposition
7 of his forces, as the corps commander. The fact that he would have the
8 understanding of Serbian doctrine for the use of artillery would be
9 useful to him, but that being said, there is nothing that's legal for
10 Serbian commanders to fire artillery into a city that is interspersed
11 with civilians. It's the simple fact of the Geneva Convention and Rules
12 of Engagement. It is not a black or white, it's legitimate or not; it
13 has a number of different factors of military target, proportionality,
14 collateral damage, and the fact that there were civilians inside the city
15 would just negate the use of this type of weapons system.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I put just one more question,
18 JUDGE KWON: Very briefly.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. This paragraph speaks for itself, but I would like to ask you
21 something else, General, sir.
22 You said that you saw for yourself that people in Sarajevo
23 suffered. Would this suffering have been less had the town been
25 A. Could you just explain what you mean by "demilitarised"?
1 Q. Had there been a thorough demilitarisation and the town placed
2 under the administration of the United Nations, so had there been a ban
3 on fire and the existence of military forces in the town. This was
4 something that was proposed by the Serbian side. Would the suffering
5 have disappeared had there been a demilitarisation of the town, itself?
6 A. Well, first, to answer your question, the Serbians had a choice
7 at the beginning not to fire into the town. That created the situation
8 in the first place, by just containing the Muslim corps, and --
9 Q. General, please, I would like you not to be answering some other
10 question. Would demilitarisation have eliminated this suffering? As to
11 whether we had a choice or not is something that we can discuss tomorrow.
12 Would placing the town under the administration of the United Nations and
13 demilitarising it have eliminated the suffering of the citizens? Thank
15 A. It would have ameliorated the situation inside the city.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for your indulgence.
17 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
18 MR. TIEGER: Because of the time, I didn't want to intervene, but
19 I think under normal circumstances, the witness should be permitted to
20 answer the question and not be interrupted in mid-course.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 I was advised, Mr. Karadzic, that you have had about two hours
23 and fifty minutes, so you will have two hours and ten minutes to conclude
24 your cross-examination tomorrow.
25 Tomorrow, we are sitting in the afternoon, so we'll resume at
1 2.15 tomorrow afternoon.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm hoping that I will get
3 more time. I believe that I should be given more time, believe me.
4 JUDGE KWON: You should be able to prioritise your questions and
5 focus on relevant questions and be efficient.
6 Probably you are well aware of this, General: During the course
7 of your evidence, you are not supposed to discuss with anybody else about
8 your testimony.
9 Have a nice evening.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.36 p.m.
12 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 19th day of
13 October, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.