1 Wednesday, 27 October 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Good morning, General. If you could take the solemn declaration,
9 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
10 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
11 WITNESS: ADRIANUS VAN BAAL
12 [The witness answered through interpreter]
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please make yourself comfortable.
14 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours. Good morning.
16 Examination by Ms. Edgerton:
17 Q. Good morning, General. Can you hear me in a language you
19 A. I understand you perfectly, thank you.
20 Q. Thank you. Then, General, perhaps I could ask you some
21 preliminary questions.
22 First, do you recall giving a statement to representatives of the
23 Office of the Prosecutor for this Tribunal in 1997?
24 A. I'll start with that.
25 Q. And you've testified before this Tribunal on two previous
1 occasions, have you not? First, during the trial of Stanislav Galic in
2 2002, and then again in 2003, during the trial of Slobodan Milosevic?
3 A. Both testimonies are correct.
4 Q. And just over one year ago, you signed a further statement for
5 the Office of the Prosecutor, consolidating elements of your
6 previously-given evidence, with some additional clarifications and
7 observations, and also references to a number of documents; correct?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. Now, have you reviewed that statement and looked at the documents
10 it refers to in preparation for your testimony today?
11 A. I've reviewed all documents presented to me again, and I had a
12 few modifications in pen entered as a final update yesterday.
13 Q. Yes. Then just referring to that update yesterday, perhaps I
14 could ask you -- or help you to explain that this way: By way of
15 corrections to that 2009 document, did you, yesterday, sign an updated
16 copy which properly displays the Serbo-Croatian diacritics and
17 incorporates some handwritten changes that you made to the 2009 version,
18 as well as a number of typographical corrections?
19 A. That's correct, two corrections with respect to dates on page 3
20 at items 6 and 7. To re-correct: On item 6, I flew to Zagreb
21 February, and 7 February 1994
22 in the third sentence, the correct date has been entered of the bombing
23 incident at Markale Market in Sarajevo
24 various abbreviations referring to the Milosevic and the Galic case have
25 been written out in full throughout the document --
1 Q. And in every other regard, is this document you signed yesterday
2 identical to your statement of 2009?
3 A. I checked that, and it's fully identical.
4 Q. So, then, if you were asked the same questions today which gave
5 rise to the evidence contained in this document, would you give the same
7 A. Yes, I would.
8 MS. EDGERTON: That being the case, then, Your Honours, could I
9 ask that 65 ter 22288, which is the updated amalgamated statement of the
10 general, be marked as a Prosecution exhibit, please?
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
13 With respect to paragraph 71, which describes incidents in
14 Gorazde, we would object and ask that that be redacted for the same
15 reasons we gave with respect to General Rose. You've already ruled on
16 that, but I wanted to preserve that objection.
17 JUDGE KWON: You know the Chamber's position, so I will not
18 repeat our ruling.
19 That will be admitted.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1818, Your Honours.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
22 What I would propose to do now, then, is to read a summary of the
23 written evidence that's just been admitted.
24 The witness, General Adrianus van Baal, served as the chief of
25 staff of the Bosnia
1 1994 to 28 August 1994
2 observations on his arrival, he concluded that the post-Markale Market
3 cease-fire of February 1994 was effectively implemented. At this time,
4 the Serb side wanted peace on the pre-condition of a complete cease-fire
5 and the demilitarisation of Sarajevo
6 General Van Baal observed an increase in sniping incidents during
7 this cease-fire period. Incidents of sniping of civilians attributed to
8 the Bosnian Serb side were raised with the Sarajevo Romanija Corps and
9 higher levels of the VRS. General Van Baal specifically recalls that
10 tram passengers were the object of sniping.
11 In a meeting in March 1994, General Milovanovic complained to
12 General Van Baal that trams were now operating in Sarajevo and it
13 presented an incorrect impression that there was peace when, in Bosnia
14 and Herzegovina
15 he would see to it that trams would, therefore, be targeted, and
16 following this meeting, trams were targeted by snipers from the Bosnian
17 Serb side.
18 General Van Baal concluded, from meetings with VRS leaders and
19 observations on the ground, that the VRS leadership retained effective
20 command and control of their forces. The VRS had a functioning
21 communications system, evidenced by, for example, their immediate
22 responses on the ground to threats of NATO air-strikes in August of 1994.
23 Restrictions on freedom of movement were another example, which were
24 dictated at the Main Staff level.
25 During meetings in March 1994 with Mr. Karadzic and the Sarajevo
1 Romanija Corps commander, General Galic, General Van Baal also observed
2 that the accused retained effective command over the military.
3 General Van Baal telephoned Mr. Karadzic when 600 VRS soldiers from the
4 Sarajevo Romanija Corps's Ilijas Brigade surrounded Canadian peacekeepers
5 enforcing the Total Exclusion Zone. Mr. Karadzic told the witness that
6 he would give orders not to shoot, and 20 minutes later the soldiers
7 withdrew. Overnight, the VRS soldiers placed mines under the Canadian
8 APCs. When General Van Baal refused to talk to Mr. Karadzic during a
9 meeting in Pale the following day until the mines had been removed, he
10 watched Mr. Karadzic verbally order General Galic to have those mines
11 removed, and within 20 minutes both the Canadians and the VRS confirmed
12 that the order had been carried out.
13 That's the summary of the written evidence.
14 Q. And now just to go further, General, with a few additional
15 questions for you, perhaps I could ask you to update your CV for everyone
16 from the time you returned to the Netherlands
17 A. In August 1994, I returned to the Netherlands. And from early
18 October, I served as director of operations for the Royal Air Force and
19 also as deputy commander. Excuse me, not the Air Force, the Royal Dutch
20 Military. And I was subsequently responsible for directing the
21 operational units that were being prepared for deployment in mission
22 areas, and I was also responsible for ensuring logistical support from
23 the Netherlands
24 including DutchBat in Srebrenica.
25 I observed intensive deterioration of the situation, culminating
1 in the fall of Srebrenica, the return of DutchBat, and especially the
2 worldwide observation of at least 7.000 men and boys that perished in the
3 fall of Srebrenica.
4 Subsequently, in 1996, I became deputy chief of Defence Staff and
5 as such was directly involved in all crisis management operations of the
6 military during that period. I was in close contact with units on the
7 ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in other places, and was able to
8 closely follow the developments and wield influence via the chief of
9 Defence Staff.
10 Subsequently, after four and a half years, I became commander of
11 the Royal Dutch Military, and a year after I assumed this command, the
12 NIOD report at the Dutch Institute for War Documentation was published,
13 reflecting an extensive investigation of the circumstances fall of the
14 Srebrenica enclave and all the consequences thereof. The publication of
15 the report had a major impact on the Dutch government. The Dutch
16 government resigned following the publication of the report and its
17 contents. And for me, as a commander operating without the support of
18 politicians was absolutely impossible at that point. And for the sake of
19 the functioning of the Royal Dutch Military and good relations between
20 the military leadership, the Royal Dutch Military and the political
21 leadership, I believed it was appropriate to make my position available.
22 This happened in April 2002.
23 At the end of 2002, a parliamentary inquiry examined the
24 questions that remained unanswered. One of those questions was whether
25 it was justified that General Van Baal resign from his office, and their
1 conclusion was that this was not necessary and was not rightly so.
2 Next, I accepted a position as reorganiser at the central
3 organisation of the ministry, and I served in that position for one year.
4 Then I entered my final position as inspector general of the Dutch
5 military for three and a half years.
6 And when I turned 60, I resigned from the military and
7 subsequently considered other jobs. I thought I was too young to stop
8 working, and I accepted a wonderful job in September 2007 as chairman of
9 the Executive Board of the Police Academy
10 have this job.
11 This is my working update. Please note that the three moments in
12 the period when I returned 16 years ago in Bosnia-Herzegovina are still
13 very clear to me, the testimony from General Mladic [as interpreted] --
14 excuse me, General Mladic and Milosevic and my testimony here today.
15 [In English] Not General Mladic, but General Galic. It's wrong
16 in line 12/09.
17 Q. Thank you. You've just referred to the period 16 years ago in
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I'll, in a few questions, then, take you back
19 there, if I may, to the time of your arrival to take up office in
20 UNPROFOR in February 1994.
21 Where were you based on your arrival?
22 A. [Interpretation] I started at the headquarters in Kiseljak, and
23 one of the most important assignments I was given in the early months was
24 to reorganise the headquarters, which was essentially the rudiment of an
25 enriched NATO headquarters which by then had been totalled changed and
1 had evolved into a huge mass of people that was not operating very
2 effectively. And my assignment was to try, as quickly as possible, to
3 form a headquarters to be transferred to Sarajevo, a small headquarters
4 that would operate effectively to support the command of General Rose,
5 and a small headquarters that would dedicate itself to personnel and
6 materiel, logistics, from Split
7 In that month, in addition to other operations, we drafted a plan
8 for the reorganisation and ensured that everybody working in the
9 headquarters received a new job either in Sarajevo, or in Split
10 the three-sector headquarters that were simultaneously formed in
11 Gornji Vakuf and in Sarajevo
12 in which some other incidents occurred, but we did succeed from 1 April
13 in getting an operational small headquarters going in Sarajevo and in
15 From 1 April, I was in Sarajevo
16 travelled frequently the -- the travel designations included the UNPROFOR
17 units throughout the area, also to Zagreb
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina to all the sites of the unit. I tried to visit
19 them all to the extent permitted in the context of freedom of movement,
20 and I also visited Pale sometimes.
21 Q. So if I understand you correctly, based on your last answer, it
22 appears that you -- from the 1st of April, you were based in Sarajevo
23 Did you remain headquartered in Sarajevo
24 in the theatre?
25 A. That's correct, but I'd like to add that I did travel a lot
1 across Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also to Bihac, and went to Zagreb and
3 where I performed my duties as chief of staff.
4 Q. Just to talk for a moment about your duties and responsibilities
5 as chief of staff, could you outline for us what those were?
6 A. First, the duty of the chief of staff was to ensure, together
7 with the staff, that the commander had adequate support, received correct
8 advice, and the moment decisions had been taken, that the correct orders
9 were issued to have those duties performed. That's the work of the
10 staff, as, in military terms, they're in support of the commander.
11 Carrying out the mandate mainly entailed ensuring freedom of movement,
12 ensuring that conditions were created to achieve a lasting cease-fire,
13 and a third task was explicitly that aid organisations, such as UNHCR and
14 others, be given the opportunity to perform their humanitarian duty. And
15 a lot of this involves ensuring that the humanitarian relief items
16 reached their destination in Bosnia
18 Second, we ensured that the injured could be treated among the
19 civilians who had suffered deeply up to that point, and we also ensured
20 that any injured were evacuated as needed, and that the quality of life
21 of the people was improved, in part, by organising housing projects, and
22 also, for example, by supplying plastic to insulate houses and seal them
23 so that where a lot of destruction of doors and windows had taken place,
24 people could, nonetheless, live.
25 The staff supported all these activities, first of all, by trying
1 to guarantee throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina that freedom of movement
2 prevailed. All three parties had guaranteed this. In practice, however,
3 the parties did not observe the freedom of movement agreements, and
4 throughout my period there, that was the most serious problem.
5 In May and June, we managed to ensure passage for nearly
6 100 per cent of the convoys, but after that the situation deteriorated,
7 with all the consequences in 1995, both humanitarian relief and the
8 supply of the military units in Sarajevo
9 virtually ground to a halt.
10 Another issue that was very important in that period was that we
11 would get a clear picture of exactly what was happening on the ground
12 throughout the area, and UNPROFOR -- a clear impression of what was
13 happening on the ground. UNPROFOR was an impartial organisation. That
14 meant that we did not have actual information that you need to do your
15 work properly. We depended heavily on the information that we received
16 from the warring parties. We depended heavily on the reports -- the
17 reports from the UN Military Observers, and we depended heavily on the
18 UNPROFOR units in the confrontation line or near the confrontation line,
19 obtaining signals of what actually happened.
20 But as for our own information organisation, we didn't have that,
21 so we had to make do with the information made available to us. And in
22 many cases, it was impossible to get a truly-confirmed impression, except
23 through asking a lot of questions and trying to use the limited means
24 that we had to confirm what was actually happening, and many of the
25 reports went unconfirmed because they were unilateral reports from the
1 warring parties. But we had virtually no opportunity to review them
2 because we weren't allowed to review and check them.
3 Q. Could I just stop you there for a while, and I'd like to come
4 back to some aspects of this.
5 But to go to the beginning of your answer, you referred to the
6 humanitarian relief and supply of military units in Sarajevo and other
7 safe areas virtually grinding to a halt after May and June, and I note
8 that paragraph 68 of your written evidence refers to a similar situation.
9 There, you noted -- and I see you flipping through a document, General.
10 Is that, by any chance, a copy of your statement?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 68 of your evidence, you noted that:
13 "After June, the Bosnian Serbs placed very stringent restrictions
14 on freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and aid convoys; for example, asking
15 for more details of our movement, longer periods of notice, wanting to
16 search our vehicles."
17 Do you see that paragraph?
18 A. I have that paragraph in front of me.
19 Q. Now, I would encourage you to listen to my questions. I'd like
20 to ask you a little bit about your assertions in this paragraph.
21 Were convoys -- when you say that convoys were ground to a halt,
22 were they actually refused?
23 A. Increasingly from June, the convoys were refused, that's correct.
24 Q. How did that come about?
25 A. Well, the underlying motives that led Milovanovic either to
1 provide verbal feedback, or through one of his staff or officers, that
2 the convoys were refused were various, and I don't have any impression of
3 the underlying motives, but I do of the arguments provided, and these
4 often related to things such as the requests are tardy, or they're not
5 properly substantiated, or there's no reason to carry out this convoy, or
6 the request may be timely and substantiated, but you have requested the
7 wrong route, at this time it's not convenient, we don't have the manpower
8 to inspect. And then a great number of accusations towards UNPROFOR,
9 where motives were used, such as: the convoys are intended to smuggle
10 contraband into the enclaves, they're being used to transport weapons and
11 munitions for the Muslims, they're being used to conduct illegal trade,
12 or it's not necessary because the supplies for the units are still
13 sufficient or the supplies for UNHCR in the enclaves are sufficient, and
14 a great many accusations that I won't repeat here, but that concerned how
15 people viewed the Muslim population in the enclaves.
16 They were highly ingenious in coming up with constant new reasons
17 for refusing the convoys. We did always ensure that the convoys didn't
18 leave in the direction of the confrontation lines before we received
19 confirmation that the convoys were, indeed, allowed.
20 In addition, a great number of convoys were admitted or were
21 admitted in part, but in May and April it turned out that a lot of
22 convoys encountered measures -- they were subject to measures were not
23 agreed. The convoys were scrutinised in the inspections, and the people
24 accompanying the convoys had items, such as cameras and weapons, taken
25 from them. And there's a large -- long list of items that were removed
1 without any substantiation whatsoever, and UNPROFOR was not in a position
2 to prevent this from happening. In most cases, they simply accepted
3 these items being seized, hoping that the convoy would, nonetheless, be
4 allowed to proceed.
5 Q. You referred, in your answer, to allegations to the effect that
6 UNPROFOR was smuggling contraband, transporting weapons and ammunition,
7 and engaging in illegal trade. Did you -- on receiving these
8 allegations, did you or your office conduct any investigations in that
10 A. UNHCR and other affiliated organisations are UN organisations and
11 are supposed to work impartially and should not accept contraband for
12 smuggling in any way, shape, or form. We had no reason whatsoever to
13 inspect UNHCR convoys in advance to see whether anything was wrong. I'm
14 convinced that if a convoy would have been inspected at a check-point and
15 weapons and munition or other contraband were found there, that we
16 certainly would have been given the opportunity to see this with our own
17 eyes. I was never requested to visit such a situation on site, and I'm
18 fully convinced that such a situation never occurred. The same holds
19 true for the supply convoys sent to the units in the enclaves or to
21 moment when anybody from UNPROFOR was called to come to a check-point to
22 take cognizance of a demonstrable smuggling incident. And I repeatedly
23 broached the issue of such an invitation in my conversations with
24 Milovanovic. I asked him, If you really see that there's something
25 wrong, please call upon me and show it to me. But I never received any
1 such invitation.
2 Q. Thank you. Your indulgence for just a moment.
3 You also referred, in your answer at page 12, to the effect that
4 convoys were -- encountered measures en route, were scrutinised in their
5 inspections -- sorry, were scrutinised in the inspections, and the people
6 accompanying the convoys had items, such as cameras and weapons, taken
7 from them. Now, in that regard, I'd like to turn to a document.
8 This is 65 ter 22987, and I should note, Your Honours, this is
9 one of the proposed new documents we submitted in our notification
10 requesting leave that it be added to our 65 ter list.
11 JUDGE KWON: Given that there's no opposition from the Defence,
12 we'll admit it -- we'll grant it, yes.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
14 Could I have 65 ter 22987, please.
15 Q. General, do you see the document on the screen before you?
16 A. Yes. [In English] Yes, I see a letter from me to General Mladic.
17 [Interpretation] Dated 28 June 1994
18 Q. Now, General, this letter, did you have an opportunity to look at
19 it in preparation for your testimony today?
20 A. I have.
21 Q. Do you recall, actually, writing this letter, General?
22 A. I remember that, and I also remember that there was virtually no
23 response or no response at all. There's an annex that goes with this
24 letter, and the annex reflects a complete chart of all the material taken
25 away from UNPROFOR units. And to my knowledge, nothing was returned, as
1 far as I can remember.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Can we then go to page 2 of this document to see
3 the annex.
4 Q. General, on page 2, in the fourth paragraph from the top, you see
5 the notation that says:
6 "Since the beginning of May, the BSA -" I assume referring to the
7 Bosnian Serb Army - "have hardened their position concerning the
8 inspection of UN convoys in the territory."
9 Now, does this accurately reflect the situation you've described
10 in your earlier answers?
11 A. That's correct. In my contacts with General Milovanovic, it was
12 repeatedly mentioned that he believed that more stringent inspection was
13 necessary. Excuse me, no, that more stringent inspection was necessary
14 on the territory of the Serbs -- not that he believed. But in addition
15 to that more stringent inspection, nonetheless, many things happened that
16 were unacceptable.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Could I ask that this be marked as the next
18 Prosecution exhibit, please?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1819, Your Honours.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
22 Q. You referred earlier on in your answers, General, to a
23 deterioration of the situation and, similarly, a deterioration of the
24 situation in terms of freedom of movement, and I wonder if you could tell
25 us whether these -- to your knowledge, whether these restrictions on
1 freedom of movement had any effect on the situation in the eastern
3 A. As I stated earlier, in May and June Bosnia-Herzegovina Command
4 managed to bring the humanitarian convoys to a very high acceptable
5 level. From June, that plummeted once again, and the consequence was
6 that, during the fall and winter and spring of 1995, the situation in the
7 enclaves, both among the civilians and among the UNPROFOR present, became
8 extremely desperate. Bosnia-Herzegovina Command had a system of tracking
9 the quantity of supplies in the enclave, both humanitarian and for the
10 UNPROFOR units, and you can tell that the situation is becoming very
11 desperate, because in February and March there is a mild surge and then
12 suddenly it became dramatic in the run-up to the fall of Srebrenica
13 enclave. We can only guess at the reason behind this, but one of the
14 points that we had was that there was a systematic squeeze-out of the
15 opportunities to function properly, militarily, for the UNPROFOR units in
16 the enclave. In addition, the situation for the civilian population
17 became increasingly desperate as well.
18 Q. Perhaps, given your -- now that we've moved on to 1995, I could
19 show you a couple of documents in that regard.
20 Could we have 65 ter 03673, please. That's a document dated
21 7 April 1995
22 the Drina
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may make an observation.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the Defence, this is a
1 completely new approach, that General Van Baal is going to talk about the
2 events following August 1994. We counted on him dealing with the period
3 that he was there, that is, until September 1994. Having said that, we
4 would need additional time to prepare ourselves for that. There is
5 nothing in the statement or the identification of 65 ter documents, so
6 this is a completely new and untackled subject.
7 JUDGE KWON: We know he was posted until August 1994, and we'll
8 see what he has to say about the events in 1995.
9 Let's move on.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
11 Q. This, as I said earlier, is a document dated 7 April 1995 from
12 the VRS Main
13 Commands, informing them that the Main Staff had not approved movement of
14 a number of convoys and teams.
15 Now, General, did you have an opportunity to review this document
16 in preparation for your testimony here today?
17 A. Well, yes, I was able to peruse this, although it was a new
18 document for me. I did not see this document in 1995. I saw it
19 recently, in preparations.
20 Q. I'd like to take you to page 2 of the English version of this
21 document, item number 9, which refers to a convoy from Kiseljak which was
22 supposed to transport diesel fuel to Srebrenica, and then over to page 3,
23 please. I'll give you moment to look at item 9.
24 A. [In English] I've seen it.
25 Q. And then over to page 3, please, item number 10, which refers to
1 a convoy from Kiseljak which is supposed to transport field beds,
2 hospital beds, and other things to Srebrenica.
3 Now, General, do you see the last line of this document before
4 the signature block, which reads:
5 "Inform the check-points of the above, and if any of the convoys
6 come to the crossings, you know the procedure"?
7 Do you see that?
8 A. [Interpretation] Yes, I do see that sentence.
9 Q. Now, I noted, General, in your written evidence at paragraph 69,
10 you said that:
11 "The conditions set out by General Milovanovic of the Main Staff
12 were imposed by individuals at check-points."
13 Do you see any relationship between your observations in your
14 written evidence and the procedures and directions as set out in this
16 A. There are great parallels, and in my experiences of 1994, as
17 chief of staff, and how it was linked back to me that convoys were
18 refused, and what conduct was at the check-points, and this was relayed
19 to me by commanders of DutchBat 2 and 3 at the time that I had returned
20 to Holland
21 information in the UN channels also ends up in the national channels and,
22 and there are great similarities between what I experienced in 1994 and
23 that which my successors experienced and also commanders of DutchBat 2
24 and 3 in Srebrenica.
25 Q. Now, this document refers to a convoy being refused which was
1 supposed to transport diesel fuel to Srebrenica. That was at point
2 number 9 of this document. To your knowledge, were the UN forces in
3 Srebrenica in 1995 affected by lack of fuel?
4 A. Well, actually, one of the main tasks of Bosnia-Herzegovina
5 Command was to give truly accurate situation descriptions of the
6 situations in which the UNPROFOR units and the population had ended up
7 in, both in the safe areas and in other areas in Bosnia. And that means
8 that also in Holland
9 how many supplies there were in the enclave, and what was interesting for
11 And really after the final convoy, as I recall, in February 1995,
12 that's when the situation deteriorated very rapidly, and it became
13 necessary that DutchBat 3 started using the supplies of UNHCR to be able
14 to function at all, at an absolute minimum level. And at a given point
15 in that period, stores and supplies of fuel were reduced almost to nil.
16 The only fuel that remained was wood on which we could try and cook food.
17 And there was very little left to keep the hospital going. But almost
18 everything else was done on foot, with minimal vehicle activity, I should
20 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I'm looking at the witness summary
23 for General Van Baal, and I don't see any reference to the events in
24 Srebrenica. And I think if he's going to testify about those events, we
25 would ask that his cross-examination be postponed until sometime next
1 year, when we deal with the Srebrenica events, because we're not prepared
2 to deal with that on cross-examination. We have no notice that his
3 testimony would be dealing with those events.
4 Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: Do you like to respond, Ms. Edgerton?
6 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.
7 [Prosecution counsel confer]
8 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, just a couple of things.
9 The documents we're referring to were part of our initial
10 notification with respect to this witness. The only new document, we've
11 already dealt with, and that was a letter generated by General Van Baal,
12 himself. So we're not dealing with any documents that were by way of
13 surprise to the Defence.
14 With respect to the issues we're going into -- and I should note
15 my line of questioning is strictly related to the freedom of movement of
16 convoys and humanitarian aid -- those areas were discussed with the
17 witness in proofing yesterday and notified at the earliest possible
18 opportunity to the Defence, which, because of our time constraints that
19 we're all operating under, was late yesterday afternoon.
20 But I would oppose the cross-examination going into next year or,
21 indeed, being delayed at all in those circumstances.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, if I could just respond very
24 This document that we're looking at, for one, doesn't deal at all
25 with Srebrenica, so I don't think that we had any notice, at least for
1 this particular document, that there would be testimony about Srebrenica
2 events. And we don't object if they want to elicit that kind of
3 testimony, and the general is local here, so it shouldn't be any
4 inconvenience for him to come back for cross-examination, but we don't
5 think that we should be required to cross-examination on -- cross-examine
6 on part of the case which we're not prepared for and which we had no
7 notice this witness would deal with.
8 Thank you.
9 JUDGE KWON: You wouldn't oppose the witness dealing with item
10 number 9 on this document?
11 MR. ROBINSON: Actually, with respect to this document, I don't
12 think this is a proper document to be --
13 JUDGE KWON: I'm only dealing with it in terms of notice.
14 MR. ROBINSON: In terms of notice, we've had notice of this
15 document, that's correct.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber notes the extent of questions relating
19 to Srebrenica in relation to this witness is somewhat limited, and at a
20 later stage, if the Defence is able to show good cause to recall this
21 witness, the Chamber will consider the matter at the time.
22 We'll proceed.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 I would like to ask that this document, please, be marked at this
25 point as the next Prosecution exhibit.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
2 We'd like to object to the use of this document. I think this is
3 a very slippery slope for both the Prosecution and the Defence, to take a
4 document that comes from a different time, when the witness was present,
5 and simply say, This is somehow consistent with what I was experiencing.
6 If we start doing that, we could have, let's say, a Defence witness
7 talking about 1992, and show him all kinds of documents for the rest of
8 the war to say this is consistent, this is consistent, and then it
9 becomes an open door to admit evidence which is really not very
11 I note that General Milovanovic is a Prosecution witness, he'll
12 be testifying here, and I think he would be the more appropriate witness
13 through whom to tender this document.
14 JUDGE KWON: Do you like to respond, Ms. Edgerton?
15 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, the jurisprudence on pattern evidence
16 applies squarely in this case. This document is relevant to show a
17 consistent pattern. The general has already been able to draw parallels
18 between the situation as he experienced it in 1994 with regard to freedom
19 of movement and effective control of the freedom of movement of
20 humanitarian aid to the enclaves, and I would submit it's clearly
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE KWON: Clearly, the witness was able to see there was some
24 parallel in this document to what was happening while he was posted
25 there. But in the Chamber's view, it does not appear that the witness
1 had referred to this document, as such. So separate from the issue
2 whether you can tender this through a Bar Table motion, the Chamber does
3 not find it appropriate to admit this through this witness.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
5 Q. General, referring to your written evidence at paragraph 61,
6 page 15, you -- and relating to an incident in April 1994, you said that
7 even after one and a half months, you had the strong conviction that all
8 UNPROFOR movements on VRS areas were tightly controlled. Have you found
9 that paragraph?
10 A. [No interpretation]
11 Q. What do you base that on?
12 A. That paragraph is in front of me, I'm sorry. I based myself on
13 various incidents that occurred in that period where, at a time when
14 there was contact with headquarters, the VRS, we also noticed that the
15 agreements that we could make there were actually being followed up.
16 Q. Did you have any personal experience in that regard, when you
17 refer to various incidents?
18 A. Yes. I can mention three examples. The first is: The
19 non-authorised weapons in the environment of Citluk, Crnici [as
20 interpreted], and the activities that UNPROFOR engaged in to bring those
21 weapons under UNPROFOR control. In the night, remote-control mines were
22 placed under the vehicles of the Canadian Forces, and at the moment that
23 these were referred to with the headquarters of the VRS, they assured us
24 that these would be removed, and they were removed. However, at the next
25 moment they were replaced there, placed back there. And, secondly, in
1 personal contact in Pale with the officials involved, once again the
2 assignment was given to remove those remote-controlled mines, and this
3 did, in fact, happen within 20 minutes. That's the first example.
4 The second example is the time at which I wanted to do an
5 investigation into the incident with a British soldier who was killed in
6 a fire-fight in Gorazde, and I was at the check-point in Rogatica, I was
7 confronted with Captain Zoran. He was being instructed based on a
8 facsimile, a message, in which it was stated precisely that the convoy,
9 which consisted of two vehicles, should submit to a search, with the
10 exception of the -- of General Van Baal and his personal effects. This
11 was a fax message that was read out exactly to state what assignment
12 had -- what order had to be executed.
13 And the third was a time at which NAVO [as interpreted] had
14 unauthorised weapons systems taken away from weapons collection points
15 around Sarajevo
16 air attacks, and I, in any case, in due consultation with General Rose,
17 agreed that it was not our intention to kill any personnel there, simply
18 just to obliterate the arms systems. And in direct contact with the
19 liaisons officer in Lukavica Barracks, a Major Indjic, I had a talk with
20 him in which I pointed out to him that the unauthorised weapons systems
21 would be attacked by NATO within a short period, and he had to make sure
22 that all personnel -- all staff had been removed from the vicinity of
23 these unauthorised weapons. And he called me back within 10 or 15
24 minutes to tell me that that separation of equipment -- of materiel and
25 personnel had actually been executed.
1 These are only three examples in a list of many which I won't all
2 repeat. Then I would really need my notes from that period, I would need
3 to peruse my reports from that time, but these are just three
4 illustrative -- three illustrations from which I concluded that what was
5 decided to be done at Pijeseko [phoen] Pale or to not do were things that
6 were actually being followed up on on the ground.
7 Q. In your experience and your involvement with the Dutch Battalion
8 in UNPROFOR that followed your return to the theatre, did you see
9 anything to -- that might alter this conviction that you held to the
10 effect that all UNPROFOR movements on VRS areas were tightly controlled?
11 A. It confirmed the impression I had acquired in 1994.
12 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
13 Those are my questions, Your Honours, for the
14 examination-in-chief. There just remains to deal with the matter of
15 associated exhibits.
16 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we deal with them right now.
17 MS. EDGERTON: I note, from the additional exhibits, Your Honour,
18 we've only sought to tender one from that list, which has been admitted.
19 That was 65 ter 22987.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. And why don't we come to the issue of
21 associated exhibits.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Yes.
23 JUDGE KWON: There are some documents that have been already
24 admitted through other witnesses?
25 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. I've discussed this with my colleague. One
1 identified as 65 ter 11570 is Exhibit P969.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. And you also listed other -- exhibits that
3 have been already exhibited -- admitted.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Yes.
5 JUDGE KWON: That's just for reference purposes?
6 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, quite so.
7 JUDGE KWON: One item, the second-last item, the 65 ter number of
8 which is 32735, your explanation is that is intercepted conversation
9 between General Van Baal and Milovanovic, but you said -- referred to
10 para 76, but para 76 refers to the intercept between General Van Baal and
11 Mr. Karadzic. I don't think this is the proper one. So you would like
12 to --
13 MS. EDGERTON: Please, let me look into that, Your Honour, and
14 address you on it as quickly as possible. I'm sure you're correct, and
15 my apologies.
16 JUDGE KWON: Any objection from the Defence, Mr. Robinson?
17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
18 Just with respect to the prior witness statement and the
19 transcripts of the testimony, I don't know if the Prosecution is minded
20 to tender those, but we don't normally have them tendered.
21 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it is their intention. So --
22 MS. EDGERTON: And if I may, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
24 MS. EDGERTON: And I really apologise to Your Honours that I seem
25 to have -- I do this from time to time. The 65 ter number which is
1 listed as 32727 should actually read "32737." And I'm very sorry about
2 that, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: So except for those items referred to, will be
4 admitted and given numbers.
5 Just shall I go through one by one?
6 So except for 32735 and all the other items that have been
7 already admitted, and except for those statements referred to by
8 Mr. Robinson, will be admitted and given numbers.
9 Mr. Karadzic, can you start your cross-examination now?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Good morning to everyone.
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Good morning, General. I'm sorry that you did not have any
15 communication with the Defence and we have to finalise things that we
16 could have finalised in an interview of that nature. The objective or
17 the intention of the Defence is not to dispute, or to subject you to
18 scrutiny, or test the conduct of the UN or of different countries, or
19 you, personally. We just want to talk about erroneously-established
21 In that sense, I noticed that you made reference today to your
22 notes. That would be very helpful for us in order to bridge the gap over
23 the years that have elapsed and to rectify, possibly, any mistakes that
24 might occur in the perception.
25 Is it possible that you make these notes of yours accessible to
2 A. I don't see any reason whatsoever to release them.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then, in that case, I have to
4 ask assistance from the Trial Chamber in this respect.
5 JUDGE KWON: Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic. It's for you to make
6 submission, if necessary.
7 Before you move on: Ms. Edgerton, there's one thing I forgot to
8 raise. It's related to 65 ter 21862, which is a part of
9 General Milovanovic's personal diary. I take it that you are tendering
10 only three pages that was referred to by the witness.
11 MS. EDGERTON: At this moment, yes, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.
13 Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Q. In order for us to be able to establish more precisely and
16 clarify certain things, let me ask you: General, do you know that we
17 gave consent to the presence of UN forces in our country?
18 A. UNPROFOR was able to act, at the consent of the three former
19 warring parties, that's correct.
20 Q. Thank you. Would you then accept that we were one of the equal
21 warring parties?
22 A. To UNPROFOR, all parties were equal. We were impartial and
24 Q. Thank you. Do you accept that, in compliance with International
25 Laws of War and the Geneva Conventions, we enjoyed identical rights as
1 the other two warring factions?
2 A. To the United Nations, all three parties were equivalent.
3 Q. According to your experience, were we treated equally by the
4 international community, the UN and its agencies?
5 A. It's not up to me, in my position here, to pass judgement about
7 Q. I'm referring to your experience, as did my learned friend
8 Ms. Edgerton. But if you do not wish to answer this question, let us
9 move on.
10 Did you treat us equally as the other two parties or one of the
11 parties that was our opponent? I'm talking about you, personally, as
12 well as your command.
13 A. You're the best person to judge that.
14 Q. Thank you. General, do you accept that as a party that had to
15 pass through -- relief and humanitarian aid through its territory, we
16 were entitled to establish the rules under which these convoys of
17 humanitarian aid would be treated and how it would be delivered and
19 A. Very generally, back in 1993 the military commanders, including
20 on the Serb side, reached an agreement with UNPROFOR to allow the convoys
21 to pass without hindrance. And the practice, as I experienced in 1994,
22 was that particularly the Serb side kept imposing new restrictions,
23 either to prevent the convoys from proceeding, or to seriously delay
24 them, or to cancel them altogether.
25 Q. Do you remember, General, that you were always being given the
1 reasons and the basis on which a convoy was either halted or denied
3 A. Yes, indeed, we were always given reasons why that was the case,
4 but the reasons were not valid.
5 Q. Do you accept that the Serb side had their own perception of
6 their safety and security, and that it was -- security-related issues
7 were something that was up to the Serb side to decide?
8 A. That was, in effect, the situation. And UNPROFOR's mandate did
9 not allow us to change that by force, so we just had to live with that.
10 Q. Thank you. I'd like to remind you of the Additional Protocol to
11 the Geneva Conventions, which refers to civilians in wartime. That's the
12 4th Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 23 in Chapter 2. If you wish,
13 I can give you a hard copy, or perhaps we can call up 1D2612, so just
14 that you can take a brief look at what the International Law guarantees
15 to us. 1D2612.
16 This is page 1. General, you see the title there.
17 Can we please now have page 9.
18 I'd like you and the others to focus on Article 23, and
19 specifically sub-items A, B and C, all the way through to Article 24.
20 I'm not going to read it, but I am kindly asking you to go through it.
21 Do you notice that the party allowing humanitarian aid to pass
22 through has the right to impose conditions, and that serious reasons
23 proffered by that party should not be taken as something to be benefitted
24 by the other party?
25 A. That corresponds very generally with how it reads here, that's
2 Q. Do you agree that you, yourself, pointed out that the situation
3 with the passage of convoys differs at times? There were periods when it
4 all ran smoothly; on the other hand, there were periods when there was
5 heightened inspection, and there was a high level of dissatisfaction on
6 the Serbian side?
7 A. As I have already stated, in May and June the humanitarian
8 convoys were largely allowed to proceed, including the resupply convoy
9 for the UNPROFOR units in the safe areas. Afterwards, this changed
10 drastically and became subject to rigid regulations that did not
11 correspond with the 25 November 1993
12 movement that was the foundation for the agreements between the warring
13 parties and UNPROFOR.
14 Q. General, can you cast your mind back at the consumption of
15 ammunition by UNPROFOR units in, let's say, enclaves?
16 A. What is your question, if I may?
17 Q. My question is: What was the level of monthly consumption of
18 ammunition by your units posted in the enclaves?
19 A. Very limited.
20 Q. You didn't shoot much, did you?
21 A. There was no reason for that.
22 Q. Well, what was, then, the reason for your asking for additional
23 supplies of the ammunition, and consequently you were receiving this
24 ammunition in the enclave, given that you say that you were not using it?
25 A. First, part of the munition was used, to the extent possible, for
1 practice. Second, it's necessary for munition that requires extensive
2 operations and is retrieved from and reinserted into weapons, it needs to
3 be replaced. In addition, there's quality care, that certain types of
4 munition actually have to be replaced every half year or year because
5 maintenance is required.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I note the time. If it is convenient,
7 we'll have a break now.
8 We'll have a break for 20 minutes and resume at quarter to 11.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.
10 --- On resuming at 10.48 a.m.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
12 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, may I just address you for a moment
13 on the two outstanding items from the list of associated exhibits.
14 That's the intercept at 65 ter 32737, dated 23 July 1994, between
15 General Van Baal and Milovanovic, and of course Your Honour was quite
16 correct, 32734, rather than 32735, an intercepted conversation between
17 General Van Baal and General Milovanovic. Those are properly up-loaded
18 in e-court now, Your Honours, and I wonder if I might ask they be marked
19 for identification.
20 JUDGE KWON: The intercepted conversation between
21 General Van Baal and General Milovanovic?
22 MS. EDGERTON: I was reading from the document. General Van Baal
23 and Dr. Karadzic, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE KWON: And that's 65 ter 32734?
25 MS. EDGERTON: Correct, yes. Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: And you suggested marking them for identification?
2 MS. EDGERTON: Given that they were transcripts, rather than
3 audios, I thought marking for identification would be -- was the practice
4 we had been following, actually, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE KWON: Given that the general is a participant in that
6 conversation, is it not a proper time to authenticate that transcript?
7 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honour. May they be marked as
8 Prosecution exhibits, then?
9 JUDGE KWON: I take it there's no opposition from the Defence?
10 MR. ROBINSON: We maintain our previous position, but we
11 understand you've been admitting these when the participant is here as a
12 witness. But we maintain our objection to the lawfulness and, under
13 Rule 95, we continue to object to intercepts.
14 JUDGE KWON: It is my understanding that the Defence has no
15 opposition [Realtime transcript read in error "position"] as to the
16 admission of intercepts during the wartime.
17 MR. ROBINSON: That's true, yes.
18 JUDGE KWON: So that will be admitted.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Q. General, are you trying to say that you conducted exercises with
24 combat ammunition in the enclaves?
25 A. In any case, there was some limited exercising with small arms
1 and ammunition, to maintain our ability to shoot at targets.
2 Q. Do you accept that this had to have disturbed the Serbian
3 soldiers around the enclaves, if firing was heard in the enclave? Did
4 you inform the Serbian Army that you would be conducting an exercise?
5 A. To my knowledge, that was agreed locally.
6 Q. Do you then accept that the quantities of ammunition that
7 UNPROFOR was bringing into the enclaves each time were cause for
8 suspicion on our part? I'm speaking about perception. Do you accept
9 that the perception on the other side was that this could have been
10 misused or would be misused?
11 A. I would, in fact, say the opposite and say that arrangements were
12 made from the outset to develop units in the enclaves that had to manage
13 independently for a certain period, and in that respect it cannot be
14 presumed in advance that a huge war machine would be built up but that a
15 unit, in the event of self-defence, might actually be able to protect
16 itself, and that requires a certain quantity of munition as well as other
17 supplies. And that was discussed extensively in advance during this
18 build-up of the units in Srebrenica and Gorazde and one other place,
20 Q. General, how frequently did the UNPROFOR have supply convoys
21 coming into the enclave?
22 A. Basically, co-ordinated with this build-up and the switching off
23 of units.
24 Q. How frequently did you request supply convoys to bring in
25 ammunition into the enclave, large quantities of ammunition? Was that
1 once a month, twice a month? How frequent was this?
2 A. The build-up of the unit in Srebrenica, as well as the build-up
3 of the unit in Gorazde, took several months. And I can't repeat, off the
4 top of my head at this point, how often munition appeared on the waybill.
5 I can't repeat that off the top of my head.
6 Q. If you were to hand your notes over to us, then it would be
7 clearer. But, General, tell me this: Were you able to build up your
8 military presence in the enclaves without our agreement?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Did you seek this agreement from us?
11 A. Continuously.
12 Q. Now we are going to see how this was reflected in one of your
13 conversations with General Milovanovic, where he is informing you why a
14 convoy was stopped, because it was announced that a relief of the forces
15 would be brought in, but no forces that were relieved would actually
16 leave the enclave, in order to build up the strength in the enclave,
17 which was not acceptable. Were there such instances, to your knowledge?
18 A. I don't have any opinion about this without date, time, and a
19 specific report in front of me. All I can do is speculate, and I won't
20 do that. I would like to ask Mr. Karadzic to indicate exactly with a
21 document or transcript referring to such an instance.
22 Q. Thank you. We're going to call up a document now.
23 General, sir, can you please tell me if you accept that we had
24 the right to inspect the convoys that we were allowing to pass through?
25 A. The general right to inspect a convoy was never contested, but in
1 many cases we couldn't even carry out the convoys because they were
2 rejected in advance in many cases after June, and so they never departed
3 and never reached the Serb check-points either.
4 Q. General, sir, everything that came into the enclaves came with
5 the consent of the Serbian side; is that correct?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. And do you know that ammunition, fuel, and other items were
8 smuggled, and the United Nations were even conducting investigations into
9 these matters?
10 A. From the period in which I was there, I have not found any
11 evidence of such investigations being conducted, nor any confirmations
12 that UNPROFOR/UNHCR units were smuggling goods into the enclaves.
13 Q. Are you aware of investigations relating to the black market and
14 that it was established that certain lower-ranking soldiers, probably
15 without the knowledge of their commands, participated in the creation of
16 a black market?
17 A. I did not see any evidence on paper or personally, based on the
18 presence in the enclave. I never found anything like that.
19 Q. Would you agree that when a convoy is approved, the soldiers at
20 the check-point must pay attention that everything is the way it is
21 stated in the papers? So if something is there that is undeclared, they
22 don't have the authority or the discretion to deviate from items that are
23 not declared? For example, if, instead of 10 trucks, 11 trucks appear,
24 isn't it to be assumed that a soldier at the check-point cannot approve
25 the passage of such a convoy?
1 A. The convoys had a waybill. We agreed with the Serb authorities
2 what had to be indicated on the waybill, and the contents had to be
3 limited to that. That's what we agreed. But, in any case, that was
4 often not the reason to block the convoy from proceeding. I repeat that
5 most convoys were rejected after they were requested. And in one
6 instance, there was a dispute at a check-point because something wasn't
7 right on the waybill or load manifest, but that was an exception.
8 Q. Thank you. General, sir, you have one attitude towards
9 General Milovanovic, who was your counterpart, the chief of staff, just
10 like you, and then in your conversations with him and in documents that
11 you exchanged, it can be seen that there was mutual respect and good
12 co-operation. So how do you explain this difference in your statements?
13 Your position is quite against the Serbs and General Milovanovic, but at
14 that time the atmosphere or the tone in your relations, and the
15 co-operation between you, was quite good, it was better.
16 A. During the period I was there, there was some moments when we had
17 serious differences of opinion. The most important one was the attitude
18 and the refusal to allow convoys, and this greatly threatened the proper
19 functioning of UNPROFOR. So it's not my call to say that this
20 relationship was disturbed, but it was clearly disturbed in that the
21 agreements we reached when we saw each other or spoke to each other over
22 the phone were not observed or were observed insufficiently by the Serbs.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D2655 now, please.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, I feel a little better now that I see that the Muslim
1 authorities did not only eavesdrop on my conversations, but they also
2 eavesdropped on yours.
3 So this is a report by the Bosnia
4 Security Department. This is 2655. If we don't have a translation, just
5 allow me to summarise what this document is. It's this:
6 You spoke on the 20th of May, 1994, with the assistance of an
7 interpreter, Ms. X. And then in the second paragraph -- actually, this
8 was a conversation of yours with General Milovanovic.
9 In the second paragraph -- I don't need to read everything. In
10 the second paragraph, it says:
11 "The second question has to do with the --"
12 And this is you speaking.
13 JUDGE KWON: We seem to have an English translation.
14 MS. EDGERTON: It's on the way, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It would be much easier if, in the
17 disclosed material, we were also given the translations.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. General, how frequently did you call General Milovanovic?
20 A. Very regularly; sometimes three times a day, sometimes once a
22 Q. Thank you. We are going to get the document in a second, but I'm
23 going to interpret this. You will be able to read it later.
24 So you were asking for convoys for Gorazde. The first convoy --
25 JUDGE KWON: Shall we put it on the ELMO.
1 MS. EDGERTON: It's four pages.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the first page,
4 [In English] "The second issue ..."
5 JUDGE KWON: Could we zoom in on the lower part. Yes.
6 Can you read, General, or shall we zoom in a bit further?
7 THE WITNESS: [In English] Yes, yes.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Do you agree that it can be concluded, on the basis of this
10 paragraph, that you were aware of our right to carry out inspections as
11 we saw fit and dictated by our suspicions?
12 A. Checking on the load manifest was an agreement that we had made.
13 Q. Can I now ask you: In the next paragraph, where we can see that
14 General Milovanovic is asking for an investigation to be conducted into
15 the murder of a Ukrainian soldier - when you finish the paragraph, just
16 let us know and then we'll look at the next page - where we can see that
17 General Milovanovic is requesting a multi-level investigative commission,
18 believing that unilateral investigation results should not be accepted,
19 and we see that he's interested in the truth, and he promises that if
20 this deed was committed by a Serb, the Serb would be punished. Can you
21 please let us know if you see that on this page. This is the fourth
22 paragraph, which says:
23 "I care about the truth, and only about the truth ..."
24 And so on and so forth. And he's asking --
25 JUDGE KWON: Could we go down further. Yes.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. And you agree here, but you said that your commander has the
3 final word in this, and the same applies to the other side. And then
4 Milovanovic, in the last paragraph at the bottom, is informing you that
5 he received another one of your requests for the police to go to the
6 scene for an investigation.
7 Can we look at the next page, please. Top of the page, please.
8 It seems to me, General, sir, that this is a pleasant
9 relationship, full of mutual requests, and not one that you seem to
10 present in your statements. Is that correct? And at the bottom, we see
11 that two convoys were authorised because of you, personally, General.
12 That's what it says.
13 "... only for the general, personally."
14 Is that correct, and do you confirm the contents of this
16 A. Well, I don't remember the literal text. I'm confronted with
17 this for the first time. But I do recall this situation, yes.
18 Q. Thank you. Can we look at the next page.
19 Is it correct that these announcements were arriving at the last
20 minute always, even immediately before, so that the requests for convoys
21 to be let through were sent at the last minute? Can you please answer
22 that question, and then we can move to the text.
23 A. The fact that -- I'm sorry, I can't hear -- that they were
24 dispatched at a very late moment, I cannot confirm that. Generally, very
25 stringent measures were always taken to make sure that what had to take
1 place was in accordance with agreements that had been made in the number
2 of days and hours before a convoy started out. I believe there was a
3 technical problem with sending the applications at one time, because they
4 were going through UNMO Pale, the United Nations Military Observers in
5 Pale, who had to send it through to headquarters in Pale, and so there
6 may have been disturbances in the smooth transition here and there, I
7 cannot rule that out.
8 Q. Thank you. And do you see in the second paragraph that
9 General Milovanovic is concerned because he doesn't see a unit coming out
10 after a unit is allowed in, and so he's talking about this unauthorised
11 reinforcement of forces, and then he says at the end that's the reason
12 why the second convoy was not authorised. And then you thank him, and
13 the rest of it is like a joke or like a pleasant conversation. Do you
14 agree that General Milovanovic, just like General Mladic and the rest of
15 the Army of Republika Srpska's main concern was not to be defeated, so
16 they did not want to make that possible by not approving the convoys?
17 A. This is -- this is your own interpretation, but very emphatically
18 in the situation of the run-off at Gorazde, we made an agreement with the
19 UNPROFOR units as to their enhancement. It included the numbers of
20 troops that would be allowed to conduct their duties there. That is
21 nothing new. Also, with the earlier warring factions, this had been an
22 agreement about exactly what would happen, how this would take place.
23 And Mr. Karadzic's remark as to the second part of this paragraph
24 I would just simply leave to his own account.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Can we tender this document, please?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D819, Your Honours.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. What I asked you about, the duties and the obligations of
6 General Milovanovic, you, as a general, is it your main concern to
7 protect your troops from getting killed and to avoid being defeated?
8 A. That is a responsibility that we had. UNPROFOR had to create
9 circumstances that would facilitate a lasting cease-fire. There were
10 several ways to do that, but always with the joint approvement of the
11 earlier warring factions.
12 Q. If I were to tell you that on the Serb side, there was the
13 perception and even evidence that after each convoy that entered an
14 enclave, the Muslim side would step up its attacks from within those
15 enclaves, so would you agree that this was a cause for concern on the
16 Serbian part in relation to the convoys?
17 A. Convoys were supplying UNPROFOR. These were the military ones.
18 But the humanitarian ones were mainly for the civilian population and had
19 nothing to do with the possible strengthening of Muslim military capacity
20 in the enclave. In my period, UNPROFOR convoys and UNHCR convoys or
21 other affiliated agency convoys would also -- would never include
22 military goods for the civilian population inside the enclave. The
23 Muslim population, I'm sorry.
24 Q. Thank you. We will show you. You will see evidence that this
25 actually did happen.
1 But, actually, can we now look at 1D2656, how permissions were
2 sought at the last minute and how General Milovanovic was very
3 understanding. 1D2656. Again, the Muslim side was eavesdropping on
4 General Milovanovic and you.
5 And may I ask if there is a translation for this document as
7 MS. EDGERTON: Its translation is coming, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Here it is, also four pages.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the translation on the
11 ELMO, please. Here it is.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Can you please look at the first sentence, where it says:
14 "General --"
15 Actually, General Milovanovic speaks of you, and he says:
16 "General Van Baal thinks that I'm his secretary. He's been
17 calling me the whole day."
18 And then you say:
19 "General, sometimes we have the same interests, so I have to call
21 And then Milovanovic says you should talk to each other once in
22 10 days and not 15 times a day.
23 And then if you look at the bottom, you are asking:
24 "All right, General, thank you for that ..."
25 And then you ask -- you say that at 6.00 that evening,
1 Mr. De Mello informed you about this, and you're actually asking that a
2 convoy that was not announced sufficiently in advance, you're kindly
3 asking for this convoy to be allowed through that evening, and
4 General Milovanovic says:
5 "No problem, they will be allowed to pass through, but I have to
6 receive the fax or you need to give me their names."
7 And then the image we get of General Milovanovic, on the basis of
8 your statements, is much worse than the image that we get on the basis of
9 your conversations with him; is that correct?
10 THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry, the interpreters couldn't hear.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We respected each other in
12 conversations, the way you should do if you're an impartial UNPROFOR
14 JUDGE KWON: General, could you kindly take a look at the
15 transcript and check whether some part of your answer is missing.
16 THE WITNESS: "The way I should do if you are an impartial
17 UNPROFOR party." So not "we," but --
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Are you thinking only of your written correspondence or do you
21 also include your telephone conversations here?
22 A. Well, there were a number of telephone conversations that were
23 intercepted, that were listened to. I did see transcripts of those. And
24 there were times at which we were not quite so respectful with each
25 other, one time at which General Milovanovic told me that, Wasn't it
1 wonderful that we hadn't killed each other on that specific day, for
3 Q. But this was a joke, wasn't it?
4 A. Well, you've got to distinguish between moments at which
5 General Milovanovic made jokes and at times that he did not make jokes,
6 even if there was an intermediary in the form of an interpreter.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Can we look at the next page, please.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. And we can see that Milovanovic said that you went a bit too far
11 with your demands, that you were giving him homework and asking him to do
12 it, and he said that:
13 "The only thing that is left, and I would be glad, and it is my
14 wish to invite you to my headquarters here in Sarajevo, and if you could
15 come by, any chance, I would like that to actually happen sometime."
16 And then a little bit down, Milovanovic says:
17 "This is what I told you. Pale was just a joke. Yes, I'll meet
18 you in my territory any time. You're always welcome there. We'll see
19 each other, of course, and now I have to work as fast as I can in regards
20 to these three passengers that you did not announce, and you don't need
21 to send me the fax ..."
22 So, General, is this proof that General Milovanovic did his
23 utmost to grant your requests, and that he wasn't being restrictive?
24 THE INTERPRETER: Again, the interpreters couldn't hear because
25 of the switch in the system, can't hear at all now. We do apologise.
1 Could he start again?
2 JUDGE KWON: There seems to have been a technical -- [Dutch
3 language on English channel].
4 Yes, it seems to be resolved now. Repeat your last answer now,
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In this situation, he did not
7 conduct restrictively, but he behaved cooperatively.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Can we have this document admitted into evidence?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D820, Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D2657, please.
13 JUDGE KWON: Is the English translation coming?
14 MS. EDGERTON: We have one, yes.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. General, while we are waiting for the document, you can take my
18 word for it this is, again, the Secret Service of the MUP of Bosnia and
20 conversation with General Milovanovic of the 2nd of June, 1994. You
21 greeted them by saying, Good evening, and the time is 20 past 10.00 in
22 the evening.
23 From the first paragraph, you can see that you have two
24 questions. One concerns the convoy that was still in Rogatica, and the
25 other one dealt with the deployment of your forces in Sarajevo. The
1 British convoy in Rogatica, for the supply of their unit -- you can see
2 this first paragraph, can't you?
3 Now, let's see what General Milovanovic says in response:
4 "Firstly, concerning the convoy stopped at Rogatica today,
5 afternoon, I have issued the instructions to my personnel to let the
6 convoy through. However, only a few lorries were checked, and a cheeky
7 English officer wouldn't allow us to check the remaining vehicles. He
8 wouldn't allow us to lift the tarpaulin over the top of the lorry. As
9 for the bags with the mail, I can really suspect UNPROFOR is, indeed,
10 delivering weapons and ammunition to the Muslims of Gorazde."
11 And you say -- can we please have the next page, or just scroll
12 up. You say:
13 "General, I agree with you that we are dealing here with a
14 routine and standard control, and, General, it is apparent that you and I
15 are receiving different information from the field."
16 And so on and so forth.
17 Milovanovic then goes on to say -- can we please have the next
18 page in English.
19 A. [In English] One moment, please. I have to read it. I see this
20 for the first time.
21 JUDGE KWON: Take your time, General.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, okay.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. And General Milovanovic says here:
25 "I will instruct my men not to check those mail bags, but I beg
1 you to instruct your personnel to remove the tarpaulin so that my men
2 could check the cargo ..."
3 And you say:
4 "This is what I intend to do."
5 Now, General, my question is as follows: Did the Serbian Army
6 request these examinations because it was an evil army, bent on
7 disturbing the process, or did they do this in compliance with the right
8 that they had to conduct the inspections and their concerns about what
9 the other side might have been receiving in that way? Were the Serbs
10 evil or were they simply concerned?
11 A. [Interpretation] I can only guess as to what was on the minds of
12 the Serbs. What we had agreed was that there would be a visual
13 inspection of the vehicles, but no searching, in the sense of no personal
14 bodily searches or of the personal possessions of the people. They would
15 stay away from that. That was the arrangement. And here's an attempt to
16 go much further, and that's what we objected to.
17 Q. But in order to conduct a visual inspection of a vehicle by
18 removing the tarpaulin is nothing unusual. How can anyone see what's
19 loaded on a vehicle without removing the tarpaulin?
20 A. [In English] No translation.
21 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your question?
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. The request for the tarpaulin to be removed in order to carry out
24 a visual inspection of a vehicle is not an exaggerated request. No one
25 can see the contents of a vehicle through the tarpaulin. Do you agree,
1 then, that the tarpaulin should have been removed?
2 A. [Interpretation] Of course.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can we have this document admitted into evidence?
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D821, Your Honours.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D2659, please.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. This is a telegram sent by General Milovanovic of the VRS. It is
10 addressed to you and the UNPROFOR in Zagreb. It's drafted in English,
11 and could you please peruse through its contents.
12 On the 15th of July, you sent information about an incident that
13 took place at the check-point near Rogatica on the 12th of July. Do you
14 agree that General Milovanovic here expresses his regret, and that he
15 apologised and promised an investigation, and that he would hold someone
16 accountable for that?
17 A. I have taken note of this message.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Can we have this admitted into evidence?
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D822, Your Honours.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D2663, please.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I make a remark
24 about this document?
25 Mr. Karadzic didn't ask me, but I feel a need to make a remark
1 about it.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, by all means. You'd like to say something.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This message of apology refers to a
4 moment when a fatal accident took place in Gorazde that I wished to
5 investigate, and I was blocked at Rogatica by the commander present at
6 that post who had written information to inspect the two vehicles of my
7 personal delegation, except for my own possessions, those of
8 General Van Baal. I absolutely refused that because it violated all
9 principles, including the effort to contact General Milovanovic, via
11 outcome was that the agreement we had reached to meet General Tolimir in
12 Gorazde and to launch a joint investigation into the death of this
13 British soldier was unable to proceed, so I thought it was perfectly
14 normal in this case for a very sharply-worded objection to this. And
15 that happened by telephone, and that was what led to this message.
16 In the end, I was prevented from entering the enclave to conduct
17 an investigation, which was most regrettable.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. But do you agree, General, that here General Milovanovic is
20 making reference not to your protest, but instead it was General Tolimir
21 and Colonel Magazin are informing him that you had faced some
22 inconveniences and unpleasantness? They were both full of understanding,
23 and that, in their judgement, due to the inconvenience and the
24 unpleasantness that you had suffered, they felt they should apologise.
25 In the second paragraph, it is said that Tolimir informed Milovanovic
1 about the unpleasant situation that you had been faced with.
2 A. Whether it was pleasant or unpleasant, I'll leave that out of
3 this, but the consequence of the activity at Rogatica was that I was
4 prohibited from proceeding to the enclave, and that's what I objected to
5 strenuously. And that could not be rectified; not the next day, either.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have an English version of
7 1D2663. Yes, we have it. Again, I would kindly request for an English
8 translation to be provided. It would have been much easier for us if we
9 received both versions at the same time. Then we can up-load it.
10 MS. EDGERTON: We don't have a translation.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Then allow me to tell
12 you what this is.
13 This is another intercept made by the Muslim Secret Service of a
14 conversation of the 30th of August, 1994, before your departure.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. You're talking here with General Milovanovic, and Milovanovic
18 "A flight to Srebrenica, on condition that the helicopter be
19 inspected in Sokolac.
20 "VB: Okay.
21 "Milovanovic: There is no need for additional requests. I
22 already have a request sent today. It was sent to me, and it pertains to
23 today's date. The helicopter will be allowed to take off, and I will
24 make sure that it is safe. They are going to fly according to the
25 schedule and the times announced for today.
1 "Secondly, convoy number 08/38131, loaded with protective
2 devices, will be let through, as well as two armoured carriers of the
3 Danish Company, who will be allowed to proceed. There is no need for any
4 further requests ..."
5 Et cetera.
6 Now, General Van Baal says:
7 "General, first of all, thank you very much for your
8 co-operation. I believe that my chief of defence personnel --" maybe you
9 said "successor" instead -- "will find it convenient to fly to Srebrenica
10 tomorrow. He will be back on Thursday, which you can see from the
12 "Thank you for your kind words. I wish you best of luck in the
13 future, and I kindly ask you to be very attentive and careful with
14 respect to your daughter. There are certain persons that I will never
15 forget for as long as I live. You, General, are definitely one of them,
16 and Lana is the other one."
17 Then Milovanovic says:
18 "Thank you very much."
19 And then you, General, say:
20 "General, that will be all. I salute you, and that will be all.
21 I have here General Briquemont, who is listening to this conversation,
22 and I am going to immediately brief him about the three issues that you
23 hate the most."
24 Do you remember what these three things were that Milovanovic
25 hated most?
1 A. Yes, I remember those.
2 Q. Are you going to share that with us or are you going to keep it a
3 secret, just as you did during that conversation when you say, Let's keep
4 that our secret? Do you agree that this reflects a civilised
5 relationship, full-on understanding, and that General Milovanovic was
6 everything but a restrictive person?
7 A. In the period that I worked with General Milovanovic from my
8 UNPROFOR capacity, there was a period when we were able to work together
9 very closely and understood each other very well, but there were also
10 many points when he was far from agreeable to allow UNPROFOR or UNHCR to
11 do its work. And that was the prevalent situation throughout the period.
12 I remember the last conversation well.
13 And my successor was not Briquemont but Brinkman. Brinkman was
14 my successor, Brinkman. Yes, that's correct.
15 And I often reflect on this period, but as I said, the
16 predominant situation was that often General Milovanovic was the
17 messenger of not allowing UNPROFOR to do its work properly or better for
18 all parties.
19 Q. From these conversations of yours, General, one can draw a
20 completely different impression and different facts. Would you be so
21 kind as to tell you [as interpreted] which three specific things are that
22 General Milovanovic found so much distasteful? I don't think anyone in
23 this courtroom would be affected by your answer.
24 A. I would prefer to leave that up to General Milovanovic, when he
25 appears here, to disclose to us what those three things are. Those were
1 his elements, and I don't believe that they are relevant to this trial.
2 Q. May I tell you what these three things are? Fat women, long
3 telephone conversations, and small glasses for drink. Is that true?
4 A. I cannot deny that.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can we have this document admitted into evidence, please?
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification, pending
9 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 32736.
11 32736, and I believe we have a translation as well. I'd like to look at
12 page 2. The original is in English, and we have a B/C/S translation. So
13 32736, page 2.
14 I believe that we need page 2 in the English as well. Then
15 page 1 in English, but it doesn't seem to be identical. This is in
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Now, this is another intercept of a conversation between
19 General Milovanovic and yourself, but we have a partial translation. I
20 am afraid that certain portions were selected to be translated for some
21 substantial reasons.
22 Do you remember talking to him on the 9th of June? Let me remind
23 you what you were talking about.
24 General Van Baal:
25 "General, good evening. I would like to put two questions to
1 you. The first one refers to my letter relating to the setting up of
2 liaison teams, in compliance with the Geneva Agreement. Since I am
3 certain that you didn't have enough time, can you please be kind to tell
4 me your position in this regard? The second issue concerns the British
5 convoy in Rogatica."
6 First of all, do you see what you were talking about here?
7 A. I have a different message in front of me. This is a message
8 dated 8 June 1994
9 Q. Then it seems that we have a different page in the English. I am
10 talking about the conversation of the 9th of June.
11 This 65 ter document actually has two documents. Oh, no, this
12 might be the correct one, the 9th of June.
13 So we both have the same versions, don't we? Can you please
14 briefly look at it. I would really like you to have a look at this
16 Do you agree, General, that here you're all -- again asking
17 clearance at the 11th hour for a passage of a convoy, and that you sent a
18 notice at the very last moment, and it seems that Milovanovic is again
19 very much prepared to accommodate your request.
20 Can we look at the next page.
21 You say here:
22 "Thank you, General, for such a speedy reaction. I have nothing
23 more to say to you."
24 Milovanovic then said:
25 "All right. The general respects my principles ..."
1 Et cetera, et cetera.
2 Now we see that General Milovanovic is very considerate and that
3 he granted approval, although the procedure was not followed exactly
4 according to the agreement. We shall try to find a document where
5 Milovanovic was not so considerate and that he had no reason to be so,
6 but here do you agree that he was very amicable and ready to accommodate
7 your request?
8 A. This refers to the British convoy that was blocked and had to be
9 inspected, and at that inspection nothing improper was found, which was
10 why the convoy was allowed to proceed, and there was no reason to prevent
11 it from passing any longer, and permission was granted, but at a certain
12 point it was stopped and an extended debate arose concerning the
13 inspection of the vehicle. But it was, nonetheless, allowed to proceed,
14 and the main reason was that nothing was found that did not appear on the
15 waybill or load manifest, and ultimately Milovanovic consented and gave
16 permission for this convoy to proceed.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Can we have this document admitted into evidence?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D824, Your Honours.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Do you agree, General, that the bill of lading must correspond to
23 the cargo, and if that is not the case, then the soldier manning the
24 check-point must react to that?
25 A. That's correct.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Can we now have 65 ter 22987. And I think it's been already
3 admitted today and given a P exhibit number.
4 THE REGISTRAR: That's Exhibit P1819 [Realtime transcript read in
5 error "P1890"].
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now go to page 2.
7 JUDGE KWON: For the record, the transcript should read "P1819."
8 Is that correct?
9 THE REGISTRAR: Correct, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. In the second paragraph, we see that as of the 1st of May, 11
13 UNPROFOR convoys were given authorisation to travel through the Bosnian
14 Serb territory, but they were subjected to inspections because certain
15 equipment had been seized from the vehicles.
16 Look at the next passage:
17 [In English] "The Serb check-point commanders have been using the
18 pretext of discrepancies on the manifest to take equipment from convoys.
19 In other circumstances, when the manifest was without fault, the Serbs
20 insisted they search the convoy in order to eliminate suspicions or
21 discrepancies. When equipment was found that was not on the manifest, it
22 was confiscated."
23 [Interpretation] Well, was that the purpose of inspections? Was
24 that the purpose, to compare what was contained in the bill of lading
25 with the actual cargo being carried? Would you agree they did not have
1 the right to prevent the entry of goods that were not on the bill of
3 A. Generally, the waybill or load manifest determines what will be
4 transported, but that's separate from the personal possessions of the
5 people who had been assigned to that convoy, both passengers and the
6 driver. So they weren't allowed to confiscate all personal items,
7 including weapons, from the UNPROFOR servicemen.
8 Q. Why wasn't that also on the bill of lading, the number of
9 persons, their identity, and their belongings, their equipment? Well,
10 you know that a Serb can be killed by weapons that are not personal?
11 A. Back to your first question: Everything that is transported was
12 listed in a load manifest. That was transported for the load, that is.
13 In addition, there was a personnel list featuring the identity numbers
14 and a list of weapons with the weapon numbers, and those weapons belonged
15 to the military servicemen and may not be taken from them. The same
16 holds true for the personal possessions. They are not listed on the load
17 manifest and should not be subjected to searches. The actual searching
18 concerned personal possessions, and they were supposed to be left alone.
19 Those are the rules of the UN, and ordinarily they have been declared
20 applicable in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the parties had committed to
21 respect them. Nonetheless, during these -- these bodily searches were
22 enforced, and personal possessions and weapons were removed from our
23 UNPROFOR servicemen.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we'll have a break for half an hour.
25 We'll resume at 12.30.
1 --- Recess taken at 12.02 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. General, sir, since you began on this topic of personal
7 possessions, I must ask you now to look at part of a statement by one of
8 the UNPROFOR officers so that you can see that personal articles were
9 used for communications that was not in accordance with the agreements.
10 This comes from -- it's a topic that arises out of the explanation made
11 at the end of the previous session.
12 JUDGE KWON: Do you have a 65 ter number?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't have that number. It's a
14 statement taken by the OTP.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Actually, Your Honour, I've had a look at the
16 document, and it's not signed. Not signed, not dated, so I would object
17 to the use of the document.
18 JUDGE KWON: Can we take a look.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The interview was conducted by
20 Stephen Upton on the 28th of December, 1996.
21 JUDGE KWON: It bears an ERN number by the OTP?
22 MS. EDGERTON: It does, indeed. At best, it appears to
23 constitute OTP notes of a meeting with the witness.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not there to be -- I'm not
25 tendering it. I would just like to look at one passage.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE KWON: Separate from the issue of admission, I don't see
3 any problem putting questions in relation to this document. Let us
5 Shall we put it on the ELMO.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Can we look at the first page on the ELMO, please.
8 And now can we look at the second page, please.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. This paragraph:
11 "On the 25th of July, I was woken up ..."
12 We can look at the middle of the paragraph:
13 "We had with us sophisticated radio equipment which we were to
14 use ..."
15 [In English] "I do not think that the VRS knew what equipment we
16 had or they may not have let us into Zepa."
17 And so on and so on.
18 [Interpretation] Do you see, General, sir, that even personal
19 equipment was being smuggled in in order to carry out communications that
20 were not planned under the agreement, and that the UNPROFOR officer was
21 aware of that?
22 A. This is a situation that's being described but relates to a
23 period that, in my view, was when General Smith and not General Rose was
24 in office. So that must have been in 1995. This is not familiar to me.
25 This is the first I see of it, and I'll leave any statements in this
1 respect to the people who gave these statements. I can't judge whether
2 it's accurate or inaccurate.
3 Q. Thank you. All I'm trying to do is to show, General, sir, that
4 personal equipment also could have been used against us and that our
5 caution was legitimate and justified; nothing more than that. We are not
6 going to tender this statement. There will be other opportunities to
7 deal with this.
8 Now, General, sir, I would like to ask you something about one
9 sentence that you ascribe to General Milovanovic. This is paragraph 40
10 of your statement. Can you please look at it, paragraph 40 of your
11 statement, where you say that General Milovanovic said -- do you see that
12 statement, that he was against the trams operating?
13 A. My statement, at number 14, starts with the objective of the TEZ.
14 That was to prevent Sarajevo
15 Q. It's paragraph 40.
16 A. 40. I see, yes. I now have paragraph 40 in front of me.
17 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Are you sure that you accurately remember what the general told
20 you, and are you sure that he told you that snipers -- actually, that the
21 trams would be the targets of snipers?
22 A. I am 100 per cent certain.
23 Q. In your opinion, is this a significant piece of information?
24 A. It is very important, because General Milovanovic's intonation
25 and diction gave me the distinct impression that he could influence what
1 happened on the ground in Sarajevo
2 Q. Did you inform your superior command about this?
3 A. Absolutely.
4 Q. In which document? Can we see the document in which you reported
5 that Milovanovic was threatening you? Or let me put another question to
7 Did General Milovanovic tell you what he was able to tell you,
8 he, myself, or anyone else, that it can happen that somebody fires at the
10 A. You are asking whether I reported this to my superiors. That's
11 the case. When I returned to Pale after this conversation, I immediately
12 reported it to General Rose. And the second part of your question is not
13 clear to me.
14 Q. Well, let's look first to see where such an important piece of
15 information appears in documents. Did you inform me about this? Did you
16 inform the main command in Zagreb
17 writing about such a significant threat?
18 A. The standard practice was that after conversations had taken
19 place at various levels, that the morning after such conversations there
20 would be feedback about them in the meeting with the chief of staff, and
21 that happened in this case as well. Brief notes were taken, and it was
22 ensured that both General Rose and Victor Andreev, General Rose's
23 political adviser, were aware of this position on the part of
25 Q. Why was I not informed about this, and I was informed about much
1 less important matters?
2 A. Sniping was a constant subject of conversation at various levels,
3 both between Mr. Akashi and Mr. Karadzic and Mr. De Mello and
4 Victor Andreev repeatedly called attention at various levels to this
5 phenomenon. It's not up to me when the chief of staff of the Bosnian
6 Serb Army takes a stand. It's not my call to ensure that his general, in
7 this case General Mladic, and the president at the time were notified. I
8 left that up to him. And, moreover, it was my distinct impression that
9 General Milovanovic adopted only the stand that he was permitted.
10 There were repeated interventions in the course of telephone
11 conversations by General Mladic to ensure that what Mladic wanted
12 General Milovanovic to say was, in fact, said and discussed with me.
13 Q. General, sir, did Mr. -- was Mr. Akashi the strategic commander
14 of the United Nations forces in Bosnia
15 Secretary-General of the United Nations?
16 A. Mr. Akashi visited Bosnia-Herzegovina regularly to talk to
17 counterparts at his levels among the different factions operating there.
18 Q. Who was the UNPROFOR commander at the strategic level?
19 A. General De Lapresle.
20 Q. Who was the civilian commander of the army of the United Nations?
21 Was there a civilian authority above you?
22 JUDGE KWON: General, could you kindly --
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, there was no civilian authority
24 superior to me. I was under the direct command of General Rose.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. And under whose command was General De Lapresle? Was there a
2 civilian authority at the -- to which the military was subordinated?
3 A. That was Mr. Akashi.
4 Q. Thank you. And who was the counterpart to Mr. Akashi on the
5 Serbian side?
6 A. That was Dr. Karadzic.
7 Q. Thank you. Are you aware that we, His Excellency Akashi and
8 myself, agreed all of the things at the strategic level and at the
9 political level, and that later they were entrusted to you, the soldiers,
10 for implementation?
11 A. This was, indeed, what happened on various fronts, such as, for
12 example, the implementation of the Total Exclusion Zone.
13 Q. So, General, sir, I would like us now to see this -- I allow for
14 the possibility that General Milovanovic said to you, If the trams start
15 moving, elements out of control may fire, and I dispute that
16 General Milovanovic could have said to you that the Sarajevo
17 Romanija Corps, meaning the army that was under the control, would fire
18 at the trams. If you understood it that way, which is what you are
19 saying now, why are there no written traces about such a major piece of
20 information, such a major issue that also constituted a violation of the
21 Laws and Customs of War? You informed me about each and every convoy and
22 failed to inform me about such an important matter?
23 A. It was not my task to inform you. It was my task to notify my
24 commander and to ensure that such information reached the appropriate
25 place in Zagreb
1 Q. Is there such a written information or notification?
2 A. I don't have the information as to whether a written document
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 65 ter 10674.
5 That is General Milovanovic's book. 10674, and can we then look at
6 page 31. In English, this is page 61. Page 61 in the English. In the
7 Serbian, it's the correct page. In the English, page 61.
8 MS. EDGERTON: It's a 39-page document in English. I don't know
9 where page 61 would be.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. Let us just check.
11 "The international legal aspects of the war in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina," that is the next heading, the next chapter.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Page 31 in English.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] All right.
15 Q. Here, in the month of March -- in the month of March, a number of
16 meetings were held with representatives of UNPROFOR. But other than
17 accusations at the Serbs, things did not progress much further.
18 We are going to find where that is right now.
19 And then there is your name. For example, that:
20 "... talks with General Van Baal on the 27th of March, 1994
21 were accused of a sniper attack on a tram full of commuters at
22 Marin Dvor."
23 And then it goes on to say:
24 "The Orthodox Church at Marin Dvor is in the centre of Sarajevo
25 And they are wrong there.
1 JUDGE KWON: Are you following, General?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I am following that.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. "We asked the general which sniper would be acting from a
5 distance of five and a half kilometres, because the Muslims were in
6 control of the city centre. The area under their control in town was
7 elliptical in shape, 22 kilometres long and 11 kilometres wide. Since
8 the tram was at the centre of the ellipse and the closest Serbian
9 position soldier was those 5.5 kilometres away, of course our question
10 remained unanswered. At that talk, as well as at many others before and
11 after, we asked that the Muslims in Sarajevo adhere to Protocol 1 of the
12 Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of civilian persons by
13 banning large-scale population gatherings at markets, in the public
14 squares and streets," and so on and so forth, "and by suspending public
15 transport since they were in a state of war."
16 How can you then connect this up with a possible threat of the
17 Army of Republika Srpska, that was under control, would fire at the
18 trams, when General Milovanovic drew your attention to the Geneva
19 Conventions and the duties of the Muslim Army?
20 A. I have three remarks concerning this statement.
21 First, the conversation, as I've reflected it and as it appears
22 in my statement, that's how it was, even after checking with my military
23 assistant who accompanied me during these conversations and the
24 interpreter. That's one remark.
25 The second is that this statement, following on my work for the
1 military and with respect to various reports I wrote about my time in
3 Third, in the discussion, we were unable to resolve the actual
4 sniping problem. But separate from that, we did establish a relationship
5 between the situation where trams rode in Sarajevo and the situation
6 where buses were unable to ride, especially in the north, because there
7 was no more fuel or spare parts available. That connection was clearly
8 made, and in that discussion it was stipulated that the trams could only
9 continue operating if the bus system was supplied with spare parts and
10 fuel. And to make it clear that this was very serious, this remark was
11 made by Mr. Milovanovic.
12 Q. Thank you. General, sir, do you know that Tito's doctrine about
13 an armed population led to everyone in Yugoslavia possessing a weapon in
14 the former Yugoslavia
15 A. Yes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Can we look at the previous page now, both in the English and the
19 Could you scroll down the English page a bit. And under the item
20 where it says "February 1994," perhaps that's the same thing in English.
21 Yes, that's item 5.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you see item 5, which speaks about the incidents?
24 But I think we need the next page in English.
25 Well, look at what is said here concerning snipers. Actually,
1 what General Milovanovic says about this issue. The first sentence from
2 the top:
3 [In English] "Sniper fire had become a huge problem for both
4 sides during the war, having completely got out of control."
5 [Interpretation] Now, do you allow for the possibility that
6 Milovanovic was not issuing a threat, but rather informing you about the
7 trams becoming a possible target?
8 A. My statement at paragraph 41 remains as is. General Milovanovic
9 said that he would see to it that the trams and any passengers on the
10 trams would be targeted. That's what he said.
11 Q. Thank you. But he didn't say that it would come under the
12 fire -- the sniper fire of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps? He never said,
13 My soldiers are going to shoot?
14 A. I sincerely remember the words as they read here. "He would see
15 to it." That means that he would use his own influence to ensure that
16 this did, in fact, happen. I can't -- I can't imagine this in any other
18 Q. General, in view of this statement, it becomes inevitable for you
19 to present your notes to us, because that could be a decisive factor in
20 the process. Therefore, you're kindly asked to produce your notes and
21 give them to us, and also to explain how come there are no written
22 records in the archives of the UN about what you're talking right now.
23 Why aren't any information of this nature mentioned in any
24 dispatches, the information that feature in your statement?
25 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, you're asking the witness to
1 speculate as to why someone else may or may not have put something into a
2 dispatch. You can, of course, ask him why he didn't, but it's limited to
4 And as to his notes, the witness has already indicated his
5 reluctance to hand them over on a voluntary basis, and it would be up to
6 you to make a motion or submission in writing.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
8 In that connection, would it be permissible to ask
9 General Van Baal, first of all, whether he recorded anything about this
10 conversation in his notes?
11 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, Mr. Robinson, that's the obvious first
13 MR. ROBINSON: And also would it be possible to ask him when was
14 the last time he referred to his notes? That might be also germane to
15 any written motion that we make.
16 JUDGE KWON: So why don't you put the questions to the witness.
17 MR. ROBINSON: Would you like me to do that or for Dr. Karadzic?
18 JUDGE KWON: Fine.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, it's a matter of law as much as a matter
20 of fact. So assuming that Dr. Karadzic doesn't mind, why don't you deal
21 with it while you're on your feet?
22 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you.
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Robinson:
24 Q. General Van Baal, I'm Peter Robinson. I'm a legal adviser to
25 Dr. Karadzic, and I just would like to ask you a few brief questions.
1 Can you tell us the last time that you looked at your notes from
2 the period when you were in Sarajevo
3 A. Very generally, when I was preparing the hearings, both in the
4 Galic case and the Milosevic case and for today, I referred to my notes
5 to prepare in general.
6 Q. Did they help you refresh your memory?
7 A. Yes. But what matters most is the statement that I made in 1997,
8 in 2002, and now.
9 Q. Thank you, we appreciate that. And, finally, did you make notes
10 of your 16 March 1994
11 A. In general terms, I took notes from some meetings.
12 Q. Do you know if you still have those notes of that meeting, if, in
13 fact, you took those notes?
14 A. Well, if you're asking about a specific moment, I'd have to check
16 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we can make a written motion, but I
17 really think we have enough elements for an oral motion that you direct
18 General Van Baal to produce his notes. If there are any personal items
19 of a non-work-related nature, we're happy to have him redact those before
20 producing them, but I think that it's almost -- it would be undisputed
21 that, having refreshed his memory with these notes, that they're
22 producible. I think we also dealt with this issue with an earlier
23 witness, and that was the result.
24 JUDGE KWON: Of course, any motion can be filed orally, but I
25 would prefer to have it in writing.
1 MR. ROBINSON: No problem. I'll do that. Thank you.
2 JUDGE KWON: I remember, Ms. Edgerton, you rose at one point of
3 time. Did you want to say something?
4 MS. EDGERTON: It was dealt -- my point was dealt with by
5 His Honour Judge Morrison. Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Can we now look at item 5. It's a new page in English --
11 actually, the previous page in English.
12 General, can you please focus on item 5. Can you see that there
13 were explosions for which the Serbs were accused, and that it was you who
14 requested Milovanovic, the chief of staff of the VRS, to set up a
15 commission? The commission produced a strictly-confidential report on
16 the 19th of August, and these are the conclusions:
17 "There has been no action from the VRS emplacements."
19 "There are no VRS mortars of that calibre in the direction from
20 which the shell had arrived."
21 Number 3:
22 "The shell is of foreign manufacture."
23 And 4:
24 "The shell was probably fired from the area of Koturine
25 Caire [phoen] ..."
1 Et cetera.
2 Do you recall this incident and the related investigation?
3 A. The explosion on that date at the airport, I can remember that,
4 but I don't truly remember the outcome of the report or the
5 investigation, to be honest.
6 Q. Do you remember if the Muslims fired at UNPROFOR and the airport,
7 and thus violated the agreement on truce?
8 A. As I already said, I don't have the outcome of the investigation
9 clear in my mind.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Further on, it says,
11 under item 5, as follows:
12 "Everybody has weapons at homes, and some parts of uniforms ..."
13 Et cetera, et cetera.
14 You already confirmed that you were aware of Tito's doctrine of
15 an armed people.
16 Can we please have pages 30 and 31 of this book admitted into
18 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
19 MS. EDGERTON: General Milovanovic has, as the Defence has
20 indicated, been identified as a Prosecution witness. I would think that
21 these matters and this book could best be dealt with through the general,
23 JUDGE KWON: You tendered his diary, didn't you?
24 MS. EDGERTON: Oh, yes, and I see we're not -- my apologies,
25 Your Honour. We're not talking about the book, we're only talking about
1 pages 30 and 31. Those are the pages that were -- that have been dealt
2 with in evidence, and to that I would have no objection. I'm sorry, I
3 thought the request was for the book, as a whole.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 We will admit them, two pages.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D825, Your Honours.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Q. General, speaking about sniping activities and sniper fire: Did
9 you ever witness a properly-conducted investigation of a sniper incident,
10 or did you perhaps carry one yourself?
11 A. No, I was not witness to one of those, and that wasn't the
12 distribution to these, either, because the investigations relating to
13 sniping incidents were carried out by the sector commander,
14 General Soubirou, for Sarajevo
15 Q. Thank you. Did the Serbian side make it quite clear to you, and
16 what it is Milovanovic is writing about, that there were armed people who
17 were not members of the army and who were out of control?
18 A. What does this question relate to, men who were not under the
19 control of BiH or the BSA?
20 Q. The VRS was under control. Now, in response to your remark that
21 there was sniping activity: Did anyone impart on you that this was not
22 done by the Army of Republika Srpska, but by some individuals who were
23 armed? That was an oral or perhaps a written official response to your
24 observation. We said it was not us who are opening fire; it was done by
25 individuals who were not under our control. Have you ever received such
2 A. In the prelude to a sniper agreement, that was the deep desire of
3 UNPROFOR since April, to get the Muslim and the Bosnian Serb governments
4 in sync regarding a sniper agreement. This was repeatedly raised by both
5 parties, that to some extent, they had no control over armed individuals
6 who decided independently to start shooting. This point surfaced
7 repeatedly in the discussions.
8 Q. Thank you. Were you ever informed that the Muslim side was
9 firing at Sarajevo
10 using heavy weapons for that purpose, that they're actually shooting at
12 A. That information never reached me. What did reach me was
13 information from Sector Sarajevo that from a government building and from
14 a hotel, there was shooting at Serb positions.
15 Q. I asked you if you had ever been informed by the Serbian side,
16 and you confirmed that in your testimony against Galic at pages 9875 and
17 9877, in which the Serbian side refuted the fact that they opened the
18 fire, and claimed, in contrast, that the fire was opened by the Muslims.
19 When you launched your oral protests with Major Indjic, were you
20 ever given a response to the effect that this had been done by elements
21 outside of control?
22 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, General: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
23 MS. EDGERTON: I wasn't quite sure what the situation or the
24 question was, but I wonder whether the general has his transcript from
25 the Galic case in front of him, because Dr. Karadzic has referred to two
1 pages and it might be helpful for him to see what his earlier testimony
3 JUDGE KWON: General, do you like to see those pages in the Galic
4 transcript or are you able to answer right now?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would appreciate being able to
6 take a look at them. So my question is: Which pages and which
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 19655 in
9 e-court, and hopefully this will jog the general's memory. And we need
10 page 36 of this document. Page 36, I believe that's the correct one:
11 [In English] "For the sake of clarity, I did not send any letter
12 to Major Indjic but to General Milovanovic. The arguments varied and
13 ranged from --"
14 JUDGE KWON: The general can read the transcript.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Can you please read it.
17 So do you agree that from high-ranking officers of the VRS, you
18 received information about the VRS not opening sniper fire, as it had
19 been accused of doing?
20 A. That's what I said earlier, that both parties accused one
21 another, that they were not the ones from whom sniper fire originated,
22 and that their people were under control. So this basically repeats what
23 I stated previously.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Can we have this page admitted into evidence?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D826, Your Honours.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you agree, General, that you were aware of the fact that the
5 Muslim side was firing at both the aircraft and the UNPROFOR troops, and
6 then, in general, it was committing acts that were difficult to
8 A. I don't have any evidence to this effect regarding this
10 Q. Well, for example, in the Slobodan Milosevic case on 10th
11 September 2003, on page 26342, you confirmed that UNPROFOR had seen
12 Muslims firing from sniper rifles from government buildings,
13 BH Government buildings, around Holiday Inn Hotel. Do you remember
14 saying that?
15 A. That's what I just stated. Those were reports from Sector
17 MS. EDGERTON: And just to clarify, there was no mention in the
18 previous testimony of the Holiday Inn Hotel.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's true.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. But do you agree, General, that the government buildings are
22 immediately opposite the Holiday Inn Hotel? I'm talking about the
23 Parliament and the government building.
24 A. From what I remember, several government buildings were located
25 across from that Holiday Inn Hotel, or at least in that general vicinity.
1 Q. Thank you. Did you also confirm that the snipers should not be
2 positioned among the civilians, nor would they be allowed to shoot at
3 civilians, nor the civilians, themselves?
4 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have a page reference?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If the general can recall his
6 answer, that would save us time. And if he can confirm that he said
7 that, indeed, then we don't have to look for the page.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Do you remember that this was your position?
10 A. If you quote correctly what I said at the time, then I will stand
11 by that statement. But I can't check it because I don't know what page
12 it is.
13 Q. Thank you. Is it true that the tram was running parallel with
14 the confrontation line and that it could have been hit from either side
15 during the exchange of fire between them, especially in the area of the
16 Sniper Alley?
17 A. Technically, that would have been possible to bring that about.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Can we please now have 1D2661.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. A moment ago, you said that you had no knowledge about fire being
22 opened at aircraft and the UN. Now, could you please refer to your
23 correspondence with Jovan Divjak. Can you explain to the Chamber who
24 General Divjak was?
25 A. General Divjak was the deputy commander of the Muslim forces.
1 Q. Thank you. Would you be so kind as to look at this letter of
2 yours. Is it true that in this letter, along with the report from the
3 airport commander, you are writing about fire being opened by Muslims at
4 the airport, which resulted in the delay of the UNHCR air-lift operation?
5 What you are basically saying is that this was an irrational act?
6 A. I can confirm the contents of this letter.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Can this be admitted?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D827, Your Honours.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. General, were you aware that certain elements in the Army of
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina were intentionally enhancing shortages and
14 deteriorating the suffering of the population in Sarajevo, and that they
15 had different agendas for doing that; that the main purpose was to
16 victimise the people of Sarajevo
17 of the international community and to draw NATO into the war conflict?
18 Were you aware of all these aspects?
19 A. These types of accusations are often expressed via the
20 international press.
21 Q. What was your experience in that respect, and what was generally
22 thought about this across the UNPROFOR commands in Sarajevo?
23 A. Generally speaking, the situation in Sarajevo, when I arrived in
24 February of 1994, was one of desperation and horror. People were 10 to
25 15 kilos lighter than normal body weight. There was fear in their eyes.
1 There were a lot of dead and injured people. And since the effect of the
2 Total Exclusion Zone came about, this changed. UNPROFOR made a serious
3 effort to improve the humanitarian situation considerably, and I never
4 noticed that the Bosnian Muslim government made any effort to block the
5 efforts or to thwart the efforts we made in Sarajevo. On the contrary,
6 in fact, they tried to ensure that the goods were properly distributed.
7 As far as the enclaves are concerned, the situation that I
8 described earlier went well for some months, in May or June, but then
9 rapidly deteriorated.
10 And to get back to the question as to whether this was a policy
11 on the part of the Bosnian Muslim government, I'll leave that up to the
12 opinion of the Bosnian Muslim government, itself.
13 Q. General, sir, I would like to ask you to stick to my questions.
14 This was not an answer to my question, this was not an answer to my
15 question. I kindly ask you -- I don't have a lot of time. It would be
16 nice to chat, but I don't have a lot of time. This was an answer to some
17 other question.
18 Was it known in the United Nations that the Government of Bosnia
19 and Herzegovina
20 international community into war, and that they were carrying out
21 incidents that would aggravate and increase the suffering of the
22 population, of the citizens of Sarajevo
23 A. The first part of your question is where. It was clearly the
24 intention of the Muslim government to ensure that the international
25 community, especially the United States, would become involved in
1 resolving the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2 The second part is certainly not the case, and I have no reason
3 to assume that that was an actual policy that was shared with us in that
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can we look at 1D2662 now, please.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. And while we're waiting: Do you recall that you wrote day in and
9 day out to General Divjak, in mid-August, that they should stop firing at
10 aircraft that were transporting food for their citizens? Do you remember
11 that there were a number of protests day after day, a number of your
13 A. That is correct. But whether this was conscious policy is not
14 something that I had reason to ascertain that this was, in fact, the
15 case. And this is what you're asking. Firing at planes that landed or
16 went up in Sarajevo
18 that. Usually, if we limit to simply ascertaining from which direction
19 this came, then we would reflect as to whether this was a Serb-controlled
20 or Muslim-controlled area. That was what we would then protest to.
21 Whether this was a point of actual policy, true systematic strategy of
22 the Bosnian government, is not something that I can confirm at this
24 Q. This letter -- actually, that was on the 13th of August, and this
25 letter was on the 15th of August; is that right?
1 A. [No verbal response]
2 Q. Perhaps they didn't translate the question correctly. Was this
3 letter two days after the other letter? Is this your letter?
4 A. [No interpretation]
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can we tender this letter?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The letter of 15th August, is that
8 what you're referring to? This is the letter that I have in front of me
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Was the previous one on the 13th of August and this one of the
13 15th of August? There was one on the 13th of August, there was one on
14 the 14th of August. There were a number of letters in August, a number
15 of your letters to Divjak, because there was continuous shooting. In one
16 letter, you say that, Not even 24 hours had passed from my warning, and
17 your soldiers did fire again.
18 JUDGE KWON: The general confirmed that --
19 [Dutch language spoken on English channel]
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
21 MS. EDGERTON: I rise on the point that it's not for Dr. Karadzic
22 to be giving evidence.
23 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit this as Exhibit D828.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And may I ask until what time we
25 are working today so that I can decide which topic I'm going to open up?
1 JUDGE KWON: If it is agreeable to the parties, I was advised
2 that we would be able to go on until 2.00 this afternoon, a further 15
4 And I wonder whether the Defence is aware of the situation for
5 tomorrow, in terms of logistics.
6 MR. ROBINSON: We're not.
7 JUDGE KWON: I was just advised that the Registry has difficulty
8 securing the interpreters, Dutch and English. They will look into the
9 matter further. But as it stands now, the situation is that they can
10 interpret Dutch to English, but not English to Dutch. So the VWS has to
11 speak to the witness, and we will have a final answer by 4.00.
12 That said, let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. General, sir, you came after the incident in Markale 1 and
15 practically are a participant in the creation of the agreement on the
16 Total Exclusion Zone; is that correct?
17 A. Well, no, because I had come in on 6th February, and it was 7th
18 February that I spoke to General Rose. Subsequently, 8th February, I
19 returned to the Netherlands
20 Total Exclusion Zone, as it was set up, and the consultations held
21 thereon, was not something that I witnessed. It wasn't until the 24th of
22 February when I re-arrived, when the total Exclusion Zone was already in
23 full effect. That is when I returned from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nor did I
24 have any influence on the developments surrounding the plan for a
25 Total Exclusion Zone from my position in the Netherlands at that time.
1 Q. Thank you. Since we didn't have an interview before your
2 testimony, then we have to double-check here in the courtroom whether we
3 understand the same things to be signified by the same terms. So perhaps
4 now we can establish what the role of UNPROFOR was in relation to heavy
5 weaponry, in terms of the collection points of heavy weapons.
6 In your statements, you write that UNPROFOR should have placed
7 these weapons under its control; is that correct?
8 A. That's correct. In any case, the weapons inside the
9 Total Exclusion Zone.
10 Q. Thank you. Were you informed that I agreed with Mr. Akashi that
11 this could not be control or inspection but only monitoring or
12 supervision, and that this was explicitly stated in the meeting?
13 A. The agreements that Mr. Akashi made with Dr. Karadzic are
14 recorded in a protocol, and I took cognizance of that.
15 Q. Were you informed that I requested that it be specified which
16 calibres would be under supervision, or, rather, monitoring, and what
17 "monitoring" means, and what "control" means, and that we agreed that
18 this cannot be controlled but only monitoring?
19 A. I made sure I was informed, when I returned 24th February, of the
20 content of the agreement. And the text, as formulated in the agreement
21 for BH Command, were leading, as far as the supervision and control was
22 concerned, of everything that had to take place around the
23 Total Exclusion Zone.
24 Q. I would now like to remember the crisis that erupted around
25 Cekrcici. You mentioned it. And do you remember that this was the
1 location where we were keeping our weapons? It was our battery at
2 Cekrcici; is that correct?
3 A. That's correct, and this is also what I referred to in my
5 Q. Thank you. Can we now have -- do you remember that your forces
6 surrounded our battery in Cekrcici and that this thing that you mentioned
7 in your statement was actually a very big misunderstanding between us?
8 Can we have 65 ter 13636, please.
9 Do you remember that?
10 A. Well, at any rate, we differed in opinion regarding the location
11 of these heavy weapons. However, there could definitely not have been a
13 THE REGISTRAR: This map is Exhibit D718.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. General, sir, could you please look at this and see if the center
16 of this circle has been moved from the eastern part of Grbavica to the
17 western part of Grbavica, as you wish, near the Church of St. Ante
18 Before, it was near the St. Joseph Church
19 different part of Sarajevo
20 A. If this map suggests that this was the location of the
21 Total Exclusion Zone, then I can't really respond to that just like this.
22 In any case, what clearly showed in the conversation 21st March
23 with Dr. Karadzic was the phenomenon that the center of the circle with
24 the diametre of 20 kilometres was -- had been set by the Serbian Army at
25 a different location than the NAVO [as interpreted] council had ordered.
1 They had unilaterally imposed what grid was to be used, what centre would
2 be elicited out of that grid, and there was some 800 metres difference
3 with the center as was being used by the Bosnian Serbian Army. And on a
4 different map than the one that is shown here, it was made clear to me in
5 Pale when the disposition -- or, rather, the positions of the various
6 [indiscernible] fire in the surroundings of Cekrcici, according to the
7 Bosnian Serbian Army, were inside -- outside, rather, the diametre of 20
8 kilometres that I just mentioned, whereas the NATO grid clearly fell
9 inside that circle.
10 Q. General, sir, this is Grbavica that we are looking at, as we're
11 entering the center of town. Marin Dvor is at the eastern edge of this
12 Grbavica, and that is where the Serbian Army was informed where the
13 center was. You -- or, rather, UNPROFOR moved that center to the west.
14 And now you can look at Cekrcici at the top, and you can see that even in
15 this variant, Cekrcici is outside of the 20-kilometre exclusion zone.
16 Do you see this part that is outside of the circle, and do you
17 agree that that is Cekrcici up there on the left, to the north-west?
18 A. Yeah. This is not relevant for the discussion. It's a sort of
19 repeat of moves that we have here. The Total Exclusion Zone was
20 unilaterally imposed. This is what parties conformed to, or committed
21 to, and the center of the circle was in a grid that NATO had ascertained
22 in its decision, rather than in the location where the center of the
23 circle has been drawn here by the Bosnian Serbian Army. So we can keep
24 repeating these arguments, but, in my view, that's not very helpful to
25 make clear what the issue really is.
1 For UNPROFOR, it was ultimately very clear, and for the warring
2 factions, that these heavy weapons were, in fact, located in the
3 Total Exclusion Zone at the end -- at the edge of the
4 Total Exclusion Zone. But, never mind, it was still within the
5 Total Exclusion Zone. UNPROFOR did not independently decide this; it was
6 the NATO council that imposed this. All parties committed to this.
7 Q. General, sir, do you agree that to the north and to the west of
8 Cekrcici, Muslim forces were able to fire without hindrance at Cekrcici
9 and Ilijas?
10 A. In the statements for the disposition of these weapons systems,
11 this was actually mentioned, that the systems were directed in the
12 direction of Visoko. They were not aimed at Sarajevo. Also, that,
13 however, is not a phenomenon that is relevant for the regime of the
14 Total Exclusion Zone. The weapons were not supposed to be located there.
15 They'd not been authorised within those 20 kilometres. That was the
16 whole issue.
17 And in the search for a solution to get out of this issue,
18 Dr. Karadzic says to General Galic, You must relocate those systems some
19 800 metres to the north-west so as to bring them outside the
20 Total Exclusion Zone, admitting, as such, that according to the NATO
21 council decision, they actually did lie within the Total Exclusion Zone.
22 Q. General, sir, the English would say "no good deed goes
23 unpunished," meaning if I relax a little bit, despite the advice of my
24 generals, that is proof that we made a mistake, that we were wrong.
25 But I would like you to look at this. Whose army was in Visoko,
1 next-door to Cekrcici? Was the Muslim Army located there, which was free
2 to fire at the Serbs within the 20-kilometre zone?
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm wondering what relevance your
4 question has, if any. We heard that this exclusion zone was just
5 imposed. Let's move on.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] But, Excellency, there is a
7 misunderstanding there. We had great rights. No one had the right to
8 encircle us there, as the Canadian unit did. No one had the right to
9 encircle us, and this is what I'm trying to prove. But let us see at
10 what the two of us said.
11 Let's look at 1D2664 in the e-court.
12 And then later we will show that the United Nations were aware
13 that we were unfairly exposed to attacks there to which we could not
15 JUDGE KWON: Do not make a speech, Mr. Karadzic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 5 now, please.
17 And my speeches are not boring, Excellency.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Can I draw your attention, General, sir, to this part here,
20 "Pulling out of heavy weapons from zone around Sarajevo":
21 [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... in Sarajevo
22 exclusion zone due to the different maps."
23 [Interpretation] Are you able to see that, and do you agree that
24 the gist has been stated here following our meeting, and that you also
25 confirmed that this was a misunderstanding of the center of the circle?
1 A. [In English] This is wording taken by a journalist, apparently,
2 and it ...
3 Q. Can we look at the top of the page now so we can look at the
4 continuation. Are you saying that your words were erroneously quoted?
5 [In English] "Today, we were very successful, and it was only
6 this problem. General Van Baal said he expressed gratitude to the
7 Bosnian Serb side and President Karadzic for their co-operation and
9 [Interpretation] Do you accept that this was the result of our
11 A. That was definitely the result, and with that, the tense,
12 sensitive situation that had arisen was resolved, for a large part.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can we tender this?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will admit this page and the first page of
16 this document so that we can know what it is about.
17 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit D829, Your Honours.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D2665, please.
19 Page 3, I beg your pardon. 1D2665 speaks about the same thing. This is
20 in the EDS
21 the same press conference and indicates that the misunderstanding was
22 about where the center of Sarajevo
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you remember Mr. McDowell, Major Simon McDowell?
25 A. Well, if I'm not mistaken, that was one of the people in the
1 personal staff of General Rose.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 It seems this hasn't arrived in e-court yet, so we just wanted to
4 say that General McDowell stated at his press conference that -- and I'm
5 going to read it:
6 "The chief of staff of UNPROFOR, Van Baal, held a meeting at Pale
7 with Radovan Karadzic on Monday afternoon relating to the
8 recently-discovered heavy weaponry of the Serbian side in the Citluk
9 location close to Cekrcici. According to what Van Baal says, the meeting
10 was very successful, the results were more than satisfactory, and the
11 readiness of Karadzic for co-operation on this matter was at a high
13 And then it goes on to say that the entire misunderstanding was
14 in the fact that the Serbian side considered the center of the circle to
15 have been near the cathedral, but actually it was near the church at
16 Marin Dvor.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Do you remember that, and did Mr. McDowell correctly convey, at
19 the press conference, the results of our meeting?
20 A. I have two questions, or there are two questions. I recall this
21 statement -- I don't recall this statement of McDowell, sorry, but he did
22 represent fairly accurate what had been discussed. That's it.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at one more? I hope we
24 have time. D717.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Do you agree, General, sir, that we established our right as to
2 when we can take back our weapons and defend ourselves?
3 A. That right was not disputed or contested, nor was it ever
4 discussed. What's more, this was in the agreements that Dr. Karadzic has
5 entered into together with Dr. Akashi -- Mr. Akashi, and this was in
6 1994, if I'm not mistaken. 18th February 1994.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can show this tomorrow, but let
8 us see how Ambassador Akashi understands us to be attacked from the
9 direction of Olovo and another location - you can look at this point -
10 saying that we're in a difficult position because of the offensive in
11 that area. We are disarmed, and they are firing in that section.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Please, can you look at this area? Do you agree that this
14 understanding of the danger we were in totally corresponds to our own
15 understanding, because our neighbours were not disarmed and we were
16 totally disarmed in Ilijas and Cekrcici, and that the ambassador
17 completely understood this and reported back on that?
18 And before you answer, perhaps we can look at the next page and
19 paragraph marked with the number 3 on that page, where it says here that
20 we have the right to defend ourselves, and it says:
21 "If the BSA comes under more pressure from the BiH, their demand
22 to have access to their weapons could become a more pressing reality,
23 under the protocol referred to above."
24 Do you agree with this?
25 A. I am taking cognizance of what it says here. And also, in my own
1 experience, my feelings at that time, and also at this stage, it was
2 never the intention to get -- to keep -- retain the BSA weapons under
3 control; simply to ensure that only in cases where there was
4 self-defence, the weapons systems in the Total Exclusion Zone would be in
5 the weapon collection points. The right to self-protection was not
6 disputed by anyone, also not by BH Command.
7 JUDGE KWON: That's it for today. I appreciate the indulgence of
8 the interpreters and court reporters and everybody.
9 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
10 MS. EDGERTON: I'm really sorry, Your Honour. Could I just have
11 your further indulgence for about two minutes?
12 There's one transcript correction which I would like to make from
13 today. Page 33, lines 9 to 10, you're recorded as saying:
14 "It's my understanding that the Defence has no position as to the
15 admission of intercepts during wartime."
16 JUDGE KWON: I corrected that. That should have read
17 "opposition." That has been noted.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 And simply by way of assistance to Dr. Karadzic, and with a view
20 to him effectively being able to complete his cross-examination tomorrow,
21 we've gone into the list of disclosed documents and found a report not
22 signed by this witness on the meeting of 27 February 1994 that
23 Dr. Karadzic was cross-examining him about. It was disclosed on 10
24 February 2009 under Rule 68, or pursuant to Rule 68, and I'd like to be
25 able to provide that to Defence so that that can assist Dr. Karadzic,
1 perhaps, as we're going over until tomorrow. And the meeting, pardon me,
2 was 27 March 1994
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 So if the issue of interpretation will be positively resolved,
5 we'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.
6 The hearing is now adjourned for today.
7 [The witness stands down]
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.03 p.m.
9 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 28th day of
10 October, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.