1 Tuesday, 7 December 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
6 The witness is not in? Is there something to be raised?
7 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: Good morning.
9 I wanted to clarify something about the exhibits from the last --
10 or, pardon.
11 [Interpretation] I would like to clarify certain issues relating
12 to the comments about the previous witness. However, Mr. Robinson
13 explained to me that everything was all right.
14 However, as far as this witness is concerned, I kindly ask you to
15 reconsider the issue of the time allocated to him. His statement has a
16 huge number of paragraphs where he has given arbitrary assessment. Here,
17 we have him as an expert with authority. Okay, he is a witness in this
18 case, but he was an expert in another case. So all these statements have
19 to be clarified by the Defence, and the witness is going to be asked to
20 provide additional explanations.
21 JUDGE KWON: Let us bring in the witness.
22 All I can say at this moment, we'll stick to the time-limit which
23 has been allowed for the moment, and we'll see how you will be going with
24 the witness. Unless there's extraordinary circumstances warranting a
25 further extension, we'll stick to the time-limit.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, while we're bringing in the
2 witness, if I could just indicate that yesterday we received a motion for
3 videolink testimony of Thorbjorn Overgard. And I've discussed that with
4 Dr. Karadzic, and we don't object to that. We could just let you know
5 that right now. And we are also hoping that we can arrange a videolink
6 interview of the witness before he testifies. Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That is granted.
8 [The witness entered court]
9 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Konings. If you could kindly take
10 the solemn declaration, please.
11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
12 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
13 WITNESS: HARRY KONINGS
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please make yourself comfortable.
15 Ms. Edgerton.
16 Examination by Ms. Edgerton:
17 Q. Good morning, Mr. Witness. Would you be able to give us your
18 full name for the trial record, please?
19 A. My name is Harry Konings.
20 Q. Now, Mr. Konings, is it correct that you've been serving with the
21 Royal Netherlands Army for the last 40 years and presently hold the rank
22 of lieutenant-colonel?
23 A. That is completely correct.
24 Q. And from May until October 1995, did you work as a United Nations
25 Military Observer, or UNMO, as part of the UN mission in Sarajevo?
1 A. I did.
2 Q. Now, I'd like to ask you some questions about the evidence you've
3 previously given to the ICTY relating to your experiences and
4 observations in Sarajevo.
5 First, do you recall giving statements to representatives of the
6 Office of the Prosecutor for this Tribunal in 1996 and again in 2006?
7 A. I do recall the fact that I gave statements then, yes.
8 Q. And did you testify before Trial Chambers of this Tribunal in the
9 case of Dragomir Milosevic in 2007 and during the trial of
10 Momcilo Perisic in 2009, all relating to your service as an UNMO in
11 Sarajevo in 1995?
12 A. I did testify in those two cases.
13 Q. Now, on November 11th of this year, did you sign a further
14 statement for the Office of the Prosecutor consolidating elements of this
15 previously-recorded evidence as it related to Sarajevo, with some
16 additional information and references to a number of documents?
17 A. Yes, I have signed that further statement on the 11th of
19 Q. Did you review that statement again in preparation for your
20 testimony here today?
21 A. I have reviewed that statement in preparation.
22 Q. On reviewing it, did you have any corrections, or modifications,
23 or other changes to make to that document?
24 A. I have no further corrections or modifications to make to this
1 Q. Now, if you were asked the same questions today which gave rise
2 to that written evidence, would you give the same answers?
3 A. I will try to do the utmost to give the same answers.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
5 That being the case, then, Your Honours, could I ask that the 11
6 November amalgamated statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Konings, 65 ter
7 90202, be marked as a Prosecution exhibit, please.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be admitted.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1953, Your Honours.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
11 I'll now read a summary of the written evidence of the witness.
12 From April until October 1995, Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Konings
13 served as a United Nations Military Observer in Sarajevo. He was posted
14 to the Sarajevo Central or SC-1 team, where he held the position of team
15 leader for most of his tour.
16 During that tour, the witness investigated at least 100 shelling
17 and sniping incidents, of which he estimates 40 or 50 involved civilian
18 casualties. The greater part his investigations concerned shelling. The
19 witness explains that the members of SC-1 attended incident sites
20 together with local Sarajevo police forces; however, they conducted
21 separate investigations. In addition to the examination of the scene,
22 the UNMOs from SC-1 would also examine the wounded and corpses in
23 hospitals and morgues.
24 They would prepare reports on their investigations, which were
25 forwarded to the UNMO chain of command. Those reports were analysed at
1 headquarters level, where conclusions were then arrived at as to origins
2 of fire. In many cases, they were able to make the conclusion that the
3 fire came from Serb territory, while in some cases, they were not able to
4 make any conclusions as to the source of fire. Sometimes the UNMOs,
5 based on information available, could form their own conclusions. The
6 witness never personally saw any fire outgoing from Bosnian-held
7 territory, nor did he investigate scenes where it was confirmed that the
8 ABiH was the source of fire.
9 According to the witness, civilian life in Sarajevo was extremely
10 difficult due to random fire by Bosnian Serb forces into civilian areas.
11 The witness investigated at least two modified air-bomb incidents
12 and recalls the highly inaccurate and destructive nature of these
13 weapons. In these cases, his observations at the scene led him to
14 conclude that these air-bombs were fired from Bosnian Serb positions.
15 The witness and his team from SC-1 participated in the
16 investigation of the second Markale Market incident on 28 August 1995.
17 He recalls seeing the very clear crater at the point of impact,
18 immediately recognisable as a crater from a mortar projectile, and the
19 tail of the projectile nearby. From the crater analysis, the witness
20 could determine the direction of fire, but not the origin. However,
21 coupled with the fact that SC-1's observation post in the same direction
22 had detected no outgoing shots from Bosnian-held territory that day, the
23 witness is of the view that the origin of fire of the killing-round and
24 other rounds fired that morning came from within Bosnian Serb-held
1 That's the summary of evidence.
2 And now, Lieutenant-Colonel Konings, if I may, I'd like to ask
3 you a number of questions in relation to some aspects of your 11 November
5 If we could first have 65 ter 14809 on the screen, please. Thank
7 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, do you see an image on the screen in front of
9 A. I do see.
10 Q. And do you recognise that image?
11 A. I recognise that very well.
12 Q. Could you tell us -- and the image being a map, could you tell us
13 what the map depicts?
14 A. The map depicts a larger part of the city of Sarajevo, especially
15 the central part, and it reflects the major part of the area of
16 operations of Sierra Charlie 1.
17 Q. Now, I see in red there's a triangle marked on the middle of the
18 page with the letters in red "OP-1." Do you know how that marking came
19 to be on this map?
20 A. In the Dragomir Milosevic case, I marked that spot on the map
21 being the location of Observation Post number 1, the observation post
22 that was occupied by Sierra Charlie 1 24 hours a day.
23 Q. Did you, yourself, ever serve at that observation post?
24 A. Yes, I did, on quite a regular basis.
25 Q. Can you describe the area around the observation post, the
1 surroundings, for us?
2 A. The observation post was located at the -- in the hills quite
3 high above the city of Sarajevo. The view from the observation post was
4 directed to the north and the north-east and the north-west, and we had a
5 very good view on the larger part of the city of Sarajevo, even to the
6 west and to the east, but especially to the central part and the
7 confrontation line in the north of the city. The view was not blocked by
8 any obstructions. The observation post was located in the outskirts --
9 in the wider outskirts of the city of Sarajevo. There were no, really,
10 obstructions between the OP-1 and the view that we had on the larger part
11 of the city.
12 Q. Do you remember where OP-1 was in relation to confrontation
14 A. The confrontation line at the south part of the city was running
15 on top of the hills at the backside of OP-1, let's say about 500, 600
16 metres above the backside -- the south side of OP-1.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
18 Could this be the next Prosecution exhibit, please, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1954, Your Honours.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
22 If we could now have 65 ter 10258.
23 Q. And just to refresh your memory, Lieutenant-Colonel, in your
24 written evidence at paragraph 12, you referred to a series of photographs
25 that you took during your tour in Sarajevo, and I'd like to deal with
1 three of those, this being the first one.
2 Now, do you see the image on the photograph or a photograph on
3 the screen in front of you, Lieutenant-Colonel?
4 A. I do see that.
5 Q. Now, you just talked about and described in detail the view from
6 OP-1, and I wonder if you could tell us what this photograph represents.
7 A. This photograph is taken from OP-1. It's taken in a northern --
8 a general northern direction, and it shows the larger part of, let's say,
9 Eastern Sarajevo, with the central part around the letter A, Alpha. That
10 part has been marked as an example during the Milosevic case to highlight
11 the old library, which is in the old part of the city and which was a
12 fine mark for us to have an idea where we -- where everything in the city
13 was. The part marked with B is the area where our team base was located,
14 the team base from Sierra Charlie 1.
15 Q. Do you remember the name of the general area of the city that
16 your team base was situated in?
17 A. That area was called Sedrenik.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
19 Could this be the next Prosecution exhibit, please, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1955, Your Honours.
22 MS. EDGERTON: If we could move on to another photo, please,
23 65 ter 10412.
24 And just on the transcript, line 17, "Sedrenik" should be spelled
25 S-e-d-r-e-n-i-k. Thank you.
1 Q. Do you see a further photograph now, Lieutenant-Colonel, on the
2 screen in front of you?
3 A. I do see a picture, yes.
4 Q. Do you recognise this picture?
5 A. Yes, this picture has been taken by myself again from OP-1.
6 Q. Does it represent the same area that we saw in the photo
7 immediately prior, P1955?
8 A. Actually, this -- this photograph can be connected to the former
9 picture, to the former photograph, and it depicts a more western area of
11 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. Could this please be the next
12 Prosecution exhibit .
13 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit P1956.
14 MS. EDGERTON: And if we could go on to one final photograph,
15 65 ter 10259, please.
16 Q. Do you see the image on the screen in front of you,
18 A. I do see the image.
19 Q. Do you recognise the photo?
20 A. Yeah. That picture has been taken by one of my colleagues and
21 depicts the actual place where we observed from OP-1.
22 Q. Could you explain -- are you in a position to explain the red
23 circle marked with the letter A on the photograph?
24 A. The red circle marked with A are the twin towers in the very
25 western part of the city, the newer part of the city very close to the
1 Holiday Inn Hotel, which shows that we had a very wide view and a clear
2 view to the larger part of the city.
3 Q. This photographs shows three persons. Do you know who these
4 three persons are?
5 A. The two persons at the right, without any head cover, are two
6 Danish soldiers which were helping us in building a kind of cover on
7 OP-1, because there was no cover whatsoever. We were standing in the
8 open, and we needed some cover, so the soldiers were helping us. And the
9 third person with the head cover, that I'm -- that's myself.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
11 Could we also tender this photograph, please, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE KWON: P1957.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
14 Q. Leaving now the photographs, Lieutenant-Colonel, I'd like to turn
15 to your involvement in the investigation of the shelling incident that
16 we'll refer to as Markale II on 28 August 1995.
17 Do you remember, Lieutenant-Colonel, when you arrived at the
18 scene in relation to the explosion, itself?
19 A. I arrived about 40 minutes after the explosion.
20 Q. Can you describe the scene when you got there?
21 A. When we came at the scene, all the bodies were removed, but there
22 was still body parts at the scene of the explosion. There were a lot of
23 people around. We were not the only UN soldiers. There were also French
24 engineers doing their own investigation. We were there together with
25 Bosnian police, and it was a quite very tense situation. The civilians
1 that were on the scene, many of them were quite hostile towards us,
2 towards everybody wearing a blue helmet or a blue beret. Well, it was a
3 very tense and very difficult situation over there.
4 Q. Talking about the scene, I'd like you to turn your head, please,
5 and look at the photomontage sitting beside you to your right, which, for
6 the record, bears the 65 ter number 09533.
7 Lieutenant-Colonel, do you recognise this? Is this something
8 you've previously seen?
9 A. I've seen this photo composition before.
10 Q. And when was that?
11 A. That was at various times in the preparation for this -- for the
12 trial session of today.
13 Q. Do you recognise it? What does it depict?
14 A. It depicts the overall scene of the place where the Markale
15 incident -- the Markale II incident took place in the main street in
16 Sarajevo. In the middle, the crater of the exploding mortar.
17 Q. To what extent does it resemble, to your recollection, the scene
18 as you first saw it on 28 August 1995?
19 A. Well, it resembles the scene quite clearly, with the exception
20 that when I was there, there were, of course, a lot of people walking
21 around on the street doing whatever they had to do over there.
22 Q. Now, you mentioned that this photograph shows the crater. Could
23 you indicate the crater to Their Honours?
24 A. I can. The crater is over here.
25 MS. EDGERTON: And the witness has pointed to --
1 JUDGE KWON: Can you up-load in the e-court as well while we are
2 using that one?
3 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, quite so.
4 The witness, for the record, has pointed to a location on the
5 ground that appears to be marked -- outlined in white markings.
6 Q. Did you make any observations about the crater at the time?
7 A. We made the regular observations that we always did, doing crater
8 analysis, which is, first of all, establish whether it was an artillery
9 or mortar projectile. In this case, we came to the conclusion that it
10 was originated -- it was made by a mortar projectile. Further things
11 that we did, just as regular as we did it every time when we did a crater
12 analysis, is building an opinion on the direction of fire and trying to
13 find remnants, shrapnels, or part of the originated projectile.
14 MS. EDGERTON: And just for the moment, could we call up the
15 image of 09533 in e-court, and the witness can actually then circle the
16 crater that he had indicated.
17 Q. Witness, are you -- you're familiar with the e-court technology.
18 Could you please draw a circle around the mortar crater that you had
19 indicated, marking that with a red circle?
20 A. [Marks]
21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
22 Could we have 09533, then, as the next Prosecution exhibit,
24 JUDGE KWON: Because of the zooming in, we lost some part of the
25 left side. Is it okay?
1 MS. EDGERTON: For the Prosecution's purposes, I'm fine with
2 that, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 That will be exhibited as P1958.
5 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.
7 Mr. Konings, if you could kindly put the date of today, which is
8 7th of December, 2010, and your signature.
9 THE WITNESS: On the picture, Your Honour?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE WITNESS: I will.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.
13 THE WITNESS: [Marks]
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
15 MS. EDGERTON:
16 Q. Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, you indicated that you were able to come
17 to the conclusion that the crater had been made by a mortar projectile.
18 On what basis did you do that?
19 A. That's a combination of training and a combination of experience.
20 Q. And what experience, in particular?
21 A. The fact that on the 28th of August, I was already in Sarajevo
22 for a longer period, and I was not the only one on the spot. I was there
23 with a patrol team of my -- of my UNMO team, and we all came together to
24 the conclusion that this was a mortar projectile because the crater of
25 a mortar, in comparison with artillery projectiles, is quite specific.
1 And on this moment in time, I had seen already several mortar
2 projectiles -- mortar craters before, so, well, it's a combination of
3 training and expertise, experience, that you come to the conclusion that
4 this is a mortar projectile crater.
5 Q. Did you notice any irregular features to this crater or any signs
6 of tampering during the course of your investigations?
7 A. No. We came to the conclusion that this was a very clear -- I
8 would even use the word "ideal" mortar crater. It was very clear. It
9 was -- there was no signs of tampering or whatever. So we came right
10 away to the conclusion that it was a mortar crater, as did the French
11 UNMO soldiers on the same spot, where we had a short conversation with.
12 Q. In terms of the calibre or size of the weapon that made the
13 crater, did you and your team make any determinations?
14 A. Yes. My patrol of my team, we came to the conclusion that it was
15 a 120-millimetre projectile.
16 Q. On what basis?
17 A. The most important point to find that was that we found the
18 mortar tail, which is very specific to a 120 or to any other calibre,
19 which we found quite close to the area of impact.
20 Q. Similarly, in the course of the investigations did you and your
21 patrol make any determinations as to the direction from which this mortar
22 was fired?
23 A. Yes. In the same way we did all our investigation, we used a
24 compass to come to the conclusion that the direction was 170 degrees.
25 Q. On the map, roughly, what does a finding of 170 degrees
2 A. Well, if you take 180 degrees as due south, 170 is almost due
4 Q. Did you conduct any other shelling investigations that same day?
5 A. We did another investigation after this one, quite close to this
6 location, where there was an impact of four additional 120-millimetre
7 mortar projectiles.
8 MS. EDGERTON: Could we now, then, look at 65 ter 14812, please.
9 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel Konings, now you see another map in front of
10 you which bears the marking of OP-1 and a number of additional markings
11 in red. Do you recognise that map?
12 A. Yes, that's also a map which was used in the Milosevic case.
13 Q. Do you know how the markings came to be on that map?
14 A. I made the markings.
15 Q. Now, if I could direct your attention to the points numbered 1,
16 2, 3, 4, and 5, could you tell us what they represent, then?
17 A. Point number 5 reflects the Markale II rounds, the rounds that we
18 were discussing before. 1, 2, 3, 4 -- the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 reflect
19 the other four rounds that we investigated at a later time-frame on the
20 28th of August.
21 Q. Now, you said earlier that those other shells were quite close
22 to -- fell quite close to the market-place. Are you in a position to --
23 or do you recall, approximately, the distance in metres of these shells,
24 these four from the fifth one?
25 A. Not exactly anymore, but it was less than 200 metres.
1 Q. Did you and your patrol make any findings as to the bearing or
2 direction from which these four mortars were fired?
3 A. These four mortars, we came to the conclusion that they came from
4 a general direction 220 to 240 degrees.
5 Q. And as you did with the shell that fell on the Markale Market,
6 could you perhaps indicate for us, roughly, what that might represent on
7 the map, in terms of direction?
8 A. Well, if 180 degrees is due south, 220 to 240 is, let's say,
9 roughly south-west.
10 Q. Now, Lieutenant-Colonel -- before I move on, actually, could I
11 have this map, please, marked as the next Prosecution exhibit.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1959, Your Honours.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
15 Q. Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, did you, yourself, come to any
16 conclusions as to the actual origin of fire of these five shells?
17 A. Not on the 28th of August.
18 Q. Did you reach any conclusion at a later time?
19 A. Yes. In combination with the findings of my observers on OP-1,
20 we had two observers on that day over there, and later on the day and on
21 the 29th we had a discussion with each other. We came to the conclusion
22 that these rounds came from Bosnian Serb territory.
23 Q. On what basis, Lieutenant-Colonel, did you come to that
25 A. We concentrated, first of all, on round number 5 on the
1 Markale II round, and if you take a bearing of 170 degrees, it brings the
2 line of fire towards the area where OP-1 is, at least in the vicinity,
3 less than one kilometre from that away. As it was a very clear day, a
4 very quiet day on the 28th of August, there was no shelling, no firing,
5 there was an excellent view. It was a bright day. The OP-1 observers
6 would have noticed anything that would have happened in Bosnian Army
7 territory on outgoing rounds. Firing a 120-millimetre mortar is
8 something that you will notice, especially when it's in your vicinity,
9 even the vicinity of one kilometre.
10 The fact that those two observers didn't hear anything, didn't
11 notice any outgoing rounds, no explosion, no smoke, no flash, we came to
12 the conclusion that the round number 5 must have come from the other side
13 of the mountains and the mountains muffled the sound of the outgoing
14 round, the actual firing of a round. That was -- so in a combination of
15 information, the fact that we found the bearing, 170, and the fact that
16 those two observers didn't see or hear anything in their wider vicinity,
17 we came to the conclusion that it was a round coming from Bosnian
18 Serb-held territory behind the mountains.
19 Q. Just in relation to what you've just explained, I have two
20 questions, the first being in relation to your statement of the fact that
21 these two observers didn't hear anything.
22 What kind of noise does the firing of a 120-millimetre mortar
23 make, to your knowledge?
24 A. Well, it's hard to describe, but it's -- it's a loud noise, and
25 I can assure you, I have a lot of experience with that. You will hear it
1 if it's fired in the area around OP-1, especially on such an absolute
2 silent, bright day with hardly any wind. So the sound is not muffled,
3 the sound is not dragged away. In fact, I should take you to the
4 artillery firing range here in the Netherlands and show you or let you
5 hear whatever the sound is. You need cover for that, even when you are
6 on a wider distance. It's a loud -- very loud bang. I cannot describe
7 it in another way.
8 Q. And talking about your observers who were in OP-1 that day, what
9 were their names?
10 A. They were two of my observers. One was a Norwegian, and that was
11 Thomas [Realtime transcript read in error "Klustat"], and the other one
12 was an Irish major. That was Paul Conway.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 A. And the name of the Norwegian is Knustadt, it's not "Klustat."
15 It's wrongly spelled.
16 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
17 Could we have a look now, please, at 65 ter 09911.
18 JUDGE KWON: While we are waiting, could you give us the spelling
19 of that Norwegian officer?
20 THE WITNESS: Yes. If I -- I spell it with the military
21 alphabet, which is Kilo-November-Uniform-Sierra-Tango-Alpha-Delta-Tango.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 THE WITNESS: Knustadt.
24 MS. EDGERTON:
25 Q. You see a document now, Lieutenant-Colonel, on the screen in
1 front of you --
2 JUDGE KWON: The second spelling should be N --
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, it's K-n-u-s-t-a-d-t. No, it's not an O; a U.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Perfect.
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct, the last one.
6 MS. EDGERTON:
7 Q. Thank you. Do you recognise the document that now appears on the
8 screen in front of you, Lieutenant-Colonel?
9 A. I recognise that document.
10 Q. Can you tell us what it is?
11 A. It's a so-called UNMO patrol report, written on the 29th of
13 Q. Do you know who wrote it?
14 A. I did.
15 Q. Could I take you over to the next page, please.
16 It's difficult to read, but I wonder if I could take you to point
17 2 under paragraph 4. If you could tell us what that represents.
18 A. This report was -- sorry. This report was written on 29th, after
19 we had a meeting with the special Bosnian committee that investigated the
20 Markale incident of the 28th. And point number 4 reflects the most
21 important subjects that were discussed during that meeting.
22 Q. And what does point 2(a) indicate?
23 A. Well, to be honest, it's nearly impossible for me to read it,
24 so --
25 JUDGE KWON: I don't think the Bench can read it either.
1 MS. EDGERTON: Now, I --
2 JUDGE KWON: Do you have a typewritten version?
3 MS. EDGERTON: Well, if we can't find one immediately,
4 Your Honour, we'll certainly provide one as soon as possible.
5 I wonder if I could just ask for what I think might be a
6 duplicate entry, a duplicate 65 ter number, and we could see if that can
7 be displayed more clearly. 14356.
8 I'm sorry?
9 THE REGISTRAR: The 65 ter number has no image in it, sorry.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence.
11 THE ACCUSED: Actually, be read -- should it be read in Serbian
12 and then through the translation.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Mr. Reid may be able to help us in short order.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 I didn't hear you, Mr. Karadzic. Your words were not translated,
16 but I -- the problem is that the witness is not able to read Serbian.
17 So can we deal with other things first, and then we come back to
18 this later on. But if you can move on, I'll leave it in your hands.
19 MS. EDGERTON: I'll move on. And, frankly, the document is
20 explored within the amalgamated statement, so what I'll do is I'll move
21 on to the final area.
22 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, in paragraph 65 of your written evidence,
23 there you set out the times of the impact of each of those shells that
24 you had indicated on the previous exhibit. And the paragraph, just for
25 ease of reference, I'll read it to you. The paragraph reads as follows:
1 "In my Perisic testimony, I marked the location of each of the
2 impacts, 65 ter 14812, according to the grid references listed on page 3
3 of Exhibit P150 in this case. The first shell landed at 1050 hours, with
4 the coordinates BP927590, and is marked 1; the second at 1050 hours,
5 BP927591, marked 2; third, at 1100 hours, BP928591, marked 3; fourth at
6 1100 hours, BP928591, marked 4; and fifth, the shot that hit Markale at
7 1114 hours, BP927594, marked 5."
8 Now, hearing that again, do you remember that evidence,
10 A. I remember that.
11 Q. Now, my question -- I've read this to focus you on the timing
12 that you indicated in your written evidence, and I wonder whether you see
13 any indication between the timing of these first four shells and the
14 timing of the shell that hit the market-place.
15 A. Well, the first four rounds seemed to have a certain combination
16 towards each other, because they all fell roughly in the same area and
17 with some time separation in between, so they could be estimated, but I
18 don't have, of course, the exact proof of that. But you can estimate
19 them to be an adjust fire - that's one possibility - which could be --
20 which one could have used in order to fire, with the correct data, the
21 fifth round on a different spot, which is not an unusual military method
22 is to adjust fire on one location and to do the end fire, the fire for
23 effect, at another location. That's a matter of military procedure, that
24 you don't want an enemy to see that you are adjusting fire on one spot,
25 knowing that the fire for effect will come on the same spot. So it's a
1 matter of -- I don't have the problem English word for that, but it's a
2 matter of disguise somebody in order to make him not aware what you
3 are -- what your intentions are. That's a possibility. I do not have
4 the proof for that, but that's an estimation you can make.
5 One other estimation is that the four rounds are aimed against a
6 separate target, one of the buildings that was in that area. I do not
7 know that.
8 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
9 Just before concluding, Mr. Reid has invited us to try 65 ter
10 09911. Again, the version that's up-loaded may be slightly better, and
11 we'll have a look shortly to see.
12 Could we just move over to the second page, please.
13 I think the more prudent course of action would be to have this
14 re-scanned, Your Honour. I don't find it to be particularly legible.
15 JUDGE KWON: If we zoom in further on the English version,
16 I think that that can be read, possibly. Why don't we collapse, for the
17 moment, the Serbian version at this moment.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Well, not bad. Could you just - thank
19 you - scroll down a bit.
20 JUDGE KWON: Humanitarian points. Now we can read it.
21 Could you read for us, Lieutenant-Colonel, what you wrote on item
22 number 4?
23 THE WITNESS: You want me to read the complete item, Your Honour?
24 JUDGE KWON: Number 4, yes.
25 THE WITNESS: I'll try to do my best.
1 "Participants of the meeting, see annex to this report, including
2 Lieutenant-Colonel Konings. The aim of the meeting was to compare the
3 reports made by UNMO patrol and the rest of the investigation team
4 (between representatives of various Bosnian authorities)."
5 Point number 2 reads:
6 "Following aspects were not mentioned in the first report and can
7 be mentioned as UNMO confirmed."
8 Under point A:
9 "In the time-frame of the five impacts, UNMOs of India Charlie
10 Zulu team working on OP-1 saw or heard no outgoing mortar rounds, neither
11 from Bosnian Army territory (general area," that I cannot read, and the
12 second thing is "Colina Kapa), nor from Bosnian Serb Army territory."
13 "The minimum" -- under point B:
14 "The minimum angle of impact of the 120-millimetre mortar
15 projectile which hit near the market-place, grid 927594, was 67 degrees."
17 "The patrol leader received a list of killed and injured people
18 (35 killed and 78 wounded)."
19 This -- I think that this says "topics," no, I cannot read that.
20 "... are added as an annex. See also patrol leader's remarks."
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 MS. EDGERTON:
23 Q. Just on this, then -- and thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel. Two
24 questions. What's the India Charlie Zulu team?
25 A. That's the new name for the Sierra Charlie 1 team. Somewhere in
1 August, we had to change names.
2 Q. Now, you indicated that this was your second report. Why was
3 this information not included in the first report?
4 A. Because the first report was written directly after our first
5 investigation on the 28th of August, and the information in this report
6 was an additional information, because only in the evening or in the
7 morning of the 29th I had the opportunity to talk in person with my
8 observers from OP-1. Before that, I only talked with them by radio, and
9 we kept radio exchange information very short because we knew that all
10 parties involved in the conflict were listening on the radio.
11 Q. Does this report of yours, then, reflect the totality of the
12 information that led you to your conclusions as to the origin of fire of
13 the killing-round?
14 A. Well, this report has to be seen in direct conjunction with the
15 first report made on the 28th. They are connected towards each other.
16 For that reason, I refer to that as well. And those two reports
17 together, after having discussed the whole matter with my UNMOs from
18 OP-1, we came to the conclusion for ourselves that the rounds came from
19 Bosnian Serb territory.
20 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
21 If I could have this as the next Prosecution exhibit, please,
22 Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: 1960, Exhibit P1960.
24 MS. EDGERTON: That concludes the examination-in-chief, then,
25 Your Honours.
1 If we could perhaps deal with the associated exhibits.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Amongst them, some of the items have
3 been already admitted. That will be 99117, 10294, and, finally, 40221.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Yes.
5 JUDGE KWON: And one final item I'd like to raise is 14345, which
6 is a record of investigation of the Stari Grad, 29th of August, 1995. I
7 take it this is a report about an unscheduled incident, and it has been
8 our practice not to admit those reports. Is there any specific reason
9 for this item to be admitted?
10 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.
11 The document, Your Honour, records the fact that
12 Lieutenant-Colonel Konings took part in this investigation, alongside
13 local officials. The lieutenant-colonel has already given evidence to
14 that effect in his written statement. So for that reason, I don't see
15 any need for 65 ter 14345.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, he refers to this incident in
17 paragraph 70, so I think that's sufficient.
18 So we admitted six of them already, so the remaining items will
19 be about six, so that will be -- unless there's any objections, that will
20 be admitted and given a number by the Court Deputy in due course.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, now it's for you to cross-examine the
23 lieutenant-colonel, but don't take it for granted that your time will be
24 extended. So you should try your best not to omit important things on
25 your part to be cross-examined.
1 Let us begin.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Good morning to everyone.
4 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Lieutenant-Colonel.
6 I believe I'll be speaking for many in the courtroom if I ask
7 that this current temperature setting will -- should be saved for August,
8 but currently we need something warmer. I feel a chill and a wind.
9 JUDGE KWON: I've been advised it will be warmed up.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, I would like to thank you for meeting with
12 the Defence and sharing with us precious information about doctrine and
13 about details. To save time, I will structure my questions in such a way
14 that you are able to answer yes or no, especially in the part covered by
15 our interview.
16 Could you refute or confirm some of the following points that I
17 noted down during our meeting. I will read in English.
18 You said:
19 [In English] "It would be legitimate to harass forces of the
20 enemy if it was directed toward military targets."
21 You said that:
22 "It was legitimate to use artillery and mortars to frighten the
24 [Interpretation] Is that right?
25 A. I assume that you were referring to the meeting we had last year.
1 Q. Yes, September last year.
2 A. First of all, I'm not able to answer you in plain yes or no. You
3 might require that from me, but I do not have that possibility. And I
4 would like to stress to Your Honours that that meeting took place more
5 than one year ago, and as far as I'm concerned, that was a very informal
6 meeting, which I accepted to do so with the permission of my Ministry of
7 Defence. And I, personally, have made no further notes of that meeting,
8 and for that reason it is very hard for me to recall everything from what
9 has been said there, especially since the purpose of that meeting was, on
10 the request of Mr. Karadzic, to have an informal meeting and to ask me
11 certain questions.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Konings.
13 Mr. Karadzic, I'm wondering where you are leading, whether it's
14 legitimate to harass the force of enemy if it was directed toward
15 military target. The witness hasn't come as a legal expert. This is not
16 the witness to explore such questions. You cannot complain on the
17 shortage of time, asking these questions. Come to your questions.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 With all due respect, I only wanted to say that what applied
20 then, as far as what was legitimate in Sarajevo, applies today still. So
21 it doesn't matter whether the interview was last year or more recently.
22 I just wanted this witness to present to the Trial Chamber what
23 constitutes legitimate action on a battle-field. And there are several
24 important matters in that area, but I will move to something else if you
25 wish, and then I'll see if we can come back to it and clear up these
1 points or perhaps clear them up as we go along.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Can you confirm that the front-line ran through the urban area
4 through the town and sometimes even bisected a building, and that it was
5 sometimes impossible to tell which party was firing?
6 A. I cannot confirm any specifics on the front-line running through
7 buildings because that was not in my part of Sarajevo. I know that in
8 certain areas, there were reports that the front-line ran through
9 buildings, but I was not stationed in that area. I was stationed in the
10 old part of the city, where we had no such situation. In my area of
11 operations, as we call an area of a team - that's a military term - the
12 confrontation line was running, let's say, outside the outskirts of the
13 city. So in my area, we had not such a situation, and so I cannot judge
14 whether that happened, yes or no.
15 Q. Thank you. But speaking of your part of the city, is it true
16 that the confrontation line followed one another and meandered through
17 the city, around the hills and over the hills?
18 A. Generically speaking, the confrontation line in my area was
19 running on the hills around the north, the east, and the western -- and
20 the southern part of the city.
21 Q. My question is: Did there exist a single section of the line
22 that was not covered by another line? Was there a single section of a
23 Muslim defence line, for instance, that was not crossed by a Serbian
25 A. I do not think I understand the question, what you mean by using
1 the word "that was not crossed by a Serbian line."
2 Q. Well, maybe it's up to the interpreters, or perhaps I was not
3 precise enough. Is it fair to say that wherever there was one line, it
4 faced the opposite party's line, so the one line is not "crossed" but
5 "overlapped by" or "facing" another line?
6 A. In my generic recollection, but that's very limited, the
7 confrontation lines of both armies were facing each other all along my
8 area of operations. But I have to add to that that our main effort of my
9 UNMO team was towards the city, itself. We were not allowed to do
10 anything in the vicinity of the confrontation line, for various reasons.
11 We were not allowed to do so by our own UN organisation, due to the
12 danger that was involved in that, and we were not allowed to come close
13 to the confrontation line, due to the restriction of movement imposed
14 upon us by the Bosnian Army. So my knowledge of the confrontation line
15 and the exact running of the confrontation line is limited, is very
17 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that you told us that you were not aware
18 of any disproportionate fire from the Serbian forces during your tenure
20 A. I do not recall that I said that. I don't think I used the word
21 "disproportionate fire from the Serbian forces" in any occasion. I don't
22 think I understand your question quite well, so I really appreciate that
23 I can re-evaluate what you ask. In fact, I think I said that the Serbs
24 used disproportionate fire, if I understand the word "disproportionate"
1 Q. With all due respect, Lieutenant-Colonel, you told us that you
2 had not observed any disproportionate fire from the Serbian side. But
3 tell me this: Is it true that you said that there was no official
4 characterisation by the UN that Sarajevo was a city under siege?
5 A. No, I never said that. I never used the word -- the statement
6 that the UN in any way characterised officially that UN [sic] was a city
7 under siege. If I have used the word "siege," that was on my own -- on
8 my own knowledge. I have nothing to add to that further. It's --
9 Q. That's precisely what you told us during the interview. Is it
10 true that you spent most of your time at Sedrenik and that you were
11 barely aware of events in the rest of the city?
12 A. Again, if you refer to the interview that we had last year, I
13 have a real problem with referring to that constantly, because as I said
14 before, for me that's an informal discussion that we had between two of
15 us and I made no note whatsoever on that speech. So I really would
16 appreciate if we can refer to official documents that have been used
17 before, and if you have anything that I have -- should have said to you,
18 I would like to read that once more, I would like to appreciate that. So
19 it is hardly impossible to recall a conversation that we had more than
20 one year ago, which I did on my own appreciation, but I really would like
21 to refer to the whole situation that I'm here for today, to official
22 documents, as the Office of the Prosecution has done before. So if you
23 recall something or if you refer to something, I would like to have it in
24 reading and not only from your recollection or from your own notes.
25 JUDGE KWON: Fair enough, Mr. Konings. Thank you.
1 Mr. Karadzic, it's time for you to ask specific questions.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Q. Would it be easier for you if we gave you a summary of that
4 interview, because this is not about what you told us then, but what you
5 meant then and what you mean now, what you knew then and what you know
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then that interview was of
9 absolutely no use at all, it was pointless.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, you said on one occasion that it was your
12 task to observe and report everything going on in the city; is that
13 right? Let me remind you. You said that in your evidence on the 12th of
14 March, 2007, in the Milosevic trial, page 3549.
15 "... and the most important task was to be the impartial
16 eye-witness of UNPROFOR inside the city of Sarajevo and give reports on
17 every incident or every happening that occurred in the city."
18 A. I don't know whether it's possible that you show me that evidence
19 on the screen, Your Honour. I just would like to read it.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I offer this hard copy to the
22 JUDGE KWON: Is it part of his testimony?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's part of his testimony on 12
24 March 2007.
25 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we have it in the e-court?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, because we were taken aback
2 to hear that the witness does not recall the things he had said about the
3 doctrine --
4 JUDGE KWON: It cannot be an excuse. But on this occasion, for
5 the sake of time, why don't we put it on the ELMO.
6 MS. EDGERTON: It's 65 ter 22281.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 So what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we raise the page a bit,
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Starting with line 25, look at the passage that is underlined and
13 bold. Did you say this in your testimony?
14 A. Yes. And, Your Honour, to make clear why I insist on having this
15 in front of me: I have done many statements before in 2007 and 2009. I
16 want to make absolutely sure that I understand the questions that are
17 asked of me so that I can give the proper and correct answer. And
18 reading this, I've said that, and I still agree with that, that this was
19 our main task.
20 Q. Thank you. Would I then be right in saying that you were
21 supposed to observe and report the events between SC-1 and OP-1, that is,
22 in the old town of Sarajevo?
23 A. We had a specific area of operations that was outlined to us and
24 that was generically spoken, the area between Sierra Charlie 1 and OP-1.
25 Q. Before we move on to Markale, we need to shed light on a couple
1 of other matters primarily linked to methodology.
2 On page 2 of your statement from 1996, you say --
3 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
4 We can remove that document from the ELMO. But just for the
5 record, can we know the page number of that page? Can we see the page
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The top part.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We should see the top part, yes. 3549.
9 MS. EDGERTON: I just note that the line numbering appears to be
10 a little off on this -- that page displayed, and I was just trying to
11 figure out the reasons why with Mr. Reid. And I have that text on pages
12 3552 and 3553 of the 65 ter number I just gave Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. In the old days, the e-court numbers
14 were not consistent with the hard-copy numbers. Thank you.
15 Let's move on.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 I also processed the text further to put it in bold, so it may
18 have changed the numbering.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Did you then state, in 1996:
21 "I estimate that I investigated at least --"
22 [In English] " ... in between 75 and 100 incidents, both shelling
23 and sniping."
24 JUDGE KWON: Your reading was not fully translated. Could you
25 read it again?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the lieutenant-colonel be given
2 a hard copy, and I will quote.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. On page 2 of the statement from 1996, you said you estimated that
5 you conducted investigations into 75 to 100 incidents of both shelling
6 and sniping; is that correct?
7 A. I just want to check. Yes, I see that in the -- on page 2 of
8 that document of 1996. That's correct.
9 Q. Thank you. Would you kindly look at page 2 of your 1996
10 statement, where you say that you conducted investigations into 150 to
11 200 shelling incidents.
12 A. I don't see that on page 2 of the 1996 document, but I might be
14 Q. Sorry, 2006, 2006.
15 A. I'm looking in the wrong document. Can you point me out which
16 point that is, which point you mean on --
17 Q. Paragraph 2, at the top, on page 2.
18 A. Yeah, that's correct. If that's in the statement, I've said
20 Q. Thank you. Lieutenant-Colonel, I'm concerned by a certain ease
21 with which things are discussed, things that should be very legally
22 precise. We should narrow down our discussion to things that you
23 directly saw or heard. Do you agree?
24 Do you agree that this is a significant discrepancy? You said
25 that you investigated between 150 and 200 shelling incidents
1 only - that's in the 2006 statement - and in the other statement you say
2 the total incidents investigated was between 75 and 100?
3 A. I redirected that also in my later statement in November 2010,
4 and I brought the number down, I think, to about 100 investigations that
5 I did on shelling incidents. But I cannot recall them all, and I
6 don't -- in various statements that I made, and especially the last one
7 in 2010, because I gave it a good -- a good thought, a good thought over
8 what happened, it is -- it is somewhere around 100, 120. I really don't
9 recall that, but it is a substantial number where I'm talking about.
10 I have been investigated by the Tribunal in a variety of
11 occasions between 1996, where I stated that I did about 100 shelling
12 incidents, and between -- recently in 2010, so you must -- you should
13 understand that this is a difficulty to recall it all. And as I
14 redirected my statement in the 2010 statement about -- I thought I said
15 there were about 100, but the OTP can help me with that, I think that's
16 the fair number that I should use. And I do not recall why I used the
17 number of 150 to -- around 150 in 2006. I really do not have a
18 recollection about that. But that I witnessed and that I investigated a
19 fairly large number of crater -- of incidents in the city of Sarajevo,
20 I think that might be very clear, and that exceeds at least the number
21 that I recalled in 1996, which is the closest to my remember [sic] after
22 1995, and the corrected one that I used in 2010.
23 JUDGE KWON: So what you wrote in your 2010 statements is like
25 "Although I haven't kept a detailed record, I've easily conducted
1 more than 100 shelling investigations of mortar and artillery impacts,
2 and three or four air-bomb impact investigations in Sarajevo"?
3 THE WITNESS: That's the best I can recollect, Your Honour, in
4 what happened. The times over there in 1995 were very tense, were very
5 busy, so that it's impossible to have a recount of the exact number that
6 I did. And I didn't keep note of everything I did during those days, but
7 I think it's fair to say -- it's just to say not fair. It's very just to
8 say that I did that number of at least 100 investigations.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I continue?
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. In addition to the fact that it was tense and that you were very
12 busy, you frequently mention, especially in relation to Markale, that you
13 conducted your investigation in very hard -- very difficult conditions
14 and under pressure, pressure from the personages around you?
15 A. I don't know what -- what the question is, Your Honour. There
16 was a lot of pressure, but -- which is normal in a war situation, that
17 there is a lot of pressure from various sides, but --
18 Q. Well, I paraphrased what you said; namely, that you carried out
19 investigations, especially the one in Markale, briefly and under pressure
20 of the surrounding people.
21 A. I'm not quite sure that I phrased it in that way, so I would like
22 to read that. But the pressure was coming from various sides. There
23 was, of course, time pressure. Because it was a very serious incident,
24 there was the pressure of the fact that - and that was always the fact -
25 when you were on the scene of an explosion, more projectiles could
1 follow. So that was the pressure that you had as well, to be as quick as
2 possible, which makes a time constraint, which brings you a time
3 pressure. You had to work very quickly because you were in danger on a
4 certain spot. Where one round falls, more rounds can falls.
5 And on this occasion, seeing the seriousness of the -- of what
6 happened over there, it brought a lot of pressure, yes. It was tense,
7 people were angry. My own superiors were there, and they were putting
8 pressure on me to work exactly and to work fast to come up with my
9 investigation results as soon as possible. And so there were -- there
10 was pressure from many sides. And, yes, I do not deny there was pressure
11 also from the Bosnian authorities who were present there, the judge from
12 the Superior Court, in order to work quickly, yes, but that was caused by
13 the whole tense situation over there and the seriousness of the thing
14 that happened over there.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Is it time for a break or shall I continue?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll break for half an hour, resume at 11.00.
18 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
19 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
22 We'd like to ask the Chamber's permission at the next break to
23 have Colonel Konings review a report of the interview that Dr. Karadzic
24 had with him in September of 2009. I've actually prepared hard copies to
25 be distributed to the Chamber. And this -- I took notes during that
1 meeting and then prepared a contemporaneous report.
2 JUDGE KWON: When did you produce this?
3 MR. ROBINSON: In September of 2009, two days after the
5 JUDGE KWON: Was it disclosed to the Prosecution?
6 MR. ROBINSON: No, it hasn't been disclosed. It was disclosed to
7 them just now. And it's -- normally we don't prepare these for anything
8 other than memorialising what was said, but since there seems to be some
9 discrepancies between what Colonel Konings recalls having been said and
10 what we recall having been said, we'd like to have the opportunity to
11 have him review that and then have Dr. Karadzic be able to put to him
12 some of those things that could either be understood as agreed by him or
13 perhaps be inconsistent statements with what he's testifying to now. So
14 in order to lay the foundation for that, we would like the opportunity
15 for him to review the statement at the next break and then be questioned
16 about it after that.
17 JUDGE KWON: I remember, Mr. Tieger, you rose at one point in
18 time. Do you have anything to say?
19 MR. TIEGER: Well, I rose initially, Your Honour, because I
20 didn't consider it appropriate to be distributing that to the Chamber
21 even before the request had been considered.
22 Secondly, this is -- to the extent that the Defence wanted the
23 witness to consider what he was purported to have said and clarify it,
24 that could have and should have been done previously, not under the time
25 pressure that exists today and after he's taken the stand. And the
1 Prosecution considers this an inappropriate, belated effort to create an
2 impeachment document that cannot serve as such under these circumstances,
3 and an appropriate procedure would have been, clearly, to clarify it with
4 the witness at the time of the interview, determine whether or not he
5 agreed with the propositions presented in this document or any other
6 document that the Defence considered memorialised some aspects of the
7 statement, and give him a fair opportunity to consider that and clarify
8 it at the time.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 THE ACCUSED: May I -- before the decision, may I say just one
12 JUDGE KWON: We don't like to waste our time.
13 If you don't mind, if you could read this document during the
14 break, and the accused may put any questions in relation to that and you
15 can say you adopt it or you don't adopt.
16 And then it is our opinion we don't need this, and we return this
17 right now.
18 JUDGE MORRISON: I think -- speaking for myself, I think it's
19 inappropriate that the Bench should read it at this stage.
20 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I may something about that as well.
21 JUDGE KWON: By all means.
22 THE WITNESS: I start to feel a bit uncomfortable now, what is
23 happening. I will read the document, but I can say already now I will --
24 I will not give any statement on that later on during this morning
25 because I -- we never made any agreement during that meeting that this
1 should happen. There was no recollection of that whatsoever. It was, as
2 I stressed before, an informal meeting on the request of Mr. Karadzic,
3 which I granted. I went over there. We had an informal discussion about
4 many things that happened over there. I might have expressed certain
5 opinions, but it was way outside this Tribunal. It was on his request,
6 and I granted him that, I co-operated with that, but I made no notes, it
7 was not official, so I'm not very willing to react on that statement
8 whatsoever. I will read it, if you require me to do so, but I don't
9 think it's very fair to require me to react on statements from more than
10 one year ago, of which I do not have any note. It's different from what
11 the notes and the things that happened in 1995 and which are official
12 documents and official testimony that I did in 2007 and 2009. Thank you
13 very much.
14 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. The Chamber is in agreement with you,
15 Lieutenant-Colonel Konings. The appropriate way for this to have been
16 done was for an aide-memoire or a note to have been made immediately
17 after the interview, and to have sent it to you then, and to see whether
18 or not that accorded with your memory. And certainly speaking for
19 myself, and I think for all the Bench, we take the view that Mr. Tieger's
20 right about the inappropriate nature of this intervention.
21 What we would ask you to do is to read the note. If there's
22 anything in that note that you feel, of your own volition, you can agree
23 to, then so be it. But if there isn't, then, equally, so be it. And we
24 will wait until you've read it before any determination of any further
1 Mr. Robinson, it's plainly not the proper way to deal with a note
2 of an interview like this. This is a matter which should have been
3 confirmed with the witness prior to his testimony. It's almost
4 cross-examination by ambush, which is not very helpful.
5 JUDGE KWON: Let's carry on, Mr. Karadzic.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, thank you.
7 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, I'm not asking you to confirm whether you
8 said this to me or not, only to confirm whether that is your view,
9 whether what is written there is correct, and whether that was a doctrine
10 that you pursued during your mission in Sarajevo.
11 Now, I would like you to focus on paragraph 16 of your
12 consolidated statement, in which you say the following. You have it with
13 you, I mean your consolidated statement. Paragraph 16, you say:
14 [In English] "We always went to the hospital, and especially to
15 the morgues, to investigate the killed people. This was an integrated
16 part of the procedure, and we checked, together with the Bosnian police,
17 the number of the killed people."
18 [Interpretation] Now I'd like to put to you a document attached
19 by the OTP to your statement, which is 65 ter 14354 -- oh, no, I
20 apologise, 14345, 65 ter. Can I please have that in e-court. It's a
21 report of 18th of June, 1995, compiled by a UNMO.
22 Just one moment, please.
23 14345. I think I misspoke the first time, so 14345. I apologise
24 just for a second.
25 It's a UNMO report of the 18th of June, 1995, in which the
1 observers are reporting certain facts to their headquarters, and you will
2 shortly see what is written therein.
3 While we are waiting: Is it true that you did not have access to
4 the hospital at all times?
5 A. I'm not quite recall [sic] that. It might been that on certain
6 occasions that we were not granted access to the hospital, but I do not
7 have a real clear memory on what happened. It might have been true that
8 on some occasions we were not allowed to get into the hospital, yes.
9 JUDGE KWON: What document are you referring to, Mr. Karadzic?
10 14345, is that what we are looking at now?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, this is a wrong number.
12 Actually, I have a wrong number. I am looking for an UNMO report of the
13 18th of June, 1995. We are trying to rectify this mistake.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, who introduced those restrictions? Who
16 prevented you from going to the hospital?
17 A. I don't know from who came -- from who came those restrictions.
18 But as I said before many in declarations, we always worked together with
19 the Bosnian police, doing the investigation, and there were occasions
20 which I can recall that due to the tense situation, that it was not very
21 appropriate to go into the hospital when people were in surgery or when
22 families were around, and then the Bosnian police told us that it was
23 better not to go into the hospital on certain occasions. But we were
24 always granted the permission to visit the morgue in case there were
25 killed people. But I do not recall from whom the Bosnian police had the
1 authority or had the directions to do so, but I do know that we had, as
2 UNMOs, the direction not to be -- to insisting on doing things -- actions
3 which were against the will of the Bosnian authorities. So we had to
4 work together with them, so we -- on certain occasions, we could be a bit
5 more persistent or insisting than on other occasions. It was a
6 from-case-to-case scenario that we had to handle.
7 Q. Thank you. We'll find this document later. Now, who instructed
8 you to co-operate so closely with the Bosnian authorities?
9 A. That was my direct superior. That was the senior military
10 observer in Sarajevo.
11 Q. Thank you. Therefore, I'm not interested who imposes
12 restrictions personally, but it seems that whenever you were prevented
13 from going into hospital to inspect the wounded people, you were
14 prevented by the Bosnian authorities; is that correct?
15 A. I don't know -- I said before I don't know who in the Bosnian
16 authority was doing so, but we were advised in those cases not to do so.
17 And it was also a matter of the hospital staff that requested us very
18 strongly not to insist in going into the hospital in order to investigate
19 whatever had happened. And as I've said before, it is a matter of
20 co-operation that we said, We are not going to do that. So we followed
21 the lines of either the Bosnian police or the hospital authorities. I
22 don't know from whom they got their directions, and I didn't pay any
23 attention to that on that moment in time because we had much other things
24 to worry about.
25 Q. Thank you. I'm more interested in hearing whether that was the
1 Bosnian side, and that is what you confirmed.
2 Can we now have Exhibit P1860, P1860. It's already in evidence.
3 I would just like you to have a look at it. Page 1.
4 This is page 1; is that right? And this is a report sent to the
6 Can we now have page 12.
7 Will you please look at the paragraph which begins: "UNMO team
8 SW-2 carried out investigation ..."
9 [In English] " ... origin approximate 300 mag. Difficult to
10 confirm. Fragments removed by local CivPol, and impact was on the
11 concrete ..."
12 [Interpretation] And then it says:
13 [In English] "... UNMOs were allowed to visit Kosovo hospital and
14 the morgue where they could confirm seven were killed. They were
15 informed that there were 10 injured casualties in the same incident.
16 Comment: UNMOs have not been allowed to visit hospitals since 15th of
17 June, and are still not allowed to do so, but in this case an exception
18 was made."
19 [Interpretation] Was that the sort of restrictions that were
20 imposed during investigations?
21 A. I don't know. This is a report of a different UNMO team, so I
22 cannot judge that. I don't know what happened exactly over there, I
23 don't know what they encountered. I only can discuss the situation that
24 I had with my own team. And as I stated before, on some occasions we
25 were not allowed to visit the people that were wounded. We always were
1 granted permission to visit the morgue. And I cannot comment upon the
2 actions of the other UNMO teams. That's way out of my business. I don't
3 know about it, so I have nothing to say about that.
4 Q. Thank you. Is it true that neither you nor anyone else from your
5 team had the required training or experience for the purpose of
6 establishing the time and cause of death; is that correct?
7 A. I had no, neither had my people, specific medical training in
8 order to -- we were no doctors or medical personnel, so we have no
9 training or experience in exactly establishing time and cause of death.
10 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us what kind of criterion was to be
11 applied in order to determine the freshness of a dead body? On the basis
12 of what can you say that that was the body of a person killed recently?
13 A. The only thing I can say about that is that when a person is
14 killed recently, as far as my experience over there recalls, is the fact
15 that -- the stiffness of the body and the fact that blood or other -- I
16 don't know how to recall that correctly - let's keep it on blood - is
17 still pouring out, or coming out, or -- coming out of the body. That's a
18 matter of judgement that you learn during the period. I fully admit that
19 the first time I saw that, that I had no knowledge whatsoever, but,
20 unfortunately, during six months in Sarajevo, and having seen on several
21 occasions those bodies, you have an idea, but only just an idea formed,
22 whether these people were killed a long time before or not, and I can
23 give you no specifics whatsoever on that. It's a matter of judgement on
24 the moment, having a feeling about. And as I said before, we were no
25 medical experts and we had no medical experts in our teams.
1 Q. Thank you. If possible, can you please answer me with a yes or
2 no. Did you ever carry out an external visual examination of a body
3 stripped of the clothes, and did you provide a description of the wounds
4 on the body?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Thank you. Did you ever try to check whether there was
7 rigour-mortise? Did you ever try to move the limbs of the body?
8 A. No. Sorry, no.
9 Q. Thank you. Do you know at which point rigour-mortise sets in and
10 when it ceases to exist?
11 JUDGE KWON: I have to intervene, Mr. Karadzic. Speaking for
12 myself, having heard you cross-examine the witness with patience, I'm at
13 a loss where you're leading. Don't expect from us to extend your time
14 for cross-examination at all.
15 JUDGE MORRISON: Another point, Dr. Karadzic, is: As you will
16 know better than most, the question of when rigor-mortise sets in depends
17 upon a huge number of variables, not the least of which is the ambient
18 temperature, and so -- and this witness has already stated he has no
19 medical expertise, so how can he help?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I just wanted to
21 ask one more question; for example, if he ever touched any of the dead
22 bodies to check the body temperature. And I know exactly where this is
23 leading to. This is leading to the events after the Markale incident.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, have you ever established the body
1 temperature by touching the corpse?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Thank you. After you would receive information about an
4 incident, you would go to the site, and in most cases the local police
5 would have arrived there before you, is that correct, and it was the
6 police who informed you about the casualties; is that right?
7 A. No, that's not the generic approach. In several cases, we met
8 the local police on their police station, and we went together to the
9 site of what had happened. So there was a variety of approaches. On
10 some occasion the police was already there, and on some occasions, we
11 were found -- we went to the police station and we picked up the local
12 police and brought them in our car to the site of the incident, because
13 the police had problems with their transportation, so we granted them
14 transport in our cars. So there was a variety of approaches. The only
15 thing that was fixed in that is that we always did the investigation
16 together with members of the Sarajevo police.
17 Q. Thank you. When you drive police officers to the site, did it
18 ever happen that you found any police officers already present on the
20 Can you look at the paragraph from your 2006 statement:
21 [In English] "We would hear from the Bosnian police
22 about casualties."
23 [Interpretation] Paragraph 7, paragraph 7.
24 Is it possible that the police had not arrived before you and the
25 police officers that you were driving to the site, and that site was not
1 secured by anyone? Is it possible that you were the first to arrive?
2 A. I don't know that. That might have been, but I really don't
3 know. I don't recall that, that amount of detail, whether any member of
4 the police force was already there or not, because they were working in
5 civilian and they were not recognisable when you came on the scene of an
6 explosion. I really don't know that. I cannot give any proper answer on
8 Q. Thank you. But the information about the victims you received
9 from the Bosnian police, and it never happened that you actually found
10 the victims at the scene ever; is that right?
11 A. To begin with the last one, that's correct, but we always went
12 together with the Bosnian police to the morgue or, on certain occasions,
13 to the hospital in order to check the number of killed and wounded
14 people. So that information we could confirm ourselves in counting the
15 killed people inside the morgue. And we had to do so because that was
16 our part -- part of our job, to offer an impartial opinion to our
18 Q. Thank you. Important information you received from the Bosnian
19 police, though. Do you know that we suspected these Bosnian police
20 officers of staging incidents all around Sarajevo; yes or no? Are you
21 aware that we publicly sought joint investigations and that we suspected
22 precisely those police officers of planting incidents?
23 A. Again, I cannot answer all your questions with yes or no, so I
24 would like to know: Who do you mean by "we suspected"?
25 Q. The Serbian side. The Serbian Army asked to take part in the
1 investigations. Did you know about that?
2 A. At that time, I did not know that.
3 Q. Thank you. For example, information about the fact that the line
4 of separation is 1.050 metres away from Markale, did you get that from
5 the Bosnian police or did you, yourself, establish that?
6 A. I did not establish that, neither did I get that from my -- from
7 the Bosnian police. That was information that was given to us by the --
8 and, again, I don't know whether it was exactly 1.050 metres, I don't
9 recall that. But information on the confrontation line, the generic --
10 the generic outline of the confrontation line was given to me by the --
11 by my superiors, my military superiors, in the headquarters of the UNMOs
12 in Sarajevo. I had no information on that by the Bosnian police.
13 Q. Thank you. During your investigations, you never determined the
14 origin of fire, but only the place and the direction from where the
15 projectile came?
16 A. I, myself --
17 Q. I'm sorry. You're reading the interpretation.
18 [In English] "But only the place -- not place but only
19 the direction from where ..."
20 [Interpretation] You did not establish the place from where the
21 projectile was fired, but only the direction from where the projectile
22 came; is that correct?
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 23 of the consolidated statement, you
25 say the following, paragraph 23:
1 [In English] "During the investigations which I conducted of
2 shelling incidents, I tried to find the direction of fire, but never
3 specifically traced the shell back to the actual point of origin. Not
4 only was no time for that; more importantly, it was impossible to do so
5 because informations on the charge ..."
6 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.
7 Do you see that, that, that, that part? And then in the same
8 paragraph, you say:
9 [In English] "There are no UNMOs left position any more on the
10 Serb side who were able to confirm outgoing fire."
11 [Interpretation] You were thus unable to establish the
12 responsibility for the incident. You could not establish which side was
13 responsible for the firing of a specific shell; is that right?
14 A. I, personally, and I explained that in my -- in various
15 statements, could not do that. But I have to say that, to make it clear,
16 what is happening, my piece of information that I recollected on the spot
17 of the explosion was only a part of the total overall information that
18 UNPROFOR or the UNMOs were collecting, so if you -- that's what we call
19 military intelligence. You gather bits of pieces of information. One is
20 the place of the explosion, one is the -- another one is the direction of
21 fire, and the third one are other reports of outgoing rounds from various
22 other UNMO or other UNPROFOR institutions. And by -- by combining
23 those -- that information, which I could not do because I was stationed
24 inside the city, so my piece of information was recollecting the grid of
25 the -- the place of the explosion, plus the origin of fire, could give my
1 superiors the opportunity to connect that information with the other
2 information, and from there come to the conclusion where -- from which
3 side the round came, either from Bosnian Army territory or from Bosnian
4 Army-held territory. That is how military intelligence works. And
5 UNPROFOR, and especially the UNMOs, were military people working with
6 military intelligence and bringing together pieces of information which
7 brings you to conclusions. But I fully admit that I was not able to do
8 so on the basis of my own observations on the spot, on the scene of an
10 Q. Thank you. You are saying that your findings, the information,
11 your reports, were not enough, in the legal and criminal sense, to
12 establish beyond a reasonable doubt who fired and from where; is that
14 A. I'm not saying that. I'm not saying anything in the legal or
15 criminal sense. I reject those words, the use of those words. I don't
16 know what they mean. My job as an UNMO was to establish the military
17 situation inside the city of Sarajevo. That was my job. I stated that
18 before, and that was in the SOP -- the standard operating procedure of
19 the UNMOs. So what I had to do was to witness, to see, to write down, to
20 report whatever was happening in my area of operations or even if I could
21 see things outside that. It is not my job -- it was not my job to say
22 anything about the legitimacy or the criminality of operations that took
23 place on that moment in time. That was for my superiors to do. I had
24 nothing to do with legitimacy or criminality in an operation on that
25 moment. My job was to be an impartial United Nations Military Observer
1 with the priority for the word "military observer." An observer means I
2 had to observe. I had to make no judgement on the legitimacy or the
3 criminality of an operation. So I really would not like to react on
4 those words. I reject those words, because they were outside our scope
5 of our working.
6 Q. Thank you. But you will admit that your statements are full of
7 qualifications which have a certain legal criminal weight. The Serbs
8 were disrupting, the Serbs were firing at random, the Serbs were firing
9 areas that are civilian areas without military targets. Do we then have
10 to look at what you said then, in light of what you have just stated now?
11 A. It's your interpretation that you interpret my words with having
12 a certain legal and criminal weight. I only stated what I observed after
13 six months of experience in Sarajevo. You cannot deny my words that I
14 have seen projectiles falling on civilian targets. That's something you
15 cannot deny from me. That's what I saw. I saw, on the 28th of August,
16 what happened. I came not to the conclusion that that round came from
17 the Serb side. That was a conclusion from the commander of UNPROFOR. So
18 what I have stated, whether it has a legal weight or a criminal weight,
19 or whatever you make of that, that has nothing to do with my statement.
20 My statements are about what I saw and what I witnessed, without any form
21 of legitimacy or idea about criminality. I saw, during six months,
22 random firing inside the city of Sarajevo. Most of those rounds were
23 coming from -- it was established, was confirmed, coming from the Serb
24 side. Whether that's legal, whether there was a legal basis for that,
25 that's not for me to judge. Whether it was criminal, it's not for me to
1 judge. I only can say what I saw, what I witnessed, and what my team
3 Q. Thank you. But in paragraph 43 of the consolidated statement,
4 state that each shell -- that every single round the Serb forces fired
5 into the city frightened people, and that's what they wanted to --
6 frighten people --
7 [In English] " ... frighten people, and that's what they wanted,
8 to frighten people."
9 [Interpretation] Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, here you're making a
10 judgement. Did you ever discuss any Serb commander -- have a discussion
11 with any Serb commander in order to establish why something was a target,
12 why something was being fired at?
13 A. To begin at the last one, I never discussed anything with any
14 Serb commander. I was not on the Serb side. I was stationed inside the
15 city. That's my first part of the answer.
16 The second thing is it is again a fact that I witnessed. It is
17 not a judgement. It is a fact that I witnessed. Six months' long, and
18 it's connected to what I stated before, it is the fact that I saw that
19 we - my team - I, myself, and my people, we witnessed falling rounds,
20 especially mortar rounds, throughout the city in a random pattern, not in
21 a way that you combat military targets with. It is not a judgement. It
22 is a witness statement. It is what I witnessed during those periods. I
23 don't know why the Serb commanders did it. I don't know what orders they
24 had. I had no opportunity to talk with them. There has been no
25 opportunity. I don't know what was in their minds, what their orders
1 from their superiors were to do so. The fact is what I saw is that they
2 were random firing with single rounds or a few rounds on areas where
3 there were no military targets whatsoever, and that brought me to the
4 judgement that I made or to the witness statement that I made. You may
5 call it a judgement. That's up -- that's your conclusion. I call it
6 those things that I witnessed, those things that I saw in the period that
7 I was there.
8 Q. Thank you. We will come to that. In paragraph 21 of the
9 consolidated statement, you say that in cases where you did not think
10 that projectiles were fired from Serbian territory, that does not
11 mean "it should not be presumed that we determined the fire came from the
12 Bosnian Muslims." So if you had no evidence that it was the Serbs, you
13 did not even think that it could have come from the Muslims; is that
15 A. That's correct, because we never witnessed from my area any
16 outgoing rounds from Muslim Army territory.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Can we have 1D2837 in the e-court, please.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
20 Q. And while we're waiting: Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, you state, in
21 the part that I quoted, that you know what the Serbs wanted, but you did
22 not even wish to speak with the Serbian commanders. They wanted to
23 frighten people, that, We wanted to frighten the civilians, both Serbs
24 and Muslims in Sarajevo; is that correct?
25 But let's look the this document. This is SC-1. This is from
1 your team; is that right? --
2 A. Yeah.
3 Q. Can you look at paragraph 2(a):
4 "Lieutenant-Colonel Konings walked up along the path which leads
5 to the actual OP. The total length of this path is about 200 metres.
6 When Lieutenant-Colonel Konings had walked about 50 metres, a single
7 20-millimetre round was fired, somewhere from the top of the hill, into
8 the city."
9 [Interpretation] And then at C you say:
10 [In English] "... came to the conclusion that these rounds seemed
11 to have come from the BH side."
12 "D. Major Jackson was on duty some 150 metres away in the OP.
13 He confirmed the above-mentioned facts and had the same impression."
14 [Interpretation] Is this opposite to what you said a bit earlier,
15 that you had never seen fire from Muslim territory?
16 A. This is a different situation. The situation we were discussing
17 before was firing from Muslim territory on the city, itself. This is a
18 fact that occurred where we had the impression that from the
19 confrontation line, a 20-millimetre round was fired on our OP-1. So it's
20 something differently, but it happened, and what's stated here is
21 absolutely correct. It's our -- our recollection of what happened then.
22 Q. It says here "into the city," not at your position. There is
23 also references to fire at your positions in other documents. But it
24 says "into the city." If you look at 3:
25 "Before we could send --
1 [In English] " ... this increp, about 10 rounds SA were fired in
2 the general direction of OP-1. The origin of fire was very clearly the
3 top of the hill, some 200 metres south of the OP, which means that to the
4 opinion of the UNMOs, these rounds came from the BH side."
5 [Interpretation] Thus, there was fire at the city and also at
6 your OP from the Muslim side; is that correct?
7 A. Our first impression at that moment, what I recall, is that the
8 fire was aimed at our OP, just above our OP, and you cannot avoid that
9 those rounds will carry on further and will hit a place in the city.
10 Yes, I don't deny that. You're absolutely right.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Can we tender this document, please?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D899, Your Honours. Sorry, Your
15 Honours, I stand corrected, D889. Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Q. And you were aware that the UNMO --
18 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter's note we did not hear what
19 Mr. Karadzic --
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters couldn't hear what
21 you said. Could you repeat.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.
23 Q. Apart from this, even in cases where you were not personally
24 present, you had information that some other observers, military
25 observers and representatives of the UN, had information, all saw that
1 Muslim forces fired at the Muslim parts of the city; correct?
2 A. Yes, but that's the only information I heard. I never witnessed
3 it myself.
4 Q. Thank you. Captain Hansen was in the area where you were. He
5 was the leader of the team before you; is that correct?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Can I please ask you to look at your statement on page 2, the
8 statement from 1996, page 2:
9 [In English] "On May the 5th, 1995 --"
10 [Interpretation] So Hansen was your predecessor, the team leader
11 in that area; is that correct?
12 A. That's correct.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can we now look at 65 ter -- this has a D number, 853, D853.
16 Q. This is the first page, and you can see that this is a report of
17 the 28th of June:
18 [In English] "A UNMO coming into the PTT building, parking his
19 car on the lower parking place, observed the following: Heard and saw an
20 outgoing projectile across the parking place and road from grid BP866587.
21 The place is in the BH territory, approximately 1.800 metres from the
22 nearest confrontation line. Dust was seen and a low-flying projectile
23 heading toward the PTT building."
24 [Interpretation] Is this one of the things that you heard or that
25 you heard of?
1 A. I don't recall that in detail. I really -- I really don't.
2 Q. Thank you. Did you know that the Muslim forces in Sarajevo --
3 other than what Captain Hansen is talking about, modified air-bombs, did
4 you know that Muslims in Sarajevo had 107- and 128-millimetre rockets in
5 Sarajevo and that they fired them?
6 A. As I said before, I only can talk about the part of the city that
7 I was working in and about the period that I was working there, and I
8 have no information that in that part of the city they had these types of
9 rockets and that they fired with those rockets.
10 Q. Thank you. You said a little bit earlier, as well as in your
11 statements, that Sarajevo was shelled at random, because, in your
12 opinion, there weren't too many military targets there.
13 Would you look at paragraph 26 of your statement from 2006, where
14 you say [In English] "there are not too many military targets."
15 [Interpretation] And in paragraph 27 of the consolidated statements, you
17 "I never saw any real concentration of troops, although sometimes
18 our movement was impeded by Bosnian roadblocks ."
19 Do you see those two paragraphs, paragraph 26 on page 6, from
20 2006, and paragraph 27 in the consolidated statement? Is that right?
21 A. I hope you give me some time to read it carefully.
22 Q. And in the consolidated statement, could you please look at 31
23 and 33, where you talk about the presence of soldiers in town and about
24 their grouping?
25 A. I would appreciate it if you would allow me to read first
1 paragraph 27, and then I will take care of the other paragraphs as well.
2 Thank you. And which were the other paragraphs that you wanted to read
3 me? 31, 33.
4 Q. First of all, let's look at 27. You had movement restrictions,
5 and this could have -- did this have an effect on your ability to gain
6 insight into the situation in the city, in terms of the numbers, the
7 weaponry, the installations, and so on in the town?
8 A. No, the restrictions of movement inside the city were not as such
9 that they prohibited us to do our work properly. We had -- from time to
10 time, we had moments or even sometimes a day of restriction of movement,
11 but inside the city, itself, inside the part that I was responsible for,
12 with the exception of permission to go into the confrontation line, we
13 had enough opportunity to get a clear view of the amount and number and
14 sort of troops that were -- that were in the city.
15 Q. Thank you. Can you look at 31 and 33, please.
16 "There were soldiers in the city but not in big groupings. There
17 were single soldiers or lone police officers, but Sarajevo was not a
18 militarised city."
19 [Interpretation] Was Sarajevo demilitarised? Was it a
20 demilitarised town?
21 A. I'm not saying that. I just say that there was a low number of
22 small troop combinations or troop organisations present in the city. I
23 haven't ever anything said about whether it was a demilitarised city or
24 such a city. I only said it didn't look very militarised. I might -- I
25 used that term in order to explain that I didn't see large forces inside
1 my part of the city. As I explained, they occurred -- only they worked
2 in small groupings, single soldiers. There were no heavy weapons systems
3 present. We didn't see any, let's say, lines of defence, typical
4 military preparations for larger combat operations there. And, again, I
5 can't -- to repeat it, the use of the word "militarised" is to explain as
6 such, that it looked very civilian, with most only civilians on the
7 streets and a very low number of military troops.
8 Q. Thank you. That means that the town was practically of a reduced
9 ability for defence and that the Serbs could have captured it; is that
11 A. That's your conclusion. I never -- I cannot state that. I only
12 can judge my part of the city. I cannot stress that over and over again.
13 I have no idea about the number of Bosnian troops in other parts of the
14 city. In my part of the city, there were very few Bosnian troops. I
15 stated that before. I don't know how many troops were in the
16 confrontation line because, again, we were not granted access to that. I
17 had no information on that. So the conclusion that the Serbs could have
18 captured Sarajevo, that's your conclusion. It's not mine.
19 Q. Thank you. I tried to draw that conclusion from your position.
20 Please look at your statement from 2006, paragraph 3 on page 2:
21 [In English] "Having seen the strength of the Muslim forces
22 inside the city, I think it would have been a brutal and bloody fight."
23 [Interpretation] So in 2006, you were making a military estimate
24 that in view of the Muslim forces in the city, a battle to take the city
25 would be brutal and bloody; correct?
1 A. Yeah, that's my statement of that time, yes, that's correct.
2 Q. The Defence shall tell you, Lieutenant-Colonel, that in your
3 zone, where you were observing, three brigades were active, three Muslim
4 brigades; 105th Mountain Brigade, 151st Mountain Brigade, and 115th
5 Mountain Brigade, around 15.000 soldiers. Only one brigade had 6.000
6 soldiers. Do you know that in the area you observed, there were three
7 active brigades?
8 A. I recall some of these numbers, especially the 105th, I think,
9 but I'm not quite sure. But, well, if you say that they had so much
10 soldiers, if I -- if I count them together, 15.000 soldiers, I'm not
11 quite sure whether these 6.000 belonged to the 15.000 or that I have to
12 add these to the 15.000, but I can only state once more that I never have
13 seen much soldiers on the street. If you put in the small area that I
14 was operating in, because it's a rather small area of the city, it's a
15 very compressed area, if you put there more than 15.000 soldiers, I'm
16 quite sure we should have noticed that and we should have seen them
17 moving around or even should have seen fortifications of places where
18 they were -- where they were putting their people together, where they
19 were bringing their people together. I think -- we never saw that amount
20 of soldiers in there. So if you say so, that they were there, that's
21 your opinion. I never saw them.
22 Q. And do you know, Lieutenant-Colonel, that up to 75 per cent of
23 the Muslim soldiers, according to their own documents, waged war in
24 civilian clothes?
25 A. I haven't seen those documents, so I don't know that.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask the Legal Officer for the
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. You have behind you, Witness, a map of the city with the zones of
5 responsibility of these three brigades marked on it.
6 Could the copies please be distributed to the parties.
7 And the document, based on which these markings were made, is a
8 Muslim document, 1D2839. We can call it up in e-court, and we will view
9 the map on paper. Could a photocopy also be given to Mr. Konings.
10 While we are waiting, Lieutenant-Colonel: Do we agree that on
11 the front-line, on the forward line, one normally does not keep
12 artillery, or mortars, or communication centres, or headquarters, or
13 logistical bases?
14 A. I will not agree with you, because it depends on, first of all,
15 what do you mean with "forward line." Secondly, I'm quite sure that in
16 any forward line, you will find mortars, you will find communication, you
17 will find certain headquarters. You will not find logistical bases. But
18 it all depends on which level you are talking about. It depends on the
19 operational level that you are discussing. Is it a tactical level, the
20 operational level? Are you talking about platoons, are you talking about
21 brigades? It's a very generic question that I cannot agree with, unless
22 you explain me exactly what you -- what you are talking about so that
23 I can try to share an opinion or offer you an opinion on that.
24 Q. Thank you. Could you please take a look at the paper before us.
25 Do you know that each section of the city was covered by the area
1 of responsibility of one of the brigades? Look at Brigade 115. Its area
2 of responsibility is from the confrontation line to the Miljacka River.
3 You can look to your right. There is a map in colour.
4 A. Yes, I see that, yeah.
5 Q. This document we have is, unfortunately, without translation, but
6 still we should look at page 3. Three brigades are described there that
7 were active in the old town. 115th Brigade organises and --
8 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. You referred to 65 ter 1D2839, which
9 is not this document.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it is a document of the
11 12th Division Command that was active in the city of Sarajevo, itself,
12 and it's an order for blocking defence from the 14th --
13 JUDGE KWON: My question is whether we have a 65 ter number for
14 this map.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, we don't have one for the map.
16 This city plan is based on this document. The data is in the
18 JUDGE KWON: So that map was produced by the Defence team
19 allegedly based upon information which is contained in this document;
20 that's what you're saying, Mr. Karadzic?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] According to this document of the
22 12th Division of the Muslim Army, there are three brigades in the city,
23 the 115th, the 152nd, and 105th. These three brigades were active in the
24 area of observation of this witness.
25 JUDGE KWON: I understand. I would like to advise you, then, to
1 put your case to the witness to see whether he can help us in this
2 regard, first of all.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, it is the case of the Defence that the
5 105th Brigade had at least 5.000 men, if not more, that its area of
6 responsibility was from Vrdonje [phoen], Streliste, Klade Vode [phoen],
7 up to Lepevir [phoen], where they boarded with another brigade. The
8 105th Brigade also had an area of responsibility up to the center of
9 town, and the 152nd Brigade had a zone of responsibility from down-town
10 to Colina Kapa, up to Miljacka River.
11 Now, the deployment of all these soldiers, the headquarters of
12 all these companies, battalions, et cetera, their communications centres,
13 their artillery and mortar support, and their routes for manoeuvre, for
14 food supply, and munitions supply, and daily movements of units and
15 rotations, which you said you observed at least for one of these
16 brigades, this area of the city, your area, was completely militarised
17 with a huge number of legitimate military targets that formed the
18 infrastructure of three large brigades. How come you were not aware of
20 A. I -- the simple factor is there that I -- I know that there were
21 three so-called brigades in that area, and I even recall the numbers, and
22 I do not deny their areas of operations as they are on the map, although
23 I do not recollect the exact borders of their area of responsibility, as
24 we call it. But if you are starting to talk about - and I refer to what
25 you said before - headquarters of all these companies, battalions, their
1 communication centre, their artillery and mortar support, their route for
2 manoeuvre for food supply, munitions supply, daily movements of units and
3 rotations, I haven't seen anything, as such. And if I recollect to my
4 own memory the movement of a brigade, and we're talking about a brigade,
5 you talk about 5.000 soldiers in an area that's rather small. It's a
6 compressed area. It's only a few kilometres by a few kilometres, and I
7 know, for 99.9 per cent, with my experience and my recollection of what a
8 brigade actually is, if you put 5.000 people, and I even think three
9 times 5.000 people, in my area of operations with, what Mr. Karadzic
10 says, communications centre, artillery and mortar support, food supply,
11 munitions supply, I would be the greatest fool of the world, and my team
12 including, if we wouldn't have noticed that, and we haven't noticed that.
13 We haven't seen anything, as such.
14 The brigade commanders that I met -- I met the commanders of
15 those three brigades. The brigade commanders I met were young majors.
16 At least they called themselves "major." And they were talking about
17 commanding a few hundred people. So I don't know where the truth is. I
18 only can say that I did not see large troop movements, I did not see
19 ammunition supply, I did not see -- you have to think. When you have a
20 unit of 5.000 people, 5.000 soldiers in an area of a few kilometres, you
21 will see them. If they supply themselves, you will see it, you will
22 notice it. We haven't seen it. So if they were there, they did an
23 excellent job in camouflaging themselves. I can say that. I can give
24 them the best credit I can give, as a military professional, then they
25 were hiding very, very well.
1 Q. Thank you. Perfectly correct. In their orders they say
2 explicitly, Take every measure possible to prevent the UNPROFOR from
3 gaining insight into the situation on our terrain.
4 Is this document accepted?
5 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it's proper to admit this document
6 through this witness. You'll have another opportunity.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Can we now call up 1D2567 to see how they managed to conceal it
9 all from you.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, these brigades, according to their
12 information, had a strength of 12.000 to 15.000, depending on how many
13 they transported out of the city and how many were brought in.
14 Can we look up page 6 of this document.
15 Look at the first page first. It's the 11th of June, when you
16 were there.
17 Look under "Anti-Armour Combat." That's paragraph 7. We need
18 the same in English. That must be the next page.
19 "Only for anti-armour combat." Look at the task. First of all,
20 look at the rocket batteries. Velesici, granted, is outside your zone,
21 but look at this:
22 "Prevent the enemy, armoured and mechanised units, from
23 penetrating along the axes accessible to tanks ..."
24 Et cetera, et cetera:
25 "Organise POP-12, a platoon of tanks and an armoured platoon in
1 the area of Ciglane."
2 And then you see POP-3 in the area of Sedrenik. Look at all this
3 activity of the armour and the launchers in your area.
4 Page 8, please -- page 10 in English, to see how they prevented
5 you from seeing what was going on.
6 It says:
7 "Establish a special traffic regimen with maximum control of
8 vehicles and persons; in particular, those of the UNPROFOR, the UNMOs,
9 and other international organisations."
10 Did you find it? It's the fourth bullet point from the bottom:
11 "If necessary, close all access routes and exits from Sarajevo
12 for UNPF and other international associations. Ban all representatives
13 of international institutions from entering the combat zone without
14 special authorisation of the 12th Division of the Land Forces commander.
15 Prevent the UNPF from pulling out and encircle them if necessary.
16 Prevent photography and documentation."
17 So they're taking maximum efforts to camouflage themselves, and
18 they are launching a massive offensive operation from the city, itself.
19 And, of course, I understand the camouflage was successful and managed to
20 deceive you, but how do you see this situation now, Lieutenant-Colonel?
21 A. With all due respect, Mr. Karadzic, I totally disagree with you.
22 I'm still convinced -- and I meant that sarcastically what I said before,
23 that they did a perfect job in camouflaging themselves. I am convinced,
24 as a professional soldier, that once you launch an offensive including
25 15.000 troops, you will not be able to hide that in a city. We would
1 have seen that. And we had not such restriction of movement that we were
2 not able to drive around and to see military equipment or to see
3 so-called assembly areas which you establish before you start an attack.
4 You will not be able, in such a compressed environment as Sarajevo, as
5 such is, to hide or to conceal such large massive amount of troops. If
6 they already had them, I don't know. I cannot read the documents. I
7 don't know how the troops were built up. I had no information on that on
8 that moment, and I don't have it now.
9 I only can say that to my recollection, to my opinion, it is just
10 not possible to launch a massive offensive operation from the inner of a
11 city without being noticed by anybody. That's just impossible. You
12 cannot hide track vehicles, tanks, and whatever you -- what is assumed
13 that the Muslims had, you cannot hide that in that area with small
14 streets, with -- it's just not possible without being noticed either by
15 us, the UNMOs, or by other UNPROFOR troops in that area. So whatever you
16 bring in -- in front of me, I haven't seen these documents before. It's
17 fine, they describe the situation as it has been established from I think
18 it's 12th Division or the 12th Corps; I don't know. I only can offer you
19 my opinion, and that's what I've done before.
20 Q. Thank you. But you do not dispute, Lieutenant-Colonel, that the
21 Muslim Army had prepared and started the first offensive of the 1st of
22 May, and intensified it on the 15th, they took advantage of the fact that
23 we were busy with air-strikes in the end of May - I'm speaking on behalf
24 of your UN documents - and launched another new offensive on the 1st of
25 June. Would you deny that the UN reported on this major offensive
1 originating from the city of Sarajevo; yes or no?
2 A. I don't know that. I don't know what the UN reported, neither on
3 the 1st, because I was not in Sarajevo on that moment. I don't know what
4 they reported on the 15th or later in May. I only know what I reported,
5 myself, and what my direct superiors reported, because what the UN
6 reported - and I don't know what you mean by the UN - either the UN in
7 command of UNPROFOR or the UN in New York, I really don't know, but we
8 were -- we had no access to that information whatsoever. I had my only
9 information from my direct superior, because we had no radio
10 communication with the outside world. I had no radio or television, so I
11 did not know what the UN outside Sarajevo was reporting or even doing, so
12 I cannot add anything to this statement.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 May this document be admitted?
15 JUDGE KWON: Likewise, there's no basis for this document to be
16 admitted through this witness. You will have another opportunity.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, your mission, as I quoted from your evidence
19 in the Milosevic case, was to report on military developments in the
20 city, and the most important task was to be an impartial witness of the
21 UNPROFOR inside the city of Sarajevo and to provide reports on every
22 incident -- every happening that occurred in the city. So you were an
23 eye-witness for the UNPROFOR, and you should know what those three
24 brigades were doing in your area.
25 P1860 is the document we need next. It's a sitrep.
1 Would firing incidents in your area of observation be something
2 you would have to report on?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Please look at this. This is from the 19th of June, an UNMO
5 report forwarding a report they got from you in amalgamated form.
6 Next page, please.
7 A. No, I reject the idea. I don't know. You don't tell me what you
8 are aiming at, so I would really appreciate that you highlight what you
9 are -- what you are really aiming at. This is not a report what they got
10 from me. This is a report from HQ Zagreb to the UN. It has nothing to
11 do with my team. So would really appreciate if you make clear whatever
12 you want to state or what you want to ask of me, because I get really
13 confused, while being confronted with documents that are none of my
14 business, that were none of my business. I was not working at the UNMO
15 HQ in Zagreb. I was a military observer inside a small part of Sarajevo.
16 Q. I would appreciate it if you would be patient. You will see that
17 it is relevant, it is related to you.
18 Look at this sentence in line 2:
19 [In English] "Limited B and H offensive, I expected to continue."
20 [Interpretation] "Limited ABiH offensives are expected to
22 Can we now see page 8? Is it 8?
23 A. I'm sorry to interrupt once more. I didn't see line 2, what you
24 are -- what you are aiming at? Which line 2? Is that now in front of
1 Q. Top of the page on the screen, if you are looking at e-court.
2 A. I read that. But what has that to do with me?
3 Q. It just says that it's expected that the offensive of the Army of
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina, which started on the 15th of June, is expected to
6 Now, if we look at page 8, we'll see the inputs for this report.
7 JUDGE KWON: I have to intervene for the benefit of the witness.
8 I think it's fair enough for the witness to say so.
9 I asked you to put your case to the witness first. What is your
10 question? Ask the question and, if necessary, put the document.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. It is our case that on the 15th of June, from the city of
13 Sarajevo, an offensive of enormous scale started against the Serbian
14 territories around Sarajevo, and the United Nations were aware of it, and
15 that the brigades inside your area of observation were fully
16 participating in that offensive and fired from the city.
17 And we see on this page, in line 4, "SC-1," that you even
18 observed some of that fire and reported it. And towards the bottom,
19 there's another incident recorded at 1300 hours. The first one was at
21 A. Yes, but I would really appreciate if we also would look to the
22 grids that the originating fire came from. And if you have an offensive
23 going on, if you have a battle going on between two warring factions or
24 between two armies, whatever you call it, it is logical that both armies
25 use their weapons systems, whether they are the Serbs or whether they are
1 the Bosnian Army. If there is an offensive from the Bosnian Army, and I
2 do not deny that, which is quite obvious in a struggle -- in a war that's
3 going on, that both parties either do offensive or defensive operations,
4 which is normal military logic, and it's normal that both parties use a
5 variety of weapons systems.
6 That we reported outgoing rounds, as stated here, I do not deny
7 that, but it would also be interesting to look to a certain -- to the
8 grids that were established on that moment.
9 So, yes, there were a few outgoing rounds, but four rounds in a
10 time-scale between 1130 and 1300 hours can hardly be known or be seen as
11 a massive offensive operation. If I recall a massive offensive
12 operation, and I have seen them around Sarajevo, but then it was
13 concentrating on the confrontation line, all the firing was going on
14 around the confrontation line, not from the inside of the city to the
16 And, again, four rounds -- four outgoing mortar rounds do not
17 recall to me as being a massive -- a major offensive operation, really
18 not. It's something that happened. I do not deny that, and I would be
19 interested to see where the Grid BP941618 is, whether it's inside the
20 city or outside the city. I really don't know.
21 Q. Thank you, but you did report this.
22 Can we now have 1D1842 -- correction, 1D2842.
23 Now, look at the report on the 105th Brigade of the 18th of June.
24 There were 483 rounds of fire, not counting bullets; only the mortars
25 that explode on impact. There is an English version available as well.
1 Then you have "RPG," and then you have "154 --"
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please slow down.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters have difficulty
4 following you. Could you repeat your question.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. So starting from grenade launcher 9, 95 pieces, downwards until
7 number 15, which is from 7 to 15, the total is 483 firing rounds from the
8 area of one brigade alone, and that brigade was in your view. Would you
9 consider that an insignificant fire? This is the document produced by
10 the Muslim side, and they are reporting, actually, the consumption of
11 ammunition by the brigade.
12 A. Well, in itself, it doesn't say anything about how and where and
13 when these ammunitions were used, and in relation to what. It's just a
14 number of rounds that apparently were used in a certain situation. And
15 if that is connected to an offensive operation from any army, that seems
16 to me to be very logical, because if you do an offensive operation, you
17 use your weapons system, so you use ammunition. That's even applicable
18 up until today when we do operations in Afghanistan, where we use a
19 substantial amount of ammunition when doing an offensive operation.
20 So the number doesn't say me anything. It doesn't say me where
21 they came from, why they were used, against whom they were used, where
22 they were fired from, so it's a number, nothing more, nothing less, for
24 Q. Could you please look at the area of responsibility of the 105th
25 Brigade. From this area, but definitely not from the front-line, but
1 rather from the depth of its zone, they fired at the Serbian positions
2 485 times. So they're not firing from the front-line, they're firing
3 from in-depth into the territory, and one should say that such huge fire
4 cannot be effected from the front-line. It has to be down behind the
5 lines. Look how many mortars were fired, and that was fire support for
6 an infantry attack. Artillery and mortar fire support, followed by an
7 attack, and the UN in Sarajevo knew about this very well.
8 Is this correct, Lieutenant-Colonel? So we are not talking about
9 four grenades only. We are talking about a variety of shells of
10 different calibres?
11 A. Again, I only can see a list in front of me where -- apparently
12 by -- this is a report of the Bosnian Army, where they claim to have
13 fired a certain amount of rounds in order to support an attack. That's
14 what I assume. These rounds, when you refer that to the 105th Brigade,
15 which is practically -- which is in the middle of my area of operations,
16 were not fired from the inner circle of that area; absolutely not. I
17 don't know where they fired them from. Probably close from the
18 confrontation line in an area where we were not allowed, but they were
19 not fired from the built-up area that the most -- the biggest part of the
20 105 Brigade is located and that we had a vision to and that we had
21 allowance to move around. So 483 rounds of larger calibre would have
22 been noticed and would have been reported. That's -- that's a very clear
23 thing. We would not miss them in order to do so.
24 And, again, this is a report about a certain use of ammunition.
25 It's logical that a brigade that does an attack uses a certain amount of
1 ammunition, but I already explained that before, what my opinion is about
2 that, so I have nothing to add to that further.
3 Q. In paragraph 34 of your consolidated statement, you say:
4 [In English] "There was a battle at the confrontation line, there
5 may have been something close to equal fire, but it was hard to count
6 rounds during such battles and hard to determine who was firing. We had
7 no proper equipment to see a source of fire; only binoculars, until they
8 were stolen. Only by doing a site investigation could we determine
9 direction of fire."
10 [Interpretation] So this is an outgoing fire that you failed to
11 notice and which you did not report. Do we have a reason not to trust
12 their report, in which the brigade, itself, is reporting how many rounds
13 of ammunition were used, which was an obligation of the commander,
14 Major Izet Berkovac, to do so?
15 A. First of all, I deny what you're saying. This outgoing fire, I
16 don't know exactly what you mean by that, but we did not miss 483 rounds.
17 I stated that before. There were no 483 outgoing rounds from the
18 specific area of 105 Brigade. There were a lot of fighting going on
19 during those days in the confrontation line. There were many explosions
20 in the confrontation line, so many that we were not able to count it or
21 even to make note of from where they came or from whom they were. That
22 was a visualisation of the fact that there was a huge battle going on in
23 and around the confrontation line. But as I stated before, we were not
24 allowed close to the confrontation line, due to various factors. It was
25 much too dangerous there, and it was an ordered to stay away from that,
1 especially on those days when there was a lot of fighting going on. But
2 on those occasions, there were not 483 large caliber rounds outgoing from
3 the area of 105 Brigade. I don't know what I can make more clear of
4 that. So we did not miss them.
5 Q. Thank you. Due to the shortage of time, sir, we're not showing
6 the daily consumption. Starting from the 15th of May until the 15th of
7 July, thousands of shells were fired, and not less than 1.000 shells were
8 fired from your area by these brigades from the depth of their territory,
9 and this area, Lieutenant-Colonel, was full of legitimate military
10 targets. Are you trying to say that these forces were not structured in
11 the similar way as the JNA or NATO?
12 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer the question: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, that -- Dr. Karadzic, with respect,
14 is getting argumentative with the witness and giving evidence, himself.
15 JUDGE KWON: I thought he was giving his case to the witness, and
16 the witness can answer the question.
17 THE WITNESS: I don't know what I can add to it more.
18 What I already stated is that the large amount of outgoing rounds
19 from the depth -- what Mr. Karadzic called the depth of the brigade area
20 of operations, they were not. We haven't witnessed so many rounds.
21 That's absolutely what I can state. During the period that I was there,
22 that's one thing I can say.
23 The second thing, I can only repeat what I have already stated,
24 I think, 10 times before, is that we did not witness the amount of troops
25 that is now scheduled to be there -- to have been there, and I don't
1 believe that 15.000 Bosnian Army troops were in the specific part of
2 Sarajevo that I was doing my work; especially mounting a large attack
3 from such a small area, and I said it before, to my opinion, it is, first
4 of all, nearly impossible; secondly, if it would have been done, we would
5 have seen it, especially during clear daylight, because it was partly
6 happening during clear daylight. So I just do not believe in that.
7 I cannot add anything more to what I already said, and I start to
8 repeat myself, and I don't think you are waiting for that.
9 JUDGE KWON: It's time to take a break, Mr. Karadzic.
10 Do you like to tender that document?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
12 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
13 MS. EDGERTON: No objection.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The witness commented on this document, and we
15 need that to understand his context. Yes, that will be admitted.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D890, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for half an hour. We'll resume
18 at 10 past 2.00. At that time, Mr. Karadzic, you will have an hour to
19 conclude your cross-examination.
20 THE ACCUSED: Ten past 1.00, if I --
21 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, 10 past 1.00. Thank you very much.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 --- Recess taken at 12.43 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 1.14 p.m.
25 JUDGE KWON: Can we go into private session briefly.
1 [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of Chamber]
2 THE REGISTRAR: We are in private session, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Robinson, we received the response from
5 Mr. Tudjman, and I read your motion for reply, but I was wondering
6 whether you could agree to the method suggested by Mr. Tudjman or, in one
7 way or another, come to a sort of an agreement.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
9 We have a solution in mind which is a little bit different; that
10 is, to ask the Government of Croatia whether it would waive the state's
11 secrets requirement, so that it would allow him to be interviewed by us.
12 So we prefer to be the ones to conduct the interview. And if you would
13 allow us to submit a reply, we could submit it today, and it covers our
14 proposal for trying to resolve that situation.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well. It is granted.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: We go back to open session, and we'll bring in the
19 [Open session]
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] While we are waiting for the
21 witness, I have to say the following: This witness cannot be validly
22 questioned during the remainder of the time that I have. I have to
23 question him about the Markale, the sniping incident, the air-bombs,
24 et cetera, and there are lots of things that pertain to the zone of the
25 three brigades that he observed. UNPROFOR said, anyway, that these
1 reports by the observers were unreliable. His statement is full of
2 assertions, but, nevertheless, we have to deal with Markale, the sniping
3 incident, and the air-bombs. And for that purpose, I kindly ask the
4 Chamber to grant me one day more tomorrow.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 JUDGE KWON: It is simply your fault not to be able to cover what
7 you deem important, after having spent two hours which, in the opinion of
8 the Chamber, speaking for myself, at least, could have been put in 10
9 minutes. You have one hour, Mr. Karadzic.
10 In the meantime, for your information, tomorrow, due to an
11 extraordinary plenary of the Judges, we'll resume -- we'll start at
12 quarter past 11.00, and we'll have two 90-minute sessions with a
13 half-an-hour break.
14 Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect,
16 Your Excellency, I don't think I wasted time, and the reason is that this
17 witness's statement is full of assertions that the Defence has to comment
18 and shed light on, and there's nothing else that I can do --
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do not waste time. Let's come to your
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The fact is that I cannot finish.
22 That's the problem.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, whenever possible, would you please give
25 me a yes-or-no answer.
1 You participated in the investigation of the incident of the 28th
2 of August which took place at Markale; is that correct?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. Thank you. You arrived at the scene some 30 or 40 minutes after
5 the incident, alongside investigators from the Bosnian police; is that
7 A. I came together there with the team of the Bosnian police, that's
9 Q. Is it true that the scene you found there was one of evacuation
10 that was in progress of the dead and the wounded?
11 A. When I arrived on the scene, all the dead or wounded were already
13 Q. Thank you. That means that the police -- the Bosnian police was
14 already there and they had conducted certain operations before your
15 arrival; is that correct?
16 A. I have no evidence of that, but I assume that seeing the amount
17 of people, that some of those people were Bosnian police. But I do not
18 have any evidence of that. I arrived there together with a team of
19 Bosnian police officers that I picked up at their police station. I'm
20 not aware of who was walking around there. I don't know all the
21 individuals that were there.
22 Q. Thank you. In one of the documents, it is said that you arrived
23 at the scene at around 11.55; is that correct? It's document P14445, a
24 UN report:
25 [In English] "The BH chief of police requested the UNMO
1 assistants to investigate the incident. A team Sedrenik PTL arrived at
2 the scene at 11.55 and was included along with sector engineer and BH
3 police investigators as part of a joint investigation team."
4 [Interpretation] Is this correct?
5 A. I'm not quite sure whether -- is this a document I have on the
6 screen? Is that the document that you refer to?
7 Q. The document is in evidence, but we don't have time to call it
8 up. It's P1445, page 9. The parties can see it.
9 But you do confirm that you arrived at around 11.45?
10 A. I confirmed what I said before, that I arrived around 40 minutes
11 later than the impact. The impact was at 11.10, so I might have been
12 there at 11.45 or 11.50. I really don't know that anymore. If there is
13 an official report which you apparently refer to which has been put into
14 evidence, I refer to P14445 [sic], it says "1.55," it might be as close
15 as it can be.
16 Q. Thank you. Is it true that you were not able to conduct the
17 usually investigation at Markale and to apply the normal standards that
18 are used in other investigations?
19 A. That is not true. I did exact -- we used the exact same way of
20 working as we did at any other investigation.
21 Q. Let us look at paragraph 13 of your 2006 statement.
22 Paragraph 13:
23 [In English] "The term the 'fuse funnel,' on a hard surface such
24 as the Markale incident, the fuse is often destroyed, leaving no funnel.
25 At Markale, on the 28th of August, 1995, I did not see a fuse funnel."
1 [Interpretation] And then you go on to say that the casualties
2 had been evacuated. And in paragraph 53 of your consolidated statement,
3 you say:
4 [In English] "Forty minutes after the explosion, all the victims
5 were evacuated."
6 [Interpretation] Is it standard practice to change the scene of
7 crime to such an extent, and is it possible, under such circumstances, to
8 conduct an appropriate and proper investigation?
9 A. As I said before, we did exactly the same sort of investigation
10 as we did at any other investigation, so I do not know what you mean by
11 "changing the scene of crime to such an extent" and -- I really don't
12 know. I can only say, once more, we did exactly the same investigation
13 as we did on every other occasion, which means trying -- establishing
14 what happened, mortar explosion, find the line of fire, find parts of the
15 mortar projectile, et cetera, et cetera, establish what we could see over
16 there, remnants of bodies, which is, at the end, consolidated in my
17 patrol report, which is, as part of the evidence of the OTP, of course,
19 Q. But in your 2006 statement, paragraph 22, you, yourself, admitted
20 that you conducted a limited investigation because none of you were
21 expert in ballistics and you didn't have enough time or proper conditions
22 for an investigation.
23 [In English] "... it would have been easier later on, with real
24 crater analysis experts with lots of time. I did not go back later on to
25 the further measurement."
1 [Interpretation] Is this what it says here?
2 A. Which is exactly the same what we did every time. We never had
3 time to do an extensive crater analysis. We never went back to any other
4 sort of investigation. We kept it to a simple method, and the simple
5 method is the limited investigation, that you try to establish, as good
6 as you can, the line of fire and try to find the remnants of the mortar
7 or any other projectile that was used. That is a limited investigation.
8 And if you have more time and if you have the possibilities with
9 instruments and -- survey instruments available, and if you have time,
10 and if you are granted the possibility, and if it's not dangerous, you
11 can do a lot of more things. But we did not have those instruments, we
12 had only limited capabilities, so that's what we did over and over again.
13 So this investigation was no exception to the rule, it was no exception
14 in comparison with the other ones.
15 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that for evacuation of 38 dead people
16 and some 60 wounded people, at least twice as many people are required,
17 and that all these casualties were evacuated by being loaded onto the
18 trucks? Do you agree that such a high activity could have resulted in
19 the tampering of the scene before your arrival?
20 A. I don't agree with your statement. I don't know what happened in
21 the time that I -- before I was there. I have no knowledge of that. I
22 was not there, so I only can talk about the moment that I arrived and
23 what I did afterwards.
24 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 76 of your consolidated statement, you
25 said that one could roughly determine the origin of fire of the
1 projectile; is that correct?
2 [In English] " ... gives you the rough bearing of where the
3 projectile came from."
4 A. And which part are you -- which paragraph, 76?
5 Q. 76: "The middle line of these two equal patterns gives you the
6 rough bearing of where the projectile came from."
7 A. That's correct, and later on I explained, in the same -- in this
8 same explanation, what I meant with "rough bearing," because a compass
9 reading is never exactly correct until the single minute or even what
10 kind of measurement you use. It's still a compass bearing which is
11 influenced by other external issues. That's what I mean with "a rough
13 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. So you said that a mistake was
14 possible. First of all, you said that you didn't use an army compass;
15 secondly, that metal part of equipment could have affected the
16 performance of the compass; and, thirdly, you listed a number of
17 scenarios of the possible mistake and error. In your view, expressed in
18 degrees, how big the mistake was?
19 A. I express that in my report, and I think I stated there between
20 10 degrees left and 10 degrees to the right, which means that when you
21 measure 170, the angle of fire could have been 180 or 160, but they are
22 still -- are in a rough southern direction.
23 Q. Thank you. That is correct that you did say that in one
24 statement. This is the consolidated statement.
25 Look at your statement, paragraph 15 of your statement from 2006.
1 Paragraph 15:
2 [In English] "We had to work very quickly because of the
3 situation, the angry crowd, the need to complete our report as soon as
4 possible. I'm sure that the margin of error could not have been 70
5 degrees difference, but it is possible that there may have been 30 to 40
6 degrees margin of error."
7 [Interpretation] 5 to 45 degrees error of margin is possible
8 according to your statement; is that correct?
9 A. I redirected that in my later statement, my amalgamated
10 statement, until -- to 10 left and 10 right, so in a 20 of maximum, so
11 that's all I can add to that.
12 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that no one from your team, including
13 yourself, spoke with the eye-witnesses?
14 A. We did not speak with any eye-witness, no.
15 Q. Thank you. Also, you did not use a stick, even though the
16 findings would have been more accurate with the stick?
17 A. I assume you refer to the stick method that you can use in order
18 to measure the angle of fire. It's very hard to use sticks in a concrete
19 environment, where you have no equipment for that. Besides that, we were
20 not provided by the UN with sticks or any other equipment in order to
21 measure the line of fire, so the thing we did, and I think that's
22 accurate enough, is to divide the crater in two parts, two equal parts,
23 and measure the line that you have on that by -- with a compass. It's
24 the exact same method that the French UNPROFOR soldiers on the spot used,
25 and they came, by the way, to the exact same direction of fire as we did,
1 only they measured it in mils, which is a military method, and they came,
2 I think, to 2.850 mils, which equals 170 degrees. That was our
3 conclusion, so -- which is, apparently, that the line of fire was
4 reasonably clear, that it came from the southern direction from the city.
5 Q. Thank you. You said that the stabiliser was found at the scene.
6 Can you tell us, what was the distance from the center of the explosion
7 that the stabiliser was found?
8 A. I'm not quite sure anymore. I think I've stated that somewhere
9 in one of the reports. I think I used the term 10 metres, 10 or 15
10 metres, but I'm not quite sure. I should have to look that into my
11 former declarations.
12 Q. Thank you. I will remind you. In paragraph 56 of the
13 consolidated statement, you said 20 metres, and in the statement of 1996,
14 on page 3, you said perhaps 50 metres from the center of the explosion.
15 Is that right? And then in 2003, you said that it lay on the ground five
16 to ten metres from the point of impact; is that correct?
17 A. If these declarations are in my statements, then that's what I
18 stated in that moment in time, yes.
19 Q. Thank you. Who took the stabiliser away from the scene,
20 according to your information? Who took it away?
21 A. I don't know who took it. I did not take it, so -- I don't know
22 who took it.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 10117, 10117. You have that
24 document in front of you. That is your -- that is information,
25 information report of the 3rd of September, 1993 -- 2003.
1 JUDGE KWON: Can you switch into e-court from Sanction. Yes,
2 thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. On page 3:
5 [In English] "Konings recalls observing the tail-fin which was
6 lying on the ground only five, ten metres from the impact."
7 [Interpretation] How can you explain the difference between five
8 metres and forty metres?
9 A. I cannot explain that at this moment in time. Those declarations
10 have been taken from me in various moments in time, in 1996, in 2003, in
11 2006, and I hope you understand that bringing the memories back from that
12 day in 1995 might cause some misunderstanding in where I found the tail
13 and how much distance that was from the point of explosion.
14 One thing, to make clear, we found the tail, and it was in the
15 vicinity of the explosion. We explored the tail, and we saw -- we
16 explored that it came from a 120-millimetre projectile. But I do not
17 recall the exact distance anymore. And, again, those moments were taken
18 in various moments of my further life after 1995, and I cannot explain
19 why I used different distances.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am not sure that this is the
21 right document. Can we have 65 ter 10120, 10120. 10120, page 3.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you remember who took the stabiliser from the scene?
24 A. As I said before, I don't know.
25 Q. You can look at the first paragraph here, one sentence but last,
1 where it says the video view --
2 JUDGE KWON: Before you continue: Lieutenant-Colonel, do you
3 know what document this is about?
4 THE WITNESS: I have a document in front of me, which is one of
5 my declarations that I gave, and, yes, I think I have the right document
6 in front of me.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, this is a report from the
8 Prosecution after having an interview with you.
9 THE WITNESS: And I read there --
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Q. You say here:
14 "The Special Committee of Inspectors of the Bosnian police ..."
15 [In English] " ... collected the tail-fin. The tail markings of
16 each round were verified and recorded by Higgs and for the UNMO reports."
17 [Interpretation] Is that correct? Thus, the Muslim police took
18 the tail-fin; is that right?
19 A. I have declared that in this report in 2003, so, yeah, well, I
20 am -- on that moment, I declared it, so it must be correct. I do not
21 really recall that today anymore. It's -- but if it's there -- if it
22 says there I have said that, I have signed it, so yes.
23 Q. You said that it wasn't unusual for the tail-fin to be so
24 damaged; is that correct?
25 A. I don't know where I said that, but you might show me that --
1 Q. Paragraph 57 of the consolidated statement states that:
2 "It wasn't unusual for the tail-fin to be bent."
3 [In English] "It was not something unusual. On earlier
4 occasions, we found tail-fins which were also damaged."
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. Do you know how this
7 damage came about?
8 A. As I explained in my report towards the Office of the
9 Prosecution, it's that there's a huge force coming free once a projectile
10 hits the ground and explodes, and that damage is -- that force is
11 damaging the tail of the mortar projectile.
12 Q. Do you agree that such a shell, with a charge that is bigger than
13 the usual one, it is more common for the tail-fin to embed itself in the
14 center of the explosion rather than to be ejected at some distance from
15 the place of the explosion?
16 A. I don't know what you mean by "such a shell with a charge that is
17 bigger than the usual one." I have no idea what you mean by that.
18 Q. We will come back to that.
19 If this was a common bend of the tail-fin, why did you say that
20 it had been driven over by a vehicle?
21 JUDGE KWON: I don't follow the question.
22 Yes, Ms. Edgerton. Just a second.
23 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
24 MS. EDGERTON: I actually don't follow the one before that,
25 either, Your Honour, where, at page 88, line 16, Dr. Karadzic asked
1 Lieutenant-Colonel Konings:
2 "What do you mean --"
3 Or perhaps it was an answer:
4 "-- by such a shell with a charge that is bigger than the usual
6 I -- I've just -- where does that come from? I saw no reference
7 to any statement by Lieutenant-Colonel Konings anywhere to that effect.
8 And, similarly, I see no reference to where the second question
9 is derived from, either.
10 JUDGE KWON: You should give your --
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will come back to that, but it
12 is generally known that the position of Lieutenant-Colonel Konings is
13 that the shell of 120 millimetres is not fired with the basic charge, not
14 even with the first charge, and that this one came with a charge greater
15 than three, whereby it would have to be embedded into the ground, as it
16 was in the Markale incident, for a distance of 26 millimetres --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic repeat the last thing he
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The interpreters didn't hear the
21 last part of your statement.
22 But before that: Mr. Konings, do you like to comment on this?
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, because in the question or the
24 remarks - I don't know whether I should call it a question or
25 remarks - that are put forward now, different issues are now compared to
1 each other, which make it impossible for me to answer questions. We are
2 talking about a projectile tail. We are suddenly talking about the
3 charge, but I assume that Mr. Karadzic means the charge that the
4 projectile is fired with, not the charge that -- in the projectile body,
5 itself. So suddenly a variety of parameters is coming in which I cannot
6 comment upon. And I need to have clear questions on clear things,
7 otherwise I cannot give you any clear answer.
8 JUDGE KWON: Fair enough. Thank you.
9 Mr. Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but for that, we need more
11 time. That is why we're hurrying.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Can you please look at page 3 of your information report from
14 2003, where you say -- where the Prosecution interprets that you say:
15 [In English] "the tail-fin was bent. While this is common as the
16 effect of the blast normally damages the fins, the appearance of the
17 tail-fin on the video suggests that it may have been damaged by vehicle
18 tyres when the victims were moved."
19 A. In which declaration are you reading that? I'm trying to find
21 JUDGE KWON: Probably it's before -- on the monitor. Where is
22 it, Mr. Karadzic?
23 THE ACCUSED: The first paragraph on the screen:
24 "A video view of the tail-fin also gives the impression it may
25 have been damaged by tyre when the victims were --"
1 JUDGE KWON: Third paragraph.
2 THE WITNESS: I see what you mean.
3 It is a possible explanation, but what I -- it's important not to
4 take that out of its proportions, is what I say before and what we say in
5 relation to all other investigations that we did, is that the tail,
6 nevertheless, is damaged. You find a damaged tail. The fact that the
7 fins are completely bent, if you look to the video screen and looking to
8 the movie, they are nearly folded against the body of the mortar
9 projectile -- of the fin -- of the tail-fin, gave, at the moment that I
10 saw the video, the impression that there might have been extra damage by
11 tyres of a vehicle that drove on top of it, but that's just an
13 I want to make clear that the tail of a mortar projectile of
14 these types of mortars is damaged anyhow when it hits -- when it's
15 hitting the ground and is part of the impact and part of the explosion.
16 And that's what we found, a variety of damage to these fins, on all
17 occasions that I did an investigation.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Q. You are assuming that the vehicles had driven over the tail-fin.
20 How can we know where the tail-fin was, then, and what the scene was like
21 before you got there? In other words, does that make it more difficult
22 to establish what, actually, the situation was?
23 A. Well, this question, with all due respect, is -- I'm the wrong
24 person to ask that. I came there on a certain moment in time. I have
25 established what I saw, I've written my patrol report. That's part of
1 your evidence of my -- of the evidence in court. There are two patrol
2 reports. Everything I've stated is there. In addition, there are
3 several reports that were made in the period afterwards. And whatever
4 happened before I came there, whatever has been done, I don't know. I
5 only can state of what I saw and what I wrote down.
6 Q. Thank you. In the Markale I incident, the shell of the same
7 calibre, 120 millimetres, that tail-fin embedded itself in the very
8 center of the blast, on a similar surface, and it was embedded to a depth
9 of 26 centimetres. Actually, the depth was nine centimetres below level
10 zero. How do you explain that the tail-fin here was ejected so many
11 metres away, whereas in the first case the tail-fin struck or was
12 embedded in the very center of the blast?
13 A. I have no comment on the first Markale incident. I have no
14 detailed knowledge of that, whatsoever, so I cannot comment on that. I
15 only can comment on the things I saw and my explanation of what happened
17 Q. Thank you. You said that -- in paragraph 87 of the consolidated
18 statement, you said:
19 [In English] "Sarajevo was surrounded by Serb troops, and also in
20 the biggest part around Sarajevo, Bosnian Army troops were opposing Serb
21 troops in trenches. And in other military emplacements, there were
22 various troops from both sides in the area between 170 degrees and 220 up
23 to 240 degrees."
24 [Interpretation] You are aware that in this range of these five
25 shells were -- in that area, the Bosnian Army and Serbian Army troops
1 were deployed?
2 A. Yes, that's what I stated in my statement.
3 Q. Thank you. You said that that morning it was quite clear and
4 calm, and that is why you could hear the incoming fire, and had the
5 fire -- had it been fired also from the Muslim territory, one would have
6 been able to hear that as well; is that correct?
7 A. It's not only about the incoming fire; it's also about what I
8 stated, the outgoing round, so the firing -- the actual firing of a
9 projectile, itself. Everything that was in the vicinity -- in the larger
10 vicinity of OP-1 or anywhere else in Sarajevo would have been heard,
11 whether it was from Muslim territory or from direct related Bosnian Army
12 territory. That's what we stated. And there was no sound of outgoing
13 rounds anywhere in that area, only the sound and the vision of incoming
14 round, so the explosions, itself, in the city.
15 Q. Thank you. I don't have time to call up the UN document which
16 states -- that is P1145, which said that there were 108 explosions during
17 the reporting period. This is the 28th of August, until 5.00 p.m. that
18 day. But, please, can you explain to us: How is it possible that your
19 observers heard one explosion, while there were actually two explosions?
20 A. I don't know. There -- I only can say what my observers heard or
21 saw, which is in the statements. I do not recall that there was an idea
22 about two explosions. So if they said they heard one explosion, the two
23 on the OP-1, I assume that you mean those two, that if they have stated
24 that they heard one explosion and saw one explosion, because they saw it
25 as well, then that's their statement, and that fits with the fact that
1 there was one explosion at the Markale.
2 Q. 200 metres from Markale, before this fifth shell, four more
3 shells dropped. Those four shells, no one -- none of your people heard
4 them. Secondly, even though four shells dropped at a distance of 400
5 metres away, Markale was full of people who were waiting for the fifth
6 shell. How can you explain these illogical things? How come your
7 observers did not record four incoming shells, the explosions that could
8 be heard, and how do you explain that nobody sought shelter after
9 four 120-millimetre shells fell?
10 A. The last point, I cannot explain, because I don't know what
11 people thought and what people heard on the moment that the Markale
12 projectile exploded and the four projectiles exploded before. And as far
13 as I can recall, my people at the OP-1 recorded those four projectiles,
14 indeed, and they can be found back in the report of the UNMO HQ of
15 Sarajevo to the UNMO HQ in Zagreb.
16 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, with all due respect, your associate,
17 Mr. Knustadt, stated that he heard the explosion of an explosive device.
18 If I may call up 1D2826 now, 1D2826 in the e-court, "Explosive
20 Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, is it usual for a military expert to use
21 the term "explosive device" instead of saying "mortar shells"?
22 A. I would like first to read what he said.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 3, please,
24 paragraph 3.
25 THE WITNESS: Well, this is in the language I cannot read, and so
1 I have no comment on this document.
2 THE ACCUSED: I will read you, and if I can ask --
3 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
4 THE ACCUSED: May I ask --
5 JUDGE KWON: Why do we not have it in the English version?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a technical misstep by the
8 Can we ask, then, to put up the English original.
9 If I can read the paragraph until we get the statement.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, put your question. You already asked the
12 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, we can print up the statement, if
13 need be. It's -- yeah. It's going to take a few minutes to print up the
14 statement, but I think that's better, to be quite honest.
15 JUDGE KWON: But we don't have it in e-court?
16 MS. EDGERTON: No.
17 JUDGE KWON: But how could you print it? It's on a separate
18 hard-drive. Okay.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. While we are waiting: In paragraph 72 of your consolidated
21 statement, it says:
22 [In English] "I talked with two UNMOs on my team, Major Conway
23 and Major Knustadt, who manned OP-1. They reported to me that they did
24 not observe any outgoing shots from the Bosnian-held territory."
25 [Interpretation] Do you know that they also said that nothing
1 flew over them either?
2 A. That might have been that they have said that or I would read
3 that. And, again, I cannot not judge their -- I cannot deny their
4 explanations or their testimonies, but I would really like to read that
5 so that I can judge it myself, what they exactly said.
6 JUDGE KWON: Let's put it on the ELMO.
7 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, I was too enthusiastic. There's two
8 diagrams that were attached to that statement.
9 JUDGE KWON: This is the one about whom you corrected the
10 spelling, yes.
11 THE ACCUSED: Page 3, please:
12 "OP, as previously stated --"
13 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
14 THE ACCUSED: "OP, as previously stated ..."
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Do you see this paragraph?
17 A. Sorry? I don't understand what was said. I don't -- it was
18 quite soft. What is the question, because I'm puzzled, what I have to --
19 JUDGE KWON: No. He asked to read that part first, and --
20 THE WITNESS: Which part do I have to read?
21 JUDGE KWON: The third paragraph, I take it.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There's some sort of confusion with
23 this translation. I'm not sure where this is going.
24 Can we -- leave this.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Tell us, please, on the scene, itself, were you under pressure by
2 the investigating team to pronounce yourself as soon as possible on the
3 direction of fire?
4 Just leave it while we organise ourselves.
5 Well, let me try to assist you. It's P150, page 2, the
6 manuscript, where the B/C/S translation says:
7 "The investigating team invested great efforts to prove that the
8 attack originated from the Serb side. That was probably because of the
9 unusual use of heavy mortars, but there is no hard evidence for that."
10 And then you say in another place that:
11 "The Bosnian part of the team asked you to determine, as quickly
12 as possible, that the shell was a Serbian one."
13 It's page 2 of this document.
14 Pardon. [In English] "The investigation" -- [Interpretation]
15 Just one moment.
16 JUDGE KWON: I think that seems to be the last paragraph on this
17 page. What is your question?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Were you --
21 JUDGE KWON: Collapse this B/C/S version.
22 Did you read that passage, Mr. Konings?
23 THE WITNESS: If it can be made a bit larger, that would be
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that's what I wonder.
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's clear to me, yeah. But I still don't
2 know what the question is, so --
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. The question is: Was the investigating team making efforts to
5 prove that this projectile came from the Serbian side?
6 A. The investigation team was making a lot of efforts in order to
7 try to find the origin of fire. And being a Bosnian Army investigation
8 team, it seemed logical that they tried to prove that it came from the
9 Serb side. Besides, I understand that a war was going on there. But you
10 can read in paragraph number 3 what my conclusion was at the end of the
11 day of 28 of August.
12 Q. What's written here, Lieutenant-Colonel, is that efforts were
13 made to prove that Serbs were to blame, not the origin of fire. And then
14 it says since a heavy mortar is involved -- are you going to tell me that
15 the Muslim side had no heavy mortars in Sarajevo?
16 A. I'm not telling you anything, and I do not state that. I do not
17 understand the question. It's suddenly a jump from one issue to another
18 issue, which I do not understand what you -- what you're really asking me
19 now. I'm not -- I never stated or never said anything that the Muslims
20 did not have heavy mortars inside Sarajevo.
21 Q. But it says that this is impossible, due to the use of heavy
22 mortars, so it's -- there's no evidence to blame it on the Serbs, so what
23 is the reason? Why was this blamed on the Serbs? I'm just stating that
24 Muslims also had heavy mortars in the center of Sarajevo.
25 A. The patrol report that is now in front of me has seen -- has a
1 piece of information, as I explained before, which is counted together by
2 the UN organisation, by UNPROFOR, to make a complete picture of what
3 happened on the 28 of August. This patrol report is written at the end
4 of -- on the 28th. On that moment in time, and only on that moment in
5 time, I came to these patrol leader's remarks. On that moment in time, I
6 had nothing further to add to what I saw and to what my -- I even didn't
7 make any conclusions, because conclusions had to be made by my
8 high-ranking superiors. It's something that they did later on.
9 During the later days, the commander of UNPROFOR came to the
10 conclusion that the round came from the Serb side. I never made that
11 conclusion. On the moment in time that this report was written, the
12 remark, as stated there, the investigation team tried very hard to prove
13 that the attack came from the Serb side, and the investigation team is
14 the overall investigation team of which we were a kind of observation
15 part. Due to the normal use of heavy mortars, that is likely, that's my
16 own conclusion, but there is no hard proof on this fact. That was stated
17 on the moment in time on the 28 of August, which is, I think, very clear.
18 It doesn't say anything about the fact whether the Muslim Army had 120s,
19 yes or no. There is no -- no relevance to that in this moment in time.
20 Q. Thank you. By excluding the possibility that the shell came from
21 the separation line or the positions of the BH Army, you drew two
22 conclusions; first of all, that the observers at OP-1 did not hear
23 outgoing fire, and, two, that it was not militarily justified to use the
24 first charge on a 120-millimetre mortar?
25 A. Again, I don't understand the question. I only can say that we
1 observed -- what we observed is that there was a round at Markale. My
2 observers did not hear or see any outgoing rounds from their vicinity,
3 from the Bosnian Army territory, or even from the confrontation line
4 where also Bosnian Serbs were. That's one thing.
5 The second thing is the term "militarily justifies to use the
6 first charge," I never used that. I only have said that in our view, the
7 view of the Royal Netherlands Army, we hardly -- we seldom or never use
8 the lowest charge of a mortar. That's a military habit that we use,
9 because when you use a 120 with a lower charge, propelling charge, I
10 mean, then it will explode in the vicinity of your own troops, which is
11 quite dangerous. So we don't use that. But it is of non-interest here,
12 because there were no outgoing rounds from the vicinity of OP-1, so the
13 charge that has been used must have been bigger than charge O, charge 1,
14 or even charge 2. And that's not only my conclusion. That's also the
15 conclusion of the commander of UNPROFOR which came out a few days later.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I wanted to let you know that you will
17 have five minutes.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I must say that this witness has
19 not ben examined. Regardless of my amateurism, he has not been examined,
20 not even on the subject of Markale, let alone anything else. Just for
21 Markale, I need one more hour. I must ask the Trial Chamber to give me
22 another 90 minutes, one session, tomorrow for this witness, for Markale
23 specifically. Certain statements have been made that we have to refute.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I made it clear on several occasions
25 that we'll stick to the time-limit this time. You didn't hear me at all.
1 If you couldn't cover all the points you wanted to cover, so be it.
2 I take it you don't have many items to cover during your
3 re-examination, Ms. Edgerton.
4 MS. EDGERTON: In fact, none.
5 JUDGE KWON: Given that it would be impractical to call another
6 witness until the end of the day, then, you'll have about 15 minutes to
7 finish your cross-examination.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, is it true that the angle of descent of this
10 shell could have been 67 degrees or more, but certainly not less?
11 A. That's our conclusion, 76 [sic] degrees or more, yes. It is
12 wrong on the text. It's 60 -- it now says "67." It now says "76," it
13 should be "67."
14 Q. Yes, 67.
15 Can we now ask for 1D2830. 1830 -- sorry, 2830.
16 Please look, Lieutenant-Colonel, at this diagram. If we take it
17 that this angle on either side was 67 degrees, would you, with your
18 knowledge of firing tables, say that these distances correspond to the
19 charges? Would, for instance, the first charge, 0 plus 1, reach to about
20 900 metres; 0 plus 2 would have a range of 1600; 0 plus 3 would have a
21 range of 2500, et cetera?
22 A. Yes, that's what this diagram is explaining.
23 Q. Thank you. Would you then agree, Lieutenant-Colonel, that the
24 apex of these trajectories would also have to be as drawn here? The
25 lowest charge would be over 500 metres in height, the next one 900
1 metres, the third one 1400 metres, et cetera?
2 A. I guess that this diagram is correct. So if you read the
3 diagram, it states the culmination point of every projectile fired with a
4 specific round, under theoretical conditions, which I think that this is,
5 coming from a firing table, and it states how -- or what the culmination
6 point, as we call it, from a round is using a certain -- certain
7 propelling charge, yes.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, before we go any further with this
10 document, which is headed in a language I don't understand, can we found
11 out, actually, what it purports to represent?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may explain.
13 This is a graphic chart, Judge, of firing tables with different
14 charges with an angle of descent of 67 degrees.
15 JUDGE KWON: Where did you get this?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have a manual with firing
17 tables. We can show it.
18 JUDGE KWON: Is it an excerpt from a book or is it something that
19 was produced by the Defence team?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a manual, a firing manual
21 including firing tables, and on this table, on this chart, we see
22 trajectories with various charges. The only constant here is the angle
23 of descent. It has to be 67 degrees or more. Otherwise, the projectile
24 would have gone through the building. So the lowest possible angle of
25 descent is 67 degrees. These are measurements that apply to various
2 JUDGE KWON: I was asking about the source of this document, but
3 you didn't answer.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Firing tables for 120-millimetre
5 mortars. It's a manual, a military book, published in 1982. It's a
6 manual for our mortars.
7 JUDGE KWON: So is this diagram produced by the Defence team on
8 the basis of that manual? That was my question.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's correct, those are firing
10 elements for various charges. Anyone can check. Anyone can check in the
11 book, and the lieutenant-colonel has already recognised this diagram as a
12 visualisation of the numbers.
13 JUDGE KWON: My apologies. I kept you waiting. Ms. Edgerton,
15 MS. EDGERTON: No apology required, Your Honour.
16 I would be prepared to accept the actual firing table for the
17 mortar produced -- for that batch of mortars produced at the period of
18 time that the artefact which caused the deaths at Markale II was
19 manufactured from that particular factory. I understand these firing
20 tables are specific to batches of weapons, batches produced at particular
21 factories at particular times, and I have no assurance, based on what
22 we've heard so far, that this represents that, indeed.
23 JUDGE KWON: Let's see how it goes. But the topic you raised,
24 maybe it's a proper topic for your redirect, possibly.
25 We'll hear the remainder of your cross-examination. What is your
1 question in relation to this diagram?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will present the tables as well.
3 We have an up-loaded document with tables.
4 Can we now see 1D2231; the same thing, only with a radar drawn
6 Until then, before we see 1D2231, I would like to say to
7 Ms. Edgerton that these are tables for all charges. It is a standard
8 thing does not vary from case to case.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, do you recall that the Cymbeline radar was
11 operating, and the lower -- lowest limit at which it would register a
12 projectile was set to 548 metres? So if the charge was 0 plus 1, and if
13 it had been fired 900 metres into Muslim territory, it would have been
14 registered. That's what we see, that the setting was to 548 metres, and
15 even the apex of the first shell for the first charge would have been
17 May I ask you once again. You claim, or at least it's your
18 position, that this shell that came from the Serb territory from a
19 distance of more than 2500 metres somehow slipped below the radar beam of
20 the Cymbelin radar which was set to 548 metres on the lower end?
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, again, I actually have a lot of
23 trouble with this question because the question is being asked based on a
24 document that assumes the -- excuse me -- that assumes the center point
25 of the Cymbelin radar, and we have no information to be able to determine
1 whether or not that assertion is accurate. We don't know where the
2 center point of the radar might have been.
3 THE WITNESS: Do I add to that, Your Honour?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, you may.
5 THE WITNESS: I cannot say anything about it. I am not aware
6 about the capabilities of the Cymbelin radar. I don't know which
7 settings it had that day. It was an UNPROFOR radar. It was not
8 controlled by the UNMOs. I had no with them before or after the
9 incident. I know that in the G-2 UNPROFOR report, there is something
10 mentioned about the Cymbelin radar, but I cannot add any information to
11 that whatsoever.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, let us look at 09917.
14 That's 65 ter 09917.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. You say:
17 "Every projectile fired in such a way that its trajectory runs
18 below the radar beam had to come from a place at a distance of between
19 1.050 and 3.500 metres."
20 You claim that this shell came from the Serbian side.
21 Can we see page 3 now.
22 So you are aware of the radar, you know at which height the radar
23 was able to register shells, and you claim that this shell had to be
24 fired from a distance greater than 1.050 metres in order to slip below
25 the radar beam.
1 Look at this paragraph 4. That's your report, where you say that
2 the radar was set --
3 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
4 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
5 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, with respect, that's not his report.
6 THE WITNESS: No, it's not.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. --
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. It's a UN report, isn't it?
10 A. Your Honour, it's not my report. It's a report from HQ UNPROFOR,
11 which I had nothing to do with. I only provided the proper information
12 which we discussed before. Cymbelin radar was not under my command. I
13 had nothing to do with that, so the statement which is on the screen now
14 is "HQ UNPROFOR." I think that was stated on the first page. It's not
15 my report.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. You are an artillery man, Lieutenant-Colonel. Are you trying to
19 say that this mortar shell, coming from a greater distance, would have a
20 lower trajectory?
21 A. I'm not stating anything.
22 Q. But based on your experience and based on these tables and the
23 diagram I showed you, would it be possible for this mortar shell to fly
24 horizontally, if fired from a greater distance, and to slip below the
25 radar beam or not?
1 A. I do think I'm not in a position to comment upon those two
2 diagrams that I only was briefly possible to look upon, so I refrain from
3 having any comments on the question.
4 Q. Regardless of any diagrams, Lieutenant-Colonel, first of all,
5 would it help you if you could look at the tables, and, tell us, is it
6 possible to avoid the radar firing from Serb territory? Was it possible
7 to fire this weapon in such a way that the shell would fly below 548
8 metres in height?
9 JUDGE KWON: Is that your question, that regardless of the radar,
10 whether a projectile could fly below 548 metres?
11 Can you answer the question, if that is the question?
12 THE WITNESS: With all respect, Your Honour, I -- I don't
13 understand the question. The point is that a mortar projectile -- I'm an
14 experienced artillery and mortar man. A mortar projectile has a high
15 angle, is a high-angle projectile, which means that it flies on high
16 angles, on high -- a certain height. Each angle that you fire it with
17 has a separate angle of impact, so you really need a firing table in
18 order to find out where we are talking about.
19 I'm not willing to discuss anything anymore until I have proper
20 tables in front of me and the capability to study that. And I already
21 said before that I do not know the specifics of the Cymbelin radar. I
22 know the specifics of the radar in my own army, but I do not know the
23 specifics of the Cymbelin radar, not at that time, it was not required to
24 me, not at this time, so I cannot say -- I cannot add anything valuable
25 to this question or to these remarks.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. In this paragraph 4, it says that it is assessed that if this
3 projectile wanted to avoid the radar, it would have to be fired from a
4 greater distance to achieve a lower trajectory. Now, you, as an
5 artilleryman, just confirmed that a mortar cannot be fired directly; that
6 is to say, from a greater distance, the trajectory would be higher, not
7 lower; is that correct?
8 A. That's not what I said. Everything is taken out of proportion.
9 There is a trajectory that belongs to each charge and each angle of fire
10 that you used. And the generic basics of a mortar projectile is that it
11 is a high-angle projectile, but on each distance that you use, each
12 charge that you use, it has a different height, a different culmination
13 point. So that's the only thing I can say.
14 And, again, in combination with the radar beam, as is suggested
15 here, I cannot say anything about it. I don't know how much time -- how
16 often I have to repeat that. I don't know the specifics of the Cymbelin
17 radar on that day.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the time is up.
19 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
20 JUDGE KWON: The time is up, but I will allow you to ask one last
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask the Trial Chamber to ask
23 the witness to create a chart on the basis of tables that we will provide
24 to him, how this shell could have come in at an angle of 67 degrees and
25 had evaded the beam of the radar? This shell could not have come in like
1 that. The radar missed it, nobody saw it, but the radar had to have
2 registered it, because it's not possible for it to happen any other way.
3 I mean, it's difficult, with a witness who does not wish to co-operate,
4 to complete our cross-examination, and these proceedings are coming to
5 the point where there is a danger of its regularity being disrupted.
6 JUDGE KWON: That will be analysed by the future lawyers and
7 historians later on.
8 Do you have any redirect examination, Ms. Edgerton?
9 MS. EDGERTON: Just very briefly, Your Honour.
10 Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
11 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel Konings, you heard earlier, at page 104, lines
12 7 and 8, that firing tables are a standard thing does not vary from case
13 to case. Now, you've said just a few moments ago you're a mortar man.
14 Is that your experience of firing tables?
15 A. A firing table is a thing that is, indeed, for a generic -- a
16 generic thing. It's a theoretical basis of every artillery or mortar
17 weapon. It's not a -- indeed, not a basis -- situation-to-situation
18 related. It is a generic book wherein you find all the theoretical data
19 of a weapons system in combination with ammunition, and that book is
20 prepared or is produced on the moment that the mortar is produced and
21 that a lot of test firing is done. From there, you -- from there, in the
22 practical situation, you do measurements of weather, of wind direction,
23 wind speed, temperature of the propelling charges, in order to make
24 everything more correct. So in the basis, the firing table is not a
25 case-to-case scenario, it's a generic book that can be used for 120, in
1 general, or 155, or whatever weapons system you have.
2 Q. So then given what you've just said, that the book is prepared or
3 produced at the moment that the mortar is produced, and that a lot of
4 test firing is done, let me ask you the following: Is there the
5 likelihood of some variation in results, depending on the individual
6 mortar batches, and the test results as well?
7 A. As I said, the book is a generic book. The book is based on --
8 as far as I know, from my own experience in the NATO army, is based upon
9 firing a lot of rounds and making -- and making calculations, and
10 bringing that all together in the book.
11 What you need to do is -- batches of ammunition that are produced
12 can have different data, they differ from each other, so they are -- they
13 are produced under controlled situations, but they, nevertheless, differ.
14 There is even a difference between each weapons system. Each weapons
15 system has a different muzzle velocity, each weapons system -- although
16 you use the same batch of ammunition. That's a variety that is -- well,
17 that is related to military arms, to arms in general. So you can use the
18 theoretical data that are in the firing table, but in practice you need
19 extra data according to the weather, the ammunition, the specific batch
20 of ammunition that you have used. You gather that, you collect that, and
21 you use that. That's the practice that we do.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
23 Nothing further, Your Honours.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I did not use my last question.
25 You promised me a last question, but then you gave the floor to
1 Ms. Edgerton.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask to have P1959 in the
4 e-court. That was admitted today.
5 Further cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, what would you say if I were to tell you
8 that based on the incoming line that you stated, the line of separation
9 was not 1.050 metres but was greater than 2.000 metres? Would you agree
10 that Colina Kapa was in Muslim hands? Do you see this? This is south of
11 OP-1. There is Pogladine [phoen] and then Colina Kapa.
12 A. I have no detailed recollection of where exactly the
13 confrontation line was running in that moment, so I have nothing to say
14 on that.
15 Q. Do you agree you can see here on the scale that one little square
16 is actually one kilometre? 94 and 95 are exactly 1 kilometre apart, and
17 there is a scale between them; isn't that right?
18 A. 94 and 95, the squares are 1 by 1, but -- that's true, but I
19 don't understand the question, so --
20 Q. The question is : You can see the scale. Is that the measure of
21 one kilometre, and then can you tell how far Colina Kapa is from
22 number 5?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
24 MS. EDGERTON: Lieutenant-Colonel Konings has already answered
25 that question, Your Honours.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In his reports and in their
2 reports, it figures that it's 1.050 metres, where the Muslim territory or
3 the line is, and that is the criteria on the basis of which it was
4 determined that it was the Serbs who fired. But I'm saying that this
5 distance is closer to 3.000 than to 1.050 metres. And we know
6 Colina Kapa was in Muslim hands the whole time. We see 5. We know where
7 the line of separation was. So the distance is 3 kilometres, and so this
8 is one of the irregularities.
9 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, could you give the reference where he
10 said -- he answered the question as to the distance from -- distance
11 between number 5 and Colina Kapa?
12 MS. EDGERTON: The answer was actually at page 111, lines 8 to
13 10, where he said he had no detailed recollection of exactly where the
14 confrontation line was running in that moment, so he had nothing to say
15 on that. And the question finished with:
16 "This is south of OP-1. There is Pogladine and then
17 Colina Kapa."
18 Immediately before that:
19 "Would you agree that Colina Kapa was in Muslim hands?"
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.
21 Having had the benefit of looking at the map again, I wonder
22 whether you can answer the question as to the distance between number 5
23 and Colina Kapa?
24 THE WITNESS: I would have to measure it carefully. But if I
25 looked to that, I would assume that it is about between 2.000 and 2.500
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 JUDGE KWON: That concludes your evidence, Mr. Konings, and I
5 thank you very much for your coming to the Tribunal to give it.
6 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: Now you are free to go.
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
9 JUDGE KWON: And we'll rise for today, and we'll resume tomorrow
10 at quarter past 11.00.
11 [The witness withdrew]
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.39 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 8th day of
14 December, 2010, at 11.15 a.m.