1 Wednesday, 2 February 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
9 I'd like to introduce Kerem Gulay, who is an interim from
11 JUDGE KWON: Good morning.
12 Good morning, sir. If you could take the solemn declaration,
14 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
15 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
16 WITNESS: PATRICK RECHNER
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please make yourself comfortable,
19 Mr. Tieger, yes.
20 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
21 And I note I appear this morning with Mr. Amir Zec as well as
22 Mr. Reid.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Excuse me, Mr. Tieger.
24 Before we start the direct examination, I had one issue I wanted
25 like to raise with the Chamber, and relating to the witness's diary. And
1 I think it's appropriate to do it in the presence of the witness, but if
2 Mr. Tieger or the Chamber feels otherwise, I'll stop.
3 Mr. President --
4 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Yes, Mr. Robinson.
5 MR. ROBINSON: On the 11th of January, we learned that the
6 witness had maintained a diary while in Bosnia, and particularly while in
7 the custody of the Bosnian Serb Army, and we had requested that from the
8 Prosecution on the 11th of January. They replied to us that they had
9 forwarded our request to Canada
10 directly make that request of the Canadian Government, which we did
11 immediately. And I understand from Mr. Tieger that the diary has not
12 been produced, the witness didn't bring the diary with him, and it's not
13 in the possession of the Office of the Prosecutor.
14 So I would ask the Chamber to inquire of the witness whether he's
15 willing to make his diary available when he returns to Canada, and he can
16 redact any personal entries that exist in the diary.
17 Thank you.
18 JUDGE KWON: As you well know well, Mr. Robinson, it has been our
19 policy to intervene in the last moment, as part of the Tribunal, and
20 leave such matters in the hands of the parties' voluntary co-operation.
21 MR. ROBINSON: I think it is the last moment, because we --
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Having said that, can I inquire of the
23 witness, what his position is about on this issue.
24 Mr. Rechner.
25 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I do not have the diary in my
1 possession right now. I'm serving outside of Canada. The original copy
2 does not exist. There may be a photocopy somewhere, but I don't know --
3 a photocopy exists, but I don't have one where I'm serving now.
4 JUDGE KWON: If you have a chance to go back to Canada and find
5 that photocopy, are you minded to make a photocopy which would be
6 available to the parties, as requested by the Defence?
7 THE WITNESS: Yes, provided I can redact the necessary portions,
8 as Mr. Robinson mentioned.
9 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any observation to make, Mr. Robinson?
10 MR. ROBINSON: No. We appreciate that very much, and we'll ask
11 the Witness and Victim Unit to follow up on that as he returns. Thank
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 Examination by Mr. Tieger:
17 Q. Witness, although your name has already been mentioned, perhaps
18 we can begin by simply asking you to state your name for the record.
19 A. It's Patrick Anthony Rechner.
20 Q. And you are currently with the Canadian Armed Forces; is that
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. And your rank, sir?
24 A. Major.
25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly pause between questions and answers.
2 Thank you.
3 MR. TIEGER: Can we first call up 65 ter 90213.
4 Q. Major, do you recognise this document as your amalgamated witness
5 statement, which incorporates portions of your testimony or evidence
6 given previously in connection with the matters before the Court?
7 A. Yes, I do.
8 Q. And can you confirm that this document accurately reflects your
9 declaration and that you would provide the same information to the Court
10 if asked the same or similar questions here in court?
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
13 Your Honour, I tender 90213.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2170.
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. Major, I want to ask you a few questions about your background,
18 but particularly with respect to your previous work in former Yugoslavia
19 But first let me ask you to confirm, as I believe you did in the
20 amalgamated witness statement, that you joined the
21 Canadian Armed Forces at the age of 18, attended military college, and
22 were commissioned as an infantry officer in 1985.
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. You served with the Canadian Battalion in Western Slavonia in
25 former Yugoslavia
1 Sector West; is that right?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. And subsequently you applied to be a United Nations
4 Military Observer, an UNMO?
5 A. That is also correct.
6 Q. And thereafter served in Sector South, that is, from July of 1994
7 to December of 1994, and was subsequently posted to Pale from January to
8 June 1995; is that correct or at least approximately correct?
9 A. Approximately correct. I actually arrived on the 31st of
10 December in Pale.
11 Q. Okay, thank you. Now, first of all, Major, may I ask you to
12 explain to the Court, generally speaking, what the role of the
13 United Nations Military Observers was in former Yugoslavia?
14 A. In general, the role of the UNMO military observers was to work
15 with the different sides in the conflict, and we lived right in the local
16 communities. What distinguished us from the other peacekeeping forces
17 was that we worked in small international teams of commissioned officers
18 holding at least the rank of captain, and we were unarmed.
19 The main duties were to help supervise the following of
20 provisions in cease-fire agreements that the different parties agreed to,
21 and where we were stationed and where we were working, that was all with
22 the agreement of the parties in conflict.
23 That is, in general terms, what the UN Military Observers did.
24 As well, we got involved in doing assistance with delivery of
25 humanitarian assistance as we were able to, but that was not our primary
2 Q. Major, in connection with your work as a
3 United Nations Military Observer or UNMO in Pale in 1995, first of all,
4 did you work with a particular team?
5 A. Yes. It was the United Nations Military Observer Liaison Office
6 to the Bosnian Serb Government and the Military High Command.
7 Q. And did that liaison office have a particular designation or name
8 by which it went?
9 A. Like all UN Military Observer teams, we normally referred to
10 ourselves by our radio call sign. So in the case of our liaison team or
11 liaison office, we were called "7 Lima."
12 Q. And specifically, Major, what was the role or duties of the
13 7 Lima
14 A. We had a very unique function, different from the other military
15 observer teams, in that our work was primarily administrative and
16 political. So we did not go out patrolling or checking violations of
17 cease-fire agreements and that sort of thing. Our job was to facilitate
18 communications between the United Nations and the Bosnian Serb military
19 and political authorities, as well as then, by extension, facilitating
20 communications with other parties in the conflict and the UN. And in
21 that way, we could also act as intermediaries if the Bosnian Serb
22 authorities wished to get some information passed or received from some
23 of the other parties in conflict.
24 Our work normally involved communicating by telephone, both land
25 line, commercial, and satellite, as well as a special United Nations
1 satellite system known as VSAT
2 called CapSat, which is similar to e-mail, and also fax machines, and
3 those were means available to us to contact the UN headquarters, that is,
4 Mr. Akashi's office, and the commander of the UN peacekeeping forces in
6 Bosnian Serb side, the government in Pale, and also the Military High
7 Command in Han Pijesak, which is located about 60 kilometres away.
8 That's the Bosnian Serb Military High Command.
9 Q. Major, you mentioned earlier that as a general matter,
10 United Nations Military Observers were also involved in assisting with or
11 delivery of humanitarian assistance. Did your team in Pale become
12 involved with this kind of work as well?
13 A. Yes. On behalf of the representative of UN Civil Affairs in
15 meetings with the Bosnian Serb Government. That was primarily the
16 Vice-President's Office, Professor Koljevic, and also the health
17 minister, Mr. Kalinic, as well as the director of the Medical Services on
18 the Bosnian Serb side, which was Dr. Sosic. And that was in our official
20 Unofficially, we tried to ease the suffering in the local
21 community. And primarily through Dr. Sosic, who also was the head of the
22 hospital in Pale, we would receive some requests if we could try to
23 obtain a small amount of some vital medicine to try and deal with a
24 critical situation with some of the patients in the hospital. So in
25 support of that, we would take it on ourselves to personally go into
2 And, as well, some of the other military observers got involved
3 in a more personal capacity helping, actually, individuals in Pale and
4 the area.
5 Q. Major, how large was the 7 Lima
6 A. We were -- we were a total of four officers. There was myself,
7 there was Ole Zidlik from the Czech Republic, Thelmo Reis from Portugal
8 and Pavel Teterevsky from Russia
9 Q. And was there a team leader or chief liaison officer?
10 A. Yeah. At the time, it was myself. Since late April, I became
11 the team leader and the chief liaison officer of 7 Lima.
12 Q. Where did the team members live and work?
13 A. We lived and worked by renting a portion of a house from a local
14 family. It was a three-storey building in Pale. Our office was a
15 converted garage on the main floor, and our living quarters were on the
16 third floor. And it was a three-storey house, so our living area was on
17 the top floor. And the house was also inhabited by a local family with
18 which we had regular and very cordial contact.
19 Q. Where was that building located in reference, for example, to any
20 official Bosnian Serb government or military structures?
21 A. It was located about 300 metres from what we knew as the
22 Bosnian Serb Presidency. It was a complex of a hotel called the Panorama
23 Hotel and a building adjacent to it that was used as an office building.
24 So we were about 300 metres in a straight line from that complex.
25 Q. Now, a few moments ago you mentioned some of the officials -- the
1 Bosnian Serb officials with whom you had contact in the course of your
2 duties. Can you tell us, please, who your main contacts were on the
3 Bosnian Serb side, as a general matter, in order to fulfill your daily
5 A. On the military side, the primary contact were two
6 Bosnian Serb Army liaison officers who were based at the main
7 headquarters in Han Pijesak. There was, first of all,
8 Colonel Milos Djurdjic and Major Kralj. On the civilian side, it was
9 primarily Professor Nikola Koljevic, the vice-president of the
10 Republika Srpska, and also he was the chairman of their Committee for
11 Co-operation with UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid agencies.
12 Q. And did you deal, on a daily or weekly basis - you can tell us
13 the frequency - directly with Professor Koljevic or with a member of his
15 A. We did not deal directly with Professor Koljevic frequently. It
16 was normally with his secretary, Ceca. Her last name was Savic. And
17 that was very frequent, essentially on a daily basis. And the same with
18 the two Bosnian Serb Army liaison officers; we dealt with them on a daily
19 basis. And I should also add that we also dealt with Mr. Karadzic's
20 office, that is, the Presidency, through his secretary, Mira, also on
21 quite a frequent basis to transfer any correspondence or if we needed to
22 request permission at that level.
23 JUDGE KWON: Just for clarification: You were a captain in rank
24 at the time?
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Q. In addition to Mira, did you deal with anyone else in
4 Mr. Karadzic's office or anyone else associated with Mr. Karadzic?
5 A. Yes. I also had fairly frequent contact with Mr. Jovan Zametica,
6 who I understood to be Mr. Karadzic's senior political adviser and
8 Q. Major, I'd like to turn your attention and our attention to a
9 specific time-period during the course of your work in Pale, and that's
10 to late May 1995, and specifically to May 25th, 1995.
11 On that date, Major, did you become aware of an air-strike by
12 NATO, or explosions generally, occurring in the vicinity of Pale?
13 A. Yes. We had actually seen two large explosions occur at about
14 4.00 in the afternoon to the south of where we were located in Pale, that
15 is, south of our office, a distance of something like 5 to 10 kilometres.
16 Q. At that time, did you know what those explosions were or were you
17 able to go out and check to see what had happened?
18 A. No, we did not know exactly what they were, and we could not go
19 out to that area because we were under restrictions of movement at the
20 time and we were not permitted to leave the Pale area. However, we did
21 suspect that they could be air-strikes, because we had transmitted
22 earlier a letter to General Mladic - that's the commander of the
23 Bosnian Serb Army - from General Smith, who was the commander of the UN
24 peacekeeping forces in Bosnia
25 were not met by the Bosnian Serb side and, actually, all parties to the
1 conflict, that they would be subject to air-strikes. And in the case of
2 the Bosnian Serbs, the first condition was that they had to return four
3 heavy weapons back to a weapons collection point from which they had been
4 removed earlier.
5 Q. Turning your attention next to the next morning, May 26th, did
6 you become aware at that time of further explosions?
7 A. Yes. At approximately 10.00 in the morning, a similar type of
8 explosions like the air-strikes the previous day occurred.
9 I should just, for the clarification of the Court, mention that
10 after the air-strikes had occurred, approximately 30 minutes later we
11 were informed by our headquarters on the 25th of May that those two
12 explosions had, in fact, been air-strikes carried out by NATO on behalf
13 of the United Nations.
14 So then on the 26th of May, there were similar explosions, but
15 much more over the course of about an hour and a half or so. We
16 estimated it was approximately 10.00 -- starting at 10.00 in the morning,
17 approximately, also.
18 Q. Now, at some point after the explosions began, did you become
19 aware of any activity at your accommodations or office?
20 A. Yes. A few minutes later, there was a couple of shots fired and
21 some yelling, some loud voices.
22 Q. And where were you when you first became aware of those shots and
23 the loud voices?
24 A. I was upstairs on the third floor, in my accommodation there.
25 Q. And, Major, what did you do after you became aware of this -- of
1 these shots and the voices?
2 A. We were aware from the news broadcast the previous day, and also
3 by the reactions of our neighbours, that people had been very angry about
4 the air-strikes there, so we were concerned who it actually was. We had
5 also requested the previous day, on the 25th of May, from Mira,
6 Mr. Karadzic's secretary, if she could ensure that our house and office
7 were being watched by their security people just to prevent any local
8 people trying to attack us for -- out of revenge or feeling badly about
9 the situation. So I wasn't sure what was going on, so I went slowly down
10 the stairs quietly to investigate the situation.
11 Q. What did you find out?
12 A. I -- our office had two entrances. There was a main entrance at
13 the front of the house which was the entrance to what previously had been
14 the garage, and then around the back there was a small door. So I went
15 around to the back. The door had already been opened, so I was able to
16 peer in and actually saw and heard what appeared to me to be three
17 Bosnian Serb people. I saw at least one who was armed.
18 So then I went to the kitchen, where we -- that's across the
19 corridor from our office, to where we had a telephone, and there I made
20 three telephone calls. The first one was to Mira, Mr. Karadzic's
21 secretary, who I'd spoken to the previous evening, inquiring -- or
22 mentioning to her that we had some armed people in our office who had
23 already been shooting outside. And I asked her if she could send someone
24 around to investigate the situation. She then asked me what time they
25 had arrived, so I said, Well, a few minutes ago, which would have been
1 approximately 10.30 that morning on the 26th of May. And then she told
2 me, Oh, they were sent -- she also asked me, Are they soldiers? And I
3 said I couldn't really tell. They weren't dressed properly as soldiers
4 in a full uniform. So then she asked me about the time, and I said,
5 10.30, and said, Okay, then they were sent officially. And I asked her
6 what that meant, and she didn't give me any further information.
7 So the second telephone call I made was then to
8 Mr. Jovan Zametica, whom I had mentioned earlier was Mr. Karadzic's
9 senior political adviser and whom I got to know personally, and I
10 asked -- and I explained the situation to him. And he said, yes, he had
11 also heard that something was being organised to send some people to our
12 office that morning. And I asked him to clarify and explain what that
13 was supposed to mean, and he said, just simply, I suggest that you be as
14 co-operative as possible.
15 And then I was able to -- had also our housekeeper there that
16 morning. So I was then going to call the chief of police in Pale to send
17 some policemen around just to verify that everything was under control.
18 And as I was about to call, our interpreter from the office who was on
19 duty that morning, Snezana Golijanin, came out of the office, started
20 waling up the stairs and calling for me in a loud voice, so I turned to
21 her and asked what was going on. And she said, You are required in the
22 office. So then I asked the housekeeper to call the chief of police and
23 went into the office.
24 Q. And when you arrived in the office, Major, who was there?
25 A. When I walked through the door, I saw one person armed with an
1 AK-47. That's a Russian assault rifle, or it could have been made in
2 Yugoslav -- the Yugoslav Army also used it, made by Zastava, their
3 weapons company, with hand-grenades, and he had a military camouflage
4 pants and T-shirt on. And the other individual was someone I had met
5 earlier in Pale on at least two occasions, who was a Canadian of Serbian
6 origin. His name was Nicholas Ribic, and he was wearing a full
7 Bosnian Serb uniform with helmet and also armed with an AK-47 rifle.
8 Q. Were any of the other members of your team either in the office
9 or in the vicinity?
10 A. Yes. Both Ole Zidlik and Pavel Teterevsky were in that office.
11 Q. And what was happening or what happened when you entered the
13 A. Nicholas Ribic immediately turned to me and said, Sit down, Pat,
14 in an angry voice, so I complied. Also, I remember Ole Zidlik then was
15 on -- was operating our radio in communication with our
16 UN Military Observer or UNMO headquarters in Sarajevo, with Nick Ribic
17 being next to him.
18 Q. At some point, did you become involved with the contact or the
19 attempt to contact headquarters, that is, UNMO headquarters, via the
20 radio system?
21 A. Yes. As the team leader then, I took over control of at least
22 our team's involvement and told our headquarters that we had some armed
23 men in our office. And then Nicholas Ribic, who spoke, of course,
24 perfect English, as a Canadian, started making threats that he wanted the
25 air-strikes called off.
1 Q. And did he indicate what would or might happen if the air-strikes
2 weren't called off?
3 A. It started first with simply demands that the air-strikes needed
4 to be called off. Then he mentioned, If you value the lives of your
5 UNMOs, you will call off the air-strikes. And then I should also add we
6 then moved -- switched over to using our satellite phone because it would
7 make the communications easier, because on the radio net, a lot of people
8 were. And Mr. Ribic was not familiar with the UN protocols for how you
9 speak on a radio and procedure, was it was getting a bit confusing with
10 our headquarters. So then we switched to the satellite phone, and then
11 Mr. Ribic continued making his threats. And he got more and more angry
12 and his threats got more specific. So at this point, he was saying, If
13 the bombing continues, we will start executing your UNMOs, meaning myself
14 and the other two team members.
15 I should say the fourth one that I had mentioned earlier -- sorry
16 for the break in the flow -- Thelmo Reis from Portugal, he was not there.
17 He was away on leave during that period out of the country, so it was
18 just the three of us, myself, Ole and Pavel.
19 So back to the situation in the office. The threats got more and
20 more specific, and then to the point where for the next bomb that falls,
21 I will -- or one UNMO will be killed.
22 Q. Now, during the course of this contact with UNMO headquarters,
23 and following the issuance of -- or the demand that the bombings be
24 halted, and the threat about what would happen if not, were you able to
25 hear the response by headquarters to Ribic?
1 A. Only on the radio. And what they told him was that he needed to
2 understand that the United Nations Military Observers were not involved
3 in the air-strikes in any way and they had no means of communications to
4 get them called off, that this would have to go through other channels.
5 So perhaps -- I'm not sure because it probably was discussed over the
6 telephone, so I didn't -- we didn't have a speaker on the phone, so it
7 was only what -- I heard was what Mr. Ribic was saying, because then at
8 some point Mr. Ribic turned to me and said, Okay, get me in touch with
9 General Smith. So then I presume our headquarters told him that it was
10 General Smith's office, that is, the UN peacekeeping forces, that would
11 be able to get the air-strikes called off more expeditiously. So then
12 Mr. Ribic told me to get him in touch with General Smith's office, and I
13 called General Smith's office using our satellite phone, which we called
14 them frequently. And I spoke with General Smith's aide-de-camp and said
15 that we had some armed people in our office who were making threats
16 against our lives and they insisted on speaking to General Smith. And
17 then Mr. Ribic took the hand-set and started making the same threats over
18 the phone to General Smith's office, his aide-de-camp.
19 Q. After these calls were completed, did other people arrive to the
20 UNMO office?
21 A. Yes. After Ribic finished his telephone conversation with
22 General Smith's office, he told us that his commander would be arriving
23 shortly. So in about 10 or 15 minutes, another group of Bosnian Serb
24 soldiers arrived at our accommodation, and they were led by a fellow
25 named Srdjan.
1 Q. After Srdjan and the other VRS members arrived, what happened
2 next? Did you stay at the accommodations or leave?
3 A. No, we were told to get our vehicle. It was a white Toyota Land
4 Cruiser with UN letters and also "UN Military Observers" written in front
5 of it with the UN flag. That was our official vehicle. So we were told
6 to get it, and then we were told to radio our headquarters that we were
7 going to be taken down to the site of the targets of the air-strikes,
8 which at that time were still continuing to be bombed. And that location
9 I was told to transmit was Jahorinski Potok.
10 Q. En route to -- first of all, who was told to get into the
11 vehicle? So it was yourself and who else?
12 A. It was myself and the other two military observers in my team, so
13 Ole Zidlik and Pavel Teterevsky. So we were all sat in the back seat,
14 and the vehicle was driven away by the Bosnian Serb soldiers. And we had
15 additional seats in the back, that's the cargo compartment, and a couple
16 of them sat there as well. And then we drove away in the direction of
17 where the air-strikes were occurring.
18 Q. And en route to Jahorinski Potok, were you and the other UNMOs
19 secured in any way?
20 A. Yes. We were all handcuffed to each other with two handcuffs.
21 So my -- I was sitting on the -- on one side of the vehicle, so my right
22 hand was handcuffed to the left hand of Ole Zidlik, and his right hand
23 was handcuffed to the left hand of Pavel Teterevsky.
24 Q. Major, what happened when you and Captain Zidlik and
25 Captain Teterevsky and the soldiers arrived at Jahorinski Potok?
1 A. At Jahorinski Potok, it was a large complex, what we thought was
2 some sort of large logistics and ammunition storage depot. We had not
3 been there before. But there was a main gate there, and it was locked,
4 so we were stopped at the main gate as one or two of the Bosnian Serb
5 soldiers then went to look for someone to open it.
6 As we were standing or waiting there, still secured by the
7 handcuffs to each other and inside the car, a fairly large group of local
8 civilians had gathered near our vehicle. And one of them then broke away
9 from the crowd and went to our vehicle, opened the door, and started
10 punching and kicking me. I had, unfortunately, only one hand to defend
11 myself, so I got a few good punches and kicks in the process.
12 Fortunately, though, the guards - that's the other Serb soldiers - were
13 able to react in time before anything serious happened to me and pulled
14 him off. Then he went back, that's the individual that attacked me. He
15 appeared to calm down, and then suddenly he pulled out a pistol,
16 chambered a round and pointed it at the vehicle. Pavel Teterevsky, the
17 Russian observer, was very quick-witted, and he immediately opened the
18 door and pulled us out of the other side. So we had the vehicle between
19 us and this armed individual. And then the guards also reacted fairly
20 quickly and managed to take the pistol away from him and unloaded it.
21 But to our surprise, once the man calmed down, they gave it back to him.
22 But that was, from our point of view, a very close call.
23 Just one other thing regarding that incident.
24 Once this man had calmed down, he asked me to come forward, so --
25 or he came -- I believe the Serbs took off my handcuffs. So I went to
1 him with the Serb soldiers just to make sure, I guess, I was protected a
2 bit. And he grabbed me by the throat and said that he had lost 12 sheep
3 in the air-strike, and he said that was his livelihood, and he was very
4 upset. And he also said that one of his relatives that had gone out that
5 morning, they didn't know where he was and were afraid that he had also
6 been killed by the air-strike. And so then he ended saying that he --
7 for those reasons, he should be allowed to kill me and I shouldn't be
8 surprised at his reaction. And I told him also that we had nothing to do
9 with the air-strikes, but he was too emotional and angry at that point to
10 sort of discuss that issue.
11 Q. Thank you, Major. Were you eventually -- was the -- was access
12 or entry to the facility obtained, and were you taken inside
13 at Jahorinski Potok?
14 A. After about 15 minutes, the lock had been -- they couldn't find
15 the key, so they broke the lock with a hammer, and we were then driven
16 inside the compound a few hundred metres in front of a large warehouse.
17 There -- because the air-strikes, I should say, were still going on and
18 we were still waiting to get confirmation from our UNMO headquarters at
19 that -- or when they would be called off, so, anyway, we stopped in front
20 of the warehouse. They took us out of the car and just sort of changed
21 the handcuffs. So we were still handcuffed to each other, but we were
22 able to stand. And one of us had his arm through the window of the rear
23 seat, so we were actually secured, through his arm, to the actual vehicle
24 so we couldn't run away or do anything.
25 So we waited there for the air-strikes to be called off. It was
1 perhaps 20 or 30 minutes. And during that time, one of the Serb
2 soldiers, who was a lieutenant-colonel that we later learned was
3 apparently the head of the press information organisation within their
4 units in Pale and who had a video camera, he showed us his revolver that
5 he took from his holster and pointed to two notches that he had cut in
6 the handle. And he explained those two notches were for two people that
7 he had already killed with it, and that if the air-strikes would not kill
8 us by the end of the day, then he would come over and personally execute
9 us, and he would really enjoy getting three more notches onto his
10 revolver handle, indicating, you know, the three notches for the three of
12 Q. Did he -- did the lieutenant-colonel indicate that he intended to
13 kill you, whatever happened, or that it was conditioned in some way on
15 A. He was not clear on that point. It could have meant either way.
16 Q. Did you receive any word from UNMO headquarters, or any other
17 source, about whether the air-strikes would be called off?
18 A. Eventually -- that is, as I mentioned, we were waiting there
19 about 20 minutes, so after about those 20 minutes we did get a radio call
20 from our UNMO headquarters, and I can refer to them at Kilo X-ray. It
21 may be easier than just repeating "UNMO headquarters" all the time. So
22 our UN military headquarters in Sarajevo Bosnia-Herzegovina Command, also
23 known as Kilo X-ray, gave us a call and said that the air-strikes had now
24 been called off.
25 Q. And after receiving that information, what happened, Major?
1 First of all, were there -- was there any other indication or any further
2 indication of air-strikes?
3 A. Not -- they were not going in constantly. It was only every five
4 or ten minutes or so, there would be another -- or even maybe 15 or 20
5 minutes. There was not a regular interval, but they were at least five
6 minutes apart. I recall also either myself or Nick Ribic, the
7 Bosnian Serb soldier of Canadian origin, would also be on contact with
8 our radio and also telling them where we were being taken. So at that
9 point, I believe Ribic mentioned that we would be taken to the actual
10 site of the air-strikes, that is, to the site of the ammunition bunkers
11 further into the complex that were being bombed that morning.
12 So they put us into the vehicle, and just as we were about to get
13 going another air-strike went in, so that is after we had gotten the all
14 clear or the confirmation that the aircraft had been called off. The
15 Serbs continued to drive towards the bunkers, so it wasn't clear to any
16 of us what the real situation was, if the air-strikes had, indeed, been
17 called off or not. Fortunately, that was the last impact, so that was
18 the last air-strike, but it went in after we got the all clear.
19 Q. And, Major, please tell the Court what happened after you and
20 Captain Zidlik and Captain Teterevsky were taken to the bunkers.
21 A. So it was the same thing as before. We were handcuffed to each
22 other, driven down. It was perhaps 1 to 2 kilometres from the warehouses
23 where we had been waiting beforehand. We arrived in front of four
24 bunkers that were approximately 50 metres away from each other. Two of
25 them had been destroyed. I presume it was that morning, because the
1 smell of the explosive, the cordite, was very strong in the air. And
2 Nick Ribic then reported on the radio that we're now at the site of -- he
3 said "warehouse," but he meant the bunkers, and he said, Any more bombing
4 and they'll be the first to go.
5 So then they took us out of the vehicles and handcuffed me and
6 Pavel Teterevsky to two lightning rods in front of one of the bunkers
7 that had not been hit yet, and they handcuffed Ole Zidlik to the door of
8 the bunker that had not been hit, and that was -- we saw was full of
10 Q. Major, after you and the other two members of your team were
11 secured to these potential targets, did you see other members of other
12 UNMO teams brought to the same area?
13 A. Yes. About an hour and a half later or so, we saw our vehicle
14 then being driven back towards the bunkers from the same direction that
15 we had been taken there earlier, and we recognised members of another
16 UN Military Observer team that was also based in Pale, but this was the
17 standard patrolling-type UN observer team that was known as Sierra Echo 1
18 by their radio call-sign. So we saw them packed in their vehicle. The
19 vehicle was driven by Serb soldiers, and they passed our position where
20 we had been handcuffed, and then they went down the road. And then
21 sometime later, 15 to 30 minutes later, then we saw the vehicle drive
22 back past us and back to the -- in the direction from which it came.
23 Q. And do you know where the -- do you know what happened with these
24 other members of the UNMO team?
25 A. At that specific moment, no. We just saw the vehicle go past us
1 and then come back the other way. But I learned later on, after a few
2 hours, that one of the military observers, a Polish officer by the name
3 of Janusz Kalbarczyk, had been taken down to where the vehicle went past
4 us and handcuffed there in front of another bunker. And then the other
5 four members of the team remained in the vehicle, and then they were
6 taken to what I think were the warehouses where we had stopped initially
7 while waiting for the air-strikes to be called off. And then also two of
8 them had been taken to a bridge in Pale for a short period of time. And
9 then I understood they were also taken back to the warehouses inside the
11 And one other thing. Before the Sierra Echo 1 team was driven
12 passed us, about half an hour before that two of the Serb soldiers who
13 had taken us hostage, they took the Russian officer in my team,
14 Pavel Teterevsky, away. So after -- so for the first hour, there was the
15 three of us from my team, and then after about an hour there was just
16 myself and Ole Zidlik handcuffed in front of the bunker.
17 Q. After securing you and Captain Zidlik to those positions, and
18 initially securing Captain Teterevsky, did the -- did the Bosnian Serb
19 soldiers remain with you at all times?
20 A. No, they had only stayed with us when -- initially when they
21 handcuffed us to the -- in my case, the lightning rod, and Pavel's case
22 as well, and Ole Zidlik to the bunker, the lieutenant-colonel who I
23 mentioned showed us -- had a video camera and showed us the pistol. He
24 filmed us in that position for a few minutes, and then -- but I think
25 they were concerned, because the situation was not quite clear what was
1 actually going on with the air-strike, so they didn't want to spend any
2 time there, so they quickly left.
3 Then about an hour later, two of them came back. They gave me a
4 box then to sit on. They moved Ole Zidlik, who was handcuffed to the
5 door of the bunker, to handcuff him to a grate over a vent in the bunker
6 which was lower down, so that would allow Ole Zidlik to sit. And then at
7 that time, they also took Pavel Teterevsky away.
8 Q. And at some point later in the day, did any VRS soldiers come to
9 check either on you and Captain Zidlik or on the UNMOs who were further
10 up the road?
11 A. Yes. Then shortly before, about 2.30 in the afternoon, two
12 soldiers who we had not seen before went up the road to check on us. And
13 both Ole Zidlik and I, we understood Serbo-Croatian, so we could
14 understand what the soldiers were discussing among themselves, and they
15 were debating whether they had time to check on the other UNMO - they
16 didn't name him - who was further down the road, because at 2.30,
17 another -- or the air-strikes were supposed to resume. And one of them
18 mentioned that he was there the previous day and there was no way that he
19 wanted to be anywhere near the area if there were going to be more
20 air-strikes. So all they did was they just walked past us quickly, just
21 went to a little -- there was a little bit of a hill, and just looked
22 over the hill, and then went back very quickly away from the location
23 where we were handcuffed.
24 Q. Major, how long did you and Captain Zidlik remain handcuffed to
25 the lightning rod or to the bunker?
1 A. I was there between five and six hours, so roughly from 11.00 or
2 after 11.00 sometime, or 12.00, until about 5.00 in the afternoon. And
3 Ole Zidlik was there until about 9.00 in the evening, so about nine hours
4 in his case.
5 Q. Now, you mentioned the soldiers who came to check at about 2.30
6 and were concerned about being in the area because of the possible
7 resumption of air-strikes. After that, did you see others come to the
9 A. Fortunately, no air-strikes occurred at least in our location at
10 2.30. So about an hour later, that is, 3.30 in the afternoon, there were
11 two groups of military officers, fairly senior from the ranks that we had
12 observed - they had some full colonels in the groups - came by to inspect
13 the area, but they appeared more interested in assessing the damage,
14 rather than our situation, but they clearly saw us. And then they were
15 followed, about 20 to 30 minutes later, by a group of civilians who I
16 supposed were government officials because most of them were wearing
17 suits, with jacket and tie. And in this group of civilians, one of the
18 members was Mr. Jovan Zametica, who I had known and who was
19 Mr. Karadzic's senior political adviser and spokesman.
20 Q. Do you know whether Mr. Zametica saw you and Mr. Zidlik there?
21 A. Yes. Not only did he see us; he came over and talked to me. And
22 I should mention we were all quite close together. When Pavel Teterevsky
23 was there, he was about 10 metres to my right, and Ole Zidlik was just
24 across the road, about 20 metres in front of me, so we were all fairly
25 close. So the delegation, both the military and the civilians, walked
1 right between us. And then Mr. Zametica came over to me, and I expressed
2 to him my shock and surprise how we were treated, saying, you know --
3 because up to that point I had thought maybe there was some sort of
4 mistake, that this was an out-of-control group that had taken us hostage.
5 When I had called Mr. Karadzic's secretary and Mr. Jovan Zametica, they
6 never clearly explained what was actually going to happen in our office.
7 So when I saw Mr. Zametica, I asked him what was going on and how he
8 could justify the treatment of us. I explained that I had been attacked
9 and so on. And he said, Well, times have changed, simply. And then in a
10 self-satisfied way, he added a comment to himself, I wonder what
11 General Smith will do now? And then he walked up the road.
12 One thing I should mention for the Court - I don't know if it was
13 mentioned before - another thing that distinguished UN Military Observers
14 from UN peacekeeping -- the normal blue-helmet soldiers, is that we are
15 protected under International Law as UN experts on mission, so we are
16 internationally-protected persons. We all were conscious of that, and so
17 was Mr. Karadzic's government and people like Zametica. So we were
18 really shocked with what was happening to us.
19 Q. Major, you mentioned a moment ago that you remained handcuffed to
20 the lightning rod at Jahorinski Potok until about 5.00. What happened
22 A. Then we saw our vehicle again come from the same direction, that
23 is, as before, from roughly where those warehouses were, driven by some
24 Bosnian Serb soldiers. They went down the road and then came back,
25 stopped, and came to me, and told me that they would be taking me away.
1 I asked where, and they wouldn't say, and they put me in the back of the
2 vehicle where Janusz Kalbarczyk was already handcuffed, and I was
3 handcuffed there as well, and then we were driven away.
4 Q. And where did the vehicle go with you and Mr. Kalbarczyk?
5 A. We went through Pale, where they picked up some more soldiers,
6 and then we drove up a road to a ski complex called Jahorino [phoen],
7 which was also -- Jahorina is also a name of a mountain, a large mountain
8 in the area. It's a road that I knew well, because in the ski resorts
9 there was a hotel named the Hotel Bistrica where some of the Bosnian Serb
10 officials stayed, and including Mr. Zametica, where I had once visited
11 him, so I recognised the road. So we were going up the road, and then it
12 stopped and pulled off on the side where there was a track. And then we
13 were at that point followed by at least one other civilian vehicle with
14 Bosnian Serb soldiers. Also, a civilian journalist named Snezan Lalovic
15 and his cameraman, as well as the lieutenant-colonel -- that's the Serb
16 lieutenant-colonel, who was the press officer, who was the other
17 cameraman. The Bosnian Serb soldiers, without explaining anything, just
18 then blindfolded both myself and Janusz Kalbarczyk. Most of the other
19 people got into the vehicle, that is, packed into it, because we then
20 went up a dirt track with their civilian vehicles. It was a Volkswagen
21 Golf was one of them, I recall, was parked. So then blindfolded, we
22 started going up a bumpy, very steep track, going up-hill for perhaps 45
23 minutes or so. Because of the nature of the road, it was slow going.
24 Then we stopped and they took us out of the vehicle, took our blindfolds
25 off. And I found myself in front of a large radar dome, together with
1 the same people that I had mentioned before, so several Bosnian Serb
2 soldiers, the two military and civilian cameramen, the reporter. And as
3 we were taken out of the vehicle and the blindfolds were taken off, two
4 of the soldiers took their weapons - that's the same AK-47 assault
5 rifles - donned black masks or balaclavas, and then Snezan Lalovic turned
6 to us and asked if we were afraid. I'm not sure what the point of his
7 question was, so I said, No, trying to appear as calm as I could. And
8 then they took Janusz Kalbarczyk, leaving me where I was next to their
9 vehicle, and they took Janusz Kalbarczyk to the radar dome about a
10 hundred metres or so in front of me. And there they handcuffed him to
11 the radar dome, filmed him with the two armed soldiers there with the
12 black masks, and conducted some sort of an interview with Janusz.
13 Q. Major, you've just told us that in response to Lalovic's question
14 about whether you were afraid once you had arrived at the radar dome and
15 the blindfolds were removed, that you weren't, but let me ask you: When
16 the vehicle stopped and you were blindfolded immediately before being
17 taken to the radar dome, what did you understand or think would happen?
18 A. Well, understand, I can't say because there were a lot of
19 different scenarios in my head, but one of the things I couldn't forget
20 was the threats that had been made throughout the whole morning, starting
21 in our office, then at the warehouses and along the way, that if there
22 would be any bombing, that we would be executed. There was also the
23 incident at 2.30 with the two soldiers who came by, arguing among
24 themselves if they had time to check on the other guy because air-strikes
25 were supposed to resume. So I didn't know if there had actually -- any
1 more air-strikes had occurred or what the situation was, but throughout
2 the day, of course, there was a concern in all of us, and we discussed
3 this with the other UNMOs later on. We were really concerned that we
4 could be executed any time not only that day but throughout our
5 captivity. But at that particular moment on the afternoon of the 26th of
6 May when we were taken up there to the radar dome, my grave concern was
7 we were taken there to be executed.
8 The other thing that caused me to be particularly worried about
9 that scenario actually happening was because on the way, as we were
10 driving up this dirt track, one of the soldiers in the car turned to
11 another one and asked him why we were going there, and he said, That is
12 up to Jahorina, and the other soldier turned to him and said, Well,
13 that's because Mladic wanted us to film some UN people there. And that's
14 why I said he didn't say filmed in what way. So perhaps one of the
15 things -- or I shouldn't say "perhaps." I mean, it was very clear in my
16 mind. One of the possibilities was that we were going to be taken there
17 to be executed, and probably filmed in the process.
18 Q. Major, you told us that Captain Kalbarczyk was taken by the men
19 with the guns and the balaclavas to be interviewed. What happened after
21 A. Well, after that interview, which was conducted by this reporter
22 also, Snezan Lalovic - he was with him and his civilian cameraman - then
23 we were again blindfolded, put into the back of the vehicle still
24 handcuffed as before, with all the soldiers piled into it, and then we
25 continued -- and then we went back the same way down the dirt track. And
1 then once we hit the main road where we had initially stopped and had
2 been first blindfolded, then the blindfolds were taken off again, and we
3 were driven to the Bistrica Hotel in the Jahorinski ski complex. And it
4 was -- the word I'm searching for is "awkward" or extremely bizarre
5 situation, because all of a sudden the mood changed to -- at least on the
6 part of the Serb soldiers, to rather festive. They offered us if we
7 wanted coffee or drinks, and they became very relaxed. I had been in the
8 hotel a couple of times before, so some of the women who had been working
9 there recognised me. So they came up to me, asked me how I was and
10 everything. So it was completely as if nothing had happened at all.
11 We then -- they took us for supper in the hotel restaurant, which
12 was actually quite a nice meal. And so it was a very strange, for me,
13 situation where sort of up to that point I had been constantly under a
14 threat, and then all of a sudden everybody relaxed and pretended nothing
15 had happened at all to us.
16 So after the supper, we then were told by the guards that we
17 would be taken to our accommodations to pick up some blankets and
18 sleeping bags and coats for ourselves and also the other team members,
19 because we would be spending the night at the bunkers or other strategic
20 targets overnight outside. So we went into our accommodations, picked up
21 those items.
22 And then as we were going back through Pale, we saw another UN
23 vehicle with Serb soldiers there, and it was another UN Military Observer
24 team that we knew as Sierra Sierra 1 from a location called Kasindol.
25 And I remember seeing a Czech, Pakistani and Dutch officer from that team
1 in the vehicle. They were dressed in civilian clothing, which surprised
2 us. But we didn't have an opportunity to talk to them because we were in
3 the back of the vehicle, and only the guards went out to chat with the
4 other Serb soldiers that were with the other vehicle to discuss
5 something. I don't know what it was.
6 And then from there, we were taken to a military garrison that
7 was known as the Koran Barracks. We were taken upstairs to the second or
8 third floor of a dormitory-type building. And there, for the first time
9 that day, I saw all the other UNMOs. So it was a very relieving
10 situation to see that everybody was okay.
11 And the other UNMOs -- so there was, from my team, just
12 Ole Zidlik, and from the other team, that's the Sierra Echo 1 team, there
13 was Griffiths Evans from Ghana
14 from Poland
15 also had a Russian officer Dmitri Batiouchenkov, who was not there, and
16 the Russian officer from my team, Pavel Teterevsky, he also wasn't there.
17 And then there was also two members from another team called Sierra Golf
18 1 from Grbavica, which is a neighbourhood in Sarajevo on the Serb side,
19 and there was two of them, Harley Alves from Brazil and Josh Gelasen
20 [phoen] from the Netherlands
21 Q. Thank you, Major. Now, the next morning, did you remain at the
22 garrison or were you taken from there?
23 A. The next morning, the first thing that happened, and it was
24 around 9.00 in the morning, Mr. Ribic and one of the other soldiers told
25 me to go with them, and they took me outside of this dormitory building
1 to our UNMO vehicle which was parked outside. And they told me to send a
2 message to Kilo X-ray. That's our UNMO headquarters in Sarajevo
3 they gave me a list of locations where I was supposed to tell them how
4 many military observers were at each one, and it was basically the places
5 where we had been handcuffed the previous day, so it was places like the
6 bunkers at Jahorinski Potok, some warehouses. I remember a bridge and
7 perhaps some other locations. So I transmitted that information and also
8 took the opportunity to add that if Mr. -- next time -- or when
9 Mr. Akashi comes for a meeting with the Bosnian Serbs, to please insist
10 on having us -- UNMO chief liaison officer with him as a way of us to,
11 sort of, not to be forgotten, and for the UN to try to involve us as
12 quickly as possible in their dealings to resolve the crisis or whatever
13 had actually been going on at that point.
14 Q. Major, let me ask you to take a quick look at a document.
15 And if I could ask that 65 ter 10597 be called up, please.
16 This is a code cable dated 27 May 1995 from Janvier to Annan.
17 And if I could ask that we turn to paragraph 5 of that document.
18 That's on the second page of the English.
19 That indicates that:
20 "The UNMO team from Pale, taken hostage during the course of
21 yesterday, have been allowed to make radio contact with UNMO HQ in
23 to brief on the location of some of the other teams."
24 Major, does that appear to be a reference to the contact that you
25 had on the morning of May 27th, to which you just referred?
1 A. I can't be absolutely certain, but it would appear so. It just
2 mentions an UNMO team from Pale, so it could be us or Sierra Echo 1. But
3 I sort of fit the description of the messages being sort of from a team
4 in Pale that made radio contact and reported some locations of the other
6 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Major.
7 Mr. President, I tender that document.
8 JUDGE KWON: That is admitted.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2171, Your Honours.
10 MR. TIEGER:
11 Q. Major, after making the call, where were you taken and by whom?
12 A. Then all of us that had spent the night together, so I mentioned
13 the three teams, a total of eight UNMOs, we were then taken back to the
14 complex that had been bombed the previous day. I remember, in the
15 message that I relayed, that I passed on, that we would be taken back in
16 front of the bunkers. And to my great relief, they actually took us not
17 to the bunkers, themselves, but a few hundred metres before that, where
18 there was a small guard hut. So that's where we were kept for the
19 duration of that day.
20 Although things were fairly calm, we saw in the back room they
21 had about 10 sets of handcuffs laid out, so we knew that they were simply
22 waiting for an order and we would be taken and find ourselves in exactly
23 the same situation as the previous day. So we spent the day there.
24 Also, sometime later that morning or early afternoon, the two
25 Russians joined us, so Pavel Teterevsky from my team and
1 Dmitri Batiouchenkov from the Sierra Echo 1 team. We spent the day there
3 Later in the afternoon, myself and a member of the Sierra Echo 1
4 team, we were told to go to our accommodations, that we could bring back
5 some toiletries and change of clothes for ourselves and the other team
6 members. So we were taken there by some of the guards. And in the
7 Sierra Echo 1 office, a couple of their interpreters were there, watching
8 television, and they had satellite TV so they were watching CNN. And the
9 interpreters told them that they saw the UNMOs used as human shields
10 broadcast around the world from the previous day, and that also on the
11 local Serb news in Pale, they had shown me, myself, and Ole Zidlik and
12 Pavel Teterevsky handcuffed to those lightning rods and the ammunition
13 bunker, and that the Serbs in the news broadcast accused us of actually
14 being the people on the ground guiding in the air-strikes, which was not
15 only false, but it infuriated us, because accusations like that put our
16 lives in danger, because the local people had very little access to
17 independent media, and we were concerned that now, especially given those
18 who were angry at the air-strikes, they would then believe these reports
19 and then seek to take their anger or frustrations out on us and retaliate
20 against us.
21 Q. Now, Major, as your statement indicates, you were eventually
22 released on the 18th of June, 1995; is that right?
23 A. That's when we left Pale, yes.
24 Q. I want to ask you about some of the events or some of what you
25 did during the period of time before that release.
1 First of all, you indicated that you had been back to your
2 accommodations. Did you go to your accommodations more than once between
3 the time you were -- that you began to be held at the garrison and the
4 time you were released?
5 A. Yes, several more times.
6 Q. At any -- at some point during one of those visits, did you
7 attempt to get someone to send a message to your HQ?
8 A. Yes. On the following day, that is now the 28th of May, so after
9 the day we spent at the guard huts near the bunkers, I was allowed again,
10 both myself and a member from the other team, to go to each of our
11 respective accommodations to pick up some more personal items for us,
12 because at that time it became clear that we would be held in captivity
13 for several more days. And one of our interpreters was on duty, and I
14 saw that since over the last three previous days, when we were no longer
15 in the office, the UN confidential situation reports kept being sent to
16 our office, so I instructed my interpreter to send a fax to our
17 headquarters, to Kilo X-ray, and tell them to stop sending the sitreps,
18 and also to report that myself and the other military observers that I
19 was with, so from my team, Sierra Echo 1 and Sierra Golf 1, were being
20 held at the Koran Barracks, and we were in good condition. And our
21 landlord was there in the office. He did not speak English, as I was
22 relaying the instructions in English to our interpreters, but he
23 understood facts and something, and he intervened very angrily and said,
24 No, no, no faxes, no telephone calls. Mr. Krajisnik had called, and he
25 said none of this is permitted. Just do as you're told and you'll be all
1 released in three or four days. And by Mr. Krajisnik -- our landlord,
2 they were close associates in business before the war and were close -- I
3 presume still close friends or colleagues, our landlord meant
4 Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik, who was the -- we understood at the time, the head
5 of the Serb Parliamentary Assembly in Pale.
6 Q. Major, during the period of time you were held, did you attempt
7 to contact Professor Koljevic, with whom you'd had previous dealings, at
8 least through his office?
9 A. Yes. In fact, I had another opportunity the following day, on
10 the 29th of May, to go over to our accommodation, because we didn't have
11 any facilities where we were being held to do laundry and so on. So we
12 discussed that with our guards, and I suggested that we get our laundry
13 done, as required, from our housekeeper where we were living, because we
14 had already paid for the next month's rent, which included services like
15 doing laundry and so on. So I went there to drop off some laundry. But
16 before then, we stopped first at the Sierra Echo 1 team location, where
17 one of my interpreters was on duty -- sorry, not on duty, she was just
18 visiting there. And I told her that we would be leaving in a few minutes
19 for my office and that I needed to get a meeting done -- organised with
20 Professor Koljevic, because I still thought at this point perhaps he
21 could intervene in helping us in some way, because I had some personal
22 dealings with him previously in my capacity as the chief liaison officer.
23 So I asked our interpreter to call Professor Koljevic's secretary, Ceca,
24 and to tell her to call my office, that I had some urgent things to
25 discuss with her. And probably that's all I said. So my interpreter
1 complied, so it worked like clockwork.
2 Five minutes later, when I answered the door to my office, the
3 phone rang. My interpreter, who was on duty, picked up the phone, and
4 turned to me and said, It's Ceca, and she wants to talk to you. So the
5 Serb guard who was with us, that's was a fellow named Captain Vojvodic,
6 who would be the main guard for the rest of our captivity, he was a bit
7 surprised. But because the call came from someone from such a position
8 of authority, he had no objection. So I spoke with Ceca, and I told her
9 that I needed to get -- to meet with Professor Koljevic to try to find
10 out what's going on, and also to discuss our conditions, which were
11 unacceptable, and if there is -- and also I wanted to straighten out what
12 the circumstances were about the air-strikes and so on. And Ceca then
13 said, yes, no problem, she would arrange the meeting, and mentioned that
14 it should be no problem at all. And then she asked me to pass the
15 telephone to Captain Vojvodic, and I understood that she had instructed
16 him that, Tomorrow a meeting would be organised with Professor Koljevic,
17 and that this was all sanctioned -- you know, is all official.
18 So when we left, Captain Vojvodic and I discussed it briefly, and
19 from that discussion I understood that he had been told that, yes, the
20 meeting would occur.
21 Then later on, once we got back to our -- to the Koran Barracks,
22 where we were being held, he asked me if Colonel Djurdjic, the main
23 Bosnian Serb Army liaison officer that we had been dealing with, and the
24 most senior one, could attend the meeting. So I said it was up to
25 Professor Koljevic, but that I personally had no objections. So then he
1 asked me to draft a letter, what we would be discussing. So I drafted a
2 short letter that evening, saying basically what I've just said, that it
3 would be discussing the conditions of our service -- of our detention,
4 the circumstances of the hostage-taking, to explain everything to
5 Professor Koljevic, how we had actually been mistreated and what had
6 actually happened, and then to discuss the way ahead, how to get out of
8 Q. And did the meeting the next day take place?
9 A. No, it didn't. And I asked Captain Vojvodic, you know, several
10 times during the day when it will be, and he said -- first he didn't
11 know, and then he said he went to try to find out, and that there was
12 nobody at all in Professor Koljevic's office and nobody else in the
13 Presidency area that he could get any information from about the meeting.
14 So he said nobody told him anything and he received no instructions about
15 any meeting.
16 Q. Did you eventually meet with Professor Koljevic during the course
17 of your captivity?
18 A. Yes, eventually, much later on, the 15th of June. So that's, I
19 believe, the 21st day of our captivity.
20 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, I'm in the Court's hands. I can
21 ask about that or we can take it up when we resume.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 11.00.
24 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
3 May I introduce Kejia Guo from China and the Netherlands
4 joining us for this session.
5 MS. GUO: Nice to meet you.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger. Please continue.
7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. Major, just before the recess I had asked you if you eventually
9 were able to meet with Professor Koljevic during your captivity. And you
10 indicated much later on -- that it did happen much later, on the 15th of
11 June. And then again -- or that was the 21st day of your captivity, as
12 you calculated it. Can you tell us about that meeting, please?
13 A. Yes. It came as a bit of a surprise, but a pleasant surprise.
14 It was on the morning of that day, Captain Vojvodic had come into our
15 accommodations and told us -- or told me to get ready, that I finally
16 have my meeting with Professor Koljevic, if I was happy, that he was able
17 to arrange this meeting. I told him, Well, it's about time.
18 So I was then taken with Captain Vojvodic. We drove to the
19 military police headquarters in Pale, and there, in a room, I had a
20 private one-on-one meeting with Professor Koljevic.
21 Q. And did you relate to Professor Koljevic your concerns about your
22 treatment and captivity and various specific issues you wanted to raise
23 with him prior to that?
24 A. Yes. In fact, in great detail, and I was grateful
25 Professor Koljevic had the time to discuss all of my concerns. The most
1 pressing concern I had, and all of us up to that point, was that we were
2 unable, except at just some very short and very limited periods of time,
3 to make contact with our next of kin. By that time, all of us had
4 managed to make a telephone call home, but for some of us, it was much
5 later, such as the 10th of June was when I actually got to make a phone
6 call home. And we wanted to not be limited to just one two-minute call
7 once during our captivity, because, of course, our families had seen all
8 the images that were broadcast of our use as human shields and were
9 extremely concerned about our well-being. And that, of course, made us
10 concerned about their well-being, how they were coping with the
11 situation, because there was no information being provided to them by the
12 Bosnian Serbs through the UN, what our conditions were. We were not able
13 to have contact with the outside world. So that was the first concern.
14 And Professor Koljevic responded positively, but he didn't commit to
15 anything. He would just say he would see what he can do.
16 Then we also discussed, in great detail, the actual
17 hostage-taking and what had actually happened to us. I wanted to make
18 sure Professor Koljevic understood everything. And he was a bit
19 surprised. He knew about some of the details, but not everything, how we
20 had actually been threatened and how the whole situation had impacted on
21 all of us; not just my team, but all the other people.
22 We then also moved on to discuss the working relationship between
23 the UN and the Bosnian Serb authorities, and my team's role as the
24 liaison office in that, specifically. And Professor Koljevic then
25 explained that the air-strikes, for the Bosnian Serbs, had been accepted
1 extremely badly. They were surprised at the intensity of them and that
2 they actually had done some real damage. Up to that point, he mentioned
3 air-strikes were really not much of a concern to the Bosnian Serbs. They
4 had normally received prior warning, and they were typically symbolic, it
5 was just one small, isolated target. But he said the air-strikes on the
6 26th, they were intensive, and they did not expect them to occur until
7 after a 12.00 noon
8 was a dead-line in General Smith's warning that all the shelling was to
9 stop. But, anyway, he mentioned, for the Serbs, this was a big crisis,
10 and they needed to react in a way that would send a shock to the UN. And
11 he then used the analogy of an electric shock, saying that sometimes if
12 you treat a patient -- a medical patient with an electric shock, you can
13 kill him, but sometimes you can cure him. So they said from their point
14 of view, this was all worth the risk.
15 Then I asked him about our future relationship, if we would be
16 released in Pale, but he said, no, the Serbs want to start a completely
17 new relationship with the UN, so that our office would be closed.
18 That's essentially what we discussed at the meeting.
19 Q. You mentioned your access to your family, communications with
20 your family, despite your requests. Were you able to -- did you request
21 to meet with and were you able to meet with, for example, the Red Cross,
22 the ICRC?
23 A. Earlier on in our captivity, on, I believe, it was the third day
24 or fourth day, I drafted a letter to Major Batinic, who was the superior
25 of Captain Vojvodic - and, again, just to recall, Captain Vojvodic was
1 the main guard during our captivity - because at that point we were
2 already starting to get frustrated by the fact that we were not receiving
3 telephone calls and other things. So we drafted a letter to
4 Major Batinic, requesting telephone calls, contact with the
5 International Committee of the Red Cross which had an office of delegates
6 right in Pale that we personally knew very well, and we knew that was our
7 right under International Law as well. We wanted access to medical care
8 because some of the people in the group were under extremely severe
9 stress. We wanted also regular access to our accommodations, and we
10 wanted regular access to news. And the final issue that we requested was
11 for me and my team to be able to work out of our office. If that was a
12 concern to the Bosnian Serbs, they could have some guards with us, but we
13 thought it would be important for us to maintain our role as the liaison
14 team between the UN and the Bosnian Serb authorities and to start that up
15 as soon as possible.
16 So regarding the Red Cross, we eventually were able to meet them.
17 I believe it was on the 8th of June, so well into our captivity. And I
18 also found out from them -- they had also been insisting from the very
19 first day, once it had been clear to them that we had been taken away,
20 that they have access to us. That is, the Red Cross wanted to have
21 immediate access as well to us.
22 Q. You mentioned a meeting with Professor Koljevic during the course
23 of your captivity. Did you also meet with someone you understood to be
24 the president of the Republika Srpska Exchange Commission?
25 A. Yes. When the delegates of the ICRC came to see us on what I
1 believe was -- I recall was the 8th of June, they were accompanied by
2 Mr. Bulajic, who was president of the Bosnia -- or the
3 Bosnian Serb Exchange Commission. This was the representative who would
4 be involved in exchanges of prisoners between the Bosnian Serbs and the
5 other parties to the conflict. And, in fact, I had met Mr. Bulajic once
6 before as I was driving from Kiseljak, which was an area near Sarajevo
7 held by the Croatian forces, and he had a problem at one of the
8 check-points, and I was travelling back from a meeting there with a
9 French team who was escorting him, and I managed -- because they didn't
10 speak Serbo-Croatian, I intervened and managed to get him access through
11 the Croatian check-point back into Republika Srpska.
12 So, anyway, Mr. Bulajic came in with the ICRC team and introduced
13 himself, and said that we were being treated properly as prisoners of
14 war, since we had been combatants. And I took issue with that. I asked
15 him was he aware that we were UN Military Observers, not other soldiers
16 or peacekeeping forces. And he said, Yes. And I asked him was he aware
17 that UN Military Observers are unarmed. He said, Yes. I said, Are you
18 aware that we were working on the Bosnian Serb held territory with the
19 permission of his president, Mr. Karadzic. And he said, Yes. So I
20 asked, Well, then how can you consider us to be combatants? And he
21 replied, Well, this is something we can discuss later on, and then just
22 turned us over to the ICRC. And I never had a chance to have further
23 discussions with him.
24 Q. You indicated earlier that you were released on the 18th of June,
25 finally. Did you meet with Professor Koljevic again after that meeting
1 of the 15th?
2 A. Yes. Also on the 18th, I had actually -- well, one was a short
3 meeting by telephone. There was an incident where, as we were packing up
4 our belongings prior to our release, we tried to take some of our office
5 equipment with us as well, and that was prevented by our landlord and the
6 Serb guards. And then Professor Koljevic found out about that and then
7 called to apologise about the incident and to reassure me that he would
8 take personal responsibility for the security of our office equipment.
9 And then later that day, as we were taken to the military police
10 headquarters, so again the same location where I had the meeting with him
11 on the 15th, this time it was the entire group of UNMOs that were being
12 held. We were taken there. And also I was met -- or I was -- I met
13 there also with a group of 11 Canadian soldiers from our peacekeeping
14 battalion that was stationed in Visoko, which is near Sarajevo. And
15 Professor Koljevic then talked to both the Canadians, as a group, and
16 then to the UNMOs, as a group, and he just mentioned that -- he
17 apologised for the treatment that we had received, and that he understood
18 a little bit because during his military service he had been imprisoned
19 in a Yugoslav military jail as part of that time. And then he repeated
20 the shock therapy analogy, asking us to understand that the Serbs were
21 required to take extreme measures.
22 Q. Earlier, when your landlord had intervened with something you
23 were trying to do in the accommodations, you mentioned that he cited
24 Mr. Krajisnik. In the instance you just described, for which
25 Mr. Koljevic apologised, was that something that you understood to be
1 done at the behest of the landlord or was there further mention of
2 Mr. Krajisnik?
3 A. What had actually happened is I had gone to the accommodations
4 first, and I'd taken my belongings and the hand-set to our satellite
5 telephone, and Ole Zidlik, the Czech UNMO on my team, he went then
6 afterwards, and he took the antenna for the satellite phone and the
7 CapSat transceiver, which is a small blue box that's essentially like a
8 hard drive on a computer that allows the system to be used over the
9 satellite's network as an e-mail-type system. Of course, we were
10 perfectly entitled to take this, this was our equipment, and I personally
11 had signed for responsibility of that equipment when I had taken over as
12 team leader.
13 However, for some reason, the wife of our landlord, Mira Savic,
14 had discussed that the antenna was missing, and she got extremely angry.
15 She called Ole Zidlik an enemy of the Serb people, that he was trying to
16 take this equipment, which was -- which surprised him very much because
17 he was particularly close to her and the children. He did a lot of good
18 every time he went on leave, he brought back lots and lots of sweets,
19 which was something we all did, but he went really out of the way to look
20 after the children of that family. So they searched his belongings but
21 only found those two items, but not the hand-sets. Our interpreter was
22 there, Svetlana Balovic [phoen]. And then when she saw the hand-set
23 wasn't there, she said, Ah, then Patrick must have it. So then I was
24 forced to come back to the accommodation to also return the hand-set, and
25 then I had an argument with our landlord. And subsequently to that -- in
1 fact, during that argument, he said he would report this to
2 Mr. Krajisnik. And then when I got the phone call later on from
3 Professor Koljevic apologising for the incident, Professor Koljevic
4 mentioned in that phone call that he had found out everything from
5 Mr. Krajisnik. So he was aware of -- so I imagine our landlord,
6 Dani Savic, called Krajisnik, who called Koljevic, who called me.
7 Q. Thank you, Major. I'd like to show you a couple of documents and
8 then some video footage as well.
9 If we could first call up 65 ter 18839. And if we could go to
10 the third page -- it should be the third page in e-court, I believe.
11 Thank you.
12 Looking at that first paragraph, Major, it reflects, among other
13 things, an entry by the VRS and into the 7 Lima house, and a threat to
14 UNMO HQ that for every bomb, one of the UNMOs will be killed. It
15 reflects that the threat was repeated to General Smith by phone, that
16 UNMOs of the 7 Lima Pale liaison team were taken to Jahorinski Potok, the
17 place where NATO conducted the air-strike. It further reflects requests
18 by VRS soldier and then 7 Lima to confirm that the bombing stop, the
19 gathering of a crowd, the team leader of 7 Lima beaten and threatened
20 with a pistol; that UNMOs handcuffed to the car; and an answer from
21 General Smith that the bombing stopped; a report by 7 Lima 9 that if
22 air-strike continues, the UNMOs will die for the sake of NATO.
23 Let me ask you, first of all, by way of clarification, 7 Lima
24 do you know what that's a reference to?
25 A. Yes, that's my personal call sign. "9" means the head of the
1 team or the commander of the team, so 7 Lima 9. Or over the radio, we
2 say "niner." That was me.
3 If I may also clarify. You mentioned VRS. The abbreviation for
4 the Bosnian Serb Army that the UNMOs tended to use in their reporting
5 was, in English, BSA, but it's the same thing.
6 Q. And what does that acronym stand for?
7 A. "BSA," Bosnian Serb Army.
8 Q. So that's the acronym for VRS --
9 A. [Overlapping speakers] ... Srpski.
10 Q. -- in English?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. So do these entries reflect some of what you experienced
13 first-hand and are they references to some of what you told the Court
14 during the course of your testimony today?
15 A. Yes, they are.
16 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I would ask that this document be
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2172, Your Honours.
20 MR. TIEGER: And if we could turn next to 65 ter 21963.
21 And if we could go to the next page, please. And the next page
22 after that. And just complete going through the two more pages. If we
23 could show those, please.
24 Q. Major, you've had a chance to look at this document previously,
25 and can you tell us, based on your own experience and what you learned
1 from others, what this document represents?
2 A. This document represents what the UN headquarters in Sarajevo
3 that is, General Smith's headquarters, I believe, or it could be the
4 Sector Sarajevo
5 where the actual UN Military Observers who were taken hostage were
7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'd ask this document be admitted.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2173, Your Honours.
10 MR. TIEGER: Major, I'd like to turn to some video footage, if we
11 could, please. And I'm going to invite you, during the course of
12 observing the footage, to assist us by indicating what is depicted there.
13 In some instances, the footage may be moving slowly enough that you'll be
14 able to speak over it. In other instances, we'll try to stop, identify
15 the particular frame at which we stop, and you can speak about what's
16 depicted at that point.
17 If we could first call up P02024, please.
18 And, Your Honour, in the 65 ter, the time code was 00:26:41
19 through 00:29:30
20 Sanction, the time code begins to run from zero, so the calculation will
21 have to be made based on the Sanction designation, and then that will
22 have to be, of course, to identify the specific portion of the video,
23 added to the commencement time of the video in the longer footage, if
24 necessary. I'll also attempt to assist by describing, to the extent
25 possible, what's on screen at that moment.
1 So if we could commence with 02024, please.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 "Reporter: Again the Serbs' ammunition dump at Pale was attacked
4 by NATO jets, and this morning four bunkers were taken out. The Serbs
5 reacted furiously, this time not with shelling but with hostage-taking.
6 It was a time of humiliation for the United Nations --"
7 MR. TIEGER: Can we stop, please.
8 Q. And, Major, you are also invited to indicate when you feel the
9 footage should be stopped so you can make a comment that pertains to your
11 Can you tell us who is depicted here and where that is?
12 A. Yes, this is my colleague from the Sierra Echo 1 team,
13 Janusz Kalbarczyk, and that's up at Mount Jahorina, the radar dome, where
14 we were taken late on the 26th of May. That's the incident where I
15 mentioned we had been blindfolded going up, and the soldiers, once we got
16 up there, took their weapons and donned black masks. And
17 Major Kalbarczyk was taken there and interviewed and filmed. And the
18 previous footage that you saw, that was also what I recollect seeing on
19 the morning of the 26th, the -- that is, the air-strikes. You saw the
20 big plume of smoke and dust, that's also what we saw from Pale, from our
21 accommodations which were on a piece of high ground.
22 MR. TIEGER: And for the record, this is shown at 00:26:58.4.
23 If we could continue, please.
24 [Video-clip played]
25 "UNMO's military observers were held chained and padlocked by the
1 Serbs to points of strategic importance, this Pole to an observatory and
2 a Ghanaian to a bridge, telling his captors what they wanted --"
3 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, if we can just go back. This is at
5 Q. Do you recognise persons depicted here, and the location as well?
6 A. Yes. This is -- on the left is Griffiths Evans from Ghana
7 on his right -- or on my right, his left, is Pepe Romero from Spain
8 these are both UNMOs from the Sierra Echo 1 team in Pale. And this is a
9 bridge in Pale which I knew quite well. It was quite close to our
10 accommodations, just about 200 metres away.
11 MR. TIEGER: Continue, please.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 "Reporter: ... captors what they wanted to hear."
14 "Today, we, the UNMOs, saw that the NATO planes bombed a lot of
15 civilian targets and a lot of civilians were killed. This is very bad,
16 and it's a crime against humanity. We, the UNMOs, will appeal to NATO,
17 especially Rupert Smith, to be aware that our lives are in danger."
18 "Reporter: Three more UNMO officers were shown chained or --"
19 MR. TIEGER: Stop, please.
20 This is 27:35.7.
21 Q. Do you recognise who is depicted here?
22 A. Yes, this is Pavel Teterevsky, who was the Russian officer in my
23 7 Lima
24 MR. TIEGER: If we can continue, please.
25 [Video-clip played]
1 "Reporter: ... to steel posts in the arms depot that NATO had
2 attacked. One was a Russian, another was a Canadian --"
3 THE WITNESS: And that's myself, and both of us were handcuffed
4 to those lightning rods, the two of them that I had mentioned earlier in
5 my testimony.
6 MR. TIEGER: That's 27:42:7.
7 [Video-clip played]
8 "Reporter: ... used as human shields, and accused, quite
9 falsely, the UN said, of having called in the air-strikes. The third
10 officer from the Czech Republic
11 THE WITNESS: And that's Ole Zidlik --
12 MR. TIEGER: That's at 27:51:5.
13 THE WITNESS: -- who's the Czech officer in the 7 Lima
14 [Video-clip played]
15 "Reporter: ... the door of a bunker with ammunition still in it.
16 Six other military observers are being held in similar circumstances. On
17 the way to the arms depot and already in the captivity of the Bosnian
18 Serbs, the hostages called their headquarters."
19 "If the bombing stops, we will be set free. Otherwise, we will
20 be killed. Over."
21 "Just to confirm, what they are waiting from General Smith is
22 confirmation that the bombing will stop? Over."
23 "If the bombing starts again, I have been instructed to tell you
24 that we will die for the sake of NATO. Over."
25 "This is BSA soldier. Three UN observers are now at the site of
1 the warehouse. Any more bombings, they'll be the first to go.
3 "Reporter: The UN was --"
4 MR. TIEGER: Can we stop for a moment.
5 Q. Major, we just heard four excerpts, broadcasted excerpts. Can
6 you tell us who was speaking on those and approximately at what point
7 those broadcasts were made, or those radio transmissions were made, or --
8 A. The first three were made by me, at the request, or demand,
9 rather, of the Bosnian Serb soldiers that had taken us into captivity. I
10 believe the first two were taken as we were waiting at the warehouses for
11 the air-strikes to be called off, and the third one was as we were
12 starting to go forward towards the bunkers. And the fourth transmission,
13 where you see the text on the screen by the Bosnian Serb soldier, this is
14 from Nicholas Ribic, who was the Canadian of Serb origin, who was the
15 first person involved in our own hostage-taking.
16 And when -- this was relayed, I believe, by warehouse. He
17 actually meant the bunker, and this was when we had arrived at the site
18 of the bunkers, just prior to being handcuffed to the lightning rod and,
19 in the case of Mr. Ole Zidlik, the door of the bunker.
20 [Video-clip played]
21 "Right now, there's --"
22 MR. TIEGER: Okay. And if we could end.
23 Q. Major, I'd like to turn your attention next to 65 ter 40557A
24 [Realtime transcript read in error "44557A"] through C. This is ERN
25 V000-8393. The time codes are 0:38:16 through 0:43:02.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 MR. TIEGER: Let's stop first. This is at approximately nine or
3 ten seconds into this.
4 Q. Do you recognise this scene and who's depicted here, Major?
5 A. Yes. This is our vehicle. This is the Toyota Land Cruiser I had
6 mentioned earlier. And closest to the vehicle, looking left to right,
7 you see my -- actually, let's go from right to left. It will be easier.
8 Closest to the vehicle is Pavel Teterevsky, then Ole Zidlik, and then
9 myself. Then the man with the crutch is Srdjan, who is the commander, or
10 at least he was indicated to us by Ribic that he was the commander of the
11 group of soldiers that had taken us hostage. And the location is the
12 warehouse just inside the facility where we were waiting for the bombing
13 to be called off, so still a kilometre or two away from the bunkers,
14 itself, but inside that large logistics and ammunition storage facility.
15 JUDGE KWON: And the 65 ter number of this is 40557?
16 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour. Did I misspeak on that? Yes,
17 that's correct.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "I didn't understand. Stay here
21 with them."
22 "Fuck it."
23 "They should all be all --"
24 "They should all be ..."
25 THE WITNESS: So that's the same location, just from a different
2 MR. TIEGER: And you're referring to the image at 59.1.
3 THE WITNESS: So left to right, that's myself, then Ole, then
5 [Video-clip played]
6 "He will die if they bomb, he will die for the good of NATO."
7 MR. TIEGER: Stop, please.
8 Q. Now, Major, you're obviously back in the vehicle now. Can you
9 orient the Trial Chamber about where this scene is taking place?
10 A. Yes. This is now we have left the warehouses where we had been
11 waiting, which is the image that you saw just before this, and now we're
12 back in the vehicle and being driven towards the actual bunkers and the
13 lightning rods, where we will then be handcuffed.
14 Q. And who was saying, "Tell them you will die if they bomb, you
15 will die for the good of NATO"?
16 A. That was Nicholas Ribic, who was the Canadian of Serbian origin,
17 who was one of the Bosnian Serb soldiers that day who took us hostage,
18 and he was sitting behind us on a bench seat in the cargo area of the
19 Land Cruiser.
20 [Video-clip played]
21 "Kilo X-ray, this is 7 Lima 9. Over."
23 "7 Lima
24 MR. TIEGER: Stop, please.
25 Q. We're obviously moving on to a different scene. That portion of
1 the video ended with, apparently, you saying -- that was you; is that
3 A. Yes, it was.
4 Q. Beginning a transmission that you'd been instructed to advise
5 them. And did that transmission continue with some of the information we
6 heard on the previous video excerpt with the radio broadcast?
7 A. Yes. I -- as you may recall, Ribic was telling me to say that we
8 will die for the good of NATO, and I changed that to that I've been
9 instructed to say that we will die for the sake of NATO, to make it a bit
10 more unintelligible and ambiguous.
11 [Video-clip played]
12 MR. TIEGER: If we could stop for just a moment.
13 Q. We've moved on to a different scene. Can you orient us now? And
14 we're at 1:36.5.
15 A. Yes. This is at the bunkers, so we've just arrived. You can see
16 where the handcuffs are being taken off. And there I am with
17 Nicholas Ribic, who is the fellow in the camouflage uniform and the green
18 helmet, and behind him is Ole Zidlik. So they are essentially taking us
19 out of the vehicle and to the lightning rods, in the case of Pavel and
20 myself, and to the door of the bunker, in the case of Ole.
21 [Video-clip played]
22 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Wait here."
23 "Oh, my dear Russian. Are you Russian?"
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. Who is dealing depicted here?
1 A. This is Pavel Teterevsky being handcuffed to the lightning rod by
2 one of the Serb soldiers.
3 MR. TIEGER: And this is at 1:47.3.
4 [Video-clip played]
5 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Call, what's his name, Kozirev. He
6 can save you. To hell with him."
7 "Not the hands."
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. At 2:04.2, what do we see here, Major?
10 A. You can see myself on the other side of the lightning rod and
11 Ole Zidlik being taken away by Ribic.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Find a wire, steel wire, something
14 more flexible."
15 THE WITNESS: Just what's being --
16 MR. TIEGER: Stop, please. We're stopping at 2:31.9 for the
17 major's comment.
18 THE WITNESS: What you seen on the transcript below and the
19 translation is there was three of us but they had only two sets of
20 handcuffs. So they used one on Pavel Teterevsky, the second one on
21 myself, and didn't have anything -- or didn't have a third set of
22 handcuffs for Ole Zidlik. So they were looking for something, and then
23 they made the decision to use Pavel's handcuffs on Ole, and then they
24 found a piece of rope and tied Pavel, with rope, to the lightning rod.
25 Q. And that's a reference to the portion of the transcript that
2 "Find a wire, steel wire, something more flexible."
3 Is that correct?
4 A. Yes, and then they ended up finding a piece of rope.
5 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "There will be a lot of UNPROFOR
8 members in this circle this evening, just to let you know."
9 MR. TIEGER: And stop here at 2:53.9.
10 Q. Can you tell us what's happening in this portion of the video?
11 A. Yeah. In this clip, that appears to be our vehicle, and it's
12 moving further down into that narrow valley where the bunkers were. So
13 the person taking the photo is standing roughly where Pavel, Ole and I
14 are now handcuffed and tied. And it's going further away from us, so
15 further away from the original warehouses where we were held.
16 Q. And you mentioned the other UNMOs who were brought after you and
17 Captain Zidlik and Captain Teterevsky were secured there, and the
18 soldiers who came to check on the UNMOs around 2.30 or so. Can you
19 orient us, in relation to this portion of the video, where the other
20 UNMOs and Kalbarczyk appeared to be?
21 A. Yes. So the direction in which that vehicle is travelling,
22 that's towards where Janusz Kalbarczyk was held, in that direction.
23 Just to clarify, we never actually saw where Janusz was held,
24 because from our angle we couldn't see that far into the valley. So we
25 just knew he was somewhere down there.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 THE WITNESS: That's me again.
3 MR. TIEGER: At approximately 3:05.
4 [Video-clip played]
5 THE WITNESS: And this is the bridge back in Pale, very near to
6 our accommodations, where you earlier had seen Griffiths Evans from Ghana
7 and Pepe Romero sitting down next to the railing with a UN flag.
8 MR. TIEGER: And these comments were made at 3:15.8.
9 Q. And do you recognise anyone here at the bridge?
10 A. The pictures are a bit fuzzy, but I see a man with a cane. He
11 looks like Srdjan. Once, I think, you start rolling the video, it will
12 become clearer.
13 MR. TIEGER: And if you recognise anyone else during the course
14 of watching, let us know.
15 [Video-clip played]
16 THE WITNESS: So there's Ribic with the helmet. And on the right
17 side of the screen, it looks like someone is putting handcuffs on him or
18 doing something with him, is Pepe Romero from Spain. And in the blue
19 uniform next to him, that's Griffiths Evans from Ghana, both from the
20 Sierra Echo 1 team.
21 MR. TIEGER: And that's at 3:20.8.
22 [Video-clip played]
23 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Don't write this down. Memorise
25 "Bomb civilian targets around Pale. Innocent civilians were
1 injured and killed. This is an act --"
2 THE WITNESS: So there you see Nicholas Ribic squatting - that's
3 the man with the helmet - giving instructions to the two UNMOs.
4 MR. TIEGER: And this is at 3:40.2.
5 Q. Do you recognise the man in the brown jacket, standing at the
6 left of the image?
7 A. Yes. That's Snezan Lalovic, who was the same reporter who then
8 accompanied myself and Janusz Kalbarczyk later in the day up to the
9 Jahorina radar site, and he's a Serb reporter from Pale.
10 [Video-clip played]
11 MR. TIEGER: Stop, please.
12 Q. We've moved to a different scene. Do you recognise what this
14 A. Yes. This is on the road to Jahorina, where, as I had just
15 mentioned, Janusz and I had been taken. And we had stopped and were
16 going to turn on to a dirt track. And I'm in the back on the left-hand
17 side. Janusz, in the blue uniform, is on the right-hand side. And they
18 are just about to put the blindfolds on us.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "This is for documentation. It's
21 not going anywhere."
22 "What documentation?"
23 "Let's see. Can he see through this?"
24 "No. He doesn't even know where he is, he's so scared and
25 traumatised. He doesn't know where he is."
1 THE WITNESS: And now we're driving -- that's the same road to
2 Jahorina. And the flagpoles that you see on the left-hand side, in front
3 of the vehicle, that's, I believe, the start of the ski resort portion of
4 that area.
5 MR. TIEGER: And we just stopped this at 4:28.9.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. Major, I'd like to --
9 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Your Honour. I'd like to tender this
11 JUDGE KWON: In one exhibit?
12 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
13 JUDGE KWON: A, B, C all together or --
14 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, Mr. Reid asked me to mention, and we've
15 discussed it with the Registry, a portion of this exhibit is already in
16 evidence. We've begun discussing the best way of clarifying that overlap
17 or ensuring it doesn't result in any problems. No full determinations
18 have been made yet, but I raise it and indicate to the Court that the
19 resolution is underway. But I think for the moment, for identification
20 purposes, it's probably best to admit this as an exhibit in its entirety,
21 and then we can sort it out.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well, we'll do that.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P2174.
24 MR. TIEGER: And I might add, Your Honour, the same will be the
25 situation for the fourth exhibit, the fourth video-clip we'll look at.
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well, yes.
2 MR. TIEGER: If we could turn next to 65 ter 40387A.
3 [Video-clip played]
4 THE WITNESS: So the man in the suit with the gray hair, that's
5 Professor Nikola Koljevic, the vice-president.
6 MR. TIEGER: And that's at 7.9 on the Sanction monitor and as
7 shown on the numbers depicted on the video, itself, 10:52:10:12.
8 [Video-clip played]
9 THE WITNESS: So there's Professor Koljevic again. And the
10 people in the military uniforms that he's talking to, they are from the
11 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is, Serbia
12 and I understood that they were a special unit from their Ministry of the
13 Interior. And this is just prior to our release on the 18th of June, and
14 these soldiers or special police were there to provide an escort for us
15 into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
16 MR. TIEGER: And at this moment, the video stopped at 16.3 in
17 Sanction and 10:52:18:21
18 [Video-clip played]
19 "I cannot make any official statement at this time. I'd like to
20 say, on behalf of myself and all of my friends and colleagues with us,
21 we're glad this crisis is now over. After 24 days, we are glad to be
22 going back to our different units, and it's been a difficult time, but we
23 are all okay and glad to be going."
24 "How were you treated, sir?"
25 "I'd rather not comment at this time."
1 "Where are you going to be going to? Are you going home? Would
2 you like to go home?"
3 "No, I still have some time left in the mission. It's up to my
4 headquarters to decide where they will send me."
5 "Would you like to continue to work here in the Serbian side of
7 "Yes, of course, as well as any other side."
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. And perhaps it's unnecessary, Major, but if you could for the
10 record identify the person who was just speaking.
11 A. Yes, that was myself. And the circumstances were we were all on
12 board the buses, ready to leave Pale for Serbia. And there was a lot of
13 newspaper reporters there, and they wanted an interview with us, and we
14 didn't want -- we just wanted to get going. And Professor Koljevic came
15 on the bus and asked or pleaded with us if someone would go, so the UNMOs
16 asked me to make the -- that short statement, which I did.
17 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, if we could tender and admit this
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2175, Your Honours.
21 MR. TIEGER: And, finally, if we could turn to 65 ter 40202A.
22 [Video-clip played]
23 MR. TIEGER: Stop, please.
24 Q. And can you tell us, Major, if you recognise what's depicted
1 A. Yes. On -- so you see one of the bunkers in the distance. That
2 one, as I recall, had the -- was hit in the back of the bunker, which you
3 can't actually see on the screen, on the left-hand side, and the back
4 of -- a bomb went -- from the air-strike went into the back of that
5 bunker and destroyed it. As you pan to the right, you see the lightning
6 rod, and that's Pavel Teterevsky. And the red dirt that you see in front
7 of him, that's the road from the warehouses in the back, which then
8 continued to where Janusz Kalbarczyk had been held. And on the screen,
9 it says the reporter is -- his name is Snezan Lalovic, and the cameraman
10 is Slobodan Stancevic.
11 [Video-clip played]
12 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "... two NATO aircraft bomb Serb
13 civilian targets in the vicinity of Pale for the second time. The Serb
14 Army has been compelled to react like this as well. UNPROFOR members,
15 that is, the soldiers who called for the NATO aircraft, are now in our
16 hands, looking like this."
17 THE WITNESS: So that's Pavel Teterevsky and now myself. And
18 this, of course, is the first -- the 26th of May.
19 MR. TIEGER: And those comments were made at approximately 1:03.
20 [Video-clip played]
21 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Of course, nothing will happen to
22 these soldiers as long as NATO strikes are not repeated."
23 THE WITNESS: That's Ole Zidlik.
24 MR. TIEGER: At approximately 1:15.
25 [Video-clip played]
1 THE WITNESS: Actually, if I can say something.
2 You just heard a comment there about front-line. One concern we
3 had, we heard what appeared to be like shots in the distance to us,
4 further in the direction where Janusz Kalbarczyk had been later taken,
5 and we were concerned if we were very close proximity to a conflict area
6 between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims. But then the soldiers said --
7 told us, no, the front-line is far away, and that that was just
8 ammunition exploding from one of the air-strikes.
9 [Video-clip played]
10 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "There are also reasonable grounds
11 to suspect that these soldiers were guiding NATO aircraft towards Serb
12 civilian targets, but the investigation is still ongoing. This is just
13 one of a dozen sites hit by destructive NATO bombs."
14 THE WITNESS: And if I just reiterate for the record that those
15 accusations that we were involved in guiding those air-strikes or
16 providing any sort of assistance whatsoever are absolutely false.
17 [Video-clip played]
18 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "All the others hit civilian
19 targets, the places where refugees from Sarajevo were accommodated.
20 "Following the NATO air-strike on Pale, members of the
21 UNPROFOR --"
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. And who is depicted here?
24 A. This is Snezan Lalovic, the reporter.
25 [Video-clip played]
1 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "... have been put under the
2 temporary control of the Serb forces, and now we're going to ask them
3 what they saw."
4 "We, the UNMOs, saw that the NATO planes bombed a lot of civilian
5 targets, and a lot of civilians were killed. This -- it's very bad, and
6 it's a crime against humanity. We want to appeal to NATO, especially
7 Rupert Smith, to [indiscernible] our lives are in danger. And we require
8 that NATO ceases bombing of BSA and Serb targets or Serb territories so
9 that our lives are spared."
10 "Reporter: Have you any problems with the Serb soldiers?"
11 "No at the moment. We don't have -- we didn't have any problem
12 at the moment."
13 "Reporter: You are from?"
14 "I'm from Spain
15 THE WITNESS: And if I may just add some explanation there as
17 Afterwards, Griffiths Evans and Pepe Romero, the two UNMOs you
18 had just seen making that statement on the bridge. They told us about
19 that, and that they'd been forced to make that statement with armed
20 people threatening them. From what we observed, no civilian targets were
21 hit, and there's no civilian houses near the areas that I observed; for
22 example, the bunk ers where I had been handcuffed. Also, from our
23 accommodations in Pale, we did not see any other targets hit, other than
24 the area of this bunker complex. So that's all I can offer, as far as
25 clarification, from what we observed about the targets that were actually
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. And, Major, you indicated earlier in your testimony that you'd
4 been told that the broadcast, the SRT broadcast, had accused you and the
5 other UNMOs of being people involved in guiding the air-strike, and we
6 see it in this broadcast. Did you ever, during the course of your
7 captivity, have an opportunity to confront the journalist, Lalovic, about
8 the allegations made?
9 A. Yes, I was able to -- actually, very early on, on the late
10 afternoon of the 27th of May. So that was the second day of our
11 captivity. This is the day when we had been -- or we were told we would
12 be taken to the bunkers, but actually only held at a guard hut a little
13 ways away, where we had spent the day. During the course of that day,
14 Janusz Kalbarczyk and Harley Alves from Brazil, they were taken to
15 Mount Jahorina
16 came there to go up there with them and then came back with them, and
17 stayed for a while. While they were gone, I went with one of the other
18 UNMOs to our accommodations, and that -- I mentioned previously in my
19 testimony that one of our interpreters at the Sierra Echo 1 location
20 mentioned that we had been shown on TV and accused of guiding in the
21 air-strikes. So when I got back to the guard hut near the bunkers, I
22 mentioned that to the other UNMOs. And Ole Zidlik and I, we confronted
23 Snezan Lalovic about these allegations, and he replied that -- well, we
24 explained to him that it was absolutely false, and he agreed, but he said
25 because the Muslim side and their propaganda, they lie, the Serbs also
1 have to lie. That was his simple explanation.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 THE WITNESS: And here you see Ole Zidlik. He was moved from
4 being handcuffed to the door to the grate in front of the vent to the
5 ammunition bunker, just in front of me. So it's the same bunker. He was
6 just moved so he could sit.
7 MR. TIEGER: And that's at 3:09.3.
8 [Video-clip played]
9 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "They have been positioned at all
10 crucial sites so that NATO could strike again, and we are going to visit
11 some of them."
12 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I would tender this exhibit.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] An objection, if I may.
15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second before that.
16 This was merged with 40202B. That was my understanding.
17 MR. TIEGER: I have it as -- I have it as slightly overlapping
18 with P02153, and that was the nature of the problem.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I was told that that was the bit already
20 admitted as Exhibit P2153.
21 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 Mr. Karadzic, what is your objection? Is your objection already
24 moot, given that it is already admitted?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no, no, it's a remark.
1 I hope that the Trial Chamber are going -- is going to disregard
2 the way they have been called, these UN soldiers, hostages. I mean, the
3 way these dialogues have been lined up --
4 MR. TIEGER: This is utterly -- first of all, it's not an
5 objection, it's an inappropriate comment, and I don't think it should be
7 JUDGE KWON: You have another opportunity to make your submission
8 or clarify with the witness, but it's not the time for you to intervene
9 in such a way.
10 Yes, Mr. Tieger, let's move on.
11 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, assuming that this exhibit -- yes, has
12 been admitted, that concludes my examination-in-chief.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 Shall we deal with the remaining associated exhibits. There are
15 a couple of exhibits that have been already admitted, which is 11723 and
16 40511B. And except those that have been admitted during your
17 examination-in-chief, the others will be admitted into evidence and given
18 a number in due course.
19 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
21 Yes, it's not a major problem, but regarding the 65 ter 22011,
22 which is a questionnaire regarding Mr. Rechner, the witness, do you have
23 to tender it, given that it is a kind of statement of the witness?
24 MR. TIEGER: I have --
25 JUDGE KWON: With his amalgamated statement?
1 MR. TIEGER: Yes, no, I understand that, Your Honour. I
2 understood that that issue might be raised. It is one that might
3 arguably -- it isn't quite as obvious as maybe some others are, but
4 I'm -- given the nature of the amalgamated statement and its admission,
5 it's -- if the Court considers that it falls close enough to being a
6 prior statement that would have formed part -- that would have formed
7 part of the amalgamated statement, I have no problem with that. In fact,
8 Your Honour, I -- yeah, I accept the Court's guidance on that, which
9 I think is it's -- so I don't want to cause the Court any problem. So it
10 doesn't need to be admitted.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much. Yes.
12 There's no opposition from the Defence in regards to the
13 remaining documents, so thank you.
14 Mr. Karadzic, are you ready to start your cross-examination?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you.
16 Good afternoon to all.
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
18 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Major. I would like to ask you
19 whether you can confirm that while you were in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a UN
20 observer, you collected information, and that this information was shared
21 with UNPROFOR or, rather, made accessible to UNPROFOR.
22 A. "Information" is an extremely broad word. What we would do, in
23 accordance with our duties, is report the results of meetings. We would
24 report to our headquarters if anything unusual occurred in carrying out
25 our official duties. But if you think that we were going around trying
1 to collect information on what was going on in Pale or about the Serb
2 military, we were not doing any of that. As I mentioned earlier, our
3 function was strictly as a liaison team. And regarding the other UNMO
4 teams, as far as I'm aware, all the information that they would provide
5 to the UN was part of their official duties only, which they were
6 carrying out with the permission and knowledge of all authorities on all
7 sides of the conflict.
8 I should also add: The UNMOs, we worked very openly. When a lot
9 of them would patrol, as far as I know, they always had a representative
10 of the local faction for their won protection or security. In our
11 offices, we had no encrypted equipment. Our radio communications were
12 open. Almost anybody could listen in to them.
13 So, no, we did not go around collecting information
14 surreptitiously or trying to undermine the security, the legitimate
15 security of any of the parties in the conflict.
16 Q. Thank you. Are you trying to say that you just acted as liaison
17 officers, is that right, and that you only provided information on the
18 content of meetings?
19 A. Essentially, yes. If something unusual would happen during the
20 course of the day, for example, we had a couple of incidents where we had
21 our vehicles hijacked at gunpoint, once someone -- actually, a group of
22 armed people came into our office and actually robbed the other members
23 of my team when I wasn't there. These sorts of things we reported.
24 We also went into Sarajevo
25 the original hard copies of correspondence that we had received for
1 transmission, and would also pick up correspondence there to send to the
2 Bosnian Serb military or civilian authorities; that is, your people.
3 Q. Thank you. Did you report about the feelings of the people,
4 about the situation among the people, about what the situation was in
5 Pale or, rather, places where you were deployed?
6 A. Not as a matter of routine. I think you're referring to a report
7 that I sent after the first day's bombing on the 25th of May, where I had
8 spoken with Mr. Akashi's office. There's a fellow there that I knew
9 quite well, John Almstrom, and I mentioned to him the concerns we had
10 about the local situation; that is, that the people were very concerned,
11 and in the media they had mentioned that civilian targets had been hit
12 and so on. And Mr. Almstrom asked me then to send that information to
13 him, but it's not something we did on a normal basis.
14 I think you'll agree these were rather unusual circumstances, and
15 I wanted to make sure that our senior leadership in the UN understood
16 that these air-strikes were regarded as basically directed against the
17 Bosnian Serb side, and because of the way that they were reported, as far
18 as we knew, falsely, that civilian targets had been hit, we were
19 concerned about our security.
20 Q. Thank you. Do you think that destroying defence capacities of
21 the Bosnian Serbs does not reflect on civilians? You saw that things
22 were destroyed that had nothing to do with collection points of weapons
23 and so on, reserves of ammunition, et cetera. Did you understand that
24 that had nothing to do with civilians and their feeling of safety and
1 A. I can't comment on what the civilians thought of military targets
2 being bombed. And if you're also asking why those targets were bombed,
3 and not collection points, I'm not in a position to know why those sorts
4 of decisions were taken.
5 Q. Thank you. What was the position of Mr. Almstrom?
6 A. He was one of the senior advisers to Mr. Akashi, and I knew him
7 well because he is a former Canadian military officer and happened to be
8 my first commanding officer when I started serving as an infantry
10 Q. Thank you. Am I right if I say that Mr. Almstrom was not in the
11 UNMO chain; rather, he was in UNPROFOR, and it was from that position
12 that he asked you to report to him; right?
13 A. I should clarify. Our liaison office was not strictly only for
14 UNMO business. We were the only UN liaison office in Pale. There was a
15 small UN High Commissioner for Refugees, two UN people, but they had a
16 different function. So we actually acted as a liaison office also for
17 Mr. Akashi's office and other UN elements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it
18 was not unusual for us to get letters or other requests sent to us
19 directly from his office to transfer to your office, and vice versa. For
20 example, if we received something from your office for him, we would send
21 it directly to Mr. Akashi's office and just inform our headquarters in
23 Q. Thank you. That's the liaison function, as it were, but this is
24 what I'm interested in: First of all, the information that you had and
25 that you collected, was it accessible to UNPROFOR? And in addition to
1 that, what you told us today, could UNPROFOR put a task before you, could
2 they ask for something, and were you supposed to get it for them?
3 A. Your question is too general. I don't know what you mean by
4 "information" and so on.
5 Q. You described what "liaison" meant. There is no contest there.
6 I would be interested in the following: Your reports, your UNMO reports,
7 were they accessible to UNPROFOR? That is one question.
8 A. By "UNPROFOR" -- or "UNMO reports," you mean the reports from my
9 office only?
10 Q. Inter alia, your office, but all of this went through UNMO
11 channels. However, was it accessible to UNPROFOR, as such?
12 A. Okay. I think I understand where you're going.
13 We had -- there was a separate chain of reporting that the
14 UN Military Observers had through their own system. As I mentioned, we
15 were a distinct organisation from the UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces, so
16 that's where the reporting went. However, at each level within the
17 UNPROFOR, there was normally a co-located UNMO office. So, for example,
18 in General Smith's headquarters in Sarajevo, at UNPROFOR headquarters as
19 it was known then, there was the UNMO office, UNMO headquarters,
20 BH Command. At the Sarajevo UNPROFOR headquarters, there was located an
21 UNMO Sector Sarajevo headquarters, and so on. So they would maintain
22 contact and pass information back and forth as necessary.
23 Q. Thank you. With all due respect, you shouldn't really be
24 speculating as to what it is I'm getting at. I'm not speculating about
25 anything, and I'm not trying to blame anyone. I'm just trying to
1 establish the nature of your links.
2 The second question is whether UNPROFOR could send requests to
3 you, asking you to do something. Could they give you tasks, assignments,
4 as Mr. Almstrom did this time?
5 A. In this time, it wasn't a task; it was just a request. They
6 could ask us -- send us requests, but they could not send us tasks; for
7 example, order us to do things. It would have to be approved through the
8 UNMO chain of command. So if it was something straightforward, a
9 request, normally at each level the UNMOs acted upon it. If it was
10 something more serious, more complicated, more difficult, then we would
11 perhaps have to get it approved at a higher level in the UNMO
13 Q. Thank you. That was your understanding; right? It was your
14 understanding that both warring parties in the zone of Sarajevo, the
15 Serbs and the Muslims, violated, in different ways, the cease-fire
16 agreements that had been reached, or the total exclusion zone, in respect
17 of heavy weaponry; isn't that right?
18 A. I recall there were violations. But our office was not involved
19 in investigating them and so forth, so I cannot provide more information
20 regarding your question.
21 Q. Thank you. Likewise, you know that the Muslim side was never
22 bombed; right?
23 A. Bombed by who?
24 Q. The United Nations, or, rather, NATO.
25 A. By "bombing," do you mean air-strikes?
1 Q. Yes, yes.
2 A. Not to my knowledge while I was there.
3 Q. Thank you. Today, on page 11 of the transcript, you confirmed
4 that NATO carried out air-strikes against Serb positions on behalf of the
5 United Nations; isn't that right?
6 A. That's the way it was reported in the press. I'm not sure how
7 the link between the UN and NATO is in conducting the air-strikes, but I
8 can confirm that the aircraft were NATO aircraft, not United Nations
10 Q. But on page 11, you characterised it as NATO air-strikes on
11 behalf of the United Nations. Do you agree that these NATO air-strikes
12 were asked for by the UN commander in Bosnia? I don't know which line it
13 is, but it is page 11. I think the line is 12 or 13.
14 A. Are you referring to my amalgamated witness statement?
15 JUDGE KWON: No, in the transcript of today's LiveNote.
16 THE WITNESS: Okay.
17 JUDGE KWON: Shall I read it for you. That part is:
18 "Yes. At approximately 10.00 in the morning, a similar type of
19 explosion like the air-strikes the previous day occurred. I should just,
20 for the clarification of the Court, mention that after the air-strikes
21 had occurred, approximately 30 minutes later we were informed by our
22 headquarters, on the 25th of May, that those two explosions had, in fact,
23 been air-strikes carried out by NATO, on behalf of the United Nations."
24 That's the transcript of what you said, and Mr. Karadzic referred
25 to that part.
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct. And I would have known that
2 based on the letter that I had received from General Smith to
3 General Mladic, warning him to return those weapons into the weapons
4 collection points unless there would be air-strikes. And it was just
5 common knowledge that if air-strikes were required, there was a system in
6 place where the UN would request NATO to carry them out.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Q. Do you know or do you agree that these NATO air-strikes were
9 carried out two hours before the UNPROFOR dead-line expired, two hours
10 before the ultimatum expired?
11 A. Are you referring to the 26th or 25th of May? We were just
12 talking about the 25th of May.
13 Q. The 25th, the beginning of the bombing that was preceded by an
14 ultimatum. There were only two hours left. Do you know that?
15 A. I would have to look at the original letter. I don't have it in
16 front of me, and I haven't seen it in the many years.
17 Q. Thank you. Can you confirm that on the 25th of May, I was in
18 Banja Luka? Do you remember that?
19 A. Yes, I do, based on information from your secretary, because I
20 had a request from Mr. Akashi's office to try to find you, that they
21 had -- they needed to discuss something with you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Could we now please have a look at 65 ter 32390. It's an
24 intercept. It's a conversation of mine with General Milovanovic about
25 this ultimatum.
1 I hope that we have a translation too. I'm not sure, but I'll
2 read it out.
3 It's the 25th of May, 1995, at 1530 hours. Ah, yes, here is the
4 translation as well. Milovanovic says -- well, he is greeting Karadzic,
5 and so on and so forth. That is not important. And then Karadzic says:
6 [In English] "Akashi
7 talk to him. I just -- he managed to find me. He asked me if I could do
8 something in the next few minutes. Is it that difficult to give back
9 those four weapons, some four weapons? Nikola is here too, he is hearing
10 it," and so on and so on.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Can you please cast a glance at this. Do you see that I've been
13 given a few minutes to achieve that from Banja Luka, to have these four
14 weapons returned to the collection points?
15 A. Just bear with me. I will have a read through the whole thing.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could all the participants please
17 read all of this, because our position is contained there. There is also
18 a reference to Western Slavonia, that had fallen a month before that,
19 although it was a protected area.
20 THE WITNESS: Regarding the time, it says "1543" on top, so that
21 was if the air-strikes occurred at 1600. Again, in my recollection,
22 that's approximate. But let's use 1600 as a reference. Then that would
23 mean it's 17 minutes beforehand. However, when the actual dead-line was
24 for those weapons to be returned, I'm not sure if it was 1600. I believe
25 it was earlier. But as I mentioned before, I'd have to look at the
1 original letter to see what the actual dead-line was.
2 The letter, just for clarification, was sent to General Mladic
3 the previous day. So he had more than 17 minutes to return them. And
4 perhaps there were also discussions earlier on that subject, but
5 that's -- I don't want to speculate about that.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 [In English] "I told him I can't even get in touch in a few
8 minutes, let alone do something about this."
9 Q. [Interpretation] Is that right? In our circumstances, when
10 situations were difficult, it was difficult to achieve anything within a
11 few minutes from Banja Luka by phone. Do you agree?
12 A. I can't comment on that. I don't know about your circumstances,
13 and the communications means, and systems that you had available to you.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]
16 May this document be received?
17 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, following our practice, we'll mark
18 it for identification.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 I should now like to display a document from the news
22 agency France-Presse, 65 ter 10726.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. You noticed, in the previous document, that our position was that
25 if Serbs were bombed, the United Nations could no longer be considered as
1 peacekeepers, but would be considered as enemies; right? We saw that in
2 the previous document, if you remember. You've read it.
3 A. These are your words, as far as I understand, yes.
4 Q. Thank you. May I ask you to look at this report from AFP
5 relating what I said in a public statement on Radio Banja Luka on the
6 25th of May. We say the same thing; namely, that if we should be
7 attacked, we would consider it as an attack, and in that case the
8 United Nations would be, to us, an enemy, a warring party?
9 A. That's what you stated, yes.
10 Q. Were you aware, Major, of the difference between close air
11 support and air-strikes as a punitive measure that changes the situation
12 on the ground, in other words, diminishes the combat capability of one of
13 the warring parties?
14 A. There are -- an air-strike is simply dropping a bomb, so -- and
15 "close air support" is also a fairly general term. So as I mentioned,
16 I'm -- well, neither at that time, nor since then, have I been trained as
17 a forward air controller, so I can't get into the subtleties of these
18 differences, in terms --
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I note the time.
20 So we'll have a break for half an hour and resume at five past
22 --- Recess taken at 12.36 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 1.06 p.m.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, if I could introduce
1 Aiofe Nichearbhaill, from the National University of Galway, who is with
2 us this session. Thank you.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue your
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. If I may remind you, Major, would you agree that close air
7 support is meant for the self-defence of UNPROFOR units when they find
8 themselves in difficulty?
9 A. I don't know how it was defined specifically for UNPROFOR. That
10 is, I don't know how close air support was specifically defined for
12 Q. Are you aware that General Mladic gave a free hand to UNPROFOR
13 generals, in case they are attacked by our forces, that they were free to
14 respond and that would have no consequence on our relationship?
15 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
16 Q. Do you agree that air-strikes are something entirely different,
17 that it's not just self-defence on the part of the UNPROFOR; it's a
18 strike against one of the parties?
19 A. As I mentioned before, I'm not aware of how you should
20 distinguish those two terms, air-strikes and close air support.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see that document again,
22 the one we had a moment ago on the screen, 65 ter 10726. It has been
24 JUDGE KWON: Not yet.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Is the content of this document consistent with what was said --
2 what I said; namely, that in the case of an attack by the UNPROFOR, by
3 the UN, the UN would no longer be regarded as a peacekeeper, but as a
4 warring party? If it was published on the 25th, that means it had been
5 said on the 24th. Is it consistent with what you heard?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
8 Well, two different questions posed. With respect to the first,
9 in case it arises again, it cannot be an appropriate question to a
10 witness, to present him with two documents he hasn't seen before and ask
11 him if -- the extent to which they may be consistent.
12 The last document seems to be -- to have something to do with the
13 witness's knowledge and experience, and that's a different matter.
14 JUDGE KWON: Maybe the witness is able to answer whether it is
15 consistent with the knowledge he had at the time.
16 THE WITNESS: As far as the consistency question, I recall that
17 there was a press statement made by Mr. Karadzic around that time. I
18 can't say whether it was the 24th, or the 25th, or earlier. And I do
19 recall him saying something to the effect that -- as reported here, that
20 use of air-strikes or bombing, perhaps close air support - I don't know
21 the exact terms that were used - would lead Mr. Karadzic to consider the
22 UN peacekeeping force as something perhaps like an enemy, but I can't say
23 if those were the exact words or accurate. But it's something along
24 those lines, but how general or how specific it was, I can't comment
25 further, especially after so many years.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that can be admitted.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D988, Your Honours.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 I'd like to refresh your memory, then, Major. I'll call 65 ter
6 12143 in e-court.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. While we're waiting: Do you agree that the strikes began on the
9 25th of May, and on that day you were asked to stay in your
11 A. My first awareness of those air-strikes occurring was those two
12 bombs that we observed on the 25th of May, and we were also -- I wouldn't
13 say "asked." We were ordered. It was made very clear. We were not
14 permitted to leave our accommodation. And that was -- that order was
15 sent to us by the Bosnian Serb Army Liaison Office, so either
16 Colonel Djurdjic or Major Kralj. And we understood it, from our
17 perspective, that we were being put under house arrest.
18 Q. Well, the problem is probably in the interpretation. The word I
19 used can be translated as both "asked" and "required."
20 Could you take a look at this document. Is this something you
21 sent to Mr. Almstrom? I don't see his rank, but is this the document?
22 A. It appears to be, yes. And Mr. Almstrom was a civilian at that
23 point. He was not a military officer.
24 Q. May I draw your attention:
25 [In English] "they repeated Karadzic's previous statements that
1 if the UN would use air-strikes against the Serbs, the Serbs would no
2 longer consider the UN troops as peacekeepers, but as enemies."
3 A. What is the question?
4 Q. [Interpretation] Well, I was waiting for the interpretation.
5 Was that, indeed, the position we took at the time, and as we see
6 from this report, that position was very well known to you?
7 A. In this report, I'm -- in paragraph 1 and those five bullets, I'm
8 just summarising what was reported on a news summary by the Serbian Radio
9 Broadcasting Service in Pale on the local television. But if you're
10 asking if this was, in fact, what I understood was being reported, that
11 is correct.
12 Q. Look at paragraph 3. It reflects your comments and conclusions;
14 I kindly ask all parties to read 3:
15 [In English] "The bombing caused and continues to cause
16 considerable alarm among Serb civilians both in Pale and among their
17 relatives and friends throughout the former Yugoslavia. Immediately
18 after the attack and before the news broadcasts began, friends and
19 relatives of the family we lived with, as well as of our neighbours,
20 began calling to determine what the --"
21 [Interpretation] Next page, please:
22 [In English] "... what the situation was ..."
23 [Interpretation] Well, let me not read all of it. The parties
24 can read for themselves, and then the next paragraph -- the whole text,
25 in fact.
1 In this paragraph, you note, quite correctly, that 60 to
2 70 per cent of the population of Pale were, in fact, refugees who had
3 already fled from other areas, and they were even worse hit by all of
4 this than the others:
5 [In English] "The state of fear continues among the civilians.
6 Just five minutes ago, the father of one of our interpreters called from
7 Ilidza to check ..."
8 And so on and so on:
9 "One should bear in mind that well over half (60 to 70 per cent
10 at least) of the population of Pale are refugees, themselves, and are
11 very sensitive to anything that could be perceived as putting their lives
12 in danger again."
13 [Interpretation] This is your observation and your conclusion at
14 the time; correct?
15 A. It was my observation, yes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now ask to see the last
18 [In English] "As far as the locals see it, the UN is (once again)
19 singling out the Serbs for blame regarding the events of the last few
20 days in Sarajevo
21 air-strikes (the four guns), they cannot understand why the Muslims go
22 unpunished for the shelling and shooting that they inflict on Serb
23 civilians in and around Sarajevo
24 Muslims started the recent surge in fighting, and the Serbs get punished
25 for defending themselves. Furthermore, the local press agency reports
1 create an overall impression that NATO has gone so far as to completely
2 disregard the safety of civilians in this latest attack."
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. That, again, was your observation and your conclusion; correct?
5 A. My observation was on the local perception, which is based on the
6 news reports and other information that they received from the
7 Bosnian Serb leaders.
8 Q. And in your view, was it really true that civilians were
9 panic-stricken and furious?
10 A. I can only comment on the ones that we had access to, which were
11 the family that we were living with, our interpreter who was on duty at
12 the time, and some of the neighbours around us, but I can't talk about
13 the general perceptions or -- further around Sarajevo. I was
14 unfortunately generalising a bit in this report.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it was part of an associated exhibit that had
18 been already admitted.
19 THE REGISTRAR: It will be assigned Exhibit P2177.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Can we now see 65 ter 19300.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours, Exhibit P2178, also part of
23 the associated exhibits.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next page.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. This is a debriefing memorandum from you, right, your report and
2 the report of Major Westlund?
3 Can we see the next page.
4 We need to look for the passage which contains your qualification
5 that civilians were panic-stricken and furious. It's the entry for the
6 25th and 26th of May. Perhaps it's on the previous page. Just a moment.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I think on e-court, page number 8.
8 If we could find that.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] 25 and 26 May.
10 Q. Can you remember this debriefing and this qualification,
11 civilians terrified and furious?
12 A. Yes. Those were not my words, though. That was drafted by
13 another individual who was debriefing me. But that was the -- it came
14 out of our conversation, so it's accurate, again, as I just mentioned
15 before, to the immediate surroundings in Pale where we were living.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now take a look at the
18 entry for the 15th of June, page 2, paragraph 81 and 82.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. You relate here your discussion with Professor Koljevic; correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you. Very well. On the 26th of May -- I don't need to
23 tender this. It's an exhibit.
24 On the 26th of May, at the time when you were captured, were you
25 in the active service of the United Nations?
1 A. I don't know what you mean by "active service."
2 Q. Were you serving then, were you on duty, were you in the service?
3 A. I was employed as a UN military observer. That means I was sent
4 there by the Canadian Forces to work as a UN military observer.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see again P2172 for a
6 moment, speaking of your estimates. This document has been exhibited
7 today. Page 3. Rather, page 2, the next page. 8166, that's the page:
8 [In English] "... panic amongst civilian and military is assessed
9 as high."
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Is this consistent with what you observed, that it was a state of
12 panic? Do you agree with this conclusion?
13 A. I apologise, Your Honour. I'm still looking for the passage that
14 he's referring to.
15 JUDGE KWON: The first three lines.
16 THE WITNESS: Oh, the first three lines.
17 All I can say is panic among the civilians in the immediate
18 vicinity where I was living, that is correct. As far as others or the
19 military, I cannot assess. For example, the Bosnian Serb Army soldiers
20 who came to take us hostage on that morning, they did not appear panicked
21 at all, just angry.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Yes, but those who drew guns and who lost their sheep and their
24 families, did they look to you both terrified and furious,
1 MR. TIEGER: I think that question assumes facts not in evidence.
2 JUDGE KWON: No. You need to put that question. Please
3 reformulate your question, Mr. Karadzic.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Q. Major, you testified today in-chief that you had suffered an
6 outburst of anger on the part of a man who later calmed down and
7 complained that he had lost a number of sheep, over 10, I think, and he
8 had lost a relative. Do you remember that?
9 A. I remember that's what he told me, yes.
10 Q. Would you qualify his state as fury, or panic, or both?
11 A. The word I would use -- it was translated as "fury" in English.
12 I would rather say just "anger."
13 Q. Thank you. May I now ask you to look at the second paragraph of
14 para 3:
15 [In English] "In such conditions when life of UN personnel cannot
16 be guaranteed, and when the possibility of directing involving the
17 UNPROFOR in military activity against one of the warring factions (BSA),
18 regular armed forces cannot be excluded, then it is strongly recommended
19 not to continue air-strikes in such conditions."
20 [Interpretation] Do you agree with this general assessment by the
21 UNMO command?
22 A. No, I cannot comment on it, because I don't know what information
23 he had at his disposal to make that assertion. I had very little
24 information. All I knew was the air-strikes that had occurred in Pale.
25 That, I could observe, and my own treatment.
1 Q. But you don't dispute that this is an official report, or,
2 rather, a general assessment made by the headquarters of the UNMOs at the
3 Sarajevo UNPROFOR headquarters? That's written at the top.
4 A. It's some sort of an assessment. But what its purpose is and
5 where it's being sent, I don't know, but it appears to be an official
7 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to repeat the same question in relation
8 to others. Were all the others who were taken prisoner together with you
9 in the active service of the United Nations?
10 A. Sorry, could you please repeat the question?
11 Q. All the others who were captured together with you, from your
12 observation post and the neighbouring observation post, were all of them
13 in active service?
14 A. The people that I was held with, that's my teams here,
15 Sierra Echo 1 and Sierra Golf 1, they were not observation posts, they
16 were UNMO teams, and they were taken at their accommodations.
17 Q. Thank you. My question is: Were they in active service at the
18 time when they were taken prisoner, just like you?
19 A. Your Honour, I'm not sure if the translation is correct, "active
20 service." Do they mean on duty, as opposed to being on holidays, or --
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Were you serving, were you on duty?
24 A. The term we would use, you're on duty. I mean, people could be
25 away on leave or they could be at their post. Instead of going away,
1 they pass some of their leave days there. As far as I'm aware, everyone
2 from my team -- well, I can say not -- I know definitely for my team, and
3 I presume from the other two UNMO teams, they were all on duty, which
4 means not on holidays.
5 Q. Thank you. In the course of your captivity, were you ever told
6 that you were treated as prisoners of war?
7 A. Twice. Once on the evening of the 27th of May, by
8 Captain Vojvodic, when we were upstairs in that dormitory building, in
9 the room where we spent the night. When he introduced himself to us, he
10 told us that we were prisoners of war of the Bosnian Serb Army. And the
11 second -- actually, that was the only place it was actually used, the
12 term "prisoners of war." Mr. Bulajic, when he called us combatants,
13 I think, was going to say that we were prisoners of war, but he never
14 mentioned that. He just talked about us being taken captive as
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Well, here in this
17 65 ter 19300 that we looked at a moment ago, on page 5 - we don't have to
18 recall that document - you say that you have been informed that you were
20 Can we now see 65 ter 22011. It's the questionnaire you filled
21 in immediately after release.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you remember, in fact, you confirmed that today, that Bulajic
24 was the president of the Committee for the Exchange of POWs on the Serb
1 A. I don't know if it was specifically for POWs. I was told he was
2 the president of what was called the Serb Exchange Commission, and I know
3 they were involved in negotiating exchanges of prisoners. But as far as
4 prisoners of war or what that status meant to you, I don't know.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see your response to
6 question number 20. I think it's the third page from here. 1037307 is
7 the ERN number. That's right.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Could you please read the question for us, as well as your
10 answer, number 20? Could you read it out, please, just your answer.
11 A. Well, it says:
12 "During the ICRC visit on 8th of June, 1995, Mr. Bulajic
13 (president of the Bosnian Serb Exchange Commission) stated to us that we
14 were POWs officially because we were combatants. I had a short argument
15 with him."
16 So perhaps he did use the word POWs or prisoners of war, but what
17 got my attention was that he referred to us as combatants.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Since this is part of the transcript now, we don't need to have
20 the questionnaire admitted.
21 Could we now have 1D3067.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. While we're waiting for that: Major, you -- or I don't know
24 whether you, personally, but you, as a group, asked for certain rights
25 and certain privileges; among other things, for a visit from the
1 Red Cross, from a doctor, and your right to receive information, or,
2 rather, watch television; right?
3 We have a translation of this document, too, so could we have
4 both on the screen?
5 Is that right, Major, that you put forth certain requests,
6 certain demands to the Serb Army, the things that I referred to; a visit
7 by the Red Cross, a visit by a doctor, and the right to watch television,
8 or, rather, to receive information through the media?
9 A. Yes, those things -- visit by the Red Cross, visit by a doctor,
10 and right to receive information through the media, that is, newspapers
11 or television, those were things that we were demanding, yes, and not
12 because anyone called us prisoners of war, because we considered that to
13 be completely unjust for us to have been taken captive.
14 Q. You asked for that in accordance with International Law,
15 international norms. I think that you referred to that today as well.
16 You asked for that in accordance with international norms. Have you
17 heard of hostages being referred to in any way in international norms?
18 A. Referred in any way? What international norms do you mean? The
20 Q. Any. For example, the International Law of War, is it envisaged
21 that hostages can make certain requests or demands, and are they
22 responded to or are they met? What do the hostages invoke when they say
23 that they want this or that or the other thing? You referred to
24 International Law.
25 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, the reality of the position is
1 that is a question that would test most professors of International Law
2 and give rise to an enormous debate and probably an enormous written
3 opinion. With great respect to this officer, I don't think he would
4 begin to claim to have that sort of expertise, so I think what you need
5 to do is to address that question in another forae, rather than put it to
6 this witness. I doubt very much -- I can't speak for him, and I don't,
7 but I doubt very much whether he has an exhaustive knowledge of this
8 topic that would be required to answer that question with the
9 particularly that you require.
10 THE WITNESS: If I may, I mean, all I'm aware of is that taking
11 of hostages is prohibited. But, I agree, I'm not the expert to be
12 discussing the details of Mr. Karadzic's question.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 I'm going to move away from questions of theory.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. But I just wanted to know, Major, when it was that you made these
17 requests that you wanted to have met. You refer to International Law.
18 Were you meaning international law that protected hostages or prisoners
19 of war?
20 A. What we were requesting was the minimum that we, as a group,
21 thought we were entitled to if the Bosnian Serbs had designated us as
22 prisoners of war, from our understanding of the rights of prisoners of
23 war under the Geneva Convention, because we weren't even getting any of
24 that. We thought that we would start that as a minimum.
25 Q. Well, you did ask for the Red Cross to visit you, as well as a
1 doctor, and to have the right to watch television, and you got all three,
2 didn't you?
3 A. Towards the end, yes. We made these requests early on, and I
4 would have to check the debriefing that you pulled up earlier, but it
5 was -- this letter was drafted, I think, on the fourth or fifth day,
6 something like that. The Red Cross visit I don't think happened until
7 the 11th day, something like that. The doctors -- sorry, the 11th of
8 June. The doctor's visit, I recall, was not until the 8th of June, and
9 it was only after constantly requesting it that this was finally given to
10 us, and only after the Serb side had started to release some of the UN
11 hostages, not beforehand.
12 Q. Thank you. With all due respect, and fully understanding how
13 much time has elapsed and the things that can happen to your memory, in
14 response to question 20, you say:
15 [In English] "During the ICRC visit on 8th of June, 1995 ..."
16 [Interpretation] So it was on the 8th of June that the Red Cross
17 visited you.
18 Let us now have a look at the 6th of June. A universities
19 professor visited you, Dr. Sosic, and this is what he says on the front
20 page, the interpreters can help us as well:
21 "Report of a doctor of the military hospital on the visit of
22 POWs, officers of the UN."
23 When it says "zarobljenik" [phoen] in our part of the world, it
24 would be superfluous to say the whole thing, "prisoners of war." It goes
25 without saying that it's a prisoner of war, a "zarobljenik." However, it
1 has been mistranslated here. It should not only say "prisoners," because
2 when you use the verb "zarobiti" [phoen], that means to take an enemy
3 prisoner or an opponent prisoner. So does it show that the professor
4 considered you to be a POW?
5 A. I don't know what report this is.
6 JUDGE KWON: I don't think the witness can help you on this
8 THE WITNESS: I'm not familiar with this report. I've not
9 seen --
10 JUDGE KWON: Move on, Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. However, we do see that on the 6th, Dr. Sosic visited you. You
14 made your request on the 4th. On the 6th, you were visited by Dr. Sosic,
15 and on the 8th by the Red Cross.
16 Now, this is Professor Sosic describing the situation that you
17 were in, your physical and mental condition, of all the captives,
18 actually. So he visited you on the 5th of June, and on the 6th, he wrote
19 his report.
20 So can we have the next page, please. Professor M. Sosic,
21 Mirko Sosic, who is a senior consult -- who is a professor, and also
22 there is a senior consultant, Dr. Babic. These are top-notch experts who
23 visited you immediately after you had requested that, and they wrote up
24 their report on the 6th of June.
25 Is it true that this is the report on that visit, and you
1 actually said some of the things that are contained in this report; that
2 one was supposed to be released immediately, and that certain measures
3 were proposed, like more fruit and vegetables, and so on?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
5 MR. TIEGER: I debated whether to get up, Your Honour, but
6 I think if I don't address these things as they happen, they will
7 continue to intrude.
8 There's more commentary by Dr. Karadzic that is identifying who
9 the experts are when it's not in the record. If it's important to him,
10 he can ask the question or elicit evidence about it. If it is not, in
11 and of itself, an important matter, I don't particularly question the
12 qualifications of these experts, but this is the kind of intrusion of
13 testimony and commentary that we need to discourage.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I agree with your observation, Mr. Tieger.
15 You have another lesson today, Mr. Karadzic. Please bear that in
16 mind. So what is your question?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My thanks to Mr. Tieger for
18 educating me, for lecturing me.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Major, do you agree that Dr. Sosic, a university professor, and
21 Dr. Babic, a senior consultant, visited you, and that this report is
22 based on that visit paid to you?
23 A. Two individuals who are doctors by that name visited us on the
24 5th of June, yes. And I'm not sure if that report is specific to us or
25 other UNMOs, but you can see that what he requests be provided us, that
1 matches fairly closely with what we had requested of Major Batinic,
2 formerly -- earlier into our detention.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can this document be admitted?
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D989, Your Honours.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Q. Major, I believe -- or, actually, I'm asking you to confirm or
9 deny that you saw POWs during your service in various situations, in
10 various theaters of war.
11 A. Actually, no, I have not, not as defined by the
13 Q. Well, I wanted to ask you something. I believe that you were at
14 different theaters of war on behalf of the UN. Did you ever see POWs who
15 were entitled to satellite telephones and other wireless communications?
16 Does any international law envisage that kind of thing, that they are
17 entitled to that?
18 JUDGE KWON: Move on to your next question, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this pertains to what the
20 distinguished Mr. Tieger asked about, taking away communications
21 equipment. When they were taken prisoner, they were forbidden
22 communication. I don't even have a mobile telephone over here right now,
23 so POWs are not entitled to --
24 JUDGE KWON: I think that that has been asked and answered.
25 I take it you are coming to an end.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We're working until 2.30, aren't
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Can we now have a look at pages 4 and 5 of 65 ter 19300, 19300.
6 JUDGE KWON: It's your debriefing.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, pages 4 and 5 of the
8 debriefing, the debriefing entry for June the 1st.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Actually, on the 1st of June, you wrote a letter, and you
11 referred to these rights that you had as POWs on the basis of the
12 Geneva Convention:
13 [In English] "... UNMOs discussed the implications of prisoners
14 all under the Geneva Convention. A six-point letter was formulated to
15 Major Batinic with various requests."
16 [Interpretation] Can you find that?
17 MR. ROBINSON: It should be e-court page 11, on the bottom, and
18 then continuing on to page 12.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, the 1st of June:
20 [In English] "The UNMO discussed how to deal with captain.
21 Consensus, was that they elected official team representative (other than
22 Rechner and Zidlik, the Serbs speaking UNMOs, so that always two UNMOs
23 could confront the captain, one acting as interpreter). They also felt
24 that they should not deal with captain, but with his superior. They
25 discussed implications of prisoners of war --"
1 [Interpretation] Could we have the next page, please:
2 [In English] "... prisoners of war and Geneva Convention."
3 [Interpretation] So here are your requests:
4 [In English] "The request was to Major Batinic, requesting:
5 Contact with next of kin; contact with ICRC; Rechner to be allowed to
6 speak with Professor Koljevic; for members of all three teams to visit
7 their accommodations to pick up clothes; access to news; medical
8 examination of UNMOs."
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Is it correct that Captain Vojvodic took some of you to get your
11 clothing from where you had been staying?
12 A. Yes, he did that for us.
13 Q. So all of these six points were met, more or less?
14 A. By were the 15th of June -- by the end of the 15th of June, yes,
15 which was the 21st day of our captivity.
16 Q. Now we have to go back to this. You wrote it up on the 1st, and
17 on the 4th you came in touch with - what's his name? - Batinic, and you
18 handed that over. I don't know when you handed it over. And then on the
19 5th, you visited by a doctor. On the 8th of June, you were visited by
20 the Red Cross; right? So it was considerably before your period of
21 captivity that these requests were met; right?
22 A. These requests were made, starting the first day, verbally. When
23 we saw we were not getting a reaction - especially what concerned us most
24 was the phone calls to our next of kin - we then decided to try to do a
25 more formal approach to Major Batinic.
1 Q. You wrote that on the 4th of June; right?
2 A. I'd have to go back. Can you scroll back to the previous page?
3 The 1st of June, as you see.
4 Q. Well, on the 1st of June, you discussed it, but earlier on you
5 said that you had handed it over in writing on the 4th of June. Did you
6 manage to speak to your families on the telephone?
7 A. Sorry, there was two questions there, one about handing over the
8 letter and something -- and speaking to our families by telephone. So
9 let me answer the first one.
10 We -- as soon as we drafted the letter, we gave it to
11 Captain Vojvodic. When Major Batinic actually had received it, I don't
13 Q. Thank you. Did any of you or all of you speak to your families
14 by phone?
15 A. As far as I know, all of us had at least one opportunity to make
16 a supervised two-minute telephone call. So one single two-minute
17 telephone call by the 15th of June.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Can I have the same document, the entry -- just a moment, please.
20 I'm sorry. Page 5. It has to do with the 1st of June yet again.
21 Can we have the next page. I have to find it now, where it says:
22 [In English] "The UNMOs agreed among themselves to give only ID
23 numbers, name, rank, and nationality because of the prisoner of war
24 status given them by the Serbs."
25 JUDGE KWON: It's in the middle, 1930.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. So, Major, the Serbs gave you that status, and you decided to say
3 only what you had to in accordance with the provisions regulating POWs,
4 as stated here; name, rank, and nationality?
5 A. As I said, I didn't draft this. This was based on discussions
6 with someone, and they drafted it. By "status," that's probably not the
7 best way of phrasing it. What it should say is that the Serbs said, You
8 are POWs, period. That's all we ever got. We never got some sort of
9 document, or list of rights, or even how we were to be treated; nothing.
10 It was just simply that we were told that we are prisoners of war of the
11 Bosnian Serb Army, period. That's all that was ever told to us. And
12 then Major -- or Mr. Bulajic said that he considered us to be combatants.
13 That's all I can say.
14 JUDGE KWON: In one way or another, that is reflected in the
15 parenthesis, which says "given them by the Serbs"?
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Then we can move on.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Is it correct that two out of the three pilots from that team
20 were questioned about the possibility of carrying out activities related
21 to forward air controllers?
22 A. I don't really know what was discussed. This is -- I mean,
23 afterwards they mentioned a little bit about the discussion and that the
24 Bosnian Serb officers were interested in NATO targeting capabilities and
25 that sort of stuff, but I don't know more than what's written here.
1 Q. I would like to ask you kindly to look at the same paragraph:
2 [In English] "The officers departed and then returned after the
3 superiors said they wanted to speak with Zidlik (Czech) and Evans
4 (Ghanaian) who were pilot background. Both the UNMOs were taken to a
5 separate area for questioning. These officers offered to allow Evans to
6 make a call home if he co-operated with them. He declined. They wanted
7 to know how the targets were selected. They also showed Zidlik a bomb
8 fragment which supposedly had grid co-ordinates marked on it and tried to
9 implicate UNMOs as providing these references to NATO."
10 [Interpretation] There is no need for me to read all of this out,
11 there is no need for me to read all of this out.
12 Do you see that the Army of Republika Srpska wondered how it was
13 possible for them to have this kind of information and to target with
14 such precision, and that it was the air force people among the UNMOs that
15 were actually doing that? Do you see that that is what is written here?
16 A. Again, I don't quite understand. Perhaps there's a problem with
17 the translation, but I'm not sure what your question is.
18 Q. Well, you did mention during the examination-in-chief that you
19 had been accused of acting as forward air controllers; not you,
20 personally, but UNMOs, in general, were accused of co-operating with
21 NATO, in terms of acting as forward air controllers; isn't that right?
22 A. Actually, my understanding was that I was accused, personally,
23 together with Ole Zidlik and Pavel Teterevsky, of acting as forward air
24 controllers on that news report on that first day.
25 Q. Thank you. But only these two air force men were questioned.
1 You weren't. And who else was there? Who else was there from the air
3 A. Well, it's stated "Evans." That's Griffiths Evans.
4 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that the questioning was carried out by
5 a major from the Security Service and that Mladic, General Mladic, was
6 not present at the time, he was not in barracks?
7 A. I don't recall seeing General Mladic there during my captivity.
8 That's all I can say. Whether he was there or not, I can't say one way
9 or the other. I didn't see him.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Can we now have D306. It's an exhibit, D306.
12 I would like to show you the statement of one of the observers
13 who was held prisoner, Gunnar Westlund from Sweden, so could we please
14 have a look at this document. Just a moment to see what page.
15 Gunnar Westlund, I think that's the right one. Can we see the
16 next page.
17 MR. ROBINSON: I think if we had page 3 on e-court, that was what
18 we're looking for.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Sorry. The pages in e-court and
20 the pages in the actual document do not always coincide.
21 Para 3.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. "In 1995 -- in April 1995, I looked out of our window and I saw a
24 UN vehicle with apparent UNMOs inside it ..."
25 Et cetera, et cetera.
1 "... about 200 metres from our building."
2 May I ask you and all the other parties to read this paragraph.
3 Were you aware of such incidents, Major?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Thank you. This was just to enhance our understanding. What was
6 the Serb side supposed to think of these ghost teams misusing your
7 uniforms and your vehicles and your insignia?
8 JUDGE KWON: The witness answered that he didn't know that.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Were you aware, Major, of any Canadian soldiers who served in
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina as forward air controllers or scouts in the
12 service of NATO?
13 A. I had heard that our battalion in Visoko had one -- perhaps two
14 such officers who were trained to be forward air controllers in case they
15 would require support from the air to protect them.
16 Q. Thank you. In the case against the said Nicholas Ribic in
18 A. Yes, I was.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Can we now see 65 ter -- 1D2904.
21 Let's first see the first page to identify the document:
22 "In the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division."
23 Now, could we see in e-court page 138. In the document, it's
24 page 137.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Now, may I ask you to look at this passage referring to forward
2 air controllers and the statement of Witness B in this case. He
3 testified that one of forward air controllers was involved in guiding
4 bombs that were dropped on Pale in May 1995.
5 Yes, that's the right page, 138.
6 He was also a major; correct?
7 A. Sorry, I don't know who you're referring to.
8 MR. TIEGER: Right. At first, of course -- well, we better get
9 much more clarity, but this question lacks foundation, given the fact
10 that all we know is that this appears to be somebody who testified in the
11 same case that this witness testified in.
12 JUDGE KWON: Could you reformulate your question, Mr. Karadzic,
13 so that the witness can understand.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. You testified in this same case, and you confirm today that
16 guiding did take place, that one of the soldiers in the UN troops was a
17 forward air controller and served in Visoko. Do you know that this
18 person, called Witness B in this case, also confirmed that a forward air
19 controller guided bombs in May 1995 in the area of Pale?
20 MR. TIEGER: Okay, and again I'm sorry, I really hate to rise
21 this much, but I think that assumes facts not in evidence. I believe the
22 witness, with respect to forward air controllers, spoke about capacity,
23 but not the act of guiding. And it shouldn't be built into questions in
24 this manner if it's not reflected in the witness's testimony.
25 JUDGE KWON: Having heard that, whether you can answer the
1 question whether you knew that this person, Witness B, confirmed that a
2 forward air controller guided bombs in May 1995 in the area of Pale.
3 THE WITNESS: First of all, I don't know anything more about this
4 person, other than there was someone named Witness B in the proceedings.
5 I was not there for the testimony or to know what he did.
6 The other thing is what I mentioned regarding our battalion in
7 Visoko. I heard that they were supposed to have, in their structure,
8 one -- somebody trained as a forward air controller, if required. If
9 they actually had one there with that battalion at that time, especially
10 at that particular time in May, I don't know. I don't have any of that
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Can we see the next page.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Major, this is very important. A captain in your national army,
16 serving the United Nations, spends a whole week in Pale, from which you
17 report on anything of consequence. He planned the operation --
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, he says he knows nothing about it.
19 Call Witness B, then, if necessary, if it has any relevance at all. Just
20 put your case to the witness.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. If I can just intervene
22 for a moment.
23 We do hope to call Witness B. We're engaged in discussions with
24 the Canadian Government about that. But I think that Dr. Karadzic,
25 although he is not quite doing it exactly the way a lawyer might do it,
1 is trying to put to this witness, to test this witness's credibility,
2 sufficient details about what Witness B has said so that later on you can
3 make an evaluation of this witness's credibility, considering these
4 events took place in the very town that he is located in. So that's the
5 object of what Dr. Karadzic is trying to do, and I think it's a
6 legitimate one.
7 JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Robinson, the witness has already said that
8 he doesn't know anything more about this person, other than there was
9 someone named Witness B in the proceedings.
10 MR. ROBINSON: But I think the object of the questions is to ask
11 the witness whether he was aware of any individuals in the
12 Canadian Armed Forces who were, number 1, conducting surveillance of the
13 target in Pale that was bombed, that had spent a week in the area of Pale
14 prior to -- selecting targets for NATO, that was providing intelligence
15 information as to what was in the very ammunition dump that he was held
16 at, and that later on he goes on to say that there were four to five air
17 controllers in the Pale area. So it seems like all of these items, which
18 are part of our case, ought, in fairness to the witness, to be put to him
19 so that he can comment. And, if, in fact, he has no knowledge of any of
20 those things, then that's fine, but I think we have a right to put that
21 to him.
22 JUDGE MORRISON: I mean, specific discreet questions can, of
23 course, be put to the witness, but it's wrong, in principle, to put to
24 the witness the testimony of another witness when he wasn't --
25 particularly when he wasn't there at the time that the witness was giving
1 evidence. So you began your intervention quite rightly, Mr. Robinson, by
2 saying Dr. Karadzic wasn't doing it in the way that a lawyer would do it,
3 and that's right. He isn't. What he needs to do is to formulate
4 specific questions to which he can get discreet answers, without
5 reference to a third party.
6 JUDGE KWON: I would expect your role in formulating questions on
7 the part of the Defence, Mr. Robinson.
8 Mr. Karadzic, having heard these, put your case to the witness
9 and let's move on, or put your questions to the witness.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm waiting. I'm just waiting for
11 the interpretation.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Witness, the gist of my question is this: You are in Pale, and
14 you are reporting from Pale on everything and anything of consequence.
15 How is it possible you were unaware that a member of your army spent a
16 week in Pale and planned NATO attacks on our targets? That's my
18 And Mr. Robinson feels what I'm trying to ask, perhaps a little
20 But how is it possible you were not aware your captain was in
21 Pale, planning an attack?
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
23 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour. I have an elephant under my
25 robes. How is Dr. Karadzic not aware of that? The problem here is
1 obvious. He's assuming facts not in evidence, presenting it to the
2 witness, and we have to rely on the witness to untangle the problems with
3 such approaches.
4 If he wants to put his case to the witness, he can. But he can't
5 assume, in the course of that, that it's been established that there was
6 a member of "your army," as he put it, who spent a week in Pale and
7 planned NATO attacks, and so on.
8 JUDGE KWON: No. The question is whether -- how is it possible
9 that the witness was not aware, while his army spent a week in Pale.
10 Yes, that's a very compound question. The witness has answered the
11 second part, whether he knew or not -- or whether or not that a member of
12 the UNPROFOR or UNMO spent a week in Pale. Just put simpler questions,
13 if you would like to.
14 Let me put it on your behalf, Mr. Karadzic.
15 Mr. Rechner, did you know at the time that an air-strike
16 controller - I'm sorry about the terminology - spent a week in Pale?
17 THE WITNESS: No, I did not. I don't even recall seeing another
18 Canadian there.
19 JUDGE KWON: Move on, Mr. Karadzic.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. The same witness stated that UN observers provided intelligence
22 to NATO. What do you have to say to that?
23 I could show a page from this testimony, and the same witness
24 says that he received from you, from UNMOs, intelligence as to what was
25 contained in our ammunition depots. Were you aware of that, and do you
1 know who provided that intelligence?
2 A. I'm not aware of anyone in my team providing intelligence to
3 NATO, and nor anybody in the UN Military Observer organisations.
4 Q. On page 149 of this transcript, the same witness says that there
5 were four teams of forward air controllers in Pale, with four to five men
6 each. Did you observe that massive presence of forward air controllers,
7 and did you report on it?
8 A. Absolutely not did I observe any such presence in Pale.
9 Therefore, of course, there was no reporting. As I mentioned, I'm not --
10 I didn't see any of these either Canadian or other air controllers in
12 Q. Thank you. You were among the last to be released; correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. How did you understand this fact, that you were kept almost until
15 the end? In other words, were you aware that the Serb side was waiting
16 with your release until they got back their own four soldiers who had
17 been captured?
18 A. No, I was not aware. In the meeting I had with
19 President Koljevic on the 15th, he said he was hoping that I would have
20 been released earlier, but that there was some technical problems. And
21 that's all he said. What those technical problems were supposed to mean,
22 either transportation, I don't know.
23 Q. In this case against Ribic, you testified to this circumstance.
24 That's on pages 181 and 182. That was reported on the local news; that
25 is to say, that these four Serbs were held prisoner.
1 Were you -- is it correct, in fact, that these four Serbs were
2 taken prisoner on Vrbanja Bridge
3 A. I had heard on the -- actually, I think it was on my shortwave
4 radio that a French position on the Vrbanja Bridge
5 Serbs, wearing French uniforms with UN blue helmets, and that a battle
6 had ensued, and that the French had captured four of these Serbs. That's
7 all I know. How it was linked -- if it was linked to our release, I have
8 no knowledge of that.
9 Q. You think that Serbs wore French uniforms; is that right?
10 A. That's the way it was reported.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have heard evidence and seen
12 statements here to the effect that Muslims put on French uniforms and
13 that was the reason why the Serbs and Muslims clashed on Vrbanja Bridge
14 Let's see 65 ter 13544. 13544.
15 THE REGISTRAR: This is an associated exhibit, the OTP
16 notification, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, perhaps the Prosecution has
18 the translation.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. You say here that the president of the republic ordered that
21 UNPROFOR members located -- no, that's not it. It should be an order to
22 release UNMOs; 17 June. Yes, this is 17 June.
23 You see here an order was given to free detained -- it's point 11
25 "The Command of the SRK
1 date, "hand over to the authorities of the MUP of Republika Srpska 26
2 members of the UN who are being released. The release and hand-over of
3 the detained members shall take place only after the UNPROFOR brings to
4 the Garrison Lukavica four captured members of the VRS."
5 Do you see that it's an all-for-all exchange?
6 A. What I see on the text is that General Mladic is instructing some
7 of his commanders not to release us, the 26 UN members, until after the 4
8 VRS members or Bosnian Serb Army soldiers or members are released to
9 Lukavica Garrison.
10 Q. Well, the language is different, that they will be released once
11 the others are released. It does not say they will not be released.
12 There is a slight difference. One group will be released as soon as the
13 other group is released. Does this look like an exchange to you, Major?
14 A. I think there's a problem. If you say -- your version does not
15 match the English translation here. The English translation, you can see
16 it's the "26 UN members will only be released (only be done after
17 UNPROFOR brings four captured VRS members to the Lukavica Garrison."
18 So the four Serbs have to be released first before we can be
19 released, is the way I understand that paragraph.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I note the time. Do you need more to
21 conclude your cross-examination?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think, Your Excellency,
23 that we have gone through most of it. I have a few questions left, but
24 basically we can conclude soon. Are we supposed to conclude now?
25 JUDGE KWON: Can you conclude in five minutes' time?
1 Do you have re-examination, Mr. Tieger?
2 MR. TIEGER: I can curtail it, in the interests, Your Honour, but
3 there is one matter I'd like to address. I will simply see if I can --
4 I'll do it as efficiently as possible or perhaps just be permitted to
5 point the Court to documents that may cover the issue as well. So I'll
6 be as quick as possible.
7 JUDGE KWON: Try to conclude in three minutes, Mr. Karadzic.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Major, you wrote a letter to Captain Vojvodic; right?
11 A. No, I don't recall writing a letter to Captain Vojvodic. It was
12 to Colonel Djurdjic and Major Batinic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Djurdjic, sorry. Let me just try
14 to find this letter.
15 Is it turned on -- sorry, is it exhibited as part of an exhibit?
16 JUDGE KWON: I don't think so, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, obviously it hasn't even been
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Do you recall that letter to Captain Djurdjic?
21 A. Yes, that was -- I mean, not the detail in my memory now, but it
22 was written on the evening of the 29th of May, at the request of
23 Captain Vojvodic, concerning the meeting with Professor Koljevic, and he
24 said he wanted -- or Colonel Djurdjic wanted to know the details of what
25 I wanted to discuss with Professor Koljevic.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This previous document is already
3 part of an exhibit; is that correct?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Did you write to anyone after your release?
7 A. Write about what?
8 Q. Did you write to any Serb officer after your release?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Thank you. Then one of your men must have written, expressing
11 gratitude for the treatment, et cetera. But since it was not you, we
12 won't look at it.
13 Thank you, Major. I'm sorry you went through what you went
14 through, but I cannot help also thinking of the Serbs who were there at
15 the time suffering from NATO air-strikes.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 I'll try to be very quick and expedite it by referring to a
19 document Mr. Karadzic referred to repeatedly himself.
20 Re-examination by Mr. Tieger:
21 Q. First, Major, you were asked questions by the accused about the
22 man who lost his sheep and who, according to Mr. Karadzic, also lost a
23 family member. I believe at the earlier portion of your transcript, you
24 had referred to the fact that the man said something about a missing
25 relative. Is it correct, as reflected in P22011, that is, the document
1 to which Dr. Karadzic referred you, the debriefing to which he referred
2 to you repeatedly, that you encountered that person again and learned
3 that, in fact, his missing relative was someone who had gone out for a
4 walk and returned shortly afterwards?
5 A. That is correct. This person who attacked me later explained
6 that his missing relative had simply gone out for a walk and returned
7 safe and sound.
8 MR. TIEGER: I shouldn't call that P. I should call it
9 65 ter 22011. My apologies.
10 Q. And, finally, Dr. Karadzic made repeated references to phone
11 calls. Again, turning to 65 ter 22011, to which Dr. Karadzic referred
12 repeatedly, at page R103-8644, which was read out by Dr. Karadzic,
13 Mr. Evans is offered a phone call if he'll co-operate, and he declined.
14 And at the previous page, you are told, on the 30th of May, that if you
15 provide notes about other UNMOs, then they could arrange for you to make
16 a phone call home. Is it correct that the prospect of granting you phone
17 calls to your family was used as leverage in an effort to get the UNMOs
18 to do something that their captors wanted?
19 A. Yes, that was certainly our understanding, that they were using
20 the bait of our need to contact our next of kin by telephones to force us
21 to do things against our will.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
23 That's all I have, Your Honour.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just two clarifications, briefly,
25 please, lest the Chamber be misled. Just two brief qualifications.
1 JUDGE KWON: What is it, Mr. Karadzic? What is it related to?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Firstly, Major, did you make
3 telephone calls, nevertheless, without having these additional requests
4 met? When you invoked the status of POW, were you allowed to make
5 telephone calls without having to do anything in return?
6 Secondly, at the point in time when that man was angry, when he
7 realised that his relative was still alive, was he still angry?
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I don't think we need the assistance
9 of the witness in that regard, and the clarification won't be necessary.
11 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry. I apologise, Your Honour.
12 There's one matter that needs clarification. I can try and do it through
13 the tapes or try to do it directly with the witness, and I apologise for
14 raising that late. It was in the earlier testimony.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 I think that concludes your evidence, Mr. Rechner, Major Rechner.
17 On behalf of the Bench and the Tribunal, as a whole, thank you very much
18 for your coming to The Hague
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
20 [The witness withdrew]
21 JUDGE KWON: Just one quick matter before we rise.
22 We are seized of the motion from the Defence to suspend the
23 proceedings for three months, starting as of 15th of February, so we
24 would appreciate it if we could have your response as early as possible.
25 MR. TIEGER: Understood, Your Honour, understood.
1 Could I clarify for the record, very quickly, I referred, during
2 that very quick redirect, to 65 ter 22011. It should be 19300. Thank
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, thank you.
5 Could do that -- file it before Wednesday of next week, 9th of
7 MR. TIEGER: I have no reason at this point to think otherwise,
8 but if we think that's some form of problem, we'll let the Court know as
9 early as possible.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 We'll rise, and we'll resume at 9.00 tomorrow morning.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.45 p.m.
13 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 3rd day of
14 February, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.