1 Tuesday, 15 February 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
6 Are there any matters to raise before we have evidence?
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you and good morning.
8 Mr. President, we would like to withdraw our request to have
9 Exhibit MFI D1051 admitted, the statement of Senaid Memic. We decided
10 that after the point raised by the Chamber, it's not in our interests to
11 ask that that statement be admitted at this time.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Secondly, we would like to discuss, before
14 General Smith comes in, the situation concerning Rule 70. And I was
15 wondering if we might go into private session to do that.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, let's do that.
17 [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are now in private session.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we postponed as long as possible
20 the questions about the Vrbanja Bridge, that is the subject of the
21 Rule 70 condition. And Mr. Tieger has informed me, and he can speak for
22 himself, that the UN has not yet made a final decision as to whether or
23 not they are going to insist upon that condition, but we feel this is a
24 matter that ought to be addressed in the way of somehow practice and
25 precedent of the Chamber, that when there's a Rule 70 condition, we
1 think, first of all, there ought to be advance notice to the parties and
2 the Chamber well before the witness testifies, that there is a Rule 70
3 condition that is being asserted, so that we could try to clear all the
4 problems in advance of the testimony of the witness, rather than having
5 testimony in private session that may later be -- come into the public
6 session, when there's no real interest in this testimony anymore. So we
7 would appreciate if the Chamber might consider making some kind of order
8 to the Prosecution in the future that part of its notifications about the
9 witnesses should include any Rule 70 conditions.
10 Secondly, with respect to this particular condition, we think
11 that it's advisable that the Chamber have the provider be more
12 accountable for conditions which seem, on their face, to be unreasonable,
13 in the sense that General Smith has given this very testimony in public
14 session in the Dragomir Milosevic case, and his testimony was admitted as
15 a public exhibit in the Momcilo Perisic case. And so I would ask that
16 you order that there be an oral hearing on Friday, at 10.00, at which the
17 representative of the United Nations would appear before the Chamber to
18 explain why the need -- there is a need for the Rule 70 condition of
19 General Smith, and then you can decide afterwards whether the remedy of
20 excluding all or part of his testimony might be applicable. But I think
21 it's necessary to have some accountability for these providers in
22 circumstances such as this, where the condition appears to be
24 Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: You mean after we will have received all of
1 General Smith's evidence?
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I don't propose holding up
3 his evidence, but I would like to keep -- while the matter is still
4 fresh, I'd like to keep some pressure so that the matter can be resolved
5 by the end of the week. Otherwise, it's liable to linger.
6 JUDGE KWON: Do you like to respond, Mr. Tieger?
7 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, briefly.
8 With respect to Mr. Robinson's point that there ought to be
9 advance notice to the parties, I trust that the Court will recall that
10 the genesis of this problem is that, notwithstanding the one-year advance
11 notice provided by the Prosecution to the Defence - I believe the Court
12 saw that notification - this matter was not raised until the witness came
13 to court. Once it was raised by the Defence, the Prosecution acted with
14 the utmost alacrity to contact the UN, provide all the relevant
15 materials, stress the urgency, and push for reconsideration again, as we
16 had before. But in light of these circumstances, with the utmost haste.
17 Unfortunately, three working days is insufficient to work through that
18 process, although we had hoped that the matter might be resolved today.
19 But to suggest that somehow there was no notice here, by posing this
20 proposed condition in this manner, I think, is quite unfair under the
22 Secondly, with respect to the proposed hearing, I think the Court
23 has already alluded to the Tribunal's jurisprudence on this matter, the
24 fact that the providers are not required to justify their conditions.
25 In any event, the reality of the situation, as I've advised the
1 Court, is that the UN has been contacted. I am optimistic that we will
2 be hearing back shortly. Everyone has moved forward on this, under these
3 circumstances, with the utmost haste. And to suggest that some further
4 procedural developments and obligations are necessary here, I think, is
5 unfounded and inappropriate, and the reality of the matter is this is a
6 fairly commonplace situation, in terms of hearing a matter in private
7 session. We have reason to hope that we will, in short order, be able to
8 transform that into public session, as I've advised Mr. Robinson. In any
9 event, even if not, it neither justifies the attention that this issue
10 has generated, nor any special hearing to address a matter that the
11 providers are not required to address or justify.
12 Thank you, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE KWON: Just one question for you.
14 You mentioned that there was one-year advance notice provided by
15 the Prosecution to the Defence in this regard. So the Defence was
16 informed about that Rule 70 condition a year ago?
17 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
18 JUDGE KWON:
19 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, maybe I'm obtuse, but when the
20 notice that we received in February of 2010 said that we were not to
21 disclose to anyone else paragraph 134 of the statement of Rupert Smith,
22 and that statement never was used, it was not an exhibit, a further
23 amalgamated statement was provided which didn't have any conditions. All
24 of the underlying documents concerning this event were provided to us
25 without any Rule 70 conditions, and I never made the connection between
1 the 2010 February restriction on one paragraph and a statement that was
2 not going to be used to a condition based on the testimony of the -- the
3 live testimony of the witness, and maybe that's my fault. But if there
4 is going to be notice, perhaps it could be a little bit more clear.
5 Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: I would expect the messages in the future to be a
7 bit clearer between the parties, and --
8 MR. TIEGER: We will, as always, endeavour to make those messages
9 as clear as possible. However, as the Court is aware, that referred to a
10 specific paragraph. It was the paragraph in the amalgamated statement.
11 We looked at it the other day. We've gone through this discussion
12 before, and as the Court noted previously, Mr. Robinson's request is a
13 belated one.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
15 And as regards -- with respect to the hearing, you suggested that
16 at this moment we find it a bit premature and unnecessary to set a date
17 for hearing at this moment.
18 Having said that, we'll go back to open session.
19 [Open session]
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: Just I wanted to raise two matters with the Court.
22 The first is that with respect to a matter the Court inquired
23 about yesterday, that is, the scheduling date for Mr. Banbury, we've
24 heard back, and the 15th of March is satisfactory.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 MR. TIEGER: Secondly, in light of the current schedule and
2 General Smith's return, it is clear that we will not get to the testimony
3 of Mr. Music this week, so he will not be appearing this week.
4 I may also note that depending on our schedule for the rest of
5 the week, with the various uncertainties of which the Court is aware with
6 certain -- the length of testimony and witnesses appearing, there is an
7 issue about whether or not Mr. Mujkic will be testifying this week as
9 So Mr. Music will not be appearing, and in light of the current
10 schedule or anticipated schedule, we'll have to see about Mr. Mujkic.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 There's one further matter to raise on the part of the Chamber.
13 The Chamber has been requested by the Defence to lift the
14 confidentiality of all the filings that pertain to Mr. Berko Zecevic, of
15 which the Prosecution is in agreement. Mr. Zecevic is listed as a
16 witness for the Prosecution and is the subject of a subpoena issued by
17 this Chamber on 20th January 2011. The Chamber subsequently issued an
18 order, in lieu of indictment, and warrant of arrest for Mr. Zecevic, in
19 light of his failure to give testimony on the date specified in the
21 The Chamber is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice
22 for the filings in relation to this matter to now be made public, and
23 we'll order the Registry to do so, with the exception of certain
24 supporting medical documentation which shall remain under seal. The
25 Chamber will communicate to the Registry, via its Legal Officer, the
1 precise documents which should now be reclassified as public documents.
2 Let us bring in the witness.
3 Just for your information, last evening -- yesterday, the Chamber
4 already authorised the Tribunal's press office to confirm the existence
5 of the order, in lieu of indictment, and the arrest warrant.
6 [The witness takes the stand]
7 WITNESS: RUPERT SMITH [Resumed]
8 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, General.
9 We appreciate your kindness to come back to the Tribunal again.
10 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
11 JUDGE KWON: I hope we'll be able to finish your evidence during
12 the course of today, hopefully before 12.30, the second session.
13 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.
15 Good morning to all. Good morning, General.
16 Thank you, on behalf of the Defence again, for having coming
18 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. I would like us to complete the topic that remained unfinished
21 last time.
22 Do you agree with the fact that President Milosevic, on the 4th
23 of August, 1994, severed all ties with us and imposed sanctions against
24 us on the Drina?
25 A. I don't remember the details of that. I remember that there was
1 some public severance of relations in 1994.
2 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that this isolation was widely
3 orchestrated and that certain representatives of the international
4 community had insisted on it?
5 A. Again, my knowledge is based, at the time of 1994, on being in
6 London. And I remember the matter being discussed, but to the -- but the
7 absolute details of it and the extent of the decisions made, as opposed
8 to the conversations being held, I don't recall the details.
9 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that President Carter partly broke
10 that isolation down by coming in December 1994? After that, we concluded
11 the so-called Carter Cease-Fire, a four-month cease-fire, and in the
12 meantime you arrived in Bosnia?
13 A. Yes, President Carter was there at the very end of 1994, and the
14 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed thereafter.
15 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that right after your arrival in
16 February 1995, at the initiative of Anthony Lake and Richard Holbrooke,
17 yet again the isolation of the leadership in Pale of Republika Srpska,
18 especially of Radovan Karadzic, was reinforced?
19 A. No, I don't remember that specifically. I can -- nor do I
20 remember the subject of isolation being a particular issue discussed with
21 me at all until sometime, I think, in March of 1995, or maybe it was
23 Q. Can you tell us what was communicated to you at that point in
24 time, what was the position to be taken vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs?
25 A. It wasn't communicated to me as any instruction at all. I had no
1 direction, in terms of isolation, whatsoever, and nor did I act in that
2 way. I was aware that this was an idea that was being considered, as I
3 said, in 1994, although exactly when that was being discussed, I can't
4 recall. And it became -- I became aware of it being discussed again. It
5 was discussed in my presence, rather than with me, as it were, as
6 instructions to me or anything like that, probably in April - now I'm
7 thinking about it more carefully - when the Contact Group or members of
8 the Contact Group visited or tried to visit Sarajevo. But this is
9 supposition. I have very little clear memory of that, if you like,
10 contextual discussion with me at that time.
11 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that when you testified in
12 General Perisic's case, on page -- just a moment, please. I beg your
13 pardon -- that you said that people did not know who was speaking on
14 behalf of the Bosnian Serbs? Do you remember that?
15 A. Yes, but I think --
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
17 THE WITNESS: Sorry.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: There was about to be a page reference, but I don't
20 believe I ever heard it.
21 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the page number, Mr. Karadzic?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a moment. I'll try to find it
23 now. Just a moment.
24 This would be it.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. You testified in the Perisic case, that is, on the 20th of May,
2 2009, page 6386. You said then --
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Do you still remember the question?
4 THE WITNESS: I think it's a direct quote that I say I don't
5 know, and I think this is a piece of evidence that's concerning March of
6 1995 and a discussion with General Mladic.
7 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 THE WITNESS: I beg your pardon. It wasn't March; it was August
10 of 1995, and a conversation with General Mladic.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Do you remember -- or, rather, can you tell us who
13 Aleksandar Ivanko was?
14 A. Aleksandar Ivanko was one of my spokesmen. He was the UN
15 spokesman, as opposed to the military spokesman.
16 Q. Do you remember that in the summer of 1995, Mr. Ivanko said at a
17 press conference that the political leadership of the Bosnian Serbs does
18 not have sufficient influence on the ground and that they would not
19 communicate with them anymore, that they don't have leverage on the
20 events? Do you remember that?
21 A. I don't remember it specifically, no. And when did he say it in
22 the summer?
23 Q. Well, we looked for those conferences, but it was in the summer
24 of 1995. And I believe that he had to have permission to state something
25 like that. Right?
1 A. Not specifically, no. I would want to know when in -- about what
2 is he talking, to be more specific.
3 Q. Well, this will do. If you don't know, you don't know. We're
4 going to get the document, itself. However, according to my notes, this
5 was in the summer of 1995. It was a press conference when he stated that
6 the United Nations would not have much to do with the political
8 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, General: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Still trying to find the reference in the Perisic
10 testimony. I've now scoured 6386 more than once, and there's -- that
11 reference doesn't appear there. If the Defence could check that and
12 provide the correct page number, please.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I hope the Defence would be able to give you a
14 reference later on.
15 In the meantime, let's continue. Where are we?
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. General, do you remember that - actually, just a moment, please -
18 that this was a rather wide undertaking, to have the leadership isolated
19 and to stop ending communication with the leadership, and to find other
20 solutions through President Milosevic for resolving the situation in
22 A. I don't remember it like that, no. From my point of view, in the
23 job I was doing in 1995, I was given no direction - in fact, on the
24 contrary, encouragement to deal with the Bosnian Serb leadership. Being
25 on the military side, my emphasis lay with the military, but not
1 exclusively. And the moment my new Civil Affairs -- chief of
2 Civil Affairs - I've forgotten his proper title, but he was called
3 Mr. Pedaway [phoen] - arrived in August, he went straight up to Pale to
4 talk to the leadership in that place.
5 What I -- I entirely agree that outside of my little world, if
6 you like, there was this policy of dealing with Mr. Milosevic. To what
7 extent that was, other than it had a label, in my mind, called
8 "Isolation," I do not know to the degree to which it was being practiced
9 to any great -- to any great degree.
10 Q. Thank you. I'll help you, so that we both jog our memory, with
11 Carl Bildt's book and Ambassador Holbrooke's book. I'm sorry, that was
12 reference was -- it had to do with the Milosevic case, actually, the
13 Slobodan Milosevic case, October 2003. And as for Dragomir Milosevic, on
14 the 27th of March, 2007. It's an exhibit there, P344.
15 It says there that you said that you were trying to establish who
16 was speaking on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, since during June, July and
17 part of August:
18 [In English] "The senior level arrangements for the Bosnian Serbs
19 in Pale were under pressure. The relations between Mladic and Karadzic
20 was unclear."
21 [Interpretation] Do you remember that?
22 A. I don't remember that, and I'm not clear which of those two cases
23 you're quoting from.
24 Q. Say from Milosevic, the 7th of March, 2007. The page is 3334.
25 As for President Milosevic, statement paragraph 104.
1 JUDGE KWON: If you like to put the specific question, why don't
2 you show the passage to the general, and let us see whether he confirms.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I just wanted to get a
4 yes-or-no answer. It's all the same. I just wanted the general to give
5 a yes-or-no answer.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Is it correct that in the summer of 1995, June, July and part of
8 August, the general did not know who was speaking on behalf of the
9 Bosnian Serbs, As he confirmed in his statement - just a moment, please -
10 when he testified in the case against President Milosevic and the case
11 against General Milosevic. Can you remember that? You said you were
12 confused by all this, Don't talk to this person, Don't talk to that
13 person, and, Milosevic was supposed to speak on behalf of us? ^
14 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.
17 First of all, I've been looking through the transcripts as we've
18 been speaking. I didn't see any reference to the word "confused."
19 Secondly, I don't see, if the witness is being confronted with
20 his prior statement, why he has to remember it, why it can't be cited to
21 him properly and read to him in context.
22 So I've tracked down one of the references in the original
23 reference that Mr. Karadzic made in the Perisic case, and it's not quite
24 the same comment posed, and now I see, in the Dragomir Milosevic case,
25 what the witness talks about is also a bit different, in context, to
1 what's being presented to him. And if he's going to be asked about what
2 he said and asked to comment on it, I think he should be given a fair
3 opportunity to know what that is.
4 JUDGE KWON: By adding your statement or comments, you make your
5 question very complicated.
6 I think by now, General, I take it the General has understood the
7 question. I wonder whether you can answer the question?
8 THE WITNESS: I'm sure I would -- my memory is this: that I was
9 always searching to understand who was speaking for the Bosnian Serbs.
10 There was this relationship between General Mladic and Dr. Karadzic, and
11 it -- there was -- I was trying to understand it, trying to understand
12 who was speaking for who and in what circumstances throughout that
13 summer, and I think those remarks and those statements are situated
14 within the context of that understanding as being discussed in those
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Q. Do you remember that at a meeting -- at two meetings that you
18 described, secret meetings, private, if I can call them that, that I said
19 to you that as regards matters pertaining to safe passage, convoys,
20 et cetera, that you should talk to my commanders; right?
21 A. I seem to remember that was your -- what you told me to do, yes.
22 Q. Do you remember that I was the political leader, the state leader
23 in the civilian sphere, and that I had to leave expert matters to my
24 army, as is done in any country?
25 A. That was my understanding at the time, yes.
1 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that quite an effort was made to sow
2 discord between the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs and the military
3 commands and that quite a bit was done in order to turn Mladic against
4 us? Milosevic worked on that, and all international factors as well. Do
5 you remember that?
6 A. No, I don't remember it as you describe it. I remember there was
7 discord. I had no knowledge of the specific details, but as I think I've
8 reported already, that one was clear that all was not always in
9 agreement. But I don't recall efforts to make it worse, certainly not by
10 UNPROFOR or the UN.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have 1D3201.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. While I'm looking for that: Can you tell us, General, what is
14 SEAD, what does that stand for?
15 A. Suppression of Enemy Air Defences.
16 Q. Do you remember --
17 A. At least it did in 1995.
18 Q. Do you remember that that was the basis for taking a position
19 vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs?
20 A. No, I don't understand the question. I certainly don't remember
21 it as a position.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 69. It's
23 different in electronic form, but it's page 69 of this document. I mean,
24 in the book itself, page 69. Page 69 in the book, itself. Yes.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. [In English] "SEAD campaigns - suppression of enemy air defence -
2 was necessary for a number of days and would preferably have to encompass
3 the whole of Bosnia."
4 [Interpretation] You can all have a look at this. It is based on
5 the guide-lines of the London Conference.
6 General, who was this supposed enemy in Bosnia?
7 A. I'm just finishing reading.
8 What is the -- is this prior the London Conference or after?
9 What is the page -- can I see the page before?
10 Q. Please, let us place this in context. Who convened the
11 London Conference, and who are the participants?
12 A. I'm still not clear if the decisions had been ... This page 68
13 is about the London Conference?
14 JUDGE KWON: If you see the next page, next paragraph on page 69,
15 it refers to "sometime in July." Can we see the next page.
16 THE WITNESS: Yes. Without going back through all the pages,
17 this looks like a discussion of either what was going on in the
18 background of the London Conference or just prior to the
19 London Conference, but I'm not certain.
20 However, to answer the question: The use of the phrase "SEAD,"
21 or the SEAD as it gets spelled, or pronounced, rather, is a way of
22 describing the precursor phase of an air action. It -- you have to do
23 this before you can get in and attack the targets you've actually been
24 sent to attack, and so it this -- you might make a plan, and this
25 precursor phase would appear in it. Whether you had decided to carry
1 out -- execute the plan or not, you would still have worked out your
2 suppression of air defences operation that would precede and be the
3 necessary enabling objectives to carry out the actual act. So if you
4 were told to carry out a -- to make a plan to conduct such an air
5 operation against whomsoever, you would have an SEAD phase in it of some
6 description, and that would be why that was being discussed at that
7 stage, I suspect. And since these were all in defence of and to reimpose
8 the exclusion zones around the enclaves, then the Bosnian Serbs would --
9 the assumption would be that the Bosnian Serbs were attacking the --
10 those enclaves, and, therefore, it would be the air defences -- the
11 Bosnian Serb air defences that one was seeking to attack.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please look at page 67,
13 two pages back.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Would you be so kind to focus on this page, where there is an
16 explanation of the context of the London Conference, and could you tell
17 us who had convened the London Conference, and what was the subject to be
18 discussed, and what was the goal and the objective of the conference?
19 A. As far as I'd be concerned, the London Conference was convened by
20 the United Kingdom, and the underpinning events that led to it was the
21 collapse of the Srebrenica pocket and all that followed thereafter. And
22 the intention was that this was not to happen in Gorazde, in the first
23 instance, and this was where a British battalion was based.
24 Q. Can you tell us -- do you remember, rather, what Operations
25 Plan 40104 was? What did that refer to?
1 A. I don't remember what that plan was or whose it was.
2 Q. Well, let me remind you.
3 On Wednesday, the 28th of June, the NATO Council in Brussels
4 decided to officially approve Operations Plan 04104 [as interpreted],
5 which envisaged mass ground invasion of Bosnia, allegedly to provide for
6 the withdrawal of UN forces. Did you know about that? And also there's
7 mention there of the recently Rapid Reaction Forces. Do you remember
9 A. I can remember the Rapid Reaction Force, and I can remember that
10 there was a contingency plan, the details of which I did not know, held
11 by NATO for the extraction of UNPROFOR.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now move back to page 64,
13 please, two pages back -- three pages back.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Look at the last sentence in paragraph 1:
16 [In English] "To use Mladic to undermine Karadzic was part of our
17 efforts. And the Sarajevo leadership was aware of these intentions of
19 [Interpretation] Therefore, in co-operation with the Muslim
20 leadership, efforts were being made to turn Mladic against Karadzic. Is
21 this what Ambassador Bildt is saying here?
22 A. That's what he says there.
23 Q. Thank you. Can you please now look at the last paragraph, which
24 refers to you and your future contacts with General Mladic.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, in relation to the last question and
1 answer, you asked the general whether it is what is written there, and he
2 confirmed. It leads us nowhere, unless you hear his answers from the
3 general, what Ambassador Bildt wrote in his book has nothing to do with
4 this witness.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General Smith attended meetings
6 with President Milosevic, Carl Bildt and Mr. Holbrooke on occasion where
7 they were working on bringing -- or toppling the authorities in Pale.
8 These things were happening at the meetings with General Milosevic --
9 with President Milosevic. I don't know if the general paid attention to
10 that. And he did confirm that he attended the meetings on the 14th and
11 15th of July.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Now, are you familiar or are you not familiar with these efforts
14 to turn the military leadership against the state leadership, General?
15 A. I was not conscious that there was a deliberate process of
16 turning the Bosnian Serb military against the Bosnian Serb political
18 Q. Were you present in the meetings in which President Milosevic
19 made promises and made predictions of the demise of the authorities in
21 A. I don't remember that in the meetings that occurred that I was
22 there, when Mladic was there, and Ambassador Bildt and
23 President Milosevic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Can we now move to page 81, please.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Can you please look from paragraph 2 downwards, where it says
3 that during the Croatian offensive, he wanted to meet Milosevic, together
4 with Pauline Neville-Jones, Alain Dejammet, and so on and so forth. He
5 was under pressure to say whether he could really deliver Pale.
6 Now, look at the next passage.
7 Do you remember that after the fall of Krajina -- do you see this
8 passage where it says:
9 [In English] "Pale was in a state of --"
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. [Interpretation] Do you remember that at that time, President
12 Milosevic wrote a letter to President Izetbegovic and General Mladic:
13 [In English] "The letter was a double insult of Karadzic, first
14 by addressing Izetbegovic as President as president, and then by
15 addressing the letter to Mladic, rather than to him. In Pale, it was
16 considered quite rightly that this was a plot designed to isolate,
17 marginalise and basically eliminate the existing Bosnian Serb
19 [Interpretation] Did you, yourself, feel and did you know that
20 that was the attitude that was taken vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs?
21 A. I don't remember it as starkly explained in the paragraph you've
22 asked me to read. My own memory of that period is one in which I'm
23 conscious that the Bosnian Serbs are -- have now moved on to the back
24 foot because of the Croatian offensive and have a great deal of troubles
25 of their own. And you've -- and we've already seen in evidence this
1 meeting in Mrkonjic Grad, where I'm trying to find out what's happening
2 and establish the degree of humanitarian aid and so forth that is
3 required of UNPROFOR for the people expelled from the Krajinas. I am not
4 conscious of and have no part to play in any of this -- of the events
5 that are described in that paragraph.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Can we look at the next page, please.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Will you please look at this page? General, do you remember when
10 you speak about humanitarian needs, there were huge influx of refugees
11 coming into Krajina and Republika Srpska at the time?
12 A. I think they were coming from the Krajinas, weren't they? But,
13 yes, I remember there was a large refugee problem, in the thousands, of
14 people moving out of the Krajinas and into Bosnia-Herzegovina, some of
15 whom were moving on into Serbia.
16 MR. TIEGER: Just a small suggestion.
17 It may be helpful in posing questions on this topic to
18 distinguish between the Croatian Krajina and the Bosnian Krajina. That
19 may eliminate answers that appear to be -- well, to not make sense.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you for this suggestion from
21 my learned friend Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. So we are talking about the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which
24 was part of the AVNOJ Croatia. It came under attack in early August, and
25 there were hundreds of thousands of people expelled from there. General,
1 is that true?
2 A. I don't remember the total figure. I think it was in excess of
3 100.000 expelled.
4 Q. Thank you. Can I draw your attention to the beginning, where it
5 says that the success of this plot, as Mr. Bildt calls it, the plot to
6 isolate and remove the Bosnian Serb leadership from power, so I'm talking
7 about the 4th of August and the dismissal of Mladic. Can you see this
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, if we are not
10 going to admit this into evidence, then I would like to read what is
11 written here. If this is admissible, then I am reluctant to call
12 Mr. Bildt to come here and appear as a witness.
13 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you specifically put it to the witness.
14 If necessary, you can read out the relevant passage. At this moment, I
15 haven't discussed it with my colleagues, but speaking for myself, I don't
16 think this is something admissible without having to hear from Mr. Bildt.
17 Mr. Tieger.
18 MR. TIEGER: I think that's -- the point has now been made, and
19 the game is now revealed. It's an effort to circumvent the need to call
20 Mr. Bildt by reading out passages of his book, asking the witness to do
21 nothing more than to affirm that that's what's written there. And as the
22 Court has previously noted, that's not an appropriate strategem.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, you are entitled to put questions, if necessary
24 reading out passages from the book.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 There's no game being played. I am just trying to be as brief as
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Paragraph 2 reads.
5 "Croat army made its pincer movement from both Croatia and Bosnia
6 towards Knin. Karadzic, on 4 August, summarily fired Mladic, accusing
7 him both of failing to defend key Serb areas properly and of having had
8 unauthorised contacts with Stoltenberg and myself. Thus, Karadzic
9 triggered an acute confrontation between the political and military
10 leadership in the most desperate of situations. It seemed totally
11 irrational, and, after a week of turmoil, Karadzic had to retreat and
12 accept that Mladic would remain as the military commander."
13 [Interpretation] Do you recall this crisis?
14 A. I cannot remember the specific thing of you writing a letter. I
15 may never have known it had occurred. I do remember there was reports of
16 this tension between the political and military leaderships, but this had
17 been going on during the summer, and I was continuing to try and
18 understand who was in charge of what and who was speaking for the Bosnian
20 Q. Thank you. That was a crucial event, and I am surprised that you
21 don't remember it.
22 There's reference here to my open letter to President Milosevic,
23 which is in the next passage, and it reads:
24 [In English] "Morale in the Republika Srpska was now at rock
25 bottom. Eventually, more than 200.000 refugees would pass through
1 Banja Luka and Brcko on their way to some sort of safety in Serbia, and
2 there were rumours all over the place of secret deals, arrangements and
3 plans giving up different territories. Karadzic wrote a public letter
4 accusing Milosevic of a betrayal of Serb interest."
5 [Interpretation] What I'm asking you now, sir, is whether you
6 were aware or whether you knew that a lot of things had been done behind
7 my back, starting from the London Conference, while, on the other hand, I
8 was requested to honour the agreements that I was not party to.
9 A. No, I wasn't aware of things in those terms.
10 Q. Did you learn anything about that later?
11 A. No, not in the way you posed that question.
12 Q. Very well, thank you. Sir, are you aware that the issue of
13 air-strikes against the Serbs was largely an issue that had to do with
14 internal political circumstances in NATO member countries and that it had
15 a lot to do with the credibility of the alliance, itself?
16 A. I was not aware of that. That was not -- and it isn't my
17 understanding at all.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, since this is not being
19 admitted, I would just like us to look at what Holbrooke says in his book
20 about this topic. So he's talking about the credibility of NATO and the
21 need to launch air-strikes against the Serbs, and to flex the muscle,
22 because the credibility of NATO was at stake. I'm going to read this:
23 [In English] "Bosnia will be the key test for American policy in
24 Europe. We must, therefore, succeed in whether we attempt. The
25 administration cannot afford to begin with either an international
1 disaster or quagmire. Despite the difficulties and risks involved, I
2 believe that inaction or a continuation of the Bush policy in Bosnia by
3 the Clinton Administration is the least desirable course. Continued
4 inaction carried long-term risk which could be disruptive to US-European
5 relations, weaken NATO, increase tensions in Greece and Turkey, and cause
6 havoc with Moscow."
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Sir, how were we to adjust our behaviour and conduct, because
9 there was so many things against us and there was so many people pulling
11 A. At the time, I -- I just don't know how to answer your question
12 against the purposes of this court. I am sitting in my headquarters in
13 Sarajevo. I am not an American, I am not part of the American
14 policy-making, and I'm certainly not the late Mr. Richard Holbrooke. And
15 the actions of the Bosnian Serbs were theirs to choose. It wasn't for me
16 to dictate them or -- mine was to react in the circumstances.
17 Q. But, General, my question is: Did air-strikes depend exclusively
18 on our conduct or did it have to do with something with internal policies
19 and the credibility of NATO? I believe that there was a larger picture
20 there, it wasn't just the matter of a small Serbian nation of, actually,
21 1.5 million Bosnian Serbs.
22 A. I cannot answer a question about your beliefs.
23 Q. Did these factors play any roles? You were the commander in
24 Bosnia. Did you have an obligation to take that into account, because
25 you, yourself, said on several occasions that you had close ties with the
2 A. I did not have to take the making of policy and the decisions
3 above me into account in the actions that I did. I had to understand
4 their background and so forth, perhaps. But in these circumstances and
5 that August, the decisions made in the London Conference had been made,
6 they were quite clear, and I was confident that their import had been
7 communicated to you, amongst others.
8 Q. General, in your talks with the key players, Annan;
9 Admiral Smith, Leighton Smith; Akashi; Holbrooke and the others, was
10 there any indication that there is something larger and more important at
11 stake than the fate of the Bosnian Serbs? Did you discuss any of these
13 A. No. The few discussions that occurred and were either to do, in
14 the case of Admiral Leighton Smith, with the contingency planning we were
15 conducting, and we've discussed already, I don't recall a conversation
16 with Mr. Akashi, although I'm sure one happened in that August. And with
17 Holbrooke and his team, it was -- there were -- I think he visited
18 Sarajevo twice in that time, and they were -- I was given the most
19 general of indications of what his negotiations -- how his negotiations
20 were going.
21 Q. Well, that's why it is so important to know who convened the
22 London Conference, who took part in it, and what was to be achieved by
23 the London Conference. Can you tell us that?
24 A. I've told you who convened it in -- that I think convened it, and
25 that was the United Kingdom government. I think every single
1 troop-contributing nation was present. And as far as I was concerned, it
2 was all to do with the establishing a -- this change in the exclusion
3 zone and safe area regime, for want of a name for it, that the decision
4 as to whether there had been an attack on a safe area was now to lie with
5 the military and not with the political chain of command. The keys to
6 initiate air attacks were put in the hands of the military commanders,
7 not the political -- the SRSG. They, after May, had been held by the
8 Secretary-General, himself, from the point of view of NATO -- I beg your
9 pardon, from the point of view of the UN. And the -- and the decision
10 was that if bombing was initiated, this, if I remember the words
11 correctly, would be continuous and disproportionate until the attack
12 stopped and the exclusion zones were re-established, or something to that
13 effect, and that these senior officers would be sent off to explain this
14 to the parties concerned.
15 Q. Thank you. Thank you for this information as well, that a
16 disproportionate attack was decided on.
17 Do you agree that Lieutenant-Colonel --
18 Lieutenant General Michael Ryan set the targets for that bombing months
19 before a reason or pretext actually came up? This is Holbrooke's book,
20 planned by Admiral Smith, page 103:
21 [In English] "... planned by Admiral Smith and his brilliant air
22 force commander, Lieutenant General Michael E. Ryan. The targets had
23 been picked months in advance."
24 [Interpretation] Did you know that?
25 A. I don't think they'd been picked. They may have collected
1 information, identified potential targets, but I don't think they'd been
3 Q. General, sir, do we agree that one air-strike took place in the
4 absence of General Janvier, another one in the absence of the
5 Secretary-General, and it was Kofi Annan who played a significant role?
6 A. I don't know what you're talking about. Which air-strike?
7 Q. Towards the end of May, the first one. You said yourself, and
8 you confirmed in your book, that General Janvier was on leave at the time
9 when you availed yourself of the opportunity to turn the key, as it were,
10 in order to start the bombing.
11 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, General: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: I wanted to give as much latitude as possible, but
13 I think we've gone beyond the outskirts of relevance and are no longer
14 even remotely illuminating the issues in this case.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. How is this last question relevant to your
16 case, Mr. Karadzic?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, this has to do with
18 side-stepping the people of top responsibility, the first echelon. And
19 it is the second echelon that makes the decisions, and we have testimony
20 to that effect in the book of the late Holbrooke, and it says here that
21 Annan got the job of Secretary-General because he supported the bombing.
22 JUDGE KWON: Side-stepping that allegedly took place on the part
23 of NATO, or whatever country, is relevant to your case how?
24 Move on to another topic, Mr. Karadzic.
25 JUDGE MORRISON: And, incidentally, Dr. Karadzic, you refer to
1 the testimony in the book of the late Richard Holbrooke. What
2 Mr. Holbrooke put in his book is not testimony, and it's certainly not
3 testimony before this Court.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is testimony by a direct
5 participant. I believe that the relevance lies in the fact that there is
6 nothing we could have done in order to affect the developments that were
7 underway. We were but a small toy in the hands of the big players.
8 We have a witness here now who was on the ground and who was
9 supposed to carry out, on the ground, something that had been planned at
10 much higher levels. That is the relevance.
11 However, we're going to move on to another topic.
12 Can we just have 23210 for a moment -- 32390.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this is marked for identification
14 as MFI D987.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. General, please, would you focus on this conversation of mine
17 with General Milovanovic on the 25th of September, when that first
18 bombing took place. And I'm going to read this out.
19 This is a copy of the conversation between Radovan Karadzic and
20 General Milovanovic, and then this is a convention --
21 "Akashi has been chasing me all day. I didn't want to call him,
22 but now I manage."
23 It says:
24 "Please, can you, over the next few minutes, try to do something?
25 Is it so difficult to return those four weapons, some four weapons?
1 Nikola is here as well. I said many things to him. He says that he was
2 with Mladic and with you, that he was in contact with you and Mladic.
3 Some of them, I don't know who exactly."
4 And then Karadzic says:
5 "Please, can you do something about this? I said to him, after
6 what happened in Western Slavonia, we are not going to honour resolutions
7 and contracts ..."
8 You can see this for yourself. I don't have to read it out:
9 "If you shoot, are you going to burn all bridges for future
10 co-operation. We will have to treat you as the enemy. That's what I
11 said on television last night as well. I was pleading. It's not a
12 question of hours, it's a question of minutes. I said that in a few
13 minutes, I cannot even establish contact, let alone do something. I said
14 that I don't even know where these four weapons are."
15 Do you see this entire conversation, General?
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Your Honour.
18 I should just note on the record that I was following the
19 transcript and the exhibit at the same time, and there are quite a few
20 words or phrases or passages omitted in the description of what was in
21 the document. So I just need to put that on the record so when someone
22 reading the transcript turns to the original document.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We have this in evidence, and I take it the
24 general was able to read the passage in its entirety.
25 So what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] My question is the following:
2 Q. General, do you see that we were given minutes to do something,
3 and in minutes I cannot even establish contact with my troops? Do you
4 agree with that?
5 A. No. I announced what was required sometime before the bombing
6 started, and I did it to Mladic and on the television, publicly. I don't
7 know -- I don't recall the time-frame, but it was certainly more than
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Since this document was just marked for identification, let's
11 move on to another topic, and then perhaps we can revisit this one.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. General, sir, did you have the approval of the Bosnian Serbs to
14 bomb their ammunition depots?
15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
16 Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: Sorry to interrupt. Just a small clarification.
18 The document was introduced as being a conversation of the 25th
19 of September, according to the transcript. The exhibit indicates the
20 25th of May.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did say the 25th of May, and I
22 mean the first air-strike. You can also read it on the document.
23 JUDGE KWON: What is your question; approval from the Bosnian
24 Serbs? Was that a question, Mr. Karadzic?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I've moved on to a new topic,
1 the topic of the mandates and the powers of the United Nations forces.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Now, the last time we discussed this issue, you agreed that the
4 presence of the UN was there, that the UN was actually present on the
5 ground with the approval of the local authorities, including the Bosnian
6 Serbs. Now, did you have the approval of the Bosnian Serbs for this
7 NATO -- for this air-strike on the 1st of May?
8 A. No. It wasn't done on the 1st of May, either. It was the 25th,
9 I think, or 26th.
10 Q. Yes, we have a problem with interpretation. I did not say on the
11 1st of May. Rather, I said the first air-strike in May, at the end of
13 Can we briefly see 917 -- 21984, 65 ter.
14 And let me ask you, General, sir, whether at this point in time
15 the United Nations actually stopped being impartial.
16 A. I use the phrase something to that effect in this document, if I
17 recall it correctly. The point I'm making is that we've now applied
18 force to one side which -- as a result of the exclusion zone/safe area
19 policy, and we cannot expect or have lost the consent of the Bosnian
20 Serbs. And this is a phrase I think I use in that document.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just scroll this up a bit.
22 Let's see point 4(a).
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. And let's see what you have to say there:
25 [In English] "UNPROFOR no longer have a peacekeeping relationship
1 with the BSA."
2 The Bosnian Serb Army; right?
3 "(It has lost the consent of one of the parties)."
4 A. That's correct, that's what I wrote there.
5 Q. "UNPROFOR is very close to being an ally of the Bosnian
6 government (it is very nearly no longer impartial)."
7 In other words, you were fully aware that the Mogadishu line had
8 been crossed?
9 A. That's for others to decide. I think we're hovering on the edges
10 of it, but that's -- that was my thoughts at that time that night.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this the time for our break or
12 can we go on?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it's time to have a break.
14 How much longer do you have to conclude your cross-examination,
15 Mr. Karadzic?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would appreciate it if I can get
17 the entire session, the next session, but I will do my best to complete
18 it sooner.
19 JUDGE KWON: You'll have an hour in the next session.
20 Yes, half an hour, and we'll resume at 11.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Q. Is it correct that the Muslim side violated provisions on the
1 total exclusion zones; in other words, that it had weapons emplacements
2 that were not at weapons collection points, but, rather, throughout town
3 and in the Marsal Tito Barracks?
4 A. I believe they had some weapons outside the weapon collection
5 points; that is to say, weapons that should have been in the weapon
6 collection points that were outside the weapon collection points. I
7 don't think they were in Tito Barracks, but I believe there were some in
8 town that were outside the weapon collection points.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Could we now briefly see 09782 on the 65 ter list. 09782,
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Can we agree that this is a telegram sent by Ambassador Akashi to
14 Kofi Annan?
15 And if we now can see paragraph 4, please.
16 The telegram is dated the 26th of May, 1995.
17 Paragraph 4, please.
18 I'd like to refer you to the portion where it says:
19 "General Smith is aware ..."
20 [In English] "... is aware that there are government weapons in
21 Sarajevo that are not in the Tito Barracks or collection point ..."
22 [Interpretation] That's the fourth line from the bottom.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Were NATO air-strikes carried out because of these violations of
25 the total exclusion zones; in other words, were Bosnian Muslims bombed?
1 A. No.
2 Q. We have a testimonial to this in P2171, where General Janvier
3 informs Kofi Annan, on the 7th of May, and says that the Army of Bosnia
4 and Herzegovina had five heavy weapons within the total exclusion zone.
5 Can you explain why the Muslim side did not receive the same treatment
6 that the Serbs were put under?
7 A. Am I looking at the 2171 or is that just an extra bit of
9 Q. No. This is telegram 09782, and I just quoted another document
10 that was already admitted - that's P2171 - and said that this information
11 about these five weapons was also something that Kofi Annan was informed
12 of therein, and all I want to know is why the Bosnian side was not
13 treated the same way as the Serbs.
14 A. Because they were not using those weapons, as I recall it, at the
15 time. And Akashi says in that telegram that they -- they are in
16 compliance with the warning thus far.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into
18 evidence, this Akashi telegram to Annan.
19 JUDGE KWON: Has it not been admitted yet? Yes, we'll admit it.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1051, Your Honours.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's take a look at 1D2841, then.
22 2841, please.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. You will recall, General, sir, that in the first part of your
25 evidence, you said that you were able to observe -- well, actually, you
1 were shown the daily expenditures of weapons, and I would like you now to
2 take a look at this report dated the 31st of May, 1995. The Bosnian
3 Army, the 1st Corps Command, produced this document. This is an interim
4 report, and it discusses the 1st Corps together with special units of
5 MUP, Bosna and Lasta, and it says that they have started with combat
6 actions along such-and-such axis.
7 And could we now just see the part of the document where the
8 ammunition expenditures are shown? Could we see the next page, please.
9 Yes, the next page.
10 General, can you please look at this. It says here that the
11 1st Corps had 2.055 explosions on that day alone where they were actually
12 opening fire on all Serb lines. So just take a look at the heavy weapons
13 mentioned here: Mortars, 60-millimetre mortars; 90-millimetre rockets.
14 Let's see what else we have here. At the bottom, we can see a
15 67-millimetre cannon, another 70- and 100-millimetre cannon, and it says:
16 "In the course -- yesterday and today, a large quantity of
17 ammunition was expended, as well as mines and explosives."
18 Even after the warning that was issued, was this mass bombing
19 that was carried out by them, was that something that was -- that went by
21 A. I don't think it was unobserved. I'm not sure - I'm pretty
22 certain - that the 60-millimetre mortar wasn't classified as a heavy
23 weapon, and I'm not sure, either, that the 76-millimetre cannon was a
24 heavy weapon either, but there I may be incorrect. The -- and I think
25 the date of this was after we'd stopped bombing, anyhow, because of the
2 Q. General, sir, perhaps we can take a look at the first page,
3 because I am afraid that there is something that we can't see on this
5 It says very clearly there 100 pieces of --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Mr. Karadzic is reading
7 too fast.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you were reading too fast so that the
9 interpreters were not able to catch up with you. Could you repeat.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
11 Q. Large-calibre explosions mentioned here, we have: TMRKRMT, 500
12 pieces, bullet; 76 millimetres, P1, 30 pieces; bullets, 76-millimetre
13 ZIS, 30 pieces; 100-millimetre bullet, 30 pieces; 105-millimetre bullet,
14 30 pieces; 120-millimetre round, 50 pieces; 152-millimetre round or
15 bullet, 20 pieces; 60-millimetre mines, 400 pieces; 82-millimetre mines
16 or shells, 800 pieces; 120-millimetre shells, 150 pieces; 107-millimetre
17 rockets, 15 pieces; and 128-millimetre rockets, 10 pieces, which brings
18 us to a total of 2.055 explosions or detonations on that day, the 30th of
19 May, going on to the 31st. And this report was prepared on the 31st of
20 May. We saw that. Correct?
21 A. Yes, 31st.
22 Q. Thank you. Now, did you know that under the agreement, anything
23 above 20.7 millimetres [as interpreted] was actually prohibited within
24 the total exclusion zone, so anything that went over the 20.7 millimetres
25 [as interpreted]? 12.7-millimetre. The transcript is not correct.
2 A. I'm -- my memory is that that is 12.7 for direct-fire weapons and
3 in excess of 82-millimetre for mortars was the definitions, but that
4 would have to be checked to be certain.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 I would like to tender this document.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: I think there's -- it's close, Your Honour, but my
9 primary concern is that we moved to the document quickly, and the witness
10 was advised that the document referred to explosions on a particular
11 date, and my recollection, from seeing the document as it moved through,
12 is that it referred to a request for supplemental information. But --
13 JUDGE KWON: We can read it. With that caveat, shall we admit
15 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1052, Your Honours.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now briefly see
19 1D372 [as interpreted], please. 1D3172.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
21 Q. Please look at this document. This is a letter sent to
22 General Mladic by you, and on the first page we see the definition of
23 heavy weapons. And then the second bullet point:
24 [In English] "All guns, howitzers and mortars of calibre larger
25 than 12.7 millimetres."
1 [Interpretation] Is that so, is that correct?
2 A. That's what's written there. But it's dated, you said, in
4 JUDGE KWON: Top of the page.
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, the 4th of September. This is, if I recall
6 the document, me telling Mladic what is to be removed from the Sarajevo
7 exclusion zone after the bombing in September.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. But, General, you did not re-define the 1994 agreement. All you
10 did here was to remind of what the definition of "heavy weapons" was.
11 And if you recall, it was then, too, that everything in excess of 12.7
12 was mentioned. So this is -- you're just giving a definition here, not a
13 new proposal.
14 A. I don't know that that's the case at all. I think the situation
15 has changed materially by now.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 I would like to tender this document, please.
18 Before that, can we just see the last page to see that the
19 general signed this letter, in fact.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Can you confirm that this is your signature?
22 A. Yes, it is.
23 JUDGE KWON: This will be admitted.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1053, Your Honours.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Would you agree, General, that the NATO air-strikes of the
2 ammunitions depot in Pale were not strictly a self-defence move?
3 A. They weren't self-defence. They were to reimpose the exclusion
5 Q. Very well. Now, you were fully aware of the distinction.
6 Can we now briefly see 1D03133. 1D03133.
7 Air-strikes are strategic measures; correct?
8 Here, we see before us a book by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the
9 former Secretary-General of the United Nations.
10 Can we now see page 86, please.
11 So on page 86, we can see:
12 [In English] "Air-strikes and close air support was important."
13 [Interpretation] Can we find that part.
14 JUDGE KWON: The penultimate paragraph, starting with: "I asked
15 NATO ..." Shall we zoom it further.
16 THE ACCUSED: "I asked NATO to co-ordinate with me ...," and so
18 [Interpretation] And then it goes on to say.
19 "... was limited, by resolution, to the protection of UN troops
20 under attack. Air-strikes were a strategic matter, the use of which
21 would signal that the peacekeeping mission had given way to war by NATO
22 and by the United Nations against the targeted forces and their political
24 [Interpretation] The United Nations -- NATO and the
25 United Nations were actually entering the war -- into war against one
1 side? Was that the case, as stated here by the Secretary-General? Would
2 you agree with this?
3 A. It's as he's written it. I think we must be very careful in --
4 to be clear as to what we mean by the words. Some people use the word
5 "air-strike" to describe any air attack, so if you were flying aeroplanes
6 in close air support, they would carry out an air-strike. In the sense
7 that Boutros-Ghali has used it in this book, he is drawing a distinction
8 between the exclusion zones, and air-strikes. I deduce -- I haven't read
9 the rest of the page to see it, but that's what I understand him to be --
10 connecting the air-strikes to the exclusion zones, and close air support
11 to the defence of a United Nations -- elements of a United Nations force.
12 And as you see in the document you've already shown me of my own
13 writing in May, I think that we get very close, indeed right on the
14 edges, of our position as peacekeepers when we start to use air-strikes
15 to impose the exclusion zone.
16 Q. But, General, sir, a moment ago you agreed that the attack on the
17 ammunition depot was not just a matter of defence, but actually an
18 air-strike. And I received the same answer from General Janvier and
19 Ambassador Akashi that these air-strikes were, in fact, a punishment, and
20 we've heard testimony about the same issue by General Rose here. But the
21 point is this is actually moving from confrontation to conflict.
22 Did you, yourself, say that after these air-strikes, you actually
23 crossed the line from confrontation into conflict with one side?
24 A. Yes. When you're bombing someone, you're in conflict with them.
25 Q. Thank you. You repeated the same things in your conversation
1 with General Mladic on the 28th of May, when you said that there were two
2 types of close air support:
3 [In English] "... as a means of air defence," [B/C/S spoken],
4 "such as the two against the Bosnian Serbs last week ..."
5 [Interpretation] And that you can order either of those types of
6 close air support. Do you recall this conversation?
7 A. Yes, and there were those two types of air-strikes, if you like
8 to call them that. Or let me put it another way. There were two
9 purposes for which you might use air-strikes; one was self-defence and
10 the other one was to do with the imposition of the safe areas and the
11 exclusion zones.
12 Q. Well, General, sir, that doesn't apply to the exclusion zones
13 alone, but, rather, to accomplishing objectives that one of the sides is
14 not willing to agree to; in other words, to impose a solution on them.
15 Is that correct?
16 A. That's what the exclusion zone -- if weapons were being taken out
17 of the weapon collection points or being used to shell the civilian
18 population, then the exclusion zone and safe area decisions were not
19 being carried out, and the -- we then had resource to air-strikes to
20 endeavour to reimpose them.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into
22 evidence, Your Excellency.
23 JUDGE KWON: That page?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, perhaps the entire document
25 or just that page. I leave it to the Trial Chamber. I don't mean the
1 entire book. I mean the five or six pages that we've used.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, what is your observation?
3 MR. TIEGER: I think the operative language is "we've used." I
4 was only aware of, as the Court noted, that particular page.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit that page 86. Yes, 86.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1054, Your Honours.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Very well.
8 Q. General, sir, you were determined, in other words, to fight the
9 Bosnian Serbs, correct, and that can explain why it was that the Muslim
10 side was not bombed?
11 A. No, it's not correct. I was determined to carry out my mandate,
12 which was to see that the safe areas and the exclusion zones were
13 established and maintained. The -- since they were being broken by the
14 Bosnian Serbs, I set about to put them back -- get the situation back to
15 where I wanted it with the means I had available, which included bombing.
16 This I set out to do, and in May this failed to achieve its purpose.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A while ago, we saw which calibre
18 was used by the Muslims to fire at us from these zones, and you didn't
19 punish them for that.
20 Can we now please have Exhibit D1009, page 321.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. It says in your book:
23 [In English] "My force was composed in the main of
24 battalions from different nations ...," and so on and so on:
25 "As a result, no battalion could be manoeuvred as a whole, which
1 meant the level of the fight I could have was, at the best, that of a
2 reinforced company, subdivision or battalion. However ..."
3 [No interpretation]:
4 "However, the opponent I ultimately came to fight, the Bosnian
5 Serbs, who were operating in company and battalion groups ..."
6 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.
7 So you were fully conscious of the fact that the Serbs were your
8 adversary. This is what is written in your book. Is that correct?
9 A. I said "ultimately came to fight" or -- yes, I ultimately came to
10 fight. That -- as I've tried to explain, my business was the delivery of
11 aid and the maintenance of the exclusion zones. If I was prevented from
12 doing either of those things, then I had, under certain circumstances,
13 the resource to armed force, and that's what I applied. And since you
14 were preventing me, you got fought. When you stopped, I stopped.
15 Q. Last time, General, you confirmed that in the first half of 1995
16 alone, the Muslims launched at least two major offensives from Sarajevo;
17 is that correct?
18 A. I -- my memory is that they launched one out of Sarajevo, and
19 that was in June. The other two that I confirmed were not out of
20 Sarajevo. One was to the west and the other to the north-east.
21 Q. Sir, on that occasion we showed you a document that an offensive
22 started on the 15th of May, and the document just admitted confirms that
23 on the 31st of May, the largest-calibre howitzers, 120-millimetre,
24 160-millimetre mortars, 100-millimetre guns were used to fire at us from
25 the exclusion zone. Did that hamper your mandate?
1 A. The situation --
2 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me.
3 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Just a couple of points, Your Honour.
5 I don't think that's a correct representation of what the
6 document states. I made that clarification earlier with respect to
7 whether -- the distinction between firing at a particular time and
8 requests for materiel. And also there seems to be an assumption built
9 into the question about where the forces were located.
10 THE WITNESS: I just wanted to make the other point that I -- due
11 to your -- Bosnian Serbs' actions, I was in no position to act at all,
12 whatever I wanted to do, on the 31st of May.
13 JUDGE KWON: Continue, Mr. Karadzic.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Were you able to do anything on the 15th of May, before we
16 committed any violations?
17 A. I think you did commit violations, and I seem to recall that my
18 deputy over that period, since I was out of the country, I think, at that
19 time, protested on a number of occasions, and the fighting died down.
20 Q. Sir, we have records of the consumption from the official Muslim
21 sources. The document referred to by Mr. Tieger said that:
22 "Yesterday and today, the large quantity of ammunition and mines
23 and explosives were consumed by the 1st Corps in Sarajevo."
24 Therefore, there is no doubt that we were under constant attack.
25 So can you tell me who violated the truce? Who violated the Carter
1 Agreement, the Bosnian Serb side or the Muslim side?
2 A. I can't -- I couldn't tell you with any confidence who was the
3 first side to start shooting at each other again after the
4 Carter Agreement was signed.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I wanted to let you know that you have
6 about half an hour to conclude.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, but I'm afraid this is
8 really not sufficient. However, let's move on.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
10 Q. In your book, you said -- to be fully effective, let me remind
11 you it's page 348.
12 Can we please have this page on our screens: "To be fully
13 effective ...," and then a little bit further on:
14 [In English] "... there is a need to select targets which will
15 affect the intentions of those one is opposed to, rather than necessarily
16 the specific incidents at hand. To deal with the taking of a bridge in
17 one village, it is sometimes better not to attack the bridge, but to hit
18 a road in another village that is of greater significance to the
20 [Interpretation] Was this logic of yours the underlying reason
21 for targeting an ammunition depot which was far away from the total
22 exclusion zone?
23 A. Yes, it was.
24 Q. Thank you. And that was the first time that the punishment was
25 not effected against the weapon that was in breach, but rather against
1 the side located at a considerable distance?
2 A. It was the -- the effect that I was after was to impress upon the
3 leadership the need to take this decision, and the decision I wanted them
4 to take, which was to remove the weapons from the exclusion zone.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that all those who were involved in
6 air-strikes were combatants?
7 A. Those carrying out the air-strikes were combatants, yes.
8 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that those who carried out
9 reconnaissance of targets for -- on their behalf behind our lines, and
10 who guided them, as forward air controllers, were also in Pale and that
11 they aided these operations?
12 A. No such people existed, as far as I am concerned.
13 Q. Is it possible that you didn't know that?
14 A. I do not think any such action was carried out.
15 Q. Didn't you say, yourself, that you posted forward air controllers
16 within the safe zones and that even national contingents had their own
17 forward air controllers that were operating on a compatible basis with
19 A. The -- I did, but there were no forward air controllers involved
20 in the attacks in May.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. We don't have any more
22 time for this. We're going to revisit this issue at a later stage.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Now, sir, did the Serbs ever give their consent for having these
25 elements, such as scouts and forward air controllers, present in that
2 A. If you were referring to the forward air controllers that were
3 forward in -- such as those in Srebrenica, I believe you knew that that's
4 what they were -- that's who they were and what they were capable of.
5 Q. Sir, let's establish a distinction between the close air support
6 and the attacks. Did we give our approval to have scouts behind our
7 lines who would be party to the air-strikes?
8 A. That is like asking me as to whether or not I stopped beating my
9 wife, isn't it? Can I have the question phrased so that I can answer it?
10 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue: General, you answered that at
11 the time, and we are talking about May, there were no forward air
12 controllers involved in the attacks in May, but there were air
13 controllers, but they were not involved in the attacks?
14 THE WITNESS: There were forward air control parties in the
15 enclaves. I think it was current Dutch ones in Srebrenica and a -- and,
16 from memory, a British one in Gorazde, but they were not involved in the
17 attacks of May, at the end of May.
18 JUDGE KWON: What were they supposed to do? What did they do?
19 THE WITNESS: They were there in case they were -- close air
20 support was required in those eastern enclaves.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue?
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Did -- the UNPROFOR reports and other intelligence collected on
25 the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina were something that were accessible by
1 NATO or were available to NATO?
2 A. I would like to differentiate between UNPROFOR reports and other
3 intelligence. UNPROFOR reports were almost certainly copied to NATO. At
4 what level and with what frequency, I cannot recall, but I'm confident it
5 was happening.
6 Q. Thank you. While you were in command of UNPROFOR, did your
7 personnel have access to information on the ground collected by UNMOs,
8 military observers?
9 A. As I think everyone knows, the UNMOs were not under my command.
10 But at my headquarters, I certainly would see the UNMOs reporting in my
11 headquarters. I don't know how much -- how far down my chain of command
12 those reports went, but I would expect them to go down to the sector
13 headquarters for those operating within that sector. To explain, the
14 Sector Sarajevo would have seen the UNMO reports that concern Sarajevo.
15 Q. Thank you. Was there any provision that prohibited your
16 personnel from sharing with NATO what was being received by UNPROFOR?
17 Did you have any such explicit prohibition not to share such things with
19 A. In my headquarters, I don't think so. As I said right at the
20 beginning, there was a NATO liaison officer, and I think the general
21 reporting in the headquarters was shared. Now, I can't speak for Zagreb
22 or any other headquarters.
23 Q. Thank you. Can we agree that all the captured members of
24 UNPROFOR, captured in May by the Serbs, were active-duty personnel of the
25 United Nations at the time of their capture?
1 A. Yes, I think they were.
2 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us, when did you realise that the Serbs
3 were intent on capturing UN members in the event of an attack in May?
4 Did you know that before the very event took place?
5 A. The potential for such an event, yes, I -- that was anticipated.
6 The nature of what happened, no. And I realised it when I was rung up
7 and told that an UNMO would have his throat cut if we didn't stop
9 Q. But, General, in our meeting of the 9th of May, and this is an
10 exhibit in evidence, your Colonel Baxter said he had intelligence that
11 BiH had begun an offensive to lift the siege of Sarajevo and that he
12 could not allow the UN to help them beat us if NATO was using against the
13 BSA, that our relationship would be -- disappear.
14 Do you remember that if you interfered and called upon NATO to
15 attack us, that that would mean the end of our relationships and that we
16 would become an enemy of yours?
17 If you need reminding, let's look at P2264, paragraph 3.
18 Do you remember this being recorded at this meeting of ours?
19 A. I'd like to look at the document, please. I don't think
20 Colonel Baxter spoke in that meeting.
21 Q. This is what Mr. Baxter quoted as my words, that I said to you
22 that I had information that an offensive was in the offing and that, in
23 that event, we shall deem you our enemy:
24 [In English] "Our relationship would disappear and we would treat
25 you as the enemy."
1 [Interpretation] In other words, I think it was made very clear
2 to you that if we come under attack, you were no longer going to be our
3 friends and impartial?
4 A. Could we turn the page over, please.
5 Q. With all due respect, I am using too much time on this. This is
6 your minutes of this meeting, and he says:
7 [In English] "He did make a distinction between UNHCR and the
8 ICRC and the UN, who he describes as the armed force of the
9 Security Council."
10 [Interpretation] And it says:
11 [In English] "It is clear the BSA will continue to fight with BiH
12 and that if the NATO are drawn into the fight, the decision has been made
13 to treat UN and NATO as enemies."
14 [Interpretation] This was told you on the 9th of May from the
15 highest place in Republika Srpska, that if you start fighting us, this
16 will turn you into an enemy.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Thank you. Did the others, for example, Dr. Zametica and other
19 Serb leaders, inform you, before, during and after the attack, that that
20 was our position?
21 Can we have 65 ter 01343, from which we can see what Dr. Zametica
22 said publicly about this issue. 65 ter 01343:
23 [In English] "A statement made by Dr. Zametica at midnight last
25 [Interpretation] That's item C. We need the next page to see
1 item C.
2 It seems we need page 5.
3 Here's the statement made by Dr. Zametica:
4 [In English] "On several occasions ..."
5 [Interpretation] I'll go directly to this portion:
6 [In English] "At meetings here in Pale, we have said to UNPROFOR
7 that should there be any air attacks anywhere in RS, we would treat the
8 entire UNPROFOR, all personnel, as enemies."
9 [Interpretation] Is that correct?
10 A. That's what it says there, yeah.
11 Q. Therefore, there was no doubt that that was the situation; that
12 if we were attacked, we would defend ourselves, and that an attack can
13 only come from an enemy, not from a friend.
14 Do you also know that Dr. Krajisnik said:
15 [In English] "The UN had taken the side of our enemy, and we had
16 to treat the UN accordingly"?
17 [Interpretation] Do you remember him saying that on the 26th of
18 May? It's the same document that I am quoting, and it's on the next
19 page, line 5 or 6 from the top:
20 [In English] "It is incomprehensible ..."
21 [Interpretation] Can you see this?
22 A. Yes, I see it.
23 Q. [In English] "It is incomprehensible that the UN ..."
24 [Interpretation] The last sentence:
25 [In English] "We have the right of defence, and we will use it."
1 [Interpretation] Can we tender this document into evidence?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1055, Your Honours.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have now 1D -- actually,
5 65 ter 11853.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Do you recall that at the very outset, the captured men, it was
8 said that they were not hostages, but prisoners of war? Now, you can see
9 Reuters' report of the 1st of June, 1995:
10 [In English] "Karadzic's comment followed warnings to the Western
12 [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please, paragraph 3:
13 [In English] "He said that the detained UN personnel were
14 prisoners of war, not hostages."
15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Turn on first the microphone.
17 Could you repeat.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Paragraph 3:
20 "He said the detained UN personnel were prisoners of war, not
22 [Interpretation] And the next one:
23 [In English] "... they have to be regarded as prisoners of war
24 because they have the same commander as the one who ordered NATO
1 [Interpretation] Were you aware of the fact that our position
2 from the very beginning of bombing was that we were going to consider you
3 as enemy, and that once the bombing started, we were going to capture
4 enemy troops and treat them as prisoners of war? Or to put it simply:
5 Is that consistent with the position that I maintained the whole period?
6 A. You've got a number of questions there.
7 As I've said to you, and I had heard you at the time, I was well
8 aware that -- that the -- we were vulnerable to having the UN, first of
9 all, being seen as your enemy; secondly, that we would have people taken
10 hostage. Hostages had been taken before, after all. What I saw happen
11 was a number of men being taken hostage, not prisoners of war. I do not
12 consider a prisoner of war is someone who is chained to a gate, or
13 something like that, and having -- with threats that he'd have his throat
14 cut. In my view, that is a hostage.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's a whole different issue that
16 we will revisit if there is any time left.
17 I would like to tender this document, please.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1056, Your Honours.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now briefly see 1D03132.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. This is an interview that I gave to an Italian news agency from
24 Milan, "Il Giornale," and:
25 [In English] "Why did the Serbs take the blue helmets hostage?"
1 "Karadzic: The UN leaders have turned the blue helmets into an
2 active part of the clash. What is more, Akashi cannot be neutral on the
3 ground and our enemy in the air. I'm talking about the dispatch of
4 fighter bombers."
5 [Interpretation] I speak here about my counterpart, Mr. Akashi,
6 and I say the same things, and I said to him the same things that your
7 counterpart, General Mladic, said to you; is that correct? Was my
8 counterpart Akashi and yours --
9 A. One could see it that way, yes.
10 Q. And was this, what is stated here on the 23rd of July, consistent
11 with my position on this matter?
12 A. We're talking about the first paragraph?
13 JUDGE KWON: Probably the paragraph in the middle:
14 "Why did the Serbs take the Blue Helmets hostage?"
15 "The UN leaders have turned the Blue Helmets into an active
16 part ..."
17 THE WITNESS: That follows on from your previous statements, yes.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 I would like to tender this.
20 And, Your Excellency, I would now urge you to allow me some more
21 time. I would really appreciate that. At least through the end of this
22 session, because I don't have enough time.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we'll give you 15 minutes, and please
25 choose the best topics to deal with during that period.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So I would like to tender this
2 document into evidence and also to add two additional pages from
3 General Smith's book to it.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Italian news clipping will be admitted as
5 Exhibit D1057, and, of course, the pages 321 and 348 will be added to the
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now move into private
8 session, please, because of the topic that I intend to broach?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Just a second.
10 [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Can we agree, General, that in the fighting around Vrbanja Most
14 on the 27th of May, the UN captured some Serb soldiers that they only
15 released on the 17th of June, when we released the UNPROFOR members?
16 A. I don't recall the date of the release, but I recall at least two
17 Serb soldiers being captured.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly see 1D3231, please.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
20 Q. Is it true, General, that the deaths occurred when your forces
21 recaptured Vrbanja Bridge from the Serbs? Is that correct?
22 A. The deaths of whom?
23 Q. Well, were two Serbs killed and four captured at Vrbanja Bridge?
24 A. I don't recall the precise details.
25 Q. Well, please take a look at your statement, paragraph 128.
1 On the --
2 [In English] "On the 27th of May, Bosnian Serb troops disguised
3 as French soldiers in UN blue helmets and French uniforms, seized a
4 French position at Vrbanja Bridge in Sarajevo, killing two French
5 soldiers and taking 11 prisoners. The French counter-attacked and
6 recaptured observation post, killing two Serb troops and taking four
8 [Interpretation] But this is not how things actually transpired,
9 not in this order.
10 Let's take a look at page 4 here, paragraph 13:
11 [In English] "On 27 May 1995, the Serbs captured an UNPROFOR
12 observation post at the Vrbanja Bridge in Sarajevo, detaining some
13 United Nations soldiers. The position was recaptured by UNPROFOR at the
14 cost of two dead and fourteen wounded. There were also Serb casualties."
15 [Interpretation] In other words, when you recaptured
16 Vrbanja Bridge, you had two deaths and we had two deaths and four
17 wounded; correct?
18 A. If that's what you -- you say so. I --
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 We would like to tender this into evidence. This is a cable to
21 the UN. Can we -- we'd like to tender it. This is Akashi reporting to
22 the UN.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1058, perhaps under seal,
25 Your Honours.
1 JUDGE KWON: Can we not admit it publicly because we dealt with
2 it in private session?
3 MR. TIEGER: I believe you're correct, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it publicly.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Q. In other words, you considered these captured soldiers to be, in
7 fact, prisoners of war; is that correct?
8 A. Whose captured soldiers?
9 Q. Serb soldiers, Serb soldiers who were captured by your soldiers
10 at Vrbanja Bridge.
11 A. I gave instructions that they were to be treated as prisoners of
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D01314 -- 013134.
14 And I have to say that I'm under great pressure, in terms of time.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, it should be 1D03134.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 3134.
18 3134, yes, now I have it.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Is this a telegram compiled by you, General?
21 A. It would seem so.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Please see item 4:
25 [In English] "The commanders should be the ones who
1 negotiate ..."
2 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. And then number 5,
3 5(A). So they are de facto prisoners of war; is that right?
4 A. That's what I put, yes.
5 Q. "I'm clear in my own mind."
6 So when you capture Serbs, they are prisoners of war.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
8 document, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: Who are "they" that are referred in this document;
10 the Serb soldiers?
11 THE WITNESS: I think I am referring to those we have captured.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 Yes, this will be Exhibit D1060.
14 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, this one should be under seal, at
15 least temporarily.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, yes.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Do you recall, General, that there were negotiations in order to
19 exchange these men, while we're still in private session?
20 A. I do recall negotiations taking place, although I was not part of
22 JUDGE KWON: I should have said this was Exhibit D1059.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Can we now have 1D03135.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Is this a UN document, sir? Please take a look at item 1:
2 [In English] "UN has not the legal right to hold prisoners of
4 [Interpretation] And then item 3:
5 [In English] "If UN uses such detainees," and so on, "as
6 bargaining chips ... UN is de facto accepting the rules of the hostage
7 game set by the party."
8 [Interpretation] And then item 4:
9 [In English] "... FMEDO advised that the Serbian soldiers held by
10 UNPROFOR must be released immediately and unconditionally."
11 [Interpretation] Is it correct that the FMEDO advised that they
12 be immediately released?
13 A. He may have done.
14 Q. And this was two days before you wrote that they were, de facto,
15 prisoners of war?
16 A. If the date -- yes, I think my document -- no, I don't -- was my
17 document the one you had earlier that -- dated the 30th?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE WITNESS: It is, right. Then it's two days before.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 I would like to tender this document.
22 JUDGE KWON: Could you tell us what is an FMEDO?
23 THE WITNESS: I don't remember.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 THE WITNESS: And I'm pretty certain this isn't in my
1 headquarters, either. I think this is Zagreb, if only because it's
2 addressed to the force commander.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 We'll admit it.
5 MR. TIEGER: Under seal, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1060, under seal.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
9 With respect to "under seal," I don't understand how we can
10 receive documents with no Rule 70 conditions and then they are becoming
11 under seal.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We put it out of an abundance of caution, and
13 we'll deal with it after this has been concluded. We'll revisit all the
14 transcript which was done in the private session and all the documents
15 put under seal.
16 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, you have more? Go until the end of this
17 session. There's only 10 minutes.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Q. Do you recall, General, sir, that these Serbs were released only
20 when UN members were released, which was on the 18th of June; in other
21 words, that they were exchanged? Do you recall that?
22 A. I think that was the case, yes.
23 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to put a few questions to you about
24 Sarajevo. And then, if we have some more time left, I will move on to
25 another topic, one final topic.
1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
2 Do you like to discuss it in open session?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. My apologies.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We go back to open session.
5 [Open session]
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Can you recall, General, sir, whether the Muslims had ever asked
8 for a cease-fire in the Sarajevo area?
9 A. I can't recall -- no, I can't recall a case in the time I was
10 commander of UNPROFOR.
11 Q. Do you agree that in other areas, they did seek to have a
12 cease-fire in place; in Bihac, Gorazde, and so on?
13 A. I can't immediately recall cases there either, cases in those
14 areas either.
15 Q. Do you know of any case where we denied a Muslim offer to have a
16 cease-fire in place?
17 A. As I said, I can't recall the Muslims asking for one.
18 Q. Thank you. Do you remember whether, while you were there, the
19 Serbs ever launched an offensive in the Sarajevo area with the objective
20 of capturing a Muslim portion of the town?
21 A. In my time there, I don't -- I can recall attacks, but not -- not
22 in such a size and scale that they appeared to be wanting to take
24 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that we declared unilateral
25 cease-fires on occasions of some religious holidays, but also outside of
1 that, in Sarajevo, itself? That's what I'm referring to.
2 A. They may have occurred. I don't remember them in 1995.
3 Q. You confirmed that they launched offensives. Do you remember,
4 General, that Muslims took advantage and exploited the NATO air-strikes
5 carried out in 1995, both in May and later on?
6 A. They did not take advantage, in my memory, at all. They did not
7 take advantage in May. In September, or late August and September, they
8 did not take advantage of the air-strikes in the vicinity of Sarajevo.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 1D3222, please, in
11 And just can we admit -- or has this previous document been
12 admitted already?
13 All right, very well. We have these two maps under the same
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. General, can you see here that the borders, HVO borders, and the
17 BH Army lines of October 1995 have been marked on this map, and can you
18 agree with me that the Serbs thereby lost a significant part of the
20 A. Can we --
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Zoom in to the legend so the general can see
22 that part.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. You can see where the VRS was and how it withdrew?
25 A. This is over by Bihac, isn't it? My memory of the map --
1 Q. Yes, that's correct. That's in South-Western Bosnia, between
2 Jajce and Donji Vakuf. At Vlasic, as it were.
3 Thank you. Can we see the next page, please.
4 Can you see, General, that this is to the south of Sarajevo, and
5 it depicts the same period, October 1995, or, rather, January through
6 October 1995, showing how Serb forces lost these villages at the foot of
7 Bjelasnica, which had been in our hands and then we handed them over to
8 UNPROFOR, and would you agree with me that this constitutes loss of
10 A. I'd certainly agree that the map shows that the Bosnian Serbs
11 moved further east, the -- and lost the ground that they were holding at
12 the beginning of the year. In the period, moved further east by October
13 1995, that's what the map shows. The -- yes, that's what the map shows.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 I would like to tender this document, these two pages, the two
16 maps. Perhaps they can be admitted as one exhibit or two, whatever you
18 JUDGE KWON: I think we heard about the origin of this map,
19 didn't we?
20 MR. TIEGER: I was trying to refresh my recollection about that
21 earlier. I can't bring it to mind, but if it's -- whatever the origin, I
22 gather it wasn't previously admitted, and I certainly don't see anything
23 about the question and answer, that is eliciting this witness's
24 map-reading skills, that would give rise to admission.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps I can assist.
1 When we showed the first map in this series, it was clear that it
2 was a map -- a CIA map, and we identified them then. And I believe that
3 one of those maps has been admitted, showing the offensive and
4 counter-offensive near Bihac, and I believe this was a map depicting
5 1994. We used it with General Rose's testimony, I believe.
6 JUDGE KWON: General, could you agree that what is depicted on
7 this map reflects the situation at the time; i.e., you said that Bosnian
8 Serbs moved further east and lost the ground that they were holding at
9 the time?
10 THE WITNESS: In broad terms, I -- that happened by the end of
11 October. I wouldn't want to be any more precise than that. And that
12 would apply to both of those maps.
13 JUDGE KWON: And with that, we'll admit this.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1061, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE KWON: Now it's really time for you to conclude.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just two quick documents.
17 D929, D929, just to show you, General, a report of the 29th of
18 May, the UN report, and to show that the UN was aware that the Muslim
19 side was taking advantage of the situation.
20 Can we see the last page, "Assessment," please, or, rather, the
21 penultimate page, before last.
22 Can we see where it says "A4"? Is that bottom of the page, it
23 says "A4." These are tables and addresses that we see here.
24 Here we have it now:
25 [In English] "Assessment: The ABiH are taking advantage of the
1 BSA preoccupation with the UN and NATO to mount offensives in the
2 Komusina and Ozren Salient. It is thought that most of their assets are
3 likely to be committed to these offensives, but future action with an
4 objective of Donji Vakuf cannot be ruled out."
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Was it clear to the UN then that elsewhere in Bosnia, the Muslim
7 side was taking advantage of the situation and exploiting the outcome of
8 the bombing?
9 A. It's clear that that's the assessment of the headquarters of this
10 document, which I think is Sector South-West by the units that are in
11 it -- that are mentioned in it.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 And one final document, 65 ter 02278, please.
14 While we wait for it to come up, I have to say that we haven't
15 even touched on the issue of weapons smuggling and many other areas, such
16 as the abuse of the situation around the airport and several other
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. I have a Serbian version before me. This is a document from the
20 28th Division, and that's a military unit of the Army of Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina in Srebrenica. Would you agree with that?
22 A. It seems so, yes, yeah.
23 Q. In the course of the Muslim offensive in Sarajevo, we see what
24 the 8th Division was doing here. It was deployed in Srebrenica and Zepa
25 enclaves, and:
1 "... although facing big problems in connection with food
2 supplies and protecting the area," and so forth, "... decided to
3 contribute to the fight against the aggressor, and, with that aim, have
4 intensified their activities deep inside the territory temporarily
5 occupied by the aggressor. In the course of their combat operations,
6 reconnaissance and sabotage groups and the 28th Division encountered
7 several times the enemy."
8 And so on.
9 And then you can see what they did. They executed 13 Serbs or
10 killed 13 Serbs, seized so and so, and then it says that:
11 "In order to prevent enemy forces from sending additional forces
12 from the Srebrenica and Zepa area to the Sarajevo theatre ..."
13 And then it says what the outcome was, seven people captured, and
14 so on and so forth.
15 So, sir, can you see here that 10 days before the Serbs captured
16 Srebrenica, they were killing Serb forces and stretching them across the
17 lines in order to prevent them to go to Sarajevo? So does this show that
18 there was an increase of activities in the Srebrenica area?
19 A. I can't say it was an increase, but it certainly reports the
20 activities they were carrying out as at the 30th of June.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can this be admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will admit it.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1062, Your Honours.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Last question, General. Should one look specifically where a
2 shell fell to see whether there is a particular target there in order to
3 be able to characterise that shell?
4 A. I don't understand the question.
5 Q. Was it important for you and your people to know fully what the
6 deployment of the opposing forces was in your zone? Was it not important
7 for you to know deployment, as a whole, of personnel and equipment?
8 A. Of all the parties, do you mean, or just me, my forces? Of
9 course, I wanted to know where mine were, and I tried to know where both
10 the Bosnian Serbs and the Federation forces were and what they were
12 Q. Did either side succeed in concealing anything before you?
13 A. Yes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Thank you, General, sir. My apologies for this rush, and,
16 therefore, some of my questions were unclear because I was not systematic
18 JUDGE KWON: I take it you have some re-examination after the
20 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for half an hour. We'll resume
22 at five past 1.00.
23 --- Recess taken at 12 .35 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 1.07 p.m.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
2 Re-examination by Mr. Tieger:
3 Q. Good afternoon, General.
4 A. Good afternoon.
5 Q. I'd like to begin with a question that was raised, I believe,
6 last Thursday at pages 11468 through 1169 [sic]. General, at that time
7 you were asked about the information you received, whether you saw things
8 for yourself or had certain services that sent you information. The
9 question was:
10 "How was it that you received information ...," et cetera.
11 And you indicated that in most cases, you were relying on reports
12 from subordinates and occasionally went to see something yourself.
13 I'd like to explore with you, a bit further, the breadth and
14 consistency of the information which you received about political and
15 military events and incidents in your area of responsibility.
16 First of all, did you receive daily reports from various sources,
17 both civil and military, in the UN chain of command?
18 A. Yes. Yes, there was a reporting system that I was part of.
19 Q. Were briefings held on a daily basis?
20 A. Yes. There was a morning brief which, if I was in my -- if it
21 was in Sarajevo, I attended, and in the afternoon I would meet again
22 with, sort of, my principal staff officers.
23 Q. Did the morning briefing include not only members of your staff,
24 but also representatives from other agencies present in Sarajevo at the
1 A. Yes, such as UNHCR were there, and the sector headquarters would
2 send a liaison officer up and so forth.
3 Q. Did you also receive information from the journalistic community
4 which was present in Sarajevo?
5 A. Yes, but not -- they didn't report to me, in a sense, but one --
6 my spokesmen were in touch with them continuously, and I had the practice
7 of meeting, usually over dinner, certain journalists during a week or
8 when there was the opportunity occurred.
9 Q. Now, in addition to these sources, did you also have contact with
10 representatives of both the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serb
11 authorities at both the political and military level?
12 A. Yes, as has just been discussed during this session.
13 Q. And I believe you indicated earlier there was, for example, a
14 liaison officer at Lukavica from the Bosnian Serb side.
15 A. Yes. A Major Indic, I think.
16 Q. Thank you, General. I wanted to turn next to a document that the
17 accused showed you at page 11 -- or beginning at page 11512. That was
18 P906. This was a document which he asserted was a telegram sent at 10.36
19 on the 29th of August from Janvier.
20 And if we could call that document up, please.
21 Mr. Karadzic then referred to your third phone call with
22 General Mladic during that period on 29 August, at 10.00 a.m., during
23 which you told Mladic that it had been established beyond reasonable
24 doubt that the shell that killed over 30 persons and injured more than 80
25 others had been fired from Bosnian Serb-held territory. And then the
1 accused said to you, at page 11513:
2 "So at 10.00, you inform Mladic that it is beyond any reasonable
3 doubt, and your commander, General Janvier, 40 minutes after you, says
4 that that is not the case, that it was not established, that it cannot be
6 And that was on the basis of this document, P906.
7 Now, can I ask you, General, to look at P906, and tell us if, in
8 fact, it is a UNPF daily sitrep which covers the time-period for 28
9 August 1995?
10 A. It covers the period 28 -- the day of the 28th of August, 1995.
11 Q. And is it also correct that it emanates from G-3 and not from
12 General Janvier at all? I think we see the drafter --
13 A. The drafter is the staff officer, grade 3 of operations. He has
14 signed it as the releasing officer, and he's sending it to a very large
15 stream of people, including UN headquarters, in the name of
16 Lieutenant General Janvier. In other words, this is a routine reporting
18 Q. And is it correct, therefore, General Smith, that this is not a
19 determination by General Janvier that what you were telling Mladic on the
20 29th of August was not correct?
21 A. Well, this is a day -- this is a comment of a day before the
23 Q. Thank you, General.
24 Staying on that theme for a moment, I want to turn your attention
25 to questions that were asked regarding your conclusions concerning
1 Markale II at page 11515.
2 Mr. Karadzic pointed you to language in a document, indicating
3 that the Cymbeline radar was operating, and if the rounds were fired
4 close to the confrontation line, they would have been detected, and if
5 fired from a longer range, the arc of the trajectory would "most likely"
6 have been below the beam of the Cymbeline radar, thus not detected.
7 And focusing on that language, "most likely," he asked you:
8 "What does that sound like to you? Does it sound like reasonable
10 Now, and you indicated, in response, that:
11 "While not an absolute positive, it is most likely to be
13 Let me ask you about your conclusions, General, a little bit
15 First of all, you told the Court, at pages 11457 through 58, that
16 in addition to the UNMO and Sector Sarajevo reports, you brought into
17 your judgement all the other systems; is that right?
18 A. That's correct, yes.
19 Q. Let me ask you, then, simply that -- if your determination that
20 the rounds had been fired by the Bosnian Serbs was based on a single
21 factor or, instead, on a weight of the combination of the factors put
23 A. No, it was a combination of the factors.
24 Q. And did that include, for example, the fact that no one heard a
25 round fired from within the proximity of Sarajevo, although, as you
1 testified --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid this is leading.
3 JUDGE KWON: No, he referred to the reason given by the witness.
4 Hear him out.
5 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. General, did that include the fact that no one heard a round
8 fired from within the proximity of Sarajevo, despite the sound that
9 a mortar makes and despite the presence of military personnel listening
10 for such incidents?
11 A. Yes, that was a factor in this judgement.
12 Q. And, General, you were asked at pages 11547 and 548 about the
13 alleged probability of hitting the particular spot where the Markale II
14 shell landed, and you said, at page 11548, that you didn't see why this
15 alleged fact should have been brought to your attention, since the
16 civilian areas of Sarajevo were "a substantial target" and "much wider
17 than nine metres wide." So, General, let me ask you directly. Did that
18 mean that you considered that it was the civilian areas of Sarajevo,
19 generally, that were targeted by the Bosnian Serb Army and not just the
20 specific spot where the shells ultimately landed?
21 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
22 You know, these questions really are leading. That suggests an
24 JUDGE MORRISON: I can see why you might think that,
25 Mr. Robinson, but I think, in reality, it's a question which is designed
1 to elicit a more particular answer by the witness, which is a perfectly
2 valid tactic in re-examination, to which the answer is not fixed. It can
3 be answered in the positive or the negative.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. General, do you have the --
6 JUDGE KWON: Sorry --
7 THE WITNESS: I'm just re-reading the question.
8 The point I was trying to make there was that it was a civilian
9 target that had been hit, and the -- and it was civilians in the market
10 that had been killed and wounded. It wasn't that particular spot that
11 was the target and had been the result of this attack.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. I'd like to ask you about another discussion that the accused
14 raised with you concerning shelling.
15 At pages 11544 through 45, there was -- there were some questions
16 about shelling and a discussion about alleged prohibitions of fire on the
17 city. You responded that, in fact, fire was coming into the city. And
18 then the accused asserted:
19 "That was the case only when we were being shot at. Returning
20 fire is legitimate."
21 So, General, I wanted to ask you a few follow-up questions in
22 connection with that.
23 First, during the course of your service in Sarajevo, was there
24 Bosnian Serb fire on the city that was unrelated, insofar as you and your
25 staff could tell, to any outgoing fire; that is, fire from the Bosnian
1 Serbs that took place when they had not been fired on?
2 A. There were occasions when one couldn't see, as it were, the cause
3 for that effect, and there were other occasions where there were no
4 military targets, as such, where the rounds were falling, but you might
5 have been able to connect them as a cause and effect because of some
6 incident on the line of confrontation.
7 Q. And, General, was there also fire from the Bosnian Serbs into the
8 city that --
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that the Prosecutor is
10 draining the witness in order to make him give him the answer that he did
11 not give and that he would like to have.
12 MR. TIEGER: I'm not the one who raised the issue of legitimate
13 fire. Sorry, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE KWON: Could you reformulate the question, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. General, you testified that there was fire after -- after -- let
17 me see if I can reformulate that. Right.
18 You indicated that there was sometimes fire from the Bosnian
19 Serbs after they had been fired on, but into areas where there were no
20 military targets. Was there also fire, after the Bosnian Serbs had been
21 fired on, into the city that failed to discriminate between possible
22 military targets and civilian areas?
23 A. If -- I find that question hard to answer from my memory, but
24 if -- nevertheless, from my memory, if there was a military target and
25 there was some -- some fire fell close to that military target and on the
1 civil population, then that would have been understood as part of the
2 same military engagement. It was when rounds fell in a civil area, where
3 we had no indication or knowledge of any military target that we could
4 see there, that we would understand that as being an attack directly onto
5 a civil -- the civil areas of Sarajevo.
6 Q. Thank you, General. General, you were asked some questions about
7 the NIOD report at a couple of junctures during your cross-examination,
8 including pages 11670 and then, in particular, at page 11728.
9 And, Your Honour, if we could have just a moment, please.
10 [Prosecution counsel confer]
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. I wanted to ask you some follow-up questions about that.
13 First of all, generally, was -- when you were -- you spoke with
14 the NIOD people, is this some kind of personal dissertation on your part
15 or were you asked questions to which you were asked to respond?
16 A. Again, this was some time ago, I think about 10 years ago now,
17 and they came to my office in the headquarters I was in. And I think
18 they had sent a sort of questionnaire in advance of -- not so much the
19 specific questions, but the sort of area in which questions would be
20 asked, if I remember correctly. And we then -- there was then an
21 interview with, I recall, fairly long answers, in that these were mostly
22 scene-setting type of questions. I'd long -- I've only seen the document
23 they produced once or twice before seeing it here again. And the content
24 of that interview was then reduced, if you like, to the -- to the sort of
25 thing you saw produced in court today.
1 Q. You said it was scene-setting. Was it, in part, aimed at
2 attempting to get information on how events might have been prevented?
3 A. I don't really remember. It was -- my understanding of what they
4 were trying to do was to understand what had happened and the setting
5 of -- in which it had happened so as to understand why it had happened.
6 Q. Now, at page 11728, the accused cited the report to show efforts
7 by internationals, or a passage from that report attributed to you, to
8 show efforts by internationals to create a rift in the Pale leadership
9 and decrease his influence. And as noted in at page 11727 in his
10 question, to reduce his influence over Mladic is how he put it. And this
11 is an issue that came up again today. And, incidentally, I wanted to ask
12 you: To the extent that you were aware of any efforts by international
13 figures to isolate Mr. Karadzic, did you understand that to be because of
14 some personal dislike or because they understood or considered him to be
15 in control of events they wanted to change?
16 A. My understanding of the isolation was nothing to do with the
17 events of day-to-day life in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The isolation was that
18 it was thought possible to make a deal with Milosevic, who had more --
19 perhaps more at stake and was -- therefore, leverage and so forth could
20 be brought to bear upon him in a way that wasn't going to be possible or
21 didn't appear to be possible with Mr. Karadzic.
22 Q. I believe, in fact, you were asked at 11728, or you were pointed
23 to that part of the report that said:
24 "Had Mladic been Milosevic's man, Srebrenica would not have
1 And when you were asked to explain that, you said:
2 "Milosevic would have understood the setting of the Srebrenica
3 and the no-fly zones and the exclusion zones in a different way to the
4 Bosnian Serbs."
5 That was at 11729. And I take it you recall that.
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. Okay. Now, earlier in your testimony, you had referred to the --
8 at page 11354, the isolation or unworldliness of Mr. Karadzic at points,
9 views that were not based on a world that anyone else was sharing, and
10 that was at 11674 through 75, and to a meeting with Mladic in August,
11 trying, without success, to explain to him that the Bosnian Serb
12 perception of the world was to their disadvantage. Do you recall those?
13 That was at 11449. Do you recall that?
14 A. Yes, I do.
15 Q. And when you referred in your answer concerning the comment in
16 the NIOD report, that is, Milosevic would understand it in a way
17 different to the Bosnian Serbs, which Bosnian Serbs were you referring
19 A. I was referring to Dr. Karadzic, who -- and the people around him
20 in Pale.
21 Q. And just so the Court understands this --
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Tieger.
23 Did you say that Mladic would understand it in a different -- in
24 a way different to the Bosnian Serbs?
25 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. If I said that, I meant "Milosevic," and
1 I hope I was understood that way.
2 THE WITNESS: That's what I understood.
3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
4 JUDGE KWON: And going back to the previous question: Had Mladic
5 been Milosevic's man, Srebrenica would not have happened, I think your
6 answer, cited by Mr. Tieger, was given to my question.
7 THE WITNESS: Correct, yes.
8 JUDGE KWON: Did you mean that it was Mr. Karadzic that --
9 because of Karadzic, Srebrenica -- what happened in Srebrenica happened?
10 THE WITNESS: Not necessarily. What I'm saying is, and I think
11 that's what I was saying to the investigation by the Dutch, was that
12 Milosevic had an understanding or appeared to me to have had an
13 understanding of what was going on around him, and he would have seen the
14 potential of dangers of allowing the pocket of Srebrenica to fall.
15 JUDGE KWON: And by "Srebrenica," did you mean the taking of a
16 safe enclave or the massacre that --
17 THE WITNESS: I can't -- I can't remember which bit of that or
18 whether I was saying it about the whole. I just don't remember.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. Just in follow-up to the President's question: Did that mean,
23 General, that you were saying that it was only Milosevic who could have
24 influenced Mladic because he had a particular view or perhaps a more
25 realistic view, in your judgement, and Karadzic and Mladic were coming at
1 it from the same perspective?
2 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
3 That is a leading question. Perhaps even Judge Morrison could
4 agree with me on that one.
5 JUDGE MORRISON: I stand corrected, Mr. Robinson. I think on
6 this occasion, that is certainly a leading question, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: Well, this is a difficult one to parse out,
8 Your Honour, but I'll be happy to ask the witness.
9 Q. What's the connection between your observations that it might
10 have been different if Mladic had been Milosevic's man and the fact that
11 Karadzic and Mladic were the Bosnian Serbs who saw things differently
12 from Milosevic?
13 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger, I'm sorry. You're bordering on
14 inviting speculation, and I think we're going down a very dangerous route
16 MR. TIEGER: Very well, Your Honour. I'll move on.
17 Q. General, you were asked quite a number of questions about attacks
18 from the enclaves, that is, from Srebrenica, most recently today, in
19 fact. And I believe at one point, in response to a question by the
20 accused - that would be 11682 -- he asked you to agree with him that the
21 attack on Srebrenica was a reaction to attacks from the enclaves, and you
23 "I think that was the immediate cause, yes."
24 I wanted to ask you about less immediate causes, both ones you
25 may have indicated in your testimony and others.
1 First of all, General, you explained what has come to be known as
2 your thesis to the Court, and I believe you indicated that - and that's
3 contained in both your amalgamated statement and your testimony - that
4 you concluded that the Bosnian Serbs were determined to resolve, by
5 military operations, in order -- the issue of Srebrenica in order to
6 alleviate over-stretching of manpower required by the need to guard the
7 enclaves; is that right?
8 A. They were -- in the thesis, they were -- it wasn't just
9 Srebrenica. They were going to resolve this whole affair militarily, and
10 the -- and to do that, they needed to squeeze the enclaves. The -- and
11 that was to reduce their significance in their rear area and free up the
12 resources that were currently committed to that -- to guarding that
14 Q. And you arrived at this conclusion at a fairly early stage in
15 your tenure in Sarajevo; is that right?
16 A. Yes, sometime in early March, this -- after the visit where I
17 met -- Srebrenica, where I had met General Mladic at Vlasenica
19 Q. Now, I presume that your -- you arrived at this conclusion
20 without benefit of access, for example, to internal Bosnian Serb military
21 records or contemporaneous internal political documents.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
23 I'm losing track of who's testifying here. These last two
24 questions is just Mr. Tieger testifying and asking leading questions.
25 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger, I think you are beginning to behave
1 a little bit like Dr. Karadzic in that respect.
2 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, Your Honour, but with respect to the
3 previous answer, I thought it was -- while arguably leading, it was a
4 predicate question about which there was no dispute. But, fine, I will
5 ask it in a classically non-leading way.
6 Q. General Smith, in arriving at your thesis, did you have access to
7 internal Bosnian Serb military records or to internal political
9 A. No, I did not.
10 Q. Did your thesis, as you've explained it to us, about squeezing
11 the enclaves and why that would -- why the Bosnian Serbs would undertake
12 that effort, preclude the possibility that there might be other factors
13 that underpinned or supported an intention to squeeze or move on the
15 A. No, I was wide open to other information coming in. This was the
16 intention. The purpose of the thesis is to guide my own analysis and
18 Q. I want to now direct your attention to a few documents that,
19 principally Bosnian Serb military documents, and then ask you a question
20 or two about that.
21 First, if we could call up P00976.
22 This is a document dated 19 November 1992. It's a directive for
23 further operations of the Army of Republika Srpska, and --
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this from 1992? Would that be
25 right for that witness? I'm wondering.
1 MR. TIEGER: The issue has been raised by the accused,
2 Your Honour, of -- or the position taken by the accused is that the
3 actions taken against the enclaves, and in particular Srebrenica, was a
4 purely reactive, one, two attacks out of the enclave in 1995, in
5 particular. You've heard the general identify his conclusion that well
6 before that action was taken, he arrived at the conclusion that such
7 action would be taken, and --
8 JUDGE KWON: Without having to hear further explanation, let us
9 see whether the general is able to answer any question about the document
10 which originates from 1992. Yes.
11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. And I'm going to just show you a couple of documents very
13 quickly, and read from them quickly.
14 This is a document signed by General Mladic. Part of it states:
15 "From its present positions, the main forces --" this is for the
16 Drina Corps, "Its main forces shall persistently defend Visegrad, the
17 dam, Zvornik and the corridor, while the rest of its forces --"
18 And this is on page 5 of the English, at the bottom.
19 "... while the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region
20 shall exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on him, and
21 force him to leave the Birac, Zepa and Gorazde areas together with the
22 Muslim population."
23 Now, General, 65 ter 2085 is a document dated 24 November 1992.
24 It's a decision for further operations to the Zvornik Light Infantry
25 Brigade pursuant to the document we just saw, the directive to the
1 Main Staff, and in part one it indicates:
2 "... launch an attack using the main body of troops and major
3 equipment to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses, exhaust
4 them, break them up, or force them to surrender, and force the Muslim
5 local population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica and
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I? May I say, before an answer
8 is given: I keep saying that this document has been mistranslated.
9 Mladic is not saying that they should surrender. He's saying that they
10 should disarm. And Mladic also is saying that since the people are
11 going, that they should take the army as well; that it's not that the
12 people should go with the army, it's the other way around. I have
13 cautioned against this translation, and now this witness is going to be
14 put in a difficult position because he's supposed to respond on the basis
15 of a poor translation.
16 JUDGE KWON: You are referring to Directive 4, not this document?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. What is this? I don't know
18 what this document is, but he showed Directive 4 and he quoted, I mean
19 Mr. Tieger did, that they should surrender. But Mladic is saying that
20 they should disarm and become civilians. And, secondly, Mladic did not
21 say that the army should lead the people; rather, the people should take
22 the army along, as that is what is happening anyway.
23 JUDGE KWON: Well, the witness must have heard your
24 interpretation or reading. Let's carry on, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Q. General, I am not going to take you through the whole panoply of
2 documents which this Court will see during the course of the case. What
3 I simply wanted to ask you, if these are among or the types of documents
4 that might have further informed your thesis and expanded your view of
5 the reasons why the Bosnian Serb political and military forces might move
6 on the enclaves.
7 A. Could I just -- before I answer, could I just see -- you've got
8 this daily report up here, but I couldn't find the bit you were quoting
10 Q. I agree. I'm sorry, I didn't see that that one was up there,
11 because the one to which I referred, I believe, was 65 ter 2085. Perhaps
12 I misspoke or perhaps my number is incorrect.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This document was -- this document
14 was here, but can I just say one word.
15 Again, we are on the wrong path. Directive 4 does not talk about
16 the ground. It is "4/1" and its executive, and it says something
17 different. Directive 4/1 is the relevant document.
18 MR. TIEGER: The confusion, Your Honour, was that it actually is
19 an exhibit, not a 65 ter number. So it is 2085, but P2085.
20 JUDGE KWON: You refer to Exhibit P2085, which is --
21 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
22 JUDGE KWON: -- this one.
23 THE WITNESS: And this of -- that I've now got on the screen is
24 also 1992, and it's part of the cascade of orders, as I understand it,
25 of -- that stems from the original directive you showed me.
1 MR. TIEGER: Correct, and I believe I've drawn your attention to
2 paragraph 1.
3 Q. My question was, simply, without going through a long list of
4 documents, whether these are among the kinds of documents that would have
5 further informed your thesis and expanded your understanding of why the
6 Bosnian Serb political and military forces could be expected to move on
7 the enclaves.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
9 If he didn't see these documents, I don't understand how this
10 question helps the Chamber if this isn't the kind of documents that would
11 have informed his thesis then. I simply don't understand what is being
12 asked General Smith and how it would assist the Chamber.
13 JUDGE KWON: Or could it be asked whether it is consistent with
14 his thesis?
15 MR. TIEGER: That's fine, Your Honour. Thank you.
16 THE WITNESS: Yes. If I had to reverse engineer my thesis, I
17 would have to write something like that at some point.
18 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Just I wanted to ask you a couple of questions about convoy
20 restrictions, General.
21 Q. There were many questions posed to you concerning the --
22 concerning restrictions, and I believe it was posed to you that
23 restrictions that were imposed on humanitarian aid and UN resupply
24 convoys were due to a concern about supplying Bosnian forces in the
25 enclaves. Do you recall that?
1 A. Yes.
2 MR. TIEGER: I'd like to look at a couple of documents in that
3 connection. First, 65 ter 3675.
4 This is a document from the Main Staff in April of 1995. And if
5 we turn to page 2.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the Serbian version as
7 well, because the translations are a disaster.
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. And, General, it may be a bit difficult to read the English when
10 it's that size, but I'll do my best to point to you it.
11 The remark is:
12 "We did not approve the following:"
13 And it identifies, in the second paragraph below that -- well,
14 first, in the first paragraph, "Swedish construction project," and then
15 in the paragraph below that:
16 "In addition to the above, we did not approve beef, salt, oil and
17 clapboards for the enclave ..."
18 And, similarly, I wanted to turn your attention to 65 ter 03673.
19 This is also a Main Staff document, Main Staff of the VRS, from
20 April 1995, to the Commands of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps and
21 Drina Corps, advising them that they have not approved the following
22 UNPROFOR convoys and teams. If we look, for example, to item 4:
23 "A convoy which was supposed to transport 12 containers with
24 humanitarian aid (beds, food, clothes, medicines and school supplies)."
25 And if we look to item 10, the last page, page 3 --
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon.
2 Can we see all of page 4.
3 MR. TIEGER: The rejection of a convoy to Srebrenica which was
4 supposed to transport various goods; a water trailer, a large quantity of
5 field beds, hospital beds, an X-ray machine, beams for construction,
6 nails, light fittings, a satellite telephone system and cables,
7 signalling equipment, roofing material, et cetera. And cleaning goods,
8 in fact.
9 Q. General, I wanted to ask you: Are these documents consistent
10 with your understanding at the time of -- and consistent with your thesis
11 about the intention to squeeze the enclaves and consistent with your
12 understanding at the time about why humanitarian and UN resupply convoys
13 were restricted?
14 A. Those remind me, you know, that that was going on, and -- and the
15 extensive nature of what was being -- of the convoys we were -- we
16 weren't able to move. And, yes, it fitted with the thesis. It was -- it
17 reinforced that view.
18 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, General.
19 Your Honour, I tender those documents.
20 JUDGE KWON: Those two will be admitted.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter 03675 was admitted as Exhibit
22 P839, and 65 ter 03673 will be Exhibit P2309.
23 JUDGE KWON: What was the number of the first one?
24 THE REGISTRAR: The first 65 ter number was 03675, which was
25 admitted as Exhibit P839.
1 JUDGE KWON: Which is already admitted?
2 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that's correct.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please be given the
5 possibility to point out just one document and put two brief questions?
6 JUDGE KWON: We'll consider it at the end of direct examination.
7 Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 That does conclude my redirect examination.
10 JUDGE KWON: Before putting your question, tell us what the
11 question is about.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The first question is whether, in
13 1992, there were any safe areas. That's the first question, whether the
14 general knows whether safe areas existed.
15 The second question has to do about the time of Markale, the
16 document of the Norwegian Battalion.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we allow you to put those questions.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 1D3219, could we have that, please, in e-court.
21 Further cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. While we're waiting for that: General, do you know that safe
24 areas were established only in 1993, in the spring of 1993?
25 A. That is -- I did know, yes.
1 Q. Mr. Tieger asked you about what was going on during the war in
2 1992; right?
3 A. That is correct, he showed me a document of that time.
4 Q. Thank you. Could you please now focus on this document. Do we
5 agree that this is a document that covers the 28th and 29th of August,
6 and on the 29th of August, at 1800 hours, it was sent -- the Norwegian
7 Battalion sent it to their own country? 29th, at 1800 hours, August
8 1995. Is that correct?
9 A. Yes, that's it, date, time, group.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, Sarajevo
11 Sector. And I would like everyone to look at the whole passage, and I'm
12 going to read only one sentence:
13 [In English] "It has not been confirmed where the shells came
14 from either."
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Therefore, not even at the end of the day on the 29th, the
17 Norwegian Battalion was able to determine from which direction the fire
18 came and to put it in the report that they are sending to their
20 A. No, they don't. This is a battalion up in the Tuzla area, and it
21 would seem to me they are sending a situation report of the whole area
22 back to their government. And what they're working from is other
23 people's reports from the other sectors that have been copied to them.
24 That's what I think is happening, but you'd need to get the -- someone
25 from the Norwegian Battalion to explain the process for certain.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At the same time, they have
2 information that the church at Ilidza, and we know it was an
3 Orthodox Church, that was hit, and that at least one person died from the
4 wedding party at the time.
5 Can we have this document admitted into evidence?
6 JUDGE KWON: The last bit was an unnecessary statement.
7 Yes, we can admit this document.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1063, Your Honours.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Chamber, and thank you,
11 JUDGE KWON: That concludes your evidence, Sir Rupert. I thank
12 you, on behalf of the Tribunal and the Bench, for your coming yet again
13 to the Tribunal to give it. Now you are free to go.
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, indeed. Thank you.
15 [The witness withdrew]
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 Is the next witness ready? I was told so.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since we often work over time,
19 could we adjourn for the day, because I find it difficult to switch from
20 one witness to another.
21 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?
22 MS. EDGERTON: We're ready to go. It's Dr. Karadzic's
23 cross-examination. The witness is here.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I hope at least we can hear the
25 examination-in-chief, at least.
1 MS. EDGERTON: This is the continuation of a witness whose
2 cross-examination began yesterday, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes, I was carried away. I'm sorry. He was
4 waiting all the time, yes, Mr. Glavas.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 WITNESS: TIHOMIR GLAVAS [Resumed]
7 [Witness answered through interpreter]
8 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Mr. Glavas.
9 Please make yourself comfortable. Please be seated.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: I apologise for your inconvenience, for the delay.
12 Although we have only 25 minutes, we'll continue with your
14 If you're ready, Mr. Karadzic.
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Glavas.
18 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President.
19 Q. Forgive me in advance if I sometimes address you as
20 General Smith, because we just finished with him as a witness.
21 A. No problem.
22 Q. I believe that yesterday, we stopped at a point when certain
23 activities were rounded up in which the Muslim side finalised some of its
24 activities relating to the increase of number of reserve police officers
25 and providing weapons for them. Is that correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. In an interview with my adviser, you said that prior to the
3 outbreak of the conflict, the large part of the Muslim population had
4 been evacuated. Can you explain how this happened, and were there any
5 Serbs crossing over from one zone to another?
6 A. Yes, that is correct. I spoke about similar things when I talked
7 to representatives of the OTP both in Sarajevo and here in The Hague.
8 Therefore, the fact is that after certain organisational activities were
9 finalised pursuant to the directive issued by the then Crisis Staff of
10 the Bosnian side, the composition of which we had at the time, although I
11 am reluctant to give you the names now, although I know them, therefore,
12 according to the directive issued by this Crisis Staff, the population
13 from the area of Ivancica and Zivici [phoen] were nearly all evacuated
14 towards Romanija. The village of Dupovci, which is on the very entrance
15 point of Hadzici, was evacuated towards Gradac and Pazaric, and one part
16 of Zunovnica and Binjezevo neighbourhood were evacuated in the direction
17 of Mount Igman. Based on the intelligence gathered on the ground, we
18 knew for certain that that was a predetermined and designed move by the
19 Bosnian authorities, which they saw as the way of dealing more easily
20 with the remaining minority Serb population in Hadzici. In the meantime,
21 and that's common knowledge, they arrested all able-bodied Serbian men
22 between Zovik and Gornja Rastovica, they arrested them, put them in
23 detention, and confiscated their weapons. And I used to say that that
24 was a classical example of a military strategy, to -- such strategy, to
25 ensure they are rear lines. They also attacked the village of Bradina,
1 which was populated exclusively by Serbs, and they practically saw this
2 as an obstacle because they perceived that as a buffer zone between the
3 territory under their control and the territory towards Konjic. So they
4 arrested the population there, including, as I said, the Serbs, arrested
5 in Hadzici from Lazovi [phoen] to Gornja Rastovica, and thereby completed
6 the preparations. And then around the 25th of May, they carried out an
7 all-out attack on Hadzici.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. In order to assist the
9 Chamber and all the other parties, can we please now have 1D674. 1D674,
10 and I would kindly ask you to mark these places that you just mentioned.
11 So can we have 1D674 in e-court, please. Thank you.
12 This is an ethnic map of Sarajevo. Can you mark, for the benefit
13 of the Chamber, the location of Hadzici municipality?
14 MS. EDGERTON: This map is not something we got notified on.
15 JUDGE KWON: You can lead with proceeding with this map. ^
16 MS. EDGERTON: I see, Your Honour.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have three maps. I think that
18 this one is the clearest one.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Do we agree that Hadzici is to the south-west, somewhere near
21 this area which is marked with number 7?
22 A. [Marks]
23 Q. So this is Hadzici, where a Serbian majority lived, and what is
24 this on the left? These green areas signify Muslim villages; is that
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Can you please circle the Serbian villages which are within the
3 Muslim territory?
4 A. You know what? I find it very difficult to find my bearings in
5 the map. In reality, I can orientate myself excellently, but I'm not
6 sure how you will also find your way around this map vis-a-vis these
8 Q. If I may help you, Mr. Glavas. Blue are Serbian villages, yellow
9 is one Croatian village, and Muslim villages are painted green. Now,
10 from number 7, if you go up and to the left, you can see a few Serbian
11 villages, and then we also see Tarcin, Pazaric, and the remaining Muslim
12 villages; is that correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Are you telling me that the Serbs from these villages that were
15 in the Muslim territory were arrested?
16 A. Yes, that's right.
17 I'm sorry. Now, from the very beginning of the war, a line was
18 established from --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the place names
20 slowly. Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
22 Mr. Glavas, the interpreter couldn't hear the names of the
23 places. Could you repeat your answer, kindly.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, no problem.
25 So at the beginning, there was a sort of improvised separation
1 line from Tinovo elevation to Dupovci and to the maintenance centre, all
2 the way up towards Mostar. Now, from Gornja Rastovica to the tunnel was
3 the territory that was absolutely under the control of the Bosnian
4 Government, both then and throughout the entire war.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Q. When you spoke about evacuation of the Muslim civilians from this
7 Serbian zone, were you referring to these green villages that were within
8 the red circle?
9 A. Yes, yes, that's right.
10 Q. Can you put the number 1 next to the first circle? Am I right if
11 I say that you have encircled the town of Hadzici and the surrounding
12 Serbian-held territories?
13 A. Yes, that's correct. We held, by far, smaller territory than was
14 the case with the Muslim side, and I think that the ratio was 30 to
15 70 per cent, meaning that the Bosnian Government held 70 per cent of the
17 Q. Thank you. Could you please put number 1?
18 A. [Marks]
19 Q. And can you now also circle these blue Serbian villages inside
20 the Muslim territory?
21 A. [Marks]
22 Q. Thank you. Put the number 2 next to it.
23 A. [Marks]
24 Q. And can you tell me, what was the fate of these villages? Can
25 you tell the Chamber what happened with the residents of the villages who
1 remained behind?
2 A. Unfortunately, it was very bad.
3 Mr. Karadzic, if you will allow me, I need some time, and I think
4 it would be beneficial for you, but primarily I want to say this for the
5 benefit of the Trial Chamber and the Prosecution.
6 JUDGE KWON: If you could be as concise as possible, please.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right.
8 Yesterday, I spoke, among other things, about part of the Muslim
9 population, especially able-bodied men, and I failed to mention a very
10 important matter which will be of great assistance to the Trial Chamber,
11 but also to the Prosecution, and that is as follows:
12 When the indoctrination was taking place, it is very important to
13 point out a feature that would later on, in the relationship between the
14 Serbs and Bosniaks in that area, have a significant effect, and that is
15 the following feature: In spite of the very difficult and complex
16 situation, there were some areas where both Serbs and Muslims were very
17 tolerant of each other. They did not want the war; they wanted peace.
18 I can say this with a clear mind and with a lot of arguments because I
19 know of these instances and cases. There were towns and villages where
20 people actually stood guard together. But, unfortunately, after the SDA
21 activities and the Crisis Staff from the Bosnian Corps in the area of
22 Hadzici, Ilidza and Trnovo, and because they did not like this situation,
23 they did all they could in order to upset the balance and the tolerance
24 that existed, both in terms of the faith, the religion, and also the
25 culture and customs of the ethnic groups that lived there, both Muslim
1 and Serb.
2 What I'm saying now, you can actually see for yourself. There
3 are numerous documents collected by the security services, and everything
4 that I've said here can be seen in numerous documents that were collected
5 by the security services.
6 The crisis staffs decided to bring into those areas KOS [as
7 interpreted] members, K-O-S members.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Could you please explain to the Trial Chamber what HOS is?
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction. H-O-S.
11 A. Yes, that's the Croatian Defence Forces, but I have to say that
12 all the members of HOS were members of Bosniak nationality who had
13 already taken part in fighting in Croatia and who had already fought
14 Serbs in those areas. Now they returned to this area and continued with
15 the same activities that they had been involved in earlier on. They
16 declared themselves, and we were very well aware of that, as haters of
17 Serbs. They came to Hadzici and Hrasnica and also Sokolovic Kolonija,
18 and also to the Trnovo area, and in a very brief time they managed to
19 commit numerous war crimes and all kinds of other illicit activities
20 which, as I've already said, were documented by the police. And I
21 personally submitted a number of criminal reports against certain
22 individuals, and these criminal reports were sent to the competent
23 prosecutor's offices, some of them in Republika Srpska and the others in
24 the Federation.
25 Now, the reason I'm saying this is for the Trial Chamber, when
1 trying to get the whole picture of the situation in the area, and that
2 can then serve as a prototype for all other areas where the Serb
3 population was in the minority, this is how things were actually carried
5 And, gentlemen, everything I've said here can be found in a book
6 published in 1996, written by Munir Alibabic, aka Munja. And let me just
7 say that he was an old-type, very capable member of the former State
8 Security Service who was the chief of the Centre of the Security Services
9 of Sarajevo during the war. The title of the book was "Bosna in the
10 cause of KOS," K-O-S, which is the Military Counter-Intelligence Service.
11 This was a book by Mr. Munir Alibabic right after the war in 1996, and in
12 it he talks about these groups of HOS members that I spoke about a little
13 earlier, and he acknowledges and admits on one of the pages of this book
14 that these men committed war crimes and that certain groups from
15 Herzegovina committed war crimes. And as you read on in the book, you
16 can actually deduce that he was referring to the HOS members.
17 And what is also very important is to say is a witness testified
18 about a crime committed in Trebevic [as interpreted], which is in Trnovo
19 municipality, to the fact that members of HOS killed every living soul in
20 that village, and when a member of Bosniak ethnicity asked the leader of
21 the group, Why did you do this, why did you kill the elderly and the
22 women? They literally said, Well, why did you call us up here?
23 So I told you about this deliberately in order for you to get an
24 overall picture of what the situation was like down there, where we were,
25 when these people came back from other areas. When they came back to
1 Pazarici and on their way back to Herzegovina, they stated, literally,
2 We've managed to create such a deep rift between the Serbs and the
3 Muslims that they will never again manage to live together in this area.
4 And I just have to add that they were quite successful in what
5 they set out to do.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I felt I had to rise, because I think
8 we've come to a situation where this evidence has gone so far to the edge
9 of being relevant that it actually has crossed the line into being
10 tu quoque.
11 JUDGE KWON: This is a Prosecution witness, isn't he?
12 MS. EDGERTON: It is.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I asked him to be concise.
14 But let's move on, Mr. Karadzic. Five minutes.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Witness, sir, thank you for pointing these things out, but may I
17 ask you now to be as brief as possible.
18 Tell us, please, these Muslims from the green areas around
19 Hadzici, did they go to the green areas and actually carry out the
20 evacuation themselves?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And what about the Serbs in the blue Serb villages; were they
23 allowed to cross over to Hadzici?
24 A. No way, out of the question.
25 Q. Were they arrested, and were they detained at the silos camp,
2 A. Well, almost all of them, and I'm referring to men, although
3 there were also some female prisoners.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 We will show a document, but before that I would like to do away
6 with the map.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Could you just tell me now one more thing? When speaking about
9 the establishment of two municipalities, did the Serbs have in mind the
10 blue areas, and did they actually include these blue areas in their
12 A. Well, yes, that's -- that's what it -- that's how it was, and I
13 believe I said as much in my statement provided to the Prosecution.
14 These were the Serb villages, and there were no pretensions on Muslim
16 Q. Thank you. When people say that the -- when they said that they
17 took over the municipalities, did the Serbs take control over the entire
18 municipalities or just their own areas under the Serb -- or, rather,
19 their part of the municipality? So is that how it transpired in Hadzici?
20 Did they just take over the Serb parts?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. Thank you. Could you please date and sign this map?
23 A. My apologies, but what is the date.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe it's the 15th.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE WITNESS: [Marks]
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 I'd like to tender this into evidence.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1064, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE KWON: And that will be it for today.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I just had one last question
8 about this same area.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Glavas, did your family have the same fate -- meet the same
11 fate as the Serbs that were in the Muslim territory, Muslim-controlled
13 A. Yes, my entire family, my two brothers, my father, and even my
14 mother was supposed to be arrested, but I was tipped off by Croats and we
15 managed to save her. Otherwise, I'm sure she would have been taken
16 prisoner as well.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Could we briefly see 1D3242 in e-court. 1D3242, please.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. While we are waiting for it to appear on the screens, let me read
21 out the content, and we can also -- we can see the English version.
22 And it says --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please repeat the date.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] "Based on intelligence from the
25 ground, we've managed to learn the following."
1 Why can't we have this document on the screen?
2 Okay, now we have it. So we have the Serbian version. Could we
3 show the English version? Oh, we don't have it. Okay.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. So, take a look at this. On the 19th of August, 1992 -- that's
6 the date of this document. So it says there:
7 "In the area of Tarcin, the Muslim forces are deployed at
8 Metarica [phoen] ...," and so on.
9 But let us see what it says further down in the third paragraph:
10 "The situation at the silo is very difficult, and the leaders of
11 the Serb population are the ones who are exposed to greatest levels of
12 torture; Plakalovic, Vaso; Nenad Kostic, who armed Serbs; Mile Bratic,
13 the staff commander; Laza Kostic, father of Dragan Krstic, who was
14 declared a Chetnik duke; and Vlastimir Glavas, the brother of
15 Tihomir Glavas, were the ones who were tortured most."
16 So is that true? Is this your brother, and was he tortured
18 A. Yes.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 I would like to admit this into evidence, and I would like to add
21 something. I can do it in the presence of the witness, but perhaps it
22 would be more appropriate, because of the Prosecution, to do it without
23 the presence of this witness. Something to do with a comment by
24 Ms. Edgerton.
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll mark it for identification,
1 pending translation.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D1065, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 Thank you, Mr. Glavas. We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 [The witness stands down]
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to say something that
10 relates to what Ms. Edgerton said.
11 I just want to say that the Defence does -- it is not the
12 intention of the Defence to use the tu quoque principle. All we want is
13 for the Trial Chamber to get a full picture of what went on there and how
14 it went on, whether there was a plan in place, being put in place, or
15 whether it was a civil war, whether there was a state plan for this,
16 years before it happened, before this conflict broke out, whether the
17 state leadership already had a plan for that or not. And this is what we
18 are trying to show here, and not trying to actually use the tu quoque
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I indicated to you several times
21 before, the criminal trial is not conducted for the purpose of creating
22 or pre-producing a white book. Certainly, it is important to understand
23 the context, but we don't have to go in detail. Bear that in mind.
24 We rise. Tomorrow morning, 9.00.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.33 p.m.,
1 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 16th day of
2 February, 2011, at 9:00 a.m.