1 Wednesday, 9 March 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
5 JUDGE MORRISON: Good morning, everybody. I ask that the next
6 witness be kept out of court for the moment to deal with two issues.
7 Mr. Tieger, thank you for your estimate of the time that you will
8 need. It seems, accordingly, that it's unlikely that we're going to get
9 through all the witnesses that are scheduled before the planned
10 adjournment. Does the OTP have a view on that?
11 MR. TIEGER: Our biggest concern, as the Court is aware, has been
12 the fixed witnesses. I think we will manage that, but I agree, we will
13 have to take on board the adjustment in schedule for other witnesses, and
14 we're looking at that at the moment.
15 JUDGE MORRISON: That's the best thing.
16 And, Mr. Robinson, I don't ask for any particular response, but
17 obviously the position of the Defence in respect of that will have to be
18 taken into account. It was the Chamber that asked for this witness to
19 be -- or the previous witness to be viva voce, and that has led to the
20 extension of time, so if there are any corresponding difficulties for the
21 Defence, no doubt you will raise them.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE MORRISON: The other thing is this, that Dr. Karadzic has
24 filed his motion for the fifth suspension of proceedings. It would be
25 very useful if the Prosecution could provide an expedited response to
1 that before the beginning of next week, i.e., before Monday, the
2 14th of March. Even if that response is not as full as it otherwise
3 might have been, at least to set out the essence of the case. Obviously
4 again for forward planning purposes. Thank you very much. Now the
5 witness can come in.
6 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. If we could just return
7 to a matter that you raised yesterday concerning General Smith's private
8 and public session. I was discussing this with Mr. --
9 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, excuse me. I'm sorry, Mr. Robinson. I
10 think this is going to raise matters that should be addressed in private
12 JUDGE MORRISON: Very well. Let's go into private session.
13 [Private session]
11 Page 13025 redacted. Private session.
24 [Open session]
25 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE MORRISON: We're back to the timing schedule we've been
2 following to date today, so we'll take a break at 10.30.
3 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, are we sitting until 1.45 or 2.30
5 JUDGE MORRISON: It's 1.45, I'm sure. Yes. Yes, 1.45.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 WITNESS: KDZ182
8 [Witness answered through interpreter]
9 JUDGE MORRISON: Good morning, Mr. Witness. Can you take the
10 solemn declaration, please.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I declare -- I solemnly declare
12 that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
13 JUDGE MORRISON: If you'd like to sit down and make yourself
15 Mr. Witness, as you will have observed, the curtains have now
16 raised, but you cannot be seen from the public gallery, and indeed you
17 cannot be seen in the -- on the video because of the image distortion,
18 and I simply caution you when you are giving your answers not to say
19 anything that might reveal your identity. Thank you.
20 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Examination by Mr. Tieger:
23 Q. And good morning, Mr. Witness.
24 MR. TIEGER: Can we begin, please, by calling up 65 ter 90238,
25 and of course that's not to be broadcast. And before I move on to this
1 document, Your Honour, perhaps in accordance with previous practice, I
2 could recognise the presence of and introduce to the Court certain
3 officials who are here today and who are seated at the portion of the
4 room to the left of the Bench.
5 Q. Witness, you see before you 65 ter 90238. Do you recognise that
6 as an amalgamated witness statement comprising information and evidence
7 that you have previously provided to this Tribunal?
8 A. Yes, indeed. This is my amalgamated statement.
9 Q. And have you had an opportunity to review that statement, and
10 does it accurately reflect the information you previously provided and
11 was that information truthful and accurate to the best of your
13 A. Yes, indeed. I had the opportunity to review this document
14 several times, and it is word-for-word the previous statements that I
15 gave to this Tribunal.
16 Q. And if asked about the same matters here in court, would you
17 provide the same information?
18 A. Yes, absolutely. I would not change anything in what I have
19 stated previously.
20 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, in accordance with 92 ter I would
21 tender 90238 for admission.
22 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
23 As Exhibit P2414, under seal, Your Honours.
24 MR. TIEGER: And I don't know when the Trial Chamber wishes to
25 address the associated exhibits, but there is one matter I would raise in
1 connection with that, and that would be that with respect to the 65 --
2 the fifth item listed on the exhibits referenced in the statement that's
3 dated 1 August 1995, which is a newspaper article referenced during the
4 course of earlier information, although we initially indicated that we
5 would not tender that for admission, largely because of the guidelines
6 referring to newspaper articles, we took another look at that and thought
7 that the nature of the discussion and basically in fairness to the
8 Defence under these circumstances it could be tendered.
9 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Robinson.
10 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, thank you, Mr. President. We welcome the
11 admission of that document and we don't object to the admission of any of
12 the other associated documents with this witness.
13 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you. Then they will all be admitted.
16 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, with the Court's leave, I would
17 read a brief summary of the -- a very brief summary of the amalgamated
19 Witness KDZ182 served with UNPROFOR in Sarajevo in late 1994 and
20 1995. The witness provided -- provides evidence that for large periods
21 of time, Sarajevo was unable to function properly due to restrictions on
22 access for humanitarian convoys and shelling and sniping attacks directed
23 at its inhabitants perpetrated by Bosnian Serb forces. Sniping incidents
24 against civilians and UNPROFOR personnel were investigated by UNPROFOR
25 personnel. They concluded that the vast majority of sniping incidents in
1 and around Sarajevo were perpetrated by Bosnian Serb forces. UNPROFOR
2 anti-sniping measures aimed at protecting the civilian population were
3 directed almost exclusively at Serb snipers.
4 Protests about attacks on civilians were made by UNPROFOR to the
5 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and in particular letters of protest were sent
6 to the commander, Dragomir Milosevic. Milosevic would either claim that
7 the Muslims fired first or would simply not respond. The treatment of
8 UN personnel taken hostage in May 1995 was also protested directly to the
9 corps commander.
10 From his own observations and according to information received
11 by the witness, General Ratko Mladic controlled the strategy in Sarajevo
12 while it was Dragomir Milosevic's job to implement this vision.
13 Colonel Indic, a liaison officer at Lukavica, acted as Mladic's eyes and
14 exerted pressure on Milosevic to ensure Mladic's vision was carried out.
15 That concludes the summary, Your Honour, and with the Court's
16 permission, I would ask the witness a number, a limited number, of
17 additional questions.
18 And if we could move first into private session.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
20 [Private session]
25 [Open session]
1 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. Witness, I wanted to ask you about a number of different areas.
4 Let me begin with this one: At page 28 of your statement, and I believe
5 in other portions as well, and I think that's both in the French and
6 English version, you refer to weapons collection points, and I wanted to
7 ask you, although I think there's some reference to that in your
8 statement, whether those weapons collection points were, in fact, points.
9 That is, were they small contained areas like a box or a single storage
10 facility or were they something else?
11 A. Yes. This admittedly is a topic which was subject of concern at
12 the time I was there. Even if the arms collection point on the Bosnian
13 side were areas which could be controlled entirely by UNPROFOR, the arms
14 collection points on the Serbian side were not closed or easily
15 identified locations. The arms, whether they be barrels or mortars, were
16 largely placed in the field, and UNPROFOR soldiers were unable to control
17 these on a permanent basis and did not know when these weapons were used,
18 because these collection points were very close to the areas where the
19 Serbian soldiers lived.
20 As I stated in my statement, the only possibility we had, more
21 often than not, was to check the hot barrel theory. Unfortunately, the
22 Serbs used these weapons to shoot. Since we were far removed from these
25 Q. And --
1 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, could we move into private session
3 [Private session]
18 [Open session]
19 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours.
24 MR. TIEGER: That is almost a bizarrely unhelpful intervention
25 once we've moved back into open session particularly.
1 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic --
2 MR. TIEGER: Can we now move into private session to address this
3 and redact that portion, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. Go into private session, please.
5 [Private session]
19 [Open session]
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
22 Q. Witness, at page 41 of your amalgamated statement, in both the
23 English and French versions, there is a discussion during which you were
24 asked about how frequently or how regularly civilians were the target of
25 Serb snipers, and you said that you could not give a precise answer but
1 indicated that 66 fires from snipers in the Serb sector were identified,
2 and also indicated that there were six incidents from the Bosnian sector
3 into Serb-held territory, although in those cases UNPROFOR -- UNPROFOR
4 was unable to verify the Serb claim that those were civilian victims
5 because there were not UNPROFOR soldiers posted in that area to confirm.
6 And, Witness, my question is: Were those identified snipings,
7 did they represent all of the sniping incidents during the period of time
8 you were there or just a portion, and if the latter, can you indicate the
10 A. The identified sniping you're talking about here are only a minor
11 quantity of the total amount of sniping incidents in Sarajevo. Why?
12 Because given the curve of the confrontation line and given the lack of
13 presence in certain areas of United Nations observers or United Nations
14 soldiers, we could only count the sniping incidents which we knew the
15 origin of. Therefore, the figures provided here are only a negligible
16 amount of the total fires targeted at the population in particular.
17 Q. And although the other incidents to which you referred were not
18 identified to UNPROFOR's satisfaction to the extent of those
19 72 incidents, that is the 66 versus 6, did you receive enough information
20 about them either individually or collectively to be able to say which
21 faction was responsible for the bulk of those incidents, or whether they
22 were equally distributed, or whether you didn't get sufficient
23 information at all?
24 A. When I say 66 versus 6, I'm talking about firing incidents, the
25 origin of which was established, verified. For the rest, there was a lot
1 of firing, but since we were not able to identify them, we did not
2 mention them in our reports. However, the general impression of the
3 people on the ground was that there was no equal distribution between the
4 firing incidents. The proportion of shootings coming from the Serb
5 faction seemed to be much higher.
6 Q. Thank you, Witness. Witness, let me ask you a couple of
7 questions about shelling attacks on the city's population by Bosnian Serb
8 forces. You refer in a number of portions of your amalgamated statement
9 to the strategy of shelling and sniping of the civilian population by the
10 Bosnian Serb forces. Let me ask you first whether you were aware of the
11 presence of military objects such as headquarters within the city of
13 A. I knew where the Bosnian corps was located in the city of
14 Sarajevo, the command of the corps.
15 Q. And when UNPROFOR forces considered, investigated, reviewed, or
16 assessed shelling of the city, did they consider the presence of either
17 the main headquarters or other headquarters or military -- other military
18 objects in determining what the object of the shelling had been?
19 A. The UNPROFOR soldiers did not have access to the staff, the
20 Main Staff, of the Bosnian corps, and when there was shelling, the only
21 places where we would go to were areas within the city, but we never had
22 access to Bosnian military targets.
23 Q. Well, let me -- I understood, and I understood that it was a
24 confusing question. Let me ask the question in this way: Bearing in
25 mind the presence of military headquarters or other military objects in
1 the city, can you tell the Court about the nature of the shelling of the
2 city that took place that led you to understand that it was the
3 population that was being targeted?
4 A. I wasn't aware of the desire of the Serbs to reach Bosnian
5 military targets in particular, but what I know is that the corps command
6 and maybe other installations as well were in the city itself and were,
7 therefore, collateral, so to speak, to the population. And even if the
8 Bosnian military targets were targeted, it -- of course, so was the
9 population, and the population was submitted to many shellings.
10 Q. Were you aware of shelling of the city -- were you aware of
11 shelling of purely residential areas, for example?
12 A. Of course. It is obvious there were areas which to my knowledge
13 and to the knowledge of UNPROFOR as a whole there was no military target,
14 those shellings aimed at the population.
15 Q. And with respect to areas of the city that were shelled, areas
16 where there were military, some or one or any military objects, what was
17 it about the nature of the shelling that indicated to you that the
18 population was being submitted to shelling as well?
19 A. The impression that UNPROFOR people had is that not only military
20 objectives were targeted, but that more generally the overall strategy of
21 Serb forces was to shell the population as well and to create a climate
22 of fear and terror within the population.
23 Q. And in areas where there were -- where there was a military
24 object or military objects, were shells concentrated on that particular
25 object or were they dispersed around the entire area? Including where
1 civilians were.
2 A. I never had the feeling that those shellings focused exclusively
3 on military targets. The shellings were dispersed, and civilians were
4 also taken as targets. I don't think it was selective shelling.
5 MR. TIEGER: If we could move into private session, please.
6 [Private session]
17 [Open session]
18 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours.
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. Witness, let me begin again, because I think that this could be
21 in open session.
22 You refer in your amalgamated statement to the anti-sniping
23 agreement and the reduction in people wounded and killed in Sniper Alley,
24 and indicate that was a demonstration of the control that the factions
25 had over the snipers. You also indicated earlier in your statement and
1 at the same page that protests to General Milosevic sometimes -- that
2 the -- as a result, the frequency of the sniping incidents diminished,
3 didn't cease but would diminish for a period. Was that another factor
4 signalling control over snipers?
5 A. Snipers who were on the ground for the Serb faction created a lot
6 of problem, and after a while an anti-sniping mechanism, so to speak, was
7 established by UNPROFOR in order to inform the snipers, the Serb snipers,
8 that if they were to shoot, they might be neutralised by UNPROFOR
9 shooters. Like I said, this mechanism reduced the activity of those
11 Those snipers were Serb shooters who were part of a military
12 organisation, and they shot according to the orders that they'd received.
13 In my opinion, the orders were that they should use any opportunity to
14 target the population and later on to target UNPROFOR soldiers.
15 Therefore, I believe that those shooters were part of an overall
16 strategy -- or, rather, within an overall tactics defined by
17 General Milosevic, and they had some freedom to target any available
19 Q. Thank you, Witness. At a number of points in your amalgamated
20 statement you make the point that it was General Mladic who was the
21 strategist and General Milosevic the technician in Sarajevo. That's
22 contained, for example, at page 16 of your amalgamated statement, and you
23 continue that General Mladic elaborated a general strategy, a strategy of
24 terror, and General Milosevic would execute it within the general
25 strategy and that his -- and then you also mention Colonel Indic, who
1 would be General Mladic's eyes to ensure that the actions taken in
2 Sarajevo were consistent with the general strategy.
3 I won't outline all the points in your statement where you
4 discuss this, but I would ask you if you could identify for the Court
5 some of the factors that brought you to this understanding of the
6 distinction between the global strategy of General Mladic and the
7 execution of that strategy by General Milosevic.
8 A. After a certain amount of months on the ground, and I realised
9 that there was an overall strategic concept which had been defined by
10 General Mladic and that the commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps,
11 General Milosevic, was using what he thought were appropriate means to
12 carry out the strategy. The strategist was Milosevic and the
13 tactician -- I'm sorry, the strategist was Mladic and the technician was
15 I give an example, a specific example, in my amalgamated
16 statement. (redacted)
23 It was a very clear example of the role attributed to these
24 various people, a good example of their attitude and reactions.
25 MR. TIEGER: And, Mr. President, if -- if we could move into
1 private session.
2 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
3 MR. TIEGER: Can I --
4 [Private session]
11 Pages 13044-13045 redacted. Private session.
14 [Open session]
15 THE REGISTRAR: Back in open session, Your Honours.
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. Witness, at several portions of your amalgamated statement you
18 indicate the nature of the hierarchy of planning and controlling
19 operations. For example, at page 11 of the English, and I believe
20 page 11 of the French as well, you state that these operations were
21 planned and carried out by Bosnian Serbs at the highest level. At
22 page 13, you say -- that's again of the English and the French, that it's
23 your view that all the incidents in Sarajevo were orchestrated, guided,
24 and designed by General Mladic, which is why he had Milosevic controlled
25 by Indic.
1 I'd like to show you a couple of documents that I don't believe
2 you've -- I have no reason to think you've seen before. The first is
3 65 ter 21880.
4 I'd like you -- what we have for 65 ter 21880 is both in English
5 and a B/C/S version. I don't know the extent of your English reading
6 comprehension skills, so let me read out -- tell you what that document
7 is and read out particular portions of it.
8 MR. TIEGER: If we could also have the English on the screen,
9 please. No.
10 THE REGISTRAR: We don't have the English uploaded as yet.
11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you to all the technical wizards.
12 Q. Witness, you can see both the English and B/C/S, and if at some
13 point it's helpful, we can enlarge any portion of that at your request.
14 This is a document from the Main Staff of the Army of
15 Republika Srpska, dated 6 November 1994, and it's -- has the time of
16 0100 hours. It says "Very urgent. To deliver immediately to President
17 of Republika Srpska for information to the SRK command, the 3rd Sarajevo
18 command, the Ilidza PBR command, and the 2nd Sarajevo PBR command."
19 And as we -- in the preamble it refers to information received
20 concerning a meeting of local authorities and the adoption of decisions
21 by them, and then on the next page we see an order.
22 And if we could turn the page of the English.
23 And as you can see from the bottom of the page, Witness, that
24 order is from General Mladic, and it says the following:
25 "I forbid all activities aimed at the blockade of UNPROFOR and
1 the seizure of heavy weapons under their control without my specific
2 order and approval.
3 "2. I forbid the planning and carrying out of any offensive
4 combat operation without the approval of the Main Staff of the
5 Republika Srpska Army or the implementation of operations planned without
6 the agreement and approval of the Main Staff.
7 "3. I forbid firing from large calibre weapons at civilian
8 targets in Sarajevo without my approval."
9 And if we could turn quickly to 65 ter 11401.
10 And this document, Mr. Witness, is a document of the
11 2nd Light Infantry Brigade, which was mentioned in the earlier order as
12 being a recipient of the Mladic order, and it says at the top:
13 "We have received a telegram from the VRS Main Staff, which we
14 copy here completely, as follows."
15 And then it provides the same order you saw previously, including
16 the forbidding of activities related to UNPROFOR, the planning of
17 offensive activities, and the forbidding of weapons of heavy calibre on
18 civilian targets in Sarajevo "without my approval," and it's the one
19 signed by General Mladic.
20 Witness, I had earlier directed your attention to portion --
21 those portions of your statement where you indicate that events,
22 incidents in Sarajevo were orchestrated and designed by General Mladic.
23 Do these documents change your view in any way, or are they consistent
24 with your view as expressed in the amalgamated statement?
25 A. These two documents, which I'm seeing for the first time,
1 corroborate the view I had initially and are tangible proof of the fact
2 that the global strategy in Sarajevo was indeed designed, controlled, and
3 supervised by General Mladic. In my view, this simply confirms what I
5 Q. Thank you, Witness.
6 MR. TIEGER: I tender these documents for admission, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Robinson.
8 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
9 JUDGE MORRISON: They will be admitted.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibits P2419 and 2420, respectively,
11 Your Honours.
12 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you.
13 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Witness. Thank you, Mr. President. That
14 concludes my examination-in-chief.
15 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you.
16 Mr. Witness, it's now Dr. Karadzic's opportunity to
18 Dr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning. Good
20 morning, Excellencies.
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
22 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, sir. As for my earlier
23 intervention, I apologise once again, because I thought we were in
24 private session.
25 Witness, sir, do you know that this meeting was held and that
1 this information that General Mladic referred to was correct? I'm
2 referring to the last document we looked at.
3 A. As I said earlier, I see this document for the first time, and I
4 did not know and I could not know that such a meeting had taken place.
5 Q. Thank you. After this document, did you encounter any other
6 document or information that would confirm that the meeting was held and
7 that this decision by the civilian authority of the Sarajevo municipality
8 was adopted?
9 In the follow-up events, did anything confirm that
10 representatives of the Sarajevo municipalities adopted this decision?
11 A. I don't quite understand what "representatives of the Sarajevo
12 municipalities" mean.
13 Q. Well, I am going to draw your attention to this: I have an
14 information that on the 5th of November, 1994, a meeting took place
15 between the local Serb leaders of the Serbian Sarajevo in Vogosca.
16 Serbian Sarajevo meaning the Sarajevo municipalities at which the
17 commander and so on and so forth was present. Did you come across any
18 document indicating that this meeting was actually held and that this
19 decision was actually adopted, or is this the only trace of that?
20 A. I see this document for the first time. I don't remember having
21 seen any other documents. I would, however, like to ask for
22 clarification. Do you talk about the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps when you
23 talk about the Serbian municipalities, or are you talking about another
25 Q. With all due respect, Witness, sir, the introduction is the most
1 important thing. General Mladic had heard that the civilian authorities
2 were interfering in military issues, so he heard, he has information and
3 is warning the military structures that they should not do that. I'm
4 asking you something else, though. Were you informed about the tensions
5 between the civilian authorities and the Serbian Army during that period?
6 A. All right. I had no knowledge whatsoever, had no information
7 whatsoever of any tension or no tension between the civilian authorities
8 and the military authorities. This was not part of my thought process.
9 Q. Thank you. Would you agree, Witness, that each side is also
10 responsible for its own civilians, meaning that it cannot conduct its
11 combat actions from an inhabited area, civilian area and in that way
12 expose the population to enemy fire. Would you agree with that?
13 A. It is quite clear that the civilian populations must not be used
14 as targets. I use this term deliberately, and the Geneva Conventions
15 prohibit this. The civilian population should not be caught up in a
16 military conflict.
17 Q. So would you agree that neither the Muslim side would be allowed
18 to violate Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council?
19 A. I would answer your question and say that the number of shelling
20 and action against the civilian population, the Muslim population, could
21 in no way be compared with shelling against the Serbian population. The
22 aggression from the Serb forces against the Muslim population was much
24 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... to answer with a yes or a
25 no. We will come to what you would like to say against the Serbs, but
1 let's look at this now. Would you agree that the Muslim side should not
2 violate Resolutions of the Security Council? Yes or no?
3 A. Neither party must breach this rule.
4 Q. Thank you. And the ban on the misuse of the exclusion zone and
5 violations of the security of the safe area would also refer to the -- or
6 apply to the Muslim side.
7 A. In the exclusion -- in the 20-kilometre exclusion zone, the
8 UNPROFOR forces controlled the area where the Bosnian forces were located
9 more specifically, and as far as I know, there were only very few mishaps
10 on their part.
11 Q. Thank you. I'm not asking you that, Witness, sir. What I'm
12 asking you is this: Does any norm or ban apply equally to each side?
13 Yes or no?
14 A. Of course. This concerned all parties.
15 Q. Thank you. Does the Muslim side then also -- is it not supposed
16 to cause unnecessary difficulties and suffering to civilians by acting in
17 the same zones?
18 A. Let me repeat what I have said already. Neither party was
19 entitled to nor could create difficulties for the population, whichever
20 it may be.
21 Q. Could we agree that neither side is permitted to attack the
22 exclusion zone or the safe area and that neither side can launch an
23 initiative from the exclusion zone or the safe zone? Yes or no?
24 A. As far as demilitarised zone is concerned, the DMZ more
25 specifically, I would like to specify that some actions were undertaken
1 to make sure that the Bosnians in that area would leave, and these were
2 actions undertaken by UNPROFOR soldiers which corroborated the totally
3 impartial position of UNPROFOR forces.
4 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... come to the demilitarised
5 zones. We will come to that. We are talking about Sarajevo now as an
6 exclusion zone, total exclusion zone, as a zone that should be treated as
7 a safe area even though it wasn't. So this is the formulation which
8 should have been treated as a safe area.
9 Can you please tell us if you know who General Nikolai is? You
10 don't have to refer to your own relationship.
11 A. Yes, I knew this general.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3377, please.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. May I ask you this --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think this could be
18 broadcast, Your Excellencies. Are there any limitations to broadcasting
20 Witness --
21 JUDGE MORRISON: One moment, Dr. Karadzic. Let me just --
22 Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: I'm not aware of any restrictions, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, it can be broadcast.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. This general is writing to General Rasim Delic on the
3 26th of April, 1995, about violations of heavy weapon violations of safe
4 areas, exclusion zones. And it says here that over the last two months,
5 an increasing number of these violations has occurred as recorded by the
7 "[In English] These reports have all been confirmed through
8 several independent sources which makes me convinced that you do not
9 observe the relevant Security Council Resolutions."
10 [Interpretation] And then a bit lower:
11 "[In English] You have also been warned that the abuse of
12 principles of safe areas in this way may cause unacceptable and great
13 risks for the civilian population in these areas."
14 [Interpretation] And somewhat lower:
15 "[In English] Therefore I demand that all heavy weapons within
16 the exclusion zone be returned to the weapon collection points and that
17 safe areas should not be abused by launching military operations from
19 [Interpretation] Did you know about this? Was this letter sent
20 to General Delic without any foundation or grounds, or were there any
21 grounds for such a strict letter?
22 A. This letter was written by General Nikolai, as you indicated
23 yourself. As regards Sarajevo, we were not made aware of the fact that
24 weapons which were collected in the Bosnian weapons collection points had
25 been extracted and used. However, many weapons from the Serb collection
1 points were used -- extracted first by the Serbs and then used for other
2 areas, other exclusion zones or for the other safe areas, I don't know.
3 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, we'll take a break now until
5 [The witness stands down]
6 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.
8 JUDGE MORRISON: I understand there's a point you wish to raise,
9 Dr. Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. For the sake of the truth and
11 for the record, I have to say this: This witness had conducted dozens of
12 interviews with various people, with various offices of the Prosecution,
13 and the product of that is his amalgamated witness [as interpreted] which
14 contains 95 pages of everything that this witness had stated. However,
15 this statement is full of generalisation, general impressions, and
16 general feelings. It has a weight of an average indictment, and it is
17 absolutely sufficient for someone to be convicted on the basis of this
18 unless everything is clarified. Whatever this witness said to the
19 detriment of both the Serbs and myself is something that we can disprove
20 through documents.
21 I have been given five hours to cross-examine this witness.
22 Five days wouldn't be enough, though, because this is a huge amount of
23 material. It's very specific, it's very arbitrary, and very dangerous.
24 Please take this into consideration, and let's find a way for the Defence
25 to be given an opportunity to discuss and shed light on every point which
1 is detrimental to the Defence.
2 Thank you.
3 JUDGE MORRISON: I take it that what you're actually doing is
4 asking for more than five hours.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Absolutely. Ninety-five pages, a
6 huge number of statements that are incorrect, and we have proof of that.
7 Whatever we have not enough time to deal with will remain as a danger for
8 conviction to be rendered. If the Defence is not given an opportunity to
9 disprove and dispute this, then how are we going to have a fair trial?
10 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, continue at the moment, Dr. Karadzic, and
11 the Chamber will consider whether or not to grant you more time in due
12 course. You will understand that the time allocation which is given
13 takes into account the assessment of the witness's evidence as the
14 Chamber sees it, and you can rest assured that if the Chamber takes the
15 view that there are material matters that you need to deal with, then
16 time is given for those. If the Chamber takes the view that there are
17 material matters -- that the matters are immaterial, those are matters
18 that you should by definition not be too concerned about, but let's
20 MR. TIEGER: I know the Court doesn't -- and I understand how the
21 Court handled it, but I'd like to make just a couple of quick points.
22 First of all, some of the material includes cross-examination
23 that took place, so very unfair to characterise it in that way.
24 Secondly, this is a repetition of what we've seen before during
25 which in the guise of requesting additional time the accused uses that
1 opportunity as a basis for broad-based claims, accusations, allegations,
2 commentary that's not appropriate, and we should continue to keep an eye
3 on it.
4 I understand the Court's view in light of the fact that these
5 kinds of requests have been made before followed by cross-examination
6 which is focused on any number of peripheral issues rather than allegedly
7 central issues, this -- the Court's intention to follow the
8 cross-examination and make any decision on this request on the basis of a
9 concrete scenario.
10 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, of course that's the essence of the trial,
11 Mr. Tieger, but there isn't unlimited time with the best will in the
12 world, and all parties, and particularly the Defence in
13 cross-examination, need to be particularly astute, to focus on those
14 matters which are actually indicted rather than broader-based material
15 that doesn't go to the core of the indictment.
16 Dr. Karadzic knows the position, and you can be assured that the
17 Judges do.
18 Let's have the witness back in, please.
19 [The witness takes the stand]
20 JUDGE MORRISON: I am sorry for the delay, Mr. Witness.
21 Dr. Karadzic, when the curtains have been raised, please
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
25 Q. Mr. Witness, you are therefore ascertaining that this letter from
1 General Nikolai was drafted not on the basis of the developments in
2 Sarajevo but elsewhere; is that correct?
3 A. It is not up to me to make a value judgement on a letter drafted
4 by General Nikolai. I don't know was -- what his state of mind was and
5 what information he had to write this letter.
6 Q. Are you trying to say that depending on one's mood, such serious
7 warnings are issued by a certain person? As I read it, there is a
8 general who is warning another general that Geneva Conventions and other
9 international covenants were in breach. How can you say that that
10 depends on one's particular state of mind and mood?
11 A. Maybe this wasn't the right word, or maybe it wasn't translated
12 appropriately. I don't know what information was at General Nikolai's
13 disposal when he wrote this letter, so I do not have any value judgement
14 on this letter, positive or negative, because I wasn't there when he
15 wrote this letter, and he did not talk to me about it.
16 Q. On the 26th of April, 1995, I believe falls within the context of
17 this cross-examination. The phrase "state of mind" was translated for me
18 as "mood." This is why I asked you this question.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document admitted
20 into evidence?
21 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1117, Your Honours.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Our position, Mr. Witness, which we are going to prove by a
25 series of documents, is that the Serbian side had no interest or reason
1 or intention whatsoever to launch any operations in Sarajevo. All our
2 operations in Sarajevo were responses to the provocations and attacks by
3 the Muslims.
4 From your responses given in the amalgamated statement and in
5 examination-in-chief, one may deduce that it was the Serbs who initiated
6 all the attacks on Sarajevo. Is that your position?
7 A. Yes. Yes, it is my position. It's correct.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3386.
10 JUDGE MORRISON: While we're waiting for that, Dr. Karadzic, the
11 last exchange is an absolutely concise example of what I meant. The
12 first from lines 22, to 36, 1, was totally unnecessary. So half your
13 time was spent on making a statement. If you extrapolate that into the
14 whole of your cross-examination, and you've wasted time accordingly, that
15 would be 2.5 out of the 5 hours gone. All you needed to do was say what
16 you said in lines 2, 3, and 4 of 36.
17 That's an exact example of the waste of time that both I and
18 other Judges have talked about.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I appreciate this, Your Excellency,
20 but in order not to refer to each and every paragraph where the witness
21 stated this, I wanted to hear from him that that was his general view
22 about the Serbs' conduct.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Now, look at this document. In your statement, Mr. Witness, you
25 said that there were two periods of intensive deterioration of the
1 situation. That's page 27 of your amalgamated statement in which you
2 cited these two periods of extremely worsening military situation in
3 Sarajevo, that is in November and October of 1994 and May to June 1995.
4 Is that correct?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. Thank you. Let's now look at this UN document dated the
7 21st of May.
8 Go to the next page, please.
9 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER: Just a very minor clarification. I think that
11 portion of the statement refers to November/December 1994, and April/May
12 1995, rather than very minor -- rather than October/November.
13 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that the witness confirmed
15 that there were periods in which the number of incidents increased. I'm
16 going to read it. It's page 27 of his consolidated statement. It reads:
17 "[In English] When I first arrived, the frequency or, rather, the
18 intensity of the incidents was fairly weak, but it increased very
19 quickly. As of late October, nearly November, it slowed down a bit over
20 the winter but stepped up again quite intensively as of April, May,
22 [Interpretation] And so on.
23 "[In English] So there are two major peaks during my tenure
24 there, November/December, and April/May."
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Witness, let's look at this page. We shall disregard
2 paragraph 2 where the Serbs are sending conciliatory messages. Let's
3 look at this portion:
4 "[In English] Heavy fighting erupts in Sarajevo. Sarajevo was
5 engulfed in heavy fighting on 16th and 17th May. More than 1.500
6 detonations were recorded around the city on May 16 and more than 1.200
7 on 17th of May. The daily average until two weeks ago was less than 20.
8 The fighting erupted in the morning of 16th of May when Bosnian forces
9 fired several mortar rounds at the main Serbian military base in
10 Lukavica, a suburb south-west of Sarajevo."
11 [Interpretation] Is this a UN document that confirms that on the
12 16th and 17th of May, the Muslim forces initiated the fighting?
13 A. In this document, as far as I can remember, it doesn't say that
14 they initiated the fighting. The document says they fired, but it does
15 not specify who had started firing. What I can say is that I was in the
16 Debelo Brdo area, and I can say that many incidents were initiated by the
18 Q. Well, Mr. Witness, the Defence cannot accept so many general
19 statements of yours. It says here:
20 "[In English] The fighting erupted in the morning of 16th of May
21 when Bosnian forces fired several mortars."
22 [Interpretation] Do you mean to say that it wasn't them who
23 started it and that it is not demonstrated in this document?
24 "[In English] Shortly after that, the Serbs began to concentrate
25 bombardment of Bosnian positions on Debelo Brdo and elsewhere."
1 [Interpretation] If you're not going to take this document into
2 account, Mr. Witness, what are we to do? It seems that you are really
3 minded to accused the Serbs.
4 A. My intention is not to accused either party. What I mean, and I
5 indicated it in my statement, is that there was a peak in the shelling, a
6 strong peak, and in my statement I do not indicate specifically who was
7 shelling. I just indicated that there was firing, and this document,
8 this document which I did not draft, provides information that I am not
9 in a position to verify or not.
10 Q. Did you receive this document at the time?
11 A. Most probably since I was one of the recipients, but I do not
12 have a clear memory today of this document.
13 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 2 reads:
14 "[In English] It seems the Serbs who were on the attack on
15 16th of May were trying to push the Bosnians off the Debelo Brdo high
17 [Interpretation] Is this what is written here and were you at
18 Debelo Brdo where the Serbs were trying to drive the Muslims away?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the document admitted
20 into evidence?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Given the intensity of the fighting
22 there, I went to see for myself what was going on. I was there at dawn
23 on the 17th, yes.
24 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger, as far as the admission of the
25 document, any objection?
1 MR. TIEGER: No, Mr. President, no.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1118, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have 1D3364.
4 MR. KARADZIC [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Witness, the first shells at Lukavica, at the barracks in
6 Lukavica, could it have been the case that you missed them and that you
7 actually didn't know who started the fire?
8 A. As I indicated in my testimony, the UNPROFOR forces counted
9 specifically all the incidents of which they knew the origin. When we
10 did not manage to know who had started it, we did not give any indication
11 as to the origin of the shooting.
12 Q. Thank you. Can I direct your attention now to a report of the
13 Secret Service of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian portion
14 thereof, from mid-May. Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ministry of Defence,
15 Security And Information Service. Now, let's look at the first sentence
16 which reads that:
17 "The attack was carried out on 16th of May at 9.00 by the BH Army
18 who fired two shells from the barrack of Bistrik towards Grbavica and at
19 the same time from the barrack prison of Ramiz Salcin, formerly Victor
20 Bubanj, towards Lukavica. The VRS fired back, and afterwards, a general
21 attack of the BH Army started on two axes." End of quote.
22 Do you agree that Grbavica is a Serbian civilian residential area
23 in Sarajevo?
24 A. I knew Lukavica. The part I knew was where Serb units were
25 located. I never actually went to the area where the population lived.
1 I went to meetings held in Lukavica in the military area.
2 Q. But you will agree about Grbavica, that that was a civilian
3 neighbourhood close to Holiday Inn; is that correct?
4 A. Are you talking about Grbavica? Indeed, Grbavica was a
5 residential area where the population lived.
6 Q. Thank you. Now look at what follows:
7 "At the same time political activities were undertaken in order
8 to involve the UN into the conflict and to provoke the activities of NATO
9 aircraft, accusing the Serbs for starting the conflict and that they are
10 opening fire against the civilian targets. In regards to the
11 aforementioned, commander of the UNPROFOR Sarajevo Sector, at a meeting
12 at 1605 with Prime Minister Silajdzic, accused the BH side for starting
13 the activities that were carried out from the populated areas and the
14 vicinity of the UN establishments in the town in order to attract the
15 Serbian artillery as well as that UN would -- will not be involved in the
16 conflict. It shall do so only in case of being under attack."
17 Did you have information about this?
18 A. When this document says so, it means that UNPROFOR soldiers were
19 able to assess the origin of the initial firing, and the person in charge
20 of that area was only saying who had fired. For the rest, I don't think
21 it was up to him. Things had to be done at a different level.
22 Q. It goes on to say:
23 "It is interesting that immediately after that statement, fire
24 was opened at the observation point of the United Nations above the
25 Jewish Cemetery and an APC of the UN with a Russian crew."
1 And then lower it says:
2 "Fire is being opened from RTV Sarajevo where the UN is located,
3 and close to the Main Staff of the UN in Djura Djakovica Street, and from
4 the former student facility on Bjelave above the Kosevo hospital, garage
5 of MUP located next to the embassy, barracks on Bistrik," et cetera,
6 et cetera.
7 Can you see the other side is informing its leadership with a --
8 by a secret document about what is happening in Sarajevo and that
9 completely proves that the Muslim side was initiating and carrying out
10 war tricks in order to accuse the Serbs and to bring the United Nations
11 into the conflict?
12 A. I believe that this document illustrates this ambiguity. Some
13 events were indeed initiated by the Bosnians. We need to remain
14 reasonable about this. But given the position of the UN forces, the
15 quasi-majority of incidents, even if some of these incidents originated
16 from the Bosnian side, most of them were initiated by the Serbs. So this
17 document specifies a fact, and this is on a one-off basis. To my mind,
18 this does not reflect a general attitude. This is how I interpret this.
19 Q. Thank you. The Defence will prove that it's the other way round,
20 that -- that there were only a few incidents from the Serbian side.
21 So we would now like to try to specify or to connect each of your
22 general statements to specify incidents.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at the next page,
24 please. I think it's the same page for the English and the Serbian
1 It states:
2 "It is our estimation that the purpose of the activities carried
3 out from the town was to provoke the VRS in order for them to open fire
4 against the UN and civil targets as well as to justify the future action
5 of lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo in front of the international
7 "On the same day, the UN initiated negotiations between the
8 parties Hajrulahovic-Tolimir at Sarajevo airport. A cease-fire was
9 arranged which was not complied with because in the morning of the
10 17th of May at 0900 hours, the sides mutually opened fire again from the
11 positions the Armija.
12 "In the evening hours an offer from Nikola Koljevic was announced
13 in which he offered a cease-fire, opening of the airport," and so on.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Do you remember that that document of the UN also talks about
16 this conciliatory offer from Professor Koljevic?
17 A. I remember the discussions. Koljevic did indeed say that it
18 would be desirable for the level of violence to come down, and he
19 explained and made proposals which we discussed, as I remember. I
20 believe this was a demonstration of the goodwill on either side.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this document?
23 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1119, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Witness, during the war did you have access to internal documents
3 of the Army of Republika Srpska and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps orders,
4 directives, and so on?
5 A. No. I had no documents coming from the Army of the
6 Republika Srpska.
7 Q. So you didn't even know precisely what the Sarajevo-Romanija
8 Corps' area of responsibility was, correct?
14 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: I think that calls -- I ask for a redaction at
16 lines 17 through 20, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. That's necessary, yes.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Can we look at the amalgamated statement. This is 2414, page 26.
20 Or I can read it. Yes, really, we're losing too much time. If all the
21 sides have the page I can read it.
22 "[In English] I knew that he had an area of responsibility that
23 encompassed Sarajevo. I did not know exactly what was the scope of the
24 area of responsibility that had been entrusted to him."
25 [Interpretation] Is that your answer?
1 A. That is indeed my answer. This is why I tried to discuss matters
2 with him, to get an understanding of the area in question, because I
3 never quite understood what it was.
4 Q. You didn't have joint documents. You didn't know what the area
5 of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of responsibility was, so on the basis of
6 sense, you came out with an assessment of what the strategic intentions
7 were of the Serbian Army and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in relation to
8 the area of Sarajevo. Based on feelings and beliefs. That was not
9 translated properly. So you reached far-reaching conclusions and made
10 different statements saying that you knew what the Serb intentions were,
11 what the Serbian strategic concept was in relation to Sarajevo.
12 A. These were not assumptions. I might ask to move into private
14 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, that's necessary.
15 [Private session]
11 [Open session]
12 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't have to broadcast. Can I
14 ask the parties to look at page 54 of the amalgamated statement, in the
15 middle. I am not going to begin from the beginning.
16 "[In English] ... Did you either observe or receive the
17 information regarding the existence or otherwise of co-ordination between
18 SRK units who were engaged in attacking the civilian population?"
19 [Interpretation] The answer is:
20 "[In English] I haven't had such information. I only had a
21 feeling and an impression."
22 Q. [Interpretation] What is confusing me, Witness, sir, is your
23 readiness to believe. And belief actually depends completely on our
24 willingness to believe something or not. However, the Defence must show
25 what you knew without any reasonable doubt, and we need to get that and
1 not conclusions, actually not your feelings or impressions.
2 Please look at what you said on page 24 at the top. Question
4 "[In English] With regard to your view of Milosevic, you believed
5 that Milosevic was a straw man; correct?"
6 Not "strange," "straw."
7 "I had the feeling that he didn't control the whole situation."
8 [Interpretation] And we are dealing with an impression of yours;
9 isn't that right?
10 A. I wish to move into private session.
11 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
12 [Private session]
11 Pages 13071-13072 redacted. Private session.
19 [Open session]
20 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am not sure that my next question
22 should be in open session.
23 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, that's why -- my question was
24 misinterpreted as a direction. That's why I prefaced it with "can we."
25 It should have been "may we." Very well. Let's go back into closed
2 [Private session]
16 [Open session]
14 MR. TIEGER: I trust that the reason for my being on my feet is
15 clear. I would ask for redactions and i think if we are going to go into
16 this aspect of discussion, we will probably need to be private session.
17 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, that occurred to me. Certainly we'll need
18 to redact portions of this.
19 Dr. Karadzic, although it's preferable to be in public session, I
20 think Mr. Tieger's right. If this line of cross-examination continues in
21 this way, it's probably inevitable that we'll have to go back into
22 private session.
23 [Private session]
11 Page 13077 redacted. Private session.
15 [Open session]
16 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Did you know anything about my participation, my influence, and
20 my role in military matters?
21 A. As regard your participation, your influence, and your role, I
22 had no knowledge of it.
23 Q. Thank you. Let's see what other conclusions you drew based on
24 feelings and assumptions. Now, can you please look at page 30 of your
25 amalgamated statement, the last paragraph -- or the penultimate
1 paragraph, rather. Question:
2 "[In English] Did events elsewhere in Bosnia appear to have any
3 effect on events in Sarajevo?"
4 [Interpretation] The answer:
5 "[In English] I had the feeling that when actions would take
6 place in Krajina or the enclaves, the pressure on Sarajevo would go
8 [Interpretation] And further on:
9 "[In English] I am not sure."
10 [Interpretation] Was this your answer?
11 A. Yes, this is my answer.
12 Q. Here we heard evidence from other witnesses based on their
13 feelings and recollections that were contrary, that if there was fighting
14 elsewhere the fighting in Sarajevo intensified as well, but it seems that
15 you are not sure --
16 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, you know very well that's improper
17 and inappropriate, and it's no more -- no more than a comment.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise, and I withdraw my
19 comment. I withdraw it.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Please look at paragraph 2 on page 33. Question:
22 "[In English] Was General Milosevic, for example, aware that
23 these sorts of things were being reported in the media?"
24 [Interpretation] Answer:
25 "[In English] He must have known, but it was just an assumption.
1 He never talked to me about it."
2 [Interpretation] Is this another conclusion which is based on the
3 assumptions? Is that correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at page 22 of your statement,
6 paragraph 4. The Judge asked you with regarding to sniping activities.
7 "[In English] ... The sniping as such and the frequency of
8 sniping was something that was authorised and ordered by the accused?"
9 [Interpretation] Answer:
10 "[In English] In my opinion, yes, indeed, that is correct. As
11 far as the shelling is concerned, when he had artillery means available,
12 yes, but it is possible - and I don't have this kind of information -
13 that reinforcements were given by his superiors to increase the strength
14 of the shelling of the town. But the SRK did have within its means
15 indirect artillery," and so on and so on.
16 [Interpretation] So you had no information about this, but,
17 nevertheless, you made your own conclusions somehow; is that correct?
18 MR. TIEGER: Well, I think that needs to be parsed out. There's
19 a reference to this kind of information within the body of the answer
20 that was quoted, but it's a reference to something particular in there.
21 So if Dr. Karadzic is going to ask the witness about that, he should do
22 so rather than attempt to embrace it or have it encompassed in the -- the
23 earlier answer the witness gave.
24 JUDGE MORRISON: Yeah. Can you reformulate your question,
25 Dr. Karadzic.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. With regard to sniping and shelling, did you have any information
3 and proof, or did you arrive at your conclusions in a different manner?
4 A. With regard to sniping, sniping activities, I indicated in my
5 testimony that we had taken into account all the sniping activities of
6 which we knew where they were coming from. As regards shelling, given
7 what I knew, what we all knew, about the artillery units of the
8 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, a brief analysis was enough to show that it was
9 possible to intensify the shelling by some artillery equipment assigned
10 to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
11 Q. Mr. Witness, the sniping and shelling incidents about which you
12 drew conclusions that they had come from the Serbian side, were any
13 proper criminal investigations carried out with respect to these
15 A. Every time there was a sniping incident or shelling, several
16 actions were taken. First of all, UN observers reported about this to
17 the relevant authorities. The UNPROFOR units were tasked to report,
18 analyse, and to define, using military procedures, where the shelling had
19 come from. In these analyses or procedures, they had to analyse the
20 impact, the trajectory of the shells, the verification by experts on how
21 weapons had been used. Once all this had been done, all the information
22 acquired were analysed by experts in various areas, trajectories,
23 artillery equipment. Then they would draft the report, and it's only
24 when there was some level of convergence between all the conclusions that
25 we would indicate what the origin of the sniping or the shelling was.
1 Q. Mr. Witness, can we get these investigation reports and materials
2 that served as a basis for the conclusions?
3 A. I don't know where those documents were ultimately sent to. They
4 belonged to UNPROFOR. Where are they now? Well, they're most probably
5 in the archives of UNPROFOR. I don't think that those documents were
6 kept by the military personnel. Military personnel do not keep
7 documents, whatever their position or their grade. They do not keep with
8 themselves documents relating to actions, orders, investigations.
9 Everything is sent to the organisation under which that particular person
10 was working.
11 Q. Thank you. I don't know if we have to go to private session.
12 This concerns a battalion that was deployed in the city of Sarajevo and
13 that was acting as a source of information. I believe we will have to go
14 into private session for a short period of time.
15 JUDGE MORRISON: So be it. We'll go into private session.
16 [Private session]
11 Pages 13083-13087 redacted. Private session.
21 [Open session]
22 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. This is P2417 or D2982. Would you kindly look at this article,
25 and can you look at the first part of it, paragraph 3, where it says that
1 this officer said:
2 "[In English] We find it almost impossible to believe, but we are
3 sure that it is true."
4 [Interpretation] Here it has been confirmed to this journalist
5 that the Muslims fired at their own civilians. Yes or no?
6 A. [No interpretation]. [Interpretation] ... media.
7 JUDGE MORRISON: I think there was a substantial gap in the
8 interpretation there, which was very useful in testing my French, but I
9 don't think is otherwise going to assist.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. But you say now that you don't agree entirely with the
12 conclusions from this article. Can we now go with yes and no answers. I
13 really lose too much time if I put too long questions and you give me
14 answers that are too long.
15 Do you agree with what is being alleged in this article?
16 A. I don't have to agree or disagree with an article. You are
17 telling me that I'm providing long answers, but I don't have to answer
18 that I agree with a journalist or that I disagree with journalist. I am
19 not at the same level as a journalist.
20 Q. Thank you. Can we then look at page 43 of your amalgamated
21 statement where you completely agree. You say:
22 "Yes, yes. [In English] Absolutely so. I agree with this
24 [Interpretation] A little bit lower, towards the end of that
25 page, you say:
1 "[In English] Yes, that is accurate. The statement is
3 A. Please place it on the screen.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 43 of the amalgamated
5 statement. 1D2982. Actually, it's P2141; right?
6 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: Yes. I mean, the accused is certainly entitled to
8 ask whatever questions he may wish arising from information in the
9 article, but as I understand the examination right now, the original
10 question was focused on whether or not the witness agreed with the
11 article. Now he's taken to portions of his statement that are clearly
12 focused on particular information in the article and that is being used
13 to -- allegedly to contradict his assertion with regard to the article in
14 its entirety. So I think a little more focus would be much more fair to
15 the witness and much more illuminating, ultimately, to the Court.
16 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, that must be right. And bear in
17 mind unless an article in a newspaper is adopted by the witness, the
18 simple fact that it's written in an article is of little moment.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will do my best.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Let's look at what is in this question. It is stated here that
22 it is said in the article that a definite investigation established --
23 the French marine unit that -- that was patrolling against sniper action,
24 said that they had established that the fire had come from a building
25 that was held by Bosnian soldiers, soldiers of the Army of Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina and their security forces. And then here is the question:
2 "[In English] Is that what the results were of the investigation
3 that you were involved in concerning a building somewhere around
4 June 8th?"
5 [Interpretation] The answer is:
6 "[In English] Yes, exactly.
7 [Interpretation] And then it says:
8 "[In English] This is exactly what my soldiers said. When their
9 report reached me I just said, Is this an impression of yours? Are you
10 absolutely concern that the fire originated from the Bosnians, and they
11 answered that it was very likely that it came from their place."
12 [Interpretation] Witness, sir, is it correct that you did not
13 accept their impressions but that you were seeking absolute certainty in
14 their answers?
15 A. That is quite correct, and if you read the rest of the statement,
16 I would like to specify that given the way in which the questions were
17 phrased, two incidents had been mixed up, and the statements also
18 specifies that the incident you are currently talking about led to a very
19 fine-tuned analysis and came to the conclusion that this was a real
20 question mark. But as far as another incident was concerned, we were a
21 hundred per cent sure, and this is something which I stated in my
23 Q. Although you assert that the Serbs terrorised the civilian
24 population in Sarajevo by snipers, you say that you didn't have any
25 information about that, and this conclusion of yours boils down to pure
1 speculation, which you did not permit your soldiers, however; is that
3 MR. TIEGER: Okay. I -- okay. I don't think the witness needs
4 my help. I'll let him answer. But that's extremely -- it's a question
5 that assumes facts not in evidence, it's argument, and -- but I'm sure
6 the witness is capable of dealing with it.
7 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. Mr. Witness, if you can, please.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When you live in a town where
9 people are being killed and people are being injured and your soldiers
10 likewise, you try to understand how all this has happened, and a
11 succession of facts lead you to believe -- analysis reports also,
12 question marks and questions put to the military lead you to believe that
13 there is a convergence of actions coming into play and that beyond all
14 forms of assumptions one reaches the conclusion that the civilian
15 population is the target of an aggression on the Serb side. I think we
16 have demonstrated our impartiality, and as far as I'm concerned, I didn't
17 think we ever engaged in an unverified conclusion.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As for Mr. Tieger's objection, in
19 my previous question, the witness confirmed that he did not accept
20 impressions from his soldiers but that he asked them to be sure. That
21 was the link in my next question.
22 Q. But, Witness, sir, when you say something, do you say that you're
23 absolutely sure of it? Do you state only something that you know for
24 sure, or do you express impressions and beliefs to a large part?
25 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, Dr. Karadzic, that's an extraordinarily
1 broad question, and I suspect it stems in part from your qualifications
2 in psychiatry, but it's a very difficult question for a witness to
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Let me then try to rephrase that. Can you state with certainty
7 that Serbs terrorised the citizens of Sarajevo by sniper fire in an
8 organised manner, that this was a plan and this was a planned activity?
9 With certainty.
10 A. I can state it with certainty. However, I cannot say at what
11 level this was all being planned, which is what I said in my statement.
12 I said that such an action launched against Sarajevo, which was not a
13 neutral area in media terms, could not be designed by locals only.
14 Therefore, these acts of terror were well-thought-out and deliberate
16 But as far as the implementation of these actions are concerned,
17 which refers to the facts in this case, I stated what the origin of fire
18 was only when I was sure who the initiator of the fire was. At the
19 conclusion of -- after conclusions had been reached on the basis of the
20 analysis that had been conducted, I would like to repeat, there was a
21 desire to spread terror among the population, that this materialised on
22 the ground, but that we only drew our conclusions on the basis of these
23 actions when we were a hundred per cent sure. In my view, the aggression
24 was much greater on the Serb side than it was on the Bosnian side.
25 Q. We will come to that topic. Can I please draw your attention to
1 page 45 of your amalgamated statement. It's at the top of the page. You
3 "[In English] Although I am not certain, I believe that the
4 snipers did not operate in a random manner. Their operation was
5 perfectly co-ordinated."
6 [Interpretation] But you are not sure, and you believe things in
7 relation to that. You don't have reliable knowledge.
8 "Although I'm not certain" is not in the transcript.
9 "[In English] Although I am not certain, I believe that the
10 snipers did not operate in a random manner."
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: When the accused switches
12 from language to language, a lot of the text is not by the transcript.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. So this sentence of yours indicates that you do not have
15 information or knowledge but you have firm beliefs; is that correct?
16 A. This is an internal problem, i.e., the freedom of the sniper to
17 seize an opportunity when the decision is taken by a superior command.
18 In this particular case, the snipers were capable of targeting or
19 shooting at the targets they discovered as part of an overall strategy
20 aiming at the population.
21 Q. My question, Witness, sir, relates to the fact that you were not
22 sure of that, but you believed it, nothing more than that.
23 A. Term "certainty" and the term "belief" are not assessment --
24 assessments which are based on hot air. When an analysis is conducted in
25 a clear fashion, a number of conclusions are drawn, we could not imagine
1 that isolated actions were undertaken. We believe that there was an
2 overall scheme behind this and this is what I mean. In other words,
3 those people implementing these sniping actions were applying on the
4 ground an intention that stemmed from the military authority.
5 Q. But you don't have proof of that; correct?
6 A. The sole proof I have is the consequence of a series of shots.
7 Soldiers or the population were either killed or injured.
8 Q. Thank you. I would now like to draw your attention to the crisis
9 relating to the demilitarised zone in Igman. You asserted - this is,
10 let's say, on page 58 of your amalgamated statement - that there was a
11 conflict of the two armies in the demilitarised zone on the -- after
12 which the Serbs retaliated against the civilians in the city of Sarajevo.
13 Yes or no?
14 A. The incident you are referring to is an incident which took place
15 on Mount Igman, where soldiers and Serb military personnel had been
16 killed by Bosnians. This is something which I have stated very clearly.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3381, please.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. And while we're waiting, Witness, sir, do you know who handed the
20 demilitarised zone over to UNPROFOR? Do you agree that in 1993, the
21 Serbs handed over their territory, the territory that they held, to
22 UNPROFOR for UNPROFOR to control?
23 A. That is quite right.
24 Q. Can we look at this document now. In your statement, you claim
25 that Serb soldiers who were killed were in the southern part of the
1 demilitarised zone, and the Muslim army was located in the northern part
2 of the demilitarised zone; is that correct?
3 A. Yes, that's right.
4 Q. And I claim, Witness, sir, that the Serbs were outside of the
5 DMZ, south of the DMZ, and that that was a post of the military medical
6 service, four of whom were women, nurses, and that they -- their throats
7 had been cut when the -- the Muslim army passed through the demilitarised
8 zone, which was under the control of UNPROFOR. Is that correct?
9 A. That is correct, and that is why I gave orders or orders were
10 given to pursue the Muslims, and we launched an operation to try and
11 retrieve them. This is what is written in my statement.
12 Q. Thank you. And the medical personnel, were they subject to the
13 protections of the Geneva Conventions?
14 A. This is something I have said in my statement. Any medical staff
15 in whatever army is protected by the Geneva Conventions, and that is one
16 of the reasons why we launched this operation to try and retrieve or find
17 these people who had committed this action.
18 Q. Thank you. Can you look at this report by the Agence France
19 Presse which describes this event. The dispatch is dated the
20 13th of October, and you can look at the information where a certain
21 Mr. Spicer is being quoted, and other officers of the United Nations.
22 And in the third from the bottom, it says:
23 "[In English] Bosnians had said they were too busy with the
24 clashes near Orlovo, north of Sarajevo, to attend to inspections ..."
25 [Interpretation] Thus, in our opinion, Witness, sir, this is not
1 a conflict of the two armies. This is a massacre of medical staff that
2 is subject to the protections of the Geneva Conventions and the massacre
3 carried out on the territory which we had handed over to you for your
4 control. Is that correct?
5 A. Let me repeat what I have already said. This action was
6 undertaken by the Bosnian forces. We did not accept it, and what the
7 journalist says is his responsibility, but we made sure that this
8 dramatic event was followed by consequences. Unfortunately, we were
9 unable to find the perpetrators of this act.
10 Q. Witness, with all due respect, the journalist quotes Mr. Spicer
11 and others. So this is not something that he's saying. He's quoting the
12 journalists. Can you see that these are quotation marks, quotation
13 marks. And this is a French agency, AFP.
14 A. Well, in this case it's not because it's a French agency that I
15 must take for granted what this journalist Mr. Spicer says. I don't know
16 exactly who this gentleman was.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Tender this document.
18 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Can we look at this page, what Spicer says. Spicer said:
21 "[In English] Sarajevo Sector commander had strongly protested a
22 Bosnian decision to pull out of a planned inspection of DMZ by senior UN
23 Bosnian and Serb generals to ensure that the zone was being respected by
24 both sides."
25 [Interpretation] Spicer said that UNPROFOR officers and UNPROFOR
1 commanders were protesting because the Muslim side was not willing to
2 participate in the investigation. According to your knowledge, was any
3 investigation launched?
4 A. The protest was very clear. What the journalist says is
5 something else. There was a very firm protest on the UNPROFOR side. The
6 investigation conducted by the UN forces enabled us to understand that
7 this had been done by the Bosnian forces. And let me repeat: We were
8 unable, despite a large operation launched by the UN, to find those
9 people that had committed this act.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this?
12 [Prosecution counsel confer]
13 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER: I don't -- I've been looking for the document in my
15 printouts. Is this one page? Is it the page we've been looking at?
16 JUDGE MORRISON: It's more than that.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
18 MR. TIEGER: Well, if I can reserve my position. Just give me a
19 moment to look at the entirety of the document.
20 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, in the meantime, can you continue,
21 Mr. Karadzic.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. You also claimed on this basis that two armies clashed there. On
24 page 57 of your statement, you say:
25 "[In English] The Serbs reacted a few days later by shelling and
1 firing into the city, about which I issued a written protest on
2 October the 10th."
3 A. Yes, that is correct.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D2466. 1D2466.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Can we agree that this is a telegram sent by Ambassador Akashi,
7 sent to Kofi Annan from Zagreb UNPROFOR HQ, on the 19th of October? Is
8 that correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Here in paragraph 1, Mr. Akashi says that on the 6th of October,
11 he had problems relating to the withdrawal from Mount Igman and the
12 problems caused by Brigadier Fikret, probably Prevljak."
13 Can we now look at the next page. Everybody can read this, and I
14 think it will be beneficial.
15 Now, look at paragraph 4.
16 "[In English] In spite of UNPROFOR's immediate protests on such
17 violations of the August 1993 agreement, the BiH did not cease their
18 activities on Igman. In fact, these increased with the use of the
19 demilitarised zone to launch attacks on the BSA, including the one of
20 6th of October which resulted in a BSA command post being wiped out with
21 threats of retaliation from the Bosnian Serb side. We have so far been
22 able to contain the Serb side from any precipitate action by our own
23 intervention through Operation Igman ..." and so on.
24 [Interpretation] How come that the boss the whole presence of the
25 United Nations in the Balkans, of course including Bosnia-Herzegovina,
1 did not mention any retaliation on the 19th of October? Quite the
2 contrary. He is saying that the Serbs had refrained from any retaliation
3 as a response to an intervention from the UN.
4 A. I believe you should ask him why he doesn't mention it in the
5 cable. Allow me an observation though. These violations of the DMZ was
6 one of my main concerns, and I will add that they were military actions
7 in October, at the end of October, to make sure that the Bosnian forces
8 leave the demilitarised zone. And it is a French UNPROFOR unit which
9 carried out a military operation in order to oust Fikret's units which
10 were located in Kupak [as interpreted].
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. Witness, my question is this: Why isn't there any trace that
14 the Serbs carried out retaliation? Quite the contrary. (redacted)
25 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER: First of all, confirm my understanding we're not in
2 private session, and if so, I will be seeking some redactions and I'll
3 identify those for the Court in a moment --
4 JUDGE MORRISON: I was going to raise that issue.
5 MR. TIEGER: And I just -- then I rose because I thought if we
6 continued, we should address that.
7 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. There are matters which I think need to be
8 considered for redaction because they are routes to identification. But
9 that can be done in a moment.
10 We've got about ten minutes left for today, Dr. Karadzic, if you
11 want to assess your remainder of your cross-examination on that basis.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. It is written here that the UN protest was issued on the
15 10th of October. Are you trying to say that this retaliation took place
16 before the 10th of October?
17 A. I'm not sure I understand your question.
18 Q. In your statement, you say -- in your statement, you say,
19 page 57, towards the bottom:
20 "[In English] The Serbs reacted a few days later by shelling and
21 firing into the city, about which I issued a written protest on the
22 10th of October.
23 A. Yes. I protested on the 10th of October.
24 Q. [Interpretation] However, in another place you say that after the
25 meeting with Mladic on Jahorina on the 10th of October, that this
1 retaliation took place after that meeting.
2 A. I do not know the specific date. I do remember the date of the
3 meeting which took place on the 10th of October in Jahorina. When the
4 retaliation took place, I'm not able to provide a specific date.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3379.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. I'm sure you will agree that it happened before the 13th or the
9 19th of October. Is that correct?
10 Mr. Witness, we saw the first text of the 13th of October. Now
11 we see that the same news agency has printed an article on the
12 31st of October, and Akashi sent his report on the 19th, and in none of
13 these documents is there any reference to the retaliation that you are
14 mentioning. And it says here that the Bosnian government forces opened
15 fire at the UN aeroplane operating in and out of Sarajevo airport Monday.
16 And then it goes on to say:
17 "[In English] Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Labarsouque said shots
18 were fired by the Muslim soldiers on the Butmir side of the airport at
19 the foot of Mount Igman."
20 [Interpretation] A little bit down.
21 "[In English] Earlier in the day, an Ilyushin transport plane was
22 hit by a stray bullet while on the tarmac. The reason for the firing was
23 not known, but some hardline Muslim soldiers, based near Butmir, have
24 objected to efforts by the UN to force them out of the -- of a
25 demilitarised zone on Mount Igman. A tentative agreement on their
1 withdrawal was reached Monday by UN Sector Sarajevo ..." and so on.
2 [Interpretation] What was this Ilyushin plane carrying?
3 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt, but while the
4 accused paused, I thought I would rise for the suggested redactions,
5 which would be 75 -- page 75, lines 23 through 24; page 76, lines 4
6 through 5, and line 7.
7 JUDGE MORRISON: All right. Some of that is in hand, but I would
8 agree with it.
9 Sorry to interrupt, Mr. Witness. Can you answer the question?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, very simply, I am not in a
11 position to tell you what was in the Ilyushin, and I believe that I was
12 never aware of what that plane was -- was carrying. It was up to the
13 persons in charge of logistics. It was probably goods, but I'm not sure.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Humanitarian aid, I presume, because that was the most frequent
17 A. It could have been humanitarian aid. It could have been
18 equipment needed by UNPROFOR for its own operations, and perhaps also for
19 soldiers more generally. I don't know. I don't know.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document admitted
22 into evidence? I believe we have time for only one more.
23 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. That's been confirmed that there was such
24 an incident. It can be admitted. And one last question then,
25 Dr. Karadzic.
1 There was another document, Mr. Tieger, that you were considering
2 the admission of, the agency report, I think.
3 MR. TIEGER: I haven't had it -- I see it wasn't on the list of
4 documents we have, but I'm not going to object to that, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE MORRISON: So be it. Then that will be admitted as well.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. 1D3381 will be Exhibit D1120.
7 And 1D3379 will be Exhibit D1121.
8 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you.
9 Dr. Karadzic, I think we've got to leave it there. I think it is
10 now quarter to.
11 Are there any other matters that we need to deal with before we
12 rise today?
13 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I received some -- I think, in response
14 to the Court's earlier inquiry about completion of witnesses and so on,
15 expressing some concern about even completing the witness who's
16 currently -- whose testimony has been interrupted. The suggestion and
17 some concern about the inability to complete that testimony before the --
18 the end of next week, before the adjournment. The one suggestion was
19 extra sitting time, and one suggestion was indeed extra sitting time
20 after the Seselj Chamber. I think that may come late in the day, but I'm
21 happy -- I want to alert the Court to the fact that that's being looked
22 into. If the Court considers that we should continue to focus on those
23 calculations and even consider the possibility of extra sessions during
24 the course of this week, even today, I'll be happy to liaise with the
25 Court Officer and let them know where we are. That would mean, of
1 course, everyone needs to stay in contact if there's any possibility of
2 today. I'm not sure that's fair at this point, but I wanted to give full
3 transparency to give the Court the benefit of the information I've been
5 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. No, it wouldn't be
6 possible today, but if you could deal with this by e-mail, I think that's
7 probably the answer.
8 Mr. Witness, thank you very much for your attendance today. I'm
9 sorry that there have been some delays, and we will sit again at
10 9.00 tomorrow morning. Thank you.
11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
12 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 10th day
13 of March, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.