1 Tuesday, 15 March 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Good morning, Mr. Banbury. If you could take the solemn
8 declaration, please.
9 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
10 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
11 WITNESS: ANTHONY BANBURY
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, sir. Please make yourself comfortable.
13 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Good morning, Mr. President, members of the
15 Trial Chamber.
16 I would just like to introduce one of our legal interns who is
17 with us this morning. Her name is Julia Kretzenbacher, and she's from
18 Melbourne University. Thank you.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 Good morning, Ms. Edgerton.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Good morning, Your Honour.
22 Examination by Ms. Edgerton:
23 Q. Good morning, Mr. Banbury. Could you actually state your full
24 name for us, please.
25 A. Anthony Nathan Banbury.
1 Q. Now, Mr. Banbury, in 1997 you gave a statement to representatives
2 of the Office of the Prosecutor here at this Tribunal on your
3 observations and your experiences while you served with the
4 United Nations as part of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia; correct?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. And in 2009, do you recall meeting me, together with a colleague
7 of mine, and giving a further statement incorporating, clarifying and
8 augmenting that statement from 1997?
9 A. Yes, I recall that.
10 Q. And that 2009 statement referred to a number of documents that
11 weren't available at the time the first statement was recorded; is that
12 not the case?
13 A. Yes, that's the case.
14 Q. And have you looked at that 2009 statement, as well as those
15 documents, in preparation for your testimony here today?
16 A. Yes, I have.
17 Q. Do you have any corrections or further clarifications you wanted
18 to make as a result of that review?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Now, if I was to ask you the same questions today as those that
21 gave rise to the evidence set out in the 2009 statement, would you give
22 the same answers?
23 A. Yes, materially, the answers would be the same.
24 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, the 2009 statement is 65 ter 22657.
25 Could that be marked as a Prosecution exhibit, please?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2451, Your Honours.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. I'll now read a summary of the written
4 evidence in P2451.
5 Anthony Banbury served with the United Nations in the former
6 Yugoslavia from April 1994 until the end of the conflict. He was first a
7 Civil Affairs officer in UNPROFOR Headquarters Sarajevo until 1 May 1995.
8 Then he worked as an assistant to the Special Representative of the
9 Secretary-General, Mr. Yasushi Akashi. In both roles, Mr. Banbury
10 attended meetings with leaders of the warring factions and drafted
11 reports, cables, letters and other correspondence on behalf of his
13 Mr. Banbury states that the population in Sarajevo suffered
14 because of a constant campaign of shelling and sniping that was directed
15 at civilians. He observed that:
16 "The weaponry employed, particularly mortars and sniping, meant
17 that no matter where you lived, as soon as you stepped outside, you could
18 be killed at any moment."
19 From attending frequent meetings with the Bosnian Serb
20 leadership, Mr. Banbury observed that they were able to modulate
21 conditions in Sarajevo by controlling the supply of utilities, the
22 freedom of movement, and the level of shelling and sniping, among other
24 In April 1995, for example, the accused, Dr. Karadzic, announced
25 that he had closed the airport in Sarajevo to "show the world who was in
1 control of the airport."
2 Mr. Banbury states that in meetings attended by the Bosnian Serb
3 leadership, the accused was clearly in control, and he was alone in
4 straddling both the political and military spheres of the leadership. He
5 demonstrated his control by negotiating and entering into agreements on a
6 range of matters.
7 On occasion, the accused expressed concern about being dominated
8 by the Muslims in Bosnia. At a dinner in April 1995, he said that Serbs
9 had lived with Muslims for 500 years and, quote:
10 "... no more. The same in Cyprus and India. Hindus were very
11 tolerant, but they can't live with Muslims."
12 The accused was frequently provided with notice of crimes being
13 committed by Serb forces during the course of meetings with UN
14 representatives. For example, at the same dinner in April, the force
15 commander, General Janvier, complained to Dr. Karadzic that Serb forces
16 targeted civilian targets. The accused joked in reply that:
17 "Maybe some of our gunners have bad eyes."
18 That's the end of the summary, Your Honours.
19 Q. Now, Mr. Banbury, before we go into some more detail about your
20 written evidence that's just been filed, I'd like to ask you a couple of
21 questions about your personal background, and that's at paragraphs 2 to 4
22 of your 2009 statement.
23 And my first question is: Your work with UNPROFOR wasn't
24 actually your first job with the United Nations, was it?
25 A. No. I had worked in three previous capacities for the
1 United Nations.
2 Q. And what were those?
3 A. I served for approximately two years as a human rights protection
4 officer, working in refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodian border for the
5 United Nations border relief operation. That was 1988 to 1990. I served
6 as a human rights officer in the United Nations peacekeeping operation in
7 Cambodia from 1992 to 1993, about a year and a half. And I served
8 briefly in the UN OAS, Organisation of American States, joint mission in
9 Haiti as a human rights officer.
10 Q. Now, since giving this statement that you gave in 2009, when you
11 served as the World Food Programme's regional director for Asia, you've
12 actually since returned to the United Nations, haven't you?
13 A. Well, the World Food Programme technically is a part of the
14 United Nations, but I've moved to -- I've returned to the United Nations
15 headquarters in a new job, yes.
16 Q. And what's that new job?
17 A. Right now, I am serving as the United Nations assistant
18 secretary-general for field support. That is a department that provides
19 all the operational and logistic support to UN peacekeeping missions and
20 special political missions around the world.
21 Q. Thank you. Now, to jump back again to your time with UNPROFOR, I
22 wonder if you could outline for us what your main tasks were, first
23 working with Civil Affairs and then working for Mr. Akashi.
24 A. I was deployed to Sarajevo at the very beginning of April 1994;
25 April 9th, I believe. And normally Civil Affairs officers, when they are
1 first in the mission, would be deployed to a small town somewhere or a
2 city to serve in a regional capacity, but the head of the UN civilian
3 operation in Bosnia, UNPROFOR civilian operation, Mr. Andreev, decided to
4 attach me to his immediate staff and serve essentially as a political
5 officer for him, together with mainly one other person. And in that
6 role, I -- I was essentially an assistant or political advisor to the
7 head civilian of UNPROFOR. I attended meetings with him with the
8 different parties to the conflict, with representatives of member states
9 who would visit, ministers, ambassadors, et cetera. I routinely prepared
10 him for the meetings and then routinely wrote a summary of the different
11 meetings; normally, a factual accounting of the main points that were
12 discussed in the meetings, the main positions of the different sides.
13 And then, normally, some kind of assessment or analysis at the end of the
14 report so that our superiors in Zagreb and New York would have not just
15 an accounting of what had transpired in the meeting, but our best
16 assessment of the significance of that particular meeting.
17 Q. Did that function change when you moved to work for Mr. Akashi?
18 A. Yes. In my role in Bosnia, I was limited just to working on
19 Bosnia issues. I regularly met with the -- or together with Mr. Andreev,
20 my boss, we'd meet with heads of the different parties to the conflict,
21 but only in Bosnia, the Bosnian parties. When I moved to Zagreb in
22 May 1995, May 1, 1995, I became special assistant to Mr. Akashi, and in
23 that role the function was very similar, but it incorporated the entire
24 territory where UNPROFOR was working, so also quite a lot of
25 responsibilities in Zagreb and Belgrade.
1 Q. Now, when you say you met with the heads of the different parties
2 to the conflict, first of all, in Bosnia, who were these people, who were
3 Mr. Andreev's interlocutors during these meetings?
4 A. President Izetbegovic, Mr. Silajdzic, Mr. Muratovic, Mr. Ganic,
5 on the Bosnian Government side. On the Bosnian Serb side, Mr. Andreev
6 and I routinely met with Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, Professor Koljevic,
7 General Mladic, General Gvero, General Tolimir. Those were our main
8 interlocutors, and then also some on the Bosnian Croat side.
9 Q. And when you moved then to meet with Mr. -- or to work with
10 Mr. Akashi, did you continue to meet with these interlocutors on the
11 Bosnian and Bosnian Serb sides?
12 A. Yes, I did, though not as frequently because I was based in
13 Zagreb instead of Sarajevo. So I would only meet with them when
14 Mr. Akashi would travel. In the past, it was -- the meetings were very
15 frequent. They were less frequent with Mr. Akashi. But then I was also
16 meeting with President Tudjman, President Milosevic, and some of their
17 senior officials.
18 Q. Now, in addition to the meetings you had with these
19 interlocutors, what other sources of information did you rely on in
20 preparing your superiors for the meetings, in preparing your assessments,
21 your analyses? What did you have available to you, and what did you rely
23 A. Well, my superiors would also frequently meet with officials of
24 member states of the United Nations, either resident ambassadors or
25 visiting ministers. There were very often high-level visits from key
1 member states. And those discussions inevitably were quite political and
2 gave an indication of where that particular member state stood or how
3 they saw the conflict or the UN role. In addition, we had a service in
4 UNPROFOR in Sarajevo that listened to or collected information from all
5 the local media from the different parties, translated it, and provided
6 that assessment to us or a summary to us. The local media was a hugely
7 important source of information for us, both factual information, what
8 was happening in different parts of the country, but also more giving us
9 a sense of the political aims of the parties, where they saw the conflict
10 headed, how they saw their role, how they saw the role of the other
11 parties to the conflict. And we lived this war day in and day out. We
12 were always talking about it. We were always talking about, among
13 ourselves, what was happening, what the significance of events were, what
14 the significance of statements were. We were immersed in it and had
15 information coming from -- information and analysis coming from just a
16 range of sources, talking to local people that we knew. And over time,
17 I think, there were a few people in UNPROFOR who developed quite a good
18 understanding of what was happening in the country.
19 Q. Did your sources include, for example, other humanitarian
20 organisations, the Red Cross, UNHCR?
21 A. Yes. The UNPROFOR headquarters, what we called
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina Command Forward based in Sarajevo, which was the
23 headquarters for the UNPROFOR lead general for Bosnia, at the time
24 General Rose, later General Smith, as well as the lead civilian,
25 Mr. Andreev for most of the time I was there, it was kind of a centre in
1 Sarajevo. We constantly were receiving visitors, whether it was from
2 member states or different UN organisations, UNHCR, ICRC, different NGOs.
3 They were always streaming through there, wanting to meet with us, talk
4 to us either about a specific issue or concern they might have or just in
5 general to find out what was going on and share with us what was going
6 on. So it was really almost a crossroads, in some senses. It was
7 probably the most important stop for anyone coming through the city, and
8 as a result we were able to meet with quite a wide array of officials --
9 civilian officials, military officials, aid workers, government
10 officials. And as a result of that, we were able to learn the
11 perspective of all those different actors.
12 Q. And what about UNPROFOR units on the ground?
13 A. There was regular reporting coming in from the different UNPROFOR
14 sector commands. They had to report daily to us what was happening.
15 And, of course, if the sector commander came in to Sarajevo for any
16 purpose, meetings, whatever, he would normally come in and see the
17 political leadership as well as the military.
18 We also had a daily briefing, a morning briefing, where the
19 briefer would report based on the reports coming in from the different
20 military units, as well as UN military observers, UN police. They would
21 report to us, in the briefing, what was happening. They would give us a
22 summary so we didn't necessarily have to read all the voluminous reports
23 coming in. We were able to benefit from that daily briefing where they
24 would summarise the most important events.
25 Q. Thank you. I'll move on to another topic now, something that you
1 addressed in your written evidence, and that's Sarajevo.
2 In your written evidence, at paragraph 197, in regard to
3 Sarajevo, I see that you noted, and I'll quote.
4 "The multi-ethnic traditions of Sarajevo were contrary to the
5 objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership."
6 Do you remember that?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. I wonder if you could clarify this for us. Could you explain
9 what you understood those objectives to be?
10 A. My understanding of the Bosnian Serb war objectives were that
11 they wanted to have or control or define certain territorial space in
12 which they had total political control and in which Bosnian -- or Serbs
13 could live separately from Muslims and Croats, and that this land should
14 include the land where traditionally Serbs had lived in in Bosnia, even
15 if other ethnic groups had also lived there. But wherever there were
16 significant Serb populations before the war, they felt that those lands
17 should be Serb lands, that the lands should be contiguous, should not be
18 separated East and West Bosnia, but they needed a fairly wide corridor in
19 the north to connect the two sides. And over that land, they wanted to
20 exercise total political control.
21 Q. Thank you. Still in relation to Sarajevo, just a couple of
22 paragraphs further in your evidence, you wrote that:
23 "Karadzic and Mladic had the ability to modulate the level of
24 terror caused by the campaign of shelling and sniping, and could improve
25 conditions, for example -- by, for example, opening the airport, allowing
1 commercial supplies, stopping shelling, stopping sniping, and equally
2 make them worse by restricting things. Both men demonstrated such
3 abilities by using them as leverage in negotiations."
4 Now, in regard to that, I'd like to ask you how. How did they
5 use these conditions, if I can call them that, the opening of the
6 airport, allowing commercial supplies, stopping shelling, stopping
7 sniping, how did they use them as leverage in negotiations?
8 A. I think they had three target groups, really. One was the
9 population of Sarajevo, two was UNPROFOR, and three was the broader
10 international community. And they tried to influence each one in
11 different ways, though their -- the control that the Bosnian Serbs
12 exerted over Sarajevo, including the airport, was a source where they
13 could -- they could influence all three groups, really. They could, at
14 their will, increase the level of sniping or mortar fire into the city or
15 decrease it. They could, at their will and very quickly, expand the
16 access of humanitarian assistance to the city or cut it off. They could,
17 at their will and very quickly, expand UNPROFOR's access to and from the
18 city or restrict it. The same for humanitarian organisations. And by --
19 through their ability to do that, to turn it on and off so quickly or
20 modulate it, expand it a little, decrease it a little, decrease it a lot,
21 they were able to exert influence, create leverage over us.
22 When they would say, Block humanitarian access to the city, or,
23 Limit UNPROFOR's ability to travel to enter or leave the city, that
24 created pressure on us and a need for us to go negotiate with them and
25 say, Please, let humanitarian convoys in, or, Open the airport so our
1 troops can fly in or out. And they would say, Well, if you want us to do
2 that, then you have to do this in return, or they would use that as
3 leverage in the negotiations. And as a result, they were able to put
4 UNPROFOR in the position of supplicant, having to constantly go beg for
5 access, whether it was for us or for humanitarian organisations. They
6 were able to hold the population of the city hostage, essentially, and
7 they were able to pressure Security Council members, in particular; more
8 broadly, the international community, but, in particular,
9 Security Council members who didn't want to get wrapped up in a war in
10 Bosnia. And if the Serbs were -- the Bosnian Serbs were threatening
11 conflict if we didn't change our behaviour, I think that influenced the
12 thinking of some Security Council members and Contact Group members.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, just in terms of examples, you mentioned the
14 airport as being one of those, and you also made that point in
15 paragraph 66 of your written evidence. How were they able to control the
16 operation of the airport?
17 A. They were able to shut it down at their will by -- essentially,
18 they would say, We can't guarantee the safety of flights coming in and
19 out of the airport. And that was code for, you know, the planes are at
20 risk, we can't guarantee their safety, they could be shot down. And
21 without assurances of safety for the flights, they wouldn't fly. And at
22 times, planes were shot at. Many times, our planes with hit by gun-fire.
23 And in those conditions, the planes wouldn't fly or certain limitations
24 would be put on them; only UN personnel could fly in or out, or no
25 UN civilians could fly in or out. You know, it depended on the
1 situation. They put various kinds of restrictions on us. They had
2 personnel -- military personnel at the airport who would conduct
3 inspections of the flights, and at any time they could -- or the cargo.
4 And at any time, they could object to something and shut down our whole
6 Q. On what basis do you put, as you did in paragraph 200, Karadzic
7 and Mladic as being the decision-makers in this regard?
8 A. Well, Dr. Karadzic was the leader of the Bosnian Serbs and, in my
9 view, the ultimate authority who made decisions on all major issues, the
10 strategic issues, the important issues. Of course, many small issues
11 never reached him, but on any significant issue, that's where we had to
12 go to get a resolution. In the case of General Mladic, there were -- he
13 was the head of the Bosnian Serb Army, the head of the Bosnian Serb
14 military, so that's where we would go to get resolution of primarily
15 military matters. General Mladic did not get involved, for the most
16 part, in civilian matters, and -- but he was the ultimate -- or he was
17 the main purely military authority. With Dr. Karadzic, as supreme
18 commander, he had a role both in the civilian side as well as the
19 military side. And if we couldn't get a resolution with
20 Professor Koljevic on some humanitarian issue, or airport access issue,
21 or with Mr. Krajisnik or with General Tolimir, we would go up the chain
22 and eventually reach Dr. Karadzic or General Mladic if we couldn't get
23 the issue resolved somewhere else.
24 Q. While we're discussing this matter -- as we're discussing this,
25 perhaps it's a good time to turn to one of the documents mentioned in
1 your statement, and that's 65 ter 11172. It's an entry from your
2 notebook of events that -- related to events that transpired on 24 April
4 Do you see that on the screen in front of you, Mr. Banbury?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And just in relation to your handwritten notes which are among
7 these associated exhibits in your statement, could you just tell us:
8 What was your practice in note-taking? How complete were your notes?
9 A. I would try and take as close to -- not verbatim notes as
10 possible, but close to it. I would try and get down a lot of key quotes
11 word for word; not for the whole meeting, but key statements, and really
12 record as much of an entire meeting or event that was taking place as
13 possible, avoiding the pleasantries and things like that. But all of the
14 substantive conversation, I would try and get down either the complete
15 meaning of it or, at times, verbatim quotes. So they were pretty
17 Q. Thank you. Could you just, then, please, have a look at this
18 excerpt. It's a two-page excerpt of events on 28 April, and perhaps you
19 could put this excerpt in context for us. What was going on in and
20 around Sarajevo at this time? Sorry, on 24 April, I meant to say. My
22 A. There had been a cessation of hostilities agreement in
23 December 1994, December/January 1995, that had made -- that was signed by
24 the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Government following President Carter's
25 peace efforts in December 1994, and that Cessation of Hostilities
1 Agreement, or COHA, had a big impact on the situation on the ground.
2 Initially, the parties broadly respected their undertakings in the COHA.
3 January 1995 was a good time in Sarajevo, and the COHA was meant to
4 create an atmosphere in which more comprehensive peace talks could take
5 place. It was meant to cool the situation on the ground so that peace
6 talks could progress. And the COHA achieved its objectives in January,
7 broadly speaking I would say, and to a large extent in February.
8 The situation started to deteriorate around March, probably,
9 because the peace talks that were supposed to take place were not
10 progressing, really. And by April 1995, it was clear that the peace
11 talks were going nowhere. And as a result, the concept behind the
12 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was -- the premise behind it was
13 flawed, it was no longer operational, and the parties were returning to a
14 military conflict, to pursuing their objectives through military means.
15 And as a result, the situation in Sarajevo in April 1995 was pretty
16 quickly deteriorating and was much worse than it had been in January.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Now, if we could go over to the second page of
18 this excerpt, and if you could please magnify it. Thank you.
19 Q. Just under halfway down to the page -- or down the page, I see a
20 reference to Dr. Karadzic, and the notation is:
21 "Karadzic on VOA (not quoted)."
22 Do you see that reference?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Could you tell us, first of all, what "VOA" means? Do you
1 A. Voice of America.
2 Q. And could you, since it's your handwriting and you can interpret
3 that better than all of us, read for us the passage that follows?
4 A. It says:
5 "The international community must accept Serb plans for peace or
6 the Bosnian Serb Army will invade Sarajevo. Also, Dr. Karadzic said that
7 he had closed the Sarajevo Airport over the weekend to show the world who
8 was in control of the airport."
9 Q. So, first of all, then, is this consistent with the situation as
10 regards control of the operation of the airport you've been discussing?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Do you recall why -- or do you recall the situation which led to
13 the closure of the airport by Dr. Karadzic?
14 A. Their -- I believe it was the general deterioration in the
15 situation in the city, and, as I said, people were -- or the sides were
16 resorting more toward pursuing their aims through military means. I do
17 not recall whether there was a specific incident that prompted it. There
18 may have been.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
20 Could I ask this be marked as a Prosecution exhibit, please,
21 Your Honours?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2452, Your Honours.
24 MS. EDGERTON:
25 Q. Now, I'd like us to talk about paragraph 32 of your written
1 evidence, which contained a discussion regarding -- or of sniping, or on
2 sniping. And before we do that in more detail, I wonder if you could
3 tell us whether you, yourself, have actually seen sniping victims during
4 your tour in Sarajevo.
5 A. Yes, I have seen a sniping victim in Sarajevo, yes.
6 Q. Could you describe what you saw?
7 A. It was -- or she was an elderly woman who was killed by sniping
8 in the area of the Holiday Inn.
9 Q. Thank you. Now, in paragraph 32 of your statement, there's --
10 the last line in paragraph 32 is a bit of a cumbersome sentence, where
11 you say:
12 "The argument that the military, including off-duty soldiers,
13 were intermingled with the population, and therefore sniping was
14 justified, is belied by the fact that civilians, including women,
15 children and the elderly, were regularly victims of sniping."
16 So, actually, in regard to this passage, perhaps you could give
17 us a little bit of clarification. By this, do you mean to say that there
18 were no military targets in Sarajevo at all?
19 A. No, I don't mean to suggest that there were no military targets
20 in Sarajevo. What I mean to say is that the preponderance of victims of
21 sniping in Sarajevo were civilians. And sniping is not an indiscriminate
22 weapon the way, say, mortars are. Or mortars are somewhat
23 indiscriminate. Sniping is very targeted at a single individual. And
24 the victims of sniping that UNPROFOR was concerned with, and the people
25 who were routinely victims in Sarajevo, were civilians.
1 Q. Thank you. I'd like to go on to another area that comes up on
2 several occasions in your statement, and it's the subject of freedom of
3 movement for the United Nations and other humanitarian organisations
4 through Bosnian Serb-held territory.
5 And perhaps I could ask you this: Were there areas of Bosnia, to
6 your recollection, that were particularly reliant on the UN's delivery of
8 A. Absolutely. I mean, Bosnia -- many civilians throughout Bosnia
9 were wholly or largely reliant on humanitarian assistance from the UN or
10 NGOs for their survival. So the population, as a whole, or large
11 portions of the population were quite reliant on us for their survival,
12 really. And there were some parts of the country where our ability to
13 maintain that aid supply was wholly dependent upon Serb acquiescence to
14 the continuation of that supply.
15 Q. Well, what areas were those?
16 A. Well, the three main ones were the eastern enclaves, Srebrenica,
17 Gorazde and Zepa. Sarajevo was largely reliant; not completely, but
18 largely reliant. And Bihac, depending -- there were other groups through
19 whom we had to get -- or whose co-operation we had to get for their
20 supply. There were different routes into Bihac, but one was dependent
21 upon the Bosnian Serbs.
22 Q. Did the United Nations then have freedom of movement to those
23 areas you've just identified?
24 A. Well, legally, we did. The Security Council resolutions
25 authorising UNPROFOR and giving us our mandate made it clear that it was
1 a right to which we were entitled. It was an obligation of all the
2 parties to the conflict. But, no, we never had real freedom of movement,
4 Q. And why not?
5 A. Because the -- in the case of the eastern enclaves, for instance,
6 the Bosnian Serbs placed a range of restrictions on us. The degree to
7 which we were able to access the areas that I previously mentioned
8 varied, and sometimes the restrictions were less onerous and our ability
9 to access these areas and provide humanitarian assistance to the
10 population was -- our ability was greater, and we were able to, to a
11 large degree, successfully carry out that responsibility, though many
12 times our freedom of movement was greatly constrained, our ability to
13 carry out our mandate in these areas was very limited, if not completely
15 Q. Did those variations depend on anything in particular? How did
16 they come about?
17 A. They depended entirely on the position of the Bosnian Serb
18 leadership in Pale, and they would impose different kinds of restrictions
19 on us for different reasons. There were often links -- they linked their
20 willingness to grant us access to different issues, and oftentimes there
21 was no reasonable or logical link. They were using the -- our need to
22 provide humanitarian assistance to people wholly dependent upon us, to
23 resupply our troops, to rotate our troops, that was an absolute need for
24 UNPROFOR. And since they totally controlled our ability to fulfil that
25 need, they had great leverage over us. They oftentimes sought to use
1 that leverage in other areas that were important to them, but not
2 necessarily linked in any way to the issue of freedom of movement or
3 access to the enclaves.
4 Q. Well, then maybe we could look at a further document, since
5 you've raised that point.
6 65 ter 10628, and that's a report dated 15 December 1994 on a
7 meeting with Bosnian Serb authorities on UNPROFOR freedom of movement.
8 Do you see that document on the screen in front of you now?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And you're noted as being the drafter of that document?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Now, the attendees at the meeting included you, the BH Command
13 Chief of Staff, General Brinkman, Lieutenant-Colonel Daniell, the head of
14 G3 convoy ops, and the Bosnian Serb representatives at the meeting were
15 then Lieutenant-Colonel Tolimir and Major Indic.
16 If we could turn to paragraph 3 -- pardon me, page 3 of this
17 document, paragraph 5, I'd like to ask you a question.
18 Now, here we see that significant progress was reported on the
19 issue of freedom of movement, but the document says:
20 "The willingness of Tolimir to make progress on our freedom of
21 movement is no doubt linked to Dr. Karadzic's attempt to engage
22 President Carter in the peace process. Were the BSA to fail to live up
23 to their commitments, Karadzic's efforts would also fail. Our freedom of
24 movement is once again being used by the BS," and I assume by that you
25 mean Bosnian Serbs, "as a pawn in their political machinations, but at
1 least this time the moves are in our favour."
2 Now, is this consistent with the situation you've just been
4 A. Yes, absolutely, it's a good example of it.
5 MS. EDGERTON: Could this be marked as a Prosecution exhibit,
6 please, Your Honours?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2453, Your Honours.
9 MS. EDGERTON:
10 Q. Now, in your statement, you commented on this document at the end
11 of paragraph 95, saying:
12 "Again, this is an example of Karadzic being able to turn the
13 pressure on and off as he pleased."
14 And I'd like to know on what basis you attribute this control of
15 freedom of movement to Dr. Karadzic.
16 A. This meeting occurred at a very important time. It was following
17 the fighting and crisis in Bihac in November and just before
18 President Carter was arriving. And I think the Bosnian Government
19 authorities were concerned by the Carter mission and that they would be
20 placed under pressure to accept things they didn't want. I think the
21 Bosnian Serb authorities were hopeful that the Carter mission would
22 deliver to them things they did want.
23 However, following the Bihac fighting and the use of air power by
24 NATO, the Bosnian Serb authorities had responded in their traditional
25 way, which was to -- they had a strategy, a quite good or intelligent
1 strategy from their perspective, I suppose, to ensure that whenever
2 UNPROFOR, in combination with NATO, used force, used air power, to
3 achieve some Security Council mandated objective, they would exact a very
4 high price from us and -- by shutting down freedom of movement, shutting
5 down the airport, stopping humanitarian supplies from reaching the
6 enclaves, et cetera. And as a result, they would ensure that they ended
7 up in a strategically superior position to UNPROFOR following the use of
8 force by UNPROFOR and/or NATO. They were willing to go further up the
9 ladder of escalation than we were. And because of this strategy that
10 they pursued, they created a big dis-incentive on the part of many to the
11 use of force. It was a very effective strategy.
12 This happened following the incidents in Bihac in November 1995,
13 just prior to this meeting, so we were facing all kinds of restrictions,
14 both in terms of delivery of humanitarian assistance and our own freedom
15 of movement, and, of course, we were protesting this. We were travelling
16 to Pale, asking for the restrictions to be lifted. We were in the role
17 of supplicant following the use of force, and the Serbs were able to
18 refuse all our entreaties.
19 Then when the Carter mission was organised, I think it was
20 understood by the Bosnian Serb authorities that they would come under a
21 lot of pressure from President Carter, immediately upon his arrival, to
22 deal with these other issues if they were outstanding, because they were
23 so objectionable, they were so unjustified, putting these kind of
24 restrictions on delivery of humanitarian assistance on the UN
25 peacekeeping force.
1 As a result, there was a quite rational political decision, I
2 believe taken at the highest levels in Pale, to grant -- I'm hesitant to
3 use the word "concession," though this was the way it was often created,
4 given the strategic dynamic. Again, it was very clever. But the Bosnian
5 Serb authorities decided to allow us greater freedom of movement,
6 resumption of humanitarian supplies, et cetera, in order to come across
7 as a more reasonable party, not the one that's imposing undue --
8 unwarranted restrictions on UNPROFOR. This was a very important
9 political strategic decision, and I don't believe it could have been made
10 by anyone other than Dr. Karadzic.
11 Q. You've just touched on, a couple of times now, these restrictions
12 on freedom of movement having an affect on UNPROFOR's operations in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I wonder, if you recall, was that also the case
14 with respect to the eastern enclaves where UNPROFOR was stationed?
15 A. Those enclaves were the places where we were most vulnerable to
16 restrictions on freedom of movement and where the issue -- that and
17 Sarajevo, to an extent, but really the freedom of movement issue was most
18 pronounced in terms of the eastern enclaves.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Perhaps we could have, then, a look at another
20 document, 65 ter 09686.
21 Q. It's a report dated 19 November 1994, which you drafted, on a
22 meeting with UNPROFOR -- of UNPROFOR military officials with
23 Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and General Tolimir, and others. And I
24 note, at the end of paragraph 1, one of the main topics of conversation
25 is the near zero or zero levels of food and fuel for UNPROFOR troops in
1 the eastern enclaves.
2 I wonder, first of all, if I could ask you: Is this, to your
3 mind, one of the results of the restrictions we've been discussing?
4 A. Yes, absolutely.
5 Q. Now, if we go over to paragraph 5 of this document, which I think
6 I recall is on the next page in English. It begins, at paragraph 5 -- or
7 it begins on the next page, bottom of the next page. We see there that
8 Dr. Karadzic is recorded as eventually allowing food and fuel stocks for
9 UNPROFOR for one week into the enclaves, and he noted that UNPROFOR -- if
10 we go over to -- sorry. He noted that -- or it is noted that UNPROFOR's
11 requirements are going to be determined by the Bosnian Serb Army
12 headquarters, following submission by BH Command of your declared
13 requirements "tomorrow."
14 If we could go over to page 3, please, "tomorrow" being the next
16 And at paragraph 6, General Brinkman reminds Dr. Karadzic of his
17 agreement with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
18 UNPROFOR stocks in the enclaves, and Dr. Karadzic maintained that the
19 agreement was consistent on removal of Bosnian forces from the
20 demilitarised zone.
21 Are you familiar with this situation?
22 A. Yes, I am.
23 Q. Can you comment on Dr. Karadzic noting that UNPROFOR's
24 requirements would be determined by the Bosnian Serb Army headquarters?
25 A. This was one of the ways in which the Bosnian Serb authorities
1 modulated/controlled our activities in the eastern enclaves, because
2 not -- it was never just a question of the convoy can pass or it can't
3 pass; it was how big is the convoy, how many trucks, who is on it, what
4 is on it. We had to provide detailed information with every convoy
5 request about the composition of the convoy, and they were able to use
6 that information in two main ways. One was to actually, on an
7 operational level, control what did go and what didn't go in terms of,
8 say, UN weapons, UN communications equipment, fuel, to the enclaves, and
9 they were able, through that, to limit our operational capability in the
10 enclaves. The second way was it gave them a bureaucratic -- a very
11 convenient bureaucratic means by which to block convoys. Your convoy
12 request said there were 13 trucks with these license plates, and you have
13 13 trucks and 12 of them have the right license plate, 1 has the wrong
14 one, so you have to send the whole convoy back. Or, you know, they would
15 have someone at a check-point somewhere who could find something that
16 wasn't on a manifest. So it was this bureaucratic approach, but not
17 because they wanted to be efficient bureaucrats, but because they wanted
18 to prevent or limit our access to the enclaves. They were able to use
19 this bureaucracy, this ponderous, onerous bureaucracy, that they imposed
20 to prevent our access or limit it, restrict it.
21 MS. EDGERTON: On subject of limiting UNPROFOR's operational
22 capacity in the enclaves, perhaps we could go to -- oh, pardon me.
23 Could I have this document as the next Prosecution exhibit,
24 please, Your Honours?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2454, Your Honours.
2 MS. EDGERTON: To recover my train of thought, perhaps, on the
3 subject of limiting UNPROFOR's operational capacity in the enclaves, we
4 could go to another document, 65 ter 10615. And this jumps forward in
5 time to 11 March 1995, and it's a weekly situation report.
6 Q. Could you just -- first of all, do you see the document on the
7 screen in front of you?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Could you just, first of all, tell us about these types of
10 documents, the weekly situation reports, how they were generated and what
11 information was typically provided in these documents?
12 A. These weekly reports became a very important document. There
13 were really two people who would draft them, either myself or a
14 colleague, and they ended up, I think, becoming rather influential. They
15 were very sought after. They were widely distributed well beyond the
16 distribution list that's indicated there because they provided the most
17 updated factual information on events that were happening, both political
18 and military, as well as analysis of the senior officials in -- of
19 UNPROFOR in Bosnia. And I don't want to in any way take credit for that,
20 that analysis, but -- I mean, it's signed by someone else, not me, so
21 they deserve the credit for it, but I think the documents were seen as
22 sort of an authoritative statement of both factually what was happening
23 and, more broadly, a sound analysis of events on the ground.
24 Q. Based on the sources you alluded to at the beginning of your
25 evidence here today?
1 A. Yes, based on all the sources of information available to us;
2 formal reporting from military chain of command in UNPROFOR, the
3 Civil Affairs chain of command. We had Civil Affairs officers dispersed
4 in many parts of the country who were meeting with mayors and displaced
5 persons groups, et cetera, from UN military observers, from our political
6 meetings, from the meetings with member states, from the press, from
7 discussions with aid officials, UN NGO, the full range of information
9 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
10 Now, in this document, I'd like us to go to page 3, paragraph 7,
11 still on the subject of freedom of movement, paragraph 7 being at the
12 bottom of the page. Thank you.
13 Q. This paragraph 7 states:
14 "Severe restrictions imposed on UNPROFOR by the Bosnian Serbs
15 have limited our ability to deliver supplies to the five enclaves,
16 including Sarajevo; hence, our ability to carry out our mandated
18 And further, the last sentence, I note here that it reads:
19 "The increasingly clear intention of the Bosnian Serb Army
20 appears to be to permit delivery of supplies to the enclaves necessary
21 for our survival, but not those needed in order for us to function."
22 First of all, referring to, as you mention in your statement, the
23 limitation on UNPROFOR's operational capacity in the enclave, is this
24 consistent with what you've just been discussing?
25 A. Yes, absolutely.
1 Q. And are you able to comment on this -- what you've described as a
2 clear intention to permit -- on the part of the Bosnian Serb Army to
3 permit only those supplies necessary to the enclaves for your survival?
4 A. The Bosnian Serbs had total control over what was transported on
5 a UN convoy, an UNPROFOR convoy, UNHCR convoy. They made the
6 determination. We could propose/request, as we did many, many times.
7 And many, many, many times, our requests were rejected and they only
8 allowed in what they allowed in, and they did not allow in, in many
9 cases, and this is one of those time-periods, they did not allow in many
10 things that we asked for, they did not allow in the supplies that we
11 judged were necessary for us to conduct our mandated operations. The
12 Security Council resolutions made very clear not just what our mandated
13 responsibilities were, but that we were entitled to freedom of movement,
14 full access to the enclaves. The Bosnian Serbs, unfortunately, didn't
15 respect that, and, as a result, we often found ourselves -- our troops in
16 the eastern enclaves did not have the material, the equipment, necessary
17 to conduct their operations. Literally, say, fuel was a good example.
18 They didn't have fuel to conduct patrols. And they -- as suggested in
19 this paragraph, they only wanted to push us so far to allow us to
20 survive, but not function. And by restricting the supplies, dramatically
21 restricting the supplies going in, they were able to achieve that.
22 Q. Did -- do you know whether this ultimately had an effect on the
23 UNPROFOR forces in the enclaves by the summer of 1995?
24 A. It absolutely did have an effect on the UNPROFOR forces, our
25 capabilities in the enclaves; all three, but in particular Srebrenica and
1 Zepa. It had an operational impact, in terms of the material, the
2 equipment, the fuel at the disposal -- the food, fresh rations versus
3 canned rations, et cetera, the communications, the medivac. They
4 oftentimes imposed restrictions on our ability to medically evacuate our
5 personnel. So it had that significant operational impact on our ability,
6 very damaging.
7 It also had a significant psychological impact on our troops
8 there, their commanders, who were so beholden to the Bosnian Serbs for
9 their survival that they started to function in a way where they did not
10 want to do anything that would upset the Bosnian Serbs for fear that more
11 restrictions would be placed on them. They wanted to ingratiate
12 themselves with the Bosnian Serbs so that the Bosnian Serbs might allow
13 food, or mail, or fuel, or whatever in. And meanwhile, because the
14 Bosnian Serbs linked these restrictions at times, the Bosnian Serb
15 authorities, to what they described as inappropriate behaviour by the
16 Bosnian Government or its forces in the enclaves, you know, the fact that
17 there were Bosnian Army soldiers in there, they said basically the
18 message to UNPROFOR, particularly the commanders on the ground, was,
19 You're facing these restrictions because the Bosnian Army, the Bosnian
20 Government, is doing something wrong. Get them to stop it and things
21 will be fine for you. So that put our forces, our commanders on the
22 ground, in the psychological position of being dependent upon the Bosnian
23 Serbs, and wanting to ingratiate themselves with them, and seeing them in
24 some ways as their -- someone who could save them or help them, and saw
25 the Bosnian Government and its forces in the enclaves as the source of
1 their difficult -- the difficult situation in which they were in. It was
2 because of their misbehaviour that they weren't -- it was because of the
3 Bosnian Government forces' misbehaviour that the UNPROFOR forces were not
4 able to eat, or have fuel, or whatever. So it was a very unpleasant
6 Q. Thank you. Before we leave this document, I'd like us to go from
7 paragraph 7 over to paragraph 9, and it goes back to the subject of
9 In paragraph 9, you talk about how sniping in the city remained a
10 problem that week, and you discuss a number of incidents. And two-thirds
11 of the way down the paragraph, you note that during a meeting with
12 BH commander General Smith, General Mladic said that:
13 "The increase in sniping by the Bosnian Serb Army in the Sarajevo
14 area was in response to Serb casualties suffered in military offensives
15 launched by the Bosnian Government. (The explicit recollection," in
16 parentheses, "by Mladic of Bosnian Serb Army responsibility for sniping
17 is somewhat surprising)."
18 And you noted in your statement, in regard to this passage, that
19 you recall being struck by this. Now, why is that?
20 A. I was surprised that General Mladic was admitting something that
21 we all suspected, but that didn't necessarily reflect very well on the
22 Bosnian Serbs; that they were deliberately using sniping to target
23 civilians or to punish the Bosnian Government authorities for actions
24 elsewhere, it was retaliation for something that was happening elsewhere,
25 they were using sniping as a tool, a point of leverage, a way to punish.
1 And we certainly suspected that or saw it that way, but we -- I was
2 surprised to hear General Mladic acknowledge that.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
4 Could this document be a Prosecution exhibit, please?
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 For the record, I note the 65 ter number, which is 10615, and it
7 will be admitted as Exhibit P2455.
8 MS. EDGERTON:
9 Q. I'd like to move, actually, on to another topic, and that's the
10 subject of NATO, and in that regard deal with another document you refer
11 to in your written evidence, 65 ter 10608, a report you drafted on
12 5 December 1994, entitled "Clarification of NATO's Role in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina," reporting on a meeting between Generals Gvero and
14 Tolimir, on the one hand, and General Rose and Mr. Andreev, on the other
16 Do you see the document in front of you?
17 A. Yes.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Now, if we could go to paragraph 4 on page 2 of
19 this document.
20 Q. We see a concern expressed that given misunderstanding by parties
21 to the conflict, the international press, on what NATO's role is in
22 Bosnia, there would be advantages to clarifying this.
23 And then if we go over to the next page of this document, it
24 attaches elements to be included in a statement from New York in this
25 regard, as drafted by General Rose.
1 So on the subject of NATO's involvement in Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina, perhaps you could give us your views, first of all, whether
3 this is consistent, these elements to be included in the statement,
4 consistent with your understanding of NATO's role in the conflict.
5 A. Yes, they are.
6 Q. Perhaps it would be helpful or would assist us if you could
7 discuss the circumstances or the type of action on the part of either of
8 the factions which would call for NATO's intervention or involvement.
9 A. Well, as this document indicates, there are four main areas where
10 NATO would possibly intervene at the request of UNPROFOR. There was the
11 no-fly zone, which, really, because there -- the limited air power
12 capabilities of the parties was not something that was resorting in NATO
13 having to use force. There were some helicopter flights by the parties,
14 but that -- that issue didn't really come up very much. There was the
15 issue of coming to UNPROFOR's assistance, self-defence. And the other
16 three areas: UNPROFOR's self-defence, enforcement of the heavy weapons
17 exclusion zone, and protection of the safe areas. But in order -- in
18 order for NATO to take action, the UNPROFOR had to agree, it had to be at
19 UNPROFOR's request, the request of the Special Representative of the
21 The threshold, in terms of the level of the violations necessary
22 in order for the SRSG to conclude that the resort to use of force was the
23 appropriate course of action, that threshold was very, very high. It
24 wasn't a formal legal requirement. The legal requirement was rather low,
25 actually. A small violation could have justified, legally, the -- a
1 request by UNPROFOR to NATO to use force. But politically for the
2 United Nations, it was very unpleasant. It was against our nature to
3 call on another party to use military force against someone. We were
4 there as peacekeepers, we wanted to stop the fighting. So in order for
5 us, and this was particularly the case, I think, with the SRSG, to feel
6 that recourse to NATO force was appropriate, it really had to be the last
7 available option. The level of violations had to be so high -- the
8 situation had to be so extreme, the issues at risk, threat to civilian
9 life, et cetera, had to be so present in order for the SRSG to request
10 NATO to use force.
11 There were routine violations of, say, the safe areas or the
12 heavy weapons exclusion zone that could have very easily, from a legal
13 basis, warranted a recourse to force. But if there was just a technical
14 violation, an artillery piece in the heavy weapons exclusion zone that
15 wasn't doing anything, there was no way that UNPROFOR was going to
16 request NATO use of force. It was only when the situation had become
17 quite extreme, civilians were being targeted, heavy weapons within the
18 zone were being used to do the targeting, that UNPROFOR would ask NATO to
19 come to its assistance.
20 Q. So in the case of what you've described as small, or technical,
21 or perhaps, I could ask, single violations, what would UNPROFOR's first
22 line of response have been, then?
23 A. We routinely approached any party that was in violation of its
24 responsibilities, and certainly in the case of these issues, routinely
25 approached the Bosnian Serb authorities, pointing out their violations,
1 whether it was heavy weapons exclusion zone or encroachment by forces
2 towards the safe area, giving them the information, telling them we knew
3 about it, explaining that it was a violation, explaining what our
4 expectations were, what the Security Council mandate required, what their
5 responsibilities were, pointing out what could happen if the violation
6 continued. So we -- 90 -- well, I can't put a specific number on it, but
7 the vast majority of our response to violations was a political one; it
8 was letters, it was meetings, it was dialogue, it was negotiation, it was
9 requests, it was beseeching. It was only in very, very extreme
10 circumstances where we would resort to the use of force.
11 Q. Just before we leave this document, if we could go back to the
12 previous page, please, paragraph 5.
13 I see that General Gvero is recorded as insisting that the
14 opening of the airport was directly connected to the Bosnian Serb Army
15 receiving guarantees that NATO wouldn't strike targets on Bosnian Serb
16 Army territory. Now, we've talked about the airport and the linkage of
17 issues earlier in your testimony, and I wonder, given that, if you have
18 any comment on this.
19 A. This is a good example of the issue that I was describing
20 earlier, where the Bosnian Serb authorities were able to control our use
21 of the airport by providing or withholding the security guarantees
22 necessary for UN flights into the airport, and their willingness at times
23 to link those security guarantees and, hence, the opening or closure of
24 the airport to unrelated issues. The airport was a valuable source of
25 leverage for the Bosnian Serbs, and here they were seeking to use that
1 leverage to obtain something that was extremely important to them, which
2 was the conditions under which NATO would use force, or tried to prevent
3 it entirely.
4 Q. And just before we leave the subject of the airport altogether,
5 could you tell us who actually benefitted most from the continued
6 operation of the airport?
7 A. It was a critical -- a critical capability for UNPROFOR to use
8 the airport. That was our point of access into the country, or for the
9 most part. Our leadership used it, our military used it, rotation
10 flights. It was also a critical source of supplies for UNHCR. The
11 air-lift into the city carrying food routinely had 10, 15 more flights a
12 day carrying food for UNHCR. And, of course, the UNHCR flights were
13 bringing humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in Sarajevo,
14 so the population there depended, to a large extent, on the airport.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
16 Could this be a Prosecution exhibit, please, Your Honour,
17 65 ter 10608?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2456, Your Honours.
20 MS. EDGERTON:
21 Q. I'd like to move to another area now, and do this by reference to
22 yet another document you referred to in your written evidence,
23 65 ter 10709.
24 Now, this document is a weekly BH political assessment,
25 number 81, for the period covering 21 to 27 August 1994, which you
1 drafted. Before we go further into it, could you just explain, briefly,
2 for us what these political assessments were?
3 A. This is the same kind of report as I was referring to earlier.
4 It's the weekly assessment of the main events and political -- I think we
5 later changed it because the assessment went beyond just political
6 issues. So it's basically a summary of the main developments on the
7 ground and an assessment of their meaning for a given week.
8 Q. Thank you. If we go over to the next page, as I recall, in this
9 document, paragraph 4 -- sorry, page 3, it would be, then.
10 Paragraph 4 reports on something you call a Serb-Serb conflict,
11 and sets out a series of accusations against the Pale leaders by Serbian
12 authorities, including the Serbian prime minister, who accused the
13 Bosnian Serb leadership of committing crimes against humanity, for
14 continuing the war for their own internal reasons, including avoiding the
15 war crimes tribunal, and also President Lilic accused the RS leadership
16 of continued ethnic cleansing and shelling Muslim civilian targets,
17 despite promises to stop.
18 First of all, how would you have become aware of this Serb-Serb
19 conflict and these public accusations?
20 A. Well, our -- one of our main responsibilities was to track
21 political developments related to the conflict, and that included all
22 aspects, not just those internal to Bosnia, but relations between the
23 Bosnian Croats and the Croatian Government in Zagreb was something that
24 we paid close attention to. And certainly the relationship between
25 President Milosevic and the authorities in Belgrade, on the one hand, and
1 Dr. Karadzic and the authorities in Pale, on the other, were a very
2 important issue for us because they could have a big impact on the course
3 of the conflict, the political negotiations, et cetera. So it was an
4 issue we paid close attention to. We tried to learn as much about it as
5 we could from a range of sources. One important source of information
6 was, simply, the media, media coming out of Belgrade, for the most part,
7 but also in Bosnia. And I think it's likely that we were aware of these
8 statements by President Lilic and Prime Minister Marjanovic from Belgrade
9 media sources.
10 Q. Now, in this -- if we could go over to paragraph 9 in this very
11 same document, we see that despite these public accusations, you reported
12 on ethnic-based expulsions of Muslims from Bijeljina, Banja Luka and
13 Sanski Most the very same week. And at the last line of that paragraph,
14 you note that:
15 "Repeated protests from the UNHCR and ICRC have had no effect on
16 the continuing policy."
17 And I'd like to know on what basis did you consider these
18 expulsions or these incidents to be the manifestations of a policy?
19 A. Ethnic-based expulsions started taking place really at the
20 beginning of the conflict. They were an issue that received a lot of
21 international attention. The Security Council resolutions that were
22 passed routinely referred to them and condemned them and demanded that
23 they stop, yet they continued. These were something that the world paid
24 a lot of attention to. There was a lot of pressure on the parties not to
25 engage in this kind of activity, yet it continued. It could not have
1 continued in the case of the ethnic groups that were being expelled or
2 pressured out from the Bosnian Serb-controlled area. It could not have
3 taken place without there being a policy to conduct this.
4 The Bosnian Serb authorities exercised very good control over
5 what happened in their territory. They certainly were able to entirely
6 control, say, our movements on their territory. They could stop a large
7 UNPROFOR convoy with many heavily-armed soldiers and weapons, and they
8 could stop it with a simple check-point. So it's not feasible that
9 large-scale population movements, under pressure sometimes from
10 paramilitary gangs, could take place without the participation, the
11 acquiescence, the role of the Bosnian Serb authorities.
12 Q. At the beginning of your evidence today, you talked about the
13 Bosnian Serb war objectives, and you included in that -- and I'll find
14 you the exact reference. You said.
15 "... that they wanted to have or control or define certain
16 territorial space in which they had total political control and in which
17 Bosnian Serbs could live separately from Muslims and Croats ..."
18 And I'm wondering if you see any relationship between these
19 incidents and the war objectives, as you explained them?
20 A. This is the -- these expulsions were the pursuit -- or one of the
21 ways through which those war objectives were pursued. The expulsions
22 also created facts on the ground that would become very hard to reverse
23 through a political process. While the Security Council was condemning
24 ethnically-based expulsions on all sides, the -- and saying that they
25 wouldn't be tolerated and people should be able to return to their homes,
1 I think there was a political reality that once an area was -- was devoid
2 of all ethnic groups except one, it was very unlikely that that
3 particular area would be handed over to a different ethnic group in the
4 course of a political settlement. So by expelling the ethnic groups --
5 the other ethnic groups from an area, the -- any party, but in this case
6 the Bosnian Serb party by expelling non-Serbs, they were more or less
7 able to assure that they would get the land from which they were
8 expelling people in a peace agreement, even if, in other circumstances,
9 that land may have been contested as part of a peace discussion.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, could this document, 65 ter 10709,
11 be the next Prosecution exhibit?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2457, Your Honours.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Is it time for the morning break now,
15 Your Honours?
16 JUDGE KWON: Quite right.
17 We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 11.00.
18 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.
19 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
20 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
22 Q. Mr. Banbury, we left on a discussion of ethnic cleansing and
23 ethnic-based expulsions of non-Serbs from Banja Luka, Sanski Most and
24 Bijeljina, and I'd like to continue on that subject by moving on to a
25 further document, 65 ter 10658, which is a weekly BiH political
1 assessment for the period covering 4 to 10 September 1994, which you
3 Do you see it on the screen in front of you?
4 A. Yes.
5 MS. EDGERTON: If we could, please, go to page 3 of this
6 document, paragraph 5, that would be helpful. Thank you.
7 Q. Now, this paragraph reports the continued expulsion of non-Serbs
8 from Bosnian Serb-controlled territory, in particular from Banja Luka,
9 Sanski Most and Bijeljina. And in paragraph 6, which begins at the very
10 bottom of the page, and if we could go over to the next page, we see that
11 you were present when Mr. de Mello raised this with Dr. Karadzic, in
12 response to which Dr. Karadzic claimed that these people were -- those
13 people departing Banja Luka were doing so of their own volition, whereas
14 those from Bijeljina were forced from their homes by criminal elements
15 akin to Hong Kong mafia. And then he told a press conference, after the
16 meeting, that the Bijeljina expulsions were not the policy of the RS and
17 had been stopped as of 48 hours earlier:
18 "Nonetheless, 1.000 more were expelled that day."
19 First of all, who was Mr. de Mello?
20 A. Sergio Vieira de Mello was the head of Civil Affairs for UNPROFOR
21 at that time; based in Zagreb, but with responsibilities for UNPROFOR
22 Civil Affairs as a whole.
23 Q. Now, in regard to this response by Dr. Karadzic, perhaps we could
24 break it down into a couple of parts or three parts. In regard to his
25 assertion that the expulsions were not a policy of the Republika Srpska,
1 do you have any comment?
2 A. I think it's clear, from the course of events over the entire
3 war, that ethnic-based expulsions were clearly one of the policies of the
4 Bosnian Serb authorities.
5 Q. And in regard to his remark to the effect that victims had been
6 forced to leave their homes by criminal elements akin to Hong Kong mafia,
7 you alluded to this earlier in your testimony this morning, and I wonder
8 if you have any comment on this particular remark.
9 A. There were non-state authorities acting in the area controlled by
10 the Bosnian Serbs, paramilitary gangs who were criminal gangs that
11 carried out just atrocious behaviour, atrocities against civilians,
12 non-Serb civilians; plundering, looting, raping, killing, burning,
13 expelling. Such gangs did exist. They operated, though, in my
14 estimation, with full awareness, a connivance, indeed at times support,
15 of the Bosnian Serb authorities. Political -- I mean, everyone knew
16 about the existence of these gangs. Certainly, the political authorities
17 in Pale were aware of them. The degree of co-operation with Bosnian Serb
18 military on the ground, I suppose, varied according to circumstances,
19 according to group, according to time-period, according to geographic
20 area, but there was certainly, at times, co-operation -- active
21 co-operation, in my view. At all times, though, these groups could not
22 have operated without the connivance, the acquiescence, of the Bosnian
23 Serb authorities.
24 Q. And, finally, Dr. Karadzic observed that these -- at the press
25 conference, Dr. Karadzic observed that these expulsions had stopped
1 48 hours earlier; nonetheless, a thousand more were expelled that same
2 day. Do you have any observation in regard to Dr. Karadzic's remark?
3 A. Well, quite clearly, they -- the expulsions had not stopped if a
4 thousand more were expelled the following day. I think there's also a
5 question with respect to whether people were leaving of their own
6 volition or not, as the paragraph raises. And that concept, I think,
7 very much depends on one's perspective. It may be true, in a certain
8 sense, that in the end, a family or a large number of people decided that
9 they wanted to leave. One needs to, though, consider the circumstances
10 surrounding that decision. And if they -- if neighbours were being
11 tormented, killed, raped, if houses were being burnt, if property was
12 being stolen, if they were being visited at their house by menacing
13 elements, paramilitary elements, saying, Leave or else, and maybe they
14 were offered some free passage out or threatened with some very dire
15 alternative, then, yes, maybe they packed up their bags and left in those
16 cases. Is that of their own volition? In a certain sense, yes, they
17 decided to leave. They, though, perhaps were not given much choice.
18 Clearly, in many cases, people were pressured, through very dire means,
19 to make that decision.
20 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
21 Could this document, Your Honour, 65 ter 10658, be marked as a
22 Prosecution exhibit, please?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2458, Your Honours.
25 MS. EDGERTON:
1 Q. I'd like now to move on to another area, and some months later in
2 the conflict, to document P2258, which is dated 27 March 1995. It was
3 65 ter 01684, and it should be a report you drafted on a meeting you
4 attended with Mr. Aguilar, General Smith, Professor Koljevic, and
5 Mr. Zametica.
6 Do you recognise -- or do you see the document on the screen in
7 front of you?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Who was Mr. Aguilar?
10 A. Enrique Aguilar was the person who succeeded Victor Andreev as
11 the delegate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and
12 the head of Civil Affairs for Bosnia, and he was, in that capacity, my
13 superior after the departure of Mr. Andreev.
14 Q. And this document refers to Mr. Zametica. Who did you understand
15 Mr. Zametica to be?
16 A. Jovan Zametica, according to my understanding, was essentially a
17 political advisor to the top Bosnian Serb leadership.
18 Q. Thank you. Now, at the very bottom of page 1 -- of paragraph 1,
19 we see:
20 "Koljevic was stark in his denunciation of Bosnian attacks, and
21 stated ..."
22 If we could go over to page 2.
23 "... that the Serb intention was now to pursue an end to the war
24 through military means."
25 You've alluded to the situation in March and April 1995 earlier
1 in your testimony, and I wonder if you could just, in that regard, put
2 this remark in context for us?
3 A. The Bosnian Serb authorities had objectives that they wanted to
4 accomplish through this war that we discussed earlier, and they had two
5 main avenues available to them to achieve those objectives, military and
6 political. And they, I think, would have preferred to get everything
7 they wanted through political means and not have to pay the price of war,
8 with their own soldiers dying, but their objectives were -- for the most
9 part, their key objectives were not changing or did not change. And when
10 they perceived that they could not achieve their aims through political
11 means, the avenue available to them was a military one. And in
12 March of 1995, at this time when the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
13 was breaking down, when the peace process was not producing results
14 favourable to them, with what was referred to earlier as the Serb-Serb
15 conflict, they perhaps saw their strategic position weakening, and
16 thought that if they were to achieve their objectives, they were going to
17 have to achieve them through military means, and probably sooner rather
18 than later.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Could we then go over to paragraph 6 of this
21 Q. You have contextualised this for us, and perhaps I can ask you a
22 question about the very last sentence in paragraph 6. You wrote:
23 "One got the impression from the meeting that Koljevic was
24 serving simply as a messenger, adding further credence to the suggestion
25 that the military is in the ascendancy at the expense of political
1 figures in Pale."
2 What did you mean by this remark?
3 A. The conflict, throughout its course, had ebbs and flows. There
4 were periods of time where the political process held out greater promise
5 for all parties that it might bring some resolution of the conflict, and
6 there were times when the political process was manifestly not able to
7 deliver on the parties' war aims. And depending upon the circumstances,
8 the political process was dominant, the military option or the military
9 conflict was dominant. There was always an element of both, but at
10 times, clearly, if, say, the political process was stalled, then the
11 parties were focused on either pursuing their aims through military
12 objectives or at least not losing ground, militarily.
13 In March 1995, at this time, with the political process not
14 delivering results, clearly stalled, then the parties or, in this case,
15 the Bosnian Serb parties, were -- the Bosnian Serb party was looking more
16 toward achieving its aims through military means, which meant the focus
17 was going to be on the Bosnian Serb Army, on how it was going to achieve
18 its objectives, how it was going to advance the objectives of the
19 Bosnian Serbs, and that meant that the military leadership was going to
20 be more dominant than the ones who would otherwise -- say the civilian
21 leaders who would be pursuing a political process. In the absence of a
22 political process, it's natural that the military leaders would be more
24 Q. Well, then, right at around this same time, and I could cite you
25 the paragraph 106 of your statement and a document which I don't need to
1 display, 65 ter 10618, you referred to Karadzic -- Dr. Karadzic appearing
2 in military uniform on 24 March in Lopare, and having seen a video report
3 of that. Given what you've said, do you attribute any significance to
4 Dr. Karadzic's change of garb into military uniform on that occasion?
5 A. I think his -- Dr. Karadzic's appearance in military uniform is
6 fully consistent with exactly what I was just describing, with the focus
7 turning more toward the military. With the focus on the military, that
8 had operational implications, but also psychological ones or morale ones
9 for the Bosnian Serb Army, for the Bosnian Serb people, and
10 Dr. Karadzic's appearance in military uniform, I think, was meant to send
11 a signal to his army, the people, as well as other involved parties, the
12 Bosnian Government, UNPROFOR, other observers, that they were headed down
13 the military path.
14 MS. EDGERTON: To finish off with this discussion, perhaps we
15 could play a short video-clip of about three minutes in length. It's
16 65 ter 45155. It's in Sanction, so there is a transcript available. And
17 I'm told by Mr. Reid that my colleagues have -- in the booth have been
18 given copies of the transcript as well.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Today, the president of
21 Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic, visited Lopare and Ugljevik, the
22 Podmajevica municipality situated in the immediate vicinity of the combat
23 activity zone which were attacked in the most recent Muslim offensive on
24 Majevica. While talking with people, leadership and military commanders,
25 Mr. Karadzic indicated the seriousness of the situation and our
1 determination to endure in these critical moments. In addition to the
2 analysis of the military situation, the actual situation at the
3 battlefield, the economic, political and executive power, and the life in
4 the combat environment were also discussed.
5 "Dear viewers, here, at the height of the Muslim offensive on the
6 Majevica, the president our republic is in Lopari, socialising with the
7 population and the people of the area. Mr. President, what are your
8 first impressions?"
9 "The impressions are that these people are cheerful and spirited,
10 and that they know what they want, and that they are adamant to defend
11 their country. It is the same in the army, the morale is excellent.
12 Equipment and the decisiveness bear no objection or reproach. On the
13 contrary, there has been a total, well-founded optimism, and I think we
14 could do something similar as we did when they attacked us from Bihac.
15 That is to say that, for us, Tuzla is no more a protected zone. It is a
16 stronghold and a headquarters of the 2nd Corps of the Muslim Army
17 wherefrom they advanced towards our territories to endanger the
18 Serbian Majevica, to endanger the relay, which, by the way, did not fall.
19 Therefore, the people need to know that. I believe that we now have all
20 the legitimate rights to return and to pursue the enemy up to, and if it
21 need to be so, Tuzla also."
22 "You are rarely in uniform. Hence, each uniform on you is a
23 warning that something serious is going on."
24 "Well, no, it's not that they are forcing us to put uniforms on.
25 If we put on uniforms, the whole of the nation will be putting them on,
1 if necessary. We are fighting up to a measure, a minimum one, to which
2 we consider it necessary to protect our interests. However, if they
3 force all of us to really put uniforms on and centralise the procurement,
4 even to proclaim a state of war, then there will be no cease-fire and
5 we'll go for the total destruction of our enemies. So far, we wanted to
6 enable this war to end in a draw. They obviously do not want it, and it
7 is our commitment now, our orientation, that the enemy must be destroyed
8 on the Majevica area first and foremost, and then further on towards our
9 territories. Finally, Tuzla also used to be ours, and there is no reason
10 for us to give it up."
11 "Since the whole world knows that it is the case, that it is
12 about a big offensive of the Muslim side, what did you, as supreme
13 commander, warn our commanders of?"
14 "Well, certain orders have been issued, and I was pleased to
15 notice yesterday, during the day, that they had been elaborated and
16 descended up to the corps command and further down there. Our army knows
17 precisely what they should do. The enemy who approached our positions
18 and tried breakthroughs should be destroyed, and we will not stop at it.
19 We have a legitimate right to a counter-offensive. The very important
20 thing is that the whole world has seen who broke the cessation of
21 hostilities. I would like to say to our viewers that the truce and the
22 cessation of hostilities considerably differ. A truce is being violated,
23 but a cessation of hostilities is an act that straightaway proceeds to
24 the signing of a total peace, that is to say, the end of the war. Even
25 that was not sacrosanct to the Muslims. They were using this truce,
1 cessation of hostilities to arm themselves, and at the moment when they
2 estimated that it did not suit them anymore, they breached it prudently.
3 The whole of the international community sees it, and now we can do
4 whatever we want and we will be pursuing them and destroying them."
5 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
6 For the record, the time code for this clip has stopped at
8 Q. Mr. Banbury, is this the video-clip you reported on?
9 A. Yes, I believe it is.
10 Q. Having heard now the English translation of the interview of
11 Dr. Karadzic, and -- having heard the English translation, do you have
12 any comment?
13 A. I noticed he referred -- Dr. Karadzic referred, early in the
14 clip, to the morale of the civilian population, as well as that of the
15 military, and I see that consistent with my earlier comments about the
16 purpose of Dr. Karadzic appearing in uniform. It was, in part, to
17 bolster the morale of the military and the civilian population, show
18 leadership at a difficult time, indicate that they are headed down a
19 certain course, and his comments about the conflict and how the Bosnian
20 Government or Bosnian Muslims, as was said, had decided on a course of
21 war; that the Bosnian Serbs were now going to defeat their enemy. So
22 it's all very consistent, I think.
23 Q. You referred earlier in your testimony to Dr. Karadzic as a
24 supreme commander, a man who straddled the political and military
25 spheres. Is this also consistent with your assessment in that regard?
1 A. Yes, and I think there were some comments in the clip that
2 indicated as much in terms of his -- he was referred to, I believe, in
3 the clip by the reporter as supreme commander, and then he made reference
4 to reviewing orders that had been passed down. So, yes, I think it is
5 also consistent.
6 MS. EDGERTON: Could this be the next Prosecution exhibit,
7 please, Your Honours?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2459, Your Honours.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
11 Your Honours, that concludes my examination-in-chief, and I would
12 like now to move into evidence all those associated exhibits which have
13 not otherwise been admitted.
14 JUDGE KWON: In your list, there are certain exhibits that have
15 already been admitted, such as Exhibit 2258, which we dealt with just
17 MS. EDGERTON: I think my colleague, the Registrar, has
18 identified three additional, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE KWON: Three additional. I noted two additional, so let's
20 find out.
21 The first one is 10616, which has been admitted as P2257, and
22 10652, which has been admitted as Exhibit D1034. Do you have anything
24 MS. EDGERTON: I didn't, Your Honour. I was relying on my
1 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
2 JUDGE KWON: And during your examination-in-chief, we admitted
3 09686, 10608, 10615, 10628, 10658, 10709, and 11172.
4 MS. EDGERTON: And this last video, yes.
5 JUDGE KWON: Which was not part of associated exhibits.
6 MS. EDGERTON: Quite so.
7 JUDGE KWON: And my last question: In relation to 11192 and
8 11193, do we have them in our e-court? I don't think they are, they
9 haven't been up-loaded yet.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for just a brief moment.
11 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
12 JUDGE KWON: They haven't.
13 MS. EDGERTON: I see, no, they have not. And, indeed, they will
14 be forthwith.
15 JUDGE KWON: Are there any objections from the Defence,
16 Mr. Robinson?
17 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE KWON: Then those that haven't been admitted will be
19 admitted and given a number by the Deputy. That's it.
20 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.
22 Mr. Karadzic, are you ready to start your cross-examination?
23 Very well.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
25 Good morning to all.
1 Welcome back, Excellency, welcome back to our midst.
2 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
3 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Banbury. First of all, I
4 would like to thank you for having been so kind as to meet up with the
5 Defence as well. Yesterday, we conducted an interview, and I hope that
6 that will make it possible for us to go through your testimony faster and
7 in an easier way.
8 First of all, I would like to ask you something briefly.
9 Let us recall the documents that you wrote for your -- or,
10 rather, drafted for your superiors. Am I right if I say that, as much as
11 possible, without stenographic notes, you wrote down what it was that
12 happened during the course of those meetings?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Thank you. The end of the document usually contains certain
15 assessments from the political and military aspects; right?
16 A. Yes, correct.
17 Q. Thank you. Who actually made these assessments?
18 A. In the documents that I drafted, I was the one who would prepare
19 the assessments. It depended. Sometimes, say, if there was a meeting in
20 Pale, and on the drive back to Sarajevo there may have been a discussion
21 in the vehicle on the significance of the meeting, and I would take away
22 some conclusions from that discussion with, say, my superior, and thus
23 incorporate his thoughts into the assessment. At other times, I simply
24 did it entirely on my own. My superior, who ultimately signed the
25 document, of course, had the ability to change the assessment, to change
1 elements of it, but normally the assessment that I initially drafted was
2 left largely, if not entirely, untouched.
3 Q. Thank you. So in the first part, although there were no
4 stenographic notes that were taken, were all the most important things
5 that were said during the course of meetings actually written up?
6 A. Yes, that was the -- my main or one of my main aims, to ensure
7 that the report accurately reflected the facts of the meeting, the main
8 points, the main discussion, in an objective way, yes.
9 Q. Thank you. So could we then say that the first part of a
10 document was the most objective one, and that the conclusion at the end
11 was somewhat less objective?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Thank you. The Prosecution expected you -- expected to introduce
14 many documents drafted or written by you, and to introduce them through
15 you. That will help both the Prosecution and the Trial Chamber, but that
16 gives me a task to differentiate between facts and opinions, impressions
17 and so on.
18 Would you agree that your comments, because we have the first
19 part of the document, which is the most objective one, then the
20 assessment at the end, which is somewhat less objective, would you agree
21 that your comments are even less objective; that by the very nature of
22 things, they have to be subjective?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you. Would you agree that we should always differentiate
25 between what you knew for certain, and mentioned as a fact, and what was
1 your assessment, or opinion, or impression, or belief?
2 A. Yes, I do recognise the important distinction between facts and
4 Q. Thank you. I have to say that you were always very correct when
5 you said -- when something that you stated was an impression, so this
6 will make our work easier.
7 And now, Mr. Banbury, I would like to focus on a subject, the
8 subject of ethnic cleansing. The following paragraphs of your statement
9 refer to it: 48 and 49, and then 60 through 63, and 87 through 89.
10 Would you agree with that?
11 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
12 Before that, I wonder if you have your statement before you,
13 Mr. Banbury.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE KWON: That's great, yes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will not comment on specific
17 paragraphs, but just so we know what is located where, in case we need
19 I would now ask for document 65 ter 1294. If we could please see
20 that in e-court.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Would you agree, Mr. Banbury, that the summer and fall of 1994
23 were marked by the work of the Contact Group? Do you remember that?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Thank you. Please have a look at this document, dated the
1 9th of September, 1994, in which HCA Vieira de Mello travelled to Pale,
2 where he held talks with the leadership of Republika Srpska. Can you
3 please have a look at this document a bit, the first page, and then we'll
4 move on to the second page.
5 Could we now please show the second page on the screen.
6 Due to a large number of documents, we have to skip the issues
7 that I'm not primarily interested in. But the document is available to
9 Can you please pay attention to paragraph 5:
10 [In English] "... HCA then called for the early re-opening the
11 airport routes, noting that their closure was raising concern over the
12 strangulation of Sarajevo and imposing hardship on the civilian
13 population ..."
14 [Interpretation] And so on.
15 Do you remember that you said today that I stated that the reason
16 for closing the airport was my wish to demonstrate who had control over
17 the airport?
18 A. Yes, I remember reference to that quote on VOA, that -- yes.
19 Q. All right. Do you know that we handed over the airport to the
20 United Nations so that they can use it?
21 A. I was not in Bosnia when the control of the airport was taken by
22 UNPROFOR. It's my understanding that there was a conflict over the
23 airport and UNPROFOR was able to take control, in part, because of
24 decisions made by the Bosnian Serb authorities.
25 Q. All right, we'll show the agreement and we did hand it over.
1 But please have a look at paragraph 6 now. It refers to ethnic
2 cleansing, and it says here:
3 [In English] "HCA then appealed to Karadzic to put an end to the
4 ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka and Bijeljina, and to make public his
5 intention to seize the criminal network, in accordance with assurances
6 given three weeks earlier to Akashi and himself. Karadzic confirmed,
7 both privately and in the public statements subsequently issued to the
8 press, that such practices did not reflect his policies, were damaging to
9 the Serb cause, that Bijeljina's police chief had been replaced, and that
10 two small independent gangs had been identified."
11 [Interpretation] Is that what you testified about today, and can
12 you see from this that certain names are mentioned of people who were
13 working with Muslims, making lists, or imposed tolls on them? Did you
14 know all this?
15 A. I'm sorry. I don't exactly understand the question. What are
16 you asking of me? Sorry.
17 Q. Can you confirm that we informed you, privately and through the
18 press, that we had replaced the police chief, not because he had done
19 something, but because he was not successful in preventing this from
20 happening? And you can see further down in paragraph 6 that this name is
21 mentioned, a person who may be acting under somebody else's instructions,
22 and that this was our position.
23 A. That was -- I confirm that was the stated position that you
24 passed on to Mr. de Mello in that meeting. That's what you said. That
25 accurately reflects what you said.
1 Q. Could you please have a look at something that's at the end of
2 paragraph 7, where it says that I agreed to allow local political
3 leaders, the Muslim political leaders, to travel to Sarajevo to meet
4 personally with Izetbegovic?
5 A. Yes, I see that.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Could this document be admitted, please?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1136, Your Honours.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Today, during examination-in-chief, you agreed -- or, rather,
12 stated that the problem of ethnic cleansing was present on all sides from
13 the very beginning; correct? That is to say, that it did not arise in
14 September or during the summer of 1994, but that it was a problem that
15 lasted much longer than that?
16 A. It's correct that the problem took -- was a problem throughout
17 the conflict and that there were population movements on all sides, yes.
18 Q. You also said that the Security Council condemned all sides, but
19 then, in continuation, you said, We would then warn the Serbian side.
20 Would you agree that the Security Council condemned all three sides for
21 such practices, but that you condemned and warned just the Serbian side?
22 I don't mean you, personally, but the UN.
23 A. The Security Council made very clear, through their resolutions
24 as well as presidential statements, that they condemned the practice of
25 ethnic cleansing, no matter who was responsible. And UNPROFOR, its
1 leadership, would, as a matter of policy and practice, condemn any
2 instances of ethnic cleansing over which they became aware and raise it
3 with authorities -- the senior authorities of the party responsible. So
4 I think it's really the case that when and if other parties to the
5 conflict were responsible for ethnic cleansing, UNPROFOR raised it with
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Could we now please see 1D0245 [as interpreted]. It is a
9 document that was issued on the eve of your arrival, but it refers to the
10 same subject. You arrived on the 9th or 10th of April. The date of this
11 document is the 2nd of April, but it talks about an ongoing problem;
13 Could we please see 1D02455.
14 JUDGE KWON: Before that, Mr. Karadzic: Mr. Banbury, and this is
15 para 6 of this document, Mr. Karadzic seemed to have been referring to
16 Arkan's gangs or something like that, which you refer to as elements akin
17 to Hong Kong mafia. Do you remember that?
18 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I don't believe the term "Hong Kong
19 mafia" was my term. I believe it was Dr. Karadzic's term.
20 JUDGE KWON: No, Dr. Karadzic.
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: But you stated that there were non-state authorities
23 acting in the area controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, paramilitary gangs,
24 who were criminal gangs that carried out just atrocities. What was your
25 basis to state -- to conclude in such a way?
1 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, there were -- I think it was well
2 established that there were paramilitary gangs, led by notorious figures,
3 some from Bosnia, some from Serbia proper, that carried out a range of
4 unpleasant activities in Bosnia. They were more dominant in the early
5 stages of the war than in the latter stages, but I think their existence
6 was not disputed. It was -- they were widely reported on through the
7 press, through UN reporting, complaints -- we received complaints about
8 them from Bosnian Government authorities or Croatian authorities. There
9 was witness testimony, victim testimony, about the activities of these
11 JUDGE KWON: My mistake.
12 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can we please zoom in.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. This is a letter from Prime Minister Dr. Vladimir Lukic. You can
17 see who this is addressed to. And now please have a look at the first
19 [In English] "We have received UNHCR report on the deteriorating
20 situation in Banja Luka. It is rather interesting that this is in the
21 first report of the minority status anywhere in the former B and H, and
22 even more interesting that UNHCR produced it to attract the attention of
23 the international community and the media. Unfortunately, it leaves us
24 in no doubt that the UN agency is becoming involved in the war against
25 the Serbs."
1 [Interpretation] And a bit down, a bit down:
2 [In English] "... UNHCR officials, it seems, do not check the
3 sources of the collected information, nor its contents, and uncritically
4 use statements of Bishop, Mufti, and Caritas representatives in the
5 field. They request the protection of the minorities, but they do not
6 seem to be interested in a number of criminal charges brought in the
7 region against individuals engaged in criminal activities of damaging the
8 property of Muslims or Croats."
9 [Interpretation] Were you aware that we arrested and prosecuted
10 elements who conducted themselves unlawfully towards the Muslims and the
12 A. I am not aware of the prosecutions -- arrests or prosecutions
13 that the Bosnian Serb authorities may have conducted against criminal
14 elements of this nature. No, I'm not aware of that.
15 Q. Thank you. And is this consistent with what I was saying about
16 this in September, before you, concerning the situation in Banja Luka and
17 the same topic?
18 A. Well, the -- your statements are consistent on this, in terms of
19 what you've just said, but the -- according to what I know or what I am
20 aware of, the main perpetrators of these acts, the leaders of these
21 gangs, they were not arrested or prosecuted. They were able to act with
22 impunity and carry on their activities over the course of a long period
23 of time. So the statements may be consistent. What I'm aware of, in
24 terms of what happened on the ground, is slightly different.
25 Q. You will be surprised, if you follow this trial to the end, to
1 know how many people we put behind bars.
2 Can we please see the following page.
3 The prime minister, Mr. Lukic, observes here that Louis Gentille
4 and the others -- actually, that there were 29 municipalities in the
5 Banja Luka region, and that whatever was going on in these remote and
6 poorly controlled municipalities was ascribed to Banja Luka, as if the
7 entire region was the town of Banja Luka, itself. And you can see here,
8 in the first paragraph, what social and refugee status the population in
9 the region had:
10 [In English] "It is absurd to raise the problem of jobs because
11 of -- the largest number of the population lost them, thanks to the care
12 of the international community to implement vigorous sanctions against
13 the Serbs."
14 [Interpretation] Therefore, it was the sanctions which caused
15 people to be dismissed. Then there was a huge number of refugees who
16 came to that region, and there were objections that the Croats and
17 Muslims were not being employed, which later on produced something that
18 you noticed. It was a reason for them to request to leave.
19 Please have a look at the second paragraph now, which says:
20 [In English] "... especially that not even a word has been said
21 on the situation of the Serbs in Sarajevo. We know that by now some
22 7.000 Serbs have been liquidated by Muslim militias in Sarajevo. Not a
23 single Serb is allowed to leave Sarajevo without the permission of Muslim
24 authorities ..."
25 [Interpretation] And somewhat lower down, the last paragraph:
1 [In English] "... political involvement of international
2 humanitarian agencies may have foreseen consequences, and it represents a
3 direct interference in the negotiating process that should bring
4 political solution to the former B and H and Yugoslavia."
5 [Interpretation] In the midst of negotiations about the
6 Contact Group plan, a secret Muslim organisation in Banja Luka was
7 preparing an uprising and launched information, and the UNHCR then
8 accepted this and obstructed the implementation of the Contact Group
10 Were you aware of the existence of this Muslim organisation in
11 Banja Luka at the time which was doing all this?
12 A. No, I'm unaware of that group or activity.
13 Q. All right. We will prove this over time.
14 And do you remember that always during conferences or important
15 meetings, there were deteriorations which were aimed at obstructing or at
16 least influencing the particular conference or the development that was
17 happening at the time?
18 A. I believe it was often the case that different parties to the
19 conflict, in advance of an important meeting or conference, would try to
20 influence the situation to their advantage in using different means, yes.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Could we have this admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?
24 MS. EDGERTON: I think there's enough there, Your Honour. No
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1137, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can we now see 1D2737, please.
5 On the following day, you will see what my reaction was, and it
6 was distributed to all organs that it had to do with. We also have the
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Please have a look at this document and read where I say I
10 order -- it says here I order to all the authorities and all check-points
11 that this can refer to, and I especially emphasise the need to shed light
12 on the crimes committed in Prijedor. You can see the points there. Let
13 me not read it all out. Everyone can see that:
14 "Take all the necessary measures. Remove all administrative
15 obstacles. Provide a police escort for International Red Cross convoys.
16 All our authorities are obliged to ensure complete safety for the
17 International Red Cross personnel."
19 "The failure to carry out this order or its incomplete execution
20 will entail the strictest consequences."
21 Mr. Banbury, is this consistent with what I told you and your
22 associates during these negotiations and meetings?
23 A. The document here is consistent with your statement that was
24 referred to in the previous code cable.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Can this be admitted, please?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1138, Your Honours.
4 MS. EDGERTON: If I may.
5 In regard to this document, I just note, actually, two different
6 signature blocks. It suggests to me that they aren't necessarily
7 translations of one another --
8 JUDGE KWON: I think that --
9 MS. EDGERTON: -- but an English and Srpski version of this same
10 document written for consumption of a wide audience.
11 JUDGE KWON: I take it that the English version was the original
12 one, copied to ICRC at that time. Do you like both of them admitted as
13 separate exhibits?
14 MS. EDGERTON: I'm just trying to figure out a good way to track
15 them, and I'm just not sure if that --
16 JUDGE KWON: So that's reflected in the transcript.
17 MS. EDGERTON: At least, yes.
18 JUDGE KWON: We will admit it as Exhibit D1138. Yes, leave them
19 as they are, yeah.
20 Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Could we now please see 1D3477. I hope that this is the only
23 document of the 150 or 200 which has not been translated, but it only
24 shows how this order of mine was implemented at the level of the army.
25 This is a telegram from the Ministry of Defence. It says on
1 top -- if you can please show the top, it says "The Ministry of Defence,
2 Banja Luka." If we can see the fax line, please. The Ministry of
3 Defence. It's the 3rd of April, and the telegram sent in the usual code,
4 urgently encoded. The same document is distributed. It's verbatim. So
5 my previous order was now turned into their order and distributed in the
7 Item 1:
8 "Take all investigative measures to shed light on crimes,
9 especially in Prijedor."
10 Item 2:
11 "Take all other measures."
12 Number 3:
13 "Remove all administrative obstacles."
14 And so on and so forth. Everything is exactly the same.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. So would you agree that this was prompt action on the part of the
17 Ministry of Defence because this was distributed on the very same day?
18 A. I don't speak Serbo-Croat, so I don't know the contents of the
19 document. But assuming it's as you described, then, yes, I would
20 certainly agree it's prompt action.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can we have this admitted as MFI until such time when we have the
23 translation ready?
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
25 MS. EDGERTON: There's a CLSS translation.
1 JUDGE KWON: Excellent.
2 Yes, that will be Exhibit D1139.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Could we now please see D705. It has been admitted, so just to
5 have a look at it briefly. To show the document to the witness,
6 actually. D705, please.
7 We are still in the month of April, and we are dealing with
8 similar issues. Mr. Akashi sends this telegram to Annan and Stoltenberg
9 on the 7th of April.
10 Can we please have a look at page 3 of this document.
11 Paragraph 10, let us please focus on that:
12 [In English] "In response to my request that the ICRC be allowed
13 to evacuate Muslims from Prijedor, Dr. Karadzic said that the situation
14 in Prijedor was an unfortunate development for the Serbs. While he
15 accepted that the situation could have been predicted (he noted that
16 civilians in the town had, at the beginning of the war, slaughtered each
17 other), he maintained that the present situation had been prompted by a
18 Muslim massacre of six Serb policemen from the town. Currently,
19 additional forces have been sent to the town to stabilise the situation,
20 and he had initially agreed to the ICRC request to evacuate individuals
21 who feared for their lives, based on the belief that the numbers
22 concerned were minimum. However ..."
23 [Interpretation] Could we move to the next page, please, and this
24 continuation you can read:
25 [In English] "However, the ICRC then indicated that they intended
1 to evacuate 80 truckloads of people at one go, and this was unacceptable.
2 He had," means Radovan Karadzic, "he had no objection to them evacuating
3 up to five trucks of people a day (approximately 100 people), as this
4 would allow those left behind to reconsider their situation in light of
5 the stabilised conditions in the town."
6 [Interpretation] And can you please look at this paragraph 12,
7 which speaks about ethnic cleansing and the violation of human rights,
8 and that it would need to stop and so on and so forth. And then Karadzic
10 "... that he would welcome my visit to Banja Luka and proposed
11 that the deputy prime minister of the interior, based in Banja Luka, be
12 the host of my trip. If possible, and if he were available, he would
13 also accompany me on my visit."
14 [Interpretation] The last sentence:
15 [In English] "He further noted that the extremists in Banja Luka
16 were difficult to control, and he hoped that my visit would discourage
17 them from future abuses in the area."
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you agree that you were also aware that a large number of
20 Serbs from Cazinska Krajina had fled to Banja Luka, also from
21 Central Bosnia, and there had to have been people among them who were not
22 familiar to the local police?
23 A. Yes, yes.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. This document is
25 already admitted. I just wanted to show it to the witness.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Does this also comport with your experiences about what I was
3 saying at meetings that you already attended or were already there for?
4 A. I think the date of that cable was April 7th, 1994. And I was
5 deployed on April 9th, so this -- these discussions were happening just
6 as I was arriving, so it's hard for me to -- you know, I don't have
7 personal experience of that meeting or I didn't prepare that code cable.
8 I'm reading it, and I -- I think it's an UNPROFOR document, and I think
9 it reflects what was discussed.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Can we now have D471. It's also a document that's been admitted.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. And while we're waiting, Mr. Banbury, I'm going to tell you about
14 our position on the events, especially those relating to the conferences.
15 It is our assertion that it was not only the local population
16 that was afraid, but also the central Muslim leadership issued
17 instructions to create certain crises and to have the population move
18 out, especially coinciding with certain conferences. Does this sound
19 familiar to you?
20 A. I'm unaware of that practice on the part of the
21 Bosnian Government authorities.
22 Q. Can you just please look at this document, then. We also have a
23 translation. This is the SDA, Party of Democratic Action, the main
24 Muslim party, and the document states in the first paragraph:
25 "As the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the security
1 point of view, is becoming more and more complex, especially after the
2 acceptance of the Geneva documents by Karadzic and his clique in Pale, it
3 is necessary, for the purpose of realising the aspiration of all Muslims,
4 the preservation and strengthening of our state of Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina, to undertake urgently the following measures in the Trebinje
7 And then the demands are listed here: to leave the municipality,
8 as a group, in an organised manner in order to create a crisis; and the
9 SDA also says that they were supposed to report in Montenegro to the
10 Merhamet and the Liberal Association of Montenegro. This is an authentic
11 document of the SDA party, creating a crisis in Trebinje.
12 Do you know that there were no killings in Trebinje, for the most
13 part - this is the 20th of January, 1993 - and that we were proud of the
14 fact that Trebinje managed to preserve its multi-ethnic character?
15 A. If the question is was I aware that there were no killings of
16 Bosnian Muslims in Trebinje in January 1993, I don't know the history
17 well enough. I'm not familiar with the particular circumstances in
18 Trebinje at that time.
19 Q. And do you remember that we would inform you at meetings that
20 Muslims were creating certain incidents and making moves that were making
21 the situation more difficult? Do you recall that we did mention Muslim
22 tricks and that you often wrote that down in your notes and reports?
23 A. Yes, I do recall that, on multiple occasions, the Bosnian Serb
24 authorities informed the UNPROFOR leadership that the Bosnian Government
25 or Bosnian Muslims were conducting tricks, so to speak, in order to
1 deceive UNPROFOR, the international community. And we did take note of
2 your warnings in that regard, yes.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can we now have 1D3439, please.
5 MS. EDGERTON: That document shouldn't be displayed, and it
6 should be used only in private session if it's going to be used.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just look at the last page,
9 please. And if necessary, we need to go into private session. It's not
10 even necessary to see to whom I said it. We just need to see what I said
11 and what is reported in the document. The parties can look at the
13 Can we look at the last part -- the page of the document, and the
14 parties need not see which document it is.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. All right. Can you look at paragraph 30, please:
17 [In English] "Karadzic said there was no --"
18 MS. EDGERTON: If Dr. Karadzic is going to quote from the
19 document, we should be doing this in private session.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought perhaps just the last
21 sentence that relates to Trebinje, without referencing the occasion, when
22 I said it and to whom I said it. But if it has to be in private session,
23 then, all right.
24 But let's look at the last sentence of paragraph 30. Can we all
25 look at that, and really that does not reveal anything to anybody, and it
1 can be put in the transcript as confirmation of what I am saying. May I
2 read the last sentence.
3 [In English] "... referring to his letter --"
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if you are going to refer to a
5 specific passage in this document, we go into private session. Let's do
7 We go into private session.
8 [Private session]
11 Page 13372 redacted. Private session.
10 [Open session]
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are now in open session.
12 MS. EDGERTON: That document's not being broadcast, is it?
13 JUDGE KWON: No.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Okay.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Banbury, do you agree that these words of mine reiterate that
17 we had always been proud of the multi-ethnic character of Trebinje? And
18 do you agree that we warned about this pattern of trickery, war trickery,
19 during the war, particularly, let's say, in light of the document that we
20 showed earlier?
21 A. I agree that the document you showed earlier included a reference
22 to your statement of pride of the multi-ethnic character of Trebinje, and
23 I agree that you and other senior officials of the Bosnian Serb authority
24 did warn UNPROFOR on -- at times that the Muslim authorities or the
25 Bosnian Government was conducting tricks or attempts to deceive UNPROFOR
1 about various issues, including with respect to reasons for ethnic
2 cleansing or sources of attacks.
3 Q. I would like us to shed a little bit of light on this.
4 At the point in time when this was told to me, without having the
5 document of the SDA, would you agree that I did not deny or reject the
6 possibility that that was so, and that I had promised that I would do
7 something about it? And would you recall that on several occasions, I
8 did accept the possibility, and that we would do something about it
9 without accepting that it was really so?
10 A. The document referred to earlier refers to events in
11 January 1993, which is about 15 months before my arrival, and I did not
12 have time to really read the document. So I can, again, agree that the
13 document referred to your statement expressing pride for the multi-ethnic
14 character of Trebinje, and I again acknowledge or agree that you, as well
15 as other senior officials of the Bosnian Serb authorities, on multiple
16 occasions told UNPROFOR -- warned UNPROFOR that the Bosnian authorities
17 were attempting to deceive us in different ways.
18 Q. Thank you. And do you remember the crisis about Banja Luka and
19 Bijeljina, and also the fact that I didn't deny that it happened until I
20 found out what exactly happened? Would you agree that our approach was
21 not to deny anything, but to say, All right, we're going to carry out an
22 investigation to see what happened?
23 A. I -- having read the previous couple documents, I agree that
24 those documents say that. I was not personally involved in those events
25 or those meetings, or those documents -- the preparation of those
1 documents, so it's -- I agree, but only based on the display of the
2 documents here and me reading passages from them.
3 Q. And do you allow for the possibility -- we saw at the meeting of
4 the 9th of September, 1994. Do you accept or do you allow for the
5 possibility that similar instructions were issued to Muslims in
6 Banja Luka and Bijeljina?
7 A. I don't know whether they were or they weren't. It's, in theory,
8 possible. I wouldn't necessarily know if it had happened. I'm unaware.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Now I'm going to show a document that served as the basis for
11 regular permissions for the population to relocate. This is a document
12 from 1992.
13 Can we look at 1D251 now, please.
14 Can we admit the previous document?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1140, under seal, Your Honours.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Under seal, isn't it?
18 Can we look at 1D251 now, please.
19 MS. EDGERTON: The previous document being the one that the
20 witness wasn't asked any related question on?
21 JUDGE KWON: I think, yes. So you are objecting to the admission
22 of that document?
23 MS. EDGERTON: I don't think the witness was asked a single
24 question related to that document whatsoever. The question was about
25 something to do with Trebinje.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may respond.
2 I asked about the pattern, and the witness confirmed that we did
3 warn about the pattern. And the document explains the previous document
4 by the Party of Democratic Action, so there's a double connection.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE KWON: In the context, we find the document to be relevant.
7 On that basis, we admit it.
8 Let us move on.
9 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Banbury, you, yourself, said during our interview that you
12 were mostly informing yourself about documents that were drafted before
13 your time and that served as the basis for the presence of the
14 United Nations in Bosnia, particularly documents such as agreements whose
15 duration was not -- was unlimited.
16 This is a document that talks about the treatment towards
17 citizens who wanted to change their place of residence. This is an
18 agreement that was signed by the parties, by representatives of all the
19 parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even those from Croatia. Actually,
20 no, it was from the Croatian Democratic Union, and this is a document
21 from the 30th of October, 1992. If necessary, we can look at the Serbian
22 version also.
23 And can we please move to page 2 of this document.
24 This is something that was created at the prompting of the
25 International Red Cross. We're looking at paragraph 3 now:
1 [In English] "... recalling that the presence of civilians may be
2 used to render certain areas immune from military operations."
3 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. This is all the
5 And now item 1:
6 [In English] "Civilians who desire to leave temporarily the
7 territory controlled by one party to reach the territory controlled by
8 another party should be entitled to do so."
9 [Interpretation] We can skip 2. Everybody can look at that for
11 And then paragraph 3:
12 [In English] "The civilians should be able to leave in an
13 organised transfer under international supervision and, if necessary,
14 protection. Its security will be guaranteed by each party on the
15 territory it controls."
16 [Interpretation] Item 4:
17 [In English] "Each party to the conflict guarantees to those who
18 leave temporarily the territory it controls:
19 "A) that their goods, assets and belongings will be respected and
21 "B) that they have a right to return home at a later stage if
22 they wish so."
23 [Interpretation] And can we have the last page so that we can
24 look at the signatures. And we can also look at the last paragraph.
25 It's not necessary to read it.
1 It states here that that is a vulnerable group and they would
2 have international assistance, including the ICRC. And then we have four
3 parties that are signatories here.
4 This is not a document of the United Nations, but does this
5 document of the ICRC shed some light on certain transfers?
6 A. This document, again, was written well before my arrival,
7 October 1992. It's my understanding that the provisions contained in the
8 document for the terms of transfers were not regularly respected and they
9 do not characterise the nature of population movements in Bosnia during
10 the war.
11 Q. And if I were to tell you, Mr. Banbury, that it was only the
12 Serbian side that provided escorts to civilians who wanted to temporarily
13 relocate, and that the Muslim side expelled Serbs with only a bundle in
14 their hands and with shots, what would you say to that?
15 A. There are two parts to that.
16 On the issue of provision of security for Muslims who were
17 departing Bosnian Serb-controlled area, yes, I'm aware that was the -- at
18 times, the case, often the case. I believe that is, in large part,
19 because the departure of those civilians was an objective that was
20 pursued by the Bosnian Serb authorities, and the Bosnian Serb authorities
21 wanted those people to leave, so they escorted them out. I'm unaware of,
22 for instance, any time where private interviews by an impartial
23 international body were conducted to determine the voluntary nature of
24 those departures.
25 In terms of the second part of the conditions under which Serbs
1 departed Bosnian Government-controlled area, I think those -- there were
2 so many instances of that, and the conditions varied from -- according to
3 circumstances. And I know that there were very unpleasant conditions
4 under which Serbs were forced or pressured to depart
5 Bosnian Government-controlled area, and I'm also aware that there were
6 very regularised departure of Bosnian Serbs from government-controlled
7 areas. So I think the circumstances varied quite a bit.
8 Q. The last question before the break, and I must note here,
9 Mr. Banbury - I believe, that is - after confirming what you knew, you
10 expressed your belief, and this is what is presenting problems to the
11 Defence and something that we must test. Did you have evidence of that
12 or was that a belief?
13 Can you please look at what I said in the previous document. It
14 was D705, in relation to Prijedor:
15 [In English] "He had no objections to them evacuating up to five
16 trucks of people a day, as this would allow those left behind to
17 reconsider their situation in light of the stabilised conditions in the
19 [Interpretation] It was not the state policy for them to leave,
20 but for the situation to stabilise and to stop the reasons why they
21 wished to leave in the first place. And does this paragraph 10 confirm
22 that without any doubt, without any "I believe," just about what it is
23 that we know?
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it would be very difficult, not only
25 for the witness but for the Bench as well, to follow without seeing the
1 document. Yes.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this document? And
3 then we can just confirm it, call it up.
4 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, we are at -- I take it he is talking
5 about 1D251 --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's the document. Can
7 we --
8 JUDGE KWON: Let's deal with it at the end. So why don't we put
9 your question in relation to this document, which is D705.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the following page,
11 please, paragraph 10. It begins here with this page. Here, we have the
12 next page.
13 JUDGE KWON: This is Mr. Akashi's report concerning his meeting
14 with Mr. Karadzic.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. So regardless of the belief, what is expressed here is our
17 attempt not to evacuate 80 trucks, but 5 trucks, even though we were
18 forced to do that as well. We were opposed to that. You will see later
19 that we objected to that, but the reason was for the rest to have time to
20 review their situation so that they would stay in town.
21 Does this document not say that, explicitly?
22 A. This document says that, yes.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Your Excellencies, can we take the break now, if that is your
25 decision, and can we admit the previous document?
1 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, what about 1D251?
2 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I got a little bit
3 confused between which document we were referring to, and I thought this
4 was all about D705. Could I just --
5 JUDGE KWON: No, 1D251, ICRC document. I'm not sure --
6 MS. EDGERTON: Could I answer you after the break, please,
7 Your Honour?
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
9 We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at five past 1.00.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 1.06 p.m.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I have to address you
15 in relation to the time allocated for this witness.
16 The Prosecution, understandably, had the ambition to have this
17 witness authenticate the documents that he authored. However, in
18 addition to the subjective assessments at the end of these documents, in
19 this statement he provided an enormous number of his interpretations
20 based on impressions, beliefs, certain psychological characteristics as
21 well. So each and every one of these words, if it is treated as
22 evidence, requires the Defence to shed more light on that or, rather, to
23 illuminate it and see that even some other UN documents contest what he
25 If the number of words for the final brief and final arguments
1 were not limited, we could deal with it that way. However, believe me,
2 within six hours we cannot indicate everything that is erroneous and
3 unacceptable as a personal interpretation of the man who was actually
4 writing all of that down, who was not an expert, who presents his own
5 views. These are minor alterations.
6 You will see today, when we go on working, for example, he says
7 that Mladic acknowledged to have fired at civilians, although he did not
8 acknowledge that. He acknowledged that there were snipers there who were
9 legitimate, that is, legal.
10 So there are minor matters like that that have mega consequences,
11 as it were. So the Trial Chamber will either neglect his comments or I
12 should be given time to illuminate all of this with him.
13 Thank you.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, six hours is still a long time, a
15 sufficient time to cover important matters. I'll give you an example
16 that you are not spending your time efficiently.
17 We admitted Exhibit D1139, which was prompted -- which is a
18 Ministry of Defence order which was prompted by your order, which was
19 Exhibit D1138. There was no need for you to show the -- this first
20 document to the witness, which could be admitted as a bar table motion or
21 which could be tendered through another witness. That's a minor example.
22 But at this moment, the Chamber is not minded to give you an
23 extension of the time allotted for this witness, so please concentrate on
24 the efficient use of your time.
25 Ms. Edgerton, shall we discuss the admission of the previous
2 MS. EDGERTON: Oh, yes. No objection, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
4 In the meantime, let's bring in the witness.
5 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D1141, Your Honours.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just recall that there are
7 214 paragraphs, and each and every one of them requires further
8 illumination, and that really puts a great deal of difficulties before
10 [The witness takes the stand]
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So the previous document has been
14 admitted; right?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3459.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Banbury, I would like to put this to you, the continuity of
19 the documents that regulate the treatment of civilians, the continuity of
20 documents that were worked on. The previous one was done with the
21 Red Cross, and this one with the co-chairman of the conference, those who
22 took over from Lord Carrington, the Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina
23 on the 27th of August, 1992. I would like to draw your attention to
24 these paragraphs that have been marked, where it says how civilians
25 should be treated; that they should not be detained in any way.
1 Look at D, repatriation to areas under the control of their
2 respective ethnic authorities.
3 Can we have the next page, please.
4 Choosing to stay temporarily in the area of detention; relocation
5 in areas away from the conflict under international supervision; and
6 temporary refuge in third countries.
7 Can we go down a bit, can we scroll down?
8 And look at 3.3. It reiterates:
9 "That refugees and displaced persons should be allowed to return
10 voluntarily and safely to their places of origin."
11 Can we have the next page, please.
12 Let's look at number 7:
13 [In English] "That all such actions should be in accordance with
14 the agreement with the parties reached in Geneva on 22nd May under the
15 auspices of the ICRC."
16 [Interpretation] So already at the beginning of the war, one
17 month into the war, the sides signed an agreement, stating how the
18 civilians will be treated, referring to their right to temporarily cross
19 to another territory. I believe that we're going to find that document,
20 too, of the 22nd.
21 And please have a look at B:
22 [In English] "That no party can be expected to give guarantees of
23 security on behalf of the other parties to the conflict."
24 [Interpretation] Do you remember, Mr. Banbury, that both the
25 Muslim and the Serb sides were so close, in terms of the lines in
1 Sarajevo, that both could fire at aircraft?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. So much for guarantees.
4 Do you agree that one should take into account all of these
5 agreements, in terms of the temporary relocation of the population, at
6 their own request and in an organised way?
7 A. I'm sorry. Could you repeat the question, please?
8 Q. Do you agree that one should bear in mind all of these agreements
9 that are a basis for the treatment of civilians in this civil war?
10 A. Yes, I do absolutely agree that all the signed commitments should
11 be taken into account, and I believe UNPROFOR did take them into account.
12 One of our great frustrations was that on many occasions, commitments
13 entered into in the course of political discussions were not respected in
14 practice. So I think it is important to differentiate between
15 commitments that were undertaken by -- voluntarily undertaken by the
16 parties, commitments that were imposed upon them through international
17 humanitarian law, the Security Council resolutions, and the practice of
18 the parties, and there were differences.
19 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that from the point of view of criminal
20 law, it should be established beyond any doubt whether someone was forced
21 to leave or whether someone had asked to relocate?
22 JUDGE KWON: It is not for the witness to answer that question,
23 Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Can this document be admitted?
1 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?
2 MS. EDGERTON: One has to look rather hard to find a link between
3 the document and the question put to the witness, actually, Your Honour.
4 But certainly it's an authentic document, and on that basis I wouldn't
6 JUDGE KWON: I'm still wondering whether or not you had to
7 present -- show this document to the witness in order to put that
8 question, but we'll admit that.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1142, Your Honours.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Banbury, the Muslim side managed to convince you that they
12 were in favour of a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina; right? And to this
13 day, you remain so convinced, and you speak of that in paragraph 204 of
14 your statement?
15 A. I believed at the time and I believe now that it was the official
16 policy and goal of the Bosnian Government to have a multi-ethnic state,
18 Q. This is what I would like to put to you: that at secret meetings
19 with the representatives of Croatia, the Muslim side said that they
20 wanted to expel Serbs from Bosnia, and that the Croats informed the
21 Americans about that. And now I'm going to show another document to you
22 where Ganic says this to President Tudjman.
23 127, 1D127, can I have that, please? Thank you.
24 Please take a look. This is a record of a meeting, or a
25 transcript of a meeting, between President Tudjman and Ejub Ganic.
1 Please look at page 23 now. In English, it is page 4 in e-court.
2 This is what Ganic is saying:
3 "Mr. President, maybe I'm unrealistic, but I think that the
4 strengthening of the Federation would marginalise the Serbian entity, in
5 particular, if you understand what I'm saying."
6 Can we have the next page? In English, it is still page 4.
7 This last paragraph down here, Ganic is saying:
8 "You know what the world will allow us to do. We can marginalise
9 the Serbs in Bosnia."
10 Can we have page 29? In English, it is page 4. We still have
11 page 4 in English.
12 "Another thing, allow us to arm more, to agree to allow us to
13 receive more weapons. We have a population that is ready for war. What
14 do you think about that? Do you believe Americans or Germans ..."
15 Et cetera. And, Mr. Banbury, that is happening on the
16 29th of April, 1995.
17 The translation is as I had put it, that we would push into war.
18 That is what the original actually says, and that is as I had said it, we
19 would push a generation into war.
20 So, Mr. Banbury, is this in line with our suspicions regarding
21 the intentions of the Muslims vis-a-vis the Serbs? We told you, the UN,
22 about that as well. The Muslims wanted to have a Bosnia without
23 Christians; first of all, without any Serbs, and then without any Croats
24 either. And see here, this is proof of that. To marginalise the Serbs
25 has become a state project, because this man is the vice-president of the
1 Muslim Presidency and he is the number-one man for running the army of
2 the Bosnian entity.
3 A. I'm sorry, Dr. Karadzic. Was that a question?
4 Q. Were you aware of this? Was it not the case that we kept telling
5 you about our fears in relation to the intentions of the Muslims? Does
6 this fit with our trepidation as to what was awaiting us?
7 A. Before I answer, could I just ask for a clarification? What was
8 the date of this meeting, please? I didn't notice it when you put on the
9 cover page. I'm sorry.
10 Q. The 29th of April, 1995. We can go back to the first page so
11 that you can see.
12 A. Okay, thank you.
13 The statement by Mr. Ganic quoted in the document, that it was
14 their intention to marginalise the Serbs, I don't know what he meant by
15 "marginalise." That term can mean many different things. But it was
16 certainly the case that there was a federation signed between the Bosnian
17 Muslims and the Bosnian Croats and that that two-party federation was,
18 de facto, aligned against the Bosnian Serbs. And certainly you and other
19 Bosnian Serb leaders did provide UNPROFOR officials with various kinds of
20 warnings or statements that the Bosnian Government, the Bosnian Muslims,
21 wanted to dominate the Serbs, or mistreat the Serbs, or do other things
22 along those lines, so you did provide that -- those kinds of warnings at
23 times, yes.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Can this be admitted, or, rather, the parts that I have read out,
1 or all of it, perhaps, the entire document?
2 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, this is actually a document in its
3 original language of more than 40 pages. As far as I understand these
4 materials, just from having been here a long time, it's a transcript --
5 purports to be a transcript of meetings held over the course of a full
6 day at President Tudjman's office. I would like to reserve our argument
7 on that or take no position on that until such time as we have a
8 translation. We have only very small translations of selected excerpts,
9 and it seems to me that given the parties, given the context, and given
10 the length of time this recording covers, it would be only useful for us
11 to have a translation to appreciate the context.
12 JUDGE KWON: I think the meeting was just about an hour.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Sorry, I stand corrected.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification for the time being,
16 and we'll decide -- make our determination after having heard from
17 Ms. Edgerton. We give the number.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D1143, Your Honours.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Q. As regards the intentions of the Serb side, you had quite a few
21 beliefs and quite a few impressions, but what you did know was -- well,
22 let us focus on what you did know.
23 In paragraphs 35 through 39, and 56 through 59, you spoke about
24 peace plans, and you repeated a few times that Serbs wanted peace, but on
25 their own terms; isn't that right?
1 A. Yes. I haven't looked at my statement, but, yes, I know that
2 that's something that I had said and was reflected in my statement
3 somewhere, yes.
4 Q. Paragraph 19 in the statement, and then 35 through 39, and
5 56 through 59, state what it was that we wanted; negotiations, plans, and
6 so on. At one point, you said that we wanted more than 50 per cent of
7 Bosnia; right?
8 A. I believe that is correct.
9 Q. Thank you. Now, did you attend any one of these conferences
10 during the war?
11 A. Sorry. Which conferences?
12 Q. Peace conferences, those that discussed the peace plan that was
13 supposed to be adopted.
14 A. I never attended any formal international peace conferences for
15 Bosnia. I was present in many Contact Group meetings or meetings of
16 Contact Group representatives and other meetings with senior officials of
17 the parties, where peace talks or elements of a peace agreement were
18 discussed. But in terms of an international conference, I don't -- there
19 was the -- there were hardly any conferences that took place by the time
20 I got there, so, no, I did not.
21 Q. Do you believe that we accepted, very early on, that we would
22 agree to less than 50 per cent? For example, at the very start, at the
23 Lisbon Conference, we accepted that we would have 44 per cent. Do you
24 remember that?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Also, during the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, we accepted that the
2 Muslims would have 33.5 per cent and the Croats 35.7 -- or, rather, 17.5,
3 which would make up 51 per cent altogether?
4 A. Yes.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly look at
6 65 ter 17686.
7 This is a letter dated the 8th of July, 1994. It's from the
8 Secretary-General, and it's addressed to the president of the
9 Security Council. It has to do with plans.
10 Now, can we look at page 12, please. Actually, page 13 in
12 I would kindly ask all the participants to have a look at this.
13 I'm going to read it in English:
14 [In English] "In paragraph 12 of the report submitted to the
15 Security Council on 29th of December, 1993, by the co-chairmen of the
16 Steering Committee (S/26922), the stage which peacemaking efforts in
17 respect of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had reached was
18 summarised as follows:"
19 [Interpretation] And now this is what it says here: that there's
20 going to be a union of three republics, Bosnia would be a union of three
21 republics; and the Muslim-majority republic would have 33.3 per cent, and
22 the Croats would have 17.5 per cent. And then look further on; that this
23 republic would have access to the sea, and the discussions between
24 Silajdzic and Krajisnik would continue on territorial delimitation.
25 And then 46 says that on the 18th and 19th of January, a map was
1 proposed by the Bosnian Serbs, offering the Muslim-majority republic
2 33.56 per cent, while the Bosnian Croats would get 17.5 per cent. And
3 Izetbegovic made it known that that was what they had been offered.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. So do you not see that the Muslim side also wanted to have access
6 to the sea, and they thought they were entitled to it?
7 A. Yes, I agree that the Bosnian Government authorities, the
8 authorities in Sarajevo, wanted access to the sea, yes.
9 Q. And do you remember that Lord Owen said in public - we even have
10 the recording somewhere here - that this was the first time that an army
11 which was not defeated would cede such a large territory; it was not
12 defeated, but for the sake of peace, it was willing to cede such big
13 territory, so from 70 per cent to 49 per cent?
14 A. I am not familiar, offhand, with Lord Owen's statement to that
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Can this document, which originates from the UN, be admitted?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Just so that the record is straight, this is not a
20 letter that has to do with plans, as Dr. Karadzic said. It's the report
21 of the co-chairmen of the Steering Committee of the activities of the
22 International Conference on the former Yugoslavia.
23 JUDGE KWON: Right.
24 Yes, that will be admitted.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1144, Your Honours.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Q. As we can see, the conference was continuing. Do you agree that
3 there was not a single day when some conference or other was not ongoing?
4 If I may remind you, in late 1991 and early 1992, the
5 Cutileiro -- or, rather, the Carrington-Cutileiro Conference started, and
6 it was ongoing until the 22nd of August, 1992, when Owen and Stoltenberg
7 took over -- or, rather, they took over in late 1993. And then in early
8 1994 -- or, rather, in spring 1994, it was the Contact Group Plan, and
9 finally there was the Dayton Agreement. Would you agree with that?
10 A. I agree that there were those distinct processes that were
11 undertaken in pursuit of peace in Bosnia, yes.
12 Q. Thank you. And I suppose you agree that before the war and
13 without the war, the European Community, as it was then called, used
14 mediators, such as Carrington and Cutileiro, and proposed through them
15 three ethnic republics in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is known as the
16 Lisbon Agreement or the Cutileiro Plan?
17 A. I'm vaguely familiar with that plan. I was not working on Bosnia
18 issues, as I indicated, until April 1994. Upon starting that work, I did
19 familiarise myself with agreements that -- prior agreements or
20 discussions that had a significant impact on the current-day events,
21 April 1994 and afterwards events, but I'm not an expert on what happened
22 politically before that period.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. For your information,
24 all three sides accepted this agreement, and had the Muslims not rejected
25 it later on, there would have been no war and we would have had less than
1 49 per cent. But you can see that in the United Nations document.
2 Can we now please see --
3 MS. EDGERTON: Is there a question? Is there a question about
4 all three sides accepting this agreement; you know, what Dr. Karadzic has
5 just offered to us?
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, refrain from making statements, or put
7 your question to the witness.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I can just add a question
9 mark at the end, because Mr. Banbury continued to carry out certain
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. So did you know that on the 18th of March, 1992, all three sides
13 had accepted the Lisbon Agreement, and a week later the Muslim side
14 rejected it?
15 A. I wouldn't have known the exact dates, but I was generally aware
16 of those circumstances.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Could we now please see 1D3424. Let us please focus.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. First of all, we agree that this is the 6th of June, 1994. It's
21 a telegram from Ambassador Akashi to Stoltenberg, Annan and himself.
22 Please have a look at item 2. Please read for yourself what is
23 in the frame, item 2 and the beginning of item 3, and also item 4, with
24 the three sub-items. When you have read it, please tell us so that we
25 could move on to the next page.
1 A. Yes, I've completed reading it.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Once again, please focus just on what is encircled, though you're
5 not limited to that.
6 Would you agree that in item 5, it says in brackets that the
7 Muslims do not want UNPROFOR inter-positioned between the sides and
8 that -- were you aware of this Serbian proposal, and was it justified and
9 reasonable, from a military point of view, in your opinion?
10 A. I confirm the document says that the Muslims do not want UNPROFOR
11 interpositioned. I am aware of this discussion, this proposal. As to
12 whether it was reasonable or not, I think that question has to be
13 answered in context, in terms of what was implementable and not
14 implementable, what was going to be acceptable by other parties, what
15 wasn't going to be acceptable. It has to be looked at in a broader
16 context, as opposed to the -- just the elements, the individual elements.
17 Certainly, some of the elements are very reasonable, in my view, and
18 would have been helpful had they been -- had they been agreed by all
19 sides and respected by all sides. Others were probably not going to be
20 accepted. And as a result, they -- this was -- this was a proposal by
21 one side that was not going to be accepted by the other side, but it was
22 a basis on which UNPROFOR could perhaps conduct some negotiations.
23 Q. Please have a look at the first part of item 7, where Karadzic
24 and Krajisnik advocate that even if the agreement was unsuccessful, that
25 the arrangements for Sarajevo should remain because they might help to
1 preserve peace in Sarajevo. Would you agree that this is noted here as
2 the proposal made by Krajisnik and Karadzic?
3 A. I agree there's reference to separate arrangements for Sarajevo.
4 I think there were many times when you and Bosnian Serb authorities made
5 proposals for Sarajevo, for the airport, for the safe areas, for UNPROFOR
6 movements that were wholly unacceptable from the UN perspective, so I
7 don't know what the elements of the special annex might have been. The
8 principle sounds good. Whether it makes sense or not or is reasonable
9 depends on the specific elements.
10 Q. Would you agree that when you enter negotiations, you first come
11 out with the highest price and then later on you might relent?
12 A. Yes, I agree that's standard practice.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can this document be admitted, please?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1145, Your Honours.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 We'll stay with this topic for yet a while, the negotiations, and
19 what Republika Srpska or the Serbian side wanted, so can we please have
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. You have noted that the Serbian side was not in favour of short
23 cease-fires, and sometimes the reasons why we were not in favour of
24 short-term cease-fires was not really properly understood.
25 Can you please have a look at item 3 here. These were
1 negotiations, as you can see, concerning the cessation of hostilities,
2 which were held in Geneva.
3 Do you remember that in the video-clip, I said that truces are
4 one thing and the cessation of hostilities is something else which we
5 request because it's an introduction for peace? Would you agree that
6 cessation of hostilities is something much more extensive and much wider
7 between the sides and warring parties than a simple truce?
8 A. Yes, in principle, that should be the case, I agree.
9 Q. Thank you. Would you agree that the Serbian side had certain
10 reserves when it came to a cease-fire that would last only four weeks,
11 and was it clear to you that it was much work to do and then after
12 four weeks the fighting might break out again, and would you agree that
13 this was a good reason not to accept such a proposal as delineated in
14 item 3?
15 A. I agree that a cessation of hostilities agreement required a lot
16 of work and commitment by the parties and UNPROFOR, and was a very
17 significant event to occur and, ideally, last longer than four weeks,
18 reasons for rejecting it, in general, by whomever could vary, and they
19 may have a range of reasons. Some, they may publicly state; others, they
20 may not. I was of the view that an important consideration in the
21 decision by you and your authorities not to accept a short-term cessation
22 of hostilities was that it allowed the -- your opponents to perhaps
23 gather strength, and you were interested in locking in territorial gains
24 that you had already achieved. That was my assessment. Whether you also
25 had the motivation that you just suggested is something I can't confirm.
1 It's possible.
2 Q. Well, I believe that we have said publicly what is the first part
3 of your claim. But as for the other part, which is your belief, I think
4 that we always accepted that we would have less than 50 per cent. Would
5 you agree that we have just seen that much earlier, it was something that
6 had already been accepted?
7 A. There, you and your authorities had accepted that you might --
8 that you might get less than 50 per cent of the territory, but that -- an
9 individual element of a peace agreement can't be looked at by itself. It
10 needs to be looked at in the broader context of the entirety of the
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Can we please see the next page. The whole page can be important
14 to read, but item 4 says that the Serbian side, on the other hand, agreed
15 to our proposed duration of four months. This is what the UN proposed,
16 four months, for the cessation of hostilities; that we accepted also the
17 proposed arrangement on the separation of forces and withdrawal and
18 control of heavy weapons; and so on. And item 5:
19 [In English] "However, when we informed the Bosnian Serb side of
20 the positions insisted upon by the Federation side, none of the
21 Federation proposals were acceptable to them. The Serb side stated that
22 the maximum they can compromise is to agree on the four-month cessation
23 of hostilities, as proposed by the seven ministers and by the UN."
24 "Seven ministers" means 7G -- G7:
25 "Dr. Karadzic said that if the Federation side wishes to discuss
1 a cease-fire, it should be done under an entirely different framework.
2 He emphasised that his side was co-operative and made considerable
3 compromise during this round of negotiations ..."
4 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.
5 And now everyone can have a look at everything else, but can we
6 now please also see the last page so that it would be seen that, in the
7 end, we accepted this and agreed to the four weeks. Ambassador Akashi
8 was someone we could not resist, and we made many concessions.
9 Please see that in a month, they would agree not to engage in any
10 offensive military operation or provocative actions. And it was signed
11 by Nikola Koljevic, Ejub Ganic. I don't know who it was on behalf of the
12 Croats who signed it. And Ambassador Akashi signed it as well.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do the Serbs sound as if they were acting cooperatively, judging
15 by this document?
16 A. Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Can it be admitted, please?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1146, Your Honours.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, this is -- the cross-examination with
22 respect to this document has been little more than having the witness
23 confirm what the document actually says, and I have a hard time accepting
24 that Dr. Karadzic might need more time when he uses the time that he has,
25 in large passages, to have the witness confirm what's printed on a
1 document that could be dealt with by way of written argument.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My main question was whether the
3 Serbian side was co-operative, in terms of implementing a cease-fire, if
4 not the cessation of hostilities. The witness has looked at the document
5 and confirmed this.
6 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, actually, Dr. Karadzic, the witness only
7 confirmed what the document appeared to say. He didn't confirm any facts
8 flowing from the document.
9 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, the Chamber is of the view that these
10 documents are relevant to understand the context of the witness's
12 Let's move on.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect, Your Honour,
14 maybe it was not properly translated. I asked the witness, Does the
15 sound as if the Serbs were co-operative, on the basis of this document?
16 And the witness confirmed, he said, Yes. Perhaps there was a problem
17 with the translation.
18 Can we now please see 1D2456.
19 JUDGE KWON: The witness's answer was noted -- reflected in the
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Q. This is a telegram also sent by Akashi to Annan and the UN. The
23 date is the 21st of June, 1994. This is in the midst of negotiations,
24 not just negotiations about the peace plan proposed by the Contact Group,
25 but also negotiations concerning a cease-fire or, rather, cessation of
2 Please focus on item 1:
3 [In English] "Immediately following the effective date of the
4 8th of June, 1994, Geneva Agreement on the cessation of offensive
5 activity, UNPROFOR noted a significant decrease in the level of activity
6 on BiH and BSA confrontation line."
7 [Interpretation] And further on, anyone can read.
8 Please have a look at item 2:
9 [In English] "The majority of both direct and indirect fire
10 violations have been initiated by the BiH, particularly in, but not
11 restricted to, the Sector North-East area of responsibility."
12 [Interpretation] Is this in line with what we've been saying all
13 along, that it was them who violated the cease-fires and placed us in an
14 impossible position? And in connection with important events, that is to
15 say, conferences, did we also inform you about this, as confirmed here by
16 Ambassador Akashi?
17 A. I believe that UNPROFOR -- that the information on which
18 Mr. Akashi is reporting these events to UN headquarters in New York is
19 most likely -- most likely from UNPROFOR military reporting or
20 UN Military Observer reporting and not just based on information from the
21 Bosnian Serbs. In this case, in this particular instance in June 1994,
22 it was the -- and in the days after the Geneva Agreement, it was the
23 Bosnian Government military that was responsible or that was taking --
24 had the greater share of responsibility for violating the cease-fire in
25 this particular case, yes.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Can we look at the next page, please.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. I agree with you, in any event, that Ambassador Akashi would not
5 rely only on our protests, but exclusively relied on UN sources.
6 Can you please look at paragraph 3 now. Second sentence, it
8 [In English] "It seems to reflect a lack of Bosnian Government
9 will to implement the agreement and may even be an indication of somewhat
10 dubious motives on their part in signing it."
11 [Interpretation] And then 4:
12 [In English] "In addition, you will recall from UNPROFOR Z-840
13 [sic] of June 18th, 1994, that it has been the BiH authorities who have
14 demonstrated the least co-operation in moving forward on the second
15 aspect of the Geneva Agreement: the immediate and complete release of all
16 persons detained, including -- persons detained, including prisoners of
18 [Interpretation] And then down there in the 5:
19 [In English] "I am particularly concerned that failure on our
20 part to denounce its continued violations on the part of BiH, is likely
21 to bring about - as was the case in the past - a disproportionate
22 counter-offensive by the BSA. Accordingly, I would request that these
23 disturbing events be brought to the attention of the Security Council. I
24 have attached a draft presidential statement on the subject, which may be
25 of assistance to you."
1 [Interpretation] And the last page is a draft how
2 Ambassador Akashi believes that the president's statement should look
4 Mr. Banbury, do you see that Mr. Akashi is completely aware that
5 keeping silent about Muslim violations of the agreement was dangerous
6 because it would lead to a disproportionate counter-offensive by the
7 Bosnian Serbs?
8 A. I think this reporting is very clear. Mr. Akashi was accurately
9 conveying to United Nations headquarters in New York our best
10 understanding of the situation on the ground, the developments, and the
11 responsible party. I think what this document very clearly shows is a
12 lack of bias on the part of UNPROFOR in reporting events on the ground, a
13 lack of partiality in terms of favouring or supporting or being against
14 one side or the other. We accurately reported what was happening on the
15 ground, our understanding of who was responsible, and our recommendations
16 on how to promote a peaceful course of action. And that was a commitment
17 and a practice to which UNPROFOR was strongly attached throughout,
18 I think, the history of the peacekeeping operation.
19 Q. If we agree, in part, well, let's look at page 2, where it does,
20 nevertheless, say that:
21 [In English] "I am particularly concerned that failure on our
22 part to denounce its continued violations on the part of the BiH ..."
23 [Interpretation] Thus, the Muslim side wasn't even warned in
24 time, neither was this announced, and that was the gist of our objection
25 regarding partiality, because the Muslim side in that way believed that
1 they can do whatever they wanted.
2 Do you agree that Ambassador Akashi, himself, says that this must
3 stop and that this party must -- all right, well, if you can just look at
4 paragraph 5, then. Would you agree that it indicates that up until then,
5 there were omissions in publishing such cases?
6 A. I do not believe that's what that paragraph refers to. The
7 paragraph clearly states at the beginning that UNPROFOR will continue to
8 raise these issues with the Bosnian Government. We very often raised, at
9 the highest levels with President Izetbegovic, with his prime minister,
10 with other senior military and civilian officials, their responsibilities
11 and cases where they were violating Security Council resolutions or
12 undertakings that they had made, formal or informal. We brought that to
13 their attention and insisted that they respect them.
14 The paragraph later says that:
15 "... failure on our part to denounce its continued violation on
16 the part of the BiH is likely to bring about - as was the case in the
17 past - a disproportionate counter-offensive ..."
18 So the concern is that there would be a disproportionate
19 counter-offensive by the Bosnian Serb Army, and hence that there needed
20 to be more decisive action than UNPROFOR raising it with the Bosnian
21 Government. And that course of action being recommended by Mr. Akashi
22 was a presidential statement, so I think it's a -- it's a logical
23 sequence of events. We were trying to resolve the situation on the
24 ground. We didn't believe that our efforts on the ground were likely to
25 achieve the desired result, and hence there was a recommendation to
1 the -- to UN headquarters in New York that action be taken at the
2 Security Council level.
3 Q. Then am I correct in saying that this does not refer to the
4 actions towards the Muslim side, but it's directed at informing the
5 public and the actions by the Security Council? It says that it was not
6 announced before, and seeks that the Security Council be informed about
8 A. Yes, my reading of the paragraph suggests that if we do not take
9 action at the New York level, the Security Council level, then the
10 response by the Bosnian Serb Army to the violations of the agreement by
11 the Bosnian Government Army is going to be as it was in the past, a
12 disproportionate counter-offensive.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can we admit this document?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1147, Your Honours.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3423 so that we
18 can see that General Mladic is pursuing the same logic when, some two or
19 three weeks before that, he addresses Boutros-Ghali and the De Lapresle
20 Command. And General Rose, this is his letter, which was sent up along
21 the UN lines, and now he says:
22 [In English] "I wish to draw your attention to successive and
23 increasing Muslim violations of the cease-fire in the area of Sarajevo
24 carried out with different weapons and, as a rule, against the civilian
25 objects and population."
1 [Interpretation] And then he cites examples.
2 And then in paragraph 2, he says:
3 [In English] "On 24th of May, 1994, against the same region, a
4 civil bus on the route Hadzici-Subotica was shot. One woman was killed,
5 whilst 13 passengers, mostly women, were wounded, two of them seriously."
6 [Interpretation] Can we have the following page.
7 We can see the whole page, and then he says -- now General Mladic
8 is posing questions. Let's look at 2, for example:
9 [In English] "I am disappointed by UNPROFOR impossibility and
10 unpreparedness to undertake effective and proper measures. Why does
11 UNPROFOR undertake no effective measures towards the Muslims to stop the
12 mentioned armed and other offensive activities?"
13 [Interpretation] And then a sentence a little bit lower:
14 [In English] "... why the world bodies and public are not
15 informed of obvious anti-peaceful behaviour of the Muslims?"
16 [Interpretation] And that is now a letter signed by Milovanovic,
17 as the chief of Mladic's staff.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Does this comport with what Ambassador Akashi, himself, says;
20 that not everyone is informed about these violations?
21 A. Well, I note that this letter is from General Milovanovic and is
22 not a UN document, so the incidents that were -- are alleged to have
23 taken place in the letter, I don't know if they were ever confirmed by
24 the United Nations. And with all due respect, we did not rely on
25 information by any one side on which to report to UN headquarters in
1 New York. We sought to confirm, as best as possible, information through
2 a variety of means. So I don't know if those events took place. And if
3 they did, I don't know to what extent we may have reported on them either
4 to UN headquarters -- we also, as a very routine matter, had press
5 conferences -- daily press briefings in Sarajevo where major or
6 significant military events were reported to the world's press, and I
7 believe we sought to report factually and accurately and fairly and
8 impartially the events that were taking place on the ground; not just to
9 UN headquarters in New York, but to the world that was paying close
10 attention, and we did that, in part, through those daily press briefings.
11 In terms of the questions asked by General Milovanovic in this
12 paragraph 2, why UNPROFOR doesn't take any effective measures toward the
13 Muslims to stop the offensive activities, why are they not obliged to
14 adhere to what is agreed, regrettably, with great regret, UNPROFOR was
15 not able to oblige any party to respect the agreements that they had
16 voluntarily undertaken, or other international obligations that they may
17 have had flowing from Security Council resolutions or international
18 agreements, and we could not compel parties to stop fighting or to cease
19 their activities. That was very much the case with all the parties, and
20 it was extremely unfortunate that we weren't able to and that the parties
21 didn't respect their obligations.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. In the context of the
23 Akashi telegram, could we admit this document, please?
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Banbury, but you would not deny that UNPROFOR
25 received such letters at the time?
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, we routinely received such types
2 of letters and protests from the Bosnian Serbs, or really all sides were,
3 as a regular practice, passing on what they claimed were information
4 about facts or events on the ground and complaining to us about our
5 failure to act to prevent incidents against their populations. This was
6 quite routine.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 Yes, that will be admitted.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1148, Your Honours.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Can we now have 1D3428, please.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. And while we're waiting, I would like to remind you that both
14 Mladic -- actually, Milovanovic, on behalf of Mladic, and Akashi said
15 that the public was not sufficiently informed and that there was a kind
16 of [indiscernible]. And now we're going to show you why this happened,
17 why the public was not informed.
18 This is a telegram of the 22nd of July of 1994 about the visit of
19 the state secretary for defence, William Perry, to our zone.
20 Can we have page 3 of this document, please.
21 Could you look at page 3, the framed highlighted areas, where
22 Secretary Perry states three possible courses of action to open the plan
23 of the Contact Group:
24 [In English] "First, the group could de-emphasise disincentives,
25 citing practical difficulties, and rely on long-term economic and
1 diplomatic pressure with no essential change of UNPROFOR's role. We
2 replied that UNPROFOR could not expect to be unaffected by any form of
3 increased pressure on the Serbs, but that isolation was an effective
5 "Secondly, Secretary Perry stated that the group could choose
6 rigorous enforcement of exclusion zones, accepting the need for UNPROFOR
7 to withdraw. Secretary Perry stated that this option would 'look like a
8 war and force us to think and deploy forces that way, helping the
9 Bosniaks and perhaps the Croats against the Serbs.'"
10 [Interpretation] And then a little bit lower, you can look. I
11 will begin:
12 [In English] "At the same time, we could seek a constitutional
13 arrangement that while failing -- while falling short of granting
14 international recognition would provide the Serbs a large degree of
15 autonomy and dignity, as well as rights to confederation similar to those
16 enjoyed by the Croats."
17 [Interpretation] Mr. Banbury, would you agree that what was being
18 contemplated here was also the defeat of the Serbs, with giving support
19 to Muslims and Croats to defeat the Serbs, and would you agree that the
20 actual plan of the Contact Group did not provide for autonomy and
21 dignity, and that that would be something that would need to be thought
22 about, autonomy and dignity to the Serbs, and that this was something
23 that needed to be considered?
24 A. My view of those options were they were being presented by
25 Secretary Perry in a theoretical sense, the theoretical options available
1 to the international community. But as -- I agree, and it's noted there
2 at the top of the paragraph currently on display on the page, that none
3 of the options cited -- well, there, it says "worked well." They weren't
4 very feasible. There was little willingness on the part of the
5 international community or NATO to go to war in Bosnia, and so they
6 needed to come up with a -- in this case, a fourth course of action, and
7 that fourth course of action explicitly suggests that there needed to be
8 a way to provide Serbs with a large degree of autonomy and dignity. So I
9 guess, I'm sorry, I don't agree with you.
10 Q. But you did see up in that part that enforcement -- an
11 enforcement zone was being mentioned, and do you remember that at the
12 time our weaponry were being monitored by the UNPROFOR in the
13 20-kilometre exclusion zone? It was already under supervision, and the
14 international community, via the United Nations, was planning to step up
15 measures against the Serbs, looking towards their defeat, and:
16 [In English] "We could seek a constitutional arrangement that,
17 while falling short of granting international recognition, would provide
18 the Serbs with a large degree of autonomy and dignity."
19 [Interpretation] So this is thus a reserve option for which we
20 had to fight for with our persistence and sacrifice, and we had already
21 handed over our weaponry to the United Nations; isn't that right? The
22 exclusion zone was already in force, was it not?
23 A. But, Dr. Karadzic, it wasn't respected by your military
24 authorities. There were widespread violations by the Bosnian Serb Army
25 of the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo. You had heavy
1 weapons scattered throughout the zone. Even the heavy weapons that the
2 Bosnian Serb Army had placed in weapons collection points were still
3 controlled by the Bosnian Serb Army, monitored by UNPROFOR but controlled
4 by the Bosnian Serb Army. And subsequent events during the course of the
5 war, when the Bosnian Serb Army withdrew the weapons from the collection
6 points and used them against your enemies showed clearly that the weapons
7 were not under UNPROFOR's control.
8 And the option that you referred to in this document here about
9 enforcing the weapons exclusion zone: One, it was simply stating that an
10 option was being considered to enforce decisions that had already been
11 taken regarding obligations that the Bosnian Serb Army had or the Bosnian
12 Serb authorities, and that those obligations were not being respected in
13 terms of the presence of heavy weapons in the exclusion zone. And the
14 option of enforcing respect for the weapons exclusion zone and enforcing
15 your authority's adherence to them was rejected because it would have
16 been a too high level of conflict for the international community, so
17 Secretary Perry -- and it seems the UN was ruling out the possibility of
18 using force to enforce your -- the obligations that you were -- the
19 obligations you had, but you were not respecting.
20 So, I'm sorry, I have a very different reading of this document
21 than you do.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We're going to see how that
23 actually looks.
24 Can we admit this document?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1149, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3426, please.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. And while we're waiting, I would just like to ask you this: Did
5 you know that we did have the right to take our weapons back in certain
6 circumstances and use it in our defence?
7 A. I do not believe that was the case. And if it were the case in
8 some very limited circumstances, certainly the conditions that would
9 have, in theory, allowed you to take the weapons and use them in
10 self-defence were, from the UNPROFOR view, never met when you -- when you
11 took those weapons out and used them.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Tomorrow, we're going to show, hour
13 by hour, how much we restrained ourselves. But let's look at the
14 dispatch by General De Lapresle on the 16th of June, 1994, status of the
15 Sarajevo Exclusion Zone.
16 Paragraph 1:
17 [In English] "I have attached a list of the BSA uncontrolled
18 weapons within the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone."
19 [Interpretation] Anybody can read this.
20 Can we look at item three now, at the bottom, please:
21 [In English] "The perception which may exist in certain quarters
22 that UNPROFOR is not in control of the 20-kilometre zone is false. A
23 number of the weapons listed are inoperable. Most others are visited
24 regularly or are under UNPROFOR observation. In addition, many of the
25 weapons in violation do not have sufficient range to reach Sarajevo.
1 Allegations made which assert that the Serbs regularly remove weapons
2 from the WCPs are false and must be refuted."
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Is this a response to the impression that you gained most
5 probably from the Muslim press?
6 A. My impression and UNPROFOR's understanding of the situation in
7 the heavy weapons exclusion zone was based on information we collected
8 ourselves, not at all upon whatever press outlets may have said. We did
9 have observers -- military observers who were able to, at times, observe
10 some weapons. We did have personnel based at the weapons collection
11 points. We had access to aerial photography. It was through a variety
12 of sources that we developed our understanding of the presence of Bosnian
13 Serb Army weapons -- heavy weapons in the exclusion zone.
14 It is the case, as is indicated in this paragraph 3, that some
15 weapons were under our direct observation. It is the case that some
16 weapons were in weapons collection points, where we were present. It is
17 the case that some weapons were old and rusty or of limited range. While
18 those are, indeed, facts, it is also the case that there was a persistent
19 pattern of violation of the heavy weapons exclusion zone by the
20 Bosnian Serb Army, with numerous placements of heavy weapons within the
21 zone, some of which could reach and were used against the civilian
22 population of Sarajevo. The UNPROFOR leadership routinely brought these
23 concerns to the attention of yourself and the Bosnian military
24 leadership, and we were never, ever, throughout the course of the war,
25 satisfied with the response, because the heavy weapons exclusion zone
1 regime was never fully respected, and this became a critical element in
2 the final days of the war.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We will get to that
4 tomorrow. You will see how things stand there.
5 Can we admit this?
6 And one more document before we finish, if possible.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1150, Your Honours.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 17724,
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. You said that we didn't want to adopt the Contact Group Plan.
13 You said the Serb side refused. But if you hadn't known, now we will see
14 that it was a question of a semantic trap and splitting of the hairs on
15 the side of the international community.
16 This is a telegram, the weekly situation report of the
17 1st of May, 1995, and then it says:
18 [In English] "Bosnian parties refuse to extend Carter's
19 [indiscernible] Contact Group for being bogged down in semantics."
20 [Interpretation] Can we now look at the following page, please?
21 Actually, two pages on.
22 In paragraph 57, you call that plan a reasonable one. But if we
23 look at paragraph 10 here, I'm going to read it:
24 [In English] "Former US President Carter, in a television
25 programme which was joined by Dr. Karadzic by a satellite link on
1 4th of May, berated the Contact Group for missing the opportunity to
2 negotiate peace in Bosnia by letting negotiations devolve into a squabble
3 over semantics. Peace, Carter contended, had been held hostage by the
4 Contact Group's insistence that the Serbs should accept the Contact Group
5 Plan before direct talks between the parties could begin. Carter
6 appealed to 'all forces that are now interested in that area (to) focus
7 their attempt to induce, even to force, both parties to co-operate in a
8 good-faith peace effort - without preconditions ...'"
9 [Interpretation] And so on.
10 So President Carter understood that we were requested to say we
11 the Contact Group plan, and then we'll negotiate. But what were we to
12 negotiate if we would accept the plan? And President Carter understood
13 that the issue was the word "accept," instead of "we agree," and so on,
14 that this was the semantic trick which was really without much value as
15 compared to the opportunity to establish peace.
16 Would you agree that President Carter, himself, believes that the
17 Serbs were not to blame for this?
18 A. I had the privilege of being assigned by Mr. Akashi to accompany
19 President Carter as an UNPROFOR political advisor when President Carter
20 engaged in the peace talks in Bosnia in December of 1994, and I was able
21 to spend the three or so days that he was in Bosnia with him, including
22 in all the talks he conducted with you, Dr. Karadzic. And so I have
23 great respect for President Carter and think he played a very valuable
24 role in December 1994. In May of 1995, or really after December 1994,
25 including up through May 1995, he wasn't intimately engaged in the peace
1 process any longer. And I think he was very committed to peace in
2 Bosnia, with the best of intentions, but I'm not sure that he had inside
3 knowledge of what the Contact Group was doing and why they were perhaps
4 pursuing the course of action they were pursuing.
5 So, yes, he -- it's clearly conveyed in the document,
6 President Carter's views, but I think there was a reason the
7 Contact Group, with all the different representatives of all the
8 different countries, had their opinion why that condition was a necessary
9 one to pursue the peace process.
10 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1151, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE KWON: And that will be it for today.
13 We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 [The witness stands down]
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.34 p.m.,
17 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 16th day of
18 March, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.