1 Wednesday, 1 June 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
6 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. If the witness could take the solemn
7 declaration, please.
8 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
9 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
10 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you very much. If you'd like to sit down
11 and make yourself comfortable.
12 Mr. Tieger.
13 WITNESS: PATRICK TREANOR
14 MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Your Honours. Everyone in and around
15 the courtroom.
16 Examination by Mr. Tieger:
17 Q. And good morning, Dr. Treanor. Can you state your full name,
19 A. My name is Patrick Joseph Treanor.
20 Q. Thank you, Dr. Treanor.
21 MR. TIEGER: I would like to call up 65 ter 14044, initially.
22 Q. And, Dr. Treanor, is this a copy of your curriculum vitae?
23 A. Yes, it is.
24 Q. And having had an opportunity to look at it, does it need any
25 quick updating?
1 A. Yes. This is a few years old. I have retired since this resume
2 was produced. I retired from ICTY and the UN at the end of 2009. I
3 think this resume also does not reflect the fact that I did testify as an
4 expert in the Perisic case and that I have submitted expert reports in
5 this case.
6 Q. Thank you, Doctor.
7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, I would tender 14044.
8 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2536, Your Honours.
10 MR. TIEGER:
11 Q. Dr. Treanor, bearing in mind that the court now has your CV in
12 evidence, I would ask if you could very quickly provide a synopsis of
13 your experience as it relates to the three reports that you prepared in
14 the context of this case. Those would be 65 ter 00592, the Bosnian Serb
15 leadership, 1990 through 1992; 65 ter 12124, the Bosnian Serb leadership,
16 1993 through 1995; and 65 ter 1215, Radovan Karadzic and the Serbian
17 leadership, 1990 through 1995.
18 A. Well, these reports represent in a certain respect the
19 totality -- the product of the totality of my training and experience in
20 this area. I began studying Slavic languages when I was in college. I
21 began studying the languages and history and culture of the Balkan
22 countries, including Yugoslavia, during my study for a Masters Degree
23 which I received in 1970. I continued studying that area in Bulgaria for
24 two years in the 1970s and went to the University of London and began a
25 Ph.D. in the mid-1970s. I began professionally working in this area in
1 1977 when I started to work as an intelligence analyst at the US
2 Library of Congress reading -- reading the press and technical including
3 military journals from the Soviet Union and eastern Europe including the
4 former Yugoslavia. A few years later I began working at the
5 U.S. Department of Justice investigating the cases of alleged Nazi war
6 criminals living in or seeking entry into the United States. I had a
7 wide area of responsibilities there, including the former Yugoslavia.
8 During the course of that work I did research in numerous countries,
9 archives in numerous countries, including the former Yugoslavia,
10 Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Banja Luka.
11 I then came to this institution in 1994, when -- when I began
12 almost immediately doing research on the Bosnian Serb leadership and have
13 been concentrating substantively in that area during the whole period of
14 my time with the Tribunal in addition, of course, to my later supervisory
15 and other responsibilities.
16 Q. Dr. Treanor, it's quickly clear from these reports that a large
17 number of documents are cited, described, and used in the context of the
18 reports. Were you involved in the collection of documents that were used
19 in -- in your reports?
20 A. Yes, indeed. The focusing on my work here again these reports
21 represent the product of the result of 15 years of work here which began
22 in 1994 when I began the effort with other people to identify and collect
23 the highest level and other documents produced by the Serbian Democratic
24 Party and Bosnia and the various governmental organs of Republika Srpska.
25 As I said, we began that effort in 1994, and I pursued a methodical
1 effort to obtain the most important documentation, certainly including
2 Official Gazettes, press from the area, and the records from the highest
3 level government and state bodies including minutes of meetings, reports,
4 decisions, orders, correspondence, diaries.
5 Q. Thank you, Doctor. And when you say methodical just a couple of
6 quick questions on that. Did you attempt to obtain entire collections of
7 documents, selected collections, and secondly, did you attempt to collect
8 documents during the course of your work related to all parties to the
10 A. Well, let me take the first -- the second part of that question
11 first. Yes, as the leader of the leadership research team, we were
12 involved in collecting documents and doing research and analysis on all
13 the parties to the conflicts. My -- most of my personal work, personal
14 substantive work continued to involve the Bosnian Serbs. I'm sorry, what
15 was the first part of the question?
16 Q. Whether or not the collection of documents was aimed at the
17 entirety of collections that you could obtain related to those types of
18 documents --
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. -- if there was any other process.
21 A. We sought to obtain access to the totality of the documentation,
22 the records, the archives of whatever particular institution was the
23 purpose of a given mission, for instance, whether it be the Presidency,
24 the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defence, et cetera.
25 Depending on the situation, we would either have to review those
1 documents in situ and make a selection of documents and have them copied
2 and bring them back to The Hague, or sometimes we were in a position to,
3 in fact, get a copy, have the whole copy -- the whole collection scanned
4 in situ or in one case we had the entire archive physically transferred
5 to The Hague.
6 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger, while it's fresh in my memory, there
7 are a number of documents the Prosecution's informed the Chamber that it
8 wishes to use with Dr. Treanor. Some it was proposed to be bar table,
9 but you will recall that if you wish to tender those documents evidence
10 of the truth of the contents, the Chamber's preferred method of admission
11 is through the witness rather than by bar table motion. So any documents
12 that you wish to use are best adduced through this witness in his
13 evidence in chief.
14 MR. TIEGER: Understood the priorities, Your Honour, which is in
15 part why there's a judicious selection of bar table documents. On the
16 other hand, in an effort to assist the Chamber to the greatest degree
17 possible, we've tried to contextualise as much of the documentation that
18 we may at this time or at a later time submit by way of bar table. So
19 it's of as much assistance to the Chamber as possible. So trying to
20 balance those -- all those factors, but I understood the Court's
22 Q. Dr. Treanor, can you tell the Court what criteria you employed in
23 selecting the documents that you used in your report or relied upon in
24 your report?
25 A. Well, when it comes to the reports themselves, you have to bear
1 in mind that by the time the reports were written we had collected a huge
2 volume of documentation. And in approaching selection of documents for
3 the reports themselves, I used my knowledge of those collections and my
4 expert knowledge of the area in general in -- in approaching the -- the
5 topics of the reports which were requested in broad terms. I decided
6 what had topics that I would deal with in those reports, and I selected
7 documents that I thought would best convey the story of the chronological
8 progress of those various topics.
9 I -- in doing so, I sought to use, as I think I've emphasised in
10 the introduction to the reports, the most authoritative documents; that
11 is, documents from the highest level state and party organs.
12 Sometimes -- and again that would be such things as records of meetings,
13 decisions, orders, correspondence, items from Official Gazettes. Absent
14 such things sometimes I've used other less authoritative documents,
15 perhaps such as items from the press. I tried to confine myself in that
16 case to items that actually reflected the words of various leaders rather
17 than simple journalistic reports or opinion pieces and that type of
18 thing. So the reports are based on the -- for the most part on the
19 actual documentation of the Bosnian Serb leaders themselves. When it
20 comes to the negotiations reports are used produced by the international
21 negotiators who were also obviously participants in those particular
22 events and in various discussions.
23 Q. Doctor, there are, as I mentioned earlier, clearly a large number
24 of documents and I think you referred to entire collections. Did -- were
25 you assisted in identifying the documents that were potentially relevant
1 to the issues addressed in your report by other members of LRT, and if
2 so, that is other members of the leadership research team, and if so,
3 what control did you exercise over the material that was eventually
4 relied upon in your report?
5 A. Initially I did all the -- all the collection and all the
6 analysis and indeed some of the early writing myself. The team wasn't
7 established until 1997. At that point when addition -- I began to bring
8 additional people on board. I assigned people to work in particular
9 areas in this case in relation to the Bosnian Serbs, to work on areas
10 such as the SDS or the Presidency, and they were responsible for
11 analysing documents in those areas, producing analysis of them, all of
12 which they did under my supervision and all of which work I reviewed, and
13 indeed I've read virtually all the documents themselves in addition. And
14 therefore especially for the first report, sections -- the initial
15 sections of that report were -- were drafted by other people, but again I
16 reviewed the entire report on the basis of my knowledge of the documents
17 and therefore take full responsibility for that report. I think in the
18 addendum and the leadership study it is explicitly stated that other
19 people were involved.
20 The involvement at that point related to mostly the -- the use of
21 CaseMap, which we started using in this institution I think around the
22 time that the first report, the main report was produced in 2002,
23 whatever it was, and it was our practice to -- it was my practice to put
24 notes, summaries or extracts or sometimes entire document of the various
25 bodies that I've been referring to into our -- into our team CaseMap, and
1 I assigned people to that task to work on particular sets of documents,
2 et cetera, and I reviewed all that work extensively and on an ongoing
3 basis and made sure that the work was as complete as possible and the
4 addendum to the report and the leadership study were largely produced
5 out -- directly -- not directly but produced out of the CaseMap in which
6 I and other people on my team, including interns, worked.
7 Q. And so when you say in your report that you bear sole
8 responsibility for the contents, what do you mean by that, Dr. Treanor?
9 A. By that I mean that I have -- as I said, I have familiarity with
10 all the documents, have read virtually all of them myself, and have
11 either wrote myself or very closely edited and checked anything that was
12 written by somebody else.
13 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I tender 00592, 12124, and 12125 at
14 this time.
15 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. Before I assign the numbers to
17 the three expert reports, there's a small correction. The CV 65 ter
18 number 14044 was assigned Exhibit P2536. In fact, it will be
19 Exhibit P2535. And then 65 ter number 592 will be Exhibit number P2536,
20 65 ter number 12124 will be Exhibit P2537, and 65 ter number 12125 will
21 be Exhibit P2538.
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. Dr. Treanor, I'd ask you to --
24 MR. TIEGER: I'd ask the registrar to call up 65 ter 00932. This
25 is an interview with Dr. Karadzic that appeared in a publication "Nin" in
1 November of 1990, and before I ask you about that, if I could ask you to
2 very briefly, and again bearing in mind that your reports are now in
3 front of the Court, place the -- this interview in context.
4 A. Yes. I'd just briefly remind the report that this interview in
5 "Nin" which is a Belgrade weekly news magazine came out about a week
6 before the -- a week or ten days before the first multi-party elections
7 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which took place on the 18th of November, 1990.
8 In the months preceding that election, a number of political parties had
9 been founded in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the Serbian Democratic
10 Party which was founded on the 12th of July, 1990, at an Assembly in
11 Sarajevo which elected Radovan Karadzic the president of the party and
12 adopted a programme and a statute.
13 The statute outlined the organisation and operations of the
14 party, created an organisational structure that -- a hierarchical
15 structure that more or less paralleled the governmental structure of --
16 of the Republic of BH going from the central level in the party which
17 included the president, a Main Board, which is a policy-making party --
18 body between Assemblies. The Assembly which would meet every year or so,
19 an executive body to handle business matters, and going down to having
20 regional boards.
21 There was no regional level of government in Bosnia, but they did
22 have regional co-ordinating party bodies to co-ordinate the Municipal
23 Boards which were very important. Municipality was the fundamental
24 governmental institution on the local level in the republic. So the --
25 every party Municipal Boards were very important, and then below that
1 there were even local community boards, the municipalities being composed
2 of what they called local communities. And they had organised by this
3 time throughout almost the entire country and almost every municipality
4 in the country the party had managed to establish some sort of
5 organisation and the -- just briefly mentioning the programme of the
6 party included a variety of points which are -- would be rather typical
7 for a political party, social and economic issues, but the point that
8 deserves emphasis here is the desire, the expressed desire of the --
9 expressed in the programme and at Dr. Karadzic's speech to the Assembly,
10 the desire of the Bosnian Serbs to remain in Yugoslavia in one state with
11 the other Serbs.
12 Q. Just a couple of quick follow-up questions with respect the
13 hierarchical structure of the SDS. First, was there any effort or
14 emphasis placed on the importance of that hierarchy in respect to the
15 flow of information or instructions from the top level to the bottom
17 A. Well, in the statute of the party, it was specified that all
18 party members were obliged to adhere to the policy of the party, and the
19 party developed over time a very efficient system of communications
20 within the party to convey instructions down from the top and to receive
21 reports up from the bottom. Or I should say it attempted to create an
22 efficient system. I think in this article we'll see how successful
23 they've been to a certain extent.
24 Q. And from 1990 to 1995, who was at the top of that hierarchy?
25 A. Well, at the top of the hierarchy was Dr. Karadzic as president
1 of the party.
2 Q. If I could direct your attention first to paragraph 4 of page 1
3 of this article. There's -- there's reference to the revival of the
4 political life of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to organisational
5 work which had been completed in a very short time, and then we see a
6 reference to the local boards and "each member of a local board of the
7 Serbian Democratic Party is in contact with 10 to 20 Serbian households
8 so that information from the most remote village reaches the Main Board
9 in two hours at most."
10 A. Yes, this is an indication of how successful their organisational
11 efforts had been, and this ability to communicate down to that level, in
12 fact, get in contact with all Serbian households was particularly
13 important immediately at this time a connection with the campaign of --
14 in connection with the upcoming elections. They used this ability to
15 transmit campaign literature and instructions, that type of thing.
16 Q. If we could turn to page 6 of the English and it would be the
17 next page, I believe, in B/C/S. At the bottom of the page we see the
18 reference "Everybody knows that under no circumstances will Serbs accept
19 to live in several independent states and to become a national minority
20 everywhere outside Serbia. The Serbs will stay in one state, federal
21 Yugoslavia, regardless of its size."
22 And if we could look quickly at the last page, page 8, the last
23 paragraph of the article or interview.
24 " We -- we are now openly saying," Dr. Karadzic states here,
25 "what could not even be whispered before. The Serbs in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina pin all their hopes on their mother country Serbia and
2 will never allow a state border to separate them from Serbia."
3 If you could place that in the -- in context both in terms of
4 what you spoke about before.
5 A. Yes. Well, here is Dr. Karadzic forcefully stating the point in
6 the programme related to the desire of the Bosnian Serbs to remain in one
7 state with the other Serbs, which was a very, very important part of
8 their message in -- during the election campaign.
9 Q. And finally if we could turn to page 3 of the English, third
10 paragraph from the bottom which states that:
11 "Serbs could be out-voted by a two-thirds majority regarding, for
12 instance, the issues of the change of the state character of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Should that happen, all conditions for a civil war
14 would be in place because the Serbs in BH are no longer helpless but very
15 powerful and united."
16 A. Here Dr. Karadzic is referring to the main concern that they had
17 in connection with their remaining in Yugoslavia, that is that the
18 other -- members of the other peoples, the other nations in Bosnia, may
19 want to split from Yugoslavia. The Serbs had a very large minority,
20 about a third of the population, but not a majority. So -- so that they
21 were concerned that the other people may simply out-vote them and take
22 Bosnia out of Yugoslavia, which they saw as highly detrimental to their
23 interests. They therefore at around this time, that is October, November
24 1990, took some steps to try to prevent that. For one thing,
25 Dr. Karadzic had -- sent a letter to the existing BH Assembly asking that
1 a Chamber of nationalities be established which would be able to block
2 any measures that individual peoples saw as going against their
3 interests. That didn't draw any response, and they found -- also found
4 that at this time a Serbian National Council in Bosnia which proclaimed,
5 as mentioned in the report, proclaimed itself to be the sole
6 representative of the Serbian nation in Bosnia and saying that they would
7 not accept any decisions by the Assembly or anyone else that ran counter
8 to the interests of the -- the Serbian people in Bosnia.
9 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I tender 00932.
10 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2539, Your Honours.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. Dr. Treanor, the article -- or the interview -- or in the course
14 of the interview we have just looked at a passage where Dr. Karadzic
15 states that in the event of being out-voted on the issue of the change of
16 state character, all conditions for a civil war would be in place. Did
17 that situation arise and did Dr. Karadzic indicate what that war would be
19 A. Yes. That situation did arise, and he did indicate what -- what
20 such a war might be like on a number of occasions. That situation arose
21 in the middle of October 1991, that is about a year later after a long
22 back and forth which I didn't go into. The -- basically the Muslim and
23 Croatian deputies in the new BH Assembly, that is the Assembly that was
24 created as a result of the 1990 elections, did in fact vote resolutions
25 which the Bosnian Serbs, known as the referendum and the letter for
1 short, which they're mentioned in my reports, which the Bosnian Serbs
2 regarded as being basically declarations of independence of Bosnia.
3 These resolutions were passed in the absence of those -- of the -- of the
4 SDS deputies to the Bosnian Serb Assembly, and they regarded them as
5 being illegitimate.
6 MR. TIEGER: Can I call up 30351, please. This is a conversation
7 between Dr. Karadzic, Miodrag Davidovic, and Luka Karadzic on the 15th of
8 October, 1991. And if I could ask the registrar to call up page 5 of
9 both the English and the B/C/S versions.
10 Q. And looking at the bottom of the page in English, Dr. Karadzic
12 "They want an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is an
13 attempt to create it. Is this hell, man? Twelve percent of Serbs made
14 hell in Croatia, they didn't allow a Ustasha state to be introduced into
15 their homes, and these here are trying to with 35 per cent, you know."
16 Turn to the next page in English, please. And there Dr. Karadzic
17 continues after a brief exchange:
18 "Who -- what are you talking about? Who'll do it man? That
19 would mean war until their extinction. The Serbs would never forgive
20 them such a thing. It would destroy them completely. First none of
21 their leaders would survive. They'd all be killed in three to four
22 hours. They'd stand no chance of surviving whatsoever."
23 Dr. Treanor, can you place this conversation in context for us,
25 A. Yes. This conversation which takes place between Dr. Karadzic
1 and his brother and a family friend in Montenegro took place later in the
2 day after the resolutions regarding the sovereignty of BH were passed.
3 Those resolution were is passed very early in the morning of the 15th of
4 October, and this is obviously taking place after that, and he's
5 commenting on his view of what that means and what the -- what the result
6 could be, namely war.
7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'd tender 30351, please.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, would ask that that be
9 received as marked for identification.
10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI P2540.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. Dr. Treanor in -- earlier you mentioned and mentioned it again
13 here the concern about out-voting. Let me ask you if more generally the
14 SDS and Dr. Karadzic were concerned about the ethnic structure of Bosnia
15 and Herzegovina.
16 A. Yes, they were. They were concerned with the changes that were
17 taking place in the ethnic structure.
18 Q. Let me ask you to look at a couple of documents. First, 18625,
19 page 24 of the B/C/S and page 28 of the English, in particular. And,
20 Dr. Treanor, can you place this in the context of your earlier response,
22 A. Yes. Well, Dr. Karadzic in his speech to the founding Assembly
23 of the SDS had noted among other things the exodus of tens if not
24 hundreds of thousands of Serbs from BH over the previous decades, and
25 that was a situation that -- which among others was of great concern to
1 him and the other SDS leaders. They had a number of studies on the
2 demographic changes taking place in Bosnia prepared. This particular
3 study was done by Milorad Skoko, who was the SDS appointee as the deputy
4 director of the republic institute of social planning. This -- this
5 report was -- is dated June 1991. He later updated that report. This
6 graph has -- the same graph has appeared in at least one of his later
7 reports and other people wrote similar reports. The thing that I want to
8 point out here about the graph, as you can see the top two lines relate
9 to the growth of the Muslim population in -- in two different variants,
10 both of which show that population increasing sharply; whereas, the next
11 line down, rather flat, is the Serbs, and below that is the Croatian --
12 the Croats, which is also rather flat. They, they being the SDS leaders,
13 therefore feared that for instance in an independent BH the Muslims would
14 soon gain an absolute majority in that republic and therefore would be
15 able to run the republic any way they saw fit and without any regard to
16 the concerns of the other peoples.
17 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, tender page 24 of the B/C/S, page
18 28 of the English this chart.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2541, Your Honours.
21 MR. TIEGER: And if we could turn next to 000 -- excuse me 06639.
22 And to page 12 of the English and the page marked SA043638 of the B/C/S.
23 Q. First of all, Dr. Treanor, do you recognise this document?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. And what is it?
1 A. This is a notebook kept by Vojislav Maksimovic who was an SDS
2 deputy in the BH Assembly and was, in fact, the president of their
3 deputy's club or caucus in the Assembly.
4 Q. And if -- we're now looking at an entry for a meeting of the
5 political council on 24th of December, 1991, and turning your attention
6 to the remarks of Professor Najdanovic who asks:
7 "What are our maximum number borders? We need a single Serbian
8 state which cannot be inhabited by Muslims because they would overwhelm
9 us with their birth rate."
10 Can you first tell us who Professor Najdanovic was, what the
11 political council was, and place the -- his comments in context?
12 A. Yes. Well, first all the political council was an advisory body
13 established by the SDS which included non-party intellectuals as well as
14 party people. It was a forum for -- a regular forum for discussion. I
15 think they tried to meet every week or so. Dr. Karadzic attended
16 frequently. This body provided the SDS leadership with input on a
17 variety of issues that they tried to get the best possible expert advice
18 on the issues of the day.
19 Professor Slavko Leovac is mentioned, who appears right at the
20 top of that entry, was the president of the council.
21 Professor Milutin Najdanovic was an SDS deputy in the Assembly. He was
22 also a deputy in the Federal Assembly in Belgrade, a member of the
23 chamber of republics.
24 Now, this meeting took place on the 24th of December, 1991.
25 We're moving along now in time. This is just a few days after the
1 Presidency and the government of BH formally requested international
2 recognition of the independence of BH from various other states and
3 international bodies. This, of course, was something that the Bosnian
4 Serbs were also bitterly opposed to. It was a logical step, indeed, from
5 the October 15th resolutions.
6 So at this time they were, they being the Bosnian Serb leaders,
7 were contemplating as an alternative to trying to keep the whole of BH
8 within Yugoslavia and all the Serbs in it. As an alternative to that,
9 defining a -- Serbian territories within BH which could in some manner be
10 separated from BH in order that those territories remain in Yugoslavia;
11 whereas, the Croats and Muslim, if they so chose, would be free to leave
12 Yugoslavia. So professor Najdanovic is contemplating what such a state
13 might look like ethnographically and is stating that it couldn't have too
14 many Muslims in it because even if they were a minority at the beginning
15 with their birth rate they would soon become a majority and then we
16 wouldn't have a Serbian state any more.
17 Q. And does that concern recur during the course of discussions
18 about the ethnic structure of a Serbian BH or other aspects of a policy
19 during the years 1991 through 1995?
20 A. Well, you see this type of comment several times in various
21 sessions of the Assembly over the course of years, and immediately after
22 this -- not immediately, but a month after this the new Bosnian Serb
23 Council of Ministers in fact requested an update of that demographic
24 report that we saw earlier. So this was an issue that was -- was very
25 much in their minds.
1 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'd tender 06639, please.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, excuse me, Mr. President. I'd like to make
3 an objection to that. I think that this is of no probative value, what
4 somebody says in a meeting. For example, would Tony Blair be charged
5 with something that somebody said in the house of commons, or would
6 President Obama be responsible for what somebody of the Tea Party says in
7 Congress? So I don't think there's any probative value to statements
8 made by somebody in some body unless it's adopted by Dr. Karadzic or in
9 some way attributed to him. I would ask that this exhibit be excluded as
10 having no probative value. Thank you.
11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. I would not like this to
12 count against my time. First of all, this is one piece of evidence in
13 the totality of evidence which the Court has already received and will be
14 receiving with respect to this issue, which is one of the reasons I asked
15 Dr. Treanor if this issue recurs in other fora at other times and
16 consistently. And it's a false argument to say that one piece of
17 evidence standing alone has a limited weight when it's clearly part of
18 the mosaic of evidence that will be relied upon and can be relied upon by
19 the Court to know what issues underpin Bosnian Serb policy.
20 Furthermore, the witness indicated the relationship between this
21 speaker as a member of the political council and Dr. Karadzic, and I can
22 elucidate that, but I think it's clear in his -- he made clear in his
23 report, made clear in his answer that these are people upon whom
24 Dr. Karadzic relies and turns to for information and opinion and views
25 upon which to frame policy. I think this is a specious objection, and
1 clearly this document should be admitted.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. The Bench is unanimous on this. If this
4 was a piece of evidence that stood alone, then its probative value would
5 be assessed, if any, on that basis, but it's part of a mosaic. Again,
6 that doesn't require or suggest that it has a specific probative value at
7 this stage, but it has the potential for having a probative value and
8 without it the jigsaw is not as complete, and on that basis it will at
9 this stage be admitted for consideration.
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2542, Your Honours.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. Dr. Treanor, you referred to the importance of the position by
14 the Bosnian Serb leadership regarding not allowing a border to separate
15 Serbs from other Serbs, for example, in Serbia. I'd like to call up
17 First I want to ask you if that fundamental aspiration to which
18 you referred of keeping the Serbs united ever changed during the course
19 of the period 1990 through 1995.
20 A. No. It never -- it never changed. If I may be allowed to
21 elucidate on my previous answer perhaps I was not as helpful to the Court
22 as I could have been. Dr. Karadzic himself did make comments on -- on
23 more than one occasion reflecting the type of demographic concerns that
24 we saw expressed in that particular exhibit.
25 Q. Did the tactical approach for achieving that objective change
1 over time?
2 A. Yes. The tactics did change.
3 Q. And looking quickly at 06583, and in particular the bottom of the
4 page, this is a -- these are the minutes of a session of the club of
5 deputies held on 30 September 1991, and at the bottom we see reflected a
6 comment by Dr. Karadzic:
7 "The war goal of the Serbian people is Yugoslavia for the simple
8 reason that it is much harder to tear something apart than to hold onto
9 the old legality."
10 If you could place that in context, please, Dr. Treanor.
11 A. Yes. Well, this comment was made at a meeting of the -- of the
12 deputy -- SDS deputy's club which I referred to. Dr. Karadzic was not a
13 deputy but as the party leader he did attend their meetings.
14 At this point in September 1991, as discussed in my -- I think in
15 the report and in the leadership study, negotiations were going on
16 between the Bosnian Serb leaders and leaders of the other national
17 communities about the future of Bosnia. One of the overriding goal, as
18 Dr. Karadzic puts it here, for them -- for the Bosnian Serbs is to remain
19 in Bosnia. I note the war goal is put in quotation marks. I think he
20 means that in the sense of their overriding goal, their chief priority.
21 Their -- their strategy at this point was to a large extent based
22 on the fact that Bosnia was a part of Yugoslavia and it would remain so
23 until a decision was taken to take it out. He thought that at this point
24 that he had agreement as reflected a little bit up the page there,
25 Mr. Izetbegovic's agreement that one people would not attempt to impose
1 their will on another; that is, anything that would happen would happen
2 by consensus. So resting on the legal status quo, which was perfectly
3 acceptable to the Bosnian Serbs, that is they were in Yugoslavia, they
4 thought they had the easy part. All they had to do was maintain the
5 status quo. So that was the basis of their approach at this time.
6 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I tender 06583.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2543, Your Honours.
8 MR. TIEGER: If we could look next at P00938 [Realtime transcript
9 read in error "P00958"], page 37 of the English and page 55 of the B/C/S.
10 It's 938. The transcript says "958." So I don't know if there's
11 confusion for the registrar.
12 Q. Looking at the middle of the page in English. This is
13 Dr. Karadzic speaking as we can see from the earlier portion of the
14 transcript, and he states:
15 "Please, until two or three months ago we were hoping to be able
16 to play the Yugoslav card and say the Yugoslav army, Yugoslavia legality,
17 et cetera, this is slipping out of our grasp. That's why we started on
18 another track, the Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, our sovereign right,
19 our army."
20 You've alluded to that before. If you could place that quickly
21 in the context of your earlier remarks.
22 A. Yes. These remarks were made at the meeting of the SDS deputies
23 club at the end of February 1991, during a time when very intensive
24 negotiations were taking place under international auspices among the
25 leaders of the national communities in Bosnia as to the future of Bosnia.
1 This comment reflects the fact that the Bosnian Serb leaders,
2 Dr. Karadzic and the other Bosnian Serb leaders, the SDS leaders. Had --
3 had to change their strategy. He makes reference to two or three months
4 ago. That was about December 1991. Without going into too much detail,
5 because I think it is discussed in the -- certainly in the leadership
6 study, that was the time when the war in Croatia which involved the
7 Croatian Serbs, who had similar concerns about remaining in Croatia to
8 those of the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia, that war was drawing to an end. An
9 agreement was being put, formulated by Mr. Cyrus Vance, ultimately known
10 as the Vance Plan, to bring a measure of peace to that republic. The
11 Croatian Serbs also wanted to stay within Yugoslavia.
12 However, the leadership in Belgrade made it clear at meetings in
13 Belgrade in December 1991, that Dr. Karadzic attended, that Serbia could
14 not continue the war. It did not have the strength, and they were going
15 to -- the best thing at that time was for the Croatian Serbs to -- was to
16 accept the -- the recognition they were getting from the international
17 community of the existence of their territories, and that after some
18 intermediate period under UN supervision they were assured by the
19 Belgrade leadership that they would then get to join Yugoslavia or Serbia
20 or whatever Serbian state may exist.
21 The same held good for Bosnia. Again, it -- basically for
22 international reasons and the reasons of exhaustion of Serbia, it was not
23 going to be as simple as staying in Yugoslavia. The international
24 community would have regarded that as aggression on the part of Serbia
25 against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and therefore the leadership
1 in Belgrade decided that they had to go ahead and form a new FRY, the
2 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of just Serbia and Montenegro
3 and not any other areas -- Serbian areas -- Serbian claimed areas outside
4 those two republics. They did ultimately in the constitution of that,
5 the new FRY in April 1992, leave the door over to accession by other
7 Q. Now, at the time these remarks we just looked at were made, with
8 respect to the Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina referred to by
9 Dr. Karadzic, were efforts underway to define its -- to establish its
10 structures, define its territorial scope and so on at that point?
11 A. Yes. The Bosnian Serbs were making their own efforts to do that,
12 and the basis of the negotiations at that time was the formation and the
13 recognition of separate entities within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14 Q. Before either the establishment of a Bosnian Serb -- well, before
15 the establishment of the Bosnian Serb Republic or before the specific
16 efforts taking place at this time, that is in late February 1992 were
17 underway, had there been efforts to identify or earmark territories
18 within Bosnia and Herzegovina considered to be Serbia by the SDS
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And can you tell us when such efforts had -- had begun?
22 A. Well, the efforts that I would refer to go under the generic name
23 of regionalisation. Regionalisation did not figure by name in the
24 programme of the SDS, but Dr. Karadzic did speak about it very shortly
25 after the first Assembly meeting in July 1990. He did speak about
1 regionalisation. The Serbs -- the Bosnian Serbs were dissatisfied with
2 the way municipal boundaries had been drawn in BH to the detriment of the
3 Serbs. They hoped to change those boundaries, and they also wanted to
4 create regions of municipalities, that is group municipalities together
5 by region to promote their interests, and they wanted to do this, form
6 these regions, on basically an ethnic basis; that is, group Serbian
7 majority municipalities together in their own regions.
8 Q. And, Dr. Treanor, bearing in mind that P2536, your report
9 entitled: "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990 through 1992," details in
10 part 2 aspects related to regionalisation. Can I just ask you quickly to
11 identify broadly the steps of regionalisation?
12 A. Yes. Right. This effort actually got underway, started being
13 discussed, as far as we know, as early as January 1991, that is,
14 immediately after the elections being discussed in SDS circles. The
15 first Serbian-dominated communities of municipalities were formed in
16 April 1991. Community municipalities was a type of co-operative
17 association that was recognised in the BH constitution. It was not a
18 governmental structure per se but just a co-operative association of
19 municipalities. But two -- at least two communities of municipalities
20 were formed at that time, one in Herzegovina, the other in Bosnian
21 Krajina by SDS-dominated municipalities, and later in September they --
22 they proceeded further with that development in the -- with the creation
23 of so-called Serbian autonomous regions.
24 Q. May I ask you to look at a September document, then,
25 65 ter 10825.
1 THE REGISTRAR: For the record, this is Exhibit P2530, Your
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Does this document refer to a decision related to regionalisation
5 and autonomous regions?
6 A. Yes, it does.
7 Q. And this particular document is a decision on appointing of the
8 staff for regional organisation on September 25, 1991, and in paragraph 2
9 of the document is -- it refers to implementation of the decision and
10 conclusions adopted at the Pale symposium of municipal, regional, and
11 republic SDS organs of 7 September 1991.
12 A. Yes, that's correct. This document is particularly important
13 because it is one of the very few documents that we have that directly
14 relate to the symposium and the decisions it took. From this document we
15 know at least the names of the decisions. We doesn't have the -- I
16 haven't been able to locate the texts of those decisions, but as the
17 Court can see, they relate to the promulgation, as the translation says,
18 of autonomous regions.
19 Q. Were there discussions about or references to the September 7th
20 meeting either before or after in the documentary record?
21 A. Yes. We have one or more intercepted telephone conversations
22 which refer to it.
23 Q. Can I call up -- first of all -- like I said, document's been
24 given -- the previous document's been given a P number and is admitted, I
25 take it. The document I identified as 1 -- 10825. I think it's --
1 THE REGISTRAR: It's P2530 Your Honours.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. If we could turn next to 65 ter 30194.
3 In particular to page 3 of the English and page 4 of the B/C/S.
4 Q. This is a conversation between Dr. Karadzic and Slobodan
5 Milosevic, and in this section Dr. Karadzic states:
6 "I'm having a big Plenary meeting here tomorrow at 4.00, all my
7 officials." Then he goes on to say "I've been to Trebinje and sacked
8 some fools. I was there for nine hours."
9 Can you place this in context of the September 7th meeting,
11 A. Yes. First of all, based on internal evidence in the -- in the
12 conversation, as I think laid out in a footnote in the report, I believe
13 that this conversation in fact took place on the 6th of September, and
14 here Dr. Karadzic is referring to a meeting -- a big meeting tomorrow,
15 which would be the 7th. So I infer that he's referring to the meeting
16 which is explicitly referenced in the previous document.
17 Q. I'm going to quickly turn to a conversation of September 8th.
18 MR. TIEGER: Could I tender this document, Your Honour.
19 MR. ROBINSON: We'd ask that it be marked for identification.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2544, Your Honours.
21 MR. TIEGER: Then turning next to 65 ter 30204. And that would
22 be page 1 of both the English and B/C/S. This is a conversation between
23 Mirko Jovic and Jovan Tintor. And on the first page Tintor states:
24 "You know what, we have no -- we have no specifics. There will
25 be chaos tomorrow. We passed -- we passed a decision yesterday that
1 Bosnia can remain officially, but we'll split it into Serbian Bosnia,
2 Croat Bosnia, and Muslim Bosnia."
3 And in terms of the September 7th meeting, can you place this
4 conversation in context, both the -- and explain what's -- what's being
6 A. Yes. This is a conversation between two lower-level SDS
7 officials, one of whom, Jovan Tintor, was obviously -- or I would
8 conclude was at the meeting, because he refers to the decision in the
9 terms he uses here, that is, dividing Bosnia into a Serbian, Muslim, and
10 Croatian Bosnia. That was the -- the thing I would comment on there,
11 because it, I think, can be a little confusing. I know it confused me.
12 The Bosnian Serbs wanted to have their own region regardless of
13 whether -- or regions, regardless of whether Bosnia as a whole remained
14 in federal Yugoslavia or not, and the basis of the negotiations that they
15 were carrying on with the -- with Muslim leaders at this time, as set out
16 in my report, certainly in the leadership study, was that there would be
17 regionalisation in Bosnia, and this -- this was something that the
18 Muslims were not particularly enthusiastic about to say the least.
19 However, at the September 30th meeting that we saw a little bit
20 previously, Dr. Karadzic was -- seemed to be very happy to announce that
21 Izetbegovic was willing to discuss regionalisation.
22 So this is the way regionalisation presented itself to -- to the
23 Bosnian Serbs, that is, dividing Bosnia into a Serbian, Muslim, and
24 Croatian Bosnia regardless of whether it stayed in Yugoslavia or not.
25 MR. TIEGER: And I tender 30204, Your Honour.
1 MR. ROBINSON: For identification, please.
2 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2545, Your Honours.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. Dr. Treanor, you mentioned that in connection with the shift from
6 the Yugo card or Yugo strategy as it's been mentioned to one of a Serbian
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that efforts were made to define the scope of its
8 territory and establish structures. What was the first institution of
9 what was to be the Bosnian Serb Republic created, and what was that?
10 A. Well, the first central institution that was created was the --
11 they called it the Bosnian -- the Assembly of the Serbian People in BH.
12 That was established on the 24th of October, 1991, a few days after the
13 adoption of the sovereignty resolutions I referred to earlier.
14 Q. And can we call up 30379, please. And I'd like to look quickly
15 at three passages there, the first one at page 1. This is a conversation
16 held on the 24th of October, 1991, between Dr. Karadzic and
17 Slobodan Milosevic. And at page 1 Dr. Karadzic says:
18 "We have to -- to prepare everything, and we have prepared
19 everything to create a de facto situation that cannot be -- which they
20 will break their teeth on. They simply have to break them. There is no
21 way we will live in a country with them. There's no way at all. That's
23 And then if we could turn to page 7 of the English. That's the
24 bottom of page 5 in B/C/S. Dr. Karadzic continues:
25 "You tell him that the Serbs are moving on that you can't -- that
1 you can't exert influence over us to mellow things down. We are moving
2 on. We will establish full authority over the Serbian territories in BiH
3 and none of his lawyers will be able to show his nose there. He will not
4 be able to exercise power. He will not have control over 65 per cent of
5 his territory. That is our goal."
6 And then continuing on the bottom of the page:
7 "Our steps are calculated and we have to establish authority and
8 control over our territories so that he doesn't get a sovereign Bosnia.
9 Croatia doesn't have control over 30 per cent of its territory, and
10 Bosnia will not have control over 60 per cent of its territory."
11 And can you place that in appropriate context for us, Doctor?
12 A. Certainly. This conversation took place on the day that the
13 Bosnian Serb Assembly was founded. However, it took place before the
14 meeting at which that occurred. Dr. Karadzic had been in Belgrade the
15 day before for a meeting of -- of Serbian leaders. Whether he spoke to
16 Mr. Milosevic directly at that time, I don't know. Mr. Milosevic, in
17 this conversation, is trying to, in fact, dissuade Dr. Karadzic from
18 taking the step of founding an Assembly, saying you shouldn't answer one
19 illegal step, that is the proclamation of Bosnian sovereignty, with
20 another illegal step, that is the formation of this Assembly. But
21 Dr. Karadzic is telling him that, "No, we have to -- we have -- we have
22 to proceed. We can't live with them any more and we --" indicates that,
23 in fact, this -- this was part of -- one step in a plan that they had and
24 they had to continue on that path.
25 MR. TIEGER: Tender 30379, Your Honour.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, for identification, please.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2546, Your Honours.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Dr. Treanor, you referred to the establishment of the Serb
5 autonomous regions in September of 1990 and now the establishment of the
6 Bosnian Serb Assembly in October. Referring back to the autonomous
7 regions for a moment, apart from identifying or aggregating territory as
8 you indicated before, did the region serve any functional purpose at that
10 A. Well, within the context of the emerging Bosnian Serb entity,
11 yes. The Assembly was just that. It was an assembly. It was a
12 legislative body, if you will. It did not have any executive organs.
13 The only executive organs that the SDS leaders had at their disposal were
14 the municipalities that they were in control of, which I indicated were
15 the fundamental unit of local government in BH. But they had also
16 created the Serbian autonomous districts, the SAOs, so they had -- they
17 could use them as executive organs and as means of communication with
18 lower-level governmental bodies as opposed to party bodies.
19 MR. TIEGER: I'd like to look at a few documents next. The first
20 would be 30400. This is a conversation between Dr. Karadzic and
21 General Simovic on the 2nd of November, 1991, and if we could turn to
22 page 4 of both the English and B/C/S. And there Dr. Karadzic explains to
23 General Simovic in the third paragraph from the bottom:
24 "I gave the order. I gave the order to all the municipalities
25 there and all the presidents of the municipalities. I gave the order.
1 They introduced the command post. They also introduced the wartime,
2 completely wartime -- wartime conditions of economy and work and all. I
3 announced general mobilisation to them because it is ongoing from earlier
4 on like I said," and so on.
5 And if -- could you place that in context, please, and do you
6 know what order Dr. Karadzic is referring to?
7 A. Yes. This conversation is with Tomislav Simovic who was at that
8 time the minister of defence of the Republic of Serbia. They're
9 discussing the ongoing war in Croatia. The need for manpower for the
10 army was a very important issue that Dr. Karadzic and the SDS got
11 involved with in Bosnia, getting people -- Bosnian Serbs to respond to a
12 call-up there or to volunteer to serve there. So that's what they're
13 discussing, and the order that he refers to that he gave I believe we do
15 MR. TIEGER: If I could tender 30400. Your Honour, I understand
16 we'll go through the identification notation by Mr. Robinson so -- so if
17 that could be marked accordingly.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be MFI P2547.
19 MR. TIEGER: Could we turn next to 05410.
20 Q. This is a telex. It refers to the Sarajevo SDS order brought to
21 light at a meeting of all the mayors it says here, and you can explain
22 what that is, Dr. Treanor. A meeting chaired by Dr. Karadzic. That
23 order provides, number 1: "To form commands and institute permanent
24 watch immediately to institute full mobility of the territorial army,"
25 and so on, and it bears the name at the bottom of the co-ordinator for
1 implementation of decision, Radoslav Brdjanin the vice-president of the
2 autonomous region Assembly. And if you could put this document in
3 context, please?
4 A. Well, this is the -- the only version that we have of the order
5 that I believe was being referred to in the previous conversation. As
6 you can see, the language of this order tracks the language - I hope you
7 can see from the English - it tracks the language of the conversation
8 that Dr. Karadzic was having with General Simovic. Something else I
9 would point out about this document is that right at the top it says it's
10 an order of the SDS and was conveyed by Dr. Karadzic at a meeting of the
11 presidents of municipalities, that was translated as "mayor."
12 Municipalities had so-called presidents who were in fact the
13 presidents of the councils, the Assemblies, of the municipalities. They
14 also had Executive Committees which were the executive organs and the
15 executive committees had presidents too. The president of the
16 municipality was regarded as the top official. So this is a meeting of
17 government officials, SDS government officials, getting an order from
18 Dr. Karadzic, a party order, being transmitted by an official of the
19 autonomous region of Krajina, which was one of the -- one of the SAOs.
20 So we see here Dr. Karadzic using the -- the SAOs, in this case the ARK,
21 the autonomous region of Krajina as a means of communication for orders
22 to government officials.
23 MR. TIEGER: Tender 05410, Mr. President.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2548, Your Honours.
25 MR. TIEGER: And if we could look next at 65 ter 30392, a
1 conversation between Mr. Brdjanin who you just discussed and his name
2 appears in the previous document and Dr. Karadzic on the 31st of October
3 1991. And if we could turn to page 5 of the English and page 4 of the
4 B/C/S, please.
5 Q. Dr. Karadzic says to Brdjanin:
6 "Come on man. Do your job. Don't call me about every minor
7 problem. I'm not your nanny. You have power in your hands and you have
8 presidents of municipalities through whom you can exercise this power
9 until we achieve autonomy. So you cannot -- you cannot call me about
10 every detail. You should execute power vigorously and to the fullest.
11 Not a single bird should be allowed to fly over Krajina and there must
12 not be a shortage of men from Krajina for the army. You must establish
13 all of that. I've seen what was written and sent. All that must be
14 implemented. Take care of that. Call each and every municipality
15 president and keep checking if it has been implemented and accomplished."
16 And if you could place that in context, please, Dr. Treanor, of
17 the issues that you've just been discussing.
18 A. Yes. Well, this conversation takes place a few days after the
19 issuing of the order that we saw on the previous document, although a
20 couple days -- in a couple days before the conversation with Simovic, and
21 here we see Dr. Karadzic urging Radoslav Brdjanin to see to the execution
22 of that order and indeed in general terms urging him to exercise the
23 powers that he and other officials in that area do have. The interesting
24 thing about Mr. Brdjanin in this context is that he is both -- both a
25 government official and a party official. I'm sorry, he was both a -- a
1 local governmental official. He was the president of the Executive
2 Committee of the municipality of Celina. So he was a local president
3 himself. He was also the deputy president of the Assembly of ARK, the
4 autonomous region of Krajina, and as we saw in the previous document he
5 was also the co-ordinator for the execution of decisions. So he had a
6 bit of an executive function as well, and he was also a deputy, an SDS
7 deputy, in the -- in the BH Assembly, and by this time a deputy in the
8 Bosnian Serb Assembly. And this is one of many conversations that --
9 that Dr. Karadzic had with -- with a broad range of officials, local
10 officials, urging them to do what -- what they need to do in order to
11 carry out instructions and to exercise their authority. Whether they be
12 party officials or government officials.
13 MR. TIEGER: And I tender --
14 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger -- yes. Marked for identification
15 or... yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI P2549.
17 JUDGE MORRISON: It's time for the break now, Mr. Tieger, and we
18 will rise and resume with Dr. Treanor at 11.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
21 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Q. Dr. Treanor, after the establishment of the SAOs, the autonomous
24 regions, in September, were any steps taken to incorporate them into the
25 emerging state structures of an anticipated Bosnian Serb Republic?
1 A. Yes. Is this on? Yes. Yes. As discussed in -- in my report
2 and the leadership study, I would mention just some of the milestones.
3 In November 1991, after the Bosnian Serb plebiscite which voted
4 overwhelmingly in favour of the Bosnian Serbs remaining in Yugoslavia,
5 the Bosnian Serb Assembly verified the establishment of the autonomous
6 regions, of five autonomous regions, and specified which municipalities
7 and parts of municipalities were in them.
8 On the 9th of January, 1992, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina was proclaimed, again as mentioned in the report, and in that
10 declaration it states that the territory of the Serbian Republic of
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of the territories of the SAOs and
12 additional territories, not precisely identified but to include areas
13 where the Serbs had been in a majority before the genocide of World War
14 II. At this time, the Bosnian Serb Assembly was also drafting a
15 constitution for the Bosnian Serb Republic and the existence of regions
16 or districts as referred to in the contusion were included.
17 Q. Let me turn next to another stage of the process as described in
18 your report, and that is the Bosnian Serb -- in particular the Bosnian
19 Serb leadership 1990 through 1992, 2536, P2536, and there at paragraphs
20 61 through 64 you address the instructions -- the 19 December 1991
21 instructions or the so-called variant A and B document. Can you tell us
22 very quickly what the variant A and B document was and what its general
23 purpose was?
24 A. The so-called A and B document is a set of instructions issued
25 under the name of the Main Board of the SDS to apparently -- or one can
1 infer to the SDS Municipal Boards. I say you can infer that because they
2 relate to activities on the municipal level. They specify two different
3 sets of actions which could be taken under -- or should be taken under
4 certain circumstances, a stage one and a stage two, phase one and phase
5 two type of thing, and it also made some slight variations in the types
6 of actions that would be taken and the different phases according to the
7 type of municipality, the municipalities being categorised into type
8 A and type B: Type A being the municipalities in which the SDS held
9 political power, that is in which they had the majority in the Assembly
10 of the given municipality, and type B municipalities being municipalities
11 in which the SDS was not in power but which nevertheless had a Serbian
12 pop -- some sort of Serbian minority.
13 Q. And you refer generally to activities on the municipal level
14 which the instructions direct municipal -- SDS municipal officials to
15 take. What sorts of actions are encompassed by the variant A and B
16 document, the 19 December instructions?
17 A. Well, such steps are specified as forming a Serbian Assembly for
18 the municipality in those municipalities where the Serbs were in a
19 minority establishing Crisis Staffs, establishing check-points, or
20 establishing various types of physical and institutional control.
21 Q. Did you find efforts by the SDS leadership, and Dr. Karadzic in
22 particular, to monitor the progress and implementation of the 19 December
23 instructions of variant A and B document?
24 A. Yes. As I mentioned, Dr. Karadzic was very active in making sure
25 that his instruction were carried out.
1 Q. Let me turn to 30489, please. And in particular to page 3 of
2 that document. This is a conversation between Dr. Karadzic and
3 Momcilo Krajisnik, held on 21 December 1991. Turn to page 3 of the
4 English as well. There's a reference at the top of the page by
5 Mr. Krajisnik to the dissatisfaction with people from the Krajina,
6 according to what he'd been told, with that Cizmovic. Dr. Karadzic,
8 "All right then, until the Serbian new year and then we'll see."
9 Then Mr. Krajisnik says:
10 "How did the idea come up that we should co-ordinate this?"
11 Dr. Karadzic, says:
12 "You know what -- who will implement what we issued last night."
13 Krajisnik, says:
14 "This council of ministers."
15 Dr. Karadzic, says:
16 "But they can't run from municipality to municipality," then he
17 continues, "They cannot run from municipality to municipality and say do
18 this, do that, or that."
19 Mr. Krajisnik, says:
20 "He won't run either."
21 Dr. Karadzic, says:
22 "But he must run."
23 Can you put this in context for us, please, Dr. Treanor.
24 A. Yes. This conversation takes place on the -- on the 21st of
25 December, 1991, as stated, which is a day after there was a big party
1 meeting of the type that is discussed in the report, and I believe as
2 discussed in the report that it was at this meeting that the instructions
3 A and B were disseminated, and I would conclude from what happened after
4 that that the word was in fact given that they should implement phase
6 Q. There's reference here to Cizmovic and his running from
7 municipality to municipality. Who was Mr. Cizmovic?
8 A. Right. Now, the next day, on the 21st of December, a session of
9 the Bosnian Serb Assembly was held. That session named a council of
10 ministers. Mr. Cizmovic was made a member of that Council of Ministers.
11 His title was as co-ordinator for the SAOs. Mr. Cizmovic was from
12 Banja Luka. Apparently people -- some people in Banja Luka didn't like
13 him. He was a lawyer. I hope that wasn't the reason why. But from this
14 conversation I would conclude that among his duties was going to be the
15 monitoring and enforcement -- or enforcement of the implementation of the
16 A and B document as well, which is a party document.
17 Q. Let me ask you to look at a few conversations with Mr. Cizmovic,
18 then, and I would tender this -- tender 30489, Your Honour?
19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, if it could be identification only.
20 JUDGE MORRISON: [Microphone not activated]
21 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2550, Your Honours.
22 MR. TIEGER: First turning to 30491, a conversation between
23 Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Cizmovic on the 21st of December, 1991. And if we
24 could turn to page 2 of both the English and B/C/S.
25 Q. And there toward the bottom of the page Dr. Karadzic states to
1 Mr. Cizmovic:
2 "The most important thing now in this very moment is that those
3 papers, those --"
4 And Cizmovic, says:
5 "To the realisation."
6 Dr. Karadzic, says:
7 "Right. Right."
8 And then continuing on to the next page in English but staying on
9 the same page in B/C/S, Dr. Karadzic tells him:
10 "You have a full authorisation to visit all our municipalities,
11 including even those where there is no and all those there who are ours."
12 And he continues: "They have to say what problems they are facing, and
13 they would certainly hear good advice from you. As to how to ..."
14 If you could place this conversation in context as you've been
15 discussing, Dr. Treanor.
16 A. Well this, conversation takes place on the same day as the
17 conversation with Mr. Krajisnik, that is the day after, I believe, the A
18 and B document was distributed, and Dr. Karadzic is giving him,
19 Mr. Cizmovic, some instructions on to -- how to carry out his task. I
20 note that the reference is to going round to the municipalities rather
21 than going to around the SAOs. So I conclude that he's referring to the
22 execution of the A and B document. I would note that he -- he refers to
23 going around to all our municipalities, our municipalities in where there
24 isn't any, "our municipalities" would be the variant A municipalities and
25 "where this isn't any" and "where we're not in control" would be variant
1 B municipalities.
2 MR. TIEGER: I tender this document, Your Honour, understanding
3 the MFI --
4 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
5 MR. TIEGER: -- comment that would be made.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2551, Your Honours.
7 MR. TIEGER: Turning next to 65 ter 30558, a conversation between
8 Mr. Cizmovic and Dr. Karadzic on the 16th of January, 1992, and if we
9 could turn to page 7 of the English and page 8 of the B/C/S.
10 Q. At that portion of the conversation Mr. Cizmovic says to
11 Dr. Karadzic:
12 "I've talked to Bijeljina," and he continues, "they are prepared
13 for full co-operation. It's the same with Northern Bosnia. I've
14 prepared a small sort of questionnaire for them -- for all of them."
15 Dr. Karadzic, says:
17 Then Mr. Cizmovic, says:
18 "What have they managed to do? How far have they come?" And
19 continues, "To what extent are they prepared to implement the first level
20 of the instructions?"
21 And if you could place that conversation in the context that
22 we've been discussing, please.
23 A. Yes. Well, this conversation takes place several weeks after the
24 previous conversation. It takes place after the proclamation of the
25 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in this conversation
1 Mr. Cizmovic is reporting back to Dr. Karadzic on his activities. He
2 mentions going to a particular municipality, and I would note the
3 reference to the question, the question in his questionnaire about being
4 ready to execute the first phase of the instructions. Again, I conclude
5 that this is a reference to the A and B document.
6 Q. And I tender 30558, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE MORRISON: Marked for identification.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2552.
9 MR. TIEGER: I think we can call up 30564, please, a conversation
10 again between Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Cizmovic, this time on the 22nd of
11 January, 1992. And if we could turn to page 5 of the English and of the
12 B/C/S as well.
13 Q. Mr. Cizmovic says to Dr. Karadzic that he's talked to Doboj, and
14 then he continues:
15 "It's going normally," et cetera, and then he says, "And say how
16 far --" excuse me, "I said as I could not attend today that they should
17 mark the problem and say how far they have got to mark the problem, to
18 see what they can do for themselves."
19 Dr. Karadzic, says:
20 "And for experts to go to them when they can't deal with
22 Mr. Cizmovic, says:
23 "If it's something for us, we'll go. We'll set up a team." He
24 continues, "It's the same situation with Bijeljina. I have finished that
25 with them too. I've still got to see about Birac."
1 And then turning to the next page it says Birac, Romanija, and
2 Herzegovina. Dr. Karadzic says:
3 "All right."
4 And Cizmovic, says:
5 "But I'll see to it that they -- that that should be finished
6 within this short time too."
7 And then continuing on page 7 of the English and page 7 of the
8 B/C/S, Mr. Cizmovic says:
9 "Tonight we also established the Crisis Staff which will --"
10 excuse me, "which will act when nobody can get together, when they can
11 assemble more quickly."
12 Dr. Karadzic, says:
14 Mr. Cizmovic, says:
15 "So that's working because the objective must be carried out,
16 instructions must be carried out."
17 And Dr. Karadzic, says:
18 "Yes, that's right."
19 And if you could place this in context as well.
20 A. This conversation takes place about a week after the previous
21 conversation, and again Mr. Cizmovic is reporting back to Dr. Karadzic on
22 his activities. Again he mentions Bijeljina which is a municipality
23 here. He also mentions Birac, Romanija, and Herzegovina which are
24 regions. He was the co-ordinator for the SAOs so that he was also
25 working on that level. I note the reference to the creation of a Crisis
1 Staff and the fact that instructions must be carried out. Again I
2 conclude that here he's referring to the A and B document and his
3 activities in seeing to the execution of those instructions.
4 Q. Dr. Treanor, your --
5 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I tender that, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes marked for identification.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2553, Your Honours.
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. Dr. Treanor, your report also notes that at paragraph 64 that the
10 second phase or stage or step of the 19 December instruction were
11 activated by Dr. Karadzic at the 14 February -- 14 February 1992 extended
12 meeting. The transcript of that meeting has already been received in
13 evidence, so I don't want to spend time with it, that's P00012, but does
14 it contain explicit references to that activation by Dr. Karadzic?
15 A. Yes, it does. The meeting on that day is another one of the
16 large meetings of the type discussed in the report, similar to the
17 meeting on the 20th of December, 1991. Dr. Karadzic makes reference to
18 phase two several times in the course of his remarks to that meeting. He
19 says, among other things, explicitly that you've been called together to
20 activate phase two, and he links the activation of phase two with the
21 passage of a resolution in the Bosnian Assembly, again in the absence of
22 the SDS deputies, to hold a referendum on independence in Bosnia and
24 Q. Dr. Treanor, with reference to these various stages or steps that
25 you -- you've discussed concerning identifying or marking territory and
1 ensuring control over those territories, toward the establishment of
2 state structures and so on, did you find indications or reflections of
3 whether these were thought up on the spot or planned in advance?
4 A. Well, there are certainly indications that they were planned in
5 advance in that connection, and I would note among other things that
6 the -- the progression of the steps that were taken broadly speaking by
7 the Bosnian Serbs were the same as those that were taken by the Croatian
8 Serbs just a little bit later.
9 MR. TIEGER: Can we turn to P00953, please. And in particular to
10 page 3 of the English and page 2 of the B/C/S. This is an interview of
11 Dr. Karadzic in January of 1995 by "Srpsko Oslobodjenje."
12 Q. And toward the bottom of the page in response to the question
13 what about the Serbian Democratic Party's role in the political struggle,
14 and then in the preparation and organisation of the Serbian people we see
15 the passage from Dr. Karadzic:
16 "We had a list of the actions and steps to take, but we always
17 waited for the Muslims to make a mistake, and after they made one, we
18 created a union of municipalities and the Serbian autonomous areas next,
19 followed by the regions and eventually our Assembly, and finally
21 And can you place that in context and explain that, please.
22 A. Yes, well, this interview takes place almost three years after
23 the Bosnian Serb Republic was proclaimed and -- gone on in the interval,
24 which I won't get into, but here Dr. Karadzic is looking back and
25 mentions the fact that they -- they had a plan, some steps laid out in
1 advance, and that they -- they waited until the appropriate time to take
2 each step. He was critical of the Croatian Serb leaders for the -- their
3 timing, basically. The steps he lays out here are ones that were in fact
4 taken by the Bosnian Serbs. I think we've -- we've mentioned them all.
5 There -- there maybe other steps that he also had planned out in advance,
6 but he certainly mentions these as being steps that they wanted to take
7 and simply waited until the appropriate time, which he links to mistakes
8 that the other side may make.
9 Q. Dr. Treanor, as you noted this is 1995, and as Dr. Karadzic
10 looking back and is a -- made in a public context, did Dr. Karadzic
11 indicate the same thing earlier and in less public forms?
12 A. Yes, he did.
13 MR. TIEGER: Can we look at 06361, please.
14 Q. Now, Dr. Treanor, this document is a record of the meeting of the
15 Presidency of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia held on
16 9 December 1991. I'd like to turn to page 78 of the English and 106 of
17 the B/C/S.
18 There at the top Dr. Karadzic explains to those gathered:
19 "We have to be wise enough and prepare both legality and the
20 factual status."
21 But I want to draw your attention to his comments in the next
22 paragraph, and he states:
23 "We have made a list of moves, ten moves in the direction we want
24 so that there are results. Bosnia remains in Yugoslavia either as a
25 whole or our areas, but we won't do anything until Alija messes something
1 up. When Alija messes something up, we make move number five, and then
2 we wait. When Alija messes something else up, we make move number six."
3 He goes on to explain that they didn't make the move on the
4 plebiscite prematurely which would have had an adverse effect and so on.
5 And he concludes:
6 "So we must all play the same strength."
7 Dr. Treanor, can you place that in context of the issues we've
8 been -- the issue we've been discussing?
9 A. Yes. First let me say this is a meeting that was held at the
10 Presidency in Belgrade. It is not a session of the Presidency in
11 Belgrade, that is a formal session of that body, but a meeting between
12 members of the Presidency, the currently active members of the
13 Presidency, and a host of other Serbian leaders from Croatia and Bosnia,
14 including Dr. Karadzic, and they're generally discussing the war, the
15 situation there, and the efforts to come to peace, the Vance Plan, that
16 type of thing.
17 And here Dr. Karadzic is saying again that he had certain steps
18 and -- in mind, and they waited for the right moment to execute each of
19 those steps. He -- he makes reference to ten steps. Now, whether there
20 are literally ten steps or whether he's just speaking sort of
21 figuratively -- figuratively, I don't know, and again whether the five or
22 six or -- exactly steps five and six, I don't know. But certainly the
23 idea is that he -- they had a -- a plan to execute certain steps and
24 waited for the right time to execute each one of them.
25 MR. TIEGER: And I tender 06361, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2554, Your Honours.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Dr. Treanor, with respect to this plan that Dr. Karadzic has
5 outlined and the stages in which it would be implemented, did he
6 communicate this to the field, to his -- to SDS officials in the regions
7 and municipalities?
8 A. Yes, he did, in general terms.
9 MR. TIEGER: Could we turn to 65 ter 30354, please. This is a
10 conversation between Dr. Karadzic, Dr. Vukic, and Boro Sendic on the 16th
11 of October 1991, and I'd ask to turn to page 2 of both the English and
13 Q. First, there Dr. Karadzic, says after a generalised -- after a
14 complaint they'd been isolated:
15 "No way, you're not isolated at all. Can listen to press
16 conferences, we're in touch over the phone, everything's going very well.
17 Nobody has the right to leave the Serbs in Central Bosnia or in Semberija
18 or in east Herzegovina high and dry. We have to pressure others. Now I
19 have to say it, although they're listening in to the conversation, we
20 have to pressure others into secession, because if we secede, we won't
21 even get a third of what belongs to us."
22 And then we could continue on page 6 of the English and page 6 of
23 the B/C/S.
24 He states:
25 "We'll come. We've worked out a scenario. We won't make a
1 single move today, if necessary we'll do it tomorrow because it would be
2 a great pity to do it today and tomorrow. It would be very useful.
3 Everything's been worked out."
4 And then continuing on the fifth entry from the bottom he notes a
5 long meeting:
6 "We had a long meeting that lasted five hours. We clarified many
7 things there, purged. Of course, not the strategic secrets but hidden
8 strategic things. We clarified everything."
9 And then he notes:
10 "We're working on the diary with precision, this move, that move,
11 so that no one can do anything, man."
12 And then finally the last entry of page 9 of the English and the
13 final entry in the B/C/S as well, he notes:
14 "There should and meeting with just a few of us. Some people
15 will get assignments. We have a diary of events. We know exactly which
16 should be made."
17 And if you can place that in the context identifying the persons
18 with whom -- or person Dr. Vukic and Mr. Sendic with whom Dr. Karadzic is
19 speak and the timing.
20 A. Yes, what Dr. Karadzic is speaking with Dr. Vukic, who is the SDS
21 president of the municipality of Banja Luka. I don't know precisely who
22 Boro Sendic is. I would infer that he's a local SDS official of some
23 description. This conversation that takes place a day after the adoption
24 of the memorandum by the Bosnian Assembly that I referred to that the
25 Bosnian Serbs objected to so much, and he's in this -- in that portions
1 of the conversation assuring Dr. Vukic, who is wondering what's going to
2 happen now, that they do have a plan. They're in control of the
3 situation. They just had a big meeting. As we know, they did have a
4 meeting of the party council at that time. He obviously doesn't want to
5 talk too much about this over the phone, but assuring Dr. Vukic that they
6 do have a strategy and they're trying to stick to it.
7 MR. TIEGER: And I tender 30354, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. Marked for identification.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2555, Your Honours.
10 MR. TIEGER:
11 Q. And -- and one more document I'd ask you to look at in connection
12 with the communication of the steps and plans to the field.
13 MR. TIEGER: If we could turn to 30543. This is a conversation
14 of January 11th, 1992, involving Dr. Karadzic and Nenad Stevandic, and if
15 we could turn, please, to page 6 of the English and page 4 of the B/C/S.
16 Q. Just at what would be the beginning of the second half of that
17 page Dr. Karadzic says to Mr. Stevandic:
18 "Listen Nenad, well, they cannot. We have all of that in the
19 plans. We have all moves in the envelopes. They must not do it before
20 we do it in the whole of Bosnia. Why are they playing smart? They're
21 explaining my policy to me."
22 Then he goes on to talk about the plebiscite, and then he
23 continues at the bottom of the page:
24 "However, we are doing everything else. We will have a council
25 of ministers today. There is -- we have done everything today. We have
1 plans for everything. They just keep running ahead like oxen after salt.
2 Let them stop for a while and let them synchronise their work with the
3 party. "
4 And if you could place that in context, please?
5 A. Yes. Well, this conversation is with Nenad Stevandic who was an
6 SDS member or supporter in Banja Luka. I'm not sure if he had any
7 position at that time. He was later a member of the Crisis Staff in the
8 autonomous region of Krajina, that this takes place a few days after the
9 proclamation of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and he, Dr. Karadzic, is
10 referring to the fact that there are - as [indiscernible] refer to them
11 on a previous occasion - ad hocs within the party who would like to --
12 were straining it at the bit, to change the metaphor, wanting to run
13 ahead. But no, we have plan and we have to do everything at the right
15 Q. And the reference to the council of ministers?
16 A. That's a reference to -- the council of ministers that was
17 appointed on 21st of December, and that council of ministers, I believe,
18 met on this day or certainly around -- around that time.
19 MR. TIEGER: And I would tender 30543, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE MORRISON: [Microphone not activated]
21 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2556, Your Honours.
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. Dr. Treanor, you've already discussed - and I know your report
24 details the hierarchical nature of the SDS, and you've mentioned the
25 emphasis on adherence to the policies and instructions of the central SDS
1 leadership by lower levels. I wanted to ask you, we've seen some
2 communications with officials in the field, but I wanted to ask you
3 quickly more generally how were -- what -- what forms of communication
4 were used for getting instructions and information to the field and
5 information back on their implementation.
6 A. Well, there were a variety of means that were available to
7 Dr. Karadzic and the other top SDS leaders at this time. First of all,
8 as discussed in the reports, they had many meetings of varying sizes,
9 some including officials from all around Bosnia, both party officials and
10 government officials who were SDS people. They could communicate by
11 telephone. They could communicate by telex, as we've seen. And they
12 could communicate by -- by letter, many of which were faxed, which was a
13 technology available at that time. So they made use of, I think, of the
14 range of technological capabilities that were available to them.
15 Q. And what role did Dr. Karadzic take in communicating with the
16 field, either at the regional or municipal levels?
17 A. Well, looking at the totality of -- of the documents that -- that
18 I've seen, not all of which are mentioned in the reports by any means,
19 Dr. Karadzic seems to have been a very active leader, a very hands-on
20 leader, if you will. He made -- he organised these large meetings on a
21 fairly regular basis and made extensive use of the telephone in talking
22 to leaders at various levels around the country, directly to municipal
23 leaders and also to regional leaders of the SDS, talking to the highest
24 level Bosnian Serb officials in the Bosnian government, that is members
25 of the Presidency, members of the government itself, with
1 Momcilo Krajisnik, of course, who was the president of the Assembly, and
2 talking to Slobodan Milosevic and other people in Belgrade.
3 MR. TIEGER: In that connection in terms of communications with
4 people in the field, can we turn next to 30058. This is a telephone
5 conversation of the 24th of June, 1991, between Dr. Karadzic and
6 Goran Babic. And if we could turn to page 3 of both the English and
8 Q. Just a couple of references and I'll ask you to place it in
9 context. There's a discussion about several people. In the middle of
10 the page by Dr. Karadzic were mention of them:
11 "All those people who made us problems cannot join the party now.
12 That is my order. Tell them that I will introduce new measures in
13 Prijedor and that I will tell them who the president will be there."
14 MR. TIEGER: And thing turning to page 4 of the English and I
15 guess remaining at page 3 of the B/C/S.
16 Q. Dr. Karadzic states:
17 "Tell him everything. Tell him that I will dissolve the board.
18 I will place ten people to lead the party."
19 And finally on the last page, Dr. Karadzic, says:
20 "If you are not able to organise the real democratic elections
21 without those bastards, I will name 10 to 15 people to lead it as I did
22 last time."
23 And if you could place that in context, please.
24 A. Yes. Well, this is a conversation with Goran Babic who was an
25 SDS man in Prijedor. I'm not sure what precise position he may have
1 occupied there, but he's calling Dr. Karadzic because he's concerned
2 about affairs in the party there, and here we see Dr. Karadzic giving him
3 instructions on how the party should be organised and telling him that if
4 they can't do it themselves, he'll do it for them basically.
5 Q. Tender that, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. That will be marked for identification.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2557, Your Honours.
8 MR. TIEGER: And if we could turn next to 65 ter 30328. This is
9 a conversation of 8 October 1991 involving Dr. Karadzic and Brane from
10 Visegrad. And if we can turn quickly to page 3.
11 Q. Toward the second half of that page they're discussing a
12 dead-line. Dr. Karadzic, says:
13 "Give them seven days," and then continues toward the bottom of
14 the page, "If not we shall proceed to organise parallel organs of power
15 with a view to protecting the Serbian people. They should be told that
16 openly and that's it, that's it."
17 And Dr. Treanor, if you can place this conversation in context
18 and of the communications made between the central level, the SDS, and
19 particularly Dr. Karadzic, directly to the field.
20 A. Yes. Well, this is a conversation with someone in Visegrad.
21 There is an SDS official down there whose first name is Brane, who was
22 reporting on a local matter, and again Dr. Karadzic is giving him
23 instructions on how to handle the situation. They make reference to
24 establishing their own police station down there. I would note that
25 around this time in October 1991 there were discussions among the Bosnian
1 Serb leaders about precisely that, establishing a separate Ministry of
2 Internal Affairs for the Serbs in Bosnia.
3 MR. TIEGER: And I would tender that document, Your Honour.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2558, Your Honours.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. As you noted, Dr. Treanor, those two communications were directly
7 with municipal officials. Were policy -- were similar discussions
8 regarding directions or policy from Dr. Karadzic also made to the
9 regional level?
10 A. Yes, I think we've seen an example of that already.
11 Q. And if I could turn your attention to perhaps one more.
12 MR. TIEGER: That's 30363.
13 Q. This is a conversation of 18 October 1991 between Dr. Karadzic
14 and Mr. Brdjanin who you discussed previously.
15 MR. TIEGER: And if we could turn quickly to page 2 of the
16 English toward the top, and that's the bottom of page 1 in the B/C/S
17 moving on to the top of page 2 of the B/C/S.
18 Q. Dr. Karadzic states:
19 "What do you mean we're not supporting you? We always do what is
20 necessary and the way it should be done. We are always with you and
21 constantly trying to calm things down. But look, you cannot refuse to
22 come today because we're taking a decision that will be important for
23 Europe and one which Europe will have to accept. Do you understand?"
24 Brdjanin says:
25 "Doesn't matter. I'm pursuing the policies from headquarters and
1 they're being implemented here. But over the past month I've got the
2 impression that they're fucking around, pardon my French, and no one is
4 And then at page 3 of the English, I just wanted to bring your
5 attention to this portion toward the second half of that page where
6 Dr. Karadzic makes reference to the -- he says:
7 "We are not a Communist Party that can simply remove someone by
8 decree even though I have introduced a state of emergency. I don't know
9 if you've received that information.
10 Mr. Brdjanin, says:
11 "Yes, of course I have."
12 Dr. Karadzic, says:
13 "The Municipal Boards must meet every day. We have to do this
15 And can you place this conversation in context, please?
16 A. Yes. This conversation is a very interesting example of
17 communications and indeed planning in the SDS. The conversation took
18 place on the 18th of October. On that day Dr. Karadzic did proclaim a
19 state of emergency in the party, something that Mr. Brdjanin was already
20 aware of, and he -- Dr. Karadzic also refers to a meeting that was going
21 to take place that day. This is a meeting in response to the adoption of
22 the memorandum on the sovereignty of Bosnia a few days before, and this
23 was the meeting at which the SDS leaders decided, among other things, to
24 establish their own Assembly and to hold a plebiscite among the Serbs in
25 Bosnia. He's insisting to Dr. -- Mr. Brdjanin how important that meeting
1 is and that he attend it and he, in fact, did attend.
2 MR. TIEGER: I tender this document, Your Honour. It's 30363.
3 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. Again, marked for identification.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2559.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Dr. Treanor, you mentioned the various ways of communicating with
7 the field. Let me just look -- ask you to look quickly at 00949. This
8 is a document dated the 15th of August, 1991, accepted by Dr. Karadzic,
9 president of Serbian Democratic Party, operating instructions to all the
10 SDS Municipal Boards, obligatory for everyone. It provides for meetings
11 once a week, local boards to meet. Every member of a local board must be
12 entrusted with maintaining the contact with 10 to 20 homes, the
13 submission of information or report on the situation and the completion
14 of a questionnaire. If you could place that in context, please.
15 A. Yes, this document is an example of a different type of
16 communication, in this case a letter or circular -- circular if you will,
17 from the -- from Dr. Karadzic. The document does not have an original
18 signature on it. It has -- does have a stamp of the SDS, however, and
19 the letterhead of the SDS, the typed letterhead as they were accustomed
20 to doing it at that time. Sent out to all the Municipal Boards and
21 telling them that they should have regular meetings and -- on the
22 municipal and local level and report back. So this is an example of a
23 particular type of communication and one that demands communication from
24 the -- the lower ranks the party.
25 MR. TIEGER: And I tender 00949, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. That will be admitted.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2560, Your Honours.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. And, Dr. Treanor, I'd like -- if I can move forward a few months
5 to late March 1992 and look at another communication --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that this was admitted
7 yesterday. That it already bears a D or a P number.
8 JUDGE MORRISON: I think that may be right. I do recognise the
9 document, so -- but that can be checked.
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you for that. In any event, we think we have
11 the document. I'd like to call up the 23 March 1992 document, which
12 either bears 05420 or a new designation.
13 Q. This is a strictly confidential, indeed must be destroyed after
14 reading, document that bears Dr. Karadzic's name and signature and the
15 seal, dated March 23rd. Can you explain what this document is -- refers
16 to and its context, please.
17 A. Yes. Well, this document was issued on the 23rd of March 1992,
18 which is at a time when the Bosnian Serb leaders were activating their
19 government structures. They had adopted a constitution on the 28th of
20 February, 1992, and some legislation associated with that law and the
21 government on ministries to flesh out that constitution, and on this
22 date, in fact, they published some of those laws in their own gazette,
23 their own "Official Gazette," and those laws would have come into effect
24 according to their texts eight days later on the 31st of March, and they,
25 in fact, had a ceremonial proclamation of the constitution of the
1 republic on the 27th of March and elected a government as opposed to a
2 council of ministers. The government now had a statutory basis in the
3 laws that I had referred to. So this was a very active period for them
4 in getting their structures, especially at the centre, activated, and
5 Dr. Karadzic in this communication, which is again a written
6 communication, is informing the municipal presidents of the establishment
7 of a -- rather the perfection, if I can put it that way, of a
8 communications system and that they should be aware of and will be able
9 to use. I would note that he sends this document as the president of the
10 party, which was the only position he occupied. He had no government
11 position in the official structure of BH as opposed to many of the other
12 leaders that we've been discussing, but he sends it to all presidents of
13 municipalities. I would conclude that he's sending this to the
14 presidents of Serbian municipalities since they were the only ones who
15 were likely to obey the head of the SDS. So it's rather interesting from
16 that point of view. We're seeing him again as -- as in the 26 October
17 1991 telex as party leader conveying instructions to government officials
18 on a lower level.
19 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I tender 05420 if it isn't already in
20 evidence, but I guess that can be determined.
21 [Registrar and Trial Chamber confer]
22 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic was right as to the admission of
23 the previous document and this will also be admitted.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The previous one is P2529, if that
25 is of any assistance.
1 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour. That's P2529, and
2 the current document which is 05420 will be Exhibit P2560.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Dr. Treanor, you've spoken about - and I know detailed more
5 extensively in your reports - the efforts to earmark territory through
6 the process of regionalisation or the creation of Serbian municipalities
7 and so on. We've now looked at a document that put us in late March
8 1992. Once the conflict began, did Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb
9 leadership take further steps to identify their priorities, and did those
10 have territorial aspects?
11 A. Yes, they did. They adopted at the 16th session of the Bosnian
12 Serb Assembly on the 12th of May, 1992, which is a very important
13 session. It changed some of the institutional structure of the republic
14 at the top. They created a three-member Presidency and elected
15 Dr. Karadzic to that Presidency and created the army and made General
16 Ratko Mladic the commander of that army. Pursuant to a report by
17 Dr. Karadzic on -- when he referred to as the strategic goals of the
18 Serbian people, they adopted those goals. The first goal was the -- as
19 detailed in my report --
20 Q. And can I stop you for a second. You may be assisted if I could
21 call up 19154.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Would you repeat the number, please?
23 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, 19154.
24 THE REGISTRAR: I think it needs to be released, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: I think that has now been released.
1 Q. Sorry to interrupt, Dr. Treanor, but I hoped this might be of
2 assistance to you and to the Court as you continue with your response
3 concerning what you were referring to, which is the adoption of the
4 strategic goals.
5 A. Yes. As I mentioned, the strategic goals are -- as set out at
6 this meeting are discussed in the leadership study. Indeed,
7 Dr. Karadzic's speech on that occasion is extracted in verbatim at some
8 length because I regard them as so important. This map quite neatly
9 summarises them. The first goal as can be seen here is the separation of
10 the Serbian people from the other two ethnic communities in their own
12 The second goal, which is the arrow at the top in the middle,
13 objective 2 is a corridor; in other words, a territorial connection
14 between the area of Semberija on the east and Bosnian Krajina on the
15 west. The corridor is a sensitive issue because the area of -- there are
16 areas of Croatian settlement up there and Muslim settlement, and the
17 corridor was necessary in order to -- to hold not only the Bosnian Serb
18 Republic together, the east and the west, but also to make possible
19 overland communications between Serbia and the eastern part of the
20 republic -- the Bosnian Serb Republic with major portions of the Croatian
21 Serb Republic, known as the Serbian Republic of Krajina, which had its
22 capital in Knin, which is sort of just south around where you see the
23 word "Una, objective 4," so in the white area around there. So it was a
24 very important communications corridor that they wanted to have.
25 The third is the Drina valley. The importance of the Drina
1 valley to them is twofold. One is that was where the border with Serbia
2 and the FR -- and Montenegro, the -- parts of Montenegro, the FRY was,
3 and they wanted to have direct communication with those Serbian states
4 and did not want to have any Muslim territory between them and the Serbs.
5 Again, there was a lot of Muslim settlement in the Drina valley. Also
6 the -- the -- a corridor, so to speak, would facilitate communication
7 between Semberija in the north and Herzegovina in the south, which is
8 around the area where you see on the map that says "Neretva, objective
9 4." The areas -- large areas of Muslim -- general Muslim population
10 being in between those two areas, otherwise the corridor along the Drina
11 was necessary for communication between them.
12 Then the objective 4 was to establish a border on the Neretva.
13 You can see that objective 4 in the centre. The bottom, the Neretva
14 River, as indicated there, kind of twists around. I don't think they
15 wanted to have their border on the whole course of it there, but
16 basically the portion that runs from directly north to south from just
17 south of Sarajevo to perhaps the sea. And then the Una is indicated, the
18 Una River, objective 4, up on the top of the map on the -- on the
19 left-hand side for large portion of that river which flows into the Sava,
20 which is at the north and is not indicated as such on that map but
21 basically the northern boundary of Bosnia is the Sava River.
22 The Una forms the border with Croatia for some of its course and
23 for other parts of the course, as you can see there, it runs through
24 Bosnia. According to this objective, the Bosnian Serbs were not claiming
25 the area to the north and the west of the Una. That's an area known as
1 Cazin Krajina from the name of one of the principal towns there and that
2 was a very heavily Muslim populated area. So they're not claiming that
3 under this objective.
4 And 5, as you can see Sarajevo is in the middle, to divide
5 Sarajevo. And 6 would have been access to the sea. They don't specify
6 exactly where, but it would have had to have been somewhere in the -- in
7 the area of where the arrow is on the map but is where the Herzegovina --
8 Bosnian Serb Herzegovina is closest to the sea.
9 Q. You indicated that these were -- these goals were articulated at
10 a session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 12th of May, 1992. Were
11 they maintained throughout the course of the conflict through -- until
12 it -- its conclusion in 1995?
13 A. Yes, they were. These objectives underlay the position of the
14 Bosnian Serb negotiators who were headed by Dr. Karadzic throughout all
15 the negotiations that took place in relation to peace throughout the
16 course of the war and going through the Dayton meetings.
17 Q. All right. Turn -- I ask you to look at 65 ter 01344.
18 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger, do you want the map admitted.
19 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour thank you very much.
20 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes that will be admitted.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2561, Your Honours.
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. This is an interview with Dr. Karadzic by Nevesinje in 1995, and
24 if I could turn your attention, please, to page 3 of the English and page
25 5 of the B/C/S, the bottom of the centre column. Dr. Karadzic states in
1 response to the question about the western and southern borders being a
2 hot topic in Herzegovina:
3 "Is Herzegovina going to return to its historical Serb borders
4 the Neretva River?"
5 And Dr. Karadzic states:
6 "Our Assembly has adopted six strategic goals of this war. Goal
7 number 3 is the Neretva River as a border. The territory and the left
8 bank of the Neretva is Serbian territory. We are not giving up on that
9 and never will. We will seek to accomplish that through political or
10 military means."
11 And then he continues to discuss the thousands of Serbs who are
12 now bravely fighting to defend the remainder of Herzegovina.
13 Can you place that in context? Is that a reflection of what you
14 were mentioning a moment ago?
15 A. Yes, it is. This interview was given in May 1995 at a time when
16 there was probably some uncertainty, some anxiety among the people and
17 the leaders of the Republic of Srpska. The Croatian forces had just on
18 the 1st of May eliminated one portion of the RSK, that is the Croatian
19 Serb entity in Croatia, which caused quite a shock among Serbs in both
21 In -- in this article we see Dr. Karadzic giving public
22 assurances that the leadership is still adhering to the six strategic
23 objectives that were adopted, and he discusses, here in particular, the
24 two objectives that would be of most concern to people in Herzegovina;
25 that is, the border on the Neretva, which had not been reached militarily
1 at that time, and access to the sea, which is -- and also not been
2 achieved by that time, either militarily or in any negotiations.
3 MR. TIEGER: I tender this document, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. That can be admitted.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2562, Your Honours.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. Now, that was a document that reflects a public statement by
8 Dr. Karadzic in respect of the strategic objectives. Let me first ask
9 you, were reflections of the adherence to the strategic objectives made
10 both in terms of explicit reference to the strategic objectives and --
11 or -- and also by references to individual goals encompassed by the
12 strategic objectives?
13 A. Yes, indeed. Sometimes you'll see references to the expression
14 the strategic objectives as a whole or the very frequent discussion of --
15 varies of the individual objectives and how far that objective has or has
16 not been obtained.
17 MR. TIEGER: Turn to 05321 please. This document reflects the
18 minutes of a meeting on August 20th, 1994, between Dr. Karadzic,
19 Mr. Krajisnik, and Milan Martic, the president of the RSK.
20 Q. And I'd like to just quickly draw your attention to three
21 references. The first on the bottom of page 5 in English and page 4 of
22 the B/C/S. Where Dr. Karadzic states that:
23 "Squeezing under the bridge in Brcko is no good. It's a tunnel,
24 not a corridor. Under this scenario you would be surrendered because we
25 would be unable to help you. Everything would be controlled."
1 And then turning to page 6 and page 4 of the B/C/S, there is a
2 reference to the -- a concern about the vulnerability of the Kljuc-Jajce
3 road which can easily be severed.
4 And finally on the next page, page 7 of the English and still on
5 page 4 of the B/C/S, the reference:
6 "The maps are unacceptable. The eastern enclaves are
8 And can you very quickly place that in context of the strategic
9 objectives -- discussion and continued adherence to the strategic
11 A. Yes. This meeting took place shortly after a break in relations
12 between the Republika Srpska and the FRY had taken place over the -- the
13 rejection of the so-called Contact Group Plan by Republika Srpska. A map
14 had been presented by the so-called Contact Group in July, and the
15 parties were asked to accept it or reject it as -- and the other parties
16 accepted it, but the Bosnian Serbs did not. They offered to continue
17 negotiations but did not accept the map.
18 And here Dr. Karadzic, in a meeting with the president of the
19 RSK, which supported the Serb position in this case, is giving a bit of a
20 rundown on their objections to the map in -- in terms of the strategic
21 objective -- objectives. The reference to the tunnel in Brcko that
22 relates to the corridor, he notes that they're being offered something
23 very, very narrow up there which is very important for them and also for
24 the RSK as a route for communications, and such a narrow corridor would
25 not be -- would not be adequate or wouldn't be defensible, that type of
1 thing. Then he mentions the Kljuc-Jajce, that area. That area relates
2 to the border on the Una which that map did not concede to them. It gave
3 the Muslims fairly extensively territory just on the east side of the
5 And then the reference to the enclaves is -- is interesting,
6 because in 1992, in laying out the objectives as quoted in my report,
7 Dr. Karadzic at that time has said that such enclaves might be
8 acceptable. Here he's indicating that they're unacceptable, although on
9 other occasions he -- around this time he said that, well, maybe they
10 would be. So a bit of a -- a bit of waffling on that point, but again
11 laying out his position on that proffered territorial settlement in terms
12 of individual objectives.
13 MR. TIEGER: I tender that document, Your Honour. I tender
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2563, Your Honours.
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. And very quickly Dr. Treanor, I just wanted to -- on the subject
18 of the last document 01363. I wanted to move ahead just slightly and --
19 this is now July of 1995, an interview with Dr. Karadzic in El Pais, and
20 I just want to draw your attention quickly to two references there.
21 First of all at the bottom of page 9 of the B/C/S, after the
22 comment above "Our number one priority is to form part of Serbia," it
23 continues to the very bottom of the page in response to the question:
24 "What's wrong with that plan?"
1 "First of all, we now have a state in one piece with contiguous
3 And then it goes on to describe what the problems may be with the
4 plan not fulfilling that. And finally turning to page 12 in e-court,
6 "What is your view on the future of Sarajevo."
8 "Sarajevo will be transformed into two cities, two neighbouring
9 cities if the Muslims wish. Otherwise, a Serbian city because the city
10 was built in a Serbian zone."
11 And again, do these remarks reflect continuing adherence to the
12 strategic objectives as you've been discussing?
13 A. Yes. Here we see Dr. Karadzic referring again to two specific
14 objectives, one to do with -- with the Drina, noting that the enclaves
15 are not viable and must disappear. I think further down in the interview
16 he -- I think he expresses a little bit more flexibility on that
17 particular issue, and then of course the other thing he discusses here is
18 the future of Sarajevo which was one of the objectives and indicates
19 continued adherence to that objective, dividing Sarajevo.
20 MR. TIEGER: And I would tender this document, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2564, Your Honours.
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. Now, Dr. Treanor, you talked about Dr. Karadzic's role in the
25 party. I wanted to ask you quickly about his position in the formal
1 structures of Republika Srpska once -- once it was established. May I
2 ask you first of all whether his position as the top person in the SDS
3 was translated into his assumption of positions in Republika Srpska.
4 A. Yes, it was. I -- I would say that -- I'm not sure what
5 "describe" has been translated into but, rather, in addition to his
6 position as party leader which he continued to be and continued to be
7 important. The first official position that we -- we see him occupying
8 is as president of the so-called National Security Council which was
9 established by the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 27th of March, 1991, just
10 in a period that I mentioned when they were activating their central
11 organs. Without going into too much detail because it's explained in the
12 reports, that National Security Council acted as a supreme executive body
13 for the Bosnian Serb Republic for a short time, sort of a central Crisis
14 Staff. Dr. Karadzic came as the president of that council. It included
15 the two acting presidents of the republic and members of the government,
16 and they met fairly frequently during April and early May to consider the
17 situation and adopted many decisions in connection with the
18 establishments of the republic and the prosecution of the war.
19 I have -- on the 12th of May, as I mentioned, the Assembly made
20 some changes to the -- to the structure of the Presidency. Again,
21 without going into too much detail because it's detailed extensively in
22 the report, they created a temporary three-man Presidency, elected
23 Dr. Karadzic to that Presidency along with Drs. Plavsic and Koljevic who,
24 at their first meeting on the same day, elected him president of that
25 Presidency, that Presidency was expanded to the five people at the
1 beginning of June, 1991, to include the prime minister Dr. Djeric and the
2 president of the Assembly, Mr. Krajisnik. Then on the 17th of December,
3 1992, the Assembly again changed the temporary structure by temporary --
4 I mean pending the holding of elections under the constitution which they
5 say could only happen after the war was over. They created a -- a single
6 president and elected Dr. Karadzic to that position and elected
7 Drs. Plavsic and Koljevic as vice-presidents.
8 Now all of those bodies that I mentioned - excuse me - exercised
9 the powers of the office of the president of the republic. In the
10 constitution and the legislation that was passed those powers are
11 specified. Again very briefly because this is laid out in -- in the
12 report and in the addendum to the report, the president of the republic
13 was the Commander-in-Chief of the army, commanded the army in war and
14 peace, and gave -- specified a wide range of duties and responsibilities
15 for the president, including disciplinary powers, powers of appointment
16 of officers, and also created the position of -- that is, legislation
17 created the position of the commander of the Main Staff of the army.
18 That would be the top uniformed professional officer. However, according
19 to the legislation, that official, that officer, only had such authority
20 as the president as Commander-in-Chief granted to that officer. So the
21 president of the republic was the Commander-in-Chief in name and fact,
22 and Dr. Karadzic was very active in exercising his powers and authority
23 as Commander-in-Chief.
24 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger, we'll take the second break now, and
25 we will resume sitting at 1.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.
3 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 Q. Mr. Treanor, just before we adjourned, you had been referring to
6 Dr. Karadzic's position as Commander-in-Chief or supreme commander of the
7 military forces of the Bosnian Serbs, including his very active role in
8 exercising those powers, and you also alluded to the position of
9 commander of the Main Staff. Your report also contains references to
10 some friction between Dr. Karadzic, the supreme commander and
11 General Mladic, the head of the Main Staff. And I wanted to direct --
12 ask you about a couple of documents in that regard.
13 MR. TIEGER: And the first is 65 ter 0657 -- 06507. Excuse me.
14 Now, this document contains -- it is dated August the 5th. It
15 contains an interview of Dr. Karadzic with Bosnian Serb television on
16 August the 4th, 1995, and with Dr. Karadzic explaining a number of
18 Q. Dr. Treanor, are you familiar with this document, and can I ask
19 you to put it in context for us, please?
20 A. Yes. I believe I use this document in the leadership study.
21 This is an interview that took place on the -- late in the evening of the
22 4th of August in connection with Dr. Karadzic's reorganisation of the top
23 military command structure in Republika Srpska and the removal of
24 General Mladic as commander of the Main Staff and making him an advisor
25 to the -- to himself as supreme commander. That came as a bit of a shock
1 to everybody.
2 The interview itself and all this is taking place at a time when
3 military developments on the ground were progressing rather rapidly.
4 There had been some successes and defeats by the Bosnian Serb forces, and
5 on this very day Croatian forces launched their Operation Storm directed
6 against the remaining portions -- the major remaining portions of the
7 RSK, including toward the -- their capital of Knin, many of those
8 operations being based in areas of Bosnia that the Croatian forces had
9 recently taken.
10 So it was a period of some military crisis. It was also
11 potentially a period of political crisis in that Mr. Milosevic had come
12 out publicly on the 1st of August, as detailed in my report, sending
13 letters, almost identical letters to General Mladic, interestingly, and
14 President Izetbegovic saying that now is the time to shift from military
15 to political means and to start negotiating peace.
16 Q. Does Dr. Karadzic in this interview in explaining his effort to
17 reorganise the -- to conduct this reorganisation, does he praise certain
18 commanders or events and criticise others?
19 A. Yes. Well, he mentions some of the successes and some of the
20 defeats, and he named certain commanders, noting that it wasn't their
21 mistake that led to those defeats, by implication blaming General Mladic.
22 In -- in this interview, Dr. Karadzic shows every intention of pursuing
23 the military struggle in the sense that he's carrying out this
24 reorganisation in order to improve the efficiency of the military
25 commander, including vis-a-vis the forces of the RSK and their
1 co-operation with those of the RS, those two entities having formed
2 several months previously as detailed in my report a joint defence
3 council. So there is a certainly very strong applied criticism here of
4 the performance of General Mladic.
5 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I tender 06507.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2565, Your Honours.
7 MR. TIEGER: And if we could turn to 04106, which is a document
8 dated 5 August 1995, the subject matter of which is seen from the
9 heading; that is, the same issue which is signed by General Mladic.
10 Q. And, Dr. Treanor, are you familiar with this document? Does it
11 refer to the same issue that you've just discussed, and can you place it
12 in context for us?
13 A. Yes. Well, this document is General Mladic's response to the
14 action of Dr. Karadzic in removing him from his post as commander of the
15 Main Staff. In this letter he in turn implicitly criticises Dr. Karadzic
16 for his handling of military affairs, including operational affairs, and
17 says that the move that he's just taken will undermine the military
18 efficiency of the Army of Republika Srpska. He indicates that this is
19 taking place at a time when Serbian unification, military and state
20 unification had not yet taken place. He seems to regard that step as
21 being detrimental to that effort, and whoever he -- General Mladic, in
22 pointing out the successes and strengths of the RS, notes that -- of the
23 Army of RS, that any army had created all the preconditions to end the
24 war by political and diplomatic means. Now, this is sort of in line
25 with -- not sort of. It is in line with what Mr. Milosevic was
1 suggesting, indicating that there may have been some disagreement at this
2 point between Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic as to the desirability of
3 continuing military operations to achieve their goals as opposed to
4 switching to political means and engaging in peace negotiations.
5 MR. TIEGER: I tender 04106, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2566, Your Honours.
8 MR. TIEGER: And finally I turn to 06182, please. This is
9 document dated 23 August 1995. It's a note from the 42nd session of the
10 Supreme Defence Council held on that date.
11 Q. At page 5 of the English and 6 of the B/C/S, we see a reference
12 toward the second half of the page to General Mladic being asked
13 whether -- asked to state whether he would accept a solution negotiated
14 by President Milosevic, and General Mladic stating that he did not wish
15 to state his opinion explaining by the fact that he is only a soldier of
16 the people.
17 And then again at page 7, General Mladic stating he did not wish
18 to contribute to a split in the Serbian people. And further down toward
19 the bottom of the first half the page, refusing to sign a document
20 stating that on behalf the Army of the Republika Srpska Main Staff he'll
21 accept the peace plan reached by President Milosevic in Geneva.
22 Dr. Treanor are you familiar with this document? Can you place
23 it in context of the issues we've been discussing, please?
24 A. Yes. This is a meeting that was held in Belgrade a couple of
25 weeks after the exchange of correspondence that we've seen. Events have
1 continued to take place. I would just mention in particular the -- in
2 that regard the success of Operation Storm by this time eliminating --
3 virtually eliminating the RSK as a factor in the conflicts. This is a
4 meeting of the Supreme Defence Council of the FRY which is a body that
5 was established under the constitution, the FRY to act as the supreme
6 commander of the Armed Forces of the FRY. General Mladic, of course,
7 among other things was a general in the -- in the -- in the army of the
8 FRY. And we see him here being pressed by the FRY political and
9 indeed -- and military leadership to support Mr. Milosevic's desire to
10 negotiate peace at this point. Mr. Milosevic was already in contact with
11 Ambassador Holbrooke who was attempting to organise such an effort.
12 And we see General Mladic refusing rather loyally to his
13 political leadership in Republika Srpska to -- to come out in favour of
14 that and -- and suggesting that they have a broader meeting to include
15 the political leadership of the -- of Republika Srpska so that they can
16 consider that issue.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. TIEGER: And I tender this document, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2567, Your Honours.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. Dr. Treanor, you spoke earlier in your testimony about the
23 strategic objectives and their continued adherence, and you've just
24 described what factors were at issue in the tensions that arose between
25 Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic in August of 1995. In either these
1 documents or in any other documentation is there any indication that
2 Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic disagreed about the strategic objectives
3 and the need to implement them?
4 A. No. I haven't seen any indication that they disagreed about the
5 goals of the conflict, broadly understood as the unification of all Serbs
6 or individually the strategic objectives. General Mladic, at the 16th
7 session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 12th of May 1992, when the
8 objectives were adopted, had spoken out in favour of adopting precise
9 objectives. He, subsequent to that session, issued a number of orders,
10 military orders, for operations to pursue various of those objectives.
11 He was perhaps, and I say perhaps and emphasise perhaps, even --
12 even more radical, if I can put it that way, than Dr. Karadzic and the
13 other Bosnian Serb leaders as expressed in the objectives in -- in the
14 military objectives that he would like to -- would have liked to see
15 achieved. Dr. Karadzic made reference at one time in the Assembly, I
16 believe, saying that General Mladic wanted to take the whole of Bosnia,
17 and Dr. Karadzic replying that that's impossible. We have to leave room
18 for the other people who live here.
19 And -- and then General Milosevic -- Mr. Milosevic was a bit
20 critical at one meeting, I believe of the Supreme Defence Council, saying
21 what General Mladic had said about anyplace that a Serbian soldier had
22 set foot should remain Serbian was not correct. Now, those are
23 statements from other people, that's not from General Mladic's mouth, but
24 certainly I don't see anything that would suggest that he did not support
25 at least the strategic objectives and the unification of all Serbs.
1 Q. You mentioned Mr. Milosevic's interest in negotiating peace at
2 that point. What sorts of pressures was Milosevic under, if any, in
3 connection with ending the conflict, either political or financial?
4 A. Well, at this time, indeed for quite some time, the FRY was under
5 tremendous economic pressure. Sanctions had been in effect since 1992
6 and gradually tightened. They were having -- and they were having their
7 effect on the -- on the -- on the economy, in the -- the FRY and the
8 situation in society, their living standards, inflation. And
9 specifically the situation was very acute, indeed it had become acute a
10 year before in relation to the capability of the FRY to continue giving
11 military supplies to Republika Srpska. Even by the middle of 1994, they
12 were -- they were running so low on ammunition and other equipment that
13 that presented a threat to their military security and the capabilities
14 of their own armed forces. Their stocks had been run down to way below
15 to where the FRY military people thought it safe, and at that time, in
16 the middle of 1994, they were resolved that they wouldn't be able to
17 give -- just give things to the Republika Srpska any more, that they were
18 going to have to buy them so that they could be manufactured because they
19 just -- nothing existed that they could give them, that it would have to
20 come out of new production. And this is before the break in relations in
21 August of 1994, in relation to the Contact Group Plan. So there was
22 going to be a scaling back on the aid from FRY in any case.
23 Now, a year later that situation was not any better because the
24 FRY was not able to replenish its own stocks and was in no condition - as
25 the top FRY military people made clear to the political leadership at
1 meetings of the Supreme Defence Council - it was in no condition to
2 conduct a war and that therefore they had to seek peace.
3 Q. And as part of the -- just -- I know some of this is in your
4 report, so I don't want to get into extensive detail, but as part of the
5 military assistance provided by Serbia to the Republika Srpska, did that
6 include salaries for officers?
7 A. Yes. As I mentioned before, General Mladic was, in fact, an
8 officer of the Army of Yugoslavia, and thousands of other officers in the
9 Army of Republika Srpska were also officers in the Army of Yugoslavia.
10 As well as some non-commissioned officers.
11 Q. And was that referred to by the FRY leadership as part of the
12 financial burden on them, that -- in the context of their desire for end
13 of the war.
14 A. Well, it was a burden on them, but I don't think that was the
15 main problem they had, but it was one of them.
16 Q. Now, you spoke about the strategic objectives. Was the continued
17 adherence to the strategic objectives a factor that played a role in the
18 ongoing negotiations that took place between 1992 and 1995?
19 A. Yes. The negotiations in that period basically turned on two
20 issues. There were territorial issues, and that -- the strategic
21 objectives from the point of view of the Bosnian Serb negotiators, they
22 sought to achieve or confirm those objectives as far as they could. And
23 if territorial settlements that were offered did not satisfy at least the
24 most important of those objectives, they rejected them.
25 The other set of issues was the nature of whatever central
1 authority might be established in BH for the three communities. They
2 were very insistent that that authority be weak, that their own authority
3 be as strong as possible, that -- that they were in favour of basically a
4 confederation, which in their conception, in the Serbian conception,
5 confederation was not a state. They wanted the Bosnian -- the unified
6 Bosnia to be as weak as possible at the centre, not to be unitary but to
7 be such a confederation so that their entity would be able to associate
8 with the other Serbs.
9 Q. Let me ask you a question about a particular paragraph in P2538,
10 your report on Radovan Karadzic and the Serbian leadership. That's
11 paragraph 326, and there you're recounting comments at the 47th session
12 of the SDC by Mr. Milosevic in December of 1995 about Dayton, and in the
13 course of that, as for the latter half of -- first did -- Mr. Milosevic
14 talks about what was entered into the books via Dayton, and then he
15 recounts what he said years earlier to the -- about what was happening in
16 Republika Srpska, and the quote you have here is:
17 "I told them that two years ago. Dear gentlemen, you should stop
18 thinking about what you want and think about what belongs to you. More
19 than half of BH does not belong to us Serbs. More cannot belong to us
20 because we constitute a third of the population. More than half is not
21 rightfully ours. You must not take what belongs others."
22 And then he continues:
23 "From Zvornik to Foca, nowhere along the Drina was there a
24 Serbian majority, and they took all of that. Or up there, Posavina,
25 nowhere did you have a Serbian majority. Mladic said two days ago, we
1 are not going to give what belongs to the Serbs. Sarajevo belongs to the
3 And he ends the quote in quoting Mladic, and then Milosevic
5 "If you please when, in this century were Serbs a majority in
6 Sarajevo? When?"
7 Dr. Treanor, are those references, the reference from Zvornik to
8 Foca and nowhere along the Drina or the reference to the Posavina or the
9 reference to Sarajevo, are those references to the strategic objectives?
10 A. Yes. Those are references to strategic objectives that we've --
11 as we've seen before, yeah.
12 Q. And are those comments a reflection of the continued adherence of
13 the Bosnian Serb leaders to the strategic objectives throughout the
14 course of negotiations?
15 A. Yes. It certainly indicates that in Milosevic's view they were
16 anxious to achieve those objectives. He seems to be -- have his own
17 views about how important some of them might be or had justified, but he
18 certainly indicates that those are the objectives they were pursuing.
19 Q. Finally, Dr. Treanor, I wanted to go back to a comment you
20 made --
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid I have to intervene.
22 There are too many leading questions. This is a Prosecution witness, and
23 my learned friend Mr. Tieger is not right to ask leading questions.
24 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, Dr. Karadzic, there's a difference between
25 an expert witness who is giving evidence in accordance with their reports
1 and their expertise and a witness who is giving evidence as to a fact.
2 The reality is that even if the questions are to some extent leading, the
3 witness will be entitled to give that evidence even if it was asked in a
4 different form, and the evidence is patently coming from the, as it were,
5 the intellect and opinion of the witness rather than derived from the
6 question. So Mr. Tieger will be well aware of the differences.
7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. I just wanted to return now very quickly to a comment that you
9 made earlier in -- and -- about an issue that was raised earlier, and
10 that was the demographic concerns. We first saw demographic concerns
11 expressed in the political council meeting exhibit that we saw. You then
12 mentioned that Dr. Karadzic himself made comments on more than one
13 occasion reflecting those demographic concerns, and if I recall
14 correctly, I think you referred to the Assembly. So I just wanted to ask
15 you about one Assembly session and the comments by Dr. Karadzic.
16 MR. TIEGER: This would be the 37th Assembly session held on 10
17 January 1994, which is P1385, 01385, and I'd like to turn to page 107 of
18 the English and 79 of the B/C/S.
19 Q. This is Dr. Karadzic speaking, and if we look at the second
20 paragraph in the English at the bottom -- toward the bottom of page 107
21 he says:
22 "We can consider ourselves as winners after occupying this land
23 since the land is 100 per cent Serbian now. Therefore, even if we come
24 down to around 50 per cent, we should be more than happy and satisfied,
25 it is Dusan's empire."
1 And then continuing on to the next page of the English. There is
2 a discussion of various percentages. These 33.3 per cent have to be
3 given to them now, and for the 44 per cent of the Muslims plus those 2 to
4 3 per cent of the population who declared themselves as Yugoslavs, it is
5 too little."
6 He continues in that paragraph:
7 "In some ways the European Community accepts this, but they say
8 give us Novi Prijedor, Sanski Most, all the way to Kljuc, the Sana River
9 valley, give us the places where we were in the majority. We say we
10 cannot give that. We were in the majority there before the Second World
11 War, and then the European Community says that's -- that's history.
12 Don't mention that now."
13 And then finally turning to the next page in English, page 109, I
14 believe that's page 83 of the B/C/S. Dr. Karadzic says:
15 "The only thing we could do is say to Muslims: 'Gentlemen,
16 Muslims, let us take piece of land from Croats and you can stay with us
17 in Yugoslavia.'"
18 And then he continues:
19 "You cannot have it all. It is not the same time to have 24 to
20 25 per cent of Muslims in Nevesinje. The 23 per cent would rise to 24
21 per cent the day after, and the day after that one it would be 25 per
22 cent, because that is how it is with them. They were 50 per cent of them
23 and now they are gone."
24 Dr. Treanor, is that one of the references to the ongoing
25 demographic concerns that you referred to in your earlier -- in the
1 earlier part of your testimony?
2 A. Yes, the last part about the population in Trebinje is one of the
3 things that I had seen. The earlier part that you read out, an
4 interesting reference to areas where genocide had been committed and
5 their continued desire to have -- have those areas. But the last part is
6 certainly the type of thing I was thinking of. The other type, another
7 example would be from the session of the deputies' club on the 28th of
8 February, 1992, where there was extensive discussion of a move that was
9 afoot in -- in Bosnian Krajina to declare their own republic, perhaps
10 join the RSK, and, among other things, Dr. Karadzic said in that
11 connection, I believe, that that would be a foolish thing to do because
12 rather quickly the Serbs in that area would be outnumbered by the Muslims
13 and it would turn into a Muslim state.
14 Q. Thank you, Dr. Treanor.
15 MR. TIEGER: That concludes the examination-in-chief,
16 Mr. President.
17 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Dr. Treanor.
21 A. Good afternoon, Dr. Karadzic.
22 Q. Before we go into any further detail, I would like to clarify the
23 nature and the origin of your engagement. How was it that you took this
24 job? How were you engaged for this job initially?
25 A. I'll briefly explain my connection with this institution. As I
1 noted at the beginning of my testimony, I worked for the
2 U.S. Department of Justice for many years investigating cases of alleged
3 Nazi war criminals living in or seeking entry to the United States. I
4 worked there for almost 14 years beginning in 1980. After our office was
5 established, a new office in Washington to do precisely that, within a
6 few years other countries had established similar offices to do -- to do
7 the same thing. They were countries such as the United States, which
8 were destinations for large numbers of refugees and other immigrants
9 after World War II, referring in particular to Australia, Canada, and the
10 United Kingdom. We worked very closely with those offices. I had worked
11 with the members of the Australian office. I knew Graham Blewitt, and he
12 knew me at least by name and reputation.
13 When this office -- when this institution was established, I was
14 very interested in being associated with it given my background in
15 investigating war crimes and in my knowledge of the particular area.
16 Therefore, I wrote a letter to Graham Blewitt offering my services, and
17 he was kind enough to accept.
18 Q. Thank you. For how long did you work as an investigator of this
19 Tribunal -- or, rather, of the Office of the Prosecutor?
20 A. I'm not sure what you mean by an "investigator." Technically,
21 that is a functional title in the Office of the Prosecutor. I think when
22 I came on board I was -- my contract said investigator. I was quickly
23 made a -- with some other people made an operations officer. Then they
24 had an exercise called classification, which is part of the UN personnel
25 system in which they, "they" being the management of OTP and the
1 Tribunal, made up job descriptions of the types of positions that they
2 needed and the numbers of people, et cetera. It was at that time that
3 they came up with a job description for something called a research
4 officer, which I -- I think I had to reapply, sort of technically. But
5 anyways, that was in about 19 -- I think 1997 that that whole drill was
6 going on. So then I became a research officer, and that's what I
7 remained for the rest of my stay at the Tribunal. I was always doing
8 more or less the same type of work. So that would be 15 and a half years
9 in total.
10 Q. Thank you. I would like to draw your attention to your own
11 statement given to the International Tribunal on the 27 January 2004, and
12 in that statement you confirm that in your capacity as a team leader for
13 research or investigations that you oversaw -- you visited the Republika
14 Srpska on two occasions, in December 1997 and January 1998. Is it
15 correct that you did indeed visit the Republika Srpska, and is it also
16 true that the government of the Republika Srpska opened all of their
17 archives to you and that you were able to pick and choose any of the
18 documents you were interested in?
19 A. Yes, I did visit Pale at that time. We were given extensive
20 access to documents at that time. I would not say that it was unfettered
21 access. We had access to a lot of things, enough to keep us busy, but
22 certain things seemed to be missing. I can go into that detail if you
23 wish. We were also -- among the things we were given access to were the
24 records of the Presidency of RS, but it was made clear to us that they
25 were only going to be available for a very short time, and we could take
1 what we wanted by way of copies from those records, but once we'd had
2 our -- our chance, it would not recur, and it was our feeling that there
3 were also gaps in those records.
4 Q. Thank you. I'll try to make my questions brief and allow you to
5 answer them by just "yes" or "no."
6 Do you agree at that moment in Republika Srpska it was the
7 government of the Serbian Democratic Party that was in power?
8 A. At the time I was there, yes.
9 Q. Thank you. When were you engaged as an expert? When did that
10 moment occur?
11 A. Well, that's a very interesting question. As I think everyone in
12 the -- in the courtroom is aware, there -- there is a practice among
13 courts around the world to use experts of various types in -- in various
14 types of trials, and indeed in the United States, in the course of our
15 litigation on war crimes, we used experts to testify at trial. Now, it's
16 the practice in the United States to use outside experts. That is,
17 people who do not work for the Prosecution. I work for the Prosecution.
18 That is the practice in the United States, and maybe in other countries.
19 At this institution, when the need started to arise for such
20 experts to testify at trial, the same approach was taken, perhaps under
21 the impact of Anglo-Saxon practices. However, as the effort to collect
22 documents, which I described briefly earlier in my testimony, proceeded,
23 and we accumulated very, very large volumes of documents on an ongoing
24 basis over a period of years and were conducting ongoing analysis, and I
25 would emphasise in that regard myself and the people in my team always
1 worked with the original documents, documents in the original language
2 and not translation, so we were in a position to immediately work with
3 documents once they had been obtained, that as a practical matter, it
4 would not be possible to engage an outside expert to write a meaningful
5 report based on those documents.
6 It was felt by management, not by me, although I had to agree
7 with it, that such an individual would have to come -- come here and
8 spend months and months reading documents and writing a report. It was,
9 on the one hand, virtually impossible to find somebody who was an expert
10 in the field, people who are usually professors at universities, who was
11 going to have that kind of time on the one hand, and on the other it was
12 going to cost -- it would have cost a lot of money to do that, to do
13 something that somebody working in OTP could do. So for those two very
14 practical reasons, they decided to adopt the practice of using so-called
15 inside experts. So that's how I became an inside expert, and I submitted
16 the first report under my name in connection with the Krajisnik case and
17 testified in that case and have done so since in other cases.
18 Q. Thank you. I asked you when and you answered as if I'd asked you
19 why. Nevertheless, it is useful.
20 How did you testify in the Brdjanin case, in what capacity, that
21 is? And that was even before the Krajisnik case.
22 A. Yes. You're absolutely -- absolutely correct. That was the
23 first time I testified as an inside expert. When you said engaged as an
24 expert, I was already engaged. I was already working for OTP, so there
25 was no, you know, question of an engagement. It was -- it was just a
1 development of my job description.
2 Q. Thank you. I'm asking you this because we have had Prosecution
3 witnesses who are also investigators and they testified as investigators.
4 We've never had a case like yours before. And you describe your
5 engagement as a necessity, because any other choice would have been more
6 expensive and more difficult.
7 For example, here in the -- 1D3522 is the number of the document.
8 A Judge David asked you -- while we're waiting for the exhibit, 1D3552,
9 in the introduction to your document 12125, which already has a P number,
10 under item 2 or in paragraph 2 you state that you were given a task from
11 the OTP. What precisely was your task that you were given by the OTP?
12 What were you supposed to do for them? Could you please be as brief as
13 possible. I asked for 40 hours for my cross-examination, and I was given
14 barely one-fourth of that time, so I would kindly ask you to be as brief
15 as possible in your answers.
16 A. Well, the task I was given by OTP in connection with these
17 reports is set out in the copy of the letter that I received from
18 Mr. Tieger, which you'll find on the second page of the addendum in the
19 leadership study. The -- there was no such letter in connection with the
20 earlier report. Procedures were a little bit different then, but the
21 task was analogous.
22 Q. Did the OTP give you an objective or something that you were to
23 look for and establish? If you look at this transcript that is now in
24 front of you, did you have a set of objectives that you were supposed to
25 achieve in your work?
1 No, this is not the correct page. Could you please first answer
2 my question. Were you given a set of objectives or an objective at the
3 same time when the OTP gave you your research or investigation task?
4 A. Well, again in connection with these reports, I would point to
5 the letter that I'm referring to. That was -- those were the
6 instructions, or the request.
7 Q. Can we look at page 14 in this document. Line 20. I would like
8 to draw your attention to lines 17 through 20. Judge David asks you
9 whether you were given any objectives for your research, and you confirm
10 that you were indeed given some objectives or goals; is that right?
11 A. Yes. Broadly speaking in the sense of the contents of the
12 letter. They ask for a report on a certain topic. They just don't ask
13 for a report. I could write a report about anything. So the -- what's
14 being referenced here are the type of guidelines or requests that is
15 contained in the letter from Mr. Tieger. Also, there might be certain
16 goals or whatever frequently in these conversations to do with the length
17 of the report and that type of thing, and the dead-line by which it's
18 due, of course.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this page be admitted into
21 evidence, page 14 in this document?
22 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE MORRISON: It's part of an official transcript, so, yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1257, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just briefly look at 1D3551.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. These reports were created while you were still affiliated with
3 the OTP; right?
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. Thank you. You confirmed that also in another case. Can we look
6 at page 599 in this document, please. Page 599. In e-court. Lines 13
7 through 22.
8 You were examined and asked the following:
9 "[In English] Well, your report -- after all, the report has been
10 introduced and refined over many years, again it hasn't been produced in
11 a vacuum. It has been produced by you working for the OTP," and
12 [Interpretation] so on and so forth, and you answered, "Yes." Can this
13 be admitted?
14 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, again, the same applies. It can be
16 THE REGISTRAR: That's Exhibit D1258, Your Honours.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Is true that you also interviewed witnesses on behalf of the OTP?
19 A. I was present during a few witness interviews, including one with
20 Mr. Krajisnik. I never conducted an interview independently.
21 Q. Did you ever put questions to the witnesses during the interviews
22 that were conducted by others?
23 A. Yes, on occasion, including the interview of Mr. Krajisnik.
24 Q. Thank you. Did you assist other OTP officials on various
25 occasions and under various circumstances, and also, did they assist you
1 in producing this report?
2 A. Well, let me address the report. I think I've said that other
3 members of my team assisted, broadly speaking, and I suppose there
4 probably were other people involved in those collection efforts of the
5 documents and that kind of thing. In preparing the report, I drew on --
6 I had the benefit of the work of any number -- a number of people. In
7 that regard, I think most -- most -- all if not all -- most if not --
8 almost all if not -- actually, all the analysis was done -- analytical
9 type of work was done by myself or members of my team under my direction.
10 Have I helped other people in OTP? Yes, of course.
11 Q. Thank you. In the introduction you say that the primary goal of
12 this description is to enable the realistic and correct understanding of
13 a -- the broader context in which allegedly Karadzic and other Bosnian
14 Serb leaders participated in the large-scale violation of the
15 humanitarian law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Did the OTP suggest that you
16 should take into account or perhaps not the conduct of other belligerent
17 parties, and would the broader context mean that you should look at the
18 conduct of the Serbs within the context of the conduct of other parties
19 in the area?
20 A. Well, for the purposes of these reports, you've seen the request
21 and the guidelines that were given to me, I could say in addition to that
22 that members of my team have done work on all the parties to the
23 conflicts, and some of them have testified in other cases involving other
24 parties to the conflicts. It was never suggested to me, as I think I
25 made clear in my introductions to these reports, nor did I seek to write
1 anything like a complete history of the conflicts. What you're
2 suggesting is indeed very interesting, and I hope some day somebody will
3 do that, drawing on the voluminous documentation that this Tribunal has
4 been able to obtain.
5 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 1 of your introduction of the document,
6 12125, you say it's about primarily the objectives of the Serbian
7 leaders, especially Radovan Karadzic, and then the course of the whole
8 process and the extent to which these objectives were reached. So I
9 wonder if it's possible to appraise the objectives of Radovan Karadzic if
10 only one conduct is studied. How would you be able to assess a boxing
11 match if -- if you were looking at a split picture, a split image seeing
12 only one of the boxers? He would seem as if he was fighting with the
13 air, flailing his arms around.
14 A. I agree with what you're saying. I just have to say that I think
15 what you're suggesting is the job of this Court. The job that I was
16 given is specified in the letter that I've been indicating.
17 Q. Thank you. You are very fair in your introduction in saying that
18 this document is not complete. Could you perhaps tell us if anyone
19 was -- is dealing with this, and can we hope for a complete report any
20 time soon?
21 A. I don't know.
22 Q. That's paragraph 4, where you say although these facts certainly
23 don't represent a complete picture of the conflict in the area, the
24 report does not pretend to be a comprehensive history of the political
25 and other conflicts, let alone of those that engulfed the whole of the
1 former Yugoslavia. Don't you think this Trial Chamber deserves to get a
2 comprehensive history?
3 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. I'll leave that to the Court.
4 JUDGE MORRISON: That's not really a question, Dr. Karadzic.
5 It's a subject for a debate, and as you rightly pointed out, you have
6 nine hours. I think it might be more efficient to move on to more
7 specific questions, and perhaps it's a matter for you, but more closed
8 questions so that you're likely to enable Dr. Treanor to give a more
9 closed, precise answer.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'll do my best, but I
11 hope that the Trial Chamber will reconsider the time given me for this
12 precious witness.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. On page 78 of today's transcript, the examination-in-chief, lines
15 19 and 20, you discussed democratic changes in Trebinje. What was the
16 reason for those changes - I'm speaking only of Trebinje - if you have
17 managed to establish that? How did the Muslim share of the population in
18 Trebinje change? How did it occur?
19 A. I'm not sure which document was being discussed at that time.
20 Q. On today's transcript, page 78, lines 19 and 20, you said:
21 "Demographic changes occurred in Trebinje." Did you mean some artificial
22 demographic changes such as ethnic cleansing or such? In any case, you
23 found certain demographic changes to have taken place?
24 A. Again, I'm not sure what's being referenced. I'm sorry, I don't
25 have transcript in front of me.
1 Q. Line 19: [In English] The last part about population in Trebinje
2 is one of the things that I had seen. The earlier part that you read out
3 an interesting reference to the -- to areas where genocide has been
4 committed and their continued desire to have these areas."
5 [Interpretation] Do you remember mentioning Trebinje in this
7 A. Yes, actually, Mr. Tieger mentioned Trebinje. I remember the
8 passage now and that was a passage that I had, of course, read before. I
9 don't know precisely how those changes took place.
10 Q. Thank you. Can we -- can we see 1D471 for a moment. I want to
11 know if you have seen this document before and whether you've taken it
12 into account. P471 -- no, it's D471. It's been already admitted.
13 Are you familiar with this instruction for evacuation from
14 Trebinje sent by the SDA party on the 20th January, 1993, under the name
15 of Hasan Cengic?
16 A. I -- I don't recall having seen it before.
17 Q. Could you then please look at it now to see the reasons and the
18 ways of gaining a complete picture of the situation in Trebinje, and I
19 would appreciate it if we could see in the original the name of the
20 sender and the signature.
21 Do you agree that in order to assess the events and the conduct
22 of the Serbian side one would need to see this document from the Muslim
24 A. Well, all I can say is this looks like a very useful document.
25 Q. Thank you. I would like to go together with you through your
1 report and look at some of its conclusions. Page 4 to begin with of the
2 65 ter document 592. Maybe we don't need to show it, because's it's a
3 well-known document, but I'd like to draw your attention to 65 ter 5912.
4 It already has a P number, namely the executive summary. I don't need to
5 read it, but it says the Serbian leadership, through the Serbian
6 Democratic Party actively undermine the existing political system.
7 And then on page 12, paragraph 4, we read that this report is to
8 give a factual description of the army of the Bosnian Serbs and its
9 political structures with special focus on the organisational steps taken
10 by this leadership to ensure control over territories in an
11 internationally recognised Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
12 Then paragraph 287 on the same document where it says that in
13 October, the Serbian leadership began to undermine the joint state,
14 et cetera, et cetera.
15 And page 94, paragraph 165, where it says that Serbian deputies
16 walked out of the Assembly.
17 And now would you please look at another document, 12125, written
18 for this case on the same subject, paragraph 68 --
19 "[In English] Karadzic's faith in Izetbegovic, however, was
20 destroyed on 15th of October, 1992." [Interpretation] "Karadzic's faith
21 in Alija Izetbegovic was destroyed on the 15th of October, 1992, and that
22 session when the declaration on independence was adopted."
23 And finally document 65 ter 592, page 62, paragraph 95, where it
24 says that:
25 "The SDS leadership [In English] Assembly establishment sent as
1 its representatives abroad and at home and continued to oversee the
2 activities [No interpretation] [In English] ... as a result of
3 the [indiscernible] in favour of independence at the B-and-H-wide
4 referendum on this issue on 29th February, 1st March 1992. The SDS cause
5 of keeping a federal B and H within Yugoslavia was all but lost."
6 [Interpretation] Could we now based on these theories say that it
7 is your position that the SDS was at that time actively undermining the
8 political and social order of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
9 A. Well, I -- I just want to comment on the passages that you've
10 mentioned. I haven't had opportunity to study them. I just -- some of
11 what's appeared on the screen I don't think is accurate, but -- well,
12 yes, the political structure I don't think dealt with social issues, but
13 that the -- yes. I mean, I agree with what -- what's stated in the
15 Q. Does it follow from your report that the SDS took organisational
16 steps in 1991 and 1992 with the view to take control over territories
17 that belong to an internationally recognised state, namely the Republic
18 of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
19 A. Well, in 1991 there was no internationally recognised state of
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina, but -- and just confining ourselves to that
21 time-frame, 1991, 1992, and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
22 answer is yes.
23 Q. Thank you. Does it follow from that conclusion that the
24 activities of the SDA and the HDZ, leading to the independence of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, were constitutional and lawful?
1 A. No, I don't think that follows from anything I said.
2 Q. Is it the case based on what you know and what you studied that
3 these were lawful and constitutional activities?
4 A. Well, I'm not a lawyer, so I really can't comment on that. I
5 could comment on the politics of it, if you'd like me to.
6 Q. Well, what were the politics of it, taking into account the fact
7 that these were three constituent peoples?
8 A. I would say that the SDA and the HDZ on these two occasions were
9 engaging in a bit of sharp parliamentary practice, certainly. I think
10 that's all I can say. I would -- in that connection, I would point out
11 that the -- the SDS had -- requested that the issue of Bosnian
12 sovereignty - this is in February 1992 - be referred to the Council for
13 National Affairs. I forget the exact name of a council that was provided
14 for it in the amendments to the Bosnian constitution in 1990, a council
15 that would consider matters that directly impacted the vital interests of
16 one or other of the peoples of -- of BH. It had been agreed at that time
17 in the Assembly that that should be done, and it never was done.
18 Q. Thank you. I cannot really agree, because in assessing Serbian
19 conduct, you put forward political but also legal judgements as to how we
20 were undermining a certain political order, and I'm asking you, did it
21 all happen in a vacuum? Was it not that the other sides were also taking
22 illegal and unconstitutional steps at the same time and provoked a
23 Serbian response?
24 To put it more simply, didn't you comment in your report on the
25 constitution and the legislative arrangements?
1 A. I guess, yes, I did report on constitution and legislative
2 arrangements in -- in my capacity as a expert on the history and politics
3 of the former Yugoslavia and not as a lawyer or a legal scholar. But,
4 yes -- I mean, by all means, I hope it's been made clear in these reports
5 that these -- these events were not taking place in a vacuum, that the
6 steps that the Bosnian Serb leadership, the SDS, was taking were
7 intimately connected with developments in Yugoslavia as a whole and in
8 Bosnia in particular, in particular the obvious drive for independence by
9 the SDA and the HDZ. That's the context that I strived to put them in.
10 As far as any illegal or legal activities by members of those
11 parties, I don't get into that question.
12 Q. Should we then reckon that all the legal references to the
13 conduct of the Serbian leadership should also be ignored? Should we
14 ignore all the legal opinions you give about the conduct of Radovan
15 Karadzic and the Serbian leadership?
16 MR. TIEGER: Well, that's a bit broad. I'm not quite sure what
17 Dr. Karadzic intends to convey by -- what was it, "legal references." It
18 seems pretty capacious and is certainly vulnerable to misunderstanding.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, Dr. Karadzic. The difficulty with that is
20 that it opens, again, it really opens a debating shop rather than a
21 cross-examination. There is nothing to stop you making a submission in
22 due course in terms of testimony, anybody's testimony, that certain
23 aspects of it should not be taken into account and give justifications
24 for that. I don't think that we're going to be assisted by going down
25 this particular route with this particular witness.
1 Again, it's entirely a matter for you, but I would have thought
2 you might have been better placed using your time where you have an issue
3 with a conclusion that Dr. Treanor has drawn, challenging or expanding
4 upon that.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Then I will conclude
6 with this segment.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Was then the referendum on the independence of Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina legal? With regards to Bosnian Serbs, you dealt with
10 legality of regionalisation and all the other actions that were closely
11 connected to the conduct of the two other sides, but what about the
12 referendum on independence on Bosnia-Herzegovina? Was it lawful, was the
13 decision to hold it legal, and was it implemented in a lawful way?
14 A. Well, again I really can't comment on the legality of it, and the
15 technical sense, as I said before, the resolution was -- before it was
16 passed at a rather contentious session of the Bosnian Assembly and could
17 be considered rather sharp practice, but I would comment that the
18 position of the SDS, although they certainly did not favour that because
19 they knew what was going to happen. Then the referendum was held
20 basically at the suggestion of the -- of the so-called Badinter
21 Commission, that that might be an indicator that the results of such a
22 referendum might an indicator that would facilitate other states in
23 making a decision on recognising the independence of Bosnia, that the
24 position of the SDS was, well, we had our plebiscite in November, so now
25 let them have theirs. They can have this referendum, their plebiscite,
1 but we're not going to take part in it. Indeed, there was some
2 discussion of the fact that at the time of the Serbian plebiscite the
3 officials from the other parties didn't really seek to thwart that and it
4 was said that, well, in February, you know, we will let them have their
5 referendum, but it will be results for them, not for us.
6 Q. Thank you. The Defence, however, has to deal with your
7 conclusions, and in order to see if those conclusions are correct and
8 accurate, we have to see which path led you to those conclusions. That's
9 why I'm asking you whether to the best of your knowledge the referendum
10 was held as Badinter suggested. Did they get to a two-third majority,
11 and was it ratified by the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a
12 two-third majority vote?
13 And if you could answer briefly, please. Was that referendum
14 held in a lawful way, even taking into account Badinter's
15 recommendations? If you don't know, it's not a problem. Just say so.
16 A. Well, I'll have to say I don't know.
17 JUDGE MORRISON: That draws today's proceedings to a close,
18 Dr. Karadzic, and we will adjourn for the day and reassemble at 9.00 a.m.
19 tomorrow morning.
20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.28 p.m.,
21 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 2nd day
22 of June, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.