1 Thursday, 9 June 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. There's one matter before
6 we hear the evidence of Ms. Hanson today. It's related to the bar table
7 motion you referred to, Mr. Tieger, at the end of yesterday and also
8 that's related to the issue which was dealt with while I was away, so I
9 will defer to my colleague Judge Morrison.
10 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, Mr. Tieger, it was the question of
11 documents tendered through Dr. Treanor. There were some that were
12 proposed to be through bar table motions, and I reminded you about the
13 preferred method, through the witness. Now, I think that there are some
14 outstanding documents that weren't actually dealt with, put through
15 Mr. -- Dr. Treanor. Is that correct?
16 MR. TIEGER: There certainly remain documents on appendix B,
17 which were not called up during the course of the examination-in-chief or
18 re-direct; that's correct.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. Was that simply lack of time or lack of --
20 this isn't a criticism, that you simply forgot?
21 MR. TIEGER: Well, it had not -- I understood the difference --
22 obviously the Court's reference to its preferred method. So it was an
23 attempt to strike a balance between the guide-lines annunciated by the
24 Court with respect to experts that provided for the submission of
25 documents via the bar table and attempted to do two things: Number one,
1 identify the documents that would be most suitable to direct reference in
2 court; and number two, not overly burden the Court with documents in the
3 bar table submission. And they really do depend, of course, I would say,
4 on the nature of the documents discussed and issues raised during the
5 course of the examination-in-chief. One clear example would be where one
6 exemplar of a particular point is made directly in examination-in-chief,
7 and then rather than burden the Court with running through the remaining
8 exemplars, they certainly would seem clearly to fall within the Court's
10 Similarly, with respect to documents that had been contextualised
11 and for which there would be more of a kind of pedantic or advocacy
12 purpose served in examination-in-chief, we considered those appropriate
13 for appendix B within the context of the Court's guide-lines. So we
14 tried to strike a balance and not burden the Court with unnecessary time
15 and utilise this mechanism in an appropriate way. Of course it's true
16 that if we took additional time, which obviously in this case, as we saw
17 yesterday, is often at a premium, all of those documents could have been
18 addressed directly. But we understood the guide-lines to be asking the
19 parties to strike an appropriate balance, and I believe we did so here.
20 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you.
21 Have you got any particular position on this, Mr. Robinson?
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. We also -- I understood basically, I think,
23 the same way you did, that if something was important to the Prosecutor
24 it should be presented orally through the witness. But we too, on the
25 other hand, we run out of time and we also probably would like to take
1 advantage of bar table motions simply because we didn't have enough time
2 to present them. So we're constrained from disagreeing too much with
3 Mr. Tieger because it will come back and bite us. But in any event I
4 think we do prefer oral -- that the documents be presented orally
5 whenever possible and would implore you to give both parties as much time
6 as necessary for that.
7 JUDGE MORRISON: I think it's -- I'm speaking for myself, but I'm
8 sure I speak for the Chamber, that it is the preferred method, but
9 inevitably there's bound to be occasions when there has to be some degree
10 of flexibility mainly because of time constraints. We don't have the
11 luxury of unlimited time, but we can perhaps deal with this particular
12 issue in isolation after conferring.
13 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, Your Honour, if I could raise one
14 additional point, and that is we certainly have tried to invoke and use a
15 bar table motion submission mechanism which does not simply provide the
16 documents to the Court without illumination, but that is done in the
17 context of a submission that identifies the relevance, where those
18 documents fit into the case, provides an opportunity for response, and in
19 that circumstance, I would submit, it is often the case that the Court is
20 provided with as much contextualisation and amplification regarding that
21 document as it would in court. I understand that the Court's interested
22 in ensuring to the extent possible that the documents it receives are
23 submitted in a manner that permits the Court the maximum opportunity to
24 use them correctly, but this process has been intended to do just that.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, could you identify the items that were
1 admitted through the course of testimony of Dr. Treanor?
2 MR. TIEGER: I'd have to take a moment to do that, Your Honour.
3 I'm sorry.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, while we're waiting I would like to
7 indicate that the Registrar has reconsidered its position concerning the
8 prior testimony of Christian Nielson and we now withdraw our motion to
9 obtain the prior testimony of Christian Nielson.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Is that the one which relates to
11 Canadian court?
12 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 Okay. Let's not waste court time further.
15 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer].
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger and Mr. Robinson, given the circumstances
17 we'll admit the -- those items that have not been dealt with through your
19 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE KWON: And that those numbers will be sorted out by the
21 Court Deputy and given number in due course.
22 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
23 JUDGE KWON: We are talking about only annex B, Mr. Tieger?
24 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, that is correct.
25 JUDGE KWON: That was the subject of a bar table motion.
1 Yes. Let's call the next witness, Mr. -- Ms. Sutherland.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour, good morning. The Prosecution
3 calls Dorothea Hanson.
4 [The witness entered court]
5 JUDGE KWON: If you could take the solemn declaration.
6 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
7 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
8 JUDGE KWON: Please make yourself comfortable.
9 Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
10 WITNESS: DOROTHEA HANSON
11 Examination by Ms. Sutherland:
12 Q. Ms. Hanson, could you please state your full name.
13 A. Dorothea Curtis Hanson.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Could I call up 65 ter 11363, please.
15 Q. Is this a copy of your curriculum vitae that you prepared in
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. It states there that since 1999 you've been employed by the ICTY
19 OTP as a research officer in the leadership research team. You continued
20 to work in the leadership research team, referred to as the LRT, as a
21 research officer?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. In addition to what's stated in the CV, you testified in 2005 as
24 an expert in the Krajisnik case; is that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly slow down and pause
2 between question and answer. Thank you.
3 MS. SUTHERLAND:
4 Q. And in 2009, you testified as an expert in the Bosnian state
5 court in the Klickovic et al. case?
6 A. Yes.
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I would tender the curriculum vitae
8 of Ms. Hanson.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2588, Your Honours.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND:
12 Q. Ms. Hanson, you were asked to prepare a report in the context of
13 this case; is that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter 23137, please.
16 Q. The document that we see on the screen, is this the report that
17 you prepared?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And that's entitled: "Expert Report, Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs,
20 War Presidencies, and War Commissions 1991 - 1995," and it's the
21 corrected version dated the 10th of September, 2009?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Could you please provide a brief synopsis of your experience as
24 it relates to this report.
25 A. Well, I was originally tasked to prepare a report -- first a
1 memorandum on Crisis Staffs which became the expert report for the
2 Krajisnik case. I then maintained my tasking in Crisis Staffs, regularly
3 reviewed and updated my notes and the report, which then formed the basis
4 of the report for the Klickovic case and also the Stanisic/Zupljanin
5 case, and then was tasked to prepare yet a -- the most up-to-date report,
6 this one for the Karadzic case, including a look at the War Presidencies
7 from 1993 to 1995.
8 Q. And you mentioned the Stanisic/Zupljanin case. You testified in
9 that case in December 2009; is that right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. In the course of preparing this report for the Karadzic case,
12 what were the source materials that you used to write the report and draw
13 your opinions?
14 A. I looked at the contemporaneous original documents as much as I
15 could, documents of the Bosnian Serb organs, institutions, individuals,
16 the minutes of Crisis Staffs, decisions and conclusions of Crisis Staffs,
17 Official Gazettes of municipalities, as well as the republic-level
18 Official Gazettes, Assembly minutes, government minutes. I did use some
19 contemporaneous open-source material when it seemed -- when it was
20 relevant, when it was individuals involved in the events commenting on
22 Q. And were you working with the original B/C/S documents?
23 A. Almost exclusively, yes.
24 Q. And you read and understand B/C/S and what about Cyrillic, the
25 Cyrillic script?
1 A. Yes, I read and understand B/C/S and Cyrillic as well as Latin.
2 Q. Can you tell the Court what criteria you employed when reviewing
3 and selecting the documents that you used in your report or relied upon
4 in your report.
5 A. For my initial review, my criteria were as wide as possible,
6 simply to find documents of the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs or about the
7 Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies, and War Commissions. I did as wide a
8 search as possible initially. And then once a pattern emerged, I would
9 noted down those documents which best illustrated the pattern or,
10 contrary to that, deviated significantly from the patterns that were
11 emerging. I then noted the most relevant and the most vivid examples or
12 articulate examples for the report itself. But behind every example
13 there are -- can be any number of similarly relevant documents,
14 examples -- examples which support it but not as clearly perhaps.
15 Q. Were you assisted in identifying the documents that were
16 potentially relevant to the topics addressed in your report by other
17 members of the LRT; and if so, what control did you exercise over the
18 material that was eventually relied upon in your report?
19 A. Colleagues in the LRT and others would bring to my attention
20 documents they found that they considered potentially relevant or if a
21 collection had been brought in, it would be brought to my attention. But
22 I would always review and select the documents myself. If it was one
23 document I would look at others related to it or surrounding it, to see
24 if they were equally relevant or, in fact, disagreed with that document.
25 So it was always ultimately my choice.
1 Q. And in your review of documents, did you identify any documents
2 of an exculpatory nature in relation to this case?
3 A. In relation to this case or any other, when -- I did and when I
4 did so, I would pass it on to the lawyers as part of my regular tasking
5 to note such material.
6 Q. Did any of those documents alter your understanding of the
7 pattern as you have described it?
8 A. No. It -- nothing made we change my mind about the pattern. I
9 would note that there are variants especially in timing, but no,
10 nothing -- I wouldn't have written my report as I did if I had found
11 material that contradicted it.
12 Q. You wished to make a few corrections to your report.
13 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could please turn to paragraph 25.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, this is a very embarrassing mistake and I
15 apologise. I don't know how I omitted the word "not" from the sentence.
16 It's very embarrassing. The first sentence of paragraph 25 should read:
17 "Karadzic intended that the 19 December 1991 Instructions were
18 not merely theoretical ..."
19 I apologise, Your Honours.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: And paragraph 83 of the report.
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, here I have confused -- or I should cite to
22 two separate minutes of government sessions, the sessions of 21 May and
23 23 May on the abolition of Crisis Staffs.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: And so that paragraph should read:
25 "The military role ..."
1 THE WITNESS: Wait.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND:
3 Q. "The military role of the Crisis Staffs prior to the
4 establishment of the Army is confirmed in the RS Government conclusions
5 of 21 and 23 May 1992 which recommended abolishing Crisis Staffs because
6 the army was unable to take over defence."
7 A. No, the army was taking over defence. By 21-23 May the army was
8 taking over defence, so that's why they recommend abolishing
9 Crisis Staffs. The conclusion of 21 May leaves a blank that is clearly
10 meant to be abolishment but it doesn't say it. The conclusion of 23 May
11 does specify abolishing Crisis Staffs.
12 JUDGE BAIRD: Ms. Hanson, how would that paragraph read now as
14 THE WITNESS: "The military role of the Crisis Staffs prior to
15 the establishment of the army is confirmed in the RS government
16 conclusions of 21 and 23 May which recommended abolishing Crisis Staffs
17 as the army was taking over defence."
18 MS. SUTHERLAND:
19 Q. And one other small correction to paragraph 108, the first
20 sentence should read --
21 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down for the interpretation. Thank
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: "At the next Assembly session" where it
24 currently reads "situation."
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's simply a wrong word. I don't know how
1 it got there. My apologies.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I tender the report.
3 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we don't have any objection to the
4 report, but if I could take this opportunity to ask you what your
5 intentions are with respect to the 34 documents that are in annex B or
6 appendix B to this witness's notification which are also proposed for the
7 bar table? Because I think if you don't intend to admit them, then the
8 Prosecutor ought to know about them; and if you are thinking of admitting
9 them, there is at least one that we have an objection to and probably
10 they ought to be alerted to that.
11 JUDGE KWON: I note those documents are so-called source
12 documents, aren't they, Ms. Sutherland, cited in the -- in an expert's
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, they are, Your Honour. But we would be
15 seeking to have the documents admitted for the truth of the contents as
16 well as a source document.
17 JUDGE KWON: So has it not been our practice that with respect to
18 those source documents, unless they are dealt with during the course of
19 the expert's testimony, we do not admit it as evidence?
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, the Trial Chamber has previously
21 admitted source documents tendered in the same manner as the documents in
22 appendix B and noted that this method of tendering documents was
23 consistent with the guide-lines and previous decisions. And that was in
24 relation to the expert witness Dr. Donia, and that's trial transcript
25 1st of June, 2010, at pages 3151, line 19, to 3152, line 8.
1 And can I add that the Prosecution has been selective in the
2 appendix B documents and concentrated on what is at issue between the
3 parties as far as we're able to anticipate it. The documents are placed
4 into context in the reports and will be further contextualised by
5 Ms. Hanson during her testimony this morning. In addition, the
6 Prosecutor has satisfied the other requirements for the admission of the
7 documents from the bar table generally and that's pursuant to your order
8 on the procedure for the conduct of the trial of the 8th of October,
9 2009, appendix A, part 7, paragraph R.
10 And for these reasons, the Prosecution would ask at the end of
11 Ms. Hanson's testimony that appendix B documents be admitted in
12 connection with the report and for all other purposes.
13 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to respond to this submission,
14 Mr. Robinson?
15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Our preference would be that
16 any comments on these documents be elicited orally from the witness, and
17 we think it burdens the whole record and it especially burdens us given
18 the limitations on us we're given when documents are admitted from the
19 bar table. On the other hand, we realise that if there is going to be
20 bar table motions, then this is probably -- most of them come within what
21 could maybe be filed as a bar table motion near the end of the case or at
22 some point during the case. And on balance we prefer that as much of the
23 information that the Chamber receives be received orally but that we also
24 be given enough time to present our side of it. Thank you.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE KWON: What I can say about this is the following three.
2 First, the bar table motion, as we indicated earlier on, should be the
3 last resort. Second, we would -- the Chamber would encourage you to deal
4 with documents as much as possible with the witness through the course of
5 your examination. Third, if there are remaining documents which are not
6 dealt with with the witness, we will issue an informed decision so that
7 this issue will not arise again.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, may I just ask Mr. Robinson if he
9 could advise the document in appendix B that they would be objecting to
10 so that I can decide whether I wish to deal with it in chief.
11 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. That's item
12 number 22 which is a newspaper article, which you've consistently held
13 are not admissible through bar table motions.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you.
15 Q. Ms. Hanson, I would now like to turn to the origins of the
16 Crisis Staffs. You will see two binders down beside the table.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honours, these are documents that are cited
18 in appendix A and appendix B. I have shown them to Mr. Robinson prior to
19 placing them near the table at -- will assist Ms. Hanson if she has hard
20 copies in front of her while the documents are being brought up on the
22 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
23 MS. SUTHERLAND:
24 Q. Ms. Hanson, were the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs operating from
25 late 1991 an entirely new phenomenon or did they have some kind of legal
2 A. In the legislature of the SFRY and the Socialist Republic of
3 Bosnia as well as some municipal statutes that I've been able to examine,
4 there were provisions for a collective body to operate in the
5 municipalities in times of war or other emergencies. There were also
6 provisions for the committees or councils for All People's Defence which
7 were seen as emergency bodies in case of war, invasion, for the municipal
8 authorities and police and military and party to run -- to be the
9 municipal authorities until such time as government was re-established.
10 So yes, there were some origins, but I've never seen the term
11 "Crisis Staff" itself in any of these -- any of this legislation.
12 Q. Can you briefly explain for the Court when and how the SDS
13 Crisis Staffs came to be formed.
14 A. They were formed on the basis of the instructions issued by the
15 SDS Main Board dated 19 December 1991.
16 Q. Under the instructions what was the role of the Crisis Staffs?
17 A. To first prepare for the creation of Serb municipal -- Serb
18 Municipal Assemblies, Serbian municipal forces, organs; and then to
19 actually be the municipal governments of the new Serbian municipalities.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honours, there are currently two versions
21 of Variant A and B instructions in evidence, P0005 and P00960. I would
22 like to show P00960, please.
23 Q. And this is referred to in paragraph 20 in footnote 17 of your
24 report --
25 JUDGE KWON: Before that, I think we forgot to give the number to
1 her report. We'll do that.
2 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2589.
3 MS. SUTHERLAND:
4 Q. Was this the instruction that you just referred to?
5 A. Yes, this is number 93. There are several versions in the
6 possession of the OTP with different numbers. This is one of them.
7 Q. Approximately how many municipalities were there in
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war?
9 A. I believe 107 or thereabouts.
10 Q. And what was the highest number of the copies found in the OTP's
12 A. I think 104 or -- I'd have to check my notes, but it's not more
13 than 107.
14 Q. What inference, if any, do you draw from that?
15 THE INTERPRETER: The speakers are kindly asked to pause between
16 question and answer in order for everything that you are saying to be
17 interpreted correctly and so that the transcript can be complete.
18 THE WITNESS: Given that different numbers have been found in
19 different municipalities, I take it --
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Ms. Hanson. I'm sorry to interrupt
22 Your question was not reflected fully. Could you repeat your
23 question, Ms. Sutherland.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, and I apologise to the interpreters.
25 Q. You said that the highest number of the copies found in OTP's
1 collection was 104, numbered 104. What inference, if any, do you draw
2 from that?
3 A. Given that different numbers of this document were found in
4 different municipalities and the highest number is close to the number of
5 municipalities, I infer that each municipality received one copy.
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could go to page 2 in the English and also
7 page 2 of the B/C/S.
8 Q. Item 4 states:
9 "In order to ensure their consistent and timely implementation,
10 tasks, measures and other activities shall be set forth in two variants,
11 A and B, and at two levels."
12 Can you just remind the Court what Variant A and B refer to.
13 A. Variant A are the majority -- municipalities where the Serbs were
14 majority of the population. Variant B was Serb minority municipalities.
15 Q. And what are the two levels referred to?
16 A. The first degree and the second degree, "stepen."
17 Q. And what was the first level aimed at?
18 A. The first level was aimed at preparations for creating Serb
19 municipalities, creating a Crisis Staff as a shadow government, including
20 the various Serb office-holders in the municipality and people with links
21 to the party centre, such as Main Board members and deputies, calling a
22 Serb Assembly, making all the preparations also as far as TO, police, and
23 commodity reserves. The second degree was the actual take-over of police
24 stations and the putting into action of the municipal organs.
25 Q. And do these instructions make any explicit reference to the
1 establishment of Crisis Staffs?
2 A. Yes, they call for the formation of Crisis Staffs in both
3 Variant A and Variant B first level.
4 Q. And I think we can see that in item 3?
5 A. Yes. As I said, it lists the people who should be in the
6 Crisis Staff, the leaders of the SDS municipal board, Serbs holding
7 office in the municipality, or the SDS candidates for those positions,
8 deputies to the Assembly, members of the Main Board, chief of police,
9 commander of the TO.
10 Q. In footnote 17 of your report -- do you have a copy of your
11 report in front of you? It's in -- is it in the front of the binder?
12 A. Yes. Yes, I found it.
13 Q. In footnote 17 of your report you list eight copies of the
15 A. Yes, from Gorazde, Livno, Trnovo, Bosanski Petrovac, and the
16 others found in various locations in Sarajevo.
17 Q. I want to now move on from the actual instructions to look at the
18 municipal boards acting upon them. What did your examination of the
19 material show with regard to how this instruction was distributed and to
20 whom it was distributed?
21 A. The evidence I have been able to examine indicates that the
22 instructions were distributed at an expanded meeting of the SDS, that is,
23 the Main Board and municipal board presidents or Municipal Assembly
24 presidents, on the 20th of December. Some may have been distributed the
25 next day at an Assembly -- Bosnian Serb Assembly session. They were
1 distributed to the municipalities and received and implemented.
2 Q. If we could look briefly at some examples.
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter 08117 on the screen,
5 Q. This is entitled: "Conclusions of SDS Zvornik municipal board
6 meeting held on the 22nd of December, 1991."
7 Do you see any relationship between this document and the
8 19 December instructions?
9 A. Yes. Two days after the instructions were distributed, the SDS
10 municipal board in Zvornik is taking steps consistent with the
11 19 December instructions, the duty service, the Crisis Staff in a make-up
12 that is consistent with the A and B instructions. For example, the
13 commander of the Crisis Staff is Branko Grujic, the president of the SDS
14 municipal board. The next member listed, Jovo Mijatovic, is the deputy
15 to the Bosnian Serb Assembly from Zvornik. The -- it mentions a
16 co-ordinator for negotiations with the SDA, that's also in the
17 19 December instructions. So it's consistent with it, and we've seen
18 other documents in Zvornik that explicitly refer to the 19 December
20 Q. And there's another document on appendix B, 65 ter 11239, the
21 declaration of the Serbian municipality of Zvornik.
22 A. Yes, and that directly cites Article 4 of the instructions for
23 the organisation of the operations of the Serbian people in the
24 municipalities of 19 December 1991.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I would seek to tender that
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 08117 will be Exhibit P2590.
4 JUDGE KWON: And 11239?
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to have that admitted also.
6 I wasn't going to call it up.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 11239 will be Exhibit P2591.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND:
9 Q. A second example is from the Kljuc municipality.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter 00979.
11 Q. These are the minutes of the 6th meeting of the Executive Board
12 of the SDS municipal board of Kljuc dated the 23rd of December, 1991.
13 Looking in particular at the preamble, is there anything of significance
15 A. By "preamble," do you mean the agenda? The briefing on the
16 decisions of the Serbian Assembly and the materials that arrived, and
17 then under that agenda item it says that:
18 "Veljko Kondic informed the meeting of the instructions for the
19 organisation and activities of the Serbian people in BH. All the organs
20 will be required to act in accordance with these instructions."
21 I take that to be a reference to the 19 December instructions
22 amongst other things because it then lists the member of the -- forms a
23 Crisis Staff, lists the members, and other tasks consistent with the
24 19 December instructions.
25 Q. And what does Brane Vojvodic have to say about the matter?
1 A. He says:
2 "I can accept all Karadzic's proposals without seeing them."
3 In fact, later in the same meeting, they say -- Kondic says: You
4 don't need yet to know what the second degree is because it's just -- the
5 first degree is preparation for the second.
6 So it's another reference to, You don't need to know everything
7 but if Karadzic is sending it, we're going to do it, it seems to say.
8 I would also note that the Assembly deputy is there and briefing
9 the municipal board on the activities of the Assembly.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2592, Your Honours.
13 MS. SUTHERLAND:
14 Q. The third example is from Sarajevo.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter 08176, please.
16 Q. This is the minutes of the SDS Crisis Staff for Sarajevo dated
17 the 24th of December, 1991. And what is the significance of this
19 A. Again, it's a reference to implementing the 19 December
20 instructions because, as you see towards the bottom of the page, it said:
21 "Particular tasks as per the instructions on the organisation and
22 activity of organs of the Serbian people in BH in emergency situations
23 according to Variant 'B' under first degree ..."
24 Then it lists a number of items. It says, for example, number 7,
25 well, paragraph 7 of B first degree refers to information and propaganda
1 activities and there a member of SDS information council is assigned a
2 task. Number 8 in Variant B first degree refers to police and TO.
3 Mico Stanisic is in the Bosnian police, so it's entirely consistent. The
4 make-up is consistent. The first name listed, Jovo Jovanovic, is a
5 member of the SDS Main Board and SDS Executive Board. It appears to be
6 an implementation of the 19 December instructions.
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender that document.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this document is in evidence as
10 Exhibit P2532.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND:
13 Q. The fourth example is from Ilidza.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: I could have P00975, please.
15 Q. This is a decision of the Serbian Municipal Assembly of Ilidza
16 proclaiming the foundation of the Assembly of Serbian municipality of
17 Ilidza number 6 of 92. Looking in particular at the preamble, is there
18 anything of significance here?
19 A. Yes. They reference the instructions, with the instructions of
20 the Serbian Democratic Party Main Board number 79. I haven't seen any
21 copy with 79 on it, but that system of referring to it is consistent with
22 the front page as we've seen with the 19 December instructions.
23 Proclaiming a Serbian Assembly is one of the -- is part of the
24 instructions. I've seen several such declarations that cite the main --
25 that cite the 19 December instructions in their preamble.
1 I would also draw your attention to paragraph 5 which says that
2 the Assembly will recognise federal regulations and those municipal
3 regulations which are not contrary to federal regulations and the
4 interests of the Serbian people.
5 So this is a specific declaration that the Serbian Municipal
6 Assembly will follow only those laws that it feels are in the interest of
7 the Serbian people.
8 Q. And if we could go to page 2 in the English and the B/C/S and the
9 distribution list?
10 A. Yes, it shows that it was forwarded to the President of the
11 Serbian Assembly, that is Momcilo Krajisnik, and the president of the
12 SDS BH, Radovan -- that would be Karadzic.
13 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender this document, Your Honour.
14 Sorry, it's already an exhibit.
15 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland, to understand the difficulty of my
16 colleague Judge Lattanzi, I was hearing through French but if you
17 could -- if you could put a pause in between the question and answer,
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour. And I apologise to
20 Judge Lattanzi.
21 Q. The last example is from the Zvornik municipality.
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter 11239.
23 Q. This is a decision regarding the formation of the Serbian
24 municipality of Zvornik.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we can --
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, the wrong page is highlighted in B/C/S.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Go to page 2 in the English and page 1 of the
4 Q. Item 3 --
5 A. Item --
6 Q. What's the significance of this item?
7 A. Item 3 says that the Serb -- certain parts of the municipality of
8 Zvornik, including parts of the town, are being separated from the
9 existing municipality of Zvornik and becoming part of the Serbian
10 municipality of Zvornik. I would also note that once again the preamble
11 cites Article 4 of the 19 December instructions.
12 Q. And on page 4 of the English and page 2 of the B/C/S, under
13 item 9 of -- it states that the declaration is to be published in
14 "Javnost." What do you infer from this?
15 A. "Javnost" was the newspaper of the SDS so that I infer that this
16 was knowledge within at least the SDS or the Serbian part of -- the Serbs
17 of Bosnia. I would also note that I've seen identical decisions from at
18 least three other municipalities, Tuzla, Donji Vakuf, and Kalesija. They
19 used the exact same wording with the only differences being obviously the
20 names of the communities entering and the number of Assembly members.
21 Q. The document you just referred to in relation to Tuzla is on
22 appendix B and that's 65 ter 11498. And the one related to Donji Vakuf
23 is also listed and that's 65 ter 00499.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to --
25 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to see those two documents,
1 Mr. Robinson, 11498 and 499?
2 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President, I don't think it's necessary.
3 But I would just like to point out -- it's not an objection but I would
4 point out that these are two municipalities that are not included in the
5 indictment, but I understand that for contextual reasons it's relevant,
6 but I would just point that out for its weight.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: So, Your Honour, I seek to tender the Zvornik
10 document, which is 11239.
11 JUDGE KWON: That has already been admitted. You dealt with it a
12 minute ago. Exhibit P2591. And we'll admit the other two, 11498 and
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibits P2593 and P2594, respectively,
16 Your Honours.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND:
18 Q. Ms. Hanson, without bringing the document up, it's 65 ter 00982,
19 it's in relation to the Prijedor municipality of the 27th of December,
21 A. Yes, that's another -- further evidence of the receipt and
22 implementation of A and B. I see several SDS municipal board minutes,
23 information on Variant A and B being discussed, and Prijedor is another
24 example of that.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender that document,
1 that's also listed on appendix B.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
3 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
4 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted as P2595.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND:
6 Q. Ms. Hanson, I now wish to turn to discuss the importance of
7 Variant A and B. What importance did Mr. Karadzic place on the
9 A. He considered the instructions vitally important for the creation
10 of municipal governments and the take-over of real functions, as he
11 described it. He made several references, both at the time and in later
12 years, to the importance of A and B -- I'm sorry, 19 December
13 instructions. They are often known informally as Variant A and B.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter 30537, and in particular,
15 page 7 of the English and page 8 of the B/C/S.
16 Q. This is an intercepted telephone conversation between a person
17 named Miroslav and Radovan Karadzic held on the 7th of January, 1992.
18 Did you listen to the audio of this intercept?
19 A. Yes. For all the intercepts cited in my report I listened to the
20 audio, if available. I listened to many other intercepts as well, but I
21 just want to reassure the Court I've listened to the audio. And here
22 Karadzic is discussing who should be in charge in the ARK, and he says he
23 doesn't want some scientist from the academy. It's -- not a university
24 professor because it's not a time for science. It is a time to take over
25 real functions -- as it is in the B/C/S, it's -- with many intercepts
1 it's a lot of ellipses, but he says: This, this, this, that, that, that,
2 real functions in the sense of that paper of ours, level 1, level 2. So
3 he's being clear that it's not just theory, it's time to take real action
4 and really make our governments function, and A and B will be a guidance
5 for that.
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to have marked for
7 identification the intercept.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will do that.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P2596, Your Honour.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND:
11 Q. Did Mr. Karadzic make any speeches in the -- you said that
12 Mr. Karadzic spoke in later years. Was that at the Assembly sessions in
13 relation to the instructions or Variant A and B?
14 A. Yes, in 1994 and in 1995 he referred to how A and B had given
15 them guide-lines at the beginning of the war.
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could quickly call up 65 -- sorry, P01403.
17 This is the Assembly session of the 11th of November, 1994. If we could
18 go to page 347 of the English and e-court page 304 of the B/C/S. It's
19 ERN 0215-3546.
20 Q. We can see in the English that Mr. Karadzic begins to speak.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: And then if we can go to page 348 of the
22 English --
23 THE WITNESS: I would just note, if I'm allowed, that the English
24 translation as provided is not correct in one sentence. Could I read the
25 B/C/S? The first -- he says:
1 [Interpretation] "Everything's clear as day to us in
2 municipalities ..."
3 [In English] The English translation for some reason has not --
4 not everything. The B/C/S is: "Everything was clear to us."
5 He is saying:
6 "Everything is clear to us. We had instruct -- do you remember
7 instruction A and instruction B? We had Crisis Staffs and it was clear
8 that they were the authority. They could make mistakes but they were the
9 authority. People were not left without authority because there was a
10 Crisis Staff."
11 So he explicitly refers to A and B, that is the 19 December
12 instructions, as creating Crisis Staffs and creating Serbian authority in
13 the municipalities.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have 60 -- sorry, P00970, please.
15 Q. This is the transcript from the 50th Session of the
16 Republika Srpska Assembly held on the 15th and 16th of April, 1995.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could go to page 144 of the English and
18 175 of the B/C/S.
19 Q. And this is set out in paragraph 27 of your report.
20 A. Yes. I don't see the reference in the English --
21 Q. It's --
22 A. Perhaps --
23 Q. -- page 145.
24 A. I am familiar with this quotation, but it's --
25 Q. If --
1 A. Perhaps the English translation is not the correct one.
2 Q. Actually, it's -- the quote of Mr. Karadzic is set out in
3 paragraph 27 of your report --
4 A. Yes, I think it's better to go to that.
5 Q. So if you could just explain the significance of the quote.
6 A. Yes, it is during an Assembly that was discussing the army in
7 somewhat heated terms and Karadzic is tying the A and B instructions not
8 only to municipal governments but also to the army.
9 "At the moment the war began in the municipalities where we were
10 in the majority, we had municipal power, held it firmly, controlled
11 everything. In the municipalities where we were in the minority, we set
12 up secret government, municipal boards, Municipal Assemblies, presidents
13 of Executive Boards. You will remember the A and B variants."
14 JUDGE KWON: Can we see it from this exhibit? Where can we
15 locate it?
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I think it's on page 144 to 145 of
17 the English and 175 and 176 of the B/C/S.
18 THE WITNESS: Um --
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: The translation -- the ERN which is cited in the
20 report is actually from a different translation, but we simply used the
21 exhibit that was already admitted in court so --
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE WITNESS: If --
24 MS. SUTHERLAND:
25 Q. Yes --
1 A. If another page of the B/C/S could be brought out, it's at
2 00846058. I don't know if that's possible here. Oh, no, it's only
3 one page.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, is that possible, to bring up --
5 JUDGE KWON: It should be possible.
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: It would be going forward about 53 pages in the
8 THE WITNESS: If I'll read the B/C/S and you can listen to the
10 [Interpretation] "At the moment when the war began we --
11 everything was perfectly clear to us that those municipalities -- in the
12 municipalities where we were the minority we set up secret governments,
13 municipal boards, Municipal Assemblies, presidents of Executive Boards.
14 You will remember the A and B variants."
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, still we haven't found the English page number.
16 So that's the problem with the -- admitting without seeing the
17 document. We have to spend days to locate this passage outside the
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I did have my copy marked, but I
20 don't see the sticker now. Uh-huh, it's -- it's on -- at the bottom of
21 the English it's on page 347 of 350 in the footnote.
22 Mr. Registrar, do you see just at the bottom here 347 of 350?
23 JUDGE KWON: Sorry, but the document we are seeing is of
24 376 pages.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yeah -- no, I'm sorry, Your Honour, I'm at the
1 wrong exhibit. I do apologise for that. It's on page 145 of 376, which
2 is the original page number I took you to.
3 THE WITNESS: No, it's not that --
4 THE REGISTRAR: We are on that page in e-court, Ms. Sutherland.
5 THE WITNESS: It's not that.
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yeah, Your Honour, we can return to it after the
7 break if necessary. I can locate --
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, let's do that.
9 In the meantime, let's proceed.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND:
11 Q. So, Ms. Hanson, in paragraph 26 of your report you state that
12 municipal leaders consulted with the SDS leadership on how to implement
13 the instructions. I wasn't going to bring the document up, but do you
14 recall any reference made in an Assembly session in 1993 regarding
15 Mr. Karadzic's involvement in the issuance of the instructions?
16 A. Yes. In 1993, the Jajce municipal president refers to
17 consultations he had the previous year with Karadzic and Krajisnik on how
18 to implement A and B. He makes it very clear that it was A and B, and
19 "in accordance with the order issued by Mr. Karadzic, I asked
20 Mr. Karadzic at a counselling what I was to do.
21 Q. And this is referred to in footnote 27 of the report; is that
23 A. Yes. I -- there's -- I also refer to an intercept in which
24 the -- some -- someone from the Sarajevo Centar municipal board calls
25 Karadzic on the 1st of January, 1992, and says: We've got the
1 instructions but we need some help in implementing them. So I take that
2 as another request for help in implementing A and B, although it does --
3 not as explicit as saying Variant A and B.
4 Q. After Variant A and B document was issued in -- at the end of
5 December or on the -- around the 20th of December, 1991, was reference
6 made in front of Karadzic in any Assembly session?
7 A. Yes. Jovan Cizmovic at the session in late January 1992 called
8 for what he termed an urgent operationalisation of the Serbian Republic,
9 that is, I take it to mean actually putting all the government organs
10 into operation; tasks set out in the instructions of 19 December 1991
11 should be carried out. So it's an explicit reference to the 19 December
13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, that's P01349, the transcript from
14 the 6th Session of the Republika Srpska Assembly on the 26th of January,
15 1992. I don't intend on calling that document up.
16 JUDGE KWON: So we are on wrong number?
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: No, actually I will call it up for Your Honour.
18 It's P01349. The problem the -- the document that we had the problem
19 with, Your Honour, was the 50th Session of the Assembly in 1995. I'm
20 going now back to immediately after the instructions were issued to the
21 Assembly session in early January -- late January 1992. So if we can
22 go --
23 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you. Yes, we can carry on.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Cizmovic's quote is on page 14 of the
25 English, and the B/C/S ERN is -- at e-court page 29 and the ERN is
2 Q. And you see the quote that you -- the reference that you made a
3 moment ago, do you see that on the pages that are on the screen in front
4 of you?
5 A. Yes, the second-to-last paragraph, "starting to solve this
6 problem ..."
7 Q. Ms. Hanson, did anything further happen relating to Variant A and
8 B within two to three weeks of this session?
9 A. Yes. On the 14th of February at a session of -- expanded
10 session, I believe municipal presidents and so on, Karadzic called for
11 the implementation of the second degree.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter 01000 -- sorry, and this
13 is P0012. English page 17 and 24 -- that we'd go to page 17 and the
14 B/C/S page 18, I think.
15 Q. Does Karadzic say there that the stage number 2 should also be
16 converted, "the one we've talked about, the one you have, if not here,
17 then at home. In order to -- in order to have authorities in the field
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And that's at line -- around line 16 --
21 A. 17 --
22 Q. -- 17 --
23 A. 16, 17 it starts.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could now go to page 24.
25 Q. Does he then say there:
1 "That is why we called you today, to intensify, to introduce the
2 second level, and to intensify the functioning of the government at any
3 cost and on every single millimetre of our territory"?
4 A. Yes, that's another reference to the second level. In the B/C/S
5 it's "stepen," which is also translated as "degree," it's the same word.
6 He also earlier in his speech makes other references to the
7 second degree, including one where he says: "You know that paper of
8 mine, that paper," and the audience responds "we know," which I take to
9 be another acknowledgement of the receipt and just knowledge of A and B.
10 Q. If we could go to an example of the implementation of the
11 activation of this second degree in the Bratunac municipality.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter 00594 on the screen,
14 Q. And that's an extract from the minutes of the meeting of the
15 Bratunac Serbian SDS municipal board on the 24th of February, 1992.
16 A. It's page 20 in the English.
17 Yes, the chairman of the SDS municipal board Miroslav Deronjic is
18 briefing the Bratunac board on introduction on the -- information on the
19 second degree of the state of emergency. Deronjic read the material
20 about the second degree which he received from the central office and
21 said that: "It was an order which we are obliged to carry out." The
22 English is a little more confused than the B/C/S.
23 Q. And another related document that you have on appendix B is
24 actually the first document on appendix B, the 65 ter 00 --
25 JUDGE KWON: First of all, let us find the passage Ms. Hanson
1 referred to. We are all on page 20.
2 THE WITNESS: "Given that the first degree of the state of
3 emergency alert was declared and it lasted until today, therefore the
4 second degree of the state of emergency is to be declared as of now.
5 Deronjic read the material about the second degree which he received from
6 the central office ..."
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2597, Your Honours.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND:
12 Q. And, Ms. Hanson, another document that's related to the Bratunac
13 municipality is the first document on appendix B, 65 ter 00595, which is
14 an extract from the minutes of the meeting of the Bratunac SDS municipal
15 board of the 23rd of December, 1991.
16 A. Yes. That's also indication that they received A and B. It's --
17 it specifies there there are two variants, A and B, which he received, he
18 said, from the Presidency of the SDS Sarajevo. So from the leadership of
19 the SDS he received A and B.
20 There is also reference to the activation of the second degree in
21 Prijedor minutes from about this time, second half of February. And I
22 believe --
23 Q. And that was the exhibit -- sorry, that's been exhibited as
24 P2595, the Prijedor document.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: But, Your Honour, I seek to tender the Bratunac
1 document that's listed on appendix B, 00595.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, would you like to see the document?
3 MR. ROBINSON: No, thank you, Mr. President. We have no
5 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
6 That will be admitted.
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour --
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2598, Your Honours.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: -- I don't know what time we're rising for the
10 first break.
11 JUDGE KWON: 10.30, Ms. Sutherland.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: Okay.
13 Q. Ms. Hanson, I now want to move on to the section in your report,
14 which is starting at page 15, entitled: "From Party Organ to Municipal
15 Government, January to April 1992."
16 You describe the evolution or change in the character of the
17 Crisis Staffs from -- in that period, but can you briefly tell the Court
18 what happened between the 14th of February until the beginning of April.
19 A. This is at the time when at the republic level the Bosnian Serb
20 Assembly is passing constitution and other laws which transform the --
21 which establish the Bosnian Serb state and transform their party organs
22 into the government organs of the Bosnian Serb state. And we see the
23 same thing at the municipal level. The 19 December instructions were the
24 guide-lines to set it up -- set up the Crisis Staff, set up the municipal
25 government, and the emphasis especially in March 1992 is now to make
1 those changes real on the ground, establish the ethnic separation on the
2 ground, as Krajisnik refers to it.
3 And we see the Assembly deputies asking for instructions in the
4 Assembly. The connection -- while the Crisis Staffs were simply party
5 organs, the connection is through the Assembly because Assembly deputies
6 were members of the municipal Crisis Staffs. So we see people like
7 Vjestica from Bosanska Krupa reporting in the Assembly on what they've
8 accomplished in establishing Serbian authority in the municipalities,
9 asking for instructions. So we see by April 1992 that the Crisis Staffs
10 themselves transform from SDS party organs to publicly declaring
11 themselves the municipal authorities in the Serbian municipalities. So
12 it's a move from party to public government functions that parallels what
13 the Assembly is doing at the republican level.
14 Q. And you mentioned that in March 1992 that the members and the
15 deputies were seeking instruction in the Assembly. Was -- without
16 calling the documents up, was Mr. Karadzic providing any instruction in
17 March Assembly sessions?
18 A. Yes, he says you will get instructions but not in the Assembly,
19 in the Deputies Club. I would note that the Assembly transcripts -- had
20 official transcripts. We don't have transcripts of the Deputies Club
21 meetings, but it's almost exactly the same make-up, it's just that -- the
22 same people there just calling themselves the Deputies Club rather than
23 the Assembly. But he assures them that they will get instructions.
24 Branko Djeric, the prime minister, also assures them that they will get
25 instructions and that it will all be done together by a secret signal to
1 take-over the municipalities. I believe he says "secret."
2 Q. This is dealt with in paragraphs 33 and 34 of your report.
3 A. Yes. He says:
4 "We can form whatever we want. The Zvornik municipality takes
5 control over everything that constitutes the Serbian municipality of
6 Zvornik. At a given moment in the next three or four days, there will be
7 a single method and you will be able to apply it in the municipalities
8 you represent, both things that must be done as well as how to do them,
9 how to separate the police force, take the resources that belong to the
10 Serbian people, and take command. I think we shall hear it today in the
11 form of instructions at the Deputies Club."
12 And he goes on at the next session of the Assembly --
13 Q. Sorry, that was the 24th of March, 1992, Assembly session, the
14 12th Session?
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: And that's Exhibit P00961 for Your Honours' and
16 Mr. Karadzic's benefit.
17 Q. And then he goes on?
18 A. At the 27th of March, he is telling the Assembly deputies to go
19 sit next to the municipal presidents and carry out our policies. So we
20 can see the deputies as the channel for republic-level policy to be
21 implemented on the ground.
22 Q. And when was the move of Crisis Staffs from party to governmental
23 organ completed?
24 A. Well, I see a significant step in that. On the 4th of April,
25 1992, when Karadzic issues an announcement which says Crisis Staffs
1 should be activated and he is issuing it not as president of the SDS but
2 as president of the National Security Council, a government position
3 rather than a party position.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we can have 65 ter 0587 -- oh, no,
5 Exhibit D00394 on the screen, please.
6 And, Your Honour, while that's coming up, the 27 March 1992
7 Assembly session is 65 ter 00023 and I don't just have at the moment the
8 exhibit number, but that was already -- that has been exhibited in this
10 Q. Exhibit D00394 is the announcement by the National Security
11 Council dated the 4th of August, 1992.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter 23 is Exhibit D304.
13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
14 Q. The document we have on the screen now, Exhibit D00394, what is
15 the significance of the public announcement?
16 A. Well, the letter-head says it comes from the Assembly of the
17 Serbian People, the Council for National Defence, so government organs.
18 Karadzic signs it as president of the council, and in the last paragraph
19 he says that Crisis Staffs should be activated in those places where --
20 he's telling them not to -- not to obey the Rump BH Presidency, as he
21 refers to the government -- the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia.
22 And he tells them that in those areas where people are obeying the
23 Bosnian Presidency, Crisis Staffs should be activated, and Serbian
24 people's TO, civilian protection, and reserve police raised.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, if I can go to one more document
1 before the break, and I would actually seek leave to use this document,
2 65 ter 23107. It was disclosed as a potential 65 ter exhibit on the 14th
3 of April, and it was listed on appendix A in the filing on the 1st of
4 June, 2011. It's the minutes of the 2nd Session of the Serbian Municipal
5 Assembly of Sanski Most held on the 16th of April, 1992.
6 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Robinson?
7 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 Please proceed.
10 THE WITNESS: Under item 5, listed here as 15 in translation,
11 that's a little unclear. Page 5.
12 This is --
13 MS. SUTHERLAND:
14 Q. Sorry, yes.
15 A. This is the Assembly of the Bosnian -- the Serb municipality of
16 Sanski Most, and it says that:
17 "... the Assembly verifies the existence of the Crisis Staff
18 determined at a session of the municipal board of the Sanski Most SDS."
19 So I see that as an example of the transformation of a body first
20 formed within the party, the SDS Crisis Staff is now confirmed by the
21 municipal organ, the Assembly, and it becomes a municipal government
22 organ, which takes over all authority of the Assembly as we'll see.
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender that document.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2599, Your Honours.
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: And just to let you know, the reference in the
2 English translation of the 50th Assembly, which is P00970, it's on
3 page 316.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 11.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Your Honour, just before the break I advised you that the page
11 number -- it's going to be the bane of my existence, the 50th Session of
12 the RS Assembly on the -- in April 1995, but Mr. Registrar has called it
13 up. It's actually on the pages that I cited to you at the beginning. On
14 page 144 of Exhibit P00970, we can see Mr. Karadzic begins to speak, and
15 on then on the following page, page 145 in English and page 176 in the
16 B/C/S ... is where Mr. -- no, I'm sorry, we're going to have to come back
17 to it. I don't --
18 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, if I may, I sat with the Registrar just
19 before we resumed. We together went through it at page 144, 145, looking
20 at it on screen. There's some kind of electronic anomaly happening.
21 We'll get it straightened out.
22 JUDGE KWON: Let's carry on.
23 MS. SUTHERLAND:
24 Q. So, Ms. Hanson, just before the break we dealt with the document
25 from Sanski Most dated the 16th of April, 1992. Going on from there, as
1 the Crisis Staffs came out into the open, did they receive any direction
2 from the republican government as to how they should operate?
3 A. Yes, they did. On the 26th of April, the president of the
4 government, Branko Djeric, issued the instructions for the work of the
5 Crisis Staffs of the Serbian people and municipalities.
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have Exhibit D00407 on the screen,
7 please, Mr. Registrar.
8 Q. This is an extract from the instructions for the work of
9 Crisis Staffs of the Serbian nation in the municipalities. This is the
10 document you just referred to?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. If I can take you through a few of the instructions, and this is
13 dealt with in paragraphs 39 to 41 of your report. Item 1, which is on
14 page 1 on the -- both English and B/C/S, can you just explain the
15 authority there.
16 A. This states clearly that:
17 "... the Crisis Staff takes over all the prerogatives and
18 functions of the Municipal Assemblies when they are unable to convene."
19 So the Crisis Staff is becoming the highest authority in the
21 Q. In relation to item 2, again on the same page, it sets out the
22 composition of the Crisis Staffs. Is this consistent with the
23 composition set out in the 19 December 1991 instructions?
24 A. Yes, it's consistent. It brings together the TO, the police,
25 other forces or organisations necessary and to -- the most important
1 resources and forces in the municipality.
2 Q. With respect to item 3?
3 A. Its job is to co-ordinate all these municipal organs to defend
4 the territory, maintain security, establish authority, organise
5 day-to-day life.
6 Q. And does that set out the Crisis Staff's role in relation to
7 military affairs?
8 A. Not -- not explicitly by itself, but it certainly says that the
9 Crisis Staff's most important job is defence and security and authority,
10 so it does not specify -- later on it -- yes, the next one, Article 4,
11 specifies that the Crisis Staff is to prevent other people interfering
12 with the command of the TO or police forces. They are a professional
13 staff, let them do their job, but the Crisis Staff co-ordinates the
14 overall activities.
15 Q. And item 6, is that outlining the Crisis Staff's -- what their
16 actions shall be based upon?
17 A. Yes. Item 6 clearly places the Crisis Staff in the Bosnian Serb
18 state system, saying that they are to work in accordance with the
19 constitution and law as well as decisions brought by the Assembly, the
20 Presidency, and the Government of the Bosnian Serb Republic.
21 Q. And do you have any comment in relation to item 8?
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could scroll down the page -- the next
24 THE WITNESS: Yes. This is 26 April, when it was still the JNA
25 was the armed -- was still in Bosnia, and it shows the -- they are to
1 support the JNA and -- support it and take-over its property -- well,
2 assume its position, but as we know, in practice that was taking over
3 army property after having consulted with the government level.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we can go to page -- sorry, item 10.
5 Q. Do you have any comment in relation to that item?
6 A. It's interesting that they -- it says that to the non-combatant
7 people, the Crisis Staff should act in accordance with the International
8 Red Cross, towards POWs act according to the laws of the Serbian
9 Republic. But, clearly both of those categories of people are considered
10 to be the business of the Crisis Staff, prisoners of war and
12 Q. And paragraph 11 talks about a duty to report?
13 A. Yes --
14 Q. Item 11, sorry.
15 A. Yes, the duty of the Crisis Staff to gather information, inform
16 and consult the proper organs of the Serbian Republic, that is,
17 government representatives -- yes, the word here is translated as
18 "representatives," but it's an important word that we'll see a lot in the
19 future. So I would note that in the B/C/S it's "povjerenik," which is
20 usually translated as "commissioner" because this is a person whose job
21 is to be their contact person -- be the Crisis Staff's contact person at
22 the republic level, the personal link between -- we'll see more about
23 him -- about the "povjerenik" later.
24 But it shows that Crisis Staffs again are part of the state
25 system, obliged to inform and consult. We see this also in item 14 where
1 they are supposed to submit weekly reports to regional and state organs.
2 So they're part of the state system receiving policy and instructions and
3 reporting back on their implementation by the "povjerenik" as a
4 go-between. I also would note in item 14 that the Crisis Staff is to
5 work collectively, bring decisions in full complement means with all the
6 people present, which is another important aspect of how they worked.
7 Q. I now want to turn to Crisis Staffs receiving and acting upon
8 instructions, and this is -- starts at paragraph 43 of your report.
9 Acting upon the 26th April instructions.
10 A. Yes, we see evidence in many municipalities that these
11 instructions were received and acted upon.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have 65 ter 05724.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters again kindly note for a pause
14 between question and answer.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: This is the decision on the organisation and
16 work of the Crisis Staff of the Prijedor municipality.
17 Q. On your review of this document, to what extent, if at all, does
18 the wording of this document reflect the 26 April 1992 instructions?
19 A. Some articles are almost a literal transcription of the 26 April
20 instructions and lead me to believe that they received the instructions
21 and implemented them at their level. For example, Article 2 is the same
22 as Article 3 of the 26 April instructions.
23 Q. Article 4?
24 A. Article 4 is consistent with the composition as instructed in the
25 26 April instructions. Article 11 of the Prijedor instruction is a
1 paraphrasing of almost exact wording, except for using -- inserting
2 Prijedor, as the last Article, Article 14, of the 26 April instructions.
3 Q. And there they regard the Crisis Staff as intermediaries; is that
5 A. Yes, they include them as another -- another organ. In fact,
6 Article 12 makes clear that it is intermediary level because they shall
7 consult first the ARK and then the republic level if necessary and
8 feasible. So the ARK is their first level, the republic level is the
10 Q. And in regard to Article 9, this is on page 4 of the English and
11 5 of the B/C/S, "maintaining co-operation via senior officers of these
12 institutions," what does this indicate with regard to the lines of
13 command of the police and other bodies?
14 A. The senior officers of the JNA units, the TO, civilian defence,
15 and police were part of the Crisis Staffs. So the Crisis Staff creates
16 the co-operation of these units by bringing the senior officers together.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: I would tender that document.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2605, Your Honours.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND:
21 Q. Did you also see these instructions being -- the 26 April 1992
22 instructions being followed in other municipalities?
23 A. Yes. I note several in my footnote where I see reference to it
24 or quotations from. I also see a document from the Executive Board of
25 the SDS itself, saying that these instructions have been forwarded and
1 are valid.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could call up 65 ter 00853, which is
3 referred to in footnote 55.
4 THE WITNESS: Yes. Here the president of the Kljuc Crisis Staff
5 says he --
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: This is on page 21 of the English, sorry, and
7 page 33 of the B/C/S.
8 THE WITNESS: He informs them of the operating instructions --
9 informs the Crisis Staff of the operating instructions, which I take to
10 be a reference to the 26 April instructions.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if we can just go to the next page in the
12 English, page 22.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the Serbian page as
14 well, please.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, it's --
16 THE WITNESS: I don't see it here, I believe it's the end of May.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: -- page 21 -- 27th of -- it's the meeting of the
18 1st of June -- I'm sorry, it's 65 ter number -- yes, that's right, the
19 1st of June, page 22 of the English and page 33 of the B/C/S.
20 THE WITNESS: I believe it's on page 7 of the English, according
21 to my citation --
22 MS. SUTHERLAND:
23 Q. You're right, you're right.
24 A. Item 1, Veljko Kondic acquainted the Crisis Staff members with
25 the SO Crisis Staff operating instructions. S O is usually an
1 abbreviation for "skupstina opstina" or Municipal Assembly.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender that document.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you wanted to see the Serbian page.
4 THE WITNESS: It's 0057-3888.
5 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: So --
7 JUDGE KWON: I was advised that only 17 pages of this document
8 have been uploaded.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, Your Honour, we will rectify that.
10 We will move on.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we give the number for --
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2606, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: 2606, and with the understanding that the Serbian
14 version will be uploaded immediately.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE KWON: All right. Thank you.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND:
18 Q. Ms. Hanson, in your report you talk about War Presidencies and
19 War Commissions. This is at paragraphs 45 to 55. Can you explain what
20 the difference was between the Crisis Staffs and the War Presidencies and
21 War Commissions?
22 A. I use "Crisis Staff" as an umbrella term for all three when
23 talking about the actions of these bodies because they were seen as very
24 much the same body in the ground -- on the ground and in practice. The
25 War Presidencies were established according to a decision of the
1 Bosnian Serb Presidency of 31 May 1992, and it says that with that
2 decision, Crisis Staffs ceased to operate; however, the terms are used
3 interchangeably. All the bodies emphasised the continuity between and
4 their tasks are the same.
5 So I see them as simply the next stage in the development of
6 Crisis Staffs because the Bosnian Serb state is now writing its laws,
7 setting up its institutions, so rather than being -- Crisis Staffs being
8 formed by the SDS Main Board instructions of December 1991, this is a
9 decision of the Presidency giving -- making their reporting lines and
10 their whole basis through the state organs.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we can look at three documents in relation to
12 War Presidencies and war commissions, the first document is 05966.
13 JUDGE KWON: Does your -- Ms. Hanson, does your previous answer
14 also relate to War Commissions?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes. There is -- that decision and the formation
16 of commissions are a little more problematical, but certainly I use --
17 when I say "Crisis Staffs" and I talk about their operations, I am also
18 including War Commissions as they operated as the municipal -- the
19 highest municipal authority. When we look at the decision on
20 War Commissions, I'll explain the differ -- the way in which they differ,
21 but in practice they did not.
22 MS. SUTHERLAND:
23 Q. And you said that you use "Crisis Staff" as an umbrella term for
24 all three when talking about the actions of these bodies. And was that
25 because the terminology was used interchangeably by the actual
1 authorities on the ground?
2 A. Yes. We often see them meeting in the same -- the same
3 composition and saying, "Oh, today we're a War Presidency, we're no
4 longer a Crisis Staff." We see them saying that the name will be changed
5 formally but what we are actually doing remains the same. This decision
6 on the formation of War Presidencies gives them the same tasking.
7 Clearly they are the same body, but simply now being formalised as a
8 state body, that is, being made part of the legislature. And I think the
9 term "War Presidency" is a more formal term. As we see, there was
10 legislative precedent for a collective Presidency and nowhere in the
11 previous legislation do we see the term "Crisis Staff," and that is a
12 more informal sounding term, but to call it a War Presidency makes it
13 clear that it is the municipal Presidency and its tasks, as we see in
14 Article 3, are very much the same as the Crisis Staff taskings.
15 Q. And you're looking now at document 05966 on the screen?
16 A. Yes, the War Presidency shall organise, co-ordinate, and adjust
17 activities for the defence of the Serbian people, create and ensure
18 conditions for the work of military organs and units defending the
19 Serbian people.
20 Q. And that is dated the 31st of May, 1992, and it was in the
21 Official Gazette which was published on the 8th of June, 1992; is that
23 A. Yes.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender that document.
25 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2607, Your Honours.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: The next document is 65 ter 18328.
3 Q. That's a memo by Trifko Komad, SDS BH Executive Board secretary,
4 re the formation of War Presidencies.
5 A. Yes, I mentioned this document before. In the first paragraph he
6 refers to the 26 April instructions, you'll note, and now he's saying,
7 "Those that you've already received for Crisis Staffs, well, now we're
8 forming War Presidencies." And just to note the confusion of terms,
9 within one paragraph he refers to the decision on Presidencies but then
10 he says, "Instead of Crisis Staffs War Commissions are being formed."
11 The translation -- the English translation is not correct. These terms
12 are tricky but I will read it. It says: [No interpretation]. [In
13 English] Commissions.
14 JUDGE KWON: If you could read it again. It has not been
16 THE WITNESS: Oh, sorry.
17 [No interpretation].
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: Sorry --
19 JUDGE KWON: How should it read in English in your --
20 THE WITNESS: Commissions. [Interpretation] War commissions, war
21 time commissions.
22 [In English] Yes, war commissions. I just note that that
23 indicates the confusion even at the republican level of these terms
24 because all of these bodies had the person of the commissioner,
25 "povjerenik," who, as I said, is the link -- the path for communications.
1 But this is significant because it's the SDS Executive Board
2 telling the presidents of regional Crisis Staffs that they should now
3 implement this decision on the formation of War Presidencies, and if they
4 have any further questions, contact the republic Presidency directly,
5 which shows again how the party organs are now becoming state organs.
6 The state is taking over from the party. The party is forwarding these
7 instructions to government -- people in a position of government
8 presumably and telling them: If you have any more questions, talk to the
9 Presidency about them.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND:
11 Q. And you mentioned a moment ago that the instructions were acted
12 upon in many Crisis Staffs, and that's at footnote 55. For example,
13 Bihac, Bosanska Dubica, Bosanska Gradiska, Bosanski Novi,
14 Bosanski Petrovac, Kljuc, Prijedor --
15 A. Yes, those are all --
16 Q. -- Bihac, Bijeljina, and again Krupa.
17 A. Yes, those are -- that's where I found evidence that the 26 April
18 instructions were received and implemented.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I tender that document.
20 JUDGE KWON: Let's have the 65 ter number.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: Well, the 65 ter number of the document on the
22 screen is 18328.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted first.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2608.
25 JUDGE KWON: And let us note the 65 ter numbers you are going to
1 tender as well.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Bihac is 65 ter 17223, that's in footnote 55 of
3 Ms. Hanson's report, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE KWON: There 65 ter number is not noted, so that's why I
5 asked. Could you -- whether you could give --
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: It's at the end of -- in footnote 55 it's:
7 "Examples of Crisis Staffs acting upon the government instructions
8 include," and then it's "Bihac" and then the decision and then citing the
9 relevant information from that decision. And then there's a
10 65 ter number at the end of --
11 JUDGE KWON: So --
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: -- at the end of the --
13 JUDGE KWON: -- at a later date there may be case I want to see
14 the passage relating to Bihac, how can I find it? What's the
15 65 ter number of that?
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: 17223, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: It's in bold at the end of the reference to
19 Bihac in footnote 55.
20 JUDGE KWON: Do you have that 65 ter number in the footnote 55?
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes.
22 JUDGE KWON: Ah, yes, I'm looking at the old version. I'm sorry.
23 Could you bring up the footnote 55 of the -- of her report.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry to -- I'm sorry for taking your
1 time but --
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: No, Your Honour, it's exhibit -- the report has
3 now been tendered as P2589.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let us -- by my mistake --
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: Sorry, 2582 --
6 JUDGE KWON: -- I brought the old version, not edited version.
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar -- I think the report is 2582, the
8 expert report.
9 JUDGE KWON: I think her report is 2589.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: That's what I initially thought, Your Honour,
11 and then I -- I'm not so sure now.
12 Mr. Registrar, the exhibit number for the expert report is
13 exhibit --
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we have it. Very well. We have --
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: It's at footnote 55 we have Bihac and then
16 65 ter number in bold at the end of the decision, and then Bosanska
17 Dubica the same, 65 ter 17202. And then if we go over the page --
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I confirmed it. Do you have --
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: -- and we can see all these 65 ter numbers
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Sutherland.
22 Do you have any objections to the admission of these documents?
23 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE KWON: They will be admitted.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 17223 will be Exhibit P2609,
1 and 65 ter 17202 will be Exhibit P2610.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Then on the page we're now looking at,
3 Bosanska Gradiska is 65 ter number --
4 JUDGE KWON: How many --
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, there's all of the -- there's
6 Gradiska, Novi Petrovac --
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, all of them will be admitted and given the
8 number by the Court Deputy --
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE KWON: -- accordingly. Thank you.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have the third document in relation
12 to the War Presidencies and War Commissions on the screen and that is
13 65 ter 05917. And this is the decision on the formation of
14 War Commissions in municipalities in time of war or imminent threat of
15 war dated the 10th of June, 1992, which was published in the
16 Official Gazette on the 30th of June, 1992.
17 Q. Could you explain what this document is.
18 A. This document is similar to the 31st of May decision that we saw
19 on the formation of War Presidencies. It makes no reference to that
20 decision, so I do find some difficulty in saying how these two relate to
21 each other. But it clearly says that War Commissions as constituted will
22 take-over from Crisis Staffs, they will supersede Crisis Staffs. So it's
23 the same intention. Article 3 on their work is very similar to the
24 wording of the War Presidency.
25 "The War Commissions shall maintain the closest possible
1 co-operation with the legal authorities; they shall convey directives
2 issued by the War Presidency of the republic; they shall convey
3 information about the problems, needs, and work of the municipal bodies
4 via their commissioners; they shall co-operate with the authorities with
5 a view to creating conditions for the work of military organs and units
6 engaged in defending the Serbian people."
7 The difference -- the most significant difference I find between
8 these two decisions is the amount of text emphasising the work of the
9 commissioner himself. It makes it clear that he has the authority to
10 dissolve the War Commissions and appoint new members in consultation with
11 the republic Presidency.
12 Could I see some more article -- the next pages -- is there more
13 or not? Oh, no, it does refer -- I'm sorry, the text. It does -- it
14 says it -- I didn't see the -- before, that it does say it takes -- it
15 supersedes the decision on War Presidencies, but in fact we don't see
16 War Commissions established everywhere and we see War Presidencies
17 operating in June and July a lot more than we see War Commissions. As I
18 understand the distinction -- well, the -- the make -- the composition as
19 described in this decision is a much smaller body than the
20 War Presidency, and it seems to be intended for those places where the
21 municipal authorities were functioning the worst, where there was more
22 need for an outsider to come and make sure everything could function. We
23 first see War Commissions established pursuant to this decision in
24 Eastern Bosnia, the area known as Birac. I don't see them, for example,
25 in the ARK, so they're not everywhere; whereas we do see War Presidencies
1 and even Crisis Staffs operating in June and July everywhere.
2 Where I do have documents of a War Commission, they are operating
3 just the same as a War Presidency in a larger composition than this
4 decision says. So I think although this decision looks like it's a
5 somewhat different body that's supposed to replace both Crisis Staffs and
6 War Presidencies, in practice where War Commissions functioned they acted
7 much the same as Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies. And I don't see
8 many documents of War Commissions operating as this instruction -- as
9 this decision would lay out.
10 Q. And as you said, the Crisis Staffs continued to operate, and did
11 they continue to receive instructions from the republic level?
12 A. Yes. They received orders from the republic level. They
13 reported to the republic level. They were still seen as a body. It was
14 seen simply as a difference in terminology in practice. In Rajlovac, for
15 example, the president of the municipality said: First we had a
16 Crisis Staff, then a War Presidency, then a War Commission, then a War
17 Presidency again. In practice the terms were much the same. We see the
18 confusion of terms noted even by the -- at the government level saying,
19 People aren't satisfied with these terms. So it's taken -- it seems to
20 be different terms are used for essentially one and the same body. I
21 certainly never see a Crisis Staff and a War Commission operating in the
22 same place at the same time. It's one or the other.
23 Q. And we'll take a look at a few examples of Crisis Staffs
24 receiving orders and implementing policies from the republic level
25 shortly, but before that just talking about the role of the Crisis Staffs
1 in the Bosnian Serb state, which you deal with at paragraphs 56 to 65 of
2 your report, once they were fully established in April 1992, what was the
3 level of authority at the municipal level?
4 A. The Crisis Staffs declared themselves to be the highest municipal
5 authority with all the rights and functions and authority of the
6 Municipal Assemblies.
7 Q. And in a nutshell what was their main role?
8 A. To co-ordinate all the forces and resources of the municipality
9 to establish Serbian power on the ground and to be the municipal
10 government of the Serbian municipalities. They brought together the
11 party, the government, the military, the police, and any other resources
12 as needed to make sure that their actions on the ground were co-ordinated
13 with the highest level of policy and instructions.
14 Q. Now, you said that they received this direction. From which
15 organs, which bodies?
16 A. They implemented decisions of the Presidency, the government,
17 the -- one of their taskings was also to carry out the policies of the
18 Main Staff of the VRS. We see them acknowledging all of those organs as
19 their authority.
20 Q. And I think you have two examples in appendix B, 65 ter 017 --
21 no, sorry. 65 ter 17217, which is the government session held on the
22 21st of May, which is referred to in paragraph 60 of your report; and
23 65 ter 05057, which is the Sanski Most document dated the 22nd of May,
24 1992, which referred to Mr. Karadzic and the government session held on
25 the 21st of May, 1992, re the issue of mobilisation?
1 A. Yes. When the Presidency issued a decree on mobilisation -- a
2 declaration on mobilisation, the government then passed it on to all
3 levels, including all municipal Crisis Staffs. And we see Sanski Most
4 implementing it.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, without calling those two documents
6 up, I would seek to tender them.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
8 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. They will be admitted
10 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter 05917 will be Exhibit P2611;
12 65 ter 17217 will be Exhibit P2612; and 65 ter 05057 will be
13 Exhibit P2613.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND:
16 Q. Ms. Hanson, I now want to take you to look at one regional level
17 document and three municipal level documents in relation to the
18 Crisis Staffs and the recognition of the authority of the RS government.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: 65 ter 04835, please.
20 Q. This is conclusions of the Crisis Staff of the Serbian
21 municipality of Sanski Most reached at a meeting on the 30th of May,
22 1992. Can you explain the significance of this document in relation to
23 the recognition of the authority of the government?
24 A. Under item 1 it says:
25 "Nedeljko Rasula, the president of the Crisis Staff, co-ordinates
1 and harmonises the work of our Crisis Staff for the Crisis Staff of ARK,"
2 which shows the co-ordination with the regional level.
3 The next item, 2, says that:
4 "Vlado Vrkes, the deputy president, is in charge of political
5 problems and the implementation of the ideas of the Serbian Democratic
6 Party leadership at the level of the republic, region, and municipality."
7 We also see that there's a -- the other forces are mentioned, TO,
8 police, and so on, but the second right up there is the idea of
9 co-ordinating with the region and implementing the party ideas at the
10 level of republic, region, and municipality. So it's a recognition of
11 the authority. And later on under -- towards the bottom of the page we
12 see them saying that they want to get in touch with the ARK leadership
13 regarding implementation of the idea on resettlement of the population.
14 So they're consulting with the regional level on how to implement on the
15 ground in this case resettlement of Muslims and Croats.
16 Q. Does it appear to you -- from what I understand with the
17 republic, regional, and municipal level that it's -- the removal of the
18 non-Serb population, what sort of effort is that?
19 A. It's co-ordinated, as we see from many documents that I cite.
20 It's considered policy and it's co-ordinated.
21 Q. The next document is 65 --
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Sorry, I seek to tender that document,
23 Your Honour.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the Serbian page 2,
25 please. Well, actually page 3.
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender this document.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2614, Your Honours.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter 11502 on the screen,
6 Q. That's the decision by the Crisis Staff of the Serbian Autonomous
7 Region Birac dated the 29th of April, 1992. What is the basis and the
8 significance of this decision?
9 A. This decision shows the republic -- the regional level acting on
10 a republic-level decision, implementing it and passing it on and using
11 that to -- passing it on to the municipal level and using that to grant
12 authority to the municipal level. It says:
13 "Pursuant to the Decision of the Council for National Security of
14 the Serbian Republic of BH on general mobilisation ... the Crisis Staff
15 of SAO Birac proclaims a state of war ... in the territory of entire
16 autonomous region."
17 And if we can have the next page it says that:
18 "... mobilisation shall be carried out by municipal staffs ..."
19 So here we see the republic-level decision passed on by the
20 regional to the municipal to implement, and it says:
21 "All units, including the existing military ones, shall come
22 under the command of the municipal Crisis Staffs and the Crisis Staff of
23 SAO Birac."
24 At the last part indicates their role in the state. Again,
25 they're subject to the legal sanctions in force in the Serbian Republic.
1 So this is very much part of the Serbian state system and it uses a
2 republic-level decision to say that the municipal Crisis Staffs are now
3 commanding all military units in the area, which we'll see later in the
4 military section.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender that document.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2615, Your Honours.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: And the document referred to -- the
9 republic-level document referred to in this decision we will be going to
10 in a moment, that's 65 ter 00153.
11 If the next document that could be brought up on the screen is
12 65 ter 01064. This is a proposal number 184/92 from the War Presidency
13 of Bosanska Krupa to the command of the 1st Krajina Podgrmec Brigade on
14 the 25th of May, 1992, signed by Klickovic.
15 Q. First of all, what's the significance of this document?
16 A. There's a lot to be seen from it, but I would quickly note this
17 is an example of a pre-31 May War Presidency. So the term was being
18 used. But most importantly here, it's the War Presidency proposing an
19 action to the local brigade basing its reason on, number 1, as we see
20 under reasons, the decision -- the political determination to have the
21 border of the Serbian entity be along the river Una. On the 16th of
22 May -- sorry, the 12th of May, the 16th Assembly Session, the strategic
23 objectives were announced which included having the Una as the border of
24 the Serbian state.
25 So on the basis of the strategic objectives, the president of the
1 War Presidency is telling the army or suggesting to the army to cleanse
2 the left bank, destroy as many residential buildings as possible, and
3 fortify the right bank. So military action on the basis of the strategic
4 objectives is being channelled through the War Presidency.
5 I would also note quickly, we might not have much time in the
6 military section, that a month earlier, in April, Klickovic was writing
7 orders to the police, now that the -- to the military. Now that the army
8 has been established it's a proposal, so not a direct order, but it's
9 still clearly conveying policy and trying to have it implemented on the
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender that document.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: P2616, Your Honours.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: And the last document in relation to
15 Crisis Staffs receiving orders and implementing policies from the
16 republic level is 65 ter 05844.
17 Q. This is a presidential decision on return of resettled persons to
18 the territory of the Serbian Republic dated the 2nd of June, 1992, and
19 published in the Official Gazette on the 8th of June, 1992 --
20 A. The English is the wrong decision.
21 Q. It's actually 172. This was supposed to be corrected in e-court,
22 the English translation -- okay. Just reading from the -- oh, here we
23 go --
24 A. No.
25 Q. Down at the bottom of the English.
1 A. Oh, yes, there.
2 Q. Can you explain the significance of this decision.
3 A. It's a Presidency decision which grants municipal Crisis Staffs a
4 great deal of authority in determining the status of the -- on the --
5 people who have left the territory of the Serbian Republic and whether
6 they can return, whether they'll even be granted citizenship. So clearly
7 the Presidency regards Crisis Staffs as a municipal authority if in this
8 decision published in the gazette they're granting this authority to
9 Crisis Staffs, it's telling people who return to report to their
10 Crisis Staffs. The Crisis Staffs will decide on who has the right to
11 return, who has the right of citizenship, and the Crisis Staffs will take
12 over the -- take care of and use the property of those who do not return.
13 So it's significant for the role of the Crisis Staff as recognised by the
14 Presidency and it's also significant for the role of the Crisis Staff in
15 the -- on the ground.
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender that document.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2617, Your Honours.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND:
20 Q. And without calling it up, it's 65 ter 21251, in July 1992, do
21 you recall them publishing a document which referred to this exhibit that
22 we have on the screen now?
23 A. Yes. A correction was published in the Official Gazette which
24 changed the dates, because as you can see here, the date says they have
25 to return by the 20th of May but the decision is published later than
1 that. However, the text -- the correction does not alter the term
2 "Crisis Staff." It changes the date to July 1992 but that's all, which I
3 take as further indication of the recognition that Crisis Staffs are the
4 municipal authority whatever term they're using at the moment.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender that document,
6 21251, please.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
8 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 That will be admitted.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2618, Your Honours.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND:
13 Q. Ms. Hanson, you also listed some other documents in appendix B
14 supporting the documents that we have just gone through from appendix A.
15 One of them is 65 ter 23137 -- sorry, 01528, which is the president of
16 the government, Branko Djeric. It's dated the 15th of May, 1992, and
17 it's referred to in footnote 82 of your report --
18 A. Sorry, I haven't memorised the appendix B, but --
19 Q. -- where he orders the Crisis Staff to supply trucks for
20 transport of prisoners from Pale to --
21 A. Yes, there's a series that --
22 Q. -- Visoko --
23 A. Yes, there is a series of orders from Djeric to municipalities,
24 Sokolac and Vogosca and elsewhere, on organising -- providing trucks for
25 the transport of prisoners.
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I would seek to tender that
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: P2619, Your Honours.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND:
6 Q. Also listed is a decision of the Autonomous Region of Krajina
7 Crisis Staff regarding membership and functions of municipal
8 War Presidencies and that's dated the 11th of June, 1992, cited in
9 footnote 122 of your report.
10 A. Yes, it shows the ARK Crisis Staff passing on the republic-level
11 instructions on War Presidencies, making it clear their function, their
12 authority in the municipality, their role in the state.
13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender that document.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2620, Your Honours.
16 THE WITNESS: And that document also emphasises the continuity
17 between Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies because it links the two
18 together. It constantly says Crisis Staffs/War Presidencies or
19 Crisis Staffs, that is, War Presidencies.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND:
21 Q. And the last document in appendix B is 65 ter 06668, an order
22 from the president of the Republika Srpska government to the
23 War Presidency of Vogosca, dated the 17th of June, 1992. This is cited
24 in footnote 68 and 82 of your report and it's in relation to securing
25 production operations at Pretis.
1 A. Yes. It's an example of an order from the government to a
2 specific Crisis Staff. We both -- we saw Djeric before ordering
3 Crisis Staffs as a category. Here it's to a specific Crisis Staff on war
4 production at Pretis.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2621, Your Honours.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND:
9 Q. If we can turn now to the issue of financial and material support
10 for Crisis Staffs from the government, this is dealt with in paragraph 61
11 of your report. You describe in that paragraph the Government of the RS
12 issuing instructions and directions, but did the government materially
13 support the Crisis Staffs in any way; and if so, how?
14 A. They did. We see in the minutes of the RS government discussions
15 of loans to specific Crisis Staffs, extending them money. We see in the
16 accounts of Crisis Staffs and their balance sheets that they received
17 cash from the government and used it to pay -- often to pay their
18 soldiers. We also see the government co-ordinating between
19 Crisis Staffs. Apparently Sokolac, I think, controlled a lot of
20 commodity reserves because the government is requesting them to release
21 food for different -- other Crisis Staffs. We see reference to
22 Crisis Staffs members meeting in Pale with the government to get money
23 and equipment for creating a Serbian police station. So we see direct
24 cash, we see food assistance, and other kinds of practical assistance.
25 Q. And these are cited in footnote 86 of your report?
1 A. 85 and 86, yes.
2 Q. 85 and 86.
3 A. All this, to my mind, is further evidence of the role of
4 Crisis Staffs in the state that the government considered its job to
5 support them.
6 Q. In appendix B you refer to five documents there. You mentioned
7 already Trnovo, which is 65 ter 17221. That's in relation to the
8 provision of essential resources, including money, communication,
9 equipment, and cars and radios for the Serbian police station.
10 A. Yes, and it refers to an agreement made in Pale two days before.
11 So I would suggest that personal -- after a personal visit they agreed on
12 what they needed and the government said: Well, send a letter of what
13 you need.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender that document.
15 JUDGE KWON: 17221?
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.
17 THE WITNESS: I would also note in that document that the
18 Crisis Staff is saying: Send the money to the SDS municipal board
19 account. It just shows how related those organs are.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
21 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2622, Your Honours.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: And 01577 is referred to in footnote 179 of your
25 report. It's a spreadsheet balance of the Ilijas Municipal Assembly for
1 the period 11 May 1992 to 30 June 1992.
2 A. Yes. You see in the revenues money coming in from the
3 government, numbers 1 and 2, and then the expenses, the payments -- many
4 of the payments are to TO commanders and TO units.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender that document.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2623, Your Honours.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND:
9 Q. Also in appendix B, document 01552 dated the 1st of June, 1992, a
10 recapitulation of the Vogosca Crisis Staff cashier's office counter
11 transactions between the 1st of May, 1992, and the 31st of May, 1992.
12 A. Again, the first item is the aid -- the assistance from the SRBH,
13 which I take here to be Serbian Republic of BiH. And the bulk of the
14 payments, as you can see, is soldiers' daily allowance.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender that document, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit 2624.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND:
18 Q. Another document, 65 ter 00159, this is referred to in your
19 report at paragraph 61, footnote 85, it's minutes of a meeting --
20 JUDGE KWON: Could you give the 65 ter number again.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: 00159.
22 JUDGE KWON: 159.
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: It's referred to in footnote 85, minutes of a
24 meeting of the Bosnian Serb government held on the 18th of May, 1992, and
25 if we could go to page 2.
1 Q. Does this document -- is the Ministry of Finance charged with
3 A. Yes, number 4, the Ministry of Finance is to propose solutions
4 for giving aid, that is, temporary loans, to Crisis Staffs. That's at
5 30 -- it seems to be if they're aiding 30 Crisis Staffs, they're clearly
6 regarding them as a state organ to be supported.
7 Q. I want to move now to the Crisis Staffs reporting to the
8 republic-level organs, and if we could --
9 JUDGE KWON: This will be admitted.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honour, yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2625, Your Honours.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have 65 ter 01019 on the screen.
13 Q. While that's coming up, did you find any evidence that the
14 Crisis Staffs were reporting back to the state organs?
15 A. Yes, I did. They report -- there's written reports, there's
16 written requests brought to government and Presidency. There's also
17 references to oral reporting.
18 Q. This is -- the document that will be coming on the screen is a
19 report from the Bijeljina Crisis Staff sent to the Main Board on the
20 situation on 1st April, 1992.
21 A. Yes, it's the Bijeljina SDS Crisis Staff reporting to the
22 SDS Main Board, but I would note that it's 1st of April. It's generally
23 within April, as I say, that we see the transformation, or after the
24 4th of April, into municipal organs. But they're reporting on the
25 situation in Bijeljina. As we know from the general record, this is the
1 time of the Serbian take-over of Bijeljina.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender that document, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2626, Your Honours.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: The next document is 00153.
6 Q. You made reference to this a moment ago. It's the minutes of the
7 session of the National Security Council and the Government of the
8 Republika Srpska BiH held on the 28th of April, 1992.
9 A. The National Security Council accepted a report on the work of
10 Crisis Staffs, number 9, and municipal organs of government. So someone
11 is reporting on the work of Crisis Staffs. It's part of the job of the
12 National Security Council, apparently, to review the work of
13 Crisis Staffs.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender that document.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2627, Your Honours.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter 17230 on the screen,
19 Q. This is a report of the Rajlovac Crisis Staff dated the
20 28th of May, 1992.
21 A. It's addressed to the Serbian government of Bosnia and it
22 seems -- it's reporting on the number of conscripts in the Serbian army
23 of the Serbian municipality of Rajlovac, which also is an indication of
24 the military role. So it's reporting and reporting on the military role
25 or the military activities of Crisis Staffs.
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender that document.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2628, Your Honours.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: And lastly, an example of a War Commission
5 reporting. If we could have P02371 on the screen, please.
6 Q. This is referred to in footnote 94 of your report and then
7 paragraph 64. This is recommendation signed by Nikola Poplasen regarding
8 the transformation of the prison in Vogosca into the penal correction
9 facility in Butmir or Pale.
10 A. Yes, Poplasen is the commissioner for Vogosca. He's addressing
11 it, if you notice, to the War Presidency of the Serb Republic, indicating
12 that at the highest level the Presidency is also operating in the same
13 way as a War Presidency, and he is saying that the prison in Vogosca is
14 illegal in the view of our legal regulations. So he suggests that it be
15 transformed into a subdivision of the Butmir facilities.
16 Q. And when you made reference to the War Presidency, of course this
17 document's dated the 24th of June, 1992, which is after the decision you
18 were talking about on forming the --
19 A. I'm referring here that it's addressed to the republican level.
20 The War Presidency is the Expanded Presidency operating at the republic
21 level. It's not the municipal War Presidency.
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Okay. If we could now go to an Assembly session
23 on the 24th of November, 1992, and that's Exhibit P01105. And I want to
24 deal very, very briefly with this document. If we could go, please, to
25 page 100 to begin with.
1 Q. What was discussed in -- at this Assembly session in relation to
2 war commissioners?
3 A. This whole Assembly session -- not this whole, but this part of
4 the debate in the Assembly is on the question of War Commissions and
5 whether they're constitutional, whether they should amend the
6 constitution or abolish those bodies. And here Krajisnik is saying -- if
7 you recall, I note in my report Krajisnik was the member of the
8 Presidency responsible for the work of commissioner. He's saying he knew
9 very well what the commissioners were doing --
10 Q. Sorry, if I can just pause there.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: The B/C/S is on page 97 and it starts at
12 ERN 0214-9728. Yes.
13 Q. Sorry, if you can continue.
14 A. I don't see it in the B/C/S, but he's saying that he knows very
15 well what the commissioner -- how the commissioners did their job and
16 they did them very efficiently. I see it on page 102 of the English --
17 I'm sorry, what do you want me to see on page 100 here?
18 Q. That was starting the --
19 A. It's the beginning of the discussion --
20 Q. -- the discussion about the war commissioners.
21 A. Yeah.
22 Q. And it goes on for some 11 pages in the English and from page 97
23 to 109 in the B/C/S.
24 A. I would ask you to go to page 102 in the English. In the B/C/S
25 0214-9731. He's saying in the English that they worked very efficiently
1 and well. I know that every deputy who went provided great service.
2 He's saying how well -- he knows how well the commissioners did. He
3 says: [No interpretation].
4 [In English] Just saying that he was on top of it, he knew where
5 everyone was going and he names them.
6 Further on in the debate there's more discussion of how well the
7 commissioners worked and that they received oral instructions and that --
8 as well as the written kind we've seen. So this debate shows us that the
9 commissioners were working and they were reporting and transmitting
11 Q. And if we can go to Mijatovic speaking on page 108 of the English
12 and it's on page 0214-9737 of the B/C/S. In your report you have made
13 reference to this at footnote 96. If we can see in the English there are
14 illegible words there. If you can just read out that sentence that
15 Mr. Mijatovic is saying in relation to "I make the following motion ... I
16 no longer feel like a commissioner ..."
17 That sentence there -- starting there.
18 A. I'm trying to find it in the -- yes, thanks. Could you make it a
19 little larger for me. It says:
20 [Interpretation] "I will send a report to the president who
21 appointed me ..."
22 [In English] It's quite legible in the B/C/S. I don't know why
23 it's marked illegible here, and I take that as a clear statement of the
24 commissioner feeling his duty is to report to the president which has
25 appointed him.
1 Q. And so as we have seen over the documents that we have just shown
2 from April 1992 of the Crisis Staffs reporting up to the republic level,
3 what is the importance of that fact?
4 A. Overall, not just this one? Yes, it's -- I find ample evidence
5 that the Crisis Staffs regarded themselves and were regarded as part of
6 the Bosnian Serb state system, and part of their job was receiving orders
7 and reporting back, and I see evidence of all of that.
8 Q. I want to turn now to briefly talk about the regional
9 Crisis Staffs, and this is dealt with in your report at paragraph 30 and
10 also 57 and 59. We've had a couple of documents or at least one from
11 Birac, but we've talked about the municipal Crisis Staffs being
12 established at the regional level. Can you just briefly explain the
13 establishment of the regional level Crisis Staffs.
14 A. As I say in my report, I don't talk much about them because the
15 document record is so unbalanced. There is a great deal of evidence from
16 ARK, there is very little from the other regions, so I'm hesitant to draw
17 any pattern. What we do see is that similar to the municipal level,
18 crisis -- a regional Crisis Staff was formed as the -- with the authority
19 of the regional Assembly and similarly saw itself as part of the
20 Bosnian Serb state system, a small collective body acting in place of the
21 Assembly. Beyond that, as I say, I'm very hesitant because it's so
22 scattered, the documentary evidence, beyond ARK. ARK is so robust, it
23 appears that the other regions were not as robust, but where we do have
24 documents such as the one from Birac, they clearly see themselves as part
25 of the state system.
1 Q. And so the role of the regional Crisis Staffs?
2 A. Was to co-ordinate defence to pass on -- to be the first stop for
3 municipalities to address their concerns before going to the republic
4 level, to co-ordinate defence and other efforts over the entire region.
5 Beyond that, I see so little aside from ARK that I don't want to even say
6 what their duties were.
7 Q. And did the Crisis Staff receive orders from the RS government
8 organs and did they act upon them?
9 A. Yes, they received them, acted upon them, and passed them on to
10 the municipal level, as we saw in the case of the decision on
11 War Presidencies.
12 Q. And this is in footnote 101 of your report.
13 I want to turn now to the military role of the Crisis Staffs.
14 What role, if any, did the Crisis Staffs play in the municipal take-overs
15 in 1992?
16 A. They led the take-overs, they co-ordinated all the forces of
17 coercion involved in -- the armed forces in the take-overs where there
18 was a military -- where force was involved, they declared themselves to
19 be the municipal authorities and therefore took over the government
20 positions in the municipality. They were the van -- they planned and led
21 the take-overs.
22 Q. And the level of co-operation and co-ordination between the
23 Crisis Staff and the military, what was that?
24 A. Very close. A -- the commander of the military forces was a
25 member of the Crisis Staff. Actions were discussed in the Crisis Staff.
1 The military was told what to do, although it may not be ordered exactly
2 how to carry out the tasks. It was at the very minimum co-ordination,
3 communication, bringing all the forces together into one body. In some
4 places, as I say in my report, we see the Crisis Staffs actually ordering
5 specific units, but it's a -- it's a spectrum of relationships. The
6 minimum is them all meeting and collectively deciding on the take-over,
7 including the use of force.
8 Q. And one example, if we could call up 65 -- and this is in
9 appendix B - 01023. This is a report from the Bijeljina SJB, the public
10 security station, on the overall security situation in Bijeljina
11 municipality and the SAO Semberija and Majevica. It's dated the
12 9th of April, 1992.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. This is in appendix B, the -- the -- maybe in the other binder
15 beside you.
16 A. Do you have the footnote? I know the --
17 Q. Footnote 69, 73, 80, and 120 in your report.
18 A. It says that the TO and the Serbian Volunteer Guard under the
19 direction of the Crisis Staff took over the -- it's just at the bottom of
20 the English page if we could have the next page as well.
21 "During the night and the next day, the TO," could we have the
22 next page in the English, "Serbian National Guard and Serbian Volunteer
23 Guard removed the barricades under the supervision of the Bijeljina
24 Crisis Staff."
25 So that's their description of the take-over. The Serbian
1 Volunteer Guard, I would note, is the name for Arkan's units, were being
2 directed -- supervised by the Crisis Staff. It's more -- the B/C/S is
3 [B/C/S/ spoken] which is a little more direct than supervision, it's the
5 Q. Another one on the 65 ter -- on appendix B, sorry, is
6 65 ter 07685. This is a Radio Prijedor broadcast of 29 April 1995 of an
7 interview conducted with Simo Miskovic, Slobodan Kuruzovic,
8 Milan Kovacevic about the take-over of the Prijedor municipality on the
9 29th of April, 1992.
10 A. Yes, they described the co-operation with the JNA -- the --
11 Colonel Arsic. They describe how they met on the weekend to -- as to --
12 to take over, how it was planned, and Arsic -- and Zeka is
13 Colonel-Major Zeljaja. I don't know if you have one particular
14 quotation, but the whole account is a very good description of the actual
15 take-over of Prijedor, and they mention the Crisis Staff having
16 previously been established as a shadow government and then just steps up
17 with the help of the JNA here and the TO and the police to take over
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I tender that transcript.
20 JUDGE KWON: Together with the previous one, 1023?
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: I thought exhibit -- oh, yes, yes.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 01023 will be Exhibit P2629 and 07685 will
24 be Exhibit P2630.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND:
1 Q. Ms. Hanson, you list in footnote 136 other examples of the level
2 of co-operation and co-ordination between the Crisis Staff and the
3 military. But I just want to just ask you a question or two in relation
4 to the Crisis Staffs and the TOs. You deal with this in paragraph 69 of
5 your report and also in paragraph 72. You talk about the instructions
6 stipulated co-operation between the Crisis Staff and the commands.
7 A. The TO or the JNA, paragraph 72 is referring to the JNA more.
8 But the TO -- the difference was, of course, that the JNA was the
9 established Yugoslav army. The TOs were municipality-based. The
10 constitution provided that municipalities or the municipal authorities
11 organised their TOs. So with Crisis Staffs operating as municipal
12 authorities, they in some places formed their own TOs or put -- would put
13 their men in charge of the municipal TO command, and the TO commander was
14 part of the Crisis Staff. And we see a lot of orders issued by
15 Crisis Staffs to TOs.
16 Q. And what was the Crisis Staff's level of involvement, if any, in
17 the arming of the local Serbs and the formation of Serbian units?
18 A. It depends very much on the situation in each municipality, and
19 unfortunately secret arming isn't the kind of thing that I see a lot of
20 documentary evidence about, but I do see references to it in SDS minutes
21 and in reports on the Crisis Staff, for example, that I think it's in
22 Krupa that they single out the people who did the most to arm the Serbs,
23 members of the Crisis Staff who did the most to arm Serbs before the war.
24 So Crisis Staffs were certainly involved in it. I would have to look at
25 each municipality to describe a pattern because as Karadzic himself said
1 in his speech on how the army -- the SDS created the army, in some places
2 they had the co-operation of the JNA and in some places they had to hide
3 from the JNA, so that's why it's hard to describe one pattern for
4 creating armies and TOs -- armed units and TOs.
5 Q. If we could --
6 JUDGE KWON: I note the time.
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: Oh, yes, sorry, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: If it is convenient.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you.
10 JUDGE KWON: We will have a break for half an hour and resume at
12 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND:
16 Q. Ms. Hanson, I want to deal now with the relationship between the
17 Crisis Staffs and paramilitaries. You refer to this in paragraph 75 of
18 your report. What was the relationship?
19 A. Again, it's not something that there's one single pattern or that
20 I found evidence of everywhere, but certainly some Crisis Staffs invited
21 paramilitaries, groups from elsewhere in Bosnia and from Serbia, paid
22 them, gave them material support, used them as their own forces.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter -- this is an example
25 that was in appendix B, 65 ter 02553, please.
1 Q. This is a Zvornik interim government decision dated the
2 4th of May, 1992. Can you comment on this document?
3 A. I would just note here that, for one thing, Zvornik is an odd
4 exception, in that their municipal -- their small collective emergency
5 municipal Presidency was called the interim government, but the
6 Crisis Staff became the interim government. And here they are paying
7 10.000 or 10 million dinars -- 10.000, I guess, to what they call the
8 volunteers from Loznica to be paid to their commander, Zuca. This was a
9 notorious group of volunteers in Zvornik, the Yellow Wasps.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender that document, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2634, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Hanson, do we have a document in which we can
14 see the establishment of interim government in Zvornik?
15 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure if it's cited in my report. I do note
16 that it was an exception and it was the Crisis Staff in early April and
17 then becomes the interim government, but I'm not sure that I cite here
18 that -- a document that shows the relationship between the two.
19 JUDGE KWON: So that's the conclusion -- your conclusion based
20 upon the documents you have --
21 THE WITNESS: Yes --
22 JUDGE KWON: -- been observing.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, the documents of the Zvornik provisional
24 government are published in their municipal gazette, so it's quite
25 clearly operating as the municipal authority. I would have to consult
1 the gazette if they have the decisions of the Crisis Staff first, but
2 it's the only place where I see this term used instead of "Crisis Staff"
3 or "Presidency."
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. B/C/S word doesn't end with e.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could look at Exhibit 65 ter 01781 -- oh,
6 sorry, which is D00325.
7 THE WITNESS: I just noticed one more thing on this document I
8 never really noticed it, but it says -- it looks like it was received.
9 It says [Interpretation] "Received by," [In English] and then, well, it
10 looks like it could be Zuca. Sorry, I hadn't noticed that before.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, if we can go now to D00325 --
13 Q. Ms. Hanson, this is the report entitled "Analysis of the
14 Combat-readiness and Activities of the Army of Republika Srpska in 1992"
15 referred to in paragraph 82 of your report and footnote 133.
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could go to, I think, page 10, pages 10
17 and 13 of the English and pages 11 and 13 of the B/C/S. First of all
18 page 10.
19 THE WITNESS: The paragraph at the bottom of page 10 in the B --
20 in the English describes the process that I describe in my report, that
21 originally the units were -- many of them commanded by Crisis Staffs, but
22 as the Army of Republika Srpska was established it took over the command
23 of those units. So it says there's two stages, the first from April 1st
24 to June 15th, and in the first period describes the self organising of
25 municipal and other regional units on the basis of Territorial Defence
1 units under the political and patriotic influence of the Serbian
2 Democratic Party. And they operated within the municipalities and
3 stopped at that, he says. Well, the next reference makes it explicitly
4 Crisis Staffs, but clearly they're organised at the municipal level,
5 commanded at the municipal level in the beginning, for the period here
6 cited as 1st April to 15 June.
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if we can go to page 13 of the English and
8 page 13 also of the B/C/S.
9 THE WITNESS: At the beginning of the section 1.1, again noting
10 the establishment of the VRS, it says the infantry units were used at the
11 beginning of the war according to the decisions of Crisis Staffs and
12 similar authoritative bodies. And when the Army of Republika Srpska was
13 formed these units were incorporated into it, while in places where there
14 were no units of the former JNA, they were the foundation for the
15 establishment of infantry units. So that's the process I describe in my
16 report, where first there were self-organised units led by the Crisis --
17 led by the SDS and the -- commanded by Crisis Staffs which were then
18 incorporated into the VRS when it was formed. In some places where there
19 were no JNA units, these new units were made up on the ground.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND:
21 Q. And in paragraph 81 of your report you say that some
22 Crisis Staffs were prepared to interpret the government and party
23 instructions in a manner giving them authority, and you give examples in
24 footnote 129. If we can just look at a couple of examples. The first
25 one is from Vlasenica municipality.
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have 65 ter 00574, please.
2 THE WITNESS: As I indicate in my report, it's a spectrum with
3 the most assertive or the most military end of the spectrum being the
4 Crisis Staff directly commanding units. And we see this here in the
5 first paragraph in Vlasenica. It's a report from 1994 on the formation
6 of the 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, and it says: On the
7 20th of April 1992, the forces of the JNA and already formed units led by
8 the Crisis Staff of the SDS liberated Vlasenica. And then -- and the SDS
9 Crisis Staff mobilised men from the former TO on the 21st of April.
10 Then further down it says: The SDS Crisis Staff commanded and
11 controlled detachments in the field through their established staff for
12 command and control until the 28th of June, 1992, when all the units
13 became part of the 1st Bircanski Brigade. So that's an example of the
14 process I describe, SDS setting up its own -- commanding its forces which
15 eventually are incorporated into the now being created VRS.
16 Q. And so during that time, what impact, if any, did the formation
17 of the VRS have on the interaction between the Crisis Staffs and the
19 A. We see it has here the Crisis Staffs integrating their units into
20 the VRS as its being established. We see VRS commanders coming to
21 Crisis Staffs -- being part of the Crisis Staff, participating in
22 Crisis Staff sessions. We see certainly continued co-ordination,
23 co-operation, support, the Crisis Staffs are still responsible for, for
24 example, mobilisation and getting the recruits into these units,
25 supporting these units, materially. But throughout June into July we see
1 the VRS taking a more assertive role in command. We see even some
2 discussion of conflict. The military thinks the Crisis Staff has in some
3 places overstepped their authority and there's some places where the
4 Crisis Staffs don't seem willing to hand it -- give up their units oro
5 their command as easily, but it's definitely -- it's a transition which
6 generally by the end of July, the VRS is robust enough to be commanding
7 the units. But everyone acknowledges that many of them were originally
8 commanded by the Crisis Staffs.
9 We see that in the Rogatica -- it's not in the appendix but in
10 Rogatica they say: Even though we formed the VRS that doesn't mean our
11 jobs have changed. Our job is still to support the army.
12 Q. And one document you have in appendix B is the conclusions of the
13 Vogosca Crisis Staff meeting held on the 16th of May. The document's
14 dated the 17th of May, that's 65 ter 01534, where I think in that
15 document the Crisis Staff were asserting a military role. This is in
16 footnote 165 and 169 of your report.
17 A. Certainly in Vogosca, the Crisis Staff head Jovan Tintor said he
18 was military and civilian commander. He was quite assertive of his
19 military role. And here the Crisis Staff is ordering the take-over of
20 the army barracks in Semizovac and placing them under the command of the
21 Crisis Staff which is under the sole command of the Serbian Republic of
23 I would note also that item 2 here describes the cleansing, the
24 "ciscenje," of Svrake and Semizovac.
25 And item 5, dismisses the Muslim and Croatian employees from the
2 Q. Can you just explain to the Court, please, the meaning of the
3 word "ciscenje" and how it's referred to in different terms in documents?
4 A. "Cistiti" means "to clean." "Ciscenje" means "cleaning" or
5 "cleansing." "Ciscenje terena" can mean "mopping-up operations." But
6 "etnicko ciscenje" means "ethnic cleansing." So I think we found it
7 preferable when we see the word "cistiti" or "ciscenje" to leave it in
8 the original with -- so that the meaning can be determined from the
9 context, whether it's simply a mopping up of the terrain, a military term
10 for the final stages of an operation, or whether it refers to ethnic
11 cleansing, the forcible removal of the population. Here it simply says
12 "cleansing" in quotation marks which is unusual, I would say, in the
13 original B/C/S. So I just note it's left also -- the second usage here
14 is left just "cleansed" in the original B/C/S.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender that document, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2635, Your Honours.
18 MS. SUTHERLAND:
19 Q. While we're discussing the language, if we could look at another
20 document on appendix B, 65 ter 17231, it's a letter from the Rajlovac
21 War Commission to Republika Srpska Presidency dated the 2nd of July,
22 1992. It's referred to in footnote 90 of your report.
23 A. This is another use of the word "cleansing," "ciscenje," where
24 fighters from the Brijesce settlement have written a letter to the War
25 Commission which then forwards it to the Presidency saying: It's up for
1 you to decide. We're not in charge of deciding the cleansing, the
2 "ciscenje." But they're requiring the "ciscenje" of Brijesce.
3 If we could have the English up, or is it not in English yet?
4 JUDGE KWON: I was told that there's no English translation.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: We will have that uploaded, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime we haven't given the number for
7 Vlasenica document, which is 54 -- 574. You are tendering it, I take it?
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
9 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2636, Your Honours.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender this document,
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask whether this is all
14 because no mention is made here of "ciscenje," cleansing, so might we
15 have the entire document displayed on the screen, please.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I would also like to see the English page.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do we have this document which is
18 signed, because we've seen quite a number of documents today with no
19 signature and no number? So the attached letter does have a number but
20 not the first document. Regardless of the fact that in the main letter
21 there's no mention of snipers and combat, so cleansing, "ciscenje," as a
22 military term.
23 THE WITNESS: I haven't -- that's the only version of the letter
24 I've seen. This signed thing that's now on the screen is not related to
25 that. Oh, but that -- the -- yes, this -- the -- this first thing is --
1 JUDGE KWON: Shall we come back to this document later on when we
2 have English translation?
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I have it -- no, I don't have the
4 English translation in my binder either. No, I'm sorry. We just --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hesitate to interrupt the
6 examination-in-chief, but all documents not signed and given a reference
7 number are unacceptable as far as the Defence is concerned.
8 JUDGE KWON: You can object when this document is tendered and
9 that may be a good subject for your cross-examination if admitted.
10 We'll carry on in the meantime.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 The next document I would like to quickly look at is, it's
13 already an exhibit, P01493. It's a letter from the commander of the VS
14 in BiH Ilijas Ratko Adzic to the president of the Presidency, dated the
15 12th of June, 1992.
16 Q. You were talking about different ends of the spectrum a moment
18 A. Yes. I would put this at the more military end of the spectrum
19 because the letter-head says the command of the Ilijas -- the Serbian
20 army of Ilijas. It's sent to the president of the Presidency of the
21 Serbian Republic and he's informing him on the defence lines, that
22 they're holding the defence lines. And he asks for tanks and
23 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns to cleanse certain areas, that's
24 "ocistim terena" [phoen], so it refers to the phrase "cleansing of
25 terrain." And Ratko Adzic, who is the president of the municipality,
1 president of the Crisis Staff, member of the SDS Main Board, here signs
2 himself as commander of the army of the Serbian people of Ilijas. So
3 he's clearly directly involved in the military effort, calling himself a
4 commander and asking for tanks and guns.
5 Q. And I think the other end of the spectrum would be the Kljuc
6 Crisis Staff which you've referred to in paragraph 80 of your report?
7 A. Well, Kljuc I might put a little more in the middle, in that they
8 told them -- gave themselves permission to wear uniforms and carry arms,
9 so they clearly see themselves as having a military role. But they state
10 clearly that they will issue orders to the military but they will not
11 interfere in the way the orders are carried out. So that is, I think,
12 sort of the middle -- the clear definition of the relationship. The
13 War Presidency will issue the orders, the military will not be
14 interfered -- will not be micro-managed.
15 Q. And did the government make any recommendations with respect to
16 military matters in the Crisis Staff?
17 A. Yes, that was one of the things I noted at -- in late May the VRS
18 has been established although it's still in formation, but the army is
19 now seen as able to take over the defence. So the recommendation -- the
20 government recommends on the 23rd of May that Crisis Staffs be abolished.
21 The minutes on the 21st of May make it clear that that is connected to
22 the army's ability to take over defence now.
23 Q. And I won't bring those documents up, but that's the -- the
24 minutes of the meeting of the government on the 21st of May is
25 65 ter 00160, and the 23rd of May is 65 ter 00161.
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honours, they're the subject of a bar table
2 motion at the moment. I just note that for the record.
3 Q. I want to turn now to discuss the Crisis Staff relations with the
4 police force and you dealt with that in paragraphs 87 to 94 of your
5 report. With respect to the police, were the ties between the police and
6 the Crisis Staffs any different from those of the military?
7 A. I would say they were even closer because the police were
8 municipality-based. We see the 19 December instructions already
9 involving the -- telling the Crisis Staff to take over the police
10 stations. We see Crisis Staffs helping set up the new Serbian police
11 stations, materially supporting, that is, getting equipment, uniforms,
12 and other things for the police forces. The commander of the police or
13 the police station is a member of the Crisis Staff. We see many orders
14 from Crisis Staffs to the police. So it's clearer I would say and
15 closer -- more easily defined than the one between the Crisis Staff and
16 the army.
17 Q. And what did Mr. Karadzic say about the relationship between the
18 police and the new Serb authorities at the 12th Assembly Session on the
19 24th of March, 1992; do you recall?
20 A. Yes, he describes the taking over of the municipality and the --
21 or part of it is separating the police and setting up a Serbian police,
22 and he says quite clearly the police will be under the civilian
23 authority. It must obey it.
24 Q. But are the -- were there also parallel chains of command?
25 A. Yes, because the police did have their own ministry, so there
1 were parallel chains of command in that the police also consulted with
2 minister -- the regional ministry officials up to the level of the
3 minister, but as we see the Expanded Presidency, the War Presidency at
4 the republic level included the minister of the interior. So the
5 lines -- we have at the highest level the military police party
6 government coming together and then repeated at the municipal level. So
7 we see Crisis Staffs ordering police forces. Occasionally the police
8 force consulting the higher level or having their -- the Crisis Staff
9 decisions confirmed, but never being told: Don't carry that out because
10 the Crisis Staff has no authority.
11 Similarly to the military, we see by July the police having a
12 sufficiently robust structure that they're saying the Crisis Staff should
13 back down. They have ordered them in the past, but now we don't like
14 that interference, but it's certainly not what we're seeing in April, for
16 And the Crisis Staffs -- or, sorry, the evidence stresses even in
17 July the commonality of purpose. Roles are getting more clearly defined,
18 but the role of the police is to make sure that the municipality is
19 secure so that the Crisis Staff can run the municipality. And always the
20 commander of the police was a member of the Crisis Staff which operated
21 collectively, so he would be part of the decision-making when the orders
22 would be drafted for the police.
23 Q. You cite in paragraph 91 of your report - I won't take you to the
24 documents - and in footnotes 148 and 149 you're giving examples of where
25 the Serb police forces were created and there was co-ordination in
1 reporting between the Crisis Staff and the municipal police forces in
2 relation to the disarming of the non-Serb population, for example. And
3 where in paragraph 94 you describe the level or degree first of the
4 issuing of orders and then receiving reports from municipal SJBs.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Is there any other further comment you wish to make on that?
7 A. Well, we have seen, for example, from Prijedor and other places,
8 a list of orders carried out by the police. And when you read
9 Crisis Staff minutes, the commander's always there -- the commander of
10 the police is always part of the Crisis Staffs contributing and one of
11 the documents I cite is the diary of the police commander in Krupa is
12 meeting almost every day with the Crisis Staff president. The
13 co-operation is very close. The orders are carried out. It's quite
14 clear the relationship there.
15 Q. The one you just talked about then, the Prijedor police station,
16 that's 65 ter number, that's on appendix B, 05767, dated the 1st of July.
17 It's a list of all the municipal and regional Crisis Staff decisions
18 which were implemented by the police. Is that the document you were
19 referring to a moment ago?
20 A. Yes.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I would seek to have that document
23 JUDGE KWON: That's what we are seeing now?
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes.
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. That's admitted.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2637, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is a number, but I'd like to
3 see the signature, nonetheless, on page 2. Thank you.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND:
5 Q. Ms. Hanson, I want to turn now to talk about the actions of the
6 Crisis Staffs in municipalities and that's dealt with at paragraphs 95 to
7 106 of your report. In paragraph 97 you state:
8 "The status and exodus of non-Serbs in Serb municipalities was a
9 constant theme of the Crisis Staff's work."
10 And I want to now just take you to a few examples of the actions
11 of the Crisis Staffs in relation to the non-Serb population. I want to
12 deal very quickly with 65 ter 11505. This is a resolution dated the
13 23rd of July, 1992, by the Celinac War Presidency on the status of the
14 non-Serb population on the territory of the county of Celinac.
15 A. Yes. It gives the non-Serbs a special status with, it says,
16 clearly expressed rights and responsibilities, but in fact those are
17 restrictions. If we can see the next page, it's a pretty restrictive
18 status they have, such as -- Article 5, forbidden from moving around
19 certain times, forbidden from lingering in the street, forbidden from
20 swimming in the rivers, hunting, and fishing, travelling without
21 permission. Article 4, you notice it's organising their departure, which
22 is another common theme we'll see. I think there might be more on the
23 next page of their -- of the English of their restrictions. No more than
24 three men can gather in a group, contacting relations who are not in
25 Celinac, communications systems aside from the public telephone, from
1 using cars.
2 So the very fact that the Crisis Staff feels it can issue an
3 order like this on the status of certain of its citizens is very telling
4 about the authority and the jobs that it saw for itself.
5 Q. This is quite a strongly worded document. Did you see or have
6 you seen any evidence of anybody speaking against this document?
7 A. Well, I know it was -- there was some effort to publish it in the
8 West when it was exposed. There was -- I saw references in 1993 when the
9 Municipal Assembly is trying -- is meeting for the first time and has to
10 verify the decisions, they -- this one is really bad, we can't accept
11 this one, but I see no -- I see no objection raised at the time from
12 higher-ups in ARK or at the republic level. I see no condemnation of
14 Q. And in footnotes 167 of your report, there's other examples of
15 Crisis Staffs controlling the freedom of movement.
16 A. Yes, similar things are not moving from your village, not
17 gathering in groups, it's a theme of the authority of the Crisis Staff
18 and the municipality controlling freedom of movement. Not everywhere is
19 explicitly applying only to non-Serbs.
20 Q. I want to turn now to paragraph 96 of your report where you state
21 that in various Crisis Staffs -- in various cases Crisis Staffs variously
22 established, controlled and supported detention centres. Can you just
23 briefly describe the types of orders issued by the Crisis Staff in this
25 A. Some Crisis Staffs named places to be set up as detention
1 centres, some Crisis Staffs named the kind of people they wanted
2 arrested, such as all military-aged Muslims who could possibly harm the
3 Serbs or put all Croats in special facilities, send -- they made lists of
4 people to be sent to some of the most notorious camps such as Manjaca.
5 They said Serbs who have been imprisoned by mistake should be released.
6 So it's pretty clear their discriminatory intentions and the role of the
7 Crisis Staffs in making -- in establishing detention centres in their
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I can tender the Celinac document,
10 Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As P2638, Your Honours.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we know who signed this?
14 THE WITNESS: It's typed-signed with the War Presidency. I don't
15 see a handwritten signature. It has a stamp.
16 MS. SUTHERLAND:
17 Q. Are you able to decipher the stamp?
18 A. Not in -- if I could have it enlarged. The translation indicates
19 that there is some signature, but I don't see it.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Just looking back at that last answer, the witness
23 indicated that their discriminatory intentions were pretty clear. I
24 think that we have been in the past not accepting evidence of other
25 people's intentions, particularly came up in your absence in one instance
1 recently. And I don't know that it's necessary to strike that - you've
2 already heard it and you're professional Judges - but we would at least
3 like to point out that we don't believe that it's the proper role of an
4 expert to be speculating on other persons' intentions.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, that wasn't how I understood
6 Ms. Hanson's evidence. She was referring to Crisis Staffs and she, in
7 her report, footnotes to documents which shows the Crisis Staffs'
8 decisions relating to the non-Serb population. And from that evidence,
9 Ms. Hanson is making this conclusion.
10 JUDGE KWON: In any event, the proper weight can be given by the
11 Judges. Let's move on.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND:
13 Q. If I can take you -- if we could have Exhibit -- sorry, in
14 paragraph 93 of your report you refer to the Serbian Republic of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP report, footnote 153 and 156 on report of some
16 aspects of the work done to date and the tasks ahead, which is addressed
17 to the president of the Presidency, Mr. Karadzic, and the prime minister,
18 dated the 17th of July, 1992.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have that exhibit, P01096, please.
20 Q. Very quickly can you explain -- if we can go to page 3 in the
21 English and page 4 in the B/C/S.
22 A. The police are saying that the army, Crisis Staffs, and
23 War Presidencies are ordering the arrest of as many Muslim civilians as
24 they can. At the top of page 3 in the B/C/S - yes - and in the English
25 as well.
1 "The army, Crisis Staffs, and War Presidencies have requested
2 that the army round up or capture as many Muslim civilians as possible,
3 and they leave such undefined camps to internal affairs organs."
4 So I cite that as an example of Crisis Staffs ordering detention
5 of non-Serbs.
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could go to another document, 65 ter
7 04200, it's a decision of the Serb municipality of Sanski Most
8 Crisis Staff containing information on the categorisation of persons sent
9 to Manjaca camp, dated the 4th of June, 1992.
10 Q. Is this the document you were just referring to?
11 A. Yes, where they say that -- under item 1, Roman numeral III,
12 among the people being sent are people who are not welcome in the
13 territory of Sanski Most. They list politicians, national extremists,
14 and people unwelcome to be sent to Manjaca.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I tender that document.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2639, Your Honours.
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: And the next document is 65 ter 05751.
19 Q. It's referred to in paragraph 96 of your report. It's an order
20 of the Prijedor public security station chief, dated the 31st of May,
21 1992. And again, very briefly, the significance of this document?
22 A. Yes. The police are acting following a decision of the
23 Crisis Staff, the chief of police is ordering that Omarska mine compound
24 be used as a collection centre. So it's the police implementing a
25 decision of the Crisis Staff, setting up one of the most notorious
1 collect -- detention camps.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender this document, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2640, Your Honours.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND:
6 Q. In paragraph 99 of your report you state that the Crisis Staffs
7 carried out the policies and procedures for the forcible departure of
8 non-Serbs, and in footnotes 169 to 171 you provide examples of
9 Crisis Staffs actually setting forced deportation as policy. If we could
10 look at a couple of documents in that regard, 65 ter 00821. This is
11 conclusions adopted at a subregional meeting of the political
12 representatives of the municipalities of Bihac, Bosanski Petrovac,
13 Srpska Krupa, Sanski Most, Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, and Kljuc, of the
14 7th of June, 1992.
15 Can you very briefly tell us what the significance of this
16 document is?
17 A. Well, I note on the first page that it's sent to the ARK
18 Crisis Staff and to the leadership of the Serbian Republic. They're
19 asking in a couple of items for clear instructions -- clear policy from
20 above on things such as the corridor, the borders. But if we could go to
21 the next page they are saying that they want to move out -- move the
22 non-Serbs out in order to establish Serbian power.
23 It says, item number 6:
24 "All municipalities in our subregion agree that the Muslims and
25 Croats should move out of our municipalities to a level where Serbian
1 authority can be maintained and implemented on its own territory ..."
2 So the municipalities agree to maintain Serbian power the Muslims
3 and Croats should be moved out -- or move out.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I tender that document.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2641, Your Honours.
7 MS. SUTHERLAND:
8 Q. I'd like to look at another document quickly from appendix B,
9 it's 65 ter 07254. It's in relation to the Foca municipality. It's
10 dated the 18th of June, 1992 --
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I once again -- could
12 Ms. Sutherland tell us who signed this document? Because anybody can
13 write something like this, but someone needs to sign it.
14 JUDGE KWON: Very well. It says it's stamped. Can you see the
15 last page?
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: As Mr. Karadzic can see for himself, the
17 document is not signed. It does have a stamp.
18 THE WITNESS: Could we -- I believe it's the SDS stamp. If we
19 could go back to that document, I could read it. Yes, it's the stamp of
20 the SDS Municipal Board of Sanski Most.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There's no name of the responsible
22 person issuing it nor is there a signature --
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. --
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- how come?
25 JUDGE KWON: That's a subject --
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, that's a matter for
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I agree.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we can have document 07254 on the screen.
5 Q. It's a letter of the Foca War Commission to operative staff and
6 executive committee dated the 18th of June, 1992. It's cited in
7 footnote 9 -- footnotes 98 and 177 of your report.
8 A. Yes, and it says that the War Commission has discussed with
9 the -- here translated as "government envoy" but the original B/C/S is
10 "povjerenik," the government commissioner, they've discussed the issue of
11 the moving out of the Muslims, that the Muslims want to move out. So I
12 take that to mean that the war commissioner appointed by the government
13 was familiar with the situation in Foca.
14 Q. Are these conclusions made in consultation with representatives
15 of the BH Serbian Republic?
16 A. That's what they -- it says, yes.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I tender that document.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P2642, Your Honours.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND:
21 Q. Ms. Hanson, in paragraphs 100 and 101 you discuss the removal of
22 non-Serbs from the territory, and in footnote 172 you provide examples of
23 committees for immigration and travel agencies and exchange offices
24 established by the Crisis Staffs. In paragraph 101 you talk about the
25 criteria, the Crisis Staff criteria, for departure. What was the general
1 criteria, if you can say?
2 A. The general criteria was that they sign a form stating that they
3 were leaving voluntarily and handing over their property to the
4 municipality, and the municipality would arrange their departure in buses
5 usually, or convoys. Another criteria was paying a fee and in some cases
6 limiting the amount of money they could take with them.
7 Q. And in paragraph 102 of your report you talk about the systematic
8 collection and redistribution of non-Serb property.
9 A. Yes, as I say, those who were leaving were told they could only
10 leave if they sign their property over to the state or the property of
11 those who had left was declared now municipal property.
12 Q. The last document I want to show you is 65 ter 00855, and this is
13 referred to in paragraph 99 and in footnotes 79, 140, 161, 166, 168, and
14 169 of your report. It's the report of the Kljuc Municipal Assembly
15 Crisis Staff (War Presidency) of the work of the Crisis Staff for the
16 period since 15th of May, 1992, and it's dated the 29th of July, 1992.
17 A. The first --
18 Q. Sorry, in reference to the title Crisis Staffs and
19 War Presidencies, the fact that these names are used together, again what
20 does that indicate?
21 A. It indicates to me the continuity seen between these two organs,
22 which the text on the next page makes quite clear when they discuss the
23 sessions of the Crisis Staff and War Presidency.
24 Q. And if we could quickly go through this document and if you can
25 highlight for the Chamber the important paragraphs.
1 A. Well, the first paragraph says that the Crisis Staff was
2 established on 23 December. We saw those minutes. The third paragraph
3 describes how it held earlier sessions as an organ of the SDS, then four
4 sessions before hostilities, 16 sessions during the war, three sessions
5 as War Presidency, so it describes the continuity. It says on the basis
6 of the Presidency decision of 31 May it was established as a
7 War Presidency. So that's the implementation of the decision we saw.
8 It says it bases its work on collective work, which I've noted
9 before. They met every day when necessary.
10 If I could see the next page of the English to catch up with what
11 I'm saying, and the next page of the B/C/S as well now, where it says
12 that the army participate -- regularly participated, that all major
13 questions related to army and police were resolved within the
14 Crisis Staff. So it makes it very clear the role of the Crisis Staff and
15 the military. It says: Very good co-operation between the Crisis Staff
16 and military organs.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: I think on -- are we on page 5?
18 A. Not yet, I think.
19 Q. Does this document also discuss the relocation of Muslims?
20 A. Yes. It says that the status of Muslim citizens were dealt with
21 and the organised moving out of Muslims was decided by -- at the
22 Crisis Staff session. So the very status of Muslims was a topic for the
23 Crisis Staff and the Crisis Staff organised the moving out of the
24 Muslims. And it also -- the paragraph above, I note simply that they
25 reviewed the conclusions of the regional Crisis Staff which were binding
1 to their work as well. So then they dealt with personnel issues in the
2 court and elsewhere. I discuss that in my report as well, how
3 Crisis Staffs would appoint Serbs to the courts and so on.
4 Q. And on page 7 of the English and page 5 of the B/C/S we can see
5 that it's type-signed the Crisis Staff War Presidency of the Municipal
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I tender that document.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2643, Your Honours.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND:
11 Q. Ms. Hanson, you -- in your report at paragraphs 103 to 114 you
12 deal with War Presidencies between 1993 and 1994. And then in
13 paragraphs 115 to 141 you deal with War Presidencies between 1994 and
14 1995. In paragraph 135 you state that the available documentation on
15 municipal War Presidencies in the latter period, 1994/1995, is much
16 scantier than for 1992, but for records found to date indicate that the
17 later War Presidencies operated within the RS state system in a manner
18 consistent with the earlier bodies.
19 Briefly, what were the chief differences, if any, between the
20 earlier Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies of 1992 and the later bodies?
21 A. The ones from 1994 and 1995 are well defined. The ones from 1993
22 are uncertain enough that I won't speak to that now. The main difference
23 would be the role of the military. By then obviously the VRS was
24 thoroughly established, and the military role of the Crisis Staff -- of
25 the War Presidencies were expressly limited. The military representation
1 of the War Presidencies was at a lower level, it was an assistant
2 commander usually. So it's not a command position. The War Presidencies
3 are supporting the military effort, but their direct military role is
4 strictly limited. And there is thorough discussion in the Assemblies on
5 these -- the legislation for these War Presidencies. There are
6 guide-lines issued by the government. It's -- the whole state was
7 functioning much more clearly by then and the difference can be seen in
8 War Presidencies.
9 Q. Your conclusions are at paragraphs 142 to 147 of the report.
10 What does all the available evidence present in respect -- in respect to
11 a pattern, if any?
12 A. That Crisis Staffs were created to establish Serbian power in
13 municipalities on the ground, that they carried out those, and in doing
14 that, those objectives -- in doing so, they helped create the Serbian
15 state on the ground and were part of the Bosnian Serb state system,
16 considered themselves as such, were seen as such by the higher levels.
17 Q. And at paragraph 144 you talk about the Crisis Staffs executing
18 the policies --
19 A. Yes, as part of the state system they're carrying out the
20 policies of the leadership. That's part of their job as a state organ.
21 They received orders, instructions from the top level; they reported back
22 to the top level.
23 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: [Microphone not activated]
25 JUDGE KWON: Microphone, please.
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, Your Honour. The English has been
2 uploaded for 65 ter 17231.
3 JUDGE KWON: Can you take a look now. We wanted to find the word
4 "cleansing" there.
5 THE WITNESS: It's on the next -- the letter that they sent.
6 It's not on this page. It's the next page. In the second paragraph, the
7 soldiers are complaining that they've heard that Brijesce will not be
9 JUDGE KWON: And what was your objection, Mr. Karadzic, on this?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the cover letter,
11 Your Excellency, has all the attributes of an official document. This
12 could have been added by anyone. We can't see it's authentic. There's
13 no signature. There's no typed name, there's no number.
14 JUDGE KWON: Well, again that may be a subject of your
16 That will be admitted.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2644, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
22 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mrs. Hanson.
23 A. Good afternoon.
24 Q. Your report, as you know, is one of the pillars of this
25 indictment and the Defence has the important task to shed light on
1 everything in the report and how it was made. In view of the very few
2 hours that we were granted, I will have to start with the most important
3 things first. In paragraphs 95 to 107 you suggested that the expulsion
4 of the non-Serbian population was carried out by the leadership of the
5 Bosnian Serbs through Crisis Staffs; correct?
6 A. I say that the Crisis Staffs are carrying out the expulsion of
7 the non-Serb population and that they are part of the -- they are -- they
8 see themselves as executing the policies of the leadership. I do not
9 claim that they had specific -- I do not cite any specific orders from
10 the leadership on the expulsion. But I describe what the Crisis Staffs
11 were doing.
12 Q. Thank you. You ascribe to the Crisis Staffs many misdeeds,
13 especially expulsion, in times of chaos, that is to say, before the state
14 authorities of the Bosnian Serb state acquired stability and authority,
15 as you say in your paragraph 146 in the conclusions. In that paragraph
16 you make the distinction between the early days and the later days of the
18 A. The later years of the war. That paragraph is discussing the
19 last -- referring to the last section of the report on 1994/1995.
20 Q. Thank you. Then you enumerate a number of municipalities
21 randomly, citing individual documents in certain paragraphs which could
22 make the Chamber believe -- although in some places you say you dare not
23 claim there was a pattern and in other places you say there was a
24 pattern. Today in the examination-in-chief, to my great regret, while
25 interpreting and representing certain documents you made things even more
1 difficult for the Defence because you were selective and you were not
2 able to represent the whole document properly, which creates additional
3 difficulties for us.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour --
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Let's start with Foca, P2642 --
7 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, I didn't hear you, Ms. Sutherland.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: I was just objecting to the lengthy --
9 JUDGE KWON: I think the question is coming. Let's start with
10 Foca, yes.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see P2642. It was
12 displayed not long ago.
13 JUDGE KWON: Before we deal with this specific issue of Foca,
14 would you like to comment on his observation?
15 THE WITNESS: My choice of municipalities was certainly not
16 random. It was directed by the evidence. Where I found evidence, I
17 cited it. When I say there was not a pattern, I was referring mostly to
18 the military -- question of military relations. I made it clear that
19 that's the one area in which I do not find one consistent pattern but I
20 do see a spectrum.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Then I have to put to you a few general questions. Is it the
1 case that first you were an investigator and how did it come about that
2 you became an expert?
3 A. I was never an investigator.
4 Q. Well, on that paper shown to us by this woman, Mrs. Sutherland,
5 it says you had worked previously in the OTP section of investigations.
6 You are an officer of the OTP; correct?
7 A. I work in the OTP. My job is a research officer.
8 Investigations -- investigators are a very different job. I'm a research
9 officer, that's essentially an analyst. I work -- that -- until recently
10 that -- my team, the LRT, fell under the overall section of
11 investigations; it no longer does. But I was never an investigator.
12 That's a specific term within the OTP. I'm a research officer. I still
14 Q. Is a researcher also an expert?
15 A. Those are two different things. A researcher can be, as I have
16 become, an expert in this topic and appear as an expert witness, but
17 certainly not every researcher -- not every research officer is a
18 court -- is an expert in the terms of the court. We become -- we are
19 knowledgeable about certain subjects, you could call it an expertise.
20 But the court term "expert" is something different from a research
22 Q. Thank you. As a witness, do you feel under obligation to be
23 unbiased and comprehensive?
24 A. As a witness, it is my obligation to tell the truth as I see it,
25 the whole truth. Comprehensive? It's not my job to explain the entire
1 course of the war, to describe what the other side did. I am
2 comprehensive in reporting my findings, as comprehensive as time allows.
3 Comprehensive, it's hard to be when we're limited by time.
4 Q. Are you limited in any way by the Prosecution -- by your
5 connection with the Prosecution? Do you share their views? Your report
6 relies on the indictment and the findings of other employees of the OTP,
7 or does the indictment follow from your report?
8 A. I do not rely on the indictment. I do not rely on other findings
9 of the employees of the OTP except one very specific paragraph, I'm sorry
10 I didn't mention before. I did in earlier testimony. One paragraph
11 relies on one colleague's research, but I absolutely accept it as mine
12 and am responsible for it. That's the paragraph 12 on the legislative
13 background. That is the only time I have relied on another OTP employee.
14 But my report, as I said before, started back in 2001; so if
15 anything, the indictment relies on it.
16 Q. Does that mean that errors in the indictment would follow from
17 errors in your report?
18 A. I don't know of errors in my report other than those that I have
19 brought to the Court's attention. I don't know of errors in the
20 indictment. I really in writing this report ignored the indictment. It
21 was not -- it was not in -- to maintain my objectivity, to maintain my
22 distance from the trial team, I was not privy to -- certainly not privy
23 to the drafting of the indictment. I don't -- I may have seen it but I
24 didn't study it for this report. I really don't think there's a
25 relationship between my report and the indictment.
1 Q. With all due respect, I find it hard to believe that you have not
2 read the indictment. It was issued in 1996 and you started your work in
3 2001. But let me ask you something else. In your efforts to be
4 comprehensive, thorough, have you used all the documents and have you put
5 the stress on and used exculpatory documents?
6 A. Of course I have not used all documents. I reviewed tens of
7 thousands of documents, as I indicated in my examination-in-chief. For
8 each of the examples cited, I could probably supply a half-dozen others.
9 I chose those that I felt were the most succinct, the most telling, the
10 most representative documents. When I encountered exculpatory documents,
11 I passed them to the notice of the trial lawyers, as is my obligation.
12 I did not find a pattern of documentation that I ignored. If I
13 found a pattern of documents indicating that the Crisis Staffs weren't
14 doing something, I would either have included it in my report or just
15 simply made that topic not part of my report. There was much on the work
16 of Crisis Staffs I ignored, their relations with the administrative
17 bodies of the Executive Board and things like that, because it's rather
18 tedious municipal matters. I could have written an entire report on fuel
19 and commodity reserves, but that was not, I felt, relevant.
20 So I did not include all documents. I included all those that I
21 felt to be relevant and representative, and I read widely before I
22 selected; and therefore made my selections on the basis of the patterns
23 that I saw in my wide reading of Crisis Staff documents.
24 Q. Mrs. Hanson, were they representative of the guilt, the
25 culpability of the Serbian side, or representative of the entire broad
1 picture, why would you give exculpatory documents to the trial team? Why
2 didn't you incorporate them in your report, as you did with incriminating
4 A. I might find individual exculpatory documents referring to
5 specific events, and it's my obligation as a member of the OTP to bring
6 those to notice, to pass them on. If it was exculpatory -- it could be
7 exculpatory in any manner, not necessarily in my report. But I show here
8 where I see the pattern -- where I see the exceptions to the pattern and
9 I note them. So it's not -- my report -- I don't think I make a
10 judgement on the question of guilt. It's not my job to say who's guilty
11 or who's culpable. I am conveying what I find in the documents, and I am
12 conveying what I find to be the general pattern and I note exceptions.
13 Q. Does that mean that your report is not complete and that one must
14 take into account that the Prosecutor or trial lawyers have documents
15 that are exculpatory or that they have documents that are exculpatory for
16 municipalities in which the picture was different, more favourable to the
17 Serbian side?
18 A. As far as I know, any documents I noted as potentially
19 exculpatory in this research and in all my research I bring to the
20 attention of the lawyers. As far as I know, they disclose them for the
21 relevant cases. I don't believe - if that's what you're asking - that
22 they're sitting on exculpatory documents.
23 Q. Thank you. But why did you not point to those documents in your
24 report? Why didn't you refer to them?
25 A. Um -- you mean -- what I found was -- formed the basis of my
1 conclusions. As I say, I don't -- I'm talking about specific little
2 examples that I might have passed on. I could have noted, yes, I found a
3 SDS Crisis Staff in Bihac in September 1992 distributing arms, getting
4 signatures from Serbs that they passed arms to. It's an SDS Crisis Staff
5 that's earlier, but I don't see it as actually exculpatory. It's more a
6 deviation from the pattern. The pattern is what I see.
7 I'm not sure that we're understanding "exculpatory" in the same
8 terms. "Exculpatory" are documents that, as I understand it, meet
9 certain criteria for the -- of the Defence's position or that show
10 somebody else was responsible for the acts. I didn't -- if I had found a
11 consistent pattern of such documents, I would certainly have not made
12 that part of my report and I would have brought it to the lawyers'
13 attention. I'm not sure that I understand what you think an exculpatory
14 document in this case would be -- I mean in the case of the
15 Crisis Staffs.
16 Q. I will now put to you the Defence case. You were not only
17 selective in your choice of municipalities and failed to show documents
18 and evidence of conduct in a large number of municipalities that are a
19 complete departure from what you describe, and you were not only
20 selective in those documents concerning chosen municipalities but also in
21 your choice of examples. For instance, take a look at this document that
22 you described here. It's the issue of Foca, 18 June 1992. In
23 paragraph 3 it says: The current civilian and military authorities of
24 the municipality of Foca, Serb municipality of Foca -- first of all let
25 me ask you that where there is a Serbian municipality there should also
1 be a Muslim municipality?
2 A. I'm not aware of any municipality where the division of the
3 municipality was agreed upon into a Serbian and a Muslim half. The Serbs
4 declared Serbian municipalities. They tried in some -- in a few
5 municipalities to negotiate the borders, but they simply -- was a
6 one-sided unilateral declaration. So I don't see that there should be a
7 Muslim municipality of Foca. There was an elected municipal government
8 with municipal borders established by the constitution, from which the
9 Serbs withdrew.
10 Q. We'll come back to that --
11 JUDGE BAIRD: Ms. Hanson, tell me, what is your answer to the
12 suggestion Dr. Karadzic put to you that you were selective in your choice
13 of municipalities?
14 THE WITNESS: First of all, my evidence is limited to that in the
15 possession of the OTP, and documents were in many cases seized on the
16 ground from municipalities of interest. There were municipalities which
17 were not visited, as far as I know, by the OTP for evidence to be
18 collected. In many places the minutes of Crisis Staffs or collections of
19 Crisis Staff documents were not found.
20 I could have -- I was selective in that I selected represent -- I
21 tried to get as wide a geographical representation as I could in my
22 selections. I could have written all of this report probably just from
23 one or two municipalities with very good collections, but where I saw a
24 pattern in more far -- different municipalities across Bosnia or from
25 where we had only a small collection of evidence, I really tried to
1 select from there just to indicate the breadth of the pattern.
2 I did not limit myself to indictment municipalities, which
3 then -- I heard an objection that they're not relevant. It's a balance
4 between choosing those municipalities where some of the -- has the most
5 attention or some of the most notorious events with showing the breadth
6 of the pattern. I generally tried to include as broad as possible, but I
7 know in selecting for -- certainly for annex A and B, the emphasis there
8 was on indictment municipalities. But I was not driven by that at all in
9 my selecting the documents for my footnotes; I was driven by the evidence
10 available to me.
11 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you.
12 Yes, you may proceed. Sorry.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm waiting for the interpretation.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Let us look at this third paragraph. The first and second
16 paragraph, first paragraph says:
17 "The winds of war have forced many Foca inhabitants, both Serb
18 and Muslim, to leave their houses and scatter throughout the former
20 And then it says:
21 "Members of families are in Foca while others are in other towns
22 and cities."
23 And then it goes:
24 "The present civilian and military authorities of the Serbian
25 municipality of Foca have so far been preventing both Serbs and Muslims
1 from leaving the Foca territory. It is perfectly normal for every family
2 to want to live together and it is therefore not surprising that the
3 pressure on the civilian and military authorities is mounting every day."
4 And then it goes in point 2:
5 "We have learned from statements by Muslim citizens that their
6 leadership has betrayed and abandoned them, which is an additional reason
7 for them to leave Foca."
8 And then it says:
9 "While respecting the wishes of individual citizens and warning
10 the military and civilian authorities that the lists should not include
11 people unable to leave the territory of the Serbian municipality of Foca
12 for security reasons, the above-named recipients are ordered to make
13 lists complete with all the necessary information, lists of these loyal
14 citizens who have expressed the wish to leave, who are to be informed of
15 this decision and are give a short, signed explanation of their reasons
16 why they want to leave the municipality."
17 Did this find a place in your report, and why did you not find
18 the time to cover this in the interpretation of the document you gave
20 A. It is clearly a War Commission deciding who can leave and
21 organising their departure. I mention that as a theme. I don't see that
22 that contradicts my conclusions. I don't quite understand what you're
23 saying I should have included. It's part of -- the very fact that the
24 War Commission is discussing this topic and is saying -- deciding who can
25 leave and organising it I think is what's relevant.
1 Q. Mrs. Hanson, earlier today while representing this document and
2 interpreting it, you made the Trial Chamber believe that Muslims were
3 being persecuted and repressed, which this document does not show. On
4 the contrary, it shows that the motivations of the Muslim population are
5 met with understanding, both of the Muslims and the Serbs who wished to
6 leave. You represented this as a sin of the Serbian authorities in Foca.
7 Why did you not represent it properly, the way it is? It is, in fact,
8 self-explanatory, but now the Defence has to spend much more time to show
9 to the Trial Chamber that you misinterpreted this document,
10 misrepresented it.
11 A. I cited this document as an example of the war commissioner being
12 sent from the government discussing the situation in Foca, including the
13 moving out of the population. I certainly never labelled any document a
14 sin. That's not the way I present my evidence.
15 As for this being the expressed wishes of the Muslims, you have
16 to be aware of the entire situation, and I know that many of those
17 documents that people signed saying they wished to leave were the product
18 of stresses, pressures on them, and not a true desire to just move for
19 the sake of it because of the war, because of the pressures on the
20 non-Serbs, because of the situation in Foca. If I had been tasked by
21 another investigative team to discuss pressures on Serbs in Foca and mass
22 detaining and killing of Serbs in Foca, I might possibly have noted this
23 document. But I simply see everywhere references to what the Serbs
24 would -- that the Muslims wanted to leave or that their departure was
25 organised for their own protection. And I do not find all of those
2 Part of my job in selection is choosing documents for their
3 credibility, and the fact that Crisis Staff reports say, Out of the
4 goodness of our heart we organise the Muslims' departure so that they
5 would be safe somewhere else because they wanted it, it doesn't convince
6 me. Given the other actions that they've taken, given what we know
7 people from that area have said why they signed those things, it's
8 disingenuous, I find. But I --
9 Q. Ms. Hanson, first of all, it says they are preventing their
10 departure, not organising it -- I beg your pardon?
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but we
12 have to rise. There is another proceeding at 3.00 in this courtroom, so
13 we have to move out. We'll have a somewhat long weekend and we'll resume
14 on Tuesday morning at 9.00.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.31 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 14th day of
17 June, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.