1 Tuesday, 21 June 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
6 There's one matter to discuss before we hear evidence of
7 Mr. Kezunovic.
8 We note that, Mr. Robinson, the accused has filed his 51st motion
9 on disclosure violation. With respect to that motion, I wonder whether
10 you can identify, with more specificity, the volume of material which the
11 accused will have to review which he contends to pertain to the testimony
12 of Nebojsa Ristic, and how much time he actually needs to review that
14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
15 The two interviews which were disclosed to us just recently
16 involve one transcript of the interview of Vlatko Lopatic, and from
17 memory, I'm estimating that transcript is about 60 to 80 pages. I think
18 it would take him one to one and a half hours to review that transcript.
19 The second matter that was not disclosed to us until recently was
20 an interview of Dusko Mihajlovic, which was not transcribed, and I,
21 myself, listened to the video of that interview, and it's about four and
22 a half hours. I don't think that Dr. Karadzic would necessarily have to
23 listen to that whole interview. I could point him to the portions of it
24 that are useful for his cross-examination. So I think we could safely
25 say that this whole exercise maybe could be completed within two to three
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 Mr. Tieger, I wonder whether you can respond orally to this
4 motion by the end of today's hearing, so far as it relates to the
5 requested postponement of Mr. Ristic's testimony.
6 MR. TIEGER: We will be filing a written submission imminently.
7 I expect it to be filed this morning, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 Very well, we can proceed. Let's bring in the witness.
10 [The witness takes the stand]
11 WITNESS: DRAGAN KEZUNOVIC [Resumed]
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Kezunovic.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue your
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to everyone.
19 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
21 Q. And good morning to you, Mr. Kezunovic.
22 A. Good morning.
23 Q. I would like to ask you about another bit of information that was
24 part of the report from the meeting that you attended, and I'm referring
25 to 65 ter 11241. I also believe that it has a P number.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2761, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have page 38 in
3 Serbian and 28 in English. And that's item 4, "Organisation, Staffing
4 and Posts."
5 Could we then have item 4 in English. I think that's the
6 previous page.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. I'd like to ask you this: We can -- if we look at the first
9 page, we'll see that this report covers the period from April to December
10 1991. Now, would you take a look at --
11 MR. GAYNOR: April to December 1992. Thank you.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 Yes, let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. The paragraph on the personnel policies. Now, are you aware of
16 this information that was provided in the meeting that 210 employees were
17 dismissed over these couple of months, criminal reports were brought
18 against 29, and 59 were suspended?
19 A. That is correct.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Could we now have D447, please.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Let us identify this document together. Its title is "Brief
24 Analysis of the Functioning of the MUP So Far," and it is dated the 11th
25 of July, 1992.
1 Can we have the next page, please. That's page 2 in both the
2 English and Serbian versions.
3 Can you see your name listed here as one of the participants of
4 the meeting? That's in the second paragraph, about the sixth or seventh
5 line from the top.
6 A. Yes, I can see it.
7 Q. So you did attend this meeting; correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Could we now have page 8 in both Serbian and English.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. If we take a look at the bottom, we see that there is a
13 paragraph -- or a bullet point beginning with:
14 "The functional communications system has been destroyed. There
15 have been talks with representatives of Rudi Cajevec ..."
16 And so on and so forth.
17 Now, can you see at the top it says that the army and the crisis
18 are requesting that as many as possible of the Muslims be gathered, and
19 do you recall that there was talk about Trnopolje and other centres where
20 civilians were being evacuated from the areas that were under combat, and
21 they were referred to the police who were guarding them?
22 A. [No interpretation]
23 THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, sir. I'm not receiving
25 JUDGE KWON: We are hearing no interpretation.
1 Mr. Kezunovic, could you kindly repeat your answer.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that I'm not very familiar
3 with those problems. I don't know any details about that, and I cannot
4 give you a precise response to this question. I really don't recall
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Could we now have --
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Or, rather, is it correct that there was an attempt to improvise
10 production, and was this done because there were sanctions imposed and
11 you could not obtain spare parts?
12 A. Well, this was the only source where we could get them from,
13 other than the equipment that we found on the premises. There was
14 nothing else, and the only chance was to work together with Cajevec
15 because they also produced, among other things, the shortwave radio sets
16 and also equipment -- encoding equipment. So they were of a lot of
17 interest to us, as the manufacturer of such products.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have page 2 in both
19 English and Serbian --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Page 12, interpreter's correction, of both
21 English and Serbian.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Let's take a look at Mr. Savic and what he has to say. He's from
24 Trebinje, and he says -- or, rather, do you agree that
25 Eastern Herzegovina is bordering on Old Herzegovina; in other words,
1 Gacko and Foca are about 40 kilometres apart, correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Does he say here that he's unable to provide any information on
4 Stara Herzegovina or Old Herzegovina because the communications are down?
5 A. Yes, that's correct, for the time in question there was a total
6 breakdown in communications.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Can we have page 13 now.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Pantic reports here on the situation in Bijeljina. He is the
11 police station commander, but he also mentioned Brcko, and he says, among
12 other things, members of the Red Berets have conducted two attacks --
13 have carried out two attacks on the Brcko Police Station, but they were
14 disarmed subsequently.
15 Do you remember that there was a lot of talk about many people
16 putting red berets on their heads and then declaring themselves to be
17 Red Berets, and then they would attack our own police?
18 A. Well, that's correct. This was not the only incident of that
19 sort. I believe that such incidents were recorded everywhere. Some were
20 more intense and others less -- of lesser intensity.
21 Q. We both have to make pauses between question and answer.
22 Could we now have pages 16 in Serbian and 15 in English, please.
23 On the previous page, if we can just see it briefly, we see that
24 these are the words of Minister Stanisic.
25 Can we just show briefly the previous page, just to show who the
1 speaker is.
2 So is this correct; these are the words of Mico Stanisic? You
3 can see it in the Serbian version.
4 A. Well, that's correct.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page now,
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. In paragraph 2, it says that:
9 "We must provide the maximum, with minimum efforts. There is a
10 lot demanded of too few people."
11 And then it goes on to say:
12 "At the government levels and in the Presidency, there is
13 constant talk about the need to stop the plundering, to maintain public
14 law and order, provide for the security of civilians ...," et cetera.
15 Do you recall that was the position taken by the minister?
16 A. Yes, I do, and this was a constant topic with the police
17 officers, whoever attended the meetings, because that was within their
18 scope of work.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have page 16 of the
20 English, please, and 17 in Serbian.
21 The third paragraph in Serbian from the top, and in English, I
22 believe that's the paragraph beginning: "We have opted ..."
23 "In order to establish power," and so on, it goes on.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Can we see here that even the MUP has decided to prevent and
1 discover criminal acts perpetrated by military personnel, not just
3 A. Yes, I can see it. This was an ongoing fight with the army,
4 whether the police could actually take measures against army personnel.
5 Q. Thank you. Then we see here that Vlasto Kusmuk is the next
7 Can we have the next page in the Serbian, and I believe the same
8 is the case in English.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. The third bullet, where he says that the codes have to be
11 determined for each station, and that an encoding system should be set
12 up, and that this issue had not been resolved even as late as the end of
13 1992. Is that correct?
14 A. Yes, that's correct. The matter here that he mentioned, the
15 encoding books and the codes, that matter had not been resolved through
16 the very end.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page now in
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. We see that the next speaker is Zdravko Borovcanin, and in
21 Serbian, we can stay on the same page.
22 In the next paragraph, he says -- he put the question of
23 jurisdiction to those present, between the army and the MUP, and then the
24 police and paramilitary units. And:
25 "What are we to do about the Muslims who wish to move to another
1 country ...," and so on and so forth.
2 And then in the last paragraph, he says:
3 "He stressed that it was necessary that those who are engaged in
4 criminal activities be removed from among us."
5 Do you recall that he, too, was a proponent of this and that this
6 was actually something that everyone -- the position that everyone took?
7 A. Well, yes, I recall that there was a question put to me during
8 one of the interviews - either with the Prosecutor or with the Defence, I
9 can't recall - relating to these very matters, whether that was correct,
10 whether there were any measures taken against such people. And I said
11 then, Believe me, if at any time I learned -- had I at any time learned
12 that the MUP condoned such conduct, I would have left the ministry on
13 that very spot. I wouldn't stay there for another moment, because I
14 cannot recall that anyone condoned such acts. Quite the contrary,
15 everyone tried their best to prevent these things. However, it was
16 general chaos, it was wartime. People just put on uniforms of all colour
17 and kind, and they did whatever they pleased.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Can we see the next page and where we see that the speaker is
20 Dobro Planojevic, assistant minister for crime prevention. In English,
21 that would be on page 19, and in Serbian, page 20. In English, we can
22 see that the speaker is Planojevic. Can we have the next page in Serbian
23 now, please.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. The fifth bullet from the top says:
1 "Measures should be taken for our members to know what to waste
2 them in case they commit a crime."
3 And then we should skip one, and the one after that says:
4 "The documenting of war crimes is a priority, and along with
5 documentation (on-site investigation reports, photographs, expert
6 opinions, medical reports) it is necessary to compile lists of war
7 criminals which are to be exchanged with other centres," so that they can
8 be monitored.
9 Do you recall this was Planojevic's position and that it was
10 shared with the other members of the leadership?
11 A. Yes, I do. And I can tell you, when speaking about
12 Dobro Planojevic, that he was one of those who fought such incidents or
13 who was against these. He was, as far as I can recall, one of the most
14 honest people in that respect, because he fought this as hard as he
16 Q. Thank you. Could we -- can it be said, Mr. Kezunovic, of our
17 police system, that, in fact, it was a system that was organised and had
18 a small head, but a huge body, that this small head was supposed to
19 control this huge body? There were few of you, few commanders in various
20 administrations and stations, but the huge problem?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. Now, take a look at what Cedo Kljajic says. He's the
23 under-secretary for public security, and he emphasised the need to
24 document war crimes in order to press criminal charges. Do you know,
25 Mr. Kezunovic, that in Krajina, for instance, all of these processes that
1 were conducted in Bihac and other areas, that are being conducted
2 nowadays, in Bihac and other areas, that all those proceedings are being
3 tried based on the documentation collected by our bodies and our organs
4 during the war?
5 A. I don't know exactly what you're referring to. Are you referring
6 to the proceedings and the trials that are being conducted now?
7 Q. Yes, that's correct.
8 A. Well, yes, I know that they're using documents that we had
10 Q. Now, let's take a look at what Simo Tusevljak had to say. He was
11 the head of the Crime Department.
12 Can we have the next page in both the English and Serbian,
13 please. In English, that's page 20, in Serbian, 21.
14 Here we see at the end of the second paragraph, where it says
15 that criminal charges are pressed against everyone:
16 "In Vlasenica alone, of 73 criminal charges, 23 were pressed
17 against Serbs. For the time being, our most pressing task is to press
18 criminal charges. War crimes are documented, even if they are committed
19 by Serbs."
20 Do you recall that this was the position?
21 A. Yes, that's absolutely correct. And it wasn't only his position.
22 He did work in the Crime Department, but that was also the position of
23 the minister as well as of all the other leaders, and this was shared
24 also by chiefs of centres and stations.
25 Q. Thank you. Was it your impression at this meeting that there was
1 a determined position that the police should do their work in a
2 professional way, in a determined way, and irrespective of who the
3 perpetrators were, irrespective of their ethnicity or faith?
4 A. [No interpretation]
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can we now have 65 ter --
7 JUDGE KWON: Did we hear his answer? What did you say,
8 Mr. Kezunovic?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that's absolutely true,
10 that's absolutely correct.
11 JUDGE KWON: Before we leave this document, can we see B/C/S
12 version, page 17, and English, 16. It's the last paragraph on English.
13 I think it's somewhere in the middle on page 16. It says:
14 "At the end of this part of the meeting, there was a separate
15 meeting among several people, among whom I included you."
16 Did you find that paragraph? In English, we move on to the next
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
19 JUDGE KWON: According to this, you spoke about - can we go
20 on - spoke about connections and the Criminal Code. I'm not sure whether
21 it's a misinterpretation, but did you talk about Criminal Code?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it's a mistranslation. "KZ"
23 means "Encryption" or "Cryptographic Protection," "Kripto Zastita."
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 Back to you, Mr. Karadzic.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Can we now see 05297, please.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2765, Your Honours.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. This is a report by the MUP from the Romanija-Bircani CSB; is
6 that correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And they're responding to a document, strictly confidential,
9 dated the 19th of July, 1992, number 1492, and they say:
10 "In connection with the above-mentioned documents, which we
11 received on 24 July, we are unable to provide data and reports in more
12 detail due to the short time-limit for their delivery.
13 "The most frequent problem in the preparation of data is weak
14 communications with public security stations as a result of war
16 Is that correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And then in the second paragraph, in the middle, it states:
19 "Groups of persons in uniforms under arms are involved in the
20 looting which creates the impression that it is a case of organised
21 crime. Reports have it that most of these people are neither in the
22 ranks of the army, nor the police. The crime-fighting section as well as
23 the police are not able to take significant measurements and activities
24 to prevent this. There are problems because we lacked sufficient number
25 of cadres, as well as the fact that the military and the police are
1 engaged on the front-lines."
2 Is that correct, that anybody could wear a uniform, get weapons,
3 and become some sort of force?
4 A. Yes, that is correct.
5 Q. So this Security Centre, where there was no interruption in the
6 territorial continuity, Birac, Romanija, Sarajevo, this person who wrote
7 this said that he wasn't able to have good communication, even though
8 everything was quite close; is that correct?
9 A. Yes, that is correct. But at the time when he was writing this,
10 his location was in Lukavac, in the Energoinvest factory, and he had a
11 large problem. He could see Ilidza, but he couldn't get to it. He
12 needed half a day to go 'round to reach Ilidza. And I don't even want to
13 talk about Ilijas, the other municipalities. His major problem was the
14 fact that the city of Sarajevo, with the 10 pre-war municipalities, a
15 large number of population, and - how shall I put it? - the line of
16 separation was quite clumsy, and then there was the background, and then
17 we were talking about whether Bratunac belongs to Sarajevo or not. And
18 the name actually speaks for itself, Sarajevo-Romanija-Birac. That
19 centre covered that area of Birac. And from Lukavica, it was hard for
20 him to command and to keep it under control and to move around. That was
21 a major problem to him; not only to him, but all the members of the
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Can we briefly have 65 ter 05631.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2767, Your Honours.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. This is a periodical report, dated the 1st of July, covering the
3 period up to the 30th of September; July, August and September for the
4 Banja Luka, or the CSB area of Banja Luka; is that correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the ERN, because there
7 are certification pages in the document. I'm not sure which number it
8 is. The ERN is 0074-9631. The document has been admitted. I just want
9 to see what they say about communications at the end of this period in
10 late September.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Can you see this first paragraph, which states -- this is item 5,
13 5.1. Can we have the same in the English, please, 5.1, "Other Tasks and
14 Assignments." And it states that in communications and cryptographic
15 protection, repairs were made, objects' malfunctioning was repaired, and
16 that during this period, non-coded dispatches and 152 coded dispatches
17 were received. Is this much less than was actually needed?
18 A. Yes, of course. If you recall, some of the previous reports on
19 the work that you showed yesterday, they encompass the period from the
20 beginning of 1992, and actually a much larger of dispatches involved. So
21 this is an incomparably lower number in comparison to the first quarter
22 of that same 1992, before the conflict broke out. So this can indicate
23 what the ratio was. It's some 10 or 15 times, as far as I can remember
24 these figures.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have 0074-9641,
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
3 Q. Do you agree -- let's look at this second paragraph in the
4 middle. They're talking about the lack of materiel and technical
5 equipment, out-dated equipment, worn-out equipment, shortage of spare
6 parts, and so on and so forth?
7 A. Yes, that is all correct.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly have D473.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. This is a summary from a working group meeting of the MUP
11 management, held on the 20th of August, 1992, in Trebinje. Do you recall
12 that this meeting was held in Trebinje?
13 A. Yes, I do.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at English page 3
15 and Serbian page 3 in the document. Actually, the page bears the
16 number 2.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. It states at the top that the meeting was chaired by the
19 minister. In the third paragraph, it says that there was an analysis of
20 the implementation of the conclusions from the previous meeting. The
21 fourth paragraph talks about removing from the MUP all those who are not
22 at the requisite professional and moral level, and it also states that
23 the army was dealing with combat activities, and the MUP can then carry
24 out its function to fight crime; is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the following page both
2 in the English and the Serbian.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, can I just add something
4 else, which is quite a feature? And these days, this is a discussion
5 ongoing regarding the change of laws in veterans' benefits, and the
6 pension and retirement law and so on. All the policemen who went to the
7 lines as fighters, when they returned, they didn't have any breaks or
8 rests, but went back to their regular jobs, so that these people really
9 were overloaded, not loaded, burdened, but over-burdened, and that was a
10 characteristic feature in that period.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 4 in the
12 English and I think it's also page 4 in the Serbian. Yes, it's the
13 following page in the Serbian too.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Krsto Savic is speaking, and in the second paragraph it states:
16 "Paramilitary groups are present in the area of the CSB but,
17 following the minister's order, this problem was successfully resolved in
18 co-operation with the Army of the Serbian Republic."
19 So now there are remnants of those groups in some areas, like
20 Nevesinje, where such formation used to number up to 200 members.
21 Do you recall that there were arrests, pursuant to my general
22 order and pursuant to the order of the minister, on the ban of military
23 formations, and here we have, at this time in late August, this
24 gentleman, Mr. Savic, reporting that this has already been cleared up, to
25 a large degree, and do you agree with this?
1 A. Yes, I remember, and I do agree. Police even -- and this is
2 somewhere in the documentation, I think, with the Prosecutor. There are
3 lists of members of the police who were leaving the ranks of the police
4 without returning their uniforms and official IDs, so it had to be
5 established where they were, what they were doing, and the rest of that,
6 specifically to prevent such occurrences.
7 Q. Well, I'm trying to save time by focusing as much as possible on
8 your area of expertise.
9 Thank you. Can we now have 1D3602. 1D3602.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Could you please look at this telegram of the 22nd of October,
12 1992. It's written by the under-secretary for the National Security
13 Service. It's dispatched to all the sector of the National Security
14 Service, and it states:
15 "Since the communications system between the SNB and the seat and
16 all SNB sectors is operative, in the future it is necessary that you
17 inform us regularly ..."
18 And so on and so forth.
19 Do you agree that only on the 22nd of October, he could request
20 that regular reports be sent in future, which implicitly means that up
21 until that time, he could not state such requests because the
22 communications were not satisfactory?
23 A. Yes, I agree. I believe that this is absolutely correct, because
24 it was in their interest to be able to communicate with everybody.
25 Q. But you agree that he could ask this only on the 22nd of October?
1 A. Yes, I agree, because you can see the date when this telegram or
2 dispatch was sent.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can we admit this?
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1368, Your Honours.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3603, please.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Do you agree that on the 15th of December, 1992, this is sent to
10 all the CSBs and the SJBs, and the under-secretary of the SNB? It's a
11 request by the minister for a report on the work, and then he goes on to
13 "Measures and activities aimed at creating and the functioning of
14 the MUP of Republika Srpska, information about the data on personnel ..."
15 Can we have the following page, please.
16 We can look at item B towards the end, the bullet point before
17 last: To inform him about the number of MUP removed from the MUP they do
18 not meet the criteria for work in the MUP, because of crimes committed
19 before the 4th of April, 1992; 2, for crimes committed after April 4th,
20 1992; and for other reasons making them unfit to work in the MUP organs;
21 and four, because of criminal charges submitted against workers of the
22 MUP of Republica Srpska, property crimes, and so on and so forth.
23 Do you recall that here, at the end of year 1992, he is asking to
24 be regularly informed about how ranks of the police are being cleansed of
25 unsuitable members?
1 A. Yes, I agree, that is correct.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then the -- if they are talking
3 about the number of criminal charges submitted, can we have the following
4 page, please.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
6 Q. It goes on to Article G. We need to look at the following page
7 in the English, total number of crimes, total number of criminal charges.
8 And then they are talking about the number of criminal reports that were
9 recorded. Do you agree that the ministry at the seat was very strict and
10 demanded complete adherence to the Rules of Service and to the law?
11 A. Yes, that is absolutely correct. While you were reading these
12 certain points, I just glanced at the rest of the things written, and
13 everything is stated here in the same way it would be during peacetime,
14 plus it takes into account wartime activities of the minister. Before he
15 became a minister, worked in the Crime Investigation Section of the
16 police, so he's a professional and knows his job.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the last page, where
18 we can look at Roman II.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Roman II --
21 THE INTERPRETER: Could we have the reference, please, in the
23 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note, we would like to have the
25 reference in the text. The reading is too fast.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you were too fast and the interpreters
2 couldn't follow. If you could repeat.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the third paragraph, where it
4 states here:
5 "In order for the MUP report to be ready in time to be presented
6 to the Government, Assembly and Presidency of the Republika Srpska, the
7 centre shall submit reports by the 5th of January, 1993, at the latest.
8 The chiefs of centres and administrations shall be held personally
9 responsible for the timeliness and accuracy of data and assessments."
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Do you agree that the Presidency, the Government and the Assembly
12 were periodically informed about the work of the MUP, as well as briefly
13 about the data according to the questionnaire sent by the minister?
14 A. Personally, I think that that was, indeed, the case, because
15 these reports had been done before the war to inform the government and
16 other agencies that needed to have them.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 I would like to tender this document, please.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1369, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE KWON: And I would like to tell you that your time is
22 almost up. You have about 10 minutes, or 15, so try to finish it as soon
23 as possible.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 I will try to do that. But before that, I'd like to show
1 65 ter 04250 and ask the witness to mark this map; in fact, to mark the
2 deployment of infrastructure.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Would you please take a look at this map, Witness, and then I
5 will show you another one so that you can tell us which one would make it
6 easier for you to mark, to show the main nodes or centres, and what you
7 had to reconnect?
8 Now, could we have D484?
9 But in the meantime, are you familiar with this map? This map
10 shows the ethnic distribution?
11 A. Well, yes, it is familiar. I don't know what period this relates
13 Q. It relates to 1991. It's from the census of 1991. But are you
14 aware that the fighting actually followed these ethnic lines?
15 A. Well, yes, for the most part.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have D484, please.
17 And could the witness be assisted with the electronic pen,
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Now, would it be easier for you to mark this map to show the
21 centres, the main nodes, the communication nodes, and the main relay
22 stations on it?
23 Could the Usher please assist the witness with the electronic
25 A. Well, I will give you a brief reply.
1 All the networks, both telephone and teleprinter networks, had
2 the node. The main node was in Sarajevo, at the Telecommunications
3 Centre building. Such telecommunications centres existed in all regional
4 centres, in other words in Banja Luka, Bihac, Prijedor, Livno, Mostar,
5 Tuzla, Gorazde; in other words, in 10 centres. If, in Banja Luka alone,
6 and Doboj, and of course Prijedor too, but at this time point in time
7 Prijedor was just a public security station, now all of those facilities
8 were controlled by Serbs, but in all other areas and, crucially, in
9 Sarajevo, which was the main node from which all the communications
10 spread out to all other centres in the republic, and also towards other
11 republics and federal institutions, all of those were controlled by the
12 other side. So simply put, by simply plugging out these systems in
13 Sarajevo, they could disable all of these centres. So it's really
14 completely irrelevant what -- where these -- all of these lines -- or how
15 they ran, along which routes, because that's really just a secondary
16 issue, because they were able, both in peacetime and also in wartime, to
17 disable all those communication by plugging them out from Sarajevo. So
18 they kept their own communications live, whereas they plugged or cut off
19 the communications controlled by Serbs.
20 Now, I don't know if you need me to mark this. I could, but this
21 is my explanation.
22 Q. Well, I would like to -- I would like you to mark it. But would
23 it be easier to use the other map, the ethnic map, as it were? Could you
24 just show us the routes that the communications ran? Could you please
25 put little squares to indicate the main nodes, and mark the ones that
1 were under the control of the Muslims in red, and in blue for the ones
2 controlled by the Serbs?
3 A. Well, here we have Sarajevo, Mostar. They had them [marks].
4 Bihac, let me find it. Bihac [marks]. Tuzla [marks], Gorazde [marks],
5 Livno [marks], Zenica [marks]. All of these centres were -- remained in
6 their -- under their control.
7 Q. Thank you. Now, would you please use the blue pen to mark what
8 remained under our control?
9 A. Well, here it is. It's Banja Luka [marks], Prijedor [marks], and
10 Doboj. Let me see where that was. Yeah, here it is [marks]. However,
11 all the rest that was part of the Serbian territory was connected or
12 linked up to the centres that were under their control. Now, I don't
13 know what colour pen I should use to show that. But, for instance,
14 Trebinje, the entire area of Stari Herzegovina all the way to Trebinje,
15 was linked up to Gorazde and Mostar. Brcko, Bijeljina, Zvornik,
16 Bratunac, all of that was linked or gravitated towards Tuzla; in other
17 words, the entire area of Central Bosnia.
18 Q. Could you indicate these areas by marking them with arrows?
19 A. Well, for instance, here, Trebinje [marks]. I didn't quite get
20 it, but it doesn't really matter. All of these municipalities here were
21 linked up to Mostar. The ones here, they gravitated towards Gorazde,
22 they links in Gorazde [marks], these municipalities around here, Rudo,
23 Visegrad. Now, Rogatica was linked with Sarajevo [marks]. All areas
24 around Brcko, Bijeljina, Zvornik, they were connected or linked up with
25 Tuzla, including Srebrenica, Vlasenica and so on [marks]. Well, I don't
1 even have to mark Bihac because that was, anyhow, territory under the
2 control of that side.
3 Q. What about the Serb municipalities of Petrovac, Drvar, Kljuc?
4 Where did they have their links?
5 A. Well, in part, they had links in Banja Luka and in other -- and
6 part of them had links in Bihac. I am not absolutely certain, but in any
7 case, they were linked up to areas, to centres that were under their
9 Q. And Glamoc and Grahovo?
10 A. Well, they were connected and linked up to Livno.
11 Q. Thank you. Would you please date and sign this map?
12 A. [Marks]
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll admit this.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1370, Your Honours.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And the last document. I would
16 appreciate the understanding of the Prosecution. This is a document that
17 was not on the list, but it's 65 ter 18342. And perhaps we can mark it
18 for identification, because we don't have a translation, but we would
19 like to use this document as it arose from something the witness said,
20 and we would like to take advantage of this witness being here. So,
21 that's 65 ter 18342, could we have it, please?
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Would you agree that this is a meeting of an expanded session --
24 or, rather, minutes from an expanded meeting of the
25 Professional Collegium of the Ministry of the Interior, and we see here
1 that your name is mentioned in the third line from the bottom, where a
2 list is given of the participants?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Since we don't have a translation, I'll have to read this slowly.
5 We can see here that part of the session was attended by the
6 counsel to the minister, Kusmuk, the commander, Karisik and so on.
7 Now, could we have the third page, please.
8 By the way, did you know these people, Kusmuk and
9 Milenko Karisik?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Was Milenko Karisik the deputy commander of the joint
12 Special Brigade, the commander of which was Dragan Vikic?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. As far as you know, was Karisik, Milenko, a very strict man when
15 it came to conditions for those who wanted to join his unit?
16 A. Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now take a look at the
18 third paragraph from the top, where Trebinje is mentioned and it says:
19 "We have to resolve all our weaknesses ... "."
20 And it says:
21 "It was emphasised one more time that only those individuals who
22 met the legal requisites to work in the organs of the interior can become
23 members of the service, and we have to rid our ranks of those individuals
24 who committed acts, that they should not be -- deliberately committed
25 acts which were not legitimate."
1 Now, there is an error in the transcript. There is Dragan Vikic,
2 that's the name, and do you agree that he was the commander of the joint
3 brigade, he was a Muslim, and Milenko Karisik was his deputy.
4 A. That's correct, and I believe this was called the
5 Special Detachment of the Republic SUP, and the commander was Vikic.
6 Q. Thank you. Can we see from this paragraph that Milenko Karisik
7 did not allow criminals to join his unit, and that he stressed that in
8 this meeting, which you attended as well, and it was re-affirmed that
9 this was the position, that the police should always be rid of such
11 A. Well, yes, we can see it from this text.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have page 6. I'm not
13 exactly sure. That's AD-2.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. In the first paragraph, it says:
16 "The minister also ordered that, like what was done in the SJB in
17 Zvornik, rigorous action be taken against chiefs of SJBs, including
18 dismissals, if so necessary, because of their failure to report to CSB
19 and MUP."
20 Does this show that the minister was completely reliant on the
21 information that he received and that there were some errors in the
22 reporting system; in other words, that the minister was misinformed at
23 some times?
24 A. Yes, there were such instances as well, and it is also true that
25 he was completely dependent on what was being reported to him from the
2 Q. And it would appear that those people did not really report their
3 own errors; correct?
4 A. Well, most probably so, as we see that he was upset about it.
5 Q. Thank you. And then under "AD-2," Minister Stanisic describes
6 why it was necessary to establish a Special Brigade of the police,
7 bearing in mind that the state is being established, and that in wartime
8 conditions, there is an emergence of destructive forces which are
9 attempting to subvert it, and so on and so forth. And he explains that
10 this is why the Special Brigade had to be established.
11 Now, do you remember whether this Special Brigade arrested
12 members of paramilitary units in Zvornik, but also elsewhere?
13 A. Yes, I remember that.
14 Q. It would appear, based on that, that Minister Stanisic had
15 established the Special Brigade because it was necessary to support law
16 and order on the territory of Republika Srpska?
17 A. That's correct.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Can we have the next page, please.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Here we see that there's a proposal to review all the
22 registrations of vehicles because there were cases of vehicle thefts, and
23 then there is also mention that there is general chaos in this respect.
24 And then in the third paragraph, it says that:
25 "The chiefs of CSB are also duty-bound to make a complete list of
1 the entire property of the MUP and to do a review from the beginning of
2 the war of all the items that had been seized, especially money and
3 valuables. And then it says:
4 "At the proposal of the chief of the Administration for
5 Communications and Encryption, we support the organising of a course for
6 training personnel for encryption."
7 Were you the chief of that administration?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Why were such courses necessary?
10 A. Well, precisely because we didn't have enough men who could
11 encode messages, written messages as well as all others.
12 Q. And we're talking about the 5th of November, 1992, right, in this
14 A. Yes, that's correct.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Can we have the next page, please.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's time for you to conclude.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I just have one or two
19 questions related to this document, and then I will be done.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Here, under paragraph 4, in the second paragraph we see that
22 there were questions from certain SJBs whether it was allowed to --
23 whether citizens were allowed to change their first and last name,
24 citizens of non-Serb nationality, and it was concluded that in such
25 cases, one should act according to the law, and that the SJB should have
1 special record-keeping in such instances. So there were instances where
2 people wanted to change their names, correct, and it was required that
3 that should be done according to the law; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we don't -- I don't have any
6 other questions.
7 I would like to tend this document, please.
8 MR. GAYNOR: Sorry.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And perhaps we can just put an MFI,
10 pending its translation, unless Mr. Gaynor has it.
11 MR. GAYNOR: Just a couple of observations.
12 No objection to its MFI'd. This document wasn't on the list, nor
13 was D447, and I think we had about 12 or 13 pages of cross-examination
14 about D447. So we would request notification, even if it's by late
15 evening, of additions like this. Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well, thank you.
17 We'll mark this document for identification.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D1371, Your Honours.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Kezunovic, thank you very
20 much, and may I just say that I am sorry that we haven't met before.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too, and good luck.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Gaynor.
23 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 First of all, could I call up P2765.
25 Re-examination by Mr. Gaynor:
1 Q. Mr. Kezunovic, earlier today you were asked a few questions about
2 this document which you'll see on the screen in front of you, and the
3 question was put to you as follows:
4 "This person who wrote this said that he wasn't able to have good
5 communication, even though everything was quite close; isn't that
7 And your answer, you said that:
8 "Yes, that is correct."
9 And then you went to point out that his location was at Lukavac,
10 and he could see Ilidza, but he couldn't get to it. "He needed half a
11 day to go 'round to reach Ilidza, and I don't even want to talk about
12 Ilijas, the other municipalities."
13 Do you recall that exchange?
14 A. I do.
15 MR. GAYNOR: Could we look at the bottom of page 2 in English,
16 going on to the top of page 3 in English. And if we could look at the
17 bottom of page 2 in B/C/S.
18 Q. Now, do you see a reference there to communications between this
19 CSB and the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?
20 A. Which line is that?
21 Q. It's halfway down the page in your version. It's the third-last
22 paragraph, the fourth-last paragraph.
23 A. I can see it.
24 Q. So you accept that this CSB was in contact with the
25 Sarajevo Romanija Corps?
1 A. This does not mean that this was -- how do you mean; in contact,
2 physically, that somebody would go to the command, or are you thinking of
3 links, communications?
4 Q. Communications links. There were communications links?
5 A. No, they didn't have that, they didn't have communication. What
6 it says here, that they handed over such and such a number of written
7 documents. It was either delivered by courier or some other way. You
8 can see that it says that some information was also given orally.
9 MR. GAYNOR: That's correct.
10 If we could go to the next page in English. We can stay on the
11 same page in B/C/S.
12 Q. Now, at the top of this, we see a reference to:
13 "100 written and a significant number of oral reports to the
14 units in the field (Vogosca, Ilijas, Ilidza, Hadzici, Pale, Sokolac and
15 Han Pijesak)."
16 Do you see that?
17 A. I see that.
18 Q. Do you, therefore, accept, yes or no, that there was, in fact,
19 communication from this CSB to Ilijas and Ilidza, as well as the other
20 areas mentioned?
21 A. I have to say, just briefly, that communication did exist, but
22 it's a question of at which point it was working and at which point it
23 wasn't, for the different reasons that I cited during the testimony;
24 power cuts, something that broke down, things like that. If everything
25 was working, in principle, within the municipality, there was
1 communication, but that does not mean that this was available
2 continuously at all times. Especially in this area, a lot of power cuts
3 occurred, and that would be enough to knock the communications out.
4 Q. I'd like to move to another point, and that is -- at pages 18 and
5 19 today, you were shown a document signed by the minister on the 22nd of
6 October, 1992, and a question was put to you:
7 "Do you agree that only on the 22nd of October, he could request
8 that regular reports be sent in future, which implicitly means that up
9 until that time he could not state such requests because communications
10 were not satisfactory?"
11 And you said that you agreed, and you believed that to be
12 absolutely correct.
13 Do you remember that exchange?
14 A. I do.
15 Q. Now, yesterday you described for us - this was at pages 14950 to
16 14951 - the process by which the daily bulletins were issued by the
17 minister, and you said that:
18 "The bulletins which during the previous 24 hours covered the
19 events would be sent by the Public Security Station officials and
20 combined into one report which would be sent to their superior security
21 centre, which put it all together into one report and sent it to the
22 ministry at the headquarters."
23 Do you recall your evidence about that?
24 A. I do, although this translation is a little bit confusing. But I
25 understand the sense; I agree with that.
1 Q. Essentially, you're telling us that the SJBs would communicate
2 reports to the CSBs, and the CSBs would collate the information within
3 their area of operation and provide that to the ministry? Is that a
4 reasonable summary?
5 A. Well, I explained that for these problems, the Analysis and
6 Information Administration was in charge of. This is not my area. As
7 for communications links, I recognise elements in the dispatch, and I
8 confirm that and I draw possible conclusions. I explained that several
9 times already. I don't know what was instructed in the minister's
10 dispatch, whether the Public Security Stations should directly report
11 back or should they sent a report to the centre, and then the centre
12 would put them all of them together and send them to the MUP. I don't
13 know that. I don't know, I don't remember what the original source
14 dispatch from the minister said. If there was an order for each station
15 to send back a report, then that's probably how it was done. If it was
16 ordered by the stations to send their reports to the centres, for the
17 centres then to make a collective report and send it to the ministry,
18 that's probably how it was done. It was done as ordered. So now I
19 really don't remember what the original dispatch by the minister said,
20 even though you showed it, but I didn't really pay attention. As far as
21 I'm concerned, this is of lesser importance. The important thing is for
22 the information to reach their destination. Of lesser importance is the
23 type of organisation, you understand.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I assist?
25 MR. GAYNOR: Well, I'd prefer to carry on, if I may,
1 Mr. President.
2 JUDGE KWON: Just what is it? You were going to object to
3 something, Mr. Karadzic?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's an objection, because we're
5 talking about state security here, but Mr. Gaynor continues to ask about
6 public security. These are two separate services.
7 JUDGE KWON: Not helpful.
8 Please carry on, Mr. Gaynor.
9 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Q. Mr. Kezunovic, yesterday you were shown a series of daily reports
11 issued by the minister, starting, I think, with Report 3 and going up to
12 Report 109, 111, 113. Do you remember that?
13 A. I do remember, but the reports were not drafted by the minister,
14 but by the Administration for Analysis and Information Affairs, and they
15 acted pursuant to the instructions by the minister. They didn't send
16 anything back to the minister because there are two situations. One is a
17 collation of everything that happened during a certain period, and then
18 this is sent in order to make a kind of report. The second thing is
19 sending a report on any kind of event of interest, from the intelligence
20 point of view, and that is something that is reported upon immediately in
21 order for action to be, perhaps, taken.
22 You understand, if something happened, anything which was of
23 interest in the security sense, then perhaps it's necessary for some unit
24 to intervene in the field, and a report about that is sent immediately.
25 That later, then, is included in the general overview in the bulletin.
1 The bulletin is just a collective review of all the events that happened
2 over a certain period of time. It's not an operative document.
3 Q. Now, the bulletins which you were shown yesterday, dated mainly
4 from April and May of 1992, and as we saw yesterday, they covered events
5 taking place in municipalities falling within the area of responsibility
6 of Banja Luka CSB as well as Bijeljina CSB and other CSBs. Do you
7 remember that?
8 A. I do.
9 Q. So at least during the early months after the establishment of
10 the RS MUP, there was capacity for those reports to be drafted at the
11 seat of the MUP, in accordance with the procedure you've described; is
12 that right?
13 MR. ROBINSON: Objection. Leading.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Could you reformulate?
15 MR. GAYNOR: I'll reformulate, Mr. President.
16 Q. During that period, April and May of 1992, Mr. Kezunovic, was
17 there, yes or no, capacity for the CSBs in Banja Luka and Bijeljina and
18 elsewhere to provide information to the seat of the ministry for
19 insertion into the daily report?
20 A. Again, I'm repeating the same thing. I cannot answer with a yes
21 or no, because, in principle, they can, but there were countless problems
22 for each specific day, so I don't know whether they were able to deliver
23 that for each specific day, because you could see in a lot of the
24 documents, only two centres provide reports and some information and
25 three of them do not for that particular day. I don't know if they
1 provided the documents the following day, the third day, the fourth day,
2 whenever they were able to. That is something that I don't know. I
3 wasn't really monitoring them. All I can do is to interpret what is
4 written in the document. You could see that two delivered and three did
5 not, and that is something that I can say for each document. But the
6 general conclusion as to whether it could have been, perhaps it could
7 have been, but perhaps it could have not. I repeat, there were countless
8 problems, combat actions, power cuts, failures, and sometimes it was true
9 that communications were not working continuously along all directions.
10 Sometimes there were interruptions, so it's difficult to give a general
11 assessment. It's much easier to give an answer for each specific case,
12 even with a yes or no.
13 Q. Finally, I'd like to clarify one small point.
14 Yesterday, at page 14995, a couple of questions were put to you
15 about the log-book of Prijedor SJB, which was the first exhibit you were
16 shown during your direct, and the question that was put to you was:
17 "Would you agree that everything that was received by Prijedor
18 was from its immediate vicinity, Banja Luka, Bosanski Novi, and so on?"
19 And then you went on to give your answer about that.
20 I want you to clarify for Their Honours that after the
21 establishment of the RS MUP, was Prijedor a CSB or was it an SJB?
22 A. I think it was an SJB, a public security station.
23 Q. And was it the practice, generally speaking, for an SJB in the
24 Krajina to communicate directly with entities over in Eastern Bosnia?
25 Was that the general method by which SJBs would give their information to
1 the minister?
2 A. I don't know now. I don't understand the question. What does it
3 mean, "over in Eastern Bosnia," and then you mention the minister? In
4 which context?
5 Q. I'll reformulate my point.
6 You've explained already the process by which SJBs would provide
7 reports to CSBs, and CSBs would then provide a collated report to the
8 minister. My question is this: Would you ordinarily expect an SJB
9 located within the area of responsibility of Banja Luka CSB, such as
10 Prijedor SJB, would you ordinarily expect that level of police station to
11 be in direct contact with, for example, SJBs in Eastern Bosnia or with
12 the seat of the ministry in Pale?
13 A. Well, I don't know why they would do that. That's why there was
14 an organisation of the ministry in the way that it existed, so that
15 everything was resolved in the way that if something happened in the
16 field, first of all, it happened in the territory of some public security
17 station area, regardless of whether there was a CSB in that town. The
18 SJB was in charge, primarily, of maintaining law and order, dealing with
19 crimes and things like that that are under the jurisdiction of the MUP.
20 The SJB is in charge of things like that first.
21 Since a problem could have something to do affecting the
22 neighbouring municipalities, the organisation is set up in such a way
23 that the CSB is in charge of co-ordinating things like that. It
24 co-ordinates within a region. If co-operation between two SJBs is
25 required, which are, for example, in different regions, for example, one,
1 let's say belongs to Bijeljina and the other one belongs to Doboj, but
2 they are boundary, neighbouring stations, but from two different regions,
3 then the matter has to be also carried through to the authorised CSBs.
4 Because they are better equipped, they have better trained personnel,
5 police crime investigation inspectors and other experts. And in that way
6 the manner of communication is set up in such a way that the stations
7 exclusively communicate to the centres, and the centres communicate with
8 the ministry, because the ministry is at the top of that overall problem
9 matter along the lines of work. It doesn't make sense for the Trebinje
10 SJB to be sending something to the Gradiska SJB unless they are, for
11 example, providing the name of the owner of a vehicle who comes from
12 Trebinje and has created a problem in Gradiska. Only things like that
13 were resolved directly among the municipalities. Otherwise, it all went
14 up to the CSBs.
15 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. Kezunovic. No further questions.
16 Thank you, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 Thank you, Mr. Kezunovic. That concludes your evidence. On
19 behalf of this Chamber and the Tribunal, I thank you for your coming to
20 the Tribunal to give it. Now you are free to go.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: We'll rise all together. It's time to have a break.
23 We'll resume at 11.00.
24 [The witness withdrew]
25 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
3 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
4 I'm sorry to disturb you. I wanted to advise you of some
5 developments that had taken place with respect to Mr. Ristic.
6 And we have filed, a few minutes ago, the 52nd motion for finding
7 of disclosure violation and a motion to exclude his testimony entirely.
8 The most recent developments is that today, the Prosecution has informed
9 us that they neglected to disclose to us two statements of this very
10 witness, Mr. Nebojsa Ristic, which were taken by the Ministry of Interior
11 of the Republika Srpska and which we suspected, from the interview, may
12 have been in the possession of the Office of the Prosecution. This is
13 another violation of Rule 66(A)(2), and one which the Prosecution has
14 conceded in their response to our 51st motion. So this will affect our
15 preparation, obviously.
16 But more so than that, we think that this is -- the time has come
17 where the Chamber has to do something more than put a Band-Aid on a small
18 cut, because these disclosure violations are pouring in at an
19 unprecedented rate, well after your final dead-line for disclosure, and
20 we simply can't continue to operate this way.
21 I know if that if we hustle and scratch around, we can find a few
22 extra hours to accommodate these violations, but it's completely unfair
23 for a trial to be conducted in this manner, where the burden is on us to
24 interrupt our preparation, to scramble around, when the Prosecution is
25 responsible entirely for unjustified and inexcusable violations of the
1 rules of disclosure.
2 Thank you.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 I take it, Mr. Tieger, that you are minded to file your response
5 in writing.
6 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, these interviews are dealt with in
7 the response we just filed. What Mr. Robinson is aware of, and fails to
8 mention, or at least I believe he's aware of it, is that these interviews
9 are irrelevant to the events during the indictment period and are of a
10 very -- relatively short nature. In any event, it's dealt in the motion,
11 the need for oral submissions to supplement the written filing is
12 difficult to see, as is the stridency of the language used in the
13 submission, so the Court will see what this matter is about in the filing
14 that was made earlier this morning.
15 JUDGE KWON: So you'll not respond to this separately? All we
16 have to do is to read your response?
17 MR. TIEGER: I'm happy to look at it again to see if any further
18 information for the Court is necessary. But as I say, we dealt with it
19 in the filing. I think that will be sufficient. If further information
20 appears necessary, we'll let the Court know right away.
21 JUDGE KWON: So if there's anything for you to raise, then do it
22 by the close of business today. Thank you.
23 Before we bring in the witness, shall we go into private session
25 [Private session]
11 Page 15074 redacted. Private session.
17 [Open session]
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's bring in the next witness.
19 [The witness entered court]
20 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, sir.
21 If you could take the solemn declaration, please.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please.
23 JUDGE KWON: Take your time, sir.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
25 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 WITNESS: RANKO VUKOVIC
2 [Witness answered through interpreter]
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 Please be seated.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gaynor from the Prosecution will ask you some
8 Yes, Mr. Gaynor.
9 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Examination by Mr. Gaynor:
11 Q. Good morning, sir.
12 A. Good morning.
13 Q. Could you state your full name, please?
14 A. My name is Ranko Vukovic.
15 Q. You've previously testified for this Tribunal in the trial of
16 Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin; is that correct?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. You've previously met with members of the Office of the
19 Prosecutor and provided information to them; is that right?
20 A. That's right.
21 Q. You've reviewed an amalgamated statement containing relevant
22 portions of your testimony from the Stanisic and Zupljanin case, as well
23 as other information that you've provided to the Prosecution; is that
25 A. That's true. However, I would like to take this opportunity to
1 say that all the statements were shown to me in the English language, and
2 I only speak Serbian, and this although I requested that I be provided
3 these statements in my mother tongue.
4 Q. Was the amalgamated statement read back to you in a language that
5 you understand?
6 A. Yes, they were read back to me, but there were some issues in one
7 part of the statement with the word "ostali," because that word can
8 have -- its meaning is twofold in our language. It can mean -- it can
9 relate to a person and others or it can be a verb where it would mean "we
10 remained" in a certain area. The same word would be used in Serbian.
11 Subsequently, when I checked the text, I realised that that word remained
12 in the text of my statement.
13 Q. Did you have an opportunity to consult with someone who speaks
14 both English and B/C/S as to the form of the translation used in your
16 A. When I was interviewed at the Office of the International
17 Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Sarajevo, in Nedzarici, I
18 requested that the interpreter provided be from my own nation, that that
19 person speak Serbian. However, because of some personal reason, that
20 personal could not attend, so that I had an interpreter who was of
21 Bosniak ethnicity. They said that that word in part of my statement was,
22 in fact, quite appropriate, as far as the structure of the sentence was
23 concerned. However, I requested that it be checked because this word,
24 "ostali," which can mean either "the others" or "to remain," that it
25 should be -- that it should actually remain, because if it was skipped
1 and taken out, that then it would completely alter the sense of the
2 sentence, and this in context of an order which was issued on the 29th of
3 April, 1992, by the commander of the then BH Army -- or, rather, the
4 BH TO, Territorial Defence, Mr. Hasan Efendic.
5 MR. GAYNOR: Your Honours, perhaps the easiest way to clarify the
6 position would be to bring up the document in question and ask the
7 witness to clarify which word he's referring to.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Which paragraph is he referring to?
9 Let's bring up the document?
10 MR. GAYNOR: It's 65 ter 22912. This particular exhibit is
11 discussed by the witness on page 33 of his statement.
12 Q. Now, Witness, you see the order of Hasan Efendic in front of you,
13 do you?
14 A. Yes, I do.
15 JUDGE KWON: Before we proceed, could you -- you said page 33 of
16 his amalgamated statement. Do you know which part he is referring to?
17 MR. GAYNOR: Your Honours, I'm somewhat unclear, but I believe
18 the translation difficulty might arise out of the document, itself. It's
19 not a translation difficulty in the statement. But I'm hoping to clarify
20 that with the witness right now, that the word which was in discussion
21 between the interpreter and the witness appears in the document.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's first proceed with this document.
23 I leave it in your hands.
24 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Q. Mr. Vukovic, do you see in this document the reference that
1 you're concerned about?
2 A. That word does not appear in the document, itself. However,
3 during the interview and during the investigation, a question was put to
4 me where I was asked to explain a sentence, where I replied -- in reply
5 to the question, I said that we remained as part of the communications
6 system of the former Territorial Defence and BH Army, so that they were
7 able, in all the documents that they sent to their subordinate units in
8 the period of the month of April and May, if those messages were sent to
9 all units, then we would have received them at our centre at Pale. In
10 other words, we remained within their system of communications, remained,
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Vukovic. The reference is, in fact, from the
13 middle of the witness's statement, page 33, and perhaps I can read the
14 words to you, Mr. Vukovic.
15 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we bring it up.
16 MR. GAYNOR: Yes. I'm sorry, it's -- 90245 is the 65 ter number,
17 and if we can go to page 33.
18 Q. Perhaps, Mr. Vukovic, I will read the question to you and I will
19 read the answer to you, and then you can make whatever clarifications
20 necessary. Is that all right?
21 A. All right.
22 Q. The question is as follows:
23 "Let's just clarify one thing. That communications centre, that
24 belonged to the city of Sarajevo, with which you were linked, as you say,
25 that was under the control of the Muslim forces; right?"
1 Your answer reads as follows:
2 "When we were part of the line of command of the city centre,
3 that was before the conflict started. In 1992, in the month of April, we
4 remained linked with the same city centre, and we could still communicate
5 with them freely."
6 That's the end of the quote.
7 Would you like to clarify your answer in any way?
8 A. Well, that was the tendency of my explanation.
9 On the critical day, when that order was sent from the
10 teleprinter of the republic centre for communications and encryption and
11 monitoring and information, from the Executive Council building, or,
12 rather, from the Republican Secretariat of National Defence, as it was
13 called at the time, from a teleprinter machine which was on the 14th
14 floor, a TX-100, manufactured by EI Nis, we received that order because
15 it was sent to a number of different addressees. And in that way, we
16 received it as well, it found its way to our desks at our centre. At the
17 time, the communications were still intact, the communications between
18 all of those different users which had been part of the Republic
19 Secretariat of National Defence. So the communications had still been
20 intact, and in this way we received that order at Pale as well. And I
21 believe this is sufficient, by way of explanation.
22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Vukovic. If we look at the first page of your
23 amalgamated statement, please. Is that your signature on the first page?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. As we've discussed previously, there is a typographical error.
1 It says that you reviewed this statement on the 23rd and 24th of May,
2 2011, and we have to correct that, because you reviewed this statement on
3 the 23rd, the 24th, and the 25th of May, 2011; is that correct?
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. As I discussed with you previously, I want to note two minor
6 typographical errors.
7 Paragraph 77 refers to 65 ter 29798. The correct number is
8 65 ter 21798.
9 Second, footnote 115 that's on the page we were looking at
10 earlier refers to 65 ter 22910 --
11 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Did you say page 67?
12 MR. GAYNOR: Sorry, the first erratum refers to paragraph 77.
13 The second refers to footnote 115. That refers to 65 ter 22910. The
14 correct number is 22912.
15 Q. Subject to the clarification that you provided to the Court, and
16 to the three typographical corrections we've just made, do you adopt the
17 amalgamated statement as your evidence? And if you were questioned today
18 about the same issues, would you provide the same information to the
19 Trial Chamber?
20 A. Yes.
21 MR. GAYNOR: Mr. President, I propose -- first of all, I would
22 like to tender the statement, and I would propose to read a summary of
24 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be admitted.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2794, Your Honours.
2 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.
3 Ranko Vukovic was the chief of the Republic Communications Centre
4 in Pale for the duration of the 1992-to-1995 conflict.
5 JUDGE KWON: For the public, what you're doing is reading out the
6 summary of his evidence.
7 MR. GAYNOR: That's correct, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Gaynor.
9 MR. GAYNOR: The primary purpose of the Republic
10 Communications Centre was to provide oral and written communications
11 links to civilian authorities in Pale, including the RS Presidency,
12 Assembly and Government. The Republic Communications Centre was equipped
13 with telephone lines, switchboards, teleprinters, fax, radio and
14 radio-relay equipment. It also used couriers.
15 Radovan Karadzic's office in Pale was connected to the Republic
16 Communications Centre by a secure telephone line. Mr. Vukovic describes
17 the methods used to keep the Republic Communications Centre in contact
18 with the regional communications centres. The Republic
19 Communications Centre was connected to the VRS Main Staff
20 Communications Centre by radio relay and by the PTT network. The VRS
21 Main Staff Communications Centre was located in a former JNA facility
22 situated deep underground in Crna Rijeka, near Han Pijesak. The
23 transmitters for the Crna Rijeka Communications Centre were located on
24 Veliki Zep, a hill above Crna Rijeka. Communications from Pale to
25 various parts of territory under Bosnian Serb control were routed through
1 the VRS Main Staff Communications Centre at Crna Rijeka.
2 Maintenance teams for the VRS 67th Communications Regiment at
3 Han Pijesak would come to repair the Republic Communications Centre's
4 equipment as necessary and very quickly. The system functioned well
5 during the war. Mr. Vukovic identifies communications sent from Karadzic
6 to the VRS Main Staff using the link from the Republic
7 Communications Centre to the VRS Main Staff Communications Centre at
8 Crna Rijeka. He also identifies documents sent from Crna Rijeka to other
9 locations, such as the commands of the corps of the VRS. It was usually
10 possible for the Republic Communications Centre to connect Karadzic to
11 whomever he wished to contact. Karadzic's office also sometimes used the
12 RS MUP communications network and had access to its own couriers. The RS
13 MUP Communications Centre in Pale was separate from the Republic
14 Communications Centre and used a separate communications system, but the
15 Republic Communications Centre assisted the RS MUP organs with their
16 communication if they were having difficulty with their own system.
17 Mr. Vukovic provides his comments on a selection of documents, including
18 communications between the Presidency and the VRS Main Staff, as well as
19 communications log-books and documents sent by the RS MUP communications
20 system in 1995 concerning security for convoys containing Karadzic.
21 That ends the summary for the benefit of the public.
22 I want to return briefly to two points arose in that summary, but
23 they're listed in your statement.
24 Q. Could you describe very briefly, Mr. Vukovic, the relationship
25 between the RS MUP Communications Centre in Pale and your centre, the
1 Republic Communications Centre?
2 A. The Communications Centre of the MUP had its own independent
3 system of communications. In other words, they did not depend on the
4 Ministry of Defence, but, rather, they used the Republic
5 Communications Centre at Pale. They developed their own documents,
6 independent of us, and they also developed their plans of work of radio
7 communications. They had trained staff to do that. But in the
8 beginning, and I'm referring to the communication centres at Pale, the
9 MUP Communications Centre, where Paunovic, Milenko -- the late
10 Milenko Paunovic worked. They had trouble hiring staff which had
11 military specialties from the Signals Corps, and we would assist them
12 with that. We would assist them to identify the required personnel that
13 was deficient, that they were short in.
14 Now, at the Republic Communications Centre throughout the combat
15 operations, throughout the war, we had also personnel problems, and in
16 those conditions we managed to carry out all the tasks that were required
17 of us, sometimes successfully, but sometimes not as successfully, and
18 sometimes we broke through the dead-lines that were asked of us because
19 we had difficulties in maintaining the communications lines, because
20 frequently they would break down and be out of operation. And until they
21 were re-established, we had to use other means of communications that we
22 developed and kept on standby as a back-up system precisely because we
23 had frequent problems with the lines going down, so that it was really
24 with super-human efforts that we managed to maintain communications
25 throughout the war.
1 JUDGE KWON: Just one minute, Mr. Gaynor.
2 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, sir.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Vukovic, I forgot to tell you that if you need a
4 break at any time, don't hesitate to let us know.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Gaynor.
7 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. Mr. Vukovic, in your statement you refer to the
9 67th Communications Regiment of the VRS. Insofar as you know, what do
10 you understand the role or mandate of the 67th Communications Regiment
12 A. Very well. From the aspect of the functioning of the Republican
13 Communications Centre, I cannot assess the operation of the
14 communications unit of the Main Staff, the 67th Communications Regiment,
15 because I'm not competent to evaluate their positions and their manner
16 and method of work, and I cannot talk about that either, because I
17 stated -- I gave the solemn declaration, I'm holding to it, and it
18 obliges me to speak about only those things that I can talk about
20 As for the 67th Communications Regiment, I can say that we often
21 repaired our equipment through them, equipment that we had in our centre,
22 and that we always were met with understanding, professionalism, good
23 attitude, because they had personnel that was trained to maintain certain
24 communications equipment that we were unable to fix in our own workshops.
25 The 67th Communications Regiment, by establishment, was
1 duty-bound to assist either us, or the MUP, or anyone in the case this
2 was required, if we had problems with communications, with means and
3 equipment, with training, for certain deficient specialties in the VS.
4 They -- for example, when we were equipping centres with new equipment,
5 in case we needed some experts which could only be trained by the
6 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, this was done because we
7 didn't have any way of training one or two of these people, because what
8 was required was to create some kind of model environment to work. And
9 there was a special unit in the 67th Communications Regiment that
10 provided training, but I can say that in all aspects of service that had
11 to do with communications, their attitude was very professional. That's
12 all I can say.
13 Q. In your answer, you referred to the abbreviation "VS." Could you
14 tell us what that means?
15 A. It's not "VS," it's "VES." This is the military occupation
17 MR. GAYNOR: Could I request 65 ter 23143, please.
18 Q. Now, in a moment, Mr. Vukovic, on the screen in front of you,
19 you'll see a map, and it's one you've seen before. If you could, first
20 of all, just tell Their Honours what you understand the map to be.
21 I beg your pardon. This is a diagram. We're coming to the map.
22 If you can explain to Their Honours what you understand, in
23 general terms, this diagram to be, and then I will ask you some specific
24 questions about it.
25 A. I cannot interpret the diagram of the protected communications of
1 the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. But as for the part
2 relating to communications between the Main Staff of the VRS and the
3 Communications Centre -- the Republican Communications Centre in Pale,
4 I can speak about those particular branches and the connection with the
5 stationary communications centre at Pale and the stationary
6 communications centre at Crna Rijeka. This is a little bit unclear. I
7 cannot really see very well.
8 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Kezunovic.
9 Could I ask the Registrar to expand the central box, the one big
10 box that we see at the centre.
11 Now, in the top right-hand corner of the screen in front of you,
12 Mr. Vukovic, you see "SCV Veliki Zep." Could you tell us what that
13 means, please?
14 A. This is not "SCV Veliki Zep," but this is the stationary node
16 Q. And could you just expand the abbreviation for us? "SCV" refers
17 to what?
18 A. Stationary Communications Node, Veliki Zep, is located at the
19 command post of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, and this
20 diagram should be interpreted by the senior officer who made it from the
21 Army of Republika Srpska. I can recognise some communications here which
22 began or ended at the stationary communications hub at Veliki Zep or the
23 one in Pale. This is an automatic telephone exchange which ended in the
24 offices of the president of the Republika Srpska and the president of the
25 Assembly of Republika Srpska. These were automatic telephone exchanges.
1 Q. Can I interrupt for a minute there.
2 In the box in the top right-hand corner of the screen in front of
3 us, we see, as the seventh and eighth entries, "ATC G-1 Predsed.RS."
4 The next one refers to "Pr.Skup.RS." Are those the two entries
5 you were just referring to?
6 A. Yes.
7 JUDGE KWON: Are we looking at that box, Mr. Gaynor?
8 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, the box in the top right-hand corner.
9 JUDGE KWON: Top right-hand corner in this box?
10 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, the box on the screen in front of us in the top
11 right-hand corner.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 MR. GAYNOR:
14 Q. Could you please explain to us what you understand "Predsed.RS"
15 and "Pr.skup.RS" mean yes?
16 A. The first one is Pr, "Predsednik," that is, president of the RS,
17 meaning that this extension was in the office of the president of
18 Republika Srpska. This extension, 171, "Prsk" means the president of the
19 Assembly of Republika Srpska. That extension was in the Cabinet of the
20 president of the Assembly of Republika Srpska, according to this
21 particular scheme.
22 Q. Thank you. And just to clarify the point: After the Presidency,
23 we see the number 230, and after the president of the Assembly, we see
24 the number 171. Is that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Now, a few entries further down, we see "Preds.VL.RS," followed
2 by the number 182. Could you tell us what that refers to?
3 A. Yes, I see it. This the prime minister's office of
4 Republika Srpska, and this was extension 182.
5 MR. GAYNOR: If we could zoom out, please, and look at the top
6 right-hand corner under, first of all, the box marked "SCV Jahorina,"
7 which is under the box marked. Thank you very much.
8 Q. Again, I think we can see, under number 7 here, a reference to
9 the Presidency of the RS, and, number 8, a reference to the president of
10 the Assembly of the RS. Could you confirm that, Mr. Vukovic?
11 A. Yes, I can see this. This is a stationary communications node at
12 the Jahorina facility, from the radio-relay communications diagram of the
13 Main Staff of Republika Srpska. Again, I note, I cannot discuss or talk
14 about that, because this is not really my jurisdiction. I'm not
15 competent to interpret the diagram of radio communications of the army.
16 But 7 and 8, those items refer to the radio-relay connections between the
17 Cabinet of the president of Republika Srpska and the Cabinet of the
18 president of the Assembly of Republika Srpska, with the stationary hub at
19 Veliki Zep.
20 MR. GAYNOR: Now, could we zoom out a bit again, Mr. Registrar,
21 please, and zoom in on the box marked "Pale."
22 Q. The last two entries in this box, again, Mr. Vukovic, could you
23 clarify what they are?
24 A. These two last entries show that these numbers, 230 and 171,
25 ended at the offices in Pale of the president of Republika Srpska and the
1 president of the Assembly of Republika Srpska via an automatic telephone
3 MR. GAYNOR: I'd like to tender that, Mr. President.
4 JUDGE KWON: You're not going to translate this?
5 MR. GAYNOR: The existing translation does not contain the
6 translations of everything inside it, but we --
7 JUDGE KWON: We have an English translation. [Overlapping
9 MR. GAYNOR: No, the English translation that's been up-loaded
10 simply gives the title of the graph, but does not indicate the entities
11 within the graph.
12 JUDGE KWON: I don't think that the translation would help us.
13 We'll admit it as it is now.
14 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2795, Your Honours.
16 MR. GAYNOR: Could I please ask for 65 ter --
17 JUDGE KWON: But just for the purpose, could you read the title
18 on the top of the page?
19 MR. GAYNOR:
20 Q. Could you read that title, please, Mr. Vukovic?
21 Perhaps we can zoom in, please.
22 A. The heading of the document is "Diagram of the --" wait, I've
23 lost it.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We have that translation.
25 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 MR. GAYNOR: Could I ask the Registrar, please, for 65 ter 04325.
3 In a moment, you'll be seeing the map I promised earlier.
4 Q. If you could explain to Their Honours, briefly, before I ask you
5 any questions about it, what you believe the map to be? It will be on
6 your screen in a moment.
7 Sorry, the 65 ter number of the map should be 04325.
8 Perhaps we could zoom in a little on the top portion of the map
9 to assist Mr. Vukovic.
10 Could you tell us what this map appears to be?
11 A. The map shows the communication connections plan of the
12 Drina Corps in defence, approved by Major General Radislav Krstic, the
14 Q. Do you see, in the middle of the map, the Cyrillic letters "IBK"?
15 A. I don't, no. No, no, I see it, I see it. Large letters standing
16 for "Eastern Bosnia Corps," "IBK."
17 MR. GAYNOR: Could we move down the map a little bit, please.
18 Now, if we could centre in on the centre of the map.
19 Q. First of all, on the right, you see large Cyrillic letters "DK"?
20 A. I do, "Drina Corps."
21 Q. And on the left-hand of the map a little further down, you see
22 "SRK" in Cyrillic?
23 A. Yes, that's the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
24 MR. GAYNOR: Could we zoom in, please, on the flag with the five
25 Cyrillic letters under it. If we could zoom in a little more, please.
1 Q. Could you tell us what this represents?
2 A. This represents the command post of the Main Staff of the Army of
3 Republika Srpska and the radio-relay hub Veliki Zep.
4 Q. The five Cyrillic letters mean what?
5 A. "The Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska," "GS VRS."
6 Q. Underneath that, we see a box. Inside the box are the letters
7 "V. Zep." What is that?
8 A. That is a hill where the Stationary Communications Centre of the
9 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska was located. That is the
10 radio-relay hub.
11 Q. Now, if we could -- first of all, you see on your left another
12 box at Han Pijesak. Do you see that?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. What do you understand that to be?
15 A. This shows the Han Pijesak PTT. This is the forward command post
16 at Han Pijesak, the IKM.
17 MR. GAYNOR: Now, could I ask the Registrar to follow the line
18 down from Han Pijesak. You can see a straight line. If we could just
19 follow that line down the map, please. And a bit further down, please.
20 And could you go a little bit further south, please, Mr. Registrar.
21 Sorry, a little further west. We need to get over to the left-hand side
22 of the -- very good, and carry on, and a little further south.
23 Now, could we zoom in there a little bit, please.
24 Q. Do you see the town of Pale on this map?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Do you see the non-straight line, the line which looks like it's
2 following a road from Pale, which meets the straight line that we've just
3 followed down from Han Pijesak?
4 A. [No interpretation]
5 Q. Could you tell us what you understand that to be?
6 A. Again, I note that I'm not competent or authorised to interpret
7 the scheme of radio-relay connections of the Drina Corps in any shape or
8 form, nor am I competent to interpret any kind of connections leading
9 from the Main Staff to subordinate units. I can help here to say that
10 this is the diagram showing how radio communications of the Army of
11 Republika Srpska functioned, but it does not show that the Republican
12 Communications Centre was part of it, the one that was located in Pale.
13 However, however, since these radio-relay routes going from the
14 Main Staff, from Veliki Zep, to all the subordinate units, then the
15 radio-relay node that we looked at just now in Jahorina is, of course,
16 part of the radio-relay connections shown on the diagram, and the
17 Republican Communications Centre had a priority in providing certain
18 services to the institutions of the civilian government. Then it had the
19 priority of being allowed access to the communications system of the
20 army, which means that we were obliged to help one another, and we were
21 at each other's disposal, which was something that was expected of us.
22 This diagram talks about the connections of the Army of
23 Republika Srpska, showing the connections of the Main Staff and the
24 subordinate corps.
25 Q. Does -- this particular map that we've just been inspecting, does
1 it show the entirety of the radio-relay network of the Army of
2 Republika Srpska?
3 A. This part of the radio-relay connection on this map does not show
4 the complete radio-relay communications of the Army of Republika Srpska.
5 This is only a part of it, covering the Drina Corps, the Main Staff and
6 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
7 So based on what I see here, I don't see the diagram in order to
8 be able to say that this represents the entire network of the Army of
9 Republika Srpska. This is only one section of it, showing the
10 communications of the Main Staff, the Drina Corps and the
11 Sarajevo Romanija Corps. That's what I can see.
12 MR. GAYNOR: Can I tender that map, Mr. President?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2796, Your Honours.
15 MR. GAYNOR: I'd now like to call up, please, 65 ter 23144.
16 Q. Could you, first of all, read out the title at the top of this
17 document, please?
18 A. Again, this is a diagram of radio relay and wire links of the
19 Drina Corps Command.
20 Q. Now, if you could help us with a few things. You see the large
21 box to the right which is marked "Veliki Zep."
22 Could we home in on that, please.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Could you tell us what this represents, as far as you're aware?
25 A. This square represents the stationary communications hub at
1 Veliki Zep. It was located at Veliki Zep.
2 Q. We see coming out of this straight lines, and we also see a
3 curled line which goes to Crna Rijeka. Could you clarify this difference
4 between straight lines and curled lines, as a general matter, on
5 communications maps?
6 A. Yes. We have radio-relay communications here, which are shown
7 with a straight line, full straight line, and this curly line is a wire
8 communications line, communications established through wire
10 Q. On this map, if we could zoom out of the map, please, we see a
11 number of circles with flags on them. Could you tell us what a circle
12 with a flag on it denotes?
13 A. The circle marks the place where a certain communications unit,
14 or a communications centre is located, or where a certain command of a
15 unit is located, or a socio-political organ, or a social political
16 community, civilian organs. On the diagram, I can see that this covers
17 the distribution of the radio-relay and wire communications in the area
18 of responsibility of the Drina Corps, Drina Corps.
19 Q. Now, this particular map doesn't happen to show any connection to
20 the town of Pale. Would you be able to explain why that is?
21 A. Well, it doesn't show Pale because this is a unit subordinated to
22 the Main Staff of the VRS and not to the civilian authorities that were
23 based in Pale. So this is a diagram of communications between units of
24 the VRS. And, again, I have to say that I'm neither competent nor
25 authorised to discuss this, because this was prepared -- this diagram was
1 prepared by an officer of the Drina Corps Command, a communications
3 MR. GAYNOR: I'd like to tender that document, Mr. President.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2797, Your Honours.
6 MR. GAYNOR: Could I now call up, please, 65 ter 02655.
7 Q. There's a map coming up now, Mr. Vukovic, which was provided to
8 us by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I'm not going to ask you about
9 what it purports to depict. We're just going to look at one small part
10 of the map.
11 Could we -- could you tell us what the title of the map appears
12 to be, Mr. Vukovic?
13 A. This is a working map of the Section for Counter-Electronic
14 Combat of the 2nd Corps, Counter-Electronic Surveillance of the
15 2nd Krajina Corps, but I can't really see clearly. What I can see is
16 that this is a map for counter-electronic surveillance of the 2nd Corps
17 of the BH Army, most probably.
18 MR. GAYNOR: Could I ask the Registrar just to go down to the
19 very bottom of the map. In fact, that will do for the moment.
20 Q. Do you see the straight lines that we see on this map?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Would you be able to comment in any way as to what they might
24 A. They might represent radio-relay routes of the commands that
25 developed certain communications centres in these areas. I'm not really
1 the best-placed person to interpret this. I don't know what units or
2 what armed forces developed these communications centres. This is
3 something that probably relates to the BH Army, the so-called BH Army.
4 JUDGE KWON: The witness may be assisted by seeing the letters on
5 the bottom right.
6 MR. GAYNOR: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
7 Could we focus in on the bottom right part of the map.
8 JUDGE KWON: And zoom in a bit further.
9 MR. GAYNOR:
10 Q. Once you've read that, Mr. Vukovic, could you tell us if that
11 informs you about what the straight lines on the map might represent?
12 A. These straight lines might represent radio-relay routes between
13 command posts of certain units.
14 MR. GAYNOR: Now, could I ask the Registrar to move west on this
16 JUDGE KWON: Can you tell us whether this is related to BH Army
17 or the VRS?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot really interpret this map.
19 I did not draft it, nor did anyone from my centre produce this. This map
20 is totally new to me and unfamiliar. But from what I see, I can tell
21 that it's a diagram of communications between some centres of
22 communications and commands of units.
23 MR. GAYNOR: Perhaps could I ask the Registrar to move to the
24 west, and we'll see there something which might assist you in determining
25 which army this relates to. If we could focus in a little bit on the
1 central part there, please.
2 Q. Does that help you at all, Mr. Vukovic?
3 A. From what I see before me, I can assume -- unless this was
4 produced by someone from the other side, the other party, the other armed
5 forces, the BH Army, I can assume that this was perhaps developed within
6 units of the Main Staff of the VRS. However, the map that you're showing
7 me here could also have been produced from the communications -- from a
8 communications unit of the BH Army. It could also be a VRS map. This is
9 the first time that I see this map, and I'm not really competent to
10 interpret it.
11 Q. In any event, Mr. Vukovic, do you accept that it appears to
12 denote a curled line going from Veliki Zep to Han Pijesak, as in the
13 earlier Drina Corps map that you inspected?
14 A. Well, based on this code-name, "Panorama," "Panorama" or
15 "Prostor," space, I can tell that this is a VRS map, and the curled line
16 would then denote a wire line between Han Pijesak and the radio-relay
17 node at Veliki Zep. But, again, I'm not competent to interpret this map.
18 However, I do see that, based on what I see before me, that this was a
19 map developed at the Main Staff of the VRS. I judge that by this
20 code-name, "Panorama."
21 Q. If we can look further down the map, just further south, we see a
22 straight line, and it ends with the word "Pale." Do you see that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Could you express what that straight line might refer to?
25 A. This line, according to me, is a radio-relay route between Pale
1 and Veliki Zep, but that would have had to go through Jahorina.
2 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. Vukovic.
3 Your Honours, we'll be showing this particular map to other
4 witnesses, who will be familiar with it. Nevertheless, I believe
5 Mr. Vukovic has provided some useful information about it.
6 JUDGE KWON: Just for the record, Mr. Vukovic, you referred to
7 "Panorama" as a code-name. It's a code-name of which organ, just to be
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was the Communications Centre
10 at the Main Staff.
11 JUDGE KWON: So "Panorama" was the code-name for the
12 Communications Centre of the VRS?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
14 JUDGE KWON: Any objections?
15 We'll admit this.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2798, Your Honours.
17 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you very much.
18 Now, subject to the tendering of those associated exhibits which
19 have not already been admitted by the Trial Chamber, that ends my
20 examination-in-chief. So I'd like to tender the balance of the exhibits
21 at this stage.
22 JUDGE KWON: Any observation, Mr. Robinson?
23 MR. ROBINSON: We don't have any objections to any of them,
24 Mr. President.
25 JUDGE KWON: I noted just one typo, Mr. Gaynor.
1 MR. GAYNOR: Sorry. I meant to clarify one thing, Mr. President.
2 I sent an e-mail to the parties and to the Trial Chamber about that.
3 The exhibits that we're tendering are all of those referred to in
4 the amalgamated statement, itself. Now, in the appendix which we filed
5 with our 92 ter notification, we omitted six 92 ter numbers which are, in
6 fact, discussed by the witness in his statement. I can read those into
7 the record at this point.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
9 MR. GAYNOR: The six 92 ter numbers which were not listed in
10 Appendix A, but which are discussed by the witness in his amalgamated
11 statement, are 18575, 17569, 18577, 22866, 21272, 22909.
12 Thank you, Mr. President.
13 JUDGE KWON: You said 92 ter numbers? 65 ter numbers?
14 MR. GAYNOR: I beg your pardon. 65 ter numbers. Thank you.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 In your second-last item in the first page, you refer to
17 65 ter 13606. Is it not a typo for "13626"?
18 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President, that's very possibly the
19 case. I'll verify that. Unless I come back to you, that is the
20 understanding. Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit them all. The Court Deputy will
22 assign appropriate numbers and inform the parties.
23 Thank you, Mr. Gaynor.
24 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE KWON: Well, Mr. Karadzic, if you are ready, start your
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Good afternoon, Major Vukovic.
6 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President.
7 Q. I'm sorry I didn't have an opportunity to meet you before you
8 began your evidence here, but I would like to thank you for meeting my
9 associates, and I hope that our cross-examination will run more smoothly
10 and more quickly as a result.
11 A. Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. Major -- I would now like to request that we move briefly into
13 private session or a closed session because of a bit of information that
14 my Defence has obtained, and I need to be in private session for that
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 [Private session]
11 Pages 15102-15107 redacted. Private session.
6 [Open session]
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Vukovic, we'll have a break for half an hour and
8 resume at 1.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.
13 Q. Major, when Mr. President asked you to explain the part that the
14 interpreters didn't catch, you explained what your role was. And it was
15 thanks to that role of yours that you knew what the location of various
16 installations was about the town?
17 A. Yes. I worked before the war, and it was TO 2120 Sarajevo that
18 was my superior command, and Velesici came under that particular command.
19 Q. Thank you. In addition to this particular feature, do you recall
20 any other military installations being present in Velesici?
21 A. There was a training centre in Velesici which specialised in
22 training senior officers of the Territorial Defence in the former
23 Yugoslavia. They were members of town TO staffs. There was also an arms
24 depot there, as was a general storage place for military equipment. All
25 of this was housed in the facility at Velesici, which is located just
1 next to the General Motor Car Servicing Centre.
2 Q. Do you know that it was this particular General Motor Car
3 Servicing Centre that serviced and repaired military vehicles before the
5 A. Yes, I am aware of this. We had our observation posts at various
6 points in the town, and VRS personnel observe the movement of enemy
7 personnel and their equipment, especially those that posed a threat to
8 our forces, our commands, and various military and civilian authorities.
9 They reported to us whenever such movement was observed. Our duty, among
10 other things, was to protect the civilians from surprise attacks,
11 including artillery attacks, aircraft raids, or sabotage actions.
12 Q. Was there a hotel facility belonging to the railways or something
13 of the sort there, and was the Delta Unit stationed there or was it
14 somewhere else?
15 A. I don't know where the Delta Unit was stationed. It was a
16 special sort of unit. I did hear of it, as I heard of the Black Swans.
17 However, there was the secondary school for railway staff stationed
19 Q. Thank you. Major, sir, before the war broke out, you had the
20 Municipal Centre for Monitoring and Reporting at Pale, and the capacities
21 you had were those required by a municipal centre of this sort; is that
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. When you mentioned the monitoring and reporting activities
25 intended for civilians, can you confirm or deny that Pale were also the
1 subject -- was also the subject of mortar and howitzer fire?
2 A. In addition to our duties related to encryption, we were also
3 duty-bound to monitor the activities in the air and on the land,
4 especially when it came to combat activities directed against civilians
5 and civilian authorities or VRS military installations.
6 I do recall that back in 1992 - it was in the month of
7 August - on around the 7th of August, 1992, the urban core of Pale came
8 under artillery fire from the direction of Precko Polje, Cakre [phoen],
9 which is between Bjelasnica and Mount Igman. It was at this time that
10 the attack resulted in one death. It was a man I knew before the war, a
11 resident of Pale. I don't know if I should mention his name or --
12 Q. Well, I do believe that we owe him that much.
13 A. It's late Njegos Marinkovic, who was killed on his own land,
14 close to his home. He was on his way to the cattle barn. The shell
15 landed on this out-building, and the shrapnel killed him. It was up
16 until the 20th of August, 1992, that the artillery fire continued, when a
17 152-millimetre Nora ^ gun was finally detected. It was the gun that kept
18 firing on the urban core, and it was destroyed.
19 Q. In your testimony in the Stanisic and Zupljanin case, at page 14,
20 in 1D3616 - we don't have to call it up; it's there for everyone to
21 see - you explained what it was that the Republican Centre engaged in;
22 i.e., encryption of data, monitoring and reporting. And at page 15 of
23 that same testimony, you said that you served the municipal authorities
24 and their needs.
25 And now I will continue in English.
1 [In English] "And due to a lack of men, we had the role of
2 Republic centre, Regional Centre, and Municipal Centre, of the
3 cryptographic data-protection system, and of monitoring and information."
4 [Interpretation] As you grew out from a municipal centre into a
5 republican centre, did you find yourself in difficulties with regard to
6 personnel and equipment?
7 A. May I just supplement what I said in that earlier testimony, when
8 we talked about the artillery fire directed at Pale. There is this one
9 detail that I left out, and if this honourable Chamber would allow me to
10 explain this, I will move on to the evolution from the Municipal to the
11 Republican Centre.
12 I forgot to mention: The artillery fire that was also present in
13 1995, in the period between, I think, the 10th of June, 1995, and the
14 28th of July, 1995, there was non-stop fire. At a later date, on the
15 30th of August, 1995, there was an all-out attack across
16 Republika Srpska, where VRS installations were targets.
17 Q. Thank you. Can I then ask you: The shelling of Pale between the
18 10th of June and the 28th of July, does it coincide with a major Muslim
19 offensive on Sarajevo?
20 A. Yes, indeed. We were able to observe, when Pale was shelled,
21 since it was our duty to find refuge for civilians and to alert the
22 civilian and military authorities of the threat coming from the enemy
23 side, we were able to observe that as soon as aircraft appeared in the
24 air, an alarm would be sounded in the enemy section of Sarajevo, where
25 the civilian population would go into the shelters, and we would then
1 come under attack.
2 I'm sorry, should I clarify something?
3 Q. No, no, I'm just waiting for the interpretation to end.
4 Can you tell us, this Municipal Centre, as it grew into a
5 republican centre which had more duties on its hands, did it come across
6 difficulties, in terms of personnel and equipment that they had?
7 A. It was a municipal centre which had a small number of staff,
8 because it had been set up for peacetime activities, which now had to
9 transform into a republican centre and service the entire republic. We
10 were confronted with a vast number of problems. In fact, the same number
11 of staff we had in 1992, as we set about these activities, remained there
12 on the 21st -- up until the 21st of November, 1995, at which point, in
13 fact, the staff was downsized. Throughout this time, we had some eight
14 to nine staff, including late Milorad Kotlica, who died in Nis in 1994
15 and was buried at Bonn [phoen], in Montenegro. He was in charge of
16 communications and encryption. And we didn't have proper personnel to
17 replace him there, so it fell upon me to take up these duties. We had
18 very few people, we had very little equipment and assets that we were at
19 great pains to maintain, and we were confronted with major problems.
20 This was a period of time when communications systems worked
21 intermittently because of the combat activities or because, simply, we
22 had some of the wires crossing enemy territory. The enemy would engage
23 in sabotage activities, cut these wires. They electronically surveilled
24 our activities. They jammed our radio-relay communications across
25 various routes and at various nodes. For this reason, the 67th Regiment
1 that I mentioned provided great assistance to us in overcoming
2 difficulties that we faced in these poorly-functioning communications
4 The MUP Communications Centre - I believe I mentioned this - had
5 great difficulties at Pale. The chief of the Communications Centre was
6 late Milenko Paunovic, also known as Mile, a friend of mine, who
7 frequently complained to me about the difficulties he had or inability to
8 carry out some of the difficulties where we were supposed to lend them a
9 hand, and we did whenever we were able to. This does not mean that we
10 were always able to assist him in whatever difficulties he had. There
11 was many an occasion when he would not ask for our help at all. Of
12 course, the Communications Centre I'm referring to belonged to the MUP,
13 and the army had its own Communications Centre.
14 I don't know if I answered your question.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
16 Can we call up 1D3617 in e-court.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Before the war, as part of your duties, you helped the Red Cross
19 and various humanitarian organisations, including the UNHCR which, back
20 in 1991, had to receive refugees from Western Slavonia, et cetera. Did
21 this situation prevail during the war as well?
22 A. In 1991, it was a large influx of refugees from the former
23 Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, from Western and Eastern Slavonia, from
24 Bila Gora, Papuk, Okucani, and those areas inhabited by Serbs. Since
25 there was an offensive by the Croatian forces, the population had to flee
1 in 1991, and a number of those refugees came to Pale. We were helping
2 those people set up communications amongst themselves. There were a lot
3 of problems. Families were separated, parents and children, and they had
4 spread out all the way from Krajina to Vojvodina.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have the following
6 page of this document. Can we look at the bottom of the next page.
7 We're looking there -- we will see the information that the witness has
8 just mentioned.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Is this your statement, is this your signature, and are you
11 explaining here what was done, just as you have told us now? Is that
13 A. Yes, that is my signature, Mr. President.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Major.
15 Can we tender this document?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1372, Your Honours.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Well, you spoke about similar issues in the Stanisic/Zupljanin
20 case in page -- 1D36136, on page 23, and then on page 31 you said that --
21 I'm going to read it in English:
22 [In English] "We had our own problems. Those were the first
23 months of combat operations, and those communications systems would be
24 down quite often."
25 [No interpretation]
1 A. That is correct.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Can we now call up D95, please.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Major, sir, do you recognise this dispatch?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. If you agree, I am instructing the presidents of municipalities
8 here in all villages in which the Croatian and Muslim inhabitants have
9 handed over their weapons and do not intend to fight, should enjoy
10 protection. Anyway, I would like you to look at the municipalities
11 listed, where it says "Gorazde, by radio"; "Foca, by radio relay";
12 "Han Pijesak, by telephone"; "Sokolac, by teleprinter"; "Rogatica, by
13 radio"; "Visegrad, by radio"; "Rudo, by radio relay to Foca and then by
14 radio"; "Cajnice, by radio relay."
15 Now, are you able to tell us why there is such an uneven method
16 of communication and why was this not done with a single means?
17 A. We had problems, especially in this period from April 1992
18 throughout the rest of 1992, when certain communication routes were
19 disrupted, certain types of communications were down. Since there was a
20 small number of people available, we tried to fulfill all of our
21 obligations in order to protect any citizen of the then Serbian Republic
22 of Bosnia and Herzegovina because at the beginning of the war, I think it
23 was the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of the
24 ethnicity, regardless of their place of residence, where they were
25 located, and in this way we were trying to resolve the problem of
1 communication. Telephones were not functioning, teleprinter
2 communications were down, so we had to find a way to see what kind of
3 communication could serve a particular type of area to reach a certain
4 municipality, a centre, in order to be able to convey the users'
5 dispatches, telegrams and orders.
6 I know that there was the matter of protection for the Muslim and
7 Croat citizens who had handed over their weapons, who did not intend to
8 put up any kind of fight against the Army of Republika Srpska, and I
9 recall very well that it was ordered that all those citizens had to be
10 protected and looked after, offered the full extent of the protection of
11 the Bosnian Serb Republic.
12 I can see that in Gorazde, we used the -- we delivered the
13 telegram by radio. Rogatica, also in Visegrad, the dispatch was
14 delivered by radio. This was an ultrashortwave 745 or 700Y device which
15 any ham radio operator would be able to use, and this is the type of
16 communications that we managed to set up. And we managed to dispatch the
17 telegrams to certain centres 24 hours a day, from where they were passed
18 on further.
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Vukovic. Do you see that the late Colonel Kotlica
20 is suggesting here to me, because it will be copied to me, that I should
21 inform the media. Does that indicate that he wasn't sure that all of
22 that would go through and that it would be a better thing to also publish
23 it in the media?
24 A. Very often, we didn't have return information, whether something
25 reached its destination or not; for example, telegrams that were sent by
1 ultrashortwave operators, by radio. We would receive a confirmation that
2 it was received, but we don't know whether the same thing applied in
3 Rogatica, in Foca, or in some other place where there was a communication
4 centre. We were unable to know what was done there from Pale. They
5 would confirm receipt, but we don't know whether the telegram was
6 actually delivered or not. This is something that would perhaps need to
7 be looked into.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 And now I would like us to briefly look at P2412. Can we look at
10 that in e-court, please.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. By establishment, you were under the Ministry of Defence before
13 the war and during the war; is that correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Thank you. Do you recognise this telegram, and did you dispatch
16 it to Banja Luka, all the bodies in the ARK and the SAO Krajina?
17 A. Yes, this telegram was sent. It was received in the Banja Luka
18 Municipal Assembly at 0959 hours. I can see the number here.
19 Q. "1/92," is that the first telegram of some Serbian defence
21 A. Yes, yes. That is the number from the log-book of outgoing
22 telegrams. I don't have the log-book in front of me now, but that should
23 be the number from the log-book.
24 I can see at the top this number "45100 Banja Luka Municipal
25 Assembly." That should have been the regional centre which was in Banja
1 Luka at the time which received the telegram by teleprinter which was
2 addressed to the governments of the autonomous region and the Serbian
3 Autonomous Region of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to all
4 Serbian assemblies.
5 Q. All Serbian assemblies. Now, I would like to ask you to help us
6 a little bit, in view of the fact that you're a member of the military.
7 Are you familiar, and I assume that you are, with the Law on
8 All People's Defence, and do you agree that pursuant to that law, every
9 municipality had a sovereign right to defence on its own territory?
10 A. Yes, it did have the right to defend its territory and endangered
11 population from any type of enemy actions which endangered the civilian
12 population or buildings on the territory of any of those socio-political
14 Q. Do you agree that it states in the first point the
15 Territorial Defence was being formed? Would you agree that that would
16 then mean that the municipal TOs were all being merged at the level of
17 the Republic of the Serb -- of the Serbian Republic of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that they would be under the command of municipal,
19 district, and regional staffs, and the republican staff of the TO?
20 A. Yes, that is natural that all municipalities had their own TO.
21 This was something that was true at the level of the whole of the former
22 Yugoslavia, and at the level of the former republics making up the former
23 Yugoslavia. The republics had their own municipal TO units, which would
24 then break down to units in the municipalities. There were TO peacetime
25 and wartime units. And they would break down into staffs. They had the
1 required number of people available, and they functioned in peacetime.
2 During war, military conscripts were called up, and they were deployed to
3 TO units at different levels and strengths, and the units were commanded
4 by non-commissioned officers who were in the commands of the TO units.
5 Q. Thank you. Major, sir, in view of the fact that you were in the
6 TO of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the war, and that on
7 the 16th of April, 1992, this is the first telegram of the Ministry of
8 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, before that did the
9 Serbian side in Bosnia and Herzegovina have any type of armed formation?
10 A. No. As far as I know, the Serbian side didn't have any
11 formations, it didn't form any formations. But, for example, in 1991, I
12 know that units were formed of the Green Berets and the Patriotic League
13 already in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These were units that were formed by
14 the Party of Democratic Action.
15 Q. Thank you. Major, sir, you were asked in the Zupljanin case,
16 Stanisic/Zupljanin case -- this is 1D3616, page 21. They asked you if
17 this document was passed down to the municipalities, and now I'm going to
18 read what you said in English:
19 [In English] "At the top of the document, you can see that the
20 memorandum was in the centre in Banja Luka. And as far as I can
21 remember, the number indicated on the document was the number of the fax
22 in the Banja Luka centre. I can't tell you whether the operator faxed
23 these documents to somebody else. I don't know that. I am not able to
24 see it from the document without the log-book. If I saw the log-book, I
25 would be able to tell you who the document was sent to. Since Banja Luka
1 was a regional centre at the time and this document applied to all
2 Serbian municipalities, I suppose that he did fax these documents to the
3 municipalities in the Krajina region."
4 [No interpretation]
5 [In English] "And that's what I conclude based just on looking at
6 the document."
7 [Interpretation] So you know that there was possibly return
8 information, that it did reach that centre, but what happened with this
9 and similar documents is something that you cannot know; is that correct?
10 A. Yes, that is correct, because I see here that the telegram was
11 sent by teleprinter. In the memo of the telegram at the top, you can see
12 that this was sent by fax, and there is a fax "12566." This is the
13 Regional Centre in Banja Luka. So the Regional Centre in Banja Luka,
14 unable to send it to all the municipalities by teleprinter because it was
15 probably down, they sent the telegram by fax, which was not permitted.
16 But at the time, that was how they did it because there was no other way
17 to do it, and that means that a fax like this and a telegram like this,
18 whoever was involved in anti-electronic surveillance could have been
19 recorded. The tapping -- surveillance Centre could have picked up this
20 document. It was not permitted to send text like this by fax because
21 that was an open communication. If it was a protected document, and in
22 this way, if it was sent, it would practically become a public one.
23 Anyone could pick it up and record it.
24 Q. Major, sir, in paragraph 46 of your statement, you say that by
25 June there was no developed system of protection of military data and
1 there was no encryption in order to protect data; is that correct?
2 A. Yes. Encryption in our centre, i.e., Cryptographic Protection,
3 began to operate, I think, around the 20th or the 22nd of June, so it was
4 in the second half of June 1992.
5 Q. Thank you. You said the same thing during your testimony in
6 Stanisic/Zupljanin, 1D3616, on pages 59 and 60.
7 Now, do you remember, Major, sir, that on the 20th of June, or
8 maybe the 22nd, but I believe it was the 20th, the presidency of Bosnia
9 and Herzegovina, the Croatian Muslim part, declared war on us?
10 A. On the 20th of June, 1992, I believe, I believe that war was
11 declared -- well, I believe that war was declared on the Republika Srpska
12 far sooner. I believe there was an order of April 1992, consisting of
13 four points, which arrived on the 29th of April, 1992, an order that was
14 signed by the first commander of the so-called BH Army, because the
15 Territorial Defence was just one component of the armed forces, the
16 component of the armed forces of Yugoslavia. However, by issuing that
17 order, consisting of four points, they declared war on the entire
18 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And I think that the authors of
19 that order are still at large and that no one was ever brought to
20 justice, not one of them, although all the following events -- the
21 subsequent events, all the deaths and the suffering of the civilians, the
22 Vase Miskina incident, the Markale I and II incidents, all of that arose
23 from that first order, a monstrous order, because that order made it
24 binding on every soldier of Bosnia and Herzegovina to wage war. This can
25 also be -- this is also confirmed in a book issued -- published by
1 Hasan Efendic, the first commander of the BH Army, the book entitled "Who
2 Defended Bosnia." This book was published in 1991 by the Association of
3 Noble Descent -- of People of Noble Descent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
4 this very order is mentioned on pages 135 or 136, or perhaps on the pages
5 between 128 and 136, where Colonel Efendic makes a reference to that
6 order of the 23rd of April, 1992, and says that that order had created a
7 major disturbance both at Pale and in Belgrade. This order of 29th -- we
8 received it on the 29th of April, 1992, at Pale. This was sent to all
9 municipalities, this order, and they probably felt that Pale, too, would
10 respond to this order and implement the four items listed there. And one
11 such copy of that order was also handed in to you and the then
12 Colonel Subotic. Another copy of this same order also arrived --
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Vukovic, I appreciate your detailed explanation,
14 however we have only a limited time, so if you could concentrate on
15 answering the question. So Mr. Karadzic will lead you with his
16 questions. The question was whether Croatia declared war.
17 Continue with your next question, Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly see D332, please,
19 and see whether this is the document that you are referring to.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. But my question was whether the formal declaration of war came on
22 the 20th of June, 1992, and we were declared the enemy, "we," as
23 Yugoslavia. First of all, is this the document that you're referring to,
24 the document that was a trigger for war even before it was declared?
25 A. Yes, this is that document of the 29th of April, 1992. That's
1 the document I was just referring to.
2 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that there was an order on combat
3 readiness that was issued by this same colonel on the 12th of April,
4 1992, and it preceded this order we have before us?
5 A. I'm not aware of that document. I cannot recall it as I sit
6 here. But I do remember this order, and I just mentioned it a moment
7 ago, because it says in paragraph 4:
8 "Hurriedly plan and begin combat operations in the entire
9 territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and co-ordinate them
10 with the territorial defence staffs of regions, districts and the
11 Republic of BH."
12 Practically, in paragraph 4, he is ordering that war should be
13 waged on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and each soldier of
14 the BH Army had to enforce this order. And this is the source of all the
15 problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina later on, and I find it hard to
16 believe to this day that not one of the authors of this order ever were
17 called to justice. It is really mind-boggling, and I don't know when
18 Croatia did that. I don't know what that relates to.
19 Q. Well, maybe the interpretation was incorrect. I said the Bosnian
20 and -- Bosnian Muslim and Croatian part of the Presidency declared war.
21 A. Well, that's correct. What I received as my interpretation was
22 that it was Croatia, which I cannot confirm. But, yes, that the part of
23 the Presidency consisting of the Bosnian and Croatian representatives
24 did, yes, that's correct.
25 Q. Thank you. Now, you just reminded me of another problem with
1 Colonel Efendic.
2 Could we now see 1D3618 in e-court, please. This is an interview
3 that you had with the Prosecution. The Prosecutor interviewed you on the
4 27th of January, 2010.
5 Could we see that, please, 1D3618. We need page 64 of the
7 Major, sir, do you remember what kind of measures were taken, and
8 how strict was the enforcement, if a soldier would waste a single bullet
9 in the JNA?
10 A. Well, it was taken very seriously because each bullet meant a
11 human life, so all the bullets, all the rounds that were issued, had to
12 be returned.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, here we see, and perhaps you can just glance at
14 it - we're not going to read it out - but there is mention here of
15 Territorial Defence of Sarajevo, and Hasan Efendic was part of it, and
16 then you go on to say that somehow 40.000 rounds went missing, and then
17 that Budimir Djordjic the prosecutor, tried to initiate the procedure in
18 1987 [Realtime transcript read in error "1997"] or 1988 [Realtime
19 transcript read in error "1998"], but that he was not able to continue
20 with it, and that it was never explained and it was never clarified how
21 it came about; correct?
22 A. Yes. There was this issue where ammunition went missing from the
23 depot at Koran?
24 Q. Thank you. Would this 40.000 rounds approximately equate to 240
25 combat kits?
1 A. Certainly, because a lot of ammunition went missing then, and it
2 was even reported in the press, in "Oslobodjenje," because there was a
3 clash within the Territorial Defence Staff. And I know this because at
4 the time I was the deputy -- I was the assistant commander for
5 mobilisation and recruitment in Pale, and I was also involved in security
6 and intelligence. And the assistant commander for logistics complained
7 to me that he could not account for that amount of ammunition and a
8 certain number of long barrels, and then it was said that that was not
9 quite the case. I even happened to fall ill at the time. I got blood
10 poisoning, I ended up in hospital, so that's where it remained. But I
11 know that they tried to clarify this, but the military prosecutor who
12 tried to conduct an investigation, he did manage to identify where the
13 problem was. He was preparing to issue an indictment against the
14 individuals who are responsible for this. However, this indictment was
15 never issued, probably because of the clash that ensued, and this same
16 person later on became one of the first commanders of the BH Army. And
17 then we know what happened next.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Gaynor.
19 MR. GAYNOR: Your Honour, I just wanted to point out an error in
20 the transcript, just in case it isn't picked up later.
21 The events we're looking at took place in 1987 or 1988, not 1997
22 and 1998, which brings me on to my second point.
23 In my submission, this entire area of evidence is really of very
24 little assistance to the Chamber, concerning, as it does, events five
25 years before the outbreak of the conflict.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Gaynor.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I reply to this?
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect for
5 Mr. Gaynor, this gentleman, Efendic, he was the commander, the man
6 responsible -- the responsible man at the time of this theft. On the
7 11th of April, he became the commander of the Territorial Defence, and on
8 the 12th of April, he ordered attacks. On the 29th of April, he ordered
9 an all-out attack. And this theft of ammunition was, in fact, to benefit
10 his side.
11 JUDGE KWON: We still have a question how relevant this is to
12 your case. Come to the question which is relevant to your case and to
13 the issues he dealt with in his examination-in-chief.
14 Please move on, Mr. Karadzic.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Q. You confirmed that up until mid-June, approximately, or, rather,
17 at the declaration of war, there was no code for protecting military
18 data. And then in paragraph 9 of your statement, you said that at that
19 time a code system was established, and it was referred to as "Vatra" or
20 "Fire." Could you tell us how that came about and how the whole thing
22 A. On the 29th of June, 1992, at the Republican Centre of
23 Communications, we established a code system to encode communications
24 that were going out to certain addressees. Now, the communications plan,
25 code-named Vatra, was a communications plan for maintaining radio
1 communications, so it is a code-name for radio communications, where
2 radio units -- radio sets were used, and it did not contain only one code
3 book, but a number of code books and documents, such as identifying
4 documents, the code book, then the key for the code book. So, in other
5 words, this is a communications plan for the secret commanding of troops,
6 or TKT for short.
7 This Vatra plan of communications could also be applied for
8 telephone communications and it would then -- it could then be forwarded
9 to the addressees or the end users either by telephone lines or through
10 the radio communications system.
11 Q. Thank you. Now, today, during the examination-in-chief, you
12 mentioned that -- on page 51, line 11, that services developed their own
13 documents independently. Would you please tell the Trial Chamber what
14 you mean by the word "documents"?
15 A. Well, "documents," that means those are parts of a communications
16 plan. So, for instance, the communications plan code-named Vatra
17 consisted of a number of documents, such as the keys for the codes, and
18 the communications plan code-named Vatra consisted of a code book. And
19 at a certain point in time, that communications plan was called Vatra.
20 Some, say, 10 months later or 15 months later, the code-name would change
21 to, for instance, Apollo. Then some few months later, it would be
22 renamed and called Ares. So all these were code-names for the plan. The
23 plan, itself, contained keys. For instance, the plan would have Lines A
24 and B, and then there would follow five-digit numbers that would, in
25 fact, be the keys to the code book. And then, in alphabetical order,
1 there would be different terms that are developed in the code book,
3 For instance, if there was an aircraft in question, then there
4 would be a five-digit number that would, in fact, stand for the word
5 "aircraft"; for instance, that an aircraft was observed or used in an
6 area and so on. So this plan could be used for communicating covertly.
7 In other words, that was the plan for the secret commanding of troops.
8 Q. Thank you. When you say that various services would each develop
9 their own documents, and you mentioned a moment ago that after some time
10 those documents would have to be changed, is it correct that such
11 documents at times had to be sent by courier to the end user so that they
12 could all change the code-name at the same time or the whole code at the
13 same time, and that this was a timely and risky endeavour?
14 A. Yes, exactly, because they all had to reach certain centres at
15 the same time, I mean the changes in the plans. This would be done via
16 radio, for instance, where a special frequency would be agreed, and then
17 they would relay the information about where such code books and plans
18 should be taken over. And then couriers would take them to these
19 locations at the time, the agreed time, and they would take them over and
20 take them to the centres where they were to be used. Now, this, of
21 course, was a very timely project.
22 Now, all of the various services developed their own plans, their
23 own systems. The police had its own and the army had its own, and they
24 were independent of each other, and they developed their own documents as
25 part of their radio communications systems. However, we could exchange
1 the documents amongst ourselves. And if it was necessary, if all our
2 communication lines were down, we could try and use those plans in order
3 to establish the communication, pending the repairs of our downed
4 communications lines or system.
5 Q. Thank you. Major, sir, you prompted me to ask you that in
6 paragraph 28 of the amalgamated statement, you spoke about these
7 stationary nodes, Jahorina, Veliki Zep and so on, radio-relay
8 connections. Even though each of you had your own documents, did you
9 share the difficulties you all encountered when there would be a power
10 cut, when the fuel would run out for the generators, when combat would be
11 directed at radio-relay facilities on the hills, and at other times? Did
12 this equally affect all the services, the police, the military and the
14 A. Yes. Looking at it from my own point of view, and based on the
15 experiences in combat, let's say, during the bombing of facilities at
16 Jahorina, the VRS communications system was damaged. It was difficult to
17 set up communications between the Main Staff and the units, so then we
18 activated our own system of communications using our centres, and thus we
19 managed to receive information from certain areas. For example, this was
20 in 1995 when there was an offensive on the Western Krajina, when the VRS
21 communications system was destroyed, when the Jahorina facilities were
22 ripped up from the ground, practically, when the communications were
23 broken down, when it was very difficult to carry out repairs and
24 maintenance. We used radio communications developed by the Republican
25 Centre for Monitoring Information, Communications, and Cryptographic Data
1 protection from Pale. So through this, we managed to convey brief
2 information to and from the Main Staff, because they could not use their
3 own communication links to be able to report back and forth about
4 everything that was happening on the ground. It was very difficult to
5 set up communications.
6 The police also had their own communications system, which I
7 cannot comment on.
8 Q. But that also depended on the status of the relays. Other than
9 the radio-relay communications, how much did the other types of
10 communication depend on the PTT system?
11 A. Well, in quite a lot of cases, they depended a lot on the PTT
12 system of communications, but even that was damaged, because they also
13 used those repeaters, those relays, to maintain the communications.
14 Q. Thank you. You told the Defence how, from time to time because
15 of difficulties and lack of equipment, you had to tie equipment to
16 radiators; is that correct?
17 A. Yes, this is true. At the beginning of combat activities, this
18 happened at the MUP school at Vraca. The school was moved. It passed
19 hands from the B and H MUP to the Republika Srpska MUP, and there was a
20 communications centre there which was destroyed. And those people who
21 were there, our police that was located in that centre, was unable to
22 communicate with their superiors, their superior commands.
23 Colonel Kotlica and I went downstairs and -- well, it's not an anecdote.
24 Actually, it's our reality. Since they had some shortwave radios --
25 ultrashortwave radios, in order to set up any kind of communications, we
1 tied those radio devices of theirs to the radiators, and then they served
2 as antennas. So you can imagine how reliable and secure that kind of
3 connection was.
4 Q. Thank you. You were shown document P2798 today, and the document
5 has the heading, some sort of counter-electronic warfare. Is it correct
6 that the 2nd Corps wire-tapped -- not only the 2nd Corps, but that it was
7 also trying to listen in to our radio-relay communications? I'm talking
8 about the Muslim army here.
9 A. Yes, it was registered that they were involved in
10 counter-intelligence activities and that they tried to wire-tap our
11 communications. This is normal in all kinds of combat, that the enemy
12 tries in any way possible to acquire data by wire-tapping or
13 eavesdropping. Many times, we had the case of registering such events.
14 The units that were supposed to create peace or implement peace were also
15 involved with that, gathering information from specific units and so on,
16 or about specific units.
17 I cannot really interpret a map which I'm not familiar with. I
18 saw it for the first time here a little bit earlier. I don't know what's
19 there, what's what. I did not draft the map. I don't know when it was
20 created, in which period. But I remember that at times when we were
21 supposed to send you a telegram - I don't know if you were in your office
22 or you were somewhere else, I don't remember - you didn't inform us about
23 your movements, but I remember very well that Mr. Milanic, Gordan was a
24 chief on your end at one time, and he informed me - this was summer
25 1995 - that you were going to be somewhere in Banja Luka, and that we
1 tried to send a telegram to you through the 1st Krajina Corps, if we are
2 not able to deliver it to your office in Pale. So I am not able to
3 actually say what happened, because a lot of time has passed since then.
4 I couldn't say where you were. I don't know if you were in the territory
5 of Pale, or the territory of Banja Luka, or perhaps you were in Belgrade
6 at the time. I don't know.
7 Q. Thank you. Major, sir, when you mentioned that, do you happen to
8 remember that information to secure routes were routed through you? Do
9 you remember that I travelled a lot all over the country and that I
10 travelled a lot abroad for negotiations, peace negotiations?
11 A. Yes, I remember that, and I remember when, for example, you had a
12 peace conference in Lisbon, and Mr. Carrington was there, I think, at the
13 time. The hydroelectric power-station in Visegrad was mined at the time,
14 and you were supposed to fly from Belgrade to that peace conference at
15 the time, and we managed, since there was the danger of the hydroelectric
16 power-plant being knocked down by that Muslim side, the then Muslim side
17 at the time, we managed to find an architect, the one who actually
18 designed the station, Mr. - can I mention his name? - Dragan Bulajic.
19 And so when you were just getting into the plane, we told you that you
20 can fly freely, without any worries, there's no need to worry, that it
21 was an insignificant amount of explosives, and that it could not really
22 damage significantly the hydroelectric power-plant in Visegrad.
23 Q. All right, thank you. Well, about the protected radio-relay
24 communications, you know that we have a whole collection here, that
25 Croatia, itself -- not Croatian from Bosnia, but Croatia practically
1 recorded every single word of ours that passed through that communication
2 of ours?
3 A. Well, that is possible, probably because the Pleso Airport was
4 also where the NATO had installed its own listening centres. We knew
5 that they had a listening centre there, and all the hostile parties
6 tried, by all possible means, to register all conversations by various
7 methods. We had some devices or stations in our centres which could
8 register anybody picking up any phone. These were some Alin stations.
9 That was the model that operated on low frequencies, and it could
10 register certain telephone conversations just like that.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Can I ask for D235 for a second.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. And can I ask you to look, together with us, at what the
15 situation was with the military communications in 1992. This is an
16 analysis of combat readiness.
17 Can we look at that document. That is document D325.
18 No, no, that's not it. Either we made a mistake or -- combat
19 readiness analysis. It's a different thing.
20 All right, we have the correct document now, and let's just wait
21 for the English version. Can we look at 27 in Serbian and page 30 in
22 English, paragraph 1, please.
23 Paragraph 1, I'm not sure if this the correct page. Yes, it
24 should be.
25 The first paragraph:
1 "Combat missions in 1992 were characterised by frequent changes
2 in the situation, continuous operations, heavy shelling of communications
3 stations and centres, of stationary communications centres, stationary
4 communications hubs, PTT communication centres, auxiliary PTT
5 communications centres and connections, at a time of simultaneous and
6 massive-scale offensive and defensive operations on both sides.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Is this something that comports with your information and
10 A. Well, it's possible. I'm seeing this type of report for the
11 first time, but it's all possible, it was possible. Certain nodes and
12 hubs were the targets to be destroyed in order to prevent functioning and
13 to damage the communication lines. Well, I'm not able to comment on the
14 report. I did not participate in its drafting.
15 Q. But the situation sounds familiar to you, doesn't it?
16 A. Yes, this is quite usual. There were actions like this; and
17 there was a continuous threat to the nodes and the communications.
18 Q. Could you please look at paragraph 4? I don't want to read it,
19 but it says that the biggest problem was the destruction of the
20 stationary section of the system, especially some vital objects like
21 Bjelasnica, Zlovrh and Vlasic? Was this something that affected you as
22 well, this loss of communications at Mounts Bjelasnica, Zlovrh and
24 A. Yes, and we had a lot of problems that we had to bridge by other
25 communications, those problems. For example, we had a lot of problems in
1 the functioning of the communications in the direction of Herzegovina,
2 towards Trebinje, because the facility and node at Boracko Jezero,
3 Orasnica [phoen], was problematic because it was unable to cover the
4 whole area, so we had problems there and constant back-ups and hold-ups
5 on the command-and-control line. There were plenty of problems there,
6 not just at those three facilities at Bjelasnica, Zlovrh and Vlasic.
7 There were problems at other places as well.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Can we look at the following page in the Serbian. The English
10 page can stay. Can we look at paragraph 6 in the English, and on the
11 following page in the Serbian, can we look at paragraph 1.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do you agree with what it states here, that the situation was
14 similar with others? Towards the bottom, there was similarities with
15 other places, and it states that facilities at Ljuta, Konjic, Bosut,
16 Trebevic, were damaged, and other facilities that were earlier in the
17 communications system, these places were damaged; is that correct?
18 A. Yes, that is correct.
19 Q. Paragraphs 3 and 4 say the same thing. On the English, page 31,
20 let's look at paragraphs 1 and 2 from the top. You can see that on the
21 Serbian page.
22 Eleven facilities, out of a total of 32 facilities, 11 were left
23 or destroyed, three were damaged, and there is a review also about that
24 in the English version on page 31, paragraphs 1 and 2.
25 A. These facilities were covered by the military, and it was their
1 duty to compile reports of this kind. And these reports are quite
3 As far as specific problems were concerned, they informed us, but
4 they didn't inform us about all the problems; for example, problems at
5 damaged facilities. There was time required for radio-relay
6 communications or certain routes to be set up.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 29, Serbian,
8 paragraph 4, and English, paragraph 6.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. It's completely the same situation with the VVF radio network
11 which, at the very beginning, with the destruction of other
12 communications, has completely been thrown out of the communications
13 system. Can you please tell us what this WWF system is?
14 A. This is very high-frequency radio waves. We didn't have a system
15 like that, this was a system that the army had, and these were the types
16 of problems they were facing. I don't recall us working with the VVF
17 communications at our centre.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at page 35
19 in the Serbian and page 39 in the English now. Last paragraph on the
20 Serbian page, and in the English, page 39, paragraph 3, where it is also
21 noted that there is lack of staff, senior officers at key posts, and it
22 is noted that there are no radio-relay technicians, radio teleprinter
23 operators, and so on and so forth.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Was this something that crippled the military as well and damaged
1 its capability to communicate?
2 A. Well, there were problems like this throughout the whole
3 1992-1995 period, and it is precisely for these reasons that we were
4 facing certain problems, shortage of staff with certain special skills;
5 for example, radio technicians, radio-relay operators, radio teleprinter
6 operators. There were problems, and because of that and because of what
7 the army needed at the beginning, we talked about organising and the
8 classification of posts in our system, from the regional to the municipal
9 level. We organised all those three functions, the Municipal Centre, the
10 Regional Centre and the Republican Centre, with the same number of
11 people. That was eight people plus the odd colonel or the communications
12 manager, who was the ninth man. But as I said, he died in 1994, so we
13 were left with a set number of eight people who had to perform all the
14 duties and tasks that were before us from 1992 to 1995. There was this
15 shortage of staff in all the units, and this was a major problem.
16 Q. Thank you. I would like to briefly refer you to a portion of the
17 interview of General Subotic. That's 65 ter 22622, page 3, please.
18 I will read out a portion of his answer. That's toward the
19 bottom of the page.
20 Could we please yes, scroll it down. Thank you.
21 [In English] "Yes, of course. Regular reports were sent.
22 Regular reports. Practically daily reports. After the communications
23 system were set up. I would say that that started in the beginning of
24 1993. Halfway through 1992 to the end of 1992, it was based on what was
25 possible. But from 1993, we had communications between ..."
1 And so on.
2 [Interpretation] Do you agree with this statement of
3 General Subotic, that from 1992 to the end of 1992, it was based on what
4 was possible, but then in 1993, a communications system sort of became
6 A. Well, yes, basically we could take this to be a true description,
7 because we were attached to the Ministry of Defence, and General Subotic
8 was there at the beginning of the war as the minister of defence. We
9 sent regular reports on the telegram and other traffic, which went
10 through the regional and republican and municipal centres. And this is a
11 very good observation, and I believe that he gave a pretty good picture
12 here in his report.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 I believe that Mr. Gaynor will need some time to put questions to
15 you, so I will just have one final question -- or, rather, one final
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Did you read everything that you sent, and did you read
19 everything that came in to your centre?
20 A. Each operative who worked at the Communications Centre,
21 especially at the encryption station, had to read and review what had
22 arrived, and then to be -- and then to be aware if there was any
23 interventions needed. But you know how it was. In our work, you had to
24 forget what you had read out as soon as you've done it. So we didn't do
25 any corrections or anything. We just returned documents to the senders.
1 For instance, for us it was very important to have -- to know the exact
2 log-books -- to keep the log-books very precisely so that those log-books
3 would show each document coming in or going out; the time, date, and so
4 on. However, there were a lot of documents in our log-books that were
5 not only from our republic centre, where I was the chief of centre in
6 1995, and those log-books were not very up to date. There were a lot of
7 omissions that I was able to observe. But whether the officers took any
8 measures to improve the way records were kept, I don't know. But in any
9 case, the information should be contained in the log-books as to who the
10 document was sent by, who it was processed by, and whom it was sent to.
11 Q. I wanted to ask you whether there was anything, in your
12 knowledge, that was ordered or recommended or proposed and that would be
13 against the law, in terms of the laws of war, anything. So was there
14 ever any order that would not be in keeping with those laws and
16 A. As far as your orders or any written document coming from you, or
17 orders or decisions coming from any of the commanders, irrespective of
18 the level, all of these men were highly educated, and they were fully
19 aware of the time and space where they were working and operating and
20 what was going on, and I know that you always ordered that each
21 individual, from the very last private up until to the highest officer,
22 had to be aware of the laws on war and the Geneva Conventions in order to
23 be able to act in keeping with them. And that was an order that was
24 issued by you, and I know that at the centre where I worked as the chief
25 of the service, I informed everyone, to the last officer, of the Geneva
1 Conventions and all of its provisions, but particularly those that
2 related to prisoners of war and the treatment of civilians. And as far
3 as I can recall, I cannot remember any instance where you ordered
4 anything that would be contrary to law and legal provisions.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Major, for making the
6 effort to come to The Hague to testify.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, and thank
8 you, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE KWON: Any questions from you for re-examination,
10 Mr. Gaynor?
11 MR. GAYNOR: Very briefly, Mr. President.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.
14 Re-examination by Mr. Gaynor:
15 Q. Major, earlier on today you gave evidence that -- I'll read out a
16 quote of what you said:
17 "For example, this was in 1995, when there was an offensive on
18 the Western Krajina, when the VRS communications system was destroyed,
19 when the Jahorina facilities were ripped up from the ground, practically,
20 when the communications were broken down, when it was very difficult to
21 carry out repairs and maintenance."
22 Do you remember that evidence?
23 A. Yes, I do remember that. This was in 1995, on the 30th of
24 August, 1995, at 0155 hours, when the mass bombing of Republika Srpska
25 began, and especially the bombing of a communications centre in Jahorina
1 and Pale. So not only were they disrupted, the systems; they were ripped
2 out of the ground. And when I say "ripped out," I mean with all the
3 bombing, where very heavy bombs were used, they just came out of the
4 ground. And all of these systems were disrupted. In Jahorina alone, we
5 had 5 dead and 3 wounded soldiers. The entire facility was destroyed.
6 People were practically blown out or blown away from the facility. We
7 couldn't even recover their bodies.
8 And as for the main relay centre at Jahorina, the so-called U-4
9 facility where there was Captain --
10 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt. It was the date of the incident that I
11 was interested in, and --
12 JUDGE KWON: Just before you --
13 MR. GAYNOR: Yes.
14 JUDGE KWON: How long would you expect?
15 MR. GAYNOR: Literally, about two minutes.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 MR. GAYNOR: If that could be provided.
18 Yes. Could I call up, please, 23160.
19 Q. If you'll see this document in front of you, you'll see it's
20 dated the 30th of August, 1995. And on the next page, we'll see it comes
21 from General Mladic. And this, indeed, in the first paragraph, refers to
22 what you've just described, if we go back to page 1. You just described
23 the large-scale NATO attacks on the 30th of August. Can you just look at
24 the first paragraph and tell me if this is what you were referring to?
25 Could we -- thank you. If we could blow up paragraph 1, please,
1 in the B/C/S.
2 A. Yes, this is a reference to that same incident, and I remember
3 that I received a report from the Main Staff, from General Tolimir. I
4 was advised that we might be targeted, that there was -- that we were one
5 of the possible targets. And he also mentioned the possible time, 01,
6 03, 05, 07, and so on.
7 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.
8 I'd like to tender that and just to show one other document.
9 Could I have 23159, please.
10 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, that will be admitted.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2825, Your Honours.
12 MR. GAYNOR: The next document is also dated the 30th of August,
14 Q. This document is not in your language, I'm afraid, Major, but it
15 is from Janvier at UNPF in Zagreb to Annan at UN --
16 JUDGE KWON: I think we have the translation.
17 MR. GAYNOR: Do we have it in -- I beg your pardon. Yes, thank
18 you, Mr. President.
19 Q. Now, on the first paragraph of this document, Major, you see a
20 reference to NATO air-strikes, and it says they were predominantly
21 targeted against the Bosnian Serb Integrated Air Defence System, that is,
22 radar, missile and communications sites. Do you see that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now, is that also a reference to the attack that you were
25 referring to earlier?
1 A. Yes, this is a reference to that, except that the attack started
2 exactly at 0155 hours; not at 0210 hours, but it started exactly at 0155
3 hours on the 30th of August.
4 Q. Do you happen to be aware of any co-ordinated NATO attack on
5 Bosnian Serb communications targets prior to 30th of August, 1995?
6 A. Well, there were air-strikes. For instance, there was an
7 air-strike on the 25th and the 26th of May, 1995, in other words, some
8 three to four months prior to this, and these were air-strikes on Pale,
9 and some warehouses were destroyed at the Jahorinski Potok site, where
10 the Depot 23 was destroyed. And a private was lightly wounded at the
11 time, but there was a lot of material damage. This was an air-strike on
12 the 25th. There were six aircraft which participated in the attack, in
13 the air-strike. The aircraft were A-10 Thunderbolt and F-16. And on the
14 26th, there were 14 air-strikes, also targeting Jahorinski Potok and
15 destroying several ammunition depots.
16 Q. Can I interrupt there just so --
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. -- we can get through this as soon as possible.
19 Though air-strikes, can you confirm, to the best of your
20 knowledge, they were targeting ammunition dumps or depots, as you've just
22 A. These air-strikes of the 25th and 26th targeted also ammunition
23 dumps. However, before they destroyed the ammunition dumps, it would be
24 necessary - and this would be in any army - to destroy anti-aircraft
25 defence facilities. And in order to do that, you also have to destroy
1 communications centres and nodes because it is necessary to disrupt the
2 command-and-control chain. And the forces that carried out these
3 air-strikes, they carried out air-strikes of these facilities on the
4 ground, but they also protected the air-space from any other flights.
5 However, they did not accomplish what they were supposed to, but they did
6 bomb and carry out air-strikes on any facility that could present a
7 threat to them. So they did conduct air-strikes on communications
8 centres; for instance, on Jahorina, where there was a communications
9 centre for the Main Staff which had links to the other units in that
10 territory, because I remember that when that was accomplished, they flew
11 at a lower height, altitude, and they just sort of waved their wings and
12 flew away.
13 Mr. Gaynor, I thank you for treating me fairly, and I thank you
14 for having understanding for me, but you will understand that I am kind
15 of eager to get home.
16 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, absolutely. I think I'll just end with this,
18 Q. The air-strikes targeting the ammunition dumps in Pale have been
19 the subject of evidence before Their Honours already in this trial. Are
20 you suggesting that there was an attack on Bosnian Serb military
21 communications facilities prior to the May attack, similar to the one
22 which started on the 30th of August, 1995, or could it be that you're
23 thinking of the one that started on the 30th of August, 1995?
24 A. Mr. Gaynor, any attack against any target requires very careful
25 preparation and protection of one's own forces from strikes from the
1 other party.
2 Now, I remember this attack of the 25th of May, 1995, which,
3 during the first air-strike on the Jahorinski Potok Barracks, that attack
4 started sometime at around 1550 hours, around 4.00 p.m., in other words,
5 and there were six aircraft that participated, that took part in that
6 attack. They were F-16 aircraft. And on that occasion, the
7 Ammunition Dump 23 was destroyed, and one soldier was slightly wounded.
8 However, when you have a synchronised attack against such facilities, you
9 also have to ensure that there is radio communications and electronic
10 jamming to disable the anti-aircraft defence system.
11 On the 26th of May, there were 14 formations that took part in
12 the air-strike on Jahorinski Potok, and as a man who was at the
13 Centre for Monitoring and Information, I monitored all the information
14 through my own system regarding the situation in air-space on that
15 territory. And we registered 14 formations that carried out sorties
16 against 26 facilities in Jahorinski Potok.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: On the 26th of May.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was a problem with these
19 facilities at Jahorina because, in addition to a radar installation that
20 was monitoring the air-space between the Mediterranean Sea and the
21 territory of Yugoslavia, the thing is they had to disable those radars as
22 well. There was strong jamming and also some targeting of those antenna
23 systems and radar installations. And as soon as that happened, as soon
24 as you targeted those facilities, immediately you would disrupt the
25 communications system.
1 I don't know if that answers your question.
2 MR. GAYNOR: Mr. President, I'd like to tender the cable from
3 Janvier to Annan of the 30th of August, 1995.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 MR. GAYNOR: I have no further questions.
6 JUDGE KWON: That will be Exhibit P2826.
7 And by hearing nothing from you, Mr. Tieger, I take it that
8 there's nothing to be added to what is contained in your written response
9 about the disclosure violation.
10 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, you were.
11 When you indicated the end of the day, we are preparing a written
12 submission which will be filed by close of business.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Vukovic. That concludes your
14 evidence, and on behalf of the Tribunal and the Bench, I'd like to thank
15 you for your coming to The Hague. Now you are free to go.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. And I
17 thank the Tribunal, and also the Prosecution, as well as the accused.
18 JUDGE KWON: I'd also like to extend my thanks to the staff
19 members for their patience.
20 Tomorrow morning at 9.00.
21 [The witness withdrew]
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.41 p.m.,
23 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 22nd day of
24 June, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.