1 Tuesday, 12 July 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Yes. Good morning,
7 Ms. Sutherland.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: Good morning, Your Honours. In relation to
9 Exhibit P2970, which was discussed on the 7th of July at transcript page
10 16291, a revised translation has been done and is uploaded and in
11 e-court, and in relation to Exhibits P2990 and P2991, which were the
12 log-books, the headings and the specific entries referred to, and this
13 was discussed at transcript page 16330 to 16331, have been translated and
14 have been uploaded and are in e-court.
15 Thank you, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Sutherland.
17 Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue your cross-examination.
18 WITNESS: CHRISTIAN NIELSEN [Resumed]
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Excellency. Good morning to all.
20 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
21 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Nielsen.
22 A. Good morning.
23 Q. As we broke off, we were discussing item 1, what you called your
24 primary objectives, and item 2, the ideology of the Bosnian Serbs.
25 Were you familiar with the programme and statute and documents,
1 founding documents, the Serb Democratic Party?
2 A. Yes, I'm familiar with those documents.
3 Q. Thank you. In these documents, did you find what you call our
4 ideology and our main objectives?
5 A. I believe that the statute and documents of the Serb Democratic
6 Party that you refer to lay out the reasons for the founding of that
7 party and its main objectives.
8 Q. Thank you. So do you rely on that knowledge when you speak
9 about -- about the ideology of the Bosnian Serbs and about our
10 objectives? Is that what you have in mind, that programme?
11 A. Yes. What I rely on is, among other things, those documents
12 through the analysis of the report written by Pat Treanor, who was the
13 main analyst engaged in an analysis of those documents. That is the
14 context for which I used -- or which I used in preparing my report on the
16 Q. Did I understand you correctly that you dealt with or relied on
17 reports of other experts in your own report, other Prosecution experts,
18 that is?
19 A. As I have stated in previous testimony and as I believe I stated
20 also last week, my report is one of a number of analytical reports
21 produced by the leadership research team. Given the very large scope of
22 topics that we were tasked to analyse, I was not able to analyse every
23 single topic myself. I was tasked specifically to analyse the
24 Bosnian Serb police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in doing so, I read the political analysis of the
1 Bosnian Serb leadership produced by Patrick Treanor, and was informed by
2 the political context that was included in that report. In many
3 instances, I also read the primary sources on which Dr. Treanor based his
4 own report.
5 Q. Thank you. These papers, these -- this report of yours, are they
6 expert findings of an expert witness?
7 A. If you are referring to the report that I have in front of me,
8 and which the Court has in front of it, it is, as it indicates on the
9 title, a research report that I personally and solely originally prepared
10 for the case of Krajisnik. It was later updated for the Mico Stanisic
11 case, and now also a corrected version was prepared for this case, and I
12 regard this as an expert report, a research report, which forms the basis
13 of my testimony here.
14 Q. I'm a bit perplexed, perhaps because I'm not a lawyer or because
15 I don't come from that legal system. Let's try to spell this out in very
16 specific terms. As an employee of the OTP, you investigated or explored
17 the nature of the MUP of Republika Srpska, and you did not research the
18 Presidency, the Crisis Staffs, the government. You did not investigate
19 the behaviour of the second party and the third party in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then you put all of your research together into
21 this report on the basis of which you're testifying here now; right?
22 A. As I mentioned just a moment ago, the topics that you just
23 enunciated or listed are so enormous in scope that it would be beyond the
24 capacity of any analyst, however capable, to deal with that on his or her
25 own capabilities or capacities. That is why we had a leadership research
1 team in the Office of the Prosecutor. That team was divided into
2 research units, and we were each tasked to focus on specific aspects of,
3 among other things, the Bosnian Serb leadership - other of my colleagues
4 worked on, for example, the Bosnian Croat or Bosnian Muslim leadership -
5 and I was in constant communication with other analysts on that team who
6 would alert me, as I would alert them, to documents that were being
7 collected and which might be potentially relevant for the preparation of
8 their own reports.
9 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that a witness has to be impartial by
10 the very nature of things?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And it is now that I find out that you are part of a bigger team
13 that collected evidence about the responsibility of the Serb side in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?
15 A. I don't know now you just found out about this at this moment
16 since it has been clearly indicated on my curriculum vitae that I was a
17 member of the leadership research team of the Office of the Prosecutor.
18 And I have in my previous testimony, as I'm sure you are aware, made it
19 very clear that the methodology that I just described was the methodology
20 employed by that team that I was a member of, of an analytical team
21 focusing on readership research and that we collaborated internally in
22 the manner that I just indicated.
23 Q. Thank you, Dr. Nielsen. I just want to establish the capacity in
24 which you're testifying here, as a researcher or as an expert, as an
25 impartial expert witness, a professional who viewed everything that
1 happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, what everyone did, all the parties did,
2 and then the Serb side within that context. Is it the first thing that I
3 said, as a researcher?
4 A. I think this is a very important point. I was always during my
5 employment at the OTP a research officer or analyst, those two being
6 synonyms in the Office of the Prosecutor, and at no point during my
7 employment for the Office of the Prosecutor was I an investigator. My
8 primary task was to research and to analyse, not to investigate.
9 Q. So while you were doing that, your task was to collect as much
10 relevant evidence as possible that indicates the responsibility of the
11 Serb side; right?
12 A. As I indicated last week, my task was to collect as much relevant
13 evidence as possible about the functioning of the police and the Ministry
14 of Internal Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia.
15 Q. Doctor, how do I then treat those parts of your report that
16 pertain to the SDS, to the Crisis Staffs, et cetera, when you did not
17 explore that?
18 A. Again, as the Court has heard in the testimony of my former
19 colleagues Dorothea Hanson and Patrick Treanor, who were also members of
20 the leadership research team, we were all working on very complex topics,
21 which as the Court I'm sure recognises, cannot always be neatly
22 delimited. For example, in the case of a document in which the
23 Crisis Staff and the police are co-operating, should that document be
24 solely the object of analysis of someone doing analysis on the
25 Crisis Staffs or should it solely be the object of someone doing analysis
1 on the police? In some cases, indeed in most cases, that document would
2 be analysed by both analysts, the one working on the Crisis Staffs and
3 myself working on the police. So to answer your question, this report is
4 written as part of a group of reports that is to be understood as an
5 effort to provide the state of the art of research on various entities,
6 institutions, parties, et cetera, functioning under the purview of the
7 Bosnian Serb leadership.
8 Q. Thank you. From the point of view of the OTP; right?
9 A. That is not correct.
10 Q. What was your task? How was your task defined, your personal
11 task, not the tax of the entire group?
12 A. My task, based on my academic background as an historian, as
13 someone who had done very large quantities of academic and archival
14 research into the functioning of the police in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,
15 was to come in, starting in June 2002 when I was hired, and write a
16 report on the functioning of the police in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
17 specifically the establishment of the Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal
19 At the time that I arrived at the OTP, there was no such report
20 that was in existence, and my supervisor, Patrick Treanor, tasked me,
21 based on my experience with police documentation to prepare a report that
22 would present again the state of the art of what could be known about the
23 Bosnian Serb police based on the documents in the possession of the OTP.
24 Q. I see. In addition to that, you mentioned that you relied on
25 newspaper articles. How did you get a hold of them?
1 A. Within the leadership research team there was also a group of
2 analysts who specifically worked with newspapers and television news
3 reports, what in the analytical business we call open sources. Those
4 analysts would read the -- both the media that we were collecting, for
5 example, newspapers such as "Glas" from Banja Luka from the 1990s, but
6 would also monitor the news that was being produced contemporaneously in
7 the former Yugoslavia that might be relevant to the former Yugoslavia and
8 specifically to the work of this Tribunal, and from those analysts, and
9 also from my own research, I would on occasion come across open-source
10 articles which I deemed relevant and therefore cited in this report.
11 Q. Thank you. How did you get to them technically speaking? How
12 did you get access to those media sources?
13 A. In some cases those news articles would be found in various
14 government institutions when we collected documents there. I recall on
15 some occasions in police or government archives in Republika Srpska we
16 often sometimes consciously, sometimes inadvertently ended up collecting
17 their own archives of old newspapers. In other cases, I directly went,
18 for example, to the offices of "Glas" in Banja Luka and asked them
19 whether it would be possible to receive access to their archives from the
20 war. In some cases, private citizens, and indeed, also journalists
21 approved the OTP and offered their own collections of old newspapers
22 because they deemed they might be relevant for the OTP and for the
23 Tribunal. And lastly, in some cases, increasingly with the capabilities
24 that the internet offers us, very large quantities of open sources became
25 available through the internet.
1 Q. Thank you. However, when you testified in Mr. Krajisnik's case,
2 you said that it was the OTP that had made this possible for you and that
3 in the OTP, itself, you found many of these articles that were registered
4 with ERN numbers; right? That is page -- page 14000, I think, 14000,
5 June 2005.
6 A. That is absolutely correct, and I view that as being consistent
7 with my previous answer. We both had collections. The OTP, as you know,
8 had existed for several years before I arrived in 2002, and in other
9 cases, as I indicated previously in my testimony, when I -- or my
10 colleagues as analysts identified gaps in these documents collections, we
11 on occasion went to the field in pursuit of more documents that would be
12 relevant to these document collections.
13 Q. So the OTP supplied you with documents, with most of the texts
14 that you used, and you -- did you work on the basis of what the OTP had
15 offered to you? What did you do with the documents that speak in favour
16 of the Bosnian Serbs? Were there such texts there too? Were there such
17 documents, and what did you do with them?
18 A. I see at least three, four separate questions in that section, so
19 I would start by saying, yes, the OTP had documents which I was able to
20 use, archives of documents. And again, very often I, myself, augmented
21 those collections by going out and had very good co-operation with the
22 Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs who provided us with additional
23 documentations -- documentation when we sought that, and as well as with
24 other institutions of Republika Srpska.
25 To your next questions, when we found documents -- well, perhaps
1 you could be more specific. What do you mean, "speak in favour of the
2 Bosnian Serbs"? I did not see it as my task to write a report that was
3 in favour, whatever that may mean, or against the Bosnian Serbs but,
4 rather, to write a report, the sole purpose of which was to explain to
5 the Court how the Ministry of Internal Affairs had functioned in the
6 period from November 1990 until the end of 1992 in its various
8 Q. Thank you. As for this way of obtaining documents, you did not
9 mention that when you testified in Mr. Krajisnik's case. Isn't that
10 right? You just confined yourself to what you received from the OTP?
11 A. I would be very surprised if I had not, at some point during my
12 testimony in the Krajisnik trial, specifically mentioned that, as I did
13 last week and as I did in the Stanisic and Zupljanin case, that I was
14 involved personally in the collection of documentation.
15 Q. Let's go back to primary goals as you call them, primary goals,
16 and Serb ideology. What does the programme of the Serb Democratic Party
18 JUDGE KWON: Before we leave, it's about the leadership research
19 team. Is there a team leader? You at one point in time you --
20 Mr. Patrick Treanor was your supervisor. So was there a team leader that
21 was -- is chairing or leading the team?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. In the period that I worked for
23 the leadership research team, the leader of that team was Patrick Treanor
24 as the chief research officer, and all the of the reports I produced,
25 both internal work product and research reports for trial, were
1 supervised and edited by Patrick Treanor, as my supervisor.
2 JUDGE KWON: So you said the supervisor supervised or edited the
3 work of the researcher. So what's the relation like between the chief
4 researcher and the researcher?
5 THE WITNESS: First of all, Your Honour, as I indicated,
6 Dr. Treanor tasked me to write this report that we have in front of us
7 today. He then proceeded to let me work for several months at such point
8 where I had a -- what I felt was a rough draft of the report ready. I
9 would submit it to Patrick Treanor, who would read the report in the
10 manner of an academic advisor. We would then go through the report where
11 he would ask questions such as what -- what needed to be clarified
12 further. He would point out any ambiguities in the report, and
13 basically, we would have a back and forth through various drafts of the
14 report before the final version of the report was produced. At no point
15 in time could I produce a report or circulate it, much less submit it as
16 an expert report, without the approval of the chief research officer.
17 JUDGE KWON: And then what's the relation like between the chief
18 researcher and Prosecutor or trial attorney or trial attorney, senior
19 attorney or Prosecutor? Does he report to the Prosecutor as to his --
20 his research?
21 THE WITNESS: For the time when I worked at the OTP, I believe
22 that the chief research officer was reporting to the chief of
23 investigations of the OTP, and in tasking -- if there came a point when
24 the senior trial attorneys or other legal officers wished analysts
25 working for the research leadership team to perform any analysis, then
1 such requests would be directed through the chief research officer to the
2 individual research officers, myself included.
3 JUDGE KWON: So the research team, leadership research team, is
4 part of investigation.
5 THE WITNESS: At the time that I worked for the team it was part
6 of investigations. It has subsequently, I believe, been moved to a
7 section called OTP support teams.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I wasn't going to interrupt
10 Mr. Karadzic earlier, but he took the witness -- he cited page 14000 of
11 the Krajisnik transcript, and just above the questions about the media
12 reports, Mr. Nielsen said he undertook a series of missions as a research
13 officers to obtain additional collections of documents pertaining to the
14 RS MUP from archives in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So I draw Mr. Karadzic's
15 attention to that page.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Actually, Mr. Witness, what I basically meant was newspaper
20 articles, and you said that there were a great many of them in the OTP;
21 right? And that the OTP provided these documents to you and these
22 articles; right? We've agreed on that.
23 A. I would like to ask for precision in terminology here. No one
24 provided documents to me. As an analyst and a research officer working
25 for the OTP, I had access to the document collections of the OTP. I did
1 my own searches. I did my own research, and I was the person who decided
2 which document collections I wanted to review.
3 I identified the document collections that were necessary and
4 useful to review in consultation with the chief research officer,
5 particularly when I was new here and I was not yet familiar with the
6 scope of those document collections, and as I indicated previously, on
7 occasion my colleague analysts would also point me in the direction of
8 document collections, including those with open sources that would be
9 relevant to my report.
10 Q. Thank you. Can we please now identify what do you understand by
11 the term "primary goals and the Serbs' ideology in Bosnia," and did you
12 find any elements to that effect in the programme of the SDS which was
13 adopted on the 12th of July, 1990, and confirmed in 1991, as a political
14 programme, whereas back in 1990 it was a founding programme? And the one
15 in 1991 was designed for implementing and carrying out power.
16 A. As I recall it, the primary goal of the Bosnian Serbs in -- or I
17 should rephrase that. The primary goal of the SDS, which regarded it as
18 the legitimate representative of the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina, was to represent politically and to protect the interests of
20 that community, that is of the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
21 Q. Now in that context what were the goals and the ideology that you
22 identified in items 1 and 2?
23 A. Certainly as I recall it one of the goals associated with the
24 political representation and protection of Bosnian Serb interests was to
25 ensure that the Bosnian Serb community would continue to reside in a
1 political entity or country in which the other Serb communities of
2 Yugoslavia also resided. That is, to oppose any efforts to separate
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina from other territories in socialist Yugoslavia in
4 which Bosnian Serb -- in which Serbs resided.
5 Q. Doctor, do you know that at that point the Party of
6 Democratic Action advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia and that the
7 Serb Democratic Party made no mention of any Serb territories or regions
8 but, rather, spoke about Yugoslavia as a whole? Are you aware of that?
9 A. Yes. I believe that's accurate.
10 Q. Do you know that that was a foundation for our coalition with the
11 SDA when we tried to exert joint power?
12 A. I'm not an expert on the political situation during that period,
13 but I believe that you're correct in stating that.
14 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that Mr. Izetbegovic, in his welcoming
15 speech, said that he was in favour of a federation, by which he meant a
16 Yugoslav federation?
17 A. I do not recall that speech, but as I mentioned last week, I do
18 recall that Mr. Izetbegovic was present at the establishment of the
19 Serbian Democratic Party.
20 Q. Thank you. Can we then say that the ideology of the
21 Serbian Democratic Party at the time of its founding, as well as during
22 the elections in 1991, was confirmed as having the element of the
23 preservation of Yugoslavia as a community of different peoples, market
24 economy, parliamentary democracy, open society and the participation of
25 Serbs and democratic responses to all the problems that might arise? Is
1 that what was literally contained in our programme?
2 A. I do not know if that was literally contained in your programme,
3 your memory of it is certainly better than mine, but to the best of my
4 recollection and, again, noting once again that I'm not a political
5 expert, that corresponds to my understanding of the Serbian Democratic
6 Party ideology, as you say, at the time of its founding. I would point
7 out that, as with any political party, the methods in which the ideology
8 were implemented evolved over time in reaction to a changing political
10 Q. Thank you. However, in item 6 of your report, you say that you
11 based your report on the analysis of the documents available provided by
12 the police and army, which were the material of the political nature
13 relating to the RS, but you then added that this was not an exhaustive
14 analysis of all the documents between November 1990 -- all the events
15 between November 1990 and the end of 1992. Therefore, you embarked on a
16 political analysis of Republika Srpska through the analysis of the police
17 and the army.
18 A. No. That is not correct. Paragraph 6 of the report indeed
19 correctly states the ambit of the report of which I have spoken several
20 times already this morning.
21 I would rephrase your last sentence. I find it much more
22 accurate to state that I embarked upon an analysis of the police of
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska which at times required an
24 analysis of the effects of the political and military situation on the
25 police. As I note in paragraph 6, all of these topics are inter-related,
1 and it is difficult, if not impossible, to state where one topic begins
2 and the other topic ends.
3 Q. Thank you. When you speak about the ideology of the
4 Bosnian Serbs in paragraph 2, you say that the SDS constantly expressed
5 dissatisfaction with the steps taken by the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
6 Croat politicians on the SRBiH's path on independence and you then go on
7 to say in paragraph 4: These multi-party elections led directly to a
8 multi-party agreement on the distribution of posts within the MUP of the
9 SRBiH. This process in time -- in turn eventually contributed to the
10 breakdown of the SRBH MUP and contributed to the outbreak of armed
11 conflict in BH.
12 First of all, Dr. Nielsen, didn't we agree on Thursday that every
13 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina ensured proportionality attributed to
14 each of the three communities in government authorities and in power?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you. Did the war in Slovenia and Croatia began in -- begin
17 in the same way? That is to say, that first they had multi-party
18 elections, then all those who were entitled had proportional
19 participation in power?
20 A. I'm not an expert on the origins of the armed conflict in
21 Slovenia and Croatia, but I believe that the general gist of your
22 statement is correct.
23 Q. So did Croatia ensure proportional participation for the Serbs in
24 Croatia, and was that the cause of the war or was the war caused by
25 Croatia's disenfranchising of the Serbs and by throwing them out of the
1 constitution, and did the war in Slovenia was caused by unilateral
2 cessation from Yugoslavia? How do you compare that to the causes of the
3 war in Bosnia?
4 A. Again, that is a question to which I can only respond as a -- as
5 a historian, as a specialist on the Balkans and not as research officer,
6 because it is not a topic in which I engaged in research while employed
7 by this Tribunal.
8 I would agree that from the perspective of the Serb minority in
9 Croatia, they believed that the Croatian Democratic Union, led by
10 Franjo Tudjman, was engaged in a disenfranchising of the Serbs, and I
11 agree that that contributed to a severe deterioration of inter-ethnic
12 relations to Croatia.
13 As for whether the war in Slovenia was caused by unilateral
14 cessation from Yugoslavia, I believe that is a question best left to
15 experts in constitutional law, of which I'm not one.
16 Q. Thank you. Then in item 5 you say that this report attempts to
17 describe the de jure and the de facto structures of the MUP of
18 Republika Srpska and the command-and-control relationships among the
19 Bosnian Serb military police and the SDS in 1992. Then the report
20 addresses the co-operation among the MUP, the army, the government, et
21 cetera, and it depicts the deterioration and final break-up between these
22 three organisations.
23 Did you know that the Serbian Democratic Party put its work on
24 hold throughout the whole of 1992? President Djeric demanded that the
25 Serb Democratic Party put their dealings on ice and to suspend all
2 A. Yes, I'm aware of that decision.
3 Q. Thank you. You said in item 6 that you did not provide an
4 exhaustive analysis of all aspects. Which specific aspects did you
5 disregard or you didn't take into account at all, and what was the basis
6 for selecting them?
7 A. I believe that I have in large part already responded to that
8 question. With regard to the basis for selecting documentation, my first
9 priority as an analyst was to read as many documents produced by the
10 joint Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina for the period from 1990 until the beginning of the
12 war in April 1992. After April 1992 and, indeed, also for the period
13 immediately leading up to April 1992, I attempted to read as many
14 documents as possible that were produced by Bosnian Serbs working in the
15 joint police until April 1992 or in the organs of the
16 Ministry of Internal Affairs of Republika Srpska after April 1992.
17 As such, this document, like any research report, is a living
18 document. It is one that reflects the state of analytical knowledge of
19 its primary topic, the police, at a given point in time, and it was
20 augmented when new document collections became available, which led to
21 the discovery of documents that shed light on salient topics dealt with
22 in this report.
23 Q. Thank you. In item 3, you speak about the fact that the SDS and
24 Bosnian Serbs in MUP frequently asserted that the presence of
25 Croatian/Muslim extremism along with increased calls for increased
1 professionalism in the ministry was part of a cautious strategy. As in
2 the overall political scene, the Bosnian Serbs in the MUP held to the
3 perception that they were the sole preservers of integrity in policing
4 and the real defenders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia.
5 Do you agree that the Bosnian Muslim and Croat extremism did
6 exist in the police ranks?
7 A. How do you define extremism?
8 Q. Well, I was expecting you to tell me that, but let's move on. Do
9 you agree that there was also lack -- total lack of professionalism in
10 the Bosnian police?
11 A. I do not know that I would agree with a characterization of the
12 Bosnian police as having a total lack of professionalism. What I do
13 speak of in the report is a very high degree of politicisation of the
14 police which grew from November 1990 until April 1992 and which brought
15 forth very acrimonious accusations on all three sides that
16 professionalism was not being adhered to in the police.
17 Q. Thank you. Item 3 suggested the Serbs had a predesigned strategy
18 or conscious strategy. You said that it was not necessary for the Serb
19 representatives in the police to be members of the SDS. Now, what about
20 Vitomir Zepinic, Momcilo Mandic, Slavko Draskovic, Tomislav Kovac,
21 Boban Kosarac [phoen]; chief of CSBs such as Zupljanin, Bjelosevic,
22 Goran Zugic, Stojanovic in Gorazde, were they all members of the SDS?
23 Was any of these prominent police officials a member of the SDS?
24 A. I do not believe that any of them were members of the SDS. As I
25 state in the report, it was not a requirement from the point of view of
1 the SDS that their representatives in the police be members of the party.
2 Q. Thank you. But do you agree that they had been in the police
3 before that because they were professionally oriented in that way? They
4 were lawyers, and they were trained to do their job. They had not been
5 brought from somewhere else. They had already been working in the
7 A. I am not familiar with the professional backgrounds of every
8 single person you mentioned in your previous question. However, for
9 those persons such as Zepinic, Zupljanin, Bjelosevic, with whom I am very
10 familiar, I agree with you that they were in the police prior to the
11 November 1990 elections.
12 Q. Thank you. Do you know that Alija Delimustafic was in the SDA
13 such as -- like Selmo --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please slowly speak the
15 names of the officials.
16 JUDGE KWON: If you name the names of individuals, please, you
17 need to slow down, please. So could you repeat your question.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. I'm going to enumerate the names of the people who held highest
20 positions in the police of Bosnia-Herzegovina and were members of the SDS
21 [as interpreted] and had not been in the police previously but only
22 joined the police after the elections. Alija Delimustafic, salesman, a
23 member of the SDA, and used to be an ordinary policeman before; is that
25 A. I agree that Delimustafic was a businessman and that he had, a
1 long time ago, been an ordinary police officer, but I do not know whether
2 he was a member of the SDA.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, did you say SDS or SDA at line 11?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe I said SDA.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you agree that Hilmo Selimovic came from the brewery and
7 became chief of personnel and that he was at the same time a highly
8 positioned official in the SDA?
9 A. In the interests of time, I might as well point out right away
10 that I'm not sure which high-ranking Bosnian Muslims in the joint MUP
11 were actually members of the SDA as to merely being appointed and
12 supported by the SDA, just as I'm not sure of that relationship between
13 the SDS and the Bosnian Serbs for all cases, and likewise, I'm not sure
14 of the exact relationship between the HDZ and the Bosnian Croats who were
15 appointed at that time in the joint MUP. That is to say, I know that
16 those persons were appointed with the support of those three parties, but
17 I do not have information as to whether each of those individuals was a
18 respect -- was a member of his respective party, as it were.
19 Q. Thank you. Let me simplify things for you. You observed that
20 the Serbs' objection was that unprofessional and untrained and even
21 criminal people be brought into the police ranks by the Muslims. That's
22 one point. Is that correct?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Secondly, that the joint police was being abused for the
25 preparation of a republican army by arming the Muslims for a war against
1 the Serbs, the army, and Yugoslavia.
2 A. Correct. That is an allegation made by the Bosnian Serbs.
3 Q. Thank you. In that respect do you recall that
4 Mirsad Srebrenkovic was a hodza, a cleric, and that the SDA recruited
5 them to work in the police, in the personnel department, after
6 Hilmo Selimovic?
7 A. I did not know into Mirsad Srebrenkovic was a hodza but I am
8 familiar with the profound dissatisfaction of Bosnian Serbs in the joint
9 police with his appointment.
10 Q. Thank you. Are you familiar with the name of Hasan Cengic and
11 what his position in the SDA was?
12 A. I know that Mr. Cengic was one of the highest functionaries of
13 the SDA during this period. I do not know what his precise function was.
14 JUDGE KWON: In the previous question and answer I don't think
15 Mr. Karadzic said Mr. Selimovic was a hodza. His successor.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mirsad Srebrenkovic.
17 THE WITNESS: I apologise, I believe I misspoke. It's
18 Mirsad Srebrenkovic.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Did you know that Hasan Cengic was a hodza as well?
21 A. No, I was not aware of that.
22 Q. Are you familiar with these names: Bakir Alispahic,
23 Munir Alibabic, Irfan Ljevakovic, et cetera? Do you agree that these
24 people had been in the MUP previously and retained their highest position
25 in the MUP after the multi-party elections?
1 A. I am familiar with the names Bakir Alispahic, and Munir Alibabic.
2 Irfan Lakovic, I am not familiar with, but I do know that Munir Alibabic
3 continued to work after November 1990 in the State Security Service as he
4 had done before that.
5 Q. Can we please now look at 1D -- just one moment, please. 1D3886.
6 This is a document. I don't know if there are restrictions
7 regarding its being broadcast. I don't think there are.
8 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, we need to go into private session,
10 and the document needs to be taken off the screen.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I'm not sure we have broadcast this. Do we
12 need to go into private session right now? Yes, let's go into private
13 session briefly.
14 [Private session]
11 Pages 16380-16385 redacted. Private session.
6 [Open session]
7 THE REGISTRAR: Back in open session, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit this document under seal.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1516, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE KWON: Under seal.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Dr. Nielsen, do these names ring any bells, Senad Sahinpasic,
13 Saja? Do you know that he was a prominent representative of the SDA, the
14 owner of the newspaper "Vox," known for anti-Serb propaganda? He was
15 also a businessman and he was also involved in the work of the joint
16 police, of course. Please look at page 4.
17 JUDGE KWON: You need to repeat the names.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Senad Sahinpasic, Saja. You can
19 see his name underlined or encircled, rather. Hasan Cengic;
20 Senad Sahinpasic, Saja; Bakir Alispahic. The names do ring a bell, don't
22 A. I'm familiar with Hasan Cengic and Bakir Alispahic. I am not
23 familiar with Senad Sahinpasic, Saja.
24 Q. Can we go to page 5. This is research done by the institutions
25 mentioned at the bottom, and the date is 8 June. Can we then go to page
1 6. There's a reference to the smuggling of a large number of passports
2 providing extremists from the Far East with these passports. Look at the
3 name. Omer Behmen. Are you familiar with his name?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you know that he had been imprisoned from 1939
6 [as interpreted] to 1983? He spent several stretches in prison. Finally
7 he ended up as an ambassador in Iran. He was a member of the Young
8 Bosnia Movement?
9 A. I don't think that Mr. Behmen was imprisoned the entire period
10 from 1939 to 1983, but I know that he was imprisoned for his involvement
11 in the Young Muslim Movement. He was one of a number of Bosnian Muslims,
12 including Alija Izetbegovic, who was arrested for activities related to
13 Muslim nationalism in socialist Yugoslavia.
14 Q. Thank you. Can we go to page 7 or perhaps this has been enough.
15 Can we then conclude that you're familiar with all these names and that
16 these people were either among the top echelons of the SDA or highly
17 positioned officials in the joint police; right?
18 A. Yes, I believe that's correct.
19 Q. Thank you. Can we show another very similar document, D1180. It
20 shouldn't be broadcast though.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I think this document we have to go
23 into private session if Mr. Karadzic wants to discuss it. It's under
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Again, I wouldn't be mentioning any
1 sources. I would like to deal with the names mentioned in the document,
2 that's all. I will not mention any sources.
3 JUDGE KWON: If you could remind us, Ms. Sutherland, if it is
4 okay if we do not broadcast this document and does not name the source.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, when I read the transcript of when
6 this document was admitted, it was discussed in private session so, out
7 of an abundance of caution, I would ask to go into private session.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: [Microphone not activated]
10 JUDGE KWON: Not yet. Let's go into private session.
11 Microphone, please.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: The document was discussed at transcript pages
13 13602 to 13607, and it was dealt with in private session.
14 [Private session]
11 Page 16389 redacted. Private session.
5 [Open session]
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We are now back in open session.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. In the light of what you have just said, if that was the first
9 step, then the removal of Bakir Alispahic and others from the police was
10 actually the result of step one; right? They left the police under the
11 pressure of the international community due to their links with the
12 Muslim terrorism; right?
13 A. I am unable to state that that is the reason why Bakir Alispahic
14 and the others were removed from the police. I know that in some cases
15 it was because of concerns with their links with Islamic fundamentalists.
16 In some cases it was due to a dissatisfaction on the part of the
17 international community with the way in which they were releasing
18 allegedly confidential information to the Bosnian media.
19 Q. Thank you. And now in that light again, in the light of what we
20 have just seen, do you accept the fact that the Serbian side in Bosnia
21 and Herzegovina and its representatives in the joint police had enough
22 arguments and reasons to be concerned about the unlawful activities that
23 were taking place in the joint police? Would you say yes or no to that?
24 A. As I stated in my report, the Serbian side in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
25 and specifically its representatives in the joint police, definitely felt
1 that both Croats and Muslims were undertaking nationalist, extremist or
2 unlawful activities that were subverting the functioning of the joint
3 police. In my report and in my testimony, I leave it merely at that,
4 that is to say, I am merely stating that is what the Bosnian Serbs felt.
5 I'm not making any statements about whether I agree with the accuracy of
6 those assertions. I would also point out that in my previous testimony,
7 I have on numerous occasions indicated that all three sides in the joint
8 MUP in the period from November 1990 to April 1992 were engaged in
9 activities which were detrimental to the functioning of a joint ministry.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I note the time.
11 Should I continue, or should we go on our first break?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it is convenient. We will have a break now for
13 half an hour and resume at 11.00.
14 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.
15 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Dr. Nielsen, in your report from paragraph 10 to paragraph 13 and
20 further on, actually, you say that Goran Zecevic, as a Serb who used to
21 work in the police, wrote a letter in which he is warning that there were
22 irregularities in the police and that these irregularities are
23 threatening the safety and security of one ethnic community; right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Do you remember that others wrote to me or to Ms. Plavsic as
1 president of the council for constitutional order? People who were not
2 members of the SDS, but they did write saying that the Serb side had --
3 had not actually paid much attention to the irregularities that were
4 prevalent in the police.
5 A. [Previous translation continues] ... I am quite certain that many
6 other people wrote letters with content similar to that of the letter of
7 Goran Zecevic. Unfortunately, I did not read many of those letters.
8 Zecevic's letter was found in the archives of the SDS. We did not find
9 many other such letters.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. -- Dr. Nielsen, I note that you are following
11 B/C/S directly. In that case, please put a pause between question and
12 answer. So the first part of your answer was not translated because of
13 that overlap.
14 THE WITNESS: I apologise, Your Honour. The first part of my
15 answer was that I am certain that many other persons besides
16 Goran Zecevic wrote letters with content similar to that of his letter.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Thank you. However, you did note, and you say that in paragraph
19 11, that Stojan Zupljanin noted that in his centre, in his security
20 centre, persons were being appoint -- appointed without him knowing about
21 it and without receiving proper clearance, and he said that he wrote
22 about that to Ms. Biljana Plavsic who was ex officio president for the
23 council for protecting the constitutional order; right?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. Thank you. Then you observed that -- actually, you're saying
1 that in paragraph 15. Karadzic told Zepinic that basically the
2 percentage of employed Serbs is not really important. If Serbs were even
3 90 per cent, they could not be a match to the others because they abide
4 by the law whereas the others do not; right?
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. So you do agree that I was not exerting pressure on them but that
7 people from the grassroots were writing to me and explaining all of this
8 to me, everyone except Zepinic, that Serb personnel in the MUP had been
9 marginalised; right?
10 A. Who is "they"?
11 Q. Serb personnel in the police and Serb personnel on the ground.
12 From the police headquarters and from a grassroots level, they wrote to
13 me saying that things were not moving in a good direction, and they were
14 asking me to make sure that the power-sharing system that had been agreed
15 upon among the political parties be followed and that I should exercise
16 my influence with Kljuic and Izetbegovic.
17 A. [Overlapping speakers] [Previous translation continues] ...
18 JUDGE KWON: Now start your answer again.
19 THE WITNESS: Apologies again. I agree that a number of Serbs in
20 MUP, as well as Serbs outside of MUP, addressed grievances about the
21 functioning of the police and in particular what they perceived to be the
22 marginalised position of Serbs in the police to the SDS. The SDS, for
23 its part, as I note in paragraph 14 of my report, had by the end of May
24 1991, decided that personnel decisions affecting Serbs in MUP had to be
25 taken by the SDS centre, that is, the Main Board in order that these
1 grievances could be addressed.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you. And do you agree that that was part of the agreement
4 among the coalition partners, the SDA, the SDS, and the HDZ? And if
5 things were not moving in the right direction on the ground, that had to
6 be resolved between myself, Izetbegovic, and Kljuic; right?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. Thank you. Let us now look at paragraph 12 -- 20 of your
9 statement where you say that Zecevic wrote to SDS council, Zupljanin to
10 Biljana Plavsic and that Zupljanin claimed that Avdo Hebib,
11 Hilmo Selimovic and so on and so forth were conspiring to form a purely
12 Muslim army out of the police, and then you say Zupljanin said that Hebib
13 and Selimovic insisted that 400 new candidates be employed of whom 80 per
14 cent came from Sandzak. Zupljanin attached the statement of a brother by
15 a Muslim police officer who claimed that, exacerbating the situation,
16 Muslims were being spent to receive training in Croatia.
17 I'm a bit perplexed. How can the situation be exacerbated by
18 reporting? Is that really what you meant, that Zupljanin is making the
19 situation worse because he's reporting on it?
20 A. Well, let me answer the first part of the question first. What
21 we see in paragraph 20 is a phenomenon where the Bosnian Serbs, from
22 their perspective, are very concerned about what they regard as an
23 inundation of the joint MUP with new employees of Muslim nationality,
24 most of whom allegedly stem from the Sandzak. By contrast, at the same
25 time, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were very concerned, and that's
1 addressed elsewhere in paragraph 20, that they would be inundated by
2 police who had -- particularly of Serb nationality who had formerly been
3 in the Croatian MUP but who had now been either resigned their posts or
4 been removed from service because of the deteriorating situation in
5 Croatia. So on all sides there are mutual recriminations about
6 manipulations with personnel policy along ethnic lines.
7 Q. Thank you. I would like to draw your attention, as well as the
8 attention of all the other participants to the footnote number 33. I
9 hope it's on page 21 in both languages. You say in June 1991, rumour
10 circulated that Muslims were training in Croatia and also participating
11 in combat actions against Serbs in Croatia. These rumours were proven
12 false as it was clarified that the Muslim police officers were present in
13 Croatia as a part of routine training. Nonetheless, the rumours served a
14 propagandist purpose for the SDS.
15 Is that correct? What was your conclusion.
16 A. That's what it says in --
17 Q. Thank you. Can we now see what it is that is going on there,
18 when the SDA is sending only Muslims to be trained in Croatia? D362.
19 Can we have a brief look at that, please.
20 So this is a document dated the 25th of July, 1991, and it is
21 stated here that persons were being sent to the MUP of Croatia from
22 Banja Luka for training. In Croatia there is already a situation of
23 imminent threat of war; right?
24 A. I believe as of the 25th of July, 1991, it was not only an
25 imminent threat of war, there actually was warfare in Croatia.
1 Q. Yes, yes. Fighting was already underway, actually. So please
2 have a look at this document. This policeman is providing information to
3 the effect that he had learned from a fair Muslim who was concerned,
4 worried, I don't want to mention his name now. It says he's a member of
5 the SDA, and he said what is being organised here is that ethnic Muslims
6 are being taken to the MUP of Croatia and that there is this training
7 organised in Zagreb and that they are receiving a salary of 6.500 dinars.
8 This is being financed by the United Emirates. They're getting uniforms
9 and they're given questionnaires. They're supposed to fill them out.
10 Did you know about all this?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. But you thought that this was propaganda; right?
13 A. No. That is not what I state in footnote 33.
14 JUDGE KWON: But this is the official note you cited in footnote
15 33, written by Vojislav Pecanac.
16 A. Yes, Your Honours. This is indeed the document that I cite in
17 footnote 33. However, what I refer to in footnote 33 is that
18 accumulatively of all the documents I was able to review, it does not
19 confirm the conclusion that these persons of Muslim nationality who were
20 sent to receive training in Croatia also participated in combat actions.
21 It states that they were sent to receive training, not that they
22 participated in combat actions. So that's what I was referring to as an,
23 if you will, as a propagandistic conclusion.
24 JUDGE KWON: But rumours that Muslims were training in Croatia
25 were proven true. Is that your conclusion?
1 THE WITNESS: Absolutely, Your Honour. It is clear that some
2 Bosnian Muslims did go to Croatia during this period and did receive
3 training, among other ways through the services of the Croatian Ministry
4 of Internal Affairs.
5 JUDGE BAIRD: Do you know what they did after they got that
7 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I do not know in all cases what these
8 individuals did. There were many hundreds of individuals. I know from
9 some documents that it is alleged that they returned to Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina where they were allegedly involved in forming armed
11 formations that were affiliated with the SDA or the HDZ. In some cases
12 they may have remained on the territory of Croatia, but it is not a topic
13 on which -- which I studied in detail, what happened with these people
14 after they finished training.
15 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. D367. Can we have a
17 look at that, please?
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. In the meantime, Dr. Nielsen, do you agree that whenever people
20 were employed in the police force they had to receive a proper clearance
21 and it had to be checked, I mean, whether they had a criminal record or
22 something like that?
23 A. Yes. That was certainly part of the normal procedure for
24 obtaining employment in the police up until that point.
25 Q. Please take a look at this document in which Stojan Zupljanin is
1 protesting because the following persons were employed and assigned to
2 the Prijedor SJB, Ilijas Aliskovic, Omer Avdic, Muharem Ramic, et cetera.
3 It says that Ilijas will go to Sanski Most, also that they were checked,
4 their records were checked, and it says here with regard to the other
5 employees from whom I had not provided a recommendation for employment in
6 the MUP, they were being received nevertheless.
7 You see what is happening. These people are being admitted in
8 the police. They are employed without receiving proper clearance and
9 without the chief of the centre knowing about it or giving his approval
10 and it's not only that the ethnic structure is being changed, but also
11 the moral and criminal structure as such, because if people who are not
12 eligible to work in the police are being employed, that is what happens,
13 if people who start working for the police who should not have been
14 cleared in the first place. Do you agree?
15 A. Yes, I agree, and there were a number of such incidents.
16 Q. Thank you. D359. Can we have a look at that briefly.
17 Do you agree that on the 31st of March, a decision was made to
18 establish the Patriotic League? It was established on the 30th of April,
19 and then on the 10th of June -- or, rather, the 11th of June the
20 Council for National Defence of the SDA was established.
21 A. I'm not an expert on Bosnian Muslim structures or on the SDA, but
22 based on my general recollection of events, what you just stated
23 corresponds to the truth.
24 Q. Thank you. This has already been admitted, this document, and it
25 is a document in which Hasan Cengic is informing the members of the SDA
1 that this National Defence Council of the SDA has been established.
2 1D3854. Could we have that now, please.
3 Actually, this happened on the 13th of June; right? On the 11th
4 it was actually established, and information about that was provided on
5 the 13th; right?
6 A. That is what the document says.
7 Q. Thank you. Can we now have 1D3854.
8 Do you agree, Dr. Nielsen, that there is a list here, a list of
9 persons who on the 20th of June were allowed to go home during the
10 holidays? That is to say, they arrived before the 20th of June, and
11 already on the 20th of June they're going home for a few days. The
12 Secondary School of Internal Affairs, the sixth course for policemen,
13 Zagreb, the 20th of June, 1991; right?
14 A. I don't have any information about how long or for what period of
15 time these persons stayed at the police course in Zagreb, but you are
16 correct. This is a document showing a list of attendees who are being
17 allowed to go on home leave.
18 Q. Thank you. Can we have page 2, please, in English. Can we focus
19 on the municipalities that they come from, Jajce, Cazin, Doboj, Gracanica
20 and so on? Are all of them Muslims? You're familiar with our names.
21 Are all of these names Muslim?
22 A. Well, yes. The names you just mentioned are place names not
23 personal names, but I agree that -- this list is a list of Muslims who it
24 appears come from municipalities in various locations in Bosnia and
1 Q. Now, in English we have a description of the 1st Battalion of the
2 2nd Company. All of them are Muslims too. Can we have in Serbian and in
3 English the next page.
4 There are 48 of them here who are going on leave; right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Can we have something different in English? We need the entire
7 list. One page up in English. Page 1, actually. Page 1 in English?
8 JUDGE KWON: I'm afraid we do not have full translation of this
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 1 there is a translation of
11 the entire list. That's the way it should be. Page 1 in e-court. Is
12 that right?
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Very well. We have the 2nd Battalion somewhere as well with 28
15 names. I don't know where that is. If we go on leafing through this, we
16 can find it.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. The 1st Battalion. We've already seen that. Can we have the
21 2nd Battalion or, rather, the next page.
22 All of them are Muslims, too; right?
23 A. So it would appear.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
1 JUDGE KWON: I note that the translation, English translation --
2 page 2 is the translation of this page, page 3 of B/C/S, where they have
3 some handwriting, 2nd Battalion. I don't think we need translation as
4 far as these names are concerned. Ms. Sutherland, would you agree?
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: I agree, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: I think we can admit this document.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1517, Your Honours.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3853. Could we have that,
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Is this the Party of Democratic Action and, et cetera, stamp?
12 And it's already July, the 8th of July. Hasan Cengic, secretary. That's
13 his signature; right?
14 A. I agree that this is a document of the SDA, a list of candidates
15 for Special Police training at the MUP of the Republic of Croatia. I'm
16 not sufficiently familiar with Mr. Cengic's signature to be able to say
17 with certainty that that is his signature.
18 Q. Very well. Can we please look at the next page. Look towards
19 the end. Three sons of Islam Basovic from the same address at Ilidza.
20 So the three of them come from Ilidza, and if we go through the list we
21 can find 19 people from Ilidza in this group alone.
22 Can we please now move two pages forward. We see Gorazde, and
23 then 16 men from Nevesinje.
24 Next page, please.
25 Vlasenica. Yes, yes, Vlasenica. Look on this page, 26.
1 Next page, please.
2 Thirty-four, 31, plus three on the next page from Vlasenica.
3 Do you agree, Dr. Nielsen, that according to the norms and rules
4 in force at the time, if you had 34 Muslim policemen in Vlasenica police
5 station, there was no place for a single Serb there.
6 A. I cannot, off the top of my head, recall what the individual
7 allocation of police officers was for any given municipal police station
8 at the time.
9 Q. Thank you. But Vlasenica had a total of 23.000 and 34 Muslim
11 Now, let us look at the next page and Ilijas. The number of
12 policemen in Ilijas envisaged is 18 Muslim policemen.
13 Can we now look at the next page.
14 Now, look at Visegrad. How many Visegrad should have?
15 Twenty-five policemen from Visegrad. Now look at the seventh line from
16 the bottom. Are you familiar with the name of Murat Sabanovic of
18 A. I'm not familiar with that name.
19 Q. Do you know that a man wanted to blow up the dam of the
20 hydroelectric power plant in Visegrad and that his name was
21 Murat Sabanovic?
22 A. I'm not familiar with that incident.
23 Q. Thank you. Do you know that in both Vlasenica and Visegrad, some
24 bloody events took place, as well as in Ilijas and in all other places
25 where these fake policemen came back from Croatia?
1 A. First of all, it seems to me that any answer to that question
2 first requires a specification of -- of time. When -- when did these
3 bloody events allegedly take place?
4 Second of all, I see here that people are being sent to Croatia
5 to receive special police training. I cannot, a priori, reach the
6 conclusion that sending people to receive police training makes them fake
7 policemen, nor do I have any indication that the people listed on this
8 very long list of names actually, in fact, went and received such
9 training or completed such training.
10 Q. Dr. Nielsen, do you know that none of those men was in the
11 police? It was only planned for them to be in the police or in the armed
12 forces, as you yourself put it.
13 A. I am not familiar with the names on this list and therefore
14 cannot conclude whether these are people who at the time of the writing
15 of this document were or were not employed by the police in Bosnia.
16 Q. Thank you. Can we have the next page so that we can see how many
17 men came from Srebrenica. Only in this group alone there were 23 of them
18 from Srebrenica. None of them was a police officer.
19 Here it is, Srebrenica, and it goes on on the following page.
20 Thank you.
21 Can we now have the last page.
22 Four hundred and eighty-four, inclusive. That's handwritten.
23 And it says the continuation of this list would be provided within seven
24 days. Rasim Muharemovic, Sarajevo.
25 Do you find that in a common state where the three peoples are
1 sharing everyday life, the SDA is sending its members to be trained in
2 Croatia where a war against Serbs had already started? What did this
3 party have to do with this?
4 A. As I believe that I have indicated previously, there were many
5 things ongoing in this period certainly on the Bosnian Muslim side,
6 certainly also on the Bosnian Croat side, and also on the Bosnian Serb
7 side, which were irregular and according to the allegations of their --
8 of their opponents, as it were, in the MUP were also allegedly illegal.
9 This is a period when there were Croats who were apparently receiving
10 police training in Croatia. Here we have an incident or a case, rather,
11 of police of Bosnian Muslim nationality who are being sent to receive
12 Special Police training in Croatia, and during this period, as I discuss
13 elsewhere in my report, there were also persons of Serb nationality who
14 were undergoing Special Police training in Pancevo, north of Belgrade.
15 So a lot of training was going on during this period, and a significant
16 amount of it, based on the records of the ministry itself, was taking
17 place in -- along irregular lines.
18 Q. Thank you. Did you find anywhere that the SDS was sending either
19 the present or the future policemen anywhere for training?
20 A. I do not know of any documentation that shows that the SDS was
21 specifically was sending future policemen for training.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document admitted
24 into evidence.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1518, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have D360, please.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. All the pages are the same. We see here the instructions for
5 candidate the SDA is sending to Croatia. Pursuant to all joint agreement
6 authorise the representatives of the MUP of the SR B and H and the MUP of
7 the Republic of Serbia -- Republic of Croatia, which is not true. Is
8 that Hasan Cengic at the bottom and is the date the 11th of July when
9 they promised to send as a continuation of the former list?
10 Can we go through all the pages because these are identical
11 texts. Only the names are different. There's a whole set of documents.
12 JUDGE KWON: Given that this document has been already admitted,
13 do you need to go through it with this witness?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. Just to -- to leaf
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. And my question is: Did you know that this was the way in which
18 the SDA was sending their people to be trained in Croatia?
19 A. Yes. I was familiar with the fact that the SDA was sending --
20 or, rather, nominating people to be trained -- to receive police training
21 in Croatia.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3852, please.
24 Let's see what happened with those people once they returned to Bosnia.
1 I'm afraid that's not the right document. I think the number is
2 wrong. ERN is 17796.
3 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not catch the whole
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3852. Yes, that's the one.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. It says here in Bratunac the chief of the public security
8 station, Senad Hodzic, a Muslim, a professional and a responsible person,
9 says that the number of reserve police officers has been increased by 100
10 per cent. That is paragraph 1. And then it says that they asked the
11 Secretariat for National Defence to give them the surplus of conscripts
12 so that they can recruit them as reserve policemen. That was on the
13 16th of March.
14 "After receiving the requested list and started making inspected
15 checks we obtained information that the list included a certain number of
16 Muslim military conscripts who have spent time in Croatia on a part of
17 the training of the MUP in Croatia. We do not know on whose orders or
18 recommendation, but it is believed that Serbian citizens do not have
19 enough trust in such future members of the reserve police force. We
20 would therefore would like to know what to do with such military
21 conscripts, especially since we know that if, of the newly invited
22 trainees, dispatch so-and-so, some ten candidates for active policemen
23 from our municipality have participated in a part of the training of the
24 Croatian MUP."
25 Have you ever seen this document before, and do you see that this
1 professional policeman, a Muslim, fully realised that this was causing
2 anxiety among the Serbs?
3 A. As to whether I've seen this specific document before, I probably
4 have. I've seen hundreds of thousands of documents, and this is probably
5 one of them. I agree that the document says what it says, what you've
6 just read out.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this please be
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1519, Your Honours.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly look at D374.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. You mentioned that the MUP reacted to my statement quoted in
14 "Oslobodjenje" and that this was warmongering and that I should be
15 careful as to what I said. Now look what the executive Serbs in MUP of
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina say, and it was on the basis of their opinion and
17 information that I reacted, and it says --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Can the accused please indicate which part he's
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the interpreter's having difficulty
21 following you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Right. I'm going to make it
23 simple. Can we have D374 in e-court. And I've got LiveNote instead of
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We are experiencing some difficulty.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Dr. Nielsen, do you know that as a rule a deputy minister is the
3 Chief of Operations. The minister is a politician, whereas his deputy is
4 Chief of Operations in the police force?
5 A. If we're speaking of the joint Bosnian MUP, I believe that's a
6 correct assertion.
7 Q. Thank you. Do you know that Vitomir Zepinic was completely
8 circumvented in the process of any decision-making, and this is this
9 bullet which says the bypassing of the deputy minister of the police.
10 A. I know that Vitomir Zepinic was of the opinion during the fall of
11 1991 that he was being circumvented in some of the decision-making - I
12 don't know about all of the decision-making - in the joint MUP, and as a
13 consequence of his inability or, as some thought, unwillingness to act in
14 his capacity as deputy minister, he was increasingly also circumvented by
15 the SDS who relied instead upon Momcilo Mandic to implement the will of
16 the party in -- in the MUP.
17 Q. Thank you. Now, speaking about the party will, Mr. Nielsen,
18 didn't we agree on Thursday that the SDS had a task to ensure equal
19 participation of the Serbian people and all these people had nothing to
20 do with the party, were not related to the party in any way?
21 A. I agree once again that Zepinic and other Serbs such as Mandic
22 were not members of the SDS. However, in their work, they agreed to take
23 decisions only if those decisions were in accordance with the desires of
24 the SDS and they consulted regularly with the leadership of the SDS
25 before taking personnel and other decisions.
1 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that there were about 32 per cent of the
2 Serbs and that the Serbian Democratic Party won over 30 per cent of the
3 votes, of the Serbian votes, which is over 90 per cent, which made it a
4 legitimate representative of the Serbian people in Bosnia?
5 A. I don't recall the exact percentages. I do, however, believe
6 that at the November 1990 elections, the large majority of Serbs in
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina gave their votes to the SDS.
8 Q. Thank you. Look at bullet number 2, which says the abolishment
9 of the post of the deputy undersecretary for the State Security Service
10 which had been allocated to the SDS.
11 Do you agree that both in democracy and in accounting, trust is
12 based on control, and that the removal of the undersecretary for state
13 security amounted to the hampering of the Serbian side to have any
14 insight into the affairs relating to state security?
15 A. I agree, and I state in paragraph 22 that, as indicated in this
16 document, the Bosnian Serbs were very dissatisfied that this position of
17 deputy under-secretary of the State Security Service, which had been
18 allocated to the Serbs under the inter-party agreement, had been
20 Q. Thank you. Now, look at the remaining bullet points relating to
21 the recruiting of people who were criminally prosecuted, the inciting of
22 empty army sentiments which is reflected in the written instruction to
23 the MUP not to take criminal records. And look at the last bullet point.
24 It says:
25 "The issuance of official ID cards to the people who are not
1 working in the MUP."
2 Do you agree that if you have a policeman appearing with an
3 official ID, in our system, even if he didn't have a warrant was to be
4 allowed to have access either to individuals or premises?
5 A. I believe that that is correct at that time -- at that point in
6 time. I would also point out since we have this document in front of us,
7 just as it adds to a point that I made earlier that that is also a
8 document where there is an insistence that it not -- that it is not
9 sufficient that there be a certain number of Serbs in the MUP. They
10 must, rather, specifically be Serbs who are not servile, that is, there
11 is an opposition to Serbs who are being appointed without what is viewed
12 as appropriate consultation with the SDS.
13 Q. In other words, Dr. Nielsen, we are requesting to be represented,
14 the Serb people, to be represented by its legitimate representatives and
15 not by puppets on string.
16 A. As indicated in this document and in numerous intercepts during
17 the summer and the fall of 1991, from the point of view of the SDS it was
18 the sole legitimate representative of the Serb nation, and therefore any
19 Serbs who did not enjoy the approval or support of that party could not
20 be regarded as proper Serbs and indeed were regarded, as I note in
21 paragraph 22, as servile Serbs instead, particularly in the police.
22 Q. Dr. Nielsen, we have established that these people who were in
23 the police, who had always been in the police and were not SDS members,
24 were professional and that they are actually asking the SDS to be -- to
25 protect them and to ensure that they have an equal status in the police.
1 They are addressing Mr. Zepinic in that respect; is that correct?
2 A. As I stated, I have included here the very important letter of
3 Goran Zecevic to the SDS council which is, indeed, in precisely the vein
4 that you just mentioned. I would, however, note that we do not have a
5 sufficient number of documents to demonstrate a clear pattern that Serbs
6 in the police were, as matter of course, asking the SDS to protect them.
7 Q. Very well. We'll come to that later. But now that you mentioned
8 the intercepts from 1991, how did it happen that we have transcripts of
9 virtually or nearly each conversation conducted by members of the Serbian
10 leadership in Bosnia?
11 Have you seen any documents that constitute a proper legal basis
12 for listening in to their partners in power from the Serbian party, but
13 also prominent people like Milorad Ekmecic, an academician, and other
14 most respected Serbs in Bosnia? Have you ever come across a document
15 that provided a legal justification for that?
16 A. I have personally not come across documents that discuss the
17 methodology or the legal justification for the wiretapping operations
18 that were being carried out by the State Security Service in Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina during that period. I am, however, aware that the legality
20 or illegality of such wiretapping operations has been extensively
21 discussed at this Tribunal.
22 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that the head of the state security
23 was Branko Kvesic, a Croat, and that a Serb, Susic, was to become his
24 deputy, later on to be replaced by Vlaski, but that after that or in the
25 meantime this post was abolished? Branko Kvesic, a Croat, was the head
1 of the state security. His deputy should have been a Serb, but that post
2 was abolished. Do you see any relation and any correlation between this
3 post and wiretapping?
4 A. As you know, in the report I discuss both the fact that
5 Branko Kvesic was the head of the State Security Service, and I also note
6 on several occasions that the Bosnian Serbs were very irate because this
7 position of under-secretary of state -- of the State Security Service
8 which they had been allocated was never fulfilled or was shut down, and
9 it is entirely clear to me that one of the reasons why the Bosnian Serbs
10 were unhappy with the situation is because the State Security Service, in
11 the course of its normal operations, was engaged with electronic
12 surveillance, including wiretapping.
13 Q. Thank you. This has been admitted, and now could we look at
15 You know that we had some objections -- or, rather, we had
16 grounds for that discussion in "Oslobodjenje" to the effect that in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, an illegal army was being secretly created and that
18 the Muslim part of the police were participating in that; right? That
19 was the object of our arguments.
20 A. I an aware that the Bosnian Serbs were during this period
21 alleging that the Bosnian Muslims were using the police to form a Bosnian
22 Army, just as the Croats had used their police to form a Croatian Army in
23 the Republic of Croatia. I'm not sure what connection that has with the
24 document that's up on the screen right now, however.
25 Q. I just asked you whether you knew that a decision on the
1 establish the of the Patriotic League was made on the 30th of March, that
2 is, the League itself was established on the 30th of April. Its
3 political leadership or committee on defence was established on the 11th
4 of June, and now I would like to show you a document issued by the first
5 commander of the BiH army, Sefer Halilovic. Can we go to the following
6 page, where he describes what he had by way of an illegal military before
7 September 1991 or even up to the end of 1991. Please look at it. You
8 can read Serbian. It says the preparation for defence, the Crisis Staff
9 with Safir Hadzic, who then established the Patriotic League. Nine
10 regional staffs, 98 municipal staffs of the Patriotic League, and a lot
11 of manoeuvre, territorial, and logistics unit.
12 Can we go to the following page.
13 Out of 109 municipality, already in September he already had 98
14 municipal staffs and municipal brigades, obviously. You can see what he
15 was doing. He approved the regional plans to the military staffs of the
16 Patriotic League and so on and so forth.
17 Did you know that in the 98 municipalities where the secret
18 military police existed together with the MUP, there were also Serbs who
19 resided in those municipalities and who were able to observe all those
21 A. I don't know about the particulars in all of those 98
22 municipalities. However, as I state in my report, it is clear that by
23 the end of 1991, the Bosnian Muslims were involved in activities that
24 included forming armed groups of their own, as were the Bosnian Croats,
25 and indeed the Bosnian Serbs as well. This is why in paragraphs 49 and
1 forward to, I believe, 52 -- in fact, to 54, I note that a December 1991
2 report by the joint MUP noted that all three sides were extensively
3 involved across the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in forming armed
4 formations, all of which was contributing to a rapidly deteriorating
5 political and security situation.
6 Q. Thank you. Dr. Nielsen, my thesis is this: The Serbian side did
7 not have its armed formations. The case was that it recommended that the
8 Serbs should report to the mobilisation corps of the reserve police and
9 the JNA reserve force; is that correct?
10 A. If we are speaking of the second half of 1991, then I cannot
11 agree with you because as stated in the December 1991 report, and I deal
12 with this in paragraph 50 of my own report, there were a number of armed
13 formations that were of Serbian nationality on the territory of
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina by that point. I note it says in the paragraph in
15 some areas, "Serb territorial defence forces" had appears and according
16 to the MUP at the time those forces were contribute to go a deteriorating
17 security situation. I also note that the that the Bosnian Serbs in
18 RS MUP later, on repeated occasions, referred to unilateral activities
19 undertaken by Bosnian Serbs both in the police and outside of the police
20 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the second half of 1991, including the
21 dispatching of an entire special unit of police to fight in the war in --
22 on the Dubrovnik battle-field in the fall of 1991.
23 Q. Thank you. Since we have come to paragraph 50, Dr. Nielsen, do
24 you make a distinction between volunteers as an organisation regulated by
25 the law and the decision of the SFRY Presidency on the one hand and
1 illegal groups such as the Green Berets, the Patriotic League, the HOS,
2 the MOS, and so on and so forth? Are you aware of any paramilitary
3 formation that was fully backed by the SDS?
4 A. Well, well in paragraph 48 of my report I note that
5 Stojan Zupljanin, whom as you previously indicated, was not an SDS
6 member, in September 1991 complained about, and I quote, "the increased
7 activity of the evermore numerous paramilitary groups in uniforms and
8 civilian clothing is particularly worrying. Through their illegal
9 activities, they seriously menace the security situation with dangers for
10 the outbreak of armed conflicts with the reserve and active staffs of the
11 police and with its citizens."
12 In that same report filed by Stojan Zupljanin in his capacity as
13 the chief of CSB Banja Luka, Stojan Zupljanin referred to the negative
14 activities of Veljko Milankovic, who, Zupljanin wrote, was "the commander
15 of a detachment of the police of SAO Krajina."
16 The SAO Krajina was an entity that had been established under the
17 leadership of the SDS at that point and as such, as of September 1991,
18 Stojan Zupljanin, a Bosnian Serb serving in the police, is reporting on
19 paramilitary formations that are being formed both by Bosnian Muslims,
20 Bosnian Croats, and by Bosnian Serbs.
21 Q. Dr. Nielsen, here you said it yourself that Stojan Zupljanin
22 referred to groups of volunteers and their return from Croatia. It is
23 true that he refers to Veljko Milankovic and his group who were arrested,
24 and in an intercept between me and Stevandic, I say they have to be
25 tried. There has to be a court decision, either a conviction or
1 acquittal. If there are reasons to imprison them, they have to be
2 imprisoned. Do you see that intercept involving me and Stevandic that
3 refers to that particular group, which was not backed by the
4 Serbian Democratic Party?
5 A. I do not at the moment recall seeing that particular intercept.
6 I would only point out that Veljko Milankovic, whatever happened to him
7 in the fall of 1991, certainly re-surfaced after the beginning of the war
8 in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 with a paramilitary formation, I
9 believe if memory serves, was called the Wolves from Vucjak, and that
10 paramilitary formation was subsequently given an award, I believe, again,
11 if memory serves, by Momcilo Krajisnik.
12 Q. Do you remember that I issued an order on the 13th of June and
13 that all those groups were resubordinated to the military or arrested?
14 That the Wolves from Vucjak decided to be resubordinated to the Army of
15 Republika Srpska? They were good fighters. They did not commit any
17 So we have the Wolves from Vucjak on the one hand and Milankovic,
18 who had been their commander before the war, on the other hand, and he
19 was an entirely different story.
20 A. First of all, to assist the Court, would I point out that the
21 order you're referring to is from June 1992, just so we are sure we're
22 talking about the right year.
23 And I agree that you did issue such an order at the time related
24 to paramilitary organisations that were to be resubordinated to the Army
25 of the RS.
1 As regards the group of Milankovic, prior to April 1992 and the
2 group of Milankovic after 1992, I am not in a position to comment on
3 whether those two groups overlapped in terms of personnel other than
4 their leader. I would, however, again note that the report of
5 Stojan Zupljanin in September 1991 made it very clear that Milankovic was
6 an individual against whom there were literally dozens of criminal
7 complaints pending, and that it is interesting to contrast the negative
8 attitude of Stojan Zupljanin in September 1991, to such persons, of whom
9 Milankovic is an example, with their subsequent willingness, from
10 Zupljanin's side and other Bosnian Serbs' side, to co-operate with such
11 formations after April 1992 or see them integrated into the armed forces
12 of the RS.
13 Q. I will ask you just briefly, Dr. Nielsen. Do you accept that
14 Wolves from Vucjak were an entirely different thing, a respectable group
15 that complied with the rules, that they were something completely
16 different from the group that existed before the war. That's all I need
17 to ask you.
18 A. I cannot accept that conclusion, not least because I do not have
19 sufficient information to make such a conclusion.
20 Q. Thank you. But you can say who we backed. Did we back
21 Milankovic or Zupljanin? I'm sure you will say that we backed Zupljanin.
22 A. In 1991, the SDS certainly backed Zupljanin. Once we enter into
23 1992, then it certainly appears that both Messrs. Milankovic and
24 Zupljanin at times enjoyed the support of the SDS.
25 Q. Thank you. We'll come to that. We'll see whether it was the SDS
1 or the Serbian structures.
2 Do you agree that pursuant to the Law on General People's Defence
3 the Territorial Defence was a regular legal municipal structure? In
4 paragraph 50 you say that the forces the Serbian Territorial Defence
6 Were Territorial Defence groups of any municipality a part of a
7 legal structure, both in peacetime, as well as in wartime?
8 A. Pursuant to the Law on territory -- Territorial Defence,
9 Territorial Defence units were certainly legal on the territory of Bosnia
10 and Herzegovina. What this document is discussing, however, is the
11 worrying trend seen from the perspective of the MUP at the end of 1991
12 that the multi-ethnic Territorial Defence units that had existed in
13 Socialist Yugoslavia were being slowly but surely replaced by mono-ethnic
14 Territorial Defence units created by Serbs, Croats, or Muslims.
15 Q. Can we knew look at 1D3887. This is a book written by that same
16 general, Sefer Halilovic. He was referred to in the sealed documents as
17 part of the Sandzak Corps in Sarajevo. 1D3887.
18 Can we go to page 2, please, which is page 4 in English. Page 4
19 in e-court. Two in Serbian, 4 in e-court.
20 Please look at the encircled part, and can this be blown up. He
22 "We were attacked. We will wage war wherever we can. Our
23 country's occupied. We'll negotiate only when we have to."
24 And can we now go to the following page, which is page 0503.
25 Just a moment, please, bear with me. What page is that? Let's see.
1 Four from where I'm looking in Serbian. And another one in Serbian.
2 Page 90 in the book, and 13 in English.
3 You see here that he mentions Hasan Cengic, Senaid Memic,
4 Sulejman Vranja, and then in the second part of page 91, 15 in English.
5 It says here already in December 1991, they had 500 organised members and
6 he's referring to a unit in Sokolovic Kolonija which is an urban
7 neighbourhood. They had as many as 500 fighters there. They had
8 purchased weapons themselves and so on and so forth.
9 Page 97 in Serbian.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, does Mr. Karadzic have a question
11 for the witness?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, what is the point of this? Just put your
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more passage from the
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Did you know, Mr. Nielsen -- or, rather, Dr. Nielsen, that the
18 complete organisation, the military organisation, which was illegal,
19 existed at the time, that it worked in mosques, that it involved hodzas,
20 that the involved the Third World Relief Organisation led by
21 Fatih El-Hasanein. You can see this here on page 97. Not 91, 97 in
22 Serbian. Did you know that a lot of preparations were going on in our
23 mixed community and that all the preparations were aimed against the
24 Serbs. Look here, did you ever hear of Fatih El-Hasanein in English, 24.
25 A. I am not familiar with some of the individuals. I am familiar
1 with other individuals who are discussed in this document and I am aware
2 of the Third World Relief Association that is discussed in Halilovic's
3 book. I would draw the Court's attention to paragraphs 53 and 54 of my
4 report in which I note that the police, in particular the State Security
5 Service was very well aware, by the end of 1991, that attempts were
6 underway to legalise the armed formations of the three major political
7 parties, the SDA, the SDS, and the HDZ, and this is corroborating what we
8 see in the book in front of us here and as I note in paragraph 54, the
9 State Security Service conclude that had it was impossible to disarm the
10 Muslim and Croat groups which held negative attitudes towards the
11 Yugoslav People's Army, not least because, as we see in the document
12 here, they were well aware of the fact that these Muslim units were quite
13 well armed and organised.
14 Q. Look at the frame where the army's mentioned as well as the MUP
15 of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bakir Alispahic. Am I right?
16 A. Yes. I can see that those names are mentioned in the B/C/S text.
17 Q. Thank you. Can the document be admitted?
18 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, it's the Chamber's practice not to
20 admit books inTO evidence.
21 JUDGE KWON: All the witness confirmed was some names with which
22 he's familiar.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But he also confirmed that they
24 were heavily armed and that the JNA could not disarm them, that he was
25 aware of that illegal military organisation. I believe that the witness
1 confirmed all that.
2 JUDGE KWON: You have that evidence already in the transcript.
3 I'm wondering if we need to admit this book of Halilovic. I'll consult
4 my colleagues.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE KWON: This book will not help the Chamber, and we do not
7 have sufficient basis to admit this through this witness. We'll not
8 admit this, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Maybe I should have
10 read more from it.
11 JUDGE KWON: No. Mr. Karadzic --
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But we don't have the time. Can we
13 now look at 1D3860.
14 JUDGE KWON: I recommend you to take lessons from Mr. Robinson
15 how to conduct your cross-examinations. Just put the question to the
16 witness, and if the witness cannot confirm your statement, then you can
17 briefly show the document, whether he's familiar or he can confirm the
18 document. If -- if not, just proceed. Reading out all the passage is a
19 waste of time.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Just briefly, can you look at this interview with Suad Cupina who
23 was the founder of the Patriotic League in Mostar and the first commander
24 of the Independent Mostar battalion. Do you see that already in May 1991
25 they increased the strength of the Patriotic League on a daily basis? In
1 September they fought in the streets of Mostar, and the 19th of September
2 they clashed with the reservists on the way to the theatre of war in
3 Croatia. Can we see the following page. Unfortunately, there's no
5 Can you see that in the framed part or perhaps there is a
6 translation. Do you see number 1 where it says how they were trained at
7 military and police manoeuvres, courses and in the war police stations --
8 I can see Ms. Sutherland on her feet?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I don't have a translation. I
11 can't follow this.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the following page.
13 Dr. Nielsen speaks the language, and I will ask him. I would just like
14 to show him how heavy the participation of the MUP was.
15 JUDGE KWON: I just pointed out previously that it is pointless
16 to read out passage. First, you put your question. What is your
17 question to the witness?
18 Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I can't check that what -- I mean,
20 Dr. Nielsen can presumably point out if Mr. Karadzic is mischaracterizing
21 what's actually written in the document, but it would help if the Defence
22 are going to use documents that they provide a translation. Thank you.
23 JUDGE KWON: Of course. What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question is this: For example,
25 in paragraph 2 --
1 JUDGE KWON: Without relying to -- relying on the document, put
2 your question. What is your question? What are you going to prove
3 through this document? Put that question to the witness.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Dr. Nielsen, did you know that the entire Muslim part of the
6 police participated in the creation of a secret republican army and that
7 that process started in May 1991 and that the army eventually developed
8 into a force numbering a lot of armed and unarmed members of the illegal
9 armed forces? Thank you.
10 A. I am aware that a significant part of the Bosnian Muslim
11 employees of the police in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from the
12 beginning of 1991 until the commencement of armed conflict in April 1992
13 engaged in activities, the objective of which was to form a Bosnian
14 Muslim armed force or at the very least a Bosnian armed force that would
15 defend a potentially independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.
16 Likewise, during the same period, Bosnian Croats were engaged in
17 similar activities aimed at defending or taking control of territories
18 which they regarded as their own, and similar activities were being
19 undertaken by Bosnian Serbs in the police during this period. The
20 conclusion that I have in my report and which is borne out by the
21 documentation I have been able to examine is that all of this activity
22 aimed at creating mono-ethnic armed formations was very detrimentary --
23 detrimental to the security situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
24 Q. This is our proposition, Dr. Nielsen, that the Serb side was late
25 and that they were defending themselves, whereas the Bosnian side --
1 Muslim side consider all of Bosnia to be their own and they wanted to
2 prevail throughout Bosnia; isn't that right?
3 A. That is a thesis with which I cannot agree.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this break time or ...?
5 JUDGE KWON: Correct. Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I note that I think the question
7 was "this is our proposition, Dr. Nielsen," not "that is your
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that's correct.
10 We'll a break for an hour. We will resume at 1.30.
11 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have that
15 document once again, the one that we had on the screen. Can we see
16 page -- the next page, paragraph 10.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. I'd like to ask you about these people, whether you know who they
19 are. Thank you.
20 Do you know this? These are the names of the people who took
21 part in the establishment of this illegal army. Do you know who
22 Jusuf Pusina, Ismet Dahic, Jasmin Guska, Mirsad Srebrenkovic are? Do you
23 know that they are all high-ranking MUP officials and some of them were
24 even ministers?
25 A. I am familiar with some of the names listed under point 10 on
1 this document. Delimustafic, being of course, Alija Delimustafic I see
2 listed here, who was the minister of the police at the time, of internal
3 affairs. As I stated earlier, I know Bakir Alispahic. I know
4 Jusuf Pusina. There are also a great many names here that I do not
6 Q. Take a look at the top, please. Meho Karisik, commander of their
7 special unit. Do you remember that?
8 A. I'm not familiar with that name.
9 Q. Are you familiar with the name Kerim Luncarevic?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Rasim Delalic, Celo?
12 A. Yes. I believe he was the person who, if I'm not mistaken, was
13 of a criminal background and who got involved in the Muslim war effort.
14 Q. And he killed a member of a Serb wedding party on the 1st of
15 March. Do you remember that?
16 A. I am familiar with that incident. I am not certain or at least I
17 do not personally have knowledge that he was the one who carried out that
19 Q. Thank you. Ismet Bajramovic. He's Celo too, but that nickname
20 doesn't seem to be here. So these are two well-known criminals.
21 Rasim Delalic, Celo, and Ismet Bajramovic, Celo, and other criminals
22 together with Delimustafic, with Efendija Hasan Cengic - efendija means
23 he's a priest - Sefko Omerbasic and so on.
24 Now, Mr. Nielsen, did you have an opportunity or did you know
25 that for us Serbs this is a terrifying organisation that is creating a
1 secret military organisation with enormous political and financial power.
2 Saja, businessmen, rich men, policemen all of them together are creating
3 an organisation that is declaring that the Serbs are their enemy?
4 A. As an analyst, I would be wary, based on this document alone, of
5 imputing some kind of monolithic programmatic intent on are the part of
6 these people. I certainly know from some of the names here that there
7 were plenty of disagreements and plenty of heterogeneity within this
8 group of people. That having been said, I agree with you that this
9 document, whatever value we attribute to it shows associations which I
10 have seen confirmed elsewhere, for example, associations between
11 Delimustafic and criminals. You might have pointed out that Bajramovic,
12 Celo, had actually worked as a body-guard for Delimustafic, so they were
13 previous acquaintances. And I would point out that this document is an
14 ample example of a very worrying trend that, again, we see in all three
15 communities before the war of an association between the police and known
16 criminal elements.
17 Q. Thank you. Can we have the last page to see that this is an
18 interview of one of these protagonists that he gave in 1993.
19 Suad Cupina, one of the organisers of the Patriotic League in Mostar in
20 Herzegovina on the 1st of October, 1993. In the middle of the war he
21 gave this interview. Thank you. Can this be admitted? For
22 identification, that is.
23 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour. May I have a moment.
25 [Prosecution counsel confer]
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour. As I said earlier, we don't
2 have translation of this. If -- if the parts that have been read to the
3 witness, if Your Honours feel that they've been affirmed by the witness,
4 then those parts could be MFI'd until we have a translation. Otherwise,
5 the document shouldn't be admitted.
6 JUDGE KWON: I don't think -- the Chamber doesn't think that
7 there's a basis to admit this document through this witness's evidence.
8 We will not admit this, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D1909. Can we have
10 that, please.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Dr. Nielsen, what we see here is that on the 26th of September,
13 operations are being reinforced and conclusions are being reached. I
14 hope that there is a translation of this document.
15 According to the minister's order, the minister of the interior
16 is going to call out the reserve police force. And you see it says here
17 in the first paragraph that it is military conscripts who do not have
18 specific assignments that should be resorted to; right?
19 A. Yes, that is correct.
20 Q. Thank you. So -- can we have the next page, actually.
21 JUDGE KWON: Have you found the English translation?
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I don't believe there's an English
23 translation for this document.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. You see this second paragraph here since it says: Since this is
1 a conclusion of the Presidency of the SRBiH, which in fact increases --
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: This is a -- this is a duplicate of D00371. If
4 we could perhaps have the exhibit, then it would hopefully have a
5 translation attached.
6 JUDGE KWON: Let's try that.
7 THE ACCUSED: I'm afraid it's not the same. Maybe now.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Now, the first page in English, we see that now. This process
10 had started, namely of taking over military conscripts and transferring
11 them to the reserve police force; right?
12 A. That is correct. I would point out to the Court that I discussed
13 this document in paragraph 28 of my report.
14 Q. Thank you. Actually, we see the English page here, so what it
15 says is that the assessment is that the reserve police force is being
16 increased in an unlimited fashion, and according to the Law on Internal
17 Affairs, the Presidency may order the mobilisation of the reserve police
18 force in a state of emergency, but this order may not increase the number
19 of reserve police officers in relation to the number established by a
20 government decision, and so on and so forth.
21 Do you remember that in that document of the Muslim police chief
22 from Bratunac it says that he had received an order to increase the
23 reserve police force by 100 per cent and that is how he discovered that
24 some of them had been in Croatia? Actually, 100 per cent, so the number
25 was doubled. We had that a moment ago, the document. Remember that.
1 A. I recall that document. I would only point out that this is
2 September 1991. The document we have on the screen and the other one
3 was, if I believe, a document from the spring of 1992, but you are
4 correct in asserting that while the Presidency may order the mobilisation
5 of the reserve police, they cannot increase the number of reserve police
6 officers without first going to other organs of the BH government.
7 Q. Thank you. Can we have the next page in Serbian and in English.
8 And this is what it says: A conclusion of -- a consequence of this
9 conclusion is that persons who are prone to commit crime, and so on and
10 so forth. And further down it says that in a part of Herzegovina, CSB
11 Mostar confirming the fears of potential conflict, et cetera, armed
12 Croatian and Muslim members of the reserve police force are being taken
14 So we had this interview of Suad Cupina a moment ago and he is
15 saying the same thing we see in this document, the creation of units that
16 are going to oppose the JNA and the Serbs.
17 A. I would agree and point out that this is again corroborating a --
18 an atmosphere in which there is an increasingly tense security situation
19 because of increases in various forms of armed forces.
20 Q. Thank you. Can we have the last page in Serbian.
21 What is being asked for is to explicitly prohibit the
22 replenishment of the reserve police with volunteers without previous
23 checks being run and that persons who had been admitted in that way
24 should be disarmed and demobilised from the reserve police force. Was
25 that a fair proposal?
1 A. The recommendations of Momcilo Mandic at this juncture are in
2 accordance with the relevant laws and regulations.
3 Q. Thank you. Can we now have a look at 65 ter 05401. Maybe it's
4 been admitted already. 05412.
5 Dr. Nielsen, do you know that the SDA had ordered, precisely on
6 the 26th of September, the monitoring of JNA activities and the
7 activities of the Serbs in the SDS secretly, the secret monitoring? In
8 September 1991.
9 A. I am not familiar with that particular date for the start of such
10 monitoring of the JNA or the SDS by the SDA. However, as is pointed out
11 in the document in front of us, both the SDA and the HDZ, by the second
12 half of 1991, displayed suspicion and at times even hostility to the JNA.
13 Q. Thank you. I think that you cited this document.
14 Stojan Zupljanin is providing information about paramilitary formations
15 in his area of responsibility, that is, the Banja Luka CSB. Basically
16 what he says there is -- you can see the third paragraph here. He's
17 referring to Milankovic, Prnjavor, Celinac, Derventa, the return of
18 people from the front line.
19 Can we have the next page in Serbian now?
20 Yes. And towards the bottom of the page it says that 33 members
21 of this group were brought into custody because of unlawful activity, and
22 Veljko Milankovic and Mladen Jankovic were detained. Can we have the
23 next page now. I think it's the same page in English and in Serbian. It
24 says that Milankovic mostly smuggled automobiles and caused incidents, it
25 says serious incidents here. And also that he was involved in illegal
1 car trade. They also found weapons, military weapons, and they seized
2 them. So they seized all of that, and they detain the two of them.
3 Now, can we have the next page in Serbian. I think that it's all
4 right in English. In the area of Kotor Varos and Prijedor - actually, I
5 think that we need the next page in English too - they found about 200
6 volunteers from Prijedor, Kotor Varos, and Mrkonjic Grad, and they were
7 practising martial arts and the use of weapons.
8 Further on, there's a reference to heightened tensions and about
9 20 people in Luska Palanka that are wearing Krajina uniforms. Can we
10 have the next page please.
11 Here you can see in English as well that the area of Kljuc there
12 was a deterioration in relations and then on page 4 in Serbian, the next
13 page in Serbian, it says during the summer about 20 young men of Muslim
14 ethnicity from Sipovo went to train in Kumrovec?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, we can all read the document --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: We can all read the document. Has Mr. Karadzic
19 got a question for the witness?
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. This is the question, Dr. Nielsen: Do you agree that
22 Mr. Zupljanin is reporting irrespective of ethnicity, completely fairly
23 and impartially, and that he is arresting people regardless of who they
25 A. As I stated previously, both in September 1991 and in the
1 document we have in front of us which is from December 1991 and which I
2 cite in footnote 74 of my report, we see that Stojan Zupljanin is
3 perfectly capable of reporting on the formation of armed or paramilitary
4 formations by Bosnian Croats, by Bosnian Serbs, and by Bosnian Muslims,
5 and in the document he notes his information that these formations are
6 linked to the various political parties affiliated with those three
7 ethnicities. So at this point, yes, Stojan Zupljanin is still reporting
8 on everything that is contributing to a deterioration of the security
9 situation regardless of ethnicity.
10 Q. Thank you. This is the end of 1992 -- or, rather, 1991. Do you
12 A. Yes. The document is dated 29 December 1991.
13 Q. Thank you. In addition to that, where there is a reference to
14 the SDS, it says -- we're going to find it now. It says the SDS secured
15 a group for Territorial Defence and that once they were armed they
16 refused to join in. I'm going to find it. Just a moment, please.
17 Page 2, both in English and in Serbian, I think. The fourth
18 paragraph in Serbian. The --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot see that.
20 JUDGE KWON: The interpreters are not following.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 2 in Serbian, paragraph 4.
22 JUDGE KWON: We have only three paragraphs. Yes.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. So the initial goal was to have these units included in the TO,
25 and now they refuse because members of the TO are wearing five-pointed
1 stars on their caps. You will agree that this is an excuse, won't you?
2 A. I agree.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1520, Your Honours.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D01403. D369,
7 actually. It's the same document. That means it's been admitted
8 already. D369.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Dr. Nielsen, again this is September 1991, after the decision of
11 the Presidency to increase the number of reservists in the police. Now
12 as party president, I'm sending this instruction to the Municipal Boards,
13 and I am saying:
14 "The wartime forces of the police are currently being mobilised.
15 There are rumours that up to 100 per cent of the forces are being
16 mobilised, although the bodies at the republican level can mobilise only
17 50 per cent of the forces. There are also rumours that only Muslims are
18 being called up, or that Serbs do not heed the call-up, which would
19 result in a Muslim police force and would create conditions for a civil
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note, we did not hear the end of
22 the question.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have --
24 JUDGE KWON: Sorry, what was your question? The interpreters did
25 not hear your question.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm asking the witness whether he
2 saw this document.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Carry on, Mr. Nielsen.
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have seen this document. I cite another
5 version of this document and discuss it in paragraph 29. It's footnoted
6 in footnote 52.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we see 1D3840.
8 That's a letter of Goran Zecevic that you do mention, but I believe that
9 it hasn't been tendered. 1D3840.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. This is a letter dated the 22nd July 1991; is that correct?
12 A. I'm waiting for it to come up on the screen, but I'm happy to
13 agree with you that it's a letter dated the 22nd of July. I cite I'm not
14 sure actually any longer whether it's two versions of the same letter or
15 two letters, but it's in footnote 17 of my report, paragraph 10.
16 Q. It says to the council of the Serbian Democratic Party,
17 information about the status of the Serbian personnel in the MUP of BH.
18 That is the information that you also had access to, didn't you? I don't
19 believe that there are two such letters. There's only one.
20 A. I'll take your word for that. It's certainly the letter that we
21 have in front of us is the one that I discuss in paragraphs 10 and
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page so that
24 Dr. Nielsen can see the signature. We have the translation provided by
25 the Defence team but it hasn't been uploaded into e-court.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Now, do you recognise this? Is that the letter that you have
4 A. I confirm that is the document I cite in the report.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, 65 ter number 18229 may have a
7 translation. There's also the other version that Dr. Nielsen said he
8 cited to, and that's 65 ter number 18230 which has a handwritten note on
10 JUDGE KWON: Let us see whether it's identical.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. It seems that that's it. Can
12 this be accepted now?
13 MS. SUTHERLAND: This is the other document that -- with the
14 other ERN number that -- of the document that Mr. Karadzic called up a
15 moment ago.
16 JUDGE KWON: This is 18230, what we are seeing. The last page
17 has some handwritten notes?
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: That's what Dr. Nielsen says in footnote 17 of
19 his report. The ERN of the original B/C/S that Mr. Karadzic called up a
20 moment ago is -- 18229.
21 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you upload it.
22 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
23 JUDGE KWON: I was told that 229 has no translation, so ...
24 Are you happy to tender this, Mr. Karadzic? Shall we admit this?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1521, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Do we agree, Dr. Nielsen, that the Council for the Protection of
6 the Constitutional Order was superior to the state security, the MUP, and
7 the public security but the state security at the very least?
8 A. Yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have now 1D38 -- 1D3865.
10 1D3865. Yes. That's the one.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. So this is a proposal of the meeting of the Council for the --
13 Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. It's been sent
14 out by Nedeljko Lakic.
15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters didn't catch the last part of
16 the question.
17 THE ACCUSED: Next page, please. Next one.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Would you be so kind to look at the agenda first, and that it
20 comprised the topic of the analysis of the situation in the country.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.
22 [In English] Next page. Yeah.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you agree that it says here that the proposals made to the
25 government and the relevant minister to become engaged in resolving these
1 issues and as one of the positive example joint action is being cited in
2 preventing armed conflict in the republic, and that was an example of how
3 the MUP and the JNA could co-operate. And it says further on that it was
4 agreed that the Ministry of the Interior would prepare a report about
5 this and inform the Presidency thereof.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Have you seen this document?
9 A. I certainly have seen the document. I'm actually just going
10 through my report, because I was quite certain that I cited it at one
11 point. I certainly mentioned the joint JNA/MUP patrols as one of the
12 steps taken to try to halt the deteriorating security situation.
13 Q. Thank you. I'm going to read the conclusion in English because I
14 can't see it in Serbian.
15 "[Previous translation continues] ... [In English] I was agreed
16 that the Ministry of the Interior will regularly inform the competent
17 state organs that it comes across in its work and that these organs will
18 acknowledge the work of the MUP and support it in the lawful pursuit of
19 duties for which it is competent.
20 [Interpretation] Do you agree that this council is being run by
21 Biljana Plavsic and that toward January she's still struggling to ensure
22 the proper functioning of the MUP and peace?
23 A. I can say more than that. I've reviewed all the meeting minutes
24 of this Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina from the -- basically from September 1991 until
1 March 1992 until the war started. I discuss it, for example, Plavsic's
2 role in paragraph 27 of my report already at the tenth session of that
3 counsel, and it is the case that Plavsic, together with other members of
4 the council regularly at sessions of this council expressed dire concern
5 with the worsening security situation in the country -- or the republic,
7 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that in one of the 1991 minutes you
8 noticed that the council expressed its dissatisfaction with the way the
9 ministry was reporting, that is to say that the ministry actually stopped
10 sending any reports to the state and other government organs? And I
11 think you made reference to that somewhere in your report.
12 A. I'm delighted to see we're on the same wavelength because I was
13 just about to mention that point which is in footnote 46 of my report.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted as Exhibit D1522.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly look now at D386.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. I believe that you also mentioned this document. In it, a group
21 of Serb police officers in Stari Grad neighbourhood of Sarajevo is
22 complaining that they had been completely marginalised and humiliated by
23 Ismet Dahic, the man who's mentioned in the interview from Mostar, as
24 well as an enormous increase of reserve police officers, up to 1.000,
25 amongst whom were only 30 Serbs.
1 Do you remember this document?
2 A. Yes, I do, and I cite another version of it in footnote 97 of the
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 3 in the Serbian,
5 probably page number 2 in the English.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Look at the penultimate paragraph which reads: Ismet Dahic is
8 going out with a sniper on a daily basis. He's chief of the police
9 station in peacetime.
10 Tell me, is a sniper rifle standard issue for a police officer in
12 A. A sniper rifle is not standard issue certainly for an ordinary
13 police officer in peacetime. There were special police officers who were
14 authorised under the internal regulations of the ministry to use sniper
15 rifles. I would point out to the Court that this type of incident in SJB
16 Stari Grad in Sarajevo is mirrored by similar incidents which I discuss
17 in paragraph 69 where we see the flip side, that is to say -- and it's
18 footnoted in footnote 101 where police officers of Muslim nationality
19 elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina were similarly complaining of
20 marginalisation by their Serb colleagues. So by the time we're into
21 March 1992, it is very much the case in a large number of municipalities
22 that depending on who the ethnic majority is in that police station in
23 that municipality, they are working proactively to exclude police
24 officers from the other ethnicities from service.
25 JUDGE KWON: We need page 3 in English.
1 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Let me ask you this, Mr. Nielsen: Are you referring to Pale and
4 Sokolac and the disagreement that occurred with employment of Muslim
5 police officers? You mentioned that in your report, didn't you?
6 A. That is, indeed, the disagreement that I discuss in paragraph 69
7 of the report. I would also note that similar disagreements or incidents
8 occurred elsewhere and I in paragraph 70 and subsequent paragraphs
9 discuss Tomislav Kovac's policy towards Muslim and Croat police officers
10 in Ilidza -- in the Ilidza area prior to the war.
11 Q. Well, we have to address this topic now. Do you remember,
12 Dr. Nielsen, that when a municipality was given a prefix Serbian and the
13 police station is also called Serbian police station, do you recall that
14 being done only in the communities which were supposed to be divided into
15 two or three different municipalities, that is to say that alongside the
16 Serb municipality there would also be a Muslim municipality?
17 A. In paragraph 70, I discuss that from the Serbs' point of view,
18 the removal of Muslims from the police station at the municipal level was
19 part of the precondition for the creation of what they called a Serbian
20 public security station. However, in the Law on Internal Affairs that
21 was still in force on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina as of
22 February and March 1992, there were no provisions for creating public
23 security stations or, for that matter, police stations or security
24 services centres with mono-ethnic prefixes.
25 Q. Do you remember that an offer was made to other policemen to
1 remain in the Serbian police station provided they enforce the law that
2 this station is enforcing and vice versa, that Serbs were also invited to
3 remain in Muslim police stations should they wish to do so?
4 A. In the interests of precision, could you please tell me whether
5 you're discussing the period prior to the establishment of RS MUP or
6 after the establishment of RS MUP.
7 Q. I'm referring to the period that was even earlier than that, when
8 proposal was made to divide one municipality into several municipalities.
9 You will remember that Vlasenica had already agreed to be divided into
10 two municipalities, and we had the Serbian municipality, and it goes
11 without saying that the other one would be Muslim municipality.
12 Otherwise, why would the former one be called a Serbian municipality?
13 Did you know that the process of transformation of single
14 municipalities into multiple municipalities was subject to an agreement?
15 A. I know that in a small number of municipalities there were indeed
16 at the local -- or I should say at the municipal level, discussions about
17 creating several municipalities out of one municipality and that in some
18 cases those negotiations advanced even to the stage that there were
19 discussions about creating, as you put it, Serb or Muslim police
20 stations. However, in all cases, that entire process was very quickly
21 passed by or made obsolete by the rapidly evolving events of late March
22 and early April 1992 when armed conflict engulfed the territory of Bosnia
23 and Herzegovina. And moreover, in the few occasions -- or on the few
24 occasions where such negotiations did take place, they tended to founder
25 very quickly upon a very difficult demographic situation which meant that
1 it was nearly impossible in most cases to reach any form of agreement on
2 how municipalities could be neatly divided into, for example, Serb and
3 Bosnian Muslim municipalities.
4 Q. Thank you. All right. Now we come to the situation when the
5 Serbian MUP was created. You were a witness to a long-standing
6 dissatisfaction of MUP representatives, the Serbian Democratic Party, but
7 other parties as well, with the situation that prevailed in the MUP. You
8 also heard our warnings that we would have no other recourse than to form
9 our own MUP unless the situation is not redressed. We started issuing
10 these kind of warnings from the summer of 1991 onwards.
11 A. Yes. That is what I've testified about.
12 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that despite that, we did not establish
13 our own MUP until March of 1992?
14 A. I would agree that the MUP of Republika Srpska, or as it is
15 called at the time the Serbian Republic -- or Republic of the Serbian
16 Nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was not formed until March of 1992.
17 However, as I indicate in many passages in my report, on the ground
18 de facto in broad areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly where the
19 SDS was in control of the municipality, many preparations had been
20 undertaken to effect the rapid establishment of such a ministry at a much
21 earlier stage.
22 Q. Can you tell us where and what was done that was unlawful? And I
23 will refrain from asking if that was probably provoked by the actions of
24 the Muslim MUP.
25 A. I think there's at least two questions there. One is can you
1 tell us where and what was done that was unlawful, and there I would
2 again please ask the Court to understand that I am not making any
3 pronouncements as an analyst on the legality or illegality of any
4 actions. I rely solely on the documents produced about such events by
5 the Bosnian Serb police themselves. I would point out in paragraph 383
6 of my report, on page 109, I note that the 1992 draft annual report of
7 the RS Ministry of Internal Affairs noted extensive "illegal organisation
8 of Serbian MUP" as well as the "illegal arming of confirmed active
9 employees for work in Serbian MUP." In some parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina
10 Serbs had, with assistance from Serbs in the joint MUP, been - again,
11 their word - illegally armed in municipalities controlled by the SDS.
12 This is one of the great many documents produced by the Bosnian Serbs
13 after April 1992 in which they describe actions that they undertook aimed
14 at the establishment of a Serbian police force prior to April 1992 and
15 which they in their own words regarded as illegal activities.
16 The second part of your question was: Was this provoked by the
17 actions of the Muslim MUP. That is an assertion that perhaps can be
18 debated, but in the documents produced by the Bosnian Serbs themselves,
19 they tend not to make reference to reacting to moves by the Bosnian
20 Muslims but, rather, portray their own actions as systematic and
21 proactive in that respect.
22 Q. Thank you. We'll come to that. But the more we talk, the more
23 we are expanding the area that we have to clarify.
24 Now, let's clarify one thing. You can speak our language, and
25 you're familiar with our history. Whenever we say that something is
1 illegal in our culture, does that imply a kind of clandestine, covert
2 struggle against occupiers and that this term came from the period of the
3 Second World War and that it was actually a positive notion and that
4 illegal in this sense mean -- means clandestine, nothing else?
5 A. I'm certainly as an historian well aware with -- well aware of
6 the tendency, which was widespread in socialist Yugoslavia, to refer with
7 pride to the illegal activities undertaken by the -- both the Communists
8 in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia where they were banned - they were an
9 illegal organisation - and with respect to the resistance that was
10 carried out by the Partisans in particular during World War II against
11 various foreign occupying forces and their domestic collaborators or
12 quisling forces.
13 I think that in this case such a focus on the word "illegal" at
14 the very least presupposes some kind of analysis or thought about who is
15 the illegal force or illegal state who is being opposed here? Who is the
16 occupying force? And I think that the pervasive use of the word
17 "illegal" makes it very clear that from the point of view of Bosnian
18 Serbs in MUP in 1991 and 1992, they regarded the joint Ministry of
19 Internal Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the second half of 1991 as
20 something that they wanted to undermine. Certainly as police officers,
21 they knew precisely where the line between legality and illegality was.
22 Whether they were in their own minds invoking a Partisan tradition or not
23 is a question for them, but it remains a fact that they frequently, often
24 prolifically, use the word "illegal" to describe their activities. It
25 would be from the point of view of an historian be ironic that they use
1 the word "illegal" to describe their activities in the Partisan sense of
2 the word because the project they have engaged in was undermining the
3 Partisan project.
4 Q. Dr. Nielsen, did Partisans achieve an independent
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina under the rule of Islamic fundamentalists or did they
6 do it within the framework of Yugoslavia? And was that process
7 reversible in respect of what the Partisans had achieved? The Serbian
8 MUP actually defended the legacy of what Partisans had once achieved?
9 A. Well, clearly the Partisans as we all know achieved a Republic of
10 Bosnia -- a socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was
11 constituted within a socialist Yugoslavia. And, in fact, as you know,
12 after World War II arrested and imprison opened many persons whom they
13 identified as Muslim nationalists or Islamic fundamentalists.
14 I cannot, however, agree as an historian that the MUP of the
15 Bosnian Serbs was defending the legacy of the Partisans during the
16 1990s -- or after 1992, I should say, because it is very clear in the
17 documents produced by the Bosnian Serbs that they regarded the Communist
18 legacy as one that had been detrimental to the Serbs. And as you
19 yourself showed us in a document a little bit earlier, frequently
20 referred derisively to Communists who had worked for the police, to the
21 point that the 1992 annual report of the Bosnian Serbs National Security
22 Service complained that many Bosnian Serbs who had worked in the
23 State Security Service prior to April 1992 were being criticised by their
24 younger colleagues for being "Komunjare" or Communists.
25 Q. Well, I agree with that, but did they defend Yugoslavia? And I
1 don't mean the ideology of the former Partisans but the state that the
2 Partisans had once established in Bosnia and Yugoslavia. We will finish
3 really very quickly. Just tell us yes or no?
4 A. From their point of view, I believe that they thought they were
5 defending a Yugoslavia which from their point of view had been
6 established as a state in which all parts of the Serb Nation would be
7 territorially united.
8 Q. Dr. Nielsen, did you agree or did you see documents that showed
9 that my first contacts with Ambassador Wijnaendts who represented
10 Mr. Vance were in 1991, and that on the 13th of February it was finally
11 established that a conference would take place and that it would lead to
12 the transformation of Bosnia a state of three different ethnic groups?
13 That was already on the 13th of February. And then on the 23rd of
14 February and then in March, to be more precise on the 18th of March the
15 Lisbon Agreement was finally agreed on and signed; right?
16 A. To your first question, no, I'm not familiar with that. To your
17 second question, yes, I am familiar with the broad scope or broad lines
18 of the negotiations that were carried out in February and March 1992 and
19 with the Lisbon Agreement which was subsequently abrogated by the Bosnian
21 Q. Thank you. Did you read my speech at the SDS plenum on the 14th
22 of March when I told everybody that it had been agreed that we would have
23 our own police, that they should go back to their homes and that they
24 should make sure that nobody fled our country and that no harm should
25 befallen anybody? Do you remember if you were ever shown that speech of
2 A. I'm not familiar or do not at this moment recall specifically
3 that speech. I'm familiar, however, with similar discussions in the
4 Bosnian Serb Assembly at that point in which similar points were made.
5 Q. I apologise. On the 14th of February. The conference started on
6 the 13th of February. I delivered my speech on the 14th of February, but
7 that's neither here nor there.
8 In any case, do you agree that before the 13th of February we had
9 not made a single move leading to the establishment of our own MUP and
10 that everything we did was after the 13th of February when it had become
11 clear that we would have our constituent unit and that we would have our
12 own MUP?
13 A. I do not know that it is possible to identify the 13th of
14 February as some kind of cut-off point prior to which there was no
15 contemplation of the establishment of a Serbian Ministry of
16 Internal Affairs.
17 As you yourself in one of your previous questions today
18 indicated, ideas or contemplations for such a ministry dated back
19 perhaps, if I may cite you from today, back to as early as summer -- the
20 summer of 1991. Certainly at the end of December 1991, when the SDS
21 formed its Council of Ministers, if I'm correct on that date,
22 Vitomir Zepinic was appointed as a kind of shadow minister of internal
23 affairs, and Mico Stanisic as minister without portfolio. He, of course,
24 being the later first minister of internal affairs of the RS. And I
25 discuss at some length in my report the meeting on the 11th of February
1 in Banja Luka in which Serb -- leading Serb officials in the MUP,
2 although not Zepinic, who did not attend, discussed the formation, indeed
3 the urgent need to form a Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs.
4 Lastly, I would also point out that the December 1991
5 instructions from the SDS, while not mentioning the creation of a
6 Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs, certainly as I have noted previously
7 envisaged an important role for the police in subsequent events.
8 Q. Thank you. Now I have to mention the instructions.
9 How do you know that those were SDS instructions issued on the
10 19th of December? Our thesis is this: Those instructions and those that
11 you described as unauthorised and unsigned documents originate from
12 military circles as proposals to the SDS.
13 You yourself say that they indicate that there was co-operation
14 with the army. It was even suggested that the state security should be
15 resubordinated to the army.
16 Does this sound familiar when I say that all the three documents
17 of whom you mentioned two as having been found, some without a signature,
18 and some without a number, that all of those are of a similar origin?
19 You yourself drew a similarity between those documents and this one dated
20 the 19th of December. Am I right?
21 A. That is interesting assertion. I wasn't aware of the fact that
22 that was your position.
23 I only in passing mentioned the instructions issued on the 19th
24 of December, and since that is primarily a political document, I had
25 based my conclusion that it was an SDS document on the analysis in
1 Patrick Treanor's report where it's clear, at least as I understand his
2 conclusions, that the SDS was involved in drafting that document and
3 certainly subsequently took actions pursuant to that document.
4 As regards the other documents, I note in the report that all of
5 these plans in the second half of 1991 envisaged quite close co-operation
6 between elements of the JNA which were predisposed to the Bosnian Serb
7 cause, as well as elements in the Federal Secretariat for
8 Internal Affairs and indeed the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs who
9 wished to assist the SDS and the Bosnian Serbs. So it would not surprise
10 me, and indeed, if we look at paragraph 40 of my report, it's pervasive
11 throughout these documents that events related to a possible formation of
12 a Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs would require the assistance
13 of federal institutions. In this case it says and I quote: "Above all
14 from the JNA and the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, as well as
15 MUP of Serbia and Montenegro."
16 Q. Thank you. I would like to draw your attention to paragraph 63
17 in your report where you say that on the 3rd of March, "Glas" published
18 something that Stojan Zupljanin had quote -- said and you quote him, and
19 he said, "We are afraid of uncontrolled processes which could arise in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. For now we are in control of the situation on the
21 territory of the region. However, in the case of a destruction of peace
22 and security, it would be very difficult to re-establish order."
23 And then on the following day you say: Zupljanin reiterated that
24 that the goal of the residents of Bosnian Krajina was to reserve peace at
25 any cost. He also said that he would carry out the orders of MUP of
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and so on and so forth.
2 And now, do you agree that we were in favour of preserving peace
3 at any cost?
4 A. Who is "we"?
5 Q. The Serbian side in Bosnia.
6 A. Does that mean the SDS?
7 Q. It includes the SDS.
8 A. I don't mean to be difficult, but I am asking for precision here
9 because there were, as you yourself earlier indicated, Serbs who were --
10 did not consider themselves to be represented by the SDS but, for
11 example, were represented by other political parties such as the
12 transformed Communist Party, the Social Democrats, but that's why I'm
14 But I would state that based on my review of the documentation,
15 publicly, politically, the SDS and Serbs in the police were very keen to
16 demonstrate their commitment to a peaceful resolution of the situation
17 and certainly not to be seen as those who were provoking incidents.
18 However, because of the documentation that I was able to review,
19 particularly from the police and, indeed, in many cases from the Bosnian
20 Serb police themselves, the overall impression that was left upon me is
21 that below the surface, at a covert level, in many cases the Bosnian Serb
22 side was very much involved in activities which involved the arming of
23 the Bosnian Serb population and which in conjunction with a whole host of
24 other events, many of which I have already addressed today, risked
25 creating a situation that could explode at a moment's notice.
1 Q. This is how I would put it, Dr. Nielsen. You're talking about
2 policemen. I would say that Serbian policemen were in favour of peace,
3 but they were not naive; right? And that they were cautious, just in
5 A. Well, the type of situation that exists in Bosnia-Herzegovina or
6 existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the spring of 1992, is a textbook case
7 of what academics call a security dilemma in which you have one or
8 more -- or two or more sides - in this case three sides - who are all
9 busy arming themselves and engaging in various kinds of activities, all
10 perhaps ostensibly with the belief that they are, as you said, not being
11 naive and wanting to protect themselves.
12 What I see overwhelmingly here is a conflagration of -- of events
13 that contributes to a huge rise, already before the war, in armed
14 incidents. I note at one point in the December 1991 State Security
15 Service report they state that by that point already there had been over
16 154 explosions, that is, incidents of grenades or even bazookas being
17 launched at places of business, residence and such, and in that context
18 events were very quickly spiraling out of control, but on the Bosnian
19 Serb side, as well as to some extent, though I'm less familiar with it,
20 on the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat side, there were people,
21 including the police, who were, unfortunately, willing to basically
22 adhere to standards of conduct that were completely incompatible with the
23 laws of the country and which increasingly drove the country towards
24 armed conflict.
25 Q. One question, Dr. Nielsen. You're an expert, which allows me to
1 put a question like that to you. Would all that have happened if there
2 had been no perseverance in the effort to carry out the secession of
4 A. I think that is a question about which I certainly have an
5 opinion as an historian, but I do not feel that it's within the ambit of
6 my expertise before this Court.
11 Pages 16453-16454 redacted.
20 [Private session]
11 Pages 16456-16457 redacted. Private session.
7 [Open session]
8 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session.
9 JUDGE KWON: We will rise for today and resume at 9.00 tomorrow
11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m.,
12 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 13th day
13 of July, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.