1 Wednesday, 20 July 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 As indicated, we continue to sit pursuant to Rule 15 bis.
8 Unless there's anything to be raised -- yes, Mr. Harvey.
9 MR. HARVEY: Your Honour, if I may just introduce
10 Ms. Tracey Begley, B-e-g-l-e-y, who has been assisted my team for the
11 last few months. Thank you.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Harvey.
13 Welcome, Ms. Begley.
14 Before I forget, I take this opportunity to note that one of our
15 court reporters, Mr. Wayne Bilko, is leaving the Tribunal. Today's the
16 last day. I would like to express our appreciation for his contribution
17 to the Tribunal. Thank you very much.
18 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: Good morning, Excellencies.
20 WITNESS: REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Good morning, Mr. Theunens.
24 A. Good morning, Mr. Karadzic.
25 Q. Mr. Theunens, I have a problem with a few things.
1 First of all, to establish whether you were given insight into
2 everything, please tell us how you got the material that you analysed,
3 or, rather, on the basis of which you compiled your report. Who gave you
4 this material?
5 A. Your Honours, I conducted searches in the databases that are
6 available to the Office of the Prosecutor. The criteria I used to
7 conduct those searches were established by me. I think I briefly
8 addressed that during examination. For example, I would conduct searches
9 on names, names of individuals, on names of locations, on names of
10 military posts, numbers of military units, on names of groups. As you
11 have also seen from the documents, including my report, that military
12 documents have a number and often refer -- in case of orders, they refer
13 to other orders. So, again, these numbers and any reference to other
14 orders would also be used as search criteria. And, of course, I could
15 also rely on the work I had conducted for related cases in the past.
16 The search criteria -- just to finalise my answer, the search
17 criteria were determined by myself only, as I mentioned already, and they
18 were based on my understanding of the guidance, i.e., the direction I had
19 been given as to which topics I was expected to cover in my report.
20 Q. I'm concerned as to whether you had insight into all documents.
21 Another thing that is a cause of concern for me: Did you check the
22 authenticity of documents, because there are some forgeries, and we're
23 going to show that here today. Thirdly, your interpretation of a
24 particular document, is it full, is it complete, in relation to
25 everything that happened, in relation to the context, in relation to the
1 document itself, and also in relation to the fine points of linguistics
2 that cannot be translated and were very often mistranslated, at that.
3 Now I would like us to deal with the question of the take-over of
4 power in certain towns.
5 Yesterday, we dealt with the take-over in Bijeljina.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Dr. Karadzic asked a question of the
9 witness, and he should be allowed to answer that, because that's the
10 point of this whole exercise here. He asks the question.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that's the subject I was about to raise.
12 Mr. Theunens -- yes.
13 JUDGE BAIRD: As a matter of fact, there are more than one
14 questions, Dr. Karadzic, so perhaps he could be given a chance to answer
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Theunens.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours.
18 I'm well aware that the Office of the Prosecutor does not have
19 all the documents. However, there were no restrictions imposed by anyone
20 on the access I had to the documents that are available in the Office of
21 the Prosecutor. I would also like to add there that in the course of the
22 various trials that have taken place at the ICTY, Defence teams have also
23 introduced documents, and these documents are also available in the
24 databases I consulted to conduct my searches.
25 In relation to authenticity of documents, again a number of these
1 documents, I would say a substantial number of these documents, have also
2 been introduced in other trials and used in those trials. A number of
3 military documents have been shown to military witnesses in order to --
4 or potential witnesses, I would say, in order to establish their
5 authenticity. Authenticity is a key issue. I would refer -- I would
6 also like to refer to the methodology I applied in relation to see
7 whether the information in the document is credible.
8 There was, I think, a third aspect, but I can't see it anymore on
9 the screen now. I'm sorry.
10 JUDGE KWON: I hope I can assist you, if you would bear with me.
11 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
12 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, the --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear
14 Mr. Karadzic.
15 JUDGE KWON: The third one is whether your interpretation of a
16 particular document, is it full, is it complete, in relation to
17 everything that happened, in relation to the context, in relation to the
18 document itself, and also in relation to the fine points of linguistics
19 that cannot be translated and were very often mistranslated?
20 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
21 It is my belief that I applied the methodology I have explained
22 in a professional manner, and then it's up to the Trial Chamber to decide
23 whether or not I, indeed, looked at all the documents in the most
24 complete or objective and pragmatic manner possible.
25 As to translation, it is correct, and that has occurred - I've
1 noticed that also several times - that military methodology is not always
2 translated in the correct manner. Now, within the Military Analysis
3 Team, there is -- there are language assistants who have been trained in
4 the use and the translation of military terminology, and I would
5 systematically verify the translation of documents with those language
6 assistants, I mean, translation of military documents, in order to make
7 sure that military terminology in Serbian was translated in the correct
8 manner into English.
9 Now, otherwise -- I mean, most of these documents are very
10 straightforward, so, again, if Mr. Karadzic can identify documents also
11 in relation to the earlier aspects I may have missed, or where I did not
12 provide a full interpretation, or maybe where a translation is incorrect,
13 of course, I'm available to review them now and also reconsider my
14 conclusions, if such a need would arise, on the basis of these additional
16 JUDGE KWON: So, Mr. Karadzic, bear that in mind. Your statement
17 is of no value at all during the course of examination. What matters is
18 the answer of the witness.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm absolutely aware of that. I
20 just want to make it possible for Mr. Theunens to express himself in the
21 right way, to avoid any kind of confusion. I don't want him to
22 understand that I'm attacking him. I am attacking imprecisions,
23 restraints, limitations in his paper. I am interested in hearing whether
24 he managed to do everything as he had wished. That was my intention.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Now I'd like to ask you, Mr. Theunens: How was that concept of
2 take-over of power instituted, for example, in the municipalities of
3 North-Western Bosnia-Herzegovina, if I can put it that way?
4 A. Your Honours, when we look at the different municipalities I have
5 discussed in the report, certain patterns can be identified, and these
6 patterns cover at least two aspects, I would say the aspect of
7 preparation, political preparation, and the second aspect is the aspect
8 of implementation. When I talk about political preparation, it means
9 that we see that in those municipalities, in accordance with the
10 instructions of Mr. Karadzic and the SDS, the SDS-led Serb crisis staffs
11 are established. These crisis staffs, I mean, depending on the location,
12 they can declare a state of imminent threat of war. I mean, they have
13 done that in some municipalities. Or they declare mobilisation, or they
14 participate in the establishment or the creation of a local Serb TO,
15 including also, depending on the municipality, appointing commanders on
16 the municipal level, assisting in arming these local Serb TOs.
17 The second aspect, then, the implementation of the take-over,
18 there we see that -- and again it depends a bit on the municipality, but
19 that various forces which I, in maybe a too general manner, identified as
20 Serbs forces, i.e., local Serb TO, sometimes like in Zvornik, also TO of
21 the Republic of Serbia, sometimes also the JNA, elements of the JNA,
22 volunteers from Serbia, sometimes reinforced by local volunteers, as well
23 as also groups that are identified at the time as volunteers, but who
24 actually maintain specific or particular links with the Ministry of the
25 Interior of the Republic of Serbia; for example, Arkan's Tigers and also
1 individuals or a group who are identified as -- colloquially identified
2 as Red Berets, they participate in the implementation, i.e., in the
3 physical take-over of power, whereby -- I mean, they don't take over
4 power as such, but they occupy what is identified as vital locations in
5 these towns. Okay, in Bijeljina, they first removed or participated in
6 the removal of barricades which had been erected by the Muslim side. And
7 once the take-over has been materialised, it is sometimes, depending on
8 the municipality, accompanied by a removal of non-Serbs. And then, okay,
9 the Bosnian Serb structures of power, I would say, consolidate their
10 power, and, yeah, then the take-over has been accomplished.
11 And this is just a summary of what I've seen in the various
12 municipalities and that is discussed for each analytical conclusion a
13 footnote referring to JNA, or Bosnian Serb MUP, or TO, or VRS document,
14 in Part 2 of the report.
15 JUDGE KWON: That's what we read from the documents?
16 THE WITNESS: That's my conclusion from the documents, Your
17 Honours, yes. And we can look at the specific municipalities, but these
18 are, in general terms, the patterns I have identified.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Theunens, that each and every one of those
22 cases is a criminal case, a large-scale criminal case in itself, and that
23 every one of these cases deserves a thorough investigation in order to
24 reach the conclusions that you are referring to, a thorough
25 investigation? Were thorough investigations carried out in each and
1 every one of these cases; for example, with regard to Bijeljina,
2 everything that we discussed yesterday? And if so, who conducted that
4 A. Your Honours, I'm not clear in relation to Mr. Karadzic's
5 conclusion that these are criminal cases. I mean, they're obviously, in
6 a number of -- or after doing a number of take-overs, crimes were
7 committed, and when I use the word "crimes," I quoted from documents
8 compiled by members of the police -- of the Bosnian Serb police in those
9 municipalities or at a local level, and these documents are quoted in my
10 report. But my task was not to conduct a criminal investigation. My
11 task was to analyse how the change in authority -- actually, no, I have
12 to rephrase that. I didn't -- my task was not how to analyse how a
13 change in authority took place, but my task was to analyse what happened
14 in these municipalities from the point of view that, okay, on the 12th of
15 May, 1992, at the 16th session of the Assembly of the Bosnian Serbs, the
16 six strategic goals are announced publicly, and, I mean, this is a key
17 event. These six strategic goals, to my knowledge, were never amended
18 during the conflict. So as an analyst, in the framework of the
19 preparation of this report, I wanted to see -- I wanted to analyse when
20 and how these goals were implemented. And my conclusion is that,
21 actually, the implementation of these goals started already prior to
22 their public announcement, and that conclusion is based on my analysis of
23 what I call the take-over operations of municipalities in
24 Northern Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that was the purpose of my analysis, so
25 there was no -- I didn't -- I was not requested or it was not my
1 intention to conduct a criminal investigation.
2 Q. But what is this expertise, then, Mr. Theunens, if it is not part
3 of a criminal process? What is your report?
4 A. Your Honours, the scope of my report is explained in that
5 particular section called "Scope." My goal is to analyse the role of
6 Mr. Karadzic, as I called it, Supreme Commander over the Bosnian Serb TO
7 and the VRS, whereby I have amended or slightly corrected the use of the
8 term "Supreme commander over the Bosnian Serb TO." There it should be,
9 actually, "the highest political authority over the Bosnian Serb TO."
10 And I conducted that analysis focusing on two aspects. First of all, his
11 de jure and de facto command authority, i.e., the ability to issue order
12 and verify their implementation. And, secondly, his situational
13 awareness, what I called his knowledge and understanding of the
14 situation, capabilities and intention of the Bosnian Serb TO and the VRS.
15 Q. All right. Now we have to move on to specific examples. Can you
16 tell us today, and do you still stand by what you said today, that on the
17 31st of March and the 1st of April, there was a take-over of power in
18 Bijeljina by someone who was not in power on the 30th of March?
19 A. Your Honours, I have not stated that today, nor yesterday, nor in
20 my report. What I state in my report, that is that based on the
21 documents I reviewed, starting on the night of the 31st of March, and
22 this is footnote 380, military -- military operations, operations or
23 activities that can be qualified as military, in the sense that they
24 involve armed forces, and in this particular case members of the Bosnian
25 Serb TO, which is a newly-established organisation, the Serbian National
1 Guard and the Serbian Volunteer Guard, and these are
2 volunteers/paramilitaries, they start to remove barricades that,
3 according to the source I quoted, "Muslim extremists," had erected. And
4 this continues, then, over the next days. And on the 4th of April, and
5 this is footnote 389, and I apologise repeating all that - I mentioned it
6 yesterday, but apparently the message was not clear - on the 4th of April
7 the JNA 17 Corps Command reports that the town of Bijeljina is controlled
8 by the SDS and Arkan's men, "who do not even allow our armoured unit to
9 reach certain positions in the town."
10 JUDGE KWON: So what you're saying is that that's all what you're
11 saying about Bijeljina?
12 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, that is what I -- when answering the
13 question of Mr. Karadzic in relation to the take-over and whether there
14 is a change in authority between what --
15 JUDGE KWON: But what did you mean by "take-over"?
16 THE WITNESS: Well, it means that you remove the -- well, the
17 take-over -- the take-over of physical control, i.e., the taking of the
18 physical control, that is that we see from these documents that the JNA,
19 which in normal conditions would be able to circle it freely in the
20 municipality, as in any other municipality, is now not able to enter
21 Bijeljina, because, as the JNA calls it, it is controlled by the SDS and
22 Arkan's men. So they are physically present on the ground, and they
23 restricted the freedom of movement, not only of the JNA, as we see also
24 from other documents. In addition, "take-over" also implies that other
25 structures of power, I would say political power, start to -- yeah, to --
1 I mean, they took over -- they took the power from the elected
2 authorities and are now the bodies that are in charge. And we see also,
3 like for other municipalities, that emphasis is laid on the fact that
4 it's not just the Municipality of Zvornik, for example, it's the Serbian
5 Municipality of Zvornik, and these are concepts that did not exist prior
6 to the SDS announcing or calling for the creation of crisis staffs in
7 various municipalities, and, of course, the events during spring 1992,
8 which then culminate in what I call the take-over operations.
9 JUDGE KWON: Then is your answer to the last question of the
10 accused, i.e., whether there was a take-over of power in Bijeljina, was
11 it yes?
12 THE WITNESS: That's my answer, yes, yes, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Tell us now, who took power over from who? Who won power in
16 Bijeljina and who lost power in Bijeljina?
17 A. Your Honours, I have answered that question several times. I
18 will do it again.
19 It is that the regular -- I mean, the elected authorities in
20 Bijeljina who would respond to the -- through the various levels of
21 civilian authority and administration to the authorities -- political
22 authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they are replaced by
23 structures that have been created by the Bosnian Serbs. I've spoken
24 about the crisis staffs. And this is accompanied also by the
25 intervention of paramilitary forces, i.e., groups organised in a military
1 way and applying military techniques or tactics that do not respond to
2 the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that were, in
3 fact, not foreseen in the legal framework or in the concept of
4 All People's Defence. And just to finalise, when I talk about legal
5 framework, in the 1982 Law on All People's Defence and its amendments.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Just an observation: I get the impression
9 that we're not making really progress, because these things were all
10 discussed yesterday, and not once, but several times, the witness had
11 given a similar or the same answer.
12 JUDGE KWON: No, but I let it go because there was unclear points
13 as to the meaning of taking over.
14 Let's proceed.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Theunens, is it correct that Mr. Jesuric was chief of the
17 Public Security Station from the elections in 1990 or sometime in 1991,
18 when government was being established, and then further on deep into the
19 war, as it were?
20 A. Your Honours, I cannot answer the question because I'm not
21 familiar with Mr. Jesuric's career. I know that he signed the document I
22 quote in footnote 382.
23 Q. Do you agree that it was the Serb Democratic Party that was in
24 power in Bijeljina and that the police is part of the authorities, and
25 that nothing changed there; that the only change was to declare a war
1 presidency once the war broke out which is, indeed, an organ which is not
2 called exactly that in the Law on National Defence, but it is an organ
3 that is called the Presidency, and that nothing changed until the war
4 escalated? Do you accept that there was unrest there, and there were
5 attempts made by Muslim extremists to create chaos there, and that did
6 not succeed, chaos did not succeed? So that's the only change?
7 A. Your Honours, I have answered the question. I have nothing to
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's proceed.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Very well.
11 Q. I'm looking for the page now. Today, you said that the Serb TO
12 took over power in Brcko. And the Serb TO, as a newly-established
13 organisation or formation, do you know when the Serb Territorial Defence
14 was established?
15 A. I haven't -- I mean, this morning I mentioned Brcko as one of the
16 examples, but I haven't specified who took over when.
17 Now, as for the establishment of the Bosnian Serb TO, I'm just
18 identifying the specific document, but we see that in the course of
19 spring 1992, decisions are taken. There are also various calls made. I
20 spoke yesterday about the call of Mr. Karadzic during the Assembly
21 session, I think, on the 27th of March, where he calls, indeed, the
22 delegates to establish local Serb TO units. I mean, he doesn't call them
23 "local Serb," but the message is clear, to establish TO units, and to
24 subordinate those to the JNA. And if I'm not wrong, that was -- yes,
25 indeed, I mentioned footnote 109.
1 In my document, I also refer to the creation or the introduction
2 of a Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Law on Defence, and this is, for
3 example -- I mean, this starts at footnote 121.
4 Q. Wasn't the Serbian Territorial Defence established on the 15th or
5 16th of April by General Subotic?
6 A. Actually, on the -- I'm sorry. On the 15th of April, the SRBiH
7 Presidency, and this is footnote 135 in Part 2 of the report, declares an
8 imminent state of war as well as the full mobilisation of the SRBiH, so
9 the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina TO. But we see from the
10 documents I have used that units that are identified as Bosnian Serb TO
11 or TO, but, in fact, it refers to Bosnian Serb TO, and I conclude that
12 from the context, that such units participate in the operations aimed at
13 taking over power or establishing Bosnian Serb control in a number of
15 Q. Mr. Theunens, I'll tell you this: Do you know that
16 Mr. Izetbegovic declared a general mobilisation of the
17 Territorial Defence and the reserve forces of the police force on the
18 4th of April, 1992?
19 A. That is possible. I have not analysed that for my report. But
20 it's important, I think, in this whole discussion to make a distinction
21 between the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
22 which was one of the TOs foreseen in the concept of All People's Defence,
23 i.e., the TOs were organised by republic and then on a regional and
24 municipal level. I mean, to make a distinction between that TO and then,
25 for example, the SRBiH TO, which is a structure that was not foreseen
1 under the doctrine of All People's Defence. The TOs were multi-ethnic, I
2 mean, they reflected the ethnic composition of the various republics,
3 whereas here we see a structure that is predominantly Serbian.
4 Q. Mr. Theunens, to understand military events in Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina, the key moment is the declaration of a general mobilisation
6 by the Croatian and the Muslim Presidency, against the will of
7 Professor Koljevic and Ms. Plavsic. You are not taking this into
9 Secondly, who broke up the Territorial Defence? Is it correct
10 that Izetbegovic dismissed the Serb General Vukosavljevic from the post
11 of commander of the Territorial Defence on the 8th of April?
12 A. Your Honours, I have not analysed the break-up of the
13 Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I would just
14 like to reiterate my reference to footnote 109, which concerns a call by
15 Mr. Karadzic during the 14th session of the Assembly of the Serbian
16 People which occurs on the 27th of March, i.e., prior to the 8th of
17 April, where he calls the delegates to organise the people to defend
18 themselves and also to organise Territorial Defence and subordinate JNA
19 to the TO.
20 The analysis of the combat readiness, without providing dates,
21 also highlights the role of the SDS in establishing what they call
22 self-organising municipal and other regional units which in my
23 understanding --
24 Q. We've seen that, Mr. Theunens. Please stick to my questions.
25 Do you know that Alija Izetbegovic, that is, the Muslim-Croatian
1 part of the rump presidency, dismissed General Vukosavljevic from the
2 post of the commander of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina on the 8th of April, thus disrupting the ethnic make-up, and
4 appointing in his place a Muslim, Hasanefendic? Do you know about that?
5 A. Your Honours, I'm overall familiar with the events in spring 1992
6 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I haven't specifically analysed, however, the
7 changes or the decisions Mr. Karadzic is addressing now.
8 Now, from the report -- from the documents I analysed in my
9 report --
10 JUDGE KWON: I think you answered the question.
11 THE WITNESS: Okay.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Q. Is it correct that you know that Branko Grujic, on the 5th of
15 April, at the level of Zvornik municipality, declared a general
16 mobilisation, and that you noted this in your report?
17 A. That is correct. That is footnote - excuse me - 428.
18 And just to complete the answer, Branko Grujic is already
19 commander of the SDS-led Crisis Staff of the Serb municipality from end
20 of 1991. And these footnotes are all in Part 2 of the report, obviously.
21 Q. What I want to know is: Is it correct that he declared the
22 general mobilisation in Zvornik municipality on the 5th of April, and
23 that this was a day after Izetbegovic's mobilisation; yes or no? And
24 then we can agree whether the 5th comes before or after the 4th.
25 A. He calls for the mobilisation of all units of the TO of the
1 Serbian Municipality of Zvornik on the 5th of April. And the 5th is
2 after the 4th --
3 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that Izetbegovic's government, on the
4 8th of April, not only dismissed General Vukosavljevic, and that this was
5 a post that belonged to the Serbs in the joint authorities, and appointed
6 Hasanefendic, and that they also declared an imminent threat of war?
7 A. Your Honours, that is possible. But it's outside the scope of my
8 report, so I haven't specifically analysed this for the purpose of my
9 report. And I don't see a causal link between the events on the 4th, as
10 Mr. Karadzic identifies them, and the events in Zvornik on the 5th and
11 also the following days, and even before the 5th of April.
12 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that the Serb side did the same a week
13 later on the 15th and 16th of April, established a
14 Serb Territorial Defence and declared an imminent threat of war?
15 A. Your Honours, I answered the question. I stated that, indeed, on
16 the 15th of April they declared this imminent threat of war, and also
17 they create a staff for the Territorial Defence or -- excuse me, the
18 mobilisation of the Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence. But from the
19 documents I reviewed, we see that the units identified themselves --
20 excuse me, or identified as Bosnian Serb TO are already established prior
21 to the 15th of April.
22 Q. In the documents signed by General Subotic or the Presidency - I
23 don't know - does it not say "Territorial Defence of the Serbian Republic
24 of Bosnia and Herzegovina is hereby established"? How could it have
25 existed before it was established?
1 Can we see that? You referred to that document. I believe it's
2 been admitted into evidence, so can we see the document referring to the
3 establishment of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its
4 Territorial Defence?
5 A. I mean, I don't doubt the document and the quotation made by
6 Mr. Karadzic, in the sense that paragraph 1, and this follows on footnote
7 139 in Part 2 of the report, paragraph 1 states:
8 "The Territorial Defence of the Serbian Republic of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina shall be established as an armed force of the ...,"
10 and then it says "SBiH."
11 Now, as I tried to explain from the documents I have reviewed
12 when analysing the Bosnian Serbs taking control or taking over
13 municipalities in Northern Bosnia, we see that there are already, prior
14 to the 15th of April -- actually, prior to the 15th of April, mention is
15 made of units of a TO. Sometimes it's identified as Bosnian Serb TO or
16 "Bosnian Serb" is left out.
17 Q. But, Mr. Theunens, knowing the Law on All People's Defence, are
18 you aware that each municipality has its own sovereign defence, it's own
19 staff and its own TO unit, it's own Council for National Defence, and its
20 own commander who is, ex officio, the president of the municipality, and
21 that these units of the Territorial Defence were joint ones, and not only
22 until the 8th, but until the 15th, when the Serbs declared their own
23 Territorial Defence?
24 A. I agree with the first part of Mr. Karadzic's proposition, but
25 the key issue, and I have explained that earlier, is that we're not
1 talking anymore about the municipalities or municipal authorities that
2 respond to the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but
3 we're talking about Serb or Serbian municipalities, and these are
4 newly-established bodies that will take over -- that took over power in a
5 number of municipalities as a result of the take-overs, replacing, then,
6 the legally-elected municipal authorities.
7 Q. And this happened in Bijeljina; is that correct?
8 A. Bijeljina is one of the examples, and it may well be that the
9 same -- I mean, on the Serbian side, the same individuals remained part
10 of the authorities, but the authorities are identified as Serbian
11 authorities. And there is also -- I mean, there are -- non-Serbs are not
12 anymore part of those authorities, at least not to the same extent as
13 they were prior to these take-overs. And these authorities, obviously,
14 do not -- these Serbian authorities do not respond to the authorities of
15 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but to the authorities of the
16 self-established Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Q. Do you know how and where, in what sort of municipality, the new
18 Serb municipalities were established? Did that mean that the Serbs were
19 taking over the entire municipality in question? Let's take Brcko as an
20 example. The Serbs promulgated the Serbian Municipality of Brcko. Does
21 that mean that they took over the entire Municipality of Brcko,
22 derogating the authority belonging to the Serb and Muslim populations?
23 A. Your Honours, the specific situation in Brcko, in relation to the
24 question of Mr. Karadzic, can be found in footnote 564, Part 2 of the
25 report, where according to the Bijeljina SJB, a report dated 19th of May,
1 1992, a report that is sent to the Ministry of the Interior of the
2 Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I quote:
3 "Serbian TO of Semberija and Majevica," which is an example of a
4 Bosnian Serb TO unit, "has liberated and holds three-quarters of the
5 Brcko town territory."
6 I can continue:
7 "Combat operations are being carried out in the city
8 neighbourhood called Klanac, where enemy forces, the so-called TO of the
9 former BiH, are mostly concentrated."
10 So this is -- I mean, I call this "take-over," but the document,
11 itself, uses the terminology "liberated."
12 Q. Does the document say that, officially, or is that something you
13 have added?
14 A. No, Your Honours, I just read out the quotation I have included
15 in my report, footnote 564, and that is, again, Part 2 of the report,
16 English pages 181 to 182.
17 JUDGE KWON: Do you have a 65 ter number for that?
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. It is 08200.
19 JUDGE KWON: Do you like to see that, Mr. Karadzic?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. It doesn't say "official," Mr. Theunens. That's a word you
23 added. It says "The Territorial Defence of the former
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina," not "the official Bosnia-Herzegovina." I see that
25 in the English language, and it can probably be seen in the Serbian
1 language as well. "Enemy forces" --
2 JUDGE KWON: I don't remember the witness has said "official."
3 THE WITNESS: Maybe it's a translation issue, but I didn't use
4 the term "official." I used "former."
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. "Formal" and "official," there's no difference, is there?
7 JUDGE KWON: "Former."
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, "former." Maybe they heard
9 "formal" and translated it as "official." Very well.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Let's clarify one thing, Mr. Theunens. Do you know that before
12 the war broke out, negotiations were going on with regard to forming
13 large municipalities into two or three ethnically-affiliated
14 municipalities, just as in Brussels there are smaller municipalities
15 which were either Flemish or Walloon?
16 A. Your Honours, I think this aspect is -- falls outside the scope
17 of my report. I haven't made a comparison between the situation in Brcko
18 and in Brussels. I do know that the situation in Brussels is quite
20 Q. Well, this is my thesis, Mr. Theunens: There was an ongoing
21 political process of transformation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That process
22 arose because we gave up the idea of remaining in Yugoslavia and accepted
23 the idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina becoming independent on condition it was
24 decentralised. Are you aware of this fact?
25 A. Your Honours, this may well have been the case. But, again, the
1 documents, referring now to Brcko, the documents I have included there in
2 order to analyse the events that occurred there and the take-over, do not
3 refer to such a political process or such negotiations. They focus on
4 combat -- on military operations in order to establish Bosnian Serb
5 control over large parts or even complete municipalities, large parts of
6 municipalities or complete municipalities.
7 Q. Now that we're talking about Brcko, you talk about this in your
8 report on page 104, subparagraph (h). You say, as in other towns in
9 North-Western Bosnia in which the Bosnian Serbs took over power in April
10 and May 1992, the take-over of Brcko was crucial for the implementation
11 of the first strategic goal, separating the Serbian people from the two
12 other ethnic communities, and the second strategic goal, establishing a
13 corridor. You go on to say that the Brcko Crisis Staff, in early April
14 1992, based on a decision by the SDS, was established by the Serbs. Do
15 you know that three municipalities were established in Brcko, a Serbian
16 municipality linked to the Serbian Varos area in town, the Muslim one,
17 the Croatian -- and the Croatian Municipality of Brcko which was called
18 Brcko Rahic, so there was Brcko Ravne, Brcko Rahic, and the Brcko with
19 Serbian Varos as its centre?
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it's not on page 104. It's, in
21 fact, on page 115.
22 JUDGE KWON: Which is also part of the summary. Yes.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours, and the summary just highlights
24 the conclusions. But the detailed discussion on Brcko --
25 JUDGE KWON: Comes on page 179.
1 THE WITNESS: Exactly, Your Honours, yes.
2 Again, what Mr. Karadzic says may well be possible. What I can
3 conclude from the documents I looked at is -- I mean, an additional
4 document is the footnote 562, which is a document compiled by the
5 War Presidency, i.e., another Bosnian Serb political structure, the
6 War Presidency of the Brcko municipality, which states that members of
7 the Serbian forces, on the 2nd of May, 1992, have broken through all
8 Green Beret barricades - and by "Green Beret" refers to forces controlled
9 by the Muslims or Bosniaks - and took all important objects in the centre
10 of the city. Now, in the context of my report, this is a vital element,
11 and, again, I haven't seen any documents referring to the negotiations
12 and the creation of these separate municipalities after this take-over or
13 the Bosnian Serbs controlling the largest part of Brcko municipality and
14 further municipalities -- the entire municipality. It may well have been
15 that such negotiations took place before these take-over operations, but
16 they have not affected the actual take-over or the actual -- the fact
17 that the Bosnian Serbs take control over these municipalities.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Well, it's not a fact, Mr. Theunens. You said yourself that the
20 Green Berets put up barricades, they blocked the Serbs in Brcko, in
21 Varos. Do you know that there is a part of Brcko which has always been
22 called the Serbian Varos?
23 A. Your Honours, it may well be possible, but, again, it doesn't
24 change the fact or the conclusions I base on the documents that I have
25 reviewed; that is, that Serb forces, and their nature and composition is
1 specified in the report, take over control over the municipality or, in
2 the case of Brcko, according to footnote 564, three-quarters of the
4 Q. I'll tell you now, Mr. Theunens. As in Bijeljina, the conflict
5 was started by the Muslim side. The Green Berets blocked up the
6 Serbian Varos part of town, and the Serbs from the regular local
7 government prevented this. They co-operated with their Muslim colleagues
8 in a joint government. But as they also attacked the JNA, the
9 Green Berets lost. And from that point onwards, the Serbs controlled the
10 Serbian part of Brcko municipality, the Croats controlled the Croatian
11 part of Brcko municipality, and the Muslims controlled the Muslim part.
12 There's a large Muslim village called Brezovo Polje, and nothing happened
13 to it. That was in the Serbian part. Whereas in the Muslim part, there
14 was a Serbian village called Bukvik which was completely destroyed, razed
15 to the ground and the population killed. Did you know that,
16 Mr. Theunens, that the Serbs controlled only the Serbian part of Brcko
17 municipality, that they did no harm to the Muslims living in this larger
18 Muslim village called Brezovo Polje which was in the Serbian part?
19 A. Your Honours, I mean, footnote 564 states that -- and which is a
20 document by the Bijeljina SJB, that Serbian TO controls three-quarters of
21 Brcko town territory.
22 In relation now to crimes, in footnote 577 I quote from a
23 document by the Brcko Municipality War Presidency, that various instances
24 of crimes are being discussed in details, and there's also later
25 documents referring to the presence of paramilitary formations,
1 "self-styled Chetnik units" and so on who are participating. We see also
2 reference to Arkan. That's, for example, footnote 580, involved in,
3 "murders for no justified reason."
4 As to what happened or what was allegedly done by the Muslim or
5 Bosniak forces, that was outside the scope of my report.
6 Q. Does that in any way affect the Serbian conduct or does it help
7 to shed some light on it?
8 A. Your Honours, at least from a military point of view, a crime
9 that has been committed or allegedly committed by the opposing
10 side should not be seized as an excuse or as a pretext to allow your own
11 forces to commit crimes.
12 Q. I'm not talking about crimes, Mr. Theunens. You have quoted
13 official reports of the Serbs from Brcko who are against a crime and take
14 measures accordingly. I'm not talking about crimes. I'm speaking about
15 defence and establishing control over their own parts of the
16 municipality, their own neighbourhoods. Is that legitimate, if the
17 Muslim side is committing crimes, that the Serbs should protect their own
18 part of town?
19 A. I mean, there are several components in this question as to these
20 reports on crimes by Bosnian Serb police as well as the War Presidency.
21 It is not always clear from these documents whether measures are taken
22 against the perpetrators. Some of them, when they refer to Arkan, and, I
23 mean, there's also mention made of names of SRS-affiliated volunteers, I
24 have not come across any information indicating that measures were taken
25 against these people.
1 And now for the second part of the question, the documents I
2 reviewed do not indicate that this take-over of control or establishing
3 Bosnian Serb control over municipalities is a purely defensive move.
4 When we look at the patterns of which municipalities are taken over,
5 when, and by which forces, my conclusion is that these take-overs are
6 part of the implementation of the six -- or at least some of the six
7 strategic goals.
8 Q. Can you tell us, Mr. Theunens, can you give us an example of what
9 you call the take-over of municipalities that came about without a
10 preceding attack of Muslim irregular forces; barricades, blockades,
11 taking control of high-rise buildings, sniping, shooting? Tell us one
12 municipality in which the Serbs took over power over their own -- in
13 their own parts of town without that being preceded by attacks of Muslim
14 irregular forces.
15 Let's take Bijeljina. Was it the Muslim side who threw the first
16 hand-grenade, set up roadblocks, positioned snipers on the tops of the
17 highest buildings, or not, and did -- or did not the same happen in
18 Brcko? The first -- first, there were roadblocks. Then the Serbs were
19 sealed off. And then when the Serbs reacted, then that's called
21 A. Your Honours, Mr. Karadzic does not give an accurate summary of
22 the documents or an accurate analysis of the documents I have included in
23 my report. According to these documents, and again they originate from
24 JNA, Bosnian Serb police, War Presidency or Crisis Staff, occasionally
25 reference is made to barricades that have been put up by Muslim
1 extremists, but there is no pattern -- or there is no indication that the
2 pattern Mr. Karadzic tries to or is depicting here also occurred in
3 practice. I mean, these documents do not -- for the different
4 municipalities do not systematically indicate that the take-over was a
5 defensive act. On the contrary. The take-over goes beyond just
6 protecting the parts that Mr. Karadzic describes as Serb parts of those
8 If you allow me just to complete.
9 For example, Bosanski Samac, footnote 504, JNA 2nd Military
10 District reports about capturing all vital facilities in Bosanski Samac,
11 and there it is described as a preemptive move. And the take-over -- or
12 the capture, excuse me, of vital facilities is carried out by
13 Tactical Group 17 and units of Serb Territorial Defence and the police.
14 Q. Mr. Theunens, I cannot go into Samac because it has been taken
15 out of my indictment. But in Samac, the 8 per cent of Muslims
16 established their own separate Territorial Defence. They had a unit of
17 Green Berets and Patriotic League and attacked the JNA. The RS has
18 nothing to do with Samac. They attacked the JNA, and the JNA defeated
19 them and took them prisoner. 8 per cent of Muslims wanted to take
20 control of Samac.
21 But my question is: I don't care if you found the document or
22 not. In the documents that you did find, does it unambiguously say that
23 the first step was the setup of Muslim roadblocks in Brcko and in
24 Bijeljina, and the second step was the clearing of these roadblocks and
25 the setting up of control by the legal existing authorities over the
1 municipality or parts of it? Just answer yes or no, and the
2 Trial Chamber will find the document.
3 A. The documents on Brcko and Bijeljina, indeed, mention roadblocks
4 put up by what is called Green Berets or Muslim extremists. However,
5 they do not indicate that subsequently there is a setting up of control
6 by the legal existing authorities. No. What these documents indicate or
7 show is that self-established Bosnian Serb structures or authorities take
8 over power.
9 Q. Show us some evidence for that. Who was the authority in
10 Bijeljina on the day before and on the day after? The same for
11 Bijeljina, which new structure replaced the old structure? Sir, in
12 Brcko, the authorities dissolved because the Green Berets introduced
13 terror, and the municipal authorities withdrew to their respective parts
14 of the municipality, and it had been envisaged, anyway, that three
15 municipalities should be set up. In Bijeljina, everything remained the
16 same. Joint authorities, joint patrols, and there was no take-over of
17 power. But let's proceed. Give us the name of any municipality where
18 the Serb side did anything before being attacked by the Muslims? Was it
19 in Visegrad, although it was taken out of the indictment? Was it the
20 Serb side who started it or did the Muslim side terrorise the Serbs all
21 year and, at the critical time, killed -- killed people, raped, and
22 introduced terror in Visegrad?
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the witness has already
24 answered the question, that the same question was posed some minutes ago.
25 JUDGE KWON: I take it his -- he was making a statement in
1 relation to Bijeljina as a habit, but we have a new question about
3 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, Visegrad is not discussed in my
4 report, so I cannot answer the question.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Q. Can you mention another municipality where the Serbs did anything
8 before being threatened and attacked by Muslim paramilitaries?
9 A. Your Honours, as you see from my report, the purpose was not to
10 determine who started a conflict where.
11 Q. Ah-hah. And was the purpose of your report to deny the Serbs the
12 right to defend themselves, because you call the Serb actions as a
13 take-over of power, a change of the situation, forceful and illegal?
14 A. Your Honours, I have explained my understanding of the concept of
15 take-over or what I understand under it, and I have not used the
16 expressions "forceful" or "illegal," unless it was included in one of the
17 documents I have used as the basis for my analysis and subsequent
19 Q. So your report pertains only to the analysis of available
20 documents, and that does not necessarily give a complete picture of the
21 events on the ground; right?
22 A. Your Honours, the documents I have included show -- I mean, show
23 the patterns I have discussed before, and my -- I mean, the purpose of
24 the analysis I have explained already earlier, i.e., in the scope of the
25 report, is to see whether there were any relations between these
1 take-overs and the authorities in the Bosnian Serb entity, or the
2 Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, as well as to see also,
3 and what I referred earlier, as to how and when the six strategic goals
4 were implemented.
5 Q. Does that mean that your entire report deals with strategic
6 goals, and its purpose is not to establish the situation on the ground?
7 A. Your Honours, the report goes beyond just the strategic goals,
8 even if they are very important. It also addresses other aspects, as has
9 been explained in the scope of the report.
10 Q. All right. Let me ask you the following: Who took over power in
11 Bosanski Brod and how?
12 A. Bosanski Brod falls outside the scope of the report. But I
13 understand, from my work outside the OTP, that Bosnian Croats and/or
14 Muslims took over control of Bosanski Brod in spring 1992. However, in
15 September 1992, Bosanski Brod fell to -- September/October 1992,
16 Bosanski Brod fell to the VRS.
17 Q. Is it correct that in Bosanski Brod, the same patterns that
18 were -- that they tried to implement in Brcko and Bijeljina, but failed,
19 succeeded in Bosanski Brod, and they took over power and they drove out
20 the Serbs? Isn't that correct?
21 A. Your Honours, I answered that the Bosanski Brod -- events in
22 spring 1992 in Bosanski Brod fall outside the scope of my report, so I
23 cannot answer the question.
24 Q. Do you mention Modrica anywhere? Is it correct that in Modrica,
25 the pattern from Bijeljina and Brcko turned out detrimentally for the
1 Serbs? Weren't the Serbs driven out of town and a control over town
2 established by the Green Berets and the Patriotic League? I'm referring
3 to the Modrica municipality in the corridor.
4 A. I believe that I have some references to Modrica in my report.
5 I'm trying to locate them now.
6 Q. Who took control of Modrica first, and who drove out whom?
7 A. The documents I have reviewed only discuss - I mean, this is
8 footnote 539, a report by the Command of the 17 Corps of the
9 JNA - referred to the events after Bosnian Serbs -- or the Bosnian Serb
10 side takes control over Modrica - and he talks -- I mean, Jankovic
11 actually talks about the arrival of volunteers originating from Serbia in
12 the area of Vranjak, Koprivna, covered by the Modrica municipality in
13 March or April 1992. This is English pages 174, 175.
14 Q. But who was able to take Modrica first and drive out the other
15 side, the Serbs or the Muslims?
16 A. Your Honours, the documents I have included in my report do not
17 provide information on that.
18 JUDGE KWON: But what does the next paragraph say, mentioning the
19 100 women and children brutally killed?
20 THE WITNESS: Indeed, but this --
21 JUDGE KWON: I didn't see the report, but does it say that that
22 group killed them or they were killed before they arrived?
23 THE WITNESS: My understanding is that the report by Jankovic
24 links the arrival of these -- links the killings to the arrival or the
25 presence of these volunteers -- 40 volunteers originating from Serbia.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. And who are the victims, Mr. Theunens?
5 A. Again, according to the document by General --
6 Major-General Jankovic, and I'm quoting from the previous paragraph,
7 people of non-Serbian nationality.
8 Q. Where was Jankovic at that moment; in Tuzla?
9 A. I'm not familiar with the whereabouts of General Jankovic at that
10 time, but he -- I mean, it is correct that he's commander of the 17 Corps
11 of the JNA. And at that time, the 17 Corps is being withdrawn from -- at
12 least officially being withdrawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
13 Q. And who took control of Odzak and drove out the other side?
14 Odzak is the adjacent municipality of Bosanski Samac.
15 A. I don't see a reference to Odzak in the documents I quote, so I
16 cannot answer that question.
17 Q. Very well. Now we're going from west to east. Is there a place
18 called Bosanska Dubica on the Sava River? Who took over power there, and
19 was there a take-over of power?
20 A. Your Honours, I don't remember that I -- I don't think I
21 discussed events in Bosanska Dubica in my report, so I'm not able to
22 answer the question. I may have a recollection from my work outside the
23 OTP, but that is probably not sufficiently precise in order to provide a
24 valuable answer to the question of Mr. Karadzic.
25 Q. Did anything happen in the Srbac municipality, which is also on
1 the Sava, and where there are some Muslim villages? Did anything happen
2 there, where the Serbs are the overwhelming majority and, indeed, the
3 municipality is -- was named "Srbac" after Serbs?
4 A. The same answer, Your Honours. I haven't discussed -- I haven't
5 looked into events in the municipality of Srbac.
6 Q. Was there a take-over of power in Bosanska Gradiska? It's also
7 on the Sava.
8 A. Same answer, Your Honours, I mean. And I think mention was made
9 that we move from west to east, but I have the impression that we move
10 from east to west.
11 Q. No, no. First there's Gradiska and then there's Srbac eastward.
12 Srbac is in the east. And a bit to the south of Srbac, in Prnjavor, was
13 there a take-over of power?
14 A. I haven't discussed events in Prnjavor in detail or as a specific
15 municipality that was taken over, so I cannot answer the question.
16 Again, some of these names obviously sound familiar, but -- because I
17 worked on issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout the conflict when I was
18 not a member of the Office of the Prosecutor. But they are not part of
19 the scope of my report, so I don't have a clear recollection on events in
20 those municipalities.
21 Q. Mr. Theunens, you are trying to prove that there was a pattern in
22 the activities of the Serbs. A pattern is something that should prevail
23 in most municipalities, and here is evidence that it wasn't that way in
24 most municipalities. The events that are attributed to the Serbs as a
25 pattern happened in a few municipalities, where the Muslim side aspired
1 to taking over power and driving out the Serbs, and they are Bijeljina,
2 Brcko, unsuccessfully, and the Serb part of town, Odzak, successfully,
3 they drove out Serbs; Modrica, successful, they drove out the Serbs, who
4 later returned; Brod, they were successful, drove out the Serbs; Doboj,
5 the municipality was split in two. Do you know any other municipality in
6 the north of Bosnia?
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, the accused now giving
8 evidence, basically making all sorts of claims, where the witness has
9 mentioned that he did not -- it was not part of his report.
10 JUDGE KWON: You're forgetting the valuable advice given by
11 His Honour Judge Baird. How can he answer all these questions? I agree
12 with Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Just reformulate -- or move on or reformulate
13 your question.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Here's my question: You are saying that there's a pattern in the
16 activities of the Serbs, and I put it to you that you haven't established
17 that. Maybe you didn't have enough documents, and maybe you
18 misunderstood the documents. And I'm putting the Defence case to you
19 that there's no pattern in the activities of the Serbs. There were
20 Muslim attempts to take over some municipalities and Serb responses to
21 that. What do you say to that? Can you prove the opposite?
22 A. Your Honours, I concluded from the municipalities I considered,
23 and I would say it's not just a question of numbers, but mainly, as I try
24 to explain in this report, a question of location and size and nature of
25 the municipality, establishing the link with the strategic goals, that in
1 those municipalities I considered in the report, certain patterns can be
2 identified as to how the take-overs took place, who participated in it,
3 and what kind of events, including crimes that took place during or after
4 the take-over.
5 Q. But why only in a few municipalities, why not the majority, but
6 rather the minority? And how can you show a pattern if it isn't present
7 in the majority? How does the exemption become a rule? It does not
8 confirm the rule; it becomes the rule, an axiom.
9 A. Your Honours, I've answered the questions. In those
10 municipalities I considered, and they are listed in the report, I
11 identified certain patterns, and I have explained which patterns these
13 JUDGE KWON: And your answer to the first part of his question,
14 i.e., his defence case, is in the negative?
15 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I would only be able to express
16 myself on the municipalities Mr. Karadzic has --
17 JUDGE KWON: No, as far as the municipalities you dealt with are
19 THE WITNESS: Well --
20 JUDGE KWON: Whether there were first Muslim attacks to take over
21 some municipalities and Serbs responded.
22 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I mean, you see the documents in my
23 report for Bijeljina and Brcko. The documents, indeed, mention the
24 existence of barricades by --
25 JUDGE KWON: So my question is whether the answer is no or you
1 don't know.
2 THE WITNESS: Well, I can't answer the question, because I
3 haven't analysed in detail what the opposing side -- the other side did.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it time for the break?
7 JUDGE KWON: Five minutes more, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. When you speak about my speeches, for example, you mention my
11 speech in March, given on the 24th of March or the 27th of March, when
12 the sessions of the Assembly of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
13 were held, do you know the context in which I speak about organising on
14 the ground and doing whatever is necessary and so on? Why I am saying
15 that, what is that based on? In other words - let me help you - do you
16 know that from the 13th of February on, at least unofficially or -- or
17 officially, but unofficially even before that, it was decided that Bosnia
18 would have three constituent republics based on the three ethnic
19 communities? And there is a chapter titled "The Main Political Events."
20 Did you know of that important political event?
21 A. Your Honours, I did not come across a document discussing what
22 appears to be a decision, but it's not clear from the question whether
23 it's an official or unofficial decision in relation to splitting
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina into three constituent republics with three ethnic
25 communities. I mean, if Mr. Karadzic has a document I can review during
1 the break, and then maybe afterwards I can be of assistance in this
3 Q. Do you know that I made statements, and we have that in the
4 newspapers, not division, but transformation, and we did get that
5 transformation by way of an offer from the European Community, and the
6 18th of March we accepted the constitutional principles of this future
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina? That was the most important political event in
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina that we all celebrated as the salvation of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 18th of March. Lord Carrington and
10 Ambassador Cutileiro, after several months of work, we achieved this,
11 definitely, some things that would not be changed. The only thing that
12 remained was to define borders, then the question of the army and the
13 referendum, so three issues. Are you aware of this main event and that
14 every speech of mine should be viewed in that context, in that light,
15 from the 14th of February until the 1st of April?
16 A. Your Honours, from my work outside the OTP, I'm familiar with the
17 efforts of Lord Carrington as well as Ambassador Cutileiro and the
18 Cutileiro Plan, which spoke about the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
19 kind of a Swiss structure. But, again, from the material that I reviewed
20 for my report, the importance Mr. Karadzic is now attributing to these --
21 to this plan and these efforts, this importance is not reflected in the
22 documents I reviewed. No. Instead, we see that -- and I analysed what
23 was happening on the Bosnian Serb side, that efforts are made already
24 prior and during the time-period mentioned by Mr. Karadzic to establish
25 military structures, to create an own Bosnian Serb TO, to arm them, to
1 co-operate with the JNA, in order to implement certain goals.
2 Q. Well, Mr. Theunens, that is total confusion. I cannot deal with
3 your limitations. You just talk about the documents that were accessible
4 to you, and you're talking about the totality of the picture. Who
5 selected these documents for you?
6 JUDGE KWON: I think we have heard the answer.
7 We'll have a -- it's time to have a break. We'll break for 25
8 minutes and resume at 11.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.
10 --- On resuming at 11.10 a.m.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Excuse me, Mr. President.
13 I don't mean to disturb you with something small, but we've run
14 into a problem this morning because security has interpreted a previous
15 decision that you've made so that our case manager would not be allowed
16 to have contact with Dr. Karadzic in the holding cell while the expert is
17 also here, and I'm referring to a decision on the 20th of August, 2010,
18 in which you did state that at any time, only two people, in addition to
19 Dr. Karadzic, would be permitted in the holding cell when the expert was
20 here. And then you went on to say that further questions or
21 clarification could be addressed to the Registry through the "proces"
22 officer. And since that decision, on every day that we've had an expert
23 here, we've also managed to have the case manager in the room, holding
24 cell, assisting us, but today the security guards, relying on your
25 decision of the 20th of August, 2010, prohibited that. And it's
1 difficult for Dr. Karadzic to manage to prepare the next session when we
2 don't have the person who's in charge of the documents with us, so we
3 would ask that either you modify your order so that one additional person
4 can be in the holding cell or else you order that Dr. Karadzic not be
5 taken to the holding cell during the breaks and we work in the courtroom,
6 where all of us can be present. Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll look into the matter during the course of this
8 session and get back to you.
9 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue your cross-examination.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Q. Let us move away from this topic, and perhaps we'll go back to it
12 later, the question of patterns.
13 On page 157, I think -- we merged a few documents here, so there
14 is a problem with the page numbers and the footnotes. "The Participation
15 of Volunteers from BiH and the Conflict in Croatia," that's the chapter,
16 and it's sub-chapter (e), and it says:
17 "On the 22nd of September, 1991, or before that date, the
18 president of the Serb Democratic Party, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, issued an
19 order to all secretariats for national defence in the Serb autonomous
21 Do you remember that paragraph?
22 A. I remember the document, Your Honours, but it would help me if I
23 had the footnote number.
24 Q. Now we'll see the number of the footnote was 503, unless that has
25 also been changed, disrupted.
1 A. Indeed, I have found the document, Your Honours.
2 Q. So you accepted this document and you took a certain position on
3 the basis of the document, and you made it part of your report, as a
4 significant document; right?
5 A. Your Honours, I included -- I did select the document for my
6 report without drawing specific conclusions on the report, as just to
7 refer to its contents.
8 JUDGE KWON: But where are we, in terms of the report?
9 THE WITNESS: This is in Part 1, Your Honours, footnote 502, 503,
10 these two footnotes. Part 1, it's English page -- at least the version I
11 have, 159, but --
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I think I was looking at Part 2.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 00957 in e-court,
14 please, ERN number 795. That's the most legible. I have three variants
15 here. 795 is the most legible one. If you have 95, that could be even
16 better, the Serbian version. It's all right, I have it on my screen.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. So do you claim that this is an authentic document? Did you take
19 it as an authentic document? Did you take it to be an authentic
21 A. Your Honours, it was my understanding that this document has also
22 been used in other trials, and even admitted there, and that is why I
23 decided to include it in my report. I have not been able to establish
24 the -- I mean, to physically establish the authenticity of the document.
25 Q. Now I'm going to present some elements to you.
1 There is no registration number. The adjective "Serb," "Serb
2 people," is not written in capital letters in the language, and that kind
3 of thing could not have happened to me.
4 Now, let's look at the rest. It is being sent to the Secretariat
5 of National Defence, SNO, Secretariat for National Defence, SAO Krajina,
6 Romanija, and North-Eastern Bosnia.
7 Mr. Theunens, in the SAOs, are there secretariats for national
9 A. Except for this document, I haven't seen any specific references
10 to secretariats for national defence, bearing in mind, however, that what
11 we see in the newly-established structures, that sometimes what I would
12 call old names, i.e., names of structures that existed in the SFRY and,
13 in this particular case where defence is concerned, under the doctrine of
14 All People's Defence, that sometimes these names are used even if we are
15 talking about different structures. And this morning I believe we
16 reviewed some documents where the use -- where these secretariats for
17 defence, national defence, or people's defence at municipal level or
18 regional level, could be seen.
19 Q. Mr. Theunens, this is preeminently military subject matter. Do
20 you agree that the Secretariat for National Defence is --
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I didn't understand your question,
22 Mr. Karadzic.
23 Did this order -- or this document says it was sent to SNO
24 Krajina, Romanija, North-Eastern Bosnia, et cetera, where can we find it?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the text, I'm reading the
1 Serbian version:
2 "At a crucial point -- at a critical point for the Serbian
3 people," and Serbian is capitalised, which is not right in our language,
4 "I hereby order that you provide assistance to our liberators and units
5 from Serbia and Montenegro by sending in our volunteers and providing
6 them with material and moral support in their mission to create an
7 alliance of Serbian states.
8 "In the SNO of the autonomous districts of Krajina, Romanija and
9 North-Eastern Bosnia," I cannot read this, "you eliminate Ustasha and
10 Muslim elements that are preventing the establishment of a fair and just
11 single Serb government in the pan-Serbian lands.
12 "If these just and humane desires of the Serbian people are
13 opposed, show no mercy (an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth).
14 "Establish court-martials for these purposes."
15 This is a forgery, a brazen one at that, and deceit.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. First of all, do you agree that secretariats of national defence
18 are under the Federal Secretariat of National Defence in Yugoslavia and
19 that they keep records, military records, for conscripts, and that they
20 are immediately responsible -- directly responsible to the
21 Federal Secretariat of National Defence, that is, the Ministry of Defence
22 of Yugoslavia; right?
23 A. Yes, that's how it should be, and that's how it should have been
24 or was under the -- when the SFRY still existed.
25 Q. On the 21st of September -- rather, here it says that it was
1 received on the 22nd of September, for Bosnia, Yugoslavia did exist. Can
2 the head of a political party issue orders to the Secretariat of
3 National Defence?
4 A. In accordance with the legislation that was applicable in the
5 SFRY, no. But we see that later on, when, for example, the Bosnian Serbs
6 or the Serbs in Croatia start to establish their own structures, as I
7 explained earlier, sometimes they still used the names as they were
8 applicable under the SFRY, even if the composition and the activities
9 and, most importantly, the relationship between these new structures and
10 the superior level have changed; i.e., they're not responding anymore to
11 republican authorities, but they're responding to Serbian authorities,
12 for example, municipalities -- Serbian municipalities to Serbian SAOs or
13 autonomous regions.
14 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Theunens, Dr. Karadzic put to you that that
15 document was a forgery. Are you in a position to answer one way or the
16 other to that suggestion?
17 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, as I mentioned, I'm not in a position
18 to physically examine the document in order to see whether it's authentic
19 or not. However, when I selected the document, I was under the
20 understanding it has been used in other -- in related trials before and
21 that such objections had not been raised at that occasion, or at least
22 I'm not familiar with any objection raised in relation to this document
23 during a prior trial here.
24 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. That makes things even worse for those trials, or, rather, those
2 accused persons, Mr. Theunens. So the head of a party at that point in
3 time -- I mean, there is no Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
4 September 1991 anyway. And what about the SAOs that had just been
5 declared and had no organs whatever; did they have secretariats for
6 national defence?
7 A. I think I answered the question already, Your Honours.
8 Q. You spoke about the municipalities, clear about the municipality
9 level. But at the level of an SAO, is there a secretariat for national
11 A. I mean, based on the documents I reviewed, I do not believe
12 that -- and, again, I haven't analysed the SAOs in detail and I haven't
13 looked at the ARK, for example, but I don't have an impression that such
14 bodies existed, even if there may be an example that -- examples that the
15 name was used for bodies that had a similar role at the SAO level.
16 Q. Did that exist in September? Did that exist ever at the level of
17 SAOs, a secretariat for national defence ?
18 A. Your Honours, I have answered the question.
19 Q. Thank you. You have not answered the question. I am asking you
20 where. If you don't know, say you don't know, and then let's move on.
21 On the 21st of September, was there an SAO Krajina then?
22 A. I cannot answer the question because I haven't looked at the -- I
23 mean, an AR Krajina, or, excuse me, an Autonomous Region Krajina, I don't
24 know when it was established, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina there was never
25 an SAO Krajina.
1 Q. Thank you. Was there an SAO North-Eastern Bosnia?
2 A. Is the question whether it existed or whether it existed on the
3 21st of September?
4 Q. On the 21st of September and ever.
5 A. Your Honours, I have included in my report a decision from the
6 21st of November, 1991. That is footnote 77, which consists of the
7 verification of the decision for the proclamation of Serb autonomous
8 districts, SAOs, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there mention is made of an
9 SAO Northern Bosnia. Now, the document does not allow to determine
10 whether any of these SAOs, or autonomous regions as far as Krajina is
11 concerned, when they were actually established. And it's footnote 77 in
12 Part 2 of the report.
13 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that North-Eastern Bosnia takes the
14 territory -- or actually is comprised of the territory of Semberija and
15 Majevica, and was it called the SAO of Semberija and Majevica?
16 A. That is correct, Your Honours.
17 Q. Thank you. Have you ever heard of "all Serbian lands," as is
18 written here, "sve srpske zemlje"?
19 A. The expression "Serbian lands" is regularly used or was regularly
20 used at the time. I don't remember seeing "all Serbian lands" as a
21 specific expression.
22 Q. Thank you. Have you ever come across any information to the
23 effect that we had court-martials?
24 A. I am familiar with the establishment of a -- I mean, a system of
25 military discipline, of military justice, within the VRS. Now, I was not
1 able to establish, when preparing this report, whether such a system also
2 existed for the Bosnian Serb TO or whether the existing structures of the
3 SFRY armed forces, i.e., the JNA, were used.
4 Q. Thank you. Did court-martials ever exist? Were they ever
5 established, even during the course of the war? And how can I then ask
6 you whether there were court-martials in peacetime in September 1991?
7 A. Your Honours, during the preparation of my report, I haven't come
8 across documents, to my recollection now, that discuss the issue of
9 court-martials, except for this one document we're looking at now.
10 Q. Thank you. Do you accept that, that these are sufficient
11 elements to say that this is not an authentic document, that it is a
12 forgery rather?
13 A. Your Honours, I agree with Mr. Karadzic that there are a number
14 of factors that cast potential doubt about the contents of the document.
15 Now, again, as I mentioned earlier, and I think I mentioned it twice,
16 that those who drafted documents not always -- were not always consistent
17 in using the correct terminology. This document is, indeed, signed by
18 Dr. Karadzic, but it may well have been drafted by somebody else and he
19 signed it. So taking that into account, yeah, one would be cautious in
20 using the document, but I cannot conclude that it's a forgery.
21 Q. Thank you. Do we have a registration number of the register,
22 that is, so that it can be checked whether it was created in the SDS?
23 A. I don't see the document now, but I don't think it included a
24 registration number. Now, I have seen more documents without a number
25 from various structures and different levels, so it is, again, a factor
1 to take into account.
2 JUDGE KWON: Up-load the document.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 957.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. There is no number in the register, where the address and the
6 letterhead of the party is; right?
7 A. That is correct, Your Honours.
8 Q. Another question in relation to this document: In how many
9 municipalities or secretariats of national defence was this document
10 found as a document that had arrived?
11 A. Your Honours, I cannot answer the question. To my understanding,
12 the OTP has only one version of it, but we would have to verify the
13 databases, also establish how it was obtained, and then check whether
14 additional versions of this document would be available. When I say
15 "additional versions," additional copies, actually, i.e., received by
16 other addressees.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, according to what we were just
19 able to find out, this version was seized from Bihac in 1996 by a member
20 of this office. But there seems to be also another version here seized
21 also from the AID Bihac in 1999, and we can look into this, whether --
22 how -- whether we have yet other versions. We can check that, but from
23 the courtroom it's rather difficult.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 If the interpreters could be kind enough to read out the first
1 line on the left top. Does it say -- is it: "Received from"?
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: "Received from."
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 THE WITNESS: Actually, Your Honours, it seems this has been
5 added to the document, because everything else is in Cyrillic, but this
6 text is in Latin script.
7 JUDGE KWON: And typed.
8 THE WITNESS: Exactly, Your Honours, yes.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Do you remember, Mr. Theunens, that the Serb Democratic Party won
12 power in 47 municipalities and that Bihac was not among the
13 municipalities where the Serb Democratic Party had won the election?
14 A. Your Honours, yes, Mr. Karadzic mentioned that yesterday. I'm
15 not fully familiar with that. I do remember that in Bihac there was no
16 significant Serbian presence. But the fact that it was received by
17 AID Bihac doesn't have to mean that AID, which was the Bosniak or Muslim
18 Intelligence Service, seized or found the document in Bihac. We would
19 have to see how the AID obtained the document, and from where, and whom,
20 and how.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 May this document be admitted into evidence?
23 JUDGE KWON: This 957, together with the allegation that it is a
24 result of a forgery?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Absolutely, and it's part of the
1 report and a footnote in Mr. Theunens' report.
2 JUDGE KWON: I take it there's no opposition from the
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1586, Your Honours.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. In the summary, paragraph 24, you say, and I'll read it out in
10 "In the period from January to March 1992, the situation in
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina was characterised by a high degree of confusion both
12 as regards the future status of BH within the SFRY as well as the role of
13 the JNA in BH ..."
14 And so on and so forth. You say:
15 "By March in 1992, at the latest, Serb-dominated JNA units were
16 openly carrying out operations, protecting, arming, and helping in other
17 ways the Bosnian Serbs and on the areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed by
18 the Serbs."
19 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note they were unable to find
20 the precise reference in the report.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. And it says:
23 "At the same time, the commands of the 2nd Military District
24 commands of the JNA --"
25 THE INTERPRETER: Would could Mr. Karadzic slow down when
1 reading, please.
2 JUDGE KWON: You need to slow down. His reading out is para 24
3 of the executive summary. I'm not sure the interpreters were provided
4 with the report.
5 Slow down, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the report be brought up in
7 e-court, perhaps?
8 JUDGE KWON: But we have the reports with us. You can put the
9 question to the witness.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. The first question is: This high degree of confusion you
13 established from January to March 1992, did it arise suddenly in January
14 1992 or was it the result of the development of a crisis?
15 A. Your Honours, it did not arise suddenly. It is a result of
16 several factors; obviously, the independence of Slovenia, followed by the
17 conflict -- the armed conflict in Croatia, as well as then activities by
18 various ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as actions of the
19 SFRY Presidency and other leadership bodies all contribute to creating a
20 situation whereby, basically, the future status of Bosnia-Herzegovina is
21 unclear and there exists confusion about this future status.
22 Q. Thank you. Were you aware of the constant statements by
23 Stjepan Mesic, who was later the Croatian president, but at that time
24 I think he was the speaker of the Croatian Parliament, his statements to
25 the effect that the war front would spill over from Croatia into Bosnia?
1 A. Your Honours, I'm not specifically familiar with the statements
2 of Stjepan Mesic. But many senior politicians on all sides made
3 statements as to the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and from these
4 statements, it was clear that everybody wanted something else.
5 Q. Thank you. Was the war in Croatia and Slovenia waged by a
6 newly-established republican army composed of the police force, as their
7 core, the National Guard Corps, and the Territorial Defence?
8 A. Your Honours, I have not analysed the conflict in Slovenia. I
9 have discussed the conflict in Croatia, or aspects of the conflict in
10 Croatia, in Part 1 of the report, where I analysed the -- again, the
11 establishment of Bosnian -- of Serbian armed structures in Croatia and
12 their relations with the JNA. I know from my work for another trial, the
13 trial of Gotovina, Cermak and Markac, about, indeed, the creation of the
14 ZNG and the transformation of the TO, or the split of the TO of the
15 Republic of Croatia into actual, actually, ZNG, local Serb TO, and
16 related structures.
17 Q. In the summary, paragraph 1, towards the end of the paragraph you
19 "The task of the armed forces of the SFRY was to protect the
20 independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and social order
21 established by the Constitution of the SFRY."
22 So you were looking at events in the context of paragraph 1 of
23 the summary. According to what you wrote here, does it follow that the
24 armed forces of the SFRY were duty-bound to prevent one-sided secession,
25 that is, breaches of the independent sovereignty, territorial integrity,
1 and social order established by the Constitution of the SFRY?
2 A. Your Honours, Mr. Karadzic, when quoting from paragraph 1,
3 provided the de jure mission of the SFRY armed force as is, indeed,
4 established in the -- was established in the 1974 Constitution and
5 confirmed in the 1982 Law on All People's Defence, but I've also
6 highlighted in my report that, again, on the basis of the documents I
7 reviewed, in the course of 1991, the mission of what remains of the SFRY
8 armed forces in Croatia changes. And this is, for example, illustrated
9 by the former Federal Secretary for People's Defence, Army
10 General Kadijevic, who identifies, in a very precise manner, the
11 different phases in the conflict in Croatia, whereby in the last phase,
12 starting at the latest in the summer of 1991, he states that the JNA
13 starts to fight in support of the Serbs in Croatia, which means that this
14 constitutional goal and mission has changed.
15 Q. I didn't intend to deal with this aspect, but since you mention
16 it, Mr. Theunens: Is it correct that changes in the de facto situation,
17 as opposed to the de jure situation, resulted from the illegal attacks on
18 the JNA, and that the JNA was able to survive only in those areas that
19 wanted it there, and those were the Serb areas in Croatia? In other
20 words, was the Constitution changed, and then the role of the JNA changed
21 accordingly, or was it due to forcible actions by the illegal armies of
22 Slovenia and Croatia that the JNA reduced its de jure role to its
23 de facto stay in those areas which accepted it?
24 A. Your Honours, the Constitution was not changed. Now, as to the
25 reasons for these de facto changes, Mr. Karadzic has presented his views.
1 The documents I have reviewed provide another picture; that is, that a
2 commonality develops in the goals of the Serbs in Croatia and of the JNA,
3 together, of course, with also the assistance of the Government of the
4 Republic of Serbia, assistance in organising and arming local Serb armed
5 structures, consisting of TO and police, as well as the participation of
6 volunteers/paramilitary groups from Serbia in the conflict in Croatia,
7 whereby all these formations, together with the JNA, most often under
8 single command, fight or conduct military operations to establish Serb
9 control over areas with a significant Serb presence or areas that are
10 considered Serb for -- by these -- by the Serbian side, sorry.
11 Q. You are a scholar, Mr. Theunens, and what you are saying now is
12 political propaganda. What I'm asking you is the following: Did someone
13 order the JNA, according to the Constitution and the law, to desist
14 from --
15 JUDGE KWON: When you say, made a statement, you should give the
16 opportunity to respond.
17 Mr. Theunens, you were referred to as making a political
19 THE WITNESS: That is not my intention, Your Honour. I'm just
20 summarising what I have written in my report, Part 1 on the conflict in
21 Croatia, whereby that is, again, based on contemporaneous sources, JNA
22 documents, documents from local Serb -- Krajina Serb TO, Krajina Serb
23 MUP, the book by Army General Kadijevic, the book by the former acting
24 chairman of the Federal Presidency, Jovic, as well as other documents.
25 The documents are there, so it can easily be verified that it's not
1 propaganda I'm making here.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you want to say that the JNA was able to and allowed to
5 derogate this constitutional decision on its own -- on its own initiative
6 or, rather, its constitutional obligation before any changes or
7 amendments were made to the Constitution? Was the JNA able and allowed
8 to say, on its own initiative, I no longer want to carry out my
9 constitutional role? You are an expert on the army. Can an army do
11 A. Your Honours, the JNA, as a component of the SFRY armed forces,
12 was at the time subordinated to the SFRY Presidency. There were a number
13 of changes in the SFRY Presidency. We also know, from the book by
14 Mr. Jovic, that in addition to the SFRY Presidency, there were meetings
15 between not only members of the Presidency, but members of the Presidency
16 together with the leadership of the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro,
17 and they all shared the same goal, which was not the constitutional goal
18 for the SFRY armed forces, and this goal was communicated to the
19 military -- to the military in order to be implemented. And I spoke also
20 about the assistance the Government of the Republic of Serbia provided in
21 arming and organising local Serb armed structures, consisting of police
22 and Territorial Defence, in --
23 Q. Can you answer my question, please, can you answer my question?
24 This is a question of doctrine. Can an army --
25 [Overlapping speakers]
1 I'm losing time. We're wasting time, Your Excellency. I have no
2 time. I didn't ask what happened in 1992.
3 JUDGE KWON: Your answer is not the one just simply answered by
4 either yes or no. That's why if the witness needs to expand, he should
5 be allowed to do so. It's for you to plan how to efficiently conduct
6 your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. May I simplify my question? In 1991, the JNA or any other army
9 in the world, was it able to redefine its constitutional role on its own,
10 without any amendments being made to the Constitution, and was it able to
11 say, I no longer want to carry out my constitutional role?
12 A. Your Honours, I have answered the question.
13 JUDGE KWON: Then let's proceed.
14 THE WITNESS: Okay.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Are you saying that the JNA would not have been deployed on
17 territories inhabited by Serbs -- or, rather, inhabited by Muslims and
18 Croats who recognised the Yugoslav institutions? Did you ever establish
19 any such thing?
20 A. Your Honours, I don't -- I'm not sure I understand the question.
21 I would assume you're talking now about Bosnia-Herzegovina. But which
22 time-period are we talking about?
23 Q. I am now referring to Croatia also. Did the JNA withdraw to Serb
24 territories because there were Serbs there or because there was no one
25 attacking them there?
1 A. Your Honours, as for Croatia, there have been attacks against JNA
2 garrisons, and that was well published -- publicised in various open
3 sources. But I have not been able to -- I mean, the research I did does
4 not show that there is, in all cases, a causal link between the
5 redeployment of the JNA as well as the combat operations conducted by the
6 JNA, on one hand, and, on the other hand, attacks against its barracks.
7 I can give you one example just from the top of my head. The JNA
8 enters Baranja, Eastern Croatia, in August 1991 without any military
9 necessity, because there is no -- if there is, it's very limited JNA
10 presence in that part of Croatia, and there are no attacks at that --
11 prior to this deployment of additional JNA forces in that part of
12 Croatia. And there are other examples.
13 I would, just to cut it short, refer to footnotes 381 and 382 of
14 Part 1 of the report to explain the political background -- or aspects of
15 the political background to the change in mission of the JNA in Croatia.
16 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that up to the 6th of April, 1992,
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of Yugoslavia, both de jure and de facto?
18 A. Your Honours, this question is outside the scope of my report.
19 From the knowledge I had prior to joining the OTP, I would agree with
20 Mr. Karadzic.
21 Q. Thank you. When did the JNA withdraw from Slovenia and Croatia
22 to Bosnia, which was a part of the territory of Yugoslavia? And is it
23 correct that when it did so, it avoided Eastern Herzegovina, which was
24 inhabited mostly by Croats, because it foresaw that it would not be
25 welcome there?
1 A. The JNA withdrew from Slovenia in -- after the events of July --
2 I mean, June/July 1991. As for Croatia, the situation is more
3 complicated, in the sense that there is an official withdrawal of the
4 JNA. Obviously, the JNA withdraws from those parts of Croatia where
5 there's no significant Serb presence or those parts of Croatia that are
6 not under Serb control. But the parts that remain under Serb control, we
7 know that there is an agreement on the Vance Plan, and part of the
8 implementation of the Vance Plan is to demilitarise the so-called UNPAs,
9 the United Nations Protected Areas that have been established by the
10 Vance Plan, but in practice, and that can be found in Part 1 of the
11 report, JNA personnel that had been born in the area, but also
12 originating from other parts of the former Yugoslavia, stays in the area,
13 and they also leave equipment behind. And after, say, April 1992, they
14 continue to provide personnel and logistic support to the Serb -- to the
15 local Serb TO, which is subsequently transformed into the SVK. And as I
16 also mentioned, there is support by the Republic of Serbia to the
17 minister of interior forces of the Serb entity in Croatia, i.e., the RSK.
18 Now, for Bosnia -- I mean, some of these units are then withdrawn
19 to Bosnia-Herzegovina or redeployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I have no
20 detailed information as to why they would not be sent to
21 Eastern Herzegovina.
22 Q. I was referring to Western Herzegovina because that's the
23 Croatian part. But let me ask you this: Is it correct that the command
24 structure of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Territorial Defence was
25 composed of officers who had left the JNA, and was this the case with the
1 Muslim army also?
2 A. Indeed, I know that Croat or Muslim or Bosniak officers who
3 served in the JNA, that a number of them left the JNA for various
4 reasons to join the armed forces that were created in their entity or
5 among their ethnic group.
6 Q. Thank you. I put all these questions in order to lead up to the
7 following: What is the standpoint taken in your report towards the fact
8 that the Serb Democratic Party, instead of developing its own party armed
9 force, supported the JNA throughout this time and supported the
10 response -- or, rather, supported the mobilisation call of the JNA? Was
11 this according to the law?
12 A. Well, Your Honours, as we saw, for example, in the document --
13 the report General Kukanjac sends on the 20th of March on the situation
14 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we see that a commonality develops in the goals
15 pursued by the SDS and the JNA. And Kukanjac, for example, talks about
16 how the Serbian people, including the SDS leadership, has embraced the
17 JNA, even if there are also examples of criticism or attacks of SDS
18 members against the JNA because they want to have their own forces or are
19 suspicious of what they call the Communist JNA.
20 Q. Did the Serb Democratic Party have its own forces, or were young
21 Serbian men in the JNA, whereas Croat and Muslim young men were in units
22 under the command of their own ethnic leaders?
23 A. This is a complicated question, Your Honours, because we see that
24 the -- that the SDS or the leadership of the SDS, including Mr. Karadzic,
25 calls for establishment and mobilisation of local Serb TO units, whereby
1 they asked the municipalities -- the Serb municipalities to send the
2 young men to these TO units. I mean, prior to that there have been calls
3 to send the young men to the JNA, but at one moment in time there is a
4 change, in spring 1992, whereby calls are made to send these mobilised
5 young men to the TO and whereby the Bosnian Serb TO is to be subordinated
6 to the JNA. So there is a -- there is an evolution.
7 And just to finalise, for example, footnote 71 in Part 2 explains
8 the relationship or the role of the SDS in this process as seen in the
9 VRS analysis of combat readiness.
10 Q. Well, since you've broadened this, I'll put the following to you:
11 Up to the 27th of March, the standpoint of the SDS was that young Serb
12 men who supported the SDS should respond to the JNA call-up. Was this a
13 legal and legitimate standpoint, bearing in mind that the JNA was the
14 only legitimate armed force?
15 A. Yes, the point of view of the SDS as being presented now by
16 Mr. Karadzic, I mean, prior to the 27th of March corresponds with the
17 existing legislation in the SFRY; that is that, okay, if there is a
18 call-up by the JNA for mobilisation, then those who are to be mobilised
19 should respond and should join the JNA.
20 Q. Let's move on. You say that in late March, at the Assembly, I
21 launched an appeal to set up a territorial defence. Do you know that on
22 the 18th of March, we were given the final right to establish our
23 constituent unit, and within that unit, we would have the authority over
24 the TO, and possibly over an army, or if not an army, then at least a
25 national guard? The issue of a joint army was put off for a later date.
1 Do you know that I made that recommendation in the context of the
2 agreements reached with the European Community?
3 A. Your Honours, in order to answer this question, I would have to
4 review these agreements. And I haven't had the opportunity it this far,
5 to do it at this stage, so I cannot answer that question.
6 Q. Thank you. You're critical towards the SDS because of its policy
7 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you think that it would be necessary for you
8 to know more about the main political processes and events, including the
9 Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, to make such conclusions?
10 A. Your Honours, I'm not critical towards SDS or any other party or
11 organisation. In my report, I just try to highlight or to illustrate the
12 activities of the SDS on the basis of the documents that I could find in
13 the database -- databases available to the OTP. When I say "the
14 activities of the SDS," the activities in relation to establishing
15 military structures as well as the role played in take-over of
16 municipalities. Yeah, that's it.
17 Q. Thank you. I would like to put forward a series of facts from
18 political life that brought about the confusion that you noticed from
19 January 'til March, and I will not be angry if you do not know about
20 them. It's only important for us to hear if you knew or didn't know
21 about them.
22 Did you know that the SDS and the SDA shared the same view with
23 regard to the change of the political system and the preservation of
25 A. Your Honours, I have not analysed the views of the SDA on the
1 future of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the preservation of Yugoslavia at that
2 moment in time, so I cannot answer the question.
3 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the SDA, the SDS and the HDZ won
4 over 90 per cent of power, and the SDS had about one-third of power in
5 all of Bosnia at the central level?
6 A. Yes, I remember from my work outside the OTP that during the last
7 elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I mean, prior to the conflict, that
8 the - I would call it - ethnically-based parties had won an overwhelming
10 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the SDA, as early as late January
11 1991, changed its attitude toward Yugoslavia, and in February and
12 March tried to push a decision on the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina
13 through the Assembly, which was a first step towards independence, and
14 that it was prevented by a constitutional mechanism; namely, the
15 Council on Ethnic Equality, in which decisions are taken by consensus?
16 A. Your Honours, I'm not 100 per cent familiar with this change in
17 attitude, as Mr. Karadzic describes it. It falls outside the scope of my
18 report, so I cannot comment on it.
19 Q. Very well. Let's move on to military issues.
20 Did you know on the 31st of March, 1991, a decision was adopted
21 to establish a secret army called the Patriotic League, and on the 30th
22 of April, it was, indeed, set up? It was a military formation of the SDA
24 A. I am familiar with the existence of a formation called -- an
25 armed formation called Patriotic League and its links with the SDA, but,
1 again, it's outside the scope of this report so I cannot provide any
2 additional information.
3 Q. Thank you. Do you know that on 10 June, the Council for the
4 Defence of the Muslims was set up, and that was a political -- or the
5 political staff of the Patriotic League in Sarajevo? You are aware that
6 the Serb Assembly had set up a council for national security, which was
7 an advisory body, in 1992, and did you know that a party body, which was
8 mono-ethnic, was set up by the Muslim side on 10 June 1991?
9 A. Your Honours, I'm not familiar with the decision nor the -- the
10 decision on the 10th of June, 1991. I can just illustrate that the
11 Council for National Security, or the National Security Council, was
12 established by the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina
13 on the 27th of March, 1992, and that's footnote 89 in Part 2 of the
15 Q. Thank you. Did you know that in late June 1991, Presidents Kucan
16 and Tudjman, as well as the president of the collective Presidency of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Izetbegovic, reached -- or actually agreed on a
18 secret military pact against Yugoslavia and the JNA? This is a military
20 A. Your Honours, it's, indeed, a military matter, but it's out -- it
21 falls outside the scope of my report, and I don't have any detailed
22 recollection of such an alleged secret military pact.
23 Q. Did you know that in July and August 1991, the Serbian side gave
24 up on the idea of regionalisation, the SAOs, and other political steps,
25 in favour of an historic Serbian-Muslim agreement offered by a minor
1 Muslim party, but it was supported by President Izetbegovic, and these
2 activities prevailed -- or these talks lasted or went on in July and
4 A. Your Honours, it's the same answer as the previous question. I
5 mean, this is not a military matter, but it's -- it falls outside the
6 scope of my report, and I have no specific recollection about this.
7 Q. I'm referring to your section "Important political Events." You
8 dealt with them. You devote an entire section to that.
9 A. Your Honours, the selection of main political events I made is
10 based on the scope of the report, and that's why selection was made.
11 Q. Thank you. Do you know, and this is a military matter, that the
12 SDA party, around about the 26th of September, decided to step up the
13 clandestine monitoring of the conduct and the structure of JNA in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina and, of course, the SDS and the Serbs? Did you know
15 that the SDA party began to spy on the JNA, which was its legitimate
17 A. Again, Your Honour, this is a matter that falls outside the scope
18 of my report, and, therefore, I'm not in a position to provide additional
20 Q. Thank you. Did you know or have you heard of Sefer Halilovic?
21 Do you know who that is?
22 A. Yes, Your Honours, I know who Sefer Halilovic is. He used to be
23 Chief of the General Staff of the ABiH, but he was removed, I think, in
24 the course of 1993. While I was working for the OTP, I did not conduct
25 any professional activities in relation to Sefer Halilovic or activities
1 of the ABiH, but I know this from my professional activities prior to
2 joining the OTP.
3 Q. Do you know that Sefer Halilovic, before he publicly became the
4 commander of the BH Army, was the secret commander of the
5 Patriotic League, and that in late September had staffs in 98
6 municipalities, as well as 9 regional staffs, and a total of about
7 100.000 soldiers? By March 1992, that had grown to 103 municipalities
8 and 120.000 men.
9 A. Your Honours, this falls outside the scope of my report. I have
10 not analysed the establishment, organisation, or activities of the
11 Patriotic League.
12 Q. Mr. Theunens, did the Serbs live in a vacuum so that their
13 conduct can be viewed without taking into account the context of their
14 opponents? How could you analyse the Serb activities without paying
15 attention to the fact that in 103 municipalities, out of which in 47 the
16 SDS was in power, civil war was being prepared?
17 A. Your Honours, the fact that the scope of my report focuses on a
18 particular aspect does not mean that anything else that occurred is
19 irrelevant or so for me, but it falls outside the scope. The scope of
20 the report is very clear, and, I mean, there's plenty of publications
21 available where a particular aspect of a conflict or of an issue can be
22 studied and analysed, and conclusions can be drawn without having to
23 analyse or drawing conclusions on the activities of others who may have
24 been involved in the situation of a conflict or a particular issue. The
25 title of the report is also very clear; it's not the history or an
1 analysis of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is an analysis of a
2 role of an individual, i.e., Mr. Karadzic, in relation to his authority
3 over the Bosnian Serb TO and the VRS.
4 Q. But you also dealt with the political background of the Serbian
5 activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the approaching of the JNA, in spite of
6 ideological differences, and then there were mobilisation call-ups and so
7 on. Did you come across our frequent warnings that civil war was
8 underway -- or, rather, was being prepared, and that we were looking for
9 political answers to what was going on right in front of our nose? Were
10 our acts justified and sensible or, as suggested by the report, some
11 rebellious conduct, without cause, that disturbs the idyllic co-existence
12 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
13 A. Your Honours, if I talk about political aspects, it is to
14 explain -- or first establish and explain the role the SDS, or other
15 political bodies established by the Bosnian Serbs, played in organising,
16 arming and supporting military structures they had established. It's not
17 my intention -- or it was not my intention, it's not -- again, it falls
18 outside the scope to determine whether any of these activities were
19 justified or unjustified, or sensible or not sensible, and I haven't
20 spoken in my report about an idyllic co-existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Again, that's outside the scope of my report.
22 Q. But, Mr. Theunens, implicitly your report suggests that the Serbs
23 engaged in illegal activities that threatened the peace. But in our
24 speeches, acts, appeals and press releases, there is enough evidence that
25 what the Serbs are pointing out was true, that a secret Muslim army was
1 being set up that was going to launch a civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2 Did you ever ask yourself why the Serbs were saying what they were saying
3 and doing what they were doing? Did anybody prohibit you from trying to
4 find the causes for that?
5 A. Your Honours, nobody prohibited me nor requested me to address
6 the causes of the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina in my report, so I haven't
7 drawn any conclusions as to who was responsible or who started what,
8 where, and when. What I have done is on the basis of the -- on the basis
9 of the documents that were available to me and within the scope of the
10 report, I have attempted to analyse the role of Mr. Karadzic as the
11 highest political authority over the Bosnian Serb TO and the VRS,
12 focusing on two aspects: his command authority, i.e., the ability to
13 issue orders and verify their implementation, and, secondly, his
14 situational awareness. That may be a very restricted scope, but that's
15 how the situation is.
16 Q. Thank you. Nonetheless, in the chapter about the
17 Territorial Defence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
18 subsection (b), the most important political events, you say that the
19 Bosnian Serbs, led by the SDS, established parallel political structures
20 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the culmination of which was the proclamation of a
21 separate Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 9th of January,
22 1992. You say that on 24 October, we established the Assembly of the
23 Serbian people. Item 1 and sub-items (a) and (b) say that the Assembly
24 of the Serbian people expressed its full support of the JNA, and so on.
25 Did you establish whether our constitutional rights had been
1 infringed upon, whether we had given the Muslims and Croats a chance to
2 correct their mistake? Did we respond by setting up our own assembly?
3 Were all of our actions responses to the illegal moves of the other side
4 or do you think that is not important?
5 A. Your Honours, as I've tried to explain -- explain in previous
6 answers, these issues fall outside the scope of my report. Now, the fact
7 that they fall outside the scope of my report does not include any
8 judgement as to their relevance or importance.
9 I will also say that establishing whether or not constitutional
10 rights had been infringed upon falls outside my professional knowledge.
11 It would be more something to be addressed maybe by a constitutional
13 JUDGE KWON: Apart from the constitutional issue, you do not know
14 the facts?
15 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honours. I may know some facts, based on
16 my professional activities outside the OTP, i.e., prior to joining the
17 OTP, but I have not covered them in my report. And that's why I
18 systematically answer that I'm not able to provide any additional
19 information, because my recollection also is quite weak of these other
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Which parallel structures of the Bosnian Serbs were effectively
24 in existence before April 1992? Which parallel structures were put into
25 effect? Do the SAOs have power? Does the Assembly of the Bosnian Serbs
1 effectively equal a council of the peoples, or did any parallel
2 institution actually get off the ground before April 1992 and have real
4 A. I mean, all I can say, Your Honours, is that a number of bodies
5 are established prior to April 1992. You can find them in the section
6 that discusses main political developments. We have the Assembly. We
7 have the proclamation of SAOs. We also have a decision on establishment
8 of a government.
9 Now, coming -- answering the question whether they had power or
10 not, the Council for National Security, for example, is established on
11 the 27th of March, 1992, issues certain decisions, even if the reports I
12 have on the activities of the Council for National Security only date
13 from after the 1st of April. Now, the 1st of April is when the take-over
14 of Bijeljina takes place. It is reasonable to assume that if the SDS and
15 Arkan, according to the JNA, take control -- excuse me, remove barricades
16 by -- erected by what was called Green Berets and then also take control
17 of the municipality, that these structures and their co-operation must
18 have been established prior to the 1st of April. I mean, from a military
19 point of view, it is not something you decide the 1st of April, in the
20 morning, and then you move ahead. You need to plan and organise it. In
21 Bijeljina, there is also other groups who participate in the take-over,
22 and these activities have to be planned and organised.
23 Q. I put it to you, Mr. Theunens, that in Bijeljina, the legitimate
24 authorities were able to defend themselves against the Green Berets, and
25 you are still saying that somebody took over power from somebody else.
1 Tell the Trial Chamber who took over power from who, and why don't you
2 prove -- how can you prove that Bijeljina was taken over?
3 JUDGE KWON: Again, asked and answered.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's come up again and it's
5 wrong again, and that's why I'm asking the witness to provide some
6 evidence for that.
7 JUDGE KWON: We do not have the luxury of time to revisit the
8 same issue again and again.
9 I think it's time to take a break.
10 Mr. Robinson, I have been now advised that Security is not
11 opposed to a third team member meeting with Mr. Karadzic in the holding
12 cell during the breaks. Therefore, on the days when the Chamber has
13 allowed a Defence expert to be present in the courtroom, this expert will
14 be allowed to meet with Mr. Karadzic in the holding cell, in addition to
15 other -- in addition to the other two team members.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you very much, Mr. President, and our thanks
17 to Security as well.
18 JUDGE KWON: We'll break for 50 minutes and resume at 25 past
20 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 1.26 p.m.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Q. Mr. Theunens, I'll try to go through some matters which are
25 important to me very quickly. Please don't feel you're under attack if
1 there's something you don't know. You received the documents you
2 received, but I want to know what you took into account and what not.
3 Do you agree that the Serbian side in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and not
4 just the SDS, but all the assemblymen in the Assembly of the
5 Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, gave up the idea of remaining
6 in Yugoslavia and agreed to remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina, provided it was
7 decentralised, and this was already in late 1991?
8 A. Just two elements, Your Honours.
9 First of all, it's not a question about the documents I received.
10 I selected the documents myself from the material that was available to
11 me in the databases held by the OTP. There were no restrictions imposed
12 on that access.
13 As to the second part of the question, I cannot comment on that
14 because I didn't conduct a political analysis. I conducted a military
15 analysis. So the proposition made by Mr. Karadzic falls outside the
16 scope of my report.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, by now you should know what the scope
18 of this witness's report is. I consider such questions as wasting
19 precious cross-examination time. Posing questions is -- the questions,
20 themselves, are no value at all unless confirmed by the witness. You'll
21 have another opportunity to put your case to another witness.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, if you had a
23 little more faith in me, you would see that this is leading to my goal,
24 and the goal is to see whether the six strategic goals were something new
25 in Serbian politics or whether this was all agreed on with the
1 international community and the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia as of late
2 1991, because I'm now moving on to the topic of the strategic goals.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Theunens, do you know that the six strategic goals, which you
5 said you felt were being taken into account and something was being done
6 about them before May, do you know that except for the Strategic Goal 2,
7 they were all part of the negotiations in the Conference on Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina from the moment we gave up the idea of remaining in
10 A. Your Honours, I cannot answer the question. It may well be the
11 case, but I have not analysed the activities of the
12 International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, nor the activities of
13 Lord Carrington or Mr. Cutileiro in the framework of that conference.
14 Q. Thank you. But you said that the Army of Republika Srpska was
15 established with the aim and task of implementing the six strategic
16 goals; is that correct?
17 A. I do not think I have worded it like that. It is correct,
18 however, and that is what I have showed in the report, that the six
19 strategic goals formed the basis for the operations conducted by the VRS
20 throughout its existence until the conclusion of a peace agreement in
21 November 1995. And there was a cease-fire just prior to that, but -- and
22 that is also visible through the directives that are issued by the
23 Main Staff, as well as two directives issued by Mr. Karadzic, as supreme
24 commander, and the orders of subordinate units, as we discussed during
25 the examination.
1 Q. Well, this is how things stand, Mr. Theunens: Was the first
2 strategic goal the ethnic separation of the Serbs from the other two
3 ethnic communities, and was it established before May 1992, before the
4 outbreak of the war, in the course of the conference; yes or no? Did we
5 achieve the European Community proposing that there should be three
6 ethnic constituent units; Serb, Croatian and Muslim? If you don't know
7 this and if you did not take this into account, how can we consider your
8 entire report at all?
9 A. Your Honours, and I'm now referring to footnote 163 in Part 2 of
10 the report, when Mr. Karadzic presents the strategic goals at the 16th
11 Assembly session, he states, in relation to the first goal, that -- and
12 now first my words. I say that it is aimed at separating, and now I
13 start the quotation.
14 "... from those who are our enemies and who have used every
15 opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us, and who would
16 continue with such practices if we were to continue to stay together in
17 the same state."
18 This is how this goal is presented by Mr. Karadzic to the members
19 of the Assembly of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He doesn't make any
20 reference to any alleged reference to this goal or to this separation in
21 any peace plans presented by the European Union -- or the
22 European Community or other international organisation at that time.
23 Again, when reviewing the material, both the Bosnian Serb
24 strategic goals as well as the directives for further operations, none of
25 these make reference to any international endorsement of these goals, let
1 alone their implementation.
2 Q. Mr. Theunens, did not ethnic intolerance lead the Slovenes and
3 Croats to leave Yugoslavia and the Muslims to leave the rump Yugoslavia,
4 as they called it, and we said to them, publicly, If you don't want to
5 live with us in Yugoslavia because you're afraid you'll be out-voted, we
6 don't want to live with you in Bosnia because then you will out-vote us?
7 In every war, the Muslims took the side of the Croats and Germans and
8 attacked us. Sir, this was said in public, We can't stay with you in the
9 same community because you have taken Muslim fundamentalism as the
10 basis -- as the foundation of your state. Did you know that this was the
11 fundamental issue behind all the secessions that took place, this ethnic
12 intolerance, including our secession?
13 A. Your Honours, I mean, my answer is probably already known. The
14 reasons or the issues like ethnic intolerance and so on, or the reasons
15 for the break-up of the SFRY fall outside the scope of my report. That's
16 why I have not analysed them.
17 Q. But you are starting your analysis from the consequence, from the
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if you prefer, you can go to the
20 witness stand on your own. Do not argue with the witness.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I only want to point out to the
22 witness, counting on his honesty, that his approach was wrong. I am
23 asking him to consider whether it is true --
24 JUDGE KWON: You know the position of the witness already and his
25 scope in relation to his report. Then it's for you later on to come up
1 with a submission as to its credibility or the completeness. But do not
2 argue with the witness and do not waste time, Mr. Karadzic.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Q. Did you know, Mr. Theunens, that before the war we accepted the
5 fact that we did not have a continuity of territory and that
6 Strategic Goal 2 was not indispensable, it only became so because of the
8 A. Your Honours, this is Mr. Karadzic's interpretation. I have
9 tried to explain in the report that what I called the take-over
10 operations in Northern -- North-Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, which took
11 place in April/May 1992, were actually part of the implementation of this
12 second strategic goal, i.e., establishing a corridor between Krajina and
14 Q. Did you establish that before we liberated the corridor, the
15 other side took over power in Derventa, in Modrica, in Odzak, in Orasje,
16 and Bosanski Brod, correct or not, in the former Province 3, according to
17 the Vance-Owen Plan, the Posavina area? Do you know that they took over
18 power before this happened and that they made it impossible for us to
20 A. Your Honours, in order to answer the question, I would like to
21 refer to my report, footnotes 163 and 164 of Part 2, where, again, these
22 are the minutes of the 16th Assembly session, and according to these
23 minutes Mr. Karadzic explains, in relation to the second strategic goal,
24 i.e., the corridor, that it is of "utmost strategic importance for the
25 Serbian people because it integrates the Serbian lands."
1 Furthermore, Mr. Karadzic states:
2 "Krajina, Bosnian Krajina, Serbian Krajina, all the alliance of
3 the Serbian states is not feasible if we fail to secure the corridor
4 which will integrate us and give us unimpeded flow from one part of our
5 state to another."
6 Q. I'm asking you something else.
7 JUDGE KWON: Hear him out, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's not what I asked,
9 Your Excellency. I'm asking whether they took the corridor before we did
10 and made it impossible for us to travel.
11 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues]... No, Mr. Karadzic.
12 Please continue, Mr. Theunens.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
14 So when Mr. Karadzic explains the strategic goal to the Assembly
15 members, he doesn't refer to the activities of, call it, the other
16 parties in relation to interrupting the corridor. He explains why the
17 corridor is needed. And I think from the text, one can conclude that the
18 main reason is to ensure the alliance of Serbian states and the unimpeded
19 flow from "one part of our state to another."
20 JUDGE KWON: So you do not know whether it was triggered by war
21 or not, because Mr. Karadzic didn't refer to it at his speech?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours.
23 My point is that if it was triggered by the others, then I would
24 have expected Mr. Karadzic to provide another explanation to the Assembly
25 members; i.e., that he would have explained to them that the corridor
1 needs to be established because the others have interrupted it, as he's
2 stating now. But based on the minutes, he does not explain it in that
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Very well.
6 Q. Do you agree that neither of the "Krajinas" could survive for any
7 other reason except that communication between them was interrupted and
8 that this interruption occurred in the course of the war?
9 A. I'm not sure I understand the question, because the corridor
10 connects -- I mean, the Posavina corridor connects Semberija with the two
11 "Krajinas," I mean, Bosanska Krajina and the Krajina in Croatia. So
12 Bosanska Krajina and the Krajina in Croatia are connected, except for
13 what became the Bihac pocket. Now, whether or not they could survive
14 without the corridor, I mean, according to what you said in -- on the
15 12th of May, 1992, indeed, the corridor was vital to ensure unimpeded
16 flow from one part to the other. There was obviously also a political
17 motivation to have the corridor; i.e., as you worded it, to -- otherwise,
18 the alliance of the Serbian state was not feasible. And also when I
19 discuss Operation Corridor, June, July, and November 1992, whereby
20 elements of the RSK, I mean by that the RSK TO as well as the MUP,
21 Ministry of the Interior, forces of the RSK, operate together under VRS
22 command and control in the corridor to widen it, also there the vital
23 nature of the corridor, as how the Serbs see it, is emphasised.
24 Q. It might be easier if I put the question like this: Before the
25 corridor was broken through, were the "Krajinas" completely surrounded by
1 the enemy, were they under siege?
2 A. Your Honours, I mean, I can talk for the Krajina in Croatia, and
3 I wouldn't define their status during the conflict in Croatia as being
4 under siege.
5 Q. Very well. And do you recall that the third strategic goal was
6 for the River Drina to be a soft border and that there should be no
7 border restrictions between two worlds, not between two Serb countries,
8 as you say in your report?
9 A. Yes. I mean, I would -- just for the sake of clarity, I use the
10 term "Serbian state." A state is not necessarily the same as a country.
11 And I can also refer -- again, it's in the text - I don't have to read it
12 out - but under 2(c), the way how Mr. Karadzic presented that third goal
13 to the Assembly members, whereby he also emphasizes the importance of
14 that goal to damage the interests of the enemy.
15 Q. Where does it say that?
16 A. Excuse me. On footnote 163 has the six strategic goals, and then
17 I quote from the minutes of the 16th Assembly session. And if you want,
18 I can read it out. In relation to the third strategic goal, Mr. Karadzic
19 states --
20 JUDGE KWON: You read out part of it.
21 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, do you have a 65 ter number for that?
22 I think it's minutes of 16th session.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour.
24 It is P00781.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this brought up on the
2 That's not it. T-1355 is the transcript.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour --
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Well, we need that as well.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It would be P00956.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's first have the minutes, and
7 then we'll move on to the transcript.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. While we're waiting for it to come up, Mr. Theunens: Were these
10 strategic goals on the agenda, and was a vote taken and a decision made?
11 A. Indeed, a decision is made, and it's disseminated through a
12 document called "Decision --" I mean, this is in footnote 163. They are
13 disseminated through a decision regarding the six strategic goals,
14 number 02-130/92, signed by Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik, President of the
16 JUDGE KWON: Let us find that passage in the document.
17 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, in the English -- I mean, when I --
18 the presentation by Mr. Karadzic of the strategic goals can be found on
19 the English page ERN 0190-8523 to 8524.
20 JUDGE KWON: But this document does not bear such ERN number.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like a brief clarification.
22 These are minutes, not the transcript.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. What I'm putting to you now, Mr. Theunens, is that neither on the
25 agenda, nor in the decisions of the Assembly, is there any mention of the
1 six strategic goals. That was information I provided on our negotiating
2 positions, so it is not an official act of the Assembly because it can be
3 found neither on the agenda, nor in the conclusions.
4 If there's a hard copy, let someone show us that this was an
5 official document which was adopted by the Assembly.
6 A. But, Your Honours, I just mentioned, I mean, in addition to the
7 minutes, there is also the decision -- or the document called "The
8 Decision on the Six Strategic Goals," signed by Mr. Krajisnik on the same
10 Q. We'll come to that. We'll come to that, and we'll see how it
11 came about. But can we go through this page by page. 1, 2, 3 do not
12 relate to this. Let's move on, let's go through the document.
13 Next page, please.
14 Here are the decisions adopted. Among these decisions, is there
15 any decision on the adoption of the six strategic goals?
16 A. On this page, not.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.
18 THE WITNESS: But, you know, when we go back to the previous
19 page, I mean, these are decisions that need to be, if I understood it
20 well, ratified or confirmed, the discussion of the strategic goals -- I
21 mean, the presentation of the goals, and the discussion follows further
22 in the document.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Can you see that a platform for negotiations with Yugoslavia is
25 mentioned here and that I was asked to give my assessment of the
1 political conditions and our negotiating position? Is there any
2 discussion or adoption of a decision on the six strategic goals?
3 A. Not on this page.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. So this is where the decisions -- the list of decisions ends with
7 number 16. This is probably part of the transcript, and this is where I
8 start to speak; right? "Ladies and gentlemen," that's the beginning of
9 my speech, and it says here that this has happened to us before, only
10 this time around it's different. The foundation of the HDZ is mentioned
11 and the way this fact influences us.
12 And now let's move on to the six strategic goals.
13 [In English] Next page, please.
14 [Interpretation] Do you agree that this is an expose by the
15 president of the republic to the Assembly on his views, and the
16 information he has, and what he has learned about the political
17 conditions prevailing at the time?
18 A. Yes, I do, Your Honours.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Can we now go to the page on which I mention the six strategic
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Excuse me. You can see here that a conference is mentioned, and
24 it says here at that conference, we achieved a great political success
25 because the European Community has agreed on a tripartite
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, three constituent states, the relations among which
2 will be stronger or firmer or looser. We were in favour of looser
3 relations. We wanted these links to be very loose. The Croats wanted
4 them to be even looser, but in Europe they wanted them to be stronger.
5 That's not so important. What matters is that we received political
6 endorsement of our will to have our own state in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
7 This was our legitimate right, and no one was denying it to us.
8 And then I go on to say that after -- in the international
9 recognition, the gentlemen from the Croatian and Muslim communities
10 confessed that their participation in the conference was a purely
11 tactical move, and they began to sabotage the conference in a brazen
12 manner, unprecedented in diplomacy, and the European diplomats could not
13 believe their eyes and ears. They could not understand that this was
14 happening, and so on and so forth.
15 Well, now can we move to where -- to the place where I speak of
16 the six strategic goals.
17 Do you agree, Mr. Theunens, that all this concerns the conference
18 and the new order to be set up in Bosnia, this entire expose?
19 A. My understanding, Your Honours, is that here Mr. Karadzic
20 provides his interpretation of, indeed, the activities of the conference
21 and -- the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia and related
22 issues, and he explains his views on his interpretation to the Assembly
24 JUDGE KWON: This is a document you are referring to in
25 footnote 163?
1 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. There are two documents in
2 footnote 163. There are the minutes, and then I also included the
3 document signed by Mr. Krajisnik that confirms the establishment of the
4 six strategic goals and disseminates those goals or the information on it
5 within the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we continue. May we go to the
7 page where I speak of the strategic goals. What ERN number is that? Can
8 somebody assist? Well, can we go through the document page by page,
10 Let's go on. The strategic goals are not on this page.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. This is about the division of the Ministry of the Interior. Do
13 you know that at the conference, we got the right to have our own police?
14 A. Your Honours, as I mentioned this morning, I did not analyse the
15 activities of the conference. Now, if I had been asked to do so, then I
16 would also have consulted not just the minutes to have Mr. Karadzic's
17 interpretation of what the conference was doing or not doing, but I would
18 also have used original documents issued by the conference or its
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Do we know what number
21 it is?
22 THE WITNESS: I mean --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The second paragraph on this page,
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Ah-hah, look here. We did everything to prevent a war, and when
2 war did break out, to have the war stop and for peace to be established,
3 which would make a political solution possible. Every cease-fire was
4 violated primarily by the Muslims in Sarajevo and the Croats in Posavina.
5 That was the corridor.
6 Do you see here that it was our standpoint that the war should
7 not have broken out, that it should have been avoided, and once it did
8 break out, on the 22nd of April I put forward the platform on the
9 cessation of the conflict? Are you aware of that platform? It's of a
10 military character. It's an original document of the protagonists whose
11 conduct you were investigating.
12 A. Your Honours, I don't exactly recall which document includes the
13 platform. But if Mr. Karadzic could show it to me, then I could review
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 1033, could we see that for
16 a moment, please, and then we can return to this. We'll try to find the
17 six strategic goals in the meantime. 65 ter 1033. It's a solitary
19 On the 12th, we agreed on a cease-fire which wasn't honoured, and
20 on the 22nd, I put forward the platform. This is the platform with which
21 this Chamber is familiar.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you see that I proposed an unconditional cease-fire, the
24 immediate continuation of the conference, the drawing of maps within the
25 framework of the conference which should be a priority, because that was
1 our conclusion of the 12th of April with Ambassador Cutileiro? Then
2 there's the public obligation of all sides in Bosnia:
3 [In English] "... that the constitutional part of BH should not
4 become a part of the neighbouring states and that no armed forces outside
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be called in or admitted into the territory
6 of BH.
7 "Public obligation that all the sides in BiH do not accept a
8 'fait accompli' policy, not the policy derived from Communist heritage,
9 and that no advantage achieved by force should be justified.
10 "Most immediate implementation of a new constitutional agreement
11 with the international community warranties.
12 "Initiation of demobilising process and transfer of JNA role
13 within reasonable period."
14 I think it was five years' period.
15 [Interpretation] I think it was five years, the period in which
16 the army should stay in order to prevent conflicts. Were you aware of
17 this platform?
18 A. Your Honours, I have not seen this document before. As I said
19 earlier, I had knowledge of the activities of the ICFY, the
20 International Conference for the former Yugoslavia, from my professional
21 activities prior to joining the OTP, but I had not seen the original of
22 this document.
23 Now, just to comment, if Mr. Karadzic, as the president of a
24 party, can make a commitment or what appears to be a commitment in point
25 1 for an unconditional and immediate cease-fire in respect of the accord
1 of the 12th of April - but I'm not familiar with the contents of the
2 accord of the 12th of April - it would, from a military point of view,
3 mean that as a party president he can, as least for the forces on his
4 side, yes, make such a commitment that they would respect an
5 unconditional cease-fire.
6 Q. Thank you. This is not the activity of the international
7 community. It's my activity.
8 I seek to tender this document.
9 I believe that it should have been considered in your report;
11 A. Your Honours, if I were to analyse the activities of the peace
12 conference, for sure. Seeing it now, I think even within the scope, I
13 would have included it, because as I mentioned now, I would see it as
14 reflecting Mr. Karadzic's authority for the forces operating on the -- on
15 the Bosnian Serb side, because he is in a position, looking at
16 paragraph 1, to make a commitment for an unconditional and immediate
18 JUDGE KWON: This will be admitted as Exhibit D -- you have
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No. Thank you, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit D1587.
22 But why was it translated in United Nations -- it is our paper,
23 yes, it's our letterhead.
24 Let's proceed.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that it was sent to them,
1 Your Excellency, and that is why. The date is 22 April 1992. It was
2 sent to them, and they translated it and forwarded it to the
3 United Nations. Or, actually, this is the letterhead of this Tribunal.
4 JUDGE KWON: That's not important. Let's proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the previous document
6 again, P956.
7 Yes. Let us go forward in the document page by page and try to
8 find the six strategic objectives.
9 Page 7 in Serbian.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Theunens, consulting this document, did you read this
12 platform or my speech I gave in the Assembly or did you just read the
13 part about the six strategic objectives?
14 A. No, Your Honours, I read the entire document, whereby I would
15 also use search terms to locate specific items in the document.
16 Q. Thank you. At the bottom of this page, I read:
17 "The Serb side in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Presidency, the
18 government, the National Security Council that we established, adopted
19 the strategic priorities of the Serbian people," priorities, not
21 It's on page 9 in English.
22 The first strategic objective is the separation from the two
23 other communities. Do you agree that this was one of the principles of
24 the Lisbon Conference?
25 A. Your Honours, I think I answered the question already when I
1 quoted from Mr. Krajisnik's -- excuse me, from Mr. Karadzic's explanation
2 he provides to the Assembly members; that is, that he doesn't refer to
3 the Lisbon Conference when he explains this goal to the Assembly members.
4 And I have not analysed the documents of the Lisbon Conference, or the
6 JUDGE KWON: Did he not talk about the conference earlier on?
7 THE WITNESS: He did earlier, Your Honours. But when he talks
8 about the six strategic goals here, he doesn't -- when he talks about the
9 first one, he doesn't refer to it. And I -- when reviewing the document,
10 I have not found -- I mean, from reviewing the minutes, I have not found
11 any reference between this first goal and his earlier explanations on the
12 Lisbon Conference. And also if I were to make such a reference to the
13 Lisbon Conference or the ICFY activities, I would have wanted to see the
14 original documents of those conferences in order to see what was really
15 proposed there and what was also, I think most importantly, the reaction
16 of the other parties that were involved in the negotiations to any
17 proposal like separation of the people.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Let us see what we say about the second strategic goal. It
20 continues to say if we were to stay together in the same state, they will
21 continue to attack us. The second strategic goal is about the corridor,
22 and it says it is something for which we may be forced to sacrifice
23 something here and there, but this is of the utmost strategic importance.
24 Do you understand, Mr. Theunens, that when I say that we will
25 sacrifice something, it means that the Serbian side in the talks will
1 have to give up some territories to get the corridor in return?
2 A. Your Honours, that may well be possible. But where we look at
3 the conflict -- I mean, the conduct of the conflict between -- during the
4 existence of the VRS, May 1992 until the Dayton Agreement, and the
5 cease-fire just prior to that, say November 1995, then we see that
6 keeping the corridor open was a priority for the VRS which required them
7 to limit the number of forces in other areas in order to free sufficient
8 forces and equipment, of course, in order to keep the corridor open,
9 because the corridor was the life-line with Serbia. And so from a
10 military point of view, sacrificing something here and there is related
11 to the fact that the number of troops in here and there, in other areas,
12 has to be reduced or limited because these troops are needed in the
13 corridor, and these troops and these means.
14 Q. I don't know, Mr. Theunens, how you arrive at your conclusions by
15 means of analogies. But this is quite explicit. Do you know that I
16 accepted the Vance-Owen Plan according to which the corridor was not ours
17 and that we only needed the corridor during the war and if there should
18 be war, but it isn't required in peace? Do you know that Province 3 --
19 or, rather, do you know to who Province 3 was supposed to go, and do you
20 know that I initialled that on the 1st of May, 1993, in Athens?
21 A. Your Honours, I'm familiar with the Vance-Owen Plan from my
22 activities prior to joining the OTP, but I also remember that, actually,
23 the Bosnian Serbs rejected the map included in the Vance-Owen Plan on the
24 basis, I think, of a vote by the Assembly members during a meeting held
25 in Pale which was also attended by the president of the Republic of
1 Serbia, Mr. Milosevic, and during which General Mladic explained which
2 territorial concessions the Bosnian Serbs would have to make if they
3 accepted the Vance-Owen Plan. So I think we should look at these various
4 aspects of the negotiations and phases of the negotiations together, and
5 the end result was that the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen Plan.
6 JUDGE KWON: But the question was whether you know about Province
8 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I would have to see the map. I don't
9 remember which province was Province 3. Vance-Owen spoke about ten
10 provinces, and there would also be, I think, an international statute for
11 Sarajevo, but I don't recall the exact map.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] All right.
13 Q. Do you remember that I accepted - and I am standing trial here -
14 not the Serbian people, and the Assembly could not decide, but put it --
15 put the question in a referendum, but the Serbian people refused, whereas
16 I am standing trial here?
17 A. Yes, Your Honours, it's correct that it was the Serbian people
18 who refused in the referendum. I didn't recall it exactly. I mean the
19 Bosnian Serb people, sorry.
20 Q. Thank you. Please take a look at Strategic Goal 3:
21 "The third strategic goal is to establish a corridor in the
22 Drina Valley, that is, the elimination of the Drina as a border between
23 two worlds."
24 Does this say "border between Serbian states" or "border between
25 two worlds"?
1 A. There it says, "Elimination of the Drina as a border between two
3 Q. Do you agree or do you know that the Drina was the border between
4 the West Roman Empire and the East Roman Empire and that it continues to
5 be the point of contact between East and West, and now also includes
6 Islam? Is that the meaning of this phrase "border between two worlds,"
7 that is, border between East and West, and we wanted to eliminate this
9 A. It may well be an explanation. But, I mean, when you continue to
10 read there, you state:
11 "We are on both sides of the Drina, and our strategic interest
12 and our living space are there."
13 When you look at the map and you look at which people or which
14 entities or states exist on both sides of the Drina, well, on the eastern
15 side you had the Republic of Serbia, and on the western side there were,
16 among others, Bosnian Serbs living there. So my conclusion was that the
17 "we" refers to the Serbian people.
18 Q. And do you know that St. Sava, a Serbian prince and monk in the
19 13th century, said that, We are the West to the East and the East to the
20 West, and that we should be the bridge between the East and the West?
21 When I say that, it's clear to any Serb, but you may not understand
22 because you don't know about St. Sava. But we consider ourselves a
23 bridge between East and West. Did you know that?
24 A. Your Honours, I am generally familiar with St. Sava, but in my
25 interpretation or my analysis, the statements of St. Sava are not
1 relevant in this context.
2 JUDGE KWON: So both subjects in the second and third sentences
3 are identical, "we"?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes. When we use the term "we," my interpretation
5 is that it talks about the Serbian people or the Serbs, whereby they
6 don't make a distinction between Serbs living in Croatia, in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or in Serbia, or in Montenegro, even.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course, because we're the same
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. But look at this. We say here:
12 "We now see a possibility for some Muslim municipalities to be
13 set up along the Drina as enclaves ..."
14 The "we" here refers to the leadership of the RS, and I'm talking
15 about the outcome of the conference. And I say that there will be Muslim
16 municipalities along the Drina. How does that compare to your
17 conclusions that we attacked Srebrenica because we didn't want any
18 enclaves, although we were always for the Muslims having their
19 territories in the Drina area?
20 A. Your Honours, the conclusion that - I'm quoting now from the
21 question from Mr. Karadzic - that "We attacked Srebrenica because we
22 didn't want any enclaves," I didn't draw that conclusion myself. We
23 discussed the Directive 6 that was signed by Mr. Karadzic, or it may even
24 be Directive 7 - I'm confused now - but, anyway, Directive 6 or
25 Directive 7 which have been admitted into evidence, they expressed the
1 goals set by Mr. Karadzic -- I mean, the military goals set by
2 Mr. Karadzic as to the future of these enclaves and the people living
4 Q. And I say, Mr. Theunens, that we conducted the operation of the
5 separation of Zepa and Srebrenica, and not to take them over, because
6 they were killing us daily. And you see that the third strategic goal
7 has nothing to do with the elimination of the enclaves, because our view
8 was that they could have enclaves in the Drina area. Doesn't this say
9 so, and don't you know that in nearly all plans, we accepted that part of
10 the Drina area belonged to the Muslims?
11 A. Yes. But, Your Honour, we should read the whole paragraph. I
12 mean, Mr. Karadzic even states, okay, that he sees the possibility -- or
13 the RS leadership, as he calls it, sees the possibility for some Muslim
14 municipalities to be set up along the Drina as enclaves in order for them
15 to achieve their rights, but that belt along the Drina must basically
16 belong to Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina. And he continues to explain --
17 well, maybe they tolerate initially the existence of these enclaves, but
18 there is a clear agenda between -- behind tolerating these enclaves. And
19 that can also be seen by the next sentence -- I mean, the last three
20 lines of that paragraph.
21 Q. And where does it say at the beginning? It says here:
22 "... in order for them to achieve their rights, but that belt
23 along the Drina must basically belong to Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina.
24 As much as it is strategically useful for us in a positive way, it helps
25 us by damaging the interests of our enemy in establishing a corridor
1 which would connect them to the Muslim international ..."
2 Do you think that Islamic fundamentalism should have been our
3 friend and that we didn't have the right to prevent the advance of Muslim
4 fundamentalism into our country? I don't care about Europe. Let Europe
5 take care of itself.
6 A. Your Honours, this issue, I mean the issue of "Islamic
7 fundamentalism" falls outside the scope of my report. And when I discuss
8 the strategic goals, I don't express any judgement as to whether they
9 were good, or bad, or anything. I just factually quote them. And then
10 by analysing the documentation that I reviewed, I came to the conclusion
11 that there was a consistency between the strategic goals, as the highest
12 level of political direction to the military, on one hand, and, on the
13 other hand, the operations conducted by the VRS between its creation in
14 May 1992 until the cease-fire agreement of the fall 1995.
15 And just I would like to correct my previous answer, when I
16 spoke -- when I was confusing -- confounding Directive 6 and 7. It
17 should be Directive 7, and it's footnote 371 in Part 2 of the report.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll come to that.
19 Could we see 1D3926 and see what Alija Izetbegovic's son, Bakir,
20 said at his inaugural speech upon -- on the occasion of his election to
21 the Dayton Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had three members.
22 That is connected with the third strategic goal.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can we just hear what the
25 relevance of that is, because it's really something that is from this
1 year or last year.
2 JUDGE KWON: But he says it's related to the third strategic
3 goal. I cannot make that assessment until I see the document.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Here, Mr. Izetbegovic, in 2010, November 2010, repeats that
6 Bosnia is a contact point between worlds. That's what matters to me. I
7 just have to find the line. It's in paragraph 4. Actually, 3.
9 "The idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina obviously transcends its
10 geographical size, its borders. This is the contact point between
11 borders. This is a knot where not only Bosnian and Herzegovinian but
12 global interests are tied or untied."
13 Actually, it's not "interests," it's "relations."
14 Do you see, Mr. Theunens, that the logic of the Muslim leader and
15 the Serbian leader is the same with regard to worlds being in contact
16 with each other in Bosnia?
17 JUDGE KWON: Now it's time for you to explain the relevance of
18 this document, to Strategic Goal 3.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I speak about
20 transcending borders between two worlds, not between Serbs and
21 Strategic Goal 3, because the River Drina was also called the border
22 between two worlds. It was the border between two Roman empires. And
23 this idea is something that is very present in our minds, and an analyst
24 shouldn't make a mistake with regard to that.
25 JUDGE KWON: How is this passage related to that borders between
1 the two worlds? I have difficulty.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not saying that the Drina
3 should be the border between two Serbian states, but I am speaking about
4 the border between two worlds, and that's what Mr. Izetbegovic also says.
5 We're speaking about something global, something spiritual here, not
7 JUDGE KWON: No. I'm asking -- maybe asking about your case.
8 Your case is that the Drina used to be the border between the two worlds,
9 East and West, as you put it?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. And concerning the third
11 strategic goal, I say that we should do something so that the Drina no
12 longer be the border between two worlds. I'm not referring to two
13 Serbian states, which has been attributed to me.
14 JUDGE KWON: I'll consult my colleagues.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber does not see any relevance of what
17 Mr. Izetbegovic's son is talking about after so many years.
18 Move on to your document -- move on to your next document,
19 Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please view the video,
21 then, and let us see what I said about the third strategic objective in a
22 TV interview in 1993. I think that there can be no confusion. I think
23 that is the relevant time.
24 [Video-clip played]
25 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The last question and we have to
1 finish this show of ours.
2 Now, when will the borders become softer and --"
3 "Mr. Karadzic: It seems that the Muslim leadership, as they --"
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have given them the Serbian
5 transcript, and we are going to ask for them to interpret while they hear
6 what is being said.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: It is very fast, it is
8 very hard to follow it except from the text.
9 [Video-clip played]
10 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "They have to report to their
12 "Reporter: The last question of the viewers and now we have to
13 finish this programme. When will the borders between Serbia and
14 Republika Srpska become softer, and does the world know that there is no
15 such border between Croatia and --"
16 The interpreter did not hear the rest.
17 "What they meant was --"
18 JUDGE KWON: Let's go back and repeat.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The last question of the viewers,
21 and now we have to finish this programme of ours. When will the borders
22 between Serbia and Republika Srpska become softer, and does the world
23 know that there are no such borders between Croatia and
25 "Karadzic: It seems to me that as the Muslim leadership put
1 forth these requests for the central government to guard the borders,
2 primarily meant the border between Herzegovina and Croatia, which does
3 exist and where there are no restrictions, rather, the border on the
4 Drina River. We will never allow that. That is one of the strategic
5 objectives that we have established at our Assembly. We are never going
6 to allow a border to pass through Serb areas and to be a real border with
7 restrictions, although that is the way it was for a while, because
8 overall economic relations were such that for a while it had to be that
9 way. Now it is going to be quite different. Finally, whichever way it
10 is resolved, Serb areas in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina will have great
11 freedom in economic and any other links with whomever they wish. That is
12 the way it is according to the Lisbon paper, and according to these
13 papers, and also in --"
14 Interpreter's note: No, the interpretation has not finished. It
15 was very fast.
16 JUDGE KWON: The interpreters -- please, we have to repeat. You
17 overlapped with the interpretation.
18 THE ACCUSED: Sorry.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "That is the way it is in accordance
21 with the Lisbon paper and according to these papers, rather, everything
22 that is a trend in Europe currently. Those are the rights enjoyed by
23 Germans and French, that is, that is the right that Alsace and Lorraine
24 enjoy, that is the right the Serbs have to have on both sides of the
25 Drina River."
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There's got to be more. That is a
3 European trend, and then I said that Maastricht -- or, rather, soft
4 borders in Europe would be established.
5 Could it all be read out?
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: This is the end of the
7 transcript that we have.
8 JUDGE KWON: Shall we play it again, only the last part.
9 [Video-clip played]
10 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Disabled persons who fought and --"
11 [Video-clip played]
12 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "We are never going to allow a
13 border going through Serb areas become a true border, although it was
14 that way for a while, because overall economic relations were such that
15 it had to be that way for a while. Now it is going to be quite
16 different. Finally, no matter how it is resolved, Serb areas in the
17 former Bosnia-Herzegovina are going to enjoy great freedom, in terms of
18 economic and any other links, with whoever they wish. That is the way it
19 is according to the Lisbon paper, and according to these papers, and in
20 accordance with what the trend is currently in Europe. Those are the
21 rights enjoyed by the Germans and the French. Those are the rights that
22 are enjoyed by Alsace and Lorraine. These rights have to be enjoyed by
23 Serbs on both sides of the Drina River."
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that has been interpreted.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Alsace and Lorraine, the Germans and French. Do you understand
2 now that the third strategic objective was perceived as a border without
3 restrictions, a soft border like the one that will exist in Europe, not
4 the unification of two Serb lands?
5 A. Your Honours, I don't use the term "unification of Serb lands."
6 I just talk about eliminating the Drina as a border, and then I added
7 myself "separating Serbian states," because that's my interpretation of
8 the second sentence in this paragraph discussing the third strategic
9 goal; that is, when Mr. Karadzic says to the Assembly members:
10 "We are on both sides of the Drina, and our strategic interest
11 and our living space are there."
12 And my impression is also from the interview we heard, that in
13 the beginning he also emphasizes the fact that a border between the Serbs
14 on both sides of the Drina is unacceptable for him.
15 JUDGE KWON: And in this interview, at the end, Mr. Karadzic
16 said, These rights have to be enjoyed by Serbs on both sides of the
17 Drina River, didn't he?
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
21 JUDGE KWON: What's the 65 ter number of this, Mr. Karadzic?
22 That will be sorted out later.
23 I take it there's no position --
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3930, 1D3930.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 That will be admitted.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1588, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now go back to the previous
4 document, that transcript from the Assembly. Let us look at the fourth,
5 fifth and sixth strategic objectives.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Do you recall that the first map gave us a border on the Una,
8 Sava, Drina, in part, and partly on the Neretva River, the Cutileiro map
9 and all other maps, and today we are on Drina, Una, Sava and the upper
10 part of the Neretva River, that is what Dayton recognised for us --
11 A. Your Honours, I haven't analysed these maps for my report, but if
12 my views would be requested, I would like to see the maps and then
13 compare the maps. I see that here in the document reference is made to a
14 working map, which suggests to me it's not the final map, so we also have
15 to consider the different versions of the maps.
16 Q. Thank you. But, Mr. Theunens, in every map we were on the Una,
17 Sava, Drina, Neretva, on each and every map. Did you know that, that
18 this was no new strategic objective; rather, it was a platform for
19 further negotiations, that we shall continue to seek that because that is
20 what had been offered to us and that is what we got? There is no dispute
22 A. Your Honours, I remember the different maps that were proposed
23 throughout the conflict during the various attempts the international
24 community made to try to find a peaceful solution to the conflict; the
25 Cutileiro, Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg -- Owen-Stoltenberg, sorry,
1 Contact Group, and at the end, the Dayton map. Now, it's a matter of
2 interpretation. There may have been areas under Serb control that
3 bordered on these -- on the rivers Mr. Karadzic has identified, but I can
4 say, without having the maps in front of me, that they are all quite
5 different; in particular, in relation to the number of entities as well
6 as the percentage of territory that would be given to the -- to the
7 different entities or parties.
8 Q. Mr. Theunens, in the Cutileiro proposal before the war, were
9 Serbs also given the Una as a natural boundary?
10 A. Your Honours, I don't remember -- I don't recall the exact map or
11 the final map in the Cutileiro proposal, so I cannot answer the question.
12 And, again, it falls outside the scope of my report.
13 Q. All right. But you are actually looking at the reasons for the
14 activity of Republika Srpska. You are justifying that by the strategic
15 objectives that were political ones and basically agreed upon before the
16 war. Therefore, they were a very important element in your report. They
17 were taken as a reason for the activity of the Army of Republika Srpska.
18 And I am telling you that we never denied the existence of Muslim
19 municipalities in Podrinje, in the Drina River Valley. Do you know that
20 President Milosevic said in Dayton, in agreement with me, that one could
21 discuss the return of Zepa and Srebrenica to the Muslims? If you look at
22 these transcripts, they're not accessible to us, but that was said, with
23 my consent. It was not our objective for them not to exist there, but
24 not to allow them to kill us. And even in Dayton, we allowed for the
25 possibility of their having their own municipality there.
1 A. Your Honours, I can only answer by referring again to the
2 directive for further operations number 7, which is footnote 370, and,
3 more specifically, footnote 371 in Part 2 of the report, which
4 establishes the mission or the task of the VRS Drina Corps, just
5 recalling that this directive is signed by Mr. Karadzic, as the supreme
6 commander, where, I start to quote:
7 "The VRS --"
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll deal with that tomorrow.
9 Please, can we have the next page? Can we look at the fifth
10 strategic objective?
11 JUDGE KWON: Just a moment. Is your question no or you don't
13 THE WITNESS: Answer, Your Honours?
14 JUDGE KWON: The question was whether in Dayton, Mr. Karadzic and
15 Milosevic allowed for the possibility of Muslims having their own
16 municipality there.
17 THE WITNESS: Probably they did, in the sense that an agreement
18 was concluded and now there is a Muslim -- I mean, after Dayton, a Muslim
19 or Bosniak municipality was established in Srebrenica.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 THE WITNESS: "We established," sorry.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Could you please take a look at the fifth strategic objective
25 Do you know that throughout the negotiations, our position was
1 for the city not to be divided, and for Bosnia not to be divided, but
2 rather to have an administrative reorganisation? Instead of ten mixed
3 municipalities, it would be ten ethnically-determined municipalities,
4 like in Brussels. That's the example that we gave, not Beirut, not
5 Nicosia, but Brussels. Did you know that?
6 A. I'm not familiar with, again, what the Bosnian Serbs or
7 Mr. Karadzic proposed during the negotiations or the peace talks of ICFY.
8 I mean, I don't remember the details. But I think the text here on his
9 explanation he gives to the delegates is quite clear. It is that as long
10 as -- he says "Alija," which refers to Izetbegovic, "does not have a
11 state, while we have a part of Sarajevo," and I think that's important to
12 understand in the context of assessing the importance of the fifth
13 strategic goal and its relevance for Mr. Karadzic.
14 Q. All right. But do you know - you should know, really - that this
15 is not a new objective that was placed on the 9th of May, this is an
16 objective that had been discussed, and there was two variants. One was
17 for Sarajevo to be extraterritorial, a condominium of all three ethnic
18 communities, for a while under UN administration, and the second variant
19 was that if there is no war, that existing municipalities should only be
20 reorganised, that they should be Serb, Croat, or Muslim municipalities;
21 yes or no? If you didn't know about it, no problem.
22 A. Your Honours, I don't -- I'm not familiar with what Mr. Karadzic
23 is saying now. Now, it may well have been his point of view at the time.
24 In any event, we can also see what is happening on the ground in Sarajevo
25 already prior to the announcement of the sixth strategic goal, when we
1 discuss -- I mean, in the section on Sarajevo in my report on -- starting
2 with footnote 657 until footnote 666, where I discuss activities of
3 Bosnian Serb forces, including crisis staffs in various municipalities in
4 Sarajevo prior to -- or in April and May 1992.
5 Q. Is it your position that the Serbs held Sarajevo under siege?
6 A. Your Honours, that is a different question.
7 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Theunens, could it be answered with a yes-or-no
9 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honours, I cannot answer it as a
10 yes-or-no answer.
11 JUDGE BAIRD: I see. I see. Okay, proceed, proceed.
12 THE WITNESS: -- because I don't have an exact recollection of
13 what is written in the documents of Sarajevo Romanija Corps. I mean, if
14 I would express myself here as to whether it was under siege or not under
15 siege, I have not analysed the status of Sarajevo during the conflict. I
16 could understand that question if that terminology would be used in one
17 of the, call it, directives or other command documents, or other military
18 documents from the VRS, if they would use the word "siege," and then I
19 would say, Look, the city was under siege because of this and this
20 document. So I can conduct that search after court, but otherwise, I
21 mean, I have not assessed or analysed the status of Sarajevo between May
22 1992 and October 1995.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Q. And the sixth strategic objective, do you know that Mr. Tudjman,
25 Mr. Izetbegovic and I had reached an agreement that Bosnia-Herzegovina
1 relinquishes its rights in Neum and the Serbs and Muslims -- Serbs and
2 Croats, rather, get access to the sea, also along the border with
3 Montenegro, and that that was even in the draft of the third agreement,
4 the Owen-Stoltenberg agreement, and our access to the sea was actually
5 depicted there? Yes or no. You do know or you don't know, that's it.
6 A. Yes, Your Honours, and I believe it was also known as the
7 "Invincible" Agreement or Negotiations because these talks took place on
8 the British Navy ship HMS Invincible at the time.
9 Q. Thank you. Can you say whether we ever tried to achieve that
10 sixth strategic objective by military means?
11 A. Your Honours, I cannot answer the question from the top of my
12 head. I would first look at the directives and see whether there are any
13 instructions in these nine directives for the VRS to conduct such
15 Now, I do remember that -- again from my activities outside of
16 the OTP, that no such military operations took place, except for the fact
17 that the VRS occasionally, and that was usually at the beginning of the
18 touristic season, would carry out some symbolic artillery shelling of the
19 wider hinterland of Dubrovnik, but -- and again that happened, for
20 example, when I was serving in UNPROFOR. We did not believe that the aim
21 of the Bosnian Serbs was to force an access to the sea. It was more to
22 harass the Croats.
23 Q. Well, now you've given me some homework to clarify the matter
24 tomorrow, because that was not true. It was not our interest to quarrel
25 with the Croats. We had a good life with them during the war. We traded
1 with them, and my army would not have survived, I would not have
2 survived, without this trade with the Croats. Did you know that, because
3 Yugoslavia, as you said, in August 1994 imposed sanctions on
4 Republika Srpska?
5 A. Your Honours, the question covers several aspects.
6 Relations between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats and
7 Croats are not covered in my report, but I know, from my work prior to
8 joining the OTP, that, in particular on the local level, for example, in
9 the area of Kiseljak, and also in other areas, there were good relations
10 between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. This changed over
11 time, like after the conclusion of the Federation Agreement in February
12 1994. On the other hand, there were, indeed, sanctions imposed by the
13 president of the Republic of Serbia against the Bosnian Serbs in August
14 1994 to punish them for their refusal of accepting the Contact Group
15 Plan. But from the documents discussed in the section on relations
16 between the VJ and the VRS, these sanctions did not interrupt the
17 assistance provided by the VJ to the VRS. And that was also highlighted,
18 for example, when we discussed SDC minutes - SDC of the FRY - minutes
19 during the examination.
20 Q. Thank you. Mr. Theunens, the problem is that you are expanding
21 this story and you're saying that this army, whose civilian chief I was,
22 shelled the hinterland of Dubrovnik to harm tourism, and that is to my
23 detriment and it's not true. And I said that we had a good life with the
24 Croats. They gave us oil. We gave them electricity with Boban. I
25 pacified huge parts of the front-line already on the 5th of May in Graz,
1 but you probably don't know about any of this.
2 All right, let us cover a few topics before we stop for the day.
3 Yesterday, on page 7, line 21, up until line 25 on page 8, you
4 were asked whether I could have ordered an investigation, and then a
5 document was put to you in which a commission had been established to
6 investigate what happened in Banja Luka in September 1993; that is to
7 say, page 7, line 21, until page 8, line 25.
8 Mr. Theunens, is this a criminal investigation or is it a
9 parliamentary investigation of a political nature?
10 A. Your Honours, one document I quote in relation to that talks
11 about an investigation commission. It doesn't use the expression
12 "criminal" nor "parliamentary." I'm just locating now whether I have
13 another document that deals with these issues.
14 Q. Among those names, do you find any criminal lawyers, any lawyers
15 in general, any judges, or are these people parliamentarians,
16 representatives of the Main Staff, the head of my military office? In a
17 word, you were asked whether I, as supreme commander, had the ability to
18 order investigations, and what was shown to you was that example. And I
19 am telling you that that is an example of a parliamentary investigation,
20 not a criminal investigation, because a president cannot order judiciary
21 organs to carry out an investigation. The president can only ask for
22 their views, but cannot order an investigation to take place.
23 Have you found a single example of the president interfering with
24 the work of the judiciary?
25 A. I have -- I haven't seen a document where Mr. Karadzic issues
1 orders to conduct an investigation to the civilian judiciary. However,
2 in footnote 1029, page 295 of the second part of the report,
3 Mr. Karadzic, on the 15th of March, 1995, issues a direct instruction to
4 General Tolimir, and now I quote, to order the security organs of the VRS
5 to take -- okay, quotation, "appropriate measures," against the Command
6 of the 3rd Battalion in Olovo. And according to the document,
7 Mr. Karadzic has information that the command of the battalion has
8 committed several criminal offences in relation to commercial crime. So
9 I agree, it's not ordering an investigation, but it's ordering those who
10 can conduct an investigation in such matters, i.e., the security organs,
11 to then take appropriate measures.
12 JUDGE KWON: The footnote number again?
13 THE WITNESS: 1029, Your Honours, in Part 2 of the report.
14 JUDGE KWON: Page number?
15 THE WITNESS: In my version --
16 JUDGE KWON: It's probably different.
17 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I have a different version.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Q. You probably came across documents where I am urging for speedier
20 trials, asking that criminals not be released, and so on. Have you ever
21 found any example of any interference of mine with the prosecution or
22 with the judiciary? Tolimir is part of the prosecution process, and I'm
23 asking him to do something. Did you find any example of my interfering
24 in somebody else's work, not taking into account the fact that I urged
25 for speedier processes, because I wasn't really interfering with the
1 merits of the cases?
2 A. No, Your Honours, I have not seen such examples.
3 JUDGE KWON: We'll rise for today.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to put one more
5 question, if we have time for that.
6 JUDGE KWON: Just one question.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. You were asked, on page 64, line 20, until page -- the next page
9 about the Documentation Centre -- the Investigation and Documentation
10 Centre concerning war crimes against non-Serbs:
11 [In English] "... Non-Serbs ... describe your report... we did
12 not need --"
13 [Interpretation] Documentation Centre concerning war crimes
14 against non-Serbs. This Documentation Centre, is it part of a criminal
15 investigation process or does it have to do with archives and
16 documentation? It is page 16 in English. Your report, actually, page 16
17 in English.
18 So this is a documentation centre for collecting information from
19 the territory that our investigation organs do not have access to. Is
20 this a documentation centre or is it an investigation centre, since it
21 was headed by Mr. Toholj, who is a well-known writer, and there are no
22 judges or lawyers in that body? In other words, can this replace
23 criminal processes, and does this annul in any way criminal processes in
24 Republika Srpska?
25 A. Your Honours, the Documentation Centre, we also saw an order by
1 Colonel Lugonja that was discussed in the examination. Lugonja, chief of
2 the security organs in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, concerned crimes
3 committed against Serbs, not non-Serbs. And I agree with Mr. Karadzic.
4 These -- I mean, the motives or the reasons behind the establishment of
5 these centres is not clear or the orders to collect this evidence, I mean
6 the order by Lugonja. But from the information that's available, it does
7 not allow to conclude that it replaces the criminal process or the
8 judicial process.
9 JUDGE KWON: We need to rise immediately.
10 9.00, tomorrow morning.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 21st day of July,
14 2011, at 9.00 a.m.