1 Tuesday, 8 November 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 WITNESS: MILAN KOMLJENOVIC [Resumed]
8 [Witness answered through interpreter]
9 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Komljenovic. I hope you had a
10 restful weekend.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. Thank you.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies. Good
15 morning to all.
16 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
17 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Komljenovic.
18 A. Good morning.
19 Q. Since I have not been given the amount of time that I had asked
20 for, I shall make an effort to ask questions that will be as clear as
21 possible so that we can have them answered by a simple yes or no as often
22 as possible, but, of course, you can always say more than that if you
23 feel it is necessary.
24 This is what I'd like to ask you: The critical event at
25 Koricanske Stijene, was it motivated by a desire appropriate property
1 although in such an abominable way? Was theft an important motive?
2 A. That certainly was one of the motives. We had received
3 information that the persons who were killed had been robbed before that,
4 and also we realised that in a restaurant called Zeka's, near Knezevo,
5 they showed their booty, that is to say, the money and the jewellery they
6 had stolen from these people.
7 Q. Thank you. I'm waiting for the interpretation, and I'd like to
8 ask you to -- ask for you to bear that in mind as well so that we do not
9 have our words overlapping.
10 You testified in the Ivankovic et al. case in the court of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. I'd like to remind you, 65 ter 22145, on page 14 -- or, rather,
14 72 in the document itself, you said that -- actually, the question was:
15 "As a young, educated person, were you interested in whether you
16 and the army and the CSB Banja Luka had acquired any knowledge, Prijedor,
17 Knezevo, and so on and so forth? Were you interested in whether somebody
18 had ordered that?"
19 And you said:
20 "I could not say yes. On the contrary. I had the impression
21 that -- actually we don't have such material. On the contrary. We had
22 the impression that people, the people I contacted, were more or less
23 taken aback and surprised. More or less, as I said, and I had no
24 assessment to the effect that somebody could have ordered this."
25 Is that your position to this day?
1 A. Yes, yes.
2 Q. Then you said:
3 "I tell you that this man had nothing to do with it. Zupljanin
4 certainly didn't have anything to do with it. I know that
5 Stojan Zupljanin would not have done that. He would not have ordered
6 that, and I know that Stojan Zupljanin was shocked. Simo Drljaca - how
7 do I put this? - had a different frame of mind, but I don't think that it
8 was Simo either. In all likelihood Simo hadn't ordered this or approved
9 of this. It was quite simply these young men, and the motive was
10 primarily theft, and that is what I put to you."
11 Is this your position to this day?
12 A. Yes, yes.
13 Q. Thank you. And then you had your first meeting in Banja Luka, in
14 Mr. Zupljanin's office, and you noticed there that Mr. Zupljanin had
15 taken a professional position that things had to be done in accordance
16 with the law and that nothing should be hushed up, and you repeated that
17 in your statement to the OTP. The 7th of December, 2009, page 5, 22144
18 is the page reference -- actually 65 ter reference and the page number is
19 5. I'm going to read it out in English so that it's interpreted.
20 "[In English] Three or four months ago Vlado Glamocic admitted to
21 me the following story which I heard for the first time. The night of
22 the massacre, Glamocic received an enraged telephone call from
23 Radovan Karadzic demanding answers about the massacre and who was
24 responsible for it. Glamocic had just returned from a business trip and
25 had no idea about the massacre but promised to call Karadzic the next day
1 with more details. However, he said he never had any further contact
2 with Karadzic concerning this and Karadzic never called him back. I
3 assume that he found out through other channels. When I heard this, I
4 was angry that Karadzic was putting us in the same box as the people from
5 Prijedor who committed this crime."
6 [Interpretation] Do you agree that you could make phone calls to
7 Europe and Europe could make phone calls to your area but you could not
8 get in touch with the eastern area?
9 A. I don't know. Perhaps I don't understand what you're saying.
10 This is what it was all about. Vlado had told me that you had called
11 him, and he said that you were angry. He said that the president was
12 angry, that he was shouting, asking what was going on over there, "What
13 have you done?" And that hurt us. "Who killed these people? What have
14 you done?" Words to that effect. He sought information. Vlado had no
15 information about what had happened. He had just arrived.
16 We were hurt, as I said, because you put us all in one basket
17 without knowing what had happened. Quite simply, you opened fire at us
18 and them and that was it.
19 Q. Thank you. I was imprecise. I did not mean you personally.
20 This is what I meant. Could you phone Banja Luka and Zagreb and Europe
21 from Knezevo? Was that easier than making a phone call to Pale, for
23 A. Well, yes. Pale and this part of Republika Srpska, the western
24 part of Herzegovina including Pale or, quite simply, Banja Luka, the
25 Krajina region was usually cut off during that period of time so this
1 communication was very often nonexistent at that time.
2 Q. Thank you. I'm asking you this because I'd like to remind you of
3 something. Do you remember that on the 22nd of August, in London, a
4 conference started, a conference that lasted until the 28th of August?
5 So already on the 20th or 21st of August I flew to London. I conducted
6 certain activities there. You do recall that this conference existed.
7 Vance and Owen took over the conference on Bosnia from Carrington and
8 Cutileiro. Do you remember that?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Is it correct that Glamocic had an impression that I was calling
11 from some trip and you mentioned that somewhere?
12 A. He actually said to me that you had called somewhere from the
13 outside. He did not know what this was all about. He knew actually that
14 you were abroad, that you were not in the country.
15 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that Subotic appeared on the 29th or
16 30th of August? Is that right?
17 A. Well, as for the dates, I cannot confirm them with any precision,
18 but Subotic did come twice. Two or three times he did come.
19 Q. Thank you. I do apologise for this impression that obviously
20 remained, that I put you all in the same basket, but I'm just asking
21 whether you could have called, not you personally but everybody, whether
22 you could make phone calls. Do you understand that I did not have any
23 other information? Well, now, if I tell you that the conference went
24 only until the 27th, that on the 28th of August I flew to Belgrade, on
25 the 29th I arrived in Pale, and I immediately asked General Subotic to go
1 to that area, does that sound plausible to you?
2 A. Yes. Yes, since you were abroad, and if you arrived on the 29th,
3 on the 30th we had this meeting in Banja Luka, the meeting that we
4 discussed here and that we saw the minutes of here. So it was on the
5 30th that Subotic chaired the meeting in Banja Luka, that's for sure, and
6 that's when things started getting resolved. The people of Prijedor were
7 given the task of being involved in the task that they were supposed to
8 carry out.
9 Q. Thank you. So General Subotic appeared there on behalf of the
10 president of the republic. He addressed the executive government, and he
11 asked for a pathologist to be involved and the judiciary organs,
12 et cetera; is that right?
13 A. Yes. In fact, those were the conclusions of this meeting that
14 had been chaired by Mr. Subotic as defence minister.
15 Q. Thank you. The army brought one of the survivors to you -- or,
16 rather, to your municipality, right, and then this survivor was taken in
17 and sent to the Paprikovac hospital in Banja Luka for treatment, medical
18 treatment. Isn't that right?
19 A. Yes. The information I had was that the man who had survived had
20 actually spent the night in Knezevo. Our people had saved him, and then
21 he was taken to the hospital in Banja Luka, and afterwards he most
22 probably went abroad.
23 Q. In your statement to the OTP on page 5, 22144, that's the
24 65 ter number, it's your December 2009 statement, you mention that had
25 meeting with Subotic. You mentioned that you took Subotic to that
1 particular spot. As minister of defence he was in charge of civilian
2 protection as well; is that right?
3 A. Yes, yes. Civilian protection also fell within the remit of the
4 Ministry of Defence. It was a department within the Ministry of Defence.
5 So the minister in charge was Minister Subotic.
6 Q. Thank you. So that was the basis. That was the reason, not
7 because the army would have had anything to do with it but simply because
8 he was in charge of civilian protection as well. That is the reason why
9 you took him to the scene.
10 A. Yes, absolutely. Minister Subotic was in charge.
11 Q. You repeated that in your statement to the Office of the
12 Prosecutor of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Ivankovic case of the
13 27th of March, 2008, on page 4. It is the same document, 21445. You
14 say, after a brief meeting, all of us who were present together with
15 Minister Bogdan Subotic went to the scene, to Koricanske Stijene. In
16 relation to this meeting at Alumina, what I remember is that it was not
17 attended by Commander Bosko Peulic. The reason why the meeting was held
18 in Alumina was the fact that Bosko Peulic did not want to receive
19 Minister Bogdan Peulic [as interpreted] in the command of the
20 22nd Brigade that was at the post office building. Minister Subotic said
21 that he was astonished by what had been done.
22 A. Yes. Yes. These relations between Minister Subotic and Peulic
23 were not very good. Generally speaking, the relations between us, the
24 civilian authorities and the military structures, especially when the
25 commander was Peulic, were not very good. If you wish, I can tell you
1 later about some of the aspects involved with regard to these problems,
2 that is, but that was one the reasons, because Subotic had already had
3 some experience with Peulic, namely, he had announced his visit and that
4 the other person simply refused to see him or, rather, avoided to see
6 Q. Thank you. Do you remember in the autumn of 1992 that was the
7 reason or pretext for General Subotic to resign as minister and to join
8 my military office? Do you remember that?
9 A. Yes, I remember that case. I am familiar with it.
10 Q. Thank you. In the same case, on page 10 and 68 in the document
11 itself, that's the 65 ter number 22145, you confirmed that the conclusion
12 of that meeting was that the people of Prijedor should be involved and
13 that they should have these bodies transferred to a proper place in order
14 to make it possible for pathologists, forensic experts to have access to
15 carry out all the necessary legal procedures and have these persons
16 buried; right?
17 A. Yes. These are the conclusions. This is the essence of the
18 conclusions that were reached at that meeting that was chaired by
19 Minister Subotic on the 30th of August.
20 I wish to avail myself of this opportunity, perhaps I won't have
21 another opportunity later, I hope that this statement of mine are going
22 to affect the summary that we discussed last time. I do apologise to the
23 Honourable Trial Chamber, but last time I did not manage to react in
24 respect of certain details that were recorded in my summary. This is
25 what it's all about.
1 In part of the summary --
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Komljenovic, I can say with certainty that you
3 can stay assured. The summary does not form part of your evidence at
4 all. So your testimony, a transcript, has been admitted in its entirety,
5 so there will be no conclusion at all in the future, rest assured.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: And, Mr. Karadzic, page 7, line 14, it's a question
8 in relation to commander Bosko Peulic. The sentence as it reads now is
9 like the following:
10 "The reason why the meeting was held in Alumina was the fact that
11 Bosko Peulic did not want to receive Minister Bogdan Peulic in the
12 22nd Brigade that was at the post office meeting."
13 I take it the latter Bogdan Peulic should read "Subotic." Is it
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I quoted Mr. Komljenovic and what
16 he stated to the BH prosecutor. The reason was that Bosko Peulic would
17 not receive Mr. Bogdan Subotic at the command of the 22nd Brigade which
18 was located in the postal building in Knezevo and so on and so forth.
19 Our commanders had this kind of dismissive position towards the civilian
20 authorities and would not always recognise their position as such; is
21 that correct?
22 A. Yes. And I already said that it was particularly a problem when
23 Peulic was in command.
24 I just wanted to finish a sentence I began when I answered your
25 previous question concerning the conclusions.
1 I didn't mention in the conclusions or in any of my statements
2 that the terrain should be cleansed by planting explosives. I said that
3 people were simply buried on the spot by putting dirt over their bodies.
4 Q. On page 12 of the same document, which is page 70, you were asked
5 whether after you had visited the location there was an on-site
6 investigation, and you mentioned Prosecutor Pantic. Your answer was
7 this. I quote:
8 "Yes. Of course I cannot discuss whether the prosecution or
9 Mr. Pantic or the people from his centre did something without us
10 knowing. They probably did. They were trying to do their job since they
11 were complaining they were unable to. I do suppose they visited the
12 location, although I don't know what they did. I have no such
14 Is that correct?
15 A. Yes. Given the scope of their authority and the tasks they were
16 to perform, they were under no obligation to report to me as the
17 municipal president, and I believe they did what they had to do without
18 us knowing. I do know that they had trouble accessing the field because
19 of the lay of the land, and this was the basic problem throughout.
20 Q. I wanted to show another diary page in order for you to
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is P32769, although I believe
23 these are only the pages that the Prosecution sought to tender. Hence we
24 will need a 65 ter number.
25 JUDGE KWON: This is just to check, Ms. Sutherland. The parts
1 which Mr. Karadzic asked the witness so far, are they reflected in the
2 92 ter statement already, or he raised something new? I didn't have time
3 to check them all.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, Your Honour. Are you talking about
5 the witness's notebook?
6 JUDGE KWON: No, the questions he asked in relation to the OTP
7 statement and Ivankovic's transcript.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, Mr. Karadzic hasn't been giving
9 page references and I'm having great difficulty in finding the portions
10 that he's referring to.
11 JUDGE KWON: So you didn't check whether it has been already
12 reflected in the 92 ter statement yet.
13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes -- no. That's correct, Your Honour. But in
14 relation to the notebook, it's 65 ter number 13299.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well. The reason I raised this is that if it
16 is already in the evidence, of course it is for you to emphasise some
17 important part. If you are short of time you don't have to do that in
18 the future. That's all --
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, Your Honour --
20 JUDGE KWON: -- I wanted to tell you, Mr. Karadzic.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: Sorry, Your Honour. Can I add that the
22 questions that Mr. Karadzic has been putting to the witness that come
23 from his -- the statement given to the Bosnian prosecutor aren't in the
24 draft amalgamated witness statement -- sorry, aren't in the witness's
25 signed amalgamated statement because that only comes from the ICTY
1 statement and his testimony before the BiH state court.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. He asked several questions with respect to OTP
3 statement and Ivankovic transcript. Thank you.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes. Sorry, the -- the -- the questions put to
5 him about the conversation that Mr. Karadzic had with Glamocic is
6 contained in paragraph 5 of the amalgamated signed statement.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let us proceed.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we please have
9 page 785. In the English it is 7803 -- no, no, 21 of 37 in the English
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Tomljenovic --
13 A. Komljenovic.
14 Q. If you remember the previous page, this one should refer to the
15 same meeting; correct?
16 A. I'm not sure.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we go two pages back? 83,
18 and then 84, and finally 85 in the Serbian version.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. This is the beginning of the meeting on the 30th of August;
22 A. Yes.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe this was tendered by the
24 Prosecution. Could we go to the next page.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Does it not say the same thing: CSB Banja Luka, identification,
2 civilian protection activities, doctors --
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you help us find the English
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: It's on -- it's got page 20 of 37, Your Honour,
6 at the bottom of the document.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. I don't know whether this page was tendered by the Prosecution,
9 but does it not say the following:
10 "Identification. Engage civilian protection. Doctors. One bus
11 from Prijedor. Food and lodging."
12 All this had to do with the extraction of the corpses; correct?
13 A. Yes. Judge Maric is mentioned, a check-point as well.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now go to the next page.
15 And I know positively that that one was not tendered. It is also the
16 next page in the English.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Does it not say: "Information on meeting and statement and its
20 What does it say? It seems that the jurisdiction had been dealt
22 A. Give me a moment. Yes. This is what it says. It mentions
23 clearing up of the division of authority between civilian and military
24 authorities, although I am confused by the mention of Major Trivic. I
25 don't recall him being included in these issues.
1 Q. Well, maybe you meant to say that he ought to be contacted. It
2 doesn't say he was present.
3 A. I don't recall he was present, and he's not on the list of those
5 Q. Thank you. What does it say further down?
6 A. "To the municipal organs on --"
7 Q. Does it say "problems"?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the other side.
11 JUDGE KWON: Are we in the correct page in English, Mr. Karadzic?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. It reads -- it seems that you or someone else proposed mixed
15 police patrols; correct?
16 A. Mixed police patrols, yes.
17 Q. Thank you. "More frequent contacts with the Military Prosecutor
18 and Military Court"; correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Then it says: "Responsible municipal organs, it should be raised
21 to a higher level." What else?
22 In any case, these are the conclusions of the meeting.
23 Identification is what we mentioned in the previous page, tasks to the
24 municipal organs, as well as mixed patrols and more frequent contact with
25 the military prosecutor and the judiciary and the responsible civilian
1 authorities, that issue should be sent to a higher level. Is that
3 A. Yes.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender these pages,
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, the pages will be added to the existing
7 Exhibit P3769.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. You were put a question by the Prosecutor in 2009 about how it
11 came about that Krejic was replaced and Drljaca could not be. You said
12 that there was an agreement in place in the municipality regarding
13 Krejic, and for Drljaca it was quite different. If we tried to remove
14 him, it would have well resulted in an uprising in Prijedor.
15 A. Yes. We had a meeting of the Municipal Assembly and Board given
16 the fact that we were facing certain problems which were under the remit
17 of civilian police, primarily the security of property and citizens.
18 That was our main problem. In other words, we had people coming back
19 from the front lines shooting, getting drunk, threatened people, looted,
20 and the police was unable to deal with it. On the other hand, they also
21 had to participate in combat at the front line, the police, that is.
22 We had a split of sorts. Some of us believed that the police
23 should be in the civilian areas to protect the security of people and
24 property, and we asked Chief Zupljanin to replace Krejic, but before that
25 we had agreed with Krejic that he would be transferred to Banja Luka. It
1 wasn't a problem in itself.
2 With Drljaca the situation was quite different. He was quite a
3 powerful man, and if Zupljanin had tried to replace him, he would have
4 had to face a significant reaction on the part of authorities in
5 Prijepolje and the area. In other words, I'm quite certain that
6 Mr. Zupljanin was waiting for a more favourable moment to do something in
7 order to have Drljaca removed.
8 Q. Thank you. Mr. Krejic was replaced because you needed someone
9 more decisive. Other than that, he had no faults.
10 A. That is correct. We simply wanted the police to take more -- a
11 more active role in providing security for property and citizens and to
12 go to the front lines less.
13 Q. Thank you. The position of the local authorities in Knezevo was
14 that the entire incident should be investigated and that the perpetrators
15 be prosecuted; is that correct?
16 A. Yes, absolutely.
17 Q. According to your knowledge, was your position identical to that
18 of Mr. Zupljanin and Minister Subotic as well as that of my position?
19 A. All the people I had been in contact at the time, all those who
20 were in charge and who had to deal with the incident were shocked. They
21 all insisted on keeping things within the law and that the bodies be
22 extracted, identified, and the perpetrators prosecuted.
23 Q. Thank you. The location of this tragic crime was very difficult
24 to access; correct?
25 A. Yes. It is next to the Ilomska River. It is a very deep canyon,
1 and the crime took place in the location where the cliffs are
2 particularly steep. It was indeed a great problem for those who were
3 supposed to recover the bodies.
4 Q. Thank you. In the Ivankovic et al. case, this is the same
5 document, 65 ter 22145, page 9 and 10, in the document itself these are
6 pages 67 and 68, there you described that your people tried to recover
7 the bodies in order to hand them over to the pathologist and inspectors
8 who were to take things up from there, but that it was a difficult thing
9 to do. The people you had at your disposal were for the most part
10 elderly and handicapped, who were not sent to the front line but, rather,
11 they were part of the civilian protection.
12 A. Yes. We had mobilised a unit of the civilian protection before
13 the meeting in Prijedor. Our great problem was that the Prijedor people
14 refused or did not want to participate in the recovery of the bodies.
15 The army took the same approach. They simply did not want to assist, and
16 it was for that reason that we mobilised the civilian protection.
17 However, it comprised mainly the elderly and people who were military
18 unfit, and they had very poor equipment. They did try to recover some
19 bodies, and they managed to recover four. They buried them initially
20 next to the road, and later on other investigative measures were taken
21 concerning those bodies. But that was the extent of what our civilian
22 protection could do at the time.
23 Time went by and we simply could not wait any longer. It was
24 next to the river, and the weather was quite warm, and given the fact
25 that everyone else refused to help, we from that area wanted to approach
1 it in a humane way, to deal with it properly, since those who could
2 assist refused.
3 I wanted to say another thing because I don't know if I'll have
4 an opportunity later. Concerning this task, much as other tasks in the
5 civilian sphere was approached in the very same way, although this was
6 not in the territory of the Knezevo municipality, we still addressed the
7 issue. The law on the annexation of our municipality to the Vlasic
8 municipality was proclaimed on the 17th of December, 1992, and it began
9 being implemented on the 30th of December, 1992. It was in the war area
10 and was not legally under the jurisdiction of the municipality or perhaps
11 not even in the RS necessarily.
12 We had tried to assist the civilians in the area, because they
13 were unable to access their home municipality of Travnik, and we assisted
14 in the civilian sphere. In other words, we organised the work of the
15 school, provided utilities, food, and then the incident took place. We
16 simply could not remain uninvolved.
17 Q. There is something missing in the transcript. Actually it says
18 that the republic was not in charge but it's actually the military.
19 A. No. I said that it was under the control of the Army of
20 Republika Srpska and that this was a war zone, a grey zone, but from a
21 formal legal point of view, since we had not had a law, the law was
22 passed later.
23 As regards civilian activities, this was an area that nobody was
24 in charge of.
25 Q. Thank you. In your testimony in Ivankovic, on page 72 in the
1 document itself, you say that as far as you know, the brigade got
2 involved partly in terms of securing the scene but that they did not do
3 anything else. Is that along the lines of what you've been saying,
4 namely that no one really wanted to get involved because everybody was
5 horrified by what had happened?
6 A. Yes. Everybody avoided getting involved, especially the brigade
7 commander. As a matter of fact, we asked him to give us men and
8 equipment so that we tried to get the victims out. However, since the
9 army had not been involved in this directly, he did not want to meddle,
10 as you had said, and we stayed at the public security centre.
11 Q. In the Ivankovic case, on page 96 in this document, otherwise it
12 is page 38 of this testimony, you were asked about your links with the
13 headquarters, the president of the Municipal Assembly, the government,
14 the ministers and so on, and you said there that you did not inform
15 anyone, that you did not send any reports. You also said that there were
16 no headquarters, basically.
17 "We were duty-bound to write reports to the Assembly, government,
18 president, republic. That was not the usual form of communication."
19 The Defence attorney says: "So, written reports?"
20 Answer, you say:
21 "In that year, 1992, I know -- and I'm not sure what the
22 telephone lines were like. I know that to Banja Luka we did have links
23 but from Banja Luka very difficult, very difficult in this case. The
24 centre of public security was a regional centre and that was it
1 Is that it?
2 A. In principle that's it. That year we were more or less left to
3 our own resources. The contacts we had with the government and certain
4 ministers were like this: You sort of have a problem, and then you tried
5 to get a hold of someone in this way or that way or through somebody else
6 in order to have things resolved.
7 As for communication -- as for communication with the government,
8 I mean in terms of formal communication, practically there was none. We
9 never wrote any reports. We never gave any explanations. Quite simply,
10 that was not the communication that was there. There was practically no
11 communication. Also telephones were down and various other links.
12 We in the Krajina were totally isolated at the time, generally
13 speaking. It was hard for us to get supplies. In Banja Luka, 12 babies
14 died that summer because there was no oxygen, and nobody got worried
15 about that. Twelve new-born babies died in July in Banja Luka, and
16 nobody did a thing about it, humanitarian organisations, nobody.
17 Q. Thank you. So you established this school in part of the
18 territory of the municipality of Travnik without any government
19 assistance. It was the municipality that did that; right?
20 A. Yes. We sent a teacher there. The school had already existed.
21 We just didn't want the children to be out of school. There were very
22 few children there, though, so we did that on our own. Also that summer
23 we worked on a transmission line so that they would have electricity out
24 there, although we did not have electricity all the time either. Then we
25 organised medicare there. We had a doctor who went there once a week
1 from Knezevo. That's the kind of work we did on our own, if I can put it
2 that way again, because we felt duty-bound towards the civilian
3 population. The law was passed only later.
4 Q. Thank you. As for these communication problems, you spoke about
5 that here on page 2 and 3, 22144 is the 65 ter number of the document.
6 So that's what you said to the OTP here as well, namely that the SDS had
7 a statute and programme and that in principle this was being implemented.
8 However, in 1992, there was no communication between the ARK Krajina and
9 the centre in Pale.
10 Also in that period you did not submit any written reports to the
11 Main Board of the SDS; is that right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: "Reports" instead of "properties."
15 [Interpretation] I did not submit any written reports. The transcript
16 says "properties" and the word used was "reports." Line 15.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. From this point of view, did all of the Krajina feel isolated,
19 and did they have to function independently from Sarajevo -- rather,
20 Pale? Did they have to make do and make decisions on their own
21 throughout 1992, at least?
22 A. Yes. The Krajina was compelled to act that way. We had already
23 established the Autonomous Region of the Krajina as an economic region.
24 Absolutely motivated by economic motives. The institute in Banja Luka
25 had conducted certain analyses and worked out certain parameters and came
1 to the conclusion that Banja Luka was seriously lagging behind Sarajevo,
2 that money was flowing out of Banja Luka and very little was being
3 returned, and therefore something had to be done. So a region was
4 established, an autonomous region, to provide for proper economic
5 development. That was our line of thinking at the time.
6 It was a multi-ethnic region. When the war started in 1992,
7 things took a different turn, of course, the way we didn't really want
8 them to develop. The entire area of Banja Luka was completely cut off
9 from the rest of Republika Srpska, and we were compelled to have a type
10 of state organisation in order to survive, because we did not have any
11 contacts with headquarters, and we did not know how things would develop.
12 That was one side of the problem. And then there was this other problem,
13 namely, that there was this danger of going into total separatism.
14 There was always this relationship between Pale and Banja Luka.
15 Banja Luka wanted to be independent and to run itself, and then there's
16 Pale. In view of the mentality involved and the kind of people we are,
17 Pale was worried that this might go too far.
18 Q. Thank you. In the OTP -- in your statement to the OTP, 22144, on
19 page 3, you mention that Skender Vakuf joined the community of
20 municipality of Bosanska Krajina on the 12th of April, 1991. It's a good
21 thing that you brought this up.
22 1D4453. Let's have a look at that. 1D4453. That is the
23 transcript of the founding Assembly of the community of municipalities of
24 Bosanska Krajina.
25 Was your position the following: That you had not received any
1 instructions from the top echelons of government or of the party?
2 A. Well, as for this enterprise, as you called it, we carried this
3 out out of fear for our own future. We were aware of the Krajina being
4 the Krajina and that very easily we could be left out on our own, and
5 that is what ultimately happened. The director of the institute,
6 Professor Jaksic, also attended this meeting, and he presented an
7 analysis to us of how much Banja Luka and the region were lagging behind
8 economically. So this was our decision which was primarily motivated by
9 economic reasons. However, this was not the only decision of ours that
10 was not being co-ordinated with Pale, although -- although these
11 misunderstandings, these sparks between Banja Luka and Pale existed
12 throughout the war.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all microphones
14 please be switched off.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would not say Banja Luka and Pale
16 only, but Banja Luka and Pale, there was this kind of rivalry, primarily
17 because of the money that was flowing out.
18 I would also like to refer to another decision that was not in
19 accord with your policy, and I can say that for sure, at least not the
20 policy that you pursued at the time and also the official Belgrade. That
21 is to say, this decision made in Grahovo to join the Krajina in 1991.
22 That is when we all -- that is when we were all attacked, rather, by this
23 decision that we had taken on our own. I remember some details from that
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Thank you.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland. I remember you rose.
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: It doesn't matter, Your Honour. I was just
4 wanting to have the correct document on the screen. We're talking about
5 April 1991, and it appears that there's a document on the screen
6 17th of November, 1992, and I just wanted the correct Defence
7 65 ter number.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do apologise. 1D4451, 4451.
9 Let's see this decision on accession. I misspoke.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. While we're waiting for that, Mr. Komljenovic, do we agree that
12 this rash and wilful step taken by the two Krajinas was based on the fear
13 of the Serbs in Croatia that they would suffer greatly and face great
15 A. Yes. Yes. Unfortunately, after the elections and after the
16 victory of the HDZ, and after the HDZ announced its policy and especially
17 when the HDZ moved from rhetoric to actual implementation of this policy,
18 especially after the constitution of the Republic of Croatia and when the
19 Serbs lost their status as a constituent people, they realised that they
20 would face a great deal of difficulty in Croatia. This was also based on
21 history. The suffering of the Serbs in Croatia is a well-known fact. So
22 this was a justified fear. It proved to be true. That is one thing.
23 On the other hand, we in Krajina were afraid that we would be cut
24 off from the rest of the republic and Serbia. So there was fear on both
25 sides, and that is why we organised ourselves politically in order to
1 survive quite simply.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid this is not that either.
4 1D4451 is the document that I asked for.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. That should be the decision of your municipality on acceding to
7 or, rather, joining -- well, actually, were you part of a community of
8 municipalities before that?
9 A. Well, yes, there was some community of municipalities.
10 Skender Vakuf earlier on belonged to the Krajina. So there was some
11 structure that existed even during the days of Communism, the previous
12 government. So basically we did not change our status. We stayed where
13 we had been. However, we confirmed this organisation. First of all, we
14 established this community of municipalities and then an autonomous
15 region. We were the only ones in BH who created a region rather than a
16 district, an SAO, as others did. So we really built up this region.
17 Those were our motives, a multi-ethnic region for purely economic
19 Later on, it proved to be necessary to have a political
20 organisation as well, that is to say, to create a state or certain state
21 structures, as it were, because we were isolated. We were on our own.
22 That was this latent and constant fear that prevailed in the Krajina.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 JUDGE KWON: You must be referring to 1D4551 and not 4451.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's right. That's right,
1 Your Excellency. I have the wrong number. We've just noticed that.
2 1D4551. Could we have that, please.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. This is that decision of yours, the one that you signed, the
5 decision of the Municipal Assembly. You were part of the community of
6 municipalities of Banja Luka, but now it was called the Bosnian Krajina
7 Association of Municipalities.
8 A. Yes, yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1889, Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I would like to ask that we go
13 through some parts of the transcript of this founding Assembly. 1D4453.
14 It's probably 4553. There was another bit of confusion. Yes. This is
15 the transcript. We probably have it in English as well. Thank you.
16 Page 3, please.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Do you agree that in the box we have Kovacevic's contribution.
19 He greeted all these present, and we have a reference to HDZ
20 representatives being present who became members of the Assembly as well
21 as of the SDA and the SDS.
22 Can we go to the next page.
23 Does he not mention the three parties?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. So they became members of the newly founded Assembly.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Could we go to the next page in English as well.
3 Before Dusko Jaksic speaks, Kovacevic says that he would also
4 like to greet Dusko Jaksic, director of the economic institute, who
5 explained the economic reasons why a decentralisation is necessary, in
6 other words, to have a more independent Bosnian Krajina which would be
7 free of -- of the influence of Sarajevo.
8 A. That's correct.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since this is a matter of
10 economics, I will not go into details, but could we have it admitted
11 nonetheless? Could we go to page 10 -- sorry 12. 1230. That's it.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. We have Mr. Brdjanin speaking. He greeted everyone, and then he
14 says the following:
15 "Since we are trying to organise economic and cultural autonomy,
16 we will also as a region ask that the fate of our region be kept within
17 Bosnia and that Bosnia remain part of Yugoslavia."
18 Was that so in April of 1991? Was it an acceptable position?
19 A. Yes. That was the official position of the SDS.
20 Q. The next page, please.
21 Here he says:
22 "It seems that we relied too much on our heroic images and this
23 was used by others who left us in the margins. We only want
24 Mr. Izetbegovic, our president, to change his position. He wants a loose
25 federation, and we want an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. We refuse any
1 kind of centralism or concentration of capital and power in Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina. Finally, I am personally convinced that regionalisation
3 would assist the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Why? Because all
4 three peoples reside in the area, as well as other ethnicities. By doing
5 so, we would reduce ethnic tensions, and I believe any Muslim, Serb, or
6 Croat would care more for the development of Banja Luka if they are
7 Banja Luka residents rather than have Mostar do the same."
8 Do you recall his words?
9 A. Yes, I do.
10 Q. Brdjanin, in other words, supported Jaksic's position and the
11 arguments from his analysis.
12 A. Yes, the entire region backed his analysis, and it was based on
13 that study of the institute we implemented certain decisions.
14 Q. Could we go to the next page.
15 We see here that 21 municipalities were represented but that only
16 14 municipalities voted today. The 15th was on the way.
17 Fourteen municipalities, in other words, joined the project,
18 whereas 21 were present in total, and the remainder of the municipalities
19 simply awaited to see what the income -- what the outcome would be.
20 Thank you. Can we now look at page 22, please.
21 Here Mr. Vukic as the president of the Regional Board of the SDS
22 advocates that people shouldn't be talking on behalf of the parties, but,
23 rather, on behalf of the people, that different opinions should also be
24 heard, and it says that the project of economic reorganisation has
25 started. At the very bottom of the page -- [In English] Just a moment.
1 Two pages -- at least one page more. Another, please.
2 [Interpretation] Yes. Here Vukic says that the economic
3 regionalisation race has begun, and then at the bottom, line 27 in
4 Serbian, Josip Juric from Mrkonjic Grad, HDZ president in Mrkonjic Grad,
5 also spoke; is that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And now can we go to the following pages both in Serbian and in
9 Here Juric says that he had come to find out for himself the
10 justification, the economic justification of the gathering and this
11 regionalisation. Mrkonjic Grad has sustained from giving a statement and
12 giving support to this gathering but wasn't against it because that would
13 mean it was against the economic justification of this unification.
14 Further on he says, at the bottom:
15 "If we want this economic organisation of the community of
16 Banja Luka municipalities, it must primarily be done at the economic
17 level, and I tell you that the Mrkonjic Grad HDZ will vote for this
18 organisation," and so on and so forth.
19 Do you remember that?
20 A. Yes, I do.
21 Q. Can we now go to page 25 and the corresponding page in English.
22 Twenty-five in Serbian.
23 Here Nedeljko Rasula, the president of the municipality of
24 Sanski Most, speaks, and he says that, "If the figures don't mean
25 anything, I don't know what should be the argument for a common strive to
1 live in better conditions," and so on and so forth. He says that there
2 would be less austerity, there would be less talk of who's Serb, who's
3 Muslim, who's Croat, and he further on supports the elaborate presented
4 [as interpreted] by Mr. Jaksic; right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Can we go to the following page both in Serbian and in English.
7 He ends by saying, "Let's try and trust each other, and if we
8 don't trust each other's words, then we have to trust statistics." And
9 then you say that you're from Skender Vakuf and that Skender Vakuf is one
10 of the least developed municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And
11 further on you say, "The municipality that we set up, we called it
12 Bosnian municipality."
13 Do you recall that?
14 A. Yes. We were obviously dissatisfied with our position. The fact
15 was that we were the least developed municipality in Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina, and that supported thesis that was presented by
17 Professor Jaksic, and that was that the whole of Krajina was largely
18 underdeveloped and lagging behind the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 Q. Can we now go to page 33.
20 It is the secretary, Dusko Djajic, who speaks here and says that
21 the association is regulated by the constitutional amendment 42. This is
22 a constitutional and legal matter, and it says that the municipalities
23 that are linked territorially and economically do so in order to exercise
24 their rights, and on that condition they can associate into a -- an
25 association of municipalities?
1 A. Yes. He referred to the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
2 its amendment 42. We wanted to development an economic region.
3 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness and the accused please be
4 asked to slow down.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Yes. This is secretary Dusko Djajic --
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you are being asked to slow down.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll do my best. However, I'm
9 under the pressure of time.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. In your answer, you say -- you said "constitution" but that was
12 not recorded properly. He said that he was referring to the
13 constitution; right?
14 A. Yes, the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, amendment 42.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This has to be corrected on
16 line 16.
17 Please bear with me. I have to skip pages. There was reference
18 to the elections. I am going to skip.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. That was a vote of confidence which was secret?
21 A. Yes. It was a secret vote. We had three or four candidates. We
22 voted. Municipal Assemblies delegated their delegates to represent them
23 in the association of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina, and they elected
24 a president. I believe that we had three or four candidates including
25 Brdjanin, Kupresanin, a gentleman for Drvar called Knezevic, and I don't
1 know if there was a fourth candidate. The Assembly was set up based on
2 the free electoral will and local Assemblies were set up after the
3 elections in 1992 -- one, and then the municipalities delegated
4 candidates for the association of municipalities.
5 Q. So they had the electoral legitimatity [as interpreted]?
6 A. Yes, it was derived from the elections.
7 Q. And can we now go to page 52 in Serbian.
8 Here Mr. Kupresanin thanks the Serbs, the Muslims and Croatians
9 for having placed trust in him, and he congratulates people for having
10 established the Assembly of Krajina.
11 Can we go to the fall -- following page. English could be 53 or
12 54. It should be a lower number. One before.
13 Here Mr. Kupresanin expresses his gratitude, and he says that
14 there will be no borders, that our name is Bosnian Krajina, not Krajina.
15 We are not breaking up the borders of Bosnia. Everybody should know
16 that. And we also say that the time for democracy has come, and
17 according to amendment 42, in keeping with the federal and republican
18 laws we have set up a region and nobody can tell us that we are in breach
19 of any laws. And further on he says, we people from Krajina have a lot
20 of tasks in front of us. We are going to carry out a lot of reforms in
21 education, health care, and so on and of -- we are going to develop an
22 affluent village, and we will not support the republican federation.
23 Was that all that based on economic premise and logic; and do you
24 remember that of the 100 dinars that went from Krajina to Sarajevo only
25 18 dinars returned to the municipalities in Krajina?
1 A. Yes, I said that was the main problem, the principal problem, and
2 Professor Jaksic, as the director of the institute, in his speech that
3 lasted two or three hours provided certain indicators that spoke about
4 Banja Luka which contributed to the budget of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In
5 view of how much Krajina and Banja Luka gave to the budget of Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina, Banja Luka is at a huge loss because there was an outpour of
7 the money into Sarajevo, and that Sarajevo was developing at the expense
8 of the region and at the expense of Banja Luka. That was the main matrix
9 of the meeting and of the policies that were adopted, and the decision
10 was based on an analysis of that kind.
11 Q. Thank you. I don't see that any one of us from the headquarters
12 of SDS or the government on the Serbian side either spoke or were
14 A. No, nobody.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the whole document be admitted
17 into evidence.
18 JUDGE KWON: Any objections, Ms. Sutherland?
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: Just one moment, Your Honour.
20 [Prosecution counsel confer]
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I don't have any objection to the
22 pages that were discussed with the witness being tendered -- being
24 JUDGE KWON: So you'd suggest not admitting those pages not shown
25 to the witness.
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Correct.
2 JUDGE KWON: The problem is identifying those pages. So if the
3 Defence, in co-operation with the Prosecution, identify to the Registry
4 later on those page numbers.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: And also, Your Honour, perhaps the Defence might
6 like to give it a better description than transcript of AV00-4354 and a
8 JUDGE KWON: That means there exists a video/audio-clip for this
9 Assembly, but what they are admitting is only the transcript.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour, but it would be preferable to
11 have a proper description in the e-court.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be done with the co-operation
13 from the Defence. We'll admit it.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1890, Your Honours.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. I would like to ask you to explain to all of us what were the
18 views of Skender Vakuf municipalities -- municipality of the needs of
19 Croats and Muslims? I have a list of settlements here, and I can see
20 that as far as Muslims were concerned, in the villages there were either
21 0 or 2 or 3 Muslims in Zivinice. There were 2 Muslims, for example, in
22 Dobratic. There were 3 Muslims, and 3 Serbs, and the rest were Croats.
23 Is it correct that few villages in Skender Vakuf were more or less
24 uniform in terms of ethnicity?
25 A. Yes. In Skender Vakuf Muslims -- 95 per cent of Muslims lived in
1 the centre of Skender Vakuf. There were about 5.000 of them altogether.
2 There were only about a dozen houses in a little village. Serbs were
3 more or less homogeneous in the villages, and Croats were also
4 homogenous, and they resided in -- resided in a neighbourhood that we
5 called Pogari, on the left bank of the Ugar River, and also they lived in
6 Ugartici [phoen].
7 Q. Thank you. In geographic terms they were separated from you by
8 the canyon. It would have been more normal for them to belong to Jajce?
9 A. Yes. They followed an economic logic as well, the same kind of
10 logic that we've governed when we set up our region. Primarily the roads
11 were better towards Jajce. Jajce was a more developed municipality than
12 Skender Vakuf, and they were also dissatisfied with their own status,
13 their own economic status. The -- our area was underdeveloped, and they
14 wanted to leave Skender Vakuf for those reasons. They wanted to develop
15 faster, and they wanted to be tied to Jajce. In Jajce there was already
16 the will and infrastructure in place. They submitted a request to be
17 joined to Jajce. We issued a decision consenting to their request. We
18 were in favour of them changing their municipality.
19 Q. Thank you. You have also answered my next question, and that was
20 about your reaction, i.e., you respected that. You were in favour of
21 them either setting up their own municipality or joining Jajce?
22 A. Yes. We fully understood their position. Their position was
23 absolutely clear to us. They had every reason to be dissatisfied with
24 their status, primarily with their economic status, and they sought ways
25 to deal with that problem in a more adequate way. We spoke with
1 representatives of Croats. Later on we had very correct relations with
3 I don't know whether I should remind everybody of some of our
4 agreements. Based on your suggestions and agreements with Boban, in 1992
5 we had an agreement with the Croats according to which all the local
6 issues should be dealt with peacefully without embarking on any
7 conflicts. And in that sense we had meetings with the representatives of
8 HDZ from Central Bosnia and Travnik, with the president of the
9 Executive Board of Travnik Mr. Boris Matisic.
10 And with your leave, I would like to share an event with you just
11 to illustrate how things were at the time. Since we were aware of your
12 agreement with Boban according to which we were to avoid any conflicts
13 wherever possible, and there was an attempt for the local communes to get
14 in touch with each other in order to further that initiative on the
15 peaceful solution to the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the
16 grassroots, as it were, we were one of the municipalities that accepted
17 that initiative, and together with the representatives of the Croatian
18 people we agreed that we would not embark on any conflicts.
19 On one occasion, the war had already started, I spent some time
20 in Travnik. I visited President Boris Matisic. It was on the occasion
21 of their Catholic Christmas. I paid them a visit. In return he promised
22 to visit us and to celebrate our -- the Catholic Easter in spring 1992,
23 and he was supposed to visit me on Mount Vlasic for our Orthodox Easter.
24 We were well received in Travnik and we confirmed our will not to enter
25 into conflicts. However, on the day when he was supposed to pay me a
1 visit he was arrested and taken to the military police command.
2 Actually, that is a problem which illustrates very well how we
3 functioned. In military circles, in some military circles there was a
4 need for those peaceful -- peace initiatives, albeit at the local level,
5 to be thwarted and prevented. We were taken by surprise as people --
6 because we had invited the man and they arrested him. We wanted to save
7 our own dignity. We tried to save him, and we managed to take him out of
8 the prison owing to another colonel who was the chief of security in --
9 in -- in Banja Luka Corps, the late Colonel Milan Stevilovic. At our
10 request he understood our situation and need to preserve peace and
11 preserve contacts with the people who were very fair to us so he set that
12 man free, and that night, Mr. Matisic and another officer of the HVO were
13 returned to Travnik in our vehicles. And that's how we saved him and we
14 also saved our face.
15 Unfortunately, certain military circles did not respect us and
16 they created a lot of confusion in order to disturb the relationships
17 that we had been building.
18 Q. Just one last question before the break. Is it correct that this
19 careful relationship you had with your Croat neighbours resulted in tens
20 of thousands of civilians being received in Vlasic as well as HVO
21 soldiers? They had been driven out of Travnik by the Muslim forces. You
22 provided accommodation for them there and then let them go to what --
23 wherever they wanted. You provided some assistance in terms of food as
25 A. Yes, but there was another event that I wanted to mention which
1 followed Matisic's arrest and his release. Four soldiers of ours found
2 themselves at an HVO check-point by mistake and then they were taken
3 prisoner. I believe they were still JNA soldiers because the JNA was
4 still in the area. There were young soldiers accompanied by a
5 lieutenant. Mr. Matisic did as we expected he would. He returned them
6 the very next day and our cooperation continued.
7 The event you refer to took place in the spring of 1993, when
8 Muslim forces launched a large offensive on Croat positions in the
9 Lasva Valley in Central Bosnia.
10 During that time, our army was at Vlasic, and as regards our
11 units, they did not take part in any combat. At that point in time, we
12 managed to save between 2 and 3.000 HVO members, women and children who
13 had fled in front of advancing Muslim forces.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'm looking at the
15 clock, Your Excellency. Is it a good time for a break?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll have a -- yes, Ms. Sutherland.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, just before we break in relation to
18 that last document, I was under the misguided impression it was around
19 150 pages, and given that it is a third of that and the number of pages
20 that were read out by the accused, I think it may be easier to admit the
21 document in its entirety.
22 JUDGE KWON: I tend to agree with you. That document will be
23 admitted in its entirety.
24 Yes. We'll take a break for half an hour and resume at 11.00.
25 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I wanted to ask
4 for your indulgence and ask for some additional time for this witness
5 since I have a number of topics left which I plan to cover quickly, but I
6 truly need his presence here to deal with that.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. Komljenovic --
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Karadzic.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: What amount of time do you have in mind when you ask
12 for extension, Mr. Karadzic?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, at least another half an hour
14 to the one I have. I didn't want to ask for an entire session of
15 90 minutes, but if I were to receive an additional 30 minutes, I believe
16 I could complete it.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will allow your request, Mr. Karadzic,
19 but that does not mean that you can ask any questions. Just please
20 focus, be focused, and concentrate on relevant and important issues,
21 Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Komljenovic, in 2009, you were asked by the Prosecution about
25 something you discussed with my team as well. It's a matter of Variants
1 1 and B -- A and B. In paragraph 12, which is 65 ter 22144 on page 3,
2 you said that you did not remember having attended a December meeting
3 when the instructions were handed out, and you added that it did not
4 concern your municipality of Skender Vakuf.
5 Is it correct that you heard of the document containing the
6 Variants A and B only after the war?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. Is it correct that you did not undertake any measures in your
9 municipality based on that piece of paper?
10 A. We never received it, and naturally we didn't follow it through.
11 We didn't do anything about it.
12 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that Jovan Cizmovic did not get in
13 touch with you with regard to that document?
14 A. I know Mr. Cizmovic only as a prominent lawyer from Banja Luka.
15 As regards his engagement at the time, I know he belonged to another
16 political party. Concerning this specific issue, we had no contact with
18 Q. Thank you. As an SDS official and municipal president, do you
19 agree you would have had to receive -- receive that document if it was
20 binding on all party members?
21 A. Is -- if the president of the party and the bodies of the party
22 were issuing instructions to the lower level, that is to say
23 Municipal Boards, it would have been logical that all Municipal Boards
24 had received it. In such circumstances, I would expect to have received
1 Q. Thank you. In 2009, on page 3 of the 65 ter 22144, you discussed
2 the matter of arming. I will read out that portion, although it's
3 probably part of some transcript.
4 "[In English] We had discussed arming the Serbs because the SDA
5 in Mahala were accusing us of this. There were rumours that the Muslims
6 were going to take over things like the power plant, waterworks,
7 et cetera. These rumours created a great deal of fear. Everyone wanted
8 weapons on all sides and everyone wanted to be armed. I cannot confirm
9 nor deny that the army provided other Serbs with weapons during this
10 time, but I did not have anything to do with that."
11 [Interpretation] Was it indeed so, and has anything changed in
12 the meantime in your position?
13 A. There's nothing to change. There was a problem immediately prior
14 to the war which was that fear was spreading. It's a different thing
15 whether it was based on any real terms or not. However, in Knezevo,
16 there were rumours that Croats and Muslims were arming themselves. By
17 the same token, the Muslims on the other side probably discussed Serbs
18 arming themselves. It all increased tensions, and we were afraid that
19 the Muslims in Skender Vakuf, if given weapons, could occupy key
20 infrastructure in the municipality such as the pipelines, the electricity
21 grid, and some other facilities. We were in direct contact with our
22 Muslim citizens, and we were aware of their fear too.
23 I would use an illustration here. They made a request, which I
24 believe may clarify another important dimension. It had to do with the
25 convoys which went through Knezevo.
1 On a certain day, our Muslim -- or, rather, Bosniak residents and
2 their representatives came to see me. They wanted to leave the
3 municipality as they were afraid, and I feel free to say that they were
4 justified in feeling that way. They asked for guarantees for their
5 safety, for the safety of their lives and property. They asked that a
6 decision be made by the municipal organs. We found ourselves in dire
7 straits. If we were to make a decision, a consequence of that could be
8 that they would interpret it as our wish for them to leave. If we failed
9 to act, we were then concerned about their safety. They asked for
10 guarantees that things would be fine, and we, on the other hand, given
11 that we had no armed force at our disposal, neither military nor police,
12 could not provide such guarantees.
13 In case of an incident, we believed that it could prove to be a
14 great mistake. That is why we were afraid for their fate, and we told
15 them that if they really wanted to leave that they should leave alone, by
16 themselves. The situation at the time was that the three ethnic
17 communities simply moved from one territory to another.
18 In the summer of 1992 [as interpreted], those who had initially
19 been driven out of Croatia arrived in Knezevo. They came to Slavonia,
20 towns such as Bakrac, Lipik and Pozega. It was on the eve of the war in
21 Croatia or at the very beginning of that conflict. The people in
22 question were our citizens who had emigrated to Croatia in the 1970s and
23 '80s. The next wave arrived from Central Bosnia, from the Lasva Valley
24 and Travnik, as well as Novi Travnik. Serbs used auxiliary side roads,
25 often through forests, and many never arrived to their destinations.
1 By the same token, members of the Croat or Muslim communities who
2 tried to flee frequently went to stay with their families and relatives.
3 In other words, people were trying to save their lives. For the reasons
4 of their safety, some municipalities decided to organise such convoys
5 while others did not. We did try to convince our neighbours to stay, but
6 we were in no position to provide the guarantees we were supposed to. We
7 were afraid that a lunatic such as the people who were at Koricani could
8 create such an incident, and then we would find ourselves in a very grave
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, this is the second time the witness
12 has given a rather long answer, over a page of transcript, to a question
13 that simply had to do with the arming of -- the arming of the population.
14 So I would ask if Mr. Karadzic can control his witness -- the witness,
16 JUDGE KWON: Well, it is for the witness. But if you give
17 simpler answers, then the accused would be more benefitted. Please bear
18 that in mind, Mr. Komljenovic.
19 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. An intervention in the
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. You said that the first wave of refugees arrived in 1991, during
24 the clashes in Croatia, whereas we have the summer of 1992 in the
1 A. The first refugees who arrived in the then Skender Vakuf arrived
2 in the fall of 1991. That's when the first wave of mobilisation took
3 place by the JNA and the war in Croatia began. So the initial refugees
4 received in Knezevo were there in the fall of 1991.
5 Q. Thank you. Those refugees from Croatia and Central Bosnia, did
6 they present a burden, economically speaking, for you and were you --
7 were you not afraid that their anger would turn against domestic Croats
8 and Muslims?
9 A. Yes. That was a great burden for the community given the fact
10 that it was at the beginning of the war and that there were no organised
11 structures who could provide humanitarian assistance. Some assistance
12 came through the Red Cross while we provided a lot of it ourselves. It
13 was a problem in its own right.
14 As for the other part of your question, it was clear that such a
15 thing -- such an emotion could spill over. The people who arrived in
16 Knezevo were frustrated by the fact that they had been expelled, and
17 always potentially at risk of creating a disturbance in Knezevo itself
18 [Realtime transcript read in error "it testified"].
19 Q. Thank you. In addition to the problem with those who had been
20 expelled, is it not correct that you did not have any local paramilitary
21 groups, but you had other groups passing through your area such as the
22 White Eagles, and you had people coming back from the front lines at
23 rotations? Were there incidents where they would freely enter shops and
24 take alcohol and that your -- that both Serb and Muslim citizens felt in
1 A. If you were to ask the Serbs or Croats or Muslims in Knezevo, we
2 probably would not have ever had war. The problem was the people who
3 transited through Knezevo. They disturbed all of our residents. There
4 were cases of robberies, shootings, and other disturbances. It was all
5 created by those who simply went through Knezevo.
6 Q. Thank you. Line 21, it says "it testified." That is an extra.
7 It doesn't belong there.
8 Still, you had no murder incidents. We had a policeman of yours
9 here who said that there were a few murders before the war and a couple
10 during the war, and these were isolated incidents involving a very
11 limited number of people.
12 A. Yes. If we look at what was going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 in general and the war, with its toll, and although Knezevo was not an
14 isolated island, we were very happy with the situation in our
15 municipality since there were very few things happening. I think all in
16 all there were five murders because of different motives, but they were
17 all processed by our public security station in keeping with the law. It
18 is something that the whole of Knezevo can be proud of. Of course, there
19 was the Koricanske Stijene incident which had a certain impact, but we
20 still believe that it was outside the territory of our municipality, as I
22 Q. Was it also important that the municipality of Knezevo is between
23 Kotor Varos and Jajce and immediately adjacent to you was Siprage with a
24 large number of Muslims residing there?
25 A. Knezevo indeed was between the territories you mentioned. There
1 was Ugar where Croats and Muslims were, and on the other side there were
2 Siprage and Vecici which were Muslim strongholds. We were simply wedged
3 into that part.
4 Q. Thank you. SDA president Suljo Susic --
5 A. Susic.
6 Q. He came to see you with a delegation asking for their organised
7 departure. Did they indeed leave of their own accord, and did many of
8 them leave Kotor Varos -- sorry, Skender Vakuf?
9 A. Knezevo or Skender Vakuf. Since we could not grant their request
10 and since we could not guarantee their safety, as I've explained, they
11 left of their own accord. They took whatever vehicles and movable
12 property they had, and without our knowledge, in a matter of a couple of
13 days, they simply left. At that point in time we saw it as their
14 salvation because we couldn't provide what they wanted. Many of them
15 left their property behind, and they left the keys to their real estate,
16 to their acquaintances and relatives. In that regard there were no
17 specific incidences. After the war they all returned, and for the most
18 part their property had been preserved.
19 Q. Thank you. A lot of people returned, therefore, and their
20 property was returned. Even those who didn't return could get their
21 property back.
22 A. Yes, that's correct. Everybody got their property back. I would
23 like to re-emphasise that all of the property save for a few sporadic
24 cases, all the poverty was saved.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I would like to call up
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you remember, although it may have not reached you in time due
5 to interrupted communications, that the government had put a ban on the
6 sale of property? It had put a ban on the sale of apartments. And
7 during the war things like that were scrutinised. Do you remember that?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. This is from the 188th session of the Executive Board of the
10 government in Banja Luka. It was held in November 1994. I'm interested
11 in page 3.
12 While we're waiting for the page to appear, Mr. Komljenovic, let
13 me ask you to explain in the shortest possible term for the benefit of
14 all the participants in the trial the term of "social assets." This is
15 something that doesn't exist in their countries when we're talking about
16 apartments and other non-private property.
17 A. This socially owned property is a phenomenon typical of the
18 former Yugoslavia. It was a dominant type of property during the entire
19 rule of the Communist League. There were no private companies. All of
20 the companies were state companies to start with and later on socially
21 owned companies. The apartments that were built in the former Yugoslavia
22 were built with the allocations from the budget, around they were given
23 to workers and officials to use, but those people were not their owners.
24 They were just the users of those apartments. It was only later on,
25 after the end of the war, new authorities will introduce a new law on
1 privatisation, so the people who used the apartments were given the right
2 to buy them at a much reduced price. So today they're the owners of
3 those apartments.
4 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at paragraph 1 -- bullet
5 point 1 where it says that consent is given to exchange municipal
6 apartments. So the apartment provider and owner was the municipality?
7 A. Yes. The owner of the apartment had to be a municipality, a
8 company or some state body.
9 Q. Thank you. We see that Semiz -- Amina Semiz, Amina Semiz, is she
10 a Muslim.
11 A. Well, judging by the name I would assume so.
12 Q. Amina Semiz is hereby allowed to exchange her apartment with
13 Stjepan Omicevic [phoen]. Stjepan could be a Serb or a Croat; right?
14 A. Yes. Although I suppose that he was probably a Croat. It is
15 more likely that he was a Croat.
16 Q. Thank you. And now you can see what is approved by way of
17 exchanging municipal apartments. Sometimes the protagonists are Muslims
18 and Serbs, sometimes Croats as well. Goran Arnautovic is probably a
19 Croat. And towards the end of the page, in conclusion we can see that a
20 municipal apartments were assigned to people for use; right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And then under bullet point 4, a decision was issued that you
23 should also be assigned a municipal apartment in October 1994. Is that
24 the time when you were transferred to Banja Luka?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Can we go to page 5 now.
2 We can see here that Husein Bahtijarevic [phoen], obviously a
3 Muslim, request was rejected - he wanted to exchange his apartment with
4 Miroslav Kopanja from Zenica - because that exchange was fictitious. And
5 further on, another request was rejected. The applicant was
6 Kemal Bibuljica, also a Muslim, who wanted to exchange his municipal
7 apartment with Milan Momic. Again the exchange would have been
8 fictitious. So fictitious exchanges were not permitted.
9 A. I don't know what is meant by this term "fictitious." What does
10 it mean when they say a fictitious exchange of an apartment? I'm not
11 sure that I understand that.
12 Q. Does that mean that the apartment doesn't exist at all or that
13 there is not an exchange but a sale of an apartment?
14 A. Yes, probably that would be the case.
15 Q. Then on the following page there is another example of the same
16 kind and then on page 10 in the same document, page 10, the right is
17 denied to Muslim, Croats, and Serbs to --
18 A. Can we zoom in? Can we blow-up that part so I can read it? Yes,
19 yes, yes.
20 Q. And here you agree with me, don't you, that there are Serbs,
21 Croats, and Muslims here; right?
22 A. Yes. There's Matic, for example, Delibasic, Jokanovic. So I
23 would say there were all kinds, Croats, Muslims and Serbs.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1891, Your Honours.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Komljenovic, according to what you know, in your municipality
5 or any municipality for that matter, those who were resettled because of
6 fear, did it ever become possible for them not to come back?
7 A. I'm not familiar with that. After the war, it was a common
8 policy for everybody to come back. That was established in the
9 Dayton Accord. This is one of the elementary human rights. I believe
10 that we were aware of the fact that those people were only leaving
11 temporarily to save themselves and, God willing, that they would be back.
12 That was the only possible solution in all of our minds.
13 Q. Thank you. The health minister who was also dealing with
14 humanitarian issues, Mr. Dragan Kalanic, on my behalf on the 22nd of May,
15 1992, signed a commitment to organise the resettlement of the population
16 from war-struck areas and areas of combat -- combat activities. It says
17 there that the municipality addressed by the population is duty-bound to
18 provide a police escort and to inform all the municipalities through
19 which they would pass as well as the municipality that would receive
20 them, that they should all be ready to receive them.
21 Do you agree that before that signature was put on the document
22 there was no organised resettlement of the population under escort but
23 that, rather, everybody was running into chaotic matter whenever --
24 wherever they could.
25 A. Well, I can't tell you that I am aware of this decision by Mr. --
1 Minister Kalanic. At least we did not receive it. Although I spoke
2 about that. I said that people were leaving in an organised or -- way or
3 otherwise in order to save themselves and that some municipalities
4 resorted to the organised manners, whereas the others couldn't do that.
5 Q. You also mentioned that Serbs from Central Bosnia fled to the
6 Republika Srpska across Vlasic using auxiliary roads in a chaotic manner.
7 Was there a single organised convoy of Serbs under escort, or did they
8 continue fleeing as best as they could until the end of the war?
9 A. The Serbs fled in a haphazard way. There were also cases of
10 exchanges on the line. I believe that the army occasionally organised
11 those exchanges of civilians for civilians, soldiers for soldiers. And
12 in such cases, I suppose that they would arrive in an organised manner.
13 However, for the large part, Serbs left Central Bosnia in a chaotic way
14 by running, fleeing, using auxiliary routes, making their way through to
15 our municipality.
16 Q. Thank you. And now I would like to ask you something about the
17 practice of work of Crisis Staffs, i.e., Councils for National Defence.
18 In your testimony in the Ivankovic case, which is 65 ter 22145 on page 3,
19 and in the document it's page 61, to the Prosecutor's question as to
20 whether the Assembly of Knezevo was also a part of the Crisis Staff, you
21 say that it depended on the stage of the war, and I quote:
22 "In the first stage, on the eve of the war, and when the war just
23 started we functioned as a council for national defence pursuant to the
24 old law. I don't remember the name of the law. It was a federal law.
25 Later on it depended on the course of developments. First they were --
1 remained as Crisis Staffs and then War Staffs."
2 Can you please tell us something about that practice. As the
3 president of the municipality, you were also the president of the Council
4 of National Defence.
5 A. Yes. We inherited the organisational structure that was based on
6 the federal Law on National Defence, according to which at the federal
7 level there were Secretariats for National Defence and social
8 self-protections, and similar organs existed at the republican level.
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina had a body of that kind. It was a -- a Secretariat
10 for National Defence and civilian protection and Territorial Defence.
11 Local communes and municipalities had similar municipal organs and
12 municipal secretariats that -- that had their secretaries and their small
14 At that time, at the -- the beginning, mobilisation was organised
15 by superior bodies. According to that law, in case of war or a -- or an
16 imminent threat of war when local Municipal Assemblies could not be
17 called up and couldn't function, the Council for National Council [as
18 interpreted] would take over their duties. I was the president of the
19 council of national defence, and in addition to myself there was the
20 chief of the local police, the President of the Executive Board, the
21 secretary of the Secretariat of National Defence, the commander of the
22 Territorial Defence Staff. Those were members by virtue of their
23 position who had also to be members of that council.
24 I believe that those councils remained functioning throughout the
25 entire 1992, but I'm not sure. However, at a certain stage they were
1 renamed the -- in a certain way, although I did not see any such decision
2 or instruction. They were then called Crisis Staffs. Towards the end of
3 the war, they were renamed as War Staffs. I don't know why that was
4 done, because in essence it didn't change anything. The same people
5 remained members of the body, and their authorities and competencies
6 remained the same. The -- the -- those authorities were civilian
7 authorities more or less, and that remained the same.
8 Q. On line 7 there is a mistake in the transcript. It should read
9 Council for National Defence rather than Council for National Council.
10 This is the federal Council for National Defence; right?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Is it true that the SDS never set up its own party Crisis Staff
13 in Knezevo?
14 A. That's correct. The SDS never set up its own Crisis Staff. We
15 functioned as state organs, organs of social self-governance throughout
16 the war.
17 Q. And the composition was based on your offices, and you acted
18 pursuant to the law which was applied when the Municipal Assembly could
19 not convene.
20 A. Yes. Municipal Assemblies could not function as bodies of the
21 local commune because of the war. So deputy members of the Assembly were
22 elsewhere and the Secretariats for National Defence took over the duties
23 of Municipal Assemblies.
24 Q. However, the executive boards existed, but they were not
25 legislative bodies, which is why they were -- received decisions from the
1 ad hoc bodies, but those decisions had to subsequently be submitted to
2 the Municipal Assembly for approval.
3 A. Executive bodies -- boards existed as the executive bodies of
4 those councils, and then the decisions that were issued by the counsel
5 for national defence once the Assemblies could be convened had to be
6 approved by the Assembly.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness and accused be asked to make
8 pauses between questions and answers. Thank you.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Komljenovic, you are being
10 asked by the interpreters to put a pause between the question and the
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Irrespective of the fact whether those bodies were called
16 War Presidencies or Crisis Staffs or something else, the essence, the
17 composition, and the functioning remained the same irrespective of the
18 name. Did you have commissioners from republican bodies?
19 A. I've already said that the essence of the work of these organs
20 regardless of whether they were federal Crisis Staffs or
21 War Presidencies, it remained the same both in terms of jurisdiction and
22 also in terms of the persons involved. The persons who were members were
23 usually members ex officio.
24 I didn't understand the second question -- the second part of
25 your question.
1 Q. Did you have war commissioners? Remember that the central
2 authorities wanted to have some kind of insight and to be able to send
3 instructions. In your municipality there was no War Commissioner; right?
4 A. We did not have one. We did function properly with a council,
5 with the Executive Board, so civilian authorities fully functioned, and
6 we did not receive any instructions nor did we have any commissioners.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm not stopping you asking these
9 lines of questions, but I take it you are fully aware that the
10 municipality of Knezevo or Skender Vakuf is not included -- included in
11 the municipalities of the indictment except for the Koricanske Stijene
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency, I fully agree with
14 you. However, this is a rare opportunity for us to see whether there was
15 or was not a pattern, whether the central authorities made municipalities
16 do something. This is an example of a municipality that managed to
17 preserve peace and dignity and was not engulfed in inter-ethnic strife.
18 However, I'm certainly going to bring this to an end.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Had there been a crisis in the functioning of the municipality,
21 although this is a hypothesis, do you think that the government would
22 have sent you a commissioner as well?
23 A. Well, we'd probably try to find a solution on our own, and we'd
24 probably turn to the government for that as well. Well, we'd certainly
25 want to receive some kind of support or assistance.
1 Q. Last question, Mr. Komljenovic. This is what I'd like to ask
2 you: In view of what was going on, are you convinced that we were forced
3 to take certain steps, as one is in chess, forced to make certain moves
4 when the SDA or the HDZ would make us do something? Were we just
5 reacting to the actions that they took? Do you agree with that, because
6 you were a local politician and you knew how the party functioned?
7 A. Yes, that's the way it can be put, basically, in view of the
8 official policy of the Serbian Democratic Party. And that is an effort
9 from the point of view of the state and the constitution to preserve what
10 was there, the state as it was, and this effort for Bosnia-Herzegovina to
11 keep its status within Yugoslavia. So it is quite clear that the moves
12 that were made and our responses to that were our referendum, actually,
13 to remain in Yugoslavia. The proclamation of Republika Srpska was
14 actually a response to their violent change of the constitution and of
15 the constitutional legal position of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the state
16 of Yugoslavia. All the problems stemmed from that, all the problems that
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina had, and we as well, all three peoples and the
18 citizens as such.
19 Q. Thank you. I'd just like to ask you one more thing. You had a
20 convincing majority. The Serbs were a majority in the population, and
21 the party won a majority vote. Did you give Muslims and Croats any
22 positions in government?
23 A. The figures were the other way round, not as you put them.
24 Croats 20 per cent and Muslims about 5 per cent.
25 Q. I see.
1 A. We strictly took this into account. As far as I know, we had a
2 coalition agreement between the SDA and the HDZ and the SDS about the
3 takeover of power and the establishment of government. The government of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina was formed in that way, whereas we in the municipality
5 of Knezevo divided portfolios in a similar way in local government. For
6 example, the HDZ got the vice-president of the Executive Board, also the
7 secretary of the Secretariat for National Defence, what we already
8 mentioned, and also the vice-president for Economic Affairs and Social
9 Services. The SDA, well, there were very few of them in Knezevo, rather,
10 Skender. However, we tried to strike a balance in terms of other
11 positions, and we strictly took that into account.
12 Q. So they did not object in any way; right?
13 A. On the contrary. We reached many decisions together. I'm
14 referring to the decisions of the local Assembly. We were very careful
15 not to out-vote the Muslims in any way. We realised that they were not
16 in the majority.
17 Q. That they were a minority.
18 A. A minority, yes. And we did not want anything bad to happen to
19 them in the war.
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Komljenovic. Especially I would like to thank you
21 for having stayed on for so long so that I could spend more than
22 two hours cross-examining you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would also like to thank the
24 Trial Chamber.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you. Ms. Sutherland.
2 Re-examination by Ms. Sutherland:
3 Q. Mr. Komljenovic, I have just a couple of matters.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have Exhibit P3769 on the screen,
6 Q. Mr. Komljenovic, this is your notebook, and at pages 12 and 13
7 today, Mr. Karadzic took you to the meeting in Banja Luka on the
8 30th of August, 1992, and asked you whether certain things were part of
9 the conclusions.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if we can just go to those pages, please.
11 And I think it's page 20 of 37 of the English translation.
12 Q. Mr. Komljenovic, you said that those pages that -- the page you
13 see in B/C/S, that's 06397783, was written by Mr. Glamocic; is that
15 A. Yes, that's right.
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: Can we have the correct English page. Thank
17 you. It's the page before that in English, please. Sorry. Page 19.
18 Q. And then as I understood your -- your -- your testimony, if we go
19 the following page in -- in B/C/S and in English, I understood you to say
20 that the -- the left-hand side of that page written in B/C/S, that's on
21 06397784, was also part of the meeting and that was the notes that you
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if we can go to the following page in
24 English as well so that we're on the same pages.
25 Q. Is that correct?
1 A. These are my notes. This is my handwriting. However, I said
2 that the right-hand side where it says "president of the court Maric,"
3 I'm not sure about that side because I'm not sure that Maric attended the
4 meeting at all. It is possible. Yes, these are my notes, but, I mean --
5 Q. Yes. And that's --
6 A. I'm not sure. I'm not sure that Maric attended the meeting, but
7 I did write this down. So if that is a whole, as it were, if it's got to
8 do with one particular meeting, then he was there too.
9 Q. Yes. But as I understood you, you were unsure whether this --
10 this other page concerned the meeting and the following page where
11 Mr. Trivic's name is mentioned. Is -- is that correct?
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other
13 microphones please be switched off.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I expressed my doubt. I said that
15 it was likely that he did not attend that meeting. It's possible that
16 this was something different, that it's not from that meeting, because I
17 do not remember Trivic being present.
18 MS. SUTHERLAND:
19 Q. [Microphone not activated] And under Mr. Maric --
20 JUDGE KWON: Microphone, Ms. Sutherland.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND:
22 Q. And under Mr. Maric and the check-point there's control of
23 persons who have been mobilised and goods and receiving 100 DM, and again
24 that you -- you were of the view that that wasn't part of the meeting as
25 well; is that correct?
1 A. Very, very possible, because I don't see why we would mention
2 100 Deutschmark at that meeting, or any check-point. It is quite
3 possible that this actually is not from that meeting.
4 Q. I'd now like to -- earlier on at transcript page -- earlier
5 today, you mentioned that -- that just in relation to something that
6 was -- was put in your summary, and you said that you never said in your
7 statement about explosives being put into the abyss. What, in fact, was
8 read out on Thursday at transcript page 20913 as part of the summary was:
9 "The witness stated that there were rumours that the bodies, the
10 remaining bodies, were burnt or explosives were put into the abyss."
11 Do you remember saying that in the Ivankovic trial? And this is
12 at page 34 of the English and page 29 of the B/C/S of
13 65 ter number 22145, please. And this is, in fact, contained on page 22
14 of your amalgamated witness statement which is now Exhibit P3768. You
15 were asked by counsel the question:
16 "And was the terrain clearing then finished and did citizens stop
17 coming to you with their complaints about unpleasant odours spreading and
19 And your -- you answered:
20 "Listen, I am saying again that there were all kinds of rumours,
21 informal and unofficial rumours that they had been heaped over, that they
22 had been mined, that they had been burnt down."
23 Do you recall saying that?
24 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I object to this being
25 part of the redirect examination since it doesn't emanate from the cross,
1 and you told the witness that the summary was not evidence.
2 JUDGE KWON: I think that's fair enough.
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour. I won't pursue it.
4 Q. Mr. Komljenovic, do you -- do you know that "Glas" is the major
5 newspaper in the Krajina -- Bosnian Krajina area?
6 A. [No interpretation].
7 Q. And do you --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters's note: We did not hear the
9 witness. Again, we did not hear the witness.
10 JUDGE KWON: I heard it but the interpreters --
11 MS. SUTHERLAND:
12 Q. Could you speak up, please.
13 JUDGE KWON: -- did not hear your answer. Could you kindly
14 repeat it.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other
16 microphones please be switched off because there is a great deal of
17 background noise and we cannot hear the witness.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I read it [as
20 MS. SUTHERLAND:
21 Q. You mentioned at transcript page 19 today that 12 babies died in
22 Banja Luka in July and that nobody did anything about it, humanitarian
23 organisations, nobody.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Could I have 65 ter number 23507 on the screen,
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] While we're waiting for that if I
2 may intervene in the transcript. The witness said: "I read 'Glas' from
3 time to time." "From time to time" was not recorded in the transcript.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be looked into.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND:
6 Q. Mr. Komljenovic, do you see this "Glas" article in front of you
7 dated the 4th of June, 1992, the headline is "Breathless Babies"?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And talking about Banja Luka, incubated babies lives are
10 endangered. Did you -- do you recall reading this article? Or did you
11 read this article in the "Glas" newspaper?
12 A. I don't remember having read it in "Glas," but I know the case of
13 the Banja Luka babies, and I don't know what is in dispute there.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Could I have 65 ter number 23508.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If the Prosecutor does not wish to
16 tender this document, I would like to tender it.
17 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, if Mr. Karadzic wishes to tender
19 it, then he can tender it. But if you -- if -- I'm more than happy to
20 tender it. If -- if -- I was going to tender this one and seek to tender
21 the next one.
22 JUDGE KWON: Well, let us see.
23 MS. SUTHERLAND:
24 Q. Do you see, Mr. Komljenovic, 65 ter number 23508 on the screen
25 which is another "Glas" article dated the 8th of June, 1992, headlined
1 "The Oxygen Has Arrived"? Do you recall if -- do you remember reading
2 this article?
3 And it says:
4 "Banja Luka, 5th of June. Three aeroplanes landed at the
5 Banja Luka airport in Mahovljani at about 1300 hours today carrying a
6 cargo of oxygen essential to the activities of health organisations.
7 According to unofficial information, the flight of these aeroplanes was
8 brokered by the International Red Cross and UNPROFOR. 60 bottles of
9 oxygen thus reached Banja Luka."
10 Do you -- do you recall reading this in the "Glas" newspaper?
11 A. I do not remember having read this. In my view it's not
12 important whether I read it or not. I know that the 12 babies in
13 Banja Luka died, so this probably arrived too late. Late, late.
14 Q. Mr. Komljenovic, do you also read the newspaper "Vreme"?
15 A. "Vreme" is a Belgrade weekly. Is that what you mean?
16 Q. Yes.
17 A. Seldom, very, very seldom.
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I would tender those two documents.
19 JUDGE KWON: Those would be admitted.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P3770 and P3771, respectively,
21 Your Honours.
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: I have no further questions.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may, could I just clarify this
24 part of the redirect that has to do with the diary. It's only going to
25 take two minutes or so.
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's upload that page.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The D document, I think, that
3 Madam Sutherland had called up.
4 Further Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
5 Q. [Interpretation] While we're waiting for this, Mr. Komljenovic,
6 let me ask you this --
7 JUDGE KWON: It's Exhibit P3769. Yes, it's coming.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the previous page,
9 please. The previous page in Serbian. Yes.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. What is written here, CSB meeting, Banja Luka.
12 A. That is what is written there, meeting of the CSB Banja Luka.
13 JUDGE KWON: Page 13 in e-court in English.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. On the previous page it is also the 30th, Banja Luka. Now, let
16 me ask you this: If someone were to mention at that meeting that Maric,
17 president of the court, should be contacted, would you have written that
18 down? Which does not mean that he had to be present there; right?
19 A. Yes. Possibly there was some discussion in that context.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Karadzic put exactly that question to the
22 witness in his cross-examination and the witness already answered it.
23 JUDGE KWON: I think so. It won't be necessary for you repeat
24 your question which you put in your cross-examination. Otherwise, then,
25 we'll conclude.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. I just wanted to ask whether
2 that would pertain to Trivic or anyone else who could have been
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. That does not necessarily mean that they were present; right?
6 A. Yes. Maric could have been mentioned --
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, that was -- that was already asked
8 and already answered in cross-examination.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you, Ms. Sutherland.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you. No further
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Komljenovic, that concludes your evidence. I
13 appreciate your coming to The Hague to give it, as well as your
14 indulgence for your agreeing to stay for an extended time. On behalf of
15 my colleagues and the Tribunal, I would like to thank you again, and now
16 you are free to go.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, thank you.
18 [The witness withdrew]
19 JUDGE KWON: Is there anything, Ms. Sutherland?
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour. Before we take a break for
21 the next witness, there is an issue of scheduling for witnesses.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Why don't you raise it now.
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: It's with the witness that's coming after the --
24 the next witness. Is the -- and I'm inquiring with the Chamber if there
25 's a possibility to sit an extended session on Wednesday or start
1 earlier, 8.30, on -- on Wednesday.
2 JUDGE KWON: Wednesday being --
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: Tomorrow.
4 JUDGE KWON: Wednesday being tomorrow.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if it's not possible, would it be possible
6 to start either at 8.30 in the morning on Wednesday and Thursday in order
7 to complete that next witness's testimony before 10.00 a.m. on Thursday?
8 JUDGE KWON: Thursday we are supposed to sit from 9.00 to 3.00.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour. The witness has a commitment
10 and advised the VWS and/or the OTP of this situation, and he has to leave
11 by 11.00 from the Hague on Thursday. And I note that Your Honours have
12 just given an estimate of three hours for cross-examination, and in order
13 to complete his testimony before 10.00 -- 10.30 at the latest, I think,
14 in order for him to leave The Hague by 11.00 on Thursday, I would ask
15 Your Honours to consider either sitting an extended session on Wednesday
16 or starting half an hour early both on Wednesday and Thursday so that we
17 would complete his testimony before 10.30 a.m. on Thursday.
18 JUDGE KWON: Your plan or suggestion is to interpose the next
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: No, Your Honour, to -- to follow -- I mean, the
21 witness that I'm speaking of is -- is Edward Vulliamy.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. How much time do we need for the next one?
23 You asked for one and a half hours? Originally you asked for just a half
24 hour, but I noted it has been extended.
25 [Prosecution counsel confer]
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Just the examination-in-chief is expected to consume
3 a little less than an hour for this next witness, Mr. President, if
4 that's of assistance.
5 JUDGE KWON: That's more than the original estimate, which was
6 half an hour. Is that correct?
7 MR. TIEGER: I'd have to check, but I believe that's right.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, with respect to this next witness
9 there's going to be a request for additional time for cross-examination.
10 So it may be better to interpose Mr. Vulliamy in the middle of -- maybe
11 he could start tomorrow morning and interrupt the testimony of the next
12 witness and then we complete Mr. Vulliamy's testimony and we can go back
13 to that witness.
14 JUDGE KWON: How does that suggestion sound to you Mr. Tieger?
15 MR. TIEGER: Well, the concern, of course, Mr. President, was the
16 length of time that witness has been here. Preliminary indications are
17 that that will work out, but maybe it's best we confer over the break to
18 make sure in view of the length of time that witness has been here.
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let us do the mathematics during the
20 break and come back to you, but before we bring in the next witness there
21 are a couple of administrative matters that I'd like to deal with in
22 private session.
23 Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.
24 [Private session]
11 Pages 20990-20991 redacted. Private session.
12 [Open session]
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Unless there are any other matters to raise,
14 then we will take a break for an hour. And let me just consult my court
15 deputy -- yes, Ms. Sutherland.
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: In doing the mathematics over the break,
17 Mr. Robinson said that Mr. Karadzic was going to seek more time for
18 cross-examination of the next witness. I don't know if Mr. Karadzic
19 had -- can indicate approximately how much additional time that he was
20 going to be seeking.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't recall how much time we
23 asked for, but we did ask for additional allotments. In any case, at
24 least between four and five hours are necessary for such an important
1 MR. ROBINSON: We asked for four hours, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE KWON: You asked for ten hours for Mr. Komljenovic and
3 then --
4 MR. ROBINSON: No, we're speaking of the next --
5 JUDGE KWON: I'm giving you an example. You asked for ten hours
6 and completed in two and a half, two and 15 minutes.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Actually this was an experiment on my part
8 because I was asked to give this by e-mail instead of putting out our
9 monthly list because it was a delayed disclosure witness. So I decided
10 to give a very realistic estimate and see how the Chamber would react, so
11 I hoped you wouldn't cut it in half or use any formula like that but give
12 something very close to what we asked in that particular case.
13 JUDGE KWON: We will consider that and come back to you after the
15 Court deputy, approach the Chamber.
16 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We will resume at quarter past 1.00.
18 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.15 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 1.18 p.m.
20 [The witness entered court]
21 JUDGE KWON: Before we proceed to hear the evidence of next
22 witness, please be seated for the moment.
24 JUDGE KWON: There are several administrative matters.
25 First as to the extension of time for Mr. Karadzic's
1 cross-examination of this witness, the -- at the moment, the Chamber sees
2 no reason to extend the time given the factors we considered in reaching
3 the original estimate of the proper amount of cross-examination. And as
4 to the scheduling to accommodate the specific peculiar circumstances
5 regarding the witness after this witness, the Chamber has decided to
6 interpose that witness into the evidence of this witness, i.e., with the
7 indulgence of this witness, we'll proceed to hear the witness next, i.e.,
8 Mr. Vulliamy, tomorrow morning. And with the understanding of the staff
9 we are minded to start at 8.30, and with two half-an-hour breaks we will
10 proceed to 2.00, whereby we will get four hours and a half, which in the
11 view of the Chamber is more than sufficient to cover that witness.
12 That said, if the -- we are going to hear this witness's evidence
13 in closed session, so could the Chamber move into closed session now.
14 [Closed session]
11 Pages 20995-21031 redacted. Closed session.
20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.02 p.m.,
21 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 9th day
22 of November, 2011, at 8.30 a.m.