1 Thursday, 17 November 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
8 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Doctor.
9 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.
11 Good morning, everyone.
12 WITNESS: IDRIZ MERDZANIC [Resumed]
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
15 Q. Good morning, Dr. Merdzanic.
16 A. Good morning, Dr. Karadzic.
17 Q. May I apologise for a moment if you would excuse me. From that
18 video 65 ter 40504, I would like to tender minutes from 24 to 25.49.
19 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland, were you able to confirm that,
20 whether those parts we saw yesterday were included in Prosecution
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, I can confirm that they weren't included in
23 the Prosecution exhibit shown.
24 JUDGE KWON: Shall we admit the Defence part separately? I think
25 that should be possible?
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, then the video shown yesterday will be admitted
3 into Defence exhibit.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1927, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Dr. Merdzanic, is it a fact that you were doing your job and
9 helping people in Trnopolje and that fact helped you keep your job, you
10 were not dismissed, or do you have another explanation?
11 A. Well, generally speaking, nobody received an official dismissal.
12 I was held in the camp like all the other inmates. I was brought there
13 by force, I was kept there by force, I could not leave the camp, and I
14 was not receiving my salary for that job. For that work.
15 Q. You were arrested along with the others, but do you have any
16 explanation why your employment was not terminated?
17 A. Who says it wasn't? Look at my payment lists. When was the last
18 time I received my salary from the health centre?
19 Q. But a formal decision was issued for others who were terminated
20 in their employment. There is no such decision for you. Do you have any
22 A. I just gave you an explanation. My last salary that I received
23 was in March and no more. From the camp I requested through the Serbian
24 Red Cross the payment of the salaries that I had earned, and the answer
25 that I received at the camp was: You're in the camp. You don't need
1 your salary anymore.
2 Q. But, Doctor, you were no longer in Trnopolje. You went to join
3 Cirkin and his unit in Kozarac?
4 A. You're not telling the truth. That did not happen.
5 Q. When did the Serbian Red Cross arrive? Do you remember the date?
6 A. I don't remember the exact date. That was the end of May, so
7 sometime in the end of May.
8 Q. Towards the end of May the Serbian Red Cross arrived. Who
10 A. Pero Curguz with another two ladies and also Dr. Dusko Ivic
11 arrived. I don't know if he arrived with them, and Mico, a technician or
12 an orderly.
13 Q. You said in your statements that you were able to go out,
14 although it depended very much on the guards how easy it was to get out
15 to look for medicines in surrounding settlements to bring them back for
16 your patients?
17 A. That's correct, and that's consistent with what I keep saying
18 here. Trnopolje operated differently in different periods.
19 Q. All right. All right.
20 A. Wait, I'm answering your question now so hear me out, please. In
21 different periods, different conditions prevailed. There were some
22 periods there was no free movement at all. In other periods we had some
23 degree of movement. It all depends on the time.
24 Q. You associated that freedom of movement with the specific guards,
25 not with various periods?
1 A. Both are true.
2 Q. Do you know that the entire western end of Republika Srpska and
3 then the entire Republika Srpska was under very severe sanctions that
4 affected medical institutions as well?
5 A. At that time Republika Srpska did not exist, only Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina existed.
7 Q. Let's leave political debates aside. I'm talking about the area
8 controlled by the Serbs. Was it under an embargo? The corridor was
9 closed and all the other routes of supply were also compromised; is that
11 A. I couldn't tell you exactly what territory was affected. I
12 believe it was the entire region, not only the area populated by Serbs,
13 but also areas populated by Muslims and Croats as well. As far as I
14 know, Prijedor was inhabited not only by Serbs but also by Muslims. And
15 if there were no medicines, they were not available to any of the ethnic
17 Q. Perhaps I was not clear enough. I'm talking about the part of
18 the territory controlled by the Serbs. Do you agree that what we now
19 call the Muslim/Croat Federation was not under an embargo? Anything
20 could be supplied via Dalmatia, whereas the situation was very different
21 for Republika Srpska?
22 A. I did not control the borders. I can't answer that question.
23 Q. Do you know who Dr. Radojka Elankov is?
24 A. You mean Elenkov. I heard the name but, I'm sorry, I can't give
25 you any details. Mrs. Elenkov must have had a husband. I know a
1 Dr. Elenkov who must have been her husband if you want to remind me.
2 Q. There was that doctor who was a Macedonian or a Bulgarian and she
3 must be one of yours?
4 A. I heard of the names. I don't know these people.
5 Q. Do you know whether Merhamet, the Muslim charity, was active in
6 the Bosnian Krajina throughout the war?
7 A. I've heard of Merhamet as a humanitarian organisation. Whether
8 it was active throughout the war, I really couldn't tell you. You should
9 make inquiries with them. It's easily verifiable.
10 Q. Thank you. Is it the case that Merhamet supplied medicines as
11 part of their mission?
12 A. I don't know what Merhamet was doing. They had no presence in
13 the camp, and I don't believe the Serbs would have allowed them to come.
14 Q. Are you trying to say they were not coming to Manjaca every week?
15 A. I'm saying Merhamet never came to Trnopolje.
16 Q. Do you know that the regimen at Manjaca was stricter than in
17 Trnopolje and Merhamet was there every week?
18 A. I don't know if the regimen was stricter. I know it was a
19 military barracks and it was all within the compound of the barracks,
20 whereas the other camps in Prijedor, as opposed to Manjaca, which was
21 linked to Banja Luka, those other camps were not controlled by the army.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D4609. I'm not sure if
23 we have a translation yet. 1D4609.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Is it the 13th July 1992 General Hospital Prijedor. They're
1 sending a notification to the Merhamet charity, listing municipalities
2 whose residents are receiving treatment at that hospital, which are
3 Sanski Most and Bosanski Novi as well as a large number of refugees. And
4 then it says below:
5 [As read] "We have to emphasize that even before the conflict we
6 were hard-up financially and in the current situation when we treat 150
7 Muslim patients daily whose treatment is not being paid for by anyone,
8 may eventually disable us from providing medical assistance at all."
9 And then it says:
10 "We are addressing you as a charity to request that you organise
11 and assist our institutions in terms of medicines, medical equipment,
12 food, or money so that we could continue to help members of your ethnic
14 Do you see that?
15 A. I'm seeing this for the first time.
16 Q. Do you agree that even before the war there were difficulties
17 with medical supplies?
18 A. I never said otherwise. The only thing is those medical supplies
19 were not distributed equally among all the ethnic communities in the
20 territories held by the Serbs.
21 Q. Why are you saying that if you can't prove it? This text proves
22 that you are wrong.
23 A. Let me tell you, in the Trnopolje camp where on the orders of the
24 SDS ethnic cleansing was carried out, civilians were kept there for a few
25 days and sent on, and there were great shortages of medical supplies.
1 So, through Dr. Ivic and the Red Cross, I requested medicines but never
2 received anything but anti-lice powder. It's absolutely impossible that
3 there was no capacity of providing a single medicine to a camp where so
4 many people were being victimised.
5 Q. By what?
6 A. By ethnic cleansing. The Serbian army rounded up people in the
7 surrounding villages, brought them there, and then transported them in
8 cattle wagons and other unsuitable transports.
9 Q. It's not nice of you to lie. Can Dr. Ivic confirm what you're
11 A. You can ask Dr. Ivic. I requested from him personally those
13 Q. What about this notification, some sort of request from Merhamet,
14 does it confirm that even the hospital was out of medicines?
15 A. I'm not saying anything about the quantity of medicines available
16 at the hospital or how they were supplied. I'm just saying that we in
17 Trnopolje did not receive any medicines from the Serbs.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be received,
20 MFI'd, pending translation.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll do so.
22 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D1928, Your Honours.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Doctor, when you talk about that cleansing and bringing people in
25 from villages, do you know that close to Trnopolje and close to Kozarac
1 there were Muslim houses that had white cloths on their windows and
2 people went on living and working a normal life for as long as they
3 declared that they would not be involved in the fighting?
4 A. I don't know the exact details, what happened outside the camp.
5 I know that as time went by village after village and hamlet after hamlet
6 had their populations expelled, if it was non-Serb population, that is,
7 for as long as the war operations went on.
8 Q. Doctor, do you know that there were armed Muslim groups in
9 Prijedor, around Prijedor, all the way up until the end of 1994, that
10 they lived in dug-outs, in the woods, they fought and killed peasants?
11 A. I cannot tell you about any of those details. I know that there
12 was resistance in certain places when Serbs wanted to take these
13 villages. I heard that on one occasion an attempt was made to liberate
14 Prijedor. That's the only information I heard.
15 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that you, the few doctors that were
16 there, received people from the entire area for medical treatment at your
18 A. At first people were coming.
19 Q. And you accepted that and you treated them, irrespective of faith
20 and ethnicity?
21 A. As I do to this day, invariably.
22 Q. Do you see in this text that 100 Muslim patients are being
23 treated daily at this department for internal medicine?
24 A. I have no way of checking that. That's what this piece of paper
25 says and I have nothing to add to that.
1 Q. Thank you. Do you know a single location in Bosanska Krajina
2 where a significant number of Muslims had not stayed on during the entire
4 A. Well, what can I tell you? How many Muslims stayed on in
5 Prijedor, compare how many were there before the war and how many were
6 there after the war.
7 Q. How many were there during the war, can you tell us what the
8 difference was between a Muslim who lived in Prijedor throughout and a
9 Muslim who left for any reason, not to speculate? There were Muslims who
10 were even in the Serb army and police and --
11 A. The difference is in the following. During those years, they
12 could not live peacefully in Prijedor. Often Serbs came to their houses
13 and searched them, and in 1994, March 1994, actually, a few families were
14 killed during the night, a husband, wife, all of them. Don't you
15 remember? Don't you remember reading about that during the war?
16 Q. You mentioned the reasons why some people fled, but how come some
17 people managed to stay on throughout the war and as for this particular
18 incident I issued an order to have it investigated in 1994?
19 A. Yes, and this was a way the remaining small number of people who
20 had stayed on were intimidated. This was aimed at getting them out of
21 there because of this mistreatment on a daily basis and you forbade --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear
23 Mr. Karadzic.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. [No interpretation]
1 A. Let me tell you I'm the one who's talking now. These people had
2 to stay because nobody could take them out.
3 Q. Do you know, Dr. Merdzanic, that Muslim extremists compiled lists
4 of many Muslims and declared them traitors because they were not fighting
5 against the Serbs?
6 A. And do you know, Mr. Karadzic, that the Serbs also held Serbs in
7 camp? Do you know that a Serb lady from Omarska, from the camp of
8 Omarska stayed --
9 Q. We haven't got time --
10 A. I am giving you answers, and when I'm giving these answers,
11 you're supposed to keep quiet. I know that the Serbs kept their very own
12 Serbs in the camp if they didn't want to do what they were told.
13 Q. Doctor, please, I am asking you whether you know about this. You
14 and I do not need to engage in a debate. Just say whether you do know or
15 you do not know?
16 A. Some questions cannot be answered by I know or I do not know.
17 Q. This one can. Do you know that the Muslims compiled a long list
18 of Muslims who they declared traitors because they were not engaged in
19 the fighting?
20 A. I do not know about that. This is the very first time I hear of
22 Q. You said that the guards were not the ones who did something to
23 people there, especially as far as rape is concerned, rather, it was
24 people who came from the outside; right?
25 A. That has to do with rape but not beatings.
1 Q. Let us finish with these beatings. You had not seen a single
2 beating. You had not been beaten yourself. And you heard Serb guards
3 shouting out there. Is that right?
4 A. That is not right. That is a total misinterpretation. The room
5 where inmates were being beaten was within the infirmary. I personally
6 examined the inmates who had been beaten and I talked to them. You don't
7 really need to be that intelligent. As for someone to be present while
8 the Serbs were beating other people, it's not that anyone was allowed to
9 be there. I told you that I saw with my very own eyes when Zigic beat up
10 an inmate.
11 Q. Thank you. But you did say, didn't you, as far as rape was
12 concerned, that there were seven reported rapes and that a woman who told
13 you about this said to you that the rapist had threatened her, saying
14 that she should not report that; right?
15 A. That is not right. I never said that the woman had made any
16 threats or that the rapist had made threats or whatever. A few women
17 agreed to be examined. I asked Dusko Ivic if he could handle that, that
18 they are taken to the gynaecology department in Prijedor.
19 Q. Let's leave this aside. Please answer my question. Let's see
20 what you said to the federal police in Kiel. 1D04464 and then it is on
21 page 041-9198 up until 9235, and there you said -- I am going to
22 interpret it to you now. The woman reported to you personally that this
23 rapist said to her that he would kill her if she reported him; right?
24 A. I cannot recall exactly. It is possible that that's the way it
25 was. But the important fact is that a rape was committed. Now, whether
1 the rapist had threatened her, saying that he'd kill her if she reported
2 it, that is something I can no longer remember.
3 Q. But it is the truth that matters for us, Mr. Merdzanic, not
5 A. That is correct, rapes were committed.
6 Q. And you said that seven women reported rape and one of these
7 seven said that the rapist had threatened her, saying that he would kill
8 her if she reported the rape; right?
9 A. I can no longer remember whether it was exactly that way, maybe
10 yes, maybe no.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 4 in this
12 document. Page 4. Now let's see. Paragraph 6, paragraph 6 from the
14 MR. KARADZIC:
15 Q. [In English] [As read] "I must add, however, that the seven women
16 who had been examined in Prijedor, and about whose situation evidence had
17 been produced, were sought out in the camp by their tormentors on the
18 following day."
19 [Interpretation] Let's see where you said: [In English] "... I do
20 not want to even imagine what the soldiers would have done to the women
21 if they had found them because one woman told me in our conversation at
22 the clinic that the soldier who raped her threatened to murder her if she
23 reported what had happened."
24 [Interpretation] Is that right?
25 A. That is what it says here precisely. I gave my statement to the
1 international court, describing these rapes.
2 Q. Thank you. I'm asking you about this paragraph. I'm asking you
3 about this fact. Is this what you stated?
4 A. That is what is contained in those papers from Kiel.
5 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that some tank operators outside the
6 camp quarrelled with Major Kuruzovic because he allowed to have these
7 women examined?
8 A. That is correct. We found out only later that these were tank
9 operators because they came to the Trnopolje camp with two tanks and they
10 quarrelled with Major Kuruzovic there.
11 Q. 1D04458, that's what you stated in the Brdjanin case on page
12 11819. I'm saying this for the benefit of the participants here so that
13 they could follow what we're discussing.
14 Did you state once that a soldier was detained because he was
15 drunk and he drove a tank -- I see. A soldier was detained and the tank
16 operators came to the entrance of the barracks and they asked for him to
17 be released.
18 A. I put it differently. I said that to the best of our knowledge,
19 these tank operators who came to Trnopolje went to the military barracks
20 and one of their soldiers had been detained there on account of that and
21 they asked for him to be released.
22 Q. He was detained because of rape; right?
23 A. That's what I heard, because of that rape.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, your time was up some minutes ago, but
1 how much longer do you need? I take it that you -- it's time for you to
2 wrap-up your cross-examination.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I shall do my best, Excellency. I
4 need about ten minutes or so to deal with certain questions because every
5 sentence needs to be challenged and double-checked.
6 JUDGE KWON: No, you don't have to repeat that sentence, but I'll
7 allow you to continue or conclude in ten minutes.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. All right. Then I'm not going to deal with the things that have
11 already been admitted. In your interview with the OTP, I see that it's
12 somewhere in Stakic, you said that you never saw a politician come to
13 Trnopolje; right?
14 A. I was an inmate, like others, and politicians did not report to
15 me. I know that on one occasion a delegation came. I think they were
16 military people, though. I do not remember any politicians coming. Now,
17 whether they actually did come or not, that is something I cannot confirm
18 or deny with 100 per cent certainty.
19 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that people could be allowed to go home
20 if a Serb friend would offer guarantees for them; right?
21 A. After journalists discovered the camp and when the
22 International Red Cross visit was announced, then the Serbs allowed
23 people who had a place to go back to leave the camp. If someone also
24 provided guarantees for them. Even this man Cedo who worked at the
25 heating plant asked for me and they refused and they said that he
1 shouldn't even ask.
2 Q. Thank you. At the end of May when the Red Cross came --
3 actually, how often did they come, the Serb Red Cross?
4 A. They came every day, I think.
5 Q. Thank you. The trouble that these seven women experienced, was
6 this reported to the Serbian Red Cross or only to Kuruzovic?
7 A. This was reported through Dusko Ivic and the Red Cross, and it's
8 only then that they talked to Kuruzovic.
9 Q. Thank you. As for Karlovac, the -- it was the UNHCR and the
10 International Red Cross that were in charge of that convoy; right?
11 A. As far as I can remember, yes.
12 Q. Did you leave as part of that convoy?
13 A. I left in that last convoy.
14 Q. And now, since I don't have enough time, I'll see if there's any
15 time left actually. I'm not going to mention the country that you live
16 in. I'm just going to ask you the following. Within the agreement you
17 reached with the OTP, did you ask for assistance several times, meaning
18 that you did not want to be repatriated back to Bosnia, you wanted to
19 stay in the country that you were in?
20 A. As far as I can remember, that is not something that happened.
21 Q. 1D4853, and could it not be broadcast. Please take a look at
22 this. In the first paragraph it says that the country, or rather, the
23 embassy of that country agreed to grant exemption from repatriation to
24 the individuals that the Tribunal needs as witnesses; right?
25 A. I personally never asked for that and I never had any problem to
1 stay on where I was. Maybe it went through the Tribunal, but I can no
2 longer remember really.
3 Q. Is your name not referred to here as well as the members of your
4 entire family?
5 A. That is correct, but I really do not remember this.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 2 now.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. But you can see that Deputy Prosecutor Blewitt wrote and
10 requested this?
11 A. Then it must have been between the OTP and the authorities of the
12 country where I live.
13 Q. And who gave them the names of your family?
14 A. In the place where I'm registered, of course they had our names
15 and the OTP also had our names.
16 Q. So you're trying to say you know nothing of this? You don't know
17 that you remained in that country thanks to your evidence here?
18 A. I'm just saying I don't remember this.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I want to tender this.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I was only going to make the
22 observation that the witness had already asked -- it had been asked and
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 Yes, this will be admitted.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1929 under seal, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D4854. Not to be
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Look at this, this is from year end 2000. Again, your name and
6 the name of your family members, another request to keep this affair
7 confidential and that the persons named herein -- also saying that one of
8 the persons here is needed by the OTP as a witness and a request is made
9 to this country. Can you see this?
10 A. I can see it. It's in English, but I'm telling you, I never
11 asked for this or I don't remember. From the beginning, from the moment
12 we entered that country, we already had a residence permit, not only a
13 temporary one, and it was never an issue. At least I was never told that
14 I should leave that country or that I have to leave the country. I don't
15 have these papers and I've never seen them.
16 Q. Did you only discuss it verbally or did you write something to
17 Mr. Gladstone? Because this is a request made by the investigating team.
18 Did you communicate with the OTP in writing or only verbally?
19 A. I don't remember ever asking to -- for their facilitation in
20 staying in the country where I was staying.
21 Q. This request says that they want you to remain there at least
22 until the 2nd of October, 2002.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1930 under seal, Your Honours.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D4855.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. This was written in 2001, again assistance is requested in
4 granting exemption from repatriation for this person and the members of
5 his family.
6 A. I believe I already had the nationality of that country. I had
7 completed my specialisation. I was working as a surgeon. Why would I,
8 with the nationality and the passport of that state, make any request to
9 be allowed to stay there? I really can't understand.
10 Q. Are you saying here under oath that this Office of the Prosecutor
11 was working without any -- without informing you of anything, you didn't
12 know about it, without any initiative from your side?
13 A. I'm telling you I can't remember any of this, and I believe this
14 was a time when I think I had already received the passport of that
15 country. I really can't recall the time-line. You should ask the
16 Office of the Prosecutor; they will be able to give you an answer.
17 Q. They don't want to give evidence. You are the one giving
18 evidence. I asked them already, but you are saying now you don't
20 A. I don't.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I don't think you correctly described
22 the position of the OTP.
23 Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yeah, that's what I was going to say,
25 Your Honour.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Sorry, the joke I made may be a bit clumsy, but it was not ill
4 JUDGE KWON: Now it's time for you to conclude, Mr. Karadzic.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. All right. I don't have time, Dr. Merdzanic, to show you all the
7 discrepancies in the evidence you gave on various occasions. I have to
8 finish. Thank you for your evidence, and I believe that as a physician
9 you have a duty to tell the truth.
10 A. Thank you. I always try to state things accurately.
11 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland, do you have any re-examination?
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: No, Your Honour.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE KWON: Dr. Merdzanic, that concludes your evidence. On
15 behalf of this Chamber and the Tribunal as a whole, I would like to thank
16 you for your coming to The Hague. And now you are free to go.
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, if we could tender that last
20 document and I believe these three documents ought to be provisional
21 under seal until we can reach some agreement with the Prosecutor
22 concerning redactions which will depend on your ruling on a pending issue
23 that's already on the same topic.
24 [The witness withdrew]
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well, that will be admitted as Exhibit D1931
1 under seal.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, before -- I have an issue with
3 respect to the report of the next witness. I don't know if you want to
4 take that up now or take a break to give the Prosecutor a chance to
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
7 Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, Mr. Nicholls will be leading
9 Ewan Brown and he would require five minutes to set up.
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
11 We'll resume at five to 10.00.
12 --- Break taken at 9.49 a.m.
13 [The witness entered court]
14 --- On resuming at 10.04 a.m.
15 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Brown.
16 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: Before you begin your evidence, we have some
18 administrative matters.
19 Mr. Robinson.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. I'm going to make
21 a motion to exclude portions of Mr. Brown's report. I don't see any harm
22 in him being here for that and I think I can just go ahead. I would like
23 to ask the Chamber to exclude paragraphs 1.19 through 1.28 of Mr. Brown's
24 report dealing with events in Western Slavonia. And also paragraphs
25 2.219 through 2.222 dealing with Operation Vrbas in Jajce on the grounds
1 these events are not contained in the indictment and therefore it's not
2 in the interests of justice for the Chamber to allow evidence to be
3 received, either through way of his report or by any oral evidence that
4 might be elicited during his testimony. And I understand that it could
5 possibly be argued that this is evidence of a consistent pattern of
6 conduct under Rule 93(A) and it's our position that in -- that rule
7 requires that the evidence be in the interests of justice before being
8 admitted. And given the scope of this trial, combined with the lack of
9 resources for the Defence, we don't believe that it would be in the
10 interests of justice to widen the scope of the trial any further than
11 it's already been widened.
12 So for those reasons we ask that you exclude the evidence. Thank
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Good morning, Your Honours. Before I start could
16 I just say we are assisted today on the Prosecution side by
17 Ms. Sarah Raveling.
18 Your Honours, I can respond to that. And I thank Mr. Robinson
19 for sending the e-mail giving us notice that he was going to raise this
20 issue. I notice that what he didn't argue to Your Honours is that the
21 material in these sections was not relevant, that is because it is
22 relevant and when these issues have come up in the past that's the test
23 Your Honours have applied. You have found at -- that these types of
24 evidence are admissible, even if not specifically listed in the
25 indictment, general elements of crimes against humanity, that was at
1 T-5480 on 19 July 2010. Elements of underlying offences, same cite.
2 Command and control, same cite, in relation to General Rose where we were
3 talking about events in Gorazde and Bihac. Similarly, effective control,
4 the same cite, and intent as well as pattern and JCE.
5 Previously Mr. Robinson on 9 June 2011 at T-14511 to -12 conceded
6 that similar evidence in relation to expert witness Dorothea Hanson was
7 admissible because it was relevant and put issues in context. And I
8 think if you look at Mr. Brown's report, the report itself explains why
9 this material is included and why it's relevant and important. That's on
10 page 17, paragraph 1.19, the very first sentence of the first part that
11 the Defence would like to exclude. Mr. Brown explains:
12 "Although this report is directed primarily towards the activity
13 of the 5th Corps/1st Krajina Corps in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is
14 important to note that events in Western Slavonia impacted on or were
15 related to subsequent events in the Bosanska Krajina."
16 And goes on to speak about how this section of the report is
17 relevant to the 5th Corps - later 1KK's - command staff and unit
18 experiences and the features of these operations in Western Slavonia were
19 later observed in the Krajina, the area directly linked to this part of
20 this indictment. And he explains that this included co-operation with
21 local TO units, arming of the Serb population, et cetera.
22 In the second section regarding Jajce and Operation Vrbas that
23 the Defence seeks to exclude, if you were to look at page 144 of the
24 report, paragraph 2.222, I won't read it all, but similarly, the report
25 itself contains an explanation of why this evidence is significant,
1 showing how at this time-period and very quickly the 1KK,
2 1st Krajina Corps, were in a position to plan, launch, and command
3 large-scale military operations under difficult circumstances and execute
4 and take direction of the Main Staff and that the Main Staff would have
5 knowledge, involvement, and direct these operations.
6 So this material --
7 JUDGE KWON: Are you talking about the 5th Krajina Corps or
8 1st Krajina Corps?
9 MR. NICHOLLS: 5th Corps -- sorry, it's 1st Krajina Corps in this
11 JUDGE KWON: With respect to Vrbas?
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes.
13 JUDGE KWON: Is it not 5th Corps? But please proceed.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, if you see what -- if you look at paragraph
15 2.222 of the report, which is on page 144 - I'll make sure I've got my
16 cite correct - it's speaking of the 1st Krajina Corps's ability in that
18 So my submission is that this material is relevant, it's an
19 expert report, and of course experts are allowed to draw on a wide range
20 of sources in their material to reach their conclusions. I don't think
21 you can dice up an expert report the way arguably you may be able to with
22 a fact witness about what's relevant.
23 And finally, that there is no prejudice whatsoever in this
24 material being included because the issue now shouldn't be one of
25 admissibility, but later the Court will be able to assign the correct
1 weight, if any, to these sections. And it may be helpful to
2 understanding the report as a whole.
3 JUDGE KWON: Separate from the issue of relevance in terms of
4 pattern or similar thing, can I ask you, Mr. Nicholls, whether
5 Prosecution should be able to show such an example using an example of an
6 operation that is included in the indictment at all?
7 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm sorry, Your Honour. I'm not sure exactly what
8 you're asking me. It's my fault, but --
9 JUDGE KWON: I -- personally, speaking for myself, I don't see
10 why the -- such circumstances should be shown using an example of an
11 operation that is not in the indictment. Put otherwise, the Prosecution
12 should be able to use evidence relating to operation of the 1KK covered
13 in the indictment, to show that it was able to launch such operations and
14 to show that the Main Staff was closely involved.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: That's -- that's correct, Your Honour. And I
16 think that's right and Operation Corridor features, for example, heavily
17 in the report. But my understanding of why these sections are included
18 in the expert report, which was written quite some time ago, I believe
19 that at the time it was written and admitted in the Brdjanin case, for
20 example, those were not parts of the indictment. However, the --
21 Mr. Brown, from my reading of the report, found that these operations
22 were useful and necessary to understanding the way that the
23 1 Krajina Corps operated and do show the pattern of their ability to
24 conduct these type of operations and the connection to the Main Staff.
25 JUDGE KWON: And with respect to the first issue, the events in
1 Croatia, did the Chamber not issue a decision ruling that those events
2 are not relevant or necessary for this case? I remember that a couple --
3 in a couple of decisions such a ruling was made, in particular in Babic
4 decision, 92 quater and the adjudicated facts.
5 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, if I can be of assistance because I have been
7 in court or led witnesses on occasions when that issue has come up. I
8 think that can be -- I think it was understood, both by the Court and by
9 the parties, as being dependent on the particular context. You -- I
10 think the Court correctly recalls the Babic ruling, on the other hand, as
11 Mr. Nicholls has indicated, there have been witnesses through whom
12 evidence about Croatia was led and clearly deemed relevant and, indeed,
13 the accused has raised issues related to Croatia in his
14 cross-examinations. So I think it -- as we've progressed throughout the
15 case, that determination has been dependent upon the particular issue
16 involved. I mean, we've heard evidence, for example, with respect to any
17 number of steps that were taken along the way toward the identification
18 of ethnic entities, the declaration of regions of autonomy of a state,
19 the extent to which we were echoed in Croatia by witnesses who -- from
20 whom that evidence was elicited in both direct and cross-examination and
21 clearly deemed relevant by the Court.
22 So sorry for a long answer, but I think while the Court correctly
23 recalls the Babic ruling, the application of that issue -- of that
24 guide-line has clearly been dependent upon the individual circumstances
25 and the extent to which it may offer genuine assistance to illuminating
1 the issues before the Court.
2 JUDGE KWON: I didn't have time to go through all the transcript
3 you cited now, but were they not related to Sarajevo events, sniping and
4 shelling, Mr. Nicholls?
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Correct, Your Honours, but also to Gorazde, which
6 was part of the basis that those events were not in the -- were not in
7 the indictment.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, can I also recall for you another
9 ruling that you made relating to the municipalities portion of the case
10 and Brcko, when you actually ruled that crimes that had been in the
11 indictment as scheduled incidents which were stricken under Rule 73(D),
12 that evidence could not be led because there was already sufficient
13 evidence in the municipalities of a pattern. And I think that this is
14 the same situation. It's even -- Rule 73(D) wouldn't have any force to
15 it if the Chamber could strike out things and yet have things that don't
16 even appear in the indictment become part of the evidence unless there's
17 a good necessity for it. And if I can just take a moment to make a small
18 reply to what's been said by the Prosecution. They've told us that the
19 evidence is relevant and I don't doubt that for a minute. For
20 Western Slavonia they want to show that they were arming the population,
21 that they were co-operating with paramilitaries, that they were providing
22 propaganda about genocide against Serbs, all of which was also done in
23 Bosnia. And so it's relevant, but is it necessary? And your decision
24 that you make today with this witness is going to also have an impact on
25 what evidence you'll hear in the Defence case. Because once you start
1 hearing evidence about Western Slavonia, you can be sure that we will
2 rebut that evidence with witnesses. And therefore, the impact on the
3 trial for admitting evidence not charged in the indictment will go beyond
4 the few paragraphs of this report. Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: We'll take a look again at Gorazde situation, but
6 with respect to Sarajevo sniping and shelling, I think I made it clear
7 that, while it is not very helpful, but the Chamber did not find it
8 appropriate to exclude that part -- and then I advised the Prosecution to
9 concentrate on the indictment issues -- issues included in the
11 Yes -- I remember, Mr. Tieger, you rose.
12 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Mr. President. Just a quick note about
13 the -- what I would say is the false analogy to 73 bis. Two quite
14 different things. On the one hand in the 73 bis circumstance, the
15 Prosecution tells the Court it won't --
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, let's leave it there.
17 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: I was just going to say I believe you're correct,
20 Your Honour, about the incidents, but there is just a difference between
21 the general pattern which the expert draws upon for his report and
22 specific schedules -- incidents.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will take a break now for half an hour
1 and resume at ten to 11.00.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I neglected to introduce our legal
3 intern who's here for -- her name is Magdalena Eaton and I would like to
4 recognise her now before you break. Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: Welcome both.
6 Yes, ten to 11.00.
7 --- Recess taken at 10.21 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.
9 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber has decided to grant the accused's
10 request to exclude paragraphs 1.19 to 1.28 and 2.219 to 2.222 of
11 Ewan Brown's expert report. With respect to paragraph 1.19 to 1.28, the
12 Chamber considers that they concern the activities of the 5th Corps in
13 Croatia. The Chamber recalls its previous rulings, that evidence dealing
14 with military campaigns in Croatia is not relevant to the indictment in
15 this case. Here I refer to paragraph 27 of this Chamber's decision on
16 second Prosecution motion for judicial notice of adjudicated facts issued
17 on 9th of October, 2009, as well as paragraphs 16 to 21 of the
18 Babic 92 quater decision of 13th of April, 2010.
19 As for paragraph 2.219 to 2.222, the Chamber notes that they deal
20 with the Operation Vrbas conducted by the 1st Krajina Corps in the Jajce
21 municipality, which is not listed in the indictment. While the
22 Prosecution submits that this is relevant in order to show the way in
23 which the 1st Krajina Corps operated in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
24 Chamber considers that this can be shown through evidence on operations
25 in areas covered by the indictment. In this regard, the Chamber notes
1 that Ewan Brown's expert report includes material related to other
2 operations directly relevant to the indictment. Therefore, given the
3 size and the scope of this case, there's no reason to include this
4 material, which is clearly outside the scope of the indictment. The
5 Chamber disagrees with the Prosecution's submission that excluding
6 passages of an expert report is not feasible in the same way as excluding
7 evidence of a fact witness would be. If anything, it is quite the
8 opposite. Given the expertise of this witness in this area, the evidence
9 he gives should be focused as much as possible on matters that are
10 directly relevant to the indictment. An expert witness differs from a
11 non-expert witness.
12 Accordingly, the Chamber once again encourages the Prosecution to
13 limit its evidence on matters relevant to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to
14 municipalities directly covered by the indictment. That's the ruling.
15 Let the witness take the solemn declaration.
16 Mr. Brown.
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
18 JUDGE KWON: Would you make the solemn declaration.
19 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
20 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Brown. Please make yourself
23 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 WITNESS: EWAN BROWN
1 Examination by Mr. Nicholls:
2 Q. Good morning, Mr. Brown.
3 A. Good morning, Mr. Nicholls.
4 Q. What I want to do quickly now is just go very quickly through
5 your background and the way that the report came into existence in 2002.
6 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have, please, and it should not be
7 broadcast, 65 ter 11118, which is Mr. Brown's CV. And while that's
8 coming up, Your Honours, if I could just say that we will introduce or
9 seek to tender a redacted CV as well. The CV has always been under seal
10 in previous cases. Thank you.
11 Q. Now, just very quickly, Mr. Brown, this is an updated CV; is that
13 A. Yes, it is, Mr. Nicholls.
14 Q. And I just want to focus on section (b) for our purposes now. As
15 we see here, you joined the OTP as an analyst in 1998. In 2000 you were
16 promoted to a senior analyst position. And in 2004 until you -- you
17 became the MAT team leader, the military analysis team; is that right?
18 A. Yes, that is right.
19 Q. And it was during that employment here that you wrote the report
20 we're going to discuss today?
21 A. Yes, that's correct.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: I'd like to tender that, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it, provisionally under seal.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P3912 under seal, Your Honours.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: And, Your Honours, I believe I can bring up now
1 65 ter 11118A, the redacted version should be available. And we could
2 tender that.
3 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted publicly.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P3913, Your Honours.
6 MR. NICHOLLS: Now just to bring up on the screen could we please
7 have 65 ter 11117, a report entitled "Military Developments in the
8 Bosanska Krajina, 1992."
9 Q. And while that's coming up, Mr. Brown, very briefly, it's spelled
10 out actually in the report, but if you could just tell us, generally,
11 what was the aim of this report? What were you trying to achieve with
12 putting this report together?
13 A. When I first arrived at the OTP in 1998, I was made aware of a
14 document collection that had been seized in Banja Luka, which was the
15 archive of -- part of the archive of the 1st Krajina Corps. I was at
16 that time tasked to support a number of cases, and that collection came
17 to my notice. Although it had been used in part, it hadn't, I believe,
18 been systematically reviewed. I asked my line manager if I could
19 undertake the task of systematically reviewing that collection, in part
20 to help me understand, support the cases I was tasked with and also to
21 support my knowledge of the military activities in the Krajina area,
22 which was one of the areas I was asked to look at. My manager agreed
23 that I could start reviewing this material, which I did. And it became
24 clear to me that I thought it was a very valuable archive and I started
25 bringing -- I started making notes myself initially actually on what I
1 was finding in the collection and brought that to the attention of
2 Ms. Korner, Ms. Joanna Korner, who was then one of the senior attorneys
3 on the Brdjanin/Talic case. She suggested that I write a report in
4 relation to what I was finding from this material. And that was agreed
5 with my line manager at the time was the leader of the military analysis
6 team. But in essence the outline of the report is provided in the
7 introduction which was to provide a background analysis for that team at
8 the time on the activities of the JNA and the VRS operating in the
9 Krajina area in 1992.
10 Q. [Microphone not activated]
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nicholls, please.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
13 Q. Again, briefly, it is contained -- but what are -- what were the
14 main sources for the report? What categories of sources did you use?
15 A. The report is predominantly sourced from contemporaneous
16 documents from the archive of the 1st Krajina Corps. There are a number
17 of additional documents, smaller in number, police documents, some
18 political minutes, and a small number of open-source material, maybe one
19 or two video -- video-clips as well. But it's overwhelmingly documents
20 from the archive of the 1st Krajina Corps.
21 Q. And could you tell us what, in your view, you might consider
22 limitations of the report or the parameters of the report?
23 A. Yes. I think, Your Honours, I'd like to draw your attention to
24 the fact that there are limitations in the report itself. There are
25 temporal limitations. This document really only deals predominantly with
1 1992. There are some references to 1991. There are some references to
2 documents in 1993 that reflect back to 1992, but it's predominantly
3 relating to 1992 in time. As I said the sources are predominantly from
4 the archive of the 1st Krajina Corps, which I think is a very valuable
5 collection and it is backed up by documents that, I think, assist the
6 understanding of that collection, but there is a limitation in that it is
7 predominantly based on that archive. It's also not a report that
8 discusses every feature of activity in the Krajina area. I think I would
9 probably still be writing that today if I had to. So there is a
10 selection to some extent, a narrowing, based on what I was finding in the
11 archive. And it isn't -- a background study or at least it was initially
12 written as a background study and it isn't on every single issue in the
13 Krajina in 1992. So those are some of the -- some of the limitations, I
15 Q. [Microphone not activated]
16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
17 MR. NICHOLLS:
18 Q. And you've prepared a couple of errata sheets for this report; is
19 that right?
20 A. Yes, that's correct.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I please have 65 ter 11103.
22 Q. And just very simply, that is one of the first errata sheets; is
23 that right?
24 A. Yes, that is correct, Mr. Nicholls.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Now, please, 23515.
1 Q. And is that a more recent errata sheet from your review, again,
2 of your report?
3 A. Yes, that is correct.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, I would tender the report, 11117,
5 and the two errata sheets that we've just seen.
6 JUDGE KWON: They will all be admitted.
7 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibits P3914 through 3916 respectively,
9 Your Honours.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
11 Q. That's the background. Now we will begin talking about the
12 substance of the report. I want to ask you first about some early
13 military developments which you discuss in the beginning of the report.
14 For everybody, the questions I'm going to go into now are found on the
15 executive summary on page 5 and concern, Mr. Brown, what you've described
16 there as a twin-track policy adopted by the JNA in the early months of
17 1992 to reduce tensions and yet the provision of aid and arms to
18 Bosnian Serbs and then, in your words, a growing convergence between the
19 JNA and the SDS. And then I will also touch briefly on the
20 16th Assembly Session strategic objectives.
21 And here, just for the record, we are beginning to go into pages
22 12 to 24 of the report. Could I please have the first exhibit, the first
23 document I want to show, that's 65 ter 01872, a 2nd Military District
24 report dated 20th of March, 1992. You actually footnote this right at
25 the beginning of your report, footnotes 2 and 5, and could you just tell
1 us why you selected this -- this document for your report and also why
2 you thought it would be relevant to your testimony.
3 A. I think when I looked at some of the early 1992 documents, the
4 JNA -- the 5th Corps documents, this twin-track policy seemed evident.
5 On the one hand there were a number of references, in fact quite a few
6 from the 5th Corps in their regular combat reports, indicating that the
7 situation in Bosnia was beginning to deteriorate. The 5th Corps at that
8 time was predominantly operating in Western Slavonia, although it had got
9 forces still in Bosnia. And in their daily combat reports there were a
10 number of references to ethnic tensions, divisions, and some references
11 in their own reports that they were trying to take measures to defuse
12 some of those tensions. However, as the months went on in 1992,
13 especially in and around March and April time, it seemed to me that, on
14 the one hand, they were still reporting ethnic divisions but that there
15 were a number of references indicating that they were supporting and
16 certainly affiliated and siding with the position of the Bosnian Serbs
17 and, in some cases, direct references to the SDS.
18 This document is a document written by the commander of the
19 2nd Military District, the 2nd -- the JNA 2nd Military District which was
20 headquartered then in Sarajevo, and it's written quite late in terms of
21 right at the, if you like, the beginning of the real difficult period of
22 April. And it's a summary by General Kukanjac, who was the commander of
23 the 2nd Military District on what he believed the situation in Bosnia --
24 what was happening in Bosnia and it is being sent to the
25 Federal Secretariat for National Defence, in essence the senior JNA
1 headquarters in Belgrade. And it summarises on the one hand that there's
2 growing ethnic difficulties in Bosnia, but it also seems to show that
3 Kukanjac and the 2nd Military District certainly believe that the
4 position of the Bosnian Serbs is more justified and it references the
5 issue of volunteers, that is, individuals outside the JNA, and that they
6 are being provided arms and weapons. It also makes reference, in the
7 latter part of the document, of their concern that TO weapons were going
8 to -- were insecure and that they wanted to take control of those
9 weapons. The Territorial Defence was actually a republican asset, if you
10 like, not a JNA asset, and at least technically, I guess, the weapons
11 were under the control of the Bosnian government. But it seems evident
12 that the JNA are worried that some of those weapons are going to be out
13 of their control and they are taking measures or suggest measures to take
14 some of these TO weapons under their control.
15 So those are some of the key themes I think that come out of this
16 document written on the 20th of March, 1992.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: I would tender that, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P3917, Your Honours.
21 MR. NICHOLLS:
22 Q. I'd like to move on now and ask you some questions about
23 developments the next month. We were just looking at 20th of May -- 20th
24 of March. Moving on now ahead to May, skipping April, and ask you about
25 some entries in the Mladic notebooks which were not available to you at
1 the time you wrote your report, but which you later had the opportunity
2 to review.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: So if I could now go to P01477 and page 255 in the
4 English. It should be page 262 in the original if we need to show the
5 original as well.
6 Q. While that's coming up, again, what we're going to look at is
7 General Mladic's notebook entries from the 6th of May, 1992, prior to the
8 creation of the VRS. So, again, if we can go to 255 of the English. All
9 right. And there we see that the entry is the 6th of May, 1992. If we
10 can go to the next page. And I'm concentrating now, Mr. Brown, the
11 second half of the page "talks," beginning at 1920 between
12 General Mladic, Radovan Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, General Adzic, and
13 others. And I'd ask you to comment on this entry and what we see
14 happening now in early May.
15 A. Your Honours, maybe if I step back a couple of days before this.
16 The situation of the JNA was, at least officially, made slightly more
17 difficult by the pronouncement of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
18 which happened, I believe, on the 28th of April which made the position
19 of the JNA in Bosnia somewhat, at least officially, difficult in that the
20 FRY was only going to consist of Serbia and Montenegro. Not long after
21 that declaration, I believe within a day or two, General Adzic, who was
22 Federal Secretary for National Defence, a senior JNA officer, visited
23 Bosnia and did a tour. There was a reference in a 5th Corps document
24 that his visit -- he came to Banja Luka and probably briefed some of the
25 general -- some of the staff there about what was going to happen to the
1 JNA in Bosnia. Concurrently with this, General Mladic became, at first,
2 deputy commander of the 2nd Military District and then commander of the
3 2nd Military District. And this meeting comes on the 6th of May, so a
4 few days after this activity has occurred. And it seems to me that this
5 is a key meeting - there may have been others - but this is a key meeting
6 in relation to the transformation of the JNA forces remaining in Bosnia,
7 as well as an articulation from the SDS leadership about where the new
8 Bosnian state was to be -- the footprint of that state. And it's of note
9 that General Adzic is also involved in these discussions. And may be if
10 I go through some of the key issues from this meeting that I think could
11 be of use.
12 Q. That is what I was going to ask you next, Mr. Brown. If you
13 could just draw our attention to the parts you find significant. I think
14 we can move to the next page, please, in the English.
15 A. Maybe before we go to that page, the first bit identifies what's
16 called problems. I don't know if that's problems that General Mladic has
17 highlighted or if it's general problems that the whole group are
18 discussing. Problem G states - this is on page 256: "If we opt for the
19 war option we must clearly find the objectives of the war and relations
20 with the enemy and our allies."
21 And then there are references in the diary that Mr. Karadzic then
22 speaks and some of the points noted down by Mladic on page 257:
23 "We will soon be one state and one army.
24 "We are controlling the Serbian settlements in the city and
25 expanding them."
1 I would assume that that probably relates to Sarajevo --
2 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, I'd like to make an
3 objection to this. This is -- I'm objecting on the grounds that this is
4 outside of the scope of this witness's expertise, to be interpreting a
5 meeting about general goals of the Bosnian Serbs. He's here to give
6 evidence, very limited to the Krajina and its military situation there.
7 Secondly, an expert witness is not allowed to give any opinions
8 on the acts, conduct, or mental state of the accused. And so we're --
9 now he's giving his opinion on a meeting in which General Mladic and also
10 Dr. Karadzic are present. And I don't believe that he should be allowed
11 to give his opinion or interpretation on anything about that meeting that
12 relates to the acts, conduct, or mental state of Dr. Karadzic. So I
13 think that this type of testimony is, number one, outside the scope of
14 the witness's expertise; and number two, it touches on the acts and
15 conduct of the accused. Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, it's absolutely not outside the
18 scope of the report. It's within the temporal time-frame of the report.
19 It's about a meeting between the person who would become the supreme
20 commander of the Armed Forces of the Republika Srpska and the commander
21 of the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska. The witness is an expert
22 witness who has identified -- who's analysed, excuse me, virtually all of
23 the 1st Krajina Corps documents. It's also apparent from his report
24 that -- and is included in his report and is part and parcel of it, the
25 analysis of the way that the goals, objectives, and tasks from the
1 political leadership were submitted to the Main Staff of the VRS and then
2 became military operations on the ground in order to achieve those goals
3 as occurs in the state of war in any country.
4 So it is not speculation, I would say, for the witness to analyse
5 a meeting between these two very important leaders of the armed forces of
6 the Republika Srpska. And he is -- the witness is an expert who is able
7 to draw conclusions, and I think it would be extremely strange for a
8 military expert whose report concerns, in part, the strategic goals, the
9 16th Assembly Session, to not be able to talk about meetings between the
10 key players at that session that occurred that month six days earlier.
11 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, first of all, if I could reply
12 that, if this is so important to the Prosecution, it should have been in
13 his report and it should have been -- or an addendum to his report. And
14 they are now expanding the scope of his testimony and, I say, going
15 beyond the expertise. This is a person who studied the
16 1st Krajina Corps, their collection of documents, and their operations.
17 And now he's giving evidence, or purporting to give evidence, on broader
18 areas for which we contend we've not been notified and he's not
20 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, if I can just respond to that, Your Honour.
21 First, I'm not aware on any prohibitions on an expert giving opinions on
22 the acts or conducts of the accused, as Mr. Brown is in this context.
23 Second, it is not outside the report. This is foundation to the
24 16th Assembly Session, the strategic goals, which are, we will see,
25 discussed in this period before the meeting.
1 JUDGE KWON: Can I hear from you in terms of notice.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: There is plenty -- there is notice, Your Honours
3 because, one, all of these entries were notified that they would be used
4 in the testimony; two, Mr. Brown did a report after his review of the
5 Mladic notebooks, which was disclosed to Defence and Defence and included
6 this entry. So there is notice that these topics would be covered. It's
7 the same topic as what's included in the report. And third, there is no
8 way that he could have analysed this material in 2002 because it had not
9 yet been seized from General Mladic's family's apartment.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, if I could just make one point. The
12 short report that was a review of the Mladic diaries was disclosed on the
13 22nd of December, 2010, so almost one year ago.
14 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Robinson, now, Mr. Nicholls said that he was
15 not aware of any prohibition on the expert giving opinion evidence on
16 acts or conduct of the accused. Can you assist us with the authority?
17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I can. I'm just looking for that right now
18 and I can -- it's going to take me about five minutes, but I know there
19 is authority on that point.
20 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: [Microphone not activated]
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: If I may, what I think what Mr. Robinson may be
2 getting at is an expert can't testify to the ultimate issue his opinion
3 in the guilt or innocence of the accused, but of course an expert can
4 testify to the acts or conduct of the accused. Every accused who
5 testifies -- who is put on trial in this courtroom, if an expert is
6 called, if it's going to be relevant, it's going to, in some way and in
7 very often direct ways, speak about what that accused did.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I can start to give you some
9 authority now for this. First is the Appeals Chamber decision in the
10 ICTR, in Nahimana versus Prosecutor in the judgement at paragraph 212 and
11 the Appeals Chamber decision in the Renzaho versus Prosecutor case, the
12 judgement of the 1st of April, 2011, at paragraph 288 and these decisions
13 say that "An expert witness cannot, in principle, testify himself or
14 herself on the acts and conduct of the accused persons without having
15 been called to testify also as a factual witness."
16 And then there's some cases for the ICTR in the Trial Chamber
17 level. Prosecutor versus Nizeyimana, further decision on the admission
18 of evidence of Dr. Alison Des Forges of the 15th of March, 2011 at
19 paragraph 11, which says that an expert witness may not testify on the
20 acts and conduct of the accused and the admission of her -- those
21 portions of her report were redacted. And then the Appeals Chamber has
22 also said that the expert witness cannot testify about the criminal
23 responsibility of the accused, which includes his mental state. So those
24 are some of the citations.
25 JUDGE KWON: Here the -- General Mladic's diaries has been
1 already admitted into evidence.
2 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, and we don't have any objection to
3 him reading any portions of the diary.
4 JUDGE KWON: As an expert, is he not able to give his opinion as
5 to the events that would lead to the formation or establishment of an
7 MR. ROBINSON: I think he -- it's probably within his expertise
8 to give evidence how the 1st Krajina Corps was formed, but not -- I
9 wouldn't say that the formation of the VRS, for example, would be within
10 his expertise or even, certainly, the political deliberations which led
11 to that. I think there was also a case -- maybe you know more about this
12 than I do -- I'm sure you do, but in the Popovic case, wasn't there an
13 issue about General Rupert Submit's expertise to testify about the VRS
14 and it was -- he was not allowed, as I recall - I might be wrong about
15 this - but I'm recalling that he wasn't allowed to testify as an expert
16 about the operation of the VRS because his expertise, while significant
17 as a military officer, wasn't in that particular -- studying that
18 particular army. So I think that just because someone's a military
19 expert doesn't give them carte blanche to testify about military issues
20 in general.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: Briefly, briefly, Your Honours, one, if we look at
23 the Popovic case -- I don't have the cases cited at hand that
24 Mr. Robinson has cited. However, we can see from the Popovic case
25 those -- that is not the practice in this Tribunal and do not control --
1 Mr. Butler, just, for example, testified at length, as he has in many
2 trials here about events in Srebrenica and including in that the
3 activities, conduct, of the accused in those cases and that has never
4 been seen in any way improper.
5 Second, this is very late, to now be saying while the expert is
6 on the stand that he doesn't have expertise in this issue. We notified
7 the Defence, as we must, with our 94 bis notification back in 2009 that
8 Mr. Brown would be an expert. They had the report --
9 JUDGE KWON: As I understand Mr. Robinson's objection is that
10 while Mr. Brown is qualified as an expert in relation to the VRS military
11 operation in the Krajina region, but not in relation to the Main Staff
12 itself. Am I correct in so understanding?
13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes.
14 JUDGE KWON: Can I hear from you on -- in that regard?
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour. What Mr. Robinson is now
16 challenging are aspects of the report which focus heavily on the
17 relationship of the Main Staff to the 1KK, the six strategic objectives
18 and the way the political goals were translated into military operations.
19 That is all extremely clear from the report that was disclosed under
20 94 bis, triggering his 30-day response. When they did respond to the
21 report, which they did not, except for asking Mr. Brown to cross, on 11
22 May 2009 the Defence wrote, paragraph 33:
23 "He does not challenge the fact that the witness is an expert and
24 that his report is relevant."
25 So if at that time there were portions of the report in which
1 there was not expertise, the challenge should have been made then, but I
2 think the report and Mr. Brown's background shows that he is, in fact, an
3 expert in these areas. He's been qualified multiple times in the
4 Brdjanin case, Krajisnik case, which was a similar political leadership
5 case. He testified an expert in that case on the basis of the same
6 report, slightly different version but the same report, to the same
7 issues. So there's precedent that he has been qualified and is an expert
8 on these areas.
9 The 1KK and the military operations of the 1KK can't be
10 hermetically sealed from the events in the time that are the subject of
11 his report. The report talks about how the strategic objectives were
12 announced at the 16th Assembly Session, for example, one of those was the
13 corridor operation. Within days the corridor operation is launched by
14 General Mladic, issuing directives to General Talic. That is an integral
15 part of the report and his, I think, expertise was manifest by the detail
16 in the report.
17 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, I just want to intervene
18 on one matter that I think is very important. In our response this is
19 exactly what we said:
20 "He does not challenge," Dr. Karadzic, "the fact that the witness
21 is an expert and that his report is relevant," and that's what
22 Mr. Nicholls read out, and then there's a comma, "but reserves the right
23 to object at trial to opinions offered outside of the expertise of the
24 witness or to the relevance of specific testimony by the witness."
25 I haven't seen an advocate do that too often in this courtroom to
1 omit a section after a comma that changes the meaning and I just wanted
2 to call that to your attention.
3 JUDGE KWON: We'll stop there.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: If I can respond to that is because I don't see
5 that on point. That to me is the boiler plate that if Mr. Brown starts
6 to testify about events about the civil war in Guatemala that they
7 reserve the right to object, not that they will --
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, I think we have heard enough.
9 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I'm sorry, I don't know if the Court
10 wants any further explication of the case cited in response to
11 His Honour Judge Baird's question, Nahimana. We have been looking for
12 it. We can't find it. It is also, I would mention, another function of
13 the belated objection. But if I can simply note this: If the Court is
14 going to consider this matter now, looking at the portions that
15 Mr. Robinson cited and the juxtaposition of the principle against -- the
16 juxtaposition of the role of an expert versus the role of a fact witness
17 this case seems to say: Look if this guy is going to testify about the
18 underlying facts -- look, I know that this guy did something and I'm
19 going to testify as a fact witness, then I have to be noticed as a fact
20 witness. If that is what this case is and we haven't been able to call
21 it up, then it is totally inapposite to the question of what an expert
22 witness can and should be testifying about.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with the Prosecution,
25 Mr. Robinson. He -- as an expert witness, he can testify about the
1 JNA/VRS military operations in the Autonomous Region of Krajina in 1992,
2 which should include the -- its relation with the Main Staff and also
3 that may relate to the establishment of the VRS. And further, the
4 Chamber notes that he's not giving his evidence as a fact witness in
5 relation to the contents contained in Mr. -- General Mladic's diary. As
6 such, he can give his opinion as far as he can. So objection is
7 overruled, Mr. Robinson.
8 Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours.
10 Q. Mr. Brown, I'm sorry you were interrupted. If we can -- we're
11 still on this entry for the 6th of May and you had stated that there were
12 some points you found significant. Could you please continue.
13 A. Yes. On page 257, Your Honours, there seems to be bullet points
14 from comments made by Mr. Karadzic and maybe continuing on with those.
15 There's a comment:
16 "It would be a disaster if we did not separate with them."
17 There is a comment on:
18 "Later, we will unite with the FRY ..."
19 I believe that this could be a long-term aspiration, that the RS
20 would ultimately unite with the FRY. This was a -- this was a comment
21 that cropped up in a number of 1 Krajina Corps documents later in the war
22 that the ultimate goal may well be, longer down the line, to unify all
23 Serb lands.
24 On page --
25 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 MR. ROBINSON: I again want to -- I'm sorry if I'm -- I'm not
3 really asking you to reconsider, but this testimony now has gone one step
4 further to interpreting Dr. Karadzic's words and I think now that the
5 issue is now more squarely before you with respect to the acts and
6 conduct of the accused, I would again reiterate my objection to this
7 witness giving any evidence concerning the acts, conduct, or mental state
8 of Mr. Karadzic.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Brown, where did you find the basis to come
10 to the conclusion that ultimate goal may be longer down the line to unify
11 all Serb lands?
12 THE WITNESS: There is a section in my report in which I deal
13 with this. If I can draw your attention to -- I'll have to go through it
14 a little bit, sir. There are references -- I would have to go through my
15 report, it's quite large and maybe I can do that in the break, but there
16 are a number of references later in the war. I believe one or two after
17 Operation Corridor is successful and later in 1992 where General Talic,
18 in congratulating his troops, imply that the territory that they've
19 gained and achieved there is not the -- is not necessarily the end state
20 and that there is an objective, a potential objective, of unifying all
21 Serb lands at some point down the line. There is also --
22 JUDGE KWON: Where do you see that potential objective?
23 THE WITNESS: I will have to go to the reference in my --
24 references in my report, if I can take a bit of time or maybe during the
25 break highlight those. I believe also, and it's -- I would have to go
1 through it again, that at the end of 1992 there's a reference in the
2 Mladic diary a, large meeting in Belgrade sometime in December, I
3 believe, it's not something I've looked at recently, with senior
4 leadership figures in Belgrade in which it seems that the position of the
5 Bosnian Serb leadership is to try and push further and faster, to
6 consider having some unification, but at which it appears some of the
7 Belgrade participants in that meeting are more hesitant on that. It
8 isn't an area of my expertise, I have to say, but I do know --
9 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, until you come back with some
10 specific bases, could you try to concentrate on your expertise, expert
12 THE WITNESS: Certainly.
13 JUDGE KWON: With that, shall we continue.
14 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
15 THE WITNESS: If we move on to page 258 of the notes, there's a
16 reference, again attributed to Mr. Karadzic, that:
17 "We are on the threshold of achieving our centuries' old dream of
18 achieving creating our own state without many internal enemies."
19 There are a number of references at the 16th Assembly Session,
20 again, a number attributed, I believe, to -- attributed to Mr. Karadzic,
21 about this issue of not having many internal enemies within the territory
22 that the Bosnian Serbs wanted to control. Now, bearing in mind this
23 meeting comes a week before the 16th Assembly Session on the 12th of May.
24 Then later on on that same page it notes:
25 "It would be good to carry out our demarcation, (a), in order for
1 us to separate, (b) for us to form a corridor (c), for the Drina not to
2 be a border, (d), to reach the coast."
3 And although they're not identical to the strategic goals that
4 were announced in the minutes of the 16th Assembly Session on the 12th of
5 May, it seems that what's being discussed here in this preliminary
6 meeting relates to the objectives that were announced at the 12th of May
7 on the 16th Assembly Session.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Again, Mr. President, I really believe that this
9 is going beyond the scope of this witness's expertise and touching upon
10 acts and conduct of the accused, and I continue to object.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: If I may respond, Your Honours, it is not beyond
13 the scope of the witness's expertise and it's quite evident from the
14 documents. What the witness discusses in his report in large part, as
15 I've said, is the 16th Assembly Session. The witness, when he wrote his
16 report, did not have access to this material, which shows that a week
17 before the 16th Assembly Session that the Bosnian Serb political
18 leadership, Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, were meeting with General Mladic
19 and others and discussing the strategic objectives, the same tasks, the
20 Drina not being border, number three, to reach the sea, number six. So
21 it's not a stretch, it's not beyond his expertise in any way, I think, to
22 be talking about the preliminary meetings that were held before the
23 16th Assembly, where the aspirations were discussed. It's written quite
24 plainly in the documents. It's not beyond a military expert's expertise
25 to talk about discussions with the military leadership which were later,
1 very soon later, pronounced officially in the Assembly Session, spoken by
2 Mr. Karadzic at that session. And again, I'm not aware that there is any
3 prohibition on an expert witness talking about what an accused said at a
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 MR. NICHOLLS: May I make just one more brief point,
7 Your Honours?
8 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber wishes to have a legal debate on
9 these -- this issue, in particular those cases cited by Mr. Robinson and
10 their applicability to this case.
11 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Just the one point in terms of relevance and how
13 they are -- these issues are within the expert report and are properly
14 discussed by this witness, and that is that there have been challenges
15 and statements that the strategic objectives are not related to military
16 operations. And Dr. Karadzic testified in the Krajisnik case and stated
17 that they were merely political goals that had no - I'm going off my
18 memory - but no relation to what happened militarily following their
19 announcement on 12 May. So it is significant within the report and we'll
20 rebut that challenge, that these same objectives, these same tasks, are
21 being discussed with the future military commander even before that
22 public -- that not public, but that meeting in Banja Luka.
23 MR. TIEGER: And just to complement that I believe the accused
24 said in his opening that the strategic objectives were just a statement
25 of their position vis-a-vis the European Community. I think that was at
1 page 944 of our transcripts.
2 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for half an hour and hear from
3 the parties on this issue and we'll continue till 1.30 and break again
4 for half an hour and then we'll continue till 3.30.
5 Is that agreeable to the parties?
6 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
7 --- Recess taken at 12.03 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, having had the further opportunity,
10 albeit brief, for further research, would you like to add anything to or
11 supplement your previous submission?
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. I -- let me just
13 start off with my best case which is an ICTR Trial Chamber decision in
14 the Karemera case called "Decision on Prosecution motion for
15 reconsideration of the decision on prospective experts." And it's on the
16 16th of November, 2007, and I'm going to refer specifically to paragraph
17 21. And basically it says that:
18 "The Chamber recalls that the established jurisprudence of this
19 Tribunal proscribes expert evidence from usurping the function of the
20 Trial Chamber by offering opinions that are determinative of the guilt or
21 innocence of the accused or by averting to the acts, conduct, and mental
22 state of the accused."
23 And in that case the Chamber affirmed its earlier decision not to
24 admit expert evidence.
25 So I -- that's the best I could find to say that evidence of acts
1 and conduct and mental state of the accused ought not to be admitted.
2 This Tribunal has several decisions in which they say that expert
3 witnesses should not offer his or her opinion on the criminal liability
4 of the accused. And there's a decision in the Dragomir Milosevic case on
5 February the 15th of 2007 and one in the Hadzihasanovic case on the 11th
6 of February, 2004, that hold that.
7 So what I've been able to gather is that there is a line of
8 authority starting with that, that's -- prohibits an expert from giving
9 their opinion on the criminal liability of the accused next to decisions
10 like the Nahimana appeals decision, which make the distinction between an
11 expert and a factual witness and say that experts shouldn't be giving the
12 kind of testimony that a factual witness would be expected to give. And
13 then, finally, to the Karemera decision that states flatly that an expert
14 should not avert to the acts, conduct, and mental state of the accused.
15 So I think that's the best I could tell you about the state of
16 the law that I've been able to establish in the last 30 minutes.
17 JUDGE KWON: Do you by any chance, Mr. Robinson, have specific
18 circumstances or specific statements or evidence that was prohibited by
19 the ICTR Chambers?
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, and I can do this only because I was, myself,
21 counsel in the Karemera case. I know exactly what the statements were
22 that were being objected to and those were interpretations by the
23 witness, Alison Des Forges, about speeches given by the accused or
24 statements made by them at rallies in Rwanda, which I think is pretty
25 analogous to interpreting comments made by Dr. Karadzic at a meeting with
1 his generals.
2 JUDGE KWON: And Ms. Alison Des Forges was an expert of what?
3 MR. ROBINSON: She was an expert on the social and political
4 history of Rwanda.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 Mr. Nicholls.
7 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours. Having looked at this
8 quickly in the break, I think that the cases cited before the break by
9 Mr. Robinson make clear that Mr. Brown's evidence is admissible and is
10 exactly the type of evidence that an expert witness is expected to give.
11 If you look at - which also concerns Alison Des Forges - the Renzaho
12 appeals decision of 2011, there were a couple of points Mr. Robinson did
13 not make in his initial submission. One -- the first, as he says and
14 which we agree to, is that the expert is not called upon to testify about
15 whether an accused is guilty and making that ultimate decision on whether
16 the -- making that ultimate opinion on the guilt or innocence of the
17 accused, which has not happened here or in the report. Second, if you
18 look at paragraph 288 of that appeals decision regarding
19 Alison Des Forges, the first part of the sentence is exactly what is
20 happening here.
21 "The report and testimony of an expert witness may be based on
22 facts narrated by ordinary witnesses or facts from other evidence."
23 And that is exactly what is happening here. He is looking at
24 other evidence, a notebook that was not available to him. It would be
25 the same, as it says in this appeals decision, if he looked at testimony
1 by other witnesses. What's -- the distinction being drawn in paragraph
2 288 is that an expert witness -- I think the Appeals Chamber there is
3 just talking about the difference between an expert witness and a fact
4 witness. An expert witness cannot, suddenly without notice, without a
5 statement, start giving factual testimony. We understand that. If
6 Mr. Brown were to suddenly start saying that he'd met Mr. Karadzic after
7 the war, that would be the situation being discussed there, testifying
8 about facts outside the report.
9 What the Appellate Chamber finds is perfectly proper and what an
10 expert should do, is to base his report on facts stated by other
11 witnesses or other evidence, while not directly opining or pronouncing
12 the criminal responsibility of the accused. That's all in
13 paragraph 2.88 [sic].
14 And Mr. Robinson also did not point out that in 293 of that same
15 appellate decision regarding Alison Des Forges' historical testimony
16 which apparently, although I don't have it in front of me, has been
17 represented to interpreting speeches made by the accused, the Court found
18 no error and that there was no mistake.
19 So what Mr. Robinson's submission really is he's seized upon this
20 one sentence in paragraph 288 and tried to broaden that to a general
21 principle which is not included there, that an expert cannot talk about
22 acts or conduct of an accused in any sense, where that paragraph is
23 simply, I say, outlining the distinction between expert witnesses and
24 fact witnesses that we all agree to.
25 And it's -- the other decision cited by Mr. Robinson, Nahimana,
1 paragraph 212, has exactly the same language in it, again referring to
2 the testimony of expert Des Forges, stating that:
3 "... while the report and testimony of an expert witness may be
4 based on facts narrated by ordinary witnesses or facts from other
5 evidence, a witness -- an expert witness, in principle ..." can't start
6 suddenly veering into factual testimony.
7 And just as an analogy, if somebody were to buy Mr. Robinson's
8 interpretation, nobody could testify about the meaning of an intercept
9 because he would say: No, no, he's interpreting what the accused
10 speaking on this intercept is saying, what is happening here, it's going
11 to the mind -- that is not the practice in this Tribunal or any other
12 court that I know of, where an expert witness cannot talk about facts
13 presented to him. This is a notebook, a diary, as you say has been
14 admitted. This fact has been admitted that this meeting -- that the
15 notebook showing this meeting taking place and what General Mladic wrote
16 down, those facts are admitted, those facts exist, and Mr. Brown is
17 interpreting those facts.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 Mr. Robinson, the Chamber tends to agree with the observation of
20 the Prosecution. Mr. Brown is not, in the view of the Chamber, going to
21 testify as a factual evidence in relation to the events appearing in
22 the -- General Mladic's diary. And we do not see authority, as you
23 indicated, that the expert witness cannot comment on the acts and conduct
24 of the accused.
25 Further, when the witness referred to the so-called objectives or
1 ultimate goal, then maybe longer down the line to unify all Serb lands,
2 the Chamber does not take it that witness is testifying to the mental
3 state of the accused; rather, given that he referred to six strategic
4 goals and he interpreted it in his report, to which the Defence did not
5 make any opposition -- so his response is consistent with his report.
6 So having considered all these matters and the submission from
7 the parties, your objection is overruled.
8 Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours.
10 If I could now move on, please, to P01477, e-court page 262.
11 Q. This is a similar topic, Mr. Brown, an entry in General Mladic's
12 notebook for the next day. We can go over this quite quickly, I think.
13 Can you tell us what you found significant in terms of later military
14 developments in the Krajina, if anything, that we see from this meeting
15 on the 7th of May, now five days before the 16th Assembly Session.
16 A. Well, I think there are two things. One is that Krajisnik seems
17 to outline the goals that were stated at the 16th Assembly Session a bit
18 later and they seem to be a little bit more clear than the previous day's
19 meeting, and I may be -- in relation to the 1st Krajina Corps strategic
20 goal number one and two are of some note. The other annotation in
21 this -- this meeting appears to be a wiring diagram or a note. It's not
22 clear who wrote it, obviously probably Mladic wrote it, but whether it
23 was as a result of the discussions or presentation that he himself put
24 forward, but the wiring diagram of the outline of the army, which is on
25 page 264 of the translation. And this seems to be what the leadership
1 believe the structure of the army should be, and in fact, up until
2 November 1992 that was what the VRS or the SR -- the army of the SR BiH
3 as it was called then, the VRS, consisted of until the Drina Corps was
4 formed later in the year. And most of the corps represented on this
5 diagram fall from the corps that already existed in the
6 2nd Military District when the JNA were present. So, for example, the
7 JNA 5th Corps became the 1st Krajina Corps in Banja Luka, but this seems
8 to be a diagram of what they expect the army to consist of. And it was,
9 in fact, a month or so later formally adopted as the structure of the
10 VRS. So it would seem from these two meetings on the 6th and 7th, the
11 military leadership and in the case of General Mladic and the
12 Bosnian Serb leadership have got together to discuss what they believe
13 are to be the objectives and the territory that they think they should
14 control and discussions on the structure of the army that is to be
15 established and was established at the 16th Assembly Session a few days
16 after this meeting.
17 Q. Now, I'm not going to go through the 16th Assembly Session or
18 pull it up on the screen. You deal with that in your report at pages 24
19 to 32 and paragraphs 1.38 to 1.60 and you give a summary at 1.60 of the
20 import of the 16th Assembly Session. For the record, that is -- the
21 16th Assembly Session is P00956, the transcript, and P01355, the minutes.
22 But very briefly can you just tell us what you feel from the point of
23 view of your report and your analysis of the events in the AOR of the
24 1KK, what are the succinctly most important points that we see from the
25 16th Assembly Session?
1 A. Your Honours, I believe that the 16th Assembly Session, although
2 not a stand-alone session in itself, is certainly a stand-out session. I
3 think with the announcement of the strategic goals by Mr. Karadzic and
4 the discussions in that Assembly session with the delegates, I would
5 argue that it crystallises that it was the objective of the Bosnian Serb
6 leadership to clearly announce to the delegates and to themselves that
7 they were to -- going to be establishing their own state; that the six
8 strategic goals, as outlined, clearly marked the territory that they
9 believed they were going to control and that they viewed as theirs; and
10 importantly in relation to strategic goal number one, that this territory
11 that was marked by these goals was not going to contain a large number of
12 individuals who they believed may be against that state and that the
13 discussions and some of the references from the delegates would seem to
14 indicate, in relation to that second bit, that there was -- they didn't
15 want to have a large number of individuals who were -- they deemed as
16 being against that state, that that would involve the resettlement,
17 movement, or the movement out of populations within that state. I think
18 this session is critically important too in that it establishes the army
19 formally and it places the Presidency, president of the Presidency, in
20 charge of the army through the Main Staff and down to the corps.
21 So I think the session and the discussions in it, for me, stood
22 out as giving the direction to the military about the territory that they
23 were, in essence, to defend or take, and that in doing so, they did not
24 want a large number of individuals who they deemed to be against that
25 state within that state. There are other issues relating to the
1 Assembly session, but for me those stand out. And when I say it's not a
2 stand-alone Assembly session, I'm aware that there had already been the
3 taking control of territory in some areas, for example, Prijedor, one of
4 the delegates in the Assembly session discussed the activities in Krupa
5 where, from his comments, there were no longer any Muslims there and that
6 operation had involved elements of the JNA from the 5th Corps. I'm aware
7 that there already had been territory, for example, in Sarajevo that had
8 been taken under control by the Serb authorities. But for me this
9 session, I feel, is critically important in understanding that the
10 Bosnian Serb leadership wanted their own state, that the strategic
11 goals - in particular, number two, three, four, five, and six -
12 articulated the boundaries of that state, and that they did not want a
13 large number of people in that territory that they deemed to be against
14 it; and that that would involve the resettlement of populations,
15 including the moving in of Serbs from areas outside that footprint and,
16 importantly, also established and placed General Mladic at the head of
17 the Main Staff and the establishment of the army.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, without meaning to be a
19 pest, I really believe that that last answer, or at least part of it,
20 infringes at least in part on the criminal liability of the accused and
21 also goes beyond the expertise of this military expert. He's --
22 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. -- please continue, yes, Mr. Robinson.
23 MR. ROBINSON: He's essentially testifying that the joint
24 criminal enterprise existed and that at this Assembly meeting at which
25 Dr. Karadzic spoke, the participants agreed to displace the Muslim
1 population or non-Serb population and in my opinion that, number one, is
2 not the province of a military expert; and number two, goes directly to
3 the criminal liability of the accused.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour --
5 JUDGE KWON: Just let me put the questions to Mr. Robinson before
6 you respond. No, I would rather listen -- hear from you, Mr. Nicholls,
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour, again, I don't think I should have to
9 respond to this. I think you've made your ruling and that the ruling was
10 clear and that from the cases we've looked at and the argument we've made
11 that Mr. Brown's answer is squarely within his expertise and it's
12 included in the report. He is not coming -- stating inadmissibly the
13 guilt or innocence of the accused. He is looking at the statements, the
14 facts of what was contained in the transcript of the
15 16th Assembly Session. He is looking at what happened militarily on the
16 ground and interpreting those facts which is exactly what an expert
17 should do and he's not straying outside the boundaries, which we've just
18 discussed and taken a break to look up.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE KWON: Probably I forgot to mention when I gave our ruling
21 previously, but the witness clearly argued and -- that the six strategic
22 goals were military ones and, as such, he's interpreting the items
23 appearing in the Mladic diary or in the 16th Session of the Assembly as
24 an expert. He's not giving -- the Chamber does not think he's giving
25 evidence as to the guilt of the accused or the joint criminal enterprise
1 or something like that. I will allow the evidence to continue,
2 Mr. Nicholls.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours.
4 Could I have P03590.
5 Q. While it's coming up, we're now two days after the
6 16th Assembly Session, 14 May 1992. This is a document from your report
7 concerning a meeting held in Kljuc. And could you just tell us why you
8 selected this document and what you find significant about it. And while
9 you're doing that, could you just tell us who Branko Basara is and what
10 his involvement was, if any, before this meeting in military operations
11 in what would become the 1KK area of responsibility.
12 A. Branko Basara, Your Honours, was a former JNA officer who became
13 a brigade commander of the 6th Brigade. He had fought in
14 Western Slavonia and was sent back from Western Slavonia, I believe in
15 April 1992, to the area of Sanski Most. He is present, I believe, at
16 this meeting because it's signed and drafted by -- or at least the
17 30th -- sorry, the 30th Partisan Division, the 30th Division, was a
18 subordinate of the 1st Krajina Corps. So you had the 1st Krajina Corps.
19 Below that you had the 30th Division and below that you had a number of
20 brigades and one of those brigades was the 6th Brigade and that was the
21 brigade that was based in Sanski Most. Prior to this meeting on the 14th
22 of May, part of that brigade had been involved in operations in
23 Bosanska Krupa. So when one of the delegates at the
24 16th Assembly Session had mentioned that there were no longer any Muslims
25 in Krupa, that they had all gone over the river, part of that brigade had
1 been involved in the actions in the preceding period. But the reason I
2 believe he's at this meeting is because the 30th Division, its area of
3 responsibility covered a number of municipalities rather than just one.
4 So whereas the 6th Brigade predominantly dealt with Sanski Most, although
5 it did operate in Krupa and it did operate in Kljuc, I believe, as well,
6 the 30th Division covered a number of municipalities. So this meeting
7 appears to be a joint civil/military meeting with the senior military
8 figure of that area, which was Colonel Stanislav Galic, who was the
9 commander of the 30th Division; a number of other military officers,
10 including Branko Basara who was one of his subordinate brigade
11 commanders; and the municipal heads of the municipalities that the
12 30th Division covered. And it comes two days after the
13 16th Assembly Session.
14 Q. And if we could just go --
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Brown, when you testify that part of that
16 brigade, i.e., the 6th Partisan Brigade had been involved in the actions
17 in the preceding period, I take it that you came to that conclusion
18 having read documents to that effect?
19 THE WITNESS: That is correct, sir.
20 JUDGE KWON: Not as a factual witness?
21 THE WITNESS: I believe there's a reference in my report to a --
22 I think there might even be two references, but there's a report -- a war
23 bulletin of the 6th Brigade and I believe there might -- there's a
24 partial diary of that brigade, highlighting that they -- some of the
25 places they'd been involved in and Krupa is one of them.
1 JUDGE KWON: So what you're saying is such-and-such document
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.
6 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours. And maybe I'll bring
7 that document up in a little while.
8 Q. If we could just quickly go to page 3 of the English and B/C/S.
9 We appear -- we see there a briefing of the meeting in Banja Luka, as
10 it's described, and the six strategic goals were presented. Can you just
11 tell us what to you that signifies?
12 A. Well, it would seem to me that they're passing down the goals
13 down the chain down at the municipal level. There's a comment that may
14 have some interest where it says:
15 "It was assessed -- it was assessed that this army can occupy a
16 large territory but this is not necessary because it would be impossible
17 to defend in the following period ..."
18 There were some comments, I believe, at the 16th Assembly Session
19 when some of the delegates were saying we should be taking this territory
20 and that territory and there were some discussions that, in essence, they
21 shouldn't bite off more than they can chew; in essence, they shouldn't
22 take more than they can hold. So whether this is a reflection of the
23 comments -- some of the comments that were made at the 16th Assembly
24 Session, it is possible. But it would seem to me that what they're doing
25 at this joint military/civilian meeting two days after the Banja Luka
1 Assembly Session that those strategic goals are being disseminated again
2 and they're being reinforced.
3 Q. Thank you. I'm now going to --
4 A. I don't know if I should also point out on page 4, there's a
5 bullet that says:
6 "Implement the decision from the meeting in Banja Luka but submit
7 them to the commands of units and municipalities ..."
8 I don't know if that's a typo but, again, whether this would seem
9 to indicate that the meeting in Banja Luka was not some irrelevant
10 discussion and that the discussions in relation to the goals, the setting
11 up of the army, the integrating of the TO, that those decisions should be
12 implemented down the chain at the municipal level. It also says:
13 "All forces of the SR BiH of Bosnia-Herzegovina should work
14 towards the same goals ... war profiteering should be prevented."
15 And also there should be meetings held every 15 days. So this
16 group presumably want to make sure that they are informed about what's
17 going on. The first part of the meeting is a briefing from each
18 municipality, maybe going back to Your Honour's point about the
19 6th Brigade, I think in relation to the point in Kljuc on page 2, there
20 is a reference that part of the 6th Brigade is already -- has already
21 been involved -- it says:
22 "At the time of the take-over of power, units from the 9th Corps
23 and the 5th Corps (a battalion of the 6th Brigade) were securing
24 Kljuc ..."
25 So I don't know if that helps your question earlier, Your Honour.
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Brown. If I could just direct you to footnote 132
2 of your report, is that the document you were referring to? This is on
3 page 40 of your report. And maybe we could bring that up. I believe
4 it's 00891.
5 A. Yes, Mr. Nicholls, I think that was the reference I was reaching
7 [Prosecution counsel confer]
8 MR. NICHOLLS: If I could have 65 ter 00891, please. And perhaps
9 go to the next page of the English.
10 Q. All right. If we look down there, several paragraphs down:
11 "Under the command of Colonel Branko Basara, the
12 6th Krajina Light Infantry Brigade took part in the following
13 campaigns ..."
14 Amongst others, we see there the liberation of Bosanska Krupa and
15 then we talk about later events. Just to be clear, is that the reference
16 you were talking about?
17 A. Yes, it is, Mr. Nicholls.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I tender that then, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P3918, Your Honours.
22 MR. NICHOLLS:
23 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, continuing on about these early developments but
24 switching gears a little bit, I want to talk to you now about
25 mobilisation in this area. This would be your report, pages 37 to 39,
1 paras 177 to 182 for the record and the mobilisation which takes place.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: And could I please have 65 ter 01536. While it's
3 coming up, I'll say this is from the 20th of May, 1992, Serbian Republic
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, "Decision on general public mobilisation of forces,"
5 signed by President Karadzic.
6 Q. Could you just tell us, please, what you find significant about
7 this particular document.
8 A. I really just highlighted the -- that very quickly after the
9 Assembly session, the Presidency was issuing an instruction down through
10 the Main Staff, down to the corps to mobilise. It had been an issue that
11 a number of delegates at the Assembly session indicated that there should
12 be mobilisation. And very quickly on the establishment -- or at least
13 the formal establishment of the army, that there is a mobilisation
14 instruction coming down from the Presidency.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender that, Your Honour, please.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P3919.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: If I Could have 65 ter 20344 on the screen. This
19 is a 1KK command document from the next day, the 21st of May.
20 Q. You cited this various times in your report. And could you just
21 tell us why you selected this document for your report, showing the
22 mobilisation order of the 1KK on this date?
23 A. There's a number of issues apart from the content. In terms of
24 timing, this is the day after the Presidency decision so it shows that
25 the 1st Krajina Corps is following the orders and instructions of the
1 Presidency and Main Staff. It was also a couple of days after the formal
2 withdrawal of the JNA. I think all JNA units were meant to have left by
3 the 19th, but in reality there was a transformation rather than a
4 withdrawal. So it showed to me in relation to the passage of information
5 that General Talic is responding very quickly to instructions from, in
6 essence, his new leadership, the Presidency and also the Main Staff. In
7 terms of the content, it makes reference to the Presidency decision in
8 the first line. Paragraph 1, Talic instructs his subordinates to
9 establish direct contact with municipal and military and territorial
10 organs on the ground. Presumably along the lines of the document we had
11 seen on the 14th of May with Stanislav Galic having briefings and
12 meetings with his chief. Paragraph 6 he states:
13 "Explain to conscripts as they arrive the goals of our struggle
14 and brief them on their duties and rights."
15 It would seem to have echos of the goals that were discussed at
16 the Assembly session in which General Talic, himself, was present.
17 Paragraph 8 notes in part 4, they're to establish the closest possible
18 co-operation with the people and legal authorities within their zones of
20 And paragraph 9 notes the issue that there are not to be the
21 presence of paramilitary formations or other special organisations in the
22 zones or his zone and the zones of responsibility of the subordinate
23 units, but they are to be integrated into the units as volunteers. And
24 if they refuse that, they are then to be broken up and destroyed.
25 So it would seem to indicate that General Talic was aware that
1 there were paramilitary groups operating potentially in his zone, but
2 that in order to control them they were to absorb them into the army.
3 And only if they refused that would they then be broken up.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: I would tender that document, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P3920, Your Honours.
8 MR. NICHOLLS:
9 Q. And just very quickly, Mr. Brown, to be clear for the record, you
10 started off your answer by saying: "I think all JNA units were meant to
11 have left by the 19th after the formal withdrawal of the JNA ..."
12 Withdrawal from where?
13 A. Because of the new FRY, it was supposed that the JNA were meant
14 to withdraw from Bosnia to go back to Serbia. But in reality, as we can
15 see, certainly the 1 Krajina Corps, the 5th Corps was present, the same
16 units were present after that withdrawal. General Talic remained in
17 command, his staff remained in command, many of the units were the same,
18 they maintained most of the equipment. So in terms of withdrawal, there
19 may have been a withdrawal of Serbian officers, Montenegrin officers.
20 But to all intents and purposes in the Krajina, the 5th Corps became the
21 1st Krajina Corps with all -- with much of its equipment.
22 Q. Okay. Thank you. Next document is from the same day, also from
23 the 1st Krajina Corps, 04196 --
24 JUDGE KWON: Just one clarification, Mr. Nicholls.
25 Did you say withdrawal of Serbian officers? Officers from
1 Republic of Serbia?
2 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour. 04196, please.
5 Q. While this is coming up, again it's 21st of May, 1KK command,
6 signed by the assistant commander for morale, Milutin Vukelic, and we see
7 that it's been -- it's handwritten that this should be sent to all units.
8 You cite this document in quite a few places in your report. The -- this
9 document by the morale officer of the same day is mobilisation. Can you
10 just briefly tell us why you found this significant to include in your
12 A. Your Honours, this was a document written by a staff officer in
13 General Talic's command, the assistant commander for morale. And in
14 essence he produced a series of documents, certainly through 1992, which
15 give a summary of the political circumstances and also, often, a summary
16 of what has happened in the zone of the corps during the period -- the
17 reporting period. And, quite often, the reports that the staff officer
18 writes he annotates at the end that they should be disseminated to units
19 of the corps and he uses often language like thrashed out with individual
20 soldiers. So in essence it is a summary document about the activities
21 above the corps in the political sphere, why they're fighting, and what's
22 going on within their zone. And it -- the date of this document I think
23 is important because it comes out on the day that General Talic writes
24 his mobilisation instruction, bearing in mind that he put in his
25 mobilisation instruction the goals and objectives - I forget the
1 phrase - the goals of our struggle should be explained to -- as a part of
2 the mobilisation process. It may well be that this document is part of
3 that explanation process. And the first part of the document explains
4 why, in essence, the 1st Krajina Corps and the Bosnian Serb army are
6 So, for example, in paragraph 2, the document says:
7 [As read] "Even though the oldest and constituent parts, the
8 Serbs are exposed to unscrupulous deprivation of their rights,
9 transformation into a national minority and genocide. In BH, the Serbian
10 people have organised themselves politically and are firmly resolved to
11 struggle alone to secure their historical right, national dignity and
12 interests. The constituent Serbian people, who live on around
13 65 per cent of the area and represent more than 35 per cent of the
14 population ... must struggle for complete separation from the Muslim and
15 Croat peoples and form their own state ...
16 "They do not want anything that is somebody else's, anything that
17 has not been theirs for centuries but they will not give an inch of their
18 own territory."
19 This issue of complete separation from the Muslim and Croat
20 peoples would seem to echo this goal of separation that was articulated
21 at the 16th Assembly Session. And bearing in mind, this was written by
22 an officer who up until days before and in his career had been a JNA
23 officer. This type of language may be of some significance. There are
24 other references in the document that I think are of note. Paragraph 3
1 "To prevent the militant and criminal Muslim and Croatian
2 anti-Serbian coalition and its paramilitaries from achieving their plans,
3 the Serbs of BH are prepared and able to resist them by all means,
4 including armed struggle."
5 Later on they talk about that the Main Staff has been appointed,
6 Ratko Mladic is the commander, and other elements of unified organisation
7 in command and control have been set up. There is a reference a bit
8 later down that page in part 2 where it says:
9 [As read] "The army of the Serbian Republic is the army of the
10 Serbian people of all patriots as well as of all citizens who are ready
11 to fight in its ranks for the just goals of the Serbian people: The
12 defence of the territorial integrity of republican peace in these areas."
13 And for me it's as much the content as the language that this is
14 very clearly pro-the position of the Serbs. I don't see too much
15 tolerance in the language there. The timing is important, I think. It
16 seems to be related to what Talic was talking about, about disseminating
17 why they are fighting. And the last paragraph in the report indicates
19 "Inform all members of the army of the contents of this report in
20 the most suitable way."
21 So I would believe that this report was disseminated down to the
22 units, brigades, and divisions, and subordinate formations of the
23 1st Krajina Corps.
24 Q. I want to move on now to take a look at a document that's already
25 in evidence, the combat-readiness report, as we call it. It's D00325.
1 And I would like to have pages 10 and 11 of the English, please,
2 beginning with page 10. And we don't need to read through all this, but
3 the point I want to make, Witness, is they -- in the combat-readiness
4 report from 1993, looking back on 1992, at the bottom of page 10 and the
5 top of page 11 there is a discussion of the two phases of the development
6 of what is by then the VRS, called the VRS. The first phase from the
7 1st of April to the 15th of June, 1992, and then the second phase from
8 June 15, 1992 to the writing of the report, which is sometime around
9 April 1993. This report features importantly in your report, and I want
10 to talk about these phases in somewhat reverse order, talking about the
11 second phase first.
12 But can you please just briefly explain from looking at this
13 report what the two phases are about and whether this report seems
14 accurate to you about the two phases.
15 A. Yes, I think it is generally accurate. There might be some
16 issues in relation to the dates because it seems to imply that the second
17 phase where there was this more formal large-scale operations were
18 conducted after the 15th. Well, there was some -- there was one
19 directive which came out after the 15th. But to all intents and purposes
20 this seems a reasonable summary of the military activity that I saw in
21 the Krajina and elsewhere, actually, that there was this period between
22 April and May and early June in which municipalities were taken - it says
23 here - under the patriotic influence of the Serbian Democratic Party,
24 using Territorial Defence units and others and that they provided, they
25 call, protection of the Serbian people in those municipalities but they
1 stopped at that, that they in essence secured that territory. And then
2 there was a second phase occurring from the middle of June in which under
3 the Main Staff and the Presidency there were, if you like, larger combat
4 operations and more formal structured combat operations that took place.
5 And I would seem to think that from the documentation that that is what
6 happened. In the Krajina Corps there were municipality take-overs in May
7 and early June, and then after that, there was a number of large military
8 operations that the corps was ordered to undertake.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: And, Your Honours, I think we're coming to the
11 break if I have it right, but I apologise; I neglected to tender 04196,
12 the mobilisation, the -- excuse me, the Vukelic document we just talked
14 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted as Exhibit P3921.
15 MR. ROBINSON: And, Mr. President, I also neglected something
16 which was to introduce our legal intern, Georgina Sneddon, who has been
17 with us.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Nicholls. We will take a break --
19 let me consult the court deputy.
20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
21 JUDGE KWON: We will take a break for 40 minutes and resume at
22 ten past 2.00.
23 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.31 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 2.12 p.m.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. If I could introduce
1 the last of our interns who's present today. This is Tadej Koncar who is
2 working with our case managers.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Welcome.
4 Yes, Mr. Nicholls, please continue.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
6 Q. Now, Witness, we just left off before the break talking about the
7 two phases of the development of the VRS, and specifically the
8 15th of June and that phase that started that phase being identified in
9 the combat-readiness report. Before we move on, I just want to refer
10 you, if I may, to on page 34, paragraph 1.69 of your report, you talk
11 about there the issuance of orders and directions from the Main Staff
12 down and reports coming up. And so can you just very quickly tell us
13 what was the situation with the up-and-down chain, orders going down,
14 decisions going down and reporting going up before the second phase,
15 before 15 June?
16 A. I think that there was -- well, there are documentary evidences
17 that indicate that the chain of command from the Main Staff down to the
18 Krajina Corps was operating almost instantaneously and very quickly. Not
19 long after, for example, the mobilisation instruction on the 20th and 21
20 the Main Staff sent an instruction to the various corps, I believe on the
21 26th possibly, asking for them to supply them with information about the
22 units of their corps and their -- the areas of operations that they were
23 working in. And General Talic in the 1st Krajina Corps responded the
24 following day giving that advice -- not advice but information.
25 General Talic was sending his daily combat reports straight away to the
1 Main Staff. There was no pause or break. The daily combat reports of
2 the 1st Krajina Corps were usually sent twice a day. I think in 1992
3 there were very few days I didn't see there was two combat reports and on
4 occasion there were also three. But I think the chain of command,
5 bearing in mind that the 5th Corps had already been working in that area
6 for a long time, it just seemed to be that they utilised exactly the same
7 reporting process on the establishment with the VRS.
8 Q. All right. Now I want to talk about the issuance of the first
9 directive of June 6th and look at three documents during that period.
10 The first is P01508, if I could have that up, please. That's a
11 Main Staff document from 1st of June, 1992, urgent, meeting of the corps
12 commanders, order. And could you just tell us about this document
13 quickly in early June.
14 A. I mean, it seems clear that the Main Staff are passing on an
15 instruction that pursuant to a Presidency decision, that there is to be a
16 meeting in Pale on the 3rd of June and that the corps commanders are to
17 attend, they are to brief, and to give a map indicating their corps' AOR.
18 This may follow on potentially from the documents I just mentioned on the
19 26th and the 27th of May, where the Main Staff is talking about what
20 units are in your corps and what AOR do you have and they discuss that
21 the corps commanders to attend, to be transported by helicopter if
22 necessary to this meeting. And it would seem to be that the Presidency
23 is interested in this, knowing what the corps are doing and what AOR
24 of -- what area of operations they're working on.
25 Q. Thank you. Now I want to move three days past the 3rd of June to
1 P01478, that's a Mladic notebook entry for June the 6th, a Saturday.
2 Page 93 of the English, 92 of the B/C/S, the original I should say. This
3 is quite a lengthy meeting and I don't want to go through the whole
4 thing, Mr. Brown, because it will take too long. But could you just tell
5 us the significance of this meeting, bearing in mind the meeting we've
6 talked about from the 3rd of June and the next document we'll see, the
7 directive, the first directive, that's issued the same day, the 6th of
9 A. Yes, I think the timing is of note because a directive comes out
10 on the same day. It seems to be a significantly detailed and large
11 consultation involving the senior leadership of the Bosnian Serbs.
12 Dr. Karadzic, at the beginning, notes again the SR BiH Assembly has
13 defined the strategic aims, on page 94; reiterates the strategic
14 objectives with comments and explanations --
15 Q. Sorry, let me just say that's on the next page of the English for
16 Your Honours.
17 Sorry to interrupt, Mr. Brown.
18 A. And also notes that we have to protect our territories
19 militarily. So, again, it would seem to lend credence that the strategic
20 goals were not just rarified statements of interest but actually had a
21 significant meaning. The rest of the report or a lot of the report -- in
22 fact, there are a couple of other comments from Mr. Karadzic and others.
23 For example, on page 97 of the translation, it's noted --
24 JUDGE KWON: Where do you find that words of Mr. Karadzic, defend
25 militarily? I didn't see that.
1 THE WITNESS: "We have to protect our territories militarily."
2 That -- I have that on page 95 of my translation about halfway down, a
3 little bit more than halfway down, actually.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: [Microphone not activated]
5 That would be the third page of the English, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE KWON: So the witness is looking at different document,
7 he's looking at the hard copy.
8 THE WITNESS: Oh, I see -- I think actually what I see -- at the
9 top of the page it says 94 and at the bottom of the page it says 95, but
10 I think it's actually page 94, sir.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: That's, Your Honours, just for the record, because
12 of the numbering that is in the actual physical diary but in e-court, we
13 are now on page --
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, now I found it.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
16 THE WITNESS: A little bit later on, page 96 or 97, I'm not sure,
17 but Mr. Karadzic says:
18 "The birth of a state and the creation of a border -- of borders
19 does not occur without war ..."
20 JUDGE KWON: If we do not see the passage, it's really difficult.
21 So make sure we have the correct page, Mr. Nicholls.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. We'll have to move a little bit
23 slower. So we're now on the correct page, which states "96" on the top.
24 In e-court that would be page 97.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please proceed.
1 THE WITNESS: And then:
2 "If we Serbs," I believe that could be a typo, "do not start
3 thinking," rather than "to not start thinking about a state and about our
4 territories, then we will lose."
5 So it seems to be in this introductory part of this meeting,
6 there is a re-emphasis on territory and a re-emphasis on strategic goals
7 and that these goals and territories are going to be achieved militarily.
8 The -- there is a comment on page 97 from Mr. Karadzic which seems
9 potentially slightly ambiguous but I would like --
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, could we go to page 98 of the English in
12 THE WITNESS: "We must not put pressure to have people
13 displaced." Exactly what Mr. Karadzic means by that is a little bit
14 ambiguous, I think, and bearing in mind the second part is talking about
15 Neretva. It seems to indicate that they want to establish their border
16 on the Neretva river.
17 The remaining part of the meeting or a large part of the meeting
18 seems to come on this page under the title where Mr. Ostojic talks and a
19 lot of the pages after this appear, to me at least, to be the leadership
20 discussing the detailed borders of a map. So where it goes borders and
21 lists a large number of locations on the following three or four pages,
22 it is possible that what is being discussed here is they have a large map
23 and that they are plotting on that map where they believe the border of
24 the state should be. I can't say that for sure because this doesn't
25 involve a map, itself, but just reading the section from Mr. Ostojic, it
1 is possible that that is what is being done.
2 It is of note that Mr. Ostojic, when he charts that line, gets to
3 Bratunac on page 100, notes that in Bratunac there are no Muslims in the
4 municipality --
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, that's page 101 of the e-court.
6 THE WITNESS: So it may well be that he's reading on the map,
7 plotting on the map, gets to Bratunac and puts the comment that there are
8 no Muslims in that area and he also talks about Srebrenica, half of it
9 being empty.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think this is completely in bad
12 taste, trying to guess what the other person is thinking. That's one
14 Another thing is I would kindly ask for the Serbian version as
15 well. I believe the translation may be incorrect.
16 JUDGE KWON: It's fair enough to have the Serbian version, B/C/S
18 MR. NICHOLLS: It should be page 101 of the Serbian as well, I
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 96 first, please.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, the other half of Dr. Karadzic's
22 objection, which I also believe is well-founded, is: Are you comfortable
23 that this is within the expertise of this witness?
24 JUDGE KWON: Can we go back to the page where we see Mr. Ostojic.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: That was page 101.
1 JUDGE KWON: Just under the name Mr. Ostojic it says, "on the
2 maps." I don't see the English translation yet.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: That's correct, Your Honour. That's on page 98
4 and then a reference to the situation with Muslims in Bratunac is still
5 Mr. Ostojic, it follows on from page 101.
6 JUDGE KWON: I think he bases conclusion on these writings, on
7 these contents, and he gives his interpretation, of course the assessment
8 of which is later for the Chamber.
9 MR. ROBINSON: But, Mr. President, is it for a military expert to
10 be interpreting a conversation of what people think and what they mean?
11 I think that's going --
12 JUDGE KWON: No, he's giving his military analysis.
13 Let me consult my colleagues.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I say another thing,
16 Your Excellencies, because this is another thing the Prosecution is doing
17 when they misquote. Unless I go about correcting each and every thing, I
18 will need 30 hours for my cross. Ostojic said that at that point in
19 time, now, there was no more Muslims. And the Muslim deputy said that
20 there were no Muslims and there will be none as long as there is combat.
21 How am I going to correct all this in my cross-examination? I simply
22 won't have any time. It says: "... while there is fighting."
23 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Nicholls, when one has regard to the objection
24 taken by Mr. Robinson, would you say that the comment of the witness was
25 his opinion or would you say that he was speculating?
1 MR. NICHOLLS: I think it's his fair analysis of what he sees in
2 this meeting. Keep in mind the chronology is this is after the corps
3 commanders' meeting where all the -- which we looked at, asking what
4 resources the different corps had and speaking about what was in their
5 territory. This is the same day the directive one is issued. It's a
6 meeting with the military command. And, as the witness said, there is a
7 notification under the name Ostojic on page 98 with underlined "on the
8 maps," and then different areas are talked about, the line of demarcation
9 to the west is the river Una. On page 99, the situation in other areas.
10 So I think it's a fair analysis by the witness, but I was rising because
11 I think Dr. Karadzic is exactly right, that this is a matter for cross,
12 and that he shouldn't be objecting to these questions piecemeal as we go
14 I'm about to move on to the next document, but I think that it's
15 entirely appropriate what the witness has testified to.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Well --
17 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Robinson, may we hear you by way of rejoinder.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, thank you. I was going to follow up on what
19 you said. If it's the opinion of the witness, then what expertise does
20 this witness have to give an opinion as to what the minister of
21 information meant based on some notes by General Mladic? I think -- what
22 is his expertise that has allowed him to do that? I can see if it's --
23 if it fits in with some military action that was taken the next day, he
24 could say: Well, they said on this day the 1st Krajina Corps should
25 attack this place and I know from reviewing the reports that they
1 attacked that place. But here he's really giving his opinion on what
2 someone meant in a meeting, and I think that goes beyond his expertise.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: If I may just briefly, if we -- if I'm allowed to
4 move on with my direct, we'll see that what is discussed in this meeting
5 amongst other things are maps and the six strategic objective, one of
6 which is the corridor, and on the same day, as Mr. Robinson thought would
7 be proper, the directive comes out which is to seize the corridor. And
8 after that, we will see the 1KK documents in which they are instructed by
9 the Main Staff, after this meeting, to seize the corridor.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, as you indicated, why don't you lead
12 evidence you referred to first and then we come back to this issue later.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
14 If we could have D00232, please. This is the directive for
15 further actions from the Main Staff of the VRS dated 6 June 1992.
16 Q. And briefly, Mr. Brown, can you tell us which, if any, parts of
17 this directive link to military options being ordered by the Main Staff
18 which have to do with the topics we've just been discussing.
19 A. Well, I believe they are because this directive comes out the
20 same day as that meeting. The military directive on the 6th of June, I
21 would argue, does three things. Firstly, or at least in summary, firstly
22 it tasks the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to maintain a blockade of Sarajevo,
23 and in the meeting before, I mean we didn't come to it, but it appears
24 that part of the discussion seems to be from some of the delegates
25 talking about the territory in and around Sarajevo that they think they
1 should control. And that is one part of this directive. It tasks the
2 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to maintain the blockade and to take control of
3 certain territories in Sarajevo.
4 Now, in relation to the 1st Krajina Corps and directly relating
5 to strategic goal number 2, which Dr. Karadzic had announced at the
6 16th Assembly Session was to secure a corridor through Semberija,
7 basically linking the 1st Krajina Corps and the East Bosna Corps.
8 Dr. Karadzic, at the 16th Assembly Session, said that that area was of
9 strategic importance to the Bosnian Serbs, not just because it linked the
10 territories in Bosnia together, i.e., the Krajina and the area around
11 East Bosna and elsewhere, but because it linked -- if they secured the
12 corridor, it linked the territories in Krajina, in Croatia -- the Serb
13 parts of the Krajina and also linked those two territories with Serbia.
14 So that is why this strategic objective number two was placed so highly
15 and so highly regarded, because it unified the Serb lands in Bosnia and
16 also unified the Serb lands in Croatia and also with Serbia. And this
17 directive on the 6th of June tasks the 1st Krajina Corps to conduct
18 operations in order to secure the territory in the corridor.
19 So when you go to the tasks of the units on -- in paragraph 5 --
20 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, sorry to interrupt you, that would
21 be on page 3 of the English, Your Honours.
22 THE WITNESS: It tasks the 1st Krajina Corps and actually the
23 East Bosna Corps to liberate territory which is in the corridor, and that
24 is exactly what General Talic did in the proceeding weeks after this. So
25 the directive tasks predominantly the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to do
1 activities in Sarajevo and the 1st Krajina Corps and the East Bosna Corps
2 to secure territory. But another area is that it continues to order the
3 other corps, and including the 1st Krajina Corps for that matter, to
4 maintain the lines that they've already achieved and to continue to
5 secure their own territory. So although for the 1st Krajina Corps the
6 focus is for the corridor, it also reminds General Talic that he has to
7 secure the other areas within this corps. The focus for me and the
8 importance for this document is that it links a strategic -- actually,
9 two if you consider the Sarajevo area as well, strategic goals that were
10 announced at the 16th Assembly Session, the goals that were discussed by
11 General Talic in some of his orders before, the meetings that occurred in
12 early June, this meeting on the same day, and the dispatch of this
13 Main Staff directive for operations, which were acted on.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I ask that the Bench require
16 of Mr. Nicholls to indicate where it says that the siege of Sarajevo
17 ought to be maintained? This is the problem: I will be short of time to
18 correct all the nuances which was part of -- which were part of this
19 testimony, and this all goes to the witness's bias. It says "deblock the
20 road between Sarajevo and Trnovo, regroup forces," and so on and so
21 forth. Where does it say that the siege of Sarajevo should be
22 maintained? It was not our position that it was a siege in the first
24 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm not sure where he said that, Your Honour, but
25 may I move on with my direct?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, I think it's a matter for Mr. Karadzic to take
2 up in his cross-examination, but I wanted to find the passage but where
3 it is --
4 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it may not be in this directive but it
5 may well be --
6 JUDGE KWON: No, no, in your testimony.
7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I suspect that's a reference to 83, 21
8 or 20 through 21, which distinguishes between -- Dr. Karadzic seems to be
9 conflating two different things and then inventing a word that wasn't
10 used to make this objection. But anyway, that's where one reference
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not making anything up. In two
13 places in the transcript the witness, I believe, said to maintain the
14 siege of Sarajevo, which implies something that does not -- is not found
15 in the document.
16 JUDGE KWON: No, probably it may be translated in that way in
17 B/C/S, but I don't find any "siege," word "siege," used by the witness
18 until you raised your objection.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: We have seized the corridor, seized, but, again, I
20 object to these interventions which could properly be part of his
21 cross-examination. He can put anything the witness said to him on cross.
22 JUDGE KWON: We would allow to raise the objection because it may
23 relate to the translation issue.
24 Let's continue.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Sorry, now we have the word
2 "siege." The witness said twice that the task of the Sarajevo-Romanija
3 Corps was to maintain the siege, the blockade, of Sarajevo.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We don't know which of the
5 two words is used in the document.
6 MR. NICHOLLS: May I continue or are we still --
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, no, the witness didn't use the word
9 Let's continue.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: All right.
11 Q. I'd like to now go very quickly -- you started talking about
12 this, Mr. Brown, P01732. 9 of June 1KK command combat report to the
13 Main Staff signed by General Talic. And what does this tell us about the
14 directive we just discussed?
15 A. There are a number of other areas of this document that may be
16 irrelevant, but in the last -- second-to-last paragraph, so paragraph 8
17 it notes that:
18 "In accordance with the directive received" --
19 Q. Sorry, I need to put the page numbers when we move around,
20 Mr. Brown.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: So that would be beginning on page 2 of the
22 English, Your Honours, page 3, I believe, of the B/C/S -- page 3, I
23 believe, of the original. And the document has not yet come up, again
24 D01732, if we could have page 2 of the English.
25 Okay, page 2 of the English, we have page 3 up there.
1 Q. And, Mr. Brown, you were talking about paragraph 8, I believe.
2 A. Yes, it says:
3 "In accordance with the directive received from the SR BiH army
4 Main Staff, a process of assessment, decision-making, and the issuing of
5 concrete assignments to subordinate units is underway. Our basic aim is
6 successfully to maintain the current positions, secure control over the
7 entire zone of responsibility, and further isolate danger spots --
8 potential danger spots, to disarm irregular military formations and
9 create conditions for active operations along the axis Derventa-Modrica
10 and Doboj-Podnovlje."
11 Those two axes were the tasks that were set the 1st Krajina Corps
12 in the Main Staff directive of the 6th of June.
13 JUDGE KWON: Where do you have it, Mr. Nicholls?
14 MR. NICHOLLS: That would be on page 3 of the English,
15 Your Honours, at the top of the page.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 THE WITNESS: And this is a regular combat report that's going to
18 the Main Staff. So it seems that the corps has received this directive,
19 it's working on it, and it's informing the Main Staff to that effect.
20 MR. NICHOLLS:
21 Q. Thank you. Now can you just tell us without going --
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just kindly ask that you
23 focus on page 82, line 18, and lines 22 and 23, as far as the blockade of
24 Sarajevo is concerned.
25 [In English] "To maintain blockade of Sarajevo."
1 MR. NICHOLLS:
2 Q. Now --
3 JUDGE KWON: It is -- it was his word. He was not reading off
4 the document, so you can take up this issue in your cross-examination.
5 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me, but may I just say this:
7 He's interpreting the text that is in front of him. He is presenting the
8 text and he's doing that erroneously. So how much time am I going to
9 need to correct each and every imprecision of this kind and each and
10 every mistake? I'm going to need five days or whatever.
11 JUDGE KWON: We can continue, Mr. Nicholls.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
13 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, without going to all of the documents on this
14 issue, can you tell us when did the 1KK Operation Corridor start? When
15 did it finish, at least the first stage? And was it successful? That's
16 a three-part, compound question, I know, but if you could -- I think it's
17 simpler if you go through those three steps.
18 A. The 1st Krajina Corps on the 10th of June pushed out its own
19 order based on the directive of the 6th of June. It was a more expansive
20 instruction, as you'd expect. There was a preliminary period between the
21 first -- sorry, I think that period, the 10th of June, and around the
22 24th of June, when the corps launched Operation Corridor. There was some
23 preliminary actions before there to secure areas that they needed to
24 launch the operation itself. Within a very short space of time, I
25 believe, initially they secured a very limited road on the 27th of June
1 and a more substantive road in the first few days of July. I think it
2 was -- it was either the 4th or 6th but I would have to check my
4 So in essence by the early part of July they had secured a
5 corridor link to the East Bosna Corps and they spent the following few
6 months expanding that corridor link up to the Sava River, which they
7 achieved by, I believe, finally taking Bosanski Brod in October. It may
8 be about the 24th of October, it may be later in the month, but around
9 that period. So they had achieved their objective quite quickly,
10 although it was quite a narrow corridor. And then they spent the
11 preceding -- sorry, the following months or weeks and months expanding
12 that corridor and it was finally secured by October.
13 Q. Thank you. I'd like to now move on to another directive, that's
14 directive number 4. That's cited footnote 80 to paragraph 1.54 of your
15 report on page 29 and discussed in your July 2009 statement, pages 7 to
16 9. And just the first point I want to come to is if we could have
17 P01481, page 141 of the English.
18 While we're waiting for page 141 to come up, that's to say this
19 is an 8 November 1992 meeting with the corps commanders noted in
20 General Mladic's notebook. And it starts off with submission of reports
21 by the corps commanders. It should also be --
22 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you upload the typewritten B/C/S part.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: Yeah, that should be page 141. Thank you.
24 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
25 JUDGE KWON: I was advised that there are some errors, but I --
1 notwithstanding, I told him to upload the typewritten part.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: Oh, I'm sorry about that, Your Honours. If there
3 is an error it should be page 141 of the typed B/C/S is my understanding.
4 Q. But what I would like to direct you to, Mr. Brown, regarding this
5 November 8th meeting --
6 JUDGE KWON: Just -- could you wait?
7 MR. NICHOLLS: Oh, yes.
8 I have a hard copy, Your Honours, we could put on the ELMO if
9 that -- if that assists.
10 JUDGE KWON: I think it's coming now.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Correct.
12 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, if we may what I'd like to do is go to page 146
13 and then 147 of the English where Mr. Krajisnik speaks, which should be
14 the same in the Serbian language. And just to ask you, we're now
15 8th of November, 11 days before directive four is issued. Could you tell
16 us what you -- what you observed in this -- at this meeting, where
17 Mladic, Karadzic, Krajisnik are present with some of the corps
19 A. This meeting seems to be similar to one that was expected in the
20 1st of June document we saw earlier on, where prior to the directive, the
21 corps commanders are asked to a meeting to give their briefings on what's
22 happening in their corps. In the first part of this meeting seem - at
23 least from the notes - appear to be each individual corps commander
24 giving a small speech about what's happening in their zone. And then
25 after that there seems to be assignments -- the discussion about what
1 should happen next. Mr. Karadzic mentions that the army has contributed
2 enormously to the results so far, but then Mr. Krajisnik notes that there
3 are some achievements that haven't yet been achieved.
4 Q. [Microphone not activated]
5 JUDGE KWON: Mike.
6 MR. NICHOLLS:
7 Q. Let me stop you, sorry, and just for everybody to go to page 145
8 of the English so that we can see that reference to Mr. Karadzic
9 speaking, which you just talked about. I believe it's -- that's the page
10 you're referring to and then we'll go to the next page.
11 A. That's right, Mr. Nicholls.
12 Q. Thank you. Then if we could continue to page 146.
13 A. On 146, Mr. Karadzic ends his section by saying:
14 "Maybe it would be good if we solve the issue of the Drina."
15 And then Mr. Krajisnik talks about the Drina, the Neretva. And
16 on page 147 says:
17 "We haven't achieved the Neretva, the sea, and the Podrinje
18 area," those being strategic objectives announced at the Assembly session
19 in May. "But we have achieved the corridor," objective number two; "and
20 separation with the Muslims."
21 He then ends this section by saying:
22 "The most press be thing is to mop-up Orasje and then to solve
23 the problem of the Podrinje area and the Neretva river valley as soon as
25 "The Muslims must not stay with us and they should not be given
1 any kind of autonomy.
2 "The most important objective is the task assigned to
3 Zivanovic - the mopping-up of the Drina.
4 "The most important task is separation from the Muslims."
5 Zivanovic being the Drina Corps commander. And it would seem
6 that this is a preliminary meeting about where they had achieved their
7 objectives to that date, but clearly that they felt that the Drina was an
8 area that they needed to give tasks to. And that is what happened in
9 directive four and the Drina Corps was tasked to conduct operations in
10 the Podrinje area.
11 Q. Thank you. Now, I won't bring it up now, but P00976 as admitted
12 is directive four from 19 November 1992. And could I just ask, sir, do
13 you -- just as we go along, do you recall that that was the day that
14 directive four, the one you were just discussing, was issued?
15 A. Yes, it was.
16 Q. I'd like to look at another document now, please, that's 14815 is
17 the 65 ter number and it's a Drina Corps command document, I'll say while
18 it's coming up, also from the 19th of November. And it's entitled a
19 "warning order." And it states, talking about some areas mentioned in
20 directive four, in the first paragraph it talks about Cerska, et cetera.
21 Can you just tell us the significance of this. What is a warning order?
22 A. Your Honours, a warning order is, in essence, a preliminary order
23 given to military formations, notifying them of upcoming operations in
24 order for them to prepare logistically and in other ways for that
25 operation. It usually is followed by a more substantive order. It's in
1 essence a preliminary order for upcoming operations.
2 Q. And if we could look at page 2, please, of the English, which is
3 still page 1 of the Serbian. And under number -- paragraphs 2 and 3, if
4 you could just comment on what we see there, where they talk about the
5 Zvornik Brigade under "forces" and then the tasks.
6 A. It would --
7 JUDGE KWON: Just before going further.
8 Was it supposed to give evidence in relation to events regarding
9 Drina Corps and that area?
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, Your Honour, he gives evidence relating to
11 the directives, and this is directive four. Directive four is noted in
12 his report, although many of these documents were not available to him at
13 the time. In July 2009 a statement, a short -- a brief statement was
14 made --
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon. Thank you,
16 Excellency, but I've actually given up on objections all together and I'm
17 not sure that the translation is right. It should read "preparatory" or
18 something like that. I mean, really, I'm going to need a month to
19 cross-examine this witness.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Nicholls.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: It may say "preparatory order," if there's a
22 mistranslation, I don't know.
23 But the directives are something that he does discuss and the way
24 directives one re -- in some cases reflect the strategic objectives and
25 the discussions of the leadership. We saw that with directive one.
1 Directive four is similar and is cited in his report. And in July 2009
2 in the statement which was provided to the Defence, he went through these
3 documents and linked them up to the conclusions he'd made in his report
4 regarding directive one and the way that the Main Staff operated and the
5 orders were transmitted from the Presidency to -- from the president, the
6 Presidency, to the Main Staff and then down the chain.
7 JUDGE KWON: The expertise, as far as we understand it, is the
8 one he got through reading out all the Banja Luka document collection
9 seized from Banja Luka. And now based upon that, he's testifying about
10 the events relating to Drina Corps. I take it there's another expert
11 coming in relation to that matter. Am I correct in so understanding?
12 That's my first question.
13 And then whether -- well, I was reluctant to put this question,
14 but do Judges need expert's knowledge in translating directives or other
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, perhaps not, Your Honour. But one --
17 what -- the first part of your question is: Yes. The primary sources
18 Mr. Brown used in his report were the Drina Corps documents, but he also
19 read Main Staff documents and --
20 JUDGE KWON: Not Drina --
21 MR. NICHOLLS: The Zvornik Brigade -- that's me thinking ahead.
22 1st Krajina Corps documents. But he talked about the structure in the
23 way orders were passed down in relation to the 1st Krajina Corps and what
24 directives were and how they were used. So these Drina Corps documents
25 from late 1992 and in early - which is the period of his report - and
1 then early into 1993 are outside the original report, it's true, but
2 they're on the same broader subject matter of the way the army
4 The second part, we do have an expert who will be -- who is much
5 more focused on the Drina Corps coming. However, in Mr. Brown's
6 statement, which was -- as I say, was disclosed to Defence, he went
7 through quite a few directive four-related documents and analysed them.
8 So I think it may be useful to the Trial Chamber to see, as he's shown
9 with directive one, that there were preparatory meetings before the
10 directives were issued, which is the case here as well with directive
11 four, and then that the series of orders and documents come out after the
12 directive is issued. And the input of the political leadership in the
13 formation of these directives.
14 JUDGE KWON: So the facts, such preparatory meeting and the order
15 was given, those facts will be established separately based upon the --
16 either on documents or factual witnesses? And he's linking those facts,
17 so to speak, in terms of his interpretation?
18 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour. And these -- these documents
19 which I'm showing are -- are, in fact, the order -- the follow-up orders
20 and some of the others which show that the -- following on from the
21 directive, actual military operations on the ground were conducted and my
22 impression - the witness can correct me if I'm wrong - in a parallel way
23 to what we saw with directive one, which tends to show the way that the
24 process worked in 1992.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, if I could just pass one
1 observation, that is: Why couldn't the Prosecution make that exact same
2 submission in its closing submission without this witness? All of this
3 evidence is simply the Prosecution's closing argument in disguise from
4 every -- this is about the sixth employee of the Office of the Prosecutor
5 who has come and linked things together and basically put forward the
6 Prosecution's closing argument. And you do have the discretion to
7 determine that it's not of much assistance to the Chamber, and I would
8 ask the Chamber to think about exercising that discretion.
9 JUDGE KWON: But one thing I can make sure at this moment,
10 Mr. Robinson, is that we as Judges, professional Judges, are capable of
11 assessing the witness -- the weight of the witness's evidence and -- so
12 you can rest assured that this -- that the Judges are able to distinguish
13 the submission and evidence.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I realise that. But given the Chamber's
15 concern with time, as constantly evidenced by the restrictions on
16 Dr. Karadzic's cross-examination, might it not be wise, if it's the type
17 of evidence that's not really of assistance to the Chamber, simply not to
18 hear it?
19 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, may I briefly --
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: The witness is not here to give our closing
22 argument. Our closing argument will be based on the evidence. The
23 witness here is discussing military documents which he's analysed and --
24 and the -- and hopefully assisting the Chamber in what these documents
25 mean in terms of what types of documents they are, the pace at which
1 these operations take place and the documents are issued. And, yes, we
2 will refer to these documents in our closing argument very likely. But I
3 do object to the characterisation. The witness here is going through the
4 documents, explaining the way directives worked.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I say a word? Mr. Robinson put
6 it very mildly. I'm going to say it differently. This is an ambitious
7 attempt, a third attempt --
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, no.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- for the Prosecution to put into
10 evidence their indictment as an exhibit --
11 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continued]... Mr. Karadzic,
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, let's continue. But the Chamber would
15 like you to concentrate on events that took place in the region of --
16 Autonomous Region of Krajina.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours.
18 All right, well in that case, Your Honours, I will, if I may,
19 just -- I will skip through some of the documents I was going to go
20 through that relate to directive four at this time, but try to ask the
21 question -- the witness one more question about the directive four
22 documentation -- [Microphone not activated]
23 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: [Microphone not activated]
25 Can you hear me -- I don't know if -- now it's working.
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: All right, could I have D00325, please. That is
3 the combat-readiness report from April 1993 looking back at 1992. And
4 just page 160 of the document in English. I'm sorry, I don't have the
5 reference to that page in the B/C/S, but it's right near the very end,
6 probably the third page from the end.
7 Q. Now, this is in a section headed "Basic characteristics of the
8 operational tactical utilisation of the Army of Republika Srpska." And I
9 would like you to look at the top of page 160. If we could scroll up --
10 the other way. If you read that paragraph starting with:
11 [As read] "Thus the primary focus of our time ..."
12 It speaks about the corridor. It speaks about gaining control of
13 other territory and then states:
14 "In the last month and a half, our operations have concentrated
15 on the liberation of Podrinje, as thereby the strategic objective of our
16 war would be realised, one that could be defined as 'establishing contact
17 with Serbia on the river Drina, or the Drina ceasing to be a frontier.'"
18 So this talks about the corridor operation which is in your
19 report and directive four which we began to discuss. Can you just
20 explain what significance you see, if any, in this mention in the
21 combat-readiness report looking back at 1992 and looking at where they
22 are at the present.
23 A. Well, it would seem to indicate that those areas, the corridor
24 and the Podrinje, were important. I think it -- those areas were
25 reflected in operational directive four, which was a document that was
1 sent to the 1st Krajina Corps and it was in the Krajina Corps archive. I
2 think from the other documents I reviewed, subsequent to the writing of
3 this report, there seems to be a clear chain that flows from the senior
4 leadership down through the directives for operations in those areas,
5 including the corridor, including the Podrinje area, and that subordinate
6 formations in the Drina Corps carried out operations as they were
7 requested. Whether they had the success, that's for somebody else to
8 deal with. But the Drina Corps documents and operational directive four
9 seemed to me to reflect very much the directive one and, actually,
10 directive three, which was also pushed out in August dealing with
11 slightly different issues. And for me they relate back to the strategic
12 goals that were articulated in May and, in fact, on the preceding page to
13 this, there is a reference to that, that the strategic goals were defined
14 and formed the basis on which the Main Staff and subordinate units,
15 guide-lines they called them, conducted operations. And I think
16 strategic directive number four was very similar to directive number one.
17 It was a slightly more polished document, I think, slightly more
18 detailed. But the Drina Corps took the tasks, as all the other corps,
19 and certainly the 1st Krajina Corps did, took the tasks that were sent to
20 them in that directive and there were other documents from the Drina
21 Corps, and subordinate formations of the Drina Corps that would seem to
22 indicate that they did what was asked of them.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: And could we please go back one page, 159, for
24 Your Honours to see and for my colleagues to see the section that --
25 Q. Could you point out the section you were talking about,
1 Mr. Brown, please.
2 A. Yes, it's in that second paragraph.
3 [As read] "The strategic objectives of our war which were
4 promptly defined and set before the Main Staff of the Army of the RS, the
5 commands and units, served as a general guide-line upon which we planned
6 the actual operations and concerted battles. This means that objectives
7 were set before us rather than specific tasks spelled out, although the
8 President of the Republic, as the supreme commander of the armed
9 forces ... did orally assign a number of tasks which were of general and
10 vital significance to our struggle in protecting the Serbian people in
11 its territories."
12 Now, this would seem to be what I see from the directives, the
13 directive that Talic himself pushed out, based on the first directive,
14 was very detailed. He provided the detail. The strategic objectives
15 were given to him at a higher level, and that there were also these oral
16 assignments. Maybe this is a reflection on the type of meeting that we
17 saw in the 3rd of June and the -- some of the meetings notated in
18 Mladic's diary and the reference to the meeting in November that we just
20 Q. All right. In the time we have left we're now going to switch
21 gears. We've gone through the directives and, in a way, phase two as
22 it's described in the combat-readiness report. I would like to talk now
23 more about military operations that began in the first phase, the early
24 phase, and this is the military operations part of your report starting
25 at page 60 in general where you identify common features of military
1 operations conducted in the Bosanska Krajina 1KK zone. Those include
2 weapons surrender dead-lines, co-operation of the military and the police
3 or the MUP, retaliatory killings or killings of prisoners, the movement
4 of the population, et cetera. So that's where we're going now. The area
5 which you talk about on your executive summary at page 7. And the first
6 document I'd like to show is 09466, this is the 65 ter number. And that
7 is the RS at the 15 April 1992 mobilisation order. If we can bring that
8 up. It's a one-page document so English and the Serbian is the same.
9 And I'm going to go through just a quick series of these
10 documents which concern the mobilisation. This is the first one. It's
11 referenced at footnote 116 of your report. Can you just quickly tell us
12 about this document, why you included it.
13 A. I think it was important because when I was looking at some of
14 the documents from the 5th Corps, 1st Krajina Corps, in April and May and
15 the engagement of some of the forces there, it seemed to me that in --
16 that there was a chain of documentation that was linked to some of the
17 municipalities, whereby operations were undertaken to -- to get people to
18 surrender illegally -- they called them illegally held weapons and those
19 then manifested themselves in planning at municipal level, involving the
20 police and the military, and subsequently engaged -- they were engaged in
21 combat operations in those municipalities. And there's -- seemed to be a
22 documentary chain in the ARK, at least for some of those municipalities,
23 and this is one of the documents that was referenced at the beginning of
24 that chain. And it was a mobilisation instruction from the Presidency
25 declaring an imminent threat of war and the mobilisation of the TO -- in
1 essence, the Serb TO.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: I would tender that document, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P3922, Your Honours.
6 MR. NICHOLLS:
7 Q. Following on could we please have P02412.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] While we're waiting, I have to keep
9 intervening. This is not an instruction. This is a decision. It should
10 be clarified and there are many such imprecisions.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it says "decision," we see.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Following the transcript, it's
13 "instruction," line 9.
14 JUDGE KWON: I think -- let's continue.
15 MR. NICHOLLS:
16 Q. Let me just ask, Mr. Brown, it does say "decision," doesn't it --
17 A. Yes, it's a decision.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: P02412, please, this is already an exhibit. It's
20 dated the 16th of April, another decision signed by
21 Minister of Defence Bogdan Subotic.
22 Q. This features several places in your report. Can you tell us
23 about this document and it's relationship to the one we just saw and the
24 one that we're going to see, the ones which followed.
25 A. Well, this would clearly be linked to the previous decision and
1 at the ARK, autonomous region level they've taken that decision and are
2 passing that down their own chain. It talks about the Presidency
3 decision of the 15th of April and they say that the Territorial Defence
4 of the Serbian Republic shall be formed as the armed force and that other
5 decisions relating to components of the armed force shall be made in
6 keeping with the solution on the political organisation of Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina and the state -- statute, maybe status, of the JNA. So this
8 was in this period when it wasn't exactly clear what was going to happen
9 to the JNA. If I take you to the second page, paragraph 3 states:
10 "The declaration of an imminent threat of war implies taking all
11 the necessary measures stemming from the situation, and in keeping with
12 the specific situation in the given territory."
13 And the last sentence reads:
14 "In preparation for the instruction as well as the engagement of
15 TO units, achieve co-operation with JNA units, and where possible, put
16 them under a single command."
17 So it seems to be taking the presidential decision of an imminent
18 threat of war and passing that down to the -- down the chain, in essence,
19 establishing the Serb TO and allowing them to take necessary measures in
20 relation to, presumably, their municipalities or areas that they're
22 Q. Thank you. Now, P02818, this is the 4th of May, 1992,
23 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Autonomous Region of
24 Bosnian Krajina, Regional Secretariat for National Defence, signed by
25 Lieutenant-Colonel Milorad Sajic. And can you tell us about this
1 document, how it relates to the one we just saw and later documents we'll
2 see about disarmament dead-lines.
3 A. Well, this one seems to be the next one in the chain. The
4 measures that they're taking pursuant to a decision 192 of the 16th of
5 April, it's -- potentially be the one previous. They're issuing the -- a
6 dead-line, talking about mobilisation. But in paragraph 5 they're
7 talking about a dead-line, which states that:
8 "All paramilitary formations and individuals who illegally
9 possess weapons and ammunition are hereby urged to present themselves no
10 later than 1500 hours on the 11th of May, 1992, to the municipal
11 Territorial Defence staffs or the nearest public security stations.
12 After the expiry of this dead-line, the competent authorities will
13 conduct searches for weapons and ammunition applying the strictest
15 So it may well be that the previous decision they believe
16 authorises them to take this kind of measure and they're issuing a
17 dead-line in the municipalities for a surrender of they call illegally
18 held weapons and that strict measures will be taken to those who -- well,
19 it says that competent authorities will conduct searches after the
20 expiration of the dead-line.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 A. It also, I think at the end of the document, notes the presence
23 of the Councils for National Defence shall be held responsible for
24 implementing the decision. So it's clear there's an expectation that
25 down at the municipal level these types of operations are to be
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, if it is convenient --
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes.
4 JUDGE KWON: -- the Chamber will rise for today.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Can I make one point, Your Honours. I failed to
6 ask to admit, when we started talking about directive four documents and
7 whether to go through them, 14815, to tender that, if I may, that was the
8 preparatory or warning order which Mr. Brown discussed.
9 JUDGE KWON: What was the number again?
10 MR. NICHOLLS: 14815 is the 65 ter number.
11 JUDGE KWON: I take it there's no opposition?
12 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct.
13 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P3923, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE KWON: You will be well aware, Mr. Brown, that you are not
17 supposed to discuss with the parties or anybody else about your
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE KWON: We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.29 p.m.,
22 to be reconvened on Friday, the 18th day of
23 November, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.