1 Friday, 18 November 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Before we begin today, I take it that it has been agreed upon not
8 to sit on Monday next week, but instead to sit on Monday next -- the
9 28th of November. But I'm not sure it has been decided whether to sit in
10 the morning or in the afternoon on the 28th. I have to ask Mr. Harvey
11 whether it is okay with him.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellency. I'm
13 grateful because this is an important religious holiday, a family holiday
14 as well. As regards the Monday you mentioned, I will simply abide by
15 your decision concerning whether we'll be sitting in the morning or in
16 the afternoon.
17 MR. HARVEY: [Microphone not activated]
18 Yes, I'm on that one. Yes, Mr. President, we're sitting at
19 2.00 p.m. in the Haradinaj case on the 28th. It will certainly be
20 convenient for me personally to sit in the morning, but if it's more
21 convenient to the other parties, I can certainly arrange for my team to
22 be fully represented if you would prefer to sit in the afternoon in this
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 In consultation -- after having consultation with the other
1 Chambers, we'll come back to you --
2 MR. HARVEY: Thank you.
3 JUDGE KWON: -- as soon as possible.
4 Yes, Mr. Nicholls, please continue.
5 Good morning, Mr. Brown.
6 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.
7 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. Good morning, Your Honours.
8 WITNESS: EWAN BROWN [Resumed]
9 Examination by Mr. Nicholls: [Continued]
10 Q. All right. Yesterday we finished off looking at the decision
11 signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Sajic, 4th of May, ordering the general
12 public mobilisation and setting a dead-line for weapons disarmament on
13 11 May. I want to continue on this topic, Mr. Brown, disarmament
14 operations, disarmament dead-lines, and the military events which
15 followed. This is primarily in pages 64 through 68 of your report,
16 paragraphs 2.10 to 2.21, where you go into these topics.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I please have 65 ter 17918 up, and while
18 it's coming up, I'll say this is the Official Gazette of the
19 Autonomous Region of Krajina or Official Gazette of the ARK as we
20 sometimes refer to it. And I would like to start off with page 1 just so
21 we can see the document we're looking at. I want it in both English and
22 the Serbian.
23 Q. And what I'm going to do, Mr. Brown, is try to go through
24 actually three different dates and decisions on weapons deadlines and
25 then I'll ask you some questions about them, but stop me if you need to.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. So here we are on page 1, we see that this is the
4 Official Gazette and, in fact, that the Sajic decision is contained on
5 the first page. It's replicated there.
6 MR. NICHOLLS: If we could skip ahead two pages now to page 3 in
7 the English which is page 2 in the B/C/S or Serbian.
8 Q. There we see the decision on the formation of the Crisis Staff of
9 the ARK dated 5th of May. Simply, the person listed at number 2,
10 Lieutenant-Colonel Milorad Sajic, vice-president, is that the same Sajic
11 who signed the decision we saw?
12 A. Yes, I believe it is.
13 Q. And just as you said, we see that number 8, General Talic, is a
14 member of this staff?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. If we go to page 5 in the English, page 3 of the Serbian. And we
17 should have here the conclusions of the Crisis Staff from the 8th of May.
18 And if we look at point 3:
19 "Presidents of the National Defence councils are to report to the
20 War Staff of the ARK about actions they ... have taken in order to disarm
21 paramilitary units ..." et cetera.
22 And that:
23 "The strictest of sanctions will be imposed on those who refuse
24 to return weapons."
25 And we also see that at one-hour intervals, Banja Luka radio is
1 to broadcast announcements to citizens to return weapons so that peace
2 can be maintained. I'm slightly paraphrasing there.
3 Moving on now to page 15 -- sorry, page 15, yes, of the English,
4 page 7 of the Serbian. This is a decision you talk about in your report,
5 the extension of the weapons dead-line. We see at the 11th of May, the
6 original date of the dead-line, the ARK Crisis Staff extended the
7 dead-line to the 14th of May, 1992, and explains their reasoning, which I
8 won't read out, in the second paragraph. And then the third paragraph
9 again states that when the dead-line expires, weapons will be confiscated
10 by employees of the security services centre of the ARK and severe
11 sanctions will be imposed on those who ignore the call of the
12 Crisis Staff.
13 And let me stop there and ask you: Do you recall discussing in
14 your report the way the military was apprised of or concerned with these
15 weapons deadlines, if you could explain that briefly?
16 A. Well, there are a number of -- at least one that I remember
17 offhand but references in the 1st Krajina Corps documents, indicating
18 that they -- in a daily combat report that they made reference to these
19 dead-lines. So presumably because General Talic or a member of his staff
20 were attending the Crisis Staff meetings, they most likely became aware
21 of those dead-lines and made reference to them in their own reports.
22 Q. Thank you. And we'll get to that one in a minute. If I could
23 now go to page 21 of the English, page 9 of the Serbian. This is
24 conclusions from the 18th of May meeting. We're now past the extended
25 dead-line of the 14th of May. And here we see the conclusion number 3
2 "Illegally obtained weapons will be taken away by members of the
3 military and civilian police."
4 And: "All those that are not part of the armed forces of Bosnia
5 and Herzegovina or its police must return their weapons," et cetera.
6 Did in fact -- and you speak about this in your report. Did the
7 weapons dead-lines and the confiscation of weapons, we see here now the
8 Crisis Staff has mentioned the military's involvement, did those
9 dead-lines and these conclusions play a role in military -- subsequent
10 military operations in the Krajina?
11 A. Yes, they did. I think initially the first few references seemed
12 to indicate that there was only going to be the police that were going to
13 be involved in the operations, but then after that from -- from this time
14 on, it makes reference to the police and the military will be taking part
15 in these operations. And, in fact, the military did take part. From the
16 documents I've seen of the Krajina Corps, they took part in a number of
17 operations to -- which they termed to disarm paramilitaries in Prijedor,
18 in Sanski Most, in Kotor Varos later on and Kljuc, certainly in the
19 1st Krajina Corps area, and others actually.
20 Q. And was disarmament ever discussed as a reason or justification
21 for a military operation?
22 A. Yes, some cases they justified that as the reason. There are a
23 number of reasons they give through the summer, but this is certainly one
24 of them. Mopping-up or cleansing the territory is another, taking
25 control of territory is another. But certainly around this time in some
1 of the municipalities, they couched the operations they were taking part
2 in as operations to disarm paramilitaries or those in the possession of
3 illegally held weapons.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, I would tender these pages. I will
6 come back to another conclusion from the ARK Crisis Staff later, so I --
7 I'm not sure whether it's best to give this one number or to separate it.
8 It's -- whichever is the most convenient.
9 JUDGE KWON: Given that this is just of 23 pages, why don't we
10 admit it in its entirety.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE KWON: I take it it has been translated in full?
13 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P3924, Your Honours.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: If I could now have, please, 65 ter 00478.
17 Q. And I may have jumped the gun a bit by asking some questions,
18 Mr. Brown. This relates to what we've just been talking about. It's the
19 12th of May, therefore it's still stamped as 5th Corps command, the same
20 day as the 16th Assembly Session, to the military district, signed by
21 General Talic. And can you just discuss -- this is included in your
22 report at page -- at footnote 267. And can you explain why this is
24 A. Well, in paragraph 3, at the end of that paragraph, it makes note
25 that the dead-line has been extended. Maybe this is what I was talking
1 about, that the Krajina -- sorry, the 5th Corps, 1st Krajina Corps were
2 aware of the decisions that were being implemented in the ARK area and
3 they're -- they obviously think it's of importance because they're
4 sending it up their own chain to their next headquarters.
5 There is another reference on the second page. It's not
6 necessarily to do specifically with the ARK dead-lines -- well, it is in
7 part, but it notes that the political and security situation is
8 deteriorating in the area of Bosanski Novi. The day before the 12th,
9 there had been operations in Bosanski Novi which, again, are linked to
10 the chain of documents about mobilisation and disarming that came from
11 Bogdan Subotic's decision on the 16th of April and the ARK decisions
12 earlier in May. So Bosanski Novi was one of the municipalities that I
13 saw where disarmament was quite early, and in fact Bosanski Novi was
14 referenced in passing by one of the delegates in the 16th Assembly
15 Session, which of course takes place on the 12th of May -- in fact, the
16 delegate from Krupa who talked about the fact that Muslims had left Krupa
17 had visited Novi the day before, on the 11th, and in the Assembly session
18 makes reference to the fact that there is operations going on there.
19 So disarmament was going on from around this time, even though in
20 some of the other municipalities, for example, in Prijedor, it was a bit
21 later in that month.
22 Q. Okay. And just for the record, were you referring to
23 Miroslav Vjestica?
24 A. Yes, I was, Mr. Nicholls.
25 Q. That's the speaker in the 16th Assembly Session.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender that document, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: P3925, Your Honours.
4 MR. NICHOLLS:
5 Q. All right. You spoke about Prijedor. I'd like to go there now.
6 MR. NICHOLLS: If I could have Exhibit D01542, please. These are
7 some documents between the Banja Luka security services centre and the
8 Prijedor public security centre which are bundled together.
9 Your Honours will see that the dates go backwards to an extent
10 from the top pages, from the 25th of May back towards the 14th of May.
11 And so perhaps it would be simplest to first just page through these
12 documents in e-court and see what they are.
13 Q. And then I'll ask you a question, Mr. Brown. And again, this is
14 an exhibit so I'll be quite quick.
15 The first is the 25th of May reply from the Prijedor chief,
16 Drljaca. And what does it say here - you reference this in your
17 report - about the involvement of the military in disarmament?
18 A. Well, this in terms of the time was after -- Hambarine, I think,
19 had been attacked first, but it's around that time in the middle of the
20 operations in Prijedor. And as I said earlier, the original disarmament
21 plan was to involve predominantly the CSB but later on it was amended
22 that the military were involved. And here it seems to be indicating at
23 the time of the operation -- that the operations are ongoing, that the
24 military are working with the police in implementing the plan or at least
25 in part and that they'd seized a number of weapons during these
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, I note that two documents seem to be
3 different. The B/C/S version is written by Zupljanin and the other --
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Then I think we've got the -- it must be the
5 second page of the B/C/S because there is -- you're correct, Your Honour,
6 I'm sorry. There is one document that looks very similar -- there is the
7 correct one. Thank you. This is the reply to Chief Zupljanin. If we
8 could go to the next page in each, please -- perhaps the prior page,
9 then, in the Serbian. Yes. And the next page in the English, please,
10 page 2.
11 Q. There we see the Zupljanin correspondence of the same day to all
12 public security stations, referencing his earlier order, asking for
13 information. If we continue now to the next page, the Banja Luka
14 security services document from 14 May. And that is correct, there is a
15 stamp for the 25th of May on the top but the document is dated 14 May.
16 So now this document is the date of the extended dead-line. It
18 "In keeping with the decision of the autonomous region of
19 Bosnian Krajina regarding the surrender of illegally owned weapons ..."
20 citing to the Crisis Staff conclusions orders the making of concrete
21 plans for the seizure of illegally owned weapons. And can you just tell
22 us why you included this document in your report. It's the same theme
23 about military activities in the Krajina.
24 A. Well, it seems to be a natural follow-on from the ARK decision,
25 to make concrete plans, and the -- Mr. Zupljanin, as the senior policeman
1 in the area, is disseminating that instruction down to his subordinates
2 to say: You are to do that. And it also makes reference that activity
3 can be implemented by authorised officials and the military police of the
4 Banja Luka corps. So this seems to indicate that there was more of an
5 engagement of the military from this period onwards.
6 Q. Thank you. And very quickly, if we can go to another document
7 that's already an exhibit, P03529. Same time-period, minutes of the
8 Council for National Defence of Prijedor Municipal Assembly, 15 May at
9 10.00 a.m. You cited this report -- this -- these minutes in your report
10 at footnotes 281 and 324.
11 And if we go to page 2, please, where we speak about mobilisation
12 in the municipality at item 2 and 3 at the top and, below number 4,
13 disarmament of paramilitary formations. Can you first just tell us who
14 the military personnel are that are present during these minutes and,
15 again, why -- why this document's significant.
16 A. The meeting is attended by Colonel Vladimir Arsic, Your Honours,
17 who was the commander of the 343rd Brigade, sometimes called the
18 43rd Brigade -- or later called the 43rd Brigade. He was also commander
19 of what was called Ops Group Prijedor which was, if you like, the
20 military command headquarters for all the military units in the Prijedor
21 area, wider Prijedor area. So he's concurrently the brigade commander
22 and concurrently the Operations Prijedor commander, so the senior
23 military figure in the area.
24 Pero Colic, Colonel Pero Colic was a brigade commander of the 5th
25 Kozara Brigade which was another big brigade based in Prijedor. Both
1 brigades had fought in Western Slavonia and both had returned in April
2 and a bit later as well, April/May time, from Western Slavonia. And
3 Pero Colic was the brigade commander of the 5th Kozara Brigade, the
4 second main brigade in Prijedor.
5 Slobodan Kuruzovic was the TO commander in Prijedor. I think he
6 remained in that position until early June when the TOs were integrated
7 into the VRS as has been expected to happen from the announcements in
8 16th Assembly Session. So he was the TO commander.
9 Radmilo Zeljaja was the 43rd deputy commander, so he is
10 Colonel Arsic's deputy.
11 And then obviously the remaining members of the meeting are the
12 senior civilian SDS municipal figures and Mr. Simo Drljaca who was the
13 chief of police. So it's a military/police/civilian meeting,
14 Crisis Staff meeting.
15 Q. And if we just see at the bottom of the page there, under
16 item 4 -- sorry, item 4.1 below, if we could go to the very bottom of the
17 page, the army command in Prijedor is actually tasked at this meeting
18 with participating in drafting the plan of disarmament?
19 A. Yes, so presumably the police and the military are involved in
20 implementing the plan that was discussed and issued from the ARK
22 Q. Thank you. I now want to move on --
23 A. Sorry, I'm just -- and obviously the plan was put into operation,
24 at least in part, as you can see from the prior document from the CSB of
25 the 25th, where they say: We implement it in part but because of ongoing
1 operations, it wasn't completed.
2 Q. Thank you. I now want to -- still moving on chronologically, as
3 you've just discussed, the putting in place of these plans and the events
4 that followed during this disarmament period and the combat operations in
5 May, June, and some of the common features you talk about, if I could go
6 to D01743, a 1KK document from 27 May 1992. You cite this several places
7 in your report, this report on the elimination of Green Berets in the
8 wider area of Kozarac. I'll just ask very simply: What do you see? Why
9 have you included this in your report and why did you believe it was an
10 important document to talk about?
11 A. I believe it's a good document, highlighting that the
12 operation -- there was a military operation in Kozarac, that it involved
13 the -- a number of key units from the 1st Krajina Corps. It talks about
14 the engagement of the 343rd Brigade or at least a part of it, that is
15 Colonel Arsic's unit, and a large battalion was involved. It talks about
16 the support of two 105-millimetre howitzer batteries. Those batteries
17 had been moved in to Prijedor in the early days of May on an instruction
18 from the corps. And also that there was the engagement of an M-84 tank
19 squadron. The M-84 tank was the most advanced tank that the Yugoslav
20 Army had at that time and a squadron is usually up to about 12 tanks.
21 It makes reference to what they call the Green Beret's strength
22 between 1.500 and 2.000 men, although my reading of this is that this was
23 not the figure of armed men that they were -- that they were up against.
24 There's other documents that would seem to indicate that what armed
25 elements there was less than this. But they say that there's -- without
1 any heavy weapons. And then it talks about the areas that they -- that
2 they -- the operation took place in and that there has been quite a large
3 number of people captured. But it also mentions that the 1KK did
4 themselves take some casualties and that did happen. There was an
5 incident at the early stage of the operation in which soldiers were
7 So it's clear that this incident was of importance for
8 General Talic, for him to report on it up to his chain of command. And
9 the date is also of some importance in that it's the 27th of May, so the
10 operation didn't last long. I think it started on the 25th, as it says
11 here, and it was finished by the 27th. So it wasn't a long --
12 particularly long operation for them. There had been a prior operation
13 at Hambarine, I believe on the 22nd to 24th or 22nd to 23rd, again in
14 which a couple of soldiers were killed. But it's clear that for
15 General Talic to write this instruction it's of some importance to him to
16 send up to the Main Staff.
17 Q. Thank you. Now, continuing in this period, P03656, please,
18 another 1KK command report from the 1st of June now, a few days later,
19 1992. This one again signed by the person we talked about yesterday,
20 Colonel Vukelic. And this goes back now - while it's coming up - to the
21 army's -- the VRS's knowledge and connection to the decisions of the ARK
22 Crisis Staff.
23 Can you please tell us about this document. And I'll note --
24 sorry, I should say that on your report at page 49, paragraph 1.13 for
25 everybody, you talk there about the 1KK's connection to the ARK
1 Crisis Staff and that Talic had members of the 1KK attend ARK
2 Crisis Staff meetings. Sorry to interrupt you there, but if you could
3 just tell us about this document.
4 A. Well, I think this is another -- well, it is another document
5 that summarises the activities of the corps in the preceding period and
6 it comes, if you like, two or three weeks after the Assembly session. I
7 believe Mr. Vukelic -- Colonel Vukelic had written another report in
8 between -- I think it went out on the 26th as well. But this one comes,
9 in essence, after a number of the attacks in the municipalities had
10 occurred, those being in Prijedor, operations in Sanski Most at this
11 time, and Kljuc also. And the report summarises from their perspective
12 what has happened in those areas.
13 So, for example, halfway down the first page, it summarises in
14 that paragraph the operations in Kljuc. It makes mention that there was
15 an attack on a JNA or a military column that was returning from Knin
16 which occurred and killed a number of soldiers. It makes reference to
17 about eight or ten Green Berets in the area, but that the energetic
18 action by the 30th Partisan Division resulted in the defeat and break-up
19 of those forces in the town of Kljuc itself and the villages of
20 Pudin Han, Velagic, and Donji Ramici, and that the corps units had
21 established full control of the area. It makes mention that weapons had
22 been seized and some 280 soldiers captured in Kljuc. Operations in Kljuc
23 were still ongoing in this time. I think they continued for another day
24 or two.
25 The next paragraph discusses the operations in or at least
1 summarises operations in Sanski Most. It talks about heavy fire from the
2 area of Kamicak and Vrhpolje against positions of the 6th Brigade. That
3 was the brigade, Colonel Basara's brigade that I mentioned yesterday, but
4 that in that area the brigade took control, captured 30 Muslim extremists
5 without any casualties.
6 The next paragraphs summarise what had happened in Prijedor in
7 the preceding days. It makes mention that there had been fighting there,
8 heavy fighting in Hambarine, Prijedor, and Kozarac, but that troops in
9 the area had, again, been involved. It makes mention that the troops had
10 arrested more than 2.000 Green Berets who were now in Omarska, 135 were
11 in Stara Gradiska prison, that was a military prison that had been used
12 in the war in Croatia, and that 5.000 were in Trnopolje. So they seemed
13 to portray anybody who was put into these detention centres as
14 Green Berets. It makes mention, again, of the 43rd Brigade, a seasoned
15 unit and that they were excelling, and that commendations or a
16 commendation from the corps commander was going to be disseminated to
17 them. So of note, he says:
18 "The 43rd Brigade are an example of how one should act when
19 defending the SRBH."
20 And it does make mention, as I said before, that the -- there
21 were some casualties in the operations in Prijedor from the VRS side. So
22 it's clear that a large number of people have been rounded up or captured
23 in that operation and that the corps is aware that they have been sent to
24 Omarska, Stara Gradiska, and Trnopolje.
25 A little bit later down in the report, it makes mention of some
1 of the other areas in the corps, but the second-to-last paragraph on the
2 same page makes reference to Kotor Varos, which at that time hadn't seen
3 military action. It saw it a little bit later, but it notes in
4 Kotor Varos that the -- some of the forces from the 122nd Brigade, which
5 was the VRS unit in that area, had sealed off Kotor Varos. There were
6 some armed extremists want -- "armed operations while some decent Muslims
7 were in favour of peaceful coexistence with the Serbs. A hundred
8 families from this town have requested to move out to Nova Gradiska. No
9 armed provocations have occurred so far, although the estimate is that
10 there are about 5- to 7.000 armed Muslims and Ustashas in the
12 It seems a rather large number and whether it's just their,
13 again, potentially couching anybody who is against the VRS as an
15 On page 3 of the English, at the very top, it notes:
16 "The municipalities of Bosanska Gradiska, Srbac, Laktasi, and
17 Prnjavor are stable, and Muslim and Croatian extremists have started
18 handing in their weapons."
19 So it would seem that the weapons deadline issue and the plans
20 were not just for Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc but were wider than
21 that and included other municipalities in the ARK area.
22 There is another reference not necessarily directed to the
23 operations themselves, but it notes, if we go back to paragraph 1 --
24 sorry, page 1, in relation to Banja Luka and also the wider ARK area, it
1 "In the Banja Luka region, such forces have been completed
2 isolated for the time being," that's enemy forces, "and individuals and
3 groups are being disarmed every day, particularly within the city
4 itself," again presumably part of this operation to disarm. "Persons who
5 fail to respond to mobilisation or work duty lose their jobs and criminal
6 prosecution is instigated against them."
7 I believe that was probably related to one of the ARK decisions
8 slightly earlier than this. It notes:
9 "A portion of the Muslim and Croatian population is moving out,
10 and the Region of Bosnian Krajina has issued decisions to facilitate such
11 departures, providing that Serbs from Central Bosnia and places with
12 predominantly Muslim and Croatian populations were also allowed to move
13 out. Those departing will not be allowed to return."
14 I believe this is also linked to an ARK decision which had
15 happened a few days before this, but it would seem to me to be clear that
16 the 1KK knows that Muslims and Croats are moving out, but that they
17 shouldn't be allowed to do so unless Serbs can move in and they at least
18 interpreted those decisions as -- that those who are leaving are not
19 going to be able to come back. It's also of note that this document is
20 another one at the end that is annotated it's to be disseminated and
21 passed down to units of the corps in order for them to be informed of the
22 situation. And I think this may be of some importance.
23 Q. Thank you. If I could go back to what we had as 65 ter 17918.
24 We'd put in the 23 pages, but I need to go a little bit further to
25 page 41 of the English. This is again the ARK Crisis Staff gazette, and
1 page 18 to 19 -- bottom of page 18 --
2 JUDGE KWON: Before we move to that document. The previous
3 document which is before us is the one which has been already admitted?
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE KWON: But the page numbers seem to be different. There
6 are additional pages at the end in B/C/S. Could you take a look into it,
8 MR. NICHOLLS: I will, Your Honour. I apologise for that.
9 Q. You referred to this decision, I think, the one that will be
10 coming up, Mr. Brown.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: It should be the conclusions of the ARK
12 Crisis Staff for 29 May 1992, again page 41 of the English, bottom of
13 page 18 in the Serbian language. Again, that was 65 ter 17918.
14 That's correct on the English. Bottom of page 18 in the Serbian version.
15 Okay. Now we need to go back to page 41 of the English.
16 Q. All right, if you can just take a look at this conclusion from
17 29 May 1992, just a few days before the June 1st 1KK document we looked
18 at. Is this a document you were referring to?
19 A. Yes, this is the document that -- that it would appear to be that
20 the meeting was held on the 29th and the military were clearly aware of
21 it. This is the document that -- or this is the conclusion, I think,
22 that is referenced in Vukelic's instruction that -- his report on the
23 1st of June that -- and it, for me, cuts to this issue of resettlement.
24 It has echos of what a number of the delegates said at the 16th Assembly
25 Session, that the establishment of territory would involve the
1 resettlement of people. And here there is a qualification that people
2 are -- will only be allowed to leave as Serbs come in, into the Krajina.
3 And from the 1st of June document, it's the military's interpretation
4 that these people are not going to be able to come back. So I think it's
5 linked to this issue that it's -- the Serb territory is going to be
6 predominantly Serb.
7 MR. NICHOLLS: I would tender that, Your Honour, which was a bit
8 further down in the same gazette that we've already put in.
9 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit those pages.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: Only those pages, yes. We'll give the number.
12 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
13 JUDGE KWON: I'm told that it has been -- part of it has been
14 admitted. Is it the same Official Gazette that we admitted in its
15 entirety? I think it's different. Page numbers are different -- oh,
16 yes --
17 MR. NICHOLLS: It's the same gazette, Your Honour, that we
18 admitted earlier today, but only up to page 23.
19 JUDGE KWON: Oh, very well.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: The actual gazette is a total of 51 pages in
21 English. It's 23 pages in the Serbian original.
22 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
23 JUDGE KWON: For ease of reference, we'll admit it separately.
24 Could you split it and --
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE KWON: -- load it separately. We'll give it a separate
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be Exhibit P3926.
4 THE WITNESS: I don't know if I can make one more comment on
6 MR. NICHOLLS:
7 Q. Please.
8 A. It strikes me that the ARK decision as well makes -- itself makes
9 note that several thousand people from Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Novi
10 had already, at least according to the decision, wished to move out. And
11 bearing in mind that this is on the 29th of May, it seems a very short
12 space of time for, all of a sudden, so many thousand people to wish to
13 voluntarily leave their homes. And I think that -- the military document
14 had already said on the 29th that there were 7.000 people in Trnopolje
15 and Omarska. And it seems to me that this is -- you know, several
16 thousand people in a very short space of time voluntarily wishing to
17 leave seems unusual to me.
18 Q. Now moving on to the next day, 2nd of June, from the -- another
19 1KK document -- command document. This is not an exhibit.
20 65 ter 00545, please.
21 You've cited this document several times in your report. Can you
22 just tell us about how you see this document in relation to the
23 1KK operations, and in particular disarmament.
24 A. This is another daily combat report going to the Main Staff, and
25 maybe I draw Your Honours' attention to a number of sections. In
1 paragraph 1 there's a reference at the end, saying:
2 "In Lisnja village, an armed conflict occurred between Muslim
3 extremists and the army of the SR BiH. Some Muslim extremists were
4 captured while a rather large number of them pulled out towards
5 Crni Vrh."
6 Lisnja is in Prnjavor municipality, I believe. There is another
7 reference later in a combat report that the population of Lisnja are
9 In the second paragraph it talks about the operations that are
10 ongoing in the corps. It notes:
11 "In Kljuc, around 900 persons have been captured in the course of
12 the fighting around Kljuc and around 400 rifles seized in the process."
13 The reference at the end of that paragraph says:
14 "... because Muslim extremists have failed to hand in their
15 weapons, the Muslim population of the area of Lisnja has been expelled."
16 And also in paragraph 3 it notes:
17 "The wider area of Sanski Most, Prijedor, and Kljuc are under the
18 control of our units."
19 Again, the operations that they conducted they conducted quite
20 quickly and at least in their reports are saying that the area is
21 generally under control, although there were still sporadic incidents
22 that followed this period. But in those municipalities, they themselves
23 seemed to have the area under control quite quickly.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: I would tender that document, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted as Exhibit P3927.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure whether the
2 translation is right, I don't know whether "expelled" would be the right
3 word to be used for "iseljavanje." Generally speaking the translations
4 leave much to be desired.
5 JUDGE KWON: Let's proceed.
6 Yes, with regard to the translation we'll -- we have another way
7 to deal with it.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: 04933, please, that's 65 ter number.
9 Q. This is a MUP document from Sanski Most coming up from the
10 15th of June, so now a couple of weeks later. We'd spoken about, in the
11 previous document, references to Sanski Most, Kljuc, that area. And this
12 document is signed by the Sanski Most SJB chief, Mirko Vrucinic.
13 Again --
14 JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Nicholls. All the
15 documents you are dealing with today must have been cited in one of his
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour, this one --
18 JUDGE KWON: Could you identify them for our reference.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour, this one is footnotes 340 and
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: And afterwards, if Your Honours -- if it would be
23 helpful, where I haven't cited them, I -- and I'm sure my friend won't
24 object, I could submit a list of footnote references for all the ones
25 that we've talked about today and yesterday.
1 JUDGE KWON: I take it there would be no objection.
2 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 MR. NICHOLLS:
5 Q. Mr. Brown, again, now this is a police document talking about the
6 disarmament operations which have been underway, again looking back at
7 May. Could you just discuss this with us briefly.
8 A. I'm assuming what's happened here is that the Sanski Most police
9 have been asked to provide a summary of what had happened in May, and it
10 discusses the operations that happened in Sanski Most, the wider
11 Sanski Most area, noting that the disarming and surrendering of weapons,
12 it was carried out between the 10th and 25th of May, again presumably
13 linked to the various decisions of the ARK and the CSBs to implement a
14 disarming operation. But it notes that the -- this is in paragraph 1:
15 "The Muslim and Croatian population handed over only hunting
16 weapons and other legally owned weapons, but illegally obtained military
17 weapons were not surrendered and were concealed (buried) on instructions
18 from above."
19 Then there clearly was an operation on the 25th, which they say:
20 "There was a military action (attack) on the down-town
21 neighbourhood of Mahala which resulted in the capture of 2.000 civilians,
22 but no significant amounts of weapons have been found because they had
23 been concealed earlier."
24 They then make note of another operation in the Muslim villages
25 of Vrhpolje and Hrustovo, and on that occasion, a Muslim force of about
1 800 men were broken up and militarily defeated while the houses were
2 destroyed and burnt down. There were notes here of some army casualties.
3 It's of note that in the very first paragraph, it says, "The
4 Serbian army units and commands (six brigade)," I think it's a typo.
5 It's actually 6th Brigade. It means Colonel Basara's brigade in
6 Sanski Most. "Territorial Defence units and the SJB have for some time
7 been disarming paramilitary Muslim and Croatian formations in the
8 Sanski Most area."
9 So it seems it was a joint operation with the 6th Brigade and the
10 TO and the police.
11 The report then talks on about that people arrested were brought
12 in, and it lists some of the weapons at the end of the document that they
13 recovered. Again, I think the document's important because it shows this
14 joint -- the issue of joint operations. It shows that the disarmament
15 plans that were being discussed in the early and middle parts of May were
16 implemented. It highlights to me that a large number of people were
17 captured very quickly. Here they're called civilians, 2.000 of them, and
18 that the operations were over very quickly, and there are references to
19 some Serb casualties. But they didn't seem to be able to take under
20 control large numbers of weapons, let alone any heavy weapons, or other
21 types of activity. So I do know that after this, there were a large
22 number of people, prisoners were taken from Sanski Most and ended up in
23 Manjaca camp. So these are some of the points that I draw from this
25 MR. NICHOLLS: I tender that, Your Honour, this document.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P3928, Your Honours.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have D01921, please.
4 Q. This is another MUP document, another report looking back in part
5 on the disarmament operations. It's cited at footnotes 256, 451, 459,
6 464, and 566 of your report, so quite heavily cited. It is an exhibit
7 already, but you clearly found this to be an important document for your
8 report. So if you could just take us through it quickly and explain the
9 significance from your perspective to us.
10 A. Your Honours, this is another one of the summary documents I
11 thought was quite useful in explaining what seemed to have happened in
12 Bosanski Novi municipality in May. It highlights a number of the issues
13 we've been talking about so far. It talks at the first part that there
14 was a disarmament operation being planned pursuant to a decision of the
15 Ministry of National Defence of the 16th of April and on the decision of
16 the Government of the Autonomous Region of Krajina in association with
17 the Bosanski Novi municipality TO headquarters --
18 Q. Sorry, let me stop one moment. Just for the record, is that the
19 Subotic order, decision?
20 A. That is, yes. The 16th is the Subotic order. The reference to
21 the ARK decision is probably the early May ARK decision about disarming
22 those in possession of illegally held weapons. There was a plan being
23 drawn up for the confiscation of arms, ammunition, and explosives. And
24 this plan anticipated activities being completed by the 11th of May. And
25 then there is an incident or an operation around 11th of May and then
1 further activity later in that month. And it's clear from this document
2 that as a result of that, large numbers of people were rounded up. And
3 later in the report it talks about them being held in the sports centre
4 and then also some being taken away -- a large number being taken away in
5 trucks, cattle trucks, although some did return.
6 The incident in relation to the cattle trucks is referenced on
7 page 2, where it makes mention that on the 9th of June, members of the
8 municipal staff, of the TO and the military police assembled a railway
9 train made up of 22 closed-type wagons, into which about 4.000
10 inhabitants from Blagaj Japra, which was the area that the operation had
11 happened in and around -- starting on the 11th of May, which is probably
12 the incident that Mr. Vjestica was talking about at the Assembly session.
13 These individuals from Blagaj Japra were taken to Doboj and I think a
14 couple of days later about 700 of them returned.
15 The document also makes mention in paragraph 2 from page 2 about
16 the resettlement of citizens from Bosanski Novi --
17 Q. Sorry, at -- this would now be page 3 of the Serbian original.
18 A. And if I take you to page 4 of the English version, it makes
19 reference to:
20 "Guided by the decision on the voluntarily resettlement of
21 citizens taken by the Government of the Autonomous Region of Krajina and
22 the order of the Crisis Staff of Bosanski Novi municipality on the
23 criteria of voluntarily resettlement, Bosanski Novi public security
24 station, at the request of citizens and according to the regulation
25 procedure, performed the following ..."
1 And it talks about the permanently deregistered individuals,
2 5.680, and other certificates. And this would presumably be relating to
3 the ARK decision that we referenced earlier on the 29th of May. So --
4 and this document is dated the middle of June, I believe -- I'd have to
5 check, but -- or maybe it's August. It seems clear that Bosanski Novi,
6 there were operations which were formed on the basis of the instructions
7 we've seen before about mobilisation and disarming, that these plans were
8 implemented, that there may have been incidents in the municipality as a
9 result of those operations, but that large numbers of individuals in
10 Bosanski Novi were rounded up and transported out of the municipality,
11 and that also the decision on the deregistering of individuals in
12 Bosanski Novi was implemented and that a large number of people were --
13 were -- left the area. It says that there were around 7.000 on the
14 transportation on the 9th of -- sorry, 4.000 on the transportation on the
15 9th of June, of which 700 returned. And then there is also a reference
16 that they were deregistering formally -- the formal process 5.600.
17 So a large number of people in that municipality seemed to have
18 left in a relatively short space of time. And I think it's important
19 because it shows, at least to me, that their -- these documents about
20 establishing plans, establishing plans of disarmament, taking control of
21 territory, and the ultimate end state was that a large number of people
22 in Bosanski Novi were no longer living there.
23 Q. Thank you. I'm going to move ahead now a little bit, and there
24 is more of this in your report but I'll move ahead past the issue of
25 disarmament now.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: And I would like to bring up 10722, please, it's a
2 65 ter number. Your Honours, this is cited in footnotes 434, 499, 511.
3 Q. It's relevant to pages 88 to 97 and paragraphs 2.77 to 2.98 of
4 your report, Mr. Brown. That's a section entitled: "Retaliatory actions
5 and killing of non-Serbs."
6 And can you please just take a look at this document on
7 3rd September and explain why you selected it. And take your -- take
8 your time to have a look through it if you need to.
9 A. I think it's quite a long and detailed report and there are a
10 number of issues that it deals with, including the issues of camps,
11 issues of -- strategic goal, for example, that they had achieved the
12 corridor, the issue of paramilitaries is in there. It's quite a detailed
14 Do you want me to highlight some issues that --
15 Q. Yes, please.
16 A. Maybe if I just go through it in order. This is another one of
17 the combat reports that summarises the situation, looks back a little bit
18 in the previous month. In the second paragraph there's a reference to
19 the corps securing the corridor, strategic goal number two. It notes,
20 also on page one, war was prevented from spreading to sensitive areas
21 such as Banja Luka, Prnjavor, Laktasi, Sanski Most, Prijedor, and
22 surrounding Banja Luka and other places where the Muslim and Croatian
23 population is dominant. It seems to be that they want to control those
24 areas, irrespective of whether a non-Serb population were in a majority
25 or not.
1 On page 2 there is a reference at the top:
2 "All units and armed formations have essentially been put under
3 control of the 1st Krajina Corps, although there is still resistance from
4 CSB centre."
5 I think this is in relation to the whole issue of paramilitaries
6 and establishing control over paramilitaries by integrating them into the
7 VRS, and this reference may be in relation to a CSB special unit that had
8 operated in Kotor Varos in July and early August and an attempt to try
9 and control that by eventually bringing it into the -- under the -- into
10 the military, integrating it into the military, and whether there was
11 still some resistance from the CSB to do that.
12 Later on down that same page, there is an interesting reference
13 about road building on Manjaca and the reconstruction starting on a
14 church in Sljivno. I think some of the prisoners from Manjaca were used
15 to build that church. At the bottom on page 2 there's references to
16 detention centres and camps. It says:
17 "The intolerant attitude of the international community towards
18 the Serbs' position in BH is causing extreme distrust of their goodwill.
19 In this period, there was great interest in visits to LRZs," which are
20 prisoner of war camps, "with euphoria the dominant feeling, interest in
21 the sick and difficult cases and attempts to show the world the
22 unbearable conditions in those camps."
23 It goes on:
24 "These and especially their negative portrayal of the situation
25 has increased the antagonism of soldiers towards the international
1 institutions. We were confronted with the problem of having to refuse
2 their visits to many check-points because of this."
3 Q. Excuse me, could we go to page 3 of the English now, which is
4 also page 3 of the original.
5 A. "The most evident example was the calculated, tactless, and
6 unannounced visit by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Although the majority of
7 foreign journalists portrayed the situation very realistically, both on
8 the battle-field and in the camps controlled by us, some journalists
9 especially from Canada used skilful fabrications to try and blame the
10 Serbs and the FRY for the crisis."
11 Mr. Mazowiecki had visited Manjaca camp not long before this
12 report was written, but he had been denied entry.
13 There's a reference a little bit down that paragraph:
14 "Mr. Karadzic's statement that he will concede 20 per cent of the
15 territory controlled by the SR army to the enemies in order to achieve a
16 peaceful solution caused some bitterness and a drop in motivation. Blood
17 was shed and many lives were lost for these territories, so it is
18 impossible to convince soldiers that this is a diplomatic move."
19 This may be of some note because at the 16th Assembly Session
20 there were a number of delegates who were articulating or advocating that
21 they should be controlling significant territories, and Mr. Karadzic, I
22 believe, and others were more cautious to say: We shouldn't be
23 controlling everything. We just should be controlling the territories we
24 want to all intents and purposes.
25 It may very well be that Mr. Karadzic was indicating here that
1 they were willing to cede certain territories back in order to achieve a
2 peaceful solution, but there were some individuals. I know some people
3 were talking about areas, for example, even Tuzla and some of the areas
4 elsewhere in Bosnia that they felt they should control. Maybe
5 Mr. Karadzic and others felt it more realistic to control the territories
6 they could control rather than the ones they wanted to. Or maybe there
7 was a realisation that they could afford to trade off some territories
8 and that this wasn't going down well with the soldiers on the ground who
9 had, in essence, fought for those and died for those areas. Jajce, for
10 example, was not a municipality or an area that was historically Serb,
11 but the VRS did take it and maybe there was negotiations that certain
12 areas could be traded back.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Brown, you stated that you believe Mr. Karadzic
14 and others were more cautious to say, in terms of the territories, and
15 further you said:
16 "Maybe Mr. Karadzic and others felt it more realistic to control
17 the territories they could control rather than the ones that they wanted
19 What's the basis for you to reach such conclusion and how it --
20 does it relate to your military expertise?
21 THE WITNESS: I think reading the Assembly -- 16th Assembly
22 Session in particular, there may also be some references in the Mladic
23 diary, I'd have to go back over them, but a number of delegates at the
24 16th Assembly Session were very much advocating territory, maybe even
25 territories that they themselves came from, that they should control. I
1 remember, at least off the top of my head, one delegate talking about:
2 We should have Tuzla or an area close to Tuzla. I think Mr. Karadzic and
3 others were more -- were more of the line of: We need to define the
4 territories we want, not necessarily the territories -- all the
5 territories we can get.
6 And it's clear -- for example, I mention Jajce. It was
7 predominantly a Croat municipality. It was also -- there was a strategic
8 interest because there was a hydro-electric plant that supplied
9 electricity throughout Bosnia. But the Serbs -- the Serb army captured
10 Jajce. They also captured some of the municipalities in the corridor
11 which were Croat predominantly. And they were quite successful,
12 certainly in the Krajina area militarily, they seized a lot of territory.
13 But it may not have been the territory that they felt they -- that they
14 often called it their territory, our hearts and language like that, but
15 that it would have been beneficial to have it in order to have it traded
16 back at some negotiation. That was my -- and that was my interpretation
17 of some of the comments from the 16th Assembly Session.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Brown.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, but I didn't hear an
21 answer to the second part of your question which is what expertise does
22 he have to read the minutes of the Assembly and give us his
24 MR. NICHOLLS: I think we've gone through that, Judge.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I think it's for us to assess later on.
1 Yes, Mr. Nicholls, please continue.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
3 Q. Mr. Brown, and then if we could just -- any other sections of
4 this document that you'd like to point out before we move on?
5 A. Yes, on -- keeping on page 3, there's a reference:
6 "The ICR's approach to distributing humanitarian aid is having a
7 very detrimental effect on the morale of soldiers and units. This aid is
8 mostly distributed to prisoners of war, Muslims, Croats, and crisis
10 And they seem to say here that there hasn't been a case of aid,
11 in essence, being given to threatened Serbs.
12 In paragraph 2 at the bottom of this page, there's a reference to
13 paramilitary governments and armed formations, this issue of
14 paramilitaries, increasing extremism towards Muslim and Croat population
15 continues -- but there are continued efforts to place the organs of
16 authority and the MUP above military formations. So here are some of the
17 problems that the 1st Krajina Corps can see. Adverse situations
18 regarding power supply and distribution of supplies. And for this
19 reason, the 1st Krajina Corps commander held a meeting with unit
20 commanders and municipal presidents at which he pointed to the problem of
21 the existence of paragovernments and paramilitaries and the need to
22 overcome this crisis, the involvement of civilians or paramilitaries
23 outside the control were identified by the 1st Krajina Corps as a
24 problem. And here it would seem that General Talic in an attempting to
25 resolve those issues is getting together unit and brigade commanders and
1 municipal civilian leaders in order to try and thrash out and come to an
2 agreement how to resolve this issue. It notes:
3 "There are -- certain tensions are still present in Kotor Varos,
4 Kljuc, and Sanski Most areas because a large number of arrested citizens
5 for whom there is no evidence or criminal reports that they participated
6 in the armed rebellion."
7 The corps seems to think they've got evidence that many people
8 who have been arrested -- there's no evidence that they've done anything
9 wrong, and this is echoed, certainly in some of the Manjaca camp
10 documents that I saw after I'd written this report, that a -- quite a
11 large number or a number of the individuals who had been brought to
12 Manjaca, there was no evidence that they had been involved in armed
13 rebellion, there was no -- they weren't carrying weapons, they weren't in
14 uniform. And to all intents and purposes, this gives me the impression
15 along with other documents, not only that the corps aware that there was
16 a large number of people who weren't involved in armed rebellion, but
17 they were still arrested.
18 There's a reference the CSB, especially from Prijedor -- this is
19 on to page 4.
20 "... is not contributing to this approach. Prijedor, headed by
21 Stevo Drljaca, who led a convoy of people who wanted to leave the crisis
22 area - they committed a massacre on the Skender Vakuf area of over
23 150 men who wanted to leave the territory of the Krajina autonomous
25 This is relating to an incident on Vlasic mountain where a convoy
1 of people had been transported to Travnik, people were taken out and
2 killed. This was reported in the 1st Krajina Corps documents, by the
3 way, in daily combat reports, which went up to the Main Staff at the
4 time, but this is a summary of what had happened.
5 "This action caused indignation not only among citizens but also
6 among 1st Krajina Corps soldiers. This dark stain which was created did
7 not have support, but it is very fortunate that the international
8 community did not find out about it in more detail."
9 The 1st Krajina Corps knew about it very quickly because they
10 reported the incidents in their daily combat report, but it seems to be
11 here that they seem more -- or at least they're making reference to the
12 fact that they're fortunate that the international community didn't get
13 to hear about it, presumably it would have caused them significant
14 problems if they had.
15 There's also a reference in the next paragraph:
16 "In Celinac area, soldiers on leave took reprisals because of the
17 activities of Muslims and Ustasha forces in the Vevcani village area."
18 It's not clear what the reprisals are, but there are one or two
19 references in the Krajina Corps document collections about reprisals,
20 including one large incident in Vecici in Kotor Varos in November --
21 early November 1992, in which a large number of individuals are reported
22 as being massacred after being captured. And there are a smaller number
23 of references in the Krajina Corps documents of reprisals, including
24 killings, that occur.
25 Those are I think -- I know it's a long document and maybe I've
1 answered your question in a rather large -- long way, but these are some
2 of the points that I've brought out from this document.
3 Q. No, thank you. That does lead us to essentially my last topic,
4 which is camps --
5 JUDGE KWON: Are you tendering that document?
6 MR. NICHOLLS: I believe it's already admitted unless I -- no --
7 yes, Your Honour, I do tender that. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P3929, Your Honours.
10 MR. NICHOLLS:
11 Q. You cover Manjaca camp quite -- quite heavily in your report, and
12 you talk in paragraph 2.133 of the report in summary about how the camps
13 in your view in essence - I'll use your words - became part of the
14 planned expulsion of non-Serbs from the area. They're a component of the
15 policy of separation. So that is the part I will -- we will be talking
16 about next. Mr. Brown, there's been quite a lot of evidence on Manjaca
17 presented, so I'll go through this part quite quickly.
18 Just before we take the break, instead of going through the
19 documents, you've already alluded to that there were reports indicating
20 that the 1KK knew about mistreatment of prisoners or that prisoners were
21 in Manjaca who had not -- there was not evidence that they had
22 participated in the armed rebellion. If you could just --
23 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, perhaps we should take the break now,
24 Your Honour, I don't think I can get through this in two minutes.
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
2 JUDGE KWON: We'll resume at 10.00 --
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you --
4 JUDGE KWON: -- I'm sorry, 11.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. Mr. Brown, I'm going to skip ahead a little bit now in the
10 interests of time. On page 29 of the transcript today, discussing P3929,
11 that's the 1KK -- the large 1KK morale report of 3rd September, in your
12 answer you noted that Mr. Mazowiecki had recently been denied access to
13 Manjaca when discussing that 3rd September report.
14 I'd like to bring up 65 ter 01614, please. This is a 1KK command
15 report signed by -- again, by the assistant commander for morale,
16 Colonel Vukelic, dated 23rd of August, 1992. And I believe --
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, Your Honours, this report is cited at
18 footnotes 187, 494, and footnote 752 and discussed on page 105 of the
19 report in connection with Manjaca camp.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much. Although it is listed -- the
21 footnotes were listed in your notice, but it's very difficult to locate
22 it at once.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: I should say, Your Honours, and I'll discuss this
24 with my friend, but we do have a hyperlinked chart of all the footnotes
25 with 65 ter numbers which makes it -- which we've provided to the Defence
1 which makes it easier to look things up. So that's something we could
2 talk about.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, that would be convenient.
4 MR. NICHOLLS:
5 Q. But could you just take a look at this report, Mr. Brown, and I
6 think this is the one you were referring to, and tell us about the
7 significance of this document and Manjaca camp.
8 A. Your Honours, this seems to give just some more details to the
9 Mazowiecki visit, which, according to the document at least, was at the
10 proposal of the Banja Luka mayor. He visits or tries to visit the camp
11 but is denied. And maybe some of the comments in the document are of
12 note. It states that he was concerned whether human rights are being
13 respected and expressed his wish to visit the detention camp at Manjaca
14 presumably in his capacity as a UN human rights representative. He was
15 informed of the struggle of the people of the Serbian Republic, the
16 difficulties arising from the blockades by the international community,
17 obstructions in receiving aid and threats of military intervention. He,
18 Mr. Mazowiecki, then seemed to reply that he'd come on a humanitarian
19 visit but the report says he failed to demonstrate his intentions.
20 Instead he wanted to visit and inspect the detention camp. Asked about
21 the purpose for his visit, he replied, The respect for human rights. The
22 document then says: Asked to reply whose rights he was inspecting, he
23 said the rights of the prisoners. He was given a detailed account of the
24 Manjaca prisoner of war camp and advised that he should also respect the
25 rights of the Serbian people. In response he did not react or show any
1 interest in this remark.
2 It's noted that -- he said he was asked under whose authority he
3 had come on a goodwill mission and he replied that he had been so charged
4 by the legal BH government. He was warned that only the government of
5 the Serbian Republic could approve this and without such approval he was
6 not allowed to talk to anyone or visit the prisoner of war camp. And he
7 clearly was denied access to the camp.
8 On page 2 there's a reference to a confidential order which I'm
9 not clear about, but:
10 "We prevented them from going to the camp on the pretext that
11 they did not have permission from the Serbian Republic government.
12 "According to Mr. Radic said that he had spoken with
13 Minister Buha, Mr. Koljevic, and Mr. Karadzic about the visit. In a
14 telephone conversation, they agreed to meet with the delegation, but
15 suggested leaving the final decision to the military authorities. For
16 this reason, please co-ordinate such activities in the future in order to
17 avoid them running counter to your orders."
18 So clearly he was refused entry. And the last paragraph is of
19 note. It states:
20 "Regardless of the consequences of the cancellation of
21 Mr. Mazowiecki's visit to the prisoner of war camp, we declare with full
22 responsibility that the purpose of his visit was not inspecting the state
23 of human rights, but on the contrary, intelligence, reconnaissance, which
24 can be confirmed by those representatives of the government of the
25 Autonomous Region of Krajina who were present and who spoke with him."
1 So it would seem that the military refused his visit and believed
2 that Mr. Mazowiecki wasn't there with the purpose of inspecting the human
3 rights of the prisoners, but on some kind of intelligence or
4 reconnaissance task. Bearing in mind that the ICRC had visited the camp
5 in July previously, and there are documents in the Krajina Corps
6 collection on that visit which indicate that the camp was in a poor
7 condition or at least some of the prisoners were in a poor condition and
8 there was notification of blood trails and mistreatment of prisoners, so
9 this visit comes about a month after that, but clearly that he is denied
10 access and sent away. And the implication in the document is that he's
11 not there on a genuine mission to inspect the rights of prisoners but on
12 some other ulterior motive.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender that document, Your Honours?
14 JUDGE KWON: Admitted.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P3930, Your Honours.
16 MR. NICHOLLS:
17 Q. And now, Mr. Brown, the documents you refer to which show some of
18 the evidence of mistreatment and knowledge of mistreatment of prisoners
19 and poor conditions I'm not going to go over now. I'm now going to move
20 to 65 ter 04225, relatively late in the year 1KK command report, a
21 regular combat report, dated 16 December 1992. And I'd like you to tell
22 us about this document and how it's significant. It's footnoted at
23 footnotes 513 and 518 of your report which are on pages 108 and 104 of
24 the report -- 108 and 109, excuse me, of the report where you discuss
25 this document. And keeping in mind what I had started to raise earlier,
1 the analysis you put forth in 2.1333 of your report about the link
2 between camps and removal of the population.
3 A. Your Honours, this document seems to be one of the -- if you
4 like, the end documents in relation to Manjaca in 1992 and what happened
5 to those prisoners who were held there. Many of them had been captured
6 in June or at least taken to Manjaca in June and July. There are visits
7 of -- many of them had arrived at Manjaca from other camps, mainly in --
8 from Omarska, Sanski Most, and Kljuc, although there are reference of
9 other places. So many of the prisoners had been taken to Manjaca from
10 other detention centres.
11 Through the summer there are references which are noted in the
12 report and also subsequent documents that many of the prisoners did not
13 deserve to be there, references in their own report that I've talked
14 about before. The conditions were poor, noted in ICRC visit and also in
15 their own Manjaca documents. The camp itself was a series of cattle
16 sheds on a military farm, a former military farm. The prisoners were
17 held there until the end of the year.
18 There are reports in the documents of a lack of water, the
19 water-pipes couldn't supply the camps. There are references in one or
20 two documents about the cold conditions later in the year. The prisoners
21 were -- there are documentary references of the prisoners undertaking
22 work, some of which which may even be of a military nature in support of
23 engineering units.
24 There was a release of some 700 prisoners in November. I think
25 around 3.000 was the maximum number of prisoners in Manjaca. There was a
1 release in November, but a large number of them, about 2.000 of them,
2 stayed there until December. And they were released in two batches, one
3 on this day and I believe another thousand two days previously. But it
4 seems to me -- and they were released from Manjaca not back to their
5 homes, not back to their municipalities, but were escorted in convoys
6 over into Croatia and released.
7 And when I looked at that sequence of events and being aware that
8 there were convoys of individuals leaving Trnopolje, leaving Omarska,
9 that in relation to many of the people who were held in detention that
10 the camps were a means or a part of the process by which people were
11 removed from the territory. It's not maybe the only one, we've talked
12 about the deregistration process, but it seems that Manjaca was linked
13 very much to other camps. It involved the operation of the military,
14 also included interrogations in the movement and use of the police to
15 bring people there. And -- but at the end of the day, the prisoners in
16 Manjaca were not returned home but they were escorted out of RS
18 Q. And we see that in paragraph 3; is that right?
19 A. Yes, paragraph 3 says:
20 "One thousand and one prisoners were released today from Manjaca
21 camp - they were escorted out of the RS ... 413 of them still remain
22 scheduled to be released on Friday ... there have been no other
23 significant changes."
24 MR. NICHOLLS: I tender this document, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted as Exhibit P3931.
1 MR. NICHOLLS:
2 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown.
3 A. Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls, redacted version will be --
5 his -- I mean his report will be tendered? Has it been already tendered?
6 MR. NICHOLLS: I believe I did tender it and it was admitted,
7 Your Honours, at the beginning of the testimony.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
10 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
11 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, are you thinking of the CV or -- I
12 think he was referring to the redacted version of the report with the
13 paragraphs deleted that were ordered to be removed.
14 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Oh, I -- no, Your Honour, we will tender that. I
16 didn't know whether you wanted a redacted version or you would just skip
17 those sections in your review, but we can redact those parts and submit
19 Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
20 JUDGE KWON: I think in terms of CV we admitted both versions,
21 one under seal and one publicly.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
25 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
1 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Brown.
2 A. Good morning, Mr. Karadzic.
3 Q. Given the time that we have and the sheer size of your report,
4 with a large number of paragraphs and footnotes, I'll strive to put as
5 simple questions as possible which could hopefully be answered with a yes
6 or a no. Of course, you are free to expand whenever you deem necessary.
7 Is that acceptable?
8 A. I will do my best, Mr. Karadzic.
9 Q. Thank you. First of all, I'd like us to look at your
10 relationship with the Prosecution. You worked for the OTP between 1998
11 and 2004; correct?
12 A. Yes, Mr. Karadzic, that's correct.
13 Q. Your job as part of the Prosecution developed in a way. Did it
14 at all times include the investigative part as well as analysis or did
15 these two things come one after another?
16 A. My job within the OTP was as a military analyst. The role within
17 the military analysis team -- the role of the military analyst was to
18 provide analytical support to the investigative teams, and that usually
19 comprised of a number of tasks. Reviewing documents was a key task and
20 providing documentary references to the investigative teams. But there
21 were times in the investigation process where I was expected to assist
22 them in the -- their own function and also to assist the trial attorneys
23 understand the context or understand certain documentations that were in
24 the possession of the OTP.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please look at 1D4848.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Which is your testimony in the Stanisic and Zupljanin case.
4 E-court it is page 192 and 193. While we wait for it I wanted to tell
5 you this. They asked you whether you were employed as a military analyst
6 and you responded with a "yes." Next you were asked about your
7 participation in investigating measures undertaken by the Prosecution,
8 the OTP, that is to say. You said that it was correct. And then you
9 were asked whether it was true that you interviewed witnesses for the
10 needs of the Prosecution.
11 Could you tell us whether you, indeed, interviewed witnesses on
12 behalf of the Prosecution?
13 A. I took part in a number of interviews, as directed by the
14 investigation team. They were relatively small in number and they
15 usually involved military figures in which the investigation team wanted
16 to use documentation that would help them and also where my expertise,
17 based on the analysis of military documents, could help in that interview
18 process. So yes, I did take part in a number of interviews; they were
19 relatively small in number.
20 Q. Thank you. In addition to witness interviews, did you also take
21 part in interviewing potential suspects?
22 A. Those were the same -- generally the same interviews.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender these two pages.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1932, Your Honours.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, Your Honours, I --
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: I don't mean to interrupt and I'm sorry. I'm just
5 not sure of the point of tendering pages where the witness says he took
6 parts in interviews, where the witness has just said on the record in our
7 case: I took part in interviews. Exactly the same thing, I believe, as
8 what is being tendered so -- no objection, but I don't really see the
10 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, I see your point, Mr. Nicholls.
11 Do we really need to admit this, given the admission of the
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps it is enough to have the
14 transcript page recorded in our transcript; however, we'll have a number
15 of pages that we will refer to from this testimony and others. I believe
16 it might be easier for the Bench to simply admit these two pages and the
17 other pages that I will be referring to.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, let us leave it at that. We'll give the number
19 for it.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1932, Your Honours.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Did you interview, for example, Colonel Basara, Branko Basara?
23 You mentioned him today.
24 A. Yes, I believe I took part in that interview. I wasn't the only
25 one, I wasn't leading the interview, but I took part in it.
1 Q. Thank you. Did you know that Basara was to -- was supposed to
2 appear as a witness in this case as well?
3 A. Mr. Karadzic, I'm not aware of that.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have page 194 admitted
6 from the same document, 1D4848, lines 6, 7, and 8. Perhaps it could be
7 joined with the same number.
8 JUDGE KWON: I don't follow the point. Did we see the page?
9 MR. NICHOLLS: [Microphone not activated]
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. It's not necessary,
11 perhaps. The witness confirmed it was so and that is where we find that
12 piece of information, that he interviewed Branko Basara, commander of the
13 6th Krajina Brigade.
14 Could we have page 15 -- 195, but it shouldn't be broadcast.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Did you also interview the person in question - I won't mention
17 the name in open session, it was a protected witness. Please have a look
18 at the name in line 11.
19 A. Yes, I believe I did take part in that interview.
20 Q. And the second box contains an answer of yours; correct?
21 A. The second box appears to have a question.
22 Q. But the answer begins with line 19; correct?
23 A. Yes, it does, Mr. Karadzic.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this page be added as well?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be done, but for the ease of
2 reference you just first put the question and if witness confirms we move
3 on. Consult Mr. Robinson.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think we would have had to
5 move into private session to do that and perhaps that's a better way to
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That -- just a second. That will be
8 admitted -- added under seal that part so -- but ...
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. So far the admit -- those parts admitted
11 were dealt with in private session in previous case so Exhibit P3932 will
12 be put under seal, but in the future I would rather put your question
13 directly in this trial without having to refer to the previous testimony.
14 If witness confirms, that's it. Let's proceed.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I believe it would be a
16 better way to go about it, but then I would have to spend more time in
17 explaining the circumstances my question refers to. Are we in open
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Brown, did you take part in investigations concerning persons
22 against whom you later testified?
23 A. I'm not sure quite what you mean by taking part in
24 investigations. An investigation a quite a wide-encompassing phrase. I
25 took part in work for the OTP on cases that did end up with accused and
1 from which I testified. So, for example, the Brdjanin -- Mr. Brdjanin's
2 case -- my work was slightly different in the OTP -- or at least the work
3 of the analysis, in that we tended to support a number of cases, mainly
4 because of the nature of the work we were doing and the material we were
5 reviewing which Prosecutors believed was useful for multiple cases. So
6 in that regard, I took part in working on cases which, in a number of
7 cases, did lead to an accused appearing here and for which I testified.
8 Q. Thank you. At page 196 of this document - it needn't be
9 uploaded - in lines 16 and 17 you said:
10 [In English] "So we worked -- clearly we worked closely with the
11 investigating team."
12 [Interpretation] Et cetera. I'm interested in this: You
13 participated in the work of the investigations team and what you said
14 just now was said in open session, I believe.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 65 ter 22651,
16 page 428 in e-court. Let's look at pages 17 through 25.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. You confirmed again that you had worked as part of the
19 investigation section.
20 A. Well, I wasn't a member of the investigation team. I was a
21 member of the military analysis team. The military analysis team
22 supported a number of investigation teams as well as supporting the
23 senior trial attorneys, to whom their -- the analysts' work was useful.
24 So I'm not sure what your question is, Mr. Karadzic, in this.
25 JUDGE KWON: In terms of organigram, military analysis team
1 belongs to investigating team?
2 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, there were two analysis teams in the
3 Office of the Prosecutor: Military analysis team and the leadership
4 research team. Each team had a number of professional analysts within
5 it. There were a number of investigation teams which had one or a number
6 of cases. The analysts in the LRT and the MAT supported those
7 investigation teams --
8 JUDGE KWON: Who is the immediate supervisor?
9 THE WITNESS: My immediate supervisor was the head of the
10 military analysis team, not the head of the investigation team. And
11 my --
12 JUDGE KWON: And head of the analysis team is supervised by who?
13 THE WITNESS: The head of investigations, chief of
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 THE WITNESS: Although it did change and then I think chief of
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 Yes, Mr. Karadzic -- yes, Mr. Nicholls.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: Excuse me, no -- no objection. Sorry to
21 interrupt. But if we continue with Mr. Karadzic citing to pages of
22 previous transcripts, no problem at all. But I see that what
23 Mr. Karadzic is doing is giving page numbers of a document that he is
24 using which do not correspond to the transcript pages. The conventional
25 way of citing to a previous case is to cite the transcript pages. In
1 this case it's - my eyes aren't good enough - 21491 that we're talking
2 about. It's just a suggestion because it would make the record clearer
3 and easier to follow in the future rather than having to have the
4 exhibits at hand.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 Probably he was referring to the e-court number, but I would
7 appreciate he would also cite the transcript page as well. But before
8 that, I just doubt the necessity of relying on those transcripts. He can
9 put his question directly and he dealt with his involvement in the
10 investigation as a whole in his examination-in-chief.
11 Well, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as pages are concerned, I
13 believe it's easier for the officer to find it if I give the page number
14 in e-court. That's why I did it that way. As for displaying, I have to
15 do it this way because the witness just asked me what I mean. I'm
16 interested in lines 24 and 25. I want to know if that's correct.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Is it true that you were part of investigations?
19 A. I was part of the investigation division. I was not part of the
20 investigation teams within that division.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this page be admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I don't think it's necessary. Let's
24 move on.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. In how many cases -- never mind.
3 You were part of that division all the time, the investigation
4 division; right?
5 A. That is correct, Mr. Karadzic.
6 Q. Yesterday on page 61, the distinguished Mr. Nicholls asked you
7 why you had chosen that document. So you were selecting documents;
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. On what criteria?
11 A. Well, Mr. Karadzic, first of all what I did was I would review
12 the documents in chronological order and clearly when I had realised
13 myself what I wanted my report and the shape of my report to be, if there
14 were documents that I thought were useful to explain a particular theme,
15 I would include them in those -- in those -- in that section. But I was
16 the one who organised the report and reviewed the material and selected
17 documents I thought talked to those themes.
18 Q. Thank you. You selected documents that supported the indictment;
20 A. That is not correct, Mr. Karadzic. I was not working on this
21 particular case. I was writing a report in relation to operations in the
22 Krajina. I did not know what the indictment was for this case, so I
23 didn't write the report in that manner.
24 Q. But you did appraise the usefulness of documents; that's what you
25 just said a moment ago. From what viewpoint did you do that, usefulness
1 for what?
2 A. Usefulness in understanding the operations in the Krajina in the
3 time-period that I was looking at.
4 Q. Did you then put together the whole truth about operations in the
5 area of the 1st Krajina Corps?
6 A. Well, I've already highlighted yesterday the limitations of the
7 report and I make no bones that this is not a report that covers every
8 single aspect of operations in the Krajina. I'm not sure what you mean
9 by "the whole truth." This report was based on military --
10 contemporaneous military documents and other contemporary documents
11 predominantly from a collection that was seized by the Office of the
12 Prosecutor and it is sourced predominantly by that type of material, and
13 I've tried to be as objective as I can in what these documents tell me.
14 But I'm more than happy to say to the Court, as I've already done, that
15 there are limitations within the documents, limitations within the
16 sources, and therefore there will be limitations of the report. But I've
17 tried to be as objective as I can based on the sources and the material
18 that I have.
19 Q. Thank you. So the OTP was in possession of a certain number of
20 documents. Who made the selection of documents that would become part of
21 your report eventually?
22 A. I did.
23 Q. Would I be right in assuming that you did that by reviewing
24 everything and then selecting some?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. What did you do with documents that seem favourable to the
2 Serbian side, the 1st Krajina Corps, and even the Serbian policies? What
3 did you do with documents that fall under Rule 68? Were they
4 incorporated in your report too?
5 A. When I had -- I knew my obligation under Rule 68, and when I had
6 documents that I thought might look -- fall into that category, I raised
7 that and flagged that to the trial attorneys in -- in the OTP. I'm not
8 sure what you mean by documents that seem favourable to the Serbian side.
9 I think there are many documents in this report in certain categories
10 that talk about, for example, casualties that the Serbs took. There are
11 references to areas that, for example, in the Croat corridor where the
12 Croats were -- had armed militarily and taken over territory there.
13 There is documents in relation to paramilitaries, for example. So I'm
14 not sure what you mean by look favourable on the side of the Serbs, but I
15 was aware of my obligations and any documents that I felt could fall in
16 that I raised to the appropriate trial attorney.
17 Q. Thank you. But did you incorporate them in your report and draw
18 the attention of the Trial Chamber to them? Do we find in your footnotes
19 documents that fall under Rule 68?
20 A. Well, I -- I included in some of the categories I've talked about
21 there areas that may potentially seem Rule 68, but I'm not a lawyer. I
22 know my obligation and I included the documents that I thought were
24 Q. So we could say that the documents disclosed to us by the OTP
25 under Rule 68 as potentially exculpatory are also to be found in your
1 report; right?
2 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm not sure that's really a question for the
3 witness, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE KWON: Witness referred to Rule 68 documents and I think
5 Mr. Karadzic is asking whether those documents are reflected in his
7 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour, I understand that. I'm just not
9 sure that Mr. Brown would be in a position to know what at the time of
10 his report the complete Rule 68 disclosure was. He said that he's --
11 I'll leave it. It's just a -- it may be beyond the scope of --
12 JUDGE KWON: Probably the witness is able to answer the question.
13 Mr. Brown -- just a second.
14 Yes, Mr. --
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [Microphone not activated] --
16 provide them.
17 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure what Rule 68 documents have been
18 provided by the Office of the Prosecutor in this case at all. That's --
19 all I can say is that when I reviewed documents, I looked at them, and if
20 there was any that I thought potentially were Rule 68, then I flagged
21 them up at the time. I can't remember specific documents, but I do know
22 that there were some areas in the report that may go to certain issues.
23 For example, the Serbs taking casualties. There were some areas that
24 were armed in the municipalities, the actions of Croats in municipalities
25 in corridor -- municipalities in -- these type of things and I include it
1 in my report.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you. But let us now forget about Rule 68. The documents
4 that you pointed out to the Prosecution as documents that are potentially
5 exculpatory as far as the 1st Krajina Corps and the Serbian politicians
6 are concerned, are they to be found in your report and in your footnotes
7 or did you just tell the OTP that such documents exist?
8 A. Well, I think in the categories I've talked about I think there
9 are references in the report.
10 Q. But you've included all such documents, all the documents that
11 you told the Prosecution were favourable to the Serbian side. Did you
12 include each one of them and provided your comment on them?
13 A. It wasn't my understanding that Rule 68 was one that was to
14 provide material favourable to the Serbian side. It's my
15 understanding - and I would have to read Rule 68 again, it was a long
16 time since I've worked here - but that it went to the potential guilt or
17 innocence of an accused. I don't remember too many documents that fell
18 under that category when I was writing the report. The report at the
19 time became, after I started writing it, became more interesting to the
20 Talic case, General Talic/Brdjanin case. And I raised any concerns I had
21 and documents in that case. But I -- it wasn't my understanding that it
22 was about providing material that's favourable to the Serbian side. As I
23 said, there were materials in there that undoubtedly portrayed some of
24 the problems that the Serbs faced. And I've included those in the report
25 in order to be as objective as I can.
1 Q. Thank you. I'm now going to put to you the following. You were
2 working for the Office of the Prosecutor in an effort to support the
3 indictment, and that's how you selected your documents. If you came
4 across a document that did not support the indictment, you reported that
5 to the OTP; but you did not include such documents, at least not all such
6 documents in your report. Correct?
7 A. I disagree with that, Mr. Karadzic.
8 Q. If you disagree, then that should mean we can find those
9 documents in your report in the footnotes accompanied with your comment.
10 A. I think I've explained, Mr. Karadzic, my position in relation to
11 Rule 68 when I was writing the report in 2002 and before.
12 Q. Yes, but it can't be that you only reported them to the
13 Prosecution and included some of them. What was your relationship
14 exactly with the OTP?
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I think that has been asked and
16 answered. Let's move on to specific topics. And further, witness denied
17 that he worked at the OTP in an effort to support the indictment.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 On two pages in the Stanisic and Zupljanin case, pages 199 and
20 200, the witness says a lot about that and I would like to include these
21 two pages in evidence with the previous exhibit number, the first six
22 lines --
23 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic. If you would like to tender that,
24 you show that and then ask the witness about it. I'm just -- I'm
25 doubting whether it is really necessary.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid it is, Your Excellency.
2 JUDGE KWON: Then put your question. Let's upload it.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D4848, page 199.
4 That's in e-court. It's the right page in e-court.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Could you please look at the first seven lines. You were asked
7 about this report from 2002; correct? Can you see the first seven lines?
8 A. Yes, I can.
9 Q. And your answer is that you sent your analysis to the party that
10 had requested it; right? That's line 10. And then in line 17, you
11 answered that the requesting party would come back to you with some
12 feedback in terms of additional requests or additional clarifications and
13 you provided them; right?
14 A. Yes. In summary, I wrote the report and completed it. There was
15 a process of some peer review internally within the military analysis
16 team, and then once I was happy with that process it was -- it was
17 disseminated to the interested party, who would read it, who read it, and
18 came back with any -- if it needed any clarification. But as I recall, I
19 don't think there were any -- too many changes at all. And, if anything,
20 it was cosmetic presentational issues or spelling issues. But I don't
21 remember any substantive changes at all.
22 Q. But anyway, the requesting party had the possibility to put their
23 objections or comments or additional requests, and that made you revise
24 your report or supplement it?
25 A. Well, they didn't have any substantive comments, and if they had
1 wanted me to change the report, I would have had to look at that quite
2 significantly and decide whether -- whether that was the case. But in
3 reality, they didn't. I wouldn't just change the report because somebody
4 else within the OTP wanted me to change it. I wouldn't have done that
5 and I didn't do that anyway.
6 Q. But in lines 17 through 20 we see that it was indeed so. You say
7 there were not many such requests, but that existed as a possibility and
8 did happen to some extent. Doesn't your answer indicate that?
9 A. Yes, but there -- the sort of comments they might have -- it was
10 a long time ago, but the comments I believe they had was a presentational
11 one. It wasn't anything to do with substance.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page, please,
13 the first six lines.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Is this correct? You accepted the claim, the assertion, made in
16 this question; right?
17 A. Yes, I think -- I think that was true. I believe that that was
18 the case. And there was some alterations I made subsequent to testimony.
19 I put some errata in and some -- a change more recently. But there
20 was -- this was not a report that the Office of the Prosecutor were
21 asking me to amend.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, 201, in
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Here you speak about the limitations, and you say there were time
2 limitations, language limitations, et cetera; correct?
3 A. Yes, that is correct, Mr. Karadzic.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can these two pages be added?
6 JUDGE KWON: Can I ask Mr. Robinson to give his observation as to
7 the usefulness or necessity or -- I don't see much difference from what
8 he's --
9 MR. ROBINSON: I think that it's better if Dr. Karadzic puts his
10 question to the witness and only refers to the transcript if the answer
11 is inconsistent with what was said in the transcript. Other than that, I
12 think it's better to just put the assertion directly to the witness and
13 only resort to the transcript in the event of an inconsistency.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please heed to that advice. I don't
15 see the necessity to receive these pages.
16 JUDGE MORRISON: And the other point, Dr. Karadzic, is it simply
17 quadruples the time that you take, and when time is of the essence, it's
18 not an efficient way of doing it.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. My intention is to
20 establish the capacity of this witness, whether he is really an expert
21 who in an unbiased and scientific way wrote his report, or is it, in
22 fact, evidence given by a member of the OTP team. And then I should ask
23 Mr. Robinson to give evidence for me.
24 JUDGE KWON: That's a totally unnecessary and unacceptable
25 statement on your part. Please move on.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. You also confirmed in the Brdjanin case that you had selected
4 documents together with your colleagues from the team - just a
5 moment - and that you were familiar with the indictment; right? You had
6 learned the indictment previously?
7 A. In the Brdjanin case I believe I did, yes.
8 Q. Thank you. In view of the fact that we recognise the language of
9 the indictment in your report and vice versa, tell me, please, did you
10 write your report after 2002? You made it after at least two indictments
11 were brought against me?
12 A. The report was completed on the date that it's noted, which I
13 think is November -- I think there were two drafts, one a few months
14 prior to that, November 2002, and I'd actually been working on the report
15 for a long time. This wasn't the only thing I was doing in the --
16 obviously the process of going through the documents and others was quite
17 time-consuming. But I'm not sure what your point is about it was written
18 after at least two indictments were brought against me. I don't know if
19 you can explain that, Mr. Karadzic.
20 Q. So were you aware of the indictments that were issued against me
21 when you started working on this report? And generally speaking
22 indictments against Serbs containing certain assertions that are repeated
23 in your report?
24 A. I was aware of an indictment or maybe more indictments I don't --
25 against you. I don't believe I read them. I wasn't working in support
1 at that time of the team that was working on this case. So your
2 indictment did not form the basis of this report at all.
3 Q. Thank you. Now, this is what I'm interested in. In the report
4 and during the examination-in-chief you made an assertion, stating that
5 what the Serbs wanted during the separation process -- to remove Croats
6 and Muslims from territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina that they thought they
7 were entitled to. Now, please help us with this: Was that incorporated
8 into the indictment as taken from your report or the other way around?
9 A. As I said, I have no idea about the issue of the compilation of
10 the indictment against you. I was aware of indictment, maybe even
11 indictments, if they were amended, against you. I wasn't working in
12 relation to that. I was working in relation to providing a report. How
13 others may have used sections of the report, I don't know. But the
14 report was written in an -- at least initially in an attempt for me to
15 understand and exploit a source of documents that the OTP had in their
16 possession. When it became clear that this might be relevant in the
17 Brdjanin/Talic case, Ms. Korner asked me to compile a report. I took
18 that away. I laid down the scope of the report, utilising the documents
19 at my disposal, and I provided the report.
20 Q. Thank you. In the Brdjanin case, right, you spoke about what
21 your share was in writing the indictments and you said that you were
22 asked for comments during the indictment process, as it were, and that
23 you provided your own contribution in this way to the writing of
24 indictments; right? I mean you did not write them up because you were
25 not a lawyer, but you did take part with your own suggestions and
1 comments that you were asked to provide; right?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: I've been -- I am not objecting. I'd like a cite
4 at this point.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then I have to waste time.
6 65 ter 22651 --
7 MR. NICHOLLS: It is not a waste of time to conduct a
8 cross-examination properly, which is to cite the witness's prior
9 statements to him.
10 JUDGE KWON: Absolutely, yes. If you cite, you have to cite
11 correctly. But let us see the page.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I recounted it.
13 65 ter 22651, page 21490 or 247 in e-court.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Please focus on this. You were asked here about the content of
16 the indictment. You said -- further down, from line 11 onwards, the
17 question ends in the following way:
18 "Did you assist in any way in drafting the indictment?"
19 And then your explanation is that you did that if you were asked
20 to provide your comments, right? This goes all the way down to line 17.
21 A. I would agree with what I've said there. I didn't draft the
22 indictment, it wasn't my function, but lawyers at some stage would come
23 and say did I have any comments on this particular issue or could I have
24 support, was there any documents that might speak to this particular
25 aspect. But it wasn't my job to write the indictment.
1 Q. But that was the only way in which you participated in creating
2 the indictment, when you were just asked to support something you would
3 find a document or you would give your comment; right?
4 A. Others created the indictment, others were working on the
5 indictment, and they may have come and said: What do you think about
6 this? Is there any documentation that might help you? I didn't write
7 the indictment.
8 Q. Thank you. In how many cases -- for how many indictments did
9 they ask for your opinion or for documents that would support the
10 indictment? Up until 2004, how many? Each and every one?
11 A. No, not each and every one. I know that in the Talic/Brdjanin
12 one there was requests. I believe in the Stakic case it had already been
13 written. I wasn't involved in the Stanisic/Zupljanin indictment. And I
14 can't remember about Mr. Krajisnik. It may well have been -- I'd have to
15 check the timings. It may well be that they asked for advice, but I
16 can't remember about the issue of the indictment for that.
17 JUDGE KWON: But not in this case, Mr. --
18 THE WITNESS: Not in this case, Your Honour, no. I have not had
19 anything to do with this.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Did they seek your advice in respect of indictments, again [as
22 interpreted] Muslim generals, Delic, Halilovic, and other commanders of
23 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24 A. No, I wasn't involved in those cases. It may have been that some
25 of my analyst colleagues might ask me for some documents or assistance
1 who were involved in those cases, but I wasn't involved at all so I
2 wasn't asked in that way.
3 Q. Thank you. Who worked on those cases? Who was your counterpart
4 in those cases?
5 A. I can't remember which of my colleagues. I know there are a
6 number -- a couple of colleagues who were working on ABiH cases, but I
7 can't remember what the division of their labour was.
8 Q. Thank you. Did you see any such report, an expert report of
9 theirs on the behaviour of the BH army?
10 A. I don't remember if they wrote reports or not. I can't remember.
11 It wasn't the focus of my work particularly, so I'm not sure. I know
12 that -- well, I -- I was going to say I believe some may have testified,
13 but I don't even want to say that because I can't remember. It was some
14 time ago. But there were colleagues working on those cases.
15 Q. Thank you. But you have not found a report akin to yours, that
16 had to do with the BH army I mean, and you don't know whether any such
17 report exists?
18 A. I'm not -- I don't know, Mr. Karadzic.
19 Q. Tell me, please, are you saying that in assessing the behaviour
20 of the 1st Krajina Corps, it was of no relevance to you whatsoever how
21 the other side was behaving, the party fighting against the
22 1st Krajina Corps?
23 A. No, it was not of no relevance. It was of relevance and there
24 are references in the Krajina Corps' own documents that make reference to
25 the activities of the ABiH. I don't doubt that in certain areas the
1 Krajina Corps was conducting some quite tough fighting against the ABiH
2 and elsewhere. I don't doubt that in even some of the municipality
3 attacks that the 1st Krajina Corps forces took some casualties. I state
4 that in the report. So it's not of no relevance, but I was utilising the
5 archive of the 1st Krajina Corps, and it makes reference to activities of
6 the ABiH which I -- in some areas I don't doubt.
7 Q. Thank you. So if you had no insight into my indictment, does
8 that mean that this particular wording that I believe is the very
9 foundation of the indictment against me, the only link, the only
10 incrimination that has to do with the chaos of the civil war and my
11 intentions, stating that we wanted to separate from the Muslims who lived
12 in our area, is that something that you established if you did not take
13 over from the indictment against me? The wording is identical, and did
14 you establish that independently of the indictment?
15 A. I had nothing to do with the writing of the indictment,
16 Mr. Karadzic. I wrote my report based on the documents that I saw. In
17 relation to the issue of separation, I think there are documents in the
18 1st Krajina Corps and elsewhere that -- having reviewed those documents
19 and reviewed the events that occurred, in particular in May, June, July,
20 August 1992, it was my analysis that separation was a critical feature
21 and that the Bosnian Serbs wished to establish their own state, they
22 wanted to separate from the Muslim and Croat communities, and that also
23 included as a result the removal of non-Serbs from the territory that
24 they wished to control. And I analysed -- reached that conclusion based
25 on the documents in the 1st Krajina Corps and elsewhere. How that links
1 to the indictment is not one I can answer. I was not involved in the
2 drafting of this indictment against you, Mr. Karadzic.
3 Q. Thank you. Did you conclude that on the basis of what was
4 happening during those months of the war or did you find programmes,
5 decisions, on the basis of which this happened and did that lead you to
6 that conclusion? So was it induction or deduction?
7 A. I think I've answered the question, Mr. Karadzic. Documents such
8 as the 16th Assembly Session, references in the 1st Krajina Corps about
9 separation, the actions and results of operations in May, June, and July
10 identified in many of the 1 Krajina Corps documents led me to the
11 conclusion about this issue of separation.
12 Q. Since you mention this in this transcript, did I say at the
13 Assembly that the Drina should not be a boundary between two Serb states
14 or between two worlds?
15 A. If I can have a second to refresh myself on the documents.
16 Q. Look at page 7 of the transcript as well, the last paragraph in
17 Serbian -- no, no, page 8.
18 A. From the minutes that I've got here, it states that you
19 articulated at the session:
20 "The third strategic goal is to establish the corridor on the
21 Drina valley, that is, elimination of the Drina as a border between two
22 worlds. We are on both sides of the Drina and our strategic interests
23 and living space are there. We now see a possibility for some Muslim
24 municipalities to be set up along the Drina as enclaves in order for them
25 to achieve their rights, but that belt along the Drina must basically
1 belong to the Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina. As much as it is
2 strategically useful for us in a positive way, it helps us by damaging
3 the interests of our enemy in establishing a corridor which would connect
4 them to the Muslim international and render this area permanently
6 Q. So, Mr. Brown, what are these two worlds that I'm referring to in
7 relation to the Drina as a boundary? Or more specifically, do you accept
8 that, traditionally, Drina was considered to be the boundary between the
9 East and the West, between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, and that this is
10 repeated in many interviews, documents, discussions?
11 A. I'm not aware of that. It's not exactly clear from your
12 statement what that means. It could be read that if it's true that the
13 Drina was seen historically as some boundary between East and West, that
14 by controlling that area, that is, having Serbs on both sides of the
15 Drina, it would no longer be such a boundary.
16 Q. Thank you. Are you familiar with the explanation I provided on
17 Serb TV in 1993, what that strategic objective means? I explained,
18 before Maas tricht at that, that in Europe all the borders are going to
19 be soft, so that should be a soft border too. That is what I explicitly
20 said television. Krajisnik and I gave an interview on television.
21 A. Are you able to show that to me so I could read it?
22 Q. Well, I do hope that we will be in a position to put it to you on
23 Tuesday. I'm not prepared to do it now, but this does complete the
24 picture. In response to a question put by a journalist in 1993, what
25 this third strategic objective was, my answer was: All of Europe is
1 going to have soft borders. Izetbegovic agreed that on the Una and the
2 Drina borders should not be needed, and I explained that there would be
3 no border restrictions on that border like, very soon, all of Europe
4 would not have any border restrictions. You didn't know that; right?
5 A. Well, I don't know those comments that you made in 1993. What I
6 do know, at least reading the documents including directive four which
7 was found in the Krajina Corps collection, was that the Drina Corps was
8 tasked with driving out -- destroying the forces -- Muslim forces in the
9 Cerska Valley and forcing the civilian population to leave, that there
10 were documents preceding that of meetings we talked about yesterday, that
11 there were Drina Corps instructions following that, including a meeting,
12 that there were documents from the Drina Corps itself echoing that
13 objective, and operations were put in place in November and December 1992
14 on the Drina with that objective. And it would -- and that actually went
15 on into the early months of 1993. And it would seem to me from reading
16 those documents and also the articulation at the Assembly session that by
17 that time, in November 1993 [sic], the objectives set before the military
18 were to seize control of the Cerska Valley and the Drina valley in order
19 for the Serbs to take that area, and obviously with Serbia being on the
20 other side, that that land would be controlled by them.
21 And certainly from operational directive four, the inference --
22 in fact, the stated objective is to cause the civilian population to
23 leave, which would seem to me, again, to indicate that it was not just a
24 case of militarily defeating an armed group in the Drina valley, but that
25 in order to take permanent control of that, individuals, Muslims or
1 non-Serbs, would be driven out and that that's what the objective, set
2 the military at the end of 1993 in the Drina valley, was.
3 But I can't comment on what you may have said publicly in your
4 press statements in 1993.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Brown, did you find that Drina Corps document in
6 the Banja Luka collection as well?
7 THE WITNESS: The operational directive four was --
8 JUDGE KWON: You said -- you referred to a document which
9 Drina Corps issued itself.
10 THE WITNESS: No, that was a document that was shown to me in a
11 statement a couple of years ago, I believe in 2010. There was a series
12 of document seizures, I believe, of the Drina Corps, and although
13 operational directive four was found in the -- which I cite in my report,
14 was found in the Drina Corps collection, I was asked to comment later on
15 on whether those documents added to my understanding of how directives
16 worked. And it seemed to me that it was quite similar to how
17 directive one had been pushed down in June with those issues of
18 preliminary meetings or meetings, directives being sent, instructions
19 being acted upon down at corps level and with subordinate formations.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
21 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic, five minutes before we take the
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Brown, it is with great pleasure that we are going to shed
1 more light on this on Tuesday. We are not in a position today, to do so
2 today. You will see that your conclusions are totally wrong and that
3 it's actually the other way around.
4 But please focus on the third objective now. Is it correct that
5 in that Drina River valley that you are speaking about, what is envisaged
6 is that there would be Muslim municipalities in Republika Srpska?
7 A. It would seem from your comment at the 16th Assembly Session,
8 Mr. Karadzic, that at that time you may have countenanced the idea of
9 having some Muslim enclaves in the Drina valley. That does not seem to
10 have been the case come November 1993 -- sorry, 1992, with operational
11 directive four.
12 Q. We'll get back to that. Do you know that in almost all the plans
13 that we accepted, what was envisaged was that there should be Muslims in
14 the Drina River valley even after the fighting for Cerska, that they
15 would be there either as enclaves in Republika Srpska or as part of the
16 Muslim constituent unit. Did you know about that?
17 A. I was not aware of that and operational directive four doesn't
18 seem to imply that either. Nor -- nor does the Drina Corps' own
19 instruction based on directive four.
20 Q. And if I put it to you now, Mr. Brown, that the fighting in the
21 Drina valley was not motivated by our ambition for them not to have a
22 municipality, their own municipalities there, but rather motivated by the
23 unbearable shooting at our troops and our people in the back. In 1993 we
24 simply could not take it any longer, to have fighting against us take
25 place in our rear. And even after 1993 we accepted that they would have
1 their own territories there. Are you aware of that?
2 A. I'm not aware of all the details in the Drina valley, but I am
3 aware that the Muslim forces in that area conducted operations that I
4 believe did involve destruction of Serbian villages. I do believe that
5 they had a degree of success. Whether operational directive four was
6 based on that in order to stop that, it's not an area that I've looked at
7 in detail. But it would seem to me, irrespective of what had happened
8 and what was going on, that there came a time in November 1992 that the
9 VRS Main Staff pushed out an operational directive, indicating that the
10 Muslim forces in the Cerska Valley were to be driven out along with the
11 civilian population and that that was echoed by a Drina Corps order
12 themselves based on that directive and that they conducted operations in
13 November and December based on that. They were not successful, I
14 believe, at least not quickly. And then there were the issues of the UN
15 safe havens into 1993. But that is my understanding of operations in the
16 Drina valley in late 1992.
17 I don't doubt that the Muslim forces were conducting operations
18 in there at that time and I believe that there were some burning and
19 destruction and probably killing of Serbs in that area, but irrespective,
20 what I can tell you is that operational directive was sent out in
21 November 1992, as I've indicated.
22 Q. Well, now that you've brought up that directive - but I hope that
23 on Tuesday we'll shed more light on all of this - does that directive say
24 that the army should leave, taking the people along, or the other way
25 around? I understand that you may not be able to make a distinction
1 because you don't know the Serbian language, but should the army leave
2 with the people or should the people leave with the army?
3 A. Is it possible to have directive four put up on the screen, sir?
4 Q. During the break. Feel free to do it during the break --
5 JUDGE KWON: Then let's take a break now. We'll --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I just put one question now?
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Objective one, do you distinguish between ethnic separation and
9 state separation, ethnic on the one hand, state on the other?
10 A. It is possible you could read directive one as a separation of
11 states, but it would seem to me that other comments in the -- by yourself
12 included, such as: We do not want to have large numbers of individuals
13 in our state who are against that state; and comments by other delegates
14 at the session who were talking about the issue of resettlement and the
15 moving of Serbs and non-Serbs within Bosnia and also the seeming
16 awareness or warning by General Mladic about this issue of resettlement,
17 that this is not simply about the division of Bosnia into states, that
18 there is going to be internal resettlement within RS territory. And it
19 would seem to me that that was borne-out by a number of the Krajina Corps
20 documents literally weeks later that we just discussed, individuals being
21 moved into camps in large numbers, permanent deregistration references.
22 It is possible if you take your comment with strategic goal number one on
23 its own --
24 Q. We'll get to that, we'll get to that, please, before the break do
25 focus on whether I said separation of states there --
1 JUDGE KWON: No, but --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] States --
3 JUDGE KWON: -- do not interrupt the witness from answering the
4 question. You --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question was not that
6 comprehensive. My question was only whether there is a distinction
7 between ethnic separation and state separation.
8 JUDGE KWON: No, I don't -- I agree with the witness expanding to
9 some extent.
10 Would you like -- do you wish to complete your answer, Mr. Brown?
11 THE WITNESS: Only to read out what is said at that section which
13 "The first goal is separation from the other two national
14 communities, separation of states," but it goes on to say, "separation
15 from those who are our enemies and who have used every opportunity,
16 especially this century, to attack us and it would continue with such
17 practices if we were to stay together in the same state," and then there
18 are a number of -- two other references in the same speech by
19 Mr. Karadzic about this issue of having large numbers of individuals
20 within the state who were against that state.
21 So on the one hand, if you take it out, yes, it does say
22 separation of states; but I think in reality, from the comments of others
23 and what happens subsequent to this Assembly session within the weeks
24 later, this is not just about: We will have a -- you know, Bosnia will
25 be divided into a number of states, but it's talking about separation
1 internally. And it's clear that the 1st Krajina Corps, from some of
2 their documents, indicate that -- that separation means separation from
3 individuals, Muslims and -- or non-Serbs, Muslims, and Croats in the
4 Krajina, not just separation of Bosnia into a number of states.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Thank you. It is with pleasure that we are going to prove that
7 it is not that way.
8 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for an hour and resume at half
9 past 1.00.
10 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 1.31 p.m.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Before we come to the substance of your report, sir, I wanted to
16 ask: In your testimony in earlier cases, did anyone point any errors out
17 to you and have you made all the necessary corrections for my trial?
18 A. Yes, I believe there was one or two points that were raised in
19 previous testimonies, and, where I thought appropriate, I made some
20 changes and I think these are included in the errata sheet.
21 Q. Thank you. But please look at paragraph 1.17, both Mr. Ackerman,
22 the Defence counsel, and the Trial Chamber pointed out to you that this
23 footnote number 17 does not reflect what you had stated about the
24 5th Corps and its intentions. Is that correct? And the same language
25 without any corrections remains in the current report. I can refresh
1 your memory if you wish, but I'm trying to save time. It was put to you
2 that the objectives of the 5th Corps do not follow from the document on
3 which you relied; right?
4 A. I think I would have to read the whole context and it may well be
5 that I hadn't amended that particular part. I hadn't got my transcript
6 of my previous testimony, which was quite a long time ago. I remember in
7 that trial Mr. Ackerman raising a number of issues. Again, it's a long
8 time ago, but I may well have conceded that there was an error there or
9 it needed adjusting, and maybe I haven't done it, but I'd really have to
10 go through the whole thing to have a look.
11 Q. Then we will have to look briefly at 65 ter 2261, page 430 in
12 e-court. The page of the transcript is 21493 or 430 in e-court. We can
13 show just one page. There is no Serbian version. Lines 17 through 25.
14 Does this now refresh your memory -- wait a minute. That's it,
15 yes. Do you recall this now?
16 A. I don't recall it, but it's quite a long time ago --
17 JUDGE KWON: Let him read it. If you're done, let us know to
18 move to the next page.
19 THE WITNESS: Is the next page possible, Your Honour.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Lines 6 through 9. And then
21 three pages further. And that's page 434 in e-court, beginning with
22 line 18.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. When you are ready, I can call the next page.
25 A. Can you go to the next page.
1 Q. Up to line 15, ending with the words of Judge Agius and your
3 Did you accommodate this and make the corrections for my trial?
4 A. No, I didn't. If I had access to the transcripts and been able
5 to read through it and also had access to additional documents, I might
6 have looked again at it and either amended my comment or reinforced it
7 with additional footnotes. But I wasn't in that position nor had I
8 remembered that this was something that had come up during that trial.
9 Q. Thank you. I leave it to the Trial Chamber whether they wish to
10 admit these pages, although it would be a good idea, I think.
11 Have you also heard any comment on paragraph 1.112 regarding the
12 staff of the AR Krajina concerning what you stated, that on the
13 14th of April, 1992, this Crisis Staff existed and operated?
14 A. Is it possible to have this up as well?
15 JUDGE KWON: While we move on to that topic, I think it's
16 necessary to receive this Brdjanin transcript part.
17 Mr. Robinson.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, I agree.
19 JUDGE KWON: But it's awkward to have a confidential part as well
20 as public part. How about replacing the previous confidential part with
21 this one -- the previous one I don't think is necessary.
22 MR. ROBINSON: I agree.
23 JUDGE KWON: No objection, Mr. Nicholls?
24 MR. NICHOLLS: No, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will -- these pages will replace the --
1 what's the number?
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1932, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the same document can we see
5 21540. In e-court it's page 477. Lines 23 through 25 and then we move
6 on to the next page.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. When you've read it, I'll ask for the next page.
9 A. Just 23 to 25, yes, I've read that.
10 Q. And now please read up to line 16 ending with the words "Assembly
11 documents." In fact, you can continue up to line 25.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down a bit.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. When you are done you can ask for the next page -- for the first
15 five lines on the next page.
16 A. Yes, I've read that section.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please, lines 1
18 through 5.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Did you agree, in this passage, that the Crisis Staff of
21 AR Krajina did not exist on the 14th of April, 1992 -- in fact, it
22 existed in April but not the whole month of April and have you corrected
23 that for my case?
24 A. I would have to check the documents, but I think the Crisis Staff
25 did not exist as it was formed in early May. I would probably have to go
1 back to my paragraph and back to the documents there, but I didn't amend
2 this section.
3 Q. Thank you. Let's move on. It was also put to you that in
4 paragraph 1.113 there are certain errors and you accepted that,
5 especially in footnotes 177 and 178, where it is stated -- I'll read it.
6 [In English] "General Lieutenant-Colonel Mladic ordered that
7 contacts be established with the president of the Autonomous Region of
8 Krajina. General-Major Talic was a member of the ARK Crisis Staff,
9 briefed the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina on military
10 situation, sent his staff officers to RS [sic] meetings, assisted ARK
11 personnel in the execution of their tasks ..."
12 [Interpretation] Do you recall that at that point you agreed that
13 certain things in the report were not correct and that you need to amend
15 A. Is it possible to scroll down where that -- where I said that?
16 Q. I think it's page 2 -- it's a different page, 479. It could be
17 this page. In the transcript it's 21542. Look at the passage beginning
18 with line 11, up to line 15, and then we move on to the next page.
19 12 through 15. If you've read it, we can look at the next page.
20 A. 12 through 15 on the English translation, the one that's in --
21 that's on my screen?
22 Q. [In English] Question -- well -- the answer:
24 [Interpretation] 11 through 15.
25 A. Okay.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Again, from line 11 to the bottom of page. There is a reference
4 to the use of the plural and it concerns footnote 178. And then we can
5 turn the page.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown the bottom
7 of the page, please.
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, this is -- are we still on the bit about the
9 plurals, Mr. Karadzic?
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Yes. Somebody is emphasising the plural there and then let's see
12 the next page to see what you said, that's 481, and also the next page,
13 lines 18 through 20. When you wish to go to the next page, let me know.
14 Lines 18 through 20; right?
15 A. Mm-hmm.
16 Q. Next page, please. Lines 4 through 9. When you are ready, we
17 want to look at just three more lines on the next page.
18 A. Could I see the top of the document, please. And the bottom of
19 the document, please.
20 Q. And the next page. Would you please look at the first three
21 lines. You accepted that on the basis of this document your conclusion
22 could not, in fact, be drawn. Did you correct this mistake? You have it
23 in hard copy, 1.113 on the errata sheet.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Is the part we're at now -- the part Mr. Karadzic
1 started off with on page 77, is this the part allegedly where the witness
2 stated that there were things in the report that were not correct and
3 that he needed to amend it? Is that what this passage -- we're talking
4 about the same thing because we've gone through a lot of pages and I
5 haven't gotten to this point yet which is where we started.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 49 in e-court and the
7 paragraph is 1.113 and then we go further down the transcript and we come
8 to the point where the witness said:
9 "On the basis of this document, no."
10 THE WITNESS: I'm a little bit lost, Your Honours, because it's
11 quite a lot of pages. I think the question may be here asking whether I
12 know what the delegation was about based on that reference. And I said
13 on the basis of the document I don't know what the delegation was about.
14 I'm not sure -- I would have to go through the transcript and I would
15 have to go through the document, I'm not sure whether the footnote was
16 making the general comment that Talic assisted members of the ARK. I
17 wasn't making a comment that I knew what the ARK members in this area
18 were doing. But Mr. Karadzic has shown me a lot of sections quite
19 quickly and I'm -- it's quite a long time since I testified in that case.
20 I did make one change in the errata sheet on the plural issue
21 which was something Mr. Ackerman had asked me and that's on one of the
22 errata sheets. It was "a member" not "members." But I think I would
23 have to go through it all, really, and -- to see what -- to make sense of
24 it, I think.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. If I can be of assistance, two pages earlier you said:
2 [In English] "Directly stated on this document it doesn't say
3 that this was a task of the ARK. What it does say is that Mr. Brdjanin
4 is heading a delegation into this area."
5 [Interpretation] And on the next page Judge Agius says:
6 [In English] "But Mr. Ackerman is also correct in his suggestions
7 that that does not follow from the document itself from the face of the
9 The witness, line 7:
10 "It doesn't state that specifically, that it was an ARK task ..."
11 [Interpretation] The last thing on the next page beginning with
12 line 1:
13 [In English] "You have no idea that this delegation was about --
14 what this delegation was about ... You would have no idea what they were
16 "A. On the basis of this document, no."
17 [Interpretation] And your corrigendum says:
18 [In English] "... the members of the ARK Crisis Staff accompanied
19 the visit." [Interpretation] And so on.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: Okay. I'm sorry, but just trying to keep some
21 accuracy in the questions being put to the witness, if we're on
22 page 21547 of the transcript, if we look at lines 19 and 20, this chain
23 of cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman ends and he moves on to his next
24 question. Where is the portion Mr. Karadzic put to the witness and told
25 the witness that he had said he agreed that things in the report were not
1 correct and that he needed to amend them, which is where we started?
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
3 Q. Well, let us look at this question in line 22 which links up --
4 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm sorry, maybe I can cut this short. Does
5 Mr. Karadzic concede that the witness did not, in fact, say that in this
6 portion of his testimony in relation to that paragraph?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think this question too relates
8 to paragraph 1.113 which establishes a link between the Crisis Staff of
9 Krajina and military structures --
10 JUDGE KWON: No, no. Why don't we let the witness answer, if
11 he's able to.
12 Have you read the page -- transcript pages? Would you like to
13 read them from the beginning?
14 THE WITNESS: I think there's been a bit of to-ing and fro-ing,
15 so I'm not sure what question relates to which document and which of my
16 answers relates to which one.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, I'm sorry to interrupt. I have hard
18 copies and he can leaf through them. It might be easier than on the
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, why don't you hand them over to the witness if
21 the Defence doesn't object to that.
22 Yes, let's do that.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: Could they please tell me -- I'm not sure myself
24 which pages I should exactly -- they would like me to give to the
1 JUDGE KWON: I think --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, for instance, can we see 491
3 in e-court.
4 JUDGE KWON: Transcript page, 21554.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Lines 23 through 25, the comment by
6 Judge Agius, 21554 I think.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Look at these three lines where the Judge wants 100 per cent
9 accuracy if something is to be admitted. And then -- next page, please.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Okay, but now we're on a completely different
11 topic, a completely different question that was put to the witness.
12 Mr. Ackerman has moved on. We are not talking about the same line of
13 questioning which was put to the witness in the beginning. So there is a
14 reason why this is not perhaps clear for the witness. We've now moved to
15 a different question, where it's being put to the witness by Mr. Ackerman
16 that something is not right.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry if I'm rushed, but my
18 question to the witness is: Does he believe that he made satisfactory
19 corrections to paragraph 1.113, especially regarding the plural, and then
20 we can move on.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's really difficult to follow. Why
22 don't you put yourself the question which was posed by Ackerman and see
23 how the witness answers, or let him read the transcript entirely for
24 himself and put your question instead of reading just piece by piece so
25 that the witness have difficulty following your question.
1 So what pages would you like the witness to read?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] According to my records, the pages
3 in e-court are 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, and 484 on this issue. Page in
4 the transcript is 21542, that's the beginning. In all these pages there
5 are references to paragraph 1.113 and the interpretation of Mazowiecki's
6 visit and the link between --
7 JUDGE KWON: So why don't we give him -- hand over to the witness
8 six pages, probably, from 21542. It will not take so long time for the
9 witness to read that part.
10 Do you have them with you? Or otherwise we can print them out.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: I have them, Your Honour, and for the record, then
12 I'm going to hand to the usher 21541 from the Brdjanin case through
13 21547, which is at least that first --
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: -- portion of the questioning.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 Could you wait and be patient until Mr. Brown --
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to state the line
19 numbers in order to cut time short if necessary.
20 JUDGE KWON: It will only confuse the witness. Let him read out
21 and then you can put your question.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It relates to the first part of
23 paragraph 1.113.
24 Could we conclude with the first part which ends with "On the
25 basis of this document, no," and then I'd like to put a question and then
1 we can move on to the next part of that paragraph.
2 The first part ends at 21547, the first three lines.
3 JUDGE KWON: Have you done the reading, Mr. Brown, of the
5 THE WITNESS: I think I've finished.
6 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. My question is this: It was my understanding that it was pointed
9 out to you that based on this document you don't know what the task was
10 of the delegation headed by Mr. Brdjanin and that this was something that
11 should have been amended. Have a look at paragraph 1.113 from your
12 errata sheet and it appears you haven't done so. Is that correct?
13 A. I think I would have to look at the documents again, but from the
14 transcript it seemed that the reference I was using was there to
15 highlight that the military were giving some assistance to members of the
16 ARK. Now, I used the word "personnel" and Mr. Ackerman felt that I
17 should use -- there should have been more -- that's plural. Maybe that
18 could have been amended, I'm not sure.
19 And then Mr. Ackerman asks that it's not clear from the
20 delegation about what the nature of that delegation is. I didn't use the
21 reference to show the nature of the delegation's task; I used it to show
22 that a member of the ARK was given assistance, in this case was given a
23 pass allowing this delegation headed by a senior member of the ARK into a
24 zone of combat during Operation Corridor. It wasn't at that time a
25 reference to know, necessarily, what the -- that the document itself
1 tells the reader exactly what the delegation's job was. I can speculate
2 or analyse about what that may have been. I would assume that it was in
3 relation to Mr. Brdjanin wanting to visit the area of the corridor which
4 was seen as important in order for him to avail himself of the situation
5 on the ground. I know that he did that in Kotor Varos too.
6 But Mr. Ackerman was right, the document doesn't say what the --
7 specify the exact nature of the task. But I wasn't highlighting the
8 document there to bring that point out. It was a simple reference of an
9 example where General Talic was assisting a member of the ARK
10 Crisis Staff, in this case Mr. Brdjanin. I would -- it's a discussion
11 that I don't remember and I would have had to maybe look at it again and
12 amend it -- if I needed to amend it, maybe saying "an individual" rather
13 than "personnel," I would do that.
14 But it strikes me that the discussion was two-fold. One was on
15 the issue of whether I should have used the word "personnel," and one was
16 on the issue of whether the task that Mr. Brdjanin was doing was ARK
17 business or whether that task was specified in the pass that had been
18 authorised by General Talic. And as I say, I think the reference relates
19 to an example whereby General Talic was assisting a member of the ARK --
20 maybe even members of the ARK if they were in the delegation.
21 Q. In your view, providing a pass amounts to providing assistance;
22 is that so?
23 A. Yes, I would say it would. It was a zone of combat. If you
24 notice the area at the time, it was -- I believe the pass was on the
25 26th of June or at least maybe the visit was due for the 26th of June.
1 Operation Corridor had been launched on the 24th of June. I believe it
2 succeeded in achieving the aim of securing a route a day or two after
3 that. So the date of the pass, the fact that it's in a zone of combat,
4 the fact that it's in the corridor, I believe, I think is of some note,
5 and the fact that General Talic is willing to have those individuals
6 visit that area I think may be of some note too. Presumably the
7 delegation could not have gone there without the assistance of
8 General Talic.
9 Q. Did the Merhamet and the Caritas as well as the Croatian [as
10 interpreted] society Dobrotvor and a number of other convoys and
11 journalists receive the same kind of assistance? Did you take note of
12 the fact that it was allowed to many, not just to members of the ARK?
13 A. I don't know about Merhamet and Caritas particularly. I am aware
14 that there were visits of journalists. We've referenced a couple earlier
15 on with visits to camps, and those presumably would have required
16 authority and agreement. But I'm not aware of those -- the processes.
17 JUDGE KWON: We'll add Brdjanin transcript pages from 2152 -- I
18 should have said 21542 to 21547 to Exhibit D1932.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you --
20 JUDGE KWON: I said 21 -- from 21542.
21 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Please look at the second part of your paragraph 1.113.
25 [In English] "Conversely, decisions or discussions of the ARK
1 Crisis Staff meetings and other regional level bodies impacted on or were
2 related to military activity."
3 [Interpretation] Do you recall that both Defence and Judge Agius
4 confronted you with a number of imprecisions with regard to the
5 footnotes. If you have the entire document, it is e-court page 8 --
6 sorry, 482 and -- sorry, 484, 21547 in the Brdjanin, lines 22 to 25, and
7 then the next page. It has to do with the camps you mention in
8 footnote 184 as something that the Crisis Staff was involved in.
9 Lines 22 through 25, and then next page, the first ten lines.
10 JUDGE KWON: I think it's included in the pages Mr. Nicholls
11 handed over to you --
12 THE WITNESS: Oh --
13 JUDGE KWON: -- last two pages. Check whether it's transcript
14 page 21547 and 8.
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, I've got that, Your Honour. Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: I think he read and you can put your question,
17 Mr. Karadzic.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Did you take into account this serious objection by Judge Agius
20 and did you include it in the errata sheets pertaining to my case? Have
21 a look at paragraph 113.
22 [In English] Containing the phrase: "These included, for
23 example ..."
24 [Interpretation] Et cetera. Are you content, does it meet the
25 requirements of what Judge Agius expected of you?
1 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether the witness should need -- need
2 to read further pages.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. I just wanted to ask whether
4 the things Judge Agius pointed out, as well as the things pointed out by
5 the Defence, made its way into any corrections.
6 JUDGE KWON: I don't see the point Judge Agius made, if any.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Please look at page 487 then in e-court. In actual fact it is
9 page -- please bear with me --
10 JUDGE KWON: I think he needs two or three pages further.
11 Do you have it, Mr. Nicholls?
12 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm looking, Your Honours. I'm not sure exactly
13 which reference Mr. Karadzic is talking about -- oh, I see.
14 THE ACCUSED: I am reading this -- [Interpretation] And then you
15 say in line 9.
16 [In English] "... maybe I should have articulated the paragraph
17 in a better way ..." [Interpretation] Line 11.
18 [In English] "... maybe I should have made it more clear in
19 relation to which was a decision and which was a discussion."
20 [Interpretation] 21550, line 21, you say that it was
21 insufficiently clear and you apologise for that. On the next page it is
22 the first eight lines that I want to look at. Judge Agius made a remark.
23 Once you've gone through that, you can indicate for us to go to the next
24 page, please.
25 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I've only -- on hard copy only got up to
1 548 --
2 JUDGE KWON: It's coming, but it was on the e-court.
3 THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry, sir.
4 JUDGE KWON: So, it's coming in hard copy.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: So now I'm handing the witness 21549 to 21552.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. 21550 and then the next one is 21551.
9 JUDGE KWON: While the witness is reading the transcript.
10 Mr. Robinson, we -- I think we have lost substantive --
11 substantial amount of time due to some amateurish style of questioning by
12 the accused. If you could give him some advice as to how to put
13 questions in relation to these kind of matters.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, we've discussed this, and I
15 was actually thinking about if this issue of the erratas is going to go
16 much further, it might be better to give the witness some homework and
17 have the questioning on that topic resume on Tuesday.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd be grateful for that. I can
20 say immediately what the pages and paragraphs in my view were not
21 amended. It is this one, so 1.113, 1.114 --
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Let us wait and then let's deal with
23 this questioning. Let us proceed.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please --
25 JUDGE KWON: I think -- have you read the --
1 THE WITNESS: I think I have.
2 JUDGE KWON: -- pages --
3 THE WITNESS: Or at least enough of it, sir.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Did you take into account Judge Agius' position and did you enter
8 appropriate corrections in the errata sheets as regards the second part
9 of paragraph 1.113?
10 A. I don't know if I did. I don't believe I did. And it was a long
11 time ago when I did this and it wasn't something I remembered. I would
12 be more than happy to take another look at it. I would be more than
13 happy to look at the documents and the footnotes and I would be more than
14 happy to amend the report if necessary.
15 Q. Could I ask you, then, to read out the numbers of paragraphs,
16 1.114. In the Brdjanin case you were asked about that at page 495, 496,
17 and 497. That is Mr. Agius discussing there. It also includes pages 498
18 and 499 --
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the witness does not have access to
20 e-court. Could you identify the transcript pages.
21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour --
22 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, maybe if we could ask the witness
23 to stay about five minutes after today and we can provide this
24 information to him without taking up the Chamber's time.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: That's just what I was going to suggest, is that
2 the Defence could print the pages of the transcript. I'd like a copy,
3 too, since we're now in cross.
4 JUDGE KWON: Of course.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: And that they could be given to the witness at the
7 JUDGE KWON: You do not have any objection to that step of
9 MR. NICHOLLS: No, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's proceed in that way, then. Then
11 let us move on.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. This will be
13 of much assistance.
14 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime we will add those - how many
15 pages? - eight -- seven or eight pages to Exhibit D1932.
16 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe it will be more clear
18 after -- I think it will be clearer on Tuesday after we have submitted
19 our notes.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. I wanted to ask you something about a more important topic which
22 goes to the gist of your report. It begins with paragraph 1.43. In that
23 paragraph you say that - and you quote me - that it is [as interpreted]
24 clearly indicated that non-Serb population was an enemy in the past and
25 that they will continue to be an enemy .
1 You can have a look at the entire paragraph. I hope you have it.
2 Next you quote me.
3 [In English] "Karadzic, himself, declared that 'We do not want to
4 get a state which has a huge number of those who are against that
5 state' ..."
6 [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, is this the basis on which you
7 concluded that we were against the non-Serb part of the population?
8 A. That's not the sole basis. I'm not sure I would phrase it that
9 we were against the non-Serb population in that way. What I was saying
10 is that you, yourself, at the 16th Assembly Session on more than one
11 occasion indicated that the non-Serb population -- well, you stated that
12 they were your historic enemy and would continue to be if they stayed in
13 the same state, but you also indicated there was a danger of including in
14 that state too many enemies who would work against that state. You also
15 said in relation to territory that you didn't -- that we must also put an
16 end to the Serbian megalomania of trying to include as many of our
17 enemies in our areas as possible, especially as much territory as
18 possible. And you also mention that we shouldn't take what is
19 ours - that's a phrase that you used.
20 So I didn't base it solely on the comments that you made but also
21 on the comments that others made at that Assembly session.
22 But then there clearly were the activities and comments in the
23 Krajina Corps after this that led me to the impression that that was the
24 case, that -- if you look at the language in the Krajina Corps
25 instruction of the 21st, a morale report, it's very forceful language,
1 it's very Serb-centric. I think I said that there wasn't too much
2 tolerance in it. And I think when you put all those together as well as
3 the notifications of what happened within weeks of this Assembly session,
4 I think it was clear that the non-Serb population were seen as enemies
5 and that there weren't to be many of them within Bosnian Serb territory.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Transcript page 91, lines -- I lost
8 it. -- line 19 in the inverted comma it should read "Karadzic clearly
9 indicated" instead of "it is clearly indicated."
10 That sentence, if I draw your attention to that sentence in the
11 1.43, "Karadzic clearly indicated that non-Serb population had been their
12 enemies in the past, were currently their enemies and would continue to
13 be so if they remained within the same state," but I don't see any
15 THE WITNESS: That was when, Your Honour, Mr. Karadzic spoke
16 about the strategic goals and when he articulated each of the goals in
17 turn, he mentioned strategic goal 1, the Serbian side in
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Presidency, the government, the Council for
19 National Security which we have set up have formulated the strategic
20 priorities, that is to say, the strategic goals for the Serbian people.
21 "The first such goal is separation from the other two national
22 communities - separation of states. Separation from those who are our
23 enemies and who have continued --" sorry, "who have used every
24 opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us and who would
25 continue with such practices if they were -- if we were to stay together
1 in the same state."
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Now, let us try to shed some light on this. Did you realise that
6 I was constantly advocating that Serbs should not take up more territory
7 than rightfully belongs to them and that King Aleksandar was mistaken in
8 wanting a great state, whereas other peoples did not want it?
9 A. Mr. Karadzic, I'm not aware that you constantly advocated that
10 Serbs shouldn't take up more territory than rightfully yours, as in
11 "constantly" being the operative phrase. Reading the 16th Session, I do
12 think you do make comments about not taking territory that is not
13 rightfully yours, presumably meaning rightfully Serb. I think one of the
14 phrases you say after you've announced the strategic goals is this one:
15 "We must also put an end to the Serbian megalomania of trying to
16 include as many of our enemies in our areas as possible, especially as
17 much territory as possible, as many hills and brooks, regardless of
18 whether they are fertile or not."
19 A number of the delegates at the Assembly session were talking
20 about areas which may have been deemed difficult to take or hold or --
21 and maybe you were more cautious in that respect.
22 As to the words "constantly advocating taking up of more
23 territory than rightfully" yours, I can't comment on that. I do see that
24 comment at the Assembly session and there was that comment about -- that
25 we talked about earlier on in the military documents where soldiers were
1 a bit unhappy about the possibility of having to trade back certain
2 territory. But as to the phrase "constantly advocating taking territory
3 that's not rightfully" yours, I can't really comment. I can say that
4 there were some echos of that at the 16th Assembly Session, but the point
5 of the Assembly session to me seemed to be it was a demarcation of what
6 territory the leadership, including yourself, Mr. Karadzic, believed
7 should be yours, meaning Serb.
8 There was a phrase that you used as well not long after that
9 quote about compact territory and, you know, need to have a compact -- a
10 compact territory. Whether that helps or not, I don't know, but ...
11 Q. Thank you. Let me ask you now: Do you know that before this
12 session on the 18th of March, I accepted the idea that the Serbian
13 constituent unit would have around 43 per cent of the territory of Bosnia
14 and Herzegovina. I think that question can be answered with a yes or no.
15 Do you know that I did accept that?
16 A. I don't know that and I don't know the details. I know there
17 were discussions with Mr. Cutileiro and plans being formulated in March
18 and prior to that, in fact, but I'm not aware of that figure.
19 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that you were able to ascertain that
20 every deputy to the Assembly wanted his own constituency to be part of
21 the Serbian Republic and that we had to include also all of the areas
22 where the Serbs were a majority and I was fighting that sort of
24 A. I would agree one or two of the deputies at the 16th Assembly
25 Session felt that they should have territory included. I think there's a
1 reference to Tuzla at one stage, some of the areas up in the corridor,
2 too, which were not predominantly Serb. But I wouldn't agree with you
3 that you only included areas where Serbs were a majority. In fact,
4 Prijedor, I believe, was not a municipality where Serbs were a majority.
5 Bosanska Krupa was not a municipality where Serbs were a majority, as I
6 remember. I think Sanski Most, it may have been even but maybe was not
7 overwhelming Serb. I would have to check. And certainly as things
8 developed in 1992, in the summer in particular, many of the
9 municipalities that were not majority Serb were taken over irrespective.
10 Some of the corridor municipalities were predominantly non-Serb. Doboj,
11 I believe, was a municipality that was not predominantly Serb.
12 So I would disagree with your view that you were only
13 advocating - you, yourself, that is - from what I've read, you were only
14 advocating that municipalities that were predominantly Serb were to be
15 part of the RS territory.
16 Q. Mr. Brown, would you agree that in the eventuality of a peaceful
17 solution, the objectives would be one set, whereas in case of a solution
18 by war there would be a different set of objectives? Just yes or no, is
19 that understandable?
20 A. I cannot answer the question in a yes-or-no manner, Mr. Karadzic.
21 This -- if you're implying that the strategic goals were somehow simply
22 political statements to be used in a political arena separate to what was
23 going to be happening militarily, I would disagree with you completely.
24 I think the strategic goals are echoed in the military documents. I
25 think they formed the -- the footprint that was -- of the RS territory
1 that the leadership wanted to control. There were reasons why they
2 didn't control all of that at certain times through the whole conflict,
3 but that was the aspiration. Those were not, to me, goals that were
4 somehow meant for international negotiations alone. They may well have
5 been part of international discussions that you or others may have had.
6 I don't know. It's not part of my expertise.
7 When I look at the goals, I see them as being a demarcation of
8 the territory that the Bosnian Serbs wished to control. I see them
9 forming very much a spine of many of the directives and certainly the
10 directive one, to some degree three and four, in 1992, that I've
11 reviewed. I can see echos from a military perspective of what they're
12 expected to do in these goals. And in the Krajina in many -- in fact,
13 probably all the areas from the Krajina Corps, they achieved their goal,
14 they achieved the goal of a corridor and they took control of territory
15 and held on to that territory almost until the end of the war when
16 things -- things changed a bit in 1995.
17 Q. It's probably my fault that I'm not asking questions that are
18 precise enough. I'll try better now. Do you know that before the war,
19 in case of a peaceful solution we also had our proposal for the borders
20 of those three constituent units. Do you know that the first Cutileiro
21 map gave us a boundary on the Una River, on the Sava River, part of the
22 Drina River, and part of the Neretva River? Is that right? If you
23 didn't know, just say so, no problem.
24 A. I don't know the details of the Cutileiro agreement. That may
25 well have been the case in part, but I also know that it wouldn't have
1 given you the corridor link, for example. I don't believe the Cutileiro
2 map gave the Serbs the cantonment and control in and around the corridor
3 areas. I don't believe - I'm not sure about Sarajevo - but one of the
4 strategic objectives in relation to Sarajevo was to divide Sarajevo into
5 two, into a Serb part and a Muslim part. And I'm not sure Cutileiro was
6 in agreement to that. But it isn't an area that I know of on expertise
7 and I would defer to others about the detail of the Cutileiro maps and
8 also the processes by which any agreements or not or made.
9 Q. Thank you. The point is this --
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm sorry to interrupt. No objection. I just
12 wanted to let my friends know I would like just a couple of minutes at
13 the end to briefly address the Chamber on the motion -- the supplemental
14 submission we received today to try to give you an update.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Do you agree, then, that before the war, in case that war could
18 be avoided and a political arrangement could be made, we had accepted
19 that Sarajevo become a district and that we would not have the north
20 corridor in Posavina. Do you understand that this is a plan that did not
21 include either a compact territory or a link between the eastern and the
22 western part of the Serb territory? You just indicated that. In case of
23 a peaceful solution, the corridor would not be needed; right?
24 A. What I know is that the various cantonments that were anticipated
25 in the Cutileiro Plan did not include the corridor area predominantly as
1 being under the Serb control. That -- that may have been the case. What
2 I do know was that after Cutileiro was no longer an option, that the
3 strategic goals - that we talked about that were referenced in
4 preparation in early May in Mladic's diary on meetings on the 6th and 7th
5 and also that were articulated on the 17th - were the goals that appeared
6 to be taken by the military and used in relation to seizing control of
7 territory deemed as Bosnian Serb.
8 Q. Thank you. Do you know that in the Vance-Owen Plan, which I had
9 also accepted, we did not have a north corridor? Province number three
10 had a considerable Croat majority. Do you know that?
11 A. I am not aware of that, Mr. Karadzic.
12 Q. Do you know that in the first Cutileiro map, the Muslim parts of
13 municipalities Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc were envisaged as a
14 separate canton, under their own administration?
15 A. I don't know the details of the maps. I do believe that Prijedor
16 at least was -- was under Muslim authority, but I can't tell you the
17 details for the other ones.
18 Q. Are you aware, Mr. Brown, that the Serbian side in Bosanska Krupa
19 controlled only the Serb areas on the right bank of the Una, whereas in
20 Prijedor 80 per cent of the territory was under a Serb majority and the
21 Serbs had proposed to Krupa, Una, and Prijedor, and Sanski Most to be
22 divided into two municipalities each. Sarajevo already had
23 12 municipalities. Why not turn them into two municipalities, where each
24 would have their own? And that proposal was still in force. It was on
25 the table even when the war had already begun.
1 A. Well, in relation to Bosanska Krupa, all I can say is I know that
2 come the 16th Assembly Session, the delegate there had made mention that
3 the Muslims were no longer on -- in the municipality and had gone over
4 the river into Croatia. Presumably the border of the Una was -- was seen
5 as the border of the RS territory. There may well have been non-Serbs on
6 the other side of the Una, but at least from Mr. Vjestica's comments,
7 there weren't any Muslims by the 12th of May and operations that had
8 occurred in there had included operations using the TO and the JNA.
9 In relation to Prijedor, all I can say is I know that Prijedor
10 municipality -- control was taken over in the 30th of April. We talked
11 about Colonel Arsic, elements of -- or he provided assistance in that
12 take-over in April. And we've already talked about the fact that the
13 issue of weapons dead-lines led to attacks in late May and that many
14 Muslims or non-Serbs in Prijedor were put into detention camps using --
15 in their own documentation by the end of May and beginning of June. And
16 many of those eventually ended up in --
17 Q. May I ask you to be more focused. You are saying that Vjestica
18 had said that Muslims had disappeared from Bosanska Krupa municipality,
19 that they had crossed the river into Croatia, whereas I'm putting it to
20 you that the Krupa municipality stretches on both banks of the Una River.
21 Most of the right side were Serbs. Most of the population on the left
22 bank were Muslims. A large number of Muslims crossed over to the right
23 bank in the same municipality, whereas Serbs evacuated their Muslims to
24 Sanski Most within the same republic. Is that true? Do you consider it
25 an expulsion when you move the population from one part of your
1 municipality to another or from one part of your republic to another
3 A. Well, I can only say what Mr. Vjestica said, which was that the
4 Muslims had been moved to the other side of the Una River and there was
5 no Muslims in his area and that he welcomed that, and he welcomed the
6 fact that the Una River was now going to be a border. And I think his
7 phrase was -- in fact, Mr. Vjestica says:
8 "What are our adversaries doing? At the moment, they are all in
9 the Cazin Krajina. On the right bank of the Una ... there are no more
10 Muslims in the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa, all the enclaves
11 that were there, Rapusa, Veliki Vrbovik," and a number of others, "we
12 have evacuated them, so that there will be none there for the duration of
13 the war. Will they have a place to return to? I think it is unlikely
14 after our President told us the happy news that the right bank of the Una
15 is the border."
16 So I draw the conclusion that Mr. Vjestica knows that the
17 Muslims -- yes, maybe the municipality was split and maybe the river
18 split the municipality, but certainly on the right bank that the Serbs
19 wished to control, he indicates that there are no Muslims left and they
20 had been evacuated over the river. And he seems to be quite pleased that
21 with your announcement that the Una is going to be a strategic goal and
22 will be the border of a new state, that these people were not going to be
23 allowed to return.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: If I can just say for our record, the section read
1 out by Mr. Brown is from P956 pages 24 to 25 in the English.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, if he says Serb municipality Bosanska Krupa, what
5 does that tell you? Doesn't that tell you that there is also a Muslim
6 municipality? It was envisaged to have two municipalities. Why is he
7 calling Bosanska Krupa a Serb municipality? Did you know that on the
8 other side of the river there is also a municipality of Krupa?
9 A. There may well be, Mr. Karadzic. But I think Mr. Vjestica is not
10 talking about what's happening necessarily on the other side of the
11 river. Mr. Vjestica is saying that there are no Muslims in the area that
12 is to be a Serb territory and that the border of that Serb territory is
13 to be on the Una River and, obviously, that he seems appreciative of the
14 fact that he doesn't think they're going to be coming back now that there
15 has been a declaration that that is the border.
16 Q. But, Mr. Brown, you cited yourself that there were none while the
17 fighting is going on. Do you know that some Muslim villages were
18 evacuated from Bosanska Krupa to Sanski Most, to another Serb territory,
19 for the duration of the fighting? If you can answer this with a yes or
20 no. Do you know that was the case?
21 A. I don't know, but it seems that Krupa was one of the early
22 municipalities. There wasn't large-scale conflict going on in the
23 Krajina when Mr. Vjestica was talking. There had been some take-overs of
24 municipalities, including Prijedor. It wasn't the same in Krupa, it
25 seems to me, as occurred later in May and into some other municipalities
1 in June and July. Municipality of Krupa was taken over quite early, I
2 believe, and he is indicating that -- that many Muslims of -- have been
3 evacuated and that they aren't going to return.
4 Nowhere do I see you, Mr. Karadzic, standing up and saying:
5 Mr. Vjestica, this is unacceptable and this is not what we're doing in
6 this Serb state. I don't see that at all. When he announces that so
7 many people have been evacuated and believes they're not going to -- the
8 happy news that this is our border and they will not return, I don't see
9 you, Mr. Karadzic, standing up and saying: I think you've got the wrong
10 end of the stick here. This is not what we're meant to be doing.
11 Q. Sir, I will show you on Tuesday what exactly I said there and in
12 many other places at many other times. Do you continue to claim that the
13 Serbs occupied Bosanska Krupa or they took control only of their own
14 territories in Bosanska Krupa? It is a small distinction when they took
15 only their own Serb municipality on the right bank of the river where
16 they were a majority, whereas the Muslim part of Bosanska Krupa was on
17 the other side of the Una River and nobody touched it.
18 A. Well, that may be true that they took control -- if I can
19 finish --
20 Q. Excellent --
21 A. -- it may be true that they took control of the part that they
22 believed was theirs which was up onto the Una River and it may well have
23 been that there were Muslim enclaves on the other side that they didn't
24 believe were to be part of RS territory. But what it seems to be is that
25 the enclaves of Muslims inside the territory of Krupa that was controlled
1 by the Bosnian Serb authorities, those Muslims were evacuated.
2 Q. Where, Mr. Brown? Where were they evacuated, within the same
3 municipality or within the same republic, to Sanski Most, for instance?
4 A. I believe Mr. Vjestica says they had been evacuated over the
5 river. Irrespective of where they've gone, they appear no longer to be
6 living in their homes.
7 Q. Thank you. Could we now look at ET 93-111. Yesterday there was
8 talk about Mladic's diary, where I speak of the mistakes made by
9 King Aleksandar. Just to show you how translation works, in the English
10 translation it said that I said if we are going to take care of our own
11 territories and our own people, whereas I claim I said: Do we care for
12 territories or do we care for people, again in my efforts to dissuade
13 those who wanted large territories. That's P01 --
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, you are not giving your evidence. Let's upload
15 the document and put your question.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a split screen with
17 English on the one side and the manuscript on the other side. That's
18 ET 93-111. The English translation -- that's the English translation,
19 93-111, and the number of the document is 01478. The Serb is 94 or
20 perhaps 96. P01478. Or maybe it's P01477. But I think it was said
21 yesterday that it was 478.
22 Now we need 96, three pages down in the manuscript. And in
23 English it's from 93 to 111. English 93, Serbian 94 in the manuscript --
24 no, it's 97 in English, two pages further.
25 JUDGE KWON: Page 97 for English.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And in Serbian I need three pages
2 further in the manuscript. [In English] 3272 [Interpretation] That's the
3 ERN number, the last digits of the ERN number.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Look at this passage, Mr. Brown, where I advocate that
6 territories should not become a fetish and I say King Aleksandar got a
7 large state but lost Serbia. That was paid for by lives. What do we
8 care for more, territories or the people?
9 Can you see that I am in favour of the people against
11 A. I don't necessarily agree that that section says that at all. I
12 agree that you say -- you pose the question:
13 "What is it that we care about: Territory or people?"
14 But it seems to me one -- that when you put them all together,
15 that your position is one that you articulate at the Assembly session, is
16 that: It's territory that we need to control. And if we are in the
17 business of wherever the Serbs are, we have to control that area, we
18 might come -- we might -- if the territory's too large, we might lose.
19 King Aleksandar got a large state and lost Serbia.
20 "We paid for this with our lives.
21 "What is it that we care about: Territory or the people?"
22 Posing the question.
23 "If we Serbs," I think that is probably "do not start."
24 "If we Serbs do not start thinking about a state and about our
25 territory, then we will lose."
1 And then there is other discussions about:
2 "According to the map we have 66 per cent of the territory which
3 the world would deny us."
4 So it seems to me that the discussion here is one of: If we're
5 not careful and do what we've done in the past, which is to get such a
6 large territory, maybe in places where Serbs are a minority or that maybe
7 are not deemed as historically Serb, then we might have the same problem
8 as happened in the past, which is that we will lose the state all
10 Q. Thank you. Do you accept that I wasn't discussing the people
11 living in Republika Srpska because King Aleksandar and his state included
12 Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the peoples of those
13 countries were not in favour of a unified state and it cost us in 1941.
14 Don't you see that this was not discussing ethnic divisions? I was in
15 favour of being modest in terms of territory and I was criticised for
16 having suggested that we give up 20 per cent of the territory.
17 A. My reading of this is that there is a discussion at the senior
18 level about what should be the defined borders of the RS state, and it
19 may well have been that others felt that borders should be more
20 expansive. Maybe others felt that wherever Serbs were, that that should
21 be part of the state. And it may well be that you are saying:
22 Historically, if we make our state so big, we may not be able to hold on
23 to it and that we need to be realistic.
24 I don't think it's talking about looking after people
25 particularly. I think it's about defining in this discussion what the
1 parameters and the borders of the state are. And maybe others have a
2 more expansive view and you have a different view. And I think you're
3 bringing to the attention of this meeting that: If we're not careful and
4 we take too big a territory, we might go the same way as you highlight
5 King Aleksandar, who loses the state all together.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more question.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Do you agree that this was not a stenograph, but Mladic's notes
10 and that he merely made short notes of what the people said? He didn't
11 write down everything. Isn't that correct?
12 A. Yes, it is a notebook, Mr. Karadzic, and it would seem to be that
13 there are bullet points here.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 JUDGE KWON: We'll rise for today.
16 We'll resume ...
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes, I totally forgot.
19 I'm sorry, yes, Mr. Nicholls.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours. I'll be quick and I
21 don't think it matters, this has nothing to do with the witness's
23 We received a supplemental submission today. I don't know if
24 this issue has already been decided by the Chamber. If not, it would be
25 moot and I will sit down and be quiet. I just wanted to let you know
1 that what we are doing now -- we will try to respond very quickly to this
2 supplemental submission. The real issue here would be confidential
3 exhibits, and what we're trying to do is match up however many
4 confidential exhibits were included in that -- in the Tolimir case,
5 point 2 of what the submission requests in paragraph 4. And we believe,
6 just from the initial review -- and I think that we will find that
7 virtually all of the confidential exhibits in that case will likely have
8 been disclosed previously as part of our disclosure in this case. So it,
9 in fact, may not be any problem at all. I won't identify which are
10 which, but it may, in fact, be that there is nothing or very little that
11 the Defence does not have access to and has not had access to for a year,
12 and we will come back to Your Honours and to our -- to the Defence as
13 soon as possible.
14 JUDGE KWON: When do you think we can hear from you on that?
15 MR. NICHOLLS: I think we're trying to -- it's not all up to
16 Mr. Reid, but I think we're going to try to get an accurate answer today.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, if the Prosecution could also
20 advise us how many confidential Defence exhibits there are and if we have
21 received any of those because that's also a problem.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: It will be both, Your Honour. We'll do our audit
23 for both categories.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 We'll resume on Tuesday at 2.15.
1 Have a nice weekend, Mr. Brown.
2 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.06 p.m.,
4 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 22nd day of
5 November, 2011, at 2.15 p.m.