Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 22135

 1                           Wednesday, 30 November 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Just a couple very

 9     quick points before we begin.  I checked the transcript we admitted as

10     the witness's 92 ter statement and there were on two days several pages

11     of testimony that was not in open session, so it may be best to leave two

12     versions, it may be simplest.

13             Second, I noticed an error when I was reading the transcript.  On

14     page 22064, last sentence:

15             "How long was the video as you remember it?"

16             Should be:

17             "How long was the meeting as you remember it?"

18             I also wanted to let the Chamber and the parties know that I

19     spoke to Mr. Robinson that we're having some difficulties obtaining Dutch

20     interpreters for the next two days and we're working on that and we'll

21     try to resolve it.

22             JUDGE KWON:  The question is:  We do need the Dutch translators

23     for the other witnesses?

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honours, we've checked that.  And I just

25     wanted to let everybody know that our estimate for expert Wright will be

Page 22136

 1     a little bit longer than we put in our notification because he's the

 2     first expert to explain the way these things worked, the direct will be a

 3     little bit longer than we estimated just to let everybody know.  Thank

 4     you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Thank you.

 6             Good morning, Mr. Boering.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

10     Good morning, everyone.

11                           WITNESS:  PIETER BOERING [Resumed]

12                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

13                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Boering.

15             JUDGE KWON:  I was told, Mr. Karadzic, that you have 40 minutes

16     for today with Mr. Boering.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Boering, you said you had not seen Serb soldiers in a long

19     time and it was necessary for somebody from the 28th Division to point

20     them out.  Why was that?

21             When you were making the decision or when the decision was being

22     made about close support or air support, your dilemma was about the

23     whereabouts of the Serb troops and you had to order strikes.  Why did you

24     need to know their location?  Did you also need to see them with your own

25     eyes?

Page 22137

 1        A.   At the time that in the enclave attacks were taking place from

 2     the outside on to the enclave and the population was withdrawing on to

 3     Srebrenica city itself.  There were -- there was fire and violence from

 4     the outside in.  And there was also the withdrawal of DutchBat and of

 5     Muslim fighters.  To nevertheless attempt to try and call a halt to these

 6     things, naturally a defence was needed that would keep and to be able to

 7     defend properly, to mount a proper defence against a larger force, you

 8     need air support, in this case too.  However, there would have to be a

 9     threat and armed contact.

10             And requests for air support, that was a procedure that I was

11     involved in indirectly, not directly.  In any case, we needed proof that

12     there was effectively a conflict.

13        Q.   Thank you.  But you also needed visual contact.  You said:  We

14     can't see them; you wanted to see them.  Was there a particular reason

15     for that?

16        A.   Once again, that was not me, I myself.  However, if you have

17     contact particularly in case of close air support, then you need to be

18     able to see as well what's going on related to danger to your own troops

19     or harm that you might do, damage that you might cause.

20        Q.   And how many forward air controllers did you have in your

21     battalion?

22        A.   Organically we had two forward air controllers who'd been trained

23     for this.  These were their main tasks, and in addition to that there

24     were also other people who were suitable for this, for example, special

25     forces.

Page 22138

 1        Q.   Thank you.  So you had your own forward air controllers and you

 2     had some extra ones.  Under whose control were the extra ones?

 3        A.   They were all under the battalion commander's command, so that

 4     was Colonel Karremans.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Was it for the sake of forward air controllers that

 6     you needed to see the troops and the artillery, so they can guide

 7     air-strikes?

 8        A.   Like I said before, a forward air controller in a case like this

 9     must truly see the target.

10        Q.   Thank you.  So he's practically aiming for the airplane above and

11     he makes up part of the crew of the airplane; right?  I'm afraid there's

12     a problem with the transcript.  Just give me a moment, please.

13             So the forward air controller is working together with the crew

14     of the aircraft, aiming the fire; right?

15        A.   Yes, joint -- jointly, they have contact.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell me this:  You were talking about the 10th

17     of July.  You said there was shooting around the road that was crawling

18     with refugees.  Was it direct or indirect fire?  What were they firing

19     with, mortars?  A cannon maybe?  With direct visual contact?  Or was it a

20     tank?  What kind of shells were they?

21        A.   Well, that's a complex question.  As far as I can recall, on the

22     10th of July there were actual shootings, firing with -- sporadically

23     mortars, and also indirect fire using, as I assume, a type of cannon or

24     artillery, so indirect fire I would say.  As far as direct fire is

25     concerned, you would hear this taking place, you would hear fire.

Page 22139

 1     However, I have -- I did not personally observe this.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that the version prevailing here was

 3     that one shell at Markale killed dozens of people and another killed just

 4     a few less, whereas you saw only one wounded boy.  Could you make up your

 5     mind, were they just poor shooters or poor marksmen, or was it perhaps

 6     the case that they were not firing at the column at all?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Okay, one, it's a compound question; two, I don't

 9     know what the witness is supposed to do with the comment:  "Do you

10     remember that the version prevailing here was that one shell at Markale

11     killed dozens of people..." which has had nothing to do with his

12     testimony, and it's argumentative as well about him making up his mind.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             Please reformulate your question, Mr. Karadzic.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Considering there was fire from both sides of the road on which

17     there was a large number of refugees and you saw only one wounded boy,

18     were you able to conclude that they were poor marksmen or perhaps they

19     were not aiming at people at all?

20        A.   If we speak of both sides of the road the way you're indicating,

21     I indicate of the 10th more from the city, inside Srebrenica, where

22     you're on a low point between some hills.  There was quite a lot of

23     population there in the streets and here and there mortars would land

24     from outside the city, in the city itself.  Whether the intention was to

25     injure people, target them, or make them worried, concerned, I think the

Page 22140

 1     latter.

 2        Q.   Concerning your own movements and the movement of civilians, were

 3     you able to conclude that the purpose of the fire was to obstruct, not to

 4     shoot to kill?

 5        A.   I have the idea that it had more to do with the people, the

 6     Muslim population, to get them moving, to eventually get as many of them

 7     to go to Potocari as possible.

 8        Q.   I'm now asking you about the fire.  I'll ask you later -- in

 9     fact, I'll first ask you about UNPROFOR.  Did you observe that the fire

10     vis-a-vis the battalion had the purpose of limiting your exit from the

11     base and that you had no casualties?

12        A.   Yes, and effectively myself, I saw a number of times shootings

13     just behind me, both from types of tanks as well as by mortar, with the

14     intention to make it clear that we as DutchBat had to stay on base as

15     much as possible and not drive around too much outside.  And this was

16     also made clear to me at one time when I was in touch in one of my trips

17     to Bratunac for a talk with some Serbian military, who indicated that,

18     you know, we had to be careful and only relocate when absolutely

19     necessary; preferably we would make contact, they said, through a sort of

20     walkie-talkie system.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Concerning the movement of people, were you aware

22     that it was the authorities that got the people on the move by sending

23     messengers to every village, that people should gather in Potocari, and

24     it had all started long before the Serbs appeared?

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I just ask if there's a basis for the part

Page 22141

 1     of the question that "this all started long before the Serbs appeared,"

 2     that the messengers were sent out to tell the people to move to Potocari?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think he cited the previous evidence.  I

 4     think it's fair enough for the accused to put that question.

 5             I'll consult my colleagues.

 6                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we can continue.

 8             Can you answer the question, Mr. Boering.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know nothing about that.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Let me try to assist the Chamber and Mr. Nicholls.  It was

12     explained by the previous protected witness.  They didn't even know what

13     was going on until the authorities came and said people were moving

14     towards Potocari.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 65 ter 19721 in

16     e-court.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   It is our case that there was no threat and no danger to

19     civilians and that the civilians, based on their own evaluations and

20     their own fears, gathered in Potocari.  Is that correct?  This document

21     relates to the time --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Please wait.  You put your case to the witness and

23     please let the witness answer the question.  Just wait.

24             You heard the question, Mr. Boering.  Not relating to the

25     document, Mr. Karadzic put his case that there was no threat and no

Page 22142

 1     danger to civilians and that the civilians, based on their own evaluation

 2     and their own fears, gathered in Potocari.  Do you agree with that?

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   And were there any contacts in town between the civilians and the

 5     Serb army --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  One at a time, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do not agree with what

 8     Mr. Karadzic says.  There was effectively fear among the population and

 9     they didn't have a clue as to what to do.  I myself walked among them and

10     talked with them several times, and they asked me what they were supposed

11     to do, and that included people I had known for a long time and I had

12     good contact with.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Thank you.  I was not very adept in putting my question.  My

15     question was supposed to mean:  Was there any contact between Serb

16     infantry and the civilians in town itself, or had the civilians gone to

17     Potocari even before?

18        A.   I myself, the last two or three days before the enclave fell in

19     Srebrenica, the view on Potocari, I do not have an idea for the last one

20     and a half day.  However, I didn't think there were a lot of people on

21     their way to Potocari.  I think it was more a gathering around

22     Srebrenica.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Was anyone threatened by guns in Potocari?  And look,

24     please, at this document that starts with some rumours about people held

25     at gunpoint and then later it was ascertained that that hadn't been the

Page 22143

 1     case.

 2        A.   Threatened, guns in Potocari -- I'm not sure what you're talking

 3     about.  By whom?

 4        Q.   I am trying to say that even -- look at this document.  It says

 5     guns were being pointed at people, at least that was said, and then it

 6     later turned out it hadn't happened.  Even you confirm it hadn't

 7     happened.

 8        A.   As I can see it, this report was drawn up when the enclave had

 9     already fallen.  The flow of refugees had already gone to Potocari, and

10     effectively there were a number of Serbian soldiers walking around at the

11     factory.

12        Q.   That is precisely what I'm asking you about, the situation in

13     Potocari.  Were these civilians at gunpoint or threatened by weapons or

14     is the situation as described here, that the situation was normal as

15     regards Serb soldiers?  I can actually read this out in English and then

16     it can be interpreted.

17             [In English] "They also went further to surround the prefab

18     factory about 200 metres from the compound in the direction of Potocari

19     where there are also a large number of refugees.  UNMOs were asked to

20     talk to some BSA soldiers who were said to be pointing their guns in a

21     threatening manner at the refugees in the prefab factory.  However, this

22     proved to be false when we got there.  Contrarily, we observed some of

23     the BSA soldiers giving out cigarettes and candies to a few of the

24     refugees.  Hope this would not prove to be a deceptive act, though."

25             [Interpretation] So you did not observe that they were threatened

Page 22144

 1     in any way, by weapons, that is?

 2        A.   I have read the report, which was probably drawn up by UNMOs in

 3     that same period.  I also asked a few UNMOs to go and stand near a

 4     building where men were selected, deported, and they were effectively

 5     threatened with guns.  The report, as I read it here, I cannot judge, I

 6     do not have any such observations.  But I did see another event at the

 7     same time, probably involving members of the same team of UNMOs.

 8     However, if I remember the name correctly, they were present under

 9     Kingori.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1969, Your Honours.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   So at the time you had not seen a single killing, whereas you and

16     your fellow officers saw nine bodies by the well, but you did not see how

17     and when these people had lost their lives; right?

18        A.   That is correct.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at 65 ter 02003.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   The Drina Corps, July 13th, and it says 200 to 300 enemy soldiers

23     managed to get to the area of Mount Udrc and that there is fighting

24     there.  And then paragraph 3 says that:

25             "The Corps zone of responsibility is under full control.  So far

Page 22145

 1     from the Srebrenica enclave about 15.000 Muslims were transferred in an

 2     organised fashion."

 3             That is probably the regular combat report for that day.  Did you

 4     hear shooting?  Did you hear about this happening around Srebrenica, in

 5     the mountains and forests?

 6        A.   As far as I've understood, there were a number of Muslim military

 7     who left the enclave in order to try and reach Tuzla.  It was unclear to

 8     me how many there were.  However, at any rate it must have been most of

 9     the military in possession of weapons because there weren't a lot of men

10     among the refugees around Potocari.  When I left with the first

11     transport, the first refugees, the first convoy - perhaps 10, 15 buses -

12     the route that we took we stopped twice because there was firing.  I

13     assume from people fleeing to Tuzla, and that had to be solved by the

14     Serbs -- Muslims, Muslim people fleeing to Tuzla.  That is my

15     recollection of the --

16        Q.   [Previous translation continued]...  the last page.  Can we have

17     the last page, please.  "Decision" in English.  Please take a look at

18     what General Krstic's decision was on the 13th of July.  Effect control

19     over the territory, disarm, disperse Muslim forces, protect the

20     population and property and at the same time secure the lines of defence

21     from attacks from behind.  Parts of the forces, et cetera.

22             Do you see that even at that time General Krstic said that the

23     population should be protected and that was one of his major points?

24        A.   That is what I'm reading here.

25        Q.   Did you have any knowledge to that effect?  Does this sound

Page 22146

 1     plausible to you as proper conduct on the part of a military commander?

 2     Is that the way one does behave?

 3        A.   Well, it is what one could describe as good behaviour, the

 4     correct way of acting.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1970, Your Honours.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly have a look at

10     65 ter 01983.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Please take a look at this, this is an order.  And when

13     describing the enemy it says, paragraph 1:

14             "The enemy in the Srebrenica enclave has completely been routed.

15     The terrain is being cleaned up."

16             And now could you please turn to page 3 so that we can see 9(c)

17     in the English version.

18             THE ACCUSED:  Next page in English, please, and third in Serbian.

19     (C) "Security."

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Please take a look at the paragraph down here.

22             [As read] "The civilian Muslim population and UNPROFOR are not

23     targets of our operations.  Collect them together and keep them under

24     guard, but crush and destroy armed military groups."

25             Was that what was done?

Page 22147

 1        A.   Well, I cannot give you a complete view on this.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, are you asking the witness about the

 3     Zepa operation or in relation to attack against Srebrenica?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, from the point of view

 5     of the Drina Corps, these were two enclaves that were together.  This is

 6     an order that had to do with the treatment of the population and UNPROFOR

 7     with regard to both Zepa and Srebrenica.  It's a strictly confidential

 8     document, a military secret.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  You heard the answer of the witness.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Are you going to have

11     this admitted?

12             JUDGE KWON:  I think you have another opportunity to tender this.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I agree.

14             65 ter 02023.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Boering, that this is only the 12th of July

17     when they started providing fuel.  It says:

18             "Pursuant to the order of the commander of the Main Staff of the

19     Army of Republika Srpska to provide 50 buses for evacuation from the

20     Srebrenica enclave, we hereby request you to approve an additional

21     quantity of fuel ..." and so on.  And then buses will be used from the

22     municipalities of Pale, Sokolac, et cetera.  And it says their final

23     destination is unknown so far.

24             So the commander of the Drina Corps, as he is leaving, he does

25     not know where the refugees will decide to go.  And it's only on the 12th

Page 22148

 1     that the fuel and buses are being prepared after General Mladic had

 2     received information from the Muslim leadership as to what it was that

 3     they wanted; right?

 4        A.   I see the date the 12th of July on this document.  And on the

 5     12th around the lunch break, 12.00, in Potocari I did see quite a few

 6     buses for the first convoy.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1971, Your Honours.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Is it correct, Mr. Boering, that on the 13th in the morning the

13     buses were being boarded even before the Serbs appeared?

14        A.   I do not know.  I was not there anymore.

15        Q.   Oh, I'm sorry, that's right.  You had left.  However, let's have

16     a look at 65 ter 2352.  Do you agree that this is a report pertaining to

17     the 12th of July, probably just before dark, where it says:

18             "The transport of the refugees has stopped because of the dark.

19     Tomorrow morning at 0700 hours it will start again.  [In English] The

20     refugees were dropped about 4 kilometres from the confrontation line with

21     Tuzla.  They were treated good and no one was harmed.  This was stated by

22     one of the DutchBat soldiers who escorted the convoy.

23             "We have no more news ..." and so on.

24             [Interpretation] You were with one of these convoys that was

25     going towards Kladanj; right?

Page 22149

 1        A.   I was with one of the convoys, the first.  What happened with the

 2     other convoys I do not know personally.  For the first convoy in which I

 3     myself was involved, I did see that upon arrival at the point from where

 4     they had to go on, on foot, men were singled out, taken apart into the

 5     woods, and I was not allowed to follow them.

 6        Q.   And is it correct, Mr. Boering, that they did not walk from the

 7     confrontation line to Tuzla; rather, only to Muslim-controlled territory?

 8        A.   I don't quite understand the question.

 9        Q.   Well, some witnesses who were part of foreign troops said that

10     they were brought to -- close to the confrontation line and that then

11     they walked to Tuzla, all the way to Tuzla, whereas I believe that they

12     only walked across no man's land.  Tuzla is very far away.  Would you

13     agree that they walked only 3 or 4 kilometres and not the entire way to

14     Tuzla?

15        A.   Yes.  It was a walk of around 4 to 5 kilometres, yeah.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1972, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE KWON:  It's time for you to conclude, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Is it correct - and it's in 92 ter, that is to say your testimony

23     in Popovic - you said that you were not particularly welcomed in Kladanj,

24     that is to say by the Muslim side; is that right?  They did not trust you

25     and they treated you in a hostile way; is that right?

Page 22150

 1        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Boering.  My time is up.  Thank you for your kind

 3     answers.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls, do you have any re-examination?

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour.

 6                           Re-examination by Mr. Nicholls:

 7        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Boering -- Colonel Boering.  You were asked

 8     yesterday quite a bit about firing on the population, that's 22124, as

 9     well as today in the time before the -- and during the time that the

10     civilian population of the enclave all went to Potocari on the 11th.  You

11     were asked yesterday at 22086 about negotiations that were said to be the

12     reason for why all the people decided to go to Potocari and to leave,

13     including Mr. Akashi and the Muslims.  And there was also a discussion

14     about -- 22122, about what date this was, whether this was the 8th or the

15     11th of July and whether there was shelling at that time.  And you were

16     asked more about that today.  So I just want to go over a few documents

17     from that period.

18             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have 02342, please, 65 ter number.  And if

19     we could blow that up so that the Colonel can read it.

20        Q.   This is an UNMO report from 10 July at 1338, so in the afternoon.

21     And could you just look - it's brief - at the paragraph, Colonel.

22             "Subject:  Situation update.

23             "Srebrenica township is still undergoing a very heavy shelling.

24     So far we have recorded figures 49 shells since 1250 hours to 1353 hours

25     this afternoon with a figure of 9 rockets launched into the town ..."

Page 22151

 1             And then it goes on:

 2             "We estimate the current situation to be getting worse, still

 3     monitoring."

 4             Can you comment now --

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?  May I ask Mr. Nicholls not

 6     to skip this part --

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  That's fine --

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- that says "exchange of fire."

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  That's fine.

10             "Rockets launched into the town and exchange of occasional HMG

11     and SA firing.  We estimate the current situation to be getting worse.

12     Still monitoring."

13        Q.   Now, reading this paragraph, can you comment on its assessment of

14     the shelling in the town of Srebrenica on 10 July?

15             JUDGE KWON:  And as well as the meaning of HMG and SA.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, which I have to confess I'm not sure of.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] HMG is heavy machine-gun.  SA is

18     small arms, you know, hand weapons or repeat weapons, repeat guns.  And

19     this report described how effectively the firing on the enclave took

20     place, and that it wasn't a limited quantity of fire, it was rather more

21     extensive.  And the UNMOs in their official capacity had as one of their

22     tasks to count and report this.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  I would tender that document, please,

Page 22152

 1     Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P3991, Your Honours.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:

 5        Q.   Same topic, Colonel Boering, I'd like to move now to 11 July.

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I please have 02346, another UNMO report

 7     from the afternoon.  Can we blow that up a little bit so that Mr. --

 8     Colonel Boering can read it.

 9        Q.   I'll just read a bit of it or as much as Mr. Karadzic wants read

10     as well.

11             "At this moment the stream of refugees and wounded is incountable

12     anymore.  We figure that a total of 20.000 refugees came to the DutchBat

13     compound of Potocari already and is growing steadily.  Since our last

14     report the shelling of the town has been going on despite of the

15     air-strikes.  The town is in the hands of the BSA by now and the latest

16     ultimatum given by the BSA is that if the air-strikes continue everything

17     inside the enclave will be bombed.  Also UNPROFOR and the other UN

18     organisations.

19             "B Company has left their compound in Srebrenica ... BSA," I'm

20     not reading verbatim, "... is all around in the enclave."  I'll skip a

21     sentence.  "The air-strikes on the north part of the enclave have not

22     been taken place up till now.  That means the compound is a very easy

23     target for all the weapons on the north ridge of the enclave."

24             And we saw in Mr. Karadzic's cross-examination the report about

25     Commander Karremans, where he talked about the sitting duck position.

Page 22153

 1     Again, can you tell me -- we've had questions about the situation in the

 2     enclave and a portrait painted on the cross-examination.  Can you tell us

 3     a comment on this report and how it reflects the situation on the 11 July

 4     around the compound in Potocari?

 5        A.   The report as I read it here -- yes, I agree completely with what

 6     it says here and I also recall that effectively from the part of

 7     Mr. Mladic it was indicated at one of the talks that if the air-strikes

 8     were to continue, he would not have a problem bombing us -- the enclave

 9     including us, I should say.  And that this really happened on the north

10     side of the enclave, that there was enough possibility to have targeted

11     fire on Potocari aimed from there is something I also know.  There were

12     people firing up in the hills and they were effectively firing on

13     Srebrenica and the environment.  So the positions of a number of

14     structures that they'd erected for that there were known to us.  We knew

15     also of the possibilities that they would fire at us from there.

16        Q.   And this is before your first meeting with General Mladic that

17     same day, is that right, that this report comes out?

18        A.   If I look at the time, yes, then that's correct.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  I tender that, please, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Admitted.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P3992, Your Honours.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:

23        Q.   Just a couple more documents.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  02347, please, another 11 July UNMO report a

25     little bit later in the day.

Page 22154

 1        Q.   I won't read it all out to save time, but it talks about the

 2     amount of water left for all the people and DutchBat, the amount of food

 3     available, that the number of severe wounded is 35 and number of light

 4     wounded is uncountable.  DutchBat can't give much help and neither can

 5     MSF.  Same question:  Can you look at this and tell us if this -- your

 6     position on how this describes the situation as you remember it from 11

 7     July at the compound?

 8        A.   Yes.  This reflects the picture of the situation at the time.

 9     And if I look at the times, this was around -- this was sent around 4.00,

10     so even before there was that meeting with General Mladic -- the first

11     one.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I tender this document?

14             THE REGISTRAR:  This is in evidence as Exhibit P841.

15             MR. NICHOLLS:  Oh, that's right.  I'm sorry.  All right.

16             Last one, 02348, again from 11 July, still talking about the

17     situation at the compound in Potocari and the enclave.

18        Q.   This is now about 5.00 p.m.

19             The number of severely wounded has grown to 50, I'll paraphrase

20     to save time.

21             "DutchBat is trying to do something about the food situation but

22     there isn't enough for more than 48 hours.  The battalion has the

23     intention to try to create a very small safe area (the compound?)  to

24     protect the refugees."

25             And then if you look at paragraph 3 as well.  Talking about BSA

Page 22155

 1     firing, that's VRS, 22 rocket shells from Dugo Polje and the co-ordinates

 2     and the sound is very close so the panic amongst the refugees increases

 3     with every shell.

 4             The same question:  You talked about how you thought the shelling

 5     was to frighten the refugees, the civilians.  Can you comment on this

 6     document and the situation it describes shortly before your first meeting

 7     with General Mladic, to talk about what would happen to the people?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may interject.  It would be

 9     fair if Mr. Nicholls would say the witness where these shells were fired

10     at because it says here that there is a large number of people involved

11     in fighting.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  I think the witness can read the document, which

13     I've asked him to, and explain and will know more about where the

14     shelling -- than I can put to him.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's proceed.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The document describes that at

17     various locations there was firing, indirect firing, and that this

18     effectively scared even more the population and the refugees who were

19     uncertain of what is happening.  So it describes the situation as I,

20     myself, actually experienced it.  And this contributed to the population

21     who thought that they might still seek some sort of security in and

22     around Potocari.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I tender that document, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Right before that.

25             Mr. Karadzic, where does this document say that large number of

Page 22156

 1     people were involved in fighting?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, Your Excellencies, it

 3     was stated in the previous document, i.e., that a large number of Muslim

 4     fighters were involved in combat.  We quickly moved to a new document,

 5     hence my error.  Therefore, my objection here is that no military reason

 6     has been stated here for fire to be opened at Budak and other places or

 7     whether it was for the purpose of intimidation.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  No, this is not a proper intervention.

 9             This will be admitted.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P3993, Your Honours.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

12        Q.   Earlier today, towards the end, Mr. Karadzic asked you about -

13     and this is at page 11 going on to page 12 - about General Krstic and

14     showed his 13 July report and put it to you that it reflected proper

15     conduct on the part of the military commander, specifically referring to

16     a section about protection of the population, suggesting to you that this

17     was the -- I believe the Muslim population and not the Serb population in

18     that report.

19             I would like to show you a report from General Krstic,

20     Drina Corps commander, at this point to the Main Staff from four days

21     later, 17 July 1995.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  65 ter 02007, please.

23        Q.   We can see it's 17 July and if -- I want to focus on the bottom

24     of the page in English, paragraph 3, it's all there on the Serbian.

25             Just take a moment to read it because I don't think you -- I'm

Page 22157

 1     sure you haven't seen this before.  This paragraph is entitled:  "The

 2     Territorial Situation in the Zone of Responsibility," of course of the

 3     Drina Corps.

 4             "The territorial situation in the Corps is under the control of

 5     our units, although complete security has not yet been established in the

 6     perimeter villages, from where the enemy are retreating ..." and it

 7     describes that and talks about an evacuation.

 8             And now I want to go to the bottom and then we'll need to go to

 9     the next page.

10             [As read] "In the last three days, following the transportation

11     of the civilian population from the former Srebrenica enclave to Kladanj,

12     there have been increasing instances of women who have been allegedly --

13     who have allegedly got lost, coming back towards us from Kladanj and

14     arriving at our forward line of defence.  After being warned by our

15     soldiers, they tried to run away.  Yesterday two women arrived from

16     Kladanj direction at the 1st Vlpbr's defence line in the Luka sector.  As

17     they refused to surrender and began to run away towards Kladanj they were

18     fired on and died as a result."

19             And I won't go through the rest of the report.  As a current

20     serving officer in the military, civilian refugees get lost and walk back

21     towards the Serb line, General Krstic's solution is to warn them to

22     surrender and then to fire upon them and kill them.  Can you describe,

23     does that -- I'll ask you the same question as Mr. Karadzic:  How does

24     that reflect on proper commander behaviour and officer behaviour?  And

25     there's an objection so please don't answer yet.

Page 22158

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  The objection is that this

 3     does not properly arise from the cross-examination.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  I --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just Mr. Nicholls referred to this certain passage

 6     in General Krstic's order on 13th of July, so how would you respond to

 7     that argument?

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Because this document is now dealing with an

 9     incident on the 17th of July, far removed from anything that was

10     discussed by Dr. Karadzic in his cross-examination.  So --

11             JUDGE KWON:  [Microphone not activated] I'm sorry.

12             When I asked Mr. Karadzic how that document in relation to Zepa

13     relates to the Srebrenica enclave, and then he said it's in general

14     vis-a-vis the civilian population.  So why can't the Prosecution not

15     tender this document to rebut that argument?

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Because it raises an entirely new incident that

17     wasn't part of the cross-examination.  If you make the definition so

18     broad that any action towards the civilian population that occurred

19     within the month of July, for example, would be -- arise from the

20     cross-examination, then it gives the Prosecution an unfair -- it opens

21     the door too wide for extending the cross-examination -- the re-direct

22     examination and seeking re-cross-examination.  So --

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  If I may reply, if I need to --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just put a pause.  Yes.

25             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

Page 22159

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, the question regarding the 13 July document

 2     was clearly put with the purpose of showing that General Krstic was a

 3     good, professional commander, and it was clearly put that part of that

 4     was his protection and care of the civilian population and implied that

 5     that was the Muslim population he was talking about.  This is four days

 6     later, it's the same people, refugees, women, civilians from Potocari;

 7     it's the same commander.  When these women who were transported or got

 8     lost walked back towards the Drina Corps line, Krstic reports that their

 9     policy is to ask them to surrender and then kill them.  So I think it

10     arises directly out of the door which was opened.  It's not a stretch.

11     And when you open a door on cross-examination on -- then you have to

12     accept the consequences.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have an opportunity to

15     clarify what Mr. Robinson doesn't know about.  This happened 60

16     kilometres from Srebrenica and four days after the completion of the

17     evacuation.  And thirdly, this was not a decision of General Krstic.  He

18     was simply reporting on what had happened.  He didn't have information,

19     he didn't have time to order for them to be killed --

20             JUDGE KWON:  No, Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- that happened on the line far

22     away from Srebrenica.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls didn't say that General Krstic ordered

24     that.

25             We agree with the observation by Mr. Nicholls, which it relates

Page 22160

 1     to the same -- similar time-frame, it relates to the same people, it's

 2     perfectly legitimate to raise this issue.

 3             This will be admitted.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3994, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect,

 6     Your Excellency, Mr. Nicholls said that that was the solution offered by

 7     Krstic.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  [Microphone not activated]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, please.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  Excuse me, Your Honours, I don't think the witness

11     answered the question, though, that I put to him.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, yes.  My apologies.

13             Yes, if you remember the question, could you proceed to answer

14     the question.

15             MR. NICHOLLS:

16        Q.   My question was:  Having read this, how does that reflect, this

17     report as you read it, reflect on proper commander behaviour, officer

18     behaviour?

19        A.   Well, what's described here is a so-called war crime and an

20     UNPROFOR commander should act against that.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  I have no further questions at this time.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be given two minutes?

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  I don't know what it is, but I object straight

25     away.  This is a recurring theme of always wanting to ask more questions.

Page 22161

 1     I'm sorry to jump the gun, but I object.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  If it's related to this document, the Chamber is not

 3     minded to allow you to put additional questions.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no, it refers to the previous

 5     documents where localities were mentioned.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Before you put that question, could the Chamber hear

 7     your question first.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm interested to hear whether the

 9     localities that were the targets were inside the town itself within the

10     enclave or were those hills that were under the control of the remnants

11     of the Muslim army.  There was mention of some co-ordinates, and I would

12     like to hear whether they pertain to the town proper or were they

13     situated around the town.

14             JUDGE KWON:  We'll allow you to put that question, but if the

15     Prosecution is minded to re-examine on that issue we'll allow that also.

16     Put one question at a time, one by one.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just -- yes, just one question.

19                           Further cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Boering, is it correct that Gradac and Budak

21     are not situated inside the town itself, but rather outside the town on

22     the surrounding hills and that at the time they were fully packed with

23     the remnants of the 28th Division?

24        A.   I don't know that, as far as the second part of your question is

25     concerned.

Page 22162

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  No, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, he didn't answer the question.

 5     Are those localities in the town or outside of the town?  The answer was

 6     avoided.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Do you -- can you answer that question,

 8     Colonel Boering?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's not in the town, but near the

10     town.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Just one question arising from that.

13                           Further re-examination by Mr. Nicholls:

14        Q.   On the 11th of July, were shells fired over the compound?

15        A.   Yes, that did happen.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             Just one minor question from me, Colonel Boering.

19                           Questioned by the Court:

20             JUDGE KWON:  It's about your rank.  Did you say that your current

21     rank is lieutenant-colonel or colonel?

22        A.   It's lieutenant-colonel.  In the past, every now and then, I did

23     see "Colonel" mentioned in the reports; however, my title -- the title is

24     often mentioned as "Colonel" instead of "Lieutenant-Colonel."

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  That clarifies all.

Page 22163

 1             That concludes your evidence unless my colleagues have questions

 2     for you.  Thank you on behalf of this Chamber and the Tribunal as a whole

 3     for your coming to the Tribunal yet again.  Now you are free to go, but

 4     we'll rise all together.

 5             We'll take a break now for half an hour and resume at five to

 6     11.00.

 7                           [The witness withdrew]

 8                           --- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.

 9                           [The witness entered court]

10                           --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness take the solemn declaration,

12     please.

13             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

14     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please make yourself comfortable.

16             Yes, Ms. West.

17             MS. WEST:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.

18             Mr. Registrar, may we have 65 ter number 90299, please.

19                           WITNESS:  EVERT ALBERT RAVE

20                           Examination by Ms. West:

21        Q.   Good morning, sir.

22        A.   Good morning.

23        Q.   What is your name?

24        A.   My name is Evert Albert Rave.

25        Q.   And have you retired from the Royal Dutch Army?

Page 22164

 1        A.   Yeah, I retired in 2009.

 2        Q.   What was your rank when you retired?

 3        A.   I retired as a major.

 4        Q.   You've testified in the Krstic case in 2000?

 5        A.   That's correct.

 6        Q.   In the Tolimir case in 2010?

 7        A.   That's correct.

 8        Q.   And an amalgamated statement was prepared containing the relevant

 9     portions of those testimonies and your OTP statement from 1998.  This

10     statement, which is on the screen now, you reviewed and signed on

11     November 10th; is that correct?

12        A.   That's correct.

13        Q.   And can you --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Because both of you are speaking the

15     same language, please put a pause between the question and answer.

16             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  This is time now you can -- French

18     translation has just been completed.

19             MS. WEST:

20        Q.   Can you confirm that the statement accurately reflects an

21     amalgamation of your previous testimonies and your OTP statement?

22        A.   Yes, it reflects.

23        Q.   Sir, and if you were asked today about the same matters contained

24     in the statement, would you provide the same answers to the

25     Trial Chamber?

Page 22165

 1        A.   Yes, I would provide the same answers.

 2             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I would tender the statement and the

 3     exhibits.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P3995, Your Honours.

 6             MS. WEST:  I'm now going to read a summary.

 7             Warrant officer 2nd Class Evert Rave was deployed to the

 8     Srebrenica enclave in January 1995.  As liaison officer, he kept contact

 9     with the Muslim population inside the enclave and the VRS outside the

10     enclave.  Rave also acted as advisor for field security to the DutchBat

11     commander.

12             From late March 1995, the Bosnian Serb forces increasingly

13     restricted humanitarian aid convoys to the enclave.  Consequently, the

14     Muslim civilians in the enclave had insufficient food and supplies and

15     there were instances of Muslim civilians raiding the DutchBat garbage

16     dump.

17             DutchBat was also affected by the restrictions.  There were

18     problems with diesel and food supplies and with obtaining leave

19     clearances.  Rave felt as if they were kept prisoners in the enclave.

20             On the 3rd of June, the Bosnian Serbs took OP Echo on the

21     southern border of the enclave.  In the first week of July, the tensions

22     mounted and the shelling from VRS positions intensified.  Starting on

23     July 6 and continuing the following days, the VRS attacked the enclave

24     with rocket-launchers and artillery fire.  Rave witnessed impacts in the

25     vicinity of the UN compound in Potocari.  Several civilian houses were

Page 22166

 1     hit.  Reports indicated that civilians were wounded.

 2             Rave described the attacks on other UN OPs during the following

 3     days.  The captured DutchBat soldiers from the OPs were brought to

 4     Bratunac.  On July 9th the shooting intensified in the vicinity of

 5     Srebrenica and by the 10th the streets were overcrowded with anxious

 6     people.

 7             On July 11th, the town was totally overcrowded and people

 8     gathered in front of Bravo Company, the UN compound located in

 9     Srebrenica, because the people thought it would be safe.  There was panic

10     and the people were anxious and late in the morning the refugees broke

11     through the barrier around Bravo Company and entered the grounds of the

12     UN compound itself.  Around noon a mortar shell landed between two APCs

13     on the compound itself and there was several wounded.

14             Eventually, DutchBat thought that the best option was to move the

15     refugees to Potocari, as it was bigger.  The witness and Major Boering

16     left in a jeep full of refugees to Potocari, driving in a stream of

17     refugees walking in the same direction.  Mortar rounds were impacting

18     along either side of the road.  Rave concluded that the Serbs wanted to

19     push the people to Potocari and keep them there.  The UN compound in

20     Potocari was overcrowded with about 10- to 15.000 refugees:  Anxious

21     elderly, sick, women and children included.

22             On the 11th of July at 8.00 p.m., Rave participated in the first

23     meeting at Hotel Fontana in Bratunac.  He arrived with Colonel Karremans

24     and Major Boering.  At Hotel Fontana, the witness saw several UN soldiers

25     who had been captured by the VRS during the take-over of the OPs.

Page 22167

 1             The witness was surprised to see General Mladic there.

 2     Everything in the meeting appeared to be premeditated:  There was a film

 3     crew and there was no real negotiation, but it was simply dictated what

 4     would happen.  The first ten minutes of the meeting were very tense.

 5     They were all put in a corner.  The witness thought that the main purpose

 6     of the meeting was to show who the boss was.

 7             On July 11th at 11.00 p.m., Rave participated in the second

 8     meeting at Hotel Fontana.  He arrived with Colonel Karremans, Boering,

 9     and Nesib Mandzic, who was brought as the Muslim civilian representative.

10     Immediately after their arrival a pig was slaughtered outside the meeting

11     room.  Rave thought this to be pure intimidation, especially with Muslim

12     Nesib Mandzic present.

13             A camera crew was again present at the meeting.  Mladic showed a

14     broken board taken from Srebrenica government building as a trophy of his

15     victory.  At the meeting, the movement of the refugees was discussed.

16     Mladic stated that transport would be provided, although two hours

17     earlier at the first meeting, he asked Karremans to arrange for the

18     buses.  All plans discussed by Mladic were tentative, and at the end of

19     the meeting the witness remained unsure as to the nature of the plans and

20     how they would be executed.

21             In the morning of the 12th, Rave witnessed the advance of Bosnian

22     Serb troops towards Potocari.  The advance and the continued shelling of

23     Potocari frightened the civilians.  Rave did not attend the third meeting

24     at Hotel Fontana.  After the meeting, however, Rave and Boering went back

25     to Bratunac to discuss the details of the buses and fuel.  However, upon

Page 22168

 1     arrival at noon, they did not find any representatives.  They contacted

 2     Major Nikolic and were informed that the buses were already in Potocari.

 3             When Rave returned to Potocari at 1.00, the buses were already

 4     there.  The witness thought that the entire operation of take-over and

 5     deportation of civilian population was organised in advance.

 6             In Potocari, Rave witnessed Muslim men ages between 17 and 70

 7     being separated from the women and children.  They were kept in the

 8     "White House."  The witness saw several times men coming out of the house

 9     who were afraid, who tried to escape, and started screaming because they

10     did not want to get onto the buses.  These men were forced onto the buses

11     and were hit and kicked.

12             The witness personally saw three buses with men leaving Potocari.

13     A DutchBat escort was stopped in Potocari [sic] and could not further

14     follow the buses, and on the 12th the witness saw Mladic in Potocari.

15             According to the witness, Mladic was aware of the separation

16     process.  Mladic said to Rave that they tried to find out whether there

17     were soldiers among the men.

18             Deportation of the refugees and separation of the men continued

19     the next day, on the 13th, and after the 13th only wounded refugees

20     remained at the Potocari compound.  A few days later on the 16th, Rave

21     met with a Bosnian Serb civilian who came to the compound and introduced

22     himself as Miroslav Deronjic, the new mayor of Srebrenica.  Deronjic

23     talked about his connections with Karadzic and stated that he was in

24     direct touch with Karadzic.  Rave attended a meeting between Karremans

25     and Deronjic.

Page 22169

 1             On the 17th, Major Nikolic screened out seven of the wounded,

 2     stating that they would be taken to the Bratunac hospital.  Rave later

 3     heard that several wounded, maybe including the seven, disappeared from

 4     the Bratunac hospital.  On July 21st, Rave and the Dutch Battalion left

 5     the enclave.

 6             Your Honours, that concludes my summary.

 7        Q.   Sir, in paragraph 68, you noted that you were surprised to see

 8     Mladic at the first Hotel Fontana meeting.  Why were you surprised?

 9        A.   Well, we had never met General Mladic before and we met General

10     Zivanovic, who was responsible for the Serbian troops around the enclave.

11     And we had the impression that the Serbian troops around the enclave

12     attacked us.  So when we were ordered to go to the Hotel Fontana, we

13     expected to see General Zivanovic over there because we had the idea that

14     he was responsible so he would be the guy to meet there and eventually

15     negotiate.

16        Q.   Who requested the meeting?

17        A.   I really don't know, but I think that the VRS requested the

18     meeting because I was ordered by Colonel Karremans to go with him to the

19     Hotel Fontana.  There was no agenda.  We did not know what to expect over

20     there.  In my opinion, the VRS ordered the meeting.

21        Q.   The meeting what -- you had noted was at 8.00.  What time were

22     you told to go to the meeting?

23        A.   One hour before, 7.00 p.m.

24        Q.   You also mentioned at paragraph 72 in your statement that the

25     meeting seemed premeditated.  Can you tell us why you think so?

Page 22170

 1        A.   Well, when we came into the meeting room, what we did not expect,

 2     of course, was, first, to see General Mladic over there.  We saw a lot of

 3     civilians and a complete film and camera crew, and the setting was in

 4     that way, that we were set into a corner with no possibilities to stand

 5     anywhere else.  The camera crew was filming everything.  I think this is

 6     not a normal way that a meeting between two military commanders is

 7     organised, especially when the meeting proceeded the way General Mladic

 8     acted.  Everything was filmed.  And I think -- I had the impression that

 9     he wanted to intimidate us, but also put on the film what was happening

10     over there.

11             Especially at the end when we tried to leave, Colonel Karremans

12     was ordered to drink a beer together with General Mladic.  The problem

13     was at that moment that there seemed to be no beer.  What I imagine

14     afterwards, beer is not that nice to see on a film, but when you have

15     there a commander who won the war and lost the war and you see them

16     toasting with a glass of wine, that even could be champagne, as you could

17     suggest, it does it much better on the video.  When I saw later on the

18     film, and I did not realise that on that moment even the interpreter was

19     interpreting the talks between Mladic and Karremans, was sent away a

20     little bit because it would be better on the film to see Mladic,

21     Karremans, focal feature, myself.  So that was him -- in my way -- in my

22     opinion enough proof that it was all pre-arranged to show the world what

23     happened over there in the way that Mladic wanted it to show.

24        Q.   Sir, we're going to show you now the video from the first meeting

25     and it's 65 ter number 40582.  We are going to start the clip at time

Page 22171

 1     code 33 minutes and 22 seconds.  There will be a couple of occasions when

 2     I stop, but we'll watch it through.

 3                           [Video-clip played]

 4             MS. WEST:  [Microphone not activated]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, Ms. West.

 6             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7        Q.   We've stopped at 39.19, and at this point Mladic has started to

 8     speak, and he's raising his voice and we played a little bit more.  But I

 9     know that you've watched this video recently.  Are there other occasions

10     at that meeting, in your memory at the meeting, where Mladic raised his

11     voice as well?

12        A.   Yeah, he did it several times.  After he started accusing

13     Colonel Karremans, he did the same after that towards me and to

14     Mr. Boering, but I didn't see that on the film.

15        Q.   So the part where he is yelling at you and the Major, is that a

16     part that is actually not on this video?

17        A.   No, that's not on the video.

18        Q.   We'll continue.

19                           [Video-clip played]

20             MS. WEST:

21        Q.   We've stopped again at 39.42 and at this point Mladic says:

22             "Who were they defending from," meaning DutchBat troops, "when

23     nobody was attacking them?"

24             Now, sir, at this point you had been in the enclave for about six

25     months.  Were DutchBat troops being attacked?

Page 22172

 1        A.   At the end on the 10th and the 11th, DutchBat troops were

 2     attacked, especially on the morning of the 11th.  On the evening of the

 3     10th we had a meeting, and the question from the higher command was, of

 4     course, is there a real attack, is there a smoking gun towards the UN

 5     troops.  We had to discover it.  So on the next morning, on the 11th, one

 6     of our APCs went forward and was shot at by a VRS tank in advance.  Also

 7     our OPs were attacked by VRS.

 8        Q.   And on the 10th and the 11th, were Muslim civilians also being

 9     attacked?

10        A.   Already in advance because the whole enclave was attacked by

11     mortar and artillery fire, and of course the Muslim population, the

12     civilian population, in the enclave was attacked.

13        Q.   And so when Mladic made this statement, was it true?

14        A.   How do you mean was it true?

15        Q.   When he said:  Who were they defending from, when no one was

16     attacking them?

17        A.   No, we were attacked.  Our troops were attacked.

18        Q.   Thank you.  We'll continue.

19                           [Video-clip played]

20             MS. WEST:

21        Q.   We've now stopped again at 43 minutes and 3 seconds, and I just

22     should note for the record the transcript in the book 65 ter 03099 is

23     included and at this part of the video is page 7828 of the transcript.

24             So, Mr. Rave, here we see and we hear Mladic say:

25             "You asked for the meeting, speak up."

Page 22173

 1             Now, you earlier testified that you believed that DutchBat did

 2     not ask for this meeting and that the Bosnian Serbs asked for the

 3     meeting.  What do you make of this statement then?

 4        A.   Well, it's one of the statements of General Mladic, and for me

 5     it's just only a statement because I can't imagine that Colonel Karremans

 6     asked for a meeting and that General Mladic shows up from Pale or

 7     Sarajevo or wherever he might have been.  So I think that General Mladic

 8     ordered the meeting.  When he's saying now that "you asked for a

 9     meeting," for me it's just a statement and it also could be a lie.

10     Because in the next days -- and also of course afterwards I saw that

11     General Mladic several times lied to us on several occasions, not only

12     for specific this meeting, but also handling with the refugees and

13     handling with the men.

14        Q.   Thank you.  We'll continue.

15                           [Video-clip played]

16             MS. WEST:

17        Q.   Sir, we've just stopped at 53 minutes and 10 seconds and this is

18     Karremans who has just said:

19             "Not knowing that I should meet you here in Bratunac ..."

20             And for the record of the transcript book, this is page 7834.

21             Sir, to your knowledge, had Karremans ever met Mladic before?

22        A.   No, to my knowledge he never met him before.

23        Q.   Earlier on in this video Mladic is talking about a gentleman

24     named Van den Broek, criticising him.  Can you tell us who that was?

25        A.   Mr. Van den Broek at that moment was the minister of foreign

Page 22174

 1     affairs of Holland.

 2        Q.   We can continue, please.

 3                           [Video-clip played]

 4             MS. WEST:

 5        Q.   We've stopped at 54 minutes and 28 seconds and here Karremans is

 6     mentioning Pale.  Sir, can you tell us about any interactions DutchBat

 7     with Pale?

 8        A.   Well, we had not interactions ourself with Pale, but everything

 9     we wanted to do in the enclave, either have a leave convoy to go out,

10     convoys to come in, supply convoys to come in, evacuations, medical

11     evacuations, everything had to be cleared by the VRS.  And every time we

12     sent in any request, it was a request that was sent to the

13     Bratunac Brigade most of the time via the chain of command.  And they

14     told us that they would send it to Pale.  So we got the impression that

15     everything that happened around the enclave should be approved or cleared

16     by Pale, and I don't know if Pale was the military or the civilian

17     authority who had to approve the clearances.

18        Q.   Thank you.  We'll continue.

19                           [Video-clip played]

20             MS. WEST:

21        Q.   Sir, Mr. Karremans was just talking about his soldiers.  Do you

22     know to what he's referring?

23        A.   Yeah, during the occupation of the enclave, some of our OPs were

24     made POWs and were brought to Bratunac, and I think 20 or 30 of our

25     soldiers who were in Bratunac as POWs.

Page 22175

 1        Q.   And were they at the hotel at the time?

 2        A.   They were at the hotel at that time, because when we entered the

 3     hotel we saw in one of the rooms some of our soldiers were gathered

 4     there.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  We'll continue.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             MS. WEST:

 8        Q.   Sir, that completes the video and that's one hour, 12 minutes,

 9     and 42 seconds.  Now, I asked you earlier about whether there were parts

10     of the meeting that are not included on the video, and you mentioned that

11     there was a part with Mladic yelling at you and Major Boering.  Are there

12     any other parts you did not see on this video?

13        A.   Yeah, I just make some notes.  We see now several threats towards

14     Colonel Karremans saying for -- this is not your last cigarette, do you

15     want to see your family again?  It's not -- you have only one life, you

16     don't want to lose it here.  And that was during the meeting.  In the

17     beginning when Mladic was screaming towards us, he was referring to the

18     air-strikes, if there were any more air-strikes.  He threatened us that

19     he would target the compound, the refugees, and the soldiers that were

20     held hostage in the Hotel Fontana.

21        Q.   And that part is not on the video?

22        A.   It's not on the video.

23        Q.   So now we're going to talk about the second meeting.  Who asked

24     for the second meeting?

25        A.   Well, the agreement was made by General Mladic at that moment.

Page 22176

 1     He wanted to see a representative of the civilian population at 11.00.

 2        Q.   And that was only a couple hours later, correct?

 3        A.   Yes, that was three hours later.

 4        Q.   Did you also attend the second meeting?

 5        A.   Yes, I also attended that meeting.

 6        Q.   And early on in the second meeting did you hear something

 7     unusual?

 8        A.   Yeah, when we entered the room what was not usual was that one of

 9     the VRS soldiers, and it seemed to me it was the body-guard of

10     General Mladic, because I saw him several times afterwards near

11     General Mladic, was standing near the window, the curtain was opened in

12     the meeting room over there, and in the beginning of the meeting after we

13     started, five minutes later on a pig was slaughtered under the window,

14     and halfway the slaughtering of the pig ended, the window was closed, and

15     the meeting went on.

16        Q.   And this is what you refer to in paragraph 78 of your statement.

17     When the pig was being slaughtered and you heard the sound, what was the

18     reaction of the people in the room?

19        A.   Some of them did not react at all, in my opinion, because they

20     already knew.  So it might have been announced in advance what would

21     happen.  Some of them were grinning, especially the man who sat opposite

22     to me.  Later on it seemed to be Lieutenant-Colonel Kosoric.  He was

23     grinning and smiling:  Well, that's the way we do it.  That's the way he

24     looked.

25        Q.   Did you notice any reaction from Mladic?

Page 22177

 1        A.   No, nothing at all.

 2        Q.   You spoke earlier about your belief that the first meeting had

 3     been premeditated.  Did you believe that the second meeting as well,

 4     including the pig slaughtering, was premeditated?

 5        A.   Yeah, of course.  I think the meeting was ordered by

 6     General Mladic and -- because I don't think that he knew what

 7     representatives we would bring to the meeting.  This was also

 8     pre-arranged, and especially the slaughtering of the pig was

 9     pre-arranged, just to intimidate us but especially the representatives of

10     the Muslims.

11        Q.   We're going to play the second meeting and this is from the trial

12     video and it begins at one hour, 12 minutes, and 42 seconds.  And of the

13     transcript book this would begin at page 7848.  We can go ahead and play

14     that.

15                           [Video-clip played]

16             MS. WEST:

17        Q.   So at one hour, 14 minutes, and 13 seconds we just heard a sound.

18     Is this the pig sound you referred to?

19        A.   Yes, it is.

20        Q.   Okay.  This will go on for another 30 seconds and we'll continue

21     to play.

22                           [Video-clip played]

23             MS. WEST:

24        Q.   Sir, how did you know that was a pig?

25        A.   Well, I've heard a slaughtering of a pig -- at least the sound of

Page 22178

 1     a slaughtering of a pig before.  My grandfather was a farmer and I heard

 2     that sound at his farm.

 3        Q.   And what -- what did you think the purpose of this slaughtering

 4     was or what was the effect of this sound?

 5        A.   Well, it was amazing to see the --

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I really think I have to interject

 7     here.  This calls for speculation and really there are too many questions

 8     that have nothing to do with the facts.

 9             MS. WEST:  I'll withdraw the question, Mr. President.

10             We can continue to play the video.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

12                           [Video-clip played]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Can you stop it.

14                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

15             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber is a bit concerned about the scheduling

16     issue, if he has to stay tomorrow there will be no Dutch interpreters,

17     that's what I heard.  Do you follow, Ms. West?

18             MS. WEST:  I understand that tomorrow there is no Dutch

19     interpreter, and we also have been working on that issue ourselves in

20     order to possibly get a Dutch interpreter as well.  But we did understand

21     that the Court was not in a position to provide it.  And we are also --

22     we anticipated that this witness was going to go, as I realise now, at

23     least until the end of the session.  We're aware of the issue.

24             JUDGE KWON:  And I followed -- noted that the witness was

25     following in English and answering in English as well, but we'll see.

Page 22179

 1             MS. WEST:  So this -- so this witness is following in English,

 2     answering in English.  The Dutch issue is the next witness.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  No, I'm concerned about this witness, Mr. Rave.  My

 4     question is specifically the -- we allowed the Defence two hours.  It's

 5     apparent that we cannot finish him today.

 6             MS. WEST:  I understand.  And -- I understand, Your Honour.  At

 7     this point I will shorten this video and then I will have about five

 8     minutes of questioning.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

10             MS. WEST:  Thank you.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

12             MS. WEST:  Thank you.

13        Q.   So, Mr. Rave, just before this we heard Mr. Mladic say a comment

14     about a sign, and this is page 7853 of the transcript.  He said:

15             "This was taken off of the Srebrenica town hall.  I brought it

16     myself."

17             To what was he referring there?

18        A.   There was a shield, as we saw on the video, was brought in, and

19     he just showed this as a kind of trophy, that he took it from the office

20     now -- the building in Srebrenica, to show that Srebrenica, in my opinion

21     at least, was his at this moment and --

22        Q.   Thank you.  And if this video continues on, you've seen it, does

23     it then go to a conversation that Mladic has with Nesib Mandzic; correct?

24     Is that right?

25        A.   That is correct.

Page 22180

 1        Q.   Okay.  And we won't watch that part of the video, but there

 2     Mr. Mandzic himself makes some statements to Mr. Mladic; right?

 3        A.   Yeah, that's also correct.

 4        Q.   So we're going to fast-forward and go to --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Are we going to watch it later on in any event or

 6     not?

 7             MS. WEST:  It was our plan to play this video today because this

 8     witness was a participant.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we play it now.

10             MS. WEST:  Okay.  Thank you very much.

11             We can continue to play.

12                           [Video-clip played]

13             MS. WEST:  Mr. President that ends the video at one hour, 38

14     minutes, and 7 seconds.  I only have a -- three minutes of questions.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

16             MS. WEST:  Thank you.

17        Q.   Sir, you had talked about how you thought the meetings were

18     prearranged.  We're now going to move to the events at Potocari.  After

19     this meeting, did you go back to Potocari?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   And ultimately the next -- for the next two days, did you remain

22     at Potocari?

23        A.   Yes, I remained at Potocari.

24        Q.   In your statement at paragraph 97 you indicated that you see --

25     you thought the events at Potocari seemed to be organised.  You wrote an

Page 22181

 1     entire operation of take-over and deportation of civilian population was

 2     organised in advance.  That was your testimony.  Can you tell us what

 3     made you believe that?

 4        A.   Yeah, I think it was organised in advance because we see on the

 5     evening of the 11th that General Mladic was asking for buses.  Well, we

 6     seemed to be not able to provide buses, but the next morning, on the

 7     12th, after Mr. Boering and myself went to Bratunac again at 12.00,

 8     between 12.00 and 1.00 suddenly enough buses and trucks were available.

 9     So I think that must have been prepared in advance.  Also what we saw,

10     the separation of Muslim women and men was prepared in advance.  The men

11     were separated.  Screening from the men started.  As General Mladic told

12     us, he wanted to see if there are soldiers or war criminals among them so

13     that he could make them prisoner of war.  At the end, all of them were

14     separately brought away in buses.  All the time camera crews were

15     available to film all the events where Mladic showed up, providing bread

16     and then candy to the local population.  In my opinion, just a media

17     spectacle.

18             All the meetings in Fontana with the photo and film teams, as we

19     see also in the second meeting, it was all prearranged.

20        Q.   And related to this, you mention in paragraph 89 that you saw

21     regular troops and irregular troops.  What about the appearance of these

22     two groups differed?

23        A.   Well, the normal VRS army was well-dressed and then

24     well-organised.  The irregular troops I'm talking about now wore parts of

25     uniforms, wore bandannas around their heads, were just around to frighten

Page 22182

 1     the local population.  Those were the people that stopped buses on the

 2     way to Kladanj and seized our UN vehicles.  After I talked to Mladic and

 3     said that this happened, that also those troops and also his VRS troops

 4     stole flak jackets, weapons, and all those type of things from us, he

 5     told me that those were not his troops but irregular troops and he was --

 6     they were not in his control.

 7        Q.   So you -- and you mention in that paragraph that you thought that

 8     the irregular troops only appeared to be so.  Why did you think that?

 9        A.   Because I can't imagine -- as we can see in the video, that

10     General Mladic was in total control over there and he would never accept,

11     in my opinion, that there were irregular troops acting in his area of

12     responsibility and doing things that he didn't want to happen.  For me it

13     was just a possibility for him to give them the freedom to act badly

14     against the local population or towards UNPROFOR and he could wash his

15     hands and say:  Well, they are not my troops.

16        Q.   Thank you, sir.

17             MS. WEST:  I have no more questions.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  You are tendering associated exhibits,

19     Ms. West?

20             MS. WEST:  I am, thank you.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Two of them actually?  You are not tendering the

22     video footages separately?

23             MS. WEST:  That's correct.  As I said on Monday, we hope to

24     tender the video all at once.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I take it there is no opposition?

Page 22183

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, Mr. President.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Both documents will be admitted.

 3             Shall we give the number right now, two of them.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honours.  65 ter number 02366 will be

 5     Exhibit P3996, and 65 ter number 15259 will be Exhibit P3997.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Before Mr. Karadzic will begin his

 7     cross-examination, we'll have a -- take a break for an hour and resume at

 8     1.40.

 9                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.40 p.m.

10                           --- On resuming at 1.42 p.m.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger and Mr. Karadzic, I was told through the

12     VWS that the witness would not be available tomorrow, so I inquired of

13     the staff whether it would be possible for another extended session after

14     3.00.  So I was told that it would be possible.  So we will be sitting

15     till around quarter past 4.00 with a short break.  That's what we can do.

16             Please, Mr. Karadzic, please start your cross-examination.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  Does

18     that mean it's our ambition to finish with this witness today, that it's

19     out of the question to re-call him some other day of next week?

20             JUDGE KWON:  [Previous translation continued]... but if necessary

21     that may of course be possible, but I think it's more than sufficient for

22     you to have two hours.  We'll see.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll do my best.

24                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

25        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Rave.

Page 22184

 1        A.   Good afternoon, Mr. Karadzic.

 2        Q.   I wish to thank you at the outset for agreeing to meet with the

 3     Defence and that will help us make progress more quickly today.  I will

 4     try to put my question in the simplest of terms so that they can be

 5     answered with a yes or no whenever possible.  To begin with, is it true

 6     that your amalgamated statement was created by the OTP and you only

 7     accepted it; in other words, is the phrasing of the paragraphs the

 8     responsibility of the Prosecution?

 9        A.   Yes, I think so, but it's a compilation of my former statements.

10        Q.   Thank you.  What I'm interested in is what was omitted not what

11     was included.  Look at paragraph 5, for instance, listing your duties.

12     However, it does not mention at all that one of your tasks was to

13     demilitarise the Muslim army and the enclave, as you correctly stated in

14     the Tolimir case, that's 1D04692, page 6779.  You said the mission of the

15     Dutch Battalion was - and you put it in the first place - to demilitarise

16     the enclave, to protect and help the civilian population as much as

17     possible along with the NGOs.  Isn't it true that it was a very important

18     part of your mission?

19        A.   Yes, it was a very important part of the mission, and I think

20     that also in this part I can't see specifically that we had to liaise

21     with the VRS but -- yeah, well, it is in paragraph 6.  But it's also

22     in -- part of the mission, that's correct.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Your interlocutors on the Serbian and Bosnian sides,

24     and I'm talking about paragraph 6, were they aware in what capacity you

25     maintained contact with them, did they know what your duties were?

Page 22185

 1        A.   I don't know if they were exactly aware of my duties.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  In some passages in your statements - and I can

 3     provide references if necessary, but it will go more quickly this

 4     way - you state the opinion that there was no real organised Muslim army

 5     there, there were only some independent groups; right?

 6        A.   I didn't state, I think, that there were independent groups.  The

 7     army we were talking about for us was Mr. Naser Oric and his second in

 8     command or his Chief of Staff Ramiz and some other military men known to

 9     us.  But there was no standing army and we had no real visible groups in

10     the enclave.

11        Q.   All right.  If I tell you that there were four brigades and one

12     independent battalion plus a fifth brigade in Zepa and another two

13     special purpose battalions, such as medical and another one, in total

14     there was seven organised units with their commanders, staffs, logistics,

15     and armed troops, would that surprise you?

16        A.   Yes, it would surprise me because we never saw anything about

17     regular, real army, as you mentioned now, and that's what I stated also

18     in paragraph 8.  We had the 8th Operational Group, but it wasn't a real

19     group and we had no idea how the group was organised below the top of the

20     group.

21        Q.   When you say "we," do you also mean your commanders, the command

22     of the Dutch Battalion, did they know more than you did?

23        A.   I don't think when we are talking about the army and the

24     existence of a standing army, I think they also did not know that there

25     was another organisation and which brigades that you mentioned.

Page 22186

 1        Q.   We have to clear that up a bit.  When you say "standing army,"

 2     you imply garrisoned units and -- that are always at the disposal of

 3     their command; right?

 4        A.   Not only a standing army.  It can also an army be that it could

 5     be mobilised, but at least I -- and I can say, we were not aware and we

 6     did not deal with parts of the army in structures like an operational

 7     group and beyond -- below that, brigades and maybe companies or even

 8     platoons.

 9        Q.   Is that because perhaps Zulfo Tursunovic, one brigade commander,

10     was unwilling to communicate with UNPROFOR completely?

11        A.   For me, Mr. Zulfo Tursunovic was one of the leaders of a part of

12     the enclave.  The enclave was divided, for the battalion at least, in a

13     northern and a southern part.  In the northern part we had a company

14     commander who dealt with local leaders.  In the southern part we had a

15     company commander who dealt with the local leaders.  And I don't know if

16     we -- when we are talking about Zulfo Tursunovic, if we are talking about

17     a military leader with a rank and even an organisation under his command.

18     For me, he was just a local civilian leader because I also never -- I

19     only once saw him, but I never saw him in military uniform, for example.

20        Q.   All right.  But do you know that up to 85 per cent of the Muslim

21     army in the first years of the war wore civilian clothing, that they were

22     not fighting in uniform, they were fighting in mufti?

23        A.   No, I'm not aware of that.

24        Q.   Thank you.  You said in your debriefing on 30th August 1995 that

25     you had had contacts with the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian

Page 22187

 1     Serb army, which is to say the VRS.  Where did you have contacts with the

 2     ABH?

 3        A.   The Bosnian Serb army -- the Bosnian army, I think we're talking

 4     about the Muslims, the only contacts we had was inside the enclave.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  You and many of your colleagues from DutchBat have

 6     confirmed to us that you had no access to the Bandera triangle; is that

 7     correct?

 8        A.   That is correct.

 9        Q.   Was your access to Bandera barred by civilians or by armed

10     civilians?

11        A.   By civilians.

12        Q.   Without any weapons?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Do you know that there was one incident when your fellow

15     servicemen were captured in this Bandera triangle?

16        A.   Yeah, I know that in the period from the 28th of January till 31

17     of January, 1995, some of our patrols were stopped in the area, and the

18     only time I was there was in the evening from the 29th of January to

19     re-supply our own troops.  I went there with Ramiz, and at that moment

20     I've not seen there any armed men who were stopping our patrols.

21        Q.   And where did you get those supplies?  Did you buy them from the

22     village people or from who?

23        A.   At that moment, in January, we had still our supplies from

24     ourselves, and of course - as I think you should know - that our supplies

25     came from the middle of Bosnia, that were brought in by supply convoys.

Page 22188

 1     And we supplied our troops with our own supplies.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now briefly look at D01956

 4     in e-court.  It originates from end January and relates to the subject.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   While we're waiting, is it true that your men had been captured

 7     there precisely and remained in captivity for three or four days?

 8        A.   They were blocked there and were not allowed to return to the

 9     base from the 28th of January until the 31 of January.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Please look at this document.  There should be a

11     translation because it's not MFI'd.  It's a proper exhibit.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Probably it was admitted under the condition that

13     English translation should be existing -- existent and to be uploaded.

14             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, we have a translation.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I think that -- that was the case.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I have it too, but it's easier

17     to upload I suppose.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we put it on the ELMO?

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   This telegram by Naser Oric, addressed to the command of the

21     2nd Corps, speaks precisely to that.  And it says the commander of the

22     Dutch Battalion in Srebrenica ordered his patrols to enter the area where

23     movement has been banned.  The commander of the 281st Mountain Brigade,

24     in agreement with the commander of the 8th Operations Group, and in

25     observation of the agreement with the UNPROFOR liaison officer, blocked

Page 22189

 1     all patrols of the UNPROFOR after warning them not to move in the said

 2     direction.

 3             So this was the 281st light -- sorry, Eastern Bosnian Light

 4     Brigade in keeping -- in agreement with the commander of the

 5     8th Operations Group.  This doesn't sound like civilians.  This sounds

 6     like the military, with their own structure.

 7        A.   Yeah, but I also did not deny that there were military people

 8     inside the enclave.  Naser Oric was one of the military leaders in the

 9     enclave, as well as was Ramiz.  Of course these kind of orders from the

10     BiH command I never saw.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now look at P3987.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The part for me a bit difficult to follow is that

13     your statement that your access to Bandera was barred by civilians.

14     Could you explain that to me?  How could a civilian influence the

15     UNPROFOR soldiers not to do something.

16             THE WITNESS:  It was quite easy in that way.  Of course we were

17     aware that there were armed people in the region.  What they did, they

18     blocked us and said that we were not allowed to go in.  They informed us

19     already from the 8th or the 10th of January, when fightings were going on

20     in the western side of the enclave, that we should not patrol there.

21     Because it were civilians, I think that the second in command of the

22     battalion, Mr. Franken, ordered his patrols to patrol inside the Bandera

23     triangle, although it was not allowed by the BiH.  And he ordered it

24     because there was no army that would stop him -- at least that's what he

25     said I think.  Of course when they were stopped by civilians -- and I

Page 22190

 1     don't know, there might have been armed civilians, but I'm not aware of

 2     that, when they were stopped I think they stopped not to escalate the

 3     situation.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Do you remember who they were, the civilians who

 5     stopped --

 6             THE WITNESS:  At least the civilians under the leadership of

 7     Zulfo Tursunovic, the local leader in that area.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   You've just given me cause again, very nicely, mentioning the

13     10th of January.  Look at this where it says your access was barred by

14     reinforcing the Buljim-Jabucno lines, and then when Serbs moved their

15     lines, it says you were given an ultimatum to return the enemy soldiers,

16     that is, the Serbs, to their original position.

17             And then it says the OG 8 Srebrenica issued an ultimatum to the

18     UN members to return the enemy soldiers to their original position, and

19     if they failed to meet this position the command will prohibit movement

20     of UNPROFOR in this area and take concrete steps.  Now, do you remember

21     that you were required to fight the Serbs or expected to fight the Serbs?

22        A.   Yeah, we were expected several times to fight the Serbs from both

23     sides and from the BiH side as well as military as civilians as -- also

24     from the VRS side.  We frequently got the request to fight or to

25     interfere in actions taken by one of the parties.  Our problem was, of

Page 22191

 1     course, when Muslims asked us to interfere in the situations where the

 2     Serbs attacked and they didn't give us the freedom of movement, we had

 3     not a possibility to interfere -- intervene.  The same is also from the

 4     VRS side.  When they blamed the BiH attacking the VRS in the western

 5     side, so in the Bandera area, we were not allowed to go there.  We also

 6     had no freedom of movement.  So from both sides we got ultimatums and

 7     requests, but we were not allowed to do our job and even come a little

 8     bit in the direction to act on their requests and just -- most of the

 9     times it was to stop one of the parties fighting the other one.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Is it true that the only demands of the Serbian side

11     were for you to disarm and demilitarise the enclave, and they never asked

12     you to fight their battles for them?

13        A.   No, but they frequently asked us to stop Muslims to fight them,

14     because they always told us that Muslims were attacking them outside the

15     enclave, that Muslims were fighting them.  We had no possibility to go

16     there and to check even if it was true and where they were attacking

17     because they did not allow us to go out of the enclave.  So they also

18     asked frequently for help to stop Muslim attacks.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that according to the agreement on the

20     protected area, the Muslims were prohibited from launching any attacks

21     from the protected area that should not have been happening and that tied

22     large forces to Srebrenica?

23        A.   Yes, of course.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at P3951.

Page 22192

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   How many Muslim troops do you think there were there?

 3        A.   As I stated before, there were -- was no regular standing army.

 4     There were no Muslim troops but there were a lot of people in the age

 5     between -- well, let's say 20 and 50 who could have been in the army

 6     before.  But there was no real army and we had not the idea that there

 7     was a standing army at all.

 8        Q.   Do you agree that even the wrong army can use live ammunition and

 9     even not a proper army can kill?

10        A.   Yeah.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Look at paragraph 2.34, please.  It was a debriefing

12     at the Dutch ministry.  It speaks of the population and the warring

13     parties.  It says around 40.000 people, including 80 per cent refugees

14     approximately, that was in paragraph 2.33.  And in 2.34 it says a

15     combined strength of 3.000 to 4.000 men.

16             We've heard today that you attended that meeting at Fontana,

17     where it was said that they also had three to four tanks.  And we've seen

18     from some papers that they had been ordering tank shells.  Did you know

19     that?

20             MS. WEST:  Apologies for interrupting.  As I understood, those

21     tanks are referenced in the weapons collection point, not that they had

22     three or four tanks.  So I would say it's a misstatement.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   First of all, do you know that this was established at this Dutch

25     briefing, that they had 3- to 4.000 fighting men, four brigades with a

Page 22193

 1     combined strength of 3- to 4.000 men?

 2        A.   I was not aware that there were real brigades, and for sure not

 3     that there were 3- or 4.000 men.  Of course there may have been 3- or

 4     4.000 men in the enclave, but not that they were organised in brigades.

 5        Q.   Do you know how many tanks they had?  Did you know how many tanks

 6     they had and how they concealed them from you?

 7        A.   When we came into the enclave in January 1995, before us there

 8     was a Dutch Battalion and before that, that was the first Dutch

 9     Battalion.  And when they came into the enclave, there had been a

10     Canadian Company already.  And I don't know in what moment the

11     demilitarisation of the enclave started.  I know for sure that with the

12     first battalion in the weapons collection point there were already two

13     tanks, not only two tanks, there were mortars, there were heavy

14     machine-guns, and lots of small arms.  So in the weapon collection point

15     were two tanks, and when we came into the enclave in January, I think in

16     the middle of January, the first question came already from the Muslim

17     side to hand-over the weapons from the weapon collection point, including

18     the tanks.  Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans did not allow them to take the

19     weapons from the weapon collection point, and I'm not aware that shells

20     for tanks came into the enclave.

21        Q.   Well, yesterday we read Naser Oric's statement here that they had

22     five tanks and that they handed over two, or rather, handed over one and

23     damaged another one, set it on fire.  Did you know that, they had five

24     tanks?

25        A.   No.

Page 22194

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that from the beginning of June onwards

 2     that they refused weapons from the depot because they had more up-to-date

 3     weapons, that is what one of your officers said?  Did you know that that

 4     is what one of your officers was told, that the Muslims said, "We don't

 5     need those weapons.  We have better ones than that"?

 6        A.   No, the only question heard several times during that period,

 7     that they want us to hand over the weapons from the weapon collection

 8     point.  So it seems to me that they had not enough weapons.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  So you are aware that Mr. Franken tried

10     to get in there, that they were locked.  And do you know that after that

11     a decision was made for your battalion not to go there; right?

12        A.   That's correct.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14        A.   I think I have to add a little bit to that because not

15     specifically that the battalion would not go in there, because I have it

16     not in my notes, I think, but in my opinion we tried several times to go

17     in there but did not succeed.

18        Q.   Yes, but in the Tolimir case, 1D04698 on page 6820, you said that

19     it was ordered that the patrols no longer go there.  And you don't know

20     whether that came from UNPROFOR or whether it was your commander who had

21     ordered that; right?

22        A.   Yeah, of course our commander ordered it to our troops, and I

23     don't know if it was his decision or it was a decision from either Tuzla

24     or BH command.

25        Q.   Thank you.  In February you were informed by General Milovanovic

Page 22195

 1     that he did not believe that the Muslims would honour the cease-fire.  Do

 2     you remember that there was a cease-fire on at that time and it was

 3     President Carter who had mediated, he had worked this out with

 4     President Izetbegovic and myself and it was supposed to be on for four

 5     months?

 6        A.   No, I don't specifically know about this cease-fire agreement

 7     because I think we had several cease-fire agreements.  I don't know on

 8     what level and when the cease-fire agreements were arranged, and

 9     especially not this one from General Milovanovic because I even don't

10     know him.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at 16414, that's

13     the 65 ter number.  That's not it.  Sorry, 1D04701 -- sorry, just a

14     moment, please.  I am sorry.  Could you please give me a minute.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   I assume that this was not communicated to you, but we can have a

17     look at this document.  65 ter 16414, Milovanovic concluded that he would

18     not observe the cease-fire.  Do you know whether the Muslims observed the

19     cease-fire?

20        A.   No, not specifically in this case.

21        Q.   Please cast a glance at the English version.  So you were aware

22     of the fact that the agreements signed by Izetbegovic were not being

23     honoured by Oric; right?

24        A.   I don't know what agreements were signed by Izetbegovic and I

25     don't know specifically what orders you are referring to.  The only thing

Page 22196

 1     we know on the ground in the enclave, that as well the BiH and the VRS

 2     frequently were fighting each other, frequently were shooting at each

 3     other, and both did not respect whatever cease-fire agreement was made,

 4     because we got complaints from both sides.  So if there had been a

 5     cease-fire agreement, I don't know which one you're referring to, but

 6     none of the parties, at least in our period, stick to it.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  I leave it to the Trial Chamber now.  I leave it in

 8     their hands to decide whether they're going to have this document

 9     admitted or not.  It's in line with the witness's experience to the

10     effect that the cease-fire is not observed?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Witness didn't confirm anything from this document.

12     We'll not admit this.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Now, for example, the end of March 1995, Major Nikolic informed

16     you about these problems that he had with Muslim soldiers; isn't that

17     right?

18        A.   I don't know which problems you're talking about now, but I can

19     assure you that from the beginning till the end Major Nikolic from the

20     VRS side, and of course the leaders in the enclave from the military and

21     civilian side, informed us frequently about problems they had from each

22     other.  And I mean that frequently they asked us to stop attacks from

23     both sides, and at the same moment both sides denied us to do our job and

24     did not give us the freedom of movement we needed to do our job and even

25     to try to answer their requests.

Page 22197

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have a brief look at 1D04701.  This is the

 2     command of this operations group, or rather, it is the Main Staff that is

 3     issuing an order to Operations Group 8 Srebrenica and the Zepa Brigade,

 4     full combat-readiness on the 17th of February, while there is a

 5     cease-fire that is in force.  Do you see that his behaviour was not in

 6     accordance with the orders of the General Staff of his army, the Muslim

 7     army?

 8        A.   Well, as I said before, I was not in the line of communications

 9     of the BiH army.  We did not get orders from the BiH Army, and these kind

10     of orders I never saw before.

11        Q.   But do you agree that it is the Main Staff here that is issuing

12     an order to take measures to raise combat-readiness of units?  This is

13     being sent to the 2nd Corps command, to the command of the operations

14     group, and particularly to the 1st Zepa Brigade command.  Do you know

15     what the 8th Operations Group was, Operations Group 8 Srebrenica?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Next page for English.

17             THE WITNESS:  As I told you before, there were representatives of

18     the 8OG inside the enclave being Naser Oric, Ramiz, and some others.

19     That was for us the 8 Operational Group.  And of course I can read what

20     is in this order but that doesn't say anything to me.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   All right.  But do you think that you would have thought if you

23     received it at the time that he was saying this to civilians or to a

24     military unit?  Look at this, raise combat-readiness, full

25     combat-readiness, helicopters, evacuation, camouflage, and it says

Page 22198

 1     here -- [In English] "Should the helicopter be found, in your contacts

 2     with UNPROFOR representative take the position that its purpose was to

 3     transport political representatives of Srebrenica and Zepa who were to

 4     take part in the work of political organs of the state ..."

 5     [Interpretation] Number 6:

 6             [In English] "The command of the 2nd Corps will carry out the

 7     preparatory activities given in the directive, in connection with the

 8     engagement of forces in the direction towards the protected areas of Zepa

 9     and Srebrenica."

10             [Interpretation] This is a long order, isn't it?  This is not

11     being sent to civilians; right?

12             MS. WEST:  Objection, Your Honour, the first question here is:

13     If you had received it at the time would you have thought it was being

14     sent to civilians or military units.  He can't answer this question.

15     Anyone can read this document and make some guess as to who is on the

16     receiving end of it.  But he's already indicated that he's not in this

17     chain of command, and I don't think he's the appropriate person to try to

18     affirm this document.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Having heard the answer given by the witness that he

20     only met civilians, I think the question was fair enough.

21             Can you answer the question, Mr. Rave?

22             THE WITNESS:  When I read this document, it's a document sent to

23     a military organisation, that's clear for me.  As I stated, we did not

24     only deal with civilians in the enclave but also with representatives of

25     the 8th OG being Naser Oric and Ramiz and some others.  So there was a

Page 22199

 1     top and there was a part of a military organisation, but not a standing

 2     army.  And -- well, that's the only thing I can add to this.  And having

 3     read parts of this, as I also stated and I think we can read it in

 4     several of my statements, I have no information that full

 5     combat-readiness of other or units were prepared in the enclave.  I have

 6     not the information that military actions were taken out, no military

 7     exercises were done.  Now and then there were rumours or the VRS informed

 8     us that it took place, but that's all.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Thank you.  At the briefings in your battalion, was there any

11     mention of helicopter flights, weapons, supplies, and so on, was there

12     any mention of that?

13        A.   We frequently had information about helicopter flights around the

14     enclave and not inside the enclave, and I have no information about

15     weapons, supplies towards the enclave.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that at one point in time, as you said,

17     you went down to 16 per cent of your ammunition reserves?  What were

18     those reserves in the beginning of January?

19        A.   I don't know.  I was not in that chain of command.  I only know

20     that there was not enough ammunition that was needed because the

21     clearances were denied to bring in reserves of ammunition or ammunition

22     at all.  And I think this is more in the line of Major Franken or

23     Major -- Mr. Karremans to ask because I really don't know.

24        Q.   Thank you.  However, can you say how that happened, how come you

25     went down to only 16 per cent of your ammunition reserves?  Did you have

Page 22200

 1     some kind of combat action or what?

 2        A.   We went not down to 16 per cent.  We -- and now I'm a little bit

 3     speculating, but I know for sure that all the ammunition we needed in the

 4     enclave and that should be provided to us when we came into the enclave

 5     and that already started with the first Dutch Battalion, that the VRS did

 6     not allow us to bring in enough ammunition to do our job properly, at

 7     least to bring in the ammunition that was required to do the job

 8     properly.  I taste a little bit now that you are suggesting that we had

 9     lots of ammunition and it went down to 16 per cent because either we used

10     it - and I think your next question will be - or did you gave it to the

11     Muslims.  The answer is no.

12        Q.   No, I'm just asking what you did with the ammunition when the

13     quantity varied.  What did you do?  At one point in time there must have

14     been 100 per cent.  How did it go down to 16 per cent?  And this is what

15     you said in the debriefing, 1D04697, the debriefing of 1995.

16             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I think we can look at that and I'll

17     look at this debriefing, but I think this is Mr. Franken's debriefing.

18     And as this witness says, either way he's never said 16 per cent.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Let us see the document.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted, so

21     can we have it removed from our screens?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West, ABiH document, order by Hadzihasanovic.

23             MS. WEST:  I was being unclear.  In the beginning of this he said

24     you said in your statement about the 16 per cent.  The witness indicated:

25     I've never said that.

Page 22201

 1             JUDGE KWON:  It's not about 16 per cent.  It's order from the

 2     General Staff of the ABiH, ordering the 8th Group to bring units to full

 3     combat-readiness.

 4             MS. WEST:  Okay.  So I understand that 4697 is not a previous

 5     statement.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  No, no.  He's asking to tender 1D4701, and I'm

 7     asking your opinion as to its admission, the document which is before us.

 8                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 9             MS. WEST:  Thank you.  My confusion, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, I was told it has been already admitted.

11             What's the number for that?  Yes, D1955.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Yeah.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  I forgot about that.

15     That's right.

16             What I have here is a piece of information, that it was said in

17     the debriefing of the 28th of February 1995, and the number is 1D04697,

18     that you got down to 16 per cent of your ammunition.  I cannot see that

19     being ascribed to Franken anywhere.  Page 4.  Now we are going to look

20     for 16 per cent.  That will help us more than anything else.  The first

21     paragraph, the last line.  Now let us see who said that.  Perhaps that's

22     on the previous page.  Perhaps we can see there who it was who said this.

23             JUDGE KWON:  First page -- if we see the first page it is a

24     statement debriefing by the witness.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  That's why it's being

Page 22202

 1     cited.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Do you remember that this was said at the Dutch debriefing, that

 4     ammunition went down to 16 per cent, the ammunition reserves, that is?

 5        A.   I don't know if it states that it went down to 16 per cent.  I

 6     think that the ammunition reserves were at 16 per cent.  And in my

 7     opinion -- well, this -- this could be true and it's in the statement.  I

 8     am for sure that we never had 100 per cent.  And of course, when you plan

 9     an operation you plan 100 per cent of ammunition and other stocks, but if

10     you've got only 16 per cent, then the ammunition reserves were at 16

11     per cent -- at least that's my translation from this document now.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, please, why would the Army of

13     Republika Srpska allow you to bring in unrestricted quantities of

14     ammunition into an enclave where you were supposed to guard a

15     demilitarised zone and where you're not supposed to spend any ammunition?

16        A.   I think that you're well aware that when a military organisation

17     is ordered to go out and do their job, they take everything they need.

18     And one of the normal things is that you carry weapons, you also carry

19     with that weapon ammunition.  When you don't have ammunition, you don't

20     have to take your weapon.  I think that in this political side that in

21     the beginning the Dutch army was not allowed to take in a lot of heavy

22     weapons as they would like it themselves.  So there was an agreement what

23     weapons should have been taken to the enclave.  When they went in, they

24     were not allowed to bring -- yeah, they were not allowed to bring in all

25     the ammunition they wanted to, and not only the ammunition, also rest of

Page 22203

 1     the reserves and rest of the stocks we needed were refused because

 2     clearances were not granted to bring reserves into the enclave.  And

 3     it's, in my opinion, standard operational procedure that if you take your

 4     weapons you also take the ammunition you need.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  We don't have an answer yet, Mr. Rave.  How did these

 6     variations happen in the quantity of ammunition?  What happened to that

 7     ammunition?  What is written here was that this was an incident, as it

 8     were, that the ammunition reserves were at 16 per cent, that is to say

 9     that they were not always at 16 per cent.  So what were you and your

10     units bringing into the enclave?

11        A.   I don't know where you read that it was not always 16 per cent.

12     I think in this debriefing the only statement is that the ammunition

13     reserve were at 16 per cent, and I'm not a logistic officer.  I really

14     don't know if it might have been a little bit more or a little bit less.

15     This is the information I got, and I think even at that moment this is

16     the information, because it was current at that moment, I think the

17     debriefing was from August or September 1995, so that might be in my

18     memory, and I can't find anything in my notes about it.  And I wasn't a

19     logistic officer and I have no documents about it to prove if there was

20     more or less.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page of this

22     document.  Can we focus on the second paragraph from the top of the page.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Do you remember that a lot of money was being smuggled in cans

25     and that there were many, many ways of abusing the presence of

Page 22204

 1     international organisations, to take money into the enclave, out of the

 2     enclave, deposit it in German bank accounts.  Please take a look at this

 3     paragraph from the very beginning.  Let us see what Naser is being asked

 4     for.  He is being asking for a million to be smuggled and then further

 5     on, this entire paragraph, until the paragraph that starts with the words

 6     "Major De Haan."

 7        A.   But what is your question?

 8        Q.   Were you aware of that, the smuggling of such large amounts of

 9     money into the enclave and by their military commanders at that?  Also,

10     they tried and probably succeeded in abusing the presence of foreign

11     representatives there, and in this way they managed to smuggle this

12     through the Serb ranks?

13        A.   I was aware, at least it was a rumour, and it came from the

14     former battalion, from the 12th Battalion, that Naser Oric was

15     approaching people to bring in large amounts of money.  In the first

16     meetings we had with him I suggested, for me, to see if it was possible

17     to get the question again because for me it was only a rumour.  I was

18     never asked and -- nor of the people in my vicinity were asked to smuggle

19     in big amounts of money.  As you have read in the first page of my

20     statements, one of the things I was -- I was there for was the field

21     security and one of the things in the field security for me was to take

22     care that all the UNPROFOR soldiers were as impartial as possible to all

23     the parties and not get involved with this kind of things.

24             So when we had rumours or information that money or those kind of

25     things were try to smuggle in or people were approached to bring in or

Page 22205

 1     use their post lines to bring in large amounts of money and then they got

 2     a request, then most of the time I was informed about it and we stopped

 3     it and it did not happen.  I once was informed that one of the Dutch

 4     soldiers got a post package from Holland that contained several cans and

 5     in the cans was a big amount of money.  We confiscated it, our royal

 6     military police took it.  We made a report of it and it was sorted out in

 7     Holland where that came from.  These were not big amounts of money from

 8     one person.  This was money from a lot of Bosnian people living somewhere

 9     in Europe.  They collected the money, put it in cans, put lists of names

10     with it, and in that way they tried to get it into the enclave to provide

11     the local population with a little bit of money so that they at least

12     could buy things on the market.

13        Q.   Thank you.  I'm kindly asking you, Mr. Rave, not to feel attacked

14     in any way, neither you yourselves nor the United Nations nor the

15     Netherlands.  I know very well what our people are capable of doing in

16     order to cover their traces and the smuggling that they were involved in.

17     I'm just asking you whether the Army of Republika Srpska, apart from the

18     fact that they were entitled to inspect the convoys, that in addition to

19     that that they had very good reasons to carry out these inspections.

20     That was where my question was leading to.  I didn't want to accuse

21     anyone of anything.

22             Do you agree that any army that is supposed to grant passage has

23     the right to know whether a people bringing in something or out of the

24     area are carrying something that might be used against this army?

25        A.   Yes, it might be the right to do it.

Page 22206

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can these two pages that were put

 3     to the witness be admitted, pages 3 and 4.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I think I have to add a little bit of this.  Of

 5     course they have the right to check, but I don't think that when they

 6     check convoys that they are not allowed to steal from convoys to make

 7     their own choices to take out whatever they like and make their own

 8     decisions on that.  Because there is no border police, there are no

 9     borders, and if they can't prove that is something that is -- could be

10     used against them, then it should be possible.  But I don't know if it's

11     possible for them to steal, for example, clothes or shoes from UNHCR

12     convoys.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Pages 1, 3, and 4 will be admitted.

14             THE ACCUSED:  1, 2, and 3 I suppose would be proper.

15             JUDGE KWON:  You said 3 and 4, so I included the first page, the

16     cover sheet.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, for the purpose of

18     identification.  So number 1, 2, and 3.

19                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

20             JUDGE KWON:  Whatever the pages, they will be the two pages shown

21     to the witness.  We'll give the number, Exhibit D --

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1973, Your Honours.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Mr. Rave I couldn't agree more with anyone else as I can agree

Page 22207

 1     with you, that this was impermissible and that nevertheless these things

 2     happened.  But we must state that those things were prohibited and that

 3     they were not included in the orders.  Do you agree that all of this was

 4     happening due to individual acts of indiscipline?

 5        A.   I don't think so because most of the time when -- at least in our

 6     visibility convoys were stopped, they were stopped at the so-called

 7     Yellow Bridge, our point of contact to the VRS.  And most of the time

 8     there were several soldiers under the leading most of the time of

 9     Major Momir Nikolic.  So I don't think they were incidents and I don't

10     think they were individuals who did it; it was, for me, a structure.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Did you find out if there was any permission given or

12     any order given to steal, or did it happen that at times when the command

13     managed to locate the items, these items were trimmed.  So my first

14     question was:  Did you know that there was a permission or an order

15     instructing the soldiers to steal?

16        A.   No.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Is it true that the Serbian side, primarily

18     Major Nikolic, tried to get in touch with Naser Oric through you and that

19     Naser Oric refused to communicate with him?

20        A.   Major Nikolic several times tried to get in touch with

21     Naser Oric.  It's amazing that it started in the beginning -- no, in the

22     middle of March until the end of March I think, and later on it happened

23     several times.  I think that Major Nikolic was aware that Naser Oric was

24     not in the enclave at that moment, although we didn't know.  He asked us

25     and I think he might have heard the rumour or he might be informed that

Page 22208

 1     he was not in the enclave, and via us he tried to get the confirmation

 2     that Naser wasn't in the enclave.

 3        Q.   Well, now, I'm not an intelligence officer, therefore I cannot

 4     qualify this as speculation.  You cannot deny that the Serbian side tried

 5     to get in touch and that they did so in order to reduce the number of

 6     incidents.  Does that sound reasonable to you?

 7        A.   No, not at all.  I think they tried to get in contact to reduce

 8     the number of incidents.  I think that we, as a liaison team, we were

 9     able to speak either to the Muslims and to the VRS, were very capable to

10     bring over messages from both sides without them letting meet each other

11     because there was so many hatred over -- that -- I don't think that they

12     even wanted to meet.  Both sides had the idea that it was too risky to

13     meet each other I think.  So it was -- again it was played, but none of

14     the sides wanted to meet the other one physically.

15        Q.   Thank you.  However, the fact is that Colonel Vukovic and

16     Major Nikolic informed you, particularly towards the end of May, the 31st

17     of May, for example, about huge losses incurred by the Serbs and the

18     incidents in which the Muslim army left the enclave in order to kill the

19     Serbs; is that correct?

20        A.   That's correct, but then we also have to add that at that same

21     moment we asked Major Nikolic, as we did several times before, and also

22     Colonel Vukovic, to give us the freedom of movement, either the UNPROFOR

23     troops or the UNMOs in the enclave, to go out the enclave and check the

24     statements they were made.  Because we only had those parts of

25     information, those statements.  They often seemed to be false because

Page 22209

 1     both sides blamed each other of doing these kind of things and we had not

 2     possibility to go out and check it.

 3        Q.   All right.  But don't you as officers trust each other?  Why

 4     shouldn't you believe Colonel Vukovic and Major Nikolic that the Serbs

 5     were getting killed as a result of the missions undertaken by the Muslim

 6     army outside of the enclave?

 7        A.   It's not only the officers.  I think it was a war situation and

 8     we had several times promises from Major Nikolic and Colonel Vukovic

 9     about agreements we made.  Several times they proved not to stick to

10     their promises and not to stick to the agreements we made to each other.

11     So of course you get a situation that you don't trust each other and

12     everything that is said has to be checked, double-checked.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly look at 1D1961.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Is it true that on some occasions the Serbs demanded vehemently

17     for Srebrenica to be demilitarised or else they were going to launch an

18     attack?  I think the number is wrong.  It should be 1D1961 and it was

19     1D1474.

20             Did you hear my question?  Is it true that the Serbian officers

21     told you on many occasions:  Bring the demilitarisation to the end,

22     otherwise we are going to launch an attack?

23        A.   That's correct.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'm going to show you a few Muslim combat reports

25     in which they speak about dozens of Serbian casualties inflicted by the

Page 22210

 1     troops from the 28th Division.  For example, one of them is a report,

 2     look at the English version of it, which says and describes what members

 3     of the 28th Division were doing; inter alia, they were intensifying

 4     activities behind our lines around Srebrenica and Zepa and they are tying

 5     our forces in order to prevent us from sending them to Sarajevo front.

 6     They killed 40 people, they burned the village of Visnjica to the ground,

 7     et cetera.  Don't you see that this tells you that you should have

 8     believed the Serb officers when they said that the situation had become

 9     unbearable?

10        A.   Of course we got frequently disinformation from the Serb

11     officers.  We reported it, and again I only can state that we wanted to

12     prevent it.  For example, because in the same time-period we frequently

13     got the information from the Serb officers that Muslims were smuggling

14     ammunition from especially Zepa into Srebrenica.  They asked us if it was

15     possible for us to take care of that and to prevent it.  Well, we had not

16     enough personnel because at one moment personnel was not allowed by the

17     VRS side to return to the enclave.  We had not enough material to build

18     new O Ps in the southern part of the enclave.  So the only thing we could

19     do was our utmost to control and observe the southern part and prevent

20     smuggling as far as we could see it.  We informed, of course, the BiH

21     about the complaints of the Serb side, and of course they denied that

22     those kind of things happened.

23        Q.   Thank you.  How many soldiers would you require in order to be

24     able to control between 4- and 6.000 Muslim soldiers within the enclave,

25     particularly the soldiers who keep changing clothes from civilian to

Page 22211

 1     uniforms and at the same time to keep yourselves safe from being killed

 2     in a guerilla way?

 3        A.   I think now we're getting again in an operational situation, and

 4     I think this is a question that should be asked to the commander or

 5     second in command and not to me.

 6        Q.   As a civilian I can put to you that as I see it the only solution

 7     was demilitarisation, because with 10- or 15.000 soldiers you couldn't

 8     have controlled 4- to 6.000 guerilla soldiers and prevent them from

 9     killing you.  Don't you agree that the only viable solution was

10     demilitarisation?

11        A.   Yes, of course.  And I think that for a complete demilitarisation

12     on both sides, at least not the regular army but also civilians, I think

13     that the UNPROFOR agreement should have been changed, for example, the

14     possibility to search all houses.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now, you have confirmed, haven't you, that on the

16     1st of July you met Colonel Vukovic and that he told you and described

17     the situation to you with regard to the enclave.  In addition, he said

18     that the Serb army had to react and to that you responded that if they

19     reacted air-strikes would follow; is that correct?

20        A.   I don't know if I said it that way.  I'm just looking in my

21     notes.

22        Q.   I believe that this was said - just one moment - in your written

23     statement, 1D --

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the number of

25     the document.

Page 22212

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's 1D04690.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   In paragraph 6 of your statement you say that you believe that he

 4     told you that they would take the OP by force, even maybe by force.

 5     That's exactly what you said.

 6        A.   Yeah, I can't find it in my notes now, but I think that's true

 7     from my recollection.  They ordered us to leave the OP because they

 8     wanted to use the road on which the OP was.  Eventually they would take

 9     over the OP with force, and I think that we answered in that we would try

10     to deny them the access to the OP and that, if necessary, we would ask

11     for close air support.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know that this belt between Zepa and

13     Srebrenica was occupied in an unauthorised way and that the Army of

14     Republika Srpska was denied access to it?

15        A.   No, I'm not aware of that because, and I just can explain, when

16     we came into the enclave, we got a map with a red line on it, and for us

17     that was the border of the enclave accepted by both parties, at least

18     that was what we thought.  Of course Muslims from one side and the Serbs

19     from the other side did not accept the red line.  Both claimed a little

20     bit more to the left or to the right.  We never managed to create a

21     situation to go with one of the parties, at least one by one, along the

22     line to check if we were talking about the same line.  And I'm not aware

23     that the situation in the south where the OP was was not correct, because

24     in my opinion the OP was already built there in the beginning of 1994.

25     So for us it was just there and I don't know if there were any documents

Page 22213

 1     in which it was mentioned that it was not correct.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I note the time.  We'll take a break

 3     for 15 minutes.  You have spent an hour and 15 minutes.  You have about

 4     three-quarters of an hour, and then I think it's time for you to come to

 5     more relevant issues after the break.

 6             We'll resume at quarter past.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 3.02 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 3.16 p.m.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Mr. Rave, let us go to the month of July as quickly as possible.

13     Is it correct that already in early June you noticed that the Muslims

14     were carrying out provocations from the proximity of your observation

15     posts with the intention of drawing you into the war?

16        A.   I don't know exactly when it started --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Sorry, Mr. Rave.  Could we wait till we have the

18     French interpreters.

19             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

20             JUDGE KWON:  I think we can continue.  Yes.  Please continue,

21     Mr. Rave.

22             THE WITNESS:  I think that I can't exactly say when it started,

23     but after the attack on the OP Echo in the south and after that on the

24     attack of OP Foxtrot, Muslims who gathered around our OPs and tried to

25     get in fire contact with the VRS, tried to get the UN involved in their

Page 22214

 1     fire-fights, that's correct.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Thank you.  I don't know if it's translatable.  In our language

 4     we say you hide behind a grandfather and then shoot at the bear in order

 5     to save yourself.  In other words, they wanted to use you and to push you

 6     into a conflict with the Serbs; correct?

 7        A.   Yes, I think that the intention was that the Serbs would fire on

 8     the OPs and they expected, of course, that the reaction would be that

 9     UNPROFOR would shoot back towards the Serbs.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall hearing from someone that Arkan had

11     been noticed in the area of Srebrenica and you nearly believed that

12     although you couldn't verify it?

13        A.   Yes, I got - and I should look at my notes - at least two times

14     the information that Arkan was sighted in the area.  One specific time

15     was that he was seen in Bratunac, I think in the afternoon or around

16     12.00, and the information came from the Muslim side, the same source

17     that provided several times that showed out to be true.  For example, the

18     building up of forces in the southern part, tanks in the southern part of

19     the enclave from the VRS and that same source who gave us that

20     information.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Only in your amalgamated statement you said that

22     those were Ekrem and Avdo Majstorovic whereas in another statement of

23     yours you said that those men were Ekrem and Ramiz.  Is that correct?

24        A.   Well, then I have to look in my notes to see when it was and I

25     can take a quick look.  I don't have an exact date.

Page 22215

 1        Q.   All right.  It's not that important.  We can move on.  Now

 2     already on the 6th and 7th of July you saw that there was fighting going

 3     on in the Bandera triangle and you speak about that in paragraph 7 of

 4     your amalgamated statement.  Is that correct?

 5        A.   I can't find that in my statement now --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Para 7, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, paragraph 7.

 8             [In English] "A lot of fire-fighting in the Bandera triangle and

 9     in the vicinity of the OP Foxtrot" --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Probably --

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Oh, I'm sorry, probably it's page 7.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes --

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes, that's correct.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Para 13.

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes, on 13, a lot of fire-fights took place.  We

17     got the information from our observation posts, I think, that were on the

18     north and the south corner of the Bandera triangle, and they informed us

19     that they heard lots of fire-fights.  And of course the information from

20     the OP Foxtrot we got directly from the OP.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Thank you.  I don't have time to show you some documents that are

23     already in evidence.  Let me ask you this:  Were you informed that

24     throughout the whole of June, and particularly from the 15th of June

25     until the end of June, a major Muslim offensive was going on in the area

Page 22216

 1     of Sarajevo and that the Muslim forces in Srebrenica tried to step-up

 2     their activities in order to assist those fighting in Sarajevo.  Just

 3     tell me if you knew about that or not?

 4        A.   No, I don't.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that this is the same Bandera triangle

 6     where you were denied access by Zulfo Tursunovic's men, whether they be

 7     civilians or soldiers, we're talking about the same location?

 8        A.   I don't know what location you're referring to, but we only had

 9     one Bandera triangle and that was the one in which Tursunovic was the

10     leader.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly have a look at

13     65 ter 15584.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   As a soldier, tell me, would you tolerate the fact that in every

16     offensive operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 28th Division becomes

17     intensely involved and engaged with the aim of defeating the Serbian

18     army?  Would you tolerate that?

19        A.   Are you asking me personally or as an UNPROFOR representative

20     that -- if we had known this and we have been able to prevent it, I think

21     we'd have done it.  But I am not aware of this document.

22        Q.   Thank you.  We see here what General Zivanovic, who was still the

23     commander, ordered on the 2nd of July active combat, and he is saying

24     where different Muslim brigades are.  He says the 280th is blocking the

25     Potocari-Srebrenica axis and the 281st is blocking the Podgaj-Borovac

Page 22217

 1     axis, and then the 202nd Zeleni Jadar, the 283rd Podravanje-Buci village,

 2     et cetera.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   You see here the next paragraph says that their intention is to

 6     unite these two enclaves, to connect them from a military point of view.

 7     And we see here where the 284th is and we see what his decision is as

 8     well, the commander of the Drina Corps, what his decision was.  Paragraph

 9     3, "I've decided."  And you see that Srebrenica and Zepa are supposed to

10     go back within the agreed borders, the tactical positions should be

11     improved, and conditions should be created for eliminating the enclave

12     because the Serb army is constantly being attacked from it.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have the next page,

14     please.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Do you remember that during your first meeting General Zivanovic

17     said to you:  Demilitarise or I will attack?

18        A.   I don't think that that were the words of Colonel -- the Colonel

19     Vukovic --

20        Q.   No, no, General Zivanovic.  This is his order.

21        A.   And the only time I met General Zivanovic was on the -- I think

22     the 6th or the 8th of January, 1995, during the hand-over meeting in the

23     Hotel Fontana.  At that moment, General Zivanovic told me that he had the

24     right to go into the enclave because the enclave was his, not from

25     General Mladic, not from Mr. Karadzic, it was his, at least the southern

Page 22218

 1     part.  That's the only thing I know about orders or ideas that

 2     General Zivanovic had about the enclave of Srebrenica.

 3        Q.   Didn't he say to you during your first meeting that you should

 4     demilitarise or that he would enter the enclave?

 5        A.   I can't remember exactly what he said during the nine-hour

 6     meeting with lots of history, and of course I think and I can imagine

 7     that the demilitarisation was mentioned but not specifically that we

 8     should demilitarise or he would take the enclave.

 9        Q.   If I find that before the end, I'll show you what it was that had

10     been said to you, but now I'm going to show you -- just a moment, please.

11     International humanitarian law, respect for that, humanitarian -- let's

12     just find that.  Just a moment, please.  Oh, all right, we don't have

13     time.  I don't have time to deal with this any longer.  So now let's move

14     on to July.

15             You saw and you received information to the effect that in the

16     south where the enclaves touch, the Serb army is advancing; isn't that

17     right?

18        A.   We got the information that more and more VRS troops collected in

19     the southern part of the enclave.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And then an attempt was made to have your people

21     withdrawn from the observation post, and then the Muslims killed a

22     soldier of yours using a dum-dum bullet; right?

23        A.   No, that's not correct.  When the OP Foxtrot was taken over by

24     the VRS, the OP manning withdrew from the OP.  They went down in their

25     APC via dirt road to the main road and that was going through the enclave

Page 22219

 1     of Srebrenica.  At the end of the dirt road, Muslim civilians were

 2     gathered there and the soldier was killed, or by a hand-grenade or by a

 3     gun-shot, I'm not sure for that.

 4        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  In the Tolimir case Mr. Franken said that

 5     that was a dum-dum bullet, but all right.  Is it correct that your army,

 6     or rather, your troops from this observation post decided to go ahead

 7     rather than back and to surrender to the Serbs rather than go back into

 8     the enclave, that is paragraph 34 and paragraph 35.  Please take a look

 9     at your statement.

10             [In English] "The men from the OP only had one possibility, going

11     forward and surrender to the VRS because they were just afraid going

12     backward where the Muslims tried to stop them and they had that incident

13     on the same day some hours before when the soldier Raviv van Renssen was

14     killed."

15        A.   Yes, and what's your question?  Because we're talking now not

16     about the OP Foxtrot but the OP Uniform in the south, and we had more

17     from that OPs -- the Muslims in the vicinity of the OPs denied us to do

18     our military job in the way we used to do it.  They only had one idea,

19     UNPROFOR should go forward and attack the VRS in the way and they would

20     maybe do it.  We -- it was not our way of working.  We were trying to go

21     backward and find a new position somewhere else.  The Muslims did not

22     allow us to go backward so the only possibility for the OP manning was go

23     forward and surrender to the VRS troops, and of course in their mind they

24     knew that if they would not listen to the warnings of the BiH, there was

25     possibility, just as happened to Raviv van Renssen, to be shot at.

Page 22220

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Today during the examination-in-chief you confirmed

 2     the suggestion made by the OTP that your people had been taken prisoner

 3     by the Serb army.  What I'm saying is what that was -- that that was

 4     their choice, to move towards the Serb army, and that after that they

 5     were put up at the hotel in Bratunac; is that right?

 6        A.   That's correct.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Further on in the night between the 10th and 11th you

 8     did confirm, did you not, that Muslim soldiers left the enclave and tried

 9     to breakthrough to Tuzla; right?

10        A.   No.  In the night from the 10th on to the 11th we had a meeting

11     in the PTT building in Srebrenica.  Colonel Karremans, Major Boering at

12     that time, and myself, to inform the local population, the civilians and

13     the military population, about what was happening and the ultimatums that

14     were made.  When we were in the vicinity of the PTT building, we saw a

15     big group of men gathered over there.  All -- no, most of them in

16     uniform -- a lot of them in uniforms, most of them armed with small arms,

17     grenade launchers, and all those kinds of things, and they were walking

18     in the north-western direction.  We had no idea what was going on and at

19     that moment we had no idea about a column trying to make a breakthrough

20     in the direction of Tuzla.

21        Q.   In Ramiz Becirovic's statement it says that at the request of the

22     Muslim's side Karremans asked for air-strikes, although you did not have

23     visual contact with the Serb army; is that right?

24        A.   No.  During that meeting at -- in the PTT building at 11.00,

25     Karremans informed the military and the civilian leaders in the enclave

Page 22221

 1     that there was an ultimatum, that if attacks were going on that it might

 2     be possible that there was an air-strike.  That's the information that's

 3     correct.  So he informed that there might be a possibility that there was

 4     an air-strike when attacks were going on.  And I think that today already

 5     stated that on the next morning one of our APCs went forward, was shot at

 6     by a VRS tank, and that was a confirmation that we were still under

 7     attack and that was the moment I think that the information went up the

 8     chain of command to ask for support.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that the Muslim side, Ramiz and the

10     rest of them, gave you co-ordinates as to where the Serbs were and that

11     you forwarded this information to NATO, with a view to air-strikes?

12        A.   No.  I think that the liaison team was the only one, except on

13     some occasions also the commander, but most of the time the liaison team

14     dealed with Ramiz and we never got from Ramiz information about Serb

15     positions that could be used for air-strikes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  We have information from your side and from the

17     Muslim side that you acted in concert, that they had provided you with

18     these co-ordinates and that this first attack took place before you

19     actually saw the Serbs at all.  However, if you're denying that, there

20     will be others who will confirm it.

21             Tell us this, please, is it correct that you did not know where

22     they had gone on the evening of the 10th, this large armed group?

23        A.   No.

24        Q.   Are you saying it's not correct or is -- are you saying that you

25     did not know?

Page 22222

 1        A.   The only thing I know that the large group went from Srebrenica

 2     on a dirt road in a north-western direction.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'd like us to deal with this meeting a bit and

 4     that film that was shown to you.  Mladic says to Karremans:  You asked

 5     for a meeting, speak up.  And you say that you did not expect Mladic and

 6     that Karremans did not expect Mladic.  Did Karremans ask to liaise with

 7     the Serb army, not expecting that it would be Mladic though?

 8        A.   I think the only one that can answer that question is Karremans

 9     himself, if he asked for a meeting.  In my opinion he did not because

10     when we left the enclave and we go to the 7.00 to leave or I was informed

11     at 7.00 that we have to be in Bratunac at 8.00, that there was a meeting,

12     but there was no agenda, that's a question for me.  Because when I ask

13     for a meeting I think I have an agenda and even a schedule for the

14     meeting.  So in my opinion, Karremans did not ask for the meeting but was

15     ordered to go there or to come there.

16        Q.   However, sir, Karremans did not deny what Mladic had said to him.

17     You asked for a meeting, speak up.  Probably Karremans asked for a

18     meeting but not with Mladic himself.  He got Mladic gratis, as it were.

19     Why did he not oppose him?  Why did he not say:  I didn't ask for a

20     meeting with you?

21        A.   I think at that moment --

22             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think it's for the witness to answer that

23     question.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe, but then he shouldn't be

25     saying that he had not asked for one, I mean Karremans, because it turns

Page 22223

 1     out that he did not ask for a meeting.  If he doesn't know one, he

 2     doesn't know the other either.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Do you agree with that, Mr. Rave, if you don't know one thing,

 5     then you don't know the other one either?

 6        A.   I think we're trying now to go into other people's minds.  When

 7     Mladic is asking Karremans why he asked for a meeting, I think at that

 8     moment we can see that Karremans' mind was somewhere else and not on

 9     those, in my opinion, at that moment, dirty details because it was not

10     interesting at all in that moment.  I think afterwards for a Court it

11     interesting, but at that moment it was in my opinion not interesting who

12     asked for the meeting.  Because there was a meeting, I think at that

13     moment we had a feeling that we lost the war and we had only one thing

14     that we had to do, take care of the 25.000 refugees.

15             JUDGE KWON:  But in answer to the question by Mr. Mladic -- by

16     Mladic, Colonel Karremans answered to the effect that he had a request

17     from General Nicolai and national authorities and refugees.  How were the

18     DutchBat going to implement such a request without liaising with the Serb

19     forces?

20             THE WITNESS:  I think that when as a commander on the ground you

21     got an order to go there to the Hotel Fontana to meet with one of the

22     people that won you war, then you inform your chain of command.  And of

23     course I think at that moment you get the informations from -- and the

24     UNPROFOR side and the national side in Holland what questions they have.

25     And you take that.

Page 22224

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Does it mean that after being ordered by Mladic to

 2     come to that hotel he asked permission from his superior?

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, I think so -- at least in my opinion that's

 4     the normal way we deal with.  But as I had stated before, the only one

 5     that can answer that question I think is Mr. Karremans himself.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Mr. Rave, do you remember that that film, 44 minutes, 55 seconds,

11     at that point Karremans said the reason for the meeting was his intention

12     to evacuate the civilians from the enclave -- to help the evacuation.  Do

13     you remember that?

14        A.   No, not specifically in these words, but -- yeah, I can't

15     specifically see what was on that minute in the film.  But I think it

16     might be one of the questions that he got from UNPROFOR or even maybe

17     from the Dutch government, ask how the evacuation will take place.  But

18     again, I'm speaking now for Mr. Karremans and I don't think I'm the right

19     person to ask this question.

20        Q.   All right.  But you're testifying about that and, perhaps this

21     was not your intention, but everything seems to suggest that there was

22     this forcible deportation of Muslim civilians from Srebrenica and that

23     that was the Serb objective.  What I'm putting to you is that the Serbs

24     do not mention evacuation anywhere.  And as for this presentation by

25     Karremans of what the objective of the visit was, Mladic says:  Bring me

Page 22225

 1     the civilians and let me hear from them what it is that they want.

 2     Wasn't that the case?

 3        A.   Yeah, of course, but in these kind of situations you can ask

 4     several -- not realistic questions because it wasn't realistic.  The

 5     enclave of Srebrenica had fallen.  The town of Srebrenica was empty I

 6     think because, in my opinion, the whole population was near the compound

 7     in Potocari.  So there was only one possibility:  Either VRS leave

 8     Srebrenica and offer the people to go back to their houses or evacuate

 9     them.  I don't know exactly, in film or a statement I read it again back

10     that I saw that Mladic offered the local population:  You have a choice,

11     to go to the north, to the south, to the east, to the west, you can

12     choose wherever you go.  Well, there wasn't a choice.  The only thing

13     that there was was buses and trucks and a lot of scary anxious people,

14     and you had only one goal:  Get away from here.  And wherever they bring

15     us is okay, get us away from this territory where we were imprisoned for

16     more than three years in very bad circumstances.  And they only had a

17     goal, to leave.  And the not realistic question:  Let us know where you

18     want to go, 25.000 people without any leadership.  The Dutch Battalion

19     tied on both hands -- well, I think it's not an issue to discuss.  It's

20     pure unrealistic.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West, do you have the 65 ter number of the trial

22     video transcript?

23             MS. WEST:  65 --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second --

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have it printed out, but I don't

Page 22226

 1     have all the minute references.  The Prosecution must have that, though.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I'm just asking for my reference.

 3             Yes.

 4             MS. WEST:  65 ter 03099.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   We can leave all of that aside.  What I'm asking you now is

 9     whether it is correct that only UNPROFOR and the Muslim side were

10     speaking about evacuation and asking for buses; whereas, the Serb side

11     was waiting to hear what it was that the Muslim civilians wanted and

12     they're asking to have a military representative there to agree on the

13     hand-over of weapons there.  The Serbs do not mention evacuation at all.

14     Mladic is asking to see the legitimate representatives of the civilians

15     to say what it is that they want, and he says that verbatim:  I want them

16     to come and to tell me what it is that they want.  Mr. Karremans says

17     both "evacuation" and "buses," whereas the Serbs do not mention that;

18     right?  We can see all of that in the transcript.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, that has been asked and answered.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.  I'm not sure that

21     that's an answer.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Tell us, please, 1 minute, 28 -- actually, 1 hour, 27 minutes --

24     there is a misinterpretation, "whichever way Mladic wants it."  It is

25     actually "Mandzic."  Was that your understanding as well, that what was

Page 22227

 1     said there, whatever Mandzic wanted, Mandzic being the representative of

 2     the Muslims?

 3        A.   I don't know exactly the subject at that specific moment --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I think it's noted in the transcript.

 5     It's -- I take it that the page Mr. Karadzic was referring to is the page

 6     ending with 7856, when Mr. Karremans said:

 7             "I presume that is something what Mr. Mladic can tell in terms of

 8     where ..."

 9             But the transcript indicates that he was pointing at

10     Nesib Mandzic, not Mladic.

11             Is that what you have in mind, Mr. Karadzic?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   And do you agree -- you said, actually, in line 47 that Mladic

15     asked for buses; however, buses are mentioned by Colonel Karremans, he's

16     asking for them.

17        A.   Again, I don't know exactly how it is, but in my opinion when

18     they were talking about the evacuation Mladic asked Colonel Karremans if

19     he was able to provide buses or UNPROFOR was able to provide buses.  But

20     then we have to look it back.  I don't know.

21        Q.   Well, the participants can see in the transcript that Mladic does

22     not mention buses or transport or evacuation at all.  He is asking them

23     to come and say what it is that they want; however, we don't have enough

24     time for this.  Tell us now -- actually, this is not our responsibility.

25     I have to indicate to the participants at 1 hour, 35 minutes

Page 22228

 1     approximately, it says Mladic says "whatever.  You can survive, or

 2     rather, stay," he corrected what he was saying, "or disappear."  So the

 3     word "opstati" or "ostati."  So both words have to be translated but it's

 4     two different words, he corrected himself.

 5             Another thing, Mr. Rave, how do you distinguish between the

 6     squealing of a pig when it's being caught and the squealing of a pig when

 7     it's being slaughtered?  Did you see this pig being slaughtered or did

 8     you just hear squealing?

 9        A.   I just heard the squealing, and when you listen carefully to the

10     video then in advance of the squealing we can hear and that slowly fades

11     away, we can hear two or three times the squealing of a pig.  And in my

12     opinion - and that's just a feeling that I have - at three or four

13     minutes in advance of the slaughtering of the pig, the pig was brought

14     into the area.  We can hear it at least two or three times, and then the

15     squealing starts and fades away.  And it didn't fade away, in my opinion,

16     because it was brought away, but just because, I think, its throat was

17     cut.

18        Q.   Thank you.  When your grandmother used to slaughter pigs, who did

19     she try to frighten?  You said that you recognised this sound because you

20     remember your grandmother slaughtering a pig.  Was she trying to

21     intimidate someone with that?

22        A.   Two things.  My grandmother didn't slaughter pigs.  My

23     grandfather was a farmer and I heard -- and I saw the slaughtering of a

24     pig on his farm, and he didn't slaughterer to intimidate somebody, but

25     they just slaughtered a pig to feed themselves during the winter.

Page 22229

 1        Q.   Thank you.  It was you who mentioned it, but I'm not going to go

 2     into this any further.  Only I'll say that you should know that every

 3     celebration that we have ends with the suffering of a pig or a suckling

 4     or a lamb.  Now, did you notice then in the first sentence that

 5     Mr. Karremans uttered, he is saying things as if he were acting in

 6     accordance with a telegram received from Mr. Akashi a day or two before

 7     that.  Didn't you realise that his primary concern was the civilians and

 8     did you know that Mr. Akashi, at the recommendation of the Muslim side,

 9     wanted the Serbs to hold talks about evacuation?

10        A.   I can't look in the mind of Mr. Akashi, of course, and I'm not

11     aware about a telegram from Mr. Akashi towards Mr. Karremans.

12        Q.   But, Mr. Rave, I am concerned about your conclusions not about

13     your knowledge.  This is not what Mr. Akashi thought.  He put it down on

14     paper.  He sent a telegram both to Mr. Annan and the Secretary-General,

15     that was on the 11th of July.  We already offered this and I don't have

16     any more time.  Now, what is worrying me are your conclusions to the

17     effect that everything had been planned in advance, that the trucks were

18     on stand-by, but look, as late as on the 12th of July, the Serbs say that

19     buses should be provided and we have this in 1D1971 --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic --

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are you objecting to the speed of

22     my speech?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   So, Mr. Rave, do you accept that I have grounds to express my

Page 22230

 1     reservations when it comes to your thoughts and your conclusions and that

 2     this should be separated from what you actually know?

 3        A.   What I know that on the 12th of July there was a meeting at 10.00

 4     in the morning in the Hotel Fontana with the civilian representatives and

 5     General Mladic and Colonel Karremans.  I didn't -- I wasn't in that

 6     meeting.  The only thing I know that around 12.00 I got the order from

 7     Colonel Karremans because there was no real time schedule to go back to

 8     Bratunac to ask if we could make a time schedule for buses or anything

 9     else because it wasn't clear to them.  When I came at that moment with

10     Mr. Boering again by the Hotel Fontana, we got in contact with

11     Major Nikolic, and he told us to go back because buses were already

12     there.

13             I think that in my opinion that's the only conclusion I can make

14     and -- well, you don't have to accept it.  But my conclusion is that when

15     you at 10.00 know that you have buses available, that they will be there

16     at 12.00, that you just inform the people who are involved that buses

17     will be there at 12.00.  It didn't happen and I don't know why, but it

18     was prepared because buses don't show up just from out of the blue.

19        Q.   But look what you said on the 11th at 2230, a meeting between

20     Mladic and representatives of the civilians, and Mladic didn't have any

21     ideas to offer or any proposals to make at that meeting.  He was merely

22     being asked to secure a safe evacuation.  Buses came only on the 12th at

23     10.00.  Don't you think it would have been beneficial for you to know

24     that Mr. Akashi had asked for the evacuation and that Mr. Karremans, as

25     your commander, should have known that.  Don't you think it would be

Page 22231

 1     really good if you knew everything so that you could be able to draw

 2     conclusions on that basis?

 3        A.   Yeah, of course it would be good to know everything, but in my

 4     position as an NCO, as a liaison officer, I was not aware about contacts

 5     between Mr. Karremans and Mr. Akashi and I was not aware that Mr. Akashi

 6     asked for evacuations.  So what do you expect for me to answer on this

 7     one?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  It's a waste of time, Mr. Karadzic, knowing what the

 9     witness's answer will be.

10             Ms. West, how long would you need for your re-examination?

11             MS. WEST:  Just a few minutes.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Please conclude by ten past 4.00.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   With all due respect for your advice, I am really concerned about

16     general statements and conclusions.  Therefore, Mr. Rave, I'm asking you

17     once again, wouldn't it have been better for the commander to draw

18     conclusions and similar thoughts, the one who was actually in

19     communication with Mr. Akashi rather than you yourself?

20        A.   Well, you ask me and I answer you, and if you don't like my

21     statements or my conclusions, then you should ask it maybe the other way

22     around.  And when you want specific answers that only the commander can

23     answer, then I think that you have it -- have to ask it to Mr. Karremans

24     and not to me.

25        Q.   I'm asking you.  On what basis are you drawing your conclusions

Page 22232

 1     about the Serbs' intentions, about the pig, about the preparedness or

 2     lack of preparedness, when we can see that the facts are contrary to

 3     this, even the facts that were available to you?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic --

 5             MS. WEST:  [Overlapping speakers] --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  -- the witness has answered to these questions.

 7     Unless you have further questions, then conclude your cross-examination.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'll do my best to make

 9     a right choice.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

11        Q.   Do you remember the paragraphs 23 and 24 that suggest that you

12     were fully aware of the Muslim provocations?  Do you remember that?  And

13     also, do you remember that Major Nikolic told you that the Muslims were

14     leaving the enclaves and en route to Tuzla were committing murders and

15     setting houses on fire in the Serb villages?

16        A.   Are you referring now to the date of the 12th and then the 13th,

17     when the big column broke out in the direction of Tuzla?

18        Q.   No, before that.  You were told on the 31st of May about that,

19     and it was Major Nikolic who told you that the Muslims were leaving the

20     enclave and that were killing Serbs and setting their villages on fire on

21     their way out.  Is that what he told you?

22        A.   I can't specifically tell you that this was exactly what

23     Major Nikolic told me.  I can again state that Major Nikolic told us

24     several times that Muslims were leaving the enclave, were going to Serb

25     villages, setting them on fire, and killing Serbs.  Our question, let us

Page 22233

 1     inform UNMOs, let us inform UNMOs in other regions, or let even ourselves

 2     go out there and check what happens over there, we were not allowed to.

 3     The only thing we were able to do were go to the BiH inside the enclave

 4     and tell them that those were the concerns of Major Nikolic and if it's

 5     true they should stop.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  But did you notice that Muslim civilians wanted to

 7     board the empty humanitarian convoys, or rather, the trucks from empty

 8     humanitarian convoys and leave the area in that way?  Did you notice that

 9     while you were posted there?

10        A.   I did not notice it myself, but I heard the rumours that they

11     tried to, and I can imagine that when you're in a prison for more than

12     three and a half years you get -- try to get every possibility to get out

13     and one of the possibilities could be in a UNHCR convoy.  But I think

14     that it's also a standard operational procedure for the UNHCR to check

15     convoys before they leave the enclave, if there are any people inside

16     their trucks, because they should return empty to the locations where

17     they came from.  And I think that when UNPROFOR saw those kind of things

18     they tried to prevent it -- well, they even prevented it because of

19     course we knew what the consequences were when people were caught in

20     UNHCR convoys.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that as far back as in 1993 the civilians

22     of Srebrenica were requesting through General Morillon to leave

23     Srebrenica and that the Serbs were asking for the Serb prisoners to be

24     released from Tuzla?

25        A.   No, I'm not aware of that.

Page 22234

 1        Q.   Do you agree that during your tour of duty, nobody came into

 2     Srebrenica, everybody was fleeing Srebrenica because people wanted to go

 3     out.  So were the numbers increasing or decreasing?

 4        A.   I think the numbers were rather stable.  The only decreasing was

 5     when we now and then had a medical evacuation from civilians from the

 6     enclave, but those were in numbers of tenths.

 7        Q.   What about these flights through the forest that Major Nikolic

 8     informed you about, did that affect the numbers of the people living in

 9     the enclave in terms of reducing them?

10        A.   Major Nikolic did not inform us about fleeing from the enclave

11     through the woods.  He only informed us about Muslims going out of the

12     enclave, going to civilian villages, try to burn them, and kill Serbian

13     people over there.

14        Q.   This is my last question or actually one major question and two

15     additional questions.  In your opinion, how many people were there,

16     irrespective of the fact whether they were civilians or soldiers in the

17     enclave, while you were there?

18        A.   Well, you're asking for an opinion again.  The answer is about

19     40.000 I think, and I think that that number was rather stable.

20        Q.   Do you know in 1994, which was the peak time, they had 37.000 but

21     they reported to you the figure of 45.000 only to secure more

22     humanitarian relief?  Did you know that on every occasion they always

23     reported between 7- or 8.000 people more than the actual number?

24        A.   Well, I'm not aware of reporting numbers from inhabitants of the

25     enclave towards the Dutch Battalion.  I think they reported it towards

Page 22235

 1     the UNHCR.  That was a completely different line of communication,

 2     because the UNHCR took care of the supplies and not the Dutch Battalion.

 3        Q.   Since you were with the convoys and also the convoys who reached

 4     convoy -- reached Kladanj, did you know how many people arrived in

 5     Kladanj on the first and second day?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   Do you know what quantities of food they allocated from the

 8     humanitarian aid and gave to their army?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Rave.  Please understand - and I apologise to you

11     if you maybe think that I am being attacking you.  My only objective is

12     to clarify any imprecision; that's my quest.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West.

14             MS. WEST:  Thank you.

15             May we have 65 ter 03099.

16                           Re-examination by Ms. West:

17        Q.   And that is the trial book, I'm specifically looking for page

18     7859.  Thank you.

19             Mr. Rave, on page 93 of today's transcript Mr. Karadzic asked you

20     about some of the words spoken at this meeting.  At 93 he said that

21     Mladic said:  Whatever, you can survive, or rather, say -- he corrected

22     what he was saying or disappear or the word -- so both words have to be

23     translated, but it's two different words.  He corrected himself.  I'm

24     going to direct you to the transcript here, and we're looking at the top,

25     it's about third line down.  I'll start with the sentence.  This is when

Page 22236

 1     Mr. Mladic is speaking directly to Mandzic, and at the beginning of this

 2     paragraph when he starts speaking directly to him he says:

 3             "Please write down the following," and he goes through a list.

 4             And then he says:

 5             "I need to have a clear position of the representatives of your

 6     people on whether you want to survive ...  stay or vanish."

 7             Sir, at that point you had been sitting in this meeting with him

 8     for, I think, over at least a half an hour, and you were present, you

 9     heard the tone of his voice, you had the context of the entire

10     conversation.  What did you understand that to mean, "survive ... stay or

11     vanish"?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This calls for speculation.  He's

13     asked to interpret Mladic's voice.

14             JUDGE KWON:  No, Mr. Karadzic.

15             Yes, please proceed to answer, Mr. Rave.

16             THE WITNESS:  Very well.

17             My impression was pure intimidation.  The tone was that if you

18     don't co-operate, you can disappear completely.

19             MS. WEST:

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MS. WEST:  May we have same document page 7846.

22        Q.   And today's transcript on page 91 Mr. Karadzic says:

23             "What I'm asking you now is whether it's correct that only

24     UNPROFOR and the Muslim side were speaking about evacuation and asking

25     for buses; whereas, the Serb side was waiting to hear what it was that

Page 22237

 1     the Muslim civilians wanted."

 2             And this is the transcript of the meeting, and here we see in the

 3     middle Mladic saying:

 4             "Can you ask for some buses through Nicolai?"

 5             And then the interpreter says:

 6             "Can you order buses through Nicolai?"

 7             And Karremans says:

 8             "Buses?  If that should be the case, then I think we can arrange

 9     that."

10             Sir, is this -- what's here in the transcript, is this consistent

11     of your memory of the meeting itself?

12        A.   Yeah, I think this is -- what was said in the meeting, because I

13     always had the impression that General Mladic asked Mr. Karremans if he

14     was able to provide buses.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West, I located that page as well, but I was

16     wondering whether buses were referred to earlier on during the meeting.

17     Could you come back to ask later on --

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

19             When everything was already agreed upon.

20             JUDGE KWON:  No, whether buses were referred to --

21             MS. WEST:  Yeah.

22             JUDGE KWON:  -- during the meeting.

23             MS. WEST:  I can ask the question.

24             JUDGE KWON:  No, but we have to go through the transcript.  We

25     didn't have time.

Page 22238

 1             So do you remember that buses were referred to before this

 2     conversation?

 3             THE WITNESS:  No, I don't -- I -- I -- I can't say that for sure.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  So I'm asking you to check the transcript and to

 5     come back to us.

 6             MS. WEST:  I will.  Thank you very much.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8             So you are through, Ms. West?

 9             MS. WEST:  Yes.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask the Chamber to ask the

11     interpreters to explain to the Chamber the similarity between "disappear"

12     and "stay because these words in our language are "opstati" and "ostati,"

13     very similar.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it is not for the witness.  You can

15     deal with it in another way, so if it is -- it relates to the

16     translation.

17             Then unless my colleagues have questions for you, that concludes

18     your evidence, Mr. Rave.  On behalf of the Tribunal and our Chamber I

19     would like to thank you for your coming to the Tribunal yet again to give

20     it and now you're free to go.

21             We'll rise all together.

22             But, Mr. Robinson, do you have something?  No.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

24             JUDGE KWON:  We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00 and we'll be hearing

25     the expert witness.

Page 22239

 1                           [The witness withdrew]

 2                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.18 p.m.,

 3                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 1st day of

 4                           December, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.