1 Wednesday, 30 November 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Good morning, Your Honours. Just a couple very
9 quick points before we begin. I checked the transcript we admitted as
10 the witness's 92 ter statement and there were on two days several pages
11 of testimony that was not in open session, so it may be best to leave two
12 versions, it may be simplest.
13 Second, I noticed an error when I was reading the transcript. On
14 page 22064, last sentence:
15 "How long was the video as you remember it?"
16 Should be:
17 "How long was the meeting as you remember it?"
18 I also wanted to let the Chamber and the parties know that I
19 spoke to Mr. Robinson that we're having some difficulties obtaining Dutch
20 interpreters for the next two days and we're working on that and we'll
21 try to resolve it.
22 JUDGE KWON: The question is: We do need the Dutch translators
23 for the other witnesses?
24 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honours, we've checked that. And I just
25 wanted to let everybody know that our estimate for expert Wright will be
1 a little bit longer than we put in our notification because he's the
2 first expert to explain the way these things worked, the direct will be a
3 little bit longer than we estimated just to let everybody know. Thank
5 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.
6 Good morning, Mr. Boering.
7 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.
10 Good morning, everyone.
11 WITNESS: PIETER BOERING [Resumed]
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Boering.
15 JUDGE KWON: I was told, Mr. Karadzic, that you have 40 minutes
16 for today with Mr. Boering.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Boering, you said you had not seen Serb soldiers in a long
19 time and it was necessary for somebody from the 28th Division to point
20 them out. Why was that?
21 When you were making the decision or when the decision was being
22 made about close support or air support, your dilemma was about the
23 whereabouts of the Serb troops and you had to order strikes. Why did you
24 need to know their location? Did you also need to see them with your own
1 A. At the time that in the enclave attacks were taking place from
2 the outside on to the enclave and the population was withdrawing on to
3 Srebrenica city itself. There were -- there was fire and violence from
4 the outside in. And there was also the withdrawal of DutchBat and of
5 Muslim fighters. To nevertheless attempt to try and call a halt to these
6 things, naturally a defence was needed that would keep and to be able to
7 defend properly, to mount a proper defence against a larger force, you
8 need air support, in this case too. However, there would have to be a
9 threat and armed contact.
10 And requests for air support, that was a procedure that I was
11 involved in indirectly, not directly. In any case, we needed proof that
12 there was effectively a conflict.
13 Q. Thank you. But you also needed visual contact. You said: We
14 can't see them; you wanted to see them. Was there a particular reason
15 for that?
16 A. Once again, that was not me, I myself. However, if you have
17 contact particularly in case of close air support, then you need to be
18 able to see as well what's going on related to danger to your own troops
19 or harm that you might do, damage that you might cause.
20 Q. And how many forward air controllers did you have in your
22 A. Organically we had two forward air controllers who'd been trained
23 for this. These were their main tasks, and in addition to that there
24 were also other people who were suitable for this, for example, special
1 Q. Thank you. So you had your own forward air controllers and you
2 had some extra ones. Under whose control were the extra ones?
3 A. They were all under the battalion commander's command, so that
4 was Colonel Karremans.
5 Q. Thank you. Was it for the sake of forward air controllers that
6 you needed to see the troops and the artillery, so they can guide
8 A. Like I said before, a forward air controller in a case like this
9 must truly see the target.
10 Q. Thank you. So he's practically aiming for the airplane above and
11 he makes up part of the crew of the airplane; right? I'm afraid there's
12 a problem with the transcript. Just give me a moment, please.
13 So the forward air controller is working together with the crew
14 of the aircraft, aiming the fire; right?
15 A. Yes, joint -- jointly, they have contact.
16 Q. Thank you. Please tell me this: You were talking about the 10th
17 of July. You said there was shooting around the road that was crawling
18 with refugees. Was it direct or indirect fire? What were they firing
19 with, mortars? A cannon maybe? With direct visual contact? Or was it a
20 tank? What kind of shells were they?
21 A. Well, that's a complex question. As far as I can recall, on the
22 10th of July there were actual shootings, firing with -- sporadically
23 mortars, and also indirect fire using, as I assume, a type of cannon or
24 artillery, so indirect fire I would say. As far as direct fire is
25 concerned, you would hear this taking place, you would hear fire.
1 However, I have -- I did not personally observe this.
2 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that the version prevailing here was
3 that one shell at Markale killed dozens of people and another killed just
4 a few less, whereas you saw only one wounded boy. Could you make up your
5 mind, were they just poor shooters or poor marksmen, or was it perhaps
6 the case that they were not firing at the column at all?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Okay, one, it's a compound question; two, I don't
9 know what the witness is supposed to do with the comment: "Do you
10 remember that the version prevailing here was that one shell at Markale
11 killed dozens of people..." which has had nothing to do with his
12 testimony, and it's argumentative as well about him making up his mind.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 Please reformulate your question, Mr. Karadzic.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Considering there was fire from both sides of the road on which
17 there was a large number of refugees and you saw only one wounded boy,
18 were you able to conclude that they were poor marksmen or perhaps they
19 were not aiming at people at all?
20 A. If we speak of both sides of the road the way you're indicating,
21 I indicate of the 10th more from the city, inside Srebrenica, where
22 you're on a low point between some hills. There was quite a lot of
23 population there in the streets and here and there mortars would land
24 from outside the city, in the city itself. Whether the intention was to
25 injure people, target them, or make them worried, concerned, I think the
2 Q. Concerning your own movements and the movement of civilians, were
3 you able to conclude that the purpose of the fire was to obstruct, not to
4 shoot to kill?
5 A. I have the idea that it had more to do with the people, the
6 Muslim population, to get them moving, to eventually get as many of them
7 to go to Potocari as possible.
8 Q. I'm now asking you about the fire. I'll ask you later -- in
9 fact, I'll first ask you about UNPROFOR. Did you observe that the fire
10 vis-a-vis the battalion had the purpose of limiting your exit from the
11 base and that you had no casualties?
12 A. Yes, and effectively myself, I saw a number of times shootings
13 just behind me, both from types of tanks as well as by mortar, with the
14 intention to make it clear that we as DutchBat had to stay on base as
15 much as possible and not drive around too much outside. And this was
16 also made clear to me at one time when I was in touch in one of my trips
17 to Bratunac for a talk with some Serbian military, who indicated that,
18 you know, we had to be careful and only relocate when absolutely
19 necessary; preferably we would make contact, they said, through a sort of
20 walkie-talkie system.
21 Q. Thank you. Concerning the movement of people, were you aware
22 that it was the authorities that got the people on the move by sending
23 messengers to every village, that people should gather in Potocari, and
24 it had all started long before the Serbs appeared?
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I just ask if there's a basis for the part
1 of the question that "this all started long before the Serbs appeared,"
2 that the messengers were sent out to tell the people to move to Potocari?
3 JUDGE KWON: I don't think he cited the previous evidence. I
4 think it's fair enough for the accused to put that question.
5 I'll consult my colleagues.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we can continue.
8 Can you answer the question, Mr. Boering.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know nothing about that.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Let me try to assist the Chamber and Mr. Nicholls. It was
12 explained by the previous protected witness. They didn't even know what
13 was going on until the authorities came and said people were moving
14 towards Potocari.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 65 ter 19721 in
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. It is our case that there was no threat and no danger to
19 civilians and that the civilians, based on their own evaluations and
20 their own fears, gathered in Potocari. Is that correct? This document
21 relates to the time --
22 JUDGE KWON: Please wait. You put your case to the witness and
23 please let the witness answer the question. Just wait.
24 You heard the question, Mr. Boering. Not relating to the
25 document, Mr. Karadzic put his case that there was no threat and no
1 danger to civilians and that the civilians, based on their own evaluation
2 and their own fears, gathered in Potocari. Do you agree with that?
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. And were there any contacts in town between the civilians and the
5 Serb army --
6 JUDGE KWON: One at a time, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do not agree with what
8 Mr. Karadzic says. There was effectively fear among the population and
9 they didn't have a clue as to what to do. I myself walked among them and
10 talked with them several times, and they asked me what they were supposed
11 to do, and that included people I had known for a long time and I had
12 good contact with.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Thank you. I was not very adept in putting my question. My
15 question was supposed to mean: Was there any contact between Serb
16 infantry and the civilians in town itself, or had the civilians gone to
17 Potocari even before?
18 A. I myself, the last two or three days before the enclave fell in
19 Srebrenica, the view on Potocari, I do not have an idea for the last one
20 and a half day. However, I didn't think there were a lot of people on
21 their way to Potocari. I think it was more a gathering around
23 Q. Thank you. Was anyone threatened by guns in Potocari? And look,
24 please, at this document that starts with some rumours about people held
25 at gunpoint and then later it was ascertained that that hadn't been the
2 A. Threatened, guns in Potocari -- I'm not sure what you're talking
3 about. By whom?
4 Q. I am trying to say that even -- look at this document. It says
5 guns were being pointed at people, at least that was said, and then it
6 later turned out it hadn't happened. Even you confirm it hadn't
8 A. As I can see it, this report was drawn up when the enclave had
9 already fallen. The flow of refugees had already gone to Potocari, and
10 effectively there were a number of Serbian soldiers walking around at the
12 Q. That is precisely what I'm asking you about, the situation in
13 Potocari. Were these civilians at gunpoint or threatened by weapons or
14 is the situation as described here, that the situation was normal as
15 regards Serb soldiers? I can actually read this out in English and then
16 it can be interpreted.
17 [In English] "They also went further to surround the prefab
18 factory about 200 metres from the compound in the direction of Potocari
19 where there are also a large number of refugees. UNMOs were asked to
20 talk to some BSA soldiers who were said to be pointing their guns in a
21 threatening manner at the refugees in the prefab factory. However, this
22 proved to be false when we got there. Contrarily, we observed some of
23 the BSA soldiers giving out cigarettes and candies to a few of the
24 refugees. Hope this would not prove to be a deceptive act, though."
25 [Interpretation] So you did not observe that they were threatened
1 in any way, by weapons, that is?
2 A. I have read the report, which was probably drawn up by UNMOs in
3 that same period. I also asked a few UNMOs to go and stand near a
4 building where men were selected, deported, and they were effectively
5 threatened with guns. The report, as I read it here, I cannot judge, I
6 do not have any such observations. But I did see another event at the
7 same time, probably involving members of the same team of UNMOs.
8 However, if I remember the name correctly, they were present under
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1969, Your Honours.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. So at the time you had not seen a single killing, whereas you and
16 your fellow officers saw nine bodies by the well, but you did not see how
17 and when these people had lost their lives; right?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at 65 ter 02003.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. The Drina Corps, July 13th, and it says 200 to 300 enemy soldiers
23 managed to get to the area of Mount Udrc and that there is fighting
24 there. And then paragraph 3 says that:
25 "The Corps zone of responsibility is under full control. So far
1 from the Srebrenica enclave about 15.000 Muslims were transferred in an
2 organised fashion."
3 That is probably the regular combat report for that day. Did you
4 hear shooting? Did you hear about this happening around Srebrenica, in
5 the mountains and forests?
6 A. As far as I've understood, there were a number of Muslim military
7 who left the enclave in order to try and reach Tuzla. It was unclear to
8 me how many there were. However, at any rate it must have been most of
9 the military in possession of weapons because there weren't a lot of men
10 among the refugees around Potocari. When I left with the first
11 transport, the first refugees, the first convoy - perhaps 10, 15 buses -
12 the route that we took we stopped twice because there was firing. I
13 assume from people fleeing to Tuzla, and that had to be solved by the
14 Serbs -- Muslims, Muslim people fleeing to Tuzla. That is my
15 recollection of the --
16 Q. [Previous translation continued]... the last page. Can we have
17 the last page, please. "Decision" in English. Please take a look at
18 what General Krstic's decision was on the 13th of July. Effect control
19 over the territory, disarm, disperse Muslim forces, protect the
20 population and property and at the same time secure the lines of defence
21 from attacks from behind. Parts of the forces, et cetera.
22 Do you see that even at that time General Krstic said that the
23 population should be protected and that was one of his major points?
24 A. That is what I'm reading here.
25 Q. Did you have any knowledge to that effect? Does this sound
1 plausible to you as proper conduct on the part of a military commander?
2 Is that the way one does behave?
3 A. Well, it is what one could describe as good behaviour, the
4 correct way of acting.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1970, Your Honours.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly have a look at
10 65 ter 01983.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Please take a look at this, this is an order. And when
13 describing the enemy it says, paragraph 1:
14 "The enemy in the Srebrenica enclave has completely been routed.
15 The terrain is being cleaned up."
16 And now could you please turn to page 3 so that we can see 9(c)
17 in the English version.
18 THE ACCUSED: Next page in English, please, and third in Serbian.
19 (C) "Security."
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Please take a look at the paragraph down here.
22 [As read] "The civilian Muslim population and UNPROFOR are not
23 targets of our operations. Collect them together and keep them under
24 guard, but crush and destroy armed military groups."
25 Was that what was done?
1 A. Well, I cannot give you a complete view on this.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, are you asking the witness about the
3 Zepa operation or in relation to attack against Srebrenica?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, from the point of view
5 of the Drina Corps, these were two enclaves that were together. This is
6 an order that had to do with the treatment of the population and UNPROFOR
7 with regard to both Zepa and Srebrenica. It's a strictly confidential
8 document, a military secret.
9 JUDGE KWON: You heard the answer of the witness.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Are you going to have
11 this admitted?
12 JUDGE KWON: I think you have another opportunity to tender this.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I agree.
14 65 ter 02023.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Boering, that this is only the 12th of July
17 when they started providing fuel. It says:
18 "Pursuant to the order of the commander of the Main Staff of the
19 Army of Republika Srpska to provide 50 buses for evacuation from the
20 Srebrenica enclave, we hereby request you to approve an additional
21 quantity of fuel ..." and so on. And then buses will be used from the
22 municipalities of Pale, Sokolac, et cetera. And it says their final
23 destination is unknown so far.
24 So the commander of the Drina Corps, as he is leaving, he does
25 not know where the refugees will decide to go. And it's only on the 12th
1 that the fuel and buses are being prepared after General Mladic had
2 received information from the Muslim leadership as to what it was that
3 they wanted; right?
4 A. I see the date the 12th of July on this document. And on the
5 12th around the lunch break, 12.00, in Potocari I did see quite a few
6 buses for the first convoy.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1971, Your Honours.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Is it correct, Mr. Boering, that on the 13th in the morning the
13 buses were being boarded even before the Serbs appeared?
14 A. I do not know. I was not there anymore.
15 Q. Oh, I'm sorry, that's right. You had left. However, let's have
16 a look at 65 ter 2352. Do you agree that this is a report pertaining to
17 the 12th of July, probably just before dark, where it says:
18 "The transport of the refugees has stopped because of the dark.
19 Tomorrow morning at 0700 hours it will start again. [In English] The
20 refugees were dropped about 4 kilometres from the confrontation line with
21 Tuzla. They were treated good and no one was harmed. This was stated by
22 one of the DutchBat soldiers who escorted the convoy.
23 "We have no more news ..." and so on.
24 [Interpretation] You were with one of these convoys that was
25 going towards Kladanj; right?
1 A. I was with one of the convoys, the first. What happened with the
2 other convoys I do not know personally. For the first convoy in which I
3 myself was involved, I did see that upon arrival at the point from where
4 they had to go on, on foot, men were singled out, taken apart into the
5 woods, and I was not allowed to follow them.
6 Q. And is it correct, Mr. Boering, that they did not walk from the
7 confrontation line to Tuzla; rather, only to Muslim-controlled territory?
8 A. I don't quite understand the question.
9 Q. Well, some witnesses who were part of foreign troops said that
10 they were brought to -- close to the confrontation line and that then
11 they walked to Tuzla, all the way to Tuzla, whereas I believe that they
12 only walked across no man's land. Tuzla is very far away. Would you
13 agree that they walked only 3 or 4 kilometres and not the entire way to
15 A. Yes. It was a walk of around 4 to 5 kilometres, yeah.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1972, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE KWON: It's time for you to conclude, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Is it correct - and it's in 92 ter, that is to say your testimony
23 in Popovic - you said that you were not particularly welcomed in Kladanj,
24 that is to say by the Muslim side; is that right? They did not trust you
25 and they treated you in a hostile way; is that right?
1 A. Yes, that's correct.
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Boering. My time is up. Thank you for your kind
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, do you have any re-examination?
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour.
6 Re-examination by Mr. Nicholls:
7 Q. Good morning, Mr. Boering -- Colonel Boering. You were asked
8 yesterday quite a bit about firing on the population, that's 22124, as
9 well as today in the time before the -- and during the time that the
10 civilian population of the enclave all went to Potocari on the 11th. You
11 were asked yesterday at 22086 about negotiations that were said to be the
12 reason for why all the people decided to go to Potocari and to leave,
13 including Mr. Akashi and the Muslims. And there was also a discussion
14 about -- 22122, about what date this was, whether this was the 8th or the
15 11th of July and whether there was shelling at that time. And you were
16 asked more about that today. So I just want to go over a few documents
17 from that period.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 02342, please, 65 ter number. And if
19 we could blow that up so that the Colonel can read it.
20 Q. This is an UNMO report from 10 July at 1338, so in the afternoon.
21 And could you just look - it's brief - at the paragraph, Colonel.
22 "Subject: Situation update.
23 "Srebrenica township is still undergoing a very heavy shelling.
24 So far we have recorded figures 49 shells since 1250 hours to 1353 hours
25 this afternoon with a figure of 9 rockets launched into the town ..."
1 And then it goes on:
2 "We estimate the current situation to be getting worse, still
4 Can you comment now --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I? May I ask Mr. Nicholls not
6 to skip this part --
7 MR. NICHOLLS: That's fine --
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- that says "exchange of fire."
9 MR. NICHOLLS: That's fine.
10 "Rockets launched into the town and exchange of occasional HMG
11 and SA firing. We estimate the current situation to be getting worse.
12 Still monitoring."
13 Q. Now, reading this paragraph, can you comment on its assessment of
14 the shelling in the town of Srebrenica on 10 July?
15 JUDGE KWON: And as well as the meaning of HMG and SA.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, which I have to confess I'm not sure of.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] HMG is heavy machine-gun. SA is
18 small arms, you know, hand weapons or repeat weapons, repeat guns. And
19 this report described how effectively the firing on the enclave took
20 place, and that it wasn't a limited quantity of fire, it was rather more
21 extensive. And the UNMOs in their official capacity had as one of their
22 tasks to count and report this.
23 MR. NICHOLLS:
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: I would tender that document, please,
1 Your Honours.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P3991, Your Honours.
4 MR. NICHOLLS:
5 Q. Same topic, Colonel Boering, I'd like to move now to 11 July.
6 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I please have 02346, another UNMO report
7 from the afternoon. Can we blow that up a little bit so that Mr. --
8 Colonel Boering can read it.
9 Q. I'll just read a bit of it or as much as Mr. Karadzic wants read
10 as well.
11 "At this moment the stream of refugees and wounded is incountable
12 anymore. We figure that a total of 20.000 refugees came to the DutchBat
13 compound of Potocari already and is growing steadily. Since our last
14 report the shelling of the town has been going on despite of the
15 air-strikes. The town is in the hands of the BSA by now and the latest
16 ultimatum given by the BSA is that if the air-strikes continue everything
17 inside the enclave will be bombed. Also UNPROFOR and the other UN
19 "B Company has left their compound in Srebrenica ... BSA," I'm
20 not reading verbatim, "... is all around in the enclave." I'll skip a
21 sentence. "The air-strikes on the north part of the enclave have not
22 been taken place up till now. That means the compound is a very easy
23 target for all the weapons on the north ridge of the enclave."
24 And we saw in Mr. Karadzic's cross-examination the report about
25 Commander Karremans, where he talked about the sitting duck position.
1 Again, can you tell me -- we've had questions about the situation in the
2 enclave and a portrait painted on the cross-examination. Can you tell us
3 a comment on this report and how it reflects the situation on the 11 July
4 around the compound in Potocari?
5 A. The report as I read it here -- yes, I agree completely with what
6 it says here and I also recall that effectively from the part of
7 Mr. Mladic it was indicated at one of the talks that if the air-strikes
8 were to continue, he would not have a problem bombing us -- the enclave
9 including us, I should say. And that this really happened on the north
10 side of the enclave, that there was enough possibility to have targeted
11 fire on Potocari aimed from there is something I also know. There were
12 people firing up in the hills and they were effectively firing on
13 Srebrenica and the environment. So the positions of a number of
14 structures that they'd erected for that there were known to us. We knew
15 also of the possibilities that they would fire at us from there.
16 Q. And this is before your first meeting with General Mladic that
17 same day, is that right, that this report comes out?
18 A. If I look at the time, yes, then that's correct.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: I tender that, please, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE KWON: Admitted.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P3992, Your Honours.
22 MR. NICHOLLS:
23 Q. Just a couple more documents.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: 02347, please, another 11 July UNMO report a
25 little bit later in the day.
1 Q. I won't read it all out to save time, but it talks about the
2 amount of water left for all the people and DutchBat, the amount of food
3 available, that the number of severe wounded is 35 and number of light
4 wounded is uncountable. DutchBat can't give much help and neither can
5 MSF. Same question: Can you look at this and tell us if this -- your
6 position on how this describes the situation as you remember it from 11
7 July at the compound?
8 A. Yes. This reflects the picture of the situation at the time.
9 And if I look at the times, this was around -- this was sent around 4.00,
10 so even before there was that meeting with General Mladic -- the first
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender this document?
14 THE REGISTRAR: This is in evidence as Exhibit P841.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Oh, that's right. I'm sorry. All right.
16 Last one, 02348, again from 11 July, still talking about the
17 situation at the compound in Potocari and the enclave.
18 Q. This is now about 5.00 p.m.
19 The number of severely wounded has grown to 50, I'll paraphrase
20 to save time.
21 "DutchBat is trying to do something about the food situation but
22 there isn't enough for more than 48 hours. The battalion has the
23 intention to try to create a very small safe area (the compound?) to
24 protect the refugees."
25 And then if you look at paragraph 3 as well. Talking about BSA
1 firing, that's VRS, 22 rocket shells from Dugo Polje and the co-ordinates
2 and the sound is very close so the panic amongst the refugees increases
3 with every shell.
4 The same question: You talked about how you thought the shelling
5 was to frighten the refugees, the civilians. Can you comment on this
6 document and the situation it describes shortly before your first meeting
7 with General Mladic, to talk about what would happen to the people?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may interject. It would be
9 fair if Mr. Nicholls would say the witness where these shells were fired
10 at because it says here that there is a large number of people involved
11 in fighting.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: I think the witness can read the document, which
13 I've asked him to, and explain and will know more about where the
14 shelling -- than I can put to him.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's proceed.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The document describes that at
17 various locations there was firing, indirect firing, and that this
18 effectively scared even more the population and the refugees who were
19 uncertain of what is happening. So it describes the situation as I,
20 myself, actually experienced it. And this contributed to the population
21 who thought that they might still seek some sort of security in and
22 around Potocari.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender that document, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE KWON: Right before that.
25 Mr. Karadzic, where does this document say that large number of
1 people were involved in fighting?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, Your Excellencies, it
3 was stated in the previous document, i.e., that a large number of Muslim
4 fighters were involved in combat. We quickly moved to a new document,
5 hence my error. Therefore, my objection here is that no military reason
6 has been stated here for fire to be opened at Budak and other places or
7 whether it was for the purpose of intimidation.
8 JUDGE KWON: No, this is not a proper intervention.
9 This will be admitted.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P3993, Your Honours.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
12 Q. Earlier today, towards the end, Mr. Karadzic asked you about -
13 and this is at page 11 going on to page 12 - about General Krstic and
14 showed his 13 July report and put it to you that it reflected proper
15 conduct on the part of the military commander, specifically referring to
16 a section about protection of the population, suggesting to you that this
17 was the -- I believe the Muslim population and not the Serb population in
18 that report.
19 I would like to show you a report from General Krstic,
20 Drina Corps commander, at this point to the Main Staff from four days
21 later, 17 July 1995.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: 65 ter 02007, please.
23 Q. We can see it's 17 July and if -- I want to focus on the bottom
24 of the page in English, paragraph 3, it's all there on the Serbian.
25 Just take a moment to read it because I don't think you -- I'm
1 sure you haven't seen this before. This paragraph is entitled: "The
2 Territorial Situation in the Zone of Responsibility," of course of the
3 Drina Corps.
4 "The territorial situation in the Corps is under the control of
5 our units, although complete security has not yet been established in the
6 perimeter villages, from where the enemy are retreating ..." and it
7 describes that and talks about an evacuation.
8 And now I want to go to the bottom and then we'll need to go to
9 the next page.
10 [As read] "In the last three days, following the transportation
11 of the civilian population from the former Srebrenica enclave to Kladanj,
12 there have been increasing instances of women who have been allegedly --
13 who have allegedly got lost, coming back towards us from Kladanj and
14 arriving at our forward line of defence. After being warned by our
15 soldiers, they tried to run away. Yesterday two women arrived from
16 Kladanj direction at the 1st Vlpbr's defence line in the Luka sector. As
17 they refused to surrender and began to run away towards Kladanj they were
18 fired on and died as a result."
19 And I won't go through the rest of the report. As a current
20 serving officer in the military, civilian refugees get lost and walk back
21 towards the Serb line, General Krstic's solution is to warn them to
22 surrender and then to fire upon them and kill them. Can you describe,
23 does that -- I'll ask you the same question as Mr. Karadzic: How does
24 that reflect on proper commander behaviour and officer behaviour? And
25 there's an objection so please don't answer yet.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. The objection is that this
3 does not properly arise from the cross-examination.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: I --
5 JUDGE KWON: Just Mr. Nicholls referred to this certain passage
6 in General Krstic's order on 13th of July, so how would you respond to
7 that argument?
8 MR. ROBINSON: Because this document is now dealing with an
9 incident on the 17th of July, far removed from anything that was
10 discussed by Dr. Karadzic in his cross-examination. So --
11 JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated] I'm sorry.
12 When I asked Mr. Karadzic how that document in relation to Zepa
13 relates to the Srebrenica enclave, and then he said it's in general
14 vis-a-vis the civilian population. So why can't the Prosecution not
15 tender this document to rebut that argument?
16 MR. ROBINSON: Because it raises an entirely new incident that
17 wasn't part of the cross-examination. If you make the definition so
18 broad that any action towards the civilian population that occurred
19 within the month of July, for example, would be -- arise from the
20 cross-examination, then it gives the Prosecution an unfair -- it opens
21 the door too wide for extending the cross-examination -- the re-direct
22 examination and seeking re-cross-examination. So --
23 MR. NICHOLLS: If I may reply, if I need to --
24 JUDGE KWON: Just put a pause. Yes.
25 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, the question regarding the 13 July document
2 was clearly put with the purpose of showing that General Krstic was a
3 good, professional commander, and it was clearly put that part of that
4 was his protection and care of the civilian population and implied that
5 that was the Muslim population he was talking about. This is four days
6 later, it's the same people, refugees, women, civilians from Potocari;
7 it's the same commander. When these women who were transported or got
8 lost walked back towards the Drina Corps line, Krstic reports that their
9 policy is to ask them to surrender and then kill them. So I think it
10 arises directly out of the door which was opened. It's not a stretch.
11 And when you open a door on cross-examination on -- then you have to
12 accept the consequences.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have an opportunity to
15 clarify what Mr. Robinson doesn't know about. This happened 60
16 kilometres from Srebrenica and four days after the completion of the
17 evacuation. And thirdly, this was not a decision of General Krstic. He
18 was simply reporting on what had happened. He didn't have information,
19 he didn't have time to order for them to be killed --
20 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- that happened on the line far
22 away from Srebrenica.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls didn't say that General Krstic ordered
25 We agree with the observation by Mr. Nicholls, which it relates
1 to the same -- similar time-frame, it relates to the same people, it's
2 perfectly legitimate to raise this issue.
3 This will be admitted.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P3994, Your Honours.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect,
6 Your Excellency, Mr. Nicholls said that that was the solution offered by
8 MR. NICHOLLS: [Microphone not activated]
9 JUDGE KWON: Microphone, please.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Excuse me, Your Honours, I don't think the witness
11 answered the question, though, that I put to him.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, yes. My apologies.
13 Yes, if you remember the question, could you proceed to answer
14 the question.
15 MR. NICHOLLS:
16 Q. My question was: Having read this, how does that reflect, this
17 report as you read it, reflect on proper commander behaviour, officer
19 A. Well, what's described here is a so-called war crime and an
20 UNPROFOR commander should act against that.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: I have no further questions at this time.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be given two minutes?
24 MR. NICHOLLS: I don't know what it is, but I object straight
25 away. This is a recurring theme of always wanting to ask more questions.
1 I'm sorry to jump the gun, but I object.
2 JUDGE KWON: If it's related to this document, the Chamber is not
3 minded to allow you to put additional questions.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no, it refers to the previous
5 documents where localities were mentioned.
6 JUDGE KWON: Before you put that question, could the Chamber hear
7 your question first.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm interested to hear whether the
9 localities that were the targets were inside the town itself within the
10 enclave or were those hills that were under the control of the remnants
11 of the Muslim army. There was mention of some co-ordinates, and I would
12 like to hear whether they pertain to the town proper or were they
13 situated around the town.
14 JUDGE KWON: We'll allow you to put that question, but if the
15 Prosecution is minded to re-examine on that issue we'll allow that also.
16 Put one question at a time, one by one.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.
18 JUDGE KWON: Just -- yes, just one question.
19 Further cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Boering, is it correct that Gradac and Budak
21 are not situated inside the town itself, but rather outside the town on
22 the surrounding hills and that at the time they were fully packed with
23 the remnants of the 28th Division?
24 A. I don't know that, as far as the second part of your question is
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, he didn't answer the question.
5 Are those localities in the town or outside of the town? The answer was
7 JUDGE KWON: Do you -- can you answer that question,
8 Colonel Boering?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's not in the town, but near the
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Just one question arising from that.
13 Further re-examination by Mr. Nicholls:
14 Q. On the 11th of July, were shells fired over the compound?
15 A. Yes, that did happen.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 Just one minor question from me, Colonel Boering.
19 Questioned by the Court:
20 JUDGE KWON: It's about your rank. Did you say that your current
21 rank is lieutenant-colonel or colonel?
22 A. It's lieutenant-colonel. In the past, every now and then, I did
23 see "Colonel" mentioned in the reports; however, my title -- the title is
24 often mentioned as "Colonel" instead of "Lieutenant-Colonel."
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That clarifies all.
1 That concludes your evidence unless my colleagues have questions
2 for you. Thank you on behalf of this Chamber and the Tribunal as a whole
3 for your coming to the Tribunal yet again. Now you are free to go, but
4 we'll rise all together.
5 We'll take a break now for half an hour and resume at five to
7 [The witness withdrew]
8 --- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.
9 [The witness entered court]
10 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.
11 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness take the solemn declaration,
13 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
14 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please make yourself comfortable.
16 Yes, Ms. West.
17 MS. WEST: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.
18 Mr. Registrar, may we have 65 ter number 90299, please.
19 WITNESS: EVERT ALBERT RAVE
20 Examination by Ms. West:
21 Q. Good morning, sir.
22 A. Good morning.
23 Q. What is your name?
24 A. My name is Evert Albert Rave.
25 Q. And have you retired from the Royal Dutch Army?
1 A. Yeah, I retired in 2009.
2 Q. What was your rank when you retired?
3 A. I retired as a major.
4 Q. You've testified in the Krstic case in 2000?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. In the Tolimir case in 2010?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. And an amalgamated statement was prepared containing the relevant
9 portions of those testimonies and your OTP statement from 1998. This
10 statement, which is on the screen now, you reviewed and signed on
11 November 10th; is that correct?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. And can you --
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Because both of you are speaking the
15 same language, please put a pause between the question and answer.
16 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. This is time now you can -- French
18 translation has just been completed.
19 MS. WEST:
20 Q. Can you confirm that the statement accurately reflects an
21 amalgamation of your previous testimonies and your OTP statement?
22 A. Yes, it reflects.
23 Q. Sir, and if you were asked today about the same matters contained
24 in the statement, would you provide the same answers to the
25 Trial Chamber?
1 A. Yes, I would provide the same answers.
2 MS. WEST: Mr. President, I would tender the statement and the
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P3995, Your Honours.
6 MS. WEST: I'm now going to read a summary.
7 Warrant officer 2nd Class Evert Rave was deployed to the
8 Srebrenica enclave in January 1995. As liaison officer, he kept contact
9 with the Muslim population inside the enclave and the VRS outside the
10 enclave. Rave also acted as advisor for field security to the DutchBat
12 From late March 1995, the Bosnian Serb forces increasingly
13 restricted humanitarian aid convoys to the enclave. Consequently, the
14 Muslim civilians in the enclave had insufficient food and supplies and
15 there were instances of Muslim civilians raiding the DutchBat garbage
17 DutchBat was also affected by the restrictions. There were
18 problems with diesel and food supplies and with obtaining leave
19 clearances. Rave felt as if they were kept prisoners in the enclave.
20 On the 3rd of June, the Bosnian Serbs took OP Echo on the
21 southern border of the enclave. In the first week of July, the tensions
22 mounted and the shelling from VRS positions intensified. Starting on
23 July 6 and continuing the following days, the VRS attacked the enclave
24 with rocket-launchers and artillery fire. Rave witnessed impacts in the
25 vicinity of the UN compound in Potocari. Several civilian houses were
1 hit. Reports indicated that civilians were wounded.
2 Rave described the attacks on other UN OPs during the following
3 days. The captured DutchBat soldiers from the OPs were brought to
4 Bratunac. On July 9th the shooting intensified in the vicinity of
5 Srebrenica and by the 10th the streets were overcrowded with anxious
7 On July 11th, the town was totally overcrowded and people
8 gathered in front of Bravo Company, the UN compound located in
9 Srebrenica, because the people thought it would be safe. There was panic
10 and the people were anxious and late in the morning the refugees broke
11 through the barrier around Bravo Company and entered the grounds of the
12 UN compound itself. Around noon a mortar shell landed between two APCs
13 on the compound itself and there was several wounded.
14 Eventually, DutchBat thought that the best option was to move the
15 refugees to Potocari, as it was bigger. The witness and Major Boering
16 left in a jeep full of refugees to Potocari, driving in a stream of
17 refugees walking in the same direction. Mortar rounds were impacting
18 along either side of the road. Rave concluded that the Serbs wanted to
19 push the people to Potocari and keep them there. The UN compound in
20 Potocari was overcrowded with about 10- to 15.000 refugees: Anxious
21 elderly, sick, women and children included.
22 On the 11th of July at 8.00 p.m., Rave participated in the first
23 meeting at Hotel Fontana in Bratunac. He arrived with Colonel Karremans
24 and Major Boering. At Hotel Fontana, the witness saw several UN soldiers
25 who had been captured by the VRS during the take-over of the OPs.
1 The witness was surprised to see General Mladic there.
2 Everything in the meeting appeared to be premeditated: There was a film
3 crew and there was no real negotiation, but it was simply dictated what
4 would happen. The first ten minutes of the meeting were very tense.
5 They were all put in a corner. The witness thought that the main purpose
6 of the meeting was to show who the boss was.
7 On July 11th at 11.00 p.m., Rave participated in the second
8 meeting at Hotel Fontana. He arrived with Colonel Karremans, Boering,
9 and Nesib Mandzic, who was brought as the Muslim civilian representative.
10 Immediately after their arrival a pig was slaughtered outside the meeting
11 room. Rave thought this to be pure intimidation, especially with Muslim
12 Nesib Mandzic present.
13 A camera crew was again present at the meeting. Mladic showed a
14 broken board taken from Srebrenica government building as a trophy of his
15 victory. At the meeting, the movement of the refugees was discussed.
16 Mladic stated that transport would be provided, although two hours
17 earlier at the first meeting, he asked Karremans to arrange for the
18 buses. All plans discussed by Mladic were tentative, and at the end of
19 the meeting the witness remained unsure as to the nature of the plans and
20 how they would be executed.
21 In the morning of the 12th, Rave witnessed the advance of Bosnian
22 Serb troops towards Potocari. The advance and the continued shelling of
23 Potocari frightened the civilians. Rave did not attend the third meeting
24 at Hotel Fontana. After the meeting, however, Rave and Boering went back
25 to Bratunac to discuss the details of the buses and fuel. However, upon
1 arrival at noon, they did not find any representatives. They contacted
2 Major Nikolic and were informed that the buses were already in Potocari.
3 When Rave returned to Potocari at 1.00, the buses were already
4 there. The witness thought that the entire operation of take-over and
5 deportation of civilian population was organised in advance.
6 In Potocari, Rave witnessed Muslim men ages between 17 and 70
7 being separated from the women and children. They were kept in the
8 "White House." The witness saw several times men coming out of the house
9 who were afraid, who tried to escape, and started screaming because they
10 did not want to get onto the buses. These men were forced onto the buses
11 and were hit and kicked.
12 The witness personally saw three buses with men leaving Potocari.
13 A DutchBat escort was stopped in Potocari [sic] and could not further
14 follow the buses, and on the 12th the witness saw Mladic in Potocari.
15 According to the witness, Mladic was aware of the separation
16 process. Mladic said to Rave that they tried to find out whether there
17 were soldiers among the men.
18 Deportation of the refugees and separation of the men continued
19 the next day, on the 13th, and after the 13th only wounded refugees
20 remained at the Potocari compound. A few days later on the 16th, Rave
21 met with a Bosnian Serb civilian who came to the compound and introduced
22 himself as Miroslav Deronjic, the new mayor of Srebrenica. Deronjic
23 talked about his connections with Karadzic and stated that he was in
24 direct touch with Karadzic. Rave attended a meeting between Karremans
25 and Deronjic.
1 On the 17th, Major Nikolic screened out seven of the wounded,
2 stating that they would be taken to the Bratunac hospital. Rave later
3 heard that several wounded, maybe including the seven, disappeared from
4 the Bratunac hospital. On July 21st, Rave and the Dutch Battalion left
5 the enclave.
6 Your Honours, that concludes my summary.
7 Q. Sir, in paragraph 68, you noted that you were surprised to see
8 Mladic at the first Hotel Fontana meeting. Why were you surprised?
9 A. Well, we had never met General Mladic before and we met General
10 Zivanovic, who was responsible for the Serbian troops around the enclave.
11 And we had the impression that the Serbian troops around the enclave
12 attacked us. So when we were ordered to go to the Hotel Fontana, we
13 expected to see General Zivanovic over there because we had the idea that
14 he was responsible so he would be the guy to meet there and eventually
16 Q. Who requested the meeting?
17 A. I really don't know, but I think that the VRS requested the
18 meeting because I was ordered by Colonel Karremans to go with him to the
19 Hotel Fontana. There was no agenda. We did not know what to expect over
20 there. In my opinion, the VRS ordered the meeting.
21 Q. The meeting what -- you had noted was at 8.00. What time were
22 you told to go to the meeting?
23 A. One hour before, 7.00 p.m.
24 Q. You also mentioned at paragraph 72 in your statement that the
25 meeting seemed premeditated. Can you tell us why you think so?
1 A. Well, when we came into the meeting room, what we did not expect,
2 of course, was, first, to see General Mladic over there. We saw a lot of
3 civilians and a complete film and camera crew, and the setting was in
4 that way, that we were set into a corner with no possibilities to stand
5 anywhere else. The camera crew was filming everything. I think this is
6 not a normal way that a meeting between two military commanders is
7 organised, especially when the meeting proceeded the way General Mladic
8 acted. Everything was filmed. And I think -- I had the impression that
9 he wanted to intimidate us, but also put on the film what was happening
10 over there.
11 Especially at the end when we tried to leave, Colonel Karremans
12 was ordered to drink a beer together with General Mladic. The problem
13 was at that moment that there seemed to be no beer. What I imagine
14 afterwards, beer is not that nice to see on a film, but when you have
15 there a commander who won the war and lost the war and you see them
16 toasting with a glass of wine, that even could be champagne, as you could
17 suggest, it does it much better on the video. When I saw later on the
18 film, and I did not realise that on that moment even the interpreter was
19 interpreting the talks between Mladic and Karremans, was sent away a
20 little bit because it would be better on the film to see Mladic,
21 Karremans, focal feature, myself. So that was him -- in my way -- in my
22 opinion enough proof that it was all pre-arranged to show the world what
23 happened over there in the way that Mladic wanted it to show.
24 Q. Sir, we're going to show you now the video from the first meeting
25 and it's 65 ter number 40582. We are going to start the clip at time
1 code 33 minutes and 22 seconds. There will be a couple of occasions when
2 I stop, but we'll watch it through.
3 [Video-clip played]
4 MS. WEST: [Microphone not activated]
5 JUDGE KWON: Microphone, Ms. West.
6 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President.
7 Q. We've stopped at 39.19, and at this point Mladic has started to
8 speak, and he's raising his voice and we played a little bit more. But I
9 know that you've watched this video recently. Are there other occasions
10 at that meeting, in your memory at the meeting, where Mladic raised his
11 voice as well?
12 A. Yeah, he did it several times. After he started accusing
13 Colonel Karremans, he did the same after that towards me and to
14 Mr. Boering, but I didn't see that on the film.
15 Q. So the part where he is yelling at you and the Major, is that a
16 part that is actually not on this video?
17 A. No, that's not on the video.
18 Q. We'll continue.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 MS. WEST:
21 Q. We've stopped again at 39.42 and at this point Mladic says:
22 "Who were they defending from," meaning DutchBat troops, "when
23 nobody was attacking them?"
24 Now, sir, at this point you had been in the enclave for about six
25 months. Were DutchBat troops being attacked?
1 A. At the end on the 10th and the 11th, DutchBat troops were
2 attacked, especially on the morning of the 11th. On the evening of the
3 10th we had a meeting, and the question from the higher command was, of
4 course, is there a real attack, is there a smoking gun towards the UN
5 troops. We had to discover it. So on the next morning, on the 11th, one
6 of our APCs went forward and was shot at by a VRS tank in advance. Also
7 our OPs were attacked by VRS.
8 Q. And on the 10th and the 11th, were Muslim civilians also being
10 A. Already in advance because the whole enclave was attacked by
11 mortar and artillery fire, and of course the Muslim population, the
12 civilian population, in the enclave was attacked.
13 Q. And so when Mladic made this statement, was it true?
14 A. How do you mean was it true?
15 Q. When he said: Who were they defending from, when no one was
16 attacking them?
17 A. No, we were attacked. Our troops were attacked.
18 Q. Thank you. We'll continue.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 MS. WEST:
21 Q. We've now stopped again at 43 minutes and 3 seconds, and I just
22 should note for the record the transcript in the book 65 ter 03099 is
23 included and at this part of the video is page 7828 of the transcript.
24 So, Mr. Rave, here we see and we hear Mladic say:
25 "You asked for the meeting, speak up."
1 Now, you earlier testified that you believed that DutchBat did
2 not ask for this meeting and that the Bosnian Serbs asked for the
3 meeting. What do you make of this statement then?
4 A. Well, it's one of the statements of General Mladic, and for me
5 it's just only a statement because I can't imagine that Colonel Karremans
6 asked for a meeting and that General Mladic shows up from Pale or
7 Sarajevo or wherever he might have been. So I think that General Mladic
8 ordered the meeting. When he's saying now that "you asked for a
9 meeting," for me it's just a statement and it also could be a lie.
10 Because in the next days -- and also of course afterwards I saw that
11 General Mladic several times lied to us on several occasions, not only
12 for specific this meeting, but also handling with the refugees and
13 handling with the men.
14 Q. Thank you. We'll continue.
15 [Video-clip played]
16 MS. WEST:
17 Q. Sir, we've just stopped at 53 minutes and 10 seconds and this is
18 Karremans who has just said:
19 "Not knowing that I should meet you here in Bratunac ..."
20 And for the record of the transcript book, this is page 7834.
21 Sir, to your knowledge, had Karremans ever met Mladic before?
22 A. No, to my knowledge he never met him before.
23 Q. Earlier on in this video Mladic is talking about a gentleman
24 named Van den Broek, criticising him. Can you tell us who that was?
25 A. Mr. Van den Broek at that moment was the minister of foreign
1 affairs of Holland.
2 Q. We can continue, please.
3 [Video-clip played]
4 MS. WEST:
5 Q. We've stopped at 54 minutes and 28 seconds and here Karremans is
6 mentioning Pale. Sir, can you tell us about any interactions DutchBat
7 with Pale?
8 A. Well, we had not interactions ourself with Pale, but everything
9 we wanted to do in the enclave, either have a leave convoy to go out,
10 convoys to come in, supply convoys to come in, evacuations, medical
11 evacuations, everything had to be cleared by the VRS. And every time we
12 sent in any request, it was a request that was sent to the
13 Bratunac Brigade most of the time via the chain of command. And they
14 told us that they would send it to Pale. So we got the impression that
15 everything that happened around the enclave should be approved or cleared
16 by Pale, and I don't know if Pale was the military or the civilian
17 authority who had to approve the clearances.
18 Q. Thank you. We'll continue.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 MS. WEST:
21 Q. Sir, Mr. Karremans was just talking about his soldiers. Do you
22 know to what he's referring?
23 A. Yeah, during the occupation of the enclave, some of our OPs were
24 made POWs and were brought to Bratunac, and I think 20 or 30 of our
25 soldiers who were in Bratunac as POWs.
1 Q. And were they at the hotel at the time?
2 A. They were at the hotel at that time, because when we entered the
3 hotel we saw in one of the rooms some of our soldiers were gathered
5 Q. Thank you. We'll continue.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 MS. WEST:
8 Q. Sir, that completes the video and that's one hour, 12 minutes,
9 and 42 seconds. Now, I asked you earlier about whether there were parts
10 of the meeting that are not included on the video, and you mentioned that
11 there was a part with Mladic yelling at you and Major Boering. Are there
12 any other parts you did not see on this video?
13 A. Yeah, I just make some notes. We see now several threats towards
14 Colonel Karremans saying for -- this is not your last cigarette, do you
15 want to see your family again? It's not -- you have only one life, you
16 don't want to lose it here. And that was during the meeting. In the
17 beginning when Mladic was screaming towards us, he was referring to the
18 air-strikes, if there were any more air-strikes. He threatened us that
19 he would target the compound, the refugees, and the soldiers that were
20 held hostage in the Hotel Fontana.
21 Q. And that part is not on the video?
22 A. It's not on the video.
23 Q. So now we're going to talk about the second meeting. Who asked
24 for the second meeting?
25 A. Well, the agreement was made by General Mladic at that moment.
1 He wanted to see a representative of the civilian population at 11.00.
2 Q. And that was only a couple hours later, correct?
3 A. Yes, that was three hours later.
4 Q. Did you also attend the second meeting?
5 A. Yes, I also attended that meeting.
6 Q. And early on in the second meeting did you hear something
8 A. Yeah, when we entered the room what was not usual was that one of
9 the VRS soldiers, and it seemed to me it was the body-guard of
10 General Mladic, because I saw him several times afterwards near
11 General Mladic, was standing near the window, the curtain was opened in
12 the meeting room over there, and in the beginning of the meeting after we
13 started, five minutes later on a pig was slaughtered under the window,
14 and halfway the slaughtering of the pig ended, the window was closed, and
15 the meeting went on.
16 Q. And this is what you refer to in paragraph 78 of your statement.
17 When the pig was being slaughtered and you heard the sound, what was the
18 reaction of the people in the room?
19 A. Some of them did not react at all, in my opinion, because they
20 already knew. So it might have been announced in advance what would
21 happen. Some of them were grinning, especially the man who sat opposite
22 to me. Later on it seemed to be Lieutenant-Colonel Kosoric. He was
23 grinning and smiling: Well, that's the way we do it. That's the way he
25 Q. Did you notice any reaction from Mladic?
1 A. No, nothing at all.
2 Q. You spoke earlier about your belief that the first meeting had
3 been premeditated. Did you believe that the second meeting as well,
4 including the pig slaughtering, was premeditated?
5 A. Yeah, of course. I think the meeting was ordered by
6 General Mladic and -- because I don't think that he knew what
7 representatives we would bring to the meeting. This was also
8 pre-arranged, and especially the slaughtering of the pig was
9 pre-arranged, just to intimidate us but especially the representatives of
10 the Muslims.
11 Q. We're going to play the second meeting and this is from the trial
12 video and it begins at one hour, 12 minutes, and 42 seconds. And of the
13 transcript book this would begin at page 7848. We can go ahead and play
15 [Video-clip played]
16 MS. WEST:
17 Q. So at one hour, 14 minutes, and 13 seconds we just heard a sound.
18 Is this the pig sound you referred to?
19 A. Yes, it is.
20 Q. Okay. This will go on for another 30 seconds and we'll continue
21 to play.
22 [Video-clip played]
23 MS. WEST:
24 Q. Sir, how did you know that was a pig?
25 A. Well, I've heard a slaughtering of a pig -- at least the sound of
1 a slaughtering of a pig before. My grandfather was a farmer and I heard
2 that sound at his farm.
3 Q. And what -- what did you think the purpose of this slaughtering
4 was or what was the effect of this sound?
5 A. Well, it was amazing to see the --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I really think I have to interject
7 here. This calls for speculation and really there are too many questions
8 that have nothing to do with the facts.
9 MS. WEST: I'll withdraw the question, Mr. President.
10 We can continue to play the video.
11 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 JUDGE KWON: Can you stop it.
14 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
15 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is a bit concerned about the scheduling
16 issue, if he has to stay tomorrow there will be no Dutch interpreters,
17 that's what I heard. Do you follow, Ms. West?
18 MS. WEST: I understand that tomorrow there is no Dutch
19 interpreter, and we also have been working on that issue ourselves in
20 order to possibly get a Dutch interpreter as well. But we did understand
21 that the Court was not in a position to provide it. And we are also --
22 we anticipated that this witness was going to go, as I realise now, at
23 least until the end of the session. We're aware of the issue.
24 JUDGE KWON: And I followed -- noted that the witness was
25 following in English and answering in English as well, but we'll see.
1 MS. WEST: So this -- so this witness is following in English,
2 answering in English. The Dutch issue is the next witness.
3 JUDGE KWON: No, I'm concerned about this witness, Mr. Rave. My
4 question is specifically the -- we allowed the Defence two hours. It's
5 apparent that we cannot finish him today.
6 MS. WEST: I understand. And -- I understand, Your Honour. At
7 this point I will shorten this video and then I will have about five
8 minutes of questioning.
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
10 MS. WEST: Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
12 MS. WEST: Thank you.
13 Q. So, Mr. Rave, just before this we heard Mr. Mladic say a comment
14 about a sign, and this is page 7853 of the transcript. He said:
15 "This was taken off of the Srebrenica town hall. I brought it
17 To what was he referring there?
18 A. There was a shield, as we saw on the video, was brought in, and
19 he just showed this as a kind of trophy, that he took it from the office
20 now -- the building in Srebrenica, to show that Srebrenica, in my opinion
21 at least, was his at this moment and --
22 Q. Thank you. And if this video continues on, you've seen it, does
23 it then go to a conversation that Mladic has with Nesib Mandzic; correct?
24 Is that right?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. Okay. And we won't watch that part of the video, but there
2 Mr. Mandzic himself makes some statements to Mr. Mladic; right?
3 A. Yeah, that's also correct.
4 Q. So we're going to fast-forward and go to --
5 JUDGE KWON: Are we going to watch it later on in any event or
7 MS. WEST: It was our plan to play this video today because this
8 witness was a participant.
9 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we play it now.
10 MS. WEST: Okay. Thank you very much.
11 We can continue to play.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 MS. WEST: Mr. President that ends the video at one hour, 38
14 minutes, and 7 seconds. I only have a -- three minutes of questions.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
16 MS. WEST: Thank you.
17 Q. Sir, you had talked about how you thought the meetings were
18 prearranged. We're now going to move to the events at Potocari. After
19 this meeting, did you go back to Potocari?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And ultimately the next -- for the next two days, did you remain
22 at Potocari?
23 A. Yes, I remained at Potocari.
24 Q. In your statement at paragraph 97 you indicated that you see --
25 you thought the events at Potocari seemed to be organised. You wrote an
1 entire operation of take-over and deportation of civilian population was
2 organised in advance. That was your testimony. Can you tell us what
3 made you believe that?
4 A. Yeah, I think it was organised in advance because we see on the
5 evening of the 11th that General Mladic was asking for buses. Well, we
6 seemed to be not able to provide buses, but the next morning, on the
7 12th, after Mr. Boering and myself went to Bratunac again at 12.00,
8 between 12.00 and 1.00 suddenly enough buses and trucks were available.
9 So I think that must have been prepared in advance. Also what we saw,
10 the separation of Muslim women and men was prepared in advance. The men
11 were separated. Screening from the men started. As General Mladic told
12 us, he wanted to see if there are soldiers or war criminals among them so
13 that he could make them prisoner of war. At the end, all of them were
14 separately brought away in buses. All the time camera crews were
15 available to film all the events where Mladic showed up, providing bread
16 and then candy to the local population. In my opinion, just a media
18 All the meetings in Fontana with the photo and film teams, as we
19 see also in the second meeting, it was all prearranged.
20 Q. And related to this, you mention in paragraph 89 that you saw
21 regular troops and irregular troops. What about the appearance of these
22 two groups differed?
23 A. Well, the normal VRS army was well-dressed and then
24 well-organised. The irregular troops I'm talking about now wore parts of
25 uniforms, wore bandannas around their heads, were just around to frighten
1 the local population. Those were the people that stopped buses on the
2 way to Kladanj and seized our UN vehicles. After I talked to Mladic and
3 said that this happened, that also those troops and also his VRS troops
4 stole flak jackets, weapons, and all those type of things from us, he
5 told me that those were not his troops but irregular troops and he was --
6 they were not in his control.
7 Q. So you -- and you mention in that paragraph that you thought that
8 the irregular troops only appeared to be so. Why did you think that?
9 A. Because I can't imagine -- as we can see in the video, that
10 General Mladic was in total control over there and he would never accept,
11 in my opinion, that there were irregular troops acting in his area of
12 responsibility and doing things that he didn't want to happen. For me it
13 was just a possibility for him to give them the freedom to act badly
14 against the local population or towards UNPROFOR and he could wash his
15 hands and say: Well, they are not my troops.
16 Q. Thank you, sir.
17 MS. WEST: I have no more questions.
18 JUDGE KWON: Very well. You are tendering associated exhibits,
19 Ms. West?
20 MS. WEST: I am, thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: Two of them actually? You are not tendering the
22 video footages separately?
23 MS. WEST: That's correct. As I said on Monday, we hope to
24 tender the video all at once.
25 JUDGE KWON: I take it there is no opposition?
1 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE KWON: Both documents will be admitted.
3 Shall we give the number right now, two of them.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. 65 ter number 02366 will be
5 Exhibit P3996, and 65 ter number 15259 will be Exhibit P3997.
6 JUDGE KWON: Before Mr. Karadzic will begin his
7 cross-examination, we'll have a -- take a break for an hour and resume at
9 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.40 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 1.42 p.m.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger and Mr. Karadzic, I was told through the
12 VWS that the witness would not be available tomorrow, so I inquired of
13 the staff whether it would be possible for another extended session after
14 3.00. So I was told that it would be possible. So we will be sitting
15 till around quarter past 4.00 with a short break. That's what we can do.
16 Please, Mr. Karadzic, please start your cross-examination.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. Does
18 that mean it's our ambition to finish with this witness today, that it's
19 out of the question to re-call him some other day of next week?
20 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continued]... but if necessary
21 that may of course be possible, but I think it's more than sufficient for
22 you to have two hours. We'll see.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll do my best.
24 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Rave.
1 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Karadzic.
2 Q. I wish to thank you at the outset for agreeing to meet with the
3 Defence and that will help us make progress more quickly today. I will
4 try to put my question in the simplest of terms so that they can be
5 answered with a yes or no whenever possible. To begin with, is it true
6 that your amalgamated statement was created by the OTP and you only
7 accepted it; in other words, is the phrasing of the paragraphs the
8 responsibility of the Prosecution?
9 A. Yes, I think so, but it's a compilation of my former statements.
10 Q. Thank you. What I'm interested in is what was omitted not what
11 was included. Look at paragraph 5, for instance, listing your duties.
12 However, it does not mention at all that one of your tasks was to
13 demilitarise the Muslim army and the enclave, as you correctly stated in
14 the Tolimir case, that's 1D04692, page 6779. You said the mission of the
15 Dutch Battalion was - and you put it in the first place - to demilitarise
16 the enclave, to protect and help the civilian population as much as
17 possible along with the NGOs. Isn't it true that it was a very important
18 part of your mission?
19 A. Yes, it was a very important part of the mission, and I think
20 that also in this part I can't see specifically that we had to liaise
21 with the VRS but -- yeah, well, it is in paragraph 6. But it's also
22 in -- part of the mission, that's correct.
23 Q. Thank you. Your interlocutors on the Serbian and Bosnian sides,
24 and I'm talking about paragraph 6, were they aware in what capacity you
25 maintained contact with them, did they know what your duties were?
1 A. I don't know if they were exactly aware of my duties.
2 Q. Thank you. In some passages in your statements - and I can
3 provide references if necessary, but it will go more quickly this
4 way - you state the opinion that there was no real organised Muslim army
5 there, there were only some independent groups; right?
6 A. I didn't state, I think, that there were independent groups. The
7 army we were talking about for us was Mr. Naser Oric and his second in
8 command or his Chief of Staff Ramiz and some other military men known to
9 us. But there was no standing army and we had no real visible groups in
10 the enclave.
11 Q. All right. If I tell you that there were four brigades and one
12 independent battalion plus a fifth brigade in Zepa and another two
13 special purpose battalions, such as medical and another one, in total
14 there was seven organised units with their commanders, staffs, logistics,
15 and armed troops, would that surprise you?
16 A. Yes, it would surprise me because we never saw anything about
17 regular, real army, as you mentioned now, and that's what I stated also
18 in paragraph 8. We had the 8th Operational Group, but it wasn't a real
19 group and we had no idea how the group was organised below the top of the
21 Q. When you say "we," do you also mean your commanders, the command
22 of the Dutch Battalion, did they know more than you did?
23 A. I don't think when we are talking about the army and the
24 existence of a standing army, I think they also did not know that there
25 was another organisation and which brigades that you mentioned.
1 Q. We have to clear that up a bit. When you say "standing army,"
2 you imply garrisoned units and -- that are always at the disposal of
3 their command; right?
4 A. Not only a standing army. It can also an army be that it could
5 be mobilised, but at least I -- and I can say, we were not aware and we
6 did not deal with parts of the army in structures like an operational
7 group and beyond -- below that, brigades and maybe companies or even
9 Q. Is that because perhaps Zulfo Tursunovic, one brigade commander,
10 was unwilling to communicate with UNPROFOR completely?
11 A. For me, Mr. Zulfo Tursunovic was one of the leaders of a part of
12 the enclave. The enclave was divided, for the battalion at least, in a
13 northern and a southern part. In the northern part we had a company
14 commander who dealt with local leaders. In the southern part we had a
15 company commander who dealt with the local leaders. And I don't know if
16 we -- when we are talking about Zulfo Tursunovic, if we are talking about
17 a military leader with a rank and even an organisation under his command.
18 For me, he was just a local civilian leader because I also never -- I
19 only once saw him, but I never saw him in military uniform, for example.
20 Q. All right. But do you know that up to 85 per cent of the Muslim
21 army in the first years of the war wore civilian clothing, that they were
22 not fighting in uniform, they were fighting in mufti?
23 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
24 Q. Thank you. You said in your debriefing on 30th August 1995 that
25 you had had contacts with the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian
1 Serb army, which is to say the VRS. Where did you have contacts with the
3 A. The Bosnian Serb army -- the Bosnian army, I think we're talking
4 about the Muslims, the only contacts we had was inside the enclave.
5 Q. Thank you. You and many of your colleagues from DutchBat have
6 confirmed to us that you had no access to the Bandera triangle; is that
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. Was your access to Bandera barred by civilians or by armed
11 A. By civilians.
12 Q. Without any weapons?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Do you know that there was one incident when your fellow
15 servicemen were captured in this Bandera triangle?
16 A. Yeah, I know that in the period from the 28th of January till 31
17 of January, 1995, some of our patrols were stopped in the area, and the
18 only time I was there was in the evening from the 29th of January to
19 re-supply our own troops. I went there with Ramiz, and at that moment
20 I've not seen there any armed men who were stopping our patrols.
21 Q. And where did you get those supplies? Did you buy them from the
22 village people or from who?
23 A. At that moment, in January, we had still our supplies from
24 ourselves, and of course - as I think you should know - that our supplies
25 came from the middle of Bosnia, that were brought in by supply convoys.
1 And we supplied our troops with our own supplies.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now briefly look at D01956
4 in e-court. It originates from end January and relates to the subject.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. While we're waiting, is it true that your men had been captured
7 there precisely and remained in captivity for three or four days?
8 A. They were blocked there and were not allowed to return to the
9 base from the 28th of January until the 31 of January.
10 Q. Thank you. Please look at this document. There should be a
11 translation because it's not MFI'd. It's a proper exhibit.
12 JUDGE KWON: Probably it was admitted under the condition that
13 English translation should be existing -- existent and to be uploaded.
14 MS. WEST: Mr. President, we have a translation.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I think that -- that was the case.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I have it too, but it's easier
17 to upload I suppose.
18 JUDGE KWON: Shall we put it on the ELMO?
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. This telegram by Naser Oric, addressed to the command of the
21 2nd Corps, speaks precisely to that. And it says the commander of the
22 Dutch Battalion in Srebrenica ordered his patrols to enter the area where
23 movement has been banned. The commander of the 281st Mountain Brigade,
24 in agreement with the commander of the 8th Operations Group, and in
25 observation of the agreement with the UNPROFOR liaison officer, blocked
1 all patrols of the UNPROFOR after warning them not to move in the said
3 So this was the 281st light -- sorry, Eastern Bosnian Light
4 Brigade in keeping -- in agreement with the commander of the
5 8th Operations Group. This doesn't sound like civilians. This sounds
6 like the military, with their own structure.
7 A. Yeah, but I also did not deny that there were military people
8 inside the enclave. Naser Oric was one of the military leaders in the
9 enclave, as well as was Ramiz. Of course these kind of orders from the
10 BiH command I never saw.
11 Q. Thank you. Could we now look at P3987.
12 JUDGE KWON: The part for me a bit difficult to follow is that
13 your statement that your access to Bandera was barred by civilians.
14 Could you explain that to me? How could a civilian influence the
15 UNPROFOR soldiers not to do something.
16 THE WITNESS: It was quite easy in that way. Of course we were
17 aware that there were armed people in the region. What they did, they
18 blocked us and said that we were not allowed to go in. They informed us
19 already from the 8th or the 10th of January, when fightings were going on
20 in the western side of the enclave, that we should not patrol there.
21 Because it were civilians, I think that the second in command of the
22 battalion, Mr. Franken, ordered his patrols to patrol inside the Bandera
23 triangle, although it was not allowed by the BiH. And he ordered it
24 because there was no army that would stop him -- at least that's what he
25 said I think. Of course when they were stopped by civilians -- and I
1 don't know, there might have been armed civilians, but I'm not aware of
2 that, when they were stopped I think they stopped not to escalate the
4 JUDGE KWON: Do you remember who they were, the civilians who
5 stopped --
6 THE WITNESS: At least the civilians under the leadership of
7 Zulfo Tursunovic, the local leader in that area.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. You've just given me cause again, very nicely, mentioning the
13 10th of January. Look at this where it says your access was barred by
14 reinforcing the Buljim-Jabucno lines, and then when Serbs moved their
15 lines, it says you were given an ultimatum to return the enemy soldiers,
16 that is, the Serbs, to their original position.
17 And then it says the OG 8 Srebrenica issued an ultimatum to the
18 UN members to return the enemy soldiers to their original position, and
19 if they failed to meet this position the command will prohibit movement
20 of UNPROFOR in this area and take concrete steps. Now, do you remember
21 that you were required to fight the Serbs or expected to fight the Serbs?
22 A. Yeah, we were expected several times to fight the Serbs from both
23 sides and from the BiH side as well as military as civilians as -- also
24 from the VRS side. We frequently got the request to fight or to
25 interfere in actions taken by one of the parties. Our problem was, of
1 course, when Muslims asked us to interfere in the situations where the
2 Serbs attacked and they didn't give us the freedom of movement, we had
3 not a possibility to interfere -- intervene. The same is also from the
4 VRS side. When they blamed the BiH attacking the VRS in the western
5 side, so in the Bandera area, we were not allowed to go there. We also
6 had no freedom of movement. So from both sides we got ultimatums and
7 requests, but we were not allowed to do our job and even come a little
8 bit in the direction to act on their requests and just -- most of the
9 times it was to stop one of the parties fighting the other one.
10 Q. Thank you. Is it true that the only demands of the Serbian side
11 were for you to disarm and demilitarise the enclave, and they never asked
12 you to fight their battles for them?
13 A. No, but they frequently asked us to stop Muslims to fight them,
14 because they always told us that Muslims were attacking them outside the
15 enclave, that Muslims were fighting them. We had no possibility to go
16 there and to check even if it was true and where they were attacking
17 because they did not allow us to go out of the enclave. So they also
18 asked frequently for help to stop Muslim attacks.
19 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that according to the agreement on the
20 protected area, the Muslims were prohibited from launching any attacks
21 from the protected area that should not have been happening and that tied
22 large forces to Srebrenica?
23 A. Yes, of course.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at P3951.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. How many Muslim troops do you think there were there?
3 A. As I stated before, there were -- was no regular standing army.
4 There were no Muslim troops but there were a lot of people in the age
5 between -- well, let's say 20 and 50 who could have been in the army
6 before. But there was no real army and we had not the idea that there
7 was a standing army at all.
8 Q. Do you agree that even the wrong army can use live ammunition and
9 even not a proper army can kill?
10 A. Yeah.
11 Q. Thank you. Look at paragraph 2.34, please. It was a debriefing
12 at the Dutch ministry. It speaks of the population and the warring
13 parties. It says around 40.000 people, including 80 per cent refugees
14 approximately, that was in paragraph 2.33. And in 2.34 it says a
15 combined strength of 3.000 to 4.000 men.
16 We've heard today that you attended that meeting at Fontana,
17 where it was said that they also had three to four tanks. And we've seen
18 from some papers that they had been ordering tank shells. Did you know
20 MS. WEST: Apologies for interrupting. As I understood, those
21 tanks are referenced in the weapons collection point, not that they had
22 three or four tanks. So I would say it's a misstatement.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. First of all, do you know that this was established at this Dutch
25 briefing, that they had 3- to 4.000 fighting men, four brigades with a
1 combined strength of 3- to 4.000 men?
2 A. I was not aware that there were real brigades, and for sure not
3 that there were 3- or 4.000 men. Of course there may have been 3- or
4 4.000 men in the enclave, but not that they were organised in brigades.
5 Q. Do you know how many tanks they had? Did you know how many tanks
6 they had and how they concealed them from you?
7 A. When we came into the enclave in January 1995, before us there
8 was a Dutch Battalion and before that, that was the first Dutch
9 Battalion. And when they came into the enclave, there had been a
10 Canadian Company already. And I don't know in what moment the
11 demilitarisation of the enclave started. I know for sure that with the
12 first battalion in the weapons collection point there were already two
13 tanks, not only two tanks, there were mortars, there were heavy
14 machine-guns, and lots of small arms. So in the weapon collection point
15 were two tanks, and when we came into the enclave in January, I think in
16 the middle of January, the first question came already from the Muslim
17 side to hand-over the weapons from the weapon collection point, including
18 the tanks. Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans did not allow them to take the
19 weapons from the weapon collection point, and I'm not aware that shells
20 for tanks came into the enclave.
21 Q. Well, yesterday we read Naser Oric's statement here that they had
22 five tanks and that they handed over two, or rather, handed over one and
23 damaged another one, set it on fire. Did you know that, they had five
25 A. No.
1 Q. Thank you. Did you know that from the beginning of June onwards
2 that they refused weapons from the depot because they had more up-to-date
3 weapons, that is what one of your officers said? Did you know that that
4 is what one of your officers was told, that the Muslims said, "We don't
5 need those weapons. We have better ones than that"?
6 A. No, the only question heard several times during that period,
7 that they want us to hand over the weapons from the weapon collection
8 point. So it seems to me that they had not enough weapons.
9 Q. Thank you. Thank you. So you are aware that Mr. Franken tried
10 to get in there, that they were locked. And do you know that after that
11 a decision was made for your battalion not to go there; right?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 A. I think I have to add a little bit to that because not
15 specifically that the battalion would not go in there, because I have it
16 not in my notes, I think, but in my opinion we tried several times to go
17 in there but did not succeed.
18 Q. Yes, but in the Tolimir case, 1D04698 on page 6820, you said that
19 it was ordered that the patrols no longer go there. And you don't know
20 whether that came from UNPROFOR or whether it was your commander who had
21 ordered that; right?
22 A. Yeah, of course our commander ordered it to our troops, and I
23 don't know if it was his decision or it was a decision from either Tuzla
24 or BH command.
25 Q. Thank you. In February you were informed by General Milovanovic
1 that he did not believe that the Muslims would honour the cease-fire. Do
2 you remember that there was a cease-fire on at that time and it was
3 President Carter who had mediated, he had worked this out with
4 President Izetbegovic and myself and it was supposed to be on for four
6 A. No, I don't specifically know about this cease-fire agreement
7 because I think we had several cease-fire agreements. I don't know on
8 what level and when the cease-fire agreements were arranged, and
9 especially not this one from General Milovanovic because I even don't
10 know him.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at 16414, that's
13 the 65 ter number. That's not it. Sorry, 1D04701 -- sorry, just a
14 moment, please. I am sorry. Could you please give me a minute.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I assume that this was not communicated to you, but we can have a
17 look at this document. 65 ter 16414, Milovanovic concluded that he would
18 not observe the cease-fire. Do you know whether the Muslims observed the
20 A. No, not specifically in this case.
21 Q. Please cast a glance at the English version. So you were aware
22 of the fact that the agreements signed by Izetbegovic were not being
23 honoured by Oric; right?
24 A. I don't know what agreements were signed by Izetbegovic and I
25 don't know specifically what orders you are referring to. The only thing
1 we know on the ground in the enclave, that as well the BiH and the VRS
2 frequently were fighting each other, frequently were shooting at each
3 other, and both did not respect whatever cease-fire agreement was made,
4 because we got complaints from both sides. So if there had been a
5 cease-fire agreement, I don't know which one you're referring to, but
6 none of the parties, at least in our period, stick to it.
7 Q. Thank you. I leave it to the Trial Chamber now. I leave it in
8 their hands to decide whether they're going to have this document
9 admitted or not. It's in line with the witness's experience to the
10 effect that the cease-fire is not observed?
11 JUDGE KWON: Witness didn't confirm anything from this document.
12 We'll not admit this.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Now, for example, the end of March 1995, Major Nikolic informed
16 you about these problems that he had with Muslim soldiers; isn't that
18 A. I don't know which problems you're talking about now, but I can
19 assure you that from the beginning till the end Major Nikolic from the
20 VRS side, and of course the leaders in the enclave from the military and
21 civilian side, informed us frequently about problems they had from each
22 other. And I mean that frequently they asked us to stop attacks from
23 both sides, and at the same moment both sides denied us to do our job and
24 did not give us the freedom of movement we needed to do our job and even
25 to try to answer their requests.
1 Q. Thank you. Can we have a brief look at 1D04701. This is the
2 command of this operations group, or rather, it is the Main Staff that is
3 issuing an order to Operations Group 8 Srebrenica and the Zepa Brigade,
4 full combat-readiness on the 17th of February, while there is a
5 cease-fire that is in force. Do you see that his behaviour was not in
6 accordance with the orders of the General Staff of his army, the Muslim
8 A. Well, as I said before, I was not in the line of communications
9 of the BiH army. We did not get orders from the BiH Army, and these kind
10 of orders I never saw before.
11 Q. But do you agree that it is the Main Staff here that is issuing
12 an order to take measures to raise combat-readiness of units? This is
13 being sent to the 2nd Corps command, to the command of the operations
14 group, and particularly to the 1st Zepa Brigade command. Do you know
15 what the 8th Operations Group was, Operations Group 8 Srebrenica?
16 JUDGE KWON: Next page for English.
17 THE WITNESS: As I told you before, there were representatives of
18 the 8OG inside the enclave being Naser Oric, Ramiz, and some others.
19 That was for us the 8 Operational Group. And of course I can read what
20 is in this order but that doesn't say anything to me.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. All right. But do you think that you would have thought if you
23 received it at the time that he was saying this to civilians or to a
24 military unit? Look at this, raise combat-readiness, full
25 combat-readiness, helicopters, evacuation, camouflage, and it says
1 here -- [In English] "Should the helicopter be found, in your contacts
2 with UNPROFOR representative take the position that its purpose was to
3 transport political representatives of Srebrenica and Zepa who were to
4 take part in the work of political organs of the state ..."
5 [Interpretation] Number 6:
6 [In English] "The command of the 2nd Corps will carry out the
7 preparatory activities given in the directive, in connection with the
8 engagement of forces in the direction towards the protected areas of Zepa
9 and Srebrenica."
10 [Interpretation] This is a long order, isn't it? This is not
11 being sent to civilians; right?
12 MS. WEST: Objection, Your Honour, the first question here is:
13 If you had received it at the time would you have thought it was being
14 sent to civilians or military units. He can't answer this question.
15 Anyone can read this document and make some guess as to who is on the
16 receiving end of it. But he's already indicated that he's not in this
17 chain of command, and I don't think he's the appropriate person to try to
18 affirm this document.
19 JUDGE KWON: Having heard the answer given by the witness that he
20 only met civilians, I think the question was fair enough.
21 Can you answer the question, Mr. Rave?
22 THE WITNESS: When I read this document, it's a document sent to
23 a military organisation, that's clear for me. As I stated, we did not
24 only deal with civilians in the enclave but also with representatives of
25 the 8th OG being Naser Oric and Ramiz and some others. So there was a
1 top and there was a part of a military organisation, but not a standing
2 army. And -- well, that's the only thing I can add to this. And having
3 read parts of this, as I also stated and I think we can read it in
4 several of my statements, I have no information that full
5 combat-readiness of other or units were prepared in the enclave. I have
6 not the information that military actions were taken out, no military
7 exercises were done. Now and then there were rumours or the VRS informed
8 us that it took place, but that's all.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Thank you. At the briefings in your battalion, was there any
11 mention of helicopter flights, weapons, supplies, and so on, was there
12 any mention of that?
13 A. We frequently had information about helicopter flights around the
14 enclave and not inside the enclave, and I have no information about
15 weapons, supplies towards the enclave.
16 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that at one point in time, as you said,
17 you went down to 16 per cent of your ammunition reserves? What were
18 those reserves in the beginning of January?
19 A. I don't know. I was not in that chain of command. I only know
20 that there was not enough ammunition that was needed because the
21 clearances were denied to bring in reserves of ammunition or ammunition
22 at all. And I think this is more in the line of Major Franken or
23 Major -- Mr. Karremans to ask because I really don't know.
24 Q. Thank you. However, can you say how that happened, how come you
25 went down to only 16 per cent of your ammunition reserves? Did you have
1 some kind of combat action or what?
2 A. We went not down to 16 per cent. We -- and now I'm a little bit
3 speculating, but I know for sure that all the ammunition we needed in the
4 enclave and that should be provided to us when we came into the enclave
5 and that already started with the first Dutch Battalion, that the VRS did
6 not allow us to bring in enough ammunition to do our job properly, at
7 least to bring in the ammunition that was required to do the job
8 properly. I taste a little bit now that you are suggesting that we had
9 lots of ammunition and it went down to 16 per cent because either we used
10 it - and I think your next question will be - or did you gave it to the
11 Muslims. The answer is no.
12 Q. No, I'm just asking what you did with the ammunition when the
13 quantity varied. What did you do? At one point in time there must have
14 been 100 per cent. How did it go down to 16 per cent? And this is what
15 you said in the debriefing, 1D04697, the debriefing of 1995.
16 MS. WEST: Mr. President, I think we can look at that and I'll
17 look at this debriefing, but I think this is Mr. Franken's debriefing.
18 And as this witness says, either way he's never said 16 per cent.
19 JUDGE KWON: Let us see the document.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted, so
21 can we have it removed from our screens?
22 JUDGE KWON: Ms. West, ABiH document, order by Hadzihasanovic.
23 MS. WEST: I was being unclear. In the beginning of this he said
24 you said in your statement about the 16 per cent. The witness indicated:
25 I've never said that.
1 JUDGE KWON: It's not about 16 per cent. It's order from the
2 General Staff of the ABiH, ordering the 8th Group to bring units to full
4 MS. WEST: Okay. So I understand that 4697 is not a previous
6 JUDGE KWON: No, no. He's asking to tender 1D4701, and I'm
7 asking your opinion as to its admission, the document which is before us.
8 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
9 MS. WEST: Thank you. My confusion, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE KWON: Oh, I was told it has been already admitted.
11 What's the number for that? Yes, D1955.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Yeah.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. I forgot about that.
15 That's right.
16 What I have here is a piece of information, that it was said in
17 the debriefing of the 28th of February 1995, and the number is 1D04697,
18 that you got down to 16 per cent of your ammunition. I cannot see that
19 being ascribed to Franken anywhere. Page 4. Now we are going to look
20 for 16 per cent. That will help us more than anything else. The first
21 paragraph, the last line. Now let us see who said that. Perhaps that's
22 on the previous page. Perhaps we can see there who it was who said this.
23 JUDGE KWON: First page -- if we see the first page it is a
24 statement debriefing by the witness.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. That's why it's being
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Do you remember that this was said at the Dutch debriefing, that
4 ammunition went down to 16 per cent, the ammunition reserves, that is?
5 A. I don't know if it states that it went down to 16 per cent. I
6 think that the ammunition reserves were at 16 per cent. And in my
7 opinion -- well, this -- this could be true and it's in the statement. I
8 am for sure that we never had 100 per cent. And of course, when you plan
9 an operation you plan 100 per cent of ammunition and other stocks, but if
10 you've got only 16 per cent, then the ammunition reserves were at 16
11 per cent -- at least that's my translation from this document now.
12 Q. Thank you. Tell me, please, why would the Army of
13 Republika Srpska allow you to bring in unrestricted quantities of
14 ammunition into an enclave where you were supposed to guard a
15 demilitarised zone and where you're not supposed to spend any ammunition?
16 A. I think that you're well aware that when a military organisation
17 is ordered to go out and do their job, they take everything they need.
18 And one of the normal things is that you carry weapons, you also carry
19 with that weapon ammunition. When you don't have ammunition, you don't
20 have to take your weapon. I think that in this political side that in
21 the beginning the Dutch army was not allowed to take in a lot of heavy
22 weapons as they would like it themselves. So there was an agreement what
23 weapons should have been taken to the enclave. When they went in, they
24 were not allowed to bring -- yeah, they were not allowed to bring in all
25 the ammunition they wanted to, and not only the ammunition, also rest of
1 the reserves and rest of the stocks we needed were refused because
2 clearances were not granted to bring reserves into the enclave. And
3 it's, in my opinion, standard operational procedure that if you take your
4 weapons you also take the ammunition you need.
5 Q. Thank you. We don't have an answer yet, Mr. Rave. How did these
6 variations happen in the quantity of ammunition? What happened to that
7 ammunition? What is written here was that this was an incident, as it
8 were, that the ammunition reserves were at 16 per cent, that is to say
9 that they were not always at 16 per cent. So what were you and your
10 units bringing into the enclave?
11 A. I don't know where you read that it was not always 16 per cent.
12 I think in this debriefing the only statement is that the ammunition
13 reserve were at 16 per cent, and I'm not a logistic officer. I really
14 don't know if it might have been a little bit more or a little bit less.
15 This is the information I got, and I think even at that moment this is
16 the information, because it was current at that moment, I think the
17 debriefing was from August or September 1995, so that might be in my
18 memory, and I can't find anything in my notes about it. And I wasn't a
19 logistic officer and I have no documents about it to prove if there was
20 more or less.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page of this
22 document. Can we focus on the second paragraph from the top of the page.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you remember that a lot of money was being smuggled in cans
25 and that there were many, many ways of abusing the presence of
1 international organisations, to take money into the enclave, out of the
2 enclave, deposit it in German bank accounts. Please take a look at this
3 paragraph from the very beginning. Let us see what Naser is being asked
4 for. He is being asking for a million to be smuggled and then further
5 on, this entire paragraph, until the paragraph that starts with the words
6 "Major De Haan."
7 A. But what is your question?
8 Q. Were you aware of that, the smuggling of such large amounts of
9 money into the enclave and by their military commanders at that? Also,
10 they tried and probably succeeded in abusing the presence of foreign
11 representatives there, and in this way they managed to smuggle this
12 through the Serb ranks?
13 A. I was aware, at least it was a rumour, and it came from the
14 former battalion, from the 12th Battalion, that Naser Oric was
15 approaching people to bring in large amounts of money. In the first
16 meetings we had with him I suggested, for me, to see if it was possible
17 to get the question again because for me it was only a rumour. I was
18 never asked and -- nor of the people in my vicinity were asked to smuggle
19 in big amounts of money. As you have read in the first page of my
20 statements, one of the things I was -- I was there for was the field
21 security and one of the things in the field security for me was to take
22 care that all the UNPROFOR soldiers were as impartial as possible to all
23 the parties and not get involved with this kind of things.
24 So when we had rumours or information that money or those kind of
25 things were try to smuggle in or people were approached to bring in or
1 use their post lines to bring in large amounts of money and then they got
2 a request, then most of the time I was informed about it and we stopped
3 it and it did not happen. I once was informed that one of the Dutch
4 soldiers got a post package from Holland that contained several cans and
5 in the cans was a big amount of money. We confiscated it, our royal
6 military police took it. We made a report of it and it was sorted out in
7 Holland where that came from. These were not big amounts of money from
8 one person. This was money from a lot of Bosnian people living somewhere
9 in Europe. They collected the money, put it in cans, put lists of names
10 with it, and in that way they tried to get it into the enclave to provide
11 the local population with a little bit of money so that they at least
12 could buy things on the market.
13 Q. Thank you. I'm kindly asking you, Mr. Rave, not to feel attacked
14 in any way, neither you yourselves nor the United Nations nor the
15 Netherlands. I know very well what our people are capable of doing in
16 order to cover their traces and the smuggling that they were involved in.
17 I'm just asking you whether the Army of Republika Srpska, apart from the
18 fact that they were entitled to inspect the convoys, that in addition to
19 that that they had very good reasons to carry out these inspections.
20 That was where my question was leading to. I didn't want to accuse
21 anyone of anything.
22 Do you agree that any army that is supposed to grant passage has
23 the right to know whether a people bringing in something or out of the
24 area are carrying something that might be used against this army?
25 A. Yes, it might be the right to do it.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can these two pages that were put
3 to the witness be admitted, pages 3 and 4.
4 THE WITNESS: I think I have to add a little bit of this. Of
5 course they have the right to check, but I don't think that when they
6 check convoys that they are not allowed to steal from convoys to make
7 their own choices to take out whatever they like and make their own
8 decisions on that. Because there is no border police, there are no
9 borders, and if they can't prove that is something that is -- could be
10 used against them, then it should be possible. But I don't know if it's
11 possible for them to steal, for example, clothes or shoes from UNHCR
13 JUDGE KWON: Pages 1, 3, and 4 will be admitted.
14 THE ACCUSED: 1, 2, and 3 I suppose would be proper.
15 JUDGE KWON: You said 3 and 4, so I included the first page, the
16 cover sheet.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, for the purpose of
18 identification. So number 1, 2, and 3.
19 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
20 JUDGE KWON: Whatever the pages, they will be the two pages shown
21 to the witness. We'll give the number, Exhibit D --
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1973, Your Honours.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Rave I couldn't agree more with anyone else as I can agree
1 with you, that this was impermissible and that nevertheless these things
2 happened. But we must state that those things were prohibited and that
3 they were not included in the orders. Do you agree that all of this was
4 happening due to individual acts of indiscipline?
5 A. I don't think so because most of the time when -- at least in our
6 visibility convoys were stopped, they were stopped at the so-called
7 Yellow Bridge, our point of contact to the VRS. And most of the time
8 there were several soldiers under the leading most of the time of
9 Major Momir Nikolic. So I don't think they were incidents and I don't
10 think they were individuals who did it; it was, for me, a structure.
11 Q. Thank you. Did you find out if there was any permission given or
12 any order given to steal, or did it happen that at times when the command
13 managed to locate the items, these items were trimmed. So my first
14 question was: Did you know that there was a permission or an order
15 instructing the soldiers to steal?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Thank you. Is it true that the Serbian side, primarily
18 Major Nikolic, tried to get in touch with Naser Oric through you and that
19 Naser Oric refused to communicate with him?
20 A. Major Nikolic several times tried to get in touch with
21 Naser Oric. It's amazing that it started in the beginning -- no, in the
22 middle of March until the end of March I think, and later on it happened
23 several times. I think that Major Nikolic was aware that Naser Oric was
24 not in the enclave at that moment, although we didn't know. He asked us
25 and I think he might have heard the rumour or he might be informed that
1 he was not in the enclave, and via us he tried to get the confirmation
2 that Naser wasn't in the enclave.
3 Q. Well, now, I'm not an intelligence officer, therefore I cannot
4 qualify this as speculation. You cannot deny that the Serbian side tried
5 to get in touch and that they did so in order to reduce the number of
6 incidents. Does that sound reasonable to you?
7 A. No, not at all. I think they tried to get in contact to reduce
8 the number of incidents. I think that we, as a liaison team, we were
9 able to speak either to the Muslims and to the VRS, were very capable to
10 bring over messages from both sides without them letting meet each other
11 because there was so many hatred over -- that -- I don't think that they
12 even wanted to meet. Both sides had the idea that it was too risky to
13 meet each other I think. So it was -- again it was played, but none of
14 the sides wanted to meet the other one physically.
15 Q. Thank you. However, the fact is that Colonel Vukovic and
16 Major Nikolic informed you, particularly towards the end of May, the 31st
17 of May, for example, about huge losses incurred by the Serbs and the
18 incidents in which the Muslim army left the enclave in order to kill the
19 Serbs; is that correct?
20 A. That's correct, but then we also have to add that at that same
21 moment we asked Major Nikolic, as we did several times before, and also
22 Colonel Vukovic, to give us the freedom of movement, either the UNPROFOR
23 troops or the UNMOs in the enclave, to go out the enclave and check the
24 statements they were made. Because we only had those parts of
25 information, those statements. They often seemed to be false because
1 both sides blamed each other of doing these kind of things and we had not
2 possibility to go out and check it.
3 Q. All right. But don't you as officers trust each other? Why
4 shouldn't you believe Colonel Vukovic and Major Nikolic that the Serbs
5 were getting killed as a result of the missions undertaken by the Muslim
6 army outside of the enclave?
7 A. It's not only the officers. I think it was a war situation and
8 we had several times promises from Major Nikolic and Colonel Vukovic
9 about agreements we made. Several times they proved not to stick to
10 their promises and not to stick to the agreements we made to each other.
11 So of course you get a situation that you don't trust each other and
12 everything that is said has to be checked, double-checked.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly look at 1D1961.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Is it true that on some occasions the Serbs demanded vehemently
17 for Srebrenica to be demilitarised or else they were going to launch an
18 attack? I think the number is wrong. It should be 1D1961 and it was
20 Did you hear my question? Is it true that the Serbian officers
21 told you on many occasions: Bring the demilitarisation to the end,
22 otherwise we are going to launch an attack?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to show you a few Muslim combat reports
25 in which they speak about dozens of Serbian casualties inflicted by the
1 troops from the 28th Division. For example, one of them is a report,
2 look at the English version of it, which says and describes what members
3 of the 28th Division were doing; inter alia, they were intensifying
4 activities behind our lines around Srebrenica and Zepa and they are tying
5 our forces in order to prevent us from sending them to Sarajevo front.
6 They killed 40 people, they burned the village of Visnjica to the ground,
7 et cetera. Don't you see that this tells you that you should have
8 believed the Serb officers when they said that the situation had become
10 A. Of course we got frequently disinformation from the Serb
11 officers. We reported it, and again I only can state that we wanted to
12 prevent it. For example, because in the same time-period we frequently
13 got the information from the Serb officers that Muslims were smuggling
14 ammunition from especially Zepa into Srebrenica. They asked us if it was
15 possible for us to take care of that and to prevent it. Well, we had not
16 enough personnel because at one moment personnel was not allowed by the
17 VRS side to return to the enclave. We had not enough material to build
18 new O Ps in the southern part of the enclave. So the only thing we could
19 do was our utmost to control and observe the southern part and prevent
20 smuggling as far as we could see it. We informed, of course, the BiH
21 about the complaints of the Serb side, and of course they denied that
22 those kind of things happened.
23 Q. Thank you. How many soldiers would you require in order to be
24 able to control between 4- and 6.000 Muslim soldiers within the enclave,
25 particularly the soldiers who keep changing clothes from civilian to
1 uniforms and at the same time to keep yourselves safe from being killed
2 in a guerilla way?
3 A. I think now we're getting again in an operational situation, and
4 I think this is a question that should be asked to the commander or
5 second in command and not to me.
6 Q. As a civilian I can put to you that as I see it the only solution
7 was demilitarisation, because with 10- or 15.000 soldiers you couldn't
8 have controlled 4- to 6.000 guerilla soldiers and prevent them from
9 killing you. Don't you agree that the only viable solution was
11 A. Yes, of course. And I think that for a complete demilitarisation
12 on both sides, at least not the regular army but also civilians, I think
13 that the UNPROFOR agreement should have been changed, for example, the
14 possibility to search all houses.
15 Q. Thank you. Now, you have confirmed, haven't you, that on the
16 1st of July you met Colonel Vukovic and that he told you and described
17 the situation to you with regard to the enclave. In addition, he said
18 that the Serb army had to react and to that you responded that if they
19 reacted air-strikes would follow; is that correct?
20 A. I don't know if I said it that way. I'm just looking in my
22 Q. I believe that this was said - just one moment - in your written
23 statement, 1D --
24 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the number of
25 the document.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's 1D04690.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. In paragraph 6 of your statement you say that you believe that he
4 told you that they would take the OP by force, even maybe by force.
5 That's exactly what you said.
6 A. Yeah, I can't find it in my notes now, but I think that's true
7 from my recollection. They ordered us to leave the OP because they
8 wanted to use the road on which the OP was. Eventually they would take
9 over the OP with force, and I think that we answered in that we would try
10 to deny them the access to the OP and that, if necessary, we would ask
11 for close air support.
12 Q. Thank you. And do you know that this belt between Zepa and
13 Srebrenica was occupied in an unauthorised way and that the Army of
14 Republika Srpska was denied access to it?
15 A. No, I'm not aware of that because, and I just can explain, when
16 we came into the enclave, we got a map with a red line on it, and for us
17 that was the border of the enclave accepted by both parties, at least
18 that was what we thought. Of course Muslims from one side and the Serbs
19 from the other side did not accept the red line. Both claimed a little
20 bit more to the left or to the right. We never managed to create a
21 situation to go with one of the parties, at least one by one, along the
22 line to check if we were talking about the same line. And I'm not aware
23 that the situation in the south where the OP was was not correct, because
24 in my opinion the OP was already built there in the beginning of 1994.
25 So for us it was just there and I don't know if there were any documents
1 in which it was mentioned that it was not correct.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I note the time. We'll take a break
3 for 15 minutes. You have spent an hour and 15 minutes. You have about
4 three-quarters of an hour, and then I think it's time for you to come to
5 more relevant issues after the break.
6 We'll resume at quarter past.
7 --- Recess taken at 3.02 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 3.16 p.m.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Rave, let us go to the month of July as quickly as possible.
13 Is it correct that already in early June you noticed that the Muslims
14 were carrying out provocations from the proximity of your observation
15 posts with the intention of drawing you into the war?
16 A. I don't know exactly when it started --
17 JUDGE KWON: Sorry, Mr. Rave. Could we wait till we have the
18 French interpreters.
19 THE WITNESS: Okay.
20 JUDGE KWON: I think we can continue. Yes. Please continue,
21 Mr. Rave.
22 THE WITNESS: I think that I can't exactly say when it started,
23 but after the attack on the OP Echo in the south and after that on the
24 attack of OP Foxtrot, Muslims who gathered around our OPs and tried to
25 get in fire contact with the VRS, tried to get the UN involved in their
1 fire-fights, that's correct.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you. I don't know if it's translatable. In our language
4 we say you hide behind a grandfather and then shoot at the bear in order
5 to save yourself. In other words, they wanted to use you and to push you
6 into a conflict with the Serbs; correct?
7 A. Yes, I think that the intention was that the Serbs would fire on
8 the OPs and they expected, of course, that the reaction would be that
9 UNPROFOR would shoot back towards the Serbs.
10 Q. Thank you. Do you recall hearing from someone that Arkan had
11 been noticed in the area of Srebrenica and you nearly believed that
12 although you couldn't verify it?
13 A. Yes, I got - and I should look at my notes - at least two times
14 the information that Arkan was sighted in the area. One specific time
15 was that he was seen in Bratunac, I think in the afternoon or around
16 12.00, and the information came from the Muslim side, the same source
17 that provided several times that showed out to be true. For example, the
18 building up of forces in the southern part, tanks in the southern part of
19 the enclave from the VRS and that same source who gave us that
21 Q. Thank you. Only in your amalgamated statement you said that
22 those were Ekrem and Avdo Majstorovic whereas in another statement of
23 yours you said that those men were Ekrem and Ramiz. Is that correct?
24 A. Well, then I have to look in my notes to see when it was and I
25 can take a quick look. I don't have an exact date.
1 Q. All right. It's not that important. We can move on. Now
2 already on the 6th and 7th of July you saw that there was fighting going
3 on in the Bandera triangle and you speak about that in paragraph 7 of
4 your amalgamated statement. Is that correct?
5 A. I can't find that in my statement now --
6 JUDGE KWON: Para 7, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, paragraph 7.
8 [In English] "A lot of fire-fighting in the Bandera triangle and
9 in the vicinity of the OP Foxtrot" --
10 JUDGE KWON: Probably --
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Oh, I'm sorry, probably it's page 7.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes --
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct.
15 JUDGE KWON: Para 13.
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, on 13, a lot of fire-fights took place. We
17 got the information from our observation posts, I think, that were on the
18 north and the south corner of the Bandera triangle, and they informed us
19 that they heard lots of fire-fights. And of course the information from
20 the OP Foxtrot we got directly from the OP.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Thank you. I don't have time to show you some documents that are
23 already in evidence. Let me ask you this: Were you informed that
24 throughout the whole of June, and particularly from the 15th of June
25 until the end of June, a major Muslim offensive was going on in the area
1 of Sarajevo and that the Muslim forces in Srebrenica tried to step-up
2 their activities in order to assist those fighting in Sarajevo. Just
3 tell me if you knew about that or not?
4 A. No, I don't.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that this is the same Bandera triangle
6 where you were denied access by Zulfo Tursunovic's men, whether they be
7 civilians or soldiers, we're talking about the same location?
8 A. I don't know what location you're referring to, but we only had
9 one Bandera triangle and that was the one in which Tursunovic was the
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly have a look at
13 65 ter 15584.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. As a soldier, tell me, would you tolerate the fact that in every
16 offensive operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 28th Division becomes
17 intensely involved and engaged with the aim of defeating the Serbian
18 army? Would you tolerate that?
19 A. Are you asking me personally or as an UNPROFOR representative
20 that -- if we had known this and we have been able to prevent it, I think
21 we'd have done it. But I am not aware of this document.
22 Q. Thank you. We see here what General Zivanovic, who was still the
23 commander, ordered on the 2nd of July active combat, and he is saying
24 where different Muslim brigades are. He says the 280th is blocking the
25 Potocari-Srebrenica axis and the 281st is blocking the Podgaj-Borovac
1 axis, and then the 202nd Zeleni Jadar, the 283rd Podravanje-Buci village,
2 et cetera.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. You see here the next paragraph says that their intention is to
6 unite these two enclaves, to connect them from a military point of view.
7 And we see here where the 284th is and we see what his decision is as
8 well, the commander of the Drina Corps, what his decision was. Paragraph
9 3, "I've decided." And you see that Srebrenica and Zepa are supposed to
10 go back within the agreed borders, the tactical positions should be
11 improved, and conditions should be created for eliminating the enclave
12 because the Serb army is constantly being attacked from it.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have the next page,
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Do you remember that during your first meeting General Zivanovic
17 said to you: Demilitarise or I will attack?
18 A. I don't think that that were the words of Colonel -- the Colonel
19 Vukovic --
20 Q. No, no, General Zivanovic. This is his order.
21 A. And the only time I met General Zivanovic was on the -- I think
22 the 6th or the 8th of January, 1995, during the hand-over meeting in the
23 Hotel Fontana. At that moment, General Zivanovic told me that he had the
24 right to go into the enclave because the enclave was his, not from
25 General Mladic, not from Mr. Karadzic, it was his, at least the southern
1 part. That's the only thing I know about orders or ideas that
2 General Zivanovic had about the enclave of Srebrenica.
3 Q. Didn't he say to you during your first meeting that you should
4 demilitarise or that he would enter the enclave?
5 A. I can't remember exactly what he said during the nine-hour
6 meeting with lots of history, and of course I think and I can imagine
7 that the demilitarisation was mentioned but not specifically that we
8 should demilitarise or he would take the enclave.
9 Q. If I find that before the end, I'll show you what it was that had
10 been said to you, but now I'm going to show you -- just a moment, please.
11 International humanitarian law, respect for that, humanitarian -- let's
12 just find that. Just a moment, please. Oh, all right, we don't have
13 time. I don't have time to deal with this any longer. So now let's move
14 on to July.
15 You saw and you received information to the effect that in the
16 south where the enclaves touch, the Serb army is advancing; isn't that
18 A. We got the information that more and more VRS troops collected in
19 the southern part of the enclave.
20 Q. Thank you. And then an attempt was made to have your people
21 withdrawn from the observation post, and then the Muslims killed a
22 soldier of yours using a dum-dum bullet; right?
23 A. No, that's not correct. When the OP Foxtrot was taken over by
24 the VRS, the OP manning withdrew from the OP. They went down in their
25 APC via dirt road to the main road and that was going through the enclave
1 of Srebrenica. At the end of the dirt road, Muslim civilians were
2 gathered there and the soldier was killed, or by a hand-grenade or by a
3 gun-shot, I'm not sure for that.
4 Q. All right. Thank you. In the Tolimir case Mr. Franken said that
5 that was a dum-dum bullet, but all right. Is it correct that your army,
6 or rather, your troops from this observation post decided to go ahead
7 rather than back and to surrender to the Serbs rather than go back into
8 the enclave, that is paragraph 34 and paragraph 35. Please take a look
9 at your statement.
10 [In English] "The men from the OP only had one possibility, going
11 forward and surrender to the VRS because they were just afraid going
12 backward where the Muslims tried to stop them and they had that incident
13 on the same day some hours before when the soldier Raviv van Renssen was
15 A. Yes, and what's your question? Because we're talking now not
16 about the OP Foxtrot but the OP Uniform in the south, and we had more
17 from that OPs -- the Muslims in the vicinity of the OPs denied us to do
18 our military job in the way we used to do it. They only had one idea,
19 UNPROFOR should go forward and attack the VRS in the way and they would
20 maybe do it. We -- it was not our way of working. We were trying to go
21 backward and find a new position somewhere else. The Muslims did not
22 allow us to go backward so the only possibility for the OP manning was go
23 forward and surrender to the VRS troops, and of course in their mind they
24 knew that if they would not listen to the warnings of the BiH, there was
25 possibility, just as happened to Raviv van Renssen, to be shot at.
1 Q. Thank you. Today during the examination-in-chief you confirmed
2 the suggestion made by the OTP that your people had been taken prisoner
3 by the Serb army. What I'm saying is what that was -- that that was
4 their choice, to move towards the Serb army, and that after that they
5 were put up at the hotel in Bratunac; is that right?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Thank you. Further on in the night between the 10th and 11th you
8 did confirm, did you not, that Muslim soldiers left the enclave and tried
9 to breakthrough to Tuzla; right?
10 A. No. In the night from the 10th on to the 11th we had a meeting
11 in the PTT building in Srebrenica. Colonel Karremans, Major Boering at
12 that time, and myself, to inform the local population, the civilians and
13 the military population, about what was happening and the ultimatums that
14 were made. When we were in the vicinity of the PTT building, we saw a
15 big group of men gathered over there. All -- no, most of them in
16 uniform -- a lot of them in uniforms, most of them armed with small arms,
17 grenade launchers, and all those kinds of things, and they were walking
18 in the north-western direction. We had no idea what was going on and at
19 that moment we had no idea about a column trying to make a breakthrough
20 in the direction of Tuzla.
21 Q. In Ramiz Becirovic's statement it says that at the request of the
22 Muslim's side Karremans asked for air-strikes, although you did not have
23 visual contact with the Serb army; is that right?
24 A. No. During that meeting at -- in the PTT building at 11.00,
25 Karremans informed the military and the civilian leaders in the enclave
1 that there was an ultimatum, that if attacks were going on that it might
2 be possible that there was an air-strike. That's the information that's
3 correct. So he informed that there might be a possibility that there was
4 an air-strike when attacks were going on. And I think that today already
5 stated that on the next morning one of our APCs went forward, was shot at
6 by a VRS tank, and that was a confirmation that we were still under
7 attack and that was the moment I think that the information went up the
8 chain of command to ask for support.
9 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that the Muslim side, Ramiz and the
10 rest of them, gave you co-ordinates as to where the Serbs were and that
11 you forwarded this information to NATO, with a view to air-strikes?
12 A. No. I think that the liaison team was the only one, except on
13 some occasions also the commander, but most of the time the liaison team
14 dealed with Ramiz and we never got from Ramiz information about Serb
15 positions that could be used for air-strikes.
16 Q. Thank you. We have information from your side and from the
17 Muslim side that you acted in concert, that they had provided you with
18 these co-ordinates and that this first attack took place before you
19 actually saw the Serbs at all. However, if you're denying that, there
20 will be others who will confirm it.
21 Tell us this, please, is it correct that you did not know where
22 they had gone on the evening of the 10th, this large armed group?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Are you saying it's not correct or is -- are you saying that you
25 did not know?
1 A. The only thing I know that the large group went from Srebrenica
2 on a dirt road in a north-western direction.
3 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like us to deal with this meeting a bit and
4 that film that was shown to you. Mladic says to Karremans: You asked
5 for a meeting, speak up. And you say that you did not expect Mladic and
6 that Karremans did not expect Mladic. Did Karremans ask to liaise with
7 the Serb army, not expecting that it would be Mladic though?
8 A. I think the only one that can answer that question is Karremans
9 himself, if he asked for a meeting. In my opinion he did not because
10 when we left the enclave and we go to the 7.00 to leave or I was informed
11 at 7.00 that we have to be in Bratunac at 8.00, that there was a meeting,
12 but there was no agenda, that's a question for me. Because when I ask
13 for a meeting I think I have an agenda and even a schedule for the
14 meeting. So in my opinion, Karremans did not ask for the meeting but was
15 ordered to go there or to come there.
16 Q. However, sir, Karremans did not deny what Mladic had said to him.
17 You asked for a meeting, speak up. Probably Karremans asked for a
18 meeting but not with Mladic himself. He got Mladic gratis, as it were.
19 Why did he not oppose him? Why did he not say: I didn't ask for a
20 meeting with you?
21 A. I think at that moment --
22 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it's for the witness to answer that
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe, but then he shouldn't be
25 saying that he had not asked for one, I mean Karremans, because it turns
1 out that he did not ask for a meeting. If he doesn't know one, he
2 doesn't know the other either.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you agree with that, Mr. Rave, if you don't know one thing,
5 then you don't know the other one either?
6 A. I think we're trying now to go into other people's minds. When
7 Mladic is asking Karremans why he asked for a meeting, I think at that
8 moment we can see that Karremans' mind was somewhere else and not on
9 those, in my opinion, at that moment, dirty details because it was not
10 interesting at all in that moment. I think afterwards for a Court it
11 interesting, but at that moment it was in my opinion not interesting who
12 asked for the meeting. Because there was a meeting, I think at that
13 moment we had a feeling that we lost the war and we had only one thing
14 that we had to do, take care of the 25.000 refugees.
15 JUDGE KWON: But in answer to the question by Mr. Mladic -- by
16 Mladic, Colonel Karremans answered to the effect that he had a request
17 from General Nicolai and national authorities and refugees. How were the
18 DutchBat going to implement such a request without liaising with the Serb
20 THE WITNESS: I think that when as a commander on the ground you
21 got an order to go there to the Hotel Fontana to meet with one of the
22 people that won you war, then you inform your chain of command. And of
23 course I think at that moment you get the informations from -- and the
24 UNPROFOR side and the national side in Holland what questions they have.
25 And you take that.
1 JUDGE KWON: Does it mean that after being ordered by Mladic to
2 come to that hotel he asked permission from his superior?
3 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I think so -- at least in my opinion that's
4 the normal way we deal with. But as I had stated before, the only one
5 that can answer that question I think is Mr. Karremans himself.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Rave, do you remember that that film, 44 minutes, 55 seconds,
11 at that point Karremans said the reason for the meeting was his intention
12 to evacuate the civilians from the enclave -- to help the evacuation. Do
13 you remember that?
14 A. No, not specifically in these words, but -- yeah, I can't
15 specifically see what was on that minute in the film. But I think it
16 might be one of the questions that he got from UNPROFOR or even maybe
17 from the Dutch government, ask how the evacuation will take place. But
18 again, I'm speaking now for Mr. Karremans and I don't think I'm the right
19 person to ask this question.
20 Q. All right. But you're testifying about that and, perhaps this
21 was not your intention, but everything seems to suggest that there was
22 this forcible deportation of Muslim civilians from Srebrenica and that
23 that was the Serb objective. What I'm putting to you is that the Serbs
24 do not mention evacuation anywhere. And as for this presentation by
25 Karremans of what the objective of the visit was, Mladic says: Bring me
1 the civilians and let me hear from them what it is that they want.
2 Wasn't that the case?
3 A. Yeah, of course, but in these kind of situations you can ask
4 several -- not realistic questions because it wasn't realistic. The
5 enclave of Srebrenica had fallen. The town of Srebrenica was empty I
6 think because, in my opinion, the whole population was near the compound
7 in Potocari. So there was only one possibility: Either VRS leave
8 Srebrenica and offer the people to go back to their houses or evacuate
9 them. I don't know exactly, in film or a statement I read it again back
10 that I saw that Mladic offered the local population: You have a choice,
11 to go to the north, to the south, to the east, to the west, you can
12 choose wherever you go. Well, there wasn't a choice. The only thing
13 that there was was buses and trucks and a lot of scary anxious people,
14 and you had only one goal: Get away from here. And wherever they bring
15 us is okay, get us away from this territory where we were imprisoned for
16 more than three years in very bad circumstances. And they only had a
17 goal, to leave. And the not realistic question: Let us know where you
18 want to go, 25.000 people without any leadership. The Dutch Battalion
19 tied on both hands -- well, I think it's not an issue to discuss. It's
20 pure unrealistic.
21 JUDGE KWON: Ms. West, do you have the 65 ter number of the trial
22 video transcript?
23 MS. WEST: 65 --
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second --
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have it printed out, but I don't
1 have all the minute references. The Prosecution must have that, though.
2 JUDGE KWON: I'm just asking for my reference.
4 MS. WEST: 65 ter 03099.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. We can leave all of that aside. What I'm asking you now is
9 whether it is correct that only UNPROFOR and the Muslim side were
10 speaking about evacuation and asking for buses; whereas, the Serb side
11 was waiting to hear what it was that the Muslim civilians wanted and
12 they're asking to have a military representative there to agree on the
13 hand-over of weapons there. The Serbs do not mention evacuation at all.
14 Mladic is asking to see the legitimate representatives of the civilians
15 to say what it is that they want, and he says that verbatim: I want them
16 to come and to tell me what it is that they want. Mr. Karremans says
17 both "evacuation" and "buses," whereas the Serbs do not mention that;
18 right? We can see all of that in the transcript.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, that has been asked and answered.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'm not sure that
21 that's an answer.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Tell us, please, 1 minute, 28 -- actually, 1 hour, 27 minutes --
24 there is a misinterpretation, "whichever way Mladic wants it." It is
25 actually "Mandzic." Was that your understanding as well, that what was
1 said there, whatever Mandzic wanted, Mandzic being the representative of
2 the Muslims?
3 A. I don't know exactly the subject at that specific moment --
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I think it's noted in the transcript.
5 It's -- I take it that the page Mr. Karadzic was referring to is the page
6 ending with 7856, when Mr. Karremans said:
7 "I presume that is something what Mr. Mladic can tell in terms of
8 where ..."
9 But the transcript indicates that he was pointing at
10 Nesib Mandzic, not Mladic.
11 Is that what you have in mind, Mr. Karadzic?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. And do you agree -- you said, actually, in line 47 that Mladic
15 asked for buses; however, buses are mentioned by Colonel Karremans, he's
16 asking for them.
17 A. Again, I don't know exactly how it is, but in my opinion when
18 they were talking about the evacuation Mladic asked Colonel Karremans if
19 he was able to provide buses or UNPROFOR was able to provide buses. But
20 then we have to look it back. I don't know.
21 Q. Well, the participants can see in the transcript that Mladic does
22 not mention buses or transport or evacuation at all. He is asking them
23 to come and say what it is that they want; however, we don't have enough
24 time for this. Tell us now -- actually, this is not our responsibility.
25 I have to indicate to the participants at 1 hour, 35 minutes
1 approximately, it says Mladic says "whatever. You can survive, or
2 rather, stay," he corrected what he was saying, "or disappear." So the
3 word "opstati" or "ostati." So both words have to be translated but it's
4 two different words, he corrected himself.
5 Another thing, Mr. Rave, how do you distinguish between the
6 squealing of a pig when it's being caught and the squealing of a pig when
7 it's being slaughtered? Did you see this pig being slaughtered or did
8 you just hear squealing?
9 A. I just heard the squealing, and when you listen carefully to the
10 video then in advance of the squealing we can hear and that slowly fades
11 away, we can hear two or three times the squealing of a pig. And in my
12 opinion - and that's just a feeling that I have - at three or four
13 minutes in advance of the slaughtering of the pig, the pig was brought
14 into the area. We can hear it at least two or three times, and then the
15 squealing starts and fades away. And it didn't fade away, in my opinion,
16 because it was brought away, but just because, I think, its throat was
18 Q. Thank you. When your grandmother used to slaughter pigs, who did
19 she try to frighten? You said that you recognised this sound because you
20 remember your grandmother slaughtering a pig. Was she trying to
21 intimidate someone with that?
22 A. Two things. My grandmother didn't slaughter pigs. My
23 grandfather was a farmer and I heard -- and I saw the slaughtering of a
24 pig on his farm, and he didn't slaughterer to intimidate somebody, but
25 they just slaughtered a pig to feed themselves during the winter.
1 Q. Thank you. It was you who mentioned it, but I'm not going to go
2 into this any further. Only I'll say that you should know that every
3 celebration that we have ends with the suffering of a pig or a suckling
4 or a lamb. Now, did you notice then in the first sentence that
5 Mr. Karremans uttered, he is saying things as if he were acting in
6 accordance with a telegram received from Mr. Akashi a day or two before
7 that. Didn't you realise that his primary concern was the civilians and
8 did you know that Mr. Akashi, at the recommendation of the Muslim side,
9 wanted the Serbs to hold talks about evacuation?
10 A. I can't look in the mind of Mr. Akashi, of course, and I'm not
11 aware about a telegram from Mr. Akashi towards Mr. Karremans.
12 Q. But, Mr. Rave, I am concerned about your conclusions not about
13 your knowledge. This is not what Mr. Akashi thought. He put it down on
14 paper. He sent a telegram both to Mr. Annan and the Secretary-General,
15 that was on the 11th of July. We already offered this and I don't have
16 any more time. Now, what is worrying me are your conclusions to the
17 effect that everything had been planned in advance, that the trucks were
18 on stand-by, but look, as late as on the 12th of July, the Serbs say that
19 buses should be provided and we have this in 1D1971 --
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are you objecting to the speed of
22 my speech?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. So, Mr. Rave, do you accept that I have grounds to express my
1 reservations when it comes to your thoughts and your conclusions and that
2 this should be separated from what you actually know?
3 A. What I know that on the 12th of July there was a meeting at 10.00
4 in the morning in the Hotel Fontana with the civilian representatives and
5 General Mladic and Colonel Karremans. I didn't -- I wasn't in that
6 meeting. The only thing I know that around 12.00 I got the order from
7 Colonel Karremans because there was no real time schedule to go back to
8 Bratunac to ask if we could make a time schedule for buses or anything
9 else because it wasn't clear to them. When I came at that moment with
10 Mr. Boering again by the Hotel Fontana, we got in contact with
11 Major Nikolic, and he told us to go back because buses were already
13 I think that in my opinion that's the only conclusion I can make
14 and -- well, you don't have to accept it. But my conclusion is that when
15 you at 10.00 know that you have buses available, that they will be there
16 at 12.00, that you just inform the people who are involved that buses
17 will be there at 12.00. It didn't happen and I don't know why, but it
18 was prepared because buses don't show up just from out of the blue.
19 Q. But look what you said on the 11th at 2230, a meeting between
20 Mladic and representatives of the civilians, and Mladic didn't have any
21 ideas to offer or any proposals to make at that meeting. He was merely
22 being asked to secure a safe evacuation. Buses came only on the 12th at
23 10.00. Don't you think it would have been beneficial for you to know
24 that Mr. Akashi had asked for the evacuation and that Mr. Karremans, as
25 your commander, should have known that. Don't you think it would be
1 really good if you knew everything so that you could be able to draw
2 conclusions on that basis?
3 A. Yeah, of course it would be good to know everything, but in my
4 position as an NCO, as a liaison officer, I was not aware about contacts
5 between Mr. Karremans and Mr. Akashi and I was not aware that Mr. Akashi
6 asked for evacuations. So what do you expect for me to answer on this
8 JUDGE KWON: It's a waste of time, Mr. Karadzic, knowing what the
9 witness's answer will be.
10 Ms. West, how long would you need for your re-examination?
11 MS. WEST: Just a few minutes.
12 JUDGE KWON: Please conclude by ten past 4.00.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. With all due respect for your advice, I am really concerned about
16 general statements and conclusions. Therefore, Mr. Rave, I'm asking you
17 once again, wouldn't it have been better for the commander to draw
18 conclusions and similar thoughts, the one who was actually in
19 communication with Mr. Akashi rather than you yourself?
20 A. Well, you ask me and I answer you, and if you don't like my
21 statements or my conclusions, then you should ask it maybe the other way
22 around. And when you want specific answers that only the commander can
23 answer, then I think that you have it -- have to ask it to Mr. Karremans
24 and not to me.
25 Q. I'm asking you. On what basis are you drawing your conclusions
1 about the Serbs' intentions, about the pig, about the preparedness or
2 lack of preparedness, when we can see that the facts are contrary to
3 this, even the facts that were available to you?
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
5 MS. WEST: [Overlapping speakers] --
6 JUDGE KWON: -- the witness has answered to these questions.
7 Unless you have further questions, then conclude your cross-examination.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'll do my best to make
9 a right choice.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
11 Q. Do you remember the paragraphs 23 and 24 that suggest that you
12 were fully aware of the Muslim provocations? Do you remember that? And
13 also, do you remember that Major Nikolic told you that the Muslims were
14 leaving the enclaves and en route to Tuzla were committing murders and
15 setting houses on fire in the Serb villages?
16 A. Are you referring now to the date of the 12th and then the 13th,
17 when the big column broke out in the direction of Tuzla?
18 Q. No, before that. You were told on the 31st of May about that,
19 and it was Major Nikolic who told you that the Muslims were leaving the
20 enclave and that were killing Serbs and setting their villages on fire on
21 their way out. Is that what he told you?
22 A. I can't specifically tell you that this was exactly what
23 Major Nikolic told me. I can again state that Major Nikolic told us
24 several times that Muslims were leaving the enclave, were going to Serb
25 villages, setting them on fire, and killing Serbs. Our question, let us
1 inform UNMOs, let us inform UNMOs in other regions, or let even ourselves
2 go out there and check what happens over there, we were not allowed to.
3 The only thing we were able to do were go to the BiH inside the enclave
4 and tell them that those were the concerns of Major Nikolic and if it's
5 true they should stop.
6 Q. Thank you. But did you notice that Muslim civilians wanted to
7 board the empty humanitarian convoys, or rather, the trucks from empty
8 humanitarian convoys and leave the area in that way? Did you notice that
9 while you were posted there?
10 A. I did not notice it myself, but I heard the rumours that they
11 tried to, and I can imagine that when you're in a prison for more than
12 three and a half years you get -- try to get every possibility to get out
13 and one of the possibilities could be in a UNHCR convoy. But I think
14 that it's also a standard operational procedure for the UNHCR to check
15 convoys before they leave the enclave, if there are any people inside
16 their trucks, because they should return empty to the locations where
17 they came from. And I think that when UNPROFOR saw those kind of things
18 they tried to prevent it -- well, they even prevented it because of
19 course we knew what the consequences were when people were caught in
20 UNHCR convoys.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you know that as far back as in 1993 the civilians
22 of Srebrenica were requesting through General Morillon to leave
23 Srebrenica and that the Serbs were asking for the Serb prisoners to be
24 released from Tuzla?
25 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
1 Q. Do you agree that during your tour of duty, nobody came into
2 Srebrenica, everybody was fleeing Srebrenica because people wanted to go
3 out. So were the numbers increasing or decreasing?
4 A. I think the numbers were rather stable. The only decreasing was
5 when we now and then had a medical evacuation from civilians from the
6 enclave, but those were in numbers of tenths.
7 Q. What about these flights through the forest that Major Nikolic
8 informed you about, did that affect the numbers of the people living in
9 the enclave in terms of reducing them?
10 A. Major Nikolic did not inform us about fleeing from the enclave
11 through the woods. He only informed us about Muslims going out of the
12 enclave, going to civilian villages, try to burn them, and kill Serbian
13 people over there.
14 Q. This is my last question or actually one major question and two
15 additional questions. In your opinion, how many people were there,
16 irrespective of the fact whether they were civilians or soldiers in the
17 enclave, while you were there?
18 A. Well, you're asking for an opinion again. The answer is about
19 40.000 I think, and I think that that number was rather stable.
20 Q. Do you know in 1994, which was the peak time, they had 37.000 but
21 they reported to you the figure of 45.000 only to secure more
22 humanitarian relief? Did you know that on every occasion they always
23 reported between 7- or 8.000 people more than the actual number?
24 A. Well, I'm not aware of reporting numbers from inhabitants of the
25 enclave towards the Dutch Battalion. I think they reported it towards
1 the UNHCR. That was a completely different line of communication,
2 because the UNHCR took care of the supplies and not the Dutch Battalion.
3 Q. Since you were with the convoys and also the convoys who reached
4 convoy -- reached Kladanj, did you know how many people arrived in
5 Kladanj on the first and second day?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Do you know what quantities of food they allocated from the
8 humanitarian aid and gave to their army?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Rave. Please understand - and I apologise to you
11 if you maybe think that I am being attacking you. My only objective is
12 to clarify any imprecision; that's my quest. Thank you.
13 JUDGE KWON: Ms. West.
14 MS. WEST: Thank you.
15 May we have 65 ter 03099.
16 Re-examination by Ms. West:
17 Q. And that is the trial book, I'm specifically looking for page
18 7859. Thank you.
19 Mr. Rave, on page 93 of today's transcript Mr. Karadzic asked you
20 about some of the words spoken at this meeting. At 93 he said that
21 Mladic said: Whatever, you can survive, or rather, say -- he corrected
22 what he was saying or disappear or the word -- so both words have to be
23 translated, but it's two different words. He corrected himself. I'm
24 going to direct you to the transcript here, and we're looking at the top,
25 it's about third line down. I'll start with the sentence. This is when
1 Mr. Mladic is speaking directly to Mandzic, and at the beginning of this
2 paragraph when he starts speaking directly to him he says:
3 "Please write down the following," and he goes through a list.
4 And then he says:
5 "I need to have a clear position of the representatives of your
6 people on whether you want to survive ... stay or vanish."
7 Sir, at that point you had been sitting in this meeting with him
8 for, I think, over at least a half an hour, and you were present, you
9 heard the tone of his voice, you had the context of the entire
10 conversation. What did you understand that to mean, "survive ... stay or
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This calls for speculation. He's
13 asked to interpret Mladic's voice.
14 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic.
15 Yes, please proceed to answer, Mr. Rave.
16 THE WITNESS: Very well.
17 My impression was pure intimidation. The tone was that if you
18 don't co-operate, you can disappear completely.
19 MS. WEST:
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MS. WEST: May we have same document page 7846.
22 Q. And today's transcript on page 91 Mr. Karadzic says:
23 "What I'm asking you now is whether it's correct that only
24 UNPROFOR and the Muslim side were speaking about evacuation and asking
25 for buses; whereas, the Serb side was waiting to hear what it was that
1 the Muslim civilians wanted."
2 And this is the transcript of the meeting, and here we see in the
3 middle Mladic saying:
4 "Can you ask for some buses through Nicolai?"
5 And then the interpreter says:
6 "Can you order buses through Nicolai?"
7 And Karremans says:
8 "Buses? If that should be the case, then I think we can arrange
10 Sir, is this -- what's here in the transcript, is this consistent
11 of your memory of the meeting itself?
12 A. Yeah, I think this is -- what was said in the meeting, because I
13 always had the impression that General Mladic asked Mr. Karremans if he
14 was able to provide buses.
15 JUDGE KWON: Ms. West, I located that page as well, but I was
16 wondering whether buses were referred to earlier on during the meeting.
17 Could you come back to ask later on --
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
19 When everything was already agreed upon.
20 JUDGE KWON: No, whether buses were referred to --
21 MS. WEST: Yeah.
22 JUDGE KWON: -- during the meeting.
23 MS. WEST: I can ask the question.
24 JUDGE KWON: No, but we have to go through the transcript. We
25 didn't have time.
1 So do you remember that buses were referred to before this
3 THE WITNESS: No, I don't -- I -- I -- I can't say that for sure.
4 JUDGE KWON: So I'm asking you to check the transcript and to
5 come back to us.
6 MS. WEST: I will. Thank you very much.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 So you are through, Ms. West?
9 MS. WEST: Yes.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask the Chamber to ask the
11 interpreters to explain to the Chamber the similarity between "disappear"
12 and "stay because these words in our language are "opstati" and "ostati,"
13 very similar.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it is not for the witness. You can
15 deal with it in another way, so if it is -- it relates to the
17 Then unless my colleagues have questions for you, that concludes
18 your evidence, Mr. Rave. On behalf of the Tribunal and our Chamber I
19 would like to thank you for your coming to the Tribunal yet again to give
20 it and now you're free to go.
21 We'll rise all together.
22 But, Mr. Robinson, do you have something? No.
23 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE KWON: We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00 and we'll be hearing
25 the expert witness.
1 [The witness withdrew]
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.18 p.m.,
3 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 1st day of
4 December, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.