Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 22816

 1                           Thursday, 12 January 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  And good morning to you

 9     and Your Honours.  Two quick matters, Mr. President.  The first concerns

10     a matter agreed upon between the Prosecution and the Defence that relates

11     to the Defence motion -- 67th motion regarding disclosure received by the

12     Prosecution yesterday --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I wanted to be sure that microphone

14     is working.  Is everybody following Mr. Tieger's submission?  Yes.

15             Please carry on.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

17             We immediately took a look at the motion and attempted to assess

18     the time and word limit required in light of previous motions dealing

19     with the same matter but with fewer witnesses.  Our assessment is that we

20     would require 30 days from the date of receipt, that is, yesterday, and

21     an additional 17.000 words, given the number of witnesses implicated.  As

22     I mentioned, I discussed this matter with Mr. Robinson and the Defence

23     agrees that this is appropriate and we would ask the Court to grant our

24     request accordingly.

25             JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated]


Page 22817

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, that's granted.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4             And the second matter is the Court kindly granted an extension of

 5     time on the 22nd of December to address discrepancies between the

 6     Registry's assessment of the time consumed and our own internal

 7     calculations.  That was extremely useful.  We have met with the Registry.

 8     Those discrepancies have been resolved.  I imagine the Court doesn't need

 9     any further information on that, but I -- so I wanted to alert the Court

10     accordingly and indicate that the matter had been resolved.  Thank you,

11     Your Honours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for that information, Mr. Tieger.  Yes.

13     Very well.

14             Mr. Karadzic, are you ready to start your cross-examination?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

16             Good morning, Your Excellencies.  Good morning to all.

17                           WITNESS:  JOSEPH KINGORI [Resumed]

18                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

19        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Kingori.  First of all, are

20     you receiving the translation?

21        A.   Yes, Your Honour, I'm receiving it.

22        Q.   First of all I would like to thank you for meeting with the

23     Defence.  I believe that that will be helpful.  At the beginning I would

24     like to ask you, did the military observers of the United Nations have a

25     formulated assignment in writing and did they have any instructions for


Page 22818

 1     their work?

 2        A.   Yes, Your Honour, they did.

 3        Q.   Are we able to get that paper?

 4        A.   You're able to get it, Your Honour, I think through the UN

 5     system.  But even in my possession I have a piece of paper that entailed

 6     our mandate in former Sector East that I worked initially.  But for the

 7     Srebrenica, I did not take it with myself.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Are you trying to say that the assignment and the

 9     extent of the work of the observers differed from one locality to the

10     next?

11        A.   Your Honour, the general work of a military observer is the same

12     everywhere, but there were guide-lines on what to observe in different

13     areas because different areas had different things to look at.  There

14     were different issues that were to be observed.  Like, if I can give an

15     example, Sector East, where I was initially, there were no open

16     hostilities, especially involving heavy artillery, unlike Srebrenica

17     where there was heavy artillery, heavy machine-gun fire, all the time.

18     So they differed from place to place.  There's some areas which were

19     considered to be slightly softer than others.  So the issues to look at

20     in those areas differed a bit from the others.

21        Q.   Thank you.  But this common invariable standard for all military

22     observers was based, first of all, on monitoring and reporting about

23     violations of the cease-fire agreement.  Would you agree, is that

24     correct?

25        A.   That's correct, Your Honour.


Page 22819

 1        Q.   Now I would like to ask you to look at item B.  I think that in

 2     the English this is somewhere on the third page, UNMO duties.  [In

 3     English] General observer duties.  [Interpretation] I wanted to ask you

 4     something --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you have only in hard copy?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency.  I converted this

 7     to Word so that I could make electronic notes because we don't have the

 8     full Adobe Acrobat.  We only have the Acrobat Reader, so then it's easier

 9     for me to convert this file into Word.  This is another one of the

10     difficulties.  If the demands of the proceedings are so tough in

11     technological terms as well as the pace and we don't have the

12     resources --

13             JUDGE KWON:  I understood.  I want to tell you to slow down when

14     you read it.  Please carry on.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Mr. Kingori, I would like to ask you to look at item D -- item B.

18     A is background, B is UNMO duties.  What I wanted to ask you was this,

19     I'm a little bit confused because some things in the Sarajevo area that I

20     was close to seem different to me.  Are you aware that in the Sarajevo

21     area observers could not cross the line of separation, but rather, some

22     were on the Serbian and some were on the Muslim side?

23        A.   Your Honour, what I'm aware is that in the Sarajevo area there

24     was a bit of difference and not just Sarajevo.  Even Sector East we had

25     observers on both sides, but Srebrenica we had observers from just inside


Page 22820

 1     the enclave.  So issues could differ from place to place.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  You state here in the first sentence, reporting

 3     violations to the cease-fire agreement, and then you go on to refer to

 4     some activities that I was not aware of about other areas, such as

 5     bringing the parties to the table, conducting meetings.  Do you know this

 6     or do you need to have your amalgamated statement in front of you?

 7        A.   Your Honour, I know this.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Were you tasked and was this noted down with bringing

 9     the sides together, sitting down with them, and even negotiating about

10     permission to enter or exit the enclave?  Are you able to explain this,

11     please, to us?

12        A.   Your Honour, the aim of us sitting together with both sides of

13     the divide was to make sure that we bring their differences to a close,

14     we reduce their differences.  We make sure that we understand why this

15     side is differing from this other side, why they would like to continue

16     with atrocities they were committing in different areas, and then bring

17     them together so that at least there could be peace in the enclave.  The

18     aim -- a second aim was to make sure that -- and this is also given -- if

19     you look at my notes, you see somewhere I think is in the statement where

20     Colonel Vukovic was intending to meet Naser Oric and he sent us to tell

21     him that he would like to meet him at a place of his choice, meaning it

22     had reached -- it was now going towards a situation whereby the two

23     antagonists could come together and discuss issues.

24        Q.   Thank you.  I understand that this was something that you wanted

25     to do from the humanitarian perspective, but did you receive a task in


Page 22821

 1     any UN document to mediate between the parties to the conflict?

 2        A.   Your Honour, any UN mission in such an area involves a lot of

 3     mediation.  Mediation was very important and it was there in writing, you

 4     mediate between the two warring factions.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  When you say "the UN mission," I can understand that.

 6     But what did the military observers do specifically?  Did you have your

 7     own line of command and reporting that was different from the one for

 8     UNPROFOR?

 9        A.   Yes, Your Honour, we had.  Our line of reporting was very

10     different from the UNPROFOR one.

11        Q.   And did you read instructions along that same line, instructions

12     and orders?

13        A.   Yes, UNMOs had their own orders and instructions and a clear

14     mandate.

15        Q.   And was mediation a part of that mandate, mediation and an active

16     relationship with the parties to the conflict, was that something that

17     was part of the MO's duties?

18        A.   Let me bring you slightly closer to the issues which were at

19     hand.  One, I said at the beginning that UN military observers had a pen

20     and a notebook to record whatever we were discussing and also to make

21     sure that the write-up we make is as strong as possible.  The reason for

22     this was whenever you meet one side of the divide, you are to discuss

23     serious issues that they had.  Later on you go to this other side, you

24     discuss serious issues that they had.  And you are to bring these

25     together.  You are to weigh what is making them far apart, stay far


Page 22822

 1     apart, and bridge the gap between the two.  You can -- you could have

 2     done that through the normal chain of command.  If it was an issue that

 3     was slightly higher than you, you forward the same to the higher levels,

 4     so that the mediation could be done at a higher level; or if it was at

 5     the operational level, you could do it at your own level.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I don't really want to spend too much time on this

 7     question, but it's important for your statement, the amalgamated

 8     statement.  Other than the human need to help, did you actually receive

 9     such an assignment from the United Nations to actively interface with the

10     parties, to mediate between them, or was it your task just to observe and

11     to report back?

12        A.   Your Honour, we were living within -- living and acting within

13     the UN mandate.

14        Q.   And was mediation a part of that mandate as well as what you

15     described?

16        A.   Your Honour, if you followed what I've gone through right now,

17     you'd see mediation was part of it.

18        Q.   Thank you.  And when the most observers were present, was the

19     number of you six at the most?  I'm talking about the enclave.  When

20     there was the greatest number of observers present was that number six?

21        A.   Yes, Your Honour, the highest number we had was six.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I'm a little confused by the ambitious task placed

23     before the six of you.  It says in the same section that:

24             "Another role was to negotiate for permission to leave or even

25     enter the enclave on behalf of other UN agencies and NGOs.  Some


Page 22823

 1     organisations like the UNHCR, IOM [In English] and all that, could not

 2     get access sometimes unless there is an intervention by the UNMOs.  Also

 3     escort, give escort to some of those organisations so that they are not

 4     harmed on the way."

 5             [Interpretation] I am wondering that six unarmed people would

 6     have such extensive and ambitious assignments, to negotiate about

 7     permissions, to protect, to escort.  I'm afraid that such a broadly

 8     understood assignment had to have led to confusion.  Were these tasks

 9     that were given to you in keeping with the rules of service for military

10     observers?

11        A.   Your Honour, one thing to know is that these were not daily

12     activities.  They were not activities being done each and every day.

13     Like asking -- and furthermore it was -- there are things we knew so they

14     were preplanned.  Like when there were crossings or food was being

15     brought into the enclave, we would get that report from our headquarters

16     or UNHCR or whichever organisation that needed clearance to get into the

17     enclave.  And all we needed to do was to write a letter to the BSA or

18     make a call through Mr. Petar and then they will say whether they are

19     going to grant the permission or not.  It was that easy.  It didn't have

20     to take a whole day, it didn't have to take a whole week.  So -- and also

21     if I go further to the escort bit that you mentioned.  This could have

22     been coupled with our normal patrols.  We could organise that because we

23     knew when the crossing was to take place and we just send one patrol to

24     go and escort this convoy or these people.

25        Q.   An unarmed patrol; is that correct?


Page 22824

 1        A.   Unarmed in terms of guns, in terms of other weapons, but armed

 2     with a pen and a book and a bit of intelligence and a bit of negotiation

 3     skills that could enable us penetrate each and every area, even most of

 4     the time the heavily guarded ones.

 5        Q.   Mr. Kingori, I am aware that the civilian affairs department

 6     communicated with us, I'm aware of letters from them and information

 7     which they sent to me, I have plenty of them as well as the Main Staff,

 8     also the UNPROFOR.  I am aware that the UNPROFOR also had an armed escort

 9     for the convoys and that we would approve the convoys, the Main Staff as

10     well as the committee in charge of approving that would approve the

11     requests from those organisations, UN agencies, and we never received a

12     single request from the military observers that would refer to somebody

13     else other than military observers.  Where did you send requests for

14     convoys to be approved, to whom did you send them?

15        A.   Your Honour, we were sending them through the normal BSA

16     channels.  We would write to the BSA through Major Nikolic.  Whether it

17     ended up there, we did not know.  All we know is we could get clearance

18     and we could be able to escort these people in to the enclave.  Also,

19     there is the normal clearance that the convoy would ask through the BSA.

20     And at times they would be compelled to disclose what they were bringing

21     in and they write everything, whatever is inside there.  But they also

22     copy the same to us and tell us, "Please come and escort us" from a

23     certain place, which we would readily do.  At times they would request

24     the UNPROFOR, that is, the DutchBat in Srebrenica, to go and escort them.

25     So it could be either way, but for sure we used to provide these issues.


Page 22825

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And what was the task of UNPROFOR in relation to

 2     convoys if you did this?

 3        A.   Your Honour, I think that question would be better answered by

 4     UNPROFOR, because they had their own mandate, their own roles.

 5        Q.   In paragraph 9 you say that DutchBat was not duty-bound to inform

 6     you about anything.  There was no system of exchange of information, but

 7     from time to time you did exchange information.  Isn't that right?

 8        A.   Yes, Your Honour, it is right.

 9        Q.   So you could only know what the six of you had seen and what

10     DutchBat wanted you to know; right?

11        A.   That's not right.  There are so many sources of information.  If

12     you read the whole thing, you see we had so many sources of information.

13     And one of them being local information, that is, information from the

14     local people.  We could get information from DutchBat officially.  We

15     could also get information from their observation posts because we had a

16     free hand of going there to observe the situation from there.  And we

17     could get a write-up, intelligence write-up, from our headquarters,

18     gathered and maybe sent to us for further verification.  And we could

19     also get information through the BSA when we held meetings with them.

20        Q.   Thank you.  However, I would like to ask you kindly to focus on

21     what you say in paragraph 9.

22             [In English] "There was no system whereby they were or ought to

23     have told us about the military activities both inside and outside."

24             [Interpretation] This is what I'm interested in now.  Did one

25     person go out on patrol or two or three?


Page 22826

 1        A.   Your Honour, it depended on the situation, in that at times we

 2     could have more people in the enclave, at times and especially during the

 3     onslaught on the enclave we had reduced personnel, we had only two, so

 4     the number in a patrol would differ.  But normally we were to have two

 5     UNMOs and one interpreter in one patrol.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  By the way, Colonel, sir, do you have your

 7     amalgamated statement with you now?

 8             THE WITNESS:  I cannot access it right now, sir.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  How about providing him a hard copy.

10             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   I'm putting these questions because I want to deal with your

15     position on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica and the military presence

16     there in the enclave as well as the presence of weaponry.  Because your

17     views drastically differ from the views of other UN institutions, going

18     all the way up to the Secretary-General himself.  Did you know that the

19     Secretary-General had said that protected areas are armed strongholds of

20     the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

21        A.   I do not understand that, Your Honour.  Maybe you can ask it

22     differently.

23        Q.   Here comes the question.  Do you have any explanation in view of

24     the following?  How come you believe that there were no troops there, no

25     weapons, that there were no military operations undertaken by the


Page 22827

 1     28th Division of the Muslim army, whereas everybody else in the UN is

 2     saying something different?  I'm not accusing the observers.  I'm just

 3     saying that perhaps they didn't inform you about this.  Now, this is what

 4     I'm interested in:  Do you simply not know about this or do you assert

 5     that no such thing happened there?

 6        A.   Your Honour, if you're talking about the military activities in

 7     Srebrenica, one thing that is certain is that what was on the Muslim side

 8     was minimal.  Definitely there were small arms and we have reported about

 9     them, there were some -- even some machine-guns and we reported seeing

10     people armed with machine-guns.  Those reports are there.  But obviously

11     you cannot compare that kind of weaponry with what was on the BSA side.

12     This is exactly what I mean by the statement you have referred to, in

13     that the -- the BSA side had heavy artillery.  They had tanks.  They had

14     other weapons like heavy machine-guns.  They had rocket-launchers, which

15     we have all documented.  They had all the heavy weapons that any army

16     has.  They had everything.  So it's in comparison with that, that is

17     where we are saying really there was nothing much that we could see from

18     the Muslim side.  Because although they had those small arms, really they

19     could not be able to encounter the heavy weaponry that was with the other

20     side.

21             Secondly, the issue of demilitarisation.  When we went in there,

22     when I personally went in there, I found it had already been concluded,

23     it was done a lot -- much earlier.  But obviously there were some small

24     arms which were left.  That is obvious.  We -- I cannot deny that.  But

25     then the issue of having a protected area by the UN was because those who


Page 22828

 1     were inside there have already given up their arms and they need

 2     protection of the UN from attacks by the armed groups that were around

 3     them.  That was the main aim of having a UN protected area, that those

 4     who were inside, you don't have anything that can be able to attack these

 5     other people outside.  And so the people outside do not have a reason to

 6     come and bombard you in your area.  That was the main reason.

 7        Q.   Could you please focus on paragraph 15 of your statement, where

 8     you say, I'm going to read it out in English.

 9             [In English] "I was asked whether the cease-fire violations

10     included holding or keeping military units inside the enclave.  The

11     violations to the cease-fire agreement were several.  One of them was

12     that no one should be able to have arms inside the safe area, and that is

13     why all the Muslims were disarmed and all the heavy weapons and small

14     arms, machine-guns, and all that were taken to a safe place, that is, the

15     DutchBat compound.  This was happening in all other demilitarised areas,

16     not just Srebrenica."

17             [Interpretation] Do you agree that there were six protected areas

18     that had been declared by the United Nations?  Let me help you with this.

19     I'm going to enumerate them, Srebrenica, Zepa, Sarajevo, Maglaj or

20     Mostar, and then there is Bihac out there, and Tuzla.  Right?

21        A.   Yeah, but you've forgotten Gorazde.

22        Q.   And Gorazde too.  Are these protected areas?  And what about

23     paragraph 15, does it not say that Srebrenica was demilitarised and

24     unarmed and that all the others were protected areas too?

25        A.   Really what you are saying is what is written.  I don't get your


Page 22829

 1     question on the same.

 2        Q.   Are you trying to say that all six protected areas were

 3     demilitarised and disarmed?

 4        A.   Your Honour, I would request that though we are going to --

 5     though you are looking at all the other UN protected areas, we focus

 6     mainly our attention on Srebrenica because that is the point at hand.  So

 7     the other areas we can just mention them in passing and say that they

 8     were UNPAs, that is, UN protected areas, and they expected the same that

 9     was happening in Srebrenica to be happening in those other areas.

10        Q.   All right.  But you mentioned that this pattern, namely,

11     demilitarisation, surrender of weapons, seizure of weapons was the same

12     in Srebrenica and in all other six -- no, five protected zones.  So you

13     brought in the others; it wasn't me.  That is why we have to clarify

14     whether that was actually the case.

15        A.   Your Honour, I still stand by what I've said.  Let's have a

16     reference on Srebrenica.  The mention of these other areas was in that it

17     was expected to be the same all over, but obviously different areas it

18     differed.  So as far as I know, Srebrenica was not in isolation as a UN

19     protected area, and I expected all the others to have been the same.

20        Q.   Thank you for this clarification.  So that was your wish and your

21     expectation.  However, here it is presented like an assertion and you

22     have to understand the Defence, we have to see what reality was as

23     distinguished from your wishful thinking --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]


Page 22830

 1        Q.   All right.  Then let us dwell on Srebrenica only.

 2             Mr. Kingori, do you claim that Srebrenica was demilitarised and

 3     that all the weapons there had been seized?  That is what it seems to be

 4     like on the basis of this paragraph, but today you said that there were

 5     some side arms there and even machine-guns.  Or did you say that they did

 6     not have any machine-guns?

 7        A.   Your Honour, what I said is that demilitarisation had already

 8     been done in the whole enclave.  All the heavy weapons were put in

 9     Bravo Company of DutchBat, and when I went in there I was shown where

10     those heavy weapons were.  And most of the other small arms had been

11     collected and put in that same safe area.  So as far as I was concerned,

12     demilitarisation had already been done.  But I also added that you could

13     not miss a few small arms out there which had not been collected.  That

14     is normal in any area.  So that's exactly what I said and I still believe

15     that is what happened.

16        Q.   If I say, Mr. Kingori, that the Muslims themselves left their

17     documents and that they had handed over only weapons that did not work

18     and if I say to you that you said somewhere, perhaps during the

19     interview, that you as observers did not check how usable the weapons

20     that had been handed over were, what would you say to that?  I'm holding

21     Naser Oric's interview in my hands and he says:

22             "We handed over only weapons that were not in order and all the

23     rest we kept."

24             Did they deceive you successfully?

25        A.   Your Honour, what I know for sure is that the weapons were handed


Page 22831

 1     over and you could see them in the Bravo Company.  But also, we were not

 2     checking the serviceability state of those weapons.  Anyone's -- any

 3     other person's assertion that maybe only the unserviceable ones were

 4     handed over really is their own -- they are the ones who said that, not

 5     me.  What I know is that it was done under the UN watch and those weapons

 6     were given to DutchBat so that they could be able to take care of them

 7     and also ensure that nobody goes in there to pick them.

 8             In any war, for sure, propaganda, is very important.  So somebody

 9     can say, "We all have the important weapons."  After all, in war you can

10     say you have the biggest army, the best army.  That does not necessarily

11     have to translate to the actual truth.  You could have a different

12     situation on ground.

13        Q.   However, do we agree that Naser Oric was the commander of the

14     28th Division, the 28th Srebrenica Division, and that he was the number

15     one man of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Srebrenica?

16        A.   Your Honour, as mentioned in my statement somewhere is that this

17     is a person I never met, Naser Oric, but we were told was the head of the

18     Muslim establishment in the enclave.  But he's a person I never met.

19     He's a person we had scanty details about.

20        Q.   When you said that in your view the demilitarisation of

21     Srebrenica had been carried out a lot before you arrived there, are you

22     trying to say that it took place in May or the summer of 1993 when the

23     agreement on demilitarisation had been reached?

24        A.   Your Honour, I'm not trying to say that.  I'm just trying to say

25     it was done much earlier before I arrived there.  As to the dates, I


Page 22832

 1     don't know, I can't remember.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Colonel, sir, the -- can I ask the connotation of

 3     the statement that demilitarisation had already been done before you

 4     arrived there.  Does it mean that the weapons had been taken before you

 5     arrived and you didn't investigate into whether there are further weapons

 6     inside the enclave yourself?

 7             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, the demilitarisation of the whole of

 8     former Yugoslavia was done much, much earlier, and especially I think --

 9     I tend to think it was done during the peace agreement or immediately

10     after the peace agreement.  I think that was somewhere in 1993.  So

11     thereafter is when they had agreed -- after they had agreed that some

12     areas needed to be demilitarised so that they can be protected by the UN,

13     that's when the demilitarisation process was done.  But as to the dates

14     when it was done, I'm not very sure.

15             JUDGE KWON:  My point was whether the demilitarisation itself is

16     not something that should be done in a continuous or constant basis, not

17     at certain point of time.

18             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, demilitarisation was done at once.

19     But continuously, if later on you find that some people are still armed,

20     you could go in and remove those weapons from them.  But that is not the

21     main demilitarisation.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

23             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly look at D1967.

25     Could we please have that in e-court.


Page 22833

 1             [Microphone not activated]

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   I beg your pardon.  Could I please ask you to identify this.

 4     Tell us, is this a report dated the 17th of February, 1995, about

 5     received weapons at the command of the 8th Operations Group in

 6     Srebrenica?  Just look at the quantities involved, mortar shells,

 7     explosives, bullets, and so on.  Were you aware of that?  Would you have

 8     considered this to be demilitarisation?

 9        A.   Your Honour, I can see all this and for sure this does not mean

10     that demilitarisation had not been done.  This can be called re-arming,

11     but at the same time you could see the kind of equipments which are said

12     to have been brought in.  We are talking about small arms, cigarettes,

13     salt, yeah, some communication equipments, rocket-propelled guns, you

14     know, grenades, that is 7-2 rockets.  And bring your attention to the

15     fact that, yes, I can see this.  But you're just seeing the mortars which

16     are how many?  I think they are 60-millimetre mortars, mortar shells.

17             And really you can see there these are 77.9-millimetre bullets or

18     these -- they may look much to somebody who does not know how an army

19     operates, they may look much, but seriously this is nothing to wage war

20     with.  This is practically nothing.  If you compare with what we know,

21     and I know you cannot bring that up here, that was in the hands of the

22     BSA, really this is peanuts.  This is nothing.  We are talking about,

23     what, two RPG rockets, 7.62 millimetres, that's small arms.  So mortars

24     are how many, six?  Six mortars are for a section -- no, not even a

25     company.  It's a platoon.  So this cannot be compared at all with what


Page 22834

 1     the BSA had.  Even if they had double this, this cannot be compared with

 2     what the BSA had.  It's nothing.

 3             JUDGE BAIRD:  But, Mr. Kingori, tell me, you described this as

 4     re-arming, did you not?

 5             THE WITNESS:  I said it could not have been -- it does not mean

 6     that demilitarisation had not been done.  It only means that they had

 7     requested for re-arming.

 8             JUDGE BAIRD:  All right.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Bringing in some more arms.

10             JUDGE BAIRD:  But would you have been aware of this?

11             THE WITNESS:  No, Your Honour, we were not aware.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Do we agree, Mr. Kingori, that this had been submitted on the

14     17th of February and that that does not mean that that had not been there

15     already.

16             Could Mr. Kingori please be shown the second page, where we can

17     see that mortars are being requested, or rather, mortar shells for an

18     82-millimetre mortar.  And also ammunition for tanks.  If I were to tell

19     you that they had three tanks in this demilitarised protected zone, what

20     would you say to that?

21        A.   I would say I did not know if they had the three tanks at all.

22     We were not aware of that.

23        Q.   You see this here, that he's asking for 82-millimetre mortar

24     shells, 60-millimetre mortar shells, and 100-millimetre tank shells;

25     right?


Page 22835

 1        A.   Yes, I can see that, Your Honour.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have a look at 1D04730.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   We have not agreed that you were aware of the existence of the

 6     28th Division consisting of five brigades and a few independent

 7     battalions in Srebrenica.  Did you come to realise after our interview

 8     that that was true after all?  Had you known about that and had you

 9     forgotten in the meantime?

10        A.   Your Honour, I did not know of the existence of such a brigade,

11     such a heavy organisation, I was not aware about it at all.

12        Q.   To the best of your knowledge, what did the Army of Bosnia and

13     Herzegovina have in the enclave?  What kind of infrastructure, what kind

14     of structure, how many combatants, how many units?  Not the brigade.  I'm

15     talking about the division, the 28th Division, consisting of

16     five brigades, including one in Zepa.  I'm asking you about what you knew

17     and about what -- and on the basis of what you drew conclusions about the

18     conduct of both sides.

19             To the best of your knowledge, what did the Army of Bosnia and

20     Herzegovina have in Srebrenica?

21        A.   Your Honour, all we knew about the BiH was that they had --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, are you hearing the answer of the

23     witness?

24             THE WITNESS:  -- is that they had some structures which we cannot

25     call organisations as such, because at least we knew there was a Chief of


Page 22836

 1     Staff, who was Ramiz Becirovic, and that there was a military leader that

 2     was called Naser Oric, who we never met during our stay in Srebrenica.

 3     But about how they were organised, we did not know, because for sure a

 4     division -- you cannot have somebody in charge of a division that could

 5     not be seen.  By that I mean the -- the 28th Division that is always

 6     talked about could have been there in existence or on paper as a

 7     division, but in reality you could not have had a division in such an

 8     enclave as Srebrenica.  You could not have had in any ordinary or

 9     conventional military, you cannot have that.

10             And I will draw your attention, Your Honours, to the fact that a

11     division is broken down to various organisations in that in a military we

12     start with a section which is composed of nine people.  That is a

13     section.  It is the first fighting unit, the smallest fighting unit.

14     Three sections form a platoon.  Three platoons form a company.  And three

15     companies ordinarily form a unit.  We are talking about a unit now has

16     got about 1.000 people.  It's not just the personnel, but that is the

17     point I would like you to note.  Sorry, Your Honour.  It's not just the

18     personnel but the accompanying weaponry, in that a section just has small

19     arms.  If you go to a platoon, they start getting a mortar, one mortar.

20     It goes on like that until you get heavy-support weapons.  And that could

21     not be seen in the enclave.  There was not such a structure.

22             Even if, as he says, there could have been a tank, two, or three,

23     that is actually to support what, a division?  A division is supposed to

24     have two tank battalions.  It's supposed to be supported by two tank

25     battalions.  It was not there.  You could not see that.  Even if you are


Page 22837

 1     talking about a whole division, a whole division is the next to an army,

 2     it is not easy to hold such a big number of personnel in such a small

 3     enclave.  Secondly, hold those heavy weapons without being seen, all of

 4     them in such an enclave, very small area.  Your Honour, it's practically

 5     impossible, practically impossible.

 6             Thirdly, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that for

 7     such a military to continue, there has got to be training, continuous

 8     training, which is not evident anywhere.  During our -- it was not

 9     evident during our stay in Srebrenica, nor is it noted anywhere that I

10     know of the continuous training.  It was not there.

11             So what I'm trying to drive at is the division could have been

12     there in writing, but in reality on ground there was nothing to show that

13     there was such a division in Srebrenica, and in fact it could not have

14     been there as a division with the personnel and the heavy weaponry.  It's

15     not possible, Your Honour.

16        Q.   Mr. Kingori, let us distinguish between two things.  First you

17     said you didn't see it and you don't know it, and then you say it did not

18     exist.  What exactly is your position, you didn't know about it, although

19     it may have existed, or it did not exist at all?  Is it one or the other?

20        A.   Your Honour, my answer remains the same, that the division -- we

21     did not see the division, though we knew there was a Chief of Staff to a

22     division.  But in reality there was no division as such.  Secondly, even

23     if it could have been there, there was no evidence to it being there on

24     ground.  As a military person, really there was nothing to show for a

25     division in that place.  And like what we had on the BSA side, you could


Page 22838

 1     see the kind of weaponry they had.  Their structures that they had is

 2     quite different.

 3        Q.   Is this opinion of yours shared by the other five military

 4     observers?

 5        A.   Your Honour, as a senior military officer, I knew that is how it

 6     was and I believe the other observers that we had shared the same thing.

 7        Q.   Did the Dutch Battalion have the same view as the one you just

 8     expressed?  Did they share your position?

 9        A.   Your Honour, the view of DutchBat I may be unable to talk about

10     because they had their own way of operating.  But one thing I know for

11     sure is that they could not see a division, a whole infantry division,

12     operating inside Srebrenica.  They could not have seen that other than

13     maybe in words, somebody saying or whatever, but not an infantry division

14     in Srebrenica.  I'm sure they could not have seen that.

15        Q.   Could you then explain this to us.  If you did not inform the

16     Secretary-General that Srebrenica is a military stronghold of the

17     BH army, if the Dutch Battalion did not do that or the Canadian Battalion

18     before them, then who deceived the Secretary-General and led him to

19     inform the Security Council that the protected areas --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic --

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   -- were strongholds of the BH army?

23             JUDGE KWON:  -- it's not for the witness to answer that question.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, then.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]


Page 22839

 1        Q.   Look at the document you see on the screen.  Do you see this is

 2     the 2nd of June, 1995, when you were there.  Look at all the things that

 3     have to be distributed in terms of military assets.  Ammunition, 5500,

 4     350 for an old rifle, grenades to the 280th Brigade, 281st, 282nd, 283rd,

 5     284th, and 280th Mountain Battalion.  The Zepa Brigade is not mentioned

 6     here.  Then on the next page you can see a staff unit, et cetera, a huge

 7     amount of ammunition.

 8             How come a brigade that does not exist uses so much ammunition?

 9     And this is a request for June 1995.  It's obvious that they had used up

10     what they had before.  How does this tally with your reporting as a

11     military observer that there was nothing there?

12        A.   Your Honour --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to see the whole document?

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Who issued it?  It's on the next page.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   This is a certification that this is authentic -- oh, yes, you

18     are right, you can see at the top, Semsudin Salihovic, Semso.  In the

19     original there is a stamp, the command of the 28th Division.

20        A.   Now, Your Honour -- yeah, I can see this.  Maybe you can take me

21     back to the second page.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.  Your Honour, you can see -- I can see all

24     this.  I can see the type of weaponry being requested, or rather, they're

25     saying they have provided.  And you can see some bullets,


Page 22840

 1     7.62-millimetres, 60-millimetres, rocket-launchers.  Yeah, I can see all

 2     this.  And I would draw your attention to the fact that this is what was

 3     said to have been provided for the BiH in the enclave.  If that is what

 4     was provided, really I cannot deny that.  All I know is that I did not

 5     know about the existence of this or the supply of this kind of weaponry,

 6     but also if you look at the kind of weaponry that is being provided,

 7     really it's not much.  The heaviest is a 60-millimetre hand-held

 8     rocket-launcher, which are two.  Yeah.  There's another one, that makes

 9     them three.

10             So if you look at all the others, about 80 per cent we are

11     talking about, the small arms bullets, that is 7.62, 7.9-millimetre

12     bullet, which are small arms.  So we are talking about small -- a small

13     arms.  Majority of this is for small arms.  That is what can be seen.

14     But the only medium weapon is the 60-millimetre mortar, that is the only

15     thing that can be seen here.

16             One other thing to note is that there is no heavy weaponry.

17     There are no artillery shells.  I cannot see any artillery shells.  So in

18     essence, this is not for heavy weaponry.  It's not for heavy artillery at

19     all.  So this still confirms of what I had said earlier, that it could

20     have been said there was a division inside there, but as for the support

21     arms, really it's not there, even with all this.  There's no evidence of

22     an infantry division in the enclave.  It could have been there in

23     writing, it could have been there, even in a few -- a few personnel could

24     have been there.  They could have called themselves whatever.  But

25     really, there is no evidence of such an existence.


Page 22841

 1             And obviously the point to note here is that this resupply, this

 2     resupply, because I can call it resupply because they're being told, We

 3     are sending you this, it essentially means they had reached a point

 4     whereby they needed to support their people.  I mean, this could have

 5     been coming from outside the enclave.  That's what I believe because

 6     they're saying, We are sending you this.  It could not have been coming

 7     from inside the enclave.  I don't believe it was coming from inside the

 8     enclave, but if that is what happened I would say I was not privy to this

 9     information but draw your attention to the fact that this is a resupply

10     to or of small arms, not of the heavy weaponry.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Colonel, could you expand on what you said, i.e.,

12     this:  "... they had reached a point whereby they needed to support their

13     people."

14             What did you mean, sir?

15             THE WITNESS:  By this, Your Honour, I mean the logistics person

16     who has signed this, who is calling himself brigadier something, I saw it

17     at the signature block, really wanted to resupply or to rearm the people

18     inside the enclave.  And to me what that means is that this could not

19     have been coming from inside the enclave.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22             JUDGE BAIRD:  One second.

23             Could it also mean, Colonel, that they would have had arms and

24     ammunition before and they're now seeking additional or a resupply of

25     those arms and ammunition?


Page 22842

 1             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, what this means is that whoever is

 2     sending this knows that whatever is inside there, meaning there must have

 3     been something.  And that is why, and it is in our reports, we could see

 4     there was small arms fire from time to time, meaning they were expending

 5     whatever they had.  So they had to be resupplied.  All this is in our

 6     reports.

 7             It's not that the whole place had no gun at all and I've said

 8     that earlier.  They had small arms.  They were firing -- in fact, normal

 9     firing in Srebrenica.  It was a normal thing.  If you stay for one night,

10     two nights without any small arms fire, you feel that there is something

11     which is not very right, in quotes.  But what I mean here is whoever is

12     trying to send this feels that the people inside there do not have enough

13     and that is why they had to be supplied with this, meaning that the

14     supply is not coming from within, it's not coming from inside the

15     enclave.  It's coming from somewhere outside.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Mr. Kingori, this says clearly that this comes from the staff of

18     the 28th Division.  Semsudin Salihovic, on the authorisation of

19     Commander Oric, who is temporarily absent, ordered that these four

20     brigades and these battalions be given from the depot a replenishment of

21     combat sets for all these weapons.  This came a long time ago illegally

22     to their depot and is being distributed from the depot.  Doesn't this say

23     clearly that there are four brigades to which this ammunition is

24     allocated?  And I would appreciate yes or no answers whenever possible

25     because we don't have enough time.


Page 22843

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the witness answered that question.

 2     Let's move on.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Mr. Kingori, can we agree that a demilitarised protected area

 6     must not and should not contain any armed units except police with small

 7     weapons, side arms.

 8        A.   Your Honour, a demilitarised area ideally should have no weaponry

 9     at all, no weapons at all.  But you find in this case - and we documented

10     that - we could see some people who were armed moving about in the

11     enclave, we could see that, and we could report on the same so that

12     something could be done about it.  And at one time the DutchBat also

13     noted that and told a meeting that we had with the Chief of Staff,

14     Ramiz Becirovic, to make sure that the people hand over their weapons.

15     He asked them, "Why are your soldiers still moving about with weapons?"

16     Because ideally they're not supposed to be armed at all.

17             But I said and I may be forced to repeat this, that though they

18     were disarmed, the disarmament had already been done, demilitarisation

19     had already been done, you could find a few people with arms.  That was

20     evident and we were reporting on the same.  But that does not mean that

21     the whole enclave was militarised because obviously it could have

22     presented a very different scenario if the whole enclave was allowed to

23     have proper militarisation, the way it was before the demilitarisation

24     was done.

25        Q.   Mr. Kingori, are you aware that the State Security Service of


Page 22844

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina reported on the 17th or 18th of July from Tuzla that

 2     10.000 fighting men of the 28th Division made a breakout, a military

 3     armed breakout, through the Serb territory?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  You would like to see the reference?

 5             MS. WEST:  Yes.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will show it after the break,

 7     Your Excellency.  I just want to know if Mr. Kingori was aware that in

 8     addition to those captured and those dead, 10.000 fighting men made it

 9     alive to Tuzla.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Or you didn't know that?

12        A.   Your Honour, I do not know -- I do not know how many made it to

13     Tuzla -- in fact, up to now I don't have that figure.  And also hasten to

14     add when you say "fighting men," it may be ordinary people with arms not

15     necessarily soldiers.  So maybe you can show us the qualification,

16     whether they were actually soldiers or just people carrying arms.

17        Q.   What distinction do you make between a person carrying and using

18     a weapon and a soldier?  Don't both kill equally?

19        A.   Your Honour, we may not have dwell on this, but for sure anybody

20     with a gun can kill, anybody with a gun is dangerous, but obviously we

21     know there's more to handling a weapon than just holding it.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Were you informed, Mr. Kingori, that those people

23     whom you called armed non-soldiers had killed over 3.000 Serbs around

24     Srebrenica and that, day and night, all the time, they went out into Serb

25     territory and killed.  And 2.000 of them got killed in Serb territory


Page 22845

 1     before July 1995, not in Srebrenica but in Serb territory.

 2        A.   Your Honour, what I can say for sure is that when we used to hold

 3     meetings with the BSA, we could hear some complaints about the Serb --

 4     the Muslims having crossed through the Serb territory to and from Zepa to

 5     bring goods.  And at times they would be attacked, they would be injured.

 6     We could also hear of some Muslims attacking some BSA, but we never heard

 7     about any BSA having been killed by the Muslims at all.  We were never

 8     informed of any BSA soldiers who had been killed by the Muslims at all in

 9     all the meetings that we held with the BSA.  But on the other hand, we

10     could be told by the Muslims of several number of their people having

11     been killed by the BSA.  So by that I mean there was killing of the

12     Muslims by the BSA and not vice versa.  But of course, you cannot

13     discount one or two anywhere, but we never documented anything like that.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Excellent.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this previous document be

16     admitted before I call another one before the break?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit 1D4730.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1993, Your Honours.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   During the interview, and I believe earlier today, you implied

21     that you were not aware of various military staffs and the military

22     infrastructure in Srebrenica itself.  If the soldiers could have been

23     around the periphery and in their own homes and you were unable to see

24     them, do you still stand by your assertion there were no military staffs

25     in Srebrenica itself?


Page 22846

 1        A.   Your Honour, I still do in that.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D4769.  I believe this

 3     should be 1994 because we had 1993 yesterday.  The previous should have a

 4     higher number, a higher exhibit number, 1994, but perhaps I'm mistaken.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Have a look, Mr. Kingori.  This is dated 22nd February 1995.  The

 7     National Defence Secretariat Tuzla, a branch of the Ministry of Defence,

 8     replies enumerating all the assets they have.  The command of the

 9     8th Operations Group is located in the Lovac feature in old town,

10     Stari Grad.  And they also have a total area of 198 square metres.  The

11     old staff of the Territorial Defence of Srebrenica is used by the command

12     of the place.  Total area, et cetera, et cetera.  For every brigade,

13     280th Brigade is located in a family house of Meho Hrvacic.  The 281st is

14     placed in a family house owned by Hajro Dautbasic -- no, that's all one

15     brigade.  And then are listed 281st, 282nd, 283rd --

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   -- 284th Brigade.  They have all the command posts, they have

19     staff headquarters, they have staff units, they have an independent

20     7th Mountain Battalion.  Srebrenica is crawling with troops and military

21     infrastructure and you are saying that was not so.  And the

22     Dutch Battalion is aware of this, but the military observers are not.

23        A.   Your Honour, I look at the whole of this list and draw you back

24     to what I said earlier, that you really cannot have a brigade being

25     housed in a house, in one house, the way you have seen house belonging to


Page 22847

 1     a certain lady here that is holding a brigade.  Really, a brigade

 2     comprises of 3 -- minimum --

 3        Q.   Not brigade, sir --

 4        A.   Your Honour, I -- there is somewhere where a brigade headquarters

 5     is given as a house.  And for your information, a brigade cannot be

 6     housed in such a place.  It is difficult.  It's impossible.  A brigade

 7     has got three infantry units, and a whole unit, actually, can occupy the

 8     whole of Srebrenica in normal circumstances.  In fact, Srebrenica was

 9     just a village.  That should have been actually for a company, not more

10     than a company.  Then you look at the heavy weapons that support a

11     brigade.  So even if we look at all this written down, it looks very

12     nice, house Podgaj used by - that is number 5 - by the 3rd LPC owned by

13     Ibrahim whoever.  You can see even the area, 55 square metres.  That is

14     very small area.  It's not even for --

15             JUDGE KWON:  That purpose was army kitchen, it says.

16             THE WITNESS:  What, Your Honour?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Does it not say that house was used as a kitchen,

18     number 5?

19             THE WITNESS:  Yes, it's --

20             JUDGE KWON:  It does not say that it holds a whole company or

21     unit.

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes, but for 55 -- I'm looking at the 55 square

23     metres even for a kitchen for even a brigade or even a company.  Later

24     on -- even if it is a platoon, a platoon cannot be -- you cannot have a

25     kitchen for a platoon in such a small area.  The attention I'm trying to


Page 22848

 1     bring in here is that it -- you can say that -- it can be said that this

 2     is what they had.  That is fine.  But in reality, this is not easy to

 3     hold.  You cannot have a brigade -- a whole brigade, a whole division in

 4     such a small area being scattered in these small, small houses.  Where is

 5     even the control and command?

 6             In these small, small houses, if one is put here, the other one

 7     is put there, the other one is put in another place, it cannot work.  It

 8     cannot work.  Hence my earlier assertion that this could have just been

 9     on paper or an assumption, fine.  You could have had a few soldiers.  I'm

10     not denying that.  The soldiers were there, a few soldiers were there.

11     We had -- they even had the small arms, fine.  But really, you cannot

12     have a whole division distributed like this in such a small enclave.  It

13     really cannot work, and I don't believe it could have been the same even

14     on the BSA side.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Mr. Kingori, please.  You as a military observer were supposed to

17     determine that that army is not properly in barracks.  The troops live at

18     home and when they are on the defence line then food is prepared for them

19     in the kitchen.  This does not say that these houses were barracks for

20     the whole brigade or battalion.  They were just staff headquarters

21     housing commanders and their staff.  You see, for instance, the

22     282nd Brigade was in a hotel, hotel called Domavija and so on.  So let's

23     not create a confusion.

24             If you draw your conclusions thinking of a professional army

25     living in barracks, then it's something different.  But here we are


Page 22849

 1     dealing with soldiers who live in their homes, not in barracks, and they

 2     take shifts going to the front line or into various operations, carrying

 3     out missions.  Wasn't it your duty to know what kind of army you're

 4     dealing with?

 5        A.   Your Honour, I knew the kind of army.  I knew the kind of

 6     military disposition that was in that area, and not just me, all the

 7     military observers that were there.  But for sure the kind of military

 8     people that we had there, the BiH side really were not, and I still

 9     maintain, an army that you could have called a conventional army.  It

10     does not matter whether the army is staying -- is going for patrols and

11     coming back and just being cooked for in a certain house or whatever.

12     There are procedures even in war that are followed.  There are ways that

13     you must -- you can show that here we have a military organisation and

14     you have seen that even in other wars.  Even when we had the Afghanistan

15     issue, when we had the Iraq issue, we could see that this is a military

16     organisation in certain place.  There are certain procedures, minimum

17     issues that have got to be observed.  But when you look at the

18     dispensation that we are getting here, this is quite a disorganised

19     military, if it was a military at all.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We will --

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document.

22             JUDGE KWON:  -- admit this document as Exhibit D1994.  We will

23     take a break for half an hour after which I expect you to move on to your

24     next topic.  We'll resume at five past --

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I would like you just to


Page 22850

 1     consider giving me more time because Mr. Kingori is giving quite detailed

 2     answers which, of course, can be useful to us but it will leave many

 3     topics uncovered.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just concentrate on important issues and be focused.

 5             We'll resume at five past.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. West.

 9             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.  May we go into private

10     session.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Shall we move into private session briefly.

12                           [Private session]

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23                           [Open session]

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for that information.

25             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.


Page 22851

 1             THE ACCUSED:  Please may I ask just for indulgence for a few

 2     minutes -- few seconds.

 3                           [Defence counsel confer]

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Mr. Kingori, did you know how much of the humanitarian aid food

 6     was going to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Srebrenica, to the

 7     28th Division?

 8        A.   Your Honour, I did not know of anything like that.

 9        Q.   It seems that this has not been uploaded into e-court, but it

10     does have a 1D number.  Perhaps this can then wait for a little bit.

11             You were already asked about this, Mr. Kingori.  Do you know that

12     the 28th Division intending to help the Muslim offensive in Sarajevo

13     which began on the 15th of June, 1995, that they conducted quite powerful

14     assault activities around Srebrenica in order to tie-up and prevent the

15     Serbian army from going to the aid of Sarajevo.

16        A.   Your Honour, I'm not aware of that.

17        Q.   Speaking about the things that you were able to do, you agreed

18     that you did not have access to an entire quadrant, an entire sector, of

19     the Srebrenica zone, the so-called Bandera Triangle.  Is that correct?

20        A.   That's correct.

21        Q.   During the interview you described to us that you would be

22     stopped by armed men.  Do you know that in the same way the armed

23     soldiers of DutchBat were stopped?

24        A.   Yes, Your Honour, I'm aware of that and it is on record.

25        Q.   If we're talking about tanks, then you don't know -- actually,


Page 22852

 1     it's possible that they could have had three tanks in the

 2     Bandera Triangle without you knowing that.  Isn't that correct?

 3        A.   For sure.  It was very easy for me to not know.  But at the same

 4     time, such information could have sort of filtered to our direction and

 5     we could have known if the tanks were there.  But for sure there is a

 6     possibility they could have been there without our knowledge.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  This is all that I would like to establish,

 8     Mr. Kingori, whether there was something that you were not able to report

 9     on because you didn't have access to the information or didn't know it.

10     This is what I would like to establish.  This is what I would like to

11     establish.

12             And now the attacks from the enclave in the second half of June

13     were so intense so that the Serbs had a lot of casualties around

14     Srebrenica.  For example, the Serbian village of Visnjica was burned and

15     civilians there were killed on the 26th of June.

16        A.   Your Honour, if I start with the issue of us not getting access

17     to some information, for sure like Bandera Triangle we could not be able

18     to access, there was a restriction of movement, which we complained

19     about.  And for the casualties you are talking about of Serbs, I may not

20     be aware of that.  There is -- that of Serbian village of Visnjica,

21     so ...

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D04780.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

25             Did you complete your answer, Colonel?  I noted that you were


Page 22853

 1     waiting for the consultation between Mr. Karadzic and his legal advisor

 2     be completed.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour, that is what I was waiting for.

 4     But for sure I think the answer is complete.  We can continue, sir.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             Can we have 1D04780, please.  There should be a translation.

 8     Perhaps there isn't one.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   In that case I will read the document to you.  This is a document

11     from the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the 27th

12     of June.  If you can look at the section for 9.45, where it says:

13             "In the morning on the 26th of June, 1995, our forces from the

14     Srebrenica sector attacked and torched the village of Visnjica.  The

15     Chetniks did have casualties among the civilian population."

16             And then for 9.48 it states:

17             "The Chetniks have information about the infiltration of a number

18     of our groups from Zepa moving towards Kladanj and are taking all

19     available measures for combat in such conditions, and all the units in

20     the -- in that sector have been alerted to the first degree of

21     combat-readiness."

22             So this is a little bit outside of your sector where a fierce war

23     is waging in which the Muslims are attacking and the Serbs are defending

24     their territory.  This is on the evening of the 26th of June.  Is that

25     correct, Mr. Kingori?


Page 22854

 1        A.   Your Honour, I can see -- I have listened to what you have said

 2     and, for sure, this never appeared in any of the meetings that we held

 3     with the BSA who could have, in normal circumstances, complained about

 4     such an issue.  So we were not -- it was not brought to our attention at

 5     all.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this.  We

 8     can mark it for identification and then we will ...

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Mr. Kingori, did you know that David Harland reported about the

11     casualties among the civilians and that the UN and other organisations

12     were informed about it and they did have that information?

13        A.   For sure we did not get this information and my worry is why even

14     on the BSA side there were no complaints lodged with us on this issue if

15     it ever happened, because normally they would tell us to complain to the

16     BiH that they did this and that.  And on this occasion there was no such

17     a complaint from them.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West, do you have any objection to the admission

19     of this document, separate from marking it for identification?

20             MS. WEST:  I don't.

21             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D1995, Your Honours.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now ask to have P2284,

24     please, and it would be paragraph 225.  So this is a Prosecution exhibit,

25     2284, and in the document it would be paragraph 225.  Paragraph 225 in


Page 22855

 1     the document.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   This is a report by the UN Secretary-General; is that correct?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we zoom in on paragraph 225,

 5     please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   It states here, I don't have to read it:

 8             [In English] "... a raiding party of Bosniaks under the

 9     leadership of Zulfo Tursunovic attacked the Serb village of Visnjica,

10     5 kilometres west of the western edge of the Srebrenica enclave.  During

11     the attack in the early morning of 26th of June, several houses were

12     burned, and either two people were killed, according to Bosniak sources,

13     or four, according to Serb sources.  (Approximately 100 sheep were also

14     stolen and taken back to Srebrenica, where they were subsequently

15     eaten)."

16             [Interpretation] So the United Nations knew about that.  And you

17     can look further down.

18             [In English] "... the attack, although relatively minor in

19     comparison to the Serb attacks which preceded it, led to strong Serb

20     condemnations.  Serb army spokesman Milutinovic stated that it was the

21     job of UNPROFOR to prevent such operations, and that the attack therefore

22     demonstrated that 'the United Nations forces are aligning themselves with

23     the Muslim army.'  General Mladic stated to UNPROFOR that Bosniak attacks

24     from Srebrenica 'brutally violate the status of the safe area of

25     Srebrenica.  Due to that fact, I strongly protest and warn you that we


Page 22856

 1     will not tolerate such cases in the future.'  Mladic failed to mention

 2     what UNPROFOR [sic] had reported to United Nations ..." and so on.

 3             [Interpretation] When you speak about your information and when

 4     you talk about protests from the Serbian side, did the Army of

 5     Republika Srpska submit their protests to the observers or to UNPROFOR?

 6     And this is where we come to the question of what exactly your mandate

 7     was.

 8        A.   Your Honour, the protest could have gone to any of the

 9     UN agencies there.  In fact, the Bosnian Serbs should have complained to

10     us, but if they complained to UNPROFOR, that is, the DutchBat which was

11     there in that particular moment, there was nothing wrong with that, only

12     that it was not brought to our attention.  But provided they have

13     complained to any UN agency, I don't think there was anything wrong with

14     that.  And for us not knowing about it, there are also some things we

15     knew that UNPROFOR did not know.  So these things used to happen.

16             JUDGE BAIRD:  But, Colonel, what I am having a bit of problem in

17     grasping is this:  You weren't aware of this situation at all, you say.

18     Did you not say so?

19             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I was not aware about it.

20             JUDGE BAIRD:  Now, here we have the report of the

21     Secretary-General referring to this situation.  Are you in a position at

22     all to explain to us this severe disconnect between your -- you and the

23     Secretary-General, between UNMO and the S-G?

24             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, the UN systems have got different ways

25     of getting information.  They have different ways.  They could have


Page 22857

 1     gotten information through us, that is, the UNMOs; they could have gotten

 2     information through UNPROFOR; there were other aid agencies like UNHCR,

 3     IOM, and other agencies who could have channelled such information

 4     without necessarily referring to us.  So the UN system had different ways

 5     of getting information.  So they could have gotten it through any other

 6     channel.

 7             JUDGE BAIRD:  Yes, Dr. Karadzic.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Mr. Kingori, this is what is causing my concern.  In your

11     statement there are some assertions, even detailed descriptions of

12     certain situations, the position of the Army of Republika Srpska and so

13     on and so forth.  However, all this was drafted with a major lack of

14     information on your part.  There is confusion between how we viewed the

15     MOs and how you viewed them.  I claim that the military observers were

16     not the party to whom we submitted our protests nor did we expect

17     six unarmed persons to intervene.  According to our understanding, you

18     were passive observers who were reporting back to the United Nations,

19     nothing more than that.  But you understood your role differently and

20     it's evident actually that a lot of information bypassed you.  Isn't that

21     correct?

22        A.   Your Honour, it's not correct at all.  For one, the military

23     observers were the ears and eyes of the UN on the ground, and especially

24     on issues to do with military activities inside the enclave.  But as I

25     said, the UN had different systems of getting information.  Some of this


Page 22858

 1     information could have been sent back again to us for verification or for

 2     confirmation.  But if not, definitely there were areas through which the

 3     UN could get and verify such information.

 4             As military observers our role was very distinct and we did it to

 5     the best of our ability, given the circumstances.  And you cannot

 6     correctly say that us being six could have limited our capabilities,

 7     could have diminished our capabilities.  What I know is that six unarmed

 8     military observers was a normal force deployed in any sector, in any

 9     team.  That was the normal composition in a team.  And definitely you

10     don't want us to believe that the UN did not know what they were doing.

11     With six military observers, two who could form a patrol, we had at least

12     two operational patrols that could be sent out at any given time.  Of

13     course the other two could be left manning the area and doing normal

14     domestics.  But then with two patrols you could be able to penetrate each

15     and every area of the enclave as part of the plan that we had.  It was

16     not every day that we had to patrol.  There were scheduled meetings with

17     both sides, both the BSA and the BiH, which we had to go for.  And this

18     is where we were exchanging information with either side.  That is, like

19     this issue, the BSA should have brought it in one of the scheduled

20     meetings, which they did not bring up at that particular time.

21             So you cannot just say that the UN -- there was a disconnect

22     because the UN has written about the -- the UN Secretary-General has

23     written about this and General Mladic has written about it, but at the

24     same time failed to recognise that even the BSA -- the local BSA command

25     should have complained about it to us and they did not.


Page 22859

 1        Q.   Mr. Kingori, can -- well, we can agree that you were the ears and

 2     the eyes of the United Nations.  But you also have this idea that you

 3     were also its legs and arms and that your task was action.  However, the

 4     Army of Republika Srpska did not receive nor did it send its protests to

 5     you.  They were sent to someone else.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please look at 1D04786.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   You can see that this was sent regularly but not to you.  It was

 9     addressed to the UNPROFOR.  What I'm concerned about now is how to view

10     and what to do with your assertions stated in 200-plus paragraphs,

11     stating that you were denied a lot of information or that you were not

12     even supposed to have this information because of the nature of your

13     mandate.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There should be a translation of

15     this.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Mr. Kingori, can you please look to the UNPROFOR in the enclave

18     Srebrenica.  When you speak about the UN, I agree.  But you're talking

19     from the position of a military observer, not from the position of the

20     United Nations.  And you can see this protest by General Zivanovic of the

21     20th of March, 1995, about the behaviour of Muslim formations which could

22     not be tolerated.  Did you know about this?  You were there already at

23     the time.

24        A.   Your Honour, I will start with the first question on why this was

25     sent to the UNPROFOR and reiterate that their mandate was slightly


Page 22860

 1     different from ours and you know that and I've already said that before,

 2     in that they were armed and they could enforce peace in that particular

 3     area.  We were not there to enforce peace but to observe.  That is where

 4     some of these issues like where he has said:  "... we cannot tolerate

 5     Muslim formations obstinately leaving the enclave and attacking areas out

 6     of the enclave borders," and said that something should be done.  Really,

 7     the UNPROFOR had the arms to do that.  We did not have the arms to do

 8     that and we were not expected to do that because that was not part of our

 9     mandate.  Ours was to write about these incidents when they occurred and

10     send them to the UN headquarters through the normal channels.  But for

11     this, obviously we were not expected to enforce.

12        Q.   Sir, again we come to the question of the mandate, the

13     assignment.  How was your task defined, in what document?  Because here

14     the Army of Republika Srpska has intensive memorandums and contacts with

15     UNPROFOR.  The observers are the eyes and ears and not the arms and legs.

16     It is not in their mandate, in the way we understand it, any

17     authorisation or was it their task to undertake any actions.  Their task

18     was just to observe and to report.  How is this different from the way in

19     which you understood your assignment?

20        A.   Your Honour, I wish the same question could have been asked to

21     Major Nikolic or Colonel Vukovic, who knew what our roles were in that

22     enclave and who used us throughout our stay in the enclave in terms of

23     giving us information on what was happening and guiding -- telling us

24     what should be done by the UN and we were reporting on the same.  And

25     also giving us a view of what they were intending to do because I wonder


Page 22861

 1     why if the observers were not important in that area, why Colonel Vukovic

 2     could tell us of what they were planning to do.  Like when they were

 3     planning to take over the enclave, he told us in his own record.  Why

 4     would he tell us that if he thought the UNMOs had no purpose in that

 5     area?

 6             Really, we had our own mission and we did it to the best of our

 7     ability.  But when it comes to armed issues, there was -- the UNPROFOR

 8     could have -- maybe the BSA felt they were the ones who could deal with

 9     it so they channelled it, according to them, to the right people who

10     could do that.  But that does not mean we had no mandate -- we had no

11     clear mandate.  We had ours, and we were doing it to the best of our

12     ability.

13        Q.   I'm afraid that there's a lack of understanding here, but let us

14     leave this aside.  We'll have to find a document of the United Nations

15     that defined your work.  Mr. Kingori, as you said to us during the

16     interview, you met with local officers of the Serb army and you

17     socialised with them.  Sometimes you would have a cup of coffee with them

18     or something else and you also had some meetings.  Did anyone keep

19     minutes at these meetings when they informed you about what you told us?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, Excellency,

21     this document?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1996, Your Honours.

24             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, the meetings that we had with

25     Major Nikolic or Colonel Vukovic were all minuted and we sent the minutes


Page 22862

 1     of what we discussed to the UNMO headquarters any time we held meetings

 2     with them.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   On your side who was it that kept the minutes of these meetings?

 5        A.   Your Honours, we are the ones, we were taking minutes.

 6     Whoever -- the observer who was there, one of them could take the

 7     minutes.  And later on when we got to the -- to our headquarters write

 8     them, refine them, and also -- and send them to the UNMO headquarters.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  With all due respect to you personally and to

10     Major Nikolic and Colonel Vukovic, are you the appropriate level to

11     discuss these major strategic moves?  What was it that you could decide

12     on in that respect and generally discuss, unless you just mean chatting

13     about this?

14        A.   Your Honour, that question maybe could have gone directly to

15     Colonel Vukovic because he's the one who brought it up.  Ours was to take

16     what he was telling us.  I hasten to add that later on it proved to be

17     very true.

18        Q.   Let us leave this aside, what ultimately turned out to be the

19     case, and let us leave analogies aside.  What kind of group are the three

20     of you?  That's what I'm interested in.  What is it that you can decide

21     on?  And how can you talk about such major issues -- but never mind, we

22     can ask them about that too.

23             In paragraph 20 of your amalgamated statement you say that

24     Muslims from Srebrenica went to Tuzla in order to get food.  Do you know

25     how large the Serb territory is there and how many Serb defence lines


Page 22863

 1     would have to be crossed on foot or on horseback in order to get to Tuzla

 2     and obtain food there?  Do you have any idea how far away Tuzla is from

 3     Srebrenica?

 4        A.   Your Honour, Tuzla was not very far from Srebrenica.  But

 5     obviously it depends on what you mean by "far."  What I know is that they

 6     used to go there.  They were -- there was an organised way of requesting

 7     permission through the BSA.  It was - and I've mentioned in my report - a

 8     mafia-type of operation where they would pay their way out and back to

 9     the enclave with the food and other items that they could buy from Tuzla.

10     And then they bring them back into the enclave for sale.  The -- at times

11     when they did not honour this promise of payment, they would be ambushed

12     and it's in our reports.  Certain ambushes were being done because they

13     had not delivered their bit of the promise.  But for sure, whether it was

14     far or near, they used to go there and bring goods to the enclave and we

15     have evidence of that.

16        Q.   I can believe that they brought food to the enclaves, but tell us

17     how often did that happen?

18        A.   By the way, I need to correct something that was on the issue of

19     Tuzla.  Here what I mean was not Tuzla but Zepa.  You may have to correct

20     that.  It is Zepa, not Tuzla.

21        Q.   Aha.  All right.  Those 100 sheep that are mentioned in UN

22     documents, were they brought from Zepa or Tuzla or Visnjica?  And every

23     time when they went out to the Serb villages to kill and torch, did they

24     always bring some food from there?  We know that they did that, but did

25     you know?


Page 22864

 1        A.   Your Honour, as for the hundred sheep, I don't think that

 2     question was asked in good faith because initially I had said I was not

 3     aware of that issue.  So asking me whether they were brought in, you

 4     know, I don't know that.  But anyway, it's okay.  I was not aware of that

 5     so I cannot correctly comment on that issue.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned that there was trade and food that they

 7     brought in different ways when they left the enclave.  Did you know that

 8     we made offers to them to enable commercial traffic and transportation;

 9     however, the black marketeers who profited from such exercises did not

10     allow that?

11        A.   Your Honour, you would be the best person suited to tell us that.

12     But on the mafia issue, the issue of people paying to get out and come

13     back with goods, still remains.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have document 1D4971 to

15     see what happened during May 1995 and how much humanitarian aid went to

16     the army.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you know that the rural population around Srebrenica had their

19     own households, livestock, and that they produced food for their own

20     purposes at least and perhaps they had a bit of a surplus.  Did you know

21     that they kept livestock?

22        A.   Yes, Your Honour, I do.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, there is a translation here.  Please take a look

24     at this report, Suljo Hasanovic is reporting to the Army of Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina about the following.  He says:


Page 22865

 1             "We hereby submit a list of the quantities of food, materiel, and

 2     technical equipment and fuel issued to our military units in our area for

 3     the month of May 1995.

 4             "25.900 kilogrammes of flour, 560 [as interpreted] kilogrammes of

 5     sugar, 1.423 litres of cooking oil, 619 kilogrammes of salt,

 6     5.000 kilogrammes of beans, 17.000 cold cuts ..."  Then powdered milk,

 7     fruit juice, and so on and so forth.  And then further on it says:

 8             "We wish to note that the above quantities have been separated

 9     out of the humanitarian aid contingent which arrived in the area through

10     UNHCR, while some of this food was obtained from the Dutch Battalion."

11             So, sir, Mr. Kingori, if the Army of Republika Srpska is raising

12     questions as to what is all of this food for, for Srebrenica I mean, when

13     we know that the rural population has food of their own and we know that

14     enormous amounts of food are being brought in, then we are being accused

15     of discrimination, whereas we see here that an entire division was being

16     fed here even by the Dutch Battalion.  Even the Dutch Battalion allocated

17     food for the army.

18        A.   Your Honour, this is not an issue that I would comfortably

19     comment on because as for the UNHCR food, the normal UNHCR convoys were

20     bringing food to the enclave because the people did not have enough food.

21     They were mainly dependent on food from the UNHCR.  That was the bottom

22     line.  Then on DutchBat, if they were giving any food to anybody else

23     outside, I did not know.  They never told us.  They never recorded it

24     with us.  And I don't think it was in their mandate to supply food to the

25     Muslim army.  And UNHCR, if I go back to it, I would just say that there


Page 22866

 1     were no provisions -- I don't think there were any provisions for food to

 2     be given to the Muslim army.

 3             But of course when food is brought to the enclave for the entire

 4     population of the enclave, you could not miss maybe some food here and

 5     there finding its way to the military, either directly or indirectly, in

 6     that even some of the people who are enlisted and were also civilians in

 7     another way could get the food and give that to their soldiers.  So I'm

 8     saying it is possible for the food to find its way to the military

 9     people, but there was no organised way of bringing in food through UNHCR

10     to the Muslim army.

11        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Kingori.  I'm not accusing any one of the

12     UN agencies.  I just wish to establish that accusations levelled against

13     the Army of Republika Srpska in terms of them being restrictive are

14     simply not true.  These were months when the Army of Republika Srpska

15     purportedly imposed restrictions.  But look at this, tonnes and tonnes of

16     food went to the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was attacking us,

17     killing us.  And do you think that our intelligence people did not know

18     that there was enough food there and that there was no need to feed the

19     Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and therefore these restrictions were

20     justified?  I'm not attacking anyone.  I'm just saying that these

21     accusations were false and unjustified.

22             Do you agree that if in the month of May these hundreds of tonnes

23     were being given to the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the 28th Division,

24     somebody had to eat all of this, right?  These tonnes of food, somebody

25     had to eat all of that?


Page 22867

 1             JUDGE KWON:  What question does he have to answer?  One question

 2     at a time.

 3             But in any event, can you answer the question, Colonel?  Is there

 4     any question at all?

 5             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, to me this looked like a statement

 6     that he's giving, so -- in fact, there is no answer but I can just expand

 7     on it and also seek to know if they -- there was food going to the

 8     soldiers, does it mean actually that everybody in the enclave was a

 9     soldier, so everybody got food.  So in effect, having some food going to

10     these soldiers does not mean that the enclave is full of food.  The

11     enclave was being fed by UNHCR.  That is the way we knew.  And even the

12     harvest they were making, even planting some of their foodstuff that they

13     were planting, was through assistance by UNHCR.  And obviously there is

14     no single time that we knew that the enclave was self-sufficient on food,

15     never.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Please take a look at paragraph 34 of your statement.  I'm trying

18     to put general questions and receive general answers because I do not

19     have enough time for 207 paragraphs.  So paragraph 34 you say that the

20     situation in the enclave was serious and so on and so forth in respect of

21     food.  Also you refer to weekly reports and so on and so forth.  In the

22     meantime, in the month of May, out of the food that the

23     Army of Republika Srpska is allowing to pass in order to provide it to

24     the civilian population, this ultimately ends up with the

25     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina that is waging war against us.  Did you know


Page 22868

 1     about that, and would this paragraph 34 have been different had you known

 2     about that?

 3        A.   Your Honour, we were writing about how the situation was on

 4     ground as far as we knew it.  And even now, if I were in the same

 5     circumstances, I would write the same because I knew for sure the enclave

 6     was not self-sufficient on food and we could go to some villages which

 7     had no food at all and we could write that in our reports.  And the other

 8     monitoring agency, which was UNHCR, was also writing on the same, hence

 9     the request to send more food into the enclave.  So the fact that you can

10     see this list here does not necessarily mean that there was

11     self-sufficiency of food in that enclave.  In fact, there was a

12     deficiency almost throughout.

13        Q.   Well, Mr. Kingori, there wasn't enough food because the civilian

14     population had been robbed.  The food that was intended for the civilian

15     population was sent to the army, whereas we were accused of imposing

16     restrictions.  Were we duty-bound to let the people feed the army --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I think we heard the answer to that

18     question from the witness.  Please move on.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1997, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D4972, please.

23             Excellencies, I should be spending an equal amount of time in

24     dealing with each and every paragraph of this statement if I am to

25     challenge all of this.


Page 22869

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic --

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber has to decide on

 3     all of this so I do need time.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  -- we never cut off you from your cross-examination

 5     as long as you stick to relevant and important issues.  Don't be

 6     repetitive in putting your question.  I'm still of the opinion that you

 7     have sufficient time to cover all the issues.  Please move on.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This hasn't been translated yet,

 9     but there is no denying that this is a bulletin of the Army of Bosnia and

10     Herzegovina and of the military security service at that.  The date is

11     the 17th of July, 1995.

12             MS. WEST:  Sorry to interrupt.  There is a translation.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             Shall we put it on the ELMO or you can -- yes -- publish -- yes,

15     let's put it on the ELMO.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

17     the English version, the first and second paragraph specifically.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Do you agree that what it says here that:

20             "Up until the 16th of July, 1995, in the early evening hours,

21     approximately 10.000 members of the 28th Division arrived in the free

22     territory as the main body of these forces were carrying out a

23     breakthrough.  The breakthrough was assisted by units of the

24     24th Division," which was not in Srebrenica but in Tuzla, "which launched

25     a fierce counter-attack against the Chetnik lines in the Baljkovica


Page 22870

 1     sector (the general sector of Memici - Nezuk) and linked up with the

 2     units of the 28th Division ..."

 3             And then they say what their casualties were.  200 soldiers in

 4     one place, Konjevic Polje, and the Serbs had about 20 casualties and

 5     six captured, and so on and so forth.  So is this something --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Next page.

 7             Mr. Karadzic referred to first two paragraphs.  When you're done

 8     with your reading, please let us know, Colonel.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Okay, Your Honour.

10             Okay.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, what is your question?

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Mr. Kingori, is it clear to you now that your conclusions suffer

14     from a lack of this particular information, that 10.000 managed to break

15     through.  Some were killed, others managed to get through.  Do you

16     realise now that your position that there were no troops there and that

17     the 28th Division was only on paper is not accurate due to the lack of

18     this particular information?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Can we see the first page again.

20             Yes, Mr. Kingori.

21             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, is there a place where they've put

22     10.000?

23             JUDGE KWON:  The first line --

24             THE WITNESS:  The first line, "approximately 10.000 members of

25     the 28th Division ..."


Page 22871

 1             Your Honour, this is something that one cannot confirm or deny.

 2     But for sure, 10.000 soldiers is not a very small number.  But who said

 3     these were all soldiers, these were trained soldiers?  These were

 4     actually breaking out because they had been defeated and there were

 5     10.000 armed soldiers.  The reason why I'm saying this is that armed --

 6     10.000 armed soldiers are not just people with small arms.  10.000, we

 7     are talking about are close to a corps.  If these cannot be able to break

 8     through in such a line, it is impossible, it is very difficult, if they

 9     are what we are calling armed.  Armed, we are talking about they needed

10     to have support arms.  They could not just be soldiers because they have

11     a gun.  Soldiers are not soldiers just because they have a gun, no; they

12     have small arms, no.  It is obligatory that if it is a division like the

13     one you are showing us here, 10.000 of them, that they have support arms.

14     Where are their tanks?  Where is the artillery?

15             So in essence what I'm trying to say is these could be people

16     with guns and that is possible to have.  Anybody can have a gun.  Anybody

17     can pass through.  He can also be called a soldier just because he has a

18     gun.  But in real sense, this is not an armed force because they lack the

19     necessary capacity to be called an armed division.

20        Q.   Mr. Kingori, that is what worried me, because you keep saying

21     this is logical, that is logical.  However, we have to establish what

22     actually happened irrespective of logic.  So you are not challenging that

23     this is a Muslim document that confirms that 10.000 soldiers left

24     fighting their way along.  Regardless of what is logical, this is a

25     people's army.  This is not a professional army.  The Serb army and the


Page 22872

 1     Muslim armies were people's armies, not professional armies.  People

 2     lived at home with their wives until they would leave.  Are you

 3     challenging this document and are you challenging that they say that

 4     10.000 of their troops were on the move?

 5             MS. WEST:  Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. West.

 7             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I see at the end of several lines

 8     there's a question, but this has continued on and on when there's a long,

 9     long statement with a small question on the end.  And I just ask that

10     Mr. Karadzic asks his questions simply to the witness and not make such

11     statements.

12             JUDGE KWON:  By making such statements you are making the

13     probative value of the witness very low.  So put your questions in a

14     simpler way.  Put your questions one at a time.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Mr. Kingori, please do not say how things should be; rather, give

17     us an answer.  Are you disputing that 10.000 soldiers left, as stated by

18     this document of the Muslim secret service?

19        A.   Your Honour, I'm not disputing that 10.000 people left and they

20     could have been having guns.  But as for an organised division -- for a

21     division to have broken through this way, it's completely

22     incomprehensible.  I don't believe it.  But obviously in any war there

23     has got to be propaganda.  You have got to show that your people are

24     many.  That is common in any war.  You have got to show that you are

25     better equipped, you are heavier, you are more than your adversary.  That


Page 22873

 1     is normal in any war.  And you have got to give morale to your soldiers

 2     that still they are there.  But for obvious reasons you really cannot

 3     have a division breaking through with, you know, 10.000 of them --

 4        Q.   Mr. Kingori, Mr. Kingori, I have to intervene.  What you are

 5     saying are logical inferences and I'm asking you about facts.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next paragraph

 7     which says that some army officers and the authorities evacuated their

 8     families abroad [In English] SVB -- [Interpretation] That's the one that

 9     begins with SVB of the 1st Corps and so on.  Could we see the text a

10     little bit further below so you can see the preparations for the

11     liquidation of Serb civilians in case Zepa falls.  Look below.

12             [In English] "SVB of the 1st Corps is privy to information that

13     after the fall of Srebrenica and the attack by the Chetniks on Zepa, a

14     group has allegedly been formed consisting of the citizens of Zepa whose

15     task is to select those Serbs who would be liquidated in case Zepa

16     falls."

17             [Interpretation] If we are talking logics, is it logical,

18     Mr. Kingori, that all of this is going on without the military observers

19     knowing?

20        A.   Your Honour, this is intelligence report gotten from your people

21     and for in the military and especially an established military like the

22     BSA, they had to get such intelligence and use it, maybe not necessarily

23     directly, but indirectly.  Maybe their plan was to eliminate those who

24     are to eliminate the BSA senior guy -- the Serb senior guys who are in

25     Zepa.  So intelligence can be gotten through many ways, you had your own


Page 22874

 1     ways of getting this intelligence and utilising it.  And the intelligence

 2     did not have to come to us.

 3        Q.   Your answer has one crucial deficiency.  This is not an

 4     Army of Republika Srpska document.  This is a document of the BH army.

 5     It's a Muslim document.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the first page in the

 7     original.  Although every page of the original bears the stamp of the

 8     Bosnian army.

 9             Can this document be admitted?

10             I would like to see the original.  You see this says

11     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It reports who arrived in Tuzla to Muslim

12     territory.  In e-court you see the Serbian version --

13             JUDGE KWON:  It's in the e-court.  You have to switch to the

14     e-court from ELMO.  It's already there.

15             We'll admit this.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1998, Your Honours.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Kingori, what did your service of military observers,

19     Sector BH North-East, report to Zagreb about this event, the breakout of

20     the Bosnian army, the losses of the Bosnian army during the breakout, the

21     number of people who made it through, do you know what was reported?

22     This was your direct command in Tuzla; right?

23        A.   Your Honour, we reported on a possible route out for the Muslims,

24     which was actually towards Tuzla, that we knew that would be the most

25     possible route out.  And we also talked about the fact that they had to


Page 22875

 1     fight their way out, we reported on that.  They had to fight their way

 2     out because obviously they would not be given a safe route out to Tuzla.

 3     So that is what we reported.

 4        Q.   That civilians would get a corridor or the 28th Division?  Were

 5     we obligated to make it possible for the 28th Division to leave our

 6     territory peacefully, carrying weapons, and then from there attack us?

 7        A.   Your Honour, it was very clear from the onset that you are not

 8     giving anybody a safe route out from the enclave because the BSA had

 9     already started the heavy bombardment of Srebrenica.  And it was very

10     clear from the onslaught -- onset that the aim was to clear the area of

11     the Muslims, as had been told to us by Colonel Vukovic.  So everything

12     was evident, it was going as part of your plan.  You had to clear the

13     whole enclave of Muslims, which you did successfully.

14        Q.   Mr. Kingori, the Trial Chamber will decide that.  I would kindly

15     ask you to stick to the facts.  Did your service report to Zagreb about

16     this event and what did they say, how many combatants and how many people

17     made it out with what kind of losses?  Do you know about the losses of

18     the 28th Division between Srebrenica and Tuzla?

19        A.   No, Your Honour, I do not know.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see 1D4 -- 04768.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Is this a report from your north-east command in Zagreb, the UNMO

23     headquarters in Zagreb, 17 July 1995; correct?

24        A.   Yes, Your Honour, I can see that.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Are these names familiar to you, who prepared this


Page 22876

 1     document and sent it to Major Kouznetsov and Mr. Woodhouse.  Do you know

 2     these names?

 3        A.   Yes, I know Woodhouse.

 4        Q.   Please look at the document.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please scroll it down and when

 6     Mr. Kingori finishes reading, we can move to the next page.  At the

 7     bottom it says:

 8             "Team Srebrenica are holding meetings tonight with

 9     representatives of the Serb side."

10             Can we see the next page?  Next page, please.

11             [No interpretation]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I don't think we had the

13     interpretation of your last comment, but we all can see this passage.

14     What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   On 17 July did you have this meeting, were you there?

17        A.   Yes, we had a meeting.  I can't remember whether I was there or

18     not, but we had a meeting, yeah.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Do you see in the next paragraph that there are

20     covered mortars mounted on Muslim trucks and did you know that Muslim

21     troops were using mobile mortars to fire and then get away, hit and run

22     in other words?

23        A.   Your Honour, I don't know what you are referring to because if it

24     is the report in front of me, starting para 4, BiH side, this is not from

25     Team Srebrenica.


Page 22877

 1        Q.   But did you know about the phenomenon itself, that mortars would

 2     be placed on trucks, covered, they would fire from them, and then hide?

 3     Did you know that that's the way they used to deceive the UN?

 4        A.   Your Honour, what I know is that when you are cornered you can do

 5     anything, so it's possible to have done that.  But obviously you cannot

 6     cheat for a very long time without being discovered.  But this is a

 7     report from Team Srebrenik, not Srebrenica.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page?

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Item D below.  We don't have time for the rest --

11             JUDGE KWON:  No, I would like the witness to read the item --

12     yes, D, capital D, yes.

13             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I can --

14             JUDGE KWON:  And there's a further passage on the next page,

15     page 4.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I agree.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   The claims you made in your statement, aren't they inconsistent

20     with what your command, the command of military observers, is reporting?

21     Did you know about this?

22        A.   Your Honour, maybe I would like to know which claims, specific

23     claims, you are talking about.

24        Q.   The UN is confirming that a large number of combatants made it

25     out of the area.  Many got killed during the breakout, that Serb villages


Page 22878

 1     were burned on the way.  They emerged into the area of responsibility of

 2     the 2nd Corps.  Correct?  This whole item D, is it reflected in your

 3     statement?  Does it make any impact on your statement?  Is your statement

 4     consistent with this report of the military observers?

 5             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, may we just go back to the first page

 6     because I think that might be what we're talking about.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This seems to be a report from the

 8     UNMO Sector North-East.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   These headquarters, these staff headquarters, was it your

11     command?  Were you answerable to them, north-east?

12        A.   Yes, Your Honour, it was.

13        Q.   So with all due respect, Mr. Kingori, I would say that your

14     statement does not reflect and is not consistent with --

15             JUDGE KWON:  No, just a -- oh, yes, is that your question?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   My question is:  Why is your amalgamated statement so

19     dramatically different from the official reports of your headquarters?

20        A.   Your Honour, I don't see any deviations from what has been

21     reported here in that the crossing of these people, you can see in the

22     report, is written they are armed with small arms, yeah, small arms.

23     That does not -- and I still insist does not signify the arming of a

24     division, anything above a section.  So in essence what we are seeing,

25     these are people who are armed.  They could have been soldiers.  They


Page 22879

 1     could have been just normal civilians who were armed.  And as I said

 2     earlier, it goes beyond normal carrying of a gun to become a soldier.  So

 3     it does not necessarily mean that all these were military people crossing

 4     over to the other side.

 5             However, the element of them burning the villages, because that

 6     is the other issue that you raised about when they were crossing, they

 7     have given the reasons why they were burning those villages, to get a

 8     wider area through which to cross and that is different from the burning

 9     of the village you talked about earlier.  So it is not an inconsistency

10     on my side at all.

11        Q.   You're talking about squads and little groups again.  Do you know

12     that in the system of the former Yugoslavia each of these men had done

13     his military service, gone through training, and were then part of the

14     reserve force?  All these men had regularly been called up to military

15     drills at regular intervals.  That was the system.  It was a popular

16     army, not a professional army.  Did you take that into account?

17        A.   Your Honour, for sure, all this information we had.  We had all

18     this information, but we also know that some of them became soldiers by

19     default.  Some of them became armed by default.  Not because they were

20     trained but just because they happened to be of a good fighting age, just

21     because they happened to be strong young men, they could just take a gun.

22     That does not make one a soldier at all, just having a gun.  Otherwise

23     everybody, even those who were normally armed and they're not soldiers,

24     would turn to soldiers.

25             So in essence, what I'm trying to let the Court know is that


Page 22880

 1     10.000 men in a division or a brigade or whatever you may call it does

 2     not go together hand in hand.  You cannot have 10.000 men and say this is

 3     a division.  It is not just the men.  It is the men together with the

 4     equipment.  And just small arms does not make someone a -- form a brigade

 5     just because you have small arms, it does not at all in any army

 6     whatever.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  But you do not dispute that there were five brigades,

 8     280th, 281st, 282nd, 283rd, 284th, and 285th, as well as several

 9     independent battalions, regardless of how well-equipped they were?  You

10     do not dispute that?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Let's move from the issue of the strength of that

12     division or brigade.  I think witness has answered the question.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Mr. Kingori, I'm looking through your paragraphs, paragraph 42

15     says there was no electricity.  Did you know the Muslim side had

16     sabotaged the transmission lines and, from that time onwards, neither

17     Serbs nor Muslims had any electrical power?

18        A.   Your Honour, we did not know what had happened to the

19     electricity.  We just knew that it was not operating and we assumed it

20     was damaged during the initial phases of the war.

21        Q.   Do you know how the protected areas were first established?  On

22     my orders the Serbian army stopped in 1993 at the entrance to Srebrenica.

23     We accepted that Srebrenica become a protected area and there was no need

24     whatsoever for a military organisation and armaments to exist there.  We

25     accepted all this and signed the agreement.  When the weapons were taken


Page 22881

 1     away for safe keeping, there was no further need for those weapons to be

 2     there because the Serb side had accepted to have that area as a protected

 3     area.

 4        A.   Your Honour, I'm aware of all that.

 5        Q.   Mr. Kingori, we'll discuss that after the break.  Did you know

 6     that the Serb side in almost all peace agreements accepted that Zepa,

 7     Srebrenica, and many other areas in the Drina River Valley become

 8     constituent parts of the Muslim entity?

 9        A.   What I knew is that Zepa was also a Muslim area, Srebrenica was a

10     Muslim area, so the eventual situation did not come to our attention,

11     whether it was to bring them together or whatever.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Probably you can see the transcript, Mr. Kingori.

13     Just the previous answer, did you say you were aware of it or you were

14     not aware of it?

15             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, they had written well and changed.  I

16     had said I'm aware of that.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             I note the time, Mr. Karadzic.  We'll take a break for an hour

19     and resume at 1.30.  And we will admit that UNMO Zagreb report as

20     Exhibit D1999.

21             THE ACCUSED:  Next is 2000.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

24                           --- On resuming at 1.33 p.m.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.


Page 22882

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Mr. Kingori, I have to dispute, and I need to dispute, something

 4     in each of the paragraphs in the statement, sometimes entire paragraphs.

 5     I don't know if I will have time to do that.  I will have to skip things

 6     now.  Is it correct that you described your departure on the 13th of July

 7     to Srebrenica itself to the hospital in order to evacuate the sick?

 8        A.   Your Honour, I don't get what you mean by if I described my

 9     departure, but all I know is that I went back to Srebrenica to pick those

10     who were left in the hospital.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Can you look at your paragraph 183, for example,

12     where you say that you think that you left Potocari on the 13th of July,

13     and then you say that with a lady from the Medecins Sans Frontieres you

14     went and you say that you saw a crater there and you did not have time to

15     analyse it, this crater.  However, at the beginning of the statement you

16     speak about how you did actually conduct a crater analysis.  Is that

17     correct?

18             You deal with this in paragraph 16.  And you say that you were

19     able to place equipment in the crater and to gauge the calibre and other

20     things.  Are you able to tell us what kind of equipment this is?

21        A.   Your Honour, these are several questions.  I don't know how best

22     to approach them because there's one on 183, there's another one on

23     paragraph 16.

24        Q.   Let's stay with paragraph 16.  Did you carry out crater analyses

25     using equipment and can you tell us what sort of equipment it is that you


Page 22883

 1     used?

 2        A.   Your Honour, the crater analysis that we used to do -- we had

 3     some equipment that we could put on the hole that had been created, that

 4     is, the crater itself.  For one, when a shell lands on a certain place,

 5     and especially if it is a hard point like on Tarmac or concrete, it forms

 6     a definite pattern, which can show you from which side the shell came

 7     from.  You can see the way it has gone in and know this shell actually

 8     came from this direction because of the pattern that it forms.

 9             Secondly, we had some meters that we were using to put over the

10     crater and also measure the depth, that is, the depth going in and also

11     the width of the crater.  With that we would be able to know the kind of

12     weapon.  It would guide us into knowing the kind of weapon, but it would

13     be added -- we would have an added advantage of looking at the shrapnels,

14     the fragments, of the crater -- of the shell which can help us identify

15     the kind of weapon that has been used.  After getting all these details,

16     we would go to a book that we held and it would guide us into knowing the

17     kind of weapon, the calibre, so that we could know the range.  Because in

18     the book it was indicated this calibre of weapon, this type of weapon,

19     has got a range of this number of kilometres, 3 kilometres, 4 kilometres,

20     or whatever, and then from there we could go to the map and put -- and

21     get the estimate distance from the point of impact to where we thought

22     that -- the launch of that weaponry could have taken place.  We would get

23     the grid reference of that particular point or grid square because

24     definitely we used to give a bigger area because you cannot be very sure

25     of the actual point where the weapon originated from.  So that is how we


Page 22884

 1     used to do it.

 2        Q.   My question just had to do with the equipment since it wasn't

 3     clear to me what sort of equipment this was.  Is it a meter or did you

 4     have some other kind of equipment?  What did you place into the crater?

 5        A.   Your Honour, we had meters and calipers and we had -- there's

 6     another equipment that I cannot remember very well that -- I can't

 7     remember the name that would give us the general direction but those are

 8     the equipments we used to use.  But I can hasten to add that when you get

 9     this, it just gives you an estimate of where the hardware could have come

10     from.  It gives you a general area, this is where it could have come

11     from, and then you give that and for confirmation you can use normal

12     patrols or inform the UN and they had their own ways of locating the

13     actual place.

14        Q.   If you recall the equipment that you were not able to recall by

15     the end of your testimony, could you please tell us the name of it so

16     that we can find the characteristics of that equipment.  What kinds of

17     shells are you talking about?

18        A.   Your Honour, we are talking about mortar shells, artillery

19     shells, rockets, and also tanks.

20        Q.   Thank you.  How many analyses of mortar shells did you actually

21     carry out?

22        A.   Your Honour, we did many.

23        Q.   And what did you conclude and in what way?  How did you determine

24     the calibre, the direction, and the distance?

25        A.   Your Honour, I've just described that, but if you want me to go


Page 22885

 1     through it again I will.

 2        Q.   We're just now talking about mortar shells; is that right?  Would

 3     you go ahead, please.

 4        A.   For the mortar shells it is the same thing.  It used to have the

 5     same thing.  You could easily be able to locate where it has coming from.

 6     It is the same thing.  We used the same procedure, but of course there is

 7     the element of error which you can get in any way because maybe they have

 8     given a bigger charge or a lower charge depending on how far they want

 9     the shell to go.  But of course that difference would not have been much.

10     You would be able to get a grid -- a proper grid square of where the

11     equipment is.

12        Q.   And how did you determine the calibre?

13        A.   Your Honour, we had an EOD, explosive ordnance depot, personnel

14     from DutchBat who could help us do that.  It was very easy because we

15     just needed to carry the fragments, give it to them, or at times they

16     could accompany us, and they could easily be able to tell us.

17        Q.   Well, I'm surprised, Mr. Kingori, that you did not use the

18     simplest means and that would be the examination of the tail fin.  That

19     would affect everything, would it not?

20        A.   Your Honour, we used all that, even the tail fin, if it is there,

21     if it is not fragmented.  We used everything available, but as for the

22     calibre, I've just told you the way we used it.

23        Q.   Are you trying to say that sometimes the tail fin also gets

24     fragmented so that you are not able to establish on the basis of the

25     whole thing but on the basis of fragments what the calibre of the mortar


Page 22886

 1     shell is?

 2        A.   Your Honour, at times even the tail fin was not easy to locate,

 3     was not there.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  How can we get any of your findings from those

 5     investigations?  Is there a way to get that from you?  Did you submit

 6     those findings in writing?

 7        A.   Yes, Your Honour, we used to submit them in writing to

 8     UNMO headquarters.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  We're going to ask the OTP to provide that for us

10     because you are their witness.

11             So you did have training in crater analysis for a few days; is

12     that correct?

13        A.   Yes, Your Honour.

14        Q.   Thank you.  And you were able to determine the calibre, the

15     direction, and the distance; is that correct?

16        A.   Yes, Your Honour, I've just said that.

17        Q.   Experts here have told us, however, that it was not possible to

18     establish the distance in any event, especially when we're talking about

19     mortar shells, possibly the direction and the longest range but not the

20     distance and the co-ordinates.  So could you please tell us how you

21     managed to do that.  Perhaps you should reveal that for them to know as

22     well, and if you can, would you be able to do that?

23        A.   Your Honour, I've already indicated how we used to do it.  I've

24     even talked about how we could be able to determine the range, we just go

25     to the book and see the ranges of that particular kind of weapon.  If it


Page 22887

 1     is between 2 and 3 kilometres, or maybe 5 kilometres, or whatever, we

 2     just go to the map, because we already know where we are and we already

 3     know the general direction, locate that on the map, the 4 or whatever

 4     kilometres, locate it on the map and get a grid square and that is what

 5     we used to give as the possible location of the equipment that fired that

 6     weapon.  And I also added that when we give that to the UN, they had

 7     their own way on getting further information on the same because they had

 8     use of everything like satellites.  But at least we have given them a

 9     general idea of where the weaponry is.

10        Q.   A shell can come in from a range of 1 to 7 kilometres.  How did

11     you establish the range from which this -- the range of this incoming

12     shell?

13        A.   Your Honour, I've just said the range is in the book that we were

14     using.  The ranges of different weaponry which were used in former

15     Yugoslavia were already in a given book that we were using.

16        Q.   Mr. Kingori, there is a scale to the range from 1 to

17     7 kilometres.  How did you determine the distance from which the shell

18     came and establish the co-ordinates, also the grid for a particular

19     weapon?  How did you establish that?

20        A.   Your Honour, I don't get what you mean, the scale to the range

21     from 1 to 7 kilometres.  We were using the longest ranges which are given

22     in the book, and you cannot have a range of between 1 and 7.  You

23     obviously know if it can hit 7 kilometres it can also hit even

24     1 kilometre, but it would be not effective.  That is for one.  Secondly,

25     it would be of no use to the people who were firing it, so we were using


Page 22888

 1     the longer ranges, and I don't think there is a range that is normally

 2     given of 1 to 7.  The effective ranges are the ones which are given and

 3     that is what we use.  Like even small arms, small arms like a rifle, you

 4     would be told is between 5- and 600 metres.  It does not mean it cannot

 5     fire 50 metres, it can.  But we're talking about the ranges, the longer

 6     ranges, that will be effective.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And what is the shortest distance from which you

 8     could fire an 82-millimetre mortar shell and what is the longest

 9     distance?  If you establish the direction, all right, very well, but what

10     is the closest and the farthest reach of that particular mortar so that

11     it would be able to hit that particular crater?  It can be from

12     1500 metres or from 7.000 metres; is that correct?

13        A.   Your Honour, you don't expect me to remember all the technical

14     details.  For this one I cannot remember obviously.

15        Q.   But any mortar operator would know that, that you can fire at

16     close range and at a long range.  How did you determine the grid and how

17     did you decide, out of that range of several kilometres that are

18     possible, how did you zone in to a particular location or a distance?

19        A.   Your Honour, I've already gone through this.  I've explained how

20     we used to get it.  I've also explained how we used to get the grid

21     square or the grid reference of the particular area that we thought the

22     weapon would be firing from.  And I really don't see why you want me to

23     repeat the same again because I am not saying anything that I should add

24     on the same.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Were these Serbian shells that were dropping on


Page 22889

 1     Srebrenica?

 2        A.   Your Honour, they were.

 3        Q.   And what was the calibre of those shells that were dropping on

 4     Srebrenica?

 5        A.   Your Honour, there were various and we put them in our reports.

 6     Some of them would be 105, 155, and even mortars, 60-millimetre mortars,

 7     and all those kind of weaponry.  We could analyse and get them and report

 8     on the same.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And do we agree that there are 60-millimetre,

10     82-millimetre, and 120-millimetre mortars?

11        A.   Your Honour, there were so many types, so many types, and it's

12     all in that book.  Whatever was used to fire is what we used to analyse

13     and this is what we wrote on, not necessarily all the weaponry in the BSA

14     arsenal.

15        Q.   But two armies, the two armies that you were observing, the

16     Army of Republika Srpska and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had

17     identical weapons.  Did they have any other mortars other than those of

18     these three calibres, 60, 82, and 120 millimetres?

19        A.   Your Honour, what we were analysing was incoming, incoming

20     weapons, not outgoing.  If there was any outgoing, that is the one that

21     could have come from the BiH, it could have been analysed by other

22     people, not us, because we were analysing what was coming into the

23     enclave.

24        Q.   Very well.  Incoming shells.  What is the longest reach or range

25     of 60-millimetre mortars?


Page 22890

 1        A.   Your Honour, I don't have those details with me.

 2        Q.   And what was the distance?  How far was the line of separation

 3     from the centre of Srebrenica?

 4        A.   Now, Your Honour, that is a very difficult question in that --

 5     unless you are specific because Srebrenica from Yellow Bridge is a

 6     certain number of kilometres.  Srebrenica from former OP Echo is

 7     different from any other section of the enclave.  So the cease-fire line

 8     really had different distances from Srebrenica.

 9        Q.   What was the closest and what was its furthest point from

10     measuring from the centre of Srebrenica to the first Serb positions in

11     all directions, did you know that?

12        A.   Your Honour, we had not kept those measurements.

13        Q.   Would you agree that an incoming 60-millimetre mortar shell would

14     call for you to determine whether this had come in from Serb positions or

15     whether it was coming from Muslim territory?

16        A.   Your Honour, there are two issues here.  A 60-millimetre mortar

17     launched from the direction of OP Echo or thereabouts or anywhere at the

18     cease-fire line towards Srebrenica will hit Srebrenica, not necessarily

19     in the town but the enclave.  It would hit the enclave, and you still go

20     there and analyse and get to know that it is a 60-millimetre mortar from

21     a certain distance outside the cease-fire line.  But at the same time, we

22     were not aware that the Muslims could fire at themselves, so we could not

23     imagine the Muslim side firing at their Muslim brothers.

24        Q.   Did you know how many killings there were in Srebrenica itself

25     and did you know that Srebrenica was led by a bandit leadership that


Page 22891

 1     foreign observers and DutchBat soldiers described as a gang and

 2     criminals, rapes, killings, prostitution, smuggling, all possible kinds

 3     of criminal acts, did you know that?

 4             MS. WEST:  Objection, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.  I'll skip that.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   I'm afraid, Mr. Kingori, that your seven-day training was not

 9     enough.  Would you agree?  We've heard experts here who have dealt with

10     this their entire lives, crater analysis I mean, and nobody told us what

11     you are telling us now.

12        A.   Your Honour, my seven-days' training was not a basic training.

13     It was training to senior officers, not just myself alone, to senior

14     officers who were -- who had experience in the military.  So it's just

15     confirmation and reconfirmation of some issues.  It's not basic training.

16     And I also said whatever we were getting were estimates and that is what

17     we would give, and that could give a proper assessment of the area from

18     where the firing would have come from and that proved very useful to the

19     UN because they didn't have to concentrate on the whole location where

20     the BSA were.  We guided them into particular areas.  Like the

21     rocket-launcher that was coming beyond Yellow Bridge, it was shelling

22     from, you know, beyond Yellow Bridge, we knew where it was and we say the

23     same.  And even when we went to Potocari -- actually after the fall of

24     the enclave, the rocket-launcher actually came from the same direction.

25     So we could have been slightly not very accurate in terms of maybe


Page 22892

 1     millimetres, metres, or whatever, but at least we give a general

 2     direction which is what was required from our mandate.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Thus, at the critical time in July, the two of you,

 4     because the third one was already in hospital, informed the

 5     Dutch Battalion about the fire from the Serb side; correct?

 6        A.   Your Honour, we were aware of what was happening.  We knew where

 7     this fire could have come from, and we were correct as far as we knew.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Is it possible that you had too much trust in your

 9     Muslim guides and interpreters who misinformed you?

10        A.   Your Honour, that would be incorrect because we also had our

11     own -- we were -- we were intelligent also in a way, in that we were

12     hearing the shell -- the shells overflying or coming from whatever

13     direction and hitting certain areas, and the only time that we relied on

14     the interpreter was when we sent him to Srebrenica because it was no

15     longer safe for us to be there.  That is the time we sent him and he was

16     able to give us where the shells were actually hitting.  That does not

17     mean ourselves were not hearing them overflying where we were or even

18     hear them land.  It's only that we could not get the actual location at

19     which we were guided into the actual location by the interpreter, so he

20     could not cheat us -- I mean, he could not lie to us on something that we

21     have also heard ourselves.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we briefly look at P4152.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   While we're waiting, do you know that both the

25     Doctors Without Borders and UNPROFOR reported that Serbs were not hitting


Page 22893

 1     buildings or features but they were firing around to prevent movement,

 2     so-called barrage fire, to prevent movement?  Do you know about that?

 3        A.   Your Honour, what I know is what we reported on.  That is what I

 4     knew.  And the shelling was actually not aimed at certain areas and

 5     leaving out others.  Nobody can tell that that shelling was not directed

 6     at buildings.  The fact that it did not hit buildings does not mean it

 7     was not directed at buildings.  It could have just missed by good luck.

 8     And as it was in our report, we were even surprised that the number of

 9     casualties were so low, and especially knowing that even our building,

10     the PTT, was targeted and missed several times, that even the hospital

11     was targeted and missed several times.  So when somebody says houses were

12     not aimed at, really I cannot understand.  I cannot understand.  I cannot

13     comprehend that.  What I can say is they were missed, some of them were

14     missed, and that was just by good luck and I'm happy that they were

15     missed, otherwise the destruction, the suffering, the death could have

16     been astronomical.

17             JUDGE KWON:  What would be your basis of conclusion that PTT

18     building as well as hospitals were targeted but missed?

19             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, when these artillery or weapons are

20     aimed at a certain place, there are different variations in that you aim

21     to get a certain point but you may miss that point because of where you

22     are launching the weapon from.  Artillery weapons are normally launched

23     from behind a hill, where they are safer and they cannot be seen directly

24     by the enemy, and that is why they are called high trajectory.  They go

25     up very high and then land somewhere.  So -- and if that -- that weapon


Page 22894

 1     is aimed at a certain building, you would definitely know in that it

 2     would miss, either go on top, fly overhead, go to the side, one side or

 3     the other side, and you would see some corrections because they normally

 4     make corrections when you aim and do not get your target, because I

 5     believe they had their own people on ground.  You change the -- either

 6     the charge or direction, you move it towards -- you correct the direction

 7     a bit, and that is the time you would see if it was hitting to the left,

 8     you see now it's hitting maybe slightly more to the right.  If it was

 9     hitting far much overhead, you see now it is hitting slightly lower.  So

10     it was very easy to know a targeted place, very easy.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Are you trying to say that tank produces indirect fire?

14        A.   I didn't say that.

15        Q.   But you did say, look here, that the tank 84 -- do you know at

16     the time it was the most powerful, the best tank that could hit and fire

17     unmistakably even when the tank was crossing dunes and going across

18     holes.  You say here the Serb 84 tank was in position.  Are you trying to

19     say that it missed by chance?

20        A.   Your Honour, I kindly request you show me where I said a tank

21     produces indirect fire.  I never mentioned that.  I've never mentioned it

22     in my report, and what I have in my report is a tank produces direct

23     fire.  And that is why when we saw tanks located some distance, about

24     2 kilometres from our PTT building, we decided to leave because it

25     produces direct fire.  So what you are saying, I'm not aware, I've not


Page 22895

 1     said anything about that.

 2        Q.   Mr. Kingori, here, on the 10th of July, you record the presence

 3     of a tank, state-of-the-art tank at the time in the world, with

 4     state-of-the-art firing devices, and you say that the Serbs were missing

 5     their targets in a non-deliberate way.  You are ascribing bad intentions

 6     to Serbs, whereas you saw with your own eyes the T-84 tank that could hit

 7     precisely any window that was targeted.

 8             MS. WEST:  May we have a paragraph number.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, did the witness say in his statement

10     that the tank actually targeted the building?  I'm reading paragraph

11     102 --

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm now talking about the document

13     before us in e-court, it's a document from this service, their own

14     observer mission.  It notes the presence of a tank on the 10th of July.

15     In the meantime, Mr. Kingori is saying that the Serbs were using heavy

16     artillery, shooting to hit, but they were missing because they were

17     shooting from beyond a hill by indirect fire.  However, the Serbs had a

18     tank and they could see it.  The tank was able to use direct fire

19     unmistakably, and I am disputing Mr. Kingori's allegation.  I put it to

20     him that he was biassed against the Serbs in ascribing them ill

21     intentions --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you are not making statements here.

23     You ask questions.  Put your questions one at a time.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Here is the question:  You claim the Serbs were missing because


Page 22896

 1     they were shooting with indirect fire from behind a hill.  If they really

 2     wanted to hit the target, why didn't they use the T-84 tank that could

 3     hit with precision any window?

 4        A.   Your Honour, I think we are mixing two issues, that of the tank

 5     and that of the high-trajectory artillery weapons, in that when I

 6     mentioned about the high-trajectory artillery weapons, that's when I said

 7     they were missing the target.  But later on is when I brought in or we

 8     brought in the issue of the tank, which could easily be seen from a

 9     certain location, which I have indicated.  So these are two different

10     things in two different areas.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Let's clear one thing up.  Look at this document.

12     From whom did you receive this information?  Are all of these your direct

13     observations or did you receive some reports from someone?

14        A.   This report came from us, and if we have not said not confirmed

15     by us, it is us who had confirmed.  So it is true it was like that.

16        Q.   I'm asking you now if the Serbs' intention was to hit and they

17     were missing because fire was indirect, from behind a hill, why did they

18     continue, on the 10th of July, to fire from behind a hill when they could

19     have used the T-84 tank which certainly wouldn't have missed?

20        A.   Your Honour, I think the tacticians are the ones who should be

21     asked that, the people from the BSA side.  But all I know is that they

22     had almost finished their job.  By the 10th, they were almost through

23     with their job so they did what they were doing.  They had already

24     softened Srebrenica.  They had already done enough damage.  People had

25     already started getting scared.  So everything was almost through.  So in


Page 22897

 1     fact, the use of the tank could not have been very essential because,

 2     after all, if they were coming to reclaim the enclave, as they had said,

 3     that is, the BSA, obviously they would not have wanted to destroy most of

 4     the buildings that they were planning to come and use.  So maybe they --

 5     these were obvious tactical or tactical reasons of not damaging

 6     everything.

 7        Q.   Sir, intentions are debatable.  I kindly ask you to tell me first

 8     who informed you about these events in Srebrenica which you were not

 9     there to see for yourself?  In paragraph -- first of all, who informed

10     you [In English] "the heavy shells probably" and so on --

11     [Interpretation] About this, the second part of the paragraph?

12        A.   Your Honour, this information could have come from our yellow

13     card, that is, the interpreter; but at the same time we had the MSF

14     person who was in contact with some other people in the hospital and you

15     could be able to get some information from there.  The point at hand is

16     of the shelling of the hospital which we could really get that it was

17     being targeted and missed by a few metres and there was no dispute to

18     that because even when I went back there later I confirmed that, that it

19     has been -- actually, it had been hit around the hospital and also in the

20     Bravo Company of DutchBat.

21        Q.   Sir, Mr. Kingori, how could you possibly know that the

22     hospital -- how far is it -- you were in Potocari.  How far are Potocari

23     from the hospital?

24        A.   It was far.  It was not that near, but we could be able to get

25     from the sources that I've already told you about.  It was far, but the


Page 22898

 1     shells we could hear.  It is only that the actually landing area of the

 2     shell we could not be able to get.  But I've given you the source of

 3     the -- that information on where the shells were landing.

 4        Q.   Look at paragraph 121 of your statement, did your interpreter

 5     have one week's training or not even that?  You were only two.  The

 6     hospital in Srebrenica is far from you.  You get your information from a

 7     Muslim who is partial.  It is in his interest to blame the Serbs.  He has

 8     only one week's training and you accept him at his word.  You take his

 9     word for it that the Serbs were targeting the hospital.

10        A.   Your Honour, the issue of the interpreter being trained for

11     one week does not arise.  That interpreter had a lot of experience.  We

12     found them there and they had worked there for over two years.  So they

13     are people who were very experienced in identifying what was an incoming

14     shell and also where it was hitting.  It was very easy for them to know.

15     They had very good experience of their work as interpreters.  And also

16     having worked with UNMOs gave them an upper hand in knowing some of the

17     things which were happening in a war zone, like it was at that time.

18             I also said that immediately after that I left for Srebrenica and

19     I noticed that everything that we had been told had actually happened and

20     it's in my report.  I found that the hospital had actually been targeted.

21     I also found that the areas around had been damaged.  The road had been

22     cratered.  The DutchBat Company -- the outside of the DutchBat Company

23     had also been cratered, you know, through heavy artillery weapons.  So

24     all that we came to believe is actually what had happened and we had not

25     exaggerated anything at all.


Page 22899

 1             As for him being a Muslim, I don't think we had issues to do with

 2     his background at that particular moment.  What we had was knowing what

 3     was happening at that particular moment and reporting on the same.  Of

 4     course, as I said earlier, the UN had its own other systems of verifying

 5     this information.  And that is why they were even able to get the targets

 6     which we had not been -- we had not given and used air power to actually

 7     attack those targets.  So I think that is the answer I can give to the

 8     questions you have asked.

 9        Q.   Mr. Kingori, those other sources of information in the area of

10     Sarajevo established more than once that military observers were useless

11     and pointless.  This incident happened at 11.26 and you are writing your

12     report based on information received from a man who is biased, who

13     belongs to one of the warring parties --

14             MS. WEST:  Objection.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   -- and still you put his words in your report --

17             MS. WEST:  Your Honour, the first sentence of this question is

18     not a question at all and has nothing to do with it, it's a statement.

19     And then he started -- I thought it was going to end in a question but

20     didn't.  This has gone on several times today and I would ask the accused

21     to just ask simple questions and we can get through this.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I totally agree.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, on my assessment, you're using

24     between one-third and half of your time today in making statements and it

25     sits ill with the complaint that you don't have enough time.


Page 22900

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I am challenging

 2     this way of thinking and making conclusions, which is groundless, in

 3     order to help Mr. Kingori to realise his mistake and I want him to answer

 4     what I'm asking, not what I'm not asking.  But I'll narrow it down even

 5     further.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   When was this report sent?  Isn't the time indicated as 11.26?

 8        A.   Your Honour, where is the time you are reading?

 9        Q.   Line 1, at the top of the document.

10             While we're waiting for the document, when did the incident

11     occur?

12             JUDGE KWON:  We don't need the B/C/S.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know why we lost the

14     English.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Do you see it says the incident happened at 11.00 and you are

17     reporting at 11.26, based on information you received from the

18     interpreter; right?

19        A.   Your Honour, I think you are putting the words in my mouth.  I

20     didn't just say the interpreter.  I mentioned other sources.  And 11.26

21     is the time of transmission, I can see that.

22        Q.   All right.  Look at paragraph 121 of your statement now.  You say

23     that you were informed that 155-millimetre artillery shells were hitting

24     the direct surrounding of the hospital.  And in my previous question I

25     also referred to the environs of the hospital.  For the record, you said


Page 22901

 1     "yellow card."  That means Emir; right?

 2        A.   Yes, it does.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Did you go to Srebrenica on the 10th or on the 13th?

 4        A.   I went on the 13th.

 5        Q.   So what you said before, that you first verified and then wrote

 6     your report, is not true.  You could not have done that by 11.26 on the

 7     10th.  You were in Srebrenica only on the 13th?

 8        A.   Your Honour, I said I verified that report that it was correct

 9     when I went back to Srebrenica, and obviously that was not on the 10th.

10     I said I went on the 13th.  But could I have gone back there and found

11     something different, I could have just written again and say I found a

12     different thing all together and that whatever we had sent earlier was

13     wrong.

14             Then, if you allow me, I can go back to the issue where you

15     talked about military observers being useless.  That is actually

16     something that is not right to say because I don't believe the whole

17     UN system would be that -- will just, you know, appoint observers if they

18     don't know what they are doing.  They would not appoint somewhere to go

19     somewhere, do something, and they know they are useless.  I don't think

20     they can form such a system.  Just because they don't fit what you would

21     like them to fit or do the way you would like them to do doesn't make

22     them useless at all.  And that is why, due to the essence of these

23     observers, they are everywhere in every mission that you ever see.

24     Wherever there is a military issue, there must be military observers,

25     contributed by the countries which have contributed troops to that


Page 22902

 1     particular theatre.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I did not say that you were useless, sir.  It was the

 3     highest commanders of the UNPROFOR who said that military observers were

 4     useless.  It was just an answer to your claims that you never made any

 5     mistakes.

 6             Look at paragraph 183.  Who were you in the hospital with?

 7             It's actually paragraphs 185 and 186, where you describe the

 8     treatment three Serb soldiers gave to three ill women.  Who were you with

 9     there?  Were you alone?

10        A.   Your Honour, I was with an MSF lady, I think her name was

11     Christine or Christina.

12        Q.   Anybody else?

13        A.   Of course there were other people.  We found some injured, some

14     people who were admitted.  We've -- the list is there, we have indicated,

15     the sick, even the number of the sick that we found there, I have

16     indicated there, and there was some BSA soldiers around.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Please take a look at paragraph 184 and particularly

18     185, and also 106, how you smear Serbian soldiers.  You say that they

19     threatened old women and you use a euphemism when you say "a bit

20     hostile," "that was a bit hostile."  I wouldn't say that.  I would say it

21     was drastic, drastically hostile.  Actually, did that happen at all?

22        A.   Your Honour, because I'm the one who was there, I said what I

23     saw, I said what I heard.  So maybe you were in a different position all

24     together.  You may -- I know you were not in that particular area so I

25     don't think it would be right for you to change what I saw or what I


Page 22903

 1     heard because I didn't report from anybody else.  I was there personally.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D4970, can we have that without

 4     having it broadcast, though.  I think that it is under an embargo.

 5             MS. WEST:  Your Honour, may we go into private session?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7                           [Private session]

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

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25   (redacted)


Page 22904

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11  Page 22904 redacted.  Private session.

12

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14

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18

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Page 22905

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19                           [Open session]

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we are now in open session.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   In paragraph 186 you say that you physically helped her go.  You

23     lifted her yourself.  Did anyone else describe that in their daily

24     reports?

25        A.   I don't know what others were writing in their daily reports.


Page 22906

 1        Q.   Did you report?

 2        A.   Yes, Your Honour, I did.

 3        Q.   Can we see your report of the 13th of July where you say that

 4     Serbs mistreat old women who are sick, forcing them to evacuate from the

 5     hospital?  Show us this report of yours.

 6        A.   Your Honour, if you can look for the reports, situation reports,

 7     and get them, well and good.  But I don't think you have all the

 8     situation reports.  All I know is that we reported on the same.

 9                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Now we are going to go back to what it was that you discussed

12     with Major Nikolic and Colonel Vukovic.  You said that there was

13     socialising involved as well and coffee and brandy.  However, you say

14     that what they said to you was heard at official meetings where minutes

15     were being kept; right?  You say that they said that they wanted all of

16     Srebrenica for themselves and that all the Muslims should be evacuated or

17     moved out; right?

18        A.   Your Honour, what I said is that in one of the meetings that we

19     had held with Colonel Vukovic - and actually it's not the first one - he

20     told us that -- he asked us what the UN might do if the BSA attacked the

21     enclave.  And he's recorded.  He's in documents, he asked that.

22        Q.   All right.  But -- well, it's possible that he asked you that.

23     But why did you then say that he had said to you that he would free the

24     entire enclave of Muslims, that that was the Serb intention?  Did you

25     report about that?


Page 22907

 1        A.   Yes, Your Honour, I did.  I just mentioned, if you look at my

 2     answer there, I just mentioned about one.  That is just one of them.

 3     There is another time that he said that they would clear the whole

 4     enclave of the Muslims, and clearing, obviously they meant they would

 5     kill everybody.  He said that, he mentioned that, and I reported on the

 6     same.  And also, if I may add, he said if they want to leave the enclave,

 7     he can provide a safe route out from the enclave.  He offered that also.

 8        Q.   Did you include that in your daily report?

 9        A.   Yes, Your Honour, we did.

10        Q.   Can you show that to us?

11        A.   Your Honour, I don't have all the situation reports that we

12     generated at that time so I don't know where it could be.

13        Q.   Mr. Kingori, as a soldier, do you make a distinction between

14     operative, tactical, and strategic levels?  You, Major Nikolic, are you

15     the level that decides on such matters?

16        A.   Your Honour, ours was not to make decisions on any matter.  It

17     was to convey decisions made at higher levels in our own areas.  On my

18     side, through the UN system all the way from the top, and on Major

19     Nikolic or Colonel Vukovic's side, all the way through the military

20     leadership up to the civilian leadership of the country, because for sure

21     it was not a military leadership.  It was a civilian-led leadership.  So

22     the decisions -- no, the -- what was being conveyed by Major Nikolic or

23     Colonel Vukovic obviously we expected to be coming from somewhere up.

24        Q.   Well, sir, your expectation was wrong.  Look at paragraph 31.

25     Vukovic said to you, [In English] "We should tell -- go and tell ..."


Page 22908

 1     [Interpretation] It was the conditional, wasn't it?  Paragraph 31.

 2             [In English] "We should tell -- go and tell the Muslims to pack

 3     up and leave Srebrenica."

 4             [Interpretation] But what the problem with your statement is

 5     analogies and conclusions in keeping --

 6             MS. WEST:  Objection --

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   -- with your own wishes, wishful thinking.  Do you know --

 9             MS. WEST:  Mr. President.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. West.

11             MS. WEST:  He start -- he asked a question.  He didn't wait for

12     the answer.  Then he made another statement by saying:  "But what the

13     problem with your statement is analogies and conclusions in keeping --"

14     he would just have continued again --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             MS. WEST:  -- with his statements unless stopped.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if I had enough time I would

18     deal with each and every paragraph, and I will ask for each and every

19     paragraph that I had not dealt with in cross-examination not to be taken

20     into account or that I be given enough time.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   As for you, Mr. Kingori, please look at paragraph 31, does it not

23     say this in the conditional, "we should ..." et cetera?

24        A.   Your Honour, what is mentioned in paragraph 31 is very true.

25     That is what he told us and that is what he meant.  And as I said


Page 22909

 1     earlier, we went on to believe that he meant it because that is exactly

 2     what was done by the BSA.

 3        Q.   And do you know, Mr. Kingori, that the United Nations and the

 4     Muslim side already on the 10th knew that the Serbs do not have a

 5     decision to the effect that they would enter Srebrenica.  On the

 6     10th of July the Serbs do not intend to go into Srebrenica yet and all

 7     the intercepts and all the reports show that.  The Serbs entered

 8     Srebrenica because the 28th Division had left Srebrenica.

 9        A.   Your Honour, the aim of starting the war on Srebrenica had to

10     have -- I mean was there from the beginning and it's qualified by what

11     I've just quoted from Colonel Vukovic, and which I said was actually

12     conveying a message from a higher up.  Secondly, the BSA really had to

13     get into the enclave.  The fact that their conversations that they were

14     not going in or they were going in, or they were going, or whatever,

15     really does not arise because immediately after they softened the target,

16     immediately after they had hit the area so hard that it was very soft

17     now, they went in through the normal way, that is, with the infantry.

18     And I've quoted that in -- you know, somewhere in here.  They had to

19     bring in the infantry to mop-up the place, to clear the place, and that's

20     exactly what they did.  So the intention must have been there from the

21     beginning.

22        Q.   How do you know what the intention of the Serb army was?  How did

23     you get to that?

24        A.   Your Honour, and I will say it again, it was conveyed to us by

25     Colonel Vukovic and also initially by Major Nikolic, and we went on to


Page 22910

 1     believe it was true because that is exactly what happened.  I think this

 2     could be the third or fourth time I'm repeating it.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. -- just a second --

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't have time.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, your time is up.

 6             But how much would you need for your re-examination, Ms. West?

 7             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I'll only need five minutes.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I kindly ask for more time.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE KWON:  How long would you need to wrap-up your

12     cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, at least an

14     additional session.  This kind of witness, with over 200 paragraphs, with

15     generalised statements, if the Chamber is going to take into account any

16     one of these statements, I ask for the opportunity to challenge them.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Make your questions simpler and be focused in

18     putting your question.  You'll have an hour tomorrow morning in addition

19     to today's session.

20             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, may I be heard?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             MS. WEST:  Just one matter.  As you're aware, tomorrow we have

23     two DutchBat witnesses who are testifying in Dutch, and so tomorrow the

24     Dutch interpreters have been ordered.  I understand that their testimony

25     probably in total would be four hours.  We have been rescheduling this a


Page 22911

 1     few times because of the issue of the interpreters, so I wonder if you

 2     could take that into account so that we don't have them go over.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Do you mean that hearing the -- one of the DutchBat

 4     officers next week is impossible?  I was not informed of that.

 5             MS. WEST:  I think -- well, of course it's not -- anything is

 6     possible, but I would wonder if perhaps tomorrow morning we could start

 7     with the DutchBat officers because they've been rescheduled so many times

 8     and we specifically have Dutch interpreters here tomorrow.  I don't know,

 9     I wonder if Mr. Kingori could then testify, and if it goes over, then he

10     goes over.

11             JUDGE KWON:  I'll have to clarify with Mr. Kingori, whether he

12     has any problem staying over in the weekend until -- staying until next

13     Monday.

14             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I would have some domestic problems

15     because I had not made some arrangements at home that I will stay longer

16     than eight days.

17             JUDGE KWON:  We'll sort out after today's hearing is adjourned in

18     co-operation with the Registry.

19             Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Please take a look at your paragraph 32 in your statement.  First

23     of all, up here we have this conditional phrase and then in paragraph 32

24     you take this to be an official document and then you give your own

25     judgement.  Just take a look at paragraph 32, isn't that the case?


Page 22912

 1        A.   Your Honour, this is -- actually, taken from what Colonel Vukovic

 2     had said and I've just summarised and said it was not just a threat.

 3     Initially we thought it was just a threat and we conveyed the same, even

 4     to the Muslims, but later on it was actualised and that is exactly what

 5     I've said here.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, by "conditional phrase," what did you

 7     refer to in his amalgamated statement?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, in paragraph 31, Mr. Kingori

 9     remembered that Colonel Vukovic said "we should say" and in our language

10     that would be the conditional, like it would allow for the possibility of

11     us sending them that message.  It's like when someone says "I'd kill him"

12     and then no one kills anyone.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  All right.  Please continue.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   On the basis of what do you say -- actually, do you know how many

16     Serbs lived in Srebrenica before 1992?  We can just have a yes or no

17     answer.

18        A.   No, I didn't.

19        Q.   Thank you.  If I tell you that one-third of the population and at

20     least one-third of the villages were Serb and that none of that existed

21     any longer after May 1992 already, they were all killed or expelled, what

22     would you say to that?

23        A.   Nothing.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that throughout Republika Srpska, then

25     and today, there were Muslims who lived in towns and villages with a Serb


Page 22913

 1     majority population?

 2        A.   Your Honour, it's possible.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Your conclusion is that Serbs planned, said, asked

 4     for Muslim civilians to be evacuated from the enclave, and this is what I

 5     put to you.  The Muslim government in Srebrenica and the Muslim

 6     government in Sarajevo and your commands and the United Nations and the

 7     envoy of the Secretary-General and Mr. Karremans, all of you were

 8     planning for them to leave and only the Serb side was silent awaiting

 9     what the Muslim side had to say?

10        A.   Your Honour, what I know is that the UN did not have any such

11     plans.  What I said or what I wrote was part of what was told to us by

12     Colonel Vukovic, a BSA officer, and Major Nikolic, also from BSA.  So I

13     do not know what else to add on that because it was not coming from

14     myself as Colonel Kingori or from the UN system.  It was coming from your

15     [Realtime transcript read in error "the"] officers.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 01883 would be the 65 ter number

17     that I'd like to have displayed now.  I think it's been admitted recently

18     as a P document.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4150, Your Honours.

20             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, maybe before you start on that the

21     answer that I gave, the last part, I said it was coming from "your

22     officers" not from "the officers."

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Kingori.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Who else?  Who were the other officers in addition to the ones


Page 22914

 1     that you've already mentioned?

 2        A.   Your Honour, there are several other officers that we were

 3     meeting with and the names are somewhere within the reports that we made.

 4        Q.   You said in this paragraph here and during your

 5     examination-in-chief, I think, that in addition to these two there were

 6     six high-ranking officers attending the meeting with you.  Who are they?

 7        A.   Your Honour, I can't remember their names, but they were names

 8     like Dricic [phoen] and several other officers.  Right now I cannot

 9     remember the names offhand.  But we listed the names and we gave them

10     out.

11        Q.   Today you said not only from the army.  Tell us, who was there on

12     behalf of the government, the civilian authorities, who had these plans

13     and how were you assured of that?

14        A.   Your Honour, what I knew at that time is that there was a

15     civilian government in place in Sarajevo for the whole of Bosnia that

16     was -- that had an army that we were calling the BSA which was led by

17     General Mladic and which had hierarchy all the way down, up to the lowest

18     level that we were operating with, that was Colonel Vukovic and

19     Major Nikolic, and the civilian leadership was in place.

20        Q.   Today you implied that you had proof that it wasn't only these

21     two local officers, middle-ranking, that had this intention, but there

22     were others who shared that intention at higher levels too.  Tell us, do

23     you have proof of that?  Do you have names?  And then we can move on.

24        A.   Your Honour, if I said that, I cannot remember.  What I know is

25     that these officers were conveying messages given to them, obviously,


Page 22915

 1     from higher up in the hierarchy, in the leadership, all the way down to

 2     that level.  And even on our side we were giving information that we had

 3     from up there and the opposite is also true, that whatever we got from

 4     there, the officers we were calling middle-ranking officers, we had to

 5     take it all the way up to the UN system.  And that if there was anything

 6     to be discussed at other higher levels, at the general level or at the

 7     presidential level, it would be done at their own level, not at ours.

 8        Q.   You're speculating, Mr. Kingori.  Do you have proof or are you

 9     just speculating, drawing logical conclusions, or do you have proof in

10     actual fact?

11        A.   Your Honour, this is not speculation.  Your Honour, there is --

12     there was a special -- a proper chain of command all the way for the BSA.

13     There was a chain of command.  All the way from the lowest to the highest

14     level --

15        Q.   These are logical conclusions.  Do you have any proof --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. --

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellency, he is

18     spending my time in dealing with general questions that I never put.

19             JUDGE KWON:  You are just repeating your question on the topic to

20     which the witness has already answered.

21             It's time to adjourn for today --

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just introduce this document,

23     Excellency, the one that we've already seen?  I hope that everybody saw

24     that.  May I?

25             JUDGE KWON:  I don't follow, Mr. Karadzic.


Page 22916

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since we've had this document

 2     called up, I would like to present it, introduce it, to show how these

 3     Muslim structures --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, very well.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- started with these requests for

 6     having the population evacuated.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, you didn't ask a question about this.  Please

 8     carry on.  What is your question?  I take it the witness has read this

 9     part.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Mr. Kingori, in this text by Mr. Akashi it says that it was the

12     initiative of the Muslim government - and this was written on the 11th in

13     the morning - to organise discussions with the Serbian side in order to

14     evacuate civilians from Srebrenica.  And before that, on the 9th July,

15     the same initiative is expressed by the Muslim authorities of Srebrenica.

16     They request from the Serbian side to open a corridor so that the

17     population can leave for the nearest free territory.  And already on the

18     11th Akashi --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic --

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   -- describes all that.

22             JUDGE KWON:  -- are you asking a question about Mr. Akashi's

23     report or on this document?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No.  I am going to introduce

25     Akashi's report, not today but tomorrow.  I'm asking if Mr. Kingori knows


Page 22917

 1     that this initiative of the 9th came from the Muslim authorities of

 2     Srebrenica, that the population be evacuated.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I think that's the question, whether you knew

 4     that --

 5             THE WITNESS:  About the evacuation?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  The initiative of the 9th came from Muslim

 7     authorities of Srebrenica, that the population be evacuated.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I can see that report here, that

 9     request, but this cannot be dealt with in isolation because the

10     activities which were going on there meant the Muslims had to get out of

11     Srebrenica.  It reached a point where they were taken all the way to

12     Potocari, living in very bad conditions, and so we had also even

13     requested that they be evacuated.  So the evacuation, even if it

14     originated or there was a letter to that effect, I'm sure the BSA maybe

15     did not know about it at that particular moment.  But they went ahead and

16     evacuated or removed the Muslims from there using their own buses, as we

17     have already seen and as it is in my statement.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             Could the Court Deputy approach the bench.

20                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21             JUDGE KWON:  I just had a word with the Court Deputy and was

22     confirmed that we can continue with Mr. Kingori's evidence tomorrow

23     morning.  We'll adjourn for today and resume at 9.00 -- but before that,

24     yes, Ms. West.

25             MS. WEST:  Apologies, Mr. President.  I just wanted to alert you


Page 22918

 1     that last time with the Dutch interpreters in December, we had difficulty

 2     getting them for another day, and I just wondered if perhaps tomorrow we

 3     might consider going long if there was an issue.

 4                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I was informed that they will be available on Monday

 6     as well.

 7             Just one quick matter.  I appreciate the indulgence of the staff

 8     members, but I was informed that Defence filed a motion to exclude some

 9     part of evidence from Mr. Tucker's statement which was filed today and I

10     wonder whether we can have your response by the end of tomorrow.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President, I believe so.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             The hearing is now adjourned.

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.07 p.m.,

15                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 13th day of

16                           January, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.

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