Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 23022

 1                           Monday, 16 January 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Before we begin today,

 7     Mr. Robinson, probably you remember the Chamber's oral order lifting the

 8     confidentiality of the submission from a certain country.  Having heard

 9     that, that country intends to respond to your motion, and having noticed

10     that order hasn't been implemented, I told the Registry to hold the

11     implementation of it.  Very well.

12             Mr. Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

14     Good morning to all.

15                           WITNESS:  ROGER PATELSKI [Resumed]

16                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

17                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

18        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Patelski.

19        A.   Good morning.

20        Q.   Did you notice the presence of any military observers in

21     Srebrenica, and if so, did you co-operate with them?

22        A.   I saw the observers various times, but I never had any contact

23     with those people.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know what it was that they did, what their job

25     was?

Page 23023

 1        A.   At the time, I understood that they were present at the different

 2     meetings on behalf of the battalion staff reporting to the superior

 3     military officers, and on various occasions they negotiated with, for

 4     example, the different parties.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know their names?  Did you know them

 6     personally?

 7        A.   No.  I don't know the observers by name, and I don't know them

 8     personally either.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Did they help the Dutch Battalion in any way?

10        A.   Quite honestly, I can't answer that because I don't know.

11        Q.   Thank you.  In your amalgamated statement, in paragraph 10, you

12     say that you saw Serb trenches and that you saw Serb snipers operating.

13     Where were Serbs within the range of snipers?  What is the range for an

14     ordinary sniper?

15        A.   If you ask me what the range is of a sniper, I can't tell you

16     exactly because that's not my area of expertise.  All I can tell you is

17     that I saw them at that time, so before the fall of the enclave.  That

18     was quite a bit before the enclave was about to fall.

19        Q.   Do you have your statement before you, your amalgamated

20     statement?  Well, we can call it up in e-court in order to be able to see

21     paragraph 10.

22        A.   I don't have it in front of me, no.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I ask the Prosecution to

24     provide a hard copy of the amalgamated statement to the witness, please.

25             JUDGE KWON:  It's here through e-court.

Page 23024

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  I have it in front of me.  I

 2     can read along.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Please look at paragraph 10 now.  Where were the

 5     Serbs in a position to use snipers against the Muslims at this point in

 6     time?

 7        A.   At the time I was doing my work, that was at the observation

 8     post, that was generally in the north-westerly direction at the top of

 9     the hills, and from that position the snipers were able to do their work.

10        Q.   What is the distance involved?

11        A.   Do you mean the distance from where I was to the sniper?

12        Q.   I mean the distance, between the Serb positions and the Muslim

13     houses.  This is what I put to you, that the distance was far too great

14     and that that did not happen.

15        A.   Well, I can't guess about the distance, and I don't want to

16     guess.  All I can say that I saw those snipers as -- as did my colleagues

17     several times from where I was.  So the sun was regularly in that line of

18     vision.  And next shots fell from that -- when shots were fired from that

19     location, we wound up with injured people several times at our

20     observation post.

21        Q.   Tell me, please, at which point during the year is the sun at

22     south-west on the northern hemisphere?  When is the sun at north-west?

23        A.   I have no idea.

24        Q.   Never, Mr. Patelski, never.  The sun can only be on the east,

25     south-east, south and south-east, on the northern hemisphere that is.  Do

Page 23025

 1     you know the name of any victim?

 2        A.   No, I don't have any names because they were all residents of the

 3     enclave, and of course I didn't know them personally.

 4        Q.   So they were within the agreed boundaries of the enclave, the

 5     area that you patrolled; right?

 6        A.   You mean the victims?

 7        Q.   Muslim village, yes, that Muslim village where people live and

 8     who were allegedly within the range of Serb trenches and Serb fire.  They

 9     were on the separation line, and the Serbs were on the other side outside

10     the enclave; right?

11        A.   At that time, the sniper was on the outside of the enclave, but

12     his range was sufficient to claim victims, and we wound up with those

13     victims at the entrance to our observation post, and we treated them.

14        Q.   Give us one such case.  Tell us who was wounded, what this

15     person's name is, when this happened.

16        A.   First, I can't give you a date.  I don't know that.  And second,

17     I certainly can't give you a name because I don't know those people by

18     name.

19        Q.   Did you report about that?

20        A.   That was one of our duties if we observed anything out of the

21     ordinary, incidents or whatever.  We would always draft a report, and we

22     would submit that report to our commanders.

23        Q.   And is there such a report that civilians were hit by sniper and

24     that you took care of them?

25        A.   When something like that has happened, we report that by radio to

Page 23026

 1     our OPs room, and all reports arrive there, and we did so.  Subsequently,

 2     it was forwarded to the commander so that he could use that information.

 3        Q.   The ones that came later were reports in writing; right?

 4        A.   At the observation post we did everything from one minute to the

 5     next.  When we observed, we would make notes.  We would take notes about

 6     that, and we would report very urgent matters immediately.  Some reports

 7     were done every other hour.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  So we have the Serb positions there, and then we have

 9     your station, and then there are the Muslim villages.  Were the Muslim

10     villages between you and the Serbs or were you between the Serbs and the

11     Muslims?

12        A.   Could you please repeat that question for me.

13        Q.   We have the Serb positions on the one hand and the Muslim village

14     on the other hand.  Was this Muslim village closer to the Serbs than you

15     were or was your observation post closer?

16        A.   We were reasonably close to the assorted villages.  So if you ask

17     me that question, then I think that we were close to the villages.  When

18     victims fell, they reached us fairly quickly.

19        Q.   However, your observation post, was it on the periphery?  Were

20     you closer to the Serbs or were the villages closer to the Serbs?

21        A.   Well from, my observation post, of course, we were adjacent to

22     the different houses across the street.  There were some houses.  The

23     closest post to us was Yellow Bridge.

24        Q.   But my question is:  Were you closer to the Serbs or were Muslim

25     villages closer to the Serbs?  Who was deeper into the enclave, you or

Page 23027

 1     the Muslim village?

 2        A.   I don't know.

 3        Q.   How can you not know?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Patelski, if you are shown a map, do you think

 5     you can mark the positions of those snipers and the victims and yourself?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Then I propose that you show

 7     me the normal map and not the aerial photograph.  I would be able to

 8     point it out better that way.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I will leave it to the parties.

10             Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   We'll go back to that.  I would kindly ask that we be provided

13     with a map that the witness would understand.

14             Actually, Mr. Witness --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it is for you, if you're minded to put

16     that to the witness.

17             Please proceed.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll find it.  I thought that the

19     OTP had it -- well, the OTP tendered something, so I thought that perhaps

20     we could have that.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   In paragraph 19 and otherwise you use this form, this form of

23     syntax:

24             [In English] "They would go near the house and throw a grenade

25     into it.  After that, they would enter the house with the dogs," and so

Page 23028

 1     on and so on.

 2             [Interpretation] Tell us, please, the civilian population, was it

 3     there when the Serbs advanced or had the civilian population left

 4     beforehand?  Had they gone to Potocari beforehand?

 5        A.   When on the day concerned the Serb troops entered the enclave, of

 6     course the day before something happened from the south, so various

 7     refugees went in the direction of Potocari to our camp, and when we were

 8     confronted with the incursion from the north, various people were still

 9     present in their homes, so on the north side of the enclave.

10        Q.   And you say that in some village the Muslim civilian population

11     was there to see the arrival of the Serb troops; right?

12        A.   I don't know if about that.  From our observation posts we can't

13     see everything in the enclave, only a small portion of it.  But I don't

14     think the population sat there waiting for the arrival of the Serb

15     militia.

16        Q.   Well, look at what you say in paragraph 19:

17             [In English] "They would go near the house," and so on and so on.

18             [Interpretation] And then you would hear gunshots and screams or

19     whatever it was that you said.  Shooting and screams.  And you say that

20     you knew that a number of Muslim people were still living in those houses

21     and that you had the impression that the people had been killed in those

22     houses.

23             Mr. Witness, you are testifying about things you had seen.  Are

24     you saying that you saw some civilians actually staying there and being

25     killed by the Serb troops once they arrived?

Page 23029

 1        A.   From the towers, from the tower of my observation post I could

 2     see very clearly that the Serb army entered and started to purge all the

 3     homes.  That's what I saw.  Not only I.  My colleagues saw that as well.

 4        Q.   Purge all the homes from what?

 5        A.   At the time the Serb army entered and marched to the south or to

 6     the base, well, all houses were looked over.  Not simply looked over to

 7     see whether there were still people there.  There were still people

 8     there.  And as I described in item 19, I stand behind that because I saw

 9     it.  I not only saw it, I also heard it.  And I was not the only one who

10     saw it.  My colleagues saw it too.

11        Q.   And how many such houses did they enter?  They -- you say that

12     they went to the next house and then they would repeat the same thing;

13     right?

14        A.   Yes.  That's entirely correct.

15        Q.   And then the people in the next house, they would just be sitting

16     there waiting for the Serbs to come and kill them; right?  And then the

17     third house and then the fourth house, and then the fifth house.  People

18     would just be sitting in their homes listening to screams and moans that

19     you allegedly heard as well, and shooting, and you say that you saw and

20     heard that, and they did nothing.  They just sat there.

21             MS. WEST:  Good morning, Mr. President.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. West.

23             MS. WEST:  I object to these forms of questions.  They're not

24     questions at all.  They're argument.  It's the defendant's case and he

25     goes on and on.  It's argumentative.  This witness should not be

Page 23030

 1     subjected to it, and the defendant should ask this witness a simple

 2     question.

 3                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you can ask the witness what he saw,

 5     not formulating as a submission, as Ms. West indicated, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, but here it is,

 7     paragraph 19.  That's what he says.  They enter one house, then shooting

 8     would be heard and screams, and then they'd leave that house and then go

 9     into the next house and then another one and yet another one.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Mr. Patelski, you say that.  You say that people were just

12     sitting there waiting, whereas these other people were purging, as you

13     say, the houses in that way.  Just tell me, is this what you're actually

14     saying?

15        A.   That's aren't my words.  Those are your words.

16        Q.   And are these your words:

17             [In English] "They would then move to the next house.  This went

18     on for a couple of hours, and at one particular moment I remember seeing

19     people coming out of at least one house."

20             [Interpretation] For several hours that was going on.  That is

21     what you describe in paragraph 19, Serbs entering houses one by one,

22     killing people, and in all these other houses people are just sitting

23     there and waiting for their turn to come.  Is that your position, sir?

24     Is that what you saw and heard?

25        A.   First, once again, those are not my words.  Those are your words.

Page 23031

 1     People don't wait to be killed.  And what I saw was that the Serb army on

 2     the -- simply marched forward, including with their dogs, and they

 3     entered.  It doesn't mean that they entered each house.  They entered

 4     along a line.  So conceivably they might take over two or three houses at

 5     a time.  They would enter it.  They would barge into the houses and

 6     shoot.  I heard screaming.  Grenades were thrown in, and at -- by the

 7     time they were done, the army set those houses on fire, and to them that

 8     was a sign that they were done once the house was ablaze, and they would

 9     continue their march.  That's how you should see it.

10        Q.   And that lasted for a few hours; right?

11        A.   From my impression, it took a few hours.

12        Q.   All right.  How many victims were there in those civilian

13     villages?

14        A.   I don't know.

15        Q.   All right.  Do you know, Mr. Patelski, that the Muslim

16     authorities had sent their representatives to every village and ordered

17     that civilians go to Potocari, whereas able bodied military-age men were

18     told to make a break-through to Tuzla?  They never met with resistance

19     from civilians.  They sometimes met with resistance from people who had

20     hidden weapons in haystacks, and those people resisted when the weapons

21     were to be seized from them.  Do you know that the Muslims were told to

22     leave before the Serbs came?

23             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, may I just have a cite for this?  I'm

24     not familiar with it.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, all the witnesses we've heard

Page 23032

 1     confirmed this, including the Dutch witnesses.  And a Muslim witness also

 2     said that the authorities had ordered civilians to go to Potocari.  Look

 3     at 0.45.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I think the accused can proceed with that question.

 5     The witness can answer as far as he knows.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All I can answer to this question

 7     is that at the moment the enclave fell I was at Observation Post Papa,

 8     and I was taken hostage there too.  There were some things that I saw,

 9     and they all appear in my statement, and everything else that happened at

10     that time, of course, I don't have any way of knowing about that.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Patelski, from that tower at that OP Papa, how

12     far were the Muslim houses that were set fire?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That would be tens of metres.  So

14     between 20 and 200 metres from where I was located, what I could see.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we then see 23519.  That's

17     the 65 ter number.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   And we would kindly ask you to mark the relevant points.  Page 8,

20     please.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we just enlarge, or rather,

22     zoom in on the area of the enclave, the border in purple.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Could you now please mark your position.  Just wait for the usher

25     to give you the pen.

Page 23033

 1        A.   My position at that moment?

 2        Q.   Yes.

 3        A.   That's OP Papa, the north side of the enclave, i.e., the entrance

 4     to the enclave.

 5        Q.   Please mark it with number 1.

 6        A.   [Marks]

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And where was the Muslim village?

 8        A.   From my position and then there are a few villages.

 9        Q.   And that's very close to the UN base in Potocari; right?

10        A.   Well, that would be between the base and the observation post

11     where I was at the time, OP Papa.  Both to the left and to the right.

12        Q.   It's almost inside the base; right?  Very close.

13        A.   It's within 1 kilometre.

14        Q.   All right.  Tell us then, how many victims were there, and in

15     which report can we find it, the kind of victims you described?

16        A.   Which victims do you mean?

17        Q.   Victims in houses.  You described the civilian population

18     remained in their homes, that Serbs came with dogs, troops came inside

19     houses, threw grenades in.  You heard screaming.  How many victims were

20     there, and in which report can we find it?

21        A.   First, I don't know how many victims there were, and second, I

22     can't tell you what the reports were.  I cannot make a statement about

23     that here.

24        Q.   And if I tell you, Mr. Patelski, that there is no such thing in

25     UN reports, although it happened, if we are to believe you, right outside

Page 23034

 1     the UN base, how come it's not in any report?

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, it's self-evident the witness

 3     can't answer a negative question like that.  First of all, you're making

 4     a submission, i.e., giving evidence that there are no reports; and

 5     secondly, you're asking the witness to comment on why something hasn't

 6     happened.  It's -- it's an example of how you use your time very badly.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could I please follow up on that?

 8     Everything that we saw through all particularities, all troop

 9     displacements, everything concerning possible victims, everything that we

10     saw, we communicated that directly via our radio connection.  At the time

11     we still had that radio connection, which was subsequently taken from us

12     by the Serb army because of the fact that we were taken hostage at the

13     time and couldn't do anything any more, but everything that we saw we

14     reported over the radio, and what happened with that afterwards I have no

15     idea, but I stand by the statement.

16             JUDGE KWON:  In your statement, Mr. Patelski, you stated that you

17     had the impression that people had been killed in houses.  So you were

18     not sure that people were actually killed inside the houses.  That's

19     correct?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  When I say my impression,

21     what I mean is that I didn't see it, physical, visual contact with the

22     victims and the people, but I did hear that people were screaming and

23     yelling.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Patelski.

25             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 23035

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Mr. Patelski, did the Muslim side have trenches between you and

 3     the Serbs, or maybe behind your back or right in front of you?  Were

 4     there any Muslim trenches facing the Serbs there?

 5        A.   I don't remember exactly how the trenches lay, but I know that

 6     the Serbs brought in reinforcements, that preparations had been in

 7     progress for a few days, so a few days in advance, reinforcements

 8     replaced, and at the same time, of course the Muslims weren't crazy.

 9     They started working on their own defence.  So they also dug trenches and

10     prepared for the things that lay ahead.

11             JUDGE KWON:  In the meantime, could you kindly put number 2 for

12     those markings indicating to the Muslim villages and then ...

13             THE WITNESS:  [Marks]

14             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  And could you kindly put your initials

15     and today's date at the bottom of the map, which is 16th of January.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ordinarily my handwriting is

17     better.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That will be the next Defence exhibit.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2005, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Thank you.  When you say Muslims were not fools and of course

23     they prepared themselves, do you know what kind of military resources

24     Muslims had in the enclave?

25        A.   No, I don't know that because I didn't see them.  I didn't see

Page 23036

 1     what types of resources the Muslim warriors had available to them.

 2        Q.   Wasn't one of the tasks of UNPROFOR to keep the enclave

 3     demilitarised?

 4        A.   That's correct, but again, I have to base myself on my level at

 5     the time and where I was at the time.  I was a soldier one, so part of

 6     implementation aspects, so all I can speak about is something that I know

 7     and that I saw, and everything else is speculation on my part.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Have you ever been told that carrying weapons is

 9     forbidden in the enclave and there should be no military formations?  Did

10     you ever receive such an assignment, and were you ever informed that

11     there were military units there and that people were carrying weapons?

12        A.   I knew that you weren't supposed to bear arms at the time.  In

13     the compound in the city of Srebrenica there was a weapon collection

14     point where all weapons were surrendered.  That's what I know about that.

15     And once again, when I was in service during the fall of the enclave, I

16     did not observe any troop displacements as far as the Muslims were

17     concerned.  All I can speak about is what I saw and all the troop

18     movements were by the Serbs.

19        Q.   Was it then also your task to -- or mainly your task to observe

20     the conduct of the Serbs and neglecting the DutchBat mission to preserve

21     demilitarisation and monitor it?

22        A.   We had to report everything out of the ordinary.  It doesn't

23     matter which group this concerned.  Everything out of the ordinary

24     concerning displacements, incidents, whether by the Muslims or the Serbs,

25     that didn't matter.  Everything relevant, which meant everything, we had

Page 23037

 1     to report everything out of the ordinary.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  May I ask for your understanding now, because I did

 3     not notify in advance one exhibit.  It's a short video, 40582.  Could we

 4     see it now, please, from 16:45.

 5                           [Video-clip played]

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Are you familiar with this area, Mr. Patelski?

 8        A.   It looks familiar, yes.

 9        Q.   It's close to your observation post.  Can you see the Muslim

10     trenches there and Muslim soldiers hiding there, finding cover from fire?

11        A.   Could you please repeat that question.

12        Q.   This was filmed from the Serb side, and you see the Serbs

13     standing in front of Muslim trenches taking cover, and they are pointing

14     to the cameraman where the Muslim trenches are.  So the enclave was

15     surrounded with Muslim trenches; correct?

16        A.   I don't know exactly.  If I watched the video properly, then that

17     recording was done near Potocari, our big base, and when the enclave was

18     about to fall.  I wasn't there because I was at OP Papa.

19        Q.   Isn't that close?

20        A.   There's about a kilometre between Potocari and Observation Post

21     Papa, and from our post you can't see all of the kilometre, of course.

22     So everything in the vicinity of OP Papa was easily perceptible to us,

23     and everything deeper into the enclave I can't tell you, and I'm not

24     going to make any statement about that.

25        Q.   Thank you.  You saw soldiers here that you described exactly that

Page 23038

 1     way, long haired and bands around their heads, a mixture of military and

 2     civilian clothing.  So did you see, did you notice that they had these

 3     hair bands or bandannas?

 4        A.   Yes, I saw that, among other things.

 5        Q.   Did you know that the Muslims had at least three tanks in the

 6     enclave?

 7        A.   No.  I knew nothing about that.

 8        Q.   But you knew that the Serbs were carrying anti-tank weapons, and

 9     you spoke about that in your statement, in your evidence before this

10     Tribunal in response to a question from the Prosecution.  That was your

11     testimony.  Let me see.  In 2000, on 6th June, number 30099299.  Did you

12     see the Serbs carrying antitank weapons?

13        A.   Well, what I saw is that Serb militias, and they were several

14     Serb militias, were armed in various ways, including those items.

15        Q.   But you also saw some Chetniks with Chetnik insignia and emblems,

16     and they were long-haired young men; right?

17        A.   Well, there was a variety of different appearances.  For example,

18     indeed long-haired men, bandannas, those things, yes.

19        Q.   Tell us, please, you mentioned you were hostages.  How did that

20     happen?  On what day, and in what form at OP Papa?

21        A.   That was on the 12th in the morning.  Anticipating this matter in

22     February, somewhere between February and March, you'll find it in my

23     statement, the observation commander, Mr. Jovo, had already told us,

24     that's me and my commander, that in the summer the Serb army would carry

25     out an offensive.  We reported that immediately.  On the 11th the south

Page 23039

 1     was attacked, and then in the north on the 12th we -- we were overrun.

 2     Before that, we were being fired at for a few days.  We were in a bunker.

 3     And then the enclave was shot at from outside and the shooting was

 4     directed at the population in the enclave.  And immediately from the

 5     early morning on the 12th, Mr. Jovo sent us report, because we had a

 6     line.  That's also in my statement.  So we had telephone contact.

 7        Q.   [No interpretation]

 8             Wait a minute.  Let's explain this.  How many victims were there

 9     among the civilian population where the shells were falling?  Let just be

10     precise.

11        A.   I can't report anything about that because I don't know the exact

12     figures.

13        Q.   You were in the bunker at OP Papa, and you say the fire was

14     targeting civilian population.  How can you prove that?

15        A.   When we were in the bunkers, at the time we still had access to

16     our communication devices, and we maintained those at all time.  We were

17     in contact with our immediate commander in the OPs room when the enclave

18     fell at the south, and the days before concerning all the particularities

19     concerning the shooting and the shelling, they reached us by radio

20     communication.  So we were informed by radio and were kept informed about

21     everything that happened in the enclave.

22             We were not only kept informed, but you can also keep track of

23     already our reports, and then from the other side of the enclave you

24     automatically get updates and particularities.

25        Q.   Thank you.  So you did not see that the fire was targeting

Page 23040

 1     civilians.  You learned that from someone else by radio; right?

 2        A.   Which fire do you mean?

 3        Q.   You said a moment ago that the enclave was under fire from

 4     outside.  The fire was targeting civilian population.  And when I asked

 5     you to corroborate that, you said that although you were under cover in a

 6     shelter, you received radio information about that.  So I'm saying you

 7     did not see that the fire targeted civilians.  You received information

 8     about that.

 9        A.   Yes.  The situation you're referring to now, that was prior to

10     the invasion of the enclave, and there was some firing before that too.

11     Again, everything that happened from the north during the fall of the

12     enclave I saw all that, and everything before then, when I was in the

13     bunker, we heard only by radio.  So I didn't see that.  So that's my

14     statement.

15        Q.   Thank you.  However, at one point you said in your statement, the

16     number is 00564816, on page 1, that you were detained at OP Papa on the

17     14th of July around 8.00 in the morning; right?

18        A.   No, that's not correct.  The date is the wrong.

19        Q.   Is it correct that that's how the statement reads?  This is the

20     questionnaire, document number such and such.  I stated the number.  It's

21     a questionnaire that you filled in.  Did you fill in a questionnaire?

22        A.   I made various statements, yes.

23        Q.   Do you see that it states here the 14th of July?  This is

24     paragraph 9 of this statement.

25        A.   Yes.  I see that it reads that.

Page 23041

 1        Q.   Thank you.  However, you were guarded by Serb soldiers at the

 2     place where you were; is that correct?

 3        A.   After the advance started, we were indeed taken hostage.  We were

 4     detained, yes.

 5        Q.   What do you understand that the definition of hostages is

 6     according to you, Mr. Patelski?

 7        A.   Well, when I'm deprived of my freedom and I can't walk from A to

 8     B and I can't say what I want to say and my equipment is taken from me

 9     and I'm held at gunpoint and I'm looking down the barrel of an AK-47,

10     then I think that would be some type of hostage situation.

11        Q.   Were you armed?  Some weapons were confiscated from you; is that

12     right?

13        A.   That's correct.  Some weapons were confiscated at our observation

14     post.  We don't carry our arm the entire day.  The weapons are kept in a

15     weapon rack, and the moment we were taken hostage, a certain number of

16     colleagues were forced to surrender their arms, and I also had to

17     surrender my arm.  And the men who were not on duty, they had their arm

18     in that rack.  In the end, we all had to surrender our -- we all had to

19     surrender our arms.  We were forced to do so.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Can you see what you said in your statement?

21     Actually, it's also in this questionnaire.  On page 2 where you say that

22     you were held, and in the statement that you gave in 2000 and page 3,

23     this is -- actually, let's look at page 2 of the questionnaire first.

24     It's paragraph 11.  Taken captive or restricted in your freedom of

25     movement:

Page 23042

 1             [In English] [As read] "At that time, we were -- OP Papa north

 2     side of the enclave, your access to the enclave through the Papa."

 3             [Interpretation] At that point in time was your battalion on the

 4     side of the Muslim armed forces?  Were they in an alliance and were they

 5     helping the Muslim forces?  Were you involved in the conflict?

 6        A.   Would you please repeat that question for me?  I didn't follow it

 7     properly.

 8        Q.   Your unit, your battalion, at that time did it place itself on

 9     the side of the Muslim army in Srebrenica and get involved in the war?

10        A.   All I can say is that I was involved in an incident and a

11     conflict between the Serbs and the Muslims, and all I can say is that I

12     was taken prisoner -- or, rather, I was taken hostage, and everything

13     else is speculation on my part, so I can't make any statement about that.

14        Q.   And what is the difference between a prisoner on a hostage in

15     your opinion?  Is there a difference?

16        A.   Why are you asking me that, if you don't mind me asking?

17        Q.   For the sake of precision, Mr. Patelski.  You are describing the

18     situation that you were in as a situation of hostage-taking.  This is one

19     criminal act.  However, taking captive and holding is something else.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Let me -- let us clarify with the Prosecution.

21             Mr. Patelski is not listed as one of the victims of

22     hostage-taking, Ms. West?

23             MS. WEST:  He's not.

24             JUDGE KWON:  No.  Let us proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 23043

 1        Q.   Thank you.  You filled in this questionnaire on the

 2     30th of October, 1995; is that correct?

 3        A.   I made various statements, including this one, yes.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender the

 6     questionnaire, and I would like to also tender the video-clip from 16:30.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please be asked to repeat

 8     the counter numbers.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Before that, yes, Ms. West.

10             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I just wanted to say for the record the

11     video-clip which is 40582, that's the 65 ter number, has three parts and

12     the part that Mr. Karadzic played was V000-9035.  He started at, I

13     believe, 16:45 to 17:27.

14             JUDGE KWON:  So you do not objection to the admission of that

15     part?

16             MS. WEST:  No.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Is it part of the Srebrenica trial video?

18             MS. WEST:  It is.  It's part of 65 ter 40582.

19             JUDGE KWON:  But separate -- irrespective of you're -- the fact

20     that you are tendering that video in its entirety, we'll admit this part

21     for the Defence purpose.  Yes.  And you have no objection to the

22     admission of his -- his response to this questionnaire?

23             MS. WEST:  I do not.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Both will be admitted.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour, the video will be Exhibit

Page 23044

 1     D2006, and the questionnaire will be Exhibit D2007.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   In your statement from 2000, however, this is 00999209, on

 5     page 3, you said that you were guarded that whole day.  [In English]

 6     Guarded all the time that day.

 7        A.   That's correct.

 8        Q.   [Interpretation] Was this the 14th or the 12th?

 9        A.   On the 12th.

10        Q.   Thank you.  And at that time you experienced that as being

11     guarded, and now you are looking at it as being a hostage; is that

12     correct?

13        A.   My colleagues and I were placed together in a corner of our

14     observation post and held at gunpoint, so from my perspective that was a

15     hostages situation.

16        Q.   But you didn't say that in 2000.  You said that you were being

17     guarded the whole day; is that correct?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, this is not a witness to clarify the

19     meaning of "hostage" different from being a prisoner or whatever.  Let us

20     proceed.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Is it correct that your camp was not overseen by the Serbian army

24     and that at the time there were Muslim soldiers in the compound; is that

25     correct?

Page 23045

 1        A.   Could you please repeat that question.

 2        Q.   You said that -- actually, you said in your statement from 2000,

 3     on page 4, that you didn't see anything but that you had the impression

 4     that somewhere in the Potocari compound Muslim soldiers were being shot

 5     at; is that correct?  But you didn't see who was shooting, nor did you

 6     see anyone get killed; is that correct?

 7        A.   I'm reading the piece on the screen right now.  Okay.  Yes, I

 8     remember this part.  I can't say who fired those shots.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Did you not say that you saw the excavator and that

10     in the compound itself a few people were buried?

11        A.   I don't know anything about an excavator.

12        Q.   But in the debriefing, at your army - this is 0055-7276 to

13     0055-7277, on page 1 - this is what you said and that the grave was

14     covered, and then you say that it was covered over more.  Do you know

15     that to this day there is digging going on, that they are searching for

16     that grave and it's not -- hasn't been found yet, and all of this because

17     somebody at your ministry stated something and misinformed them?

18        A.   All I can tell you is what I saw, and if you're referring to the

19     improvised grave in the compound, yes, I did see that.  At least I saw it

20     being -- I saw it being shut and the earth being thrown into it.  I

21     didn't speak with the person assigned to do that.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Excuse me.  Excuse me.  "I did speak with the

23     person assigned to do that."

24             MS. WEST:

25        Q.   Who was that person?  You are saying, thus, that there was a

Page 23046

 1     grave dug at the compound and that somebody was buried.  Did you see that

 2     they were burying somebody in that grave?

 3        A.   I'll repeat this one more time for you.  All I saw was the last

 4     moment when the grave was covered.  It was basically all finished.

 5        Q.   Were there any bodies in the grave?  Whose bodies?  How did they

 6     die?

 7        A.   Whose bodies those were and how they died, I don't know.  All I

 8     saw was part of a hand protruding, and later on that was neatly covered

 9     as well.

10        Q.   Mr. Patelski, they're digging there, and they're looking for it

11     there on the basis of your information, and they haven't found anything

12     yet.  Was this recorded in your battalion, and who was the person who did

13     that?

14        A.   I don't know who submitted the reports.  When I returned from

15     Observation Post Papa, we walked around the base several times to escort

16     and help the different injured and refugees.  And once again, I saw a

17     grave being covered there.  And how many people they were and which

18     reports were submitted, I can't tell you that.

19        Q.   Did you see the grave in the compound in your base, inside the

20     base?

21        A.   Did I see what?  What's your question?

22        Q.   Was the grave within the compound, and did your forces deal with

23     it?  Under whose jurisdiction was it?  Who was digging?  Who did the

24     actual burial?

25        A.   All I can say about this is that we had an engineering commander,

Page 23047

 1     and he was responsible for the goings-on within the base.  And who

 2     assigned the digging of that grave, I can't tell you that.  All I can

 3     base myself on is what I saw.  So I don't know everything surrounding

 4     that.  All I can tell you is what I saw, and I stand by my statement.

 5        Q.   Thank you, but this was done by UN soldiers, in any case, wasn't

 6     it?

 7        A.   What were UN soldiers doing?

 8        Q.   Dealing with the grave.  They buried somebody there.

 9        A.   I spoke very briefly with the driver of the excavator, the

10     engineer, and he filled in the grave.  When I approached him it was as

11     good as done.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have any incidents where your equipment at

13     the observation post was being stolen, that Muslims were stealing your

14     equipment; is that correct?

15        A.   No equipment whatsoever was stolen from us.

16        Q.   Didn't you say something like that in the debriefing of the

17     6th of September, 1995, on page 3, about thefts?  And that in early June

18     at Papa Post there were threats, that the URFs [as interpreted] would be

19     used against the Serbs?

20        A.   Exactly what are you asking me?

21        Q.   Is it correct that equipment was being stolen at your post?  Is

22     it correct what it says here in this statement?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Let us upload that statement.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The ERN number is 0134084, page 3.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 23048

 1        Q.   Can you see that?

 2             [In English] "The subject knows that in early June, when he was

 3     at the OP Papa, on one occasion a threat was made to the effect that the

 4     QRF would be used against the Serbs."

 5             [Interpretation] We will find the place where you speak about

 6     thefts.  I think this is at the top of the page.  Is what it says here

 7     correct?  Was it so?  Right above this section there is talk about theft;

 8     is that right?

 9             [In English] "In order to be able to carry out his task.  Well,

10     the subject was involved in incidents at the OP Papa a couple of times.

11     On these occasions, the Muslims were stealing at the OP.  The subject

12     heard rumours that the colleagues had cocked his weapon on one occasion

13     at the OP during one of the above-mentioned thefts."

14        A.   There were indeed some moments that thefts were committed, yes,

15     by the Muslims.  That's true.

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Thank you.  And do you know that the Serb side

17     was always afraid that one day your weapons will end up in Muslim hands

18     and that they would use them against us?

19        A.   I don't know that.

20        Q.   Can we look at page 2 of the debriefing, please.  Did you order,

21     did you give instructions for the grave to be dug up, and were there not

22     some six bodies involved?

23        A.   Which grave do you mean?

24        Q.   Which grave was it that you gave instructions to be dug up and to

25     have six bodies placed there?

Page 23049

 1        A.   I don't understand this question.  I don't know what you're

 2     looking for.

 3        Q.   I will tell you that you stated that you saw or you had six

 4     bodies that needed to be buried behind the compound in Potocari, that you

 5     issued instructions for a large grave to be dug up, 2 metres long, where

 6     these six victims could be buried.  And those victims were buried, a

 7     new-born that died with its umbilical cord still around its neck, then a

 8     78-year-old man, a 16-year-old girl who died from diabetes, and two

 9     others.  There is no information as to the reason why they died.  Did

10     this happen?

11             MS. WEST:  May we just have the correct cite?  I don't see it on

12     the page.  I'm not sure from where we ...

13             JUDGE KWON:  Before doing that, do you remember such statement,

14     Mr. Patelski?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't know anything about

16     that.  And I'm not sure exactly what you said, but I certainly didn't

17     issue any such instructions.  At the time I was a soldier.  I didn't

18     issue instructions.  I carried them out.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

20             MR. KARADZIC:

21        Q.   [In English] [Indiscernible] Dealt with the funeral proceedings.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I'm asking you to upload that

23     statement.  This is not it.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the debriefing of the

25     Royal Netherlands Army, ERN 1088132.  I thought it was the same briefing.

Page 23050

 1     There aren't two.  I was thinking of the 1D number.  I thought that there

 2     was only one debriefing.  The ERN number 108832 [as interpreted].

 3             And then this would be on page 2.  [In English] R1088132, R.

 4     [Indiscernible], R.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West, would you need some time for your

 6     re-examination?

 7             MS. WEST:  I will need a few moments.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, please conclude your

 9     cross-examination.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   You spoke about the separation of men, and you said that at least

12     100 Muslims were separate, men, Muslim men, were separated and

13     transported.  How many buses is that, one or two?

14        A.   I don't know.  I'm not going to make a statement about that.  I'm

15     not going to estimate how many people fit into a bus.

16        Q.   And do you remember that in 2000 you said that about 100 men were

17     separated?

18        A.   That's perfectly conceivable that I said that in 2000.  There

19     were quite a few men, yes.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  I have no further questions.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. West.

22             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23                           Re-examination by Ms. West:

24        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Patelski.  Mr. Karadzic --

25        A.   Good morning.

Page 23051

 1        Q.   Mr. Karadzic asked you about D2007.  May we have that, please.

 2     It's the questionnaire from October of 1995, and on the first page he

 3     asked you about the date that you were held -- held captive in OP Papa.

 4     Now, today you testified that that took place on the 12th, but when you

 5     did this questionnaire in October of 1995, and we're looking specifically

 6     at number 9, you answered that it was on the 14th.  Is it possible that

 7     you could have gotten the date wrong when you said on the 14th?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we show --

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that's a bit --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Why we don't show him page 7, which he wrote in

11     Dutch.

12             MS. WEST:  Thank you.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see 14 July on the screen.

14     Conceivably I made a mistake about the date.  It's been a while, and I

15     had to think way back about everything that I had seen and what the date

16     had been, but the fact is that it's known on what date the enclave fell.

17     And once again exactly which date, it could have been the 14th or the

18     12th, I can't say, but the facts are as they are.

19             MS. WEST:  May we have 65 ter 22446.  Mr. Patelski, today you

20     were asked about sniping, and you were asked about the distance the

21     snipers were from both your post and from the Muslim houses, and on

22     page 3 today --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I'm receiving Dutch interpretation,

24     but I'm not sure that your microphone has been activated.  Mr. Harvey

25     does not hear it.  Do you hear my voice?

Page 23052

 1             MR. HARVEY:  It has just come back.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

 3             MS. WEST:

 4        Q.   And on page 3 of today's daily transcript, Mr. Karadzic remarked

 5     the distance was far too great and that it did not happen, and on page 12

 6     he said there is no such thing in the UN reports, although it happened if

 7     we are to believe you.  Now we're going to look at 22446.  This is your

 8     statement that you gave to the OTP in June of 2000.  We're going to go to

 9     page 2.  Do you remember being interviewed by the OTP in 2000?

10        A.   Well, I don't know whether that was the OTP.  Yes, several -- I

11     was asked several questions at that time, but do you mean questions

12     concerning the snipers?

13        Q.   My first question is:  Do you remember being interviewed by

14     somebody in 2000 and this report being produced?

15        A.   At the time, I was here as well to make a statement in 2000, yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  And we're going to look at paragraph 4 and see what

17     you said about sniping in 2000, and there, the end of that paragraph, it

18     says:

19              "Two weeks before the fall of the enclave, I saw two Serbian

20     tanks moving close to that house.  I saw that the snipers were posted on

21     the surrounding hills and the artillery and mortars firing in the

22     direction of the enclave."

23             Sir, do you remember making that statement back in 2000?

24        A.   That's entirely correct, yes.

25             MS. WEST:  May we have 65 ter 2095, please.  We're going to look

Page 23053

 1     at a few pages of this, but the first page of this indicates that it's a

 2     report from July 4th.  It's a Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade report.

 3     Now, if we can go to the page ending in 6541, please.  And the bottom of

 4     6541, it says page 9 in the English.  I think we have the wrong page

 5     there.  Apologies if that's my fault.  The ERN ends in 6541, and the top

 6     says "Inventory of Ammunition."

 7             Your Honour, it appears that the B/C/S is probably right.  I just

 8     don't think the English is right.  At least that's first -- okay.  Thank

 9     you very much.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Page 17.

11             MS. WEST:  Yeah.  Thank you very much.

12        Q.   And we focus in on bullets.  It says 7.9 millimetres for snipers,

13     1.350 pieces.  If we just turn to the next page.  Page 18.  Number 6 -- I

14     think we've skipped a page, but if I can represent that on the next page

15     under ammunition, number 6 says bullet, 7.9 millimetre for sniper,

16     1.000 --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Previous page.

18             MS. WEST:  There we go.

19             JUDGE KWON:  The point is number 8.

20             MS. WEST:  I see number -- yes, for 8 we see bullets for snipers.

21     And then if I can just -- if the Court can indulge me for one more page,

22     which would be ERN 6551.  It's a few more pages.  In the document at the

23     bottom it says 19, and the top it says "Realisation of Training and

24     Participation."

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I kindly ask that the

Page 23054

 1     distinguished Prosecutor --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  It seems to be page 7, Ms. West.

 3             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  And what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I would kindly ask to have an

 6     indication of these sniper bullets that are intended for civilians.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Well, you brought the issue of sniping, and you

 8     challenged the witness's evidence, and now the Prosecution is absolutely

 9     entitled to deal with this issue.

10             MS. WEST:  This -- thank you, Mr. President.

11        Q.   This regards training and participation in courses during the

12     first half of 1995, and under number 7 it remarks on sniper training, and

13     it remarks that it was accomplished.

14             So, sir, my question for you is:  In the area where you were

15     located at OP Papa you testified that you saw sniping activity.  Now,

16     these reports regard June.  Can you tell us, can you tell the

17     Trial Chamber, when exactly you saw that sniper activity?

18        A.   Not exactly, but it was throughout the six months or so that I

19     was there.  Basically starting in the spring some pin pricks were issued.

20     So shots were fired toward Budak and Pale.  Those villages, and in the

21     run-up to the fall, the villages were shot at daily, and I think that

22     that happened two weeks before the enclave fell.  So that it was -- the

23     shooting was intensified, so several times, and as far as I remember, it

24     happened at exactly the same time every day.

25             MS. WEST:  Thank you.  I don't have anything else.

Page 23055

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             Mr. Patelski, that concludes your evidence.  On behalf of the

 3     Chamber and the Tribunal, I would like to thank you for your coming to

 4     the Tribunal to give it.  Now you're free to go, but we'll rise all

 5     together.

 6             We'll take a break for half an hour and resume at quarter past

 7     11.00.

 8                           [The witness withdrew]

 9                           --- Recess taken at 10.46 a.m.

10                           --- On resuming at 11.19 a.m.

11                           [The witness entered court]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness take the solemn declaration,

13     please.

14             THE WITNESS:  [Interpretation] I hereby state that I will tell

15     the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

16                           WITNESS:  ROBERT FRANKEN

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, sir.  Please make yourself comfortable.

18             Yes, Ms. West.

19             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.

20             Could we have 65 ter 90307, please.  Mr. President, for the

21     record, this witness will be testifying in English.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

23                           Examination by Ms. West:

24        Q.   Thank you.  Good morning.

25        A.   Good morning.

Page 23056

 1        Q.   What is your name?

 2        A.   My name is Robert Franken.

 3        Q.   When did you retire from the military?

 4        A.   In the year 2003.

 5        Q.   And what was your rank at retirement?

 6        A.   Lieutenant-colonel.

 7        Q.   Sir, you testified --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Could I remind you, sir, that you need to put a

 9     pause between the question and answer.  Thank you.

10             THE WITNESS:  I will, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.

12             MS. WEST:

13        Q.   Colonel Franken, you testified in the Krstic case in 2000

14     [Realtime transcript read in error "2007"], the Blagojevic case in 2003,

15     Milosevic in 2003, Popovic et al. 2006, and Tolimir case in 2010; is that

16     right?

17        A.   That is correct.

18             JUDGE KWON:  What is the year in which he testified in Krstic?

19             MS. WEST:  2000.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it should --

21             MS. WEST:  Thank you very much.

22             JUDGE KWON: -- be corrected.

23             MS. WEST:

24        Q.   Sir, an amalgamated statement was prepared containing relevant

25     portions of your testimonies in Blagojevic, Popovic, and Tolimir, with

Page 23057

 1     some additional clarifications and observations.  This statement is on

 2     the screen before you now, and you also have a hard copy on the desk in

 3     front of you, is the one you signed on 15 January 2012; correct?

 4        A.   That is correct.

 5        Q.   Can you confirm that the statement accurately reflects an

 6     amalgamation of those three testimonies and the information that you

 7     previously -- or excuse me, you recently provided?

 8        A.   Yes, I can confirm that.

 9        Q.   Sir, and today if -- if you were asked today about the same

10     matters contained in the statement, would you provide the same

11     information to the Trial Chamber?

12        A.   Yes, I would.

13             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, we would tender the statement and the

14     exhibits and of the exhibits, of the associated exhibits, there are a

15     total of 40.  There are eight in which we could not seek to admit.  In

16     the comments section on our table, we have indicated the eight that we

17     will not seek -- and excuse me, I -- a ninth as well, that we would not

18     seek admission.  The ninth is 65 ter 03675.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Any objections?

20             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

21             JUDGE KWON:  We will admit the 92 ter statement first.  We'll

22     give the number.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4175, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE KWON:  In his amalgamated statement in 100 -- paragraph

25     114, the witness refers to several documents which were tendered as

Page 23058

 1     associate exhibits, but what witness states is that he merely has been

 2     shown this document, I take it about 22, that, in general, documents

 3     confirm the actual situation at that time.  However, there seems to be no

 4     indication of -- in what respect they reflected the actual situation.  So

 5     the Chamber wonders how that forms indispensable and inseparable part of

 6     his associate -- of his statement.  The Chamber is of the opinion if you

 7     are minded to tender all those documents, you should put them -- put

 8     those to the witness.  So then I think the deputy could sort it out.  So

 9     separate from those documents referred to in his para 114, we'll admit

10     them all.

11             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             MS. WEST:  If I may read a summary, please.

14     Colonel Robert Franken served in the Royal Netherlands Army in various

15     command and staff positions.  He retired after 33 years of service with

16     the rank of colonel.

17             From January 1995 to July 1995, he was assigned to DutchBat

18     Battalion 3 in Potocari.  During this time he held the position of

19     major and deputy commander officer.  His immediate superior was DutchBat

20     commander Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans.  As DCO, Franken was responsible

21     for organising supplies to keep the battalion operational.  In early

22     1995, the VRS began to place increasingly strict restrictions on the

23     passage of supply convoys to the Srebrenica enclave.  VRS approval was

24     required for both the contents and number of trucks in every convoy.  The

25     VRS categorically denied supplies relating to weapons systems, spare

Page 23059

 1     parts, testing devices, ammunition, and communication equipment.  VRS

 2     restrictions on convoys increased after February when the last fuel

 3     convoy was approved.  UNHCR convoys were subject to the same approval

 4     process and restrictions.

 5             And the colonel has described the collective VRS convoy

 6     restrictions as a convoy terror.

 7             The restriction had a significant impact on DutchBat's ability to

 8     carry out its mission.  Due to lack of fuel, DutchBat personnel had to

 9     patrol the enclave on foot and chop wood for heat.  They could not keep

10     their medical station operation and were unable to purify water or cook

11     food.  The VRS convoy restrictions also reduced the DutchBat weapons and

12     ammunition supplies and prevented proper maintenance of those weapons.

13     DutchBat rotations were also affected.  When Franken arrived in Potocari,

14     the battalion strength was over 300.  By July 1995, only 147

15     combat-trained soldiers remained.

16             The VRS began to increase its attack on DutchBat patrols and

17     observation points from April 1995 onwards.  Franken has described the

18     June 3rd attack on OP Echo as a --

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Could you please read more slowly for the

20     interpreters.  Thank you.

21             MS. WEST:  Yes.  Excuse me.

22             Franken described the June 3rd attack on OP Echo as a test case

23     for future attacks.  During that attack, 40 Serb infantry supported by a

24     T55 battle tank forced the peacekeepers out of the OP after firing on it

25     and striking its observation post -- excuse me, tower.

Page 23060

 1             On July 6, there's the attack on the enclave including direct VRS

 2     firing on OPs, shelling on the town, firing on Potocari and its

 3     surroundings.  This attack resulted in significant civilian casualties.

 4             Between the 6th and 10th of July, the colonel received reports of

 5     further attacks by the VRS on various OPs.

 6             On July 9th, the colonel was ordered to form blocking positions

 7     with APCs in order to prevent further VRS penetration into the safe area

 8     and to force the VRS to stay static enough to be struck by close-air

 9     support.  These APCs also came under direct VRS tank and artillery fire

10     resulting in one APCs being shot off the road and shrapnel wounds and

11     injuries to DutchBat peacekeepers.  The recovery vehicle sent to retrieve

12     the APC came under fire and had to withdraw.

13             On the 10th, the colonel's blocking positions came under fire and

14     there was massive shelling of Srebrenica including the UN Bravo Company

15     resulting in further injuries to civilians and DutchBat personnel.

16             The VRS issued an ultimatum to civilians.  BiH soldiers,

17     DutchBat, and UNHCR to leave by 6.00 -- 600 hours on July 11th.  The

18     UNPROFOR responded with an ultimatum of its own that the VRS should

19     withdraw to the so-called Morillon line by 6.00 in the morning or there

20     would be massive air-strikes.

21             On the 11th of July, the colonel received reports about the fall

22     of the remaining OPs.  The DutchBat soldiers manning these OPs were made

23     to hand in their small-calibre weapons and were taken to Bratunac where

24     they were held prisoner by the VRS.  In the meantime, the civilian

25     population of the enclave were fleeing in great numbers from Srebrenica

Page 23061

 1     to Potocari.  Bravo Company peacekeepers accompanied the refugees, and

 2     Franken received reports of shelling of the column.  Bravo Company picked

 3     up the wounded and transported them to Potocari.  Franken made sure that

 4     the peacekeepers guided the refugees to the back of the Potocari compound

 5     and away from the road as he believed that the VRS would fire on them.

 6     Refugees were also directed to abandoned factories and bus stations.

 7             Close-air support was first delivered in the afternoon of

 8     July 11th and Franken received a threat that if air support continued,

 9     the VRS would shell the compound housing the refugees and would kill the

10     soldiers in Bratunac.  Franken took the threat to shell the compound

11     seriously, because the Serb forces had fired on refugees with all their

12     means before.  Shortly following the threat, there was a mortar shelling

13     of the area of the bus station and a full round of the multiple rocket

14     system in the area of Potocari.  The shelling caused injury to some

15     refugees and instilled fear in the population.

16             Franken observed that the refugees were totally exhausted and in

17     bad condition.  It was if the world had stopped for them.

18             On the morning of the 12th, Franken observed Serb forces

19     advancing towards Potocari from the north.  Sometime after noon, a large

20     number of buses and trucks began arriving.  Franken was ordered to

21     co-ordinate support for the evacuation of the refugees.  That day, he met

22     with the VRS colonel, Acamovic, who identified himself as logistics

23     officer.  He also met with a VRS colonel, Jankovic, who identified

24     himself as being from Pale and said his mission was to co-ordinate

25     DutchBat's withdrawal.

Page 23062

 1             Franken was told by Jankovic that the Serb forces already had

 2     6.000 POWs.  Franken also estimated that there were approximately 1.000

 3     men being held in the compound in the surrounding area.  In total, he

 4     states that there appears to have been up to 7.000 men involved in the

 5     events of mid-July, 1995.

 6             Franken ordered Major Boering, and a captain to escort the first

 7     convoy.  Franken believed that although the refugees left voluntarily,

 8     they had been subjected to humanitarian crisis that left them no

 9     alternative but to get on the buses.  He received reports that the first

10     and second convoys went well, but thereafter the VRS stopped all of the

11     UN escorts and stripped them of their weapons, equipment, and clothing.

12             Franken believed the Serb forces did not want the UN escorts to

13     be witnesses and wanted them out of the way.  He complained to Jankovic

14     to no avail.

15             General Mladic had announced that the men were to be separated

16     from the group of refugees to determine if they were war criminals.

17     After the first convoy, men were separated from the group immediately

18     after they left the perimeter secured by the peacekeepers.  They were

19     taken to the white house for interrogation and then transported in the

20     direction of Bratunac -- Bratunac.  The men were forced to leave their

21     personal belongings in front of the white house in a large pile which the

22     Serb forces later burned.  The Serbs consistently thwarted efforts to

23     have UN officials escort the buses and also prevented peacekeepers from

24     investigating reports of maltreatment of the men in the white house.

25     Franken complained to Jankovic about the situation but nothing changed.

Page 23063

 1     He attempted to register the Muslim men, compiling at one stage a list of

 2     over 200 men.  He informed Jankovic that he had done so, but he did not

 3     hand over the list.

 4             Between the 12th and the 13th of July, he received reports of

 5     executions of Muslim men.  One of his OP crews also reported seeing a

 6     large group of men kneeling on a soccer field next to a road in rows with

 7     their hands on their necks.  Jankovic had contacted Franken to arrange a

 8     truck to bring that OP crew back and during this time the conditions of

 9     the refugees on the DutchBat base were rapidly deteriorating.  Franken

10     recalls that at least 11 people died from wounds, dehydration and

11     exhaustion.

12             After the general population moved out, there were still 59

13     wounded Muslims remaining.  The Serbs wanted to keep them in Serb

14     territory.  Franken contacted the ICRC and MSF to evacuate them.  On the

15     17th of July, Jankovic led a Serb delegation which included Momir Nikolic

16     to arrange the evacuation.

17             On that same day, Jankovic asked Franken and a Muslim -- the

18     Muslim representative, Nesib Mandic, to sign a declaration.  The

19     declaration stated that the evacuations had been conducted in accordance

20     with international law and the Geneva Conventions.  Colonel Franken

21     stated that that part of the document stating that the population could

22     remain in the enclave was nonsense since they never had a realistic

23     opportunity to stay.  He stated that being as afraid and lethargic as the

24     refugees were, staying was not a choice.  Franken signed the declaration

25     because Jankovic had indicated that doing so would facilitate the

Page 23064

 1     evacuation of the wounded.

 2             On the 21st of July, Franken left Potocari with some of his

 3     troops.  He observed General Nikolai, General Mladic, and

 4     Colonel Karremans saluting the units as they passed by.  Colonel Franken

 5     drove off.

 6        Q.   Sir, I'm going to ask you a few questions.

 7        A.   Sorry, but before you do so, it's very kind of you to promote me

 8     to colonel, but I was -- I retired as a lieutenant-colonel.

 9        Q.   Thank you for that correction, sir.  I'm going to ask you some

10     questions on a number of convoy documents that you've seen before.

11             And if I can ask for the assistance of the usher.

12             I'm giving these to you in hard copy so it might be easier, but

13     they'll also come up on the screen.

14             If we may have 65 ter 19005, please.

15             Sir, this is a document dated January 31st, 1995.  It's entitled

16     "Principles for Freedom of Movement."  And it regards -- have you seen

17     this document before?

18        A.   Yes, but not when I was in the enclave.

19        Q.   That's fine.  I just want to ask you a couple things about it.

20             Under number 2, it indicates that:

21             "UNPROFOR will notify the Serb army authorities 48 hours in

22     advance of convoy movements and 24 hours for single vehicles."

23             Was that your experience at the time?  Were you required to give

24     advance notice.

25        A.   We had to give advance notice 72 hours before to BH command.  So

Page 23065

 1     that helps with what's stated here.

 2        Q.   And under C, it says:

 3             "Approval for convoy movement will be given by the Serbian army

 4     HQ.  In case of disapproval of a convoy, the Serbian authority is obliged

 5     to give a proper explanation, stating the reasons of refusal of a

 6     particular convoy."

 7             And, Mr. Franken, is that what actually happened?  Did UNPROFOR

 8     receive proper explanations for refusals?

 9        A.   Well, I do not know of that because I was not a party in that

10     communication.  I asked for a convoy and then BH command applied for it

11     at the Serb authorities, so when they refused then the communication due

12     to that, I never saw that or heard of that.

13        Q.   And under paragraph 3 "Control":

14             "Convoys may be checked only once by an SA check-points."

15             To your knowledge, were convoys checked only once or more than

16     once?

17        A.   More than once.  As far as I reflect, at least three times.

18             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, we would like to tender this document.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes that will be accepted.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P4186, Your Honours.

21             MS. WEST:  I'd like to look at 65 ter 3521, please.  This is a

22     document from March 10th, 1995.

23        Q.   Mr. Franken, as I go through these documents it's going to go

24     chronologically.  So we're now on March 10th.  This is a Main Staff

25     document to the Drina Corps, and it's one that regards whether the

Page 23066

 1     UNPROFOR convoys have been approved or not.  If we can go to paragraph --

 2     excuse me, page 3.  And on page 3 there's a note.  This regards a convoy

 3     for Srebrenica.  It says:

 4              "We did not allow the following three" -- there's a question as

 5     to fuel tankers and five trailer trucks "... from Srebrenica the same

 6     vehicles and a jeep and 28 personnel members.

 7             Colonel Franken can you tell us the last time the enclave

 8     received fuel?

 9        A.   That was in February, end of February.

10        Q.   And this document is March 10th.  In the month of March, do you

11     have any memory of receiving fuel?

12        A.   No, we did not receive any fuel as of February.

13        Q.   If you go further down on that page under "no" it says:

14             "We did not allow 36 metres cubed of diesel fuel."

15             Is it consistent with your memory that -- strike that:

16             "We did not allow 36 metres cubed of diesel fuel and additional

17     ten crates of dry food, additional five crates of frozen foot, additional

18     ten crates of cold food?"

19             Can you tell us what the food situation was like in the middle of

20     March?

21        A.   Well, we did not have any fresh food so we lived on combat

22     rations still in stock at our compound.

23        Q.   If we go to the last page of this document.  It's the last

24     paragraph.  Pardon me.  It's the second to last page in the English.

25     It's the last page.  It says:

Page 23067

 1             "Discuss the information on unapproved convoys with check-points.

 2     Do not tell third persons and do not give any explanation to UNPROFOR

 3     representatives (pretend you did for the get them).  If a convoy shows up

 4     at a crossing point, return it to the place of departure."

 5             Do you know if your convoy drivers ever got any explanations as

 6     to the refusals?

 7        A.   No.  Convoy drivers didn't nor their convoy commanders.

 8             MS. WEST:  I'd like to tender this, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Exhibit P4187.

10             MS. WEST:  Thank you.

11        Q.   65 ter 3522.  This is again March 10th.  It's a Main Staff

12     document to the Drina Corps.  We're going to look at page 2 of the

13     English.  And it says:

14             "... importing of fuel is forbidden.  We are expecting that in

15     spite of the information on restrictions we forwarded to the

16     co-ordinating body for humanitarian aid that UNHCR will try to take fuel

17     to the enclave.  It should be prevented."

18             Mr. Franken, can you tell me, as a result of fuel being

19     forbidden, what was the effect of that on the everyday activity of

20     DutchBat?

21        A.   Well, as I came there in January, the fuel stocks were very low

22     in the beginning.  So we had very little fuel, which meant that we were

23     not able to rise any energy, because all the energy we had came from

24     generators.  We were not able to heat.  In the end, we were not able to

25     cook and so on.  We had to do everything on foot, even resupplying our

Page 23068

 1     OPs.  For that occasion, we occasionally used local ponies to bring stuff

 2     up to the OPs observation post.  So, in general, that is the situation

 3     and consequence of this, as I call it, convoy terror.

 4             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, we would tender that document.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4188, Your Honours.

 7             MS. WEST:

 8        Q.   Look at 65 ter 21661, and this is a multiple page document.  It's

 9     dated March 31st.  It's a Main Staff document and it's to the UNPROFOR

10     command in Sarajevo.  At the end of this document appear to be requested

11     from UNPROFOR for convoys.

12             Sir, can you tell us what the process was by which UNPROFOR

13     requested convoys to come to the enclave?

14        A.   As far as I know, it went like this:  I had a need for certain

15     supplies.  I communicated that to my logistic command, Dutch logistic

16     command which was in Bosnia-Herzegovina area, and they came up with

17     requests to BiH command for a convoy.  They -- they -- destined [sic]

18     what cars, how many cars, et cetera, et cetera, and the amounts and the

19     exact sort, et cetera, so the contents.  That goes to BH command, and

20     from BH command there goes a request to the Serb -- Muslim Serb staff and

21     then they or not consented it.

22        Q.   And I know you've looked at this document before and there are

23     requests at the end of it, and at the first page it says at 12, 13, and

24     14 that these requests to Srebrenica were denied.  Is this an example of

25     the process by which you just spoke about?

Page 23069

 1        A.   Well, the only thing I -- because I did not get this kind of

 2     information in the enclave.  The only result of the procedure was that I

 3     heard that the convoy wouldn't come because the Serbs denied it.  The

 4     exact text and -- of denials or the request done by BH command I never

 5     saw those documents.

 6        Q.   Okay.

 7        A.   I only heard the result and that was mostly no.

 8        Q.   And the results recorded here 12, 13, and 14 are those consistent

 9     with your memory?

10        A.   That's correct.

11             MS. WEST:  I would ask for this admission, please.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4189, Your Honours.

14             MS. WEST:  May we have 65 ter 3664, please.

15        Q.   This is April 2nd.  It's a Main Staff document to the

16     Drina Corps, and in this document, up in the right-hand corner, there's

17     handwriting, and it says:

18             "Not a single convoy or ICRC or Doctors Without Borders may enter

19     Srebrenica without my permission and presence."

20             And it's signed by M. Nikolic.

21             Sir, in the beginning of April -- first, let me ask you this:

22     Mr. Nikolic, do you know who he was?

23        A.   I suppose that is the captain or Major Nikolic we knew as being a

24     member of the Bratunac Brigade.

25        Q.   And were there discussions between Nikolic and your liaison

Page 23070

 1     officers about convoy needs?

 2        A.   No, because we supposed Nikolic was not in a level in that

 3     decision-making.

 4        Q.   After the beginning of April - this is April 2nd - did you see

 5     any ICRC or MSF convoys coming through?

 6        A.   Not as I recollect.  Later in May, as I recollect, there was one,

 7     I believe, MSF transport.  But when I'm correct that was personnel, not

 8     stocks.

 9        Q.   Okay.  So in the month of April you did not see [overlapping

10     speakers] convoys?

11        A.   No.

12             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, we would ask for admission of this

13     document.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, it will be admitted.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4190, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Do you know where this was seized?

17             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, if I can have a moment to get that

18     information, I will get it for you.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I'm asking because this is a Main Staff

20     document addressed to Drina Corps and somebody wrote it at

21     Bratunac Brigade.

22             MS. WEST:  Thank you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Let's proceed.  Yes.  Thank you.

24             MS. WEST:

25        Q.   Mr. Franken, during this spring of 1995, did you ever take leave?

Page 23071

 1        A.   Yes.  I was on a leave in March.

 2        Q.   And for how long was your leave?

 3        A.   Ten days.

 4        Q.   And did Colonel Karremans ever take leave?

 5        A.   Yeah.  When I came back Colonel Karremans went on leave, so he

 6     returned somewhere halfway down April or in the beginning of April.

 7             MS. WEST:  If we may have 65 ter 22012.

 8        Q.   These are three documents dated May 18th, and if we can look at

 9     the last page of the English.  This is to General Mladic from Janvier.

10     And in the last paragraph it says:

11             "For the past three weeks we have been attempting to effect the

12     normal and scheduled rotation of personnel from our peacekeeping forces

13     in Srebrenica, and, at present, there are approximately 170 soldiers

14     waiting in Zagreb who have been unable to take up their responsibilities

15     due to restrictions of movement imposed by your forces.  Included in this

16     is a total of a 13-member DutchBat medical team required for the medical

17     support of our UN forces in Srebrenica.  Almost daily since the 27th of

18     April, there have been refusals from your authorities to allow clearance

19     for these rotations ... I believe you would agree with me that the

20     situation is not acceptable and only serves to heighten tension at a

21     critical period."

22             Sir, can you tell us whether this last paragraph we've just

23     reviewed was consistent with what was going on at the time.

24        A.   It is.

25             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I would ask for the admission of that

Page 23072

 1     document.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Exhibit P4191.

 3             MS. WEST:  65 ter 21952.

 4        Q.   This is an UNPROFOR headquarter Weekly Situation Report.  It's

 5     dated the 29th of May to 4 June of 1995, and if we may go to the fifth

 6     page of the English, please.  It's paragraph 17.  "Situation in the

 7     enclaves":

 8             "Limited amounts of humanitarian assistance through convoys

 9     reached Tuzla during the reporting period.  All the other enclaves did

10     not receive their scheduled supplies.  Should the present state of

11     affairs persist, the enclaves which depend entirely on humanitarian

12     assistance will suffer tremendously."

13             Does this describe the humanitarian aid situation at the time?

14        A.   Completely, yes.

15        Q.   And to what extent were civilians already suffering by May?

16        A.   Well, the only food that was present in -- in the enclave for the

17     civilians was stocks or that what they -- what do you call that?  Made

18     themselves the little lambs, a bit of vegetables that's -- things like

19     that.  But it was absolutely insufficient food for the civil population.

20             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I would ask for admission of this

21     document.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Exhibit P4192.

23             MS. WEST:  Certificate 03706, please.

24        Q.   This is a June 15th document.  It's a Main Staff to the

25     Drina Corps, and if I can go to the third page of the English, please.

Page 23073

 1     Here it says:

 2             "Check the level of fuel in tanks.  Have the necessary tool, a

 3     stick, ready for the checking.  Measure the level of fuel in the tanks at

 4     the entrance of the enclave and after.  Carry out the checking and enable

 5     them to move along the above-cited routes."

 6             To what does this paragraph refer in regard to this checking?

 7        A.   Probably the -- the -- the strict control they want to have on --

 8     on the fuel levels, fuel stock levels, within the enclave, because they

 9     want to check whether they did not get some fuel out of the tanks of the

10     vehicles coming in and that the use of fuel was just because the struck

11     itself drove and we didn't take anything out just to stock up our

12     fuels -- fuel reserves, sorry.

13        Q.   So the necessary tool to which it refers is actually going into

14     the tank of the convoy truck?

15        A.   Yes, that's correct.

16             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I would ask for its admission.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4193, Your Honours.

19             MS. WEST:  And now 65 ter 3488, please.

20        Q.   This is June 18th.  It's a Main Staff document.  Look at

21     paragraph 3 in English where it says:

22             "Cargo for Srebrenica:  One container with eight pallets of

23     frozen food, one container with eight pallets of dry food, and one tanker

24     with 11 cubic metres of diesel fuel."

25             And a little bit down, it says again:

Page 23074

 1             "I demand a detailed check of all vehicles, including the

 2     inspection of cargo.  Pay special attention to the fuel in the fuel tanks

 3     and the fuel being brought into the enclave."

 4             Sir, can you comment on the parts that I just read?  First of

 5     all, what was the food situation like?  This is 18th of June.

 6        A.   Somewhere in that area, we were through our own supplies as well.

 7     We didn't have any combat rations as well, so we ate about ten days for

 8     breakfast peanut butter and rice; for lunch, rice and peanut butter; and

 9     for variation, for dinner, peanut butter and rice.  So there was not much

10     food for us as well.  I recollect that, indeed, a convoy came in, a

11     couple of vehicles, with some combat rations.  I can't recollect whether

12     it was exactly the 18th or 19th or something, but I do not recollect fuel

13     coming in.

14        Q.   Okay.  And again, this speaks a little bit further down about the

15     detailed check of all vehicles?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Is that what you spoke about a little earlier?

18        A.   Yes, that's correct.

19             MS. WEST:  I move for admission of this document.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4194, Your Honours.

22             MS. WEST:  65 ter 19546.

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly make a pause between questions and

24     answers, thank you.

25             MS. WEST:

Page 23075

 1        Q.   This is to General Delic from Nikolai.  And in the middle of this

 2     document, the paragraph beginning with "Although."  This is talking about

 3     DutchBat:

 4             "Although this unit has been suffering a lack of fuel for several

 5     months now, it still occupies its OPs along the confrontation line and is

 6     still by its presence contributes to the protection of the civilian

 7     population living in the area.  I have to admit that the lack of fuel

 8     prevents them from conducting mechanised patrols and that due to security

 9     measures they also stopped their foot patrols temporarily."

10             Can you tell us about foot patrols and how the foot patrols came

11     about?

12        A.   First a remark.  We never stopped our foot patrols, so I don't

13     know where this comes from.  Well, it meant that we -- in the average, we

14     had ten up to -- yeah, around ten foot patrols in the area between the

15     observation posts, which meant that they had combat load and had to do

16     patrols over about 10, 15 kilometres in accidented [phoen] -- or in

17     hillious terrain.  Well -- is that an answer?

18        Q.   Yes, thank you.  And where it says:

19             "The unit has been suffering a lack of fuel for several months

20     now..."

21        A.   That's correct.

22        Q.   That's correct?

23        A.   Yes, that's correct.

24             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, we move for admission of this document.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 23076

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4195, Your Honours.

 2             MS. WEST:  65 ter 19547.

 3        Q.   This is the same date, June 26th, and one's to Mladic, Nikolai.

 4     And in the middle the first paragraphs, it says:

 5             "As you are very well aware, my troops are limited in their

 6     ability to execute effective patrolling as a direct result of the lack of

 7     fuel."

 8              Again, this is similar to the document we just saw.  Was this

 9     consistent with what happened at the time?

10        A.   It is consistent.  At that time, we were not allowed to do foot

11     patrols as well in Bosnian Serb area.  I suggested that to Nikolic once

12     when he reported an attack north of the enclave, and said, Okay, let us

13     patrol down there and see what happens and see whether we can find the

14     route the ABiH took.  But it was not allowed.

15             MS. WEST:  We tender this document.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4196, Your Honours.

18             MS. WEST:  65 ter 3544.

19        Q.   This is July 1.  Go to page 3 of the English.  It's a Main Staff

20     document.  On page 3 of the English it's -- there's a note.  And it's

21     talking about the movement of convoys under 5 and 6, and this was

22     personnel movement, which has been approved conditionally, should be

23     specially controlled by teams at check points and liaison officers of the

24     Drina Corps.

25             Sir, can you tell us about the rotation of personnel in and out

Page 23077

 1     of the enclave and what was happening with that?

 2        A.   Well, in general, the rotations stopped half April.  That's why

 3     we had 170 guys in Zagreb, and this is probably concerning the rotation

 4     of my medical staff.  We had some surgeons who were due to rotate, and

 5     that is what this is about.  We were not allowed to rotate completely as

 6     I recollect.  About ten guys of that ration couldn't go along.

 7        Q.   So for July 1 this rotation does not include combat transport?

 8        A.   No, no, no, no.  It's a personnel rotation.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MS. WEST:  I tender this document, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4197, Your Honours.

13             MS. WEST:  65 ter 2280.

14        Q.   I'm looking for the second page in English.  This is July 6th.

15     This is a BiH combat report.  We're going to go to paragraph 3, the last

16     part of paragraph 3, "This morning," it says:

17             "This morning I was told by the UN liaison officer that 25 UN

18     members left Srebrenica and that as many were supposed to have arrived

19     along with a number of officers from the command of the new battalion.

20     However, the Serbs in Zvornik let in only 20 UN members through, mostly

21     medical and administrative personnel."

22             So when you commented earlier about your medical staff rotation

23     does this refer to that?

24        A.   That's correct.

25        Q.   And under number 4:

Page 23078

 1             "Situation continues to be exceptionally difficult.  The food

 2     convoy announced for today has not arrived.  Elderly and weak persons are

 3     in an exceptionally difficult situation due to starvation.  The first

 4     people to die of hunger in the area of Srebrenica after the

 5     demilitarisation were registered today.  I request that every effort be

 6     made to deliver food to our area."

 7             Sir, were you aware of people dying in the area due hunger in the

 8     beginning of July?

 9        A.   Yes, and, as I recollect, the first reports came to me around the

10     20th of June.  So one or two weeks earlier.

11             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I would ask for the admission of that

12     document.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Exhibit P4198.

14             MS. WEST:

15        Q.   Sir, we're now going to move on to the attack, and first I'd like

16     to talk to you about OP Echo which happened on June 3rd, and in your

17     statement it's paragraph 44.  You refer to it as a test case.

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Why did you refer to it as a test case?

20        A.   If you are a military unit and you are attacked, you try to find

21     out why and what the purpose of that attack is.  So at the beginning, I

22     thought it was a beginning of an offensive to go for Srebrenica, the city

23     itself, and it proved out that they didn't advance, although they were

24     successful, which is strange because a military unit that attacks --

25     tries to keep up his speed and attack when he is successful, but they

Page 23079

 1     stopped.  I then sent down what later became Observation Post Sierra and

 2     Uniform, and I was surprised that they could come down south that far.

 3     They came to the very edge of the Zeleni Jadar valley which meant that

 4     the Serbs, in fact, did, more or less, retire from their utmost deepness

 5     of the attack, so they were on the high edge, and that obviously withdraw

 6     from there to the factory again.  Then, I concluded that it must have

 7     been a test case:  First to see what would be the reaction of -- of

 8     UNPROFOR, DutchBat specifically.  Would they stand in their OP or would

 9     they leave on request, which we did not; and then triggered by their

10     withdrawal to the factory again, see whether UNPROFOR would react with

11     air support because the conditions for giving air support were fulfilled.

12        Q.   Did you ask for air support?

13        A.   Yes, we did.  Did you get it?  No.  That's why I concluded it's a

14     test case.  The Serbs want to see how UNPROFOR reacts on an attack on --

15     on a UN unit and crossing the UN -- the confrontation line.

16             MS. WEST:  May I have 65 ter 3852.

17        Q.   This is a June 2nd document.  It's a Drina Corps document.  This

18     is the day before OP Echo fell.  This is an order from Milenko Zivanovic.

19             Sir, have you looked at this order before?

20        A.   No.  Well, I've seen it here, but not of course in the period I

21     was in the enclave.

22        Q.   This is an order under number 1.  It says:

23             "He shall order him the following:"

24             And then there's a whole list of very specific items.

25             Mr. Franken, is there anything unusual -- unusual about this

Page 23080

 1     document to you?

 2        A.   Well, it's very detailed.  To make clear what I mean, for us an

 3     attack on a location as OP Echo would be -- well, almost a platoon action

 4     when not a company action, and the way it is done is left to the company

 5     commander.  There is not a higher command interfering with this.  And

 6     here I see that a corps level interferes with incredible details, and not

 7     even that, sending down some officers to control the -- the attack or

 8     even to command the attack.  That's, in my military mind, very unusual.

 9        Q.   And I know you've had an opportunity to go through all these

10     details, but is this document consistent with what actually happened the

11     following day when OP Echo was taken?

12        A.   It's consistent with the reports I got, yes.

13             MS. WEST:  I would ask for the admission of this document.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4199, Your Honours.

16             MS. WEST:  And if we can have 65 ter 22815, please.

17        Q.   Now, this is a document from June 3rd, 1900 hours, so that

18     evening.  It's a VRS combat report.  And under number 1, it says:

19             "After a successful operation and the forceful expulsion of the

20     UNPROFOR from the Zeleni Jadar post ..."  The Zeleni Jadar post, is that

21     OP Echo?

22        A.   That's correct.

23        Q.   "... the enemy was observed systematically building up large

24     forces and moving them from the Srebrenica sector towards the general

25     sector of Zeleni Jadar.  Their formation included two armoured personnel

Page 23081

 1     carriers and one tank."

 2             Just if we can go down a little bit further to the next

 3     paragraph:

 4             "The inhabitants of Zeleni Jadar moved out in panic following

 5     UNPROFOR's withdrawal and large groups of people (probably civilians)

 6     were observed in the afternoon moving towards Srebrenica."

 7             Is this consistent with what happened after OP Echo fell?

 8        A.   First, the reaction on those two personnel carriers and one tank,

 9     to my knowledge, there were no armoured personnel carriers and tank on

10     the Bosnia side.  Remember that in that area my observe posts Sierra and

11     Uniform were established and when there were tanks operating in that area

12     it would have been reported to me, so I doubt that observation.

13             Secondly, as they mean Zeleni Jadar, as I know it, there were no

14     inhabitants of Zeleni Jadar because that was absolutely left.  It was

15     on -- exactly on the confrontation line.  So it's a bit puzzling to me.

16     If they mean the population of the Swedish Shelter Project, possible that

17     they were starting to flee in the direction of Srebrenica --

18        Q.   And --

19        A.   -- which is consistent with Post Pusmulici because that is a

20     village quite close to that shelter project.

21        Q.   Thank you.  That was exactly what I was going to ask you.  The

22     next paragraph is:

23             "The general conclusion is that the enemy was taken completely by

24     surprise.  They did not have full or permanent control of their forward

25     defence and they seemed quite disorganised."

Page 23082

 1             Is this consistent with your memory as well?

 2        A.   As far as the ABiH is concerned, yes.

 3        Q.   And on the second page, before paragraph 3, it says:

 4             "The men are rather tired.  A strong police check-point is

 5     expected to arrive in Zeleni Jadar."

 6             And then under 4, it says:

 7             "Ensure the arrival of police to man the check-point in

 8     Zeleni Jadar as soon as possible."

 9             Sir, can you tell us what was your -- what's your memory as to

10     the presence of police in the area?

11        A.   We were not aware of a police check-point at Zeleni Jadar.

12     Probably it was out of our line of sight, but they -- they -- how do you

13     say that?  Later on, we saw many times that police forces were integrated

14     in the operations of the BSA, the regular forces.  So it's not -- to me,

15     it's not a surprise that they did that at Zeleni Jadar as well, but again

16     we did not observe that.

17             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I would tender this document.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Admitted.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4200, Your Honours.

20             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, we're going to play two videos at

21     this -- at this point.  And again, as you know, that's 65 ter 40582.  The

22     companion transcript, the book, is 65 ter 03099.  And at this point,

23     we -- we have shown a number of these videos, as you know, with the

24     witnesses, and we would ask for the full admission of the video.  I spoke

25     to Mr. Robinson before to see his comment on our request, and he has no

Page 23083

 1     objection as I understand it.  I would also pointed out that in the book

 2     itself, the back of the book it lists the entire video and it gives the

 3     sources, and so for the ease of continuing on with the video and the book

 4     I would ask for the admission of both.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We think that by the time

 7     we've heard the testimony of Mr. Ruez, in particular, that there would be

 8     an established foundation for the admission of the video, so it seems

 9     easier to admit it now.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Together with the book itself.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll admit them and give the number.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the video will be Exhibit P4201 and

14     the accompanying book will be Exhibit P4202.

15             MS. WEST:  Thank you.  So we'll now play P4201.  This is going to

16     be the video ending in 9014.  We're starting at minute 15.  And in regard

17     to the transcript, if you care to look at that, at P4202, it's e-court

18     pages 197 to 198.

19             JUDGE KWON:  By any chance do you have the hard copy page

20     numbers?  Last four digits.

21             MS. WEST:  That is 7815.  And just to tell you that this part of

22     the video are trucks coming into Potocari, and there's actually not a lot

23     of speaking.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25                           [Video-clip played]

Page 23084

 1             MS. WEST:

 2        Q.   Mr. Franken, we just saw a number of people coming off of trucks.

 3     It appears to be a facility.  Can you tell us -- can you identify this

 4     area?

 5        A.   Yes.  It's the HQ of DutchBat at Potocari, and the building you

 6     see is an industrial hall which -- in which we later had about 5- or

 7     6.000 refugees sheltered, and these are transports coming in from the

 8     Srebrenica area.

 9        Q.   And were you there when this was happening?

10        A.   I saw this myself, yes.

11             MS. WEST:  We'll continue to play the video, and it's going to

12     change over to a part of the video with Mladic entering the town of

13     Srebrenica.  And for the Trial Chamber, for the transcript, this is 7815.

14     And the time-code where we just stopped was 18 minutes and 40 seconds.

15                           [Video-clip played]

16             MS. WEST:

17        Q.   Sir, could you recognise that tank?

18        A.   Yeah.  It's an APCs of DutchBat, and seeing the number, it is the

19     APCs of Captain Hageman who was fired upon by a Serb tank when he tried

20     to reach Bravo 2, one of the blocking positions.

21        Q.   And is this the tank you refer to in your statement at paragraph

22     53?

23        A.   I suppose it's 52, but yes.

24              MS. WEST:  For the record that's 18 minutes and 59 seconds and

25     we'll continue.

Page 23085

 1                           [Video-clip played]

 2             MS. WEST:  Just stopped at 19 minutes and 59 seconds, right after

 3     the person says, "Do not paint over it."

 4        Q.   Sir, were there occasions where your equipment was stolen?

 5        A.   The question is whether there were occasions when my equipment

 6     was stolen.  Yes, many of them.

 7             MS. WEST:  Okay.  And we'll continue on, please.

 8                           [Video-clip played]

 9             MS. WEST:  And here we're at 21 minutes and 11 seconds, and

10     General Mladic has just said:

11             "Put that on so it can be seen that you are an UNPROFOR member."

12        Q.   Sir, if you know, to what is he referring?

13        A.   Probably he wants to use that APCs with a UN-looking crew for

14     anything.  I had reports later on that -- that infantry, Serb infantry,

15     used stolen UN equipment like flak jackets and helmets to pose as

16     DutchBat members.

17        Q.   I'm going to show you another part of the video now.  This is --

18     again it's P4201 and it's V000-9016, and we're going to start at

19     11 minutes and 20 seconds.  We'll go to 17 minutes and 45 seconds.

20                           [Video-clip played]

21             MS. WEST:  We've stopped the video at 17 minutes and 45 seconds.

22        Q.   Sir, can you describe the vantage point from where that video was

23     taken?

24        A.   Well, as I can see it, it's from the tower which was on the

25     building in which our HQ was, within our compound.

Page 23086

 1        Q.   And in which direction were those buses moving?

 2        A.   In the direction of Bratunac, and the departure point is right in

 3     front of our main gate.

 4        Q.   And if you know, what was the day and the time of that video?

 5        A.   As I see it, I suggest it's the 13th, the last day of the -- of

 6     the evacuation.

 7             MS. WEST:  Sir, I have no more questions for you.

 8             Mr. President, for the record, you had asked for where we found

 9     P4190.  It was the document with the handwriting of Momir Nikolic.  That

10     was seized by the ICTY at the Bratunac Brigade on March 6, 1998.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             We'll take a break, Mr. Franken, for an hour.

13                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

14             JUDGE KWON:  For an hour, and we'll resume at 1.35, but there's

15     one matter, albeit briefly, to deal with in your absence confidentially,

16     so if you could excuse yourself.

17                           [The witness stands down]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.

19                           [Private session]

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 23087

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3                           [Open session]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll take a break for an hour.

 5                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.36 p.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 1.36 p.m.

 7                           [The witness takes the stand]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Franken, as you heard that your evidence

 9     in other cases as well as the statements were admitted in the form of

10     amalgamated statements in lieu of your examination-in-chief, you will be

11     further asked by Mr. Karadzic in his cross-examination.

12             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

15        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Franken.  If you don't mind,

16     I would prefer addressing you as Mr. So-and-so, rather than

17     Lieutenant-Colonel So-and-so because it's quite long in our language at

18     least.

19        A.   No problem.

20        Q.   This is what I'd like to ask you:  How did you understand that

21     restriction regarding fuel?  Why did that happen?

22        A.   If you control the logistic support of an isolated unit like

23     DutchBat III was, you can control his operational capability, and, in my

24     opinion, the aim of that convoy terror, as I call it, was to diminish

25     that capability of DutchBat.

Page 23088

 1        Q.   Why would the DutchBat bother us?  Why would we want to diminish

 2     the capability of DutchBat?

 3        A.   Well, it's not a question for me.  Probably you could better ask

 4     that question to the ones that did diminish our logistical situation.

 5     You could analyse that if the Serbs wanted a solution for the enclaves,

 6     for instance, an attack neutralising it, it would be in their interest to

 7     have the operational capacities of DutchBat diminished.

 8        Q.   Why would we be bothered by DutchBat?  Do you think that we

 9     expected you to fight against us?  Your mandate was not to defend the

10     enclave, was it; isn't that right?

11        A.   Well, again you asked me a question why you or you said "we," do

12     anything or what the reasons were for your own action.  I do not know.  I

13     can only say that the logistic situation was that -- that way that we

14     were not capable to, if necessary, deploy our operational capability.

15        Q.   What would your task be for which you would require operational

16     capability?  What was it that you did?  Did you demilitarised the zone?

17        A.   First question was:  What was it that we did.  According to our

18     orders, we deterred by presence, so to say; second question:  Whether I

19     did demilitarise the zone, the answer is no.

20        Q.   Thank you.  You were trying to deter clashes whereby Serbs did

21     not attack until the month of July.  Did you manage to deter incursions

22     by Oric's force into Serb-held territory?  Did you manage to deter the

23     killing of Serbs, the torching of villages?

24        A.   First, the Serbs did attack before July.  I consider the attack

25     on OP Echo as a Serb attack and that was in June.

Page 23089

 1             Secondly, the second question is we were not able to withhold the

 2     28th Division of actions into Serb territory.  That is correct as well.

 3        Q.   If I were to say to you that we had expected you to demilitarise

 4     the zone, prevent the 28th Division from killing us, then this is what I

 5     put to you:  It was in our interest for you to have operational

 6     capability.  Wouldn't that be logical?

 7        A.   Well, it would have been logical only that the convoy terror

 8     indicates the opposite.

 9             Thank you.

10        Q.   All right.  Now, this thinking of yours, these conclusions of

11     yours regarding the reasons for restrictions, would that be the one and

12     only explanation or can there be another explanation?

13        A.   Well, to me it's the -- the only explanation, as I thought of it.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Tomorrow we'll probably show that, but would you

15     agree that there were cases of smuggling, not by a unit or its command

16     but by individuals from the UN force?  The smuggling primarily of fuel,

17     ammunition, and so on.

18        A.   I heard of that, but as far as I know, it did not happen in the

19     case of DutchBat III and the enclave of Srebrenica concerning the

20     battalion itself.

21        Q.   Thank you.  What do you say to -- I think, Mr. Franken, that you

22     can just lean back and then the microphone problem will be resolved.  You

23     are too close to the microphone -- or, rather, you were too close to the

24     microphone.

25             And what do you say to this, Mr. Franken:  If this did not happen

Page 23090

 1     for the reasons that you mentioned, that were your conclusion -- rather,

 2     if reports were received from the ground that convoys were being abused

 3     and that there were convoys that smuggled fuel, would you understand that

 4     that was the reason, then, rather than any intention of taking the

 5     enclave?

 6        A.   Again, I'm not aware of facts of convoys coming into Srebrenica

 7     for the battalion were abused.  Then again, I can't imagine that you

 8     would say we won't bring in fuel or smuggle fuel, because when you wanted

 9     us -- what the hell?

10             JUDGE KWON:  You are being asked by the interpreter to speak to

11     the microphone, but I hope there will work again.

12             Thank you.

13             THE WITNESS:  Otherwise I will stand up and speak louder,

14     Your Honour.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             THE WITNESS:  In fact, there couldn't have been the question of

17     smuggling fuel.  The thing was, we needed fuel, and bringing in fuel

18     authorised by everybody would have solved a lot of problems.  So I can't

19     react on smuggling fuel.  Then again, as far as UN convoys to Srebrenica

20     DutchBat III are concerned, there was no abusing of those convoys.  I'm

21     pretty sure of that.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you have an explanation as to how come the 28th Division had

24     fuel?

25        A.   Old stores or perhaps smuggled in through Zepa.  I do not know,

Page 23091

 1     but it is just possibilities.

 2        Q.   How come there's fuel in Zepa?  Zepa's an enclave as well?

 3        A.   Again, it was just an idea that could have come from Zepa.  I do

 4     not know about that.  It's a possibility, and I'm not aware of the

 5     logistic situation in Zepa in those times.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I believe that if you had this document that I will

 7     show now, you would have taken this possibility into account as well.

 8     This is what I put to you:  The Main Staff did not act in that direction

 9     out of any kind of ill-intention but, rather, because they had been

10     warned from the ground that there was smuggling of fuel.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please show Mr. Franken

12     D157.  Could I please have the translation as well.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   I have the Serbian version, and you can see the English version.

15     On the 12th of May, 1995, the command of the Birac brigade is informing

16     the corps command and then the corps command, of course, is forwarding

17     this information to the Main Staff and you can read it for yourself.

18     There's no need for me to read it out.  UNPROFOR, UNHCR, and other

19     international organisations have been transporting fuel illegally to

20     Muslims in the enclaves of Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica.  And

21     then there's a description here as to how this was actually done.

22             Were you aware of this report from the field?

23        A.   No, I never read that report because I was not in the line of

24     communication of this organisation.  That's one.  But again, why are we

25     speaking of smuggling of fuel?  There is an enclave, there is a Dutch

Page 23092

 1     Battalion, there is a civilian enclave who needs to survive fuel, so why

 2     just don't let the fuel in?  I don't understand this smuggling.

 3     Obviously when you say smuggling you did not have the intention to kept

 4     them -- to let them have fuel.  So again, this document is not known to

 5     me, and again, I'm not aware.  I was not reported, and I'm pretty firm

 6     about not abusing the UN convoys into Srebrenica for, in this case,

 7     DutchBat III.

 8        Q.   Well, this is how this was smuggling.  A lot of fuel comes in,

 9     and you leave with a minimal quantity, and you leave this fuel to our

10     enemies.  Had Srebrenica been demilitarised, everything would have been

11     easier for the population, for us.  However, do you remember that after

12     each convoy came, the Muslim army, both in Gorazde and in Srebrenica, the

13     28th Division, that is, were a lot more active in their offensives?

14        A.   Well, I didn't see after a convoy -- well, first, you say we left

15     fuel to your enemy.  That is incorrect.  I never gave the 28th Division

16     any amount of fuel.  Whether or not there was smuggling of fuel within

17     UNHCR convoys, I do not know of, and I'm not responsible for that.  So we

18     had no reports that was more active -- more activities in their

19     offensives after a UN convoy, being a convoy meant for DutchBat, came in.

20     That is incorrect.

21        Q.   I kindly ask you not to feel attacked.  When I say "you," I'm

22     referring to someone from the UN.  I'm confident that not a single

23     officer did that.  However, it did happen, and you know that yourself,

24     that individuals were involved in this kind of trade, smuggling.  They

25     sold things to the option, bought other things from the population, and

Page 23093

 1     so on.  Were there not such cases?

 2             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, before the last question everything in

 3     in front of it was a statement.  It's argumentative, it's a waste of

 4     time, and this witness deserves better than this.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   I had just wanted to apologise to you, Mr. Franken.  When I say

 8     "you," I'm not referring to you personally or the institution of the

 9     United Nations.  I'm meaning individuals from the UN.  I'm not attacking

10     a single officer.  That was the statement I had to make.

11             However, were you aware that certain individuals were involved in

12     unlawful activity, certain individuals who were members of the UN force?

13        A.   Well, I did not feel attacked, and if you say "you" to me I think

14     you mean DutchBat, and that's why I reacted.

15             Whether there were members of UN organisations that did smuggle,

16     I do not know of that.  I can only confirm that it was not done by

17     members of DutchBat or my logistic command coming in with logistic

18     convoys.

19        Q.   Do you accept that I'm not specifically referring to the

20     Dutch Battalion?  Quite simply, I'm referring to the presence of the

21     international community and its representatives because it doesn't only

22     say UNPROFOR and UNHCR here, it also says other international

23     organisations.  So I'm absolutely not accusing your battalion.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, he answered did he not know of that.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Very well.

Page 23094

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Mr. Franken, do you agree that regardless of whether that is

 3     correct or not, the Main Staff received information from the ground to

 4     the effect that this kind of thing was happening?  Do you agree that

 5     these were sufficient grounds for the Main Staff to exercise caution and

 6     impose restrictions?

 7        A.   Whether the Main Staff got information and how valuable and

 8     trustworthy that information was, I just read that report.  I did not

 9     know of that in that time, and it's not -- to me, it's not that relevant.

10     Whether there were sufficient grounds to exercise caution, yeah, perhaps,

11     but the restrictions again, I do not understand why you speak of

12     smuggling fuel if the fuel is meant for an enclave, military unit and

13     civilian population, to survive in that surroundings.  But that is

14     probably a difference in opinion we have.

15        Q.   I'm just searching for motive.  Do you agree that it looks

16     different now, and perhaps the intention for -- to take Srebrenica was

17     not the motive, rather, this information from the colonel on the ground.

18     However, you have already responded to this.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  He answered the question.  Please move on to

20     your next topic.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   You said -- actually, what do you think was the food situation in

23     May 1995?

24        A.   If you mean that the situation for the battalion in May -- well,

25     it was low, but we still had stocks.  Combat rations, if you mean the

Page 23095

 1     population, I know that the warehouse of the UNHCR in that period was

 2     empty, so the food that was present was only the food the people had

 3     themselves in their own house.

 4        Q.   If I had enough time, I would show you a document that we

 5     admitted on Friday.  In May, the 28th Division appropriated almost

 6     30 tonnes of flour, an tonne and a half of cooking oil, a lot of sugar,

 7     and many other products that we had allowed through in order for the

 8     population to obtain them when you say that there were food shortages.

 9     What do you say to that?

10        A.   I just stated what I recollect about the food situation in May.

11     If there is a proof of any convoy coming in with food, I just don't

12     recollect that.  It's 17 years ago.  I don't know every detail any more.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Were you fully aware -- or, rather, to what extent

14     were you aware of the size and structure of the 28th Division?

15        A.   What we knew at that time was that the 28th Division, being the

16     former Operational Group, was organised in brigades, had a divisional

17     structure, estimated strength 4-, 4.500 infantrymen, some mortars, and a

18     couple of weapons -- weapon systems, including the T-55 main battle tank

19     in the weapon collection point compound in Srebrenica where our B Company

20     was.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that they had at least two more tanks

22     hidden in the hills and at least one self-propelled gun?

23        A.   I did not know, and I doubt that.

24        Q.   I hope that we're going to show a document tomorrow showing how

25     this equipment was being taken out.  Did they take a tank from the

Page 23096

 1     storage facility in Srebrenica?  Did they take it to Tuzla?

 2        A.   No, they did not.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Then if they were getting some tank and some

 4     self-propelled vehicle out, then that was a different piece of equipment

 5     altogether, wasn't it?

 6        A.   If they were getting it out, it was equipment we were not aware

 7     of it.  And again, based on the position of my observation post, the very

 8     moment these kind of vehicles would be deployed, I would have reports on

 9     that because it would have been without our -- within our observation.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Within the battalion, did you have an exchange of

11     information, not only commanders and officers, but did your soldiers know

12     about the environment that they lived and worked in?  Did they know

13     everything that the officers knew?

14        A.   If you mean information about the ABiH, they knew what we knew.

15        Q.   Thank you.  I'm concerned because some people who testified here

16     said that they didn't know anything.  They have either forgotten, or they

17     didn't want to speak the truth.

18             So you did not conceal the presence of a division there from

19     them, a division consisting of four or five brigades; right?

20             JUDGE KWON:  That's a totally improper statement.  Proceed with

21     your questions, please.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I think that I do

23     have the right to test what their -- what the previous witness has said.

24     Their commander is saying --

25             JUDGE KWON:  You are absolutely entitled to put questions what

Page 23097

 1     this witness knows, but not argue with this witness as to other

 2     witnesses's evidence.  It is not now for you to make submissions.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Were you aware of the agreement on the basis of which the

 6     Srebrenica protected area was established?

 7        A.   Generally, yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Did they give you a copy of that agreement with the

 9     map that showed the boundaries of that protected area as well as Zepa?

10        A.   I can't remember seeing a copy of the full agreement, the text, I

11     mean, but I got a map with the boundaries, the UN boundaries, of the

12     Srebrenica enclave.  On that map were also marked the Bosnian Serb

13     boundaries and ABiH boundaries.  There were, in fact, three boundaries,

14     but we kept, as far as DutchBat is concerned, for us, of course, the UN

15     boundaries were the correct ones.

16        Q.   Thank you.  This map, can one see on this map that the protected

17     areas of Srebrenica and Zepa have a certain territory between them, a

18     certain belt, if you will, that remained under Serb control?

19        A.   I know of that, but just to be clear, I never saw a map of Zepa

20     and the exact boundaries.  My knowledge is comprised to the boundaries of

21     Srebrenica, and I'm aware of the fact that there was a corridor or space

22     between the enclave of Srebrenica and Zepa.

23        Q.   The corridor that linked them together or set them apart?

24        A.   I probably used the wrong word.  A corridor that set them apart.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that this corridor included the road

Page 23098

 1     between Podravanje and Skelani, or, rather, to Serb territories on the

 2     west, Milici, and on the east, Skelani, and the mine used that road?

 3        A.   I know much of the areas pretty good, but I can't exactly put

 4     Podravanje and Skelani in a place, but if you mean the road that was

 5     directly south or even at the edge of OP Echo, then to my map that part,

 6     let's say about 100 metres west/east, just in front of OP Echo was within

 7     the Srebrenica enclave.

 8        Q.   Why would we have signed such an agreement?  Did somebody perhaps

 9     deceive you about this?  Because when we signed the agreement we made

10     sure that the road remained the territory we controlled, because they

11     didn't need it and we did.  Do you allow the possibility that somebody

12     misrepresented the boundaries of the enclave?

13        A.   Well, it's speculation.  I don't know whether there is a

14     misrepresentation in the boundaries.  I can only say how the boundaries

15     were when we took over, and to me, that were the boundaries and that

16     meant that, what, about 100 metres of that road were within Muslim

17     territory.  And if you state that it is a bad solution or idiotic, well,

18     okay, but these are the facts.  There was 100 metres of that road within

19     the enclave, so not at this position of the Bosnian Serbs.

20        Q.   That's precisely what I'm talking about, Mr. Franken.  We never

21     signed that map.  In our map that was signed, the road was under our

22     control, but we'll show that tomorrow.

23             Tell us, did the Muslim side work to join and eventually manage

24     to join the two enclaves, making them territorially continuous?

25        A.   As far as I know, no.  I know that there was some illegal traffic

Page 23099

 1     between those two locations, between the enclaves, but I never had

 2     reports or any indications that they tried to really join them

 3     geographically.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Did you ever get hold of Muslim military documents

 5     from Spring 1995 containing plans to join the two enclaves and also to

 6     join these two enclaves to the Tuzla region?

 7        A.   No.

 8        Q.   Let us go back to the civilian issues for a moment.  You

 9     confirmed somewhere that the Serb side had suggested commercial

10     co-operation and trade to be restored, but the Muslim side rejected that;

11     correct?

12        A.   That's correct.

13        Q.   Do you agree that one of the possible motives of that rejection

14     was that the prices would fall and profits to be made on the black

15     markets would be smaller?

16        A.   I don't agree, but it is a possibility that that was a motive.

17        Q.   But you were certainly aware of the existence of the black

18     market, weren't you?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   Do you believe that this black market was not controlled by a

21     pauper?  It was controlled by the political and military leadership who

22     had ways and means of protecting their own interests.

23        A.   Well, I don't know whether it's relevant what I believe or

24     believed.  We did some investigations in that direction to see whether

25     and what amount the 28th Division was involved in the black market, but

Page 23100

 1     we couldn't find proof of that.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  You spoke about that in your statement of the 26th

 3     and 27th September, 1995, on page 00443276 and 77 could we see that in

 4     e-court.  Let me repeat.  00443276 and 77.

 5             Do we agree that your recollection was much fresher in 1995 than

 6     today?

 7        A.   That's always true.  Recollection in 1995 was better than in

 8     2012.

 9        Q.   This could be it.  It's 1D04773.  The ERN number should end in

10     276.  That's it.  And then the next page.  Let us take a look.

11             Did you give this statement?

12        A.   Just wait.  I'm trying to read it.

13        Q.   Could we zoom in a bit.

14        A.   Yes, that is my statement - it's correct - about this trade.  At

15     least I see a part of it.  I suppose it goes on.

16        Q.   Is it true what it says in the second paragraph, that the first

17     few months there were no major incidents, or very few, and then:

18             [In English] [As read] "In this period there was a proposal by

19     the Serbs to do business with the Muslims according to the prices on the

20     black market in the enclave.  When I say business, I mean business in

21     everything, except ammunition.  After several rounds of negotiations, the

22     civilian authorities of the enclave gave their approval for the goods to

23     be supplied by the Serbs to the enclave.  We visited that -- we insisted

24     that the goods be sold in the enclave for roughly the same market price

25     that DutchBat played -- paid," and so on.

Page 23101

 1             [Interpretation] Could we see the next page where you discuss who

 2     was involved in this.  The civilian authorities were supporting it, if

 3     I'm seeing well, and the command of the 28th Division brought it down?

 4        A.   Yes.  What is your question?

 5        Q.   My question is:  And now we see that during the first few months

 6     it was quiet without major incidents.  How do you explain that?

 7        A.   Well, it's just given the facts, there is not an explanation for

 8     the fact that in January, February, it was quiet, meaning incidents,

 9     armed incidents, just stating the situation.  And I don't have an

10     explanation for that, because the situation was the same that in the end

11     DutchBat II was there, so there was no change in then.

12        Q.   Would the situation have been different for the civilian

13     population in the enclave if the commercial and trade connections had

14     been re-established?

15        A.   I do think so, yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted, at

18     least these two pages?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Very well, yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2008, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D04767 is the next document I

22     would like to call up.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Did you have the impression that the Muslims in Srebrenica were

25     thinking only about the defence of their enclave, or they had active

Page 23102

 1     plans targeting Serb territories?

 2        A.   Well, I should give two answers.  If you mean with the Muslims

 3     and referring to the normal civil population, they were only concerned in

 4     survival.  The 28th Division, they did some -- I know of some attacks

 5     they did in Serbian territory.  Whether they had plans or they had a

 6     strategy or whatever, I do not know of.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Take a look at this order of 27 May 1995.  The

 8     28th Division is ordering the 285th Brigade in Zepa to prevent the

 9     departure of civilians.  To the best of your knowledge and in your

10     experience, were the civilians willing to leave and go to some areas

11     where they would live better, areas under Muslim control?

12        A.   That thought or that will was never reported to me, and we didn't

13     inquire anything in that direction, so I do not know whether they wanted

14     to go in that period.  There were no indications that they were.

15        Q.   And is it true that they were trying to board UNHCR trucks when

16     they returned empty, and many of them had put their names on waiting

17     lists, wishing to leave?

18        A.   I do not know anything about boarding UNHCR trucks, and I know

19     nothing about waiting lists or any organisation about leaving the

20     enclave.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Look at the first paragraph which indicates that such

22     a tendency existed and it was forbidden.  And then look at paragraph 3.

23     It speaks of armed control over the Serb territorial corridor between

24     Zepa and Srebrenica.  I don't want to read it out, but read at least the

25     first ten lines of this paragraph 3.

Page 23103

 1        A.   I read it, and it is a pity I was not in that line of

 2     communications.  Then I would have known in that time that those plans

 3     were there.  But actually, in that period we were not aware of those

 4     plans or these orders.  Again, I was not in the line of communication of

 5     the Bosnian Muslim army alas.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have the impression that the sides were

 7     concealing certain things from the international community and its

 8     representatives?

 9        A.   Not the impression.  I had the conviction that it was so, because

10     many times we asked the staff of 28th Division whether they had

11     information.  Perhaps you know that the intelligence information we got

12     from the UN was close to zero.  And then again, when we asked the Bosnian

13     Serb army through Major Nikolic information, especially when he reported

14     that there had been a raid by the Muslims, we got nilch [sic] on the

15     report as well.  We didn't get information.  So although we knew they had

16     information, they wouldn't give it to us, which means they concealed

17     things.

18        Q.   There's a conviction where we live that Serbs are poor hens,

19     because hens, when they lay an egg, they trumpet it all over the place,

20     whereas Serbs don't.  So they probably did not take responsibility for

21     this.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this document?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West?

24             MS. WEST:  I have no objection.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Exhibit D2009.

Page 23104

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   So you did know, or at least you heard rumours, that humanitarian

 3     aid is ending up in the hands of the army, the Bosnian army, and that the

 4     army is involved in its distribution and control?

 5        A.   In answer to the first question, I know - I didn't hear rumours -

 6     but UNHCR told me, reported to me, and they consented in that, that the

 7     28th Division took a part of the food supplies that came in by UNHCR.

 8     Whether the army - re: it the 28th Division - was involved in the

 9     distribution and control further for the other stocks, the resting

10     stocks, I do not know.  As far as I know, the "opstina," the civil

11     element controlling the enclave, was responsible for that.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that we had no obligation whatsoever to

13     feed the enemy army or to allow that food and resources for the enemy

14     army pass through our territory?

15        A.   What I understood is that what the 28th Division reserved for

16     itself was for the families of the soldiers and the members of that

17     division, because there were no barracks.  They were still in their

18     houses those soldiers.  So of course the Serbs didn't have, what do you

19     say, obligation in that way, but it was never a question that the Serbs

20     had to bring food to the enclave.  The UNHCR wanted and did, and the only

21     role the Serbs played was consented, and then, I mean, the food was, in

22     fact, for human beings, not only for the army.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Perhaps we could call it up, although you confirmed

24     it already.  Maybe I don't need the transcript.  You said approximately

25     the same thing in the Tolimir case and then in Popovic; Tolimir in 2010,

Page 23105

 1     and Popovic in 2006.  But you confirm the same essentially.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  If there is no need, then you can proceed.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we look at

 4     65 ter 15563.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   This is before you came, but in our experience, it was

 7     uninterrupted, so by the time you arrived, we already had certain

 8     experiences and certain misgivings.  So take a look at this document.

 9     Next page, please.

10             I don't know why there are no more pages.  It deals with the

11     inspection of persons and weapons.  Never mind.  We'll remove this

12     because it's obviously not the whole document.  Can we see 65 ter 19464.

13     5D54.  It must be chapter 5.  [In English] Chapter 5, D54.

14             [Interpretation] You were quoted here as concluding that the

15     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was more aggressive in inspecting convoys than

16     the VRS, than the Army of Republika Srpska.  Is it indeed what you

17     reported?

18             MS. WEST:  Can we just have that pointed out?

19             THE WITNESS:  Sorry?

20             JUDGE KWON:  The Prosecution wanted the exact reference, but it's

21     only chapter 4.  I don't see any chapter 5 in this document.  But without

22     seeing the document, can you answer that question, Mr. Franken?

23             THE WITNESS:  I think I can, Your Honour.  It's a strange quote,

24     because I can't have said anything about the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

25     inspecting convoys because that was not the case, at least not in the

Page 23106

 1     period I was in Yugoslavia, in Srebrenica, and not as far as convoys

 2     meant for DutchBat III were concerned.  They did not control within my

 3     area of responsibility.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Could you please look at the last sentence.

 6        A.   Sorry, of what?  Of chapter 4 or what?

 7        Q.   Page 1:

 8             [In English] "The Bosnian Muslims, for their part, also impose

 9     restrictions on UNPROFOR's freedom of movement with the objective of

10     controlling UNPROFOR and to be able to carry out operations without

11     UNPROFOR's knowledge."

12        A.   Yes.  My -- what is your question?

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Is this part of the report of the

14     Secretary-General correct?  Did this indeed happen?

15        A.   Yes.  Within the enclave we had problems with freedom of movement

16     in the so-called Bandera Triangle, piece of the enclave in the

17     south-west.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see page 5 now.  [In English] Fifth page out

19     of seven.  [Interpretation] That's the one.  Paragraph 2:

20             [In English] [As read] "It surprised Franken that UNHCR was not

21     aware of the ABiH measures of checking convoys because he assumed that

22     this had been passed on informally to -- by the Dutch liaison officer to

23     the local UNHCR representative.  However, MSF also appeared to be unaware

24     of this measure."

25        A.   Yes, it can't be a convoy of vehicles.  I never stated that

Page 23107

 1     because it is nonsense, as I tried to make clear before.  The ABiH,

 2     within the enclave, never controlled anything about convoys or transports

 3     coming in or going out.  So --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like the previous paragraph preceding that

 5     on page 4, the last part.

 6             THE WITNESS:  I refer to the text, "It surprised Franken" --

 7     [overlapping speakers]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  That's the top of page 5, so please take a look at

 9     the bottom part of the previous page, page 4.  I think there's a

10     reference to you, sir, "Major Franken explained this ..."  could you take

11     a look.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Yes, this last paragraph here.

14        A.   I'm reading.  Just hold, please.  This refers to a period in

15     which we, more or less, controlled UNHCR convoys, because the ABiH

16     claimed then, as is said in this paragraph, they wanted to control them

17     because they were afraid that illegal things came in through UNHCR.  We

18     made then a kind of control just for the show to say we are doing that so

19     you don't need to.  Later on, the ABiH again threatened to make

20     check-points within the enclave, which I forbade.  That came to an

21     incident, and when they still wanted to do that, I said that I would

22     prevent that with all means.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see the next page.  These convoy leaders were

24     angry and the convoy inspections were supposed to take place on no man's

25     land, and -- yes.  Could you continue reading, please.

Page 23108

 1             Do we agree then that it's quite a way from Zvornik to Srebrenica

 2     all through Serbian-held territory; is that correct?

 3        A.   Sorry, I missed -- I just have -- I was reading.  I'll just read

 4     the transcript.

 5             The route from Zvornik to Srebrenica is through Serbian-held

 6     territory.  Yeah, it is correct.

 7        Q.   And inspections were only at the entrance to Zvornik and also at

 8     the entrance to Srebrenica; isn't that right?

 9        A.   That is probable.  I don't know exactly where those convoys were

10     inspected.  Earlier I stated that the UN convoys who came through --

11     mostly through another route were at least three times inspected.  I was

12     not part of those UNHCR convoys so I don't know, I was not reported where

13     they were inspected in what way.  As far as the text on the screen and on

14     the page starting with the 20th of June, I doubt -- or, rather, I -- so

15     it's incorrect that we should have search an UNHCR convoy more thoroughly

16     than the VRS had done.  Again, it was to show control to keep the ABiH

17     quiet.

18        Q.   For the first time you see that the Serbs ensured that only 100

19     to 150 litres of fuel remained in the truck so that there was nothing to

20     be left in the enclave to the Muslim army; is that correct?  This is one

21     of those restrictions; isn't that right?

22        A.   Yeah.  Whether that is right, I don't know.  I see it here that

23     how many litres remained, and, yes, you confirmed that one of the

24     restrictions would be, as I gave on the convoys, was checking how much

25     diesel was in the fuel tanks when they get in and how much there was in

Page 23109

 1     there when they come back.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall that from the 15th of June, there was

 3     an offensive by the Muslim forces, first of all around Sarajevo, and that

 4     on June 20th when this convoy came with 56 tonnes of sugar, beans, salt,

 5     fish, and so on and so forth, flour, and so on and so forth, did the

 6     28th Division carry out active combat in Serbian territory around

 7     Srebrenica in order to draw out the Serb forces and to make it easier for

 8     the Muslim army in Sarajevo?  Did you know about that?

 9        A.   I think I answered that, because you're saying that there was a

10     convoy coming in and activity of the 28th Division increased.  Again, I

11     have no reports about that, and I don't have information about that.  And

12     if the 28th Division carried out its combat in Serbian territory, I'm not

13     aware.  I was not part of the decision-making, so I do not know what

14     their strategy or their tactics or their objective was in that case.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at the top of the next page, please.

16             Do you see here that the Muslim side also put some conditions to

17     the UNHCR, and demands, and that there was a misunderstanding between

18     them?  Your name is mentioned.  Somebody accused you of giving in to the

19     Muslim side, and you said that you were not dancing to their tune; isn't

20     that right?

21        A.   I see that, but I do not recollect that, and I cannot imagine

22     that I was dancing to anybody's tunes.

23        Q.   The Secretary-General said that you denied that, but obviously

24     somebody did, but do you recall that the Serbian side had objections?

25     And you can see now that the UNHCR also had objections regarding the

Page 23110

 1     UNPROFOR being a little bit more yielding in relation to the Muslims in

 2     Srebrenica.

 3        A.   I can read the text.  I don't know what the source of that text

 4     is.  I do not recall this as such.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this,

 7     article 9 of chapter 4.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West?

 9             MS. WEST:  No objection.

10             JUDGE KWON:  We will admit it as Exhibit D2010.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Could you please tell us if you did a lot of shooting in the

14     enclave.

15        A.   If we did a lot of shooting in the enclave.  Well, that is quite

16     subjective.  What is a lot of shooting?  No, we did not a lot of

17     shooting.  On occasion when we were attacked we returned fire, if that is

18     an answer to your question.

19        Q.   What were you spending your ammunition on and needed to replenish

20     it, resupply it then?

21        A.   First part of the answer is the situation when I came in was

22     already that way, that we had a minimum amount of ammunition because when

23     DutchBat I came in then already they were not able to bring all the

24     ammunition that was needed.  Ammunition tears -- that wears out, so to

25     say, so in the situation when I came there I had about 16 per cent of the

Page 23111

 1     total amount of ammunition, which meant, for instance, that almost all my

 2     anti-tank capacity was not operational any more, because that ammunition

 3     couldn't be kept in a proper way, and it wears out if you have it in the

 4     field that long.  It is sensible.  And it is not only replenishing, it

 5     was, in fact, bringing the stock to the level that it should have been

 6     all the time.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  What was worrying the Serbian side was where

 8     84 per cent of the combat kit was spent.  Where did -- if you had

 9     16 per cent, where did the 84 per cent go, without having training

10     practice, because that is something that would have disturbed both us and

11     the Muslims; isn't that right?

12        A.   I know that DutchBat II had some training practice, but again, 84

13     was never spent.  The 84 per cent was never in the enclave.  And that

14     could have been 80 because there was some shooting training by DutchBat I

15     and DutchBat II, but around 80 per cent never arrived in the enclave.

16        Q.   Is it possible to rule out if not smuggling and sales then

17     thefts?  Do you know of instances of theft of Dutch equipment by the

18     Muslims both in your battalion and the one before yours?

19        A.   To answer the last question, I do not know of any incidents like

20     that in the period before DutchBat III.  I recollect three times with one

21     attempt to steal equipment from OPs.  Those were temporary OPs.  And then

22     ammunition was not involved.  It was always they tried to steal a can of

23     diesel fuel or something like that.  Two were successful, one not.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Since you are aware of the LiveNote, the transcript,

25     in your previous answer you meant that DutchBat also had some training

Page 23112

 1     practice, not specifically DutchBat number II.  The first line, "I know

 2     that ..."

 3             THE WITNESS:  That's referring to the use of ammunition.

 4     DutchBat III did not train with ammunition in that period because we had

 5     that little ammunition, but DutchBat I and II, the two battalions were --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, the first line of your answer DutchBat II

 7     should read DutchBat II also.

 8             THE WITNESS:  "I know the Dutch ..."  You mean the answer, "I

 9     know that DutchBat II had some training practice"?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE WITNESS:  That should be DutchBat I and II had some training

12     practice.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             THE WITNESS:  That's correct, Your Honour, sorry.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at 1D04741 [Realtime transcript read in

18     error "1D4074"] now, please.

19             Is it correct that the Muslim side counted on your military

20     alliance and that it was making preparations to act together with you

21     against the Serbs?

22        A.   I do not know how and in what esteem they counted on our military

23     alliance.  I know that I had a conversation, and I look to the date,

24     31st of May.  Yes, that must have been in May where I had a conversation

25     with the Chief of Staff of the 28th Division where he asked me what

Page 23113

 1     DutchBat would do when the Serbs attacked the enclave.  End of that --

 2     that discussion was that I said we would defend our observation posts,

 3     and he said that the 28th Division would defend the area between the

 4     observation posts.  So there is -- being a UN unit, I could not really

 5     co-ordinate any defence, of course, but there is in that way some

 6     co-ordination in the case that the Bosnian Serb Army would attack the

 7     enclave.

 8             MS. WEST:  Just to interrupt.  I just to make sure the record is

 9     clear.  At line 15 it should be 1D4741.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am not sure, but that is that

12     document, but very well.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you recall that Mr. Oric was outside of the enclave on the

15     31st of May and that he did not come back since March and that this

16     Ramiz Becirevic was standing in for him, his Chief of Staff of the

17     28th Division; is that correct?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Let's look at these paragraphs together then.  In the first one

20     that there should be a test.  In the second that they should conceal

21     weaponry from you, that you don't see what they have.  These are just

22     bullet points.  In the third one, to be convincing and to fight, then an

23     order to order the mortar trenches on all axes, and then to begin us, the

24     Dutch Battalion to give you back the ammunition and infantry weapons that

25     we handed over so that we would have a true picture if they were our

Page 23114

 1     allies but to do it without the knowledge of the observers.  And then it

 2     says do not agree with the Dutch dissolving their depot from their

 3     headquarters to other locations because it will enable them or it might

 4     be a trick intended to leave us without ammunition, and knowing what is

 5     in store for them it would give them an excuse to say the Chetniks took

 6     it, and so on and so forth.

 7             All right.  Well, when this falls into our hands on the

 8     31st of May, can you imagine what we are thinking about your

 9     co-operation?

10        A.   I can imagine anything.  There's a simple solution for that:  Ask

11     us.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this,

14     please.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West?

16             MS. WEST:  No objection.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This will be admitted.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2011, Your Honours.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Can we look at 1D976, please, so that we can see how two days

21     after that measures are enforced in relation to you.

22             You can see on the 2nd of June to the command of the 285th Zepa,

23     from the division command, it says:  With reference to your document

24     written confidential, and so on and so forth, we here give you all the

25     following instructions:  Cover all UN check-points with our forces and do

Page 23115

 1     not allow UN troops to cross over to the Serbian side.  In case UN troops

 2     attempt to leave Zepa they are to be disarmed and captured and their

 3     weapons and hardware put to use in the defence of the territory.  Assure

 4     the UNPROFOR commander in Zepa, Colonel Dudnjik, of our good intentions

 5     and co-operation and convince him to withdraw explosives from the

 6     check-points.  Let him know that we are prepared to defend both ourselves

 7     and then in the event of an attack.  Also use the civilian organs of

 8     authority to give him this assurance.  Ban any kind of contact between UN

 9     soldiers and unauthorised personnel.

10             So, is it clear to you now why the Serbian Army was concerned

11     about the weaponry and equipment you were bringing into the enclave,

12     because at any point they could fall into the hands of the 28th Division?

13        A.   As far as I can see, this document refers to the situation in

14     Zepa and the UN unit in Zepa.  Yeah.  Why the Serbian Army was concerned

15     about what, I do not know.  I do not think there was any reason in

16     Srebrenica, because you could be sure that under no circumstances I would

17     give our equipment and weaponry to any party in that area.

18        Q.   Well, perhaps not voluntarily, but would you hand them over if

19     5.000 of Oric's soldiers surrounded you and made you do that?  What would

20     you do in such a situation?  What could you do in that situation?

21        A.   I can't answer that question because that depends on the

22     situation:  How the grouping is, in what terrain, et cetera, et cetera.

23     I can't give an answer to that question.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this.

Page 23116

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2012, Your Honours.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Thank you.

 4             Can we look at 65 ter 30734.  Either I didn't say the number

 5     properly or something else is in question.  It's not a transcript.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please be asked to repeat

 7     the last two numbers.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the number.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 03734.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  And this should be the last question for

11     today.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Can I please draw your attention to the text.  We will soon see a

14     translation.  This is an analysis of the Army of Republika Srpska on the

15     10th of July before the capture of the enclave about events that preceded

16     it.  Could you please look at all the things that were going on before

17     you and also in the months before the month of July.

18        A.   Yes, I could, and I have to read it.  Just hold, please.

19             I read it that far.

20        Q.   Could we look at the next page, please.  It states here the

21     UNPROFOR is entirely informed about the Muslim terrorists and overall

22     military activities and is not preventing them.

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Could we please know where Mr. Karadzic is

24     reading from.

25             THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

Page 23117

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Franken can read it.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I'm trying to, Your Honour, please.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   My question is this:  Is there a possibility or another

 6     explanation for the first action which the Serbs halted even though they

 7     could have continued with it?  And in this case, in this one when the

 8     Serbs halted and entered Srebrenica only when the 28th Division left it,

 9     is there another explanation, too, about what you said how the Serbs made

10     a breakthrough?  My Serb -- my thesis is that the Serbs did not have a

11     plan to enter Srebrenica and that they entered Srebrenica in July because

12     the 28th Division had pulled out completely and the town had been

13     emptied; isn't that right?

14        A.   That is not correct.

15        Q.   And the units that were in the town, did they clash?

16        A.   You're referring to what units?  ABiH units clash with each other

17     you mean?  I see you nod.  No, they did not clash.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we'll --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would just like to clarify this

20     question, Your Excellency.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Did the 28th Division defend the town street by street?  Were

23     they fighting to keep the town, or did the 28th Division withdraw before

24     the Serbs reached the town?

25        A.   To give a complete answer, the 28th Division fought its way back

Page 23118

 1     to town from the confrontation line, UN confrontation line.  Then, as I

 2     recollect well, in the evening of the 10th, they were still in defensive

 3     positions around Srebrenica, and as far as I know, they left in the night

 4     of the 11th, in the early morning of the 11th.  Then they withdrew from

 5     Srebrenica.  But before that the Bosnian Serb army attacked, actually,

 6     Srebrenica.  Even my forces opened fire on them when they came down the

 7     hill.  Then they withdrew.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We will clarify this

 9     further tomorrow.  I would like to tender this.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West.

11             MS. WEST:  No objection.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We will admit this.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2013, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE KWON:  We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.  Probably

15     you are already aware of this, but you're not supposed to discuss with

16     anybody else about your testimony.

17             THE WITNESS:  That's clear, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  The hearing is adjourned.

19                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m.,

20                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 17th day

21                           of January, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.