1 Tuesday, 14 February 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Good morning, Mr. Nikolic.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
10 WITNESS: MOMIR NIKOLIC [Resumed]
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Good morning, Your Honours.
13 Examination by Mr. Nicholls: [Continued]
14 Q. Good morning, Mr. Nikolic.
15 A. Good morning.
16 Q. Now, we -- when we left off yesterday, we were still talking
17 about 12 July, events of that day and what you saw and experienced in
18 Potocari. One thing you talked about, you told us yesterday about the
19 conversation with Lieutenant-Colonel Vujadin Popovic before you went to
20 Potocari about what would happen to the men and to the women and
21 children, and you told us about what you saw when you were there in
22 Potocari, the mistreatment and that you realised that things were not
23 going the way they should have, and you talked that there were some men
24 placed on the first convoy but only on the first convoy.
25 Can you tell me about whether that first convoy was filmed and
1 your conclusion as to why it was filmed, if it was?
2 A. I'm not receiving any interpretation, and something of what you
3 said I understood, but ...
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nikolic, are you now hearing me?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, I can hear the
6 interpretation now.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 MR. NICHOLLS:
9 Q. I'll ask it again, Mr. Nikolic. Yesterday, we were talking about
10 the 12th of July and what you saw and experienced in Potocari with the
11 separations of the men. You told us about your conversation with
12 Lieutenant-Colonel Vujadin Popovic before you went to Potocari, the
13 mistreatment of the men in Potocari and that you realised things were not
14 going as the way they should be done. And you talked about how some men
15 were put on the first convoy out. Now, I want to ask you whether that
16 convoy -- that process of men getting onto the first bus, I should say,
17 not first convoy, that on the first group to leave there were some men.
18 Was that process filmed, and if it was, why did you conclude that that
19 part of the process had been filmed?
20 A. Yes. What I know, in fact what I saw is that for some time in
21 Potocari the press centre from the Drina Corps command was present. I
22 know those people personally, and I know their chief, their head,
23 Captain Zoran. There were other teams as well, but I'm referring to this
24 service that is part of the Drina Corps command of my superior command.
25 They were filming that, and all I can do is express my opinion, which I
1 have done on numerous occasions to date. I will repeat it. In the first
2 convoy alone there were men, and this was filmed. Given the way in which
3 events subsequently unfolded, the only conclusion I could draw was that
4 this was filmed for the benefit of DutchBat representatives and for the
5 purpose of spreading propaganda by this press department, by the
6 journalists who were part of a given command. And, in fact, in that
7 film, in those videos, one attempted to demonstrate that everything was
8 fine, that everything was being done in accordance with the rules, but,
9 in fact, my impression was that all this was done for the purpose of
10 propaganda, because only the first convoy and only one convoy was filmed
11 and nothing else after that, apart from that process of film being
12 certain soldiers and officers who gave statements about all the events
13 were also filmed. Positive opinions were expressed. I would say that no
14 one who participated in that operation was incriminated.
15 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Nikolic, can you clarify for me. Were the men
16 on the first bus or the first convoy?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The men were in the first convoy.
18 I won't claim that they were in each and every bus, but in -- in terms of
19 percentage, 90 per cent of the buses in the first convoy there were a few
20 men at least. I can't really provide you with any precise figures, it is
21 impossible, but I could see in the buses of the first convoy there were
22 men. They would enter as the buses arrived. One bus would arrive and
23 then the family with a man would enter the bus. A brother, a father - it
24 doesn't really matter - would enter. Then the next bus would arrive and
25 some men would enter the next bus as well. So I am speaking about the
1 first convoy, not the first bus.
2 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you very much.
3 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Q. How long did you spend in Potocari that day?
6 A. On that day, on the 12th, as I have already said I was the duty
7 officer on at that day, and occasionally I spent some time in Potocari,
8 and when I wasn't in Potocari, I was in the operations room where I was
9 the duty officer.
10 Q. Let me stop you. When you arrived in Potocari on the 12th after
11 the last Hotel Fontana meeting, how long did you stay there before you
12 returned to Bratunac?
13 A. On the first occasion not very long, perhaps 30 minutes, perhaps
14 a little less. But I didn't spend a long time there. The first time I
15 went there I didn't spend much time in Potocari.
16 Q. And when did you come back that day?
17 A. Well, I went to Potocari on a number of occasions on that day, so
18 I really cannot tell you exactly when I returned. I can't give you the
19 exact hour or minute. I returned on a number of occasions because I
20 would do so whenever it was necessary to return to deal with certain
21 questions or certain problems that had arisen. I can mention a few
22 problems that I, myself, dealt with, but the first time I went there I
23 know that I saw Mr. Kingori, Major Kingori, who was part of the military
24 observers team. He said that they had no water. So I went to Bratunac
25 and water was delivered to Potocari by truck. I know that he also
1 complained that the soldiers who entered Potocari had taken equipment and
2 food and other things from them at a check-point in Potocari. He also
3 complained that the soldiers who entered disarmed some UNPROFOR soldiers
4 who weren't at their base in Potocari, who were outside their base. So
5 that was the first time.
6 The next time I went there was because there were problems
7 regarding the passage of convoys. The convoy transporting Muslims from
8 Potocari to Kladanj was targeted. They threw stones at it, in fact, and
9 I was told that there were problems with the convoy that was passing
10 through urban areas. So that's about a distance of 700 metres or
11 1 kilometre, and it was on that stretch of road that they stoned the
13 I contacted the civilian police, I contacted the command of the
14 military police, and we provided security for that stretch of road so
15 that the convoy could pass through safely and so that we could prevent
16 the buses, the wind screens from being broken and so on and so forth.
17 So these were practical problems I had to deal with when I went
18 to Potocari.
19 Q. Okay. And you were there when the transport began. Can you tell
20 us about approximately what time that was in the afternoon?
21 A. I think it was between 1.00 and 2.00 that the buses started
22 arriving one by one, and as they arrived, the transport command -- or,
23 rather, they would fill up the buses. When the buses arrived, they
24 formed a convoy out of the buses that arrived. This was a continual
25 process. New buses kept arriving. Some left. They formed these columns
1 and then they would leave and others would arrive. So this is how this
2 evacuation was done -- or, rather, this is how these people from Potocari
3 were moved.
4 Q. Okay. And when do you remember it ended on that day on the 12th,
5 when the last buses with people on them left?
6 A. In the evening hours, but I really don't know. Don't ask me to
7 tell you but it was in the evening hours. I knew exactly when. I knew
8 the time because I was the duty officer on the day and I made a note of
9 such things.
10 Q. All right.
11 A. Well, I don't want to speculate, but it was in the evening hours
12 of that first day. It took a long time. It was before night fell.
13 Q. All right. Could I have 65 ter 22820, please. While this is
14 coming up, I don't want to go over it again because you explained it, but
15 you talked yesterday about Vujadin Popovic being in Potocari, as well as
16 members of state security or RDB.
17 This document is dated 12 July 1995, headed Drina Corps IKM,
18 forward command post. It's from Lieutenant-Colonel Vujadin Popovic.
19 Very urgent. And it says:
20 "To the Main Staff of the VRS, sector for intelligence and
21 security affairs. Security administration. Command of the Drina Corps.
22 Security Department."
23 If we could scroll down so that the witness can see paragraph 3.
24 It is on the next page in the English.
25 There we see:
1 "A refugee group of about 30- to 35.000 women, children, elderly,
2 and infirm and the sick is located after beyond the UNPROFOR base towards
3 Srebrenica, on the road and inside the facilities of the former
4 factories. The security was established and the evacuation to Kladanj
5 started. About 5.000 women and children were evacuated so far. We are
6 separating men from 17 to 60 years of age and we are not transporting
7 them. We have about 70 of them so far and the security organs and the DB
8 are working with them."
9 And it's got a stamp. It's hard to read. It sayings received
10 January 12, 1934 on the bottom right. And I should have said on the
11 top -- if we go back up to the top of the front first page in the
12 English. We see that under the date of 12 July it says 1730 hours.
13 You spoke about after the first convoy all the men were separated
14 and detained. I want you to comment on whether this paragraph 3 written
15 by Vujadin Popovic, the Drina Corps security chief, that he is reporting
16 up to all these different organs is accurate.
17 A. Yes. You can see who Mr. Popovic is reporting to at the top of
18 the document.
19 Q. And the numbers look accurate to you that he quotes, at that
20 point in time?
21 A. I think it was a higher number -- or, rather, I don't think so.
22 I'm sure, I'm absolutely sure because I saw this myself. Could you just
23 scroll up so I could see the figure. Is says that about 70 of them. I
24 am claiming that there were between 350 and 400 of them who had been
25 separated on that day, singled out. That's what I know for sure. And at
1 the time that the report was made, well, the hour is 1730 hours. At that
2 time, my claim is that there were far more than 70 of them. And in the
3 last paragraph, it says that the security organs and members of the state
4 security sector were involved in this process of separation.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender this document, Your Honour?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 Mr. Nikolic, the last sentence you read, i.e., We have about 70
8 of them so far and the security organs and the state security are working
9 with them.
10 The security organs refer to -- refer to you. So security organs
11 on the ground means you. Am I correct in so understanding?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The organs on the ground -- at the
13 time there were several security organs on the ground at the time. It's
14 true that I was also part of the security organs, and I was also present
15 in Potocari. That is also true. But there were other security organs
16 there. Security organs from the Drina Corps were present, or the chief
17 of the intelligence organ from the Drina Corps was there, and there were
18 other security organs there, not just myself and Popovic. There were
19 others from other units, because all units have -- this includes those
20 from Potocari. All units have security organs as an integral part of
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll give the next Prosecution exhibit
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P4388, Your Honours.
25 MR. NICHOLLS:
1 Q. Now, yesterday as well, you gave your estimate of a thousand,
2 1.500 or 2.000 men at the time who were in the column moving from
3 Srebrenica towards -- to Potocari and then who gathered there, and you
4 stated that it was your assessment that many of them -- or that they were
5 not all soldiers. As security and intelligence chief in Bratunac at that
6 time, all these men who were separated after the first convoy left,
7 amongst them, were there men - the men referred to in Popovic's report -
8 who were not soldiers, who had not committed any crimes against the Serb
10 A. Either the interpretation is not correct or there's some other
11 problem, but I don't really understand what your question is.
12 Q. Let me ask it again. I'll make it simpler.
13 Among all the men who were separated in Potocari who we have been
14 talking about, were there men who were just plain civilians, who were not
15 soldiers and had not committed any crimes?
16 A. In my assessment, and this is what I have always claimed and I
17 still make this claim, most of the people, the men who were separated in
18 Potocari, this is on the basis of what I know, most of them shouldn't
19 have been separated for any reason or any military reason. To single
20 someone out, to separate someone, you have to have information according
21 to which there are reasonable grounds to suspect that person of having
22 committed a crime.
23 Given the way in which they separated these people, well, there
24 were no controls. Nothing was checked. As far as I know, they had no
25 evidence against those people, yet they were separated. And yet again,
1 I'm claiming that it wouldn't have been a problem even if they had been
2 separated. Had they been checked and if it wasn't shown that they had
3 committed a crime, then they could have transported them somewhere. That
4 wouldn't have been a problem. But my claim here is that most of those
5 people were not members of the ABiH. Perhaps they were men who were fit
6 for military service, but they were not members of that force. And I can
7 say for certain that everyone who participated in a crime or war crime,
8 everyone who killed civilian -- civilians, Serbs, or put fire to their
9 property didn't arrive in Potocari. No one arrived in Potocari. Those
10 who arrived in Potocari were people who certainly did not do anything and
11 had no reason to flee across the forest. They went to Potocari to be
12 safe with their families and to be evacuated to the liberated territory,
13 which is what had been agreed.
14 So that is my opinion as far as the -- as these people are
15 concerned, the sort of people who were separated.
16 Q. I have one follow-up question from yesterday's transcript. This
17 was at 24621, lines 24 and 25. You were talking about this process and
18 how you thought that there would be some type of screening of the men,
19 and you said:
20 "That was my first thought when I heard about the separation.
21 After that, of course, you know what happened."
22 I just want to ask you what happened? What did you mean when you
23 said "you know what happened," to all the men who had been separated?
24 A. Yes. What I wanted to say is that as someone from the security
25 organ, I know what the security organ's duties in Potocari should have
1 been. Military selection involves the sort of process I've mentioned
2 earlier on. It involves identifying those who have committed a crime or
3 those whom you suspect of having committed a crime, a war crime, or any
4 other kind of crime, crime against the civilian population or against
5 prisoners, soldiers, and so on and so forth. So I'm convinced that this
6 is a legitimate military process that is done in all armies when dealing
7 with prisoners, and naturally this screening concerns soldiers who
8 surrenders to you and concerns individuals who may have committed crimes,
9 so individuals that you suspect of having committed crimes. But no one
10 else should be the subject of screenings, civilians who have nothing to
11 do with the military. If you have no information on them, there is no
12 need to separate them.
13 When I mentioned those who were separated in Potocari, when I
14 heard what Popovic was saying, I understood what was going to happen was
15 what in fact happened, what we were discussing, but all those who
16 remained in Potocari were separated. They were first detained in
17 Potocari in houses, in certain facilities, and afterwards they were
18 transferred to Bratunac, and they were detained in the primary school
19 Vuk Karadzic, mostly in that school on the first day. And then what I
20 know for sure is that these very same people, in the morning on the 14th,
21 were transferred to the territory of Zvornik municipality, and all those
22 who were separated in Potocari were temporarily detained, transferred to
23 Bratunac and then to Zvornik, and after they'd been taken to Zvornik,
24 they were executed in the territory of Zvornik municipality.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to intervene for the
1 transcript. In the first sentence, the witness said that when he heard
2 Popovic speak, he thought that what was to ensue was what he described,
3 which is the legitimate military screening, whereas we don't see that the
4 way the first sentence is recorded.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nikolic, can you confirm what Mr. Karadzic said?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't speak English. I cannot
7 compare what I said with what's in the transcript. I can only repeat
8 what I have stated.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said this: When I heard what
11 Mr. Popovic said, it was my understanding that by going to Potocari a
12 military screening process was to take place, which is a legitimate
13 military procedure entailing identification -- the identification of
14 those who need to be separated, and checks are carried out because there
15 is a possibility of those who committed war crimes and crimes against
16 humanity being present. That was my understanding, and that is what I
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, and that is why I
19 intervened for the transcript.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nikolic, what is it that you heard from
21 Mr. Popovic by when you say, "When I heard what Mr. Popovic said"? What
22 word of Mr. Popovic did you refer to?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When Mr. Popovic, on the 12th in
24 the morning, before the 10.00 meeting, said that the women and children
25 were to go to Tuzla, to free territory, and that the military -- the men
1 who are fit for military service would be separated in Potocari.
2 JUDGE KWON: I'll leave it to you, Mr. Nicholls.
3 MR. NICHOLLS:
4 Q. And just to clarify this, yesterday at 24621 you said that
5 Mr. Popovic also said, you've testified about this before, that all the
6 men should be killed, and that after that there was a discussion of
7 execution sites; right?
8 A. Yes, that's correct. I have testified to that yesterday. He
9 said that all Balijas should be killed. That's what I meant, and I
10 didn't think I needed to explain again.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 JUDGE KWON: No. Mr. Nikolic, if that is what Mr. Popovic said,
13 how is it consistent with separating them and screening them? I meant
14 screening them.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In order to kill someone, that
16 person must be separated from the rest of the group. In other words, the
17 Muslims separated at Potocari were previously part of a group of 35.000
18 civilians. That was the context I tried to describe when the separation
19 of men is concerned as well as the transport of women and children from
20 Potocari. That is the context I was describing yesterday and today.
21 Popovic was perfectly clear that in Potocari able-bodied men
22 should be separated who were there. However, as I have explained
23 yesterday, not only able-bodied men were separated but all men were
24 separated in Potocari. All those who tried to board the buses,
25 irrespective of whether they were able-bodied or not, it was enough that
1 they were men and that's why they were separated. And all the separated
2 men were Muslim. There was no one else there in Potocari. And when I
3 asked him what would happen with the people, Mr. Popovic said that
4 Balijas, referring to them, ought to be killed, every one of them.
5 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Nikolic, after Popovic said that they should
6 all be killed, you said there was a discussion as to the locations where
7 they should be killed, did you not?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
9 JUDGE BAIRD: Who took part in those discussions?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Popovic, Mr. Kosoric, and I
11 participated in the conversation.
12 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you.
13 JUDGE KWON: Just one more clarification, because I wasn't clear
14 about this.
15 After having heard from Mr. Popovic that all men are to be
16 killed, or all Balijas are to be killed, how could you think what would
17 ensue is a legitimate military procedure entailing identification -- the
18 identification of those who need to be separated and checks are carried
19 out because there's a possibility of those who committed war crimes and
20 crimes against humanity?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've also answered similar
22 questions before.
23 At the moment when he said that, to be honest, I did not believe
24 that all the men, all the Balijas in Potocari, would be killed. I have
25 testified to that before. I believed then, and I couldn't even presume
1 that things would develop the way they did. That was my belief. At the
2 moment he said that all the Balijas should be killed, I thought that as
3 many times before, because I heard many people, many officers say similar
4 things, that Balijas should be killed or this or that, I thought this was
5 yet another statement by Popovic who had the habit of saying things like
6 that. So I thought that it wasn't exactly what he meant and that we
7 would indeed do what was prescribed under the rules. However, things
8 developed quite the other way following what he said, and what followed
9 is what I have testified to before.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
11 MR. NICHOLLS:
12 Q. But again, after Popovic said all the Balijas should be killed,
13 there was a discussion of where these men could be executed, including
14 Sase mine and Ciglana brick factory; right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you. I leave it there. 65 ter 01947, please.
17 While it's coming up, I'll say this is a document from RDB head
18 Dragan Kijac, 13 July 1995, to the RS deputy minister of the interior
19 personally and the head of the RS MUP Bijeljina RJB
20 Public Security Department personally.
21 First of all, do you know who the deputy minister of the interior
22 was on 13 July 1995?
23 A. I knew -- I think it was Mr. Kijac, or perhaps not. I'll think
24 of the name later on. I can't off-the-cuff.
25 Q. I was talking about the deputy minister of the interior. If you
1 don't remember, that's all right.
2 A. I even know him personally, but I can't recall his name. I
3 really can't.
4 Q. Do you know a man named Tomo Kovac?
5 A. Yes, yes. Precisely. Tomo Kovac was either his deputy or acting
6 in that capacity.
7 Q. All right. You spoke yesterday about how state security -- that
8 one of the separated men they took custody of was Mr. Mustafic. If we
9 look at the first paragraph, first full paragraph of this document, we
10 see it begins talking about the events of the night of 12-13 July, saying
11 that members of the VRS and the MUP have started capturing large numbers
12 of Muslim soldiers in ambushes set up in the general Konjevic Polje area.
13 Further down it states:
14 "The operation to detect and neutralise the Muslim troops is
15 continuing. Earlier information regarding their intentions and the axis
16 of movement towards Kladanj and Tuzla
17 (Buljim-Pobudje-Konjevic Polje-Kaldrmica-Cerska-Snagovo-Crni Vrh) has
18 been confirmed many times in interviews with prisoners."
19 Now, very simply, is that just a reference to information that
20 the security organs have learned from interrogating captured Muslim men,
21 or separated Muslim men?
22 A. This is mostly intelligence information to the effect that in the
23 period referred to -- well, we had that information at the command and as
24 well as in the police structures at the time. In other words, my answer
25 is yes, this is the intelligence information that was in use at the time
1 at the level of army commands and the police.
2 Q. Thank you. And at the bottom of that paragraph it states and
3 it's written here:
4 "Ibgan Mustafic, a former SDA deputy in the former BH Assembly
5 and a great opponent of Naser Oric, was among the prisoners and can, with
6 the necessary preparation, be used well in the media. "
7 What I'm just asking you is: Is this the same man, the same
8 Mustafic, that you referred to him as Ibran, that you discussed
9 yesterday, had been taken into custody by state security?
10 A. Yes, Ibran Mustafic, who was a SDA deputy in the Assembly of
12 MR. NICHOLLS: I would tender that document, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be Exhibit P4389.
14 MR. NICHOLLS:
15 Q. All right. Moving on chronologically, Mr. Nikolic, I want to get
16 to the 13th of July now. Is it correct that the night of the 12th to
17 the -- into the 13th you were duty officer at the Bratunac Brigade?
18 A. Yes, that is correct. As of 7.00 on the 12th of July until 7.00
19 on the 13th of July; that is to say, 24 hours.
20 Q. All right. Now, I'd just like to go through the 13th of July,
21 what you did that day, the places you went, the people you saw.
22 Let's start off with the morning. Where did you go, what did you
23 do first thing on the 13th?
24 A. On the 13th -- or, rather, I was duty officer between the 12th
25 and the 13th. At around 3.00 on the 13th, 3.00 a.m., that is, I went to
1 sleep. I slept for an hour or two. And at around 7.00 I was back at the
2 Bratunac Brigade command. I was there first in the morning at around
3 9.00 or 9.30. There was a meeting at the command attended by
4 General Ratko Mladic, Colonel Vasic of the police, General Krstic,
5 Popovic, my commander, as well as a number of other officers. I wasn't
6 present at the meeting, and I don't know what it is that they discussed.
7 Before I had a hand-over of duty the meeting took place.
8 Following the meeting, I spoke with my commander in his office,
9 and he told me that on the 13th, I was to continue with my activities of
10 the 12th, which is basically the area of Potocari and the operation that
11 was underway there.
12 Having concluded that conversation with him, I went to Potocari
13 where I saw that, much as the previous day, the transport of people who
14 were there resumed. I saw and was in contact with Dusko Jevic of the MUP
15 special brigade. I told him then -- so it's the 13th. By that time we
16 already had information that on the road between Konjevic Polje, Sandici,
17 Pervani, and Kaldrmica, as well Nova Kasaba, people were already
18 surrendering and that many Muslim soldiers and civilians were being
19 captured. I said that if he was in radio contact with the units, the
20 police units, along that route to tell them that all those who
21 surrendered or were captured be transferred to the facilities designated
22 for detaining those who were captured.
23 After a short stay in Potocari, I returned to the
24 Bratunac Brigade command. I went to the seat of the military police.
25 Mirko Jankovic, the MP commander, told me that on that day, the 13th,
1 along the road Bratunac-Kravica-Konjevic Polje and further afield,
2 Ratko Mladic was to travel there together with his team. The MP
3 commander also told me that the unit of the Bratunac Brigade military
4 police, which was escorting and securing General Mladic from the moment
5 of his arrival, was to accompany him further and that they will continue
6 to act as his security detail.
7 Q. Let me stop you for a minute.
8 A. [In English] Okay.
9 Q. And then we can continue on that trip. You referred to at the
10 morning meeting on the 13th, which you did not attend, Colonel Vasic of
11 the police. Is that Dragomir Vasic of the Zvornik centre?
12 A. [Interpretation] Yes, Dragomir Vasic from Zvornik, chief of
13 centre in Zvornik.
14 Q. Thank you. And you also explained to us that when you spoke with
15 Dusko Jevic, this is on page 18 at lines 15, if he was in radio contact
16 with the units, the police unit, along the route to tell them that all
17 those who surrendered or were captured be transferred to the facilities
18 designated for detaining those who were captured.
19 My question is: Were these men who were captured along the road,
20 were they going to be treated the same way as the men separated in
21 Potocari, detained in the same facilities in Bratunac, or was there
22 something different about the way these captured men were going to be
24 A. I didn't know of any other or different intention. All those
25 separated in Potocari and all those captured along the route had the same
1 status. I don't know of any other or different treatment or intentions.
2 As far as I know, all the men were treated the same way.
3 Q. Thank you. And I'd interrupted you, and you were starting to
4 tell us how you learned that General Mladic was in the vicinity and was
5 going to be travelling along the Bratunac-Kravica-Konjevic Polje road.
6 So can you just tell us what you did with Mirko Jankovic in regard to
7 Ratko Mladic's security.
8 A. As regards General Ratko Mladic's route, it is an obligation on
9 the security organ that for as long as the commander of the Main Staff,
10 Ratko Mladic, was in Bratunac in the AOR of my unit, it was my
11 obligation, in addition to undertaking additional security measures,
12 which he otherwise enjoyed in terms of immediate security as well as the
13 additional military police detachment from our unit. On top of all that,
14 I was under an obligation to verify security situation along the route he
15 was to travel at any given point in time.
16 On this occasion, I took a military policeman, and we went
17 together by vehicle to the road itself between Kravica and
18 Konjevic Polje. I wanted to check the safety of the road and whether any
19 traffic could move along. I had information that by that time there were
20 already police forces deployed along the route. In any case, I wanted to
21 see it for myself.
22 At around 12.00, perhaps, I set off from Bratunac and arrived in
23 Konjevic Polje some half an hour later at an intersection or a crossroads
24 which takes one to Bratunac, Vlasenica, or Zvornik, and the crossroads is
25 called Konjevic Polje.
1 If you want me to tell you what things I saw along the route, I
2 can tell you. There were police forces there by that time at Sandici.
3 The special brigade was deployed. They were easy to identify. They had
4 heavy weaponry, APCs, and a tank. En route, I also saw Mr. Borovcanin in
5 Sandici where the heavy weaponry was deployed. Further along the route
6 there was nothing in particular on my way there as opposed to on my way
8 Once in Konjevic Polje, I saw something I had already known,
9 which is that there was a check-point manned by the police. It was
10 manned by the men of the public security station from Bratunac. The
11 policemen were at the check-point in Konjevic Polje, and it was a
12 permanent check-point even before the operation began and Srebrenica
14 I waited there for some 40, 45 minutes when General Mladic
15 appeared. He arrived in Konjevic Polje, parked in front of an old yellow
16 building which is there no longer on the right-hand side as one entered
17 Konjevic Polje. His security detail came out as well, as well as the
18 military policemen of the Bratunac Brigade.
19 I reported to him that the road was safe, and it was an official
20 military report, which is something I was obliged to do upon his arrival.
21 Do you want me to go on?
22 Q. [Microphone not activated] Let me ask you, on --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
24 MR. NICHOLLS:
25 Q. Let me ask you, on the trip to Konjevic Polje, in addition to the
1 MUP forces you've described, did you see any prisoners on the way to
2 Konjevic Polje?
3 A. I think that on the first occasion in Sandici there were some
4 prisoners. They had surrendered in Sandici. There was a group of about
5 10 or 15 people who had already surrendered, and they were at that place
6 in Sandici where Ljubisa Borovcanin was also present. So on that first
7 occasion, I don't remember there being a large number of imprisoned
8 individuals at some other place.
9 Q. At Konjevic Polje, were there prisoners when you saw
10 General Mladic there?
11 A. Yes. There was a slightly higher number of people who had
12 surrendered in Konjevic Polje or who had been captured. Some people were
13 in Konjevic Polje in a facility in a meadow at the crossroads itself, or
14 not too far from the cross roads, in fact, and some of the prisoners were
15 somewhere in a house or in a facility that belonged to the
16 5th Engineers Battalion, and that's where they had been provided with
17 accommodation and where security was being organised for them.
18 Q. And did you see whether General Mladic had any interaction with
19 the prisoners? Did he speak to them?
20 A. Yes. After he got out of the car, after I had reported to him,
21 he approached those people in the meadow at the crossroads in
22 Konjevic Polje, and he addressed them and said, and I paraphrase, Don't
23 worry. Everything will be fine. There won't be any problems. He
24 addressed them very briefly. He promised that nothing would happen to
25 them. He said that they would be transferred to where they wanted to go,
1 and that was the essence of what he said to those people.
2 Q. And you heard that? You heard him saying those words?
3 A. Yes, I did, because I was with him all the time. I was by his
4 side or right behind him. So I was with him all the time that he was in
5 Konjevic Polje, because those are the military rules, or wherever he
6 went, I went too.
7 Q. Now, did you have any discussion with General Mladic after he
8 gave those reassuring words to the prisoners?
9 A. Yes. I spoke to General Mladic after he had finished speaking to
10 them and went to the place where his car was parked. At that point in
11 time I asked him something. I said, General, what's going to happen to
12 these people? That was my question. And General Mladic didn't reply.
13 He just looked at me and gestured with his hand in this manner. He then
14 smiled and got into the car. So that was his reaction. He didn't make
15 any comments of any kind.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: And just for our record, the gesture he made was
17 kind of sweeping at his waist with his right hand from the left to the
19 Q. Now, after that --
20 JUDGE KWON: Have you heard the answer, Mr. Nikolic?
21 MR. NICHOLLS: The question is: Mr. Nikolic, is that correct the
22 way I described the gesture? Let me put it that way.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we need your verbal answer for the benefit of
24 the transcript.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I showed you what I saw. There was
1 no comment. General Mladic didn't say anything, so I showed you the
2 gesture he made with his hand. It was a gesture with his hand from the
3 left to the right, and that's more or less what I said.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 MR. NICHOLLS:
7 Q. Can you tell us what happened next, and specifically I'm asking
8 if you met a man named Resid Sinanovic about this time and what happened.
9 A. Yes. In Konjevic Polje, after the meeting -- or, rather, after
10 General Mladic had left and went his way, members of the police told me
11 that they had an important prisoner. When I asked who it was, they told
12 me that it was Resid Sinanovic.
13 Do you want me to tell you what then happened, or will you put
14 questions to me?
15 Q. I'll -- I'll put the question. What -- did you meet
16 Mr. Sinanovic, and what did you do next? Where did you take him?
17 A. After I had been provided with that information, the military
18 policemen and myself took charge of Resid Sinanovic. The civilian police
19 delivered him into our hands.
20 Q. Who was he before the war? What is his position and -- I'll ask
21 that first.
22 A. Resid Sinanovic was, among other things, the chief of the public
23 security station in Bratunac before the war.
24 Q. And do you know why he was considered -- the MUP who had custody
25 of him, why did they consider him an important prisoner?
1 A. Well, I can only make an assumption. The chief of the public
2 security station in a small town, that's an important person.
3 Resid Sinanovic was important probably for another reason, too, because
4 before the war he held high positions in the MUP, inter alia, and the
5 reason why he was taken over was the fact that Resid Sinanovic was on
6 that list of persons from Bratunac who were considered to be -- or,
7 rather, there was reasonable doubt that he had committed war crimes
8 during the war. That's why he was an important prisoner, and that's why
9 I took him over as a man who was a war crimes suspect.
10 Q. And where did you deliver him to?
11 A. I brought Sinanovic to Bratunac, and I personally handed him over
12 to Zlatan Celanovic. That is the person that I told you about yesterday,
13 that I testified about yesterday. So he was a law -- lawyer who was in
14 charge of interrogating suspects, and also then criminal charges were
15 supposed to be brought against individuals and then this person would be
16 prosecuted by the appropriate authorities.
17 Q. Did you find out from Zlatan Celanovic whether he interviewed
18 Mr. Sinanovic and whether he found that he -- that there was cause to
19 prosecute him as a criminal?
20 A. Yes. Zlatan Celanovic had a duty, and that was the standing
21 practice in my brigade; that is to say, after dealing with each detainee,
22 prisoner, each person who was brought in, the results of the interview or
23 the report involved should be submitted to the commander and to myself.
24 This time, Zlatan Celanovic, I think even on the very same day
25 when I brought him -- or perhaps the next day, in the morning, informed
1 me that on the basis of everything that he had, on the basis of all the
2 statements, on the basis of what he heard from Sinanovic during the
3 interview, that he believed that there were no grounds for keeping him
4 any longer and that there was no reason to bring criminal charges against
5 him or to file an indictment. That's what he said to me at his own
6 initiative. He made that decision at his own initiative after some Serbs
7 from Bratunac who were his friends who used to work with him came to
8 visit Sinanovic, and after that visit he decided to transfer
9 Resid Sinanovic to the Vuk Karadzic school where all the other prisoners
10 were kept. And according to the information I have, that is where he was
11 transferred to.
12 Q. And briefly, to the best of your knowledge, what happened to
13 Resid Sinanovic after he was transferred to the Vuk Karadzic school on
14 the 13th of July, 1995?
15 A. After he was transferred to where the other prisoners were, this
16 is what I know: On the 14th, in the morning, within the convoy that went
17 to Zvornik, Resid Sinanovic left together with all the other prisoners
18 who were in the Vuk Karadzic school and at the other buildings in
20 Now, in Zvornik, I don't know. I have no information. In
21 Zvornik, like all others, he was executed, shot dead, brought out to be
22 executed. And then I heard that he was wounded, and although wounded, he
23 swam across the Drina River. That is the river that is a natural
24 boundary between Bosnia and Serbia.
25 He swam to the other bank and reached a restaurant in
1 Banja Koviljaca, a small place there. People recognise many him because
2 they're neighbours and Sinanovic often went there. They recognised him
3 and they transferred him to a hospital.
4 Everything that happened after that and everything that has to do
5 with his medical treatment, my lawyers investigated that. They took the
6 medical documents that had to do with his treatment in hospital. I think
7 that later he was transferred to Loznica, but there is this complete
8 documentation that my lawyers handed over to the OTP.
9 A lady doctor who worked in the hospital there was his neighbour
10 from Bratunac. So when the war started, from the Bratunac health centre
11 she went to Loznica and worked as a doctor there. She recognised him.
12 Then also -- I mean, they lived on the same floor in this apartment
13 buildings, so they literally lived next door, a metre away from each
15 She called the station in Bratunac. She informed them about
16 this, and they probably, I assume, informed the centre or the police in
17 Zvornik, and according to the information I have, the police, the
18 civilian police, took him over in Loznica.
19 I'm saying this only on the basis of this information. I mean, I
20 don't have any reliable information. I'm just telling you about the
21 information that I heard. The police who took him over killed him on the
22 bridge between Zvornik and Serbia, in that area.
23 That is what I know about that particular case. My lawyers
24 directly investigated all of this, and there is documentation concerning
25 his stay and medical treatment in Banja Koviljaca and Loznica.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 JUDGE KWON: For the purpose of scheduling, although I'm not sure
3 whether we can sit until 3.00 today, but the first break will be at
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Q. All right. Now, if we can go chronologically through the rest of
7 13 July. After you delivered Mr. Sinanovic to Zlatan Celanovic, I
8 believe you made another trip out towards Konjevic Polje; is that right?
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the
11 MR. NICHOLLS:
12 Q. Could you repeat your answer, please.
13 A. Yes. I said yes, that's right. I went once again.
14 Q. Why did you go out again this time?
15 A. I went once again with the commander of the military police and
16 with the deputy, with Mirko Jankovic and Mile Petrovic. In the brigade
17 command we had a few APCs from the Dutch Battalion. Mirko Jankovic knew
18 how to drive a APC, so we went there because at that point in time that
19 is where everything was happening, everything that had to do with combat,
20 prisoner-taking, and so on.
21 So from Potocari the focus moved to that area, Kravica,
22 Konjevic Polje, Kasaba. So I went there. Mirko Jankovic took that APC,
23 the commander of the military police. Mile and I got into the APC and
24 went to Mirko, to that area, together.
25 Q. Now, did that APC have a loudspeaker, some kind of broadcast
2 A. Yes. All the APCs that were there had loudspeakers as part of
3 their regular equipment. In addition to other things, they had
4 loudspeakers too.
5 JUDGE KWON: And in your previous answer, we heard the
6 translation that "Mile and I got into the APC and went to Mirko, to that
7 area, together." Could you clarify that, Mr. Nikolic?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think that that's what I
9 said. Well, possibly. So Mirko Jankovic knew how to drive an APC. He
10 took this APC. Mirko Jankovic drove it, and Mile Petrovic and I entered
11 that APC, and together with Mirko Jankovic we went to the area of
12 Bratunac-Konjevic Polje.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Q. Did you -- was that loudspeaker used on the trip, and, if so,
16 what was it used for?
17 A. Yes. Mile Petrovic, after Kravica, roughly from the village of
18 Sandici and further on, that is to say towards Konjevic Polje, used that
19 loudspeaker, and from time to time, I mean the APC was moving slowly, he
20 called upon the Muslims to surrender.
21 Q. Did any Muslim men surrender to you and Mirko and --
22 Mirko Jankovic and Mile Petrovic? Did you take any prisoners?
23 A. For the sake of the truth, I have to say that I'm not sure now
24 whether what you want me to say was a consequence of the call over the
25 loudspeaker. Now, whether somebody surrendered because Mile Petrovic was
1 calling them to surrender, I cannot say that that's the way it was, and I
2 cannot deny it either, but --
3 Q. Let me stop you again and ask the question, okay, because maybe
4 it was mis-interpreted. I didn't talk about the process and there's
5 nothing I want you to say other than what you remember. Let me ask you
6 the question again. Did any Muslim men surrender to you? Did you take
7 any prisoners? That's the question.
8 A. If that can be defined as surrender, I will explain what happened
9 and then we can discuss whether that is surrender.
10 So along the road towards Konjevic Polje, Mirko Jankovic,
11 Mile Petrovic, and I were in this APC, and along this road we caught up
12 with six Muslims who were moving towards Konjevic Polje. We stopped the
13 APC. We stopped it, and we took them into the APC. That is the absolute
14 truth. That is what happened. We took them into the APC and drove them
15 to Konjevic Polje. That's what happened. There was no fighting.
16 Surrender is something that you force people to do. That's what
17 I think. They did not offer any resistance. They did not attack us.
18 They did not shoot at us. We did not shoot at them. We quite simply
19 took them into this APC and drove them to Konjevic Polje.
20 Q. Thank you for explaining the way that worked. What happened at
21 Konjevic Polje?
22 A. The second time -- or, rather, when I returned to Konjevic Polje,
23 in Konjevic Polje, indeed there was already a large number of prisoners
24 who had already been taken prisoner, between 250 and 300 people, roughly,
25 in one area. In another area, there were, say, 10 or 15 people. So in
1 this area, people, Muslims were surrendering en masse already.
2 As we arrived in Konjevic Polje, Mirko Jankovic parked the APC
3 there and I said to Mile Petrovic, Mile, please, these people who are in
4 the APC, take them there together with this group that is already there.
5 After I said that to him, I went -- say, 50 metres away from the
6 crossroads there's a burned house, and I sat underneath part of that
7 burned house. There were five or six Muslims there, and they were even
8 roasting something there. There was a fire there, and there was the
9 civilian police, there were these Muslims, and I sat on this slab of
10 concrete that was there.
11 After a while, I heard a burst of gunfire that could be heard
12 from some place that was very, very close. After this burst of gunfire,
13 perhaps five or six minutes later, Mile Petrovic showed up and addressed
14 me with the following words: Boss, today I revenged my brother. And I
15 said, What did you do? And he said, I killed him. That was the
16 conversation between myself and him. I did not ask him anything. To be
17 quite frank, I didn't even know that his brother was killed. I mean,
18 quite simply, I did not make any comments. I did not ask him anything
19 else. After that they went towards Kuslat with this APC, and that was
20 the entire conversation, the dialogue between him and me as far as the
21 fate of these six men is concerned.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, if it is convenient, shall we take a
23 break now?
24 MR. NICHOLLS: That's fine. Thank you, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE KWON: There's one matter I'd like to deal with before we
1 break. I can say it in public session.
2 Mr. Robinson, in light of yesterday's filing by Germany, the
3 Chamber is of the view that before it starts considering your motion to
4 report Germany to the Security Council, the best way to proceed would be
5 for you to set up another interview and see how that plays out. Also, I
6 note that Germany's offering you the option of providing the German
7 authorities with written questions for Mr. von Bezolt. This may be worth
8 considering by you and your team.
9 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. We'll do that.
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We will have a break for half an hour
11 and resume at 11.00.
12 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to
16 introduce Kirsten Schelwitz, who is from the United States and working as
17 an intern with our case managers. She will be joining us this session.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 I now confirm that we will be sitting until 3.00 today.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.
22 MR. NICHOLLS:
23 Q. Now, before we move on, just a couple questions, Mr. Nikolic. Do
24 you know a man named Nenad Deronjic?
25 A. Yes, I do.
1 Q. And what was -- what was his position, or what unit, if any, or
2 group was he a member of in July 1995?
3 A. In June 1995, he was a policeman at the public security station
4 in Bratunac.
5 Q. And what about July 1995?
6 A. In July 1995, he was also a policeman, but -- or, rather, he was
7 in the unit at the check-point in Konjevic Polje.
8 Q. And what about a man named Mirko Petro -- Peric? Excuse me.
9 A. Yes. I know Mirko Peric personally, too. Mirko Peric was a
10 policeman as well. He belonged to the public security station Bratunac.
11 On that day, the 13th, when I was in Konjevic Polje, I saw Mirko Peric as
12 well at the check-point in Konjevic Polje.
13 Q. Okay. And just to be very clear, as well as, you mean you saw
14 him as well as Nenad Deronjic at the check-point in Konjevic Polje on
15 13 July 1995?
16 A. Yes, that's right.
17 Q. All right. After this trip to Konjevic Polje which you've
18 described to us, did you return to Bratunac that day?
19 A. Yes. I returned on the same day, in the evening.
20 Q. And what happened when you returned to Bratunac in the evening?
21 Who did you meet? What did you do?
22 A. When I returned to Bratunac, I went to the command of my brigade.
23 I think I was in the kitchen when I was informed from the communications
24 centre that I should report to Bratunac, to Colonel Beara. After dinner,
25 say between 8.00 and 8.30 p.m. on that day, I went and met up with
1 Colonel Beara in town.
2 Q. Let me ask you about the time. In your previous testimony in the
3 Tolimir case, at 12409 is the page, you said that it was around 5.30 or
4 6.00 p.m. that you were told in the communications centre to meet with
5 Colonel Beara.
6 A. I don't think I ever said anything even similar to that. The
7 interpretation I heard was that I met with Colonel Beara at the
8 communications centre. I never stated that, but that is the
9 interpretation I heard just now.
10 Q. That's wrong. That's not what I said. Let me ask it again. I'm
11 just trying to talk about the timing. In your previous testimony, you
12 said that you were told at about 5.30 or 6.00 p.m. that you should meet
13 with Colonel Beara.
14 A. That is the time when I returned to the Bratunac Brigade from
15 Konjevic Polje and that is correct, that is to say in that period, but
16 then, again, every time I testify I say this. I do not want to specify
17 exact times because it's been so many years. I really can no longer
18 remember whether it was an hour or half an hour here or there. At any
19 rate, I can speak specifically and precisely about with a happened about
20 events, but this is tentatively the time when I returned from
21 Konjevic Polje. I went to eat in the kitchen, and that is when I
22 received this information from the communications centre that I should
23 report to Colonel Beara. That is correct, and that is what I testified
24 to every time, and I confirm it this time as well.
25 Q. All right. And did you meet with Colonel -- you say you went up
1 and you met with Colonel Beara in town. Tell us what happened then.
2 A. Yes. I met up with him. Colonel Beara ordered me, told me,
3 whatever you wish, but I think that this is a kind of order, to go to the
4 command of the Zvornik Brigade to find Drago Nikolic, the chief of
5 security of the Zvornik Brigade, and to convey to him his order to have
6 facilities prepared as well as people for providing security and to
7 convey to him the decision that the prisoners who are in Bratunac would
8 be transferred to the zone of the Zvornik Brigade and that conditions
9 should be provided for taking them in, detaining them, and that there
10 should be physical security provided for them.
11 Q. And did Colonel Beara order you to inform Drago [Realtime
12 transcript read in error "Dragan"] Nikolic about anything else that would
13 happen to the prisoners once they reached the Zvornik Brigade area of
15 A. Colonel Beara and I spoke very briefly. I told you what the
16 essence of that was. Then on the 13th, I already had information,
17 meaning I already knew on the evening of the 13th what would happen to
18 these people who had been taken prisoner. It wasn't necessary to say
19 anything directly, but from the conversation with him, I did understand
20 that that was the message roughly of Colonel Beara, that these people who
21 were going down there would be executed in the territory of the
22 municipality of Zvornik. However, I can say that already then --
23 actually, the situation was clear as regards their fate.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, your question at line 5,
1 "Dragan Nikolic" should read "Drago Nikolic."
2 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 MR. NICHOLLS:
5 Q. All right. Well, I want you to be a little bit more precise if
6 you can. You said, It wasn't necessary to say anything directly, but
7 from the conversation with him, I did understand that that was the
8 message roughly of Colonel Beara, that these people who were going down
9 there would be executed in the territory of the Zvornik Brigade.
10 Now, did Colonel Beara order you to convey to Drago Nikolic that
11 the men would be executed in Zvornik?
12 A. Well, really, I cannot. I mean, I always have this dilemma when
13 I testify about that, but I think -- it's not that I think. As far as I
14 can remember -- actually, when he ordered me to go to Zvornik, among
15 other things he said that these people should be transferred down there
16 and that they would be killed in Zvornik. However, the dilemma I've had
17 all of these years is that I do not remember exactly the way in which he
18 communicated that to me. I cannot be specific there. However, what I
19 understood and what I conveyed to Drago was -- I mean, my understanding
20 was that these people were being transferred there in order to be killed
21 in Zvornik. That was my understanding. That was the message that I did
22 convey to Drago when I saw him. What I knew was that these people would
23 be transferred and killed in the territory of Zvornik.
24 Q. Thank you. Now, if you could briefly describe for us the trip to
25 Zvornik and how you met up with Drago Nikolic and conveyed this
2 A. Yes. After I received the order I got into the car and drove to
3 Zvornik. The trip to Zvornik took about an hour and 15 minutes. It's
4 40, 42, 45 kilometres to the brigade command. I reached the HQ of the
5 Zvornik Brigade, went to the reception and asked to be taken to see
6 Draga [as interpreted] Nikolic. The soldiers at the reception assigned a
7 soldier to me who escorted me to a room in the Zvornik Brigade command.
8 I arrived there, and in the office I met an officer. I told him that I
9 needed to contact Drago Nikolic directly. I sat down there, and two or
10 three minutes later he called an officer, a man who came to the office.
11 He asked me whether he could help me since Drago Nikolic wasn't there. I
12 said that my orders were that I should convey the order directly to
13 Drago Nikolic, and I said that what I had to convey to him could not be
14 said to him.
15 Afterwards, the officer in the room told the policeman, ordered
16 the policeman, in fact, to escort me to the forward command post, and I
17 was told that Drago Nikolic was there, that he was the duty officer
18 there. I was told that the policeman would escort me there. We left the
19 command. We got into my car, and first we drove down the asphalt road
20 and then down the macadam road to the place. I arrived there, parked in
21 front of the house where the command post of theirs was located. The
22 policeman entered the house, called to Drago Nikolic, then came back out,
23 and my conversation with Drago Nikolic took five, six, seven, ten minutes
24 at the most, and I told him that I had been sent there by Colonel Beara
25 for a certain reason. I told him what the reason was. I conveyed the
1 order to him, and then I told Drago that I had information according to
2 which the people who were going to his area would be killed in Zvornik.
3 Drago Nikolic didn't make any comments. He said, I'm the duty officer,
4 I'll contact my command, and then I will see what action should be taken.
5 At the door with Drago Nikolic there was a communications
6 officer, and afterwards the policeman and myself got back into the car
7 and returned to Zvornik. I left the policeman in Zvornik and continued
8 my trip to Bratunac.
9 Q. Had you met Drago Nikolic before this night?
10 A. I know Drago Nikolic in private capacity. He is from my village.
11 I had no meetings with Drago Nikolic. Never. Perhaps we had seen each
12 other one or two occasions at the most, but over those days, no, I didn't
13 meet or speak to Drago Nikolic.
14 Q. That's right, but my question was just more simple. That wasn't
15 the first time you'd met Drago Nikolic that night. Had you met him
17 A. Yes. That question is different to the one I answered. I know
18 Drago from before, and that was not the first time that I had met Drago.
19 Yes, I know Drago from before.
20 Q. Now, on -- you continued, you said, your trip to Bratunac. Did
21 you see any buses heading towards Zvornik area as you were going back
22 towards Bratunac?
23 A. Yes. When I was returning to Bratunac, the Kuslata sector, the
24 village of Kuslat, I saw three or four buses heading in the direction of
25 Zvornik. They were full of people who were going to Zvornik.
1 Q. And do you have any information of whether prisoners, Muslim men
2 prisoners from Bratunac were taken to Zvornik at about this time? Is
3 that the same buses or is it something else?
4 A. No. The buses that I have just mentioned are buses which were
5 heading towards Zvornik from Konjevic Polje,
6 Konjevic Polje-Drinjaca-Zvornik. When I arrived in Bratunac in the
7 evening, on the 13th in the evening, from the command of the military
8 police and of the police I was told that a convoy of Muslims, five or six
9 buses, as far as I can remember, I was told that such a convoy had taken
10 a different route which also led in the direction of Zvornik. It's
11 Bratunac, the bridge over the Drina-Polim-Zelinje-Drinjaca-Zvornik
12 direction. So that is the road that leads to Zvornik along the Drina
13 River. It's the old road towards Zvornik. It's not an asphalted road
14 but it was a practicable route that could be used.
15 Q. Thank you for at that clarification. Now, when you returned back
16 to Bratunac that night, what was the situation in town?
17 A. I returned to Bratunac around 12.00. At the time, the situation
18 in Bratunac was terrible. It was chaotic. Those are the right terms to
19 use. There were many problems. The situation was such that it was very
20 difficult to control anything under such conditions. It was very
21 difficult to organise anything under such conditions. When I arrived in
22 Bratunac, at that time all the facilities for detention were more or less
23 full in the town, in all the streets from the centre of the town. From
24 the municipality building in Bratunac and onwards, none of the roads,
25 none of the roads, the main roads or the side roads were empty. There
1 were buses or lorries parked in those roads. The football stadium, for
2 example, the parking places, a kilometre and a half outside the town on
3 the periphery, you could also find buses and lorries with people who had
4 been brought in from the direction of Nova Kasaba and Konjevic Polje.
5 The situation was chaotic, and that is putting it mildly.
6 Q. And just to be clear, when you're talking about these buses and
7 lorries, people brought in, these are prisoners, Muslim men prisoners;
8 correct, held on those vehicles?
9 A. On the whole -- well, in fact, not on the whole, but in a
10 hundred per cent of those cases, all those who were in the buses and in
11 the lorries were prisoners who had been captured on those axes, and on
12 the 13th in the evening hours and in the course of the night, they were
13 transferred to Bratunac.
14 Q. Where else were prisoners held in Bratunac that night on the
15 13th, besides buses and lorries?
16 A. As far as I know, on that night they were also kept in the
17 Vuk Karadzic primary school in the physical training hall of that very
18 same primary school, in a hangar as well. And, also, as far as I know,
19 another school was made use of. It's the old school, the secondary
20 Djuro Pucar school. It's an old building that was there before the war,
21 and it was the secondary school in Bratunac until a new school was built.
22 And in those facilities there were these prisoners who were being held
23 there. They had been separated in Potocari or they had subsequently been
24 transferred from Konjevic Polje and Kasaba to Bratunac.
25 Q. And what about the playground or stadium?
1 A. As far as I know, a few buses were parked in the direction of the
2 stadium and in the area immediately after the entry; but if you're
3 referring to the pitch itself, as far as I know, there were no prisoners
4 there. There were buses, but the prisoners were in the buses, and in
5 that part of the stadium, but in the stadium itself, on the pitch, in
6 fact, there was no one according to the information I have.
7 Q. At this point in time, around midnight, the night of the 13th of
8 July, who was guarding these prisoners? Who was securing them?
9 A. Well, I can say the following: I can refer to the buildings.
10 Perhaps that will be the best description of what was taking place there.
11 The security for the Vuk Karadzic school was provided by part of the MPs
12 from the Bratunac Brigade and also members of the public security station
13 in Bratunac. As for the other facilities, the hangar, the physical
14 training room, and the secondary school, the security was provided on the
15 whole by the police from various formations, units. Police from the
16 public security station in Bratunac or policemen from special purposes
17 units or there were even policemen from the special companies, these
18 companies from special brigades, they provided security in the evening
19 hours. I don't know how this worked exactly, but I know that the
20 military police, members of the military police, members of the civilian
21 police from various structures were providing security. There were also
22 soldiers who provided security and civilians to whom weapons had been
23 distributed since there weren't enough people for security. So they
24 would provide security for the buses and the lorries for these vehicles
25 that had been brought into Bratunac. So on the whole, everyone who was
1 available and who could be engaged participated in addition to those
2 whose task it was to provide security, and it was their task to provide
3 security for the Muslims who had been taken to Bratunac in buses or in
5 Q. And did you hear whether any prisoners were killed during that
6 night in any of the detention facilities in Bratunac?
7 A. After all this came to an end, after a certain period of time had
8 passed, when speaking to Dragan Mirkovic I found out that on that
9 evening, between the 13th and the 14th, people were killed in the hangar,
10 mostly in the hangar, and also in the physical training hall, the sports
11 hall. As far as the Vuk Karadzic primary school is concerned, according
12 to my information there were no killings, but in the hangar and in the
13 sports hall in the Vuk Karadzic primary school people were taken out and
15 In addition to those cases in which people were killed, I had
16 information according to which certain individuals were taken out and
17 certain people were killed in revenge. Serbs whose family members had
18 been killed wanted to find Muslims according to -- they wanted to find
19 Muslims who had allegedly kill members of their family.
20 I had evidence about such killings -- or, rather, I had evidence
21 from -- about individuals who had taken Muslims out of buses in order to
22 kill them for purposes of revenge.
23 Q. All right. Thank you. You've described the situation that
24 night, and you'd started telling us that you were told to meet
25 Colonel Beara. Where did you meet -- well, what happened next? Did you
1 meet with Colonel Beara?
2 A. If I've understood the question correctly, did I meet
3 Colonel Beara? Well, I have already spoken about the meeting and about
4 what happened. If the question is whether I met Colonel Beara after the
5 return from Zvornik, well, in that case that's a different question.
6 Q. That's the question.
7 A. Yes. Having returned from Zvornik, as I've already said, I
8 returned about 12.00. I went to the Fontana Hotel which is where
9 Colonel Beara was, and I gave a report to Colonel Beara. I told him that
10 I had gone to Zvornik and I had carried out his orders.
11 Q. Then what happened?
12 A. After I had told him that I had carried out his orders,
13 Colonel Beara asked me to take him to the SDS office in Bratunac, and
14 naturally it's not far from the Fontana Hotel to the SDS office. We got
15 up, left the Fontana Hotel and set off in the direction of the SDS
16 office. I arrived there and when I enter the office, Miroslav Deronjic
17 and Colonel Vasic were already there. I arrived can Colonel Beara and we
18 entered those premises.
19 Q. Again, this is Dragomir Vasic?
20 A. Yes, Colonel Dragomir Vasic, the chief of the centre. He was
21 present at that meeting.
22 Q. Then what happened?
23 A. When we entered the premises, and I have to say this for the
24 benefit of the Chamber, these premises consist of two offices. One of
25 the offices is an office in which there's a desk and a number of chairs,
1 and the other office is a small reception area. There was a small table
2 and a couple of chairs as well. I arrived with Colonel Beara.
3 Miroslav Deronjic was in the office. I told Miroslav Deronjic, This is
4 my boss from the Main Staff, Colonel Beara, and I entered that room. I
5 sat down in the reception area. In between the reception area and
6 Deronjic's office, well, there was just a distance of about a metre and a
7 metre and a half between those two offices, so there's a very small area
8 there. And at the very beginning they started discussing things, and
9 they started quarreling. Colonel Beara said that he had received
10 instructions from his boss as to what should be done with the prisoners,
11 and Miroslav Deronjic referred to the instructions he had received from
12 his boss, President Karadzic. He said he had instructions from his boss
13 regarding what was to be done with the prisoners. For the sake of
14 informing the Trial Chamber, I have to explain something because I know
15 this is contradictory, but I'm telling you exactly what happened.
16 Colonel Beara sent me to Zvornik to say that the prisoners would be going
17 to Zvornik. This happened when I arrived in the centre and received
18 orders. And when I arrived in the SDS office, Colonel Beara insisted at
19 that meeting that those prisoners should remain in Bratunac. Why was
20 this happening? Well, since I was the duty officer on the 12th and I
21 know exactly how the information was distributed and how orders were
22 given, well, on the 13th the decisions taken, especially on the 13th,
23 changed rapidly. So first you would receive one order and half an hour
24 later the order was amended, you would receive a different order, and
25 that was the situation that prevailed in Bratunac at the time, and in
1 particular on the 13th when there were many problems. Miroslav Deronjic
2 was insistent and he said that he had received instructions according to
3 which all prisoners in Bratunac should be transferred to Zvornik. First
4 they quarreled. They confronted -- they had a confrontation of opinions,
5 and then they sat down at the table. Miroslav took out some glasses, put
6 alcohol into the glasses and had a drink and continued to speak to each
7 other. I have testified to this previously. On the 13th in the evening
8 at about 12.00 or between 12.00 and half past 12.00 when this meeting was
9 being held, the status or the fate of the prisoners was certain, and no
10 one no longer asked about what should be done with the prisoners. It was
11 openly said that these prisoners would be killed. The only issue was
12 whether these prisoners should be killed in Bratunac or in Zvornik. That
13 was the dilemma. That was the subject of the dispute. Miroslav Deronjic
14 insisted that he had a sufficient number of problems in Bratunac. He
15 said he didn't want anyone to be killed in Bratunac. And that is why he
16 was insistent. And finally they reached an agreement. At the end of the
17 meeting everyone, agreed that the prisoners should be transferred to
18 Zvornik or to the area of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade in the
19 coming days.
20 In addition to these issues that were discussed, a number of
21 other issues were discussed, issues that concerned dealing with the
22 current problems in Bratunac. These issues concerned providing security
23 for the prisoners. They concerned the threat if they came out of the
24 buses or the lorries, the risk. So these were the security issues that
25 were discussed and that they attempted to deal with that evening. So in
1 brief, that is what happened at that meeting.
2 Q. All right, sir. I just want to be extremely clear. You've
3 testified about this before. What did Miroslav Deronjic say his
4 instructions were that he had received from President Karadzic regarding
5 the prisoners?
6 A. Miroslav Deronjic claimed that he had received instructions
7 according to which all prisoners from Bratunac should leave Bratunac in
8 the following days. That is what Miroslav Deronjic insisted on. He
9 said, I have received instructions from President Karadzic according to
10 which the prisoners in Bratunac should be transferred to Zvornik, and
11 Deronjic then said that he did not want anyone to be killed in Bratunac.
12 He said he had enough problems as it was and he didn't want this. That's
13 what I heard in relation to the prisoners.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 JUDGE KWON: Just to be clear, Mr. Nikolic, your previous
16 evidence, testimony, is not in evidence in this case. So probably you
17 may have to repeat, but what did Beara insist upon? I'm not sure whether
18 you talked about it.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Beara was at the meeting and at
20 half past 8.00 he had issued orders to me, but it was different later.
21 He said everyone would be transferred to Zvornik. I should tell
22 Drago Nikolic about that. But at that meeting he insisted that these
23 soldiers should remain in Bratunac. It differed from his previous order.
24 That is what I was telling you about, because I know that there is a
25 difference. I know that it is contradictory. He was insisting, first of
1 all, that they should remain in Bratunac and then -- or, rather, at the
2 first meeting, he insisted that they should go to Zvornik; and at the
3 second meeting, he insisted on them remaining in Bratunac. So this is
4 contradictory. All I want to do is tell you the truth about what
5 happened. I know that this is contradictory, but it's the truth.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to intervene. In line 18,
7 it says "contradictory." Later the witness said the one excludes the
8 other, and that wasn't recorded.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Did you say that Beara told you that
10 these soldiers should remain in Bratunac? Did he use the term
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Prisoners. Prisoners. Perhaps it
13 was a slip of the tongue. I'm referring to the prisoners who were in
14 Bratunac. Among the prisoners, there were soldiers, of course.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to say that prisoners and
16 captives doesn't mean the same thing.
17 JUDGE KWON: Because we heard "soldiers."
18 Yes, please continue, Mr. Nicholls.
19 MR. NICHOLLS:
20 Q. All right. You've explained that the agreement was reached in
21 the end between the parties present. What happened next? What did you
22 do after this, after what you've finished telling us what happened?
23 A. After that, it was late. I went to the Bratunac Brigade command,
24 and in the command of the Bratunac Brigade the colleagues of mine in the
25 operations room and others who were present, and I told all of them that
1 we all had to work up until the early morning hours, and I told them that
2 I had information according to which these captives and everyone in
3 Bratunac, all the Muslims, should be transferred to the area of
4 responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade in the following days.
5 Q. Well, let's move to the following day, 14 July. Tell us what
6 happened with the prisoners.
7 A. The next day, in keeping with what had been arranged the previous
8 evening, during the morning buses began arriving for the most part,
9 although there were some trucks as well. In any case, in the column that
10 was formed, there were trucks which came from that direction, and those
11 who were already on those trucks remained there and simply joined the
13 In the early hours of the 14th -- or, in the morning of the 14th,
14 all those who were held in detention buildings and facilities entered the
15 buses and boarded the trucks. The column was headed by an APC driven by
16 Mirko Jankovic, MP platoon commander. The convoy was about 1 or
17 1.5 kilometres in length. It included all those who were captured on the
18 12th, as well as those taken prisoner and brought to Bratunac on the
19 13th. All of them went to the AOR of the Zvornik Brigade on the 14th.
20 Q. If you know, can you tell us if you know at all about escorts,
21 guards, of these transports, which -- whether there was military police,
22 MUP, Bratunac Brigade, or who provided the escort to the prisoner convoy
23 on the 14th?
24 A. The escort of the convoy, that is to say the buses and trucks and
25 all the people on them, resembled any similar security detail. Some of
1 the military policemen who were available were included, as well as
2 members of the civilian police. It also included those who had guarded
3 the trucks that were outside the facilities. So it included members of
4 the military police, civilian police, soldiers, and even civilians who
5 stood guard and had weapons. They all escorted those they had guarded
6 the previous night. That was how the escort was organised. The column
7 was headed by an APC driven by the military police commander and the APC
8 belonged to DutchBat.
9 Q. Thank you. I'm going to move on now a little bit and talk about
10 an issue that came up a few days later, past the 14th, and that's about
11 the question of local staff of UNPROFOR and international organisations
12 from the enclave.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 65 ter 02123, please.
14 Q. Now, that's not a very good copy, but I think you're familiar
15 with this document. It's from the command, the 1st Bratunac
16 Light Infantry Brigade intelligence organ dated 18 July 1995, situation
17 in the Srebrenica region.
18 If we can go to the bottom of both documents, please. And to the
19 left for the Serbian version.
20 Can you see your name there on the bottom, sir?
21 A. Yes, I can see it.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: Is there another page in the Serbian in e-court?
23 Could we go to that if there is one?
24 Q. There's a handwritten copy of the same document, sir. Can you
25 tell us about why there's two versions of this, a handwritten document
1 and a teleprinter or typed version?
2 A. I need to correct you. There are no two versions. There is a
3 single version. This is how all such documents were sent. You, an
4 operative, sending the report writes it by hand, sends it to the
5 communications centre. They type it out and send it on. Then you
6 receive your handwritten version and the typed version back. That was
7 standard procedure in submitting reports to your superior command or
8 whoever was to receive such a report.
9 This report was specific, though. I said yesterday that in my
10 office there was Colonel Jankovic from the intelligence administration of
11 the Main Staff. The two of us usually sent all information to our
12 superior commands together. In practical terms, it meant once we had
13 enough information, we sat down and made a draft of what we wanted to
14 report about. This is not my handwriting. Colonel Jankovic wrote this
15 report by hand, and after he did that, I took it and since it was the
16 headquarters of my brigade, I took it to communication -- to the
17 communications centre to be sent. This was done automatically. The
18 person in the communications centre typed it out and sent it on,
19 including my name on the report. So you have Colonel Jankovic's text
20 with me in the signature block. That's the explanation.
21 Q. Thank you for that clear explanation. If we look at the bottom
22 of this document -- we need to go to the next page of the Serbian,
24 There's a question about local staff and the international
25 organisations, and it says:
1 "Will you please tell me what stand to take in terms of
2 authorisation for evacuation of the international organisation Medecins
3 sans Frontieres, in fact, how to deal with so-called local staff. This
4 also applies to the interpreters of military monitors and UNPROFOR. RDB,
5 regional state security, passed on to us an opinion that
6 President Karadzic had allegedly abolished all local staff who used to
7 work for UNPROFOR. It is our opinion that they should not be held."
8 But first of all, what was the issue here about local staff?
9 What does that mean, "local staff," of international organisations?
10 A. The term "local staff" of international organisations, including
11 DutchBat, because they, too, had people working for them from the local
12 community of Srebrenica, this included for the most part all technical
13 personnel; first and foremost, people in charge of maintenance such as
14 plumbers, electricians, mechanics and different types of tradesmen who
15 worked on either maintaining their buildings or their technical assets.
16 When we brought this question up, we had those people in mind who
17 worked with UNPROFOR, the ICRC, the MSF, the UNHCR, and -- am I
18 forgetting anyone? Yes, and the military observers. They were Muslims
19 from the Srebrenica enclave, and we asked what to do with them.
20 Here you see what the position was and that we believed they
21 shouldn't be held but, rather, allowed to leave with those who employed
23 Q. And just this sentence:
24 "RDB passed on to us" --
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Should we ask the witness to read
1 that sentence?
2 Could you read out the last sentence for us, starting from "RDB."
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mm-hmm.
4 "RDB conveyed to us the position that allegedly
5 President Karadzic pardoned all local personnel working for UNPROFOR. It
6 is our opinion that they shouldn't be held."
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That's helpful.
8 Mr. Nicholls.
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you --
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] An intervention for the transcript.
11 The witness said that the international observers, too, had such
12 personnel, so does it include the international observers or only the
13 local staff working for them?
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour, I completely object. I ask that you
15 cut this off.
16 JUDGE KWON: If it is not a translation issue, it is not a
17 appropriate moment for you to intervene, Mr. Karadzic.
18 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
20 Q. Mr. Nikolic, the last sentence you read out, can you -- when you
21 wrote this -- or, excuse me, when Colonel -- when Jankovic wrote it and
22 then it was sent off, what is the meaning of that that President Karadzic
23 has abolished or pardoned all local staff, as you put it?
24 A. I did not receive interpretation.
25 JUDGE KWON: Now do you hear me, Mr. Nikolic? Okay.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 Q. I'll ask the question again, Mr. Nikolic. I'm sorry you didn't
4 hear it the first time.
5 When this last sentence that you read out was written by Jankovic
6 and then it was sent out, what's the meaning? What did you understand
7 that to mean, that President Karadzic had allegedly abolished or pardoned
8 local staff?
9 A. I am not sure what it is that you want me to explain.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nikolic, let me explain. When you read out, it
11 was translated in English as "Mr. Karadzic allegedly pardoned all local
12 staff," but in the English translation, in written form, it says,
13 "Mr. Karadzic had allegedly abolished all local staff." I do not know
14 the difference in B/C/S between "pardon" and "abolish," but that's the
15 origin of confusion.
16 Do you have any observation, Mr. Nikolic?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is absolutely clear now what the
18 problem is.
19 Without going into any explanations as to what "pardon" or
20 "amnesty" mean in my country, I will say this: In my language, this
21 means to me that the RDB sent information that Mr. Karadzic let them go
22 free. In other words, that they should not be held and that they should
23 not be separated. If it were the other way around, they would not have
24 been allowed to leave with UNPROFOR or those they worked for. They would
25 have been separated. That is one thing I wanted to say. Due to language
1 differences, I wanted to also say this: In my country, where I live --
2 well, this was written by Colonel Jankovic. The term "to pardon" in the
3 Serbian language, well, for that, one would have to have been sentenced
4 first in order to be pardoned, but these people were not, so no pardon
5 was necessary. They only needed to be permitted to leave the territory
6 of the enclave together with those they worked for. There was no need
7 for any pardon, because they had not been sentenced. They were simply
8 employees of international organisations. Perhaps this clarifies things.
9 If you require any further explanations, do ask. In any case, it does
10 not mean what was in the English translation.
11 Q. Thank you. I'm now going to move to another topic.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender that, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P4390, Your Honours.
15 MR. NICHOLLS:
16 Q. What I'd like to ask you about now, sir, is what you can tell us
17 about any operation that you know of to move the bodies of Muslim persons
18 who had been killed after the fall of Srebrenica, the reburial operation.
19 JUDGE KWON: Just one clarifying question, Mr. Nicholls. The
20 Prosecution's estimate for time for the examination-in-chief was nine
21 hours. Is this still the case?
22 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm going to finish quite soon, Your Honours. To
23 be honest, I'm not sure how much time I've used exactly, but I'll be
24 wrapping up in -- I think I've got less than an hour.
25 JUDGE KWON: You, I think, used about six hours --
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
2 JUDGE KWON: -- roughly. Yes, please continue.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Nicholson [sic], I'm not sure
4 what the Chamber is interested in. There is a lot of things I can say
5 about this, because I know exactly how the operation developed.
6 MR. NICHOLLS:
7 Q. Well, let me put it this way: Let's start in September 1995.
8 Did you discuss this topic or receive orders on this topic from
9 Lieutenant-Colonel Vujadin Popovic?
10 A. Yes. Sometime in September 1995 my brigade was visited by
11 Lieutenant-Colonel Vujadin Popovic from the Drina Corps command,
12 including myself. He conveyed an order or information that the
13 Main Staff ordered a -- that relocation be carried out of the mortal
14 remains of the Muslims buried in the graves in Glogova. They were
15 supposed to be taken out of the grave and placed in another location in
16 the municipality of Srebrenica because Glogova was in
17 Bratunac municipality.
18 Q. And did that ordered relocation take place?
19 A. Yes. The order was carried out, and the operation naming my
20 brigade was called "asanacija," sanitation and hygiene measures
21 operation. It was implemented in keeping with the orders of the
22 Main Staff.
23 Q. And which bodies took part or assisted in this, talking about
24 VRS, MUP, civilian protection? Which of these different bodies took
1 A. In this operation, starting with the idea of bodies being
2 relocated and ending with the relocation itself, the following structures
3 were involved: It included representatives of the political
4 predominantly executive authorities in Bratunac; that is to say, the
5 Executive Council and its president, the municipal president, and the
6 chief of MUP. Then it included representatives of companies which had
7 machinery such as ULTs, excavators, and other construction machinery that
8 was needed for such an operation.
9 In terms of construction companies, it included the Rad Bratunac
10 public utility company. Then there was machinery from the state-owned
11 company, the brickworks, in Bratunac. Next, from Srebrenica, there were
12 also some companies taking part, such as the socially owned construction
13 company Radnik and their machinery, and the Sase mine construction
14 machinery as well as trucks. There were also trucks of the Autoprevoz
15 company in Srebrenica. I may have forgotten some, but probably not.
16 That's which companies took part. As for the military, the task was
17 issued to the Bratunac Brigade because the graves were in its area of
18 responsibility. The military police of the Bratunac Brigade take part.
19 They secure the road between Konjevic Polje and Bratunac and Bratunac and
20 Ljubovija. In addition to the military police, the civilian police took
21 part as well, that is to say the public security station from Bratunac.
22 They were engaged on the same tasks with the military police. They
23 secured the roads together between Bratunac and Konjevic Polje and
24 Bratunac and Ljubovija. They diverted all traffic to another road.
25 As for the Drina Corps, there was the 5th Engineering Battalion
1 with their machinery, and it is also important to note that the fuel for
2 the operation was provided by the Drina Corps command on two occasions:
3 The first time around 5 tonnes of oil and the next time about 2.5 tonnes
4 of oil or fuel. All that was preceded by a number of meetings held at
5 the Bratunac municipality premises in the office of the municipal
6 president. He undertook upon himself to communicate with the companies
7 so that the part of work not related to the military be carried out.
8 They needed to provide machinery needed for the operation. It lasted
9 from September on, for some two months, with several breaks due to a
10 number of problems. In any case, the whole thing took about two months.
11 Right at the outset, it was supposed to be secret, and I knew
12 that as the chief of security. However, given the number of participants
13 and the number of workers from the public utility company and the number
14 of military and civilian policemen and other bodies, also given the
15 number of assets that was required such as trucks, excavators, ULTs and
16 other machinery from a number of construction companies, it was for
17 all -- because of all that that the operation was no longer secret. That
18 was the original intention. But, in my view, it cannot be deemed covert
19 because everyone knew that the implement -- that the operation was
20 implemented or carried out.
21 That is it in briefest possible terms. If there's anything else
22 you want to know, please ask.
23 Q. Thank you. I'll just quickly show you a document, 65 ter 02084.
24 Can we have the first page, please.
25 Now, in the translation which will come up in a minute, I hope,
1 it says, "Reports, meetings, 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade." Thank
3 Just quickly, do you recognise this document, Mr. Nikolic? This
4 book, rather.
5 A. Yes, I do. These are briefings from my 1st Bratunac Light
6 Infantry Brigade.
7 Q. What was the purpose of this book, or who took the notes in this
8 book or how was it used?
9 A. These briefings, or, rather, minutes from meetings of units from
10 brigades including my own were written up for the sake of keeping records
11 so that people could see what it was that was discussed at meetings, and
12 it was basically the command of the brigade, the commander and his
13 assistant commanders, and sometimes at such a briefing commanders of
14 battalions would also be present and also of other units depending on
15 what the meeting would focus on. So this is a document that is
16 permanently kept in a brigade, and there are minutes kept at each and
17 every meeting of this kind that is held.
18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
19 make sure to speak into the microphone. Otherwise, we cannot hear him
20 well. Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nikolic, could you speak into the microphone for
22 the benefit of the interpreters.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honours. I do
25 MR. NICHOLLS: All right. Can we go to page 11 of the English,
1 24 of the B/C/S, please.
2 Q. Now, here we have in the working meeting of commander with
3 command staff and battalion commander from 16 October 1995. We see at
4 the top Colonel Blagojevic speaking. Can we roll down to the bottom of
5 each page, please. This is an 8.00 a.m. meeting that ended at 10.00 a.m.
6 First of all, Mr. Nikolic, we see the name Nikolic written there
7 in the notes of this meeting. Do you know if that's referring to you or
8 if it's somebody else?
9 A. Yes. Yes. These are minutes from a meeting in my brigade, so
10 Nikolic, that is me.
11 Q. And we see the three points that are recorded that you said, and
12 I'm looking at the third one today at the moment, which states in the
14 "We are currently engaged in task issued by Army of
15 Republika Srpska Main Staff (hygiene and sanitation measures)."
16 Is that what it says in your version? I don't -- if you could
17 read out the last point under your name.
18 A. We are currently working on obligations given by the Main Staff
19 of the Army of Republika Srpska, and then in parentheses, hygiene and
20 sanitation measures.
21 Q. And the word in your language is "asanacija," is that right,
22 that's written there, if I pronounced it correctly?
23 A. Yes, excellent.
24 Q. All right. And what does this entry refer to? What are you
25 saying -- what are these tasks? What's going on?
1 A. If you're asking me about what I read out just now, then at this
2 meeting I reported to my commander saying that currently I was working
3 on -- I mean, I meant the military police, because when the komandir is
4 not there, then I usually do what they do. I usually say what it is that
5 they were doing. So I informed my commander that I worked on the tasks
6 that we had been given by the Main Staff, and they have to do with
7 sanitation and hygiene measures. I already explained that the operation
8 of relocation from Glogova was called "asanacija" in my brigade.
9 Q. Right. So this entry, just to be clear, refers to that
10 relocation operation in Glogova.
11 A. This point that I read out just now refers to what you said, but
12 the note refers to many other things, but specifically the point that we
13 discussed just now has to do with the relocation from Glogova.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, could I tender perhaps the cover
16 page and that page or whichever parts Your Honours --
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, two pages, the first page and the last page.
18 That will be admitted as the next Prosecution exhibit, i.e.,
19 Exhibit P4391.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: I don't know if it is acceptable to Your Honours,
21 but I wonder if we might take the break now. I'm just about done, but I
22 wouldn't mind taking a quick look to check over my materials.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll have a break for an hour and resume at
25 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.22 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 1.28 p.m.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls, please continue.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours.
4 Q. Mr. Nikolic, yesterday we discussed in the beginning that you had
5 entered a guilty plea before this Tribunal and taken responsibility and
6 accepted responsibility. I just want to ask you if you'd like to tell
7 the Trial Chamber how you feel about what happened in Srebrenica and what
8 happened to the Bosnian Muslim population in July 1995.
9 A. Yes. Whenever I testify, I take the opportunity to express my
10 regret for everything that happened over there. I am absolutely aware of
11 the fact that a terrible crime was committed in Srebrenica, that people
12 were killed, that many families lost their children, their sons, their
13 fathers, their brothers and sisters, and everything else. I personally
14 feel responsible, and it's particular difficult for me because I worked
15 in the school where many of those who lost their lives were provided with
16 an education, and I quite simply wasn't able to help those who lost their
17 lives, though I had -- I didn't have the courage to do that. Perhaps I
18 helped certain individuals, my Muslim friends who were friends even
19 before the war, but that wasn't sufficient, and yet again I'll use this
20 opportunity to apologise to all the families and to all the victims of
21 the crimes that were committed there.
22 I want to say that I'm extremely sorry for having been there, for
23 having carried out the orders I was given and for having contributed to
24 the perpetration of the crimes committed in that way. I want to
25 apologise to all the victims of the crime once more, and I'm very sorry
1 that I did not flee when it became certain that these things were going
2 to happen.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: No further questions at this time, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.
5 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good day, Your Honours.
7 Good day to everyone.
8 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
9 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Nikolic.
10 A. Good day, Mr. Karadzic.
11 Q. First of all, I would like to thank you for being so kind as to
12 meet with me and the Defence, and I believe that we agreed that we should
13 try to determine the truth with as much precision as possible, whatever
14 that truth might be, and I believe that you will assist us in attaining
15 this objective. Thank you once more.
16 Could we see P4391, a fairly fresh item, and I would like you to
17 have a look at a detail in that document. E-court, P4391, and I would
18 like to ask you whether you knew many of those people, Serbs and Muslims.
19 I apologise. 4390, the previous one, 4390.
20 Did you personally know many of those people? You said a minute
21 ago that you taught some of them.
22 A. I have in front of me -- well, now I have nothing in front of me.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 4390. 02123 is the 65 ter number.
24 That should be the one.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Could I ask you --
2 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we show the witness the written part,
3 handwritten part. Probably page 3.
4 Yes. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we enlarge this?
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Can you see the part that concerns wounded Muslim out of 23 who
8 remained after the evacuation which was organised by the ICRC, and he was
9 handed over to the Zvornik CSB. This is dated the 18th of July; isn't
10 that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Halilovic, Osman is the name of the enemy soldier. Did you know
13 this gentleman?
14 A. Mr. Karadzic, I knew quite a lot of Halilovics from Bratunac and
15 Srebrenica. To be quite frank, I can't tell you whether I knew this
16 particular Halilovic, but I can tell you that I knew a lot of people
17 personally from the area of Bratunac and Srebrenica.
18 Q. Thank you. And do you remember how old this Halilovic was, the
19 one referred to in this report?
20 A. There's something I have to say for the benefit of the
21 Trial Chamber, and this has to do with Halilovic. He is referred to in
22 this report, but there is also a written report that concerns him alone
23 that I provided to the Drina Corps command, and it's a man who is
24 middle-aged or perhaps even younger. I don't want to speak off the top
25 of my head, but I know exactly who is concerned, and I know what happened
1 to him.
2 Q. Was he arrested and handed over to the CSB in Zvornik in the area
3 of responsibility of your brigade; is that correct?
4 A. No, he wasn't arrested. He was one of the wounded who were
5 provided with accommodation in the health centre in Bratunac, and then
6 the CSB officials took charge of him. He was on their list as someone
7 who had committed a war crime. And operations officers from the
8 State Security Service in Zvornik took charge of him and took him for
9 further processing in the Zvornik centre.
10 Q. Thank you. And what happened in the end? You don't know?
11 A. Well, of course I do. Osman Halilovic was interviewed. He was
12 processed, and I don't know what the results of the process were, but
13 according to the information I had, he was processed or he was taken
14 before the judiciary.
15 Q. Thank you for that information. We'll try and locate that case
16 to see which Osman we are actually dealing with. Thank you very much.
17 As you've already told us in the interview, you don't know much
18 about police affairs, but very briefly, you held an important position
19 from 1986, and that position had to do with the system of
20 All People's Defence.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: You don't know much
22 about political events.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In order to be precise for the sake
24 of the Trial Chamber, in our interview I said that I was not someone who
25 officially participated in political events because I wasn't part of the
1 legislative or executive authorities, but naturally with regard to the
2 political events, I, as someone who was involved in intelligence work,
3 know many things about such political events, but I have told you that
4 I'm not a credible witness when it comes to such matters because I wasn't
5 a participant in the political life of the country, and I wasn't a member
6 of a single political organisation -- or, rather, of the SDS which was in
7 power at the time.
8 And in response to your second question, yes, in 1986 I left the
9 secondary school I was working in and started working in the
10 Territorial Defence Staff, and I was assistant commander for intelligence
11 in the Territorial Defence Staff in Bratunac.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Thank you. I'm waiting for the end of the interpretation, so
14 please could you try to do the same.
15 A. Yes. I'll try and take that into account.
16 Q. What subject did you teach in secondary school?
17 A. I was there for about five academic years, and during that period
18 of time I taught defence and protection. That was the name of the
19 subject that was a regular subject in secondary schools at the time.
20 Q. Did that subject have to do with the laws on All People's Defence
21 and of the self-protection of a society, and did it have to do with
22 Tito's doctrine as a whole on an armed people?
23 A. Well, that subject, the subject of defence and protection, had
24 its own curriculum, and it also included the field that you have just
25 mentioned. I could agree with that.
1 Q. Thank you. Then tomorrow we will ask you to clarify certain
2 matters with regard to that subject, but something that we could have a
3 look at now is the following: On page 59 the order "asanacija" was
4 mentioned taking sanitation and hygiene measures or cleaning the terrain.
5 Would you agree that "asanacija," taking such measures, is something that
6 is covered by the law, and the civilian protection has to take such
7 measures in peacetime and in wartime, in peacetime after catastrophes
8 have occurred and in wartime after there has been a battle?
9 A. Yes, Mr. Karadzic. I am a professor, and I dealt with that
10 field. I know exactly what measures of sanitation and hygiene concern.
11 It's a measure for civilian protection that is taken as a preventive
12 measure. If that's not possible, hygiene and sanitation measures are
13 taken in order to remove the results of catastrophes, natural
14 catastrophes, or the results of war and so on and so forth.
15 Q. Thank you. This includes removing the corpses or remains of
16 animals or people. It also has to do with removing the results or
17 eliminating the results of any kind of extraordinary activities or
19 A. It depends on the event, on the misfortune. So what taking
20 hygiene and sanitation measures involves depends on the event itself.
21 Q. This is a legal obligation, taking such measures is a legal
22 measure that has to be taken. It is not a matter for someone to decide
23 on voluntarily; is that correct?
24 A. Every social community takes sanitation and hygiene measures
25 because it's in their own interest. I agree with you that this is a
1 legal obligation and it is not a matter of someone's individual will.
2 Q. Thank you. With regard to the period prior to the war, very
3 briefly, you were in that position from 1986 up until the time when the
4 war broke out, and during that period of time you had the opportunity,
5 did you not, to report on or find out about reports on the possibility of
6 threats to the security of the country or threats to the security of the
7 armed forces; isn't that correct?
8 A. If your question were more precise, perhaps I could provide you
9 with a more precise answer. But as a rule, given the position I
10 occupied, I had the opportunity to obtain information of that nature as
12 Q. Am I correct if I say that the Territorial Defence at all
13 territorial levels was an integral part of the armed forces of Yugoslavia
14 and at the same time it was administratively considered to be part of the
15 municipality's defence, and the president of the municipality, given his
16 position, was the president of the council for defence and there was also
17 a municipal brigade for the Territorial Defence, for territorial
18 protection, in fact?
19 A. Yes. What you said contains some precise elements and some
20 imprecise elements. I'll try and assist you.
21 The armed forces of the former SFRJ were supposed of the JNA and
22 the Territorial Defence. These were two parallel and equal components.
23 So the TO - you asked me about the TO, the Territorial Defence - was one
24 of the component parts of the armed forces of the former
25 Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. It was organised, on the
1 whole, at the republican level. Every republic had its own
2 Territorial Defence, and every municipality at its own level had
3 municipal Territorial Defence. The highest level of organisation in the
4 municipality in terms of command was the Territorial Defence Staff, the
5 Municipal Staff, of course; and the highest level of organisation for the
6 units on the territorial or municipal principle were the
7 Territorial Defence detachments. So these were units the strength of a
8 battalion. In brigades or in independent battalions they were a little
9 more numerous than is the case for classical traditional battalions.
10 Within the municipal Territorial Defence, in addition to these municipal
11 staffs, there were sector staffs which were formed in local communes that
12 covered a large territory and a detachment would be formed in that kind
13 of a local commune which was extensive in territorial terms.
14 In addition to detachments, there were Territorial Defence
15 companies and there were independent platoons within the
16 Territorial Defence system. So that was the structure of the
17 Territorial Defence from the top to the municipal level, and it's true
18 that the Territorial Defence was led by and supplied by the organs of the
19 social and political community. The president of the municipality, in
20 fact, was the president of the council, as you have said. But when it
21 comes to command, the next level of command is the level of
22 District Staffs and the district staff of Bratunac and Srebrenica was the
23 Tuzla district staff. So that is the staff that was responsible for the
24 training, the control, and the equipment of the Territorial Defence at
25 the level of the municipalities of Bratunac and Srebrenica. And then
1 there was the republican staff with the centre in Sarajevo, and this was
2 the highest level of supervision.
3 Q. Thank you for that information. It will be useful. Am I correct
4 in saying that this entire structure that you have just described is a
5 structure that also exists in peacetime not just in wartime, and it
6 functions in peacetime and keeps one in a state of combat readiness for
7 the defence of the country?
8 A. You know it all, and I am going to explain this for the benefit
9 of the Chamber. You know that the JNA and it's staffs, commands and
10 units for the most part were units that were manned up to the maximum
11 levels in principle. As opposed to the units of the JNA, staffs and
12 commands and units of the TO were not a standing force. There was always
13 a nucleus of such formation only and frequently they differed. For
14 example, a peacetime TO staff greatly differed from a wartime TO staff.
15 But in any case, your statement that there were staffs within the
16 organisational schemes as well as commands and units that were manned, it
17 meant that they could mobilise personnel. The weapons and equipment was
18 provided as such at Municipal TO staff levels and in case of need there
19 were draft calls and the manning was brought up to necessary levels.
20 Q. Thank you. I will try to put simple questions that will
21 hopefully be answered with a yes or no.
22 You agree then that there were weapons in the municipalities and
23 companies belonging to the TO and that the whole country was basically
24 packed with arms. There were depots in municipalities, local communes,
25 and companies?
1 A. I understand the thrust of your question. The weapons of the
2 units, staffs, and commands of the TO was in TO warehouses that were
3 controlled. Some of that -- those weapons, since in addition to the
4 units I mentioned there were companies which had their own TO units,
5 which meant that those weapons held by companies, for example, the Vihor
6 company had a company in my area the weapons were their property and was
7 stored on their premises as well as the equipment they had. So there is
8 a slight difference between what you said and what I have just explained.
9 Q. Thank you. It means that they paid for it with their own money
10 with the agreement of the TO, of course, and then they used the weapons
11 to arm their own company. In other words, the weapons were their
13 A. Yes. There was a legal procedure which was to be followed which
14 prescribed the way in which a company could procure military weapons and
15 equipment, and there was -- there was also regulation in place as to its
17 Q. Thank you. Do we agree that between the beginning of the war in
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the establishment of Republika Srpska and the
19 VRS when it split from the JNA on the 19th and 20th of May, that the TO
20 municipal brigades and staffs existed as a tactical reserve of the JNA
21 and that they continued to exist within the VRS as regular units? Or to
22 be more precise, who defended Bratunac before the VRS was established?
23 A. Until the brigades of the VRS were formed, all defence activities
24 were under the competence of the units, commands, and staffs of the TO.
25 Q. Thank you. Do we agree that not only in Bratunac but across the
1 republic such brigades became municipal units, basically enjoying their
2 logistical support and payment? In other words, they had very strong
3 ties with their respective municipalities.
4 A. I can agree with that. The mechanism of manning such units even
5 before the VRS brigades were formed and following that was based on the
6 territorial principle. In other words, if you were to form a brigade in
7 the area of Bratunac, it automatically meant that you manned your unit
8 with the people from the municipal territory, and this functioned at all
9 levels up to the level of the republic.
10 Q. Thank you. As an officer, do you see a difference between a
11 people's army which is distributed territorially because it meant that
12 people had their families there who were under the attack of another
13 side's army which was again based on territorial principles, as opposed
14 to a regular standing army where we have professional soldiers and their
15 families are not involved in all that is happening?
16 A. That's a very complex question, but I'll try to be brief.
17 Concerning your question, I can say that there was a huge difference
18 between TO units and professional JNA units which were present there.
19 Now, as for any analysis of everything else you've mentioned, I'd rather
20 not go there, but in any case, my answer is that, yes, there was a
21 noticeable difference between the units manned by such soldiers as
22 farmers, teachers, musicians who were there to man the TO as compared to
23 professional units of the JNA.
24 Q. Thank you. I put this question because of what you said at
25 page 20 yesterday where you said that there was some irresponsible people
1 who used snipers to shoot around Srebrenica, contrary to what the orders
3 This element, this fact that people knew each other and that they
4 had personal motives such as revenge and because of the fact that their
5 families were at stake, did it all multiply the possibility of such
6 irresponsible incidents of people who did not wait for any orders to
7 start shooting or even disobey it? I'm trying to gauge the contribution
8 to this whole tragedy of the fact that these were not professional armed
9 forces but, rather, simple people who were literally in the midst of a
10 civil war.
11 A. Mr. Karadzic, I'd rather not go into such speculations. To each
12 and every one of your questions I could go into a deep analysis of what I
13 think of the matter, but in this specific instance, in my understanding,
14 what you are referring to cannot be included as an element in the whole
15 situation. I don't think there is a causal relationship between the fact
16 that someone was not a professional soldier but was still on a front line
17 and fired upon a non-military target. My understanding of this whole
18 thing is the following: It is completely irrelevant whether someone is a
19 professional or not. If you wish to engage a non-military target, you
20 may do so no matter how professional you are. So I see no direct link
21 between what you are trying to establish, that is to say, between
22 amateurism, so to speak, and illegal opening of fire from the enclave.
23 Q. I did not mean to involve amateurs. What I meant to say was that
24 a professional soldier's family was far away from any theatre of war,
25 whereas this people's soldier was in the middle of it, and you mentioned
1 yourself in a number of cases that there was this danger of personal
2 revenge, and you said that you had to secure the prisoners.
3 I'm interested in the following: I am not referring to specify
4 incidents, but was there this element of personal revenge which was
5 increased multifold in this situation where we had two people's armies
6 opposing one another as opposed to an international conflict?
7 A. I did not have occasion to take part in the professional force.
8 I can only cite my experience from the people's army, as you call it,
9 which existed at the level of municipalities. I can confirm that revenge
10 was one of the causes of people being killed on both sides, but again
11 I'll strive to be precise.
12 I think that taking revenge only involved individual cases. And
13 in this specific situation of Srebrenica and Bratunac, it did not play a
14 role. There were individual instances of revenge and murders, and we are
15 aware of that.
16 Q. Speaking of uncontrolled shooting, on page 20 yesterday, you also
17 referred to that. I wanted to clarify this. Is it more difficult for an
18 officer to control such an army when there are soldiers whose families'
19 lives are at stake than it would be for an officer to command a
20 professional army? As an officer, would you agree that it would be more
21 difficult to control?
22 A. Of course there is this military rule: The more professional
23 your army is, the better trained it is, the less problems you have and
24 the easier they are to control. And the other way around: If you have
25 amateurs in your units, people who are unprofessional or poorly trained
1 or who have been trained a long time ago, of course it is much more
2 difficult to command and control such a force as opposed to a
3 professional force.
4 Q. Thank you. Another brief question. During that period between
5 1986 and 1991 when Croatia and Slovenia seceded, through your
6 intelligence channels did you receive information that perhaps a
7 situation might occur in which a civil war was imminent or at least
8 possible? Did you follow developments in your area and did the army and
9 the TO -- well, in other words, you, as an intelligence officer were,
10 busy doing something at the time, were you not?
11 A. As an intelligence organ in the pre-war period, I worked on
12 similar things as during the war. I have already told you what it was I
13 did during the war. However, there is another situation which is an
14 imminent threat of war and the situation which makes it possible.
15 The year when I joined the staff, or two, three, or four years
16 later, it was the specific situation during -- because of which I kept
17 receiving information such as the things you refer to. At the municipal
18 level, that is to say my level, I also received information about a
19 possible conflict, a possible war and inter-ethnic clashes in our
21 Q. Thank you. During the pre-war period, did you take note of the
22 fact that the Drina division was established? I think that's the name it
23 had. It was established by a former professional officer,
24 Nurif Rizvanovic.
25 A. I know Nurif Rizvanovic personally, and I know what activities he
1 engaged in. We did have information that Nurif Rizvanovic, who otherwise
2 hails from Glogova, that during the time just before the war, was busy
3 arming, raising funds, and bringing in weapons to the people in the area
4 of villages around Glogova, including Hranca, Konjevic Polje, Sandici,
5 et cetera.
6 In that regard, I did have information about his activities, and
7 I reported it to my superior at the district staff in Tuzla.
8 Q. Thank you. Perhaps slightly less importance, but nonetheless
9 important for the Chamber to know, is it true that he was one of their
10 leaders at the beginning of the war and that Oric and Tursunovic
11 literally killed him off? There seems to have been some court-martial
13 A. You asked me about the 28th Division. I did not have such
14 information, and I think his activities cannot be put in the context of
15 the 28th Division activities during that time. Later on, yes, but not
16 during the time you refer to. I know of an incident, and I do have
17 information about what happened with Mr. Rizvanovic.
18 Q. Is it true that he was liquidated by Oric and Tursunovic, members
19 of his own ethnic group?
20 A. All of the information I was able to gather during the war and
21 later point in that direction. It seems that during a visit by Oric and
22 Tursunovic to Konjevic Polje where he was commander, they took him along
23 on route to Tuzla but killed him along the way.
24 Q. Thank you. As an intelligence officer, did you have insight into
25 the formation of the Patriotic League and the Green Berets, or, rather,
1 what Sefer Halilovic was doing already from April 1991 onwards? And from
2 that point of view, was Podrinje, the Drina River Valley very important
3 for them?
4 A. Yes. At the time, I had information about the establishment of
5 units and staffs by the Patriotic League. However, I never dealt with
6 that level, if you will. I dealt with the activities that were at the
7 level of my municipality. I knew -- actually, I knew things that were
8 important in relation to the establishment and formation and arming of --
9 actually, that were a consequence of the orders that came from the
10 leadership of the Patriotic League.
11 Q. Thank you. Was my information correct, and we heard some of that
12 here, namely that Muslims in Bratunac itself were not that militant?
13 However, in Hranca, Glogova, and other Muslim concentrations they had
14 units that were armed and that they had a parallel organisation of their
15 own even before the war?
16 A. It is true that in the territory of the municipality of Bratunac
17 there are villages or local communes that were more militant than the
18 centre of town itself. I can mention a few of them. For example,
19 Glogova - you've mentioned it as well - a very militant area, a big local
20 commune; and Konjevic Polje, likewise; and part of Voljavica and Zaluzje,
21 extremely militant.
22 Anyway, the town of Bratunac itself and the inhabitants of the
23 town of Bratunac were less quarrelsome and less militant when compared to
24 Glogova, Voljavica, and so on.
25 Q. Is it correct that Osman Malagic from Voljavica, before he got
1 killed in July or August, already gained fame as a military leader who
2 led actions against the Serbs?
3 A. I know of the Malagics from Voljavica, but believe me -- well, I
4 had records of all excessive conduct and activities, but it's been 20
5 years now and I really cannot recall each and every instance, names and
6 incidents pertaining to that period.
7 Q. Thank you. Just one more political question: Did you notice
8 that just before the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina the Serb side gave
9 up on its struggle for Yugoslavia and that it was the reorganisation of
10 Bosnia that was on the agenda, and from at that point of view there were
11 political agreements that were conducive to the establishment of two
12 municipalities in Bratunac.
13 A. Yes, I know. I know all of this that you've mentioned. I also
14 know about the initiative in Bratunac to establish the Serb municipality
15 of Bratunac and the Muslim municipalities of Bratunac. And if you're
16 interested, I even know the details in that regard.
17 Q. Is it correct that agreements were already underway and that
18 peacefully and lovingly the transformation of the police into two police
19 stations had already taken place in these two municipalities, or give us
20 another detail of your own choice.
21 A. Well, what I heard here was peacefully and lovingly. No, there
22 was no love. Peace, yes. There was no love whatsoever, and it wasn't
23 naive at all. And it wasn't peaceful at all.
24 I'll tell you what the truth is. The truth is that the quarrels
25 broke out precisely because of these divisions. In a police station --
1 or, rather, in this single building, there was the police, public
2 security station, and the Muslim public security station in the very same
3 building. In the very same office you'd had a Serb duty officer and a
4 Muslim duty officer. One would be the duty officer of the Muslim police
5 station, and the other one of the Serb police station. And then there
6 was this division of the territory of the municipality of Bratunac into
7 the territory of the part of the municipality of Bratunac that was
8 declared the Serb municipality of Bratunac, and the other one was the
9 Muslim municipality of Bratunac. You know what it was like to divide
10 Bratunac in that way? Practically that was impossible. It is not
11 possible even in theory to make that kind of division. I'll just give
12 you one example: You have Bratunac towards Kravica and Konjevic Polje,
13 and then the next village is Vekocvac [phoen] which is Serb village. The
14 next village Hranca is partly Muslim, and then the next part, about
15 20 per cent of that village is Serb, and then the next village is Glogova
16 where there is a 100 per cent Muslim population, and then the next
17 village is Kravica that is 100 per cent Serb, and so on and so forth.
18 And now you're trying to divide something and then you also have these
19 villages where the percentage is half/half, 60 per cent/40 per cent, and
20 so on and so forth.
21 Well, furthermore, what was very wrong was the fact that this
22 division went on. Then they even divided companies. When they divided
23 companies, then Serbs who worked in Muslim companies, I mean those that
24 were given to the Muslims, then they started laying off Serbs, and they
25 started replacing them by Muslims who then got jobs in these companies.
1 This was chaos.
2 After all of that, when all of this was created, this total
3 confusion, then they established check-points. So say you set out to
4 Konjevic Polje, you're stopped in Repovac after 2 kilometres first, and
5 then after 3 kilometres you're stopped in Glogova, and then after
6 4 kilometres you're stopped in Kravica, and then in Sandici after yet
7 another kilometre. So that was it. I am telling you practically what
8 was happening on the ground and this happened in all directions. So
9 there would be a Muslim village that had its own guards, its own
10 roadblocks, its own check-points. Every Serb village would have its own
11 check-point and roadblock. So you had a town that was absolutely
12 divided. Bratunac is a very small town. So you have this political
13 division, and it was exactly on an ethnic basis. All the Serbs were on
14 the side of the SDS, all the Muslims were on the side of the SDA, and
15 then there are police institutions that are divided, then the business
16 sector is divided, and then there are these check-points, police
17 check-points, and there is restricted movement, there. And within all of
18 that you have activists that are being armed on both sides. The Serbs
19 are arming their own, the Muslims are arming their own, and all of this
20 is done illegally, under quotation marks. I follow this professionally
21 and I knew exactly how these weapons were being brought in and how all of
22 this happened and I reported on that.
23 Q. Thank you. Let me ask you this: If you were chief of police or
24 at the position that you did hold, as for Glogova, would you send ethnic
25 Serb policemen or ethnic Muslim policemen to chase criminals there?
1 Would it become complicated if you were to send a Serb team or a Serb
2 patrol, a predominantly Serb patrol, say, to Glogova? Or if you would
3 send Muslims to a Serb village at that time, in those times of distrust,
4 would that have been a risk?
5 A. Yes. If you take that context, the one that you are referring to
6 and the time and all the divisions that were carried out, of course my
7 answer is going to be negative, that I would never send Serb policemen to
9 Q. And the other way round?
10 A. Of course, the other way round as well.
11 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that the first division occurred on the
12 31st of August, roughly, when the JNA was prevented from obtaining
13 mobilisation documentation from the military department in Bratunac? Did
14 about 10.000 SDA supporters assemble then, preventing the JNA from taking
15 these documents?
16 A. What I know for sure is that members of the JNA -- or, rather,
17 the team that came over to take these documents from the Secretariat for
18 National Defence from Bratunac were prevented from doing this. This was
19 the first organised conflict and protest in Bratunac that had been
20 organised by the SDA.
21 Q. Thank you. Is it correct, do you agree, that there were quite a
22 few armed actions already in March and that they were organised by Muslim
23 paramilitaries, including sabotage and armed actions as such?
24 A. Please, Mr. Karadzic, could you be more specific. Can you give
25 us the year you mean? March which year? What is the year that you have
1 in mind?
2 Q. I apologise. 1992. March 1992. That is to say, before the war
3 break out. During the Lisbon negotiations, is it correct that already
4 from the month of March onwards the Muslims were organising these
5 actions? During the interview I handed some material over to you where
6 they specify all the things that they did.
7 A. Conflicts, armed conflicts, in the month of March 1992. As far
8 as I know, there weren't any in the territory of Bratunac.
9 Disagreements, quarrels, protests, yes, that kind of thing did happen.
10 If you jog my memory, if you remind me of a specific action from that
11 period, perhaps I may remember, or if you show me a document. However,
12 as far as I know, there weren't any armed conflicts in the month of March
13 in the territory of the municipality of Bratunac.
14 Q. Thank you. If you are going to restrict yourself only to
15 Bratunac, then I am not going to pursue the matter any further. However,
16 can I count on the following, that after the war broke out, you knew
17 quite a bit about Srebrenica as well, not only Bratunac?
18 A. As for Srebrenica, once the war broke out, I knew quite a few
19 things, and of course I will tell you about everything that I know, and
20 if I don't know about something, I will tell you I don't know about that,
21 so I'm not going to speak about anything that I'm not familiar with.
22 Q. Thank you. On the 18th of April, 1992, as you said to us
23 yesterday, you were mobilised and you became assistant commander for
24 intelligence affairs. Let me ask you the following: Do you remember at
25 the time you were in the Territorial Defence, do you remember that
1 Mr. Izetbegovic declared general mobilisation on the 4th of April, 1992?
2 A. I don't remember the exact date, but I know that in April general
3 mobilisation was declared. I don't know the date exactly. I do not
4 remember -- actually, I didn't focus on that, but I do know that
5 mobilisation was declared.
6 Q. Do you remember that on the 8th of April the commander of the
7 republican Territorial Defence, General Vukosavljevic, was dismissed, and
8 on the 8th of April, Izetbegovic established a new Territorial Defence
9 that did not include us, and he declared a state of imminent threat of
10 war, and we did that on the 16th of April?
11 A. As for these activities at the level of the republican staff or
12 at the level of the Presidency, what Alija Izetbegovic did I cannot give
13 you affirmative or precise answers there, but I was informed about the
14 activities that had to do with the Territorial Defence, namely the
15 disintegration of the existing Territorial Defence and the establishment
16 of a new one. That I did know at the level of my municipality. I took
17 part in the establishment of the Territorial Defence of the municipality
18 of Bratunac.
19 Q. Thank you. You became assistant commander for intelligence, and
20 I think that yesterday you said that for a while you also worked on
21 security affairs as well; is that right?
22 A. As the Bratunac Brigade was established, that is to say in 1992,
23 from its very establishment until the end, I was the chief for
24 intelligence and security affairs in the Light Infantry Brigade in
25 Bratunac, that is to say throughout.
1 Q. Thank you. Did you have an assistant for intelligence and
2 another assistant for security, or did you do all of it, because it
3 wasn't a big brigade? Did you do it separately, or did you do all of it
5 A. According to the establishment of the Light Infantry Brigade, the
6 organ for intelligence and security has a chief and also an officer for
7 intelligence affairs. At one point I did have such an officer. From
8 time to time I would have one, and then there were some periods when I
9 did not have anyone else, when I was there on my own.
10 Q. Thank you. You did tell us, didn't you, that you reported to
11 your brigade commander, according to the chain of command, and that
12 professionally you had your chain to the same kind of service in the
13 corps command; is that right?
14 A. Yes, that's right.
15 Q. Thank you. Was the same valid in the other direction as well,
16 that is to say that down these chains from the corps command you would
17 get orders or instructions?
18 A. Yes. In the sense of command, one receives orders from one's
19 superior command. In terms of professional reporting, one receives
20 instructions from one's superior instance.
21 Q. Thank you. To be more precise, if you received two contradictory
22 orders from the brigade commander and from the corps command, from your
23 intelligence and security superior instance, which of them would take
25 A. Mr. Karadzic, it's a hypothetical question which is exactly that,
1 hypothetical. There is a rule. There is a law. Security or
2 intelligence organs are managed and commanded by the commander of the
3 unit that you are part of. Immediate command over security organs is in
4 the hands of my brigade commander. He was authorised to manage, control,
5 and command.
6 In professional terms, there was also professional management
7 which follows the other line, the intelligence and security line.
8 At brigade level, there was no one who managed me professionally.
9 The next higher level that was in charge of that was the chief of intel
10 and security organ from the Drina Corps. That was the rule. There are
11 exceptions, though, if you are in the field or in combat, as well as when
12 the commander is absent, but there are officers there from a senior
13 command, and each of those exceptions is then considered separately.
14 Q. Thank you. If I understood properly, if there is a senior staff
15 member visiting, he has primacy. He calls the shots if he's there;
17 A. Generally speaking, no. I'll use a practical example. There is
18 the Bratunac Brigade. If the corps commander is there and tells the
19 brigade commander, As of today I'm here, and I will command and control
20 the operation, then as was his right, he undertook upon himself to
21 command in the AOR of my brigade. However, irrespective of his presence
22 in the AOR, if he did not take over responsibility, it is the brigade
23 commander who continues to command the brigade that he is in charge of.
24 So there is no delegation of responsibility or command by virtue of your
25 arrival in the area. That's the rule.
1 Q. Let me see if I understood that correctly. The security
2 component is in a way more attached to the brigade, because the task is
3 to secure the brigade, its soldiers and assets. You discussed that in
4 the Blagojevic case in 2003 at page 1606. You said there that the duties
5 involved were to plan and propose security measures with the aim of
6 protecting the forces and assets as well as equipment and everything else
7 that may be in danger in case of an enemy attack, or in case of any
8 operation coming from outside of the unit. In that sense you are linked
9 to the brigade and its security; correct? Your tasks also included any
10 potential threats or acts of treason, et cetera.
11 A. Excuse me. When it comes to intelligence and security matters, I
12 am, first and foremost, attached to the brigade, linked to the brigade.
13 In all intel and security matters, as well as counter-intelligence, I am
14 exclusively tied to the brigade.
15 Q. Thank you. In that regard, as was probably the case, you were
16 supposed to know everything about your brigade and soldiers. It's about
17 ability, dangers, and operations aimed against the brigade from the
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpret's correction: From outside.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If we look jointly at intelligence
21 and security, the priority task was to know the dangers, something that
22 threatens the units. It is one's primary duty as an intel officer to
23 know who is in front of you, who is your enemy and what his force is.
24 Once you know that, once you know about the enemy, his intentions,
25 operations, and strength, when you have had assessed all that well, based
1 on it all, you plan or propose to the commander what needs to be done to
2 repel or deter enemy activity in order to protect one's own units,
3 personnel, equipment, assets, et cetera.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Thank you. At transcript page 24568, said yesterday that there
6 was an additional obligation, in terms of counter-intelligence, was to
7 gather evidence, documents, and information about the crimes committed in
8 the area of responsibility which included all units. Did it include any
9 crimes committed by our soldiers as well as enemy soldiers?
10 A. I can tell you what the practice was in my brigade. Documenting
11 crimes was a permanent task. It had no time limit. That is to say, from
12 the beginning until the end of the war, as security organ I gathered
13 intelligence information and documented instances of crime which took
14 place in the area of responsibility in my brigade on both sides.
15 Q. Thank you. So irrespective of who committed them; correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Did it also include any crimes which took place outside of
18 combat, which had nothing to do with the hostilities in question in times
19 of cease-fire if such crimes included military personnel?
20 A. My activities predominantly covered military personnel. When
21 speaking of our unit, it included the soldiers and officers of my
22 brigade. I did not have a single case file which involved members of
23 civilian structures or those who were not in the ranks of the unit. In
24 that sense, I know nothing. As for the officers and soldiers of my
25 brigade, I basically knew everything that went on.
1 Q. Thank you. Next you said that given the fact that you are not a
2 lawyer, you had an assistant who was supposed to put it in a legal
3 framework. You said so on the same page of the transcript, 24568. The
4 person in question was Zlatan Celanovic, who was a lawyer. He was
5 supposed to draft a criminal report and include all the material you gave
6 him in a legal procedure.
7 A. I'll try to be more precise in answering your question, because
8 not everything you said is correct.
9 Zlatan Celanovic was a desk officer of the morale, religious, and
10 personal affairs. He is a lawyer by profession, but he had an office
11 with the police. All matters related to criminal law was something that
12 he was in charge of. It meant interviewing POWs, people who fled to the
13 other side, collecting documents about crimes committed by members of the
14 Bratunac Brigade, drafting criminal reports, and submitting all evidence
15 and reports to the brigade commander for signature.
16 I took part in all that by way of information I had. I forwarded
17 all such information to Zlatan Celanovic so that he could use that to
18 further corroborate any criminal reports he was going to submit. That
19 was my part in assisting his work. He, in turn, was obliged that once
20 such documents were signed by the commander to forward them to the
21 competent military prosecutor and military courts for further processing.
22 Q. Thank you. When you said in line 8 that he had an office with
23 the police, did you mean the military police?
24 A. Yes. He had an office in the MP building, that is to say the
25 military police of the Bratunac Brigade.
1 Q. Thank you. You discuss your role vis-a-vis the military police
2 in the Blagojevic case on page 1606. In that regard, you had the ability
3 to propose the use of the MP company - or was it a battalion? - in
4 keeping with any brigade commander's orders. You were also in charge of
5 communicating with the civilian police; is that correct?
6 A. I have to correct you. It was neither a company or a battalion
7 of the military police. It was an MP platoon that was part of the
8 Bratunac Brigade.
9 As regards my relationship with the military police, it mostly
10 had to do with the professional management of the
11 Military Police Platoon, professional management. As for command and
12 control of the military police, that was in the hands of the commander.
13 The brigade commander was the officer who directly commanded and
14 controlled the military police that was within his brigade's
15 establishment structure. In this case it was
16 Commander Vidoje Blagojevic. He was the officer who commanded and
17 controlled Mirko Jankovic, commander of the military police.
18 Q. Thank you. Let us not forget to mention something from 1992 as
19 we are to move to another year.
20 Were you in Bratunac when different groups terrorised the town
21 and did many things against the wishes of the Bratunac people before the
22 28th of May and then later on in late 1992 and early 1993? Can you tell
23 us something about that situation? If not, we'll just move on to the
24 next topic.
25 A. I was in Bratunac in early 1992. When we had an interview
1 together, I told you during what time I was not in Bratunac. I was also
2 there in late 1992, early 1993, and onwards.
3 All I know from that period is something I'm willing to share
4 with you.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you remember April 1992? Do you remember some
6 unrest? Do you remember the arrival of a group from Voljavica which
7 demonstrated and fired weapons all around Bratunac in early April?
8 A. In early April in Bratunac municipality, I don't know what
9 specific incident you have in mind, but there were lots of cases of
10 demonstrations, violence, shooting, although there were no killings.
11 However, the situation of April 1992 was very serious, very tense, and it
12 was only a question of moment when there would be an armed conflict or a
14 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that as of the 17th of April on, some
15 volunteers appeared, most of whom refused to join the JNA, and they
16 terrorised both Serbs and Muslims around town? Do you have any such
17 information or knowledge? The period I have in mind is the six weeks
18 between the 17th of April and the end of May.
19 A. Yes. I know exactly that in this period of time that you refer
20 to volunteers appeared in Bratunac. They called themselves different
21 names, from the White Eagles to Arkan's men. I don't even know all of
22 their names any more. At any rate, these were people who were not from
23 the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is what I know about these groups.
24 What I'm saying to you now is based on the information I received
25 from the state security organ from Ljubovija. I talked to them, and I
1 simply wanted to check to see who this was.
2 Q. Sorry, just for the Trial Chamber, so for information or help,
3 you turned to a neighbouring municipality in Serbia. Ljubovija's in
4 Serbia; right?
5 A. Yes, yes.
6 Q. Thank you. Please proceed.
7 A. Since I received information that they were from Serbia, it was
8 easiest for me to check through their organs who these people actually
9 were, and on the Drina Bridge where people were crossing from Bosnia to
10 Serbia, they would take these people's documents and check each and every
11 one of them individually, and then they informed me about who they were.
12 On the basis of the information I received from them, most of the people
13 who came there were criminals. They were multiple offenders who had
14 spent several years in prison several times. There were also psychopaths
15 among them, sick people, people like that.
16 So these groups that were there did the worst things in the
17 beginning. First they started with looting, then abusing Muslims, then
18 when there were no Muslims left, that is to say when the Muslims left the
19 territory of the municipality of Bratunac, then they started stopping
20 Serb people, barging into their homes, attacking Serb girls, women,
21 et cetera. So we had lots of problems with these people who arrived in
22 the beginning of 1992, and they spent quite a while in Bratunac.
23 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that the municipal authorities did not
24 have the strength to deal with them and that individuals and
25 representatives of the authorities advised Muslims to stay away until
1 these groups would get expelled? If you knew about that, tell us. If
2 you didn't, then we'll move on.
3 A. Of course I had this information. I personally asked for a unit
4 to come from Serbia and expel these people, and indeed when there were
5 problems. An officer came from Pancevo. I will remember the name. I'm
6 a bit tired now, I will remember the man's name. This was an officer who
7 came with a unit of the military police, and the police stayed at a motel
8 in Ljubovija, and he came to see me at the staff in Bratunac. I
9 explained all of this to him. Beforehand, since on the other side in
10 Serbia, in Gucevo, there was the Drina operations group and it was
11 commanded by Commander Milosevic, I asked Milosevic to send someone there
12 to place these volunteers under their control and expel them.
13 He came and a meeting was organised between the president of the
14 Executive Board, I think the president of the municipality was there as
15 well, then the chief of the Ministry of Defence was there, I was there,
16 then this officer who had come from Belgrade, and there was a priest.
17 When I asked for that, Rodoljub Djukanovic, the president of the
18 Executive Board, and the priest declared that I was a traitor who wanted
19 to expel their liberators.
20 During this meeting, the priest organised a group of women and
21 men who came to protest in front of the municipality building while we
22 were in that meeting. And then of course the man said, Mr. Nikolic, you
23 see how people feel. I don't want to go into this. He got his police
24 escort, and he left, and then they were simply no longer there. So
25 that's the story about the volunteers in that period.
1 Q. Thank you. Then this priest left the church later on as well;
3 A. He left everything. He was one of the men who abused the church,
4 humanitarian aid, everything that went through him, and also he took
5 advantage of these unfortunate people who went by what he said. And now
6 because of Rodoljub Djukanovic, these same people who were involved in
7 this protest in front of the municipality building were later abused by
8 these people who they did not want to see expelled.
9 Q. Thank you. In the beginning of 1993, was there a group of
10 important instructors there that imposed a reign of terror in Bratunac?
11 A. Yes. In 1993, there was this group of instructors, and as for
12 this group and their activities and everything they did, I wrote a
13 report. I'm not sure whether I also sent it to the Main Staff of the
14 command of the Drina Corps. I'm not sure about that, but there is this
15 report of mine from 1993 about their activities and everything that they
16 did in Bratunac.
17 Q. After a while you got rid of them, too, in a way; is that right?
18 A. After lots and lots of problems that we had there, I personally
19 had all these problems with them as well, but we did have very many
20 problems that had to do with abusing people, beating up officers, beating
21 up the brigade commander, kicking the brigade commander. And also we had
22 this group of criminals that had come there. Quite simply, their basic
23 objective was to take over power totally. There is a report to that
24 effect. They did not dare attack the command of the brigade because I
25 threatened that if they tried to do that as they did to the police, I
1 threatened that I would come with the unit and with our combat resources
2 and that I would destroy them. So they left me alone, and they left the
3 brigade alone, but in this report it says that they looted, abused
4 people, detained people. They beat the president of the municipality.
5 They beat the president of the SDS. Your Miroslav Deronjic, they
6 physically beat him, abused him. It was chaos.
7 Q. Thank you. Jokic was a man's name, or whatever from Srebrenica,
8 is also a high official from the SDS. They led him with his hands tied
9 through town. Was this the first group or the second group?
10 A. This was the second group from 1993. And it's not only Jokic
11 that they had tied up, also Delivoje Sorak, who was commander of the
12 Territorial Defence Staff of Srebrenica at the time. They took him
13 through town. They put a board around his neck in front of him and it
14 says, Sorak Delivoje admits that he killed Goran Zekic -- or, rather,
15 Delivoje and Goran Zekic were in the same car when Goran Zekic was
16 assassinated, and then they put this board around Zorko's
17 [as interpreted] neck and they took him out and paraded him through town
18 for days and people spat at him because on that board it said, I killed
19 Goran Zekic, but actually Delivoje is an honest man and he had nothing
20 whatsoever to do with the killing.
21 Q. Yes. This is Zekic, who was an MP and a judge, and he was killed
22 on the 8th of May, and isn't it correct that he was killed by the Muslims
23 after all, not Serbs? There's no dilemma about that; right?
24 A. I have no dilemma in this regard. On the basis of all the
25 reports, all the interviews, all the evidence gathered, I'm sure, I'm
1 convinced that he was killed by the Muslims and that Delivoje Sorak had
2 nothing to do with it.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Excellencies, tell us,
4 what is your next move? Are we going to call it a day or do we have more
5 time left?
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We will adjourn for today and resume
7 tomorrow at 9.00.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.01 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 15th day
10 of February, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.