1 Wednesday, 29 February 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Good morning, General.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls, please continue.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. Good morning, Your Honours.
11 WITNESS: MANOJLO MILOVANOVIC [Resumed]
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 Examination by Mr. Nicholls: [Continued]
14 Q. Good morning, General.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Good morning, everybody.
16 Q. One follow-up question, General Milovanovic, before we move on
17 today from yesterday. You told us about how on May 12th communications
18 systems were being worked on and how they worked a bit. What I wanted to
19 ask you is: At any time during the war, were the communications systems
20 of the VRS knocked out and had to be -- and communications had to be used
21 by a back-up system? And I'm referring to, I believe, around August
22 1995. If you could tell us if there was a communications problem at that
24 A. Yes, sometime around the 29th or 30th of August, 1995, the
25 NATO Pact launched Tomahawk rockets and destroyed all of our 13 nodes,
1 communications nodes. We were down with no communications for two hours,
2 and in those two hours we managed to establish a back-up system.
3 At the beginning of the war we managed to obtain four sets of
4 communications systems. We actually had the communications system of the
5 former staff of the -- the defence staff of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That
6 was the first set. The second set was the set that we inherited from the
7 former military district in Sarajevo and we seized two sets, or rather,
8 we did not let them be returned to Yugoslavia. This was the
9 communications system of the -- the communications brigade of the
10 Supreme Command. We only let the soldiers and -- with their side-arms
11 leave the territory, but we kept the equipment. So we had four sets.
12 One of those sets was operational, the other one was a back-up system,
13 one of them was always being serviced. We had a factory called
14 Rudi Cajavec in Banja Luka which maintained these communications systems.
15 And there was a set that was sometimes had to be re-fitted or adapted.
16 And as far as I can recall, we were hit by NATO Pact on
17 six occasions and they never managed, other than this 30th or
18 31st of August, I can't remember, to destroy all of our 13 communications
19 nodes so that at that point in time we were without a communications
20 system for two hours.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, before we move on, this question for
22 the Defence.
23 Mr. Robinson, the Chamber is seized of the Prosecution's request
24 for extension of time to comply with the Trial Chamber's order compelling
25 inspection of items material to the Sarajevo defence case which was filed
1 yesterday. If my memory is correct, the Prosecution is suggesting
2 disclosing some of 130 prospective witness materials by 2nd of March and
3 then disclosing the remainder on a rolling basis by 9th of May. So if I
4 can hear your observation on this some --
5 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we don't object to that, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, the Prosecution's request is granted.
9 Thank you.
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls, please continue.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Q. Thank you, General Milovanovic. Just to move on then to make
14 sure I understand clearly. Those two hours in August 1995, that was the
15 only time that the communications were down during the war?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Thank you. All right. I'm going to move on to a new topic
18 now --
19 JUDGE KWON: That refers to military communication,
20 General Milovanovic?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, military communications,
22 command communications, command and co-ordination communications, that's
23 what we called them.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. I'm going to move on to a new topic now about -- and show you
1 some documents and orders. And the first one is an exhibit already,
2 P00846. Now, this document, General --
3 MR. NICHOLLS: It may need to be made larger for the General,
4 please. Perhaps, if necessary, just have the Serbian on the screen, I
5 don't know, or split it.
6 Q. This is an order from the president of 7 February 1994, regarding
7 artillery use, and we see here what the president is ordering. Before I
8 ask you anything substantive about this, do you remember seeing this
9 document before, General?
10 A. Allow me just to see what the order actually is. Yes, I had
11 occasion to see this document during the war and I also saw it during one
12 of the first interviews that were conducted with me by Mr. Barry Hogan in
13 Banja Luka, the 23rd, 24th, and 25th of May, 2001. This is the ratio of
14 responding to fire, where the ratio should be 1:1.
15 If I can just see the date, please. Thank you.
16 This is the 7th of February, 1994, in preparation of the
17 delegation of the VRS for negotiations in Sarajevo with UNPROFOR and the
18 Muslims on pulling out artillery to a zone 20 kilometres away from
19 Sarajevo, and I headed the VRS delegation.
20 Q. Thank you. Let me show you another document now.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: This is 65 ter 15598, also dated 7th of February.
22 And if we can blow that up so that the witness can see his name at the
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see the signature; however,
25 the document is very smudged and -- just a minute, please. Could we
1 scroll it down. Thank you. I have read it.
2 This is a document that I drafted and it is the implementation of
3 a previous order received from the supreme commander on being careful
4 with ammunition, or rather, responding to enemy fire one on one, in other
5 words, a missile for a missile or a projectile for a projectile. There
6 is a term mentioned here, shelling, and in the course of the war this
7 term, shelling, was in fact imposed by the UNPROFOR and it's become
8 commonplace. However, it's incorrect. In artillery, technically
9 speaking it should be called counter-batting. In other words, you open
10 fire on a weapon or a piece of artillery that is opening fire at you.
11 Now, the shelling, the term "shelling," is problematic because it
12 implies the dispersion of shells beyond the target itself, and this was
13 never actually the case on either our side or the Muslim side. And also,
14 there is mention here of the corps artillery group and the responsibility
15 for it is the direct responsibility of the corps commander, whereas the
16 deployment of artillery was in the remit of the brigade commander. In
17 other words, if there should be a disproportionate response to enemy
18 fire, I don't have to go looking for who was responsible; the
19 responsibility is with the brigade commander.
20 MR. NICHOLLS:
21 Q. Thank you. And just then, this is, as you say, your implementing
22 the order on the same day it was received at the Main Staff from the
24 A. Yes.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender this document, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P4493, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: Could we see the previous document, i.e.,
4 Exhibit P846. If we could blow it up a bit further.
5 General Milovanovic, how should we read item number 3, Corps
6 commanders shall answer directly to the president?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The corps commander shall answer
8 directly to me for the acts of the corps while brigade commanders shall
9 answer for the acts of the brigades. In explaining the earlier document
10 I stressed these two matters. Because the corps has its own artillery
11 group for their engagement - and these are mostly large-calibre weapons
12 and long-range weapons - whereas the brigade is 122-millimetre calibres
13 up to 18 kilometres. In other words, the commander of the brigade is
14 responsible for the brigade weapons. So the corps commander does not
15 care who it was who actually fired that shell or who the platoon
16 commander was. All he wants to know is whether it was the corps group or
17 the brigade artillery that acted, and then they would lay the
18 responsibility at the hands of the corps commander or the brigade
19 commander, depending on who opened fire. So I only -- in this order, I
20 only actually conveyed who was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief.
21 JUDGE KWON: My question was rather: The president was
22 exercising command and control over those corps and brigade commanders
23 directly by this document?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's correct. That is the
25 power of the supreme commander, and he addressed this order - as we can
1 see if we scroll it down a bit - to the Main Staff I believe, the command
2 of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and all brigade commanders. In other
3 words, he wanted this to reach the units as soon as possible, but he did
4 not bypass the Main Staff. And based on that order I also had to forward
5 this order to the Main Staff so that the brigade commander would not
6 actually carry out orders to the third superior, but rather the orders of
7 the Main Staff.
8 I think, or rather, I'm certain that all this means is that
9 the -- this commander's concept had to reach the -- those who are to
10 implement it as soon as possible. So there is nothing unlawful in this.
11 It would have been unlawful had the supreme commander skipped or
12 overlooked the Main Staff when issuing this order, but he did not bypass
14 JUDGE KWON: However, when you issued the implementation order,
15 you didn't include this item, did you?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think I did and I have explained
17 why corps commanders were responsible or what they were responsible for
18 and what the brigade commanders were responsible for.
19 JUDGE KWON: Directly answerable to the president?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To the president and to the
21 Main Staff.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we go back to
25 General Milovanovic's document to see it again --
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's for you to take up the issue in
2 your cross-examination.
3 Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
5 Could I now have P03041. This is a document dated 31st of March,
6 1994, from the Main Staff marked "urgent."
7 And, Your Honours, if there's no objection, I have a hard copy in
8 the Serbian language which may be easier for General Milovanovic to read
9 if he wants.
10 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Robinson?
11 That will be done.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If we could scroll up a bit.
13 THE ACCUSED: Can we have a copy for us?
14 JUDGE KWON: It's from -- you can see it in e-court. That's for
15 the convenience of the General so that he can read in hard copy.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, this has been released --
17 JUDGE KWON: You can print out from the e-court.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't need a hard copy. I can
19 see it quite clearly on the screen.
20 MR. NICHOLLS:
21 Q. Thank you, then.
22 A. Could we scroll up. Let's move on with the text.
23 Q. Well, I don't want to go through the whole thing now, General,
24 because there's a particular part I wanted to ask you about. If we could
25 go to the last page so you can see who this document came from at the
2 A. I sent the document.
3 Q. Yes. Now, this is quite a lengthy analysis, and I won't go
4 through all the different paragraphs. What I wanted to focus on was the
5 actual order, if we go to the previous page in Serbian. And this is a
6 document, if you remember, General, that you and I looked at when we met
7 about three weeks ago. If you could just read through the order and my
8 question will be about section (G), the last at the bottom.
9 A. Could we scroll up, please. That's good.
10 Q. I'll just read it out.
11 "(G) The commanders of corps and brigades can receive
12 assignments and orders only from the Main Staff of the VRS and the
13 supreme commander of Republika Srpska armed forces Dr. Radovan Karadzic
14 and from nobody else. Before the acknowledging of orders, the commanders
15 are obliged to report that they have received them so the superior
16 headquarters can adjust the strategic, operational, and tactical
17 objectives with the situation at battle-fields ..."
18 And then I won't read it all but it continues that you strictly
19 forbid local governing orders, Assemblies, municipal, and other bodies
20 from giving orders --
21 JUDGE KWON: Probably we need to change the next page for B/C/S,
23 MR. NICHOLLS: Next page, please.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you let me know what the
25 question is.
1 MR. NICHOLLS:
2 Q. Yes. I was just waiting for you to finish reading it. The
3 question is: Can you explain to us why you included this order at the
4 bottom, (G), that we've just seen, that only the Main Staff and the
5 president can issue orders and nobody else?
6 A. This is another attempt to avoid dual or parallel command system
7 when it came to using the combat units of the VRS, although we had
8 eliminated Crisis Staffs from the system of command. Nevertheless, these
9 municipal organs maintained the brigades that had been established in the
10 territory of the municipalities, and in a certain sense they considered
11 that they had certain rights since they were feeding and maintaining the
12 troops, they had certain rights to use the troops too. That's what they
13 believed. The supreme commander was with the Main Staff. I told you
14 about the event when, in front of me, he eliminated from a system of
15 command Dusko Kornjaca, he removed him from the system of command,
16 Dusko Kornjaca, Cajnice, and Ratko Radic at Hadzici. We took advantage
17 of this and then got rid of all the Crisis Staffs.
18 As far as this document itself is concerned, it has a certain
19 background history. On the 19th of March of this year, 10 or 12 days
20 before the document was issued, there was a briefing in the Main Staff,
21 an assessment of the situation. This was my task, to give suggestions to
22 the commander and to assess the situation. I thought that there would be
23 a Muslim-Croat offensive in the spring of 1994, and I warned the
24 Main Staff of this and mentioned all the axes that are referred to in the
25 introduction of the order.
1 The first time we were together, General Mladic didn't accept my
2 assessment and my suggestions. He interrupted the briefing, and on the
3 following day he came to see me in my office. He was on his own. He
4 told me we would not continue with the briefing and that he didn't agree
5 with my assessment. He said I had overestimated the enemy, that the
6 enemy didn't have the material possibility for carrying out such a
7 large-scale offensive. He only authorised some of my suggestions, and
8 that was to carry out a planned action, Zvijezda 94 in the vicinity of
9 Gorazde. And as for everything else, that was to wait for better times.
10 On one occasion - I cannot now remember the date - but from the
11 20th or between the 20th and the 30th of March, I informed the supreme
12 commander that the commander hadn't accepted my assessment. The supreme
13 commander did not react either positively or negatively. He just said
14 that these are your affairs in the Main Staff. On the 24th, there was an
15 accident. Mladic lost his daughter. There was an incident. He went to
16 the funeral in Belgrade, and that is why I signed this document as deputy
18 The enemy offensive commenced on several axes, in several areas,
19 Posavina, Majevica, Gorazde, and I don't know, in Bugojno, in both
20 Vakufs, and so on. And then I made good use of my assessment of the
21 19th of March, and I warned the corps commanders of the things that we
22 have read about in the introduction to the order. And I also used my
23 prerogative to issue an order for the VRS to prepare itself to mount a
24 defence against the spring-time offensive in Bosnia and Herzegovina
25 launched by the Muslim and Croat forces. And this is my explanation as
1 to the provenance of this order.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Very quickly, 13899, please.
4 Q. While it's coming up, this is from the next day, 1st of April,
5 1994. It's an IBK, or Eastern Bosnian Corps, command document from
6 General Novica Simic. And take a look at the cover page, General, and
7 then we'll look at the last page. And I'm simply going to ask you if
8 what we see is your order and the analysis being passed down to the
9 corps. And then we see that General Simic says that all corps members
10 shall be informed about the document.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: So maybe we could go to the last page of the
12 Serbian now. Perhaps one page back, sorry, so that we can see that this
13 is the section which is the order. And then down some more.
14 Q. There we see ...
15 A. Yes, I've seen it. What's the question?
16 Q. The question is simply: Is this the order we just looked at
17 signed by you being passed down to the corps level, again an
19 A. This is General Simic's reaction to the order of mine that we
20 have had a look at. He didn't amend it but passed it down as it was to
21 his subordinate units, so he was implementing the order of mine that we
22 have just had a look at.
23 Q. Thank you, General.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: May I admit -- tender this, Your Honour?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be admitted.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P4494, Your Honours.
2 MR. NICHOLLS:
3 Q. I'm going to jump ahead a little bit, General, and now show you
4 some more documents. These are from March 1995.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 65 ter 07526, please.
6 Q. This is an order from President Karadzic to the Main Staff of the
7 Army of Republika Srpska, as well as to the minister of the Ministry of
8 the Interior of the Republika Srpska, 29 March 1995. And it states in
9 paragraph 1:
10 "Based on RDB state security information on the intentions of the
11 Muslims of Srebrenica to transfer 1500 manoeuvre brigade soldiers to
12 Kladanj and previous intelligence information concerning their intentions
13 to cut off the Vlasenica-Zvornik road, set up ambushes immediately along
14 the possible axis of withdrawal of units and increase the number of
15 patrols controlling the area.
16 "2. Inform me of the execution of this order in a timely
18 Now, the question is: You explained to us yesterday about how as
19 president Dr. Radovan Karadzic was supreme commander of the armed forces
20 of the RS, which included the MUP, the police, as well as the army and
21 also civilian protection. Do you recall this order coming into the
22 Main Staff?
23 A. Yes, I do remember it. This is a typical, regular act by the
24 supreme commander. He's forwarding the order to the troops and the
25 Ministry of the Interior, to the police. He's sending them the order.
1 He is warning us what might happen. I don't want to comment on the
2 contents of the text. 1.500 soldiers, a brigade, is mentioned. The
3 Muslims want to transfer them from the Srebrenica enclave. That is
4 supposed to be a safe area and there should be no armed soldiers there.
5 Soldiers are being sent from the enclave to Kladanj, to assist in the
6 defence of Kladanj.
7 At the time I think that we were carrying out the Krivaja 94
8 offensive and our objective was to take Prevoj -- the Sokolina pass
9 between Zvornik and Kladanj. Let's put it that way. We succeeded in
10 doing this. However, I and Milenko Karisik, I believe, the commander of
11 the special police units, that's the combat part of the MUP, we reached
12 an agreement, made a plan to have mixed patrols. We patrolled along the
13 Han Pijesak-Milici-Zvornik axis and the Han Pijesak-Vlasenica-Sekovici
14 axis. This was a matter of taking precautions, to make sure that Muslims
15 didn't make any attempts and if they did make any attempts, for those
16 patrols to discover them and to attack them.
17 Another problem is mentioned here. You can't see it, but it's
18 something you can read in between the lines. UNPROFOR knew that there
19 were armed men in the Srebrenica enclave, and throughout that period of
20 time these people were trying to join up with Tuzla, Kladanj, and Olovo.
21 They wanted the Srebrenica and Zepa enclave to join up over the Susica
22 mountain. And the VRS spent about two and a half years of the war
23 fighting against those groups that would come out of Srebrenica, Zepa,
24 and Gorazde.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender this, Your Honour?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be Exhibit P4495.
3 MR. NICHOLLS:
4 Q. Now, you talked about meeting with Mr. Karisik and I'm going to
5 show a couple more documents related to this order from the president,
6 some of which talk about that topic.
7 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have P02253, please.
8 Q. This is a 30th of March - in other words, the next day - order
9 from the VRS Main Staff. It's to the Drina Corps command and it's about
10 the prevention of transfer of Muslim forces from Srebrenica to Kladanj,
11 and then we see the order. And again, before General Milovanovic --
12 well, I'll just tell you, General, when you get to the last page of this,
13 page 2, you'll see that it's written by you at the bottom of the page.
14 Now, the question is quite simple. Take a look at the document.
15 This order emanates from the presidential order we saw the day before; is
16 that right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And if we can go down to the time-stamp at the bottom on the
19 right. It's not completely easy to read, at least for me, but we can see
20 that this was received and processed at approximately 5 p.m.; is that
22 A. Yes, the 30th of March, 5 -- or 1700 hours processed, which means
23 that it was received at the Drina Corps command. And it was sent at
24 4.10 p.m., or 1610 hours, which means that it took about 40 minutes for
25 the encryption officer to dis-encrypt it and to forward it to the
1 commander. So this is just a military implementation of the previous
2 order of the supreme commander, and there should be a similar document
3 from the Ministry of the Interior and I believe we've had occasion to see
4 it during the proofing sessions. So this is just the implementation of
5 the supreme commander's order, and you can see here that I also ordered
6 that a group should be sent to assist the -- this task force, and that's
7 a group of 30 men highly trained, and they can assist very rapidly.
8 Q. Thank you. And if we look at paragraph 3 --
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a minor correction.
10 According to the English translation, 1610 says -- means telegram
11 number and the first line says it was received 1655. So I don't read how
12 we can know that it took 40 minutes to decode this telegram. It was
13 received 1655 and processed 1700. That's what it says. Do you confirm
14 that, General?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we're both correct.
16 This telegram was received at 1655. This is a telegram that was sent via
17 teleprinter - in other words, it was encrypted - and it was completed at
18 1655, the decoding was completed at 1655, and its re-typing. And there's
19 a code-name and then something is smudged. And then the 1610, that's
20 probably the time when it was sent from my teleprinter to the Drina Corps
21 teleprinter, and the encryption officers finally processed this at 5.00,
22 at 1700 hours. So it took him about five minutes to re-type this. I
23 don't see that there is anything in dispute here. This is just a
24 technical matter. I handed this document to my teleprinter officer, he
25 had to encrypt it, and then use the Morse code or whatever - I'm not very
1 good with technology. But it took about 50 minutes to an hour for this
2 telegram to actually come to the desk of the corps commander, in other
3 words, the end user.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
6 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Q. And I think you've already explained it, General, but paragraph 3
8 we see here says:
9 "By agreement with the authorised representatives of the RS MUP
10 ensure control of the territory ..." et cetera, this task of blocking
11 Muslim troops.
12 Does that refer to what you just spoke about, your meeting with
13 Milenko Karisik?
14 A. Yes. I am here instructing the corps commander -- command to get
15 in touch with the police of that region, Vlasenica, Zvornik, and the
16 surrounding places, towns, Han Pijesak, and to co-ordinate the details
17 regarding these mixed patrols, whatever they agree. In some cases there
18 would be purely military patrols, in others purely police, and then there
19 would be mixed ones. In other words, the details on the transfer of
20 these Muslim soldiers are left to the corps commander to work out.
21 Q. Thank you. If I could now have another document, again in this
22 chain, again it's related, General. It's number 07853. We'll just take
23 a minute to look at that one, General, sir. It's also in your name.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we can continue. Thank you.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Can we scroll down, please.
1 Q. I want to take a look at these stamps as well. This is from the
2 Main Staff of the VRS, same day, 30 March 1995, very urgent. Now, this
3 one is to the president of Republika Srpska, the supreme commander,
4 CC: Minister of the Interior of Republika Srpska, if we go back to the
5 top. And on the top right we have a stamp which in my translation reads:
6 "RS president's office, 30 March 1995." Time 1750 hours.
7 And you are responding to the president. It begins:
8 "Re: Your order strictly confidential number 01-574/95 ..."
9 And then it says -- and then it talks about other orders and the
10 Drina Corps forces being engaged in Spreca 95. And I'm interested most
11 at the moment in paragraph 3.
12 "Ministry of the Interior of RS informed me in its letter ..." I
13 won't read out the number "... of 23 March 1995 that some members of the
14 PJP," special police unit, "had been based in the area of Konjevic Polje
15 and given the task of controlling the areas of Konjevic Polje, Cerska,
16 Udrc, and Glogova and securing the roads in this area.
17 "We propose that the MUP forces through ambushes and patrols
18 ensure the control of the territory in depth along the
19 Srebrenica-Han Pogled-Kladanj axis which would, together with our
20 intensified security and alertness along the line of contact, block this
21 and the announced movement of the Muslim brigade from Srebrenica."
22 And then below there we see another time-stamp, 1630, 1645
23 processed. So can you explain this document to us. We saw the order
24 received from the president, the order conveyed to the Drina Corps, and
25 this one now, can you explain what you're doing making a proposal to the
2 A. This is my report to the supreme commander that I've acted upon
3 his order. The request to the supreme commander in paragraph 2, because
4 of the engagement of the Drina Corps in Operation Spreca and so on, and
5 then I say what it is that I am unable to do. And then I tell him who
6 would be able to carry that out, and that is the MUP forces. Simply put,
7 this is a report to the supreme commander, informing him that we have
8 acted on his order.
9 And in the signature block I see that I've signed this as the
10 Chief of Staff, whereas earlier I signed the other document as the deputy
11 commander of the Main Staff. And the reason is that I received this
12 order from the supreme commander as the deputy commander, because Mladic
13 was not there. He probably had returned to Bosnia in the meantime, but
14 because I was the person who had received the first order I had to report
15 to the supreme commander what it was that I had done.
16 As for these stamps saying "received" and "processed," I don't
17 see why you insist on it so much. As you can see here, this telegram was
18 processed in 15 minutes, whereas in the upper right corner we see that it
19 says that it was processed at 1750; in other words, an hour and
20 five minutes were necessary for the administration of the president of
21 the republic to log this in the main register, to put it in protocols,
22 and then to disseminate it through his counsellors.
23 So simply, what we see here is the way these documents, the
24 process -- the way these documents were sent. Sometimes they are
25 processed very quickly and they're sent by teleprinter, but here, from
1 this upper stamp we can see that the administration didn't do their job
3 Q. Thank you, General. The reason I insist, as you put it, is
4 exactly that, so you can help us understand the way this process worked.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender that, Your Honour?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Exhibit P4496.
7 MR. NICHOLLS: And could I now have P02254 also from
8 30th of March, 1995, a Drina Corps command document with the heading
9 "Prevention of relocation of Muslim armed forces from Srebrenica to
11 This is signed by the Drina Corps commander. We don't need to go
12 there right now, but it's general -- it's signed by Milenko Zivanovic.
13 And we can see the different brigades it's sent to. If we could go to
14 page 2 of the English. I think it's okay, page 1 of the Serbian. At the
15 top we see that Commander Zivanovic has written that:
16 This is pursuant to the order of the president of the RS and the
17 order of the VRS Main Staff and pursuant to the DK, Drina Corps's,
18 command's assessment.
19 If we now go to paragraph 11, which is on the next page of the
20 English and it's on page 2 of the Serbian. And then we'll need to go
21 over in a minute to the next page of the English.
22 Q. A simple question, General. The reason I'm showing you this
23 document is to ask you: Is this now what we see as the implementation of
24 the president's order through the Main Staff and the MUP?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you. One more document now on this topic. 65 ter 07049.
2 This is the RS Ministry of the Interior office of the minister document,
3 also dated 30th of March, to president of the RS, Dr. Radovan Karadzic,
4 signed not by but for Minister Zivko Rakic.
5 Now, does this document refer to the same order and task we saw,
6 to block these Muslim armed forces?
7 A. Yes, but Minister Zika Rakic wasn't fair towards me as I was
8 towards him. This document wasn't sent to me for my information, but I
9 sent one to him. This is a report that he sent to the Supreme Command,
10 according to which he acted in accordance with his order of March 1995.
11 And as I have the microphone, in that first document that we
12 analysed and related to this subject matter I mentioned that Krivaja 94
13 operation, but it was the Spreca 95 operation. It wasn't the Krivaja
14 operation. I don't know how I made that slip. It was a corps operation,
15 not a Main Staff operation. So I probably got confused.
16 Q. Thank you for that clarification. Just before we move on, you
17 may -- we saw the document a minute ago where you made the proposal to
18 the president regarding engagement of the MUP forces. Do you recall if
19 President Karadzic accepted your proposal or how you learned that he
20 accepted your proposal, if he did?
21 A. I'm afraid I didn't understand the question. Did I know whether
22 the president accepted my suggestion or not? Was that the question?
23 Q. Yes. That -- you made a proposal, as we saw in the document that
24 we began with. You proposed that the MUP forces be engaged on the
25 Srebrenica-Han Pogled-Kladanj axis. I'm just wondering how did you find
1 out, if you did, that that proposal had been accepted by the supreme
3 A. I don't remember having received a response from the president of
4 the republic and it wasn't necessary, because there is a saying: Silence
5 is tantamount to confirmation. So he didn't have to tell me whether he'd
6 engage the police or not, but as to whether he did or not, it wasn't a
7 matter of interest for me anymore because the command post there was
8 General Mladic at the time. And perhaps he informed General Mladic. I
9 don't know. I don't really think it's important whether he accepted my
10 proposal or not because from the report from the corps commander or from
11 his order to subordinate units, I can see that the Srebrenica-Han Pogled
12 axis -- Srebrenica-Han Pogled-Kladanj axis had been closed off by police
13 forces and that, in fact, was my proposal.
14 Q. Thank you. I want to move on now to another topic --
15 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to tender that?
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour, thank you for the reminder.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be the next exhibit, P4497.
18 MR. NICHOLLS:
19 Q. I'd like to move on to another topic now, General. This is
20 something that you discussed and testified about before, and that are --
21 and those are directives. The directives we've seen, like directive 4,
22 directive 7, which we may discuss, can you just define those for us.
23 What are directives? What is the purpose of a directive issued from the
24 president to the Main Staff?
25 A. In war time, directives from the Supreme Command are doctrinaire
1 documents, military and political documents which amalgamate the tasks of
2 the army within the framework of the current or future political events.
3 A directive is a document that is issued by the Supreme Command. It
4 guides the military forces and tells them how to act at present or in the
5 future period. Usually they regulate future periods.
6 Should I tell you something about the way in which directives are
8 Q. Yes, please, General.
9 A. The Supreme Command as a military and political organ responsible
10 for conducting war in a given country -- well, war is too serious for
11 generals to be in charge of it. Politics has to get involved. The
12 politicians carry out wars. If the Supreme Command had certain
13 assessments according to which something might happen, and perhaps I
14 incited them in my order to have such an assessment, on such occasions
15 the supreme commander issues a task to the operations officer from the
16 Supreme Command Staff or from the Ministry of Defence.
17 The task consists of guide-lines. It mentions what the
18 Supreme Command wants, what the army has to do, what the police have to
19 do, what the civilian protection have to do. So these are the various
20 parts that are concerned. The guide-lines don't have to be provided in
21 written form. The operations officer can be called in, the one who is
22 going to work on the directive, and he can be provided with the necessary
23 oral information.
24 Yesterday, we spoke about the fact that our Ministry of Defence
25 wasn't capable of conducting military operations. It had no staff;
1 that's well known. So many segments from the Ministry of Defence are
2 segments that the Supreme Command made the Main Staff responsible for.
3 For example, mobilisation, drafting combat documents, and so on and so
5 Later I found out that General Mladic had the task for the
6 Main Staff to issue a directive with those guide-lines. He designated my
7 deputy, the chief of the operations administration, General Miletic. I
8 don't know what sort of form Miletic received those guide-lines from
9 Karadzic in, whether it was conveyed to him orally or in written form,
10 and he was the author of the text of directive number 7. I was the
11 author of directive number 4 that was issued three days earlier, on the
12 19th of November, 1992. The other one was issued at some time around the
13 beginning of March 1995.
14 I don't know how Miletic created it, but I know the procedure
15 when he produced the first version or handwritten version, as they said
16 at the time, then it would be sent to the supreme commander for the
17 implementation of the directive. It was so that it could be examined and
18 so that a final form could be given to it. When the supreme commander
19 carried out his work, he would return the directive to the author, to
20 General Miletic, so that it could be amended. Then the final form would
21 be given to it, it would be typed out, and he would then send it to the
22 supreme commander so that the supreme commander could sign it.
23 In military terms, if you have a combat document, an order or a
24 directive, there are three individuals who are responsible for the
25 document to have the right form: The author; the technical -- or the
1 technician who typed it out, put it down on paper in some other way; and
2 you have the most responsible person, and that is the person who signed
3 the document. This should have been the way in which directive number 7
4 was created.
5 What happened in the meantime after the first checks had been
6 carried out of the draft directive, well, I don't know. Did the supreme
7 commander make certain amendments with regard to the final version that
8 was sent to him for him to sign. In part of the indictment against
9 General Miletic, I had the opportunity of reading that directive, but
10 that was ten years later, ten years after the end of the war. That much
11 about the process that is involved when producing a directive.
12 Q. Thank you --
13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Nicholls.
14 You mentioned that there are three individuals who are
15 responsible for the document in military terms. Author and signatory.
16 Who else did you refer to?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The typist, so this technical
18 individual, if you will.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Thank you for describing the process. Could I have -- let's go
22 right to directive 7, P00838.
23 Now, first, General, sir, do you see that this is, in fact, what
24 we have before us, directive 7?
25 A. Yes, I can see it.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Could we go to the last page of the Serbian, which
2 for some reason is the first page of the English. If we can go to the
3 last page of the Serbian version -- sorry, second-to-last. And blow that
4 up for the General to read.
5 Q. Tell me when you've read that page, please, sir.
6 A. I've read it.
7 Q. Okay. Do you recognise the signature on the right under your
9 A. Yes, that's my signature.
10 Q. Okay. And we can see it, but what's the stamp?
11 A. The Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. It's the
12 Main Staff's stamp.
13 Q. Thank you. And this is headed "very urgent." Main Staff of the
14 VRS. Directive for operations to the command of the 1KK, I should say
15 1st Krajina Corps.
16 "Enclosed with this document we are sending you a directive for
17 further operations, operation number 7. Confirm receipt of the
18 above-mentioned directive by returning a copy."
19 Now, can you just basically explain what your role was in
20 forwarding this document to the 1KK?
21 A. Between the 6th and 12th, at that time I was in the western part
22 of the front, in Krupa na Uni. I returned on the 12th and this document
23 probably -- well, not probably. This document -- or rather, the post had
24 been prepared for the 1st Krajina Corps, and this is an additional
25 document from me -- in fact, it's an order for the courier, who is to
1 deliver it to Banja Luka. It's an order for him to give the document to
2 the 1st KK commander. And you'll see that it took four days for the
3 document to be delivered. He left on the 17th and confirmation from the
4 1st KK that it was received is dated the 21st of March. So my -- all I
5 had to do was to see the title of the document that was being sent, and I
6 had to attach this order to the document, this order for the courier, so
7 that he could deliver it.
8 Q. Thank you. Did you read the document at that time, in
9 March 1995, if you remember? And by "the document," I mean directive 7.
10 A. I told you when I read it. I read it about ten years after the
11 end of the war at one of these conversations or interviews, depending on
12 how you want to call it. I was shown this along with part of the
13 indictment that had been brought against General Miletic.
14 Q. Now, let me ask you a couple questions about this --
15 JUDGE KWON: General Milovanovic, one may find it difficult to
16 understand that you didn't read this document, directive, at the time
17 when signing off to the subordinate corps. Could you expand on that a
18 bit further.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This additional document is signed
20 by the most senior officer in the Main Staff who is there when the post
21 is being delivered to subordinates or to superiors. And probably on the
22 17th I was the most senior officer in the Main Staff, as a result of
23 which I had to sign this additional document for the courier, or this
24 cover letter. The number of the additional document isn't mine. My
25 number is 02. The number here is 03. That is the operations
1 administration's number. So the person who prepared the post was
2 General Miletic. Slash 4, I can't remember exactly what his number was
3 because they all had their own numbers.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
6 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Q. Now, this is -- as you say, you testified about this directive
8 before. If you had read it at the time, in March 1995, would you have
9 been able to change anything in it? Would you have been able to alter or
10 amend the directive?
11 A. No. It was signed by the supreme commander, the Main Staff
12 commander received it, General Mladic. He started acting on it. You can
13 see that the original was sent to the 1st Corps command. He probably
14 sent it to all other corps too. Why did Mladic send the original of
15 Karadzic's directive to subordinate units instead of only sending his
16 combat order that was a result of the directive? I know that that order
17 7/1 also existed. Well, in the course of the testimony I saw that
18 Mladic's combat order was somewhat changed in comparison with
19 Mr. Karadzic's directive. No one could do anything with regard to the
20 directive after the supreme commander had signed it.
21 Q. All right. Thank you. Well, that brings me just to another
22 question which I think you've basically just answered, but it also came
23 up when you testified before. This was drafted by Main Staff
24 Colonel Radivoje Miletic. Could he have altered the directive, added
25 language, taken out language, changed language, after it had been signed
1 by President Karadzic?
2 A. No, he couldn't do anything after Karadzic had signed it.
3 Q. Thank you. I'd like to look now at page 10 in the English, 15 in
4 the Serbian. And the part I'm focusing on, I'm sorry, is the section of
5 where it says "Drina Corps" in the heading. Take a moment to read the
6 tasks to the -- or what it says under the Drina Corps heading, General,
7 and I'll ask you again, as you said you have gone through this before,
8 I'll ask you the question: The parts of this directive which start with
9 the words "the Drina Corps," are these tasks or duties assigned to the
10 Drina Corps by the signatory, President Karadzic, as supreme commander?
11 A. Could I see the heading of this document. I don't know its
12 provenance. Because I cannot determine from the text itself who it is
13 who is issuing the order.
14 Q. All right.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Could we go to the first page again.
16 JUDGE KWON: This is the directive 7.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: And could we go to --
18 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we show one page -- one by one all the
19 pages, go through the pages.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes --
21 JUDGE KWON: So that the General can --
22 MR. NICHOLLS: -- thank you, Your Honour, for the suggestion.
23 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well. I've seen the heading.
25 This is a document dated the 8th of March, 1995, from the Supreme Command
1 of the Army of Republika Srpska, and it's directive 7, the directive from
2 the Supreme Command.
3 Now can we move on to the signature part, signature block.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Page 21, please, in Serbian.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Processed or produced by
6 Radivoje Miletic -- Colonel Radivoje Miletic, typed up by
7 Spasoje Zelkovic, sergeant, and typed up in two copies. All -- and
8 signed by Dr. Radovan Karadzic. All I can say regarding this document is
9 why the Supreme Command sent this directive directly to the corps. I
10 didn't see in the heading whether it had also been sent to the
11 Main Staff, but as you can see it was typed up in two copies. In other
12 words, one copy was to remain in the files of the Supreme Command,
13 whereas the other copy was to be sent to the implementer, in other words,
14 the Main Staff.
15 So automatically this would mean that typed up in two copies is
16 incorrect, or the other possibility is that Miletic typed this up in
17 two copies, kept one copy for himself at the archives of the Main Staff,
18 and the original to the Supreme Command for signature. I don't know who
19 added these words "typed up in two copies," because it's obvious, it's
20 evident that it could not be in two copies because it was sent to all the
21 six corps and then to the air force and anti-aircraft defence and so on.
22 So there would have had to be some eight copies or so.
23 MR. NICHOLLS:
24 Q. Okay. There would have been more copies. But in any event, you
25 found a copy at the Main Staff when you returned and forwarded it to the
1 1KK. That's what I understood you to say.
2 A. Yes, that is so. However, now that I see this stamp, there is
3 another thing that's perplexing. We see that over the signature of the
4 supreme commander there is a stamp of the Main Staff of the Army of
5 Republika Srpska - in other words, it's not the Supreme Command stamp.
6 And I really can't see how it would have been done, how it was possible
7 for the stamp of the Main Staff to be placed over the signature of the
8 supreme commander. So, looking at this document and at who signed it and
9 who counter-signed it, this document is not legal.
10 Q. Let's see the first line under number 7.
11 "The command post of the Supreme Command shall be in the Pale
12 area, and the KM and the PKM of the VRS Main Staff shall be in the
13 Han Pijesak area ..."
14 And then it talks about communications and reporting. Is that
15 indicating that the command indicated for this directive is in Pale?
16 A. The command post of the Supreme Command in the area of Pale. It
17 was there throughout the war. In other words, he is informing the
18 subordinates that it's not moving away from Pale. The command post and
19 the rear command post of the Main Staff in the Han Pijesak area, those
20 two command posts were in Han Pijesak throughout the war. In other
21 words, he's informing those who were to implement this, that that command
22 too is staying put, it's not moving away from where it was.
23 Q. Right. Now if we could go to page 10 of the English, page 15 of
24 the Serbian, under the heading of "Drina Corps," you haven't answered my
25 question yet which I asked you a little while ago and then you wanted to
1 look through the document. This is something you've testified about
3 Under the words "Drina Corps," which you've read through, are
4 these tasks or duties being assigned to the Drina Corps by the supreme
6 A. Well, from reading this, the supreme commander only reiterated or
7 supported the task assigned to the Drina Corps by the Main Staff at the
8 time when it was established. The enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, the
9 protected areas, were established subsequently, and the Drina Corps then
10 had this additional assignment, to prevent the link-up of those two
11 enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa and their link-up with Gorazde. And then
12 there was the other order that we saw about the manoeuvre and the
13 transfer of the Muslim forces from -- between Srebrenica and Kladanj.
14 These were permanent tasks of the Drina Corps, they were ongoing tasks.
15 Now, here I see that the supreme commander is envisaging another
16 operation, Operation Zvijezda, but not 94 anymore, it's 95. The
17 Operation Zvijezda 94 Gorazde was limited to a protected area within a
18 perimeter of 3 kilometres; and here I see that he's ordering the
19 Drina Corps, or rather, the Army of Republika Srpska that
20 Operation Zvijezda 95 is to return the Muslim army back into this
21 3-kilometre area.
22 I don't see anything out of the ordinary here. However, this
23 directive is too detailed for the Supreme Command to have produced it
24 because it provides or it issues assignments to units two levels below
25 the Supreme Command. So it should have been forwarded to the Main Staff
1 for it to then work it out the way it is presented here. It was probably
2 considered that because Colonel Miletic was the one who processed this
3 document, that it was, in fact, thereby produced by the main command.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the last
6 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the last sentence, General. The
7 interpreters didn't hear your last sentence, after you referred to
8 Colonel Miletic.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it is possible that the
10 supreme commander considered that this was a joint document of the
11 Main Staff and the Supreme Command because the author of the document was
12 a member of the Main Staff. And so he would have given details for these
13 various assignments to units because there is a gap here of two levels of
14 command. The Main Staff was bypassed and the next level was the
15 commander of the subordinate unit, and that was not really necessary.
16 JUDGE BAIRD: But, General, can you assist us, please, with the
17 last sentence of that paragraph headed "Drina Corps."
18 "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations create an
19 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival
20 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
21 Would this have been part of the task assigned to the Drina Corps
22 by the Main Staff?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. This task was assigned to the
24 Drina Corps directly by the Supreme Command. As far as I can recall from
25 my earlier testimonies, when we looked at Mladic's order, sentences of
1 this nature were non-existent. There was no reference to the population.
2 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you very much indeed.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: [Microphone not activated]
4 Are we breaking or continuing?
5 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes, I note the time.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] However, we will need to intervene
7 in the transcript. On page 22, line 9, where General Milovanovic said
8 that the directive was a doctrinary document, which did not make it into
9 the transcript, up until this line -- let me see what line that is, where
10 General Milovanovic said that following the directive as a general
11 document, General Mladic would then produce an executive order as
12 directive 7.1. In other words, it is not shown in the transcript that
13 after the directive General Mladic would produce his own document.
14 JUDGE KWON: Page 22. In the meantime, General Milovanovic, do
15 you confirm what Mr. Karadzic just said?
16 MR. NICHOLLS: And did -- if I may, Your Honour, did you say all
17 of that exactly that way, is the question, sir.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes -- or for the benefit of the transcript if you
19 can tell us about that again.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, as you wish. I mean, I accept
21 and I agree, rather, with the remark made by Mr. Karadzic because that
22 is, indeed, what I said. But I can also repeat it if you so wish.
23 Pursuant to the directive from the Supreme Command, the
24 Main Staff or General Mladic specifically has to develop his own combat
25 order and define the tasks assigned to his subordinate units. And as far
1 as I could see, he produced -- I don't know if it was an order or a
2 directive 7.1, or rather, 7/1. So that was the first document that was
3 produced following directive number 7.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 We'll take a break for half an hour and resume at ten past 11.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 11.12 a.m.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls, please continue.
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Can you hear me, General?
11 A. I can.
12 Q. Good. Almost done with questions about directive 7, but I would
13 like to show you one more document, that's P03040.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, this was not on my notification. I
15 discussed with Mr. Robinson during the break that I would be bringing it
16 up and it's arisen a bit from the conversation.
17 Q. Now, General, we were just discussing and Judge Baird asked you a
18 question about tasks for the Drina Corps. What I'm showing you now is a
19 command of the Drina Corps document dated 20th of March, 1995. It says
20 "Copy number 9," to the commands of the various brigades, "order for
21 defence and active combat operations number 7."
22 And I'm not going to go through the whole document, but can we go
23 to the last page so that we can see that it is signed by the Drina Corps
24 commander. You can see it was drafted by Colonel Milenko Lazic. Now I'd
25 like to go to page 5 of the English, which is page 3 of the Serbian,
1 where we see number 2, "Tasks of the Drina Corps." Drina Corps tasks as
2 of 20th of March, 1995. And it starts off: "Enemy breakthroughs along
3 selected operational tactical lines should be prevented ..." et cetera.
4 If we could go to the next page of the English, we can stay on
5 that same page in the Serbian, and see the end of this first paragraph.
6 And we talked just before the break about directive 7 going to the corps
7 and the brigades. I want to look at the last sentence of that first
8 paragraph which is being sent to all the brigades of the Drina Corps.
9 "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations create an
10 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival
11 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
12 So my question is simply: Having seen this, we looked at
13 directive 7 a moment ago, what does this Drina Corps order say about
14 whether those tasks in directive 7 that we discussed were also tasks
15 directly for the Drina Corps?
16 A. Are you asking me to confirm the accuracy of what is written here
17 or to give you my comments?
18 Q. I'm asking for you not to confirm just the accuracy of what is
19 written, but your comment on whether, now seeing this, what we saw under
20 the "Drina Corps" heading in directive 7 were, in fact, tasks for the
21 Drina Corps which were recognised as such by the Drina Corps commander in
22 this order? This paragraph is entitled: "Tasks of the Drina Corps."
23 That's my question: Is that accurate?
24 A. This sentence that you pointed out, make living conditions
25 unbearable and so on, this is the original sentence simply copied from
1 directive number 7 that was signed by the supreme commander. However, in
2 this document I did not see - so can we go back to the heading - whether
3 General Zivanovic started this document with the words: "On the basis of
4 directive number 7 of the Supreme Command ..." or "order 7/1 of the
5 Main Staff."
6 Q. Take a look and take your time reading the heading.
7 A. This is an introduction. Could we please move down a bit to the
8 part where it says: "I hereby order ..."
9 All of this is simply copied from the order of the
10 Supreme Command because how would the commander of the corps know what
11 France and other countries were doing? He wanted to -- actually, can we
12 move the text further down.
13 Still, there's only a reference to the general situation in the
14 theatre of war. There's a reference here to the enemy, the enemy forces'
15 intentions, and so on. So this is still an introduction into the order
16 itself. And this is paragraph 2, "Tasks of the Drina Corps." Again,
17 this is copied from the directive of the Supreme Command.
18 JUDGE KWON: How do we know --
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I hereby decide.
20 JUDGE KWON: -- that's copied from the directive, how do we know
21 that, or the task was defined by the corps commander?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that because a moment ago I
23 saw the original directive. I saw the tasks given to the Drina Corps and
24 I see that the sentences are identical. He didn't change anything. But
25 now in paragraph 4 he starts out by saying, "I have decided ..."
1 Now, I have to see whether this is Mr. Karadzic's decision or the
2 decision of the corps commander. Please allow me to read this paragraph
3 and then I will answer your question. Yes, this is a decision of the
4 corps commander, that is to say, that he continues now. After this
5 paragraph there should be paragraph 5 that would read "tasks to
6 subordinate units."
7 JUDGE KWON: But the corps commander didn't refer to the
8 president's directive here. He just set out the task, tasks -- could we
9 see number 2 again.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: English is page 5 and 6.
11 JUDGE KWON: It says "The Tasks of the Drina Corps," so we can --
12 we take it that it's defined by the corps commander. It's the tasks
13 defined by the corps commander, although it may be identical with the
14 directive of the president. He agreed and he defined the tasks himself
15 here again.
16 What is your observation to such comment?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would say what I see, and what I
18 see is that he fully, in paragraph 2, copied the tasks of his corps, as
19 had been set out to him by his supreme commander. However, there were
20 already some bits of his own at the very end.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We could not find it.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So even this order --
23 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, for the benefit of the interpreters,
24 could you repeat what you said.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right. I do apologise to the
1 interpreters. Even this very last line - and at first I thought that it
2 was Zivanovic's, or rather, that it was written by the corps
3 commander - it has to do with the command post and the forward command
4 post, that was also copied from the directive of the Supreme Command. So
5 paragraph number 2, "Tasks of the Drina Corps," this was literally copied
6 from directive number 7. However, a moment ago I asked to see the
7 heading so that I can link things up. On the basis of what
8 General Zivanovic wrote up this document, was it on the basis of
9 directive number 7 or Mladic's order, 7/1.
10 MR. NICHOLLS:
11 Q. General, I can help you this is entitled: "Order for defence and
12 active combat operations, operative number 7," as we see on page 1.
13 JUDGE KWON: First page. Mr. Nicholls, is it your case that this
14 operation number 7 refers to directive number 7?
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Our case is that in this combat -- operative
16 number 7 it does indeed relate directly to directive 7.
17 JUDGE KWON: Without specific reference?
18 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, it doesn't say "directive 7 of the supreme
19 commander" in the document.
20 JUDGE KWON: And what was your question for the General?
21 MR. NICHOLLS: I think he answered my last question. He asked to
22 see the beginning.
23 Q. Let me just ask you one question, General, and I'll try to move
24 on from this. But if we go to page 3 of the Serbian, page 7 of the
25 English, at the bottom you said that the forward command post and rear
1 command post was also copied direct from directive 7. Doesn't this say
2 the KM shall be in Vlasenica, which is not what was said in directive 7?
3 A. Well, I don't know now what directive number 7 said. However,
4 gentlemen, let us not torment ourselves any further. This is Zivanovic's
5 document, and between it and directive number 7 of the Supreme Command
6 there is a discrepancy. Mladic's directive 7/1 is not there.
7 General Zivanovic was not supposed to use the original directive
8 number 7. If General Mladic had altered it - and I know that he had
9 altered it because when I first testified in the Popovic et al. case,
10 that was mentioned, this particular sentence was referred to, every day
11 combat operations creating conditions of total insecurity, I think, and
12 so on. It's a bit illegible.
13 Then we established during that testimony that in Mladic's
14 directive number 7/1, this sentence is simply not there. And then
15 somebody -- I don't know whether it was the Defence attorney or the
16 Prosecutor who asked me how could that have happened? And I explained to
17 him that Mladic deleted this sentence, took upon himself the
18 responsibility of not carrying out the order of the supreme commander.
19 Because his assessment was whatever it was, I don't know what his
20 assessment was, but at any rate he thought that this sentence should not
21 be in the strategy of using the Army of Republika Srpska. So the army
22 was not aiming against the civilian population.
23 Why General Zivanovic did that, well, probably out of ignorance.
24 Let us now not give more thought to other things, although I would be
25 entitled to do that. Maybe he wanted to pander to the supreme commander
1 because he bestows ranks upon people and gives promotions and so on. But
2 maybe his assessment was that this sentence did have some kind of
3 justification; however, he disregarded the order of his immediate
4 superior which he was not supposed to do.
5 Q. Let --
6 A. Quite simply, the document is unlawful.
7 JUDGE KWON: Could you remind me the date of directive 7/1,
8 General, or Mr. Nicholls. Do you remember that?
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, directive 7/1 is 31st of March,
11 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry? The 31st of?
12 MR. NICHOLLS: March 1995, so 11 days later.
13 JUDGE KWON: After this document?
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Correct.
15 JUDGE KWON: So when General Zivanovic issued this operative, 7/1
16 did not exist?
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Correct.
18 JUDGE KWON: Does it change your observation,
19 General Milovanovic?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it doesn't, because when we had
21 a look at directive 7 a minute ago, Supreme Command passed the directive
22 number 7 down to the Main Staff and to the corps commands, so to the
23 second subordinates, and perhaps General Zivanovic wasn't expecting
24 Mladic's directive. So he immediately, on the basis of Karadzic's
25 directive, wrote this document of his because in the text he doesn't
1 refer to either of the directives. He starts immediately with a military
2 political assessment from a directive number 7. So it was his duty. I
3 don't know whether such a document exists, but when he received Mladic's
4 directive 7/1, it was his duty to amend his combat order. Nowhere did I
5 find that he did that. Or when he received Mladic's order, he believed
6 that he had passed his order down to the units, it wasn't necessary to
7 amend it, and this sentence reached the brigade commander, the sentence
8 about creating intolerable conditions for the civilian population.
9 So we have a double mistake, the mistake of the Supreme Command
10 that was passed down to the corps command, and then the corps commander's
11 mistake, as he acted on the basis of that directive and didn't wait for
12 the directive of his immediate superior, but drafted his own combat
13 order. I don't know, perhaps the Prosecution has a correction or
14 amendment to this order of Zivanovic's, but I don't remember it. I
15 haven't seen it.
16 JUDGE KWON: Are you going to leave this subject?
17 MR. NICHOLLS: I was going to move on, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, then, General Zivanovic -- no, I'm sorry,
19 Milovanovic. There's a point that I have difficulty understanding you.
20 You just testified that the Supreme Command passed the directive number 7
21 down to the Main Staff and to the corps command. It may be true, but
22 wasn't it you that sent again the directive to the corps command, as we
23 see in the case of 1st Krajina Corps on the 17th of March?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, we are both right. I sent the
25 directive number 7 only to the 1st KK command, the 1st Krajina Corps
1 command. I don't know why that happened, but we saw in the original
2 directive from the Supreme Command that there were two copies that had
3 been made and they were forwarded to the Main Staff and to all the corps
4 commands, the air force and anti-aircraft defence. So it went to the
5 Main Staff and to the subordinate commands, or rather, the commands that
6 were subordinated to the Main Staff. So this is a matter of
7 disseminating the document. It's not the personal responsibility of the
8 supreme commander. It's the responsibility of those assisting him. So
9 they copied the directive, made copies of it, and this was illegal. One
10 copy of the directive should have arrived at the Main Staff, and then the
11 Main Staff amends it or in accordance with the decision from the
12 commander passes it down to subordinate units. So that is probably how
13 this document of Zivanovic's was created as a result of someone acting in
14 a rather confused and hasty manner.
15 JUDGE KWON: Having seen the case of 1st Krajina Corps, can we
16 not take it that similar -- same copy would have been sent to the
17 Drina Corps by you, General Milovanovic?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what the operations
19 officer did, Colonel Miletic, in fact. Perhaps he complained to the
20 1st Krajina Corps commander that he didn't receive the directive, it was
21 only separated and sent to him and I sent -- I signed the additional
22 document on the 8th of March, when the document was issued, up until the
23 17th of March, when I sent a copy to the 1st Corps, well, I don't know
24 what happened during that period of time. I don't know whether other
25 corps received them, because the Drina, Eastern Bosnian, and Sarajevo
1 Corps were in the vicinity of the command post of the Main Staff.
2 Perhaps their officers went there and took a copy directly from the
3 Main Staff. I quite simply don't have an explanation as to why the
4 directive only went to the 1st Krajina Corps and was delivered to that
5 corps through a courier.
6 JUDGE BAIRD: But, General, at the end of the day, are you
7 maintaining that the combat order of General Zivanovic was not lawful?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, because it relates to the
9 original directive from the Supreme Command, not to the Main Staff
10 directive that was created on the basis of the Supreme Command directive.
11 MR. NICHOLLS:
12 Q. Now, General, you've told us you didn't read directive 7 at the
13 time and read it ten years later. So what you're doing when you're
14 explaining how all this worked with directive 7 and 7/1 is explaining how
15 you think things worked, analysing a document in retrospect that you
16 never read when you received it in March 1995; right?
17 A. It's correct that at the time I didn't read directive number 7.
18 And as far as I can remember, in the course of today's testimony you
19 asked me to comment on the directive, or rather, on the manner in which
20 directives are created, directives in general.
21 Q. Yes, thank you. Let me show you another document now.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: 6 -- I think it's been exhibited now. It was
23 65 ter 01977. I know it's been exhibited but, I apologise, I don't have
24 the exhibit number. That's Krivaja 95.
25 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit 3054.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. This may help, General. This is dated 2nd July 1995, command of
3 the Drina Corps, copy number 3 of Krivaja 95. This is an order for
4 active combat operations. If we go to the last page, you'll see that
5 it's again signed by the Drina Corps commander, same Drina Corps
6 commander, obviously, Milenko Zivanovic.
7 I'd like to go to page 3 of the English, which should be page 2
8 of the Serbian. Now, under point 2:
9 "The Command of the Drina Corps pursuant to Operations Directives
10 number 7 and 7/1 of the VRS Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska
11 and on the basis of the situation in the Corps area of responsibility,
12 has the task of carrying out offensive activities with free forces deep
13 in the Drina Corps zone as soon as possible in order to split apart the
14 enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica and reduce them to their urban areas."
15 Below we see "objective" at the bottom of paragraph 4.
16 "Objective: By a surprise attack, to separate and reduce in size
17 the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, to improve the tactical position of the
18 forces in the depth of the area, and to create conditions for the
19 elimination of the enclaves."
20 And we don't need to go to the last page now, but a copy of this
21 does go to the Main Staff.
22 So my question is: This order from the Drina Corps commander
23 Zivanovic does not cite just 7/1, it cites directive 7 and 7/1. Can you
24 just explain to us why that would be the case if the only relevant
25 directive was 7/1? If you know.
1 A. First of all, I don't know. On the 2nd of July, 1995, I was in
2 Drvar. However, as I'm an expert of a kind for combat documents, well, I
3 can say that General Zivanovic was referring to directive number 7 and
4 directive number 7/1 as well. This isn't justified, he shouldn't have
5 done this. He should have just referred to one of the directives. When
6 we discussed his order that was created on the basis of directive
7 number 7 from the Supreme Command I asked whether there was some
8 subsequent document that modified that sentence we referred to, and here
9 it is under paragraph 2:
10 "The Command of the Drina Corps on the basis of directive number
11 7 and 7/1 ..." and then it says what it says.
12 Directive number 7 and 7/1 differ in regard of that sentence that
13 concerns creating impossible conditions, intolerable conditions, for the
14 survival of the civilian population. Well, he quite simply shouldn't
15 have referred to two documents. He's carrying out the order of his
16 immediate superior, General Mladic, and it is for General Mladic to see
17 how he will deal with the supreme commander because he failed to include
18 a sentence from Mr. Karadzic's directive. So the corps commander got a
19 little tangled up in that web. There is an expression in the Serbian
20 language that is not quite nice. It means to want to do things both
21 ways. He wanted to carry out the order of the supreme commander, but the
22 commander of the Main Staff is preventing him from doing so. So he takes
23 the language from both documents, and this is not right.
24 Q. Okay. Thank you for that.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, I was -- I think I must have been
1 mistaken. I was advised that this document hasn't been admitted yet.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: In that case, I tender it, Your Honour. I thought
3 it had been the other day --
4 JUDGE KWON: Any objections, Mr. Robinson?
5 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll give a new number for this.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P4498, Your Honours.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I please have P00976.
9 Q. This is directive 4, General, which you're acquainted with and
10 have talked about. Do you need to see the last page? Would you like to
11 see the last page for your signature or your name?
12 A. No, it's not necessary. I'm familiar with this.
13 Q. Okay. Now, you drafted this document; is that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And was it approved by the supreme commander?
16 A. When this document was completed, I first informed the
17 supreme commander about the fact we were having a different conversation
18 that didn't concern this. I told him that directive number 4 would be
19 arriving. I asked him to have a look at it and to sign it. The
20 Vice-President, Koljevic, arrived at the command post of the Main Staff.
21 Very quickly, the Supreme Command wasn't functioning then. It was the
22 Presidency that was in function. He brought me this directive and said
23 that the supreme commander had authorised the directive, he had approved
24 of it. But since it was something that concerned the military structure
25 alone, he said that General Mladic, the commander of the -- should sign
1 the directive, which he did. So the supreme commander didn't sign it.
2 The army's commander signed it, with the approval of the supreme
3 commander. The supreme commander saw it before it was signed by Mladic.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Could we go to page 5 of the English which, if I
6 have it right, is page 23 in the Serbian. It's I think re-printed twice
7 in e-court.
8 Q. And again looking at Drina Corps tasks under (d). Now, General,
9 I'm going to ask you about this sentence that you've explained before.
10 Just for the Trial Chamber in this case, we see:
11 "The Drina Corps from its" -- I should have said at the
12 beginning, sorry, for the record. This is dated November 19, 1992, so
13 we're going back in time a few years.
14 "The Drina Corps: From its present positions, its main forces
15 shall persistently defend Visegrad (the dam), Zvornik, and the corridor,
16 while the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region shall exhaust
17 the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on him and force him to
18 leave the Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas together with the Muslim
20 Now, the -- inflicting the heaviest possible losses on the enemy
21 and forcing the enemy to leave, that's clear. Can you explain why,
22 though, it says here "together with the Muslim population"?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to say something. It's
24 not "together with the Muslim population."
25 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, if there are a lot
2 of mistakes because of the translation, when am I going to correct them?
3 It's not "together with the Muslim population." This changes the
4 meaning --
5 JUDGE KWON: No, the General has the B/C/S original in front of
6 him. He's following the document from the original. He can comment on
7 it. And if there's something further you can explore, you can do it in
8 your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, it doesn't concern
10 the text. It concerns Mr. Nicholls' question, in which he changed the
11 wording. He said "together with the Muslim population." That is not
12 correct. That is not what it says in the text.
13 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
14 General, could you read out the part which refers to the
15 Drina Corps. Could you read it aloud for us.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can.
17 "The Drina Corps: From the present positions, where the brunt of
18 the forces persistently defend Visegrad (the dam)," that's the
19 hydro-electric power-plant dam of Visegrad, "Zvornik and the corridor,
20 and the other forces are to be used in the general area of Podrinje to
21 exhaust the enemy, inflict as many losses as possible on him, and force
22 him to leave the area of Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde with the Muslim
23 population. Previously offer the disarming of able-bodied men and armed
24 men, and if they refuse, destroy them. Further deblock and repair the
25 road: Milici-Konjevic Polje-Zvornik, and be ready for intensive combat
1 against inserted sabotage terrorist raids -- raid groups and paramilitary
2 groups. The command post shall be in Vlasenica and forward command post
3 as decided by the ... commander."
4 Is there something you want me to explain with reference to what
5 I've just read out?
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That is sufficient for now. What we
8 "Force the enemy to leave areas with the Muslim population." We
9 didn't hear "together with," but what we heard is just "with."
10 I'll leave it in your hands to take up from there.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you --
12 JUDGE BAIRD: Dr. Karadzic, would you have a different
13 interpretation of that?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency. It does not
15 say here that the army should lead the population; rather, it is implied
16 that the population want to leave themselves and in that case the army
17 would go with them.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: This is -- I understand he was answering this, but
19 this is now argument not translation.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 MR. NICHOLLS:
22 Q. I saw you raise your hand, General. I want to ask --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My apologies. The issue is how to
24 properly interpret this sentence. It should be properly interpreted to
25 reflect the spirit of the Serbian language.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, this directive number 4 was in
2 evidence from a long time ago. That's -- such translation is raised in a
3 proper manner, not when the witness is being examined by the Prosecution.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
5 Q. Now, General, as you read out the sentence, as you read it in
6 your language, could you explain to us why there is a reference there to
7 the Muslim population leaving? Why is the Muslim population referred to
8 in there?
9 A. Yes, I can and I will. Because of this sentence, I was
10 considered a suspect in 2005, because two items were mistranslated or
11 misinterpreted in the transcript. First the word "iznuravanje." If you
12 take a look at the transcript of 18 October 2005 in Banja Luka, the word
13 "iznuravanje" is translated as --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Which is "attrition," interpreter's note.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- is translated as "izguravanje"
16 which is "pushing out."
17 Now, Your Honour, you were a member of the Trial Chamber when I
18 testified in late May 2007 and you put the following question to me.
19 When we finally -- when the Prosecutor and I finally agreed that this
20 sentence actually means to force it to leave the area with the Muslim
21 population, you then put -- you asked me how it was that I knew that the
22 Muslim population would be leaving from that area. And then I tried to
23 explain. The Prosecutor interrupted me at one point, but after an
24 intervention by the Defence counsel, Ms. Faveau, I was allowed to explain
25 it through the end.
1 I said that the nations of China, France, and Serbia are
2 well-known nations or people, populations, that move behind the army,
3 they move with the army after them. Now, in the last war in our areas,
4 this was something that the Muslims also started doing. As soon as there
5 was fighting somewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the population would
6 start moving. The Serbs would flee to the areas where there was a
7 majority of Serb population because of security reasons. The Muslims did
8 the same, plus they also went to third countries. In other words, they
9 were leaving the areas where there was shooting. Proof of that, for
10 instance, on the 16th of January, 1993, when Skelani was attacked, over
11 20.000 Serbs crossed over the Drina River from Eastern Bosnia.
12 I expected that the Muslims, too, once we exert armed pressure,
13 when we exert pressure on the armed forces of the so-called BH, that the
14 Muslims too would start moving. Our objective was to also force the army
15 to move behind this population or to move with them, not to remain there.
16 So my expectation was that the civilians would start moving out, and I
17 wanted to make sure that the Muslim army did not remain there, that they
18 too should move out.
19 And I believe that it is well-known why it was that we did not
20 want the Muslim army in central Podrinje. Because from May 1992 up until
21 14th February 1993, they destroyed 156 Serb villages and hamlets, killed
22 over 1.300 and something Serbs. There is a cemetery in Bratunac
23 containing 780 graves, and I first saw this cemetery in August 1992,
24 which means that in the three months in Bratunac municipality alone, some
25 780 people were killed. That is the explanation for this sentence.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, I didn't know if you had a question,
3 Your Honour.
4 Q. I'd like to show you P02085, please.
5 JUDGE KWON: And just one correction, Mr. Nicholls, while you're
6 waiting for that document. I was advised that Krivaja 95 was admitted
7 under different 65 ter number.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Oh.
9 JUDGE KWON: Which was -- I was told that the number for that
10 exhibit was P4481.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you for that, Your Honour. I'm sorry, I had
12 a different number.
13 Q. Now, General, directive 4 was 19 November 1992. As with
14 directive 7, I'm now going to look at the Drina Corps command document,
15 which relates to that. This one is Drina Corps command,
16 24 November 1992, very urgent, "Decision for further operations, to the
17 Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade (personally to the Commander or Chief of
19 And it says specifically:
20 "Pursuant to the Directive of the Main Staff of the Army of
21 Republika Srpska strictly confidential number 02/5 of 19 November 1992
22 and an assessment of the situation, I have decided:
23 "1. Launch an attack using the main body of troops and major
24 equipment to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses, exhaust
25 them, break them up or force them to surrender, and force the Muslim
1 local population to abandon the areas of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and
3 Is that what it says in the Serbian?
4 A. Are you asking me?
5 Q. Yes, I'm asking you.
6 A. Yes, that's what it says in Serbian.
7 Q. So how do you account for this language, which is not exactly the
8 same but quite close to the language in directive number 4?
9 A. According to me, it's not even close, the language. In
10 directive 4 it doesn't say anywhere force the Muslim population out or
11 expel the Muslim population. This can just be a personal view or idea of
12 the general of this corps who then passed this down to a subordinate
14 Q. All right. Thank you. I think I'll leave that there.
15 I'd like to change topics now, General, and move on to something
16 we discussed when we met, and that is the 14th Session of the
17 Supreme Command which you attended in April 1995.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 65 ter 22049, please.
19 Q. This is quite a lengthy document, so it would be impossible to go
20 through all the sections of it. I just want to ask you about a couple
21 parts of it and some background. First of all, just to help you
22 remember, do you remember that we gave you a copy of this to read in
23 Serbian when I met you a few weeks ago -- or we actually gave it to you
24 in advance of the meeting?
25 A. You gave me - sent it to Banja Luka - the minutes from a session
1 of the Supreme Command held on the 31st of January -- I apologise, the
2 31st of March, 1995. It had 93 pages. And as for this document, you did
3 not send it to me, to Banja Luka. The only document that I did get was
4 the 31st March session document, and I received it in Banja Luka.
5 Q. Let -- let --
6 A. Now, if you showed me some of what it says there, I could maybe
7 remember whether you've shown it to me here.
8 Q. Let me stop you there because you're absolutely right. Could we
9 go to page 2 of each document. I was reading off the cover sheet here
10 which says: State Secret, RS Office of the President of the Republic,
11 Main Staff of Republika Srpska, personally to the Commander-in-Chief, and
12 this is dated 5th of April from Major-General Bogdan Subotic. If we look
13 at the next page, I think that we can see -- you're absolutely right, the
14 session was the 31st of March, 1995, in Pale.
15 Now that you've corrected me, do you remember that these are the
16 minutes we gave you to review?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now, there were -- this Supreme Command session went from, again,
19 at 5.00 p.m. and ended at 2 .15 in the morning, so it was a long session.
20 And there was several topics addressed here. Again, I won't go through
21 all of them. But this one issue -- well, let me ask you this, I'm sorry.
22 Let me start again.
23 I believe this was an extraordinary session. Can you briefly, as
24 briefly as you can, explain to us why this session was held in
25 March 1995. Who called for it and why it was held.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have it precisely
2 stated where it says that this is an extraordinary session.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: It doesn't say that. I'm basing that on my
4 knowledge. The witness can correct me if I'm wrong.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, first of all, it is numbered.
6 It was the 14th Session, in other words, it was not an extraordinary
7 session. To be honest, I never paid much attention to the numeration of
8 the sessions of the Supreme Command because there were many extraordinary
9 sessions, interim sessions, and so on. Rather, I took note of the dates
10 and times when the session was held and I linked it to the situation in
11 the battle-ground.
12 Now, I recall this session very well. Perhaps if you put -- if
13 you're more specific in your questions I can answer them because this --
14 these minutes have 93 pages. It took me three days to read it through.
15 In order to comment on it, I would need five times as much time.
16 MR. NICHOLLS:
17 Q. All right. You're correct. I'll give you some precise
18 questions. If we go to page -- the page we're on, we can see who's
19 attending. Was this the full membership of the Supreme Command at that
20 time? Dr. Karadzic, Nikola Koljevic, Dr. Plavsic, Mr. Krajisnik,
21 Dusan Kozic, Milan Ninkovic, and Tomo Kovac?
22 A. Yes.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: Let's go to page 9 of the English, pages 8, to
24 begin with, of the Serbian. Now, there we see -- it's paragraph 11 I'm
25 looking at in the Serbian, towards the bottom of the page, I think.
1 Q. Now, briefly if I summarise, above paragraph 11, General Mladic
2 says that even as a battalion commander he had the right to promote a
3 private and a corporal, and there seems to be a dispute over -- between
4 General Mladic and the supreme commander, Dr. Karadzic, about promotions,
5 who has the right to promote. Could you briefly explain what that was
7 A. Unfortunately, I can. That session of the Supreme Command was
8 convened with the objective of considering the exposé of the Main Staff
9 about the situation in the Army of Republika Srpska. The task of this --
10 the task to prepare this exposé was given to the Main Staff during the
11 analysis of combat-readiness for 1994. I think that it had to be the
12 29th of January, 1995, when we from the Main Staff and the directly
13 subordinated corps commanders explained to -- complained to the supreme
14 commander because the Army of Republika Srpska was not properly funded
15 and equipped. Our reserves were running out for everything that was
16 necessary for combat. From a social point of view, our officers were
17 having a very hard life. And then the supreme commander ordered us to
18 prepare this exposé to describe all of these troubles that the army was
19 facing, and he said that he would take action, or rather, convene the
20 National Assembly so that this exposé could be discussed and so that the
21 deputies, the members of parliament, could take a position as to whether
22 the army should be helped or not and what should be done in general.
23 When the supreme commander left, we were given tasks according to
24 sectors, namely, every sector in the Main Staff was supposed to describe
25 its own problems and line of work. Specifically, my sector was given the
1 task that it always had, that is to say, combat operations and what we
2 expected in the future, what we expected from the enemy. The logistics
3 sector was the busiest one, that was General Djukic's sector. He was
4 supposed to deal with all these troubles that we were facing in dealing
5 with the army, and that was indeed done and that is why this session on
6 the 31st of March was convened. So we had a month to do all of that.
7 In the meantime, the National Assembly passed a new Law on the
8 Army of Republika Srpska, and a new Law on Defence on the Army of
9 Republika Srpska. Before this was passed in the Assembly, these two laws
10 were submitted to the Main Staff and the corps commands to have views
11 accommodated, as it were. It was called a public debate. We had quite a
12 few objections or amendments, if you will, as one says in parliamentary
14 As for both of these laws, none of our amendments were adopted.
15 The Assembly voted for the laws in their original version. On that 31st,
16 when the Supreme Command session was opened, the supreme commander
17 presented the agenda that you can see here, so I don't have to refer to
18 it. However, for reasons unknown to me, General Mladic stated that with
19 regard to the first item, it would not be a good thing for us to have a
20 discussion because allegedly we had not finished the exposé. The exposé
21 had been finished in its working version. The Supreme Command was
22 supposed to adopt it, and then as such it would be presented to the
23 Assembly. Then the vice-president interjected, the vice-president of the
24 republic, who was a member of the Supreme Command, Mr. Nikola Koljevic.
25 He asked for the following.
1 Before the official agenda was embarked upon, he and
2 General Gvero should report to the Assembly because during the previous
3 few days they had toured the entire front line of Republika Srpska.
4 Because of this intervention by Mr. Koljevic, the agenda itself was
5 shaken. First, General Mladic objected to the Supreme Command, saying
6 that some of his powers had been taken away from him in terms of army
7 control and command. Actually, according to the first law, as for NCO
8 ranks, commissioned officer ranks, and general ranks, decisions on
9 promotion to these ranks were made by the supreme commander. As for
10 promotion of officers to the rank of colonel, these decisions were to be
11 made by the minister of defence.
12 Interim promotions of all other NCOs, officers, commissioned
13 officers, that is, up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel was under the
14 jurisdiction of the commander of the Main Staff. This new law, or
15 rather, the Law on the Army and on National Defence took away that right
16 from the commander of the Main Staff. And you see here that
17 General Mladic rebelled. He said that as a major he could promote a
18 corporal, a lance corporal, et cetera, but according to this law he
19 couldn't even do that. And then that discussion started. The exposé was
21 Members of the army, or rather, of the Main Staff, except for me,
22 were attacked. It was said that they did not respect state organs. And
23 now examples were being given. For example, what was held against Mladic
24 was that he interfered in state affairs and that he was not up to that.
25 Then he on his part always said that members of the Supreme Command,
1 specifically Mr. Karadzic, was a walking state, and so on and so forth.
2 So this was this kind of political squabbling.
3 In my assessment, I was not attacked. And to tell you the truth,
4 I felt good about that because often the Supreme Command excluded me from
5 these attacks, if I can call them that. So it was a bit embarrassing for
6 me within the Main Staff. It seemed that I was wearing somebody else's
7 jersey, if you will. It seemed that I supported the Supreme Command
8 rather than the Main Staff. I think that the supreme commander did that
9 sometimes perhaps unconsciously because he invited me to sessions of the
10 Supreme Command, in spite of Mr. Mladic being there. And irrespective of
11 how Dr. Karadzic views this as a psychiatrist, this was not easy for me.
12 The speaker of the National Assembly took the floor, he was also
13 a member of the Supreme Command, that was Mr. Krajisnik. And he wanted
14 to give an example that would show that I also did not honour decisions
15 made by state organs, and then he mentioned the example that is contained
16 in these minutes here.
17 But, Mr. Prosecutor, I think that this will do by way of an
18 introduction on my part.
19 Q. Thank you very much. So one issue was, as you've discussed,
20 promotions; another issue I believe which you may have mentioned was the
21 logistical supply of the army and the army not being adequately equipped
22 with equipment it needed. Is that right as well, just one of the
23 problems at that time?
24 A. Yes, that was supposed to be an item on the agenda of this
25 session of the Supreme Command; however, because of these unimportant
1 things, things turned in another direction, in the opposite direction.
2 So the session did not resolve the problem for which it had been called
3 in the first place. General Mladic and the supreme commander at the end
4 of the session did draw certain conclusions on the basis of which it
5 seemed that everything had been fine at that session, that we had
6 exchanged views, reached agreement, and so on.
7 As for depriving Mladic of this right to promote people and grant
8 ranks to that, he defended the Supreme Command, saying that he -- or
9 rather, the supreme commander said that he accepted all the proposals of
10 the Main Staff relating to promotions. I personally was satisfied with
11 that. I don't know to what extent other members of the Main Staff were
12 satisfied, but I didn't want to state that specifically then so that it
13 would not turn out again that I was a black sheep in the Main Staff.
14 Q. I understand that. Thank you. Let me now turn to the section
15 where Mr. Krajisnik spoke and in a way -- I don't want to characterise
16 it, but spoke about his interaction with you, and that's on page 28 of
17 the English - that's right - and on page 25 of the Serbian language.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: And, Your Honour, sorry to ask. I just wonder
19 when -- will we take the break at the normal time or go a little bit
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, as usual, in five minutes.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: Then I'll just ask you now to -- if we could blow
23 up the part just where Mr. Krajisnik speaks large enough for the witness
24 to read it. Thank you.
25 Q. Now, we spoke about this and you raised it. The part I want to
1 ask you about is this, and it's the part about freedom of movement.
2 "When we signed a document which allowed free passage, freedom of
3 movement was permitted with the intention that we could pull out the
4 greatest possible number of Serbs from the Muslim part of the territory,
5 and if the Muslims want to go from our territory, then we enable them to
6 leave the area, our area, without coercion because we do not have the
7 right to do that. Nor should anyone take on himself their ethnic
8 cleansing, but there would be no crying if they left from here. In
9 connection with that, I was not up on who organised a convoy that went
10 towards Okucani. An order had gone out from the Main Staff, from
11 General Mladic, that had forbidden the passage of that convoy. Was that
12 only for that convoy or for something else?"
13 And then he -- I'll skip a little bit.
14 "I made a very polite call to General Milovanovic and said,
15 Please, General, I have received an urgent message that the convoy should
16 leave. We have to let it go, to see to its freedom of movement.
17 General Milovanovic told me, I cannot now interpret that whole flow of
18 the conversation." He says that there was an order.
19 And further down in the next paragraph, Mr. Krajisnik says:
20 "General, we will tell you all residents have the right to leave.
21 I was not able" -- this is now on page 26 of the Serbian.
22 "I was not able to say relating only to the Muslims that a small
23 percentage of them might possibly return but a large percentage would
25 So just before we -- well, maybe if we take the break now I'll
1 ask you what that was about when you come back, General. Or we --
2 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we finish --
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Okay.
4 JUDGE KWON: -- this topic and take a break.
5 MR. NICHOLLS:
6 Q. We'll do it now, General. Thank you. Could you just please
7 explain what was Mr. Krajisnik's complaint there? What was he
8 complaining about that he made a call to you and this convoy hadn't been
9 allowed out?
10 A. First of all, in relation to what you said with regard to this
11 topic, you said that Krajisnik wanted to explain our co-operation. It
12 was not co-operation. It was lack of co-operation. He accused me of not
13 co-operating with the state organs, and he supported that by this
14 discussion that you read out here. He said that that was supporting
15 evidence. You will see that in my response to him; however, I can make
16 it shorter.
17 It is correct that he was the head of the delegation or the
18 chairman of some commission for freedom of movement within
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I don't know. Mr. Karadzic knows that better. It
20 was some kind of action or drive called Blue Roads or something like
21 that, ensuring freedom of movement. However, the Muslims were not
22 allowed to leave Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and some other towns.
23 Since we had a reserve homeland nearby, across the Drina River, our
24 deserters and the civilian population too, as soon as there was any kind
25 of shooting 20 kilometres away from the Drina River, they fled across the
2 General Mladic wrote an order, or rather, signed it, stating that
3 without his knowledge, military conscripts could not cross the front line
4 or the state border. At the time we had a state border with Serbia,
5 Montenegro, and Croatia. The front lines were practically internal ones,
6 filtrating boundaries, as they're called, between the Muslim-Croat
7 Federation, that is, in Republika Srpska.
8 It is correct that Krajisnik did call me on one occasion and he
9 said to me that he had been informed, or rather, that someone from
10 Gradiska was asking him to intervene to allow four buses full of people,
11 I think. Most of them were Muslims and a few Croats. They wanted to
12 leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. They wanted to go to Croatia.
13 However, that morning -- or rather, before Krajisnik, Colonel
14 Bogojevic called me. He was an intelligence officer in the command of
15 the 1st Krajina Corps. And he said to me that the police, our military
16 police, had stopped the buses with these people who wanted to cross the
17 border. I asked him, "Why did you stop them? Who organised this?" And
18 he said, "It was privately organised, but I have orders from
19 General Mladic, the Main Staff, that I should not allow able-bodied men
20 of any ethnicity to cross the border." And I said, "Bogojevic" -- or
21 actually, I called Tolimir, General Tolimir, because he was nearby in
22 barracks, and I asked him whether he knew about that order because I
23 probably did not remember it anymore. Tolimir came and brought me that
24 order and he said, "You've got this order of General Mladic. This was
25 not allowed and so on and so forth." I told him the whole story and he
1 said, "Well, the smartest thing for you to do would be to probably stop
3 I conveyed that to this colonel, that this should be halted, and
4 I think I said to him that the buses should be returned, that they could
5 not cross over because of that order. Soon after that, Krajisnik called
6 me, and this is how it started first. First he sang my praises. He knew
7 how to talk to people. He said, "General, you are the almighty in the
8 army. You can do this, you can do that. You see, there is this
9 collision with some order of Mladic's and I'm asking you to be
10 reasonable, to allow these four buses to cross over." And I said that I
11 knew about this and that Bogojevic informed me about it, and I ordered
12 that these buses be returned because I did not want to violate Mladic's
13 order. Again, he tried in a nice way to say, "Well, General, don't do
14 this, don't do that. Well, you see these people have addressed me asking
15 for my help because I signed this," whatever it was, declaration on
16 freedom of movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 I said to him, "General Mladic is not here at the command post
18 now. He is the only one who can retract his order in full or partly."
19 However, I said, "You have the supreme commander there as well who can
20 totally annul Mladic's order." And then all hell broke loose. I am as
21 firm as a rock, as hard as a rock. I do not need Karadzic's protection.
22 I do not need Mladic's protection. And basically the conversation
23 stopped there and I said that I was carrying out Mladic's order.
24 These buses were returned. To tell you the truth, I had
25 forgotten all about that until that session. What happened at the
1 session happened. He launched this attack and you have in the text that
2 follows my defence, although Tolimir sat next to me and nudged me, saying
3 that I should react straight away. I didn't want to. But Tolimir was
4 whispering about this process of organising this private organisation of
5 having Muslims and Croats cross the state border. And then I answered
6 verbatim what it says in the text that follows, in the minutes, that is.
7 Q. Thank you, General.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll have a break for an hour and resume at
10 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.37 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 1.37 p.m.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. If I could just take one
14 moment to address very quickly some scheduling matters. I don't want to
15 immerse the Court too deeply in the complicated logistics of scheduling,
16 but I wanted to pass on a discussion I had with Mr. Robinson and the
17 anticipated scheduling so that the Court would be aware and we have a
18 reasonable degree of certainty.
19 We don't anticipate, as I think the Court would have expected,
20 that we will have another witness on the stand this week. With respect
21 to Monday, because one of the witnesses has some intra-European travel
22 commitments, we would reverse the order of the witnesses. Mr. Manning
23 would appear on Monday, to be followed by Mr. Djurdjevic. We would hope
24 to complete the testimony of both by Tuesday, within the Monday and
25 Tuesday period. Originally they both had commitments that we understood
1 required that testimony be completed, but we have discussed the matter
2 with Mr. Djurdjevic. If necessary, he can -- his testimony can continue
3 on Wednesday, but it needs to be completed by then. So that's why we
4 reversed the order. There's no objection with the Defence and I wanted
5 to alert the Court accordingly. Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for the information, Mr. Tieger.
7 Yes, please, Mr. Nicholls, please continue.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. Still just a few more questions on this meeting, General.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Could we go to page -- if I could have the
11 document back up, this is 22049 --
12 JUDGE KWON: I think it's on Sanction. Let's go to e-court,
13 switch it, please.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Ah, thank you. Could I have page 63 of the
15 English, which I -- which should be 57 -- 56, excuse me, of the Serbian.
16 Now, the English is correct.
17 Q. General Milovanovic, on your version, do you see your response
18 there that we were talking about to Mr. Krajisnik, where you explained to
19 him that you had an order from General Mladic regarding this convoy or
20 these buses of men?
21 A. Yes, I can see that part, but I don't understand what the
22 question is.
23 Q. I haven't asked the question yet, General. And I just wanted to
24 confirm that this was the part that you were talking about before the
25 break, where you said you responded and explained that we have the
1 correct section here. Is that the correct part, General?
2 A. Yes, that's my conversation. It wasn't a response. You have
3 responses in parliaments, but within the Supreme Command you have
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I'm not sure that the English
6 version is identical to the Serbian. There's Gvero, Karadzic,
7 Milovanovic, and here we have -- oh, yes, General Milanovic is at the
9 THE INTERPRETER: Milovanovic, interpreter's correction.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.
11 Could we now go over to page 65 of the English, which should be
12 at page 58 in the Serbian language.
13 Q. And I'm interested in the part where Mr. Karadzic speaks now.
14 And he says, and we talked about this when we met a few weeks ago:
15 "It is the standpoint of our policy. There has been a separation
16 of peoples, of cultures, of worlds. What Vojkan did is not allowed, for
17 Vojkan too worked illegally" --
18 A. I apologise. I'm looking at page number 17.
19 Q. Yeah, this should be page 58, the e-court number in the Serbian,
20 if my page numbers are correct.
21 THE ACCUSED: I think it's okay.
22 MR. NICHOLLS:
23 Q. Yeah, it's marked page 17 on the top, General, but we have
24 different page numbers in our electronic system. I'll read the part and
25 see if you can find it.
1 "What Vojkan did is not allowed, for Vojkan too worked illegally.
2 He was excluded from the state commission, et cetera. What do private
3 agencies do, they find, probably for big money, they secure him a foreign
4 visa and secure him a passport to travel to that foreign country. What
5 happens now, if that were being done by a state institution, we would be
6 accused of ethnic cleansing. A private arrangement between a Muslim and
7 a private firm is absolutely none of our business, absolutely none of our
8 business, and of the 100 Muslims who go to Europe, only ten will come
9 back. There is no patriotism in them. They are simply looking to take
10 to their heels."
11 Now, were you able to find that part, General?
12 A. Yes, I found it.
13 Q. Okay. And we can see that here. This is after Mr. Krajisnik
14 spoke. What did you as a member of the Main Staff at the Supreme Command
15 meeting, what did you understand Mr. Karadzic to be saying there?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be read out to the end,
17 please, so that we can understand it correctly.
18 JUDGE KWON: I think -- yes, General, could you read out -- no,
19 read this entire paragraph yourself and ...
20 Let us know if you are done with the reading.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've read through to the end.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
23 MR. NICHOLLS:
24 Q. Can you answer my question, General? Do you remember it?
25 A. Could you please repeat it.
1 Q. Yes. You were here at the Supreme Command session. Mr. --
2 President Karadzic has spoken just after General -- after Mr. Krajisnik
3 about this issue of freedom of movement and the buses. What did you
4 understand here that General -- that President Karadzic was saying to you
5 on this issue?
6 A. Your Honour, do I have to answer this question?
7 JUDGE KWON: I don't follow your comment. Do you have difficulty
8 in answering this question? What is your understanding?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, the question is how I
10 understood this, but I'm asking you to tell me whether I have to answer
11 that question.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, if you could.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Then I'll answer it.
14 In the course of this discussion of Mr. Karadzic's, I came to the
15 conclusion that he as the president of the republic also knew that this
16 was being done in Republika Srpska. And previously in my discussion it
17 says that I at the time of the session, I found out that this was being
18 done for the first time.
19 MR. NICHOLLS:
20 Q. And what was being done? What do you mean by that?
21 A. I mean that there were Muslims and Croats who were being taken
22 over the state border and this was being privately organised. The state
23 border is a state institution, and therefore it's impossible to do
24 something that involves the state border and have the state organs remain
25 ignorant of the fact.
1 Q. And I'll just ask this. From this discussion Mr. Krajisnik's
2 view, that "none of us would shed a tear" if they left, that we saw; and
3 President Karadzic saying, If we did this, we would be accused of ethnic
4 cleansing, what did you on the Main Staff understand that their view was
5 about Muslims remaining in Republika Srpska?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it would be better for
7 Mr. Nicholls to quote rather than interpret. This isn't fair to the
8 witness either.
9 JUDGE KWON: The witness has read the passage.
10 What is your question, Mr. Nicholls?
11 MR. NICHOLLS:
12 Q. From the passages we've read from what Mr. Krajisnik said and
13 what Mr. Karadzic said about these private arrangements, what was your
14 understanding - you as a member of the Main Staff - on what
15 Mr. Karadzic's view was of whether it was desirable to have Muslims
16 remain in Republika Srpska?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I protest. Again, that's not what
18 the passage says, and this question can't be put on the basis of this
20 JUDGE KWON: No. Well, he didn't cite specific passage. He
21 referred to the entire passage the General had read, and the question
22 was: What was his understanding?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This passage, how he understood,
24 this passage --
25 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic --
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- and this is distorting --
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you can take up the issue in your
3 cross-examination, but at this time please don't intervene -- interrupt
4 Mr. Nicholls' question.
5 General Milovanovic, do you remember the question?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My opinion on this discussion of
7 Mr. Karadzic's at the session of the Supreme Command was asked for, and
8 as a representative of the Main Staff -- well, I wasn't the
9 representative of the Main Staff at that session. I had the commander of
10 the Main Staff next to me at that session.
11 JUDGE KWON: Probably you need to repeat your question.
12 MR. NICHOLLS:
13 Q. Okay. I'll ask you again, General, and again the reason I'm
14 asking you this is because it's something we talked about before and
15 you -- how did you take these comments by Mr. Karadzic? I didn't say you
16 were there as the representative of the Main Staff, but you were on the
17 Main Staff at this time and the supreme commander is talking to you. How
18 did you take these statements regarding Mr. Karadzic's view of whether it
19 was desirable to have Muslims remaining in the Republika Srpska?
20 A. I apologise, I think this question has been put in a slightly
21 complicated manner. I'll answer the question as I understood it. The
22 first part of the question or the first question is how did I view
23 Mr. Karadzic's statement at the session, his statement that it would be
24 good to have as small as possible number of Muslims in Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina. My understanding was that this was -- Mr. Karadzic had
1 expressed his own opinion, his private opinion, that there should be very
2 few able-bodied Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I was a bit surprised
3 by this because we both knew that the Muslims going to the territory of
4 Croatia were later returning to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. So
5 it was just one stop on the way to their return to Bosnia and
7 And the second part of the question, well, President Karadzic
8 wasn't expressing something the state wanted. He was expressing what he
9 felt. He thought it would be better for there to be 5.000 less Muslims
10 around Teslic. It would be better if they didn't return to Bosnia and
12 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender this document, Your Honour?
13 JUDGE KWON: What pages shall we admit?
14 MR. NICHOLLS: My submission would be that it would be good to
15 admit the entire session. It's a verbatim tape-recording, so it -- it
16 doesn't have a -- well, it's minutes so it doesn't have an accuracy
17 problem. The witness has spoken about a few parts of it. I think it's a
18 useful document to have because it's the notes of a Supreme Command
19 session. To go through the entire --
20 JUDGE KWON: However, the Chamber's preference is to admit those
21 pages dealt with with the witness in terms of volumes of -- just a
23 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, do you have any observation?
25 MR. ROBINSON: Actually, Mr. President, it seems like this is
1 something akin to like the Assembly sessions that we've admitted in their
2 entirety and perhaps this can be an exception and be admitted in its
4 MR. TIEGER: In fact, Mr. -- oh.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well. The Chamber will admit it in its
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit Number P4498.
10 MR. NICHOLLS:
11 Q. One last question about Supreme Command sessions. I speak to you
12 now about your experience from those you attended, General Milovanovic.
13 How would the decisions be made at the end of the sessions, or how would
14 decisions be made? Was there voting or not?
15 A. Well, it depended. The sessions that I attended weren't sessions
16 where there was the traditional kind of voting that involved raising your
17 hand. I attended sessions without the supreme commander, that was after
18 he signed the Vance-Owen Plan on the 2nd of May, 1993 or 1994. When the
19 members of the Supreme Command would express their opinions about that
20 signature, well, Momcilo Krajisnik was chairing the session and I was
21 asked to express my opinion. I didn't experience a session of the
22 Supreme Command where there was majority voting, or rather, where the
23 participants had to vote by raising their hands. There were discussions,
24 explanations, people tried to convince each other, and then usually the
25 supreme commander would adopt conclusions and tasks.
1 Q. Thank you. Now, one of the things we talked about earlier and we
2 talked about that in terms of some of the orders is whether they would go
3 directly sometimes from President Karadzic to the corps. What I want to
4 ask you about now is just briefly about the situation in Sarajevo. And
5 can you tell us whether --
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, we are leaving this Supreme Command
8 MR. NICHOLLS: I was, Your Honour, yes.
9 JUDGE KWON: Was it 31st March?
10 MR. NICHOLLS: It's the 31st of March, Your Honours --
11 JUDGE KWON: And was it the day on which directive 7/1 was
12 issued, General Milovanovic? Do you remember that?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, the directive was not mentioned
14 at the session at that day at all. As we saw this morning, it was issued
15 on the 8th of March, 1995, that is to say, 23 days before that.
16 JUDGE KWON: I meant directive 7/1.
17 Mr. Nicholls, could you give the exhibit number for 7/1.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, it's P02246, and you are correct,
19 Your Honour, it's the same date.
20 JUDGE KWON: You don't remember that, General?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
22 JUDGE KWON: Were you involved in issuing directive 7/1?
23 Did you put that question, Mr. Nicholls?
24 MR. NICHOLLS: I did not, Your Honour.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was not involved in issuing
1 directive 7/1.
2 JUDGE KWON: And you didn't read directive 7/1 at the time?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I read it only about ten years
4 later when I read directive number 7. We discussed that when I testified
5 the first time the end of May 2007, here.
6 JUDGE KWON: So not only directive 7 but also 7/1, you read them
7 only in 2007, both of them?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. I just wanted to ask you now briefly - and this is something else
13 not related to directive 7/1 - if you could tell us about
14 President Karadzic's relationship to the Sarajevo Corps commanders,
15 whether in the Main Staff there was a feeling that he had a special
16 relationship with General Galic or General Milosevic that may have caused
17 any problems in the command chain.
18 A. The system of command in the chain from the Supreme Command
19 Main Staff to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was the same as it was in
20 relation to other corps. However, when the previous head of staff,
21 Colonel Dragan Macetic [phoen], was replaced, Colonel Milosevic was
22 brought in as Chief of Staff of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Sometime in
23 December or, to be more specific, on the 10th of December, 1993,
24 President Karadzic invited me to come for a talk. It was a preparation
25 for the departure of a military political delegation of Republika Srpska
1 to attend a meeting in Belgrade that had been scheduled for the
2 13th of December. He told me what the agenda would be in Belgrade and he
3 said that it was General Mladic; General Milovanovic; Colonel Milosevic,
4 as Chief of Staff; and a brigade commander, Dragan Josipovic, who would
5 be on this delegation. Dragan Josipovic was commander of the 3rd Brigade
6 of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. I told him straight away that it would
7 not be a good thing for the Chief of Staff to go, since there was a corps
8 commander, General Galic, whereas Lieutenant-Colonel Josipovic as a
9 brigade commander had no place in these talks at strategic level.
10 Upon my return to the Main Staff, I familiarised General Mladic
11 with the subject of my meeting with the supreme commander, and Mladic
12 thought that these two men should not go. I met him again on the
13 12th of December after the meeting I had with the Chief of Staff of
14 UNPROFOR for BH, I think it was General Ramsey. I told President
15 Karadzic what the reaction was of the Main Staff to our conversation held
16 on the 10th of December and that General Mladic also did not agree with
17 these two going.
18 The supreme commander then changed his decision and excluded
19 Milosevic and Josipovic, and he put the corps commander, General Galic,
20 into the delegation. Of course, being a human being, I wondered why
21 Milosevic had been given that kind of priority. I did not get to any
22 kind of conclusion except for the possibility of Milosevic being favoured
23 in relation to corps commander. However, already the following year
24 Galic was pensioned off and Milosevic took over. That was it.
25 I don't have a specific opinion. It's just that personally as
1 Chief of Staff, Chief of Main Staff, I was bothered by this, why the
2 Chief of Staff was to take part in some talks and negotiations, since the
3 commander was there already. Mladic was taking me along so that I would
4 take minutes or whatever, and Galic should have taken Milosevic as well.
5 So it was simply a lack of observance of the military principle of
6 military subordination.
7 Q. Thank you. Thank you. I don't have any further questions right
8 now, General. Thank you.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.
11 Yes, now, Mr. Karadzic, now it's your turn to cross-examine
12 General Milovanovic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
15 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General.
16 Good afternoon to all. I've already greeted Their Excellencies
17 at the very outset.
18 Have you received interpretation, General?
19 A. Well, I keep receiving interpretation all the time. Well, yes,
20 good afternoon.
21 Q. Thank you. General, let's start with the most recent part. Some
22 mistakes of mine, as you consider them, were referred to just now. Do
23 you agree that I accepted quite a few suggestions, in that case and in
24 other cases, and there were no negative consequences to be suffered by
25 anyone who criticised me in any way; right?
1 A. That's right.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 JUDGE KWON: Probably you will be aware by now, General, could
4 you please put a pause between the question and the answer for the
5 benefit of the interpreters.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well. I know that. I think
7 that I abided by that over these past two days, but now I just blurted it
8 out. I do apologise.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. That is because we both speak Serbian, and before you had to wait
11 for the interpretation of Mr. Nicholls' words.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since we are starting with the most
13 recent bit, can we go back to P4497. Let us try to understand properly
14 the last paragraph that we saw on our screens. P4498, in Serbian 58,
15 e-court, and in English it's page 65. In Serbian 58, in English 65.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. General, please take a look at this briefly. What was the plan
18 that Muratovic presented to Krajisnik? He said that the eastern part
19 from Brcko would be taken by them and so on; however, this part that
20 pertains to my view, that it's good -- or rather, that it's not good for
21 them to be there and that they would not return. What is written here,
22 General? Does it say here that my return -- that my concern has to do
23 with their return to fighting? He would go to Travnik and I hope that
24 not more than 10 per cent would return. Does that mean returning for
25 combat purposes or returning ever?
1 A. Sir, I don't really know what you're asking me now. Do you want
2 me to confirm what is written here? "Out of 100 Muslims who go to
3 Europe, only ten will come back"?
4 Q. And please go on. So what is my concern, whether they would go
5 back to fight or whether they would go to a third country? Do you see
6 Travnik here. If he were a patriot, he would go back to Travnik, he
7 would not go to third countries; right?
8 A. Well, yes, but I don't see what you want me to do.
9 Q. All right. I'll try to simplify it. Mr. Nicholls suggested that
10 I did not wish to have Muslims in Bosnia or Republika Srpska. Please
11 take a look at this, how this was presented and interpreted, the example
12 of Teslic. What is it that I'm saying here, that we had to say that
13 Muslims from Teslic from the front line should be pulled into the
14 territory in depth, that we guard them as civilians so that they do not
15 fall victim?
16 A. Mr. Karadzic, you said this. That is written faithfully as far
17 as I can remember what you said. I don't see why I would be analysing
18 your words. I can only help you with this, that you gave a very high
19 percentage of return, that is, 10 per cent. I cannot change anything
20 here in the text. That is what was said. My understanding of these
21 words of yours was as follows. This was an explanation as to why it was
22 a good thing for private groups to work on the moving out of Muslims so
23 that the state would not be involved. I don't understand what it is that
24 you want me to confirm or deny.
25 Q. Thank you. First of all this, General, bringing the Muslims in,
1 into the territory, as an attack was expected to take place on Teslic,
2 was that ethnic cleansing or was this a measure that was envisaged by our
4 A. If pulling them into the territory in depth, as you said here, if
5 that is protection of the civilian population, then that is a positive
6 measure; that is not ethnic cleansing.
7 Q. Thank you. And these thoughts of mine regarding return, does
8 that have to do with returning to fighting in times of combat? Please
9 take a look at the rest of that sentence.
10 A. What you say here is that somewhere at some point in time you
11 asked the Main Staff -- well, where labour brigades were necessary, put
12 them to work. They have to work too. I don't remember that request of
13 yours. Perhaps you addressed it to General Mladic. But as far as I
14 know, the army, or rather, the Main Staff never asked for Muslim work
15 units. There were Muslim work units in smaller towns, specifically I
16 know near Gradiska there is a Muslim village, Dubrave. Able-bodied men
17 of military age who did not want to go into the so-called Army of Bosnia
18 and Herzegovina and who did not want to join the Army of
19 Republika Srpska, nor did they have to, they made up a work unit that
20 maintained that farm near Gradiska. I'm not aware of any massive use of
21 Muslims in work units as they did in Sarajevo when they used Serbs for
22 these work units that fortified positions around Sarajevo.
23 Q. Thank you, General. I meant the upper part of the paragraph.
24 Who will return, how many Muslims. Is it not clear here that I'm
25 concerned how many of them will return and go back to fighting?
1 A. On the basis of this sentence and this, out of 100 Muslims who go
2 to Europe, only ten will return, I don't know whether you meant the
3 entire population that would go to Europe, and out of them 10 per cent
4 would return. Or did you mean able-bodied men. I cannot see that from
5 this document and I'm not capable of seeing it.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page now,
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Let's have a look at how this discussion with Mr. Krajisnik ended
11 and how he understood something he was not aware of previously. It's at
12 the bottom of the page. It says, I don't think General Milovanovic said
13 anything that was false, but there are some things that have to be
14 clarified now. First of all, I had no idea about a convoy of any kind
15 nor did I know that people would be going nor who was exporting them.
16 Rajko Kasagic called me, he says. Our policy is such as stated by
17 President Karadzic, and I think that we all want that, not to ethnically
18 cleanse them. And then it mentions freedom of movement and so on and so
19 forth. And further down, it says ethnic cleansing is a big problem. So
20 in a certain sense this misunderstanding was cleared up. Isn't that
22 A. Mr. Karadzic, I think it's clear to both of us that at this
23 session Momcilo Krajisnik bit his tongue. He also wanted me to be placed
24 in the category of generals who had been attacked and I'm grateful to him
25 for that. However, he explained this in a manner that did him no good.
1 He discovered the existence of groups that were making private
2 arrangements to move people out. So he cannot now deny what I said. In
3 a certain sense he praised me, he accepted the fact that I was telling
4 the truth. So I was no longer considered responsible for not having
5 carried out state obligations, as he said, obligations given to me from
6 the state organs.
7 Q. Thank you, General. I have to put questions in a way that will
8 enable you to answer by saying yes or no, but you can expand whenever you
10 So he understood something that he hadn't understood at the time
11 that he was angry; is that correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Thank you. Is it clear that these private agencies cannot force
14 the Muslims to leave, but they pay them -- for them to obtain visas and
15 they pay for the trip and for the service?
16 A. I couldn't agree with that because here information is provided
17 according to which this was done for 6.000 German marks per person. Who
18 did that money go to?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 25 in the
20 document. It's page 28 in the English version, page 25 in the Serbian
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Let's have a look at the line that starts with "freedom of
24 movement." It's somewhere halfway down the page. Have you found that
25 part? Yes, you can see where the cursor is now. It says:
1 "The freedom of movement is allowed with the intention of us
2 getting as many Serbs as possible out from the Muslim part of the
3 territory, and if the Muslims want to leave our territory, we should make
4 this possible for them without the use of force because we don't have the
5 right to do that and no one should undertake ethnic cleansing."
6 Is that what Mr. Krajisnik said at the session? And do you
7 remember that we were always trying to get Serbs out of Sarajevo and
8 Tuzla and our idea of freedom of movement was to get Serbs out. It
9 wasn't a matter of driving the Muslims out.
10 A. Given the time that has passed, I cannot now remember whether
11 this is what Krajisnik said, but I have no reason not to believe the
12 transcript and the transcript says that that's what he said. However,
13 I'm assisting you in the following manner today. I said that -- well,
14 when we started discussing this subject matter I said that
15 Alija Izetbegovic wouldn't allow people to leave big towns, Sarajevo,
16 Tuzla, and I don't know which other towns I mentioned. So this sentence
17 here, freedom of movement is allowed with the objective of us getting as
18 many Serbs out of the Muslim part of the territory, well, that's fine and
19 that tallies with the policies pursued by Republika Srpska. The army
20 couldn't ask itself whether it would do this or not. It had to strive to
21 do this.
22 Q. Thank you. On page 62 you said that Muslims were prohibited from
23 leaving Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Srebrenica. But you didn't say who
24 introduced this ban. Can we agree that this ban on the movement of
25 civilians, Muslims and Serbs, was a ban issued by the Serbian --
1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: By the Muslim
2 authorities, not by us.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Thank you. A minute ago you said that the Muslim able-bodied men
6 didn't have to and they on the whole didn't want to join the VRS. Do we
7 agree that the obligation for mobilisation and for recruitment only
8 concerned Serbs and everyone else was free to act as they saw fit. Do we
9 agree that this was a form of positive discrimination?
10 A. Yes, apart from positive discrimination, discrimination is
11 discrimination whether it's positive or not. Of course it was a matter
12 of their own free will. If they wanted to join the VRS, they could do
13 so. And we had a battalion that was called the Mesa Selimovic Battalion,
14 and its members were exclusively of Muslim ethnicity.
15 Q. Thank you. Let's move on to a fresh subject, the fresh subject
16 directive number 7 -- directive number 4.
17 Could we see 65 ter number 4315 and let's have a look at this
18 document. It's an analysis on the conduct of combat operations under the
19 code-name Breakthrough, where directives 4 and 5 are implemented within
20 the framework of this operation, the code-name of which is Breakthrough.
21 And could I ask you to have a look at the documents that are referred to,
22 the combat documents on the basis of which this operation was carried
24 Have a look at the bottom. The operation Proboj starts on the
25 24th of November. Do we agree that that is the date on which
1 General Zivanovic issued the combat order that we have had a look at and
2 which to a certain extent amended what was said in directive 4?
3 A. Could we scroll up a bit and zoom in. The letters are too small.
4 Q. If I can be of assistance, it mentions directive number 4,
5 amendments --
6 A. I can see.
7 Q. Decision on liberating Konjevic Polje and so on. And then does
8 it say that the co-ordination group, the group for co-ordinating the
9 activities, consisted of Colonel Miladin Prstojevic and the others --
10 Colonel Miladin Prstojevic and the others; is that correct?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. Let's have a look at the second page, please. Under (b) it says
13 at the beginning of operation, and then it mentions the enemy forces, its
14 deployment in the wider Skelani sector, and at the bottom at the end it
15 says -- can we scroll up. It says Bratunac-Skelani were defended in the
16 operation and the enemy attack was repelled and so on and so forth. Do
17 we agree about that, and then let's go back to the first page.
18 A. Could we scroll up a bit so that I can see the rest. Yes, I've
19 seen that. And what is the question?
20 Q. Let's have a look at the first page. Do we agree that a decision
21 was taken on liberating Pobudje, Konjevic Polje, and Cerska on the
22 8th of December -- yes, the third bullet, third line under (b). It has
23 to do with the liberation of Pobudje, the 8th of December, 1992, and
24 Miladin Prstojevic -- Colonel Miladina Prstojevic is appointed as the
25 chief of purposes for co-ordination. Is that correct?
1 A. Miladin Prstojevic, Colonel Miladin Prstojevic, was an operations
2 officer at the time in the corps command. However, if I may add
3 something about this operation, Breakthrough.
4 Q. Please go ahead if there's anything you believe is relevant, you
5 can tell us about it.
6 A. Yes, the usual names for military operations are geographical
7 terms, Podrinje 93, Corridor 92, for example, or Lukavac, the village of
8 Lukavac, 93. The General, or rather, Colonel Zivanovic at the time was
9 obsessed with certain other terms because -- other names because this
10 operation, Breakthrough Operation, it wasn't an operation in the
11 operative sense of the term. This is a battle liberating a village.
12 Kamenica can't be a matter of combat. Two or three brigades are involved
13 in combat, in a battle. But to liberate Kamenica perhaps one battalion
14 would be sufficient or perhaps a brigade. That's a fight.
15 So these are minor operations. These are fights and battles
16 organised by the Drina Corps. And he would give them these names, such
17 as Breakthrough. We mentioned the Operation Pesnica, or Fist, today. So
18 these were unusual terms. These were names used for brief operations.
19 For example, Operation Fist. You hit someone with your fist, if you
20 break his head, fine; if not, fine. And that was the case with
21 Operation Breakthrough. He received a task in accordance with
22 directive 4. The task was to defend the towns in Podrinje - I won't list
23 the names of the towns - and he was to use other forces to exhaust the
24 enemy and to inflict losses on the enemy, and that takes us back to
25 directive number 4. So the Birac territory was to be left.
1 Q. Thank you, General.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted and
3 then we'll have a look at the decision on liberating Pobudje and
4 Konjevic Polje.
5 Your Excellency, could this document please be admitted.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be next Defence exhibit.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2135, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE KWON: While we are with this document.
9 Mr. Nicholls, do you see the first paragraph? It refers to the
10 amendment of the directive dated 25th of November, and also amended
11 directive amended 7th of December. Do we have that in our evidence or do
12 you have that in your custody?
13 MR. NICHOLLS: I believe so, Your Honour. We have -- I'll check.
14 We have the -- I'm having difficulty seeing it now on the screen. --
15 yeah, for sure the 7 December 1992 and I'll have to check on the first
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. If the Chamber could see them.
18 Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 On the 7th of December there was an amendment to directive 4.
21 Could we see 65 ter document 9148 issued on the 8th of December, an order
22 on liberation of these villages. 95 [as interpreted] ter 9148, that's
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Please have a look. Above all, do we agree that it's not
1 referring to directive 4, and under item 1, as usual, the enemy is
2 described. Isn't that correct? And 10- to 15.000 armed soldiers are
3 identified in the Srebrenica-Zepa-Cerska sectors and Kamenica as well
4 towards Zvornik. Is that correct or not?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Thank you. On page 2 it says what sort of weapons the enemy has,
7 but could we have a look at the last page. Do we agree that in the first
8 two lines the co-ordination group is named and Miladin Prstojevic is the
9 person first mentioned.
10 A. Yes, I see that.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this is in evidence as
15 Exhibit D1597.
16 JUDGE KWON: Correct.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.
18 Can we now have 65 ter 2542.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Let us see what Mr. Prstojevic, who was appointed by
21 General Zivanovic -- I mean, let us see what his position is and how he's
22 going to act and co-ordinate. The 18th of December, 1992, isn't that
23 right? It says "urgent." And what he's writing is information on the
24 need to adhere to international norms in war. So the order is to be
25 implemented by way of this information on the need to adhere to
1 international norms in war; right?
2 Actually, I'm asking you to read the first page. In line 3,
3 there's a reference to wounded persons, civilians, humane qualities and
4 so on. And towards the end of the paragraph it says that we should
5 prevent any kind of abuse on our side. A bit further down it says that
6 we must bear in mind that for a state to be internationally recognised it
7 must first and foremost be a state based on rule of law. And then it
8 says what that means.
9 If you've read it, you can ask for the next page.
10 A. I read the document only a few days ago, two or three days ago,
11 either when I saw you or when I saw the Prosecutor, so we can move on to
12 the next page.
13 Q. Thank you. Can we have the next page. Yes, here it is.
14 Do we agree, General, that here on this page it is not only that
15 he's issuing an order. He is also appealing, beseeching, saying that
16 humaneness is so important. In line two, four, six, eight from the top,
17 he says when there is violence the most important thing is to be humane
18 and so on and so forth. Do we agree that this is considerable care on
19 the part of this officer, who is in charge of co-ordinating the
21 A. Yes, I agree. This is an attempt made by Colonel Prstojevic to
22 act as a shock absorber for the first sentence of Zivanovic's order that
23 has to do with treatment of the civilian population. Colonel
24 Miladin Prstojevic worked in the Main Staff. When the Drina Corps was
25 established, as you know yourself, I brought Colonel Zivanovic for a
1 meeting with you on the 15th of January, 1993. In the corps they did not
2 really write very well, so we were trying to find a way out.
3 First of all, there were personnel mistakes made by Mladic
4 appointing Zivanovic corps commander. He appointed him corps commander
5 as a kind of reward for the fact that he had been wounded. This is a man
6 who still has 21 bullets in his body. When Mladic made that decision
7 when visiting him at the JNA and I said, "For heaven's sake, boss, how
8 can Zivanovic command a corps? He's a good artillery man." And Mladic
9 said, "Well, that's what I thought, but you and I will go on commanding
10 the corps." Then I took Prstojevic out of the Main Staff because I knew
11 him very well and I sent him there to be operations officer in the corps
12 command to make them more literate, if you will, and you see what the man
13 is doing. He cannot annul the corps commander's order, but he's diluting
14 it, he's explaining to people what war crimes are and basically he's
15 explaining international law and the law of war. He was not doing this
16 as a matter of capriciousness or because he was bored and didn't have
17 enough work. He was precisely doing it for the purpose that you
18 referring to and that is preventing mistreatment of the civilian
20 Q. Thank you, General. Was this officer ever punished on account of
21 this or was he promoted --
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
23 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour, the 25 -- sorry to interrupt. The 25
25 November 1992 addition to operative directive number 4 is 65 ter 09348,
1 so we do have that. The 7 December 1992 order to amend directive
2 number 4 is in evidence as P4249.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. General, sir, this is what I wanted to ask: This kind of action
6 taken by Colonel Prstojevic, did it harm him or did -- was it a
7 recommendation? Did this recommend him as a good officer? Was he
8 punished for explaining the order in this way?
9 A. I have to speak openly. Because of such actions,
10 Colonel Prstojevic was persecuted by the corps commander. Now, was it
11 after this -- but at any rate, while he was operations officer in the
12 corps command, he was there for a brief period of time only, he came to
13 see me at the staff. He was upset, he was angry, and he said to me,
14 "Send me anywhere, just as far away as possible from Zivanovic. I cannot
15 take it." I think that I returned him to the Main Staff again, to the
16 teaching sector with Miletic. And after General Spremo was retired as
17 Chief of Staff of the Sarajevo Corps, Prstojevic was appointed -- sorry,
18 it was the Herzegovina Corps actually. And then he was appointed
19 Chief of Staff and he became a general there and he retired as a general
20 of the Army of Republika Srpska.
21 We were aware of the clashes between him and General Zivanovic,
22 just as later there would be a conflict between General Zivanovic and
23 Vinko Pandurevic, who was then a rising officer. Then also his Chief of
24 Staff, General Krstic. I mean, Zivanovic could not take any kind of
25 objections. He always relied on the commander of the Main Staff because
1 he had brought him there in the first place from the Knin Corps, or
2 rather, from the Benkovac garrison.
3 Q. Thank you, General. However, may we conclude by saying that in
4 the Main Staff, Prstojevic was not being stopped. So even if not being
5 favoured, at least he was promoted on a regular basis?
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the
7 beginning of the answer.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Thank you.
10 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your answer, General.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, because it was the Main Staff,
12 not corps commands, that pursued personnel policy in the army. So these
13 conflicts between Zivanovic as corps commander and his subordinates did
14 not affect the career of his subordinates.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2136, Your Honours.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 15307, could we please take
20 a look at that, unless it's already been admitted on some basis. I mean,
21 even if it has been admitted, let's have a look at it, 65 ter number
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do we agree, General, that at the time until the liberation of
25 Cerska and Konjevic Polje, this was a single Muslim military space from
1 Zepa, including Kamenica, Zepa, Srebrenica, a large part of the
2 municipality of Bratunac, a part of the Milici municipality; isn't that
4 JUDGE KWON: You don't have English translation, do you,
5 Mr. Karadzic?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] English? I don't know. I see that
7 this question has been recorded in the transcript and I hear you. I hear
8 the interpretation of what you're saying into Serbian.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. And now there's a question for you, General. Until spring 1993,
11 is it true that this was a single --
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, my question is whether we have English
13 translation of this document.
14 THE ACCUSED: I suppose so, 65 ter.
15 JUDGE KWON: No.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that that was mentioned
17 today, this operation.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: Mr. Reid has found a translation and is uploading
19 it for us.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. General, sir, do we agree that what is described here is
23 Operation Pesnica, Fist, that was carried out between the
24 11th of January, 1993, until the 20th of January, 1993, after
25 Operation Proboj, Breakthrough; right?
1 A. Yes. However, this Operation Fist is actually a sequel to
2 Operation Breakthrough, and you asked me whether it was correct that the
3 territory of mid-Podrinje was compact and under Muslim control from the
4 village of Kamenica, that is to say, near Zvornik, all the way to Zepa,
5 Zepa included. That is correct too.
6 However, this sheet of paper in front of us is analysis of combat
7 operations carried out within operation under the code-name of Pesnica,
8 and I spoke about what Pesnica meant a moment ago, fist, a blow with a
9 fist. And what he says here is up until the 10th of January, 1993.
10 However, he forgot that on the 16th of January, 1993, Naser Oric carried
11 out a counter-attack, a smaller counter-attack against Skelani and that
12 in this way he threw out about 20.000 inhabits of Skelani. Somewhere in
13 here I saw that he was issuing a task to a battalion from the
14 1st Krajina Corps. I had to bring in two battalions from the
15 Krajina Corps to resolve the problem of Skelani and the problem was
16 resolved on the 23rd of January.
17 So Zivanovic is, well, carrying out a bit of an analysis here but
18 he did not abide by the time when it's supposed to begin and when it's
19 supposed to end. Four days beforehand he had lost the entire territory
20 of the municipality of Skelani --
21 Q. Thank you, General. We'll have a look at another document about
22 that. Look at the last paragraph down here. The main task of units in
23 Operation Pesnica was to cut the Muslims forces area of concentration and
24 to separate the Srebrenica area from the area of Cerska and liberate the
25 Milici-Konjevic Polje-Zvornik road and so on and so forth. Do you see
1 that paragraph?
2 And can we have the next page now once you've read this, that is.
3 So to cut this area, this space, where 15.000 fighters of Oric's
4 were attacking our villages, our areas; right?
5 A. Yes, I see this. Actually, this is implementation of a task that
6 he had received from the Main Staff. I think it was dated the
7 7th of December, one of these supplements to the directives issued.
8 Until then we had communication or we had a corridor along the following
9 route: Vlasenica-Sekovici-Caparde-Zvornik. And we made this corridor in
10 the following way. We cut down a forest by this road between Sekovici
11 and Caparde. You remember that, 1 kilometre on the left and 1 kilometre
12 on the right, and for years those logs were there.
13 Q. Yes, yes, but can I just ask for the next page. In other words,
14 let us tell the Trial Chamber that this was a longer route and that it
15 went around the territory?
16 A. Yes, and I think that it had to do with this last supplement
17 dated the 4th of December. So the corridor should be
18 Vlasenica-Milici-Zvornik, and he should do that and he is doing it
19 through this operation entitled Pesnica, Fist.
20 Q. Thank you. Last paragraph, take a look at that now -- no, first
21 paragraph. It says the combat operations were co-ordinated by
22 Miladin Prstojevic and the others, so he is still being appointed
23 co-ordinator, in spite of his courage to change things. Take a look at
24 this -- actually, do you agree with what I said just now, that at the
25 time he was still the leading operations officer out there?
1 A. Yes. Once again, I repeat, Colonel Prstojevic was a man who knew
2 how to work in a high command, but he also knew how to mingle with
3 combatants and he knew how to motivate people by his very presence.
4 Although Zivanovic persecuted him in a way. On the other hand, he could
5 hardly do without him. After that, Milosevic came in as his operations
6 officer, again a literate man who could bear the command of the corps.
7 Q. Thank you. And look at the last paragraph. It says the
8 successful conduct of this operation has particularly high significance
9 for the general territory of the town of Bratunac as well as the
10 prevention of a further relocation of the population from the general
11 Bratunac sector to the FRY over the Drina River. So that is part of that
12 municipality, but they were in favour of crossing the Drina River, right,
13 and fleeing in that way?
14 A. The entire area to the south of Zvornik, all the way up to Zepa,
15 Zepa included, was always ready to swim across the Drina River, which
16 bothered us.
17 Q. Thank you. Do we agree that there is nothing bad here as regards
18 civilians and that this is a legitimate operation with military
20 A. Although it is a leading question, I am going to answer with a
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted and
24 you decide how long we're going to work.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, do you have any objection?
1 MR. NICHOLLS: No, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE KWON: It's not dated nor was it signed.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: I don't object to it, Your Honour. I honestly did
4 not notice that there was no date, but --
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2137, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll adjourn for today -- just a second.
8 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
9 THE ACCUSED: If there is possibility to continue, we -- the
10 Defence would --
11 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
12 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: If we can continue, the Defence would not oppose.
15 JUDGE KWON: I was told that it's not possible.
16 Before we adjourn, the Chamber will issue an oral ruling on a
17 matter which arose during the testimony of Mr. Robert Block.
18 On the 21st of February, 2012, the accused's legal advisor orally
19 requested that the Chamber order Witness Robert Block to look for the
20 notes he may have taken regarding his meeting with Mr. Zoran Petrovic, or
21 Pirocanac, on the 18th of July, 1995, and to turn them over to the
22 accused. The accused's legal advisor argued, inter alia, that the lack
23 of any reference to the accused in Block's notes could go directly to the
24 accused's responsibility. The Chamber notes Mr. Block's statement during
25 his testimony that he did not believe he took notes on those days. In
1 any event, during his testimony, the witness did not mention that he used
2 notes of any kind to refresh his memory before testifying in these
3 proceedings. Given these circumstances, the Chamber thus denies the
5 We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m.,
7 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 1st day of
8 March, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.