Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 25571

 1                           Thursday, 1 March 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, good morning, Mr. Harvey.

 8             MR. HARVEY:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.  May I

 9     introduce Mr. Nick Bano who has joined my team and is a pro bono legal

10     assistant for the stand-by team.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

13             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  Good morning,

15     Your Honours.

16             Just one housekeeping matter.  Yesterday, a document was admitted

17     as P4498, the Supreme Command minutes.  That had actually previously been

18     admitted as P3149, so it does not actually need a new number.  I

19     apologise for that.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.

21             Yes.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellency.

23     Good morning to all.

24                           WITNESS:  MANOJLO MILOVANOVIC [Resumed]

25                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

Page 25572

 1                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] And good morning to you, General.

 3        A.   Good morning.

 4        Q.   I have to remind both you and myself that we should pause between

 5     question and answer and answer and question for interpretation.  In this

 6     case the Defence is allowed pose leading questions and I would like to

 7     show you a number of very useful documents.  So I would appreciate it if,

 8     whenever you can, you answer with a yes or no.  And of course, as always,

 9     you're free to expand if you feel that you have to say something more.

10     Can we agree on this?

11        A.   Very well.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 15682 from the

14     65 ter list.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   And while we're waiting for it to come up I will tell you what my

17     intention is.  It is my intention to show you documents and to show you

18     that directive 4, whatever its contents, had no negative consequences for

19     the civilians on the ground.  The only negative consequences were for the

20     army, for the military.

21             Now, do you recall this analysis.  It is entitled "Realisation of

22     planned tasks from directives numbers 4 and 5" from 15 September 1993.

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now see page 4 in the Serbian version and

25     page 6 in the English.  It should read 4.  Perhaps in e-court it's the

Page 25573

 1     next page.  Thank you.  In the middle of this page approximately, it

 2     says:

 3             "The enemy with its front end ..."

 4        A.   Yes, I can see it.

 5        Q.   "... with its front end of the defence, the enemy took up the

 6     dominant elevations which were difficult to capture and they provided a

 7     good view for the enemy.  They're organising and opening a surprise side

 8     fire and opening artillery fire on our citizens and towns."

 9             And then on the next page - in English it's page 6:

10             "In view of the fact that the enemy -- that we were more numerous

11     and had larger forces, the enemy had a very dense line."

12             So is this a reference to the enemy's personnel?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And this is consistent with what you knew about it at the time,

15     they were very thickly deployed and they must have had a lot of losses,

16     and of course it was also very difficult for us to actually get to those

17     elevations; correct?

18        A.   Yes, but I would like to add something here.

19        Q.   Please go on.

20        A.   Well, the density of the enemy positions was increased by the

21     Muslims by using civilians.  On the 18th of September, 1992, Milici was

22     attacked from Srebrenica.  In this attack, very few soldiers took part

23     who were armed, but there were some 20.000, as far as Colonel Simic and I

24     could assess on that day, the 18th of September, 1992, there was

25     civilians who had pots and pans, drums, and they made a lot of noise.

Page 25574

 1     There was a racket.  There was a lot of noise and this was psychological

 2     pressure on the population of Milici as well as the VRS which was

 3     defending Milici.  It was defended by the 1st Birac Brigade and commanded

 4     by Svetozar Andric.  So this is correct, that the density of the enemy

 5     lines and the deployment of personnel on the enemy lines was very dense,

 6     but I just have to say that that was strengthened and reinforced by

 7     civilians.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now, according to what you know as a professional

 9     soldier, would that be a violation of the Geneva Conventions; in other

10     words, exposing civilians to an enemy fire, to our fire?

11        A.   Yes, and this was not the only instance.  In many front lines, on

12     many front lines, they did that.  For instance, in Sarajevo the 1st

13     Muslim Corps numbered 50.000 to 70.000 men at all times.  They were

14     deployed in combat formation over some 250 square kilometres, in other

15     words, along that ellipsis that was controlled by the Muslims, which was

16     22 kilometres long and 17 wide.  In other words, this area was the area

17     of deployment of this anti-air combat corps, and I believe that was the

18     greatest density in any battle-field in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

19        Q.   Thank you, General.  We will have occasion to look at some

20     excerpts from your book, so we will be able to discuss that then.  Now

21     could we see page 16 in e-court now.  Let us see what the outcome of this

22     clash was.  General, do you agree that these losses that we suffered, 214

23     dead, 321 seriously wounded, 557 lightly injured - we had over a thousand

24     casualties - do you agree that this could not be accomplished had it been

25     an attack on civilians?  It would only be so if the attack was against a

Page 25575

 1     very well equipped and armed military force.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the English page

 3     reference.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In English that will be page 24,

 5     paragraph 1.  I believe we have it on the screens already.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could we just scroll this down a

 7     bit, or rather, I would like to see the heading because I can't see from

 8     this text whose document this is, or at least if I could be shown the

 9     signature.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Well, it's the same document we've seen before, the command of --

12        A.   Very well.  Then I understand.  As far as I can recall, you asked

13     me whether these losses, losses of this type, would be possible if an

14     attack was launched against civilians or whether, rather, it would be

15     possible in the case where an attack was against the military.

16        Q.   Well, yes, that's what I wanted to know.  Are these very large

17     losses, losses that can only be inflicted by a military force, not by

18     civilians?

19        A.   Yes.  Losses of this scale cannot be inflicted by unarmed

20     civilians.  They're only possible in the context of an army.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page in both

23     versions.  In English that's 34 and then over to 35 and in Serbian that's

24     the very last page.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 25576

 1        Q.   General, please take a look at the last paragraph, the

 2     sanitisation or restoration of the battle-field.  The "assanation," the

 3     clearing up of the front was performed with tremendous assistance from

 4     the Sokolac team with our own forces and the identification of the dead

 5     and those who were disinterred from the --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  The accused is reading too fast for

 7     interpretation.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My apologies to the interpreters.

 9     I thought that they had the text before them.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Now, first of all, could you tell us, sir, could you confirm that

12     the clearing up of the battle-field was an obligation that was regulated

13     by law which entailed the removal of carcasses and dead bodies after any

14     incident or any combat, in other words, a restoration of the

15     battle-field?

16        A.   Yes, and I would like to explain what this acronym, ZMPM, means.

17     That is the institute --

18             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter could not catch that.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Thank you.  That was another criticism of me.  I didn't really

21     know what that meant.  Now, the second thing is:  Is it correct that when

22     we liberated Podrinje we discovered a number of smaller and larger mass

23     graves where Muslims had interred the Serbs that they had killed in the

24     previous year, in other words, from April 1992 through April 1993.  And

25     that those were people from those 150 or so villages that had been

Page 25577

 1     torched, and that was the main reason why this was no longer bearable.

 2     It could not be tolerated anymore.

 3        A.   Yes.  We attended the disinterment, or rather, the burial of

 4     these disinterred bodies in 1993 in Zvornik.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that General Morillon also attended

 6     some of these burials in other locations?

 7        A.   I don't remember that, but I do remember that General Morillon

 8     went to Cerska because we were accused of having committed a massacre

 9     there, and when he returned from Cerska, Morillon publicly said that

10     there had been no massacre and no killings in Cerska.

11        Q.   Thank you.  When we move to 1995, I will get back to this,

12     whether there was a similar situation then.  Now let me ask you this:  Is

13     it correct that we found on that occasion massacred, mutilated bodies.

14     They were in body parts and we saw, we were exposed, to this horrible

15     suffering that the Serbs had gone through.  There was even an 18-year --

16     an 11-year-old boy's body there who had returned to get his dog.

17        A.   Yes, I remember the bodies that we disinterred in Kamenica.  We

18     found several bodies at a time that were bound together with barbed wire

19     and probably tied to what must have been a haystack.  And then they were

20     set on fire and that's how they died, that's how they ended.  And I can't

21     really say that they were buried.  They were just dumped into the ground

22     as they had burnt.  And I have to remind you that at that time you

23     returned from Geneva and you told me that I should ask the pathologist,

24     Dr. Stankovic, to pay attention to the sexual organs.  On the next day I

25     went to the burial site, and when I said this to the pathologist he got

Page 25578

 1     furious.  He said, You know, I'm an expert and I know what my job is.

 2     But I do understand what you were aiming at.

 3        Q.   But is it correct that it was frequently the case that the

 4     genitals were massacred and that there were instances ranging from

 5     circumcision to castration?

 6        A.   I did not see that, but when I was in Kamenica the pathologist

 7     told me that they found, they had found, there were instances where they

 8     found genitals of men in the mouths of the killed persons.  And what you

 9     warned me about, that they should pay attention to the genitals - and

10     that's probably what you also had in mind - was to make sure, or rather,

11     to establish whether there were any circumcised men among the bodies; in

12     other words, that there weren't any Muslims.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into

15     evidence.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2138, Your Honours.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now see 9085

19     from the 65 ter list.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   This is another order, can you see, very urgent, an order to

22     implement or launch Operation Fist, which was also grounded on this

23     directive number 4.  Would you please take a look at the first paragraph

24     where the reasons are given for launching this offensive.  It says:

25             "Muslim forces on 8th January 1993 carried out an offensive in

Page 25579

 1     the area of the south slope of the Glogova Planina, Kravica village,

 2     Glogova village and are trying to extend operations towards Bratunac, and

 3     then by linking up forces on the wider area of Srebrenica, Cerska, and

 4     Kamenica, direct operation towards Kalesija and Tuzla.

 5             "During the above combat operations, the Muslims destroyed nine

 6     Serbian villages in a cruel and vicious manner, killing 49 men, women and

 7     children and wounding more than 50 people."

 8             Do you remember this massacre around Christmas time in 1993, the

 9     Orthodox Christmas?

10        A.   First of all, there is a typographical error in the document.

11     The document was registered on the 10th of January, 1993, and the first

12     paragraph starts with the words "the Muslim forces on the 8th of

13     August" -- oh, sorry, 8 through 8.  It's a mistake.  It should be between

14     the 7th and 8th of January carried out, and so on and so forth.

15             I remember the massacre in Kravica where exactly 49 persons were

16     killed, civilians.  That was done exactly on Christmas day,

17     Orthodox Christmas day, the 7th of January, 1993.  Otherwise, in all of

18     their campaigns Muslims chose to act on Orthodox Christian holidays,

19     Easter day, Christmas day, St. Peter's Day.  They probably thought that

20     we would be relaxed and unfortunately they were right often.

21             The massacre in Kravica, as far as I realised later - I did a

22     great deal of study on this - was carried out by civilians more than

23     soldiers.  It was villagers against villagers, Muslim villagers against

24     Serb villagers.  As a matter of fact, there is another version that some

25     of them had been visiting the Serbs on Christmas Eve, and when returning

Page 25580

 1     home they killed entire families.

 2        Q.   Thank you, General.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page now.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   This is your document.  You probably recognise it.  Do you agree

 6     that in number 3 you say:

 7             "Taking advantage of the peace initiative of the

 8     Army of Republika Srpska at the time of the Geneva Conference, the Muslim

 9     forces are trying to take as much territory as possible within the former

10     BiH and to inflict losses on the Serb people so that they would have the

11     most favourable negotiating positions in Geneva."

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear the

13     question.

14             JUDGE KWON:  So, Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat your question.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   So the question, General:  This position of yours from

18     paragraph 3, was it confirmed in practice, and along with this reason,

19     did you see for yourself that during conferences Muslims made the

20     situation in the theatre of war even worse with a view to sabotaging the

21     conferences that were being held?

22        A.   Yes.  This was my position throughout the war, so I don't see

23     whether I was the person who wrote this document, or rather, signed this

24     document.  However, the fact remains that that is my position.  When

25     these peace conferences on Bosnia and Herzegovina were underway and also

Page 25581

 1     the previous conference on the former Yugoslavia, either within the

 2     country or abroad, whenever the Muslims did not like something at these

 3     negotiations they found a way of stopping negotiations by way of carrying

 4     out combat or turning the whole situation against you, against the Serb

 5     delegation.  An example of that is Vase Miskin Crni Street.  I'm still

 6     convinced that Markale 1 was a situation like that.  I'm not sufficiently

 7     certain with regard to Markale 2 because I wasn't there.  Whenever things

 8     went downhill for them at these negotiations or if you would offer

 9     something that would be favourable to the international community, the

10     Muslims wanted the negotiations to stop in order to have the war

11     continued.  You can ask me about specific events, the ones that I

12     mentioned.  I can explain all of that.

13        Q.   Thank you, General.  If there's enough time we'll deal with that

14     too.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have a look at the

16     last page so that the General can see who drafted this for him and so he

17     can see his signature.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Was this Milenko Lazic who worked with you?  Do you agree that

20     this is your document?

21        A.   Yes, this is my document.  It was drafted by the late

22     Colonel Milenko Lazic.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 25582

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2139, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5350, could we have that, please.

 3     1D5350.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, please, at the same time when they were committing

 6     massacres and constant attacks, you are ordering to have convoys allowed

 7     to pass.  And look at this, on the 27th of February, and you say in the

 8     first paragraph, in relation to UNHCR convoys transporting humanitarian

 9     aid to Muslims in the areas of Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa, Srebrenica, and

10     Cerska for which approval was also granted by the president of the

11     republic, I hereby order.  And then in paragraph 2, you say:

12             "Once the convoy has been checked (inspected) it need not be

13     checked again along its route, but our patrols should provide security

14     for it as it passes through our zone."

15             And 3 it says:

16             "Continue providing the usual inspection of the control, which

17     should be carried out by persons trained to do it who will be extremely

18     professional and civilised in the performance of their job."

19             General, do you agree that there are no consequences whatsoever

20     that would affect the civilian population, no consequence of directive 4

21     or of their attacks against us.  The civilian population should be cared

22     for as if they are our own.  They are allowed to receive food convoys as

23     well.

24        A.   Yes.  Every time such documents were sent to subordinate unit, I

25     had to invoke your position because if I did not do that, as I did up

Page 25583

 1     here - that is to say, for which approval was also granted by the

 2     president of Republika Srpska - I was criticised from the grass roots,

 3     from the subordinate units.  I was criticised.  They said that I was not

 4     feeding Serbs, that I was feeding Muslims, and I always had to say, How

 5     come this happened?  So if they really minded this, let them be angry at

 6     you rather than at me.

 7        Q.   Thank you, General.  Let us see that sometimes they were partly

 8     right.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2140, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5349, could we have that now,

13     please.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   This is the 19th of February, 1993, that is to say just before

16     that convoy.  Please focus on Kamenica, and it says that they got ahold

17     of some report from Srebrenica, and it says I had to withdraw from the

18     Sase mine and they took that.  What they showed on TV is not correct,

19     Chetnik propaganda.  Our fighters who fled after the attack on Rudnik, I

20     hope you will return them here.  In five days Bratunac will be ours.  Let

21     us just have food here, and these guys will take care of the rest.

22             So do we agree that your subordinates were partly right, and did

23     you notice that invariably after convoys the attacks became far more

24     fierce than they had been before the convoys?

25             JUDGE KWON:  English translation is not attached -- actually, the

Page 25584

 1     Serbian version is also duplicated attached as English translation.

 2             Could we see the English translation?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is an English translation.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it's now uploaded.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, this is Jasenica.  I don't

 6     think this is it.  This is Jasenica.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  This is wrong again, yes, it's 1994.  Original is

 8     dated as 1993.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that the previous document

10     was the right one, the previous one in English.  1D5349.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't you move on to the next document, coming

12     back to this document later on.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Fine.  Thank you.  We're going to

14     tender it then as well.

15             Let me just see whether I had put a question.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   General, do you agree that this is proof that they can hardly

18     wait for this food to arrive and for them to continue fighting?  And do

19     you agree that always after convoys their attacks became far more fierce?

20        A.   First of all, this document was not produced by the command of

21     the Drina Corps, as the heading says.  It is an intercept and this is

22     what the Muslim side was saying.  Now, I don't know where this was

23     intercepted, was it from Tuzla or wherever.  So this shows what the

24     Muslims had heard about us, that we were preparing for the northern front

25     near Zvornik, then also what Naser Oric agrees with, what he disagrees

Page 25585

 1     with.  I mean, when we go back to this document -- well, what I'm trying

 2     to say is that this document does not speak about the situation in the

 3     Army of Republika Srpska and its intentions.  These are the results of

 4     intercepts of Muslim radio communications.

 5        Q.   Thank you for this explanation, General.  On the basis of what

 6     they're saying, can we not the see that they're just waiting for food to

 7     arrive and then they would attack.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I told you to move on because we don't have English

 9     translation.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'm sorry.  I

11     apologise.

12             1D5352, could we have a look at that now, please.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you remember this order?  Further operations after the

15     9th of April, 1993, and you say that a strong attack should be launched

16     towards Srebrenica straight away.  And in paragraph 2, you say:

17             "In the attack on Srebrenica, I categorically prohibit any mortar

18     or artillery targeting of the town of Srebrenica itself."

19             Was this the result of all of these attacks of theirs, when one

20     simply had to attack?

21        A.   The document is mine.  I say that on the basis of the number and

22     my signature.  I cannot exactly recall the situation when I issued this

23     document, but I stand by what I wrote and signed then.

24        Q.   Thank you.  General, this order when directive 4 was in force,

25     does it give due consideration to civilians or is it aggressive towards

Page 25586

 1     civilians?

 2        A.   Yes, it does give due consideration to civilians.  Do recall all

 3     military operations that I was carrying out between my forces and between

 4     the enemy forces there were never any civilians, Muslims, Serbs, or

 5     Croats.  The area between us was always cleared, I had always cleared it,

 6     regardless of whether we were defending ourselves or attacking.  If the

 7     Muslims tried to do something as they did in Operation Sword near

 8     Medjedja, the village of Medjedja, when they tried to insert a group of

 9     civilians between us, then I simply went around that village and I did

10     the same thing another time.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters did not catch the other

12     incident.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   The interpreters did not hear the other village.  The first one

15     was Medjedja, and the other one?

16        A.   Hamdzici at the foot of Mount Jahorina.

17        Q.   Thank you, General.  And when the population is evacuated, which

18     is also based on law, that means that they should not return after the

19     fighting is over?

20        A.   I never evacuated the Muslim population.  I said that I went

21     around them and I evacuated the Serb population before the fighting.  I

22     did that, for example, in Grahovo in 1994, in December, late in December.

23     I evacuated the civilian population, the Serb population.  I evacuated

24     Glamoc on the 28th of July, 1995, Glamoc did not fall because of the

25     force of Croat arms.  I evacuated the population and I withdrew about

Page 25587

 1     1500 civilians and the entire Glamoc brigade.

 2        Q.   Thank you, General.  However, in the question, line 13, or

 3     rather, line 14, there is a mistake.  My question was:  That does not

 4     mean that the evacuated population cannot return later.  Here it says

 5     that they could not return.  So these civilians were not moved with the

 6     intention of never having them return.  They are just supposed to be

 7     removed from the area if there is fighting going on, and that is what the

 8     law says; right?  Regardless of whether these were Serbs or Muslims.

 9        A.   Yes.  I can't remember now which document I could cite here as an

10     illustration, but mainly the population, the civilian population, would

11     be evacuated but they would return or could return after the combat.  For

12     instance, I did that on Grmec in 1994.  General Dudakovic had expelled

13     Serbs from the villages of the foot of Mount Grmec, torched them,

14     destroyed them, and when the Serb forces launched a counter-attack, the

15     civilian population was moving behind me into these ruins.  And if you

16     recall, I asked for the state commission to come to Grmec to assist me

17     because I was unable to feed properly even my own soldiers, let alone the

18     civilians.  And then you sent Velibor Ostojic and Radoslav Brdjanin on

19     this mission, these two ministers from the government who spent the night

20     with me there, and unfortunately then just disappeared.

21        Q.   Thank you, General.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

23     document, please.

24             JUDGE KWON:  This will be admitted as Defence Exhibit D2141.

25             General, this was addressed not only to the Drina Corps but also

Page 25588

 1     to various brigades of Drina Corps directly.  Is it usual practice?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was not standard or usual

 3     practice.  This only referred to documents that were marked like this

 4     one, very urgent.  In other words, you wouldn't wait for a regular

 5     procedure.  And it was for the commander of the -- so we wouldn't have to

 6     wait for the commander of the Drina Corps to study, analyse this, and so

 7     on.  But it would rather immediately mean that the -- that the instance

 8     that was to implement the order would immediately and that would probably

 9     sometimes be one step removed as subordinate -- would immediately proceed

10     and act.  In other words, this document required immediate action.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D5353, please.

14     1D5353.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   This is another one of your documents, General.  Now, in the

17     midst of this operation - and apparently we do not have a translation

18     yet, but this deals with figures for the most part so we can wait for the

19     translation.  But do you agree that in this midst of this operation you

20     had no restrictions vis-a-vis the civilian population there, the Muslim

21     civilian population, and that regardless of what was stated in the order

22     you were allowed to -- allow humanitarian aid for civilians to get

23     through, both for Muslims and Serbs.  So could you just tell us about

24     this.  This is -- this refers to the Serbs in Visegrad, Foca; Muslims in

25     Zvornik and Tuzla; the 13th for -- and the 17th for the Muslims in

Page 25589

 1     Srebrenica and Tuzla.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we just scroll it down a bit

 3     so the General can see.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you don't have to scroll it

 5     down.  I see that the Chief of Staff has signed this document.  I just

 6     need a bit of time to look at it.

 7             Yes, this is my document and you can see that on a daily basis I

 8     allowed or ordered convoys to be allowed through, convoys for Serbs but

 9     also in every one of these items I also allow convoys for Muslims to get

10     through.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we just pull this up a bit

14     and look at the handwritten part where it is added:  Forward this to the

15     Zvornik, Bratunac, 1st Birac Brigade, Visegrad Brigade and the

16     2nd Motorised Romanija Brigade.  Is that what it is?  Somebody forwarded

17     this immediately, this order of yours; correct?

18        A.   Yes, this is probably the Drina Command Corps that forwarded this

19     onward immediately.  Probably they didn't have time to re-type it and

20     then send it as their own order, so they just forwarded this document to

21     the Zvornik Brigade, Pandurevic; Bratunac Brigade; the Birac Brigade; and

22     the 2nd Romanija Brigade; Visegrad Brigade; and the 2nd Romanija Brigade

23     which was under the command of Radislav Krstic, now General Krstic.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document,

Page 25590

 1     please.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  We are -- my microphone is not working.

 3             Yes.  I think it's working.

 4             Mr. Robinson, shall I make a finding of violation of court order

 5     every time he uses untranslated documents?

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, Mr. President, I don't know that you've made

 7     an order that we have to have translated documents, but we try our best

 8     and sometimes it's because he comes up with the idea at the last minute

 9     to use the document and other times it's because of simply -- our

10     resources are such that we can't get them to translation in time.  But we

11     do our best.

12             JUDGE KWON:  It's very difficult to follow if the document hasn't

13     been translated.  Yes, we'll mark it for identification.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D2142, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you for your understanding,

16     Excellency, but we asked for translation of over 200 documents over a

17     month ago and probably the translation unit was just swamped with them.

18     It was documents that related to this particular witness.

19             Now could we briefly pull up D43, please.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   You mentioned, General, that these massacres and the nature of a

22     civil war where villages fight against other villages and civilians fight

23     civilians, you mentioned that after the entrance into Srebrenica one

24     could expect uncontrolled fury.  Now, do you recall that this document of

25     mine which was produced after I talked to you, it was ordered that all

Page 25591

 1     combat should cease, that there should be no entering Srebrenica, that

 2     the weapons should be surrendered, and fighters should be treated as

 3     civilians, and no investigations into war crimes should be undertaken

 4     until the situation calmed down a bit.  Do you recall that, the 16th of

 5     April?

 6        A.   I remember it very well.  This order was drafted when you and I

 7     discussed the possibility of establishing enclaves in Eastern Bosnia, and

 8     that was the first time that I heard of those enclaves and I was happy

 9     because I thought that if the security areas became -- came into being,

10     as required by the UN documents, then I would gain something from it,

11     that there would be one-third of forces that would be blocked, whereas

12     the rest of the forces could be used on the battle-field.  However,

13     that's not how it transpired.  This order was probably the result of that

14     conversation that you and I had on that day, that morning.

15             But, Mr. Karadzic, I would also have to remind you of all the

16     troubles that I had before it was possible to draft an order of this

17     nature.  I will remind you that sometime in late January 1993 I mentioned

18     to you that you would have to give some consideration to the issue of

19     Srebrenica and what to do with it next.  And on the 5th of March, 1993,

20     when I entered Konjevic Polje, we had already taken Cerska and Kamenica

21     without any fighting thanks to Philippe Morillon.  And when I entered

22     there, you remember the acronym KP, Communist Party, but, in fact, it

23     stood for Konjevic Polje.  You then called me - I think you were in

24     Geneva or London or somewhere with General Mladic - and I told you then,

25     President Karadzic, you will have to decide what to do with Srebrenica.

Page 25592

 1     Srebrenica has become a military and political problem and not a

 2     target -- not a military objective.

 3             And you said then, Stop.  Mladic was with you in the room and I

 4     could overhear him saying, behind you probably, no stopping, just move

 5     into Srebrenica.  And then I asked you to talk to him and decide by the

 6     next morning what you wanted me to do because one of you was a supreme

 7     commander and the other one was the commander of the army.  So I could

 8     end up in court.  Now, you did not call back, so I called you sometime

 9     between 9.00 and 10.00 in the morning, the next morning.  You had no

10     decision yet, and I decided to stop; not because of your order or

11     Mladic's order, but I learned from Morillon that there was some 64.000

12     refugees in Srebrenica.  The mass grave in Kamenica had been -- had just

13     been discovered before that.  I had ten brigades around Srebrenica, and

14     there was not a single fighter in that brigade.  I believe I mentioned that

15     this army was predominantly of police type, from the area where combat was

16     conducted.  So there was not a single fighter who hadn't had or who didn't

17     have in Kamenica a friend or a relative or a brother.  So I feared that if

18     the VRS entered Srebrenica, I feared that there would be a massacre in

19     retaliation as revenge.  On the other hand, I was afraid of my own losses,

20     because even though most of these people were civilians, I knew that Oric

21     had withdrawn some 12.000 of his men into Srebrenica.  So I assessed that if

22     I were to move into Srebrenica I would lose -- I would have losses of some

23     3.000 to 3.500 soldiers.  And that is why, Mr. President, I stopped then.

24             Now, on the line where the Serb forces stopped, that is where the

25     border of the future protection zone was to be, and this was in light of

Page 25593

 1     this order of yours that I've said all this.

 2        Q.   Thank you, General.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see P4704, please, to show

 4     what the position was on other enclaves.  P4074, please.  Well, very

 5     well, we -- it's not necessary.  We can move on.

 6             Could we have page -- or rather, could we have 1D5354.  We'll

 7     just continue along the same line we were going before.  1D5354.  That

 8     document has already been admitted and it shows that the civilians were

 9     free to do whatever they chose.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Do you recall this agreement on the demilitarisation of the

12     protected zones, in this particular case, Srebrenica?

13        A.   Yes, I do.  And the protected area for Srebrenica and that

14     agreement was signed by the commanders of the warring parties,

15     Ratko Mladic and Sefer Halilovic, and the guarantees were provided by

16     General Morillon, the UNPROFOR commander.  This was done on the

17     8th of May, 1993.  And as for Zepa, an agreement of the same type was

18     signed on the 18th of May in 1993.  As for Gorazde, I cannot recall the

19     date, but it followed soon after that.

20             After these agreements by the commanders of the warring parties,

21     which was in keeping with the Geneva Conventions, the Security Council of

22     the United Nations - and I can't recall the Resolution number which

23     proclaimed this - declared protected areas unilaterally without any

24     agreement of the commanders of the warring parties of Tuzla, Sarajevo,

25     and Bihac.  Now, first of all, the way it was -- they were declared

Page 25594

 1     guaranteed that they would be unsuccessful in advance.  These -- this was

 2     sure in advance because the Sarajevo, Bihac, and Tuzla areas were not

 3     delineated, either on the ground or on any maps.  And this was not

 4     binding on the Muslims in Sarajevo and Bihac to disarm.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  We will move on to that probably, but is it correct

 6     that this document talks about the requirement that there would be

 7     disarming in the next 72 hours, the demilitarisation of Srebrenica will

 8     be completed within 72 hours, and that they would have to hand over all

 9     mines, explosives, ammunition, and so on.  And that the responsibility

10     for the pacification and demilitarisation of Srebrenica was to be with

11     the UNPROFOR forces?  And this was explicitly stated and it was not

12     ambiguous in any sense in this agreement.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps we can see the next page in

14     Serbian.

15             MR. KARADZIC:

16        Q.   " ...remain in the town.  UNPROFOR is responsible for the

17     demilitarisation process."

18             [Interpretation] So here it says UNPROFOR is responsible for the

19     demilitarisation process.  So is this completely unambiguous and had it

20     been implemented you would have -- there would have been no casualties

21     and you would have had more forces?

22        A.   Yes.  But, please, when you put questions to me don't then

23     continue to explain them because then I don't know when I can start

24     answering your question.  But the answer to that question is yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 25595

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted?

 2             Could we have a look at the last page, General Milovanovic sent

 3     this, too.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this will be admitted.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2143, Your Honours.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5355, please.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Do you remember this order of yours dated the 18th of April, in

 9     which you ordered that you should halt at the lines reached, opening fire

10     is prohibited, bringing in new forces is prohibited in the wide

11     Srebrenica sector.  Do you remember this?  Not a single bullet should be

12     fired.  After the period of time mentioned, not a single bullet or

13     projectile should be fired from a weapon of any kind.

14        A.   Yes, this is the result of your order dated the 16th of April

15     that we were analysing just a while ago.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Here it says again that -- it repeats everything stated in that

20     order.  It will be on the last page.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the second page.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Item 6 you speak about demilitarisation.  In item 5 you talk

24     about the evacuation of the wounded, about the organisation of UNPROFOR,

25     two doctors from the VRS.  Yes, that's the page.  Item 5 mentions

Page 25596

 1     evacuation; item 6 mentions demilitarisation.  Isn't that correct?

 2        A.   Yes, this is the implementation of the agreement reached by the

 3     commanders of the warring sides.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page in the

 6     Serbian version and I think it's also the next page in the English

 7     version.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Do you agree that here you are ordering the manner in which mines

10     will be cleared and the terrain will be cleared.  In item 6 the same

11     words are used that we used in my order, the civilian population has

12     complete freedom to decide whether to remain in Srebrenica or to leave.

13     No party may hinder the freedom of movement of civilians.  Muslim

14     combatants are to be treated as civilians after being disarmed.

15             General, is it quite clear here that whatever directive 4 says

16     doesn't concern civilians and the civilians didn't suffer any

17     consequences as the result of directive 4?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 2144.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5361, please.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   It's another order of yours, General.  1D5361.  This is an order

Page 25597

 1     of yours after the signed agreement dated the 8th of May, 1993, the

 2     cessation of combat, and you refer to the agreement on the basis of the

 3     agreement between Mladic and Halilovic.  In the presence of

 4     General Morillon you say, and you're issuing this order on the same day,

 5     you mention a total cease-fire.  That's item 1.  Item 3, the total

 6     demilitarisation of the Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde sectors.  And here

 7     you planned for the weapons to be surrendered to UNPROFOR, not to us.

 8             Can we have a look at the next page.

 9             Item 5 you are prohibiting entry for representatives of the VRS

10     into the Zepa, Gorazde sector and apart from the representatives of the

11     above-mentioned members of the commission.  And under 7:

12             "Members of the so-called Army of BiH, once the weapons are

13     handed over, are to be treated like other civilians and freedom of

14     movement is to be ensured for all so if they wish they can leave the said

15     regions or remain there."

16             General, this very favourable for both sides and especially for

17     the Muslim civilians?  They are not to be treated as POWs but as

18     civilians.  When they stop fighting they become civilians.

19        A.   Yes, but let me say something about the conditions, the

20     circumstances, under which this order was created.  The results of the

21     agreement were known to me.  I found out about them over the phone.  In

22     the course of these negotiations these two commanders from the warring

23     sides and General Morillon were involved in these negotiations and

24     Morillon wasn't convinced he wanted to persuade the Muslims of something.

25     He said that General Mladic didn't have a centralised command in the VRS.

Page 25598

 1     It meant that we weren't an army that had been organised in a

 2     contemporary manner, in a modern manner.  He asked General Mladic to open

 3     fire on a certain target, mostly in Podrinje.  Mladic called me and asked

 4     me how long it would take me to open fire on some feature, I can't

 5     remember which feature was concerned.  I said I can do so immediately.

 6     However, he confounded me when he said, Fire.  I conveyed the order to

 7     the Drina Corps command and fire was opened in two or three minutes'

 8     time.

 9             A few minutes later Mladic called again and he said, This person

10     still doesn't trust me.  Open fire on this target.  Artillery fire has

11     numbers, so I can't remember exactly what it was.  We opened fire again

12     and I asked him, Boss, how long am I to continue using our ammunition?

13     But finally he understood the situation and realised that we had a

14     centralised command over the VRS.  So that was proof of the manner in

15     which Morillon entered these negotiations, but the idea to create a safe

16     havens was his idea.  His idea was also to have the population in

17     Srebrenica transferred -- the Muslim population from Srebrenica was to be

18     transferred to Tuzla on the 14th of March; and the Serbian population

19     from Tuzla, 17.500 could go to Podrinje.  I told him that that was ethnic

20     cleansing, regardless of the fact that we were -- or rather, that he was

21     trying to save the civilian population.  He said, That's my problem.

22     Tolimir and I negotiated with him.  We had to make a note of this.  I

23     think Tolimir sent a report to you about the matter, or rather, to the

24     Supreme Command.  The evacuation of the civilian population from

25     Srebrenica commenced.  But priority was given to the wounded, and the

Page 25599

 1     evacuation continued until 12.500 people were taken out of Srebrenica and

 2     then it stopped.

 3             I asked him, General, not a single Serbian was taken out.  He

 4     said, Your Serbians don't want to leave Tuzla.  They are concerned about

 5     their flats.  Why did you stop with the evacuation of these people?  He

 6     said, I've obtained my objective.  But later I understood that he had

 7     taken out members of Naser Oric's army, about 12.500 men.  There were

 8     some civilians amongst them, mothers, sisters, children, but on the whole

 9     he saved Naser Oric's army from being destroyed in central Podrinje.  So

10     much about that so.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2145, Your Honours.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, whenever possible I'll try to obtain yes or no answers.

17     Do you remember that the Muslim population, especially those who weren't

18     originally from Srebrenica but were from the surrounding places,

19     continually strove to go to Tuzla.  And our assessment was that it would

20     be easier for their army to fight if they had fewer civilians?

21        A.   The answer is no because Alija Izetbegovic, even earlier we spoke

22     about this yesterday, issued various proclamations and prohibitions on

23     leaving Sarajevo and Srebrenica.  He prohibited the civilian population

24     from leaving.  The Muslim army did not want to be left without the

25     civilian population.  They used the civilians so that they could have the

Page 25600

 1     civilian population in the vicinity of military targets.  So I could not

 2     agree with that.  Our desire was to remove the civilians so they didn't

 3     hinder the armies.  I mentioned the villages of Medjedja and Hamdzici

 4     yesterday but we weren't successful.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  My question was general so it wasn't precise.  Did

 6     the civilians have certain desires, and Izetbegovic, did he have

 7     different desires?

 8        A.   Well, that's a different kettle of fish.  The answer is yes.

 9        Q.   Well, could we now see 65 ter 4219 to see where directive 4 comes

10     from, or rather, where -- why it is that there's certain imprecisions in

11     directive 4.

12             While waiting for it, do you remember the crisis in Vecici

13     village, in Kotor Varos?  Two weeks before the directive, directive 4, do

14     you remember that there was an ultimatum from the Muslims to have their

15     civilians allowed to leave Vecici and for the troops to remain?  And

16     there was a misunderstanding, a dispute, between me, Mladic, and Talic.

17     Mladic accepted my agreement; Talic executed the idea, but there were

18     reservations.  Have a look at this.  Do you remember this matter --

19             JUDGE KWON:  This is all your comment.  It has no probative value

20     at all.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I didn't intend to

22     make any comments, but I wanted to summarise this so that the General

23     didn't have to spend too much time familiarising himself with the text.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Put a question to the witness.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 25601

 1        Q.   Once you've read through it, let us know, General.

 2        A.   I have read this page.

 3        Q.   Do you remember that in the end Mladic agreed to let the women

 4     and children leave, but Talic thought that the troops should also hand

 5     over their weapons and should leave with the population.  The troops

 6     should not remain behind in our rear.

 7        A.   Yes.  Talic in this document made the same request I made in

 8     directive number 4, and that was that the troops shouldn't remain behind

 9     after the civilians had left because Talic was the commander in the field

10     and he wasn't going to leave troops in his rear.  That would be

11     illogical.  But I can see that the man carried out General Mladic's

12     order.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted?

15             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure whether this translation is a finalised

16     version.  It didn't translate the heading.  Is this your Defence team

17     translation, Mr. Karadzic?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, it's from the OTP.  But

19     "explanation" means "explanation."  So the title is somewhat incomplete

20     in graphical terms, so it would be better to have it translated again, to

21     have a literal translation.  The Serbian version is quite clear and

22     unambiguous.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls, is this from other case?

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour, precisely.  It's a Defence

25     translation from the Krajisnik case, which is why it's -- appears in a

Page 25602

 1     different format.  I'm trying to see if we have one ourselves, but it

 2     doesn't appear that we do.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we mark it for identification until confirmed

 4     by the CLSS, or are you happy to admit it as it is?

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  This document I do not object to its admission

 6     with the translation that we have, and we can just check it if necessary

 7     to provide an updated one.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 9             We'll admit this.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D2146, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   General, let me not call up --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  We'll mark it for identification or

15     we'll admit it in full, Mr. Nicholls?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, we want -- we want to have an

17     official translation, a more precise one.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll mark it for identification.

19             Yes, please continue.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, let me not call up documents now because you're familiar

22     with them anyway.  Do you agree that in our language there is a

23     substantive difference between these two sentences, that the army should

24     leave with the people; and the second one that the people should leave

25     with the army?  Could you please explain what the first variant means,

Page 25603

 1     for the army to leave with the people in the spirit of our language; and

 2     what the other variant means, that the people would leave with the army.

 3        A.   The wish of the opposing side or of the enemy is that every time

 4     the people withdraw, the army of that people should withdraw too.  That

 5     means that the army should leave with the people.  On the other hand,

 6     there can be another wish, for the people to leave with the army.

 7     However, that wish is not exhibited by the commanders of the warring

 8     parties.  That wish is exhibited by the people.  Yesterday I talked about

 9     the tradition of China, France, and Serbia, that people follow the army

10     or go with the army, either in front of it or behind it.  Here's an

11     evident example.

12             In October 1994, the people of Grmec were moving in front of

13     their army, that is to say they were withdrawing.  A month later, they

14     were moving behind their army.  So as the army was advancing, the people

15     were following.  There is a linguistic difference:  With the army or with

16     the people; however, the meaning is the same.  It means that the army is

17     leaving certain areas.  Is the army the first one to leave and then the

18     people follow, or the other way around?  The only difference is that the

19     enemy wants the army to leave the area with the people, and we know which

20     people.

21        Q.   Thank you, General.  Bearing in mind what happened two weeks

22     before directive 4 and Vecici, do you agree that when one says the army

23     should leave with the people, it means that the people were leaving

24     anyway and they should take the army along as well, as opposed to a

25     different situation when the army would be leading the people.

Page 25604

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could all other

 2     microphones be switched off.  Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   I have to help the interpreters.  Oh, I see they have made a

 5     remark of sorts.

 6             So if it says that the army leaves with the people rather than

 7     the people with the army, is the first case that the people lead the army

 8     and the other case is the army leads the people?

 9        A.   In the case of Vecici, General Talic wanted the army to leave

10     with the people, or rather, for the people to lead the army out of

11     Vecici.  That is how I understood the question.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Is that also reflected in directive 4?  It's not that

13     the army should leave and cleanse the people, but rather, since the

14     people were leaving anyway then the army should leave too, and the

15     analogy follows Vecici?

16        A.   Yes, although when I wrote that directive I did not have Vecici

17     in mind.  This was the strategy of the Army of Republika Srpska.  When

18     there is no local population, then that population's army is not there

19     either.  We simply wanted to have a clear situation in a particular area.

20     However, I have to warn you.  All three armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

21     except for the regular army of Croatia and later on the NATO Alliance,

22     the armies of the three warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina were armies

23     of a militia type.  They were linked to a particular territory, although

24     we manoeuvred with our units from Krajina for Sarajevo or from

25     Herzegovina to that Visoka Krajina of yours.  Nevertheless, these armies

Page 25605

 1     were attached to territories, to municipalities.  When a population

 2     moved, there was no guarantee for me that my army would stay in Drvar a

 3     month after the population of Drvar left.

 4             The Muslims had the same situation.  When the people were no

 5     longer in a particular area, then the army - unless it's expelled by the

 6     enemy - will withdraw on its own anyway.  They simply cannot keep on

 7     staying there.  These are peoples' armies.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Let us now call up the directive now.  Do you agree

 9     that the directive says that they should unconditionally surrender

10     weapons, and in Zivanovic's order it says that they should

11     unconditionally surrender?  Is that a significant difference?  The

12     directive says that weapons should be surrendered, whereas he misquoted

13     it by saying that they should surrender unconditionally?

14        A.   Yes, it's a vast difference.  In the directive it says "surrender

15     of weapons."  And later on you saw in the orders that implemented

16     directive number 4, it said specifically for Srebrenica soldiers who

17     surrender weapons will be considered civilians and will be treated as

18     civilians, whereas Zivanovic wrote compulsory surrender of fighters.

19     Now, these are two different things all together.

20        Q.   Thank you, General.

21             With the agreement of the Trial Chamber and the Prosecution, can

22     I ask you to take a look at a Prosecution exhibit during the break and

23     another 65 ter document so that we would put questions faster and more

24     easily, if everybody agrees.  Could you please use part of your break to

25     read these documents that you are familiar with.

Page 25606

 1             JUDGE KWON:  No objection, Mr. Nicholls?  If it is items are

 2     known to you.  Would you like to take a look?

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  No.  In principle, no objection, Your Honour,

 4     unless of course the witness wants to, you know, really take a break

 5     during the break.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P3040, 4245 is the 65 ter number.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  I'll leave it to you,

 8     General Milovanovic.

 9             We'll have a break for half an hour.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may take a look at these

11     documents, perhaps I have them in the waiting room, just so I know which

12     documents are involved.  I do not mind taking a look at them during the

13     break.  I just need to see what the documents are.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for your understanding.

15             We'll resume at 11.00.

16                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, have you had a look at these two documents during the

22     break?

23        A.   Yes, and I compared them.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can we first call up P3040 just to establish one

25     thing.  Paragraph 2, "Tasks of the Drina Corps."  Let's take a look at

Page 25607

 1     that.  Next page, yes.  "Tasks of the Drina Corps."

 2             Do we agree, General, that this was a copy-paste situation in

 3     relation to directive 7, these general tasks?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have the next page.  Paragraph 4, that is

 6     usually the decision itself.  Do we agree, General, that in this

 7     paragraph all the way until the end of the document - so this has to do

 8     with the decision of the commander of the Drina Corps - there is no trace

 9     whatsoever of any kind of controversial sentence or controversial

10     intention.  What was pasted in the introductory part is not repeated.

11        A.   There is a difference and there should not be one.  Specifically,

12     it has to do with Srebrenica and Zepa in case UNPROFOR leaves these two

13     enclaves.  There is a reference to Operation Jadar.  In the first part I

14     did not notice that remark, what to do with Srebrenica and Zepa if

15     UNPROFOR leaves them.  Srebrenica and Zepa are mentioned within the

16     context of other built-up areas with a tendency of blocking them.

17        Q.   Please take a look at the second paragraph here.  In

18     co-ordination with the forces of the SRK and the Herzegovina Corps as

19     Star 95 is being carried out, liberate Serb areas in the enclave of

20     Gorazde and reduce it to a protected area of 3 kilometres from the centre

21     of town.  And in case UNPROFOR leaves Srebrenica and Zepa,

22     Operation Jadar should be carried out and that is when Muslim forces

23     should be crushed and destroyed in these enclaves, and Podrinje should be

24     definitely liberated.

25             Do we agree that this refers to Muslim forces?

Page 25608

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now move on to this next document,

 3     65 ter 4245.

 4             Do we agree, General, that this is a document of the Drina Corps

 5     that is based on directive 7/1, so eight days after directive 7/1 was

 6     issued by Mladic as an executive order.  The commander of the Drina Corps

 7     issued this order for defence and active combat operations.

 8             That's it, isn't it?

 9        A.   Yes.  This order of General Zivanovic was produced exactly 15

10     days after the first order that was based on your directive.  However,

11     this order, since it was of a more recent date, was supposed to annul the

12     first order, Zivanovic's first order, because it has to do with the same

13     problem, the same operation.  However, Zivanovic did not do that.  He did

14     not mention at all that that previous order would no longer be in force.

15     Secondly, in this order he only refers to two brigades, the

16     Zvornik Brigade and the Bircanska Brigade and in the first one he gave

17     tasks to all brigades of the corps.  The tasks of these two brigades that

18     he mentioned here match, to a degree, the tasks given in the first

19     directive.  However, he did not give any tasks to the other brigades

20     here, at least he did not repeat them.  So these two commanders cannot

21     resolve in their orders the problem of neighbours and the organisation of

22     co-ordination.

23             Now that we're dealing with these two documents, towards the end

24     it says that the documents were drafted by the same person, the same

25     author, Colonel Lazic.  However, they were not registered under the same

Page 25609

 1     number.  If we look at the heading, it is the number of the operations

 2     administration, I think in one of them it is /3, and now the second one I

 3     haven't got it here with me, something was added in pen, /4, so it was

 4     not registered in the same person's documents.

 5        Q.   Ah-ha.  May I remind you of the following:  The 20th of March,

 6     04277-2, that is the number, and this more recent one is 03277-3, and

 7     it's right, this was added in pen, 277-2, that was added.  So this one

 8     should annul the previous one; right?

 9        A.   Yes, that is based on the principles of control and command, that

10     the order with the most recent date, unless otherwise stated somewhere in

11     the text, automatically annuls the previous one.  It would have been

12     smarter for Zivanovic to have written this up as an amendment to an order

13     or a correction or whatever.  So what he wanted to do here was to satisfy

14     the Supreme Command but the Main Staff as well, because you see he's

15     doing this 15 days later.

16             Mr. President, at the time obviously the Drina Corps command got

17     itself confused as well as its units.  Now, if you look at the brigades

18     that were given these tasks in the second order, they are slightly

19     different if compared to the first order.  Now, as for neighbour

20     brigades, they know what the original order was, but they don't know what

21     the second order was.  So the commanders were not able to co-ordinate

22     action with each other.

23        Q.   Thank you, General.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this, please.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I didn't follow when the witness

Page 25610

 1     discussed what was added by pen.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the earlier ones, the protocol

 3     number was entered by hand -- well, perhaps we can pull it up, that's

 4     P3040.  The protocol number was added by hand.  I guess they didn't know

 5     when it was.  Now, the other document was typed, typed up, but there was

 6     the same number but then what follows is -3.  So the protocol number was

 7     entered by hand in pencil, and that can be done if they did not know the

 8     protocol number at the time when they wrote this.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I'd like to hear from the witness.

10             Is that what you said, Mr. Milovanovic?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's exactly what I said.

12     On the last page of the document, we can see that the same person drafted

13     both documents; however, the same person did not register them as their

14     own number.  The first one was registered by Milenko Lazic, who had this

15     mark -2, whereas the other one had -4 which means that it wasn't the same

16     person.  Now, whether it was the same person or not who registered them,

17     it doesn't really matter; what does matter is that the signature of

18     General Zivanovic was there, the signatory of both these documents.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             Yes, this will be admitted as next Defence exhibit.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2147, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   And, General, you are right, there is a Latin proverb saying lex

25     specialis derogates the lex generalis.

Page 25611

 1             Now, there is another example where we can see how an even later

 2     document superseded these, and I believe we have a better copy, that's

 3     65 ter 19577.  65 ter 1977.  It has already been admitted.  There is a

 4     P number for this document; however, this copy is clearer, it's more

 5     legible.  Yes, this is the document.

 6             Now, please take a look at it.  Can we agree that the protocol

 7     number was entered by hand here as well, and it is dated the

 8     2nd of July, 1995?

 9        A.   Yes, you're trying to prove to me that this is indeed possible.

10     Well, it is possible.  Now, when a document is very urgent, it would be

11     sent immediately to the teleprinter operator, and once the teleprinter

12     operator has sent it to the end user, then it would be returned to the

13     administration to enter this number.

14        Q.   Thank you.  The Prosecutor showed you this document with the

15     intent of pointing out that directive 7 was implemented or how it was

16     implemented and how it had an effect on this executive order.  Now I

17     would like to show you page 5 in Serbian, I believe, and in English that

18     would be page 7.

19             The -- this paragraph was not shown to you.  Could we please have

20     65 ter 1977, not the P number, because the reason we asked for the 65 ter

21     version was that this copy is actually smudged, the P copy.

22        A.   What paragraph do you want me to look at?

23        Q.   Well, let's just wait for the more legible copy, the clearer

24     copy.  Here we have it.  Now, please take a look at the following.  The

25     security organs will send to the subordinate commands for their

Page 25612

 1     information the regime of security in combat areas and there should be

 2     heightened security while preparations are made for an attack.

 3        A.   [No interpretation]

 4        Q.   Well, my apologies.  But before that, security organs and

 5     military police organs shall establish the areas where prisoners of war

 6     and the war booty will be concentrated.  In this, in the treatment of the

 7     prisoners of war and the civilians, you are to abide by the

 8     Geneva Conventions in every respect.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  While we discuss this, can we not upload the English

10     translation of P4421 so that we can follow.  1977 does not accompany the

11     English translation.

12             Mr. Nicholls, you agree that 1977 is just a copy of the same

13     document which does not have the handwriting part?

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, it doesn't have the handwriting.  I'm taking

15     a look.  I was trying to see exactly where 1977 was sent to, to see that

16     it is exactly the same --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, but the first page looked the same.  Very well,

18     let's --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's page 7 in English.  Page 7

20     in English.  Page 7, paragraph 1.  Before the "Camouflage "section.  Yes,

21     here where it says "Security."

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Here it appears crossed out, but in fact it should be underlined,

24     it shouldn't be crossed out, the portion that I'm referring to.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Just --

Page 25613

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Would you please take a look at the Serbian version.  Does it say

 3     here:

 4             "Security organs and military police will indicate the sectors

 5     for gathering and securing prisoners of war and war booty," and so on and

 6     so forth?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  [Overlapping speakers]

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   So instead of underlining this section, this portion, it is

10     crossed out here?

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I see the --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we see the original of P4421, i.e., the

13     65 ter number 15583.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm sorry, could I see the first page of the

15     English version.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Of this one?

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes --

18             JUDGE KWON:  1977, yes, before we ...

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Okay.

20             JUDGE KWON:  In B/C/S 1977.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Did you want to see the English page?

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  I did, I saw it, Your Honour.  Thank you.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, okay.  Thank you.

25             Page -- what's the page number of Mr. -- of B/C/S, Mr. --

Page 25614

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 5.  In Serbian it's 5 and in

 2     English that's 7.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Can we agree, General, that somebody tried to underline this but

 5     he wasn't very precise and that the Geneva Conventions are not even

 6     underlined?

 7        A.   Well, I cannot really be the judge of whether this is underlined

 8     or crossed out.  The way I see it, it's crossed out.  However, the

 9     previous copy you showed me on the screen didn't have this.  But there

10     was an imprecision not in the text but you've said it.  You said the

11     security organs and organs of the military police, whereas it should only

12     read "security organs" and they would implement this through the military

13     police because the military police is their instrument of action.

14     Because should it remain as it is, it would mean that the military police

15     also has the authority to issue orders, whereas they only can implement

16     orders.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

18             General, could you read the handwritten part at the top of the

19     page.  We can -- yes.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The section where prisoners of war

21     will be secured is in Pribicevac.  The sector where the prisoners of war

22     and war booty shall be deployed is in Pribicevac.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Now, General, does it say that the security organs and those of

25     military police shall stipulate this, and then by hand, on top, somebody

Page 25615

 1     added "the sector where prisoners of war and war booty will be deployed

 2     is in the Pribicevac sector"?

 3        A.   You're correct.  This sector or this area was added by hand by

 4     the person who was responsible for deciding where that will be.  However,

 5     this sentence is not principled.  The sector where prisoners of war will

 6     be centralised as well as war booty and their security shall -- is

 7     normally something that is done by a logistics unit, the rear organs.

 8     And security organs, with the help of the military police, interrogate

 9     prisoners of war and perform a triage so that when it is determined that

10     a prisoner of war had committed a war crime, that person would be

11     separated and taken into custody and prosecuted.  For those for whom it

12     was established that they had not committed a war crime, they would be

13     taken to a centre, a camp, where they would await an exchange or

14     whatever.  So the security of prisoners of war is something that is

15     organised by logistics -- the logistics department, whereas the security

16     organs and the military police only performed a triage.  And of course

17     they also tried to obtain as much information as possible on the

18     situation or the status of enemy forces.  However, a prisoner of war

19     under the Geneva Conventions is not duty-bound -- is not obliged to

20     answer to any questions other than what his name was, what his name is,

21     what his rank is, what unit he belonged to, and the number of his

22     military tag.  Those are tags that are issued to all troops in case of

23     death.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, after the sentence

25     "Geneva Convention," I take it, whether it is an underline or a striking

Page 25616

 1     out, on the right side does it not say "nee," which I take it to mean

 2     "no"?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Was that a question for me?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it's a question -- I asked you, General.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, my answer to that will be:

 6     Yes.  The person who processed this document felt it necessary to exclude

 7     this obligation of the security organ.  Now, why that person did that,

 8     probably because they thought that every officer would know what I

 9     mentioned just a moment ago, what are the questions that a prisoner of

10     war must answer.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

12             Yes, Mr. Nicholls, I remember you rose.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  I've been jumping up and down.  First

14     of all, I object to the representation unless there is some foundation

15     and basis made in the question this was underlining not strike-through

16     and putting that to the witness.  It is clearly -- I was going to try to

17     make the same observation that Your Honour just did about writing no.

18     It's clear it's a strike-through and different changes.  Second, this is

19     indeed a version of Krivaja 95.  It's -- just to be clear, the version we

20     were looking at before has the Drina Corps stamp on the end.  This is the

21     version received at the Bratunac Brigade, and that's the stamp at the end

22     of this one, so it's the version received at the Bratunac Brigade that we

23     have handwriting and strike-throughs on.  Thank you.

24             JUDGE KWON:  I think we can admit the clean version that was

25     admitted in -- received by the Bratunac Brigade, if you wish,

Page 25617

 1     Mr. Karadzic, and continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's right, Your Excellency.  I

 3     just want to see through this witness.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Witness, do you agree that there was a clean version from the

 6     corps that was sent out from the corps, and someone in the field issued

 7     an order and said that these handwritten additions were added in the

 8     field?  This wasn't done in the corps.

 9        A.   I thank the OTP for that intervention.  I now know who underlined

10     this and who crossed this out, and so on and so forth.  It was the

11     commander of the Bratunac Brigade.  At the time it was

12     Colonel Vidoje Blagojevic.  When he examined this document, he

13     immediately made notes for himself to see what should be done with regard

14     to each item, and he drew the conclusion that the sector where these

15     things would be gathered for his brigade would be in Pribicevac.  He

16     wrote this down immediately.  He came to the conclusion that provisions

17     for the work of subordinate commands with regard to interviewing

18     witnesses were not necessary.  He put "no" there.  We know who sent the

19     document.  We know he didn't -- the person who sent the document didn't

20     cross this out, but the person who received the document, who was to act

21     on the document, made these markings.  Having marked the document, this

22     person already provided guide-lines for the operations officer who had to

23     draft an order of his own, so that one could know what to -- what should

24     be taken into consideration.  So the operations officer wouldn't take

25     this sentence into account in the order that he drafted.

Page 25618

 1        Q.   Thank you, General.  Can we agree that the person who issued the

 2     order and the brigade commander didn't tamper with the sentence that

 3     said:

 4             "When treating POWs and the civilians, make sure that you abide

 5     by the Geneva Conventions"?

 6        A.   In essence, yes, because when this was crossed out the commander

 7     of the Bratunac Brigade assumed responsibility for deleting certain parts

 8     of the order.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  If we take the date into consideration, the

10     2nd of July, and a fresh document replaces a new one, that's a principle,

11     can we agree that regardless of what the previous documents state, in

12     this case, in this document, it is stated that the Geneva Conventions

13     have to be abided by and the person who issued the order and the brigade

14     commander didn't believe it was necessary to delete this sentence or to

15     amend it in any way?

16        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I'm testifying here, or rather, I'm not testifying

17     about the events that I saw, the events that I participated in.  This is

18     on the 2nd of July, and I don't know whether I was in a tent or on the

19     Golja mountain.  However, these comments I'm making are comments that I'm

20     making as someone who is aware of the process of creating and

21     distributing documents.  I don't know what the brigade commander had in

22     mind when he crossed this out.  I don't know whether he thought that it

23     wasn't necessary because everyone knew about this.  I don't know whether

24     he thought it wasn't necessary to carry out the corps commander's order.

25     So he deleted this and assumed responsibility for this act.  I can't

Page 25619

 1     answer this question precisely by saying yes or no.

 2        Q.   General, the sentence "on the conventions," is it something that

 3     is not in dispute for the person who issued the order and for the brigade

 4     commander.  This is the part that wasn't crossed out.  It has to do with

 5     action taken.  Please have a look at the sentence.

 6        A.   Yes, this sentence is not in dispute.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And the latest document -- well, this was the

 8     freshest or the latest document, and as such, this was the document that

 9     had force; isn't that correct?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the document sent from the

13     corps also be admitted, not just the one that was amended in the brigade,

14     because the corps' intention was not to have these amendments made?

15             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit the 65 ter number 1977.

16                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

17             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think we need to translate it again.  The

18     translation should be the same, Mr. Nicholls, but only that the

19     crossed-out part or underlined part will revive.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  We do have a translation, if I'm understanding, of

21     the Bratunac Brigade-received order with the crossed out shown and the

22     English --

23             JUDGE KWON:  The original one is 15583 has translation, yes.  I'm

24     talking about 1977, which does not have any handwriting part.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  No, that's correct.  We --

Page 25620

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Am I correct?

 2             I'll check with the Registrar.

 3                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Another option for the Registrar is to add this

 5     document to the previous exhibit, P4421.  I think that's more convenient

 6     in terms of reference.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour, with both translations.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll do that.  Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's acceptable for the Defence.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue -- yes, General, you have

11     something to say?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  While you were

13     conferring I had another, closer look at this document.  The question as

14     to whether this was crossed out or underlined -- well, with regard to

15     that issue I would say that it has been crossed out because the commander

16     personally undertook the obligation to indicate a sector, and he wrote

17     this at the top.  It's not the obligation of the security organ anymore,

18     and this part down here was also crossed out, the commander confirmed

19     this by making a note of "no."  This hasn't -- this doesn't have to be

20     included in the order.  He probably thought that all the officers were

21     familiar with the Geneva Conventions.  So my conclusion is that it hasn't

22     been underlined, because if it had been underlined, it would have been

23     emphasised in some way.  It was crossed out so that others did not have

24     to think about these matters.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 25621

 1             THE ACCUSED:  [Interpretation] Could we now have a look at this

 2     1D15349, and we have the translation.  1D5349.  We've had a look at it

 3     already.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   And you are right, our service was listening on to what Oric and

 6     his associates were saying and in the lower part where it says Kamenica

 7     it says:  Drive out in five days' time.  I hope you will return those who

 8     fled.  Drive them out in five days' time.  Bratunac will be ours.  Food

 9     should come in and these young men from the group will complete the task.

10     Do we agree that it is clear here that they are waiting for a convoy and

11     after that they will be ready to go into combat?  This is 1993.  We've

12     called up this document now.  You provided authorisation for the convoy.

13     There was a convoy before this and after this.

14        A.   Yes.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted or has it been

16     given a number?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2148, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Could we now see 65 ter 16354.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, you wrote a book at the Prosecution's suggestion, if I'm

23     correct, because you provided information about the war and this

24     information was appropriate for the purposes of writing a book.  I think

25     we have a translation and we could see the translation?

Page 25622

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure if we have translation.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, and I'm sure that The Hague

 3     Tribunal has a translation.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a look at 1D5159.  We

 5     have the pages we are interested in translated there and we have nothing

 6     against the translation of the entire book.  Could we see the last page.

 7     The first and last cover.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   And you are the person in this photograph, aren't you?

10        A.   That should be me.

11        Q.   Thank you, General.  Do we agree that if we don't include the

12     introduction, the page -- the book has about a hundred pages and you

13     stand by this book and by the information contained in this book?

14        A.   Yes, I do stand by everything, apart from the critique and the

15     biography because I didn't write that.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could this please be

18     admitted, with the exception of the additional texts that weren't written

19     by General Milovanovic?

20             JUDGE KWON:  What's the point of admitting a book without putting

21     a single question about the content?

22             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, we discussed this, and this is the

24     problem:  There's so much information that this witness has that we're

25     going to have to call him back in our Defence case if we don't -- given

Page 25623

 1     if we don't find some other way to present his information to the Chamber

 2     in the time that's allotted to us.  So we were hoping that by submitting

 3     this book we could later on refer to the items in the book in lieu of his

 4     oral testimony, and that was the idea we had.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Before we consider, can I be hearing the views of

 6     the Prosecution.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  We absolutely object, Your Honour.  This is about

 8     127 scanned pages.  I think this is some kind of 92 ter process they're

 9     trying to do.  We don't have a translation of the entire book.  The --

10     there isn't yet any crisis in time for the Defence presentation of their

11     case, and the perfect remedy -- this doesn't come under 90(H) or getting

12     evidence favourable to you through questioning the witness.  If there is

13     a huge amount of favourable information which they wish to call from this

14     witness, they ought to call him in their Defence.  And I would probably

15     want to cross-examine on some of the material in this book, which I have

16     not read and can't read at the moment.  So I strenuously object to the

17     entire document coming in, and it would be against the practice we've had

18     of referring to pages of this type of material, which is in essence

19     they're offering it as an enormous statement.

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber absolutely agrees with the views of

22     Mr. Nicholls.

23             Mr. Karadzic, if you so wish, you go through the important parts.

24     And as long as you stick to the relevant part, the Chamber never limited

25     your time for cross-examination.  We'll not admit this in such a hasty

Page 25624

 1     manner.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  I was

 3     just afraid that I wouldn't have enough time, but if we have enough time

 4     we'll go through certain things without calling General Milovanovic

 5     again.

 6             Could we see 23620.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   General, did you write a text "my meetings with the president of

 9     the republic and the supreme commander, Dr. Radovan Karadzic"?  Did you

10     do this during the war?  And was this text created for the needs of this

11     Tribunal, or rather, for the needs you felt you had as a witness who came

12     to testify here?

13             We have a translation of this document and we are looking for it.

14        A.   Yes, I did write this immediately after you'd been brought to

15     The Hague because I knew that I would be involved as a witness for the

16     Defence or for the Prosecution, it was all the same to me.  I wrote this

17     down as a sort of aide-memoire so that I could refresh my memory.  I read

18     through this at least 15 times.  I read through it a few days ago and

19     last night, too.  I provided it to your Defence team about -- well, I

20     think at the end of 2009 or at the beginning of 2010.  I thought that you

21     would provide a copy to the Prosecution; however, when I was being

22     proofed by the Prosecution on the 31st of January and on the 1st and 2nd

23     of February, I saw that they didn't have a copy.  So I provided them with

24     one.  So here it says how I obtained the information, on what basis I

25     obtained such information, and I also made a note of my conclusion.

Page 25625

 1     Since the main source of information was, well, relying on my memory, it

 2     was therefore necessary to consider this material to be fairly precise or

 3     backed up by arguments.

 4        Q.   Thank you, General.  Could we have a look at the next version,

 5     the Serbian version, and it's also the next page in the English version.

 6     Do we agree where you say again in the evening on the 14th of May this

 7     first meeting, when I told you that Serbs were trying to avoid war but we

 8     could not sacrifice political freedom.  So you gave a rather accurate

 9     description of our contacts here; right?

10        A.   Yes.  May I just correct something in relation to a problem we

11     came across yesterday.  Yesterday we discussed an order dated the 26th of

12     May, 1992, and what it says there is the following:  On the basis of

13     talks held between the Main Staff and the members of the Presidency - and

14     then this follows - it says -- actually, on the basis of the talks

15     between the Main Staff and the authorities of Republika Srpska on the

16     26th of June.  I think -- it's not that I think.  That's a typo in that

17     text.  It should have said dated the 16th of June, and the document was

18     issued on the 26th -- I beg your pardon, on the 26th of May.  So this

19     document from the 26th of May is actually a product of this meeting of

20     ours that was held on the 16th of May.

21        Q.   Thank you, General.  Since this was created for the purposes of

22     testifying here - and as far as I know the Prosecution does not oppose

23     having this document admitted - I am tendering the document.  If we have

24     enough time left, we can go through it.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

Page 25626

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  I don't object, Your Honour.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  This document seems to be different.  We'll admit

 4     this.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2149, Your Honours.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   General, now I'd like to move on to the topic of the relationship

 9     between the supreme commander and the Main Staff.  So I'm going to remind

10     you of an interview with a Prosecutor that you conducted on the

11     2nd of July, 2007; that is 65 ter 22556 on page 130.  The Prosecutor

12     asked you about what happened on the 12th of May when the

13     Army of Republika Srpska was established.  And you say that a decision

14     was made -- actually, do you remember.  It says here I was not appointed

15     a member at this Assembly, it was Mladic who was appointed.  The Assembly

16     appointed Mladic, and after that he had the freedom of establishing his

17     own team; is that right?

18        A.   Yes.  Mark Harmon was the Prosecutor I talked to in Banja Luka on

19     the 2nd and 3rd of July, 1997 -- sorry, 2007.  And perhaps my statement

20     was somewhat modified through translation, but this is what I stated.  At

21     the Assembly on the 12th of May, 1992, a decision was passed on the

22     establishment of the Army of Republika Srpska.  It's not that the army

23     was established as such.  Secondly, the Assembly appointed Ratko Mladic

24     commander of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska and

25     authorised him to propose appointees for his assistant commanders,

Page 25627

 1     commanders of corps, Chiefs of Staff of corps, so all people who would

 2     hold the position of general.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  General, now I'm going to try to summarise as much as

 4     possible so that we can have as many yes or no answers as possible.  Did

 5     you confirm in that interview that Mladic --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Why do we not have English on our screen.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  That was my question, if I could just have the

 8     English page reference.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  English is noted as "translation."  That may be the

10     problem.  I can see from my personal computer.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm fairly certain, at least, that the English

12     would be the original version.  It should be there.

13                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

14             JUDGE KWON:  What page in English, Mr. Karadzic?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it's 130.  I didn't want to

16     tender the document because this is viva voce testimony.  I just wanted

17     to get answers as to whether what had been said was correct.

18             JUDGE KWON:  But we need to follow.  Is this the correct page,

19     Mr. Karadzic?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, this seems to be the beginning.

21     It should be page 130.  In Serbian it's 130.  Just a moment, please, I

22     don't know what page it is in English.  Actually, it's not even the right

23     page in Serbian.  No, the page is not right in Serbian or in English.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   While it's being found - I don't know what page it is - can I

Page 25628

 1     have your position, General.  Did you say then that Mladic was appointed

 2     by the Assembly at the time and that he was authorised to set up his own

 3     team, and that that was the reason why attempts made by the

 4     Supreme Command to have Mladic replaced were not successful because it

 5     was only the Assembly that could have him dismissed?

 6        A.   Yes.  You could not replace Mladic, but you could make a proposal

 7     to that effect to the Assembly.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Further on, do you remember -- actually, is that not

 9     fresh in your memory, the night before the Assembly when you agreed what

10     should be done by this army, whether it would be an offensive or a

11     defensive one.  Can you tell us what it was that was discussed on the

12     11th of May, on the eve of this Assembly meeting?  What was it that you,

13     founders of the army, discussed?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, General.

15             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm -- I'd -- I'm not suggesting that there's any

17     misrepresentation, but I do object to conducting the cross-examination in

18     terms of "you said this" and "further on you said that," if I have no way

19     of following.  So maybe he can put - as Mr. Robinson has suggested to him

20     before - just put the question rather than saying "you said this" if

21     we're not able to follow along and -- because if it's represented that

22     "you said this," then I want to be able to check it.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Fair enough.  I was about to say to the accused the

24     same thing.

25             Just put your question.  It's quicker, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 25629

 1             Yes, can you -- do you remember the question,

 2     General Milovanovic?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I remember the question.  The

 4     question was roughly what it was that we discussed that night between the

 5     11th and 12th of May, 1992.  It was explained in detail very precisely in

 6     my book.  On one particular page there are eight points where I said what

 7     it was that was discussed exactly.  Should I repeat that from memory, if

 8     I can?

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Can you tell us whether it is correct that on the 11th in the

11     evening you agreed about a few important things, that it would be an army

12     of defence, that it would be a depoliticised army?  Can you tell us what

13     the essence was that you reached at that meeting?

14        A.   Yes.  That evening we did not adopt the actual tasks; rather, we

15     adopted some conclusions on the basis of certain principles as to what we

16     would do the following day once the Assembly passes its decision.  Our

17     first conclusion was, or one of our first decisions was that the future

18     Army of Republika Srpska would be based on the already existing of the

19     Army of the Territorial Defence of a militia type, and that is what the

20     leadership of Republika Srpska started after the 4th of April; that is to

21     say, between the 4th and the 20th of April.  That was the establishment

22     of those brigades of the Territorial Defence in the municipalities that

23     were on the outskirts.  That was the first mainstay of the army.

24             The second mainstay of the army would be the remains of the JNA,

25     both in terms of manpower and equipment.  Thirdly, we would go for the

Page 25630

 1     existing paramilitaries in order to include them in the future Army of

 2     the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Further on, the system of

 3     supplying the army would be based on municipal organs of government, that

 4     is to say those who established a brigade would support it until we find

 5     a more favourable solution.  Further on, we had the intention of

 6     excluding Crisis Staffs from the system of command and control; over the

 7     army, that is.  Crisis Staffs would stay on and carry out their duties

 8     that had to do with taking care of citizens in situations of imminent

 9     threat of war.  And we also envisaged imposing a state of war as such so

10     they could do everything except command units.

11             I've already mentioned paramilitaries.  They were supposed to be

12     built into the system of command of the Army of Republika Srpska or they

13     should be expelled or destroyed.  As far as morale is concerned, the

14     morale of the army, all of a sudden we were moving on to a system --

15     well, I cannot say that we were moving from a communist, but say a

16     socialist system of governing society, and from that we were moving on to

17     a purely Serb army.  So there is no brotherhood in unity.  We will be

18     fighting our hitherto brothers.  So then we went to the sources of

19     morale; that is to say the traditions of the Serb army, faith,

20     enlightenment of members of the military as regards the objectives of our

21     struggle.  Also, we built in a segment that had to do with commanders and

22     officers giving, or rather, setting an example.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Did you agree then that the Geneva Conventions should

24     be observed and, in a way, you expressed faith in one another or loyalty;

25     rather, if one of you is replaced, then the rest would follow?

Page 25631

 1        A.   Yes.  I think that that conclusion about observing international

 2     humanitarian law follows what I already explained, that is to say the

 3     building of combat morale, and that is one of these principles of ours.

 4             Could you please repeat the second part of your question.

 5        Q.   The second part of the question has to do with the following:  Is

 6     it correct that in a way you pledged loyalty to one another?  In case one

 7     of you is replaced, then all the others would resign?

 8        A.   First of all, I omitted an important thing in relation to these

 9     principles of ours, and that is that we were building an army of defence.

10     At strategic level it was of defensive character and in terms of

11     operations and tactics it would be offensive.  That is very important as

12     far as the nature of the army is concerned.

13             As for this question, this last one, that is not part of the

14     principles, that is not part of the system of command and control.

15     Rather, the 12 of us pledged ourselves to one another, that we would go

16     on operating as a team.  And if one of us is dismissed for political

17     reasons, that is to say if somebody or a political party that is in power

18     does not like us, then we would all leave the positions we currently

19     held.  We would go back into the trenches with the troops.  We made the

20     corps commands aware of that when the Main Staff was first assembled, and

21     that was the 26th of May I think -- no -- yes, the 26th of May.  We made

22     them aware of that at the proposal of General Talic, and all corps

23     commands accepted that.  They said that they would do the same thing.

24     And that was one of the explanations I gave to you.  When you tried to

25     dismiss General Mladic, I said to you that we had undertaken this

Page 25632

 1     obligation amongst ourselves and that you would no longer have any

 2     commanding personnel if that were to be carried out.

 3        Q.   Thank you, General.  I remember.  Is it correct that on several

 4     occasions I asked you to take over the command, that is to say the

 5     Main Staff, and on each and every occasion you gave this same answer.  So

 6     it wasn't only once, it was several times?

 7        A.   Yes, twice it was orally.  On the 6th of August, 1993, in Pale;

 8     and on the 3rd of August, 1995, in Drvar at my command post.  The third

 9     time it was in written form by way of an order on re-naming the

10     Main Staff into a General Staff and my appointment as head of this

11     General Staff, and you assigned Mladic to a position of special advisor

12     to the Supreme Command of the armed forces of Republika Srpska and the

13     Republic of the Serb Krajina.

14        Q.   Thank you.  When you spoke about this error being incorporated

15     into the Law on the Army, did you -- do you agree that because of that

16     error we had a two-headed army and armed forces, instead of having the

17     Main Staff become the staff of the Supreme Command?

18        A.   Yes, I remember that, and I stand by it as I sit here.  However,

19     command and control of the army during the war was not two-headed, as it

20     were, and that is mainly thanks to the Main Staff.  We remained under

21     your personal command and you know very well that no one from the

22     Supreme Command could issue orders to the Main Staff other than you.  So

23     you were that link between the Supreme Command and the Main Staff.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now please just elicit short answers.  Can

25     we agree that this carefulness of yours came from the fact that a party

Page 25633

 1     that was not a socialist party had won in the elections, that there was a

 2     change not only in the regime but also the entire political system, and

 3     that there was danger that there might follow a clash between the new

 4     regime and the old army?

 5        A.   No.  The result of that cautiousness was something quite

 6     different.  We -- when speaking about the army that still existed and it

 7     was mentioned yesterday, some 85.000 to 90.000 armed men, we found, in

 8     fact, some kind of Chetnik strategy of fighting in their structures.

 9     That would be camping as a method, and then if somebody attacked a

10     Serbian town or place then they would just rise and go.  And by the time

11     they reached there, the place would have been destroyed and it would have

12     been too late.

13             As for the officers of the Army of Republika Srpska, a large

14     number of officers at the lower level of command and control were in

15     favour of the Partizan strategy of warfare.  I believe that was the

16     result of the previous 50 years where we were taught and trained in this

17     tradition, and we assessed that neither strategy was viable for us.  The

18     Chetnik strategy could not -- we could not win with; and as for the

19     Partizan strategy, that was not viable because of the territory.  But

20     also because of constitutional provisions, the provisions of the

21     constitution of Republika Srpska.  The constitution of Republika Srpska

22     obliges the citizens of Republika Srpska to defend the well-defined

23     territories of Republika Srpska and to defend and protect the population

24     lest the genocide of 1941 through 1945 repeat itself.

25        Q.   Thank you.  You've answered one of my intended questions.  Is it

Page 25634

 1     correct that the leadership set two objectives for the army.  The first

 2     one was to prevent a potential new genocide and the second was to defend

 3     the people and the territories until a political solution was found.  Yes

 4     or no?  We can deal with this easily.

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that at the time of the Vance-Owen Plan,

 7     the tensions were high, and do you agree in principle that this tension

 8     between the civilian and military structures did not -- arose from

 9     different approaches to what the new state system should be like, so it

10     was really of doctrinary nature?

11        A.   You mentioned crimes as a possible reason for these differences

12     in approaches; however, I would like to correct you.  There was the

13     Vance-Owen Plan, the Stoltenberg Plan, the Contact Group Plan, so I'm not

14     sure which one you're referring to exactly.  I believe that's the one

15     that you signed in Athens.  That was not the reason, Mr. Karadzic, for

16     our differences.  The reason was that we based ourselves on these two

17     provisions of the constitution.  The army did not want to allow the

18     crumbling of Republika Srpska, its disintegration, or division into these

19     10 or 11 cantons.  So we opted for armed struggle in order to maintain an

20     integral Republika Srpska; you opted for diplomacy.  Up until early 1995,

21     the army provided for you, if you recall our telephone conversations, my

22     first sentence would usually be, Mr. President, you can take the high

23     ground because we have an advantage.  Or, if not, we would say, You would

24     need assistance from -- we would need assistance from diplomacy.

25             So this was where our differences were.  The army was in charge

Page 25635

 1     of the war, whereas you were in charge of diplomacy.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in one of the documents that we've admitted I

 3     read that you actually had a grudge -- held a grudge against me because I

 4     said at some point that our army was too combative - is that correct? -

 5     this was said in the context of the different proposals for peace

 6     resolution that were coming in the context of the international

 7     community.

 8        A.   Yes.  I believe you said that at the Supreme Command session of

 9     the -- of August 6.  This was an expanded session when we reached

10     Bjelasnica and Igman because then the negotiations were already underway

11     on our withdrawal, and then I said, Well, how can the Supreme Commander

12     not want to have a combative army?  Now, that was the first thing but

13     then I also objected to your statement that we did not wish to defeat

14     the Muslims and I even –- objected to something that the Patriarch Pavle,

15     when addressing the Serb people, said.  He said, We should not hate

16     the enemy.

17             We build combat morale on the hatred toward the enemy.  Now, all

18     of a sudden you are urging us not to defeat this enemy; and on the other

19     hand, the patriarch was calling on us not to hate the Muslims.  So that

20     was contradictory.

21        Q.   Subsequently there -- it was said that you were the initiator of

22     establishing new contacts with the political leadership that had reached

23     it's slow point at that time?

24        A.   Yes.  On the 12th of August, 1995, that's when it came about.

25     Now, you know the Assembly session where Mitsotakis and Milosevic

Page 25636

 1     attended, and the Assembly declined to accept your signature.  Milosevic

 2     was putting that in the context of push back but win the war, and somehow

 3     with that position of his, he seemed to take the upper hand at that

 4     session of the Assembly.  After that, Milosevic and perhaps the Greeks,

 5     I'm not sure if they had part in that sent Perisic, because he understood

 6     that the army was the one that was against the implementation of the

 7     Contact Group Plan, so he sent the Chief of the General Staff Perisic to

 8     us, to the Main Staff, so that he could talk reason to us.  Now, we spent

 9     the whole afternoon discussing this, looking for a way out.

10             Now, the civilian leaderships of Republika Srpska and the

11     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia too were not functioning too well.  And in

12     search of a way out, I said that we in Republika Srpska first have to

13     re-establish our ties with the civilian authorities of Republika Srpska,

14     that we had to establish co-operation, that after that Assembly session

15     we even stopped exchanging opinions with each other.  And it was not

16     expected that General Mladic would be so offended, and he asked me then,

17     What was it that you said?  And I said, Well, we should re-establish the

18     links with our political leadership, and only then can we put pressure on

19     them for them to renew the contacts with the Federal Republic of

20     Yugoslavia.

21             Then he said, could you repeat that one more time so I can write

22     it down.  And then I realised what it was all about.  He was actually

23     against that.  There were other people there.  Some of them were rumbling

24     and I wasn't sure if they were actually opposing what I said or what he

25     said.

Page 25637

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Now, you remember, General, that I asked you to

 2     withdraw the army from Igman and Bjelasnica, that you said that then you

 3     had to deal with this hot potato, but that then I asked of you to

 4     withdraw from Igman and Bjelasnica but in the least painful way; in other

 5     words, to hand it over to UNPROFOR, not to the Muslim army.  Correct?

 6        A.   Yes, Mr. Karadzic, and even as I sit here when I think of those

 7     days, the 12th, 13th, and 14th of August, 1995, I still feel

 8     uncomfortable.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  This was another reason why -- which explained this

10     tension between us - correct? - because the civilian leadership - or me

11     specifically - in view of my obligations arising from the negotiations, I

12     frequently actually was an obstacle or presented an obstacle to the army?

13        A.   Well, you could put it that way; however, I never said that you

14     obstructed the army.  But I did say on a number of occasions - and I will

15     reiterate it - that you made some moves without previously consulting the

16     army.  Let me remind you of the problem between the two of us that had to

17     do with pulling back the air force and the anti-aircraft defence.  This

18     started on the 24th of August, 1992, and was at its peak in October 1992,

19     and then it lingered all the way through the adoption of the

20     Resolution 816 of the Security Council on the no-fly zone over Bosnia and

21     Herzegovina of the 31st of March, 1994.

22        Q.   Thank you.  But is it true that your logic, the military logic,

23     was not to withdraw, whereas my position was that we should withdraw

24     because that arose from the negotiations.  And is that what caused these

25     tensions between us when talking about Bjelasnica and Igman?

Page 25638

 1        A.   Do you mean between you and me or between you and Mladic or do

 2     you mean between the Supreme Command and the Main Staff?

 3        Q.   Well, between the Supreme Command and the Main Staff or me and

 4     Mladic.  You heard from both of us from Geneva; correct?

 5        A.   Unfortunately, yes.  One was pulling one way, wanted me to stop;

 6     and the other was pulling the other way and demanding that I not cede

 7     territory; in other words, you were asking me to withdraw and Mladic was

 8     asking me not to cede the territory to the Muslims.  Or five months

 9     earlier, as we discussed this in Srebrenica, you staid Stop, and Mladic

10     said, Move into Srebrenica.  To be honest, it wasn't fair on either one

11     of your parts.  And the two of you were together there.

12             Now, the other case, Igman and Bjelasnica, I had strict orders

13     from you to pull back.  And until the breakdown in communications - if

14     you recall I was in a vehicle when we were talking - I had this idea how

15     to actually carry this out, how do I withdraw the army but not cede

16     territory?  So when I said this to General Hayes and I said my supreme

17     commander wants me to withdraw the army but not cede territory to the

18     enemy.  And then he said, well -- he probably already had a clear idea in

19     his mind.  He said, General, I will help you.  You withdraw your army and

20     I will take positions of your forward positions and I prevent the Muslims

21     from taking control of that territory.  Had he not been a man, I would

22     probably have given him a kiss then.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Now, General, do you remember that I told you that I

24     was under pressure to replace Mladic and I wanted to move him to the

25     political leadership, but you said not only because of that covenant that

Page 25639

 1     you had between you, that that was not possible because he could -- not

 2     only because of that covenant but also because only the Assembly could

 3     actually dismiss him?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Can we have a date or a time-frame for this

 6     question?

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   As of 6th August 1993, do you remember that I told you then that

 9     there were pressures, and then after that, on another occasion, I told

10     you --

11        A.   Well, that was on the 3rd of August, 1995.

12        Q.   Yes, but in 1993 that was August 6th, and this was in the context

13     of Bjelasnica and Igman?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   And then on one occasion I said that you would take over the army

16     and I said in May.

17             Now, the 6th of August, 1993, before we go on break, can you just

18     briefly describe what it was about.  What did I ask you to do?

19        A.   I can, but you have to stop adding things on because I'm looking

20     at the cursor and I don't know when I can go on.

21             Well, there were other reasons and I presented them to you.  Do

22     you remember that I asked you then who would be my boss?  Because I

23     thought that that was your final decision.  And you said that you would

24     be my boss; in other words, that I would take over command of the army.

25     I said that I would not do that and I mentioned the reasons, the loyalty

Page 25640

 1     that we pledged to one another and so on.  Then I said that Mladic was

 2     able and capable to command the army.  I told you, Mr. Karadzic, that

 3     Mladic's authority in the army and amongst the population is something

 4     that I wouldn't be able to accomplish through the end of the war.

 5     Whenever Mladic showed up anywhere and said, Let's go, nobody would

 6     question it, they would just follow him, whereas I as -- or a corps

 7     commander appeared somewhere, we would always have to justify what we

 8     were asking.  As you can see from all those documents, there is always

 9     some kind of explanation in the preamble, explaining why we are ordering

10     so and so, whereas in Mladic's documents there was no such thing.  And I

11     also said that I'm more useful as the chief of the Main Staff in the VRS

12     than as a commander of that army because the chief of the Main Staff is

13     the position which actually unifies everything from supplies through

14     combat use, and this is then presented to the commander.  I felt that I

15     would be more useful in that position than if I were to be the commander

16     of that army.  So those were my reasons.

17             Now, the reasons that I had on the 3rd of August, 1995, were

18     somewhat simpler and shorter.  One of them was - and I told both you and

19     Krajisnik of this - I said, Which fool would take over command of an army

20     while it was withdrawing throughout the front and which would be followed

21     by loss of territory?

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, may I just ask or say,

24     rather, that the Defence would not mind to have a shorter break or, if

25     possible, to extend our work today past 3.00 p.m. today because I would

Page 25641

 1     like to show as many documents as I can to this witness because he's a

 2     very valuable witness.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Does it mean that you want to conclude your

 4     cross-examination during today?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'd rather not,

 6     Your Excellency, but I'm not sure how much time I still have.  I'd rather

 7     have the General come back on Monday, if that's possible.  Because the

 8     number of documents that he had seen and decisions, relevant decisions,

 9     that he had to do with are very relevant and would be very helpful to the

10     Trial Chamber.

11             JUDGE KWON:  I'm just asking, General Milovanovic, for planning

12     purposes, is it a possibility for you to stay till Monday?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would rather stay than have to

14     come back on another occasion sometime later, which is what happened in

15     one instance earlier.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE KWON:  We'll take a break now and then we'll see how it

19     evolves.  We'll resume at 1.30.

20                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   General, is it correct that you considered Mladic to be a fairly

Page 25642

 1     reasonable person when it came to military issues and you could influence

 2     him, but in political terms it was difficult for politicians to deal with

 3     him and to have a dialogue with him?  He was inflexible, in political

 4     terms.

 5        A.   Yes.  General Mladic is fully fledged military individual.  That

 6     concerns all aspects of the military.  He has a sort of natural or

 7     so-called natural intelligence that assists him in drawing conclusions.

 8     As to how he dealt with you, the politicians, well, you're in a better

 9     place to know about that than I am.  But given what I could see when I

10     participated in your conversations, it's true that he was inflexible.  He

11     would never budge an inch.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Is it true that on one occasion I told you that I

13     would present you with a fait accompli in front of the journalists and I

14     would say that I'd handed the army over to you, that you would be the

15     commander of the Main Staff.  And you said that you would deny this and

16     that this is not something that could be done without there being an

17     Assembly decision?

18        A.   Yes, that was on the 6th of August, 1993, when you and I went to

19     give statements to 100 or 150 journalists.  That's about how many there

20     were in front of the Assembly building.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And do you remember that in December 1993 I was angry

22     because I never knew where Mladic was and I would have to ask you about

23     his whereabouts, if you knew about them.  And then I asked you to come

24     and see me privately to have a conversation in Pale, and there I also

25     suggested that you take over the army?

Page 25643

 1        A.   That was on the 10th of December, 1993.  On that occasion you

 2     suggested that I -- or rather, you didn't suggest that I take over the

 3     army.  You said that it would be better if I were in command of the army.

 4        Q.   It's not really in the transcript, but is it true that I was a

 5     bit critical because I never knew where Mladic was, and therefore I said

 6     that you were a better soldier than your commander because you would say

 7     where you were, whereas in his case I didn't know his whereabouts?

 8        A.   Yes, that was after you had explained the reasons for calling me.

 9     You didn't want us to talk as the supreme commander and the

10     Chief of Staff, but you wanted the conversation to be a private one,

11     between two men, Karadzic and myself.  I said that although you wanted

12     this conversation to be a private one, I was obliged to inform

13     General Mladic of the fact pursuant to the law.  Then I said that

14     General Mladic was in Belgrade, and you then said that I was a better

15     soldier than Mladic because I would report to my commander, inform him of

16     my whereabouts, but he didn't deem it necessary to tell you that he was

17     leaving the battle-field.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that after August 1994 sanctions were

19     imposed upon us.  The SRY imposed sanctions on us and officers no longer

20     received their salaries.  So given the dissatisfaction or not to say the

21     revolt in the Eastern Bosnia Corps, you went along with me to speak to

22     those officers?

23        A.   Yes.  The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia imposed sanctions on us

24     on the 4th of August, 1994.  On that occasion, the officers did not

25     receive their salaries for the following three months.  However, in

Page 25644

 1     May 1993 after the difficulties concerning the Vance-Owen Plan there was

 2     a five-month period.  I was with you to calm down those officers who were

 3     in revolt -- well, I can't say in revolt because they didn't use their

 4     weapons, but they were dissatisfied and they wanted to speak to you and

 5     General Mladic.  General Mladic sent me to speak to them and he said that

 6     you probably wouldn't have anything against it.  That was his

 7     justification.  You wouldn't have anything against me being there.  And

 8     certainly he was afraid of whom he should support.  He had to support

 9     you, the supreme commander, or rather, he had to justify your actions,

10     but he couldn't let down the officers over whom he had command.  And we

11     were down there together.  You know how the meeting ended.  No one was

12     satisfied.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell the Chamber what my reaction was.

14     Could these officers have told me everything to my face and did

15     everything end in a democratic and positive way?

16        A.   The officers told you all sorts of things.  First of all, someone

17     spoke about the reasons for calling you there.  Colonel Slobodan Jelesic,

18     the deputy commander, the assistant commander of General Simic for

19     morale, spoke about the reasons for calling you there.  And then you gave

20     the floor to the participants at the meeting.  Everything would say all

21     sorts of things.  The best way to depict the atmosphere there is for me

22     to mention Momcilo Krajisnik's speech.  He was there with you, or rather,

23     with us and he said the following:

24             Radovan, aren't we fortunate to have such officers?  We will

25     certainly be victorious.  Given that they can tell you the sort of things

Page 25645

 1     that they have told you, then you can imagine the sort of things that

 2     they could do to the enemy.  And you used those words of Krajisnik so

 3     that the meeting would end successfully for you and for me.  You accepted

 4     all their comments, all their objections, and you promised them that the

 5     state would not forget about its officers.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I wasn't angry with them or with Mladic for not being

 7     there; isn't that correct?  I had nothing against you being there?

 8        A.   You were not angry, but I was angry with the officers on that

 9     occasion because they applauded Krajisnik's speech.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that in June or May or the beginning

11     of June, perhaps, I issued an order that concerned retiring the Generals

12     Gvero, Djukic and Tolimir and Colonel Beara.  I didn't succeed in doing

13     that and later I didn't have any contact with them.  It was as if they

14     had retired or been sent into retirement.  That was in 1995, May or June

15     1995.

16        A.   I know that it was in May 1995.  I personally considered that to

17     be a manner of sanctioning the officers because of the way they conducted

18     themselves at the Sanski Assembly on the 15th of April, 1995.  I think

19     that they were sent into retirement.  I think that General Gvero,

20     General Djukic, and General Beara and Tolimir were sent into retirement.

21     But there were no other interventions up until 1996 to ensure that that

22     order was implemented.

23        Q.   But I no longer considered them to be our officers.  I no longer

24     asked them to submit reports to me, nor did I have any contact with them.

25        A.   I couldn't say because I really don't know whether you had

Page 25646

 1     contact with them or not.  They didn't complain to me.  I know that they

 2     continued to communicate with me and Mladic, so I can't confirm that nor

 3     can I deny it.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  It was clear to you, was it not, that in the

 5     Main Staff that the daily reports that were sent to the supreme commander

 6     were read by my advisors, and is it true that you were critical of my

 7     advisors?  You didn't consider them to be sufficiently capable or

 8     sufficiently educated to provide me with correct advice, adequate advice?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Your position was that when it came to military

11     matters I was quite subject to -- well, I could be easily influenced.  I

12     wasn't a professional and as someone who was in favour of

13     Republika Srpska I didn't take my interests into account.  And according

14     to you, many of my assistants influenced me and tried to pursue their own

15     interests through me.

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And was your position that my advisors should be

18     sufficiently capable to distinguish what was important from what wasn't

19     important and they should provide the president with important

20     information, information that had been selected according to relevant

21     criteria, and they should also put forward certain proposals, certain

22     solutions?

23        A.   Yes, I came to that conclusion at our first meeting on the

24     16th of May, 1992, when Colonel Tacic was attacked.  First this was

25     fabricated; and secondly, it wasn't the most important piece of

Page 25647

 1     information provided to you by the Main Staff.  There were far more

 2     serious problems; for example, liberating captured officers and soldiers

 3     and family members in Sarajevo barracks.  There was the problem of

 4     raising the blockade of those barracks and there was the problem of the

 5     JNA's withdrawal.  That was the 16th of May and the dead-line for

 6     withdrawal was the 19th of May.  Instead of discussing that issue, we

 7     discussed the fact that some colonel had allegedly taken 12 tanks from

 8     Vlasenica to Serbia, which was not correct.

 9        Q.   But apparently it was correct that the whole rocket brigade had

10     been taken out by him, so we didn't have as much equipment, as many

11     weapons that we could use to defend ourselves from NATO; is that correct?

12        A.   I don't know which rocket brigade you had in mind.

13        Q.   I think there was a rocket brigade in Romanija before the war and

14     he was responsible for it and he took it to Serbia, to Yugoslavia.

15        A.   This is the first time I've heard about that.  I know that we

16     kept surface-to-surface rocket brigade from the JNA of the Luna type.  We

17     kept the 155th Rocket Brigade, the anti-aircraft defence

18     155th Rocket Brigade.  There was the independent rocket regiment

19     somewhere in Romanija or Sokoca [phoen] area.  This is the first time

20     I've heard about this brigade that was taken there, and Tacic didn't have

21     that establishment speciality that would have enabled him to be in

22     command of a rocket brigade.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that from the 1st of July up until

24     about the 4th of August, I mainly communicated with you, and as a result

25     I sent you, in fact, reports and I sent you my decisions.  And as a

Page 25648

 1     result, other generals were a little suspicious about this.  It was from

 2     the 1st of July until August 1995.  Nevertheless, you had to report to

 3     Mladic about this and you had to carry out his orders.  And in

 4     exceptional cases, you had to report to the second in command, your

 5     second superior.

 6        A.   Yes, that happened in the month of July up until the 6th -- the

 7     4th of August, 1995, not all the time, though, if I understand you

 8     correctly.  But it did happen a few times.  However, whenever that

 9     happened I cautioned you or General Subotic, saying that the system of

10     command was being duplicated.  I never refused to carry out your order,

11     but I would forward that order to General Mladic as my first reporting

12     officer.  And then I'd wait for his answer.  Usually the wait would take

13     about 24 hours.  If I received an answer, then I carried things out the

14     way he had wanted them to be carried out.  If he responded to me, he

15     mostly supported your orders.  If I did not receive a response, then I

16     acted on your order.  The problem with that was doubling the time for

17     carrying out the order, and that was the reason why I voiced my

18     criticism.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that you had an objection because I was

20     almost unnaturally peace loving as far as the Bosnian Croats were

21     concerned, and this happened, although they attacked the Serbs if they

22     were not at war with the Muslims, for example, in the Lasva river valley.

23     And is it true that when the Muslims expelled them from the Lasva river

24     valley, the Army of Republika Srpska took them in at Vlasic and acted as

25     their host?

Page 25649

 1        A.   Yes.  To this day I'm angry with the current president of the

 2     Republika Srpska because he plays along with the Croats way too much and

 3     then in the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina they turned their backs on

 4     him.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to show you something now, General.  The

 6     Prosecution showed an example of where things developed rather smoothly

 7     in our communications and in the transmission of orders.  Now I'd like to

 8     show that we had great difficulties in this respect too.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So could the General please be

10     shown 1D05438.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Do you remember this additional order that had to do with the

13     order not to bring into custody national deputies or members of the MUP

14     and government, because that kind of thing had happened?

15        A.   Could you please tell me - because I cannot see myself - is this

16     a document from 1995 or 1996?

17        Q.   September 1995.

18        A.   I do not remember this, but I do remember a document - that's why

19     I asked whether it was 1995 or 1996 - because I remember that in the

20     heading there is a reference number and then there is /96 and then

21     underneath it says the 18 of September.  Now, I really cannot see whether

22     it is 1995 or 1996.  If it is 1995, I do not remember the document.

23     However, if it is 1996, you issued a similar order in 1996 after that

24     mutual arrest.  The civilian authorities were arresting generals, and

25     General Mladic responded by arresting civilian authorities; however, the

Page 25650

 1     war was already over and it had to do with the implementation of the

 2     Dayton Peace Accords.

 3        Q.   Thank you, General.  This is an old Serbian habit.  Once the war

 4     against the enemy is over, then it starts against the Serbs; right?

 5     Actually, you don't have to answer that.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document admitted?

 7     So it's the Main Staff and this is being sent to the 1st Krajina Corps,

 8     although I think it should have been sent to the 2nd Krajina Corps.  And

 9     now I'm going to show you this other document.  Can this be admitted?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, he didn't know anything about it, I thought.

12     He knew about an event in 1996, if I followed, but he said he didn't --

13     if this is 1995, I don't remember the document, and then spoke about a

14     different event in 1996.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, do you know -- you said -- actually, you said that the

17     war was over, practically over, September 1995, when the

18     2nd Krajina Corps, in contravention of my orders, ordered the

19     mobilisation of the top people from the MUP, the business community,

20     et cetera.  And then I ordered that that should not be done and I added

21     this to that order.  Do you remember all of this?  This was sent to the

22     Main Staff in September.

23        A.   I really do not recall, although at the time I was in the area of

24     the 2nd Krajina Corps, that is, September, and there is combat against

25     the Croatian Operation Storm.

Page 25651

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have a look at

 2     1D05440.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Do you remember now?  For example, the 2nd Krajina Corps is

 5     ordering the mobilisation of the leaders of the business community here,

 6     and that upset me because that means that the economy grinds to a halt

 7     and it was hard for us to feed the army anyway.

 8        A.   This document was signed by the late General Tomanic, and I do

 9     not recall it, although I was in his command.  However, this is the end

10     of September, it's the 29th, and that previous order of yours was issued

11     somewhat earlier.  I don't remember it.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can we then just look at 1D03904 from the

13     2nd of October.  Actually, I'm interested in the principle involved,

14     General.  The 2nd Krajina Corps, did it have to act in accordance with my

15     order or was there some misunderstanding there?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I'm not sure how it relates to your

17     case.  While complaining about shortage of time, I would like you to

18     concentrate on more critical issues.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to show, Excellency,

20     that there were quite a few misunderstandings and there was a lot of

21     friction, too.  For example, the order that I called up a moment ago,

22     that this other order that was here should be annulled, and look at this:

23     On the 4th General Mladic is responding to me.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   For example, do you remember this, General?

Page 25652

 1        A.   No, I do not remember this at all, although I was in the command

 2     of the 2nd Krajina Corps.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Actually, do you remember Mladic's letter sent to me

 4     dated the 4th of October, where he says we analysed the order and so on

 5     and so forth, order issued to the 2nd Krajina Corps, and on the basis of

 6     these facts we concluded that the command of the 2nd Krajina Corps acted

 7     in accordance with the order issued by the superior command and that this

 8     order would be carried out in subordinate units.  So I'm just trying to

 9     indicate what the principle is and that was not always easy.  And can we

10     have a look at 14324, that would be the 65 ter number.  Please take a

11     look at this.  Do you agree that after all it was stated here that the

12     2nd Krajina Corps would act in accordance with General Mladic's orders

13     and that I could not have my decision implemented?

14        A.   I don't remember this order because it did not have to do with

15     the forward command post.  It was sent directly to you from

16     General Mladic, so -- I mean, quite simply, I don't remember this.

17        Q.   Did General Mladic have to act in accordance with my orders?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have 1D05441 and then we are going to decide

20     on how admissible this is later.  So this is two days later that I'm

21     answering General Mladic.  Also, I concluded from his document that

22     number 2, my order had not been carried out.  Number 3, that in this way

23     the authority of the government, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the

24     Interior, and so on, is being infringed upon.  And can we move on to the

25     next page now.  Please take a look at this:

Page 25653

 1             I hereby order that the order changes in the order issued by the

 2     Main Staff ... be carried out straight away and that the provisions that

 3     apply to managers, et cetera, should be repealed.  Do you agree that it

 4     was not easy to implement all of my decisions?  For example, Milutinovic,

 5     Radio Krajina, many other things.  It was simply not that easy to

 6     implement my decisions with regard to any of this?

 7        A.   I fully agree with you, that it was hard for you.  However, there

 8     are few things that I'm surprised at.  You know what your attitude was

 9     towards General Tomanic, specifically.  And I'm surprised that Tomanic

10     did that, or rather, that he did something against your will.  He carried

11     out General Mladic's order.  The man is dead now, but he was sitting on

12     two chairs, if you will.  Secondly, I'm surprised that the Main Staff, or

13     rather, General Mladic rebelled against this order of yours when the

14     Main Staff itself, as far as I know - let me work this out now - three,

15     four times asked for you to intervene through the MUP so that the MUP

16     would help us with the additional mobilisation of certain areas where the

17     military police was insufficient, or to have the MUP help us in some

18     operations.  Quite simply, the author of these papers of Mladic's

19     disregarded the fact that we had asked you for your assistance.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I do not do this gladly, but I had to present this

21     because the Prosecution wanted to present things as if they were moving

22     along smoothly.  And now I would like to have all of these documents

23     admitted because they speak about the difficulties that were there, how

24     difficult it was to be in charge of the state and the army in a

25     principled way?

Page 25654

 1             JUDGE KWON:  If Mr. Robinson could expand on the relevance, how

 2     it relates to the period relevant to the indictment.

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, I believe the period relating

 4     to the indictment goes to November 1995, first of all, so I think we're

 5     well within that period.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  What's in that -- could I -- could you ...

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  If we look at the -- I'll have to call it up, but

 8     if we look at the indictment, the question of the -- how long the joint

 9     criminal enterprise lasted --

10             JUDGE KWON:  No, but the crimes --

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Well the --

12             JUDGE KWON:  -- committed after --

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, we certainly have Markale 2 on the 28th of

14     August, 1995, that's -- at least we have that as a specific crime.  But I

15     think the -- and Mr. Tieger can speak to this more authoritatively than I

16     can, but my understanding is that the indictment periods covers -- this

17     is within the indictment period.

18             If I could also say, to me this goes to the core of the case with

19     respect to Srebrenica, the issues of effective control --

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  Excuse me --

21             MR. ROBINSON:  -- ability --

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  I just wonder if my friend can think about whether

23     or not this should be in front of the witness.  I don't know what he's

24     about to say.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  I think it can be in front of the witness, but you

Page 25655

 1     can stop me if I'm saying too much, but the issues that we're dealing

 2     with here deal with issues of effective control and the ability to

 3     prevent and punish the crimes in July of 1995, for starters.  So it seems

 4     to me to be very relevant.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may just add something.  This

 6     had been going on from 1993 onwards.  The General spoke about that.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  If you have examples 1993/1994 which the General is

 8     aware of, why don't you use it?  I will consult my colleagues.

 9             Would you like to respond?  But you do not challenge the

10     authenticity of these documents?

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  No, Your Honour.  Just that they are late, as

12     Your Honour points out.  The -- and the witness did not know about

13     this -- these alleged difficulties about mobilisation of businessmen in

14     the western part of the country.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, if I could just add two more

16     things.  Number one, I think he gave enough context to this dispute to

17     admit the documents; and number two, I'm just reminded in -- was with the

18     last witness the Prosecution was introducing documents from January and

19     March of 1996.  So I think it's not very fair to call something in

20     September 1995 late, especially when the duty to punish exists after the

21     crimes.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  The 1996 documents, if they're the ones I'm

23     thinking of, referred to cover-ups and events which occurred in the heart

24     of the Srebrenica, what we consider, week of crime.

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 25656

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Although the witness was not able to confirm the

 2     content of these documents, certainly it relates to a topic which he

 3     deals with, i.e., the relation between the military on the one hand and

 4     the civilian political authority on the other hand.  And in that regard,

 5     the Chamber finds that it will be assisting us.  Also, we note

 6     Mr. Robinson's submission, so we'll admit them all.  So 1D5440 will be

 7     given Exhibit D2150, and 1D3904 will be 1D2151.  Mladic's letter which is

 8     14324 will be 1D2152, and the last, Mr. Karadzic's order, will be

 9     admitted as D2153.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I can just assist, 1D05438, that

11     is the additional order, will that also be assigned a number?  Will it be

12     admitted?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2154, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   General, I would just now like to ask you briefly to see if we

18     can agree.  Do you remember that on the 30th of March there was the

19     14th Session of the Supreme Command - and you spoke about this during the

20     examination-in-chief.  Now, can we agree that after that time the

21     exacerbated conditions had, as a consequence, a session in Sanski Most on

22     the 15th of April, and this was when it culminated, when the developments

23     culminated, as it were?

24        A.   That session was held on the 31st of March, the 14th Session.

25     That session did not affect negatively the relationship to the effect

Page 25657

 1     that they would come to a head at that session of the 15th of April in

 2     Sanski Most.  In between there was another session of the Supreme Command

 3     in Banja Luka on the 13th of March.

 4        Q.   The 13th of April you mean?

 5        A.   Yes, you're correct, the 13th of April in the evening.  That is

 6     when these deteriorating relationship between the Supreme Command and the

 7     Main Staff came to a head.  At that session we were supposed to discuss

 8     the final version of the expose of the Main Staff which the Main Staff

 9     was supposed to present to the Assembly.  Simply, we were not heard.  It

10     was said - because you had received those materials earlier and they were

11     probably -- they had probably been read by members of the

12     Supreme Command.  I believe that Krajisnik spoke for the Supreme Command

13     and said that a document of this form cannot be presented to the

14     Assembly.

15             After this session of the 13th of April, we agreed that

16     General Mladic would take the floor at the Assembly session and read out

17     the expose, and that is what transpired.  The Assembly session completed

18     its work, irrespective of the events of the 15th and the 16th of April in

19     Sanski Most.  It ended amicably because neither you nor Mladic could

20     afford to have the echos of this relationship become public.  And then

21     you met on the 16th or the 17th of April, the two of you, on

22     Mount Vlasic.  There is video footage showing the two of you inspecting

23     the visit -- inspecting the soldiers on the front line.  And after this

24     session of the Assembly there were -- there was no reaction from either

25     the Supreme Command or the Main Staff, other than --

Page 25658

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not catch other than what.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And I understood that to be some

 3     sort of punishment meted out to the generals.

 4             But, Mr. Karadzic, I have to add something.  After that Assembly

 5     session, the distrust between the supreme -- the Main Staff and the

 6     Supreme Command became very pronounced, and I could feel it in my

 7     position.  Whenever any step was taken by anyone, the intentions were in

 8     contravention of the intentions of the other side.  Well, first of all,

 9     the army did not get what it expected to get from that Assembly session,

10     it didn't get anything.  However, the Supreme Command and the Assembly

11     did not heed or accept or acknowledge if anything at least the military

12     assessments.  Fourteen days later Operation Flash began and the Serbs

13     lost Western Slavonia then, and the Army of Republika Srpska now had a

14     direct enemy opposing it on the Una and Sava River.

15             So this was in nobody's interest and neither side can be proud of

16     what we did then on the 15th and 16th of April.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Thank you, General.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D3910.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   And can we agree, General, that irrespective of whether the

22     suspicions were justified, that both sides were certain that they were

23     correct in their suspicions.  So the level of distrust was very high.

24     And do you remember this letter that I wrote to the members of the

25     Supreme Command and the members of the Main Staff.  This was on the night

Page 25659

 1     after this session that Operation Flash began?  Do you agree that the

 2     commander, the chief, the assistant commanders received this letter that

 3     I addressed to them on the 30th of April -- actually, my -- the date when

 4     I sent it was the 29th of April, but it was forwarded on the

 5     30th of April.  Do you recall that?  If you wish and when you feel it's

 6     necessary, we can scroll to the next page.

 7        A.   It is not necessary to move on to the next page.  I can remember

 8     this very well.  Fourteen of us generals received this letter and not on

 9     the 30th of April.  Rather, it had been brought by a courier.  He was

10     wearing a blue police uniform.  He brought it to the Main Staff

11     headquarters.  Now, we were in the midst of an expanded session of the

12     personnel administration.  All corps commanders were present, and out of

13     14 generals who were present there, we were all accused - and that is how

14     I read this letter and I said as much to you then.  I still have it with

15     me, it's there in the waiting room in my bag -- we were accused of

16     preparing a coup d'etat.

17             When we received it, we stopped with our work, we read the

18     letter, and I was assigned by this entire group of people to get in touch

19     with you and to ask you to have -- to convene a session of the

20     Supreme Command at the headquarters of the Main Staff.  At first you

21     accepted this.  This session was supposed to start at 4.00 p.m..  You

22     were supposed to arrive there by 4.00 p.m. but you didn't, but you called

23     me on the phone and you said that it was inappropriate for the

24     Supreme Command to go to the Main Staff; rather, that we should go to

25     Pale.  I asked you whether we should also bring with us the corps

Page 25660

 1     commanders because there were a lot of them who were accused by this

 2     letter, and you agreed.  We went to Pale.  And on that day, that was the

 3     1st of May, at 5.30 in the morning, Operation Flash was launched.  And on

 4     the eve of that operation, or rather, on the 29th of April, when this

 5     letter was drafted, I had informed you and the Supreme Command of the

 6     Republic of Serbian Krajina that an imminent -- an attack was imminent in

 7     Western Slavonia on the 30th of April.  That did not come to pass on the

 8     30th of April.  And then Milan Martic, the president of the Republic of

 9     Serbian Krajina and Celeketic, General Celeketic, sent a letter to you

10     and to Mladic to the effect that I was again disturbing the people of

11     Serbian Krajina, that there was no attack, that I was just trying to

12     intimidate them and so on.  And the conclusion was, like two or three

13     years before that, that they did not wish to have any kind of

14     co-operation with the main -- with the chief of the Main Staff.

15             So when we had that session at Pale, it began with this issue.

16     You ordered then that each one of the -- let's call them accused or

17     individuals suspected of this, should prepare a statement, write a

18     statement, and I said I wouldn't do it and that I would respond in

19     writing.  And I warned you then that it is impossible for an army to

20     stage a coup d'etat in peace time.  They can -- what they can do is they

21     can mount a putsch which means that there would be a temporary take-over

22     of power pending an Assembly session.  Now, at this session the

23     generals --

24        Q.   You said in your reply, didn't you, and this is for the record,

25     that history will have a final say on this; it won't be me?

Page 25661

 1        A.   Yes, that's correct, and I can repeat that.  I recall the words

 2     of General Krstic at that session.  He was still the Chief of Staff of

 3     the Drina Corps.  He said that for him General Mladic was an ideal

 4     military commander and that it would never occur to him to change his

 5     opinion about General Mladic based on this letter.  I don't think it's

 6     necessary to repeat before this Tribunal what all happened at that

 7     session of the Supreme Command, whereas you should recall that I changed

 8     the course of this session of the Supreme Command because the supreme

 9     commander of the Republic of Serbian Krajina had sent a telegram that

10     arrived in the midst of that session, informing you that the Republic of

11     Serbian Krajina had engaged the enemy as planned earlier, which wasn't

12     correct; that they had pulled out three brigades to the territory of

13     Republika Srpska; that they had left one brigade in Pakrac and the

14     surrounding area, as previously planned; and that they were preparing a

15     counter-attack which was to be staged in two days, in other words, on the

16     3rd of May.  And they were asking you to send them assistance in the form

17     of an expert on counter-attacks.  Not batting an eye, you told Mladic to

18     send me there, and Mladic gladly accepted.  Now, you know the outcome of

19     that counter-attack and everything that surrounded it.  We were in

20     Banja Luka on the 3rd May, or rather, on the 4th May at 1.00 a.m. --

21        Q.   Thank you, General.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this into

23     evidence.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   In the transcript, I would like it to be reflected that you said

Page 25662

 1     you would not give an answer to me because you count on history providing

 2     that answer, correct, when you refused to provide a written statement?

 3        A.   Yes, that's correct.  I said, as far as I can recall, the

 4     following:  Mr. President, I refuse to write any written explanation.

 5     You will get an answer from history.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

 8     document.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2155, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now have 15697

12     from the 65 ter list.  I don't know whether there's a Serbian version,

13     apparently not.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Do you remember that General Mladic here forwarded a response to

16     me from General Simic, the commander of the Eastern Bosnia Corps.  This

17     was in response to my request for him to state a position.  Do you

18     remember that he sent that letter.  Could we have a look at the next page

19     so that we can see his letter.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  There must be a Serbian version of this that we

21     can get, otherwise we can print a copy for the witness.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd be grateful.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   While waiting, General, could I read out the beginning of item

Page 25663

 1     number 5 to you.  It will be translated correctly for your benefit.  It's

 2     on page number 3.  Could we see page number 3, item number 5, so that the

 3     interpreters can see the passage I will be reading out.  Item 5, and I'll

 4     read it out in English:

 5             [In English] "Your letter is also inspired by the mistrust of the

 6     professional officers of the Army of Republika Srpska nurtured by some

 7     representatives of the civilian authorities" --

 8        A.   I can't hear the interpreters clearly because of Mr. Karadzic.

 9        Q.   [Interpretation] So you're hearing the Serbian?

10        A.   Yes, you should read it out not so loudly, or the interpreter

11     should be a little louder.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Not to interrupt.  It's printing now.  Maybe it

13     would be simpler for Mr. Karadzic just to allow the witness to read the

14     document or parts of it.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, while we're waiting for the

16     document I wonder if we might address, at this time, the schedule, how

17     we're going to deal with the remainder of this witness's testimony and

18     the other witnesses who are scheduled for next week.

19             JUDGE KWON:  At the end of the day it may depend upon how much

20     longer the accused needs.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Okay.  If you prefer to discuss that at the end,

22     we can do that.

23             JUDGE KWON:  If we can discuss it now, how much longer do you

24     need, Mr. Karadzic, to conclude?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At least a day and a half or two

Page 25664

 1     days so that the Chamber can have the maximum benefit from this witness

 2     and so that the Chamber can gain an understanding of the entire war.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  So in concrete terms, how many hours do you need?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Six to eight, roughly speaking.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  I was just going to say, Your Honour, to keep in

 7     mind an issue that was raised with the book.  If -- there's a difference

 8     between cross-examination in the classical dealing with the evidence,

 9     which we led, and just putting in everything possible which could be

10     useful through a witness pursuant to 90(H).  If there is a lot of

11     material that doesn't really go directly to my direct examination and the

12     remedy may be to call the witness in their case, that's just something

13     that I need to add, that 90(H) I don't think encompasses necessarily

14     leading -- changing a Defence witness into a Prosecution witness and

15     allowing just, you know, days and days of cross-examination which is

16     really direct examination or should be direct examination.  And the only

17     other minor point is that at this stage I think I have at least half an

18     hour, probably a little bit more, of re-direct.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've read through this.  What is

21     the question?

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   First I wanted to ask you whether you agreed with the first

24     sentence, item 5, where it says that from the beginning of the war

25     there's a lack of trust fuelled by some of the civilian authorities.  But

Page 25665

 1     do you agree that the entire letter is a manner in which one's own

 2     opinion is expounded in very strident terms?

 3        A.   Before answering the question, General Simic was on his death-bed

 4     for a few days.  I want to tell you about that.  But as far as this

 5     letter is concerned, this isn't General Simic's opinion.  It's the

 6     opinion of his collegium.  He consulted his assistants.  And if you want

 7     me to say whether I agree with it or not, I fully agree with what

 8     General Simic emphasised.

 9             And now the question is after the war I also found out that

10     the -- according to the war, the army that had been depoliticised had

11     several officers and even generals who were secret members of the party

12     in power.  They weren't allowed to be such members openly because they

13     would have been driven out.

14        Q.   Thank you.  But you agree that in the party in power -- the party

15     in power thought that all the generals were in the SK for Yugoslavia, the

16     League of Communists, the movement for Yugoslavia?

17        A.   I don't see why we can't reveal our cards.  Krajisnik and Kalinic

18     had such -- Krajisnik and Kalinic had such opinions, and they would

19     convey them to the municipal Crisis Staffs where they called the officers

20     the red sort of group.  We inherited Tito's system, they called us

21     Milosevic's mercenaries, because Milosevic, or rather, the

22     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia paid us.  And you're well aware of that

23     fact, as am I.  You know who these people were, and when they said these

24     things they called us the red gang.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 25666

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Back to scheduling issue.

 2             Mr. Tieger, when you said, was it yesterday or today, that

 3     Mr. Dean Manning is fixed, what did you mean in concrete terms?

 4             MR. TIEGER:  I essentially meant, Mr. President, that not only

 5     Mr. Manning but both of the witnesses had to be completed by Tuesday.  I

 6     had further discussions, managed to arrange for the possibility that

 7     Witness Djurdjevic could conclude his testimony on Wednesday, but

 8     certainly not any further than that.  So that's what was meant by fixed.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  When you said Mr. Djurdjevic could conclude on

10     Wednesday, did you know that we are sitting in the afternoon on

11     Wednesday?

12             MR. TIEGER:  I -- thank you, Mr. President.  I don't know that

13     that was specifically taken into account, but I don't think the

14     anticipation was that he would fly on Wednesday afternoon, for example.

15     So I can check.  I don't think that made a difference in the calculation.

16     I think the idea was that he could complete his testimony at any point on

17     Wednesday if that's what the Court is inquiring about in terms of the

18     schedule.  But, as I indicated, our previous understanding was that both

19     witnesses had commitments that required them to complete their testimony

20     by Tuesday in whatever order, and then Mr. Djurdjevic had some additional

21     flexibility which allowed for the possibility that we could conclude his

22     testimony on Wednesday, but not later than that.

23             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry, I was mistaken.  We are sitting in the

24     morning on Wednesday.  It is on Tuesday that we are sitting in the

25     afternoon.

Page 25667

 1             Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber -- yes, Mr. Tieger.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, Mr. President.

 3             And I just wanted to underscore or perhaps slightly amplify

 4     another matter and a continuing concern of the Prosecution.  Mr. Nicholls

 5     raised the 90(H) issue.  Of course we understand that 90(H) provides for

 6     cross-examination that goes beyond the scope of the direct examination,

 7     which is a practical accommodation to the -- at least in large part, to

 8     the travel requirements of witnesses.  However, as I discussed recently

 9     with Mr. Robinson, there's clearly a stretching point to that provision

10     of 90(H) because what it amounts to is a direct examination by the

11     Prosecution and a cross-examination by the Defence, then a lengthy and

12     sometimes potentially lengthier than the Prosecution direct examination,

13     a lengthy direct examination by the Defence without cross-examination by

14     the Prosecution, without the provision for that.  That's clearly not fair

15     to the Prosecution, it's clearly not fair to the Court, and clearly not

16     fair to the truth-seeking process.  Mr. Robinson did not dispute that.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  But it's difficult to deal with it in a

18     vacuum.  We'll deal with it when it arises.

19             MR. TIEGER:  I understand.  But I think when a request is made

20     for cross-examination for purposes of leading affirmative evidence of

21     this length, we have encountered that very situation, and I think we have

22     touched upon it previously.  Prosecution has been willing to accommodate

23     so as not to interrupt the schedule, but it clearly has an impact on our

24     ability to respond.  And on the time we take in re-direct examination it

25     consumes -- that would -- that should normally be cross-examination time

Page 25668

 1     that doesn't cut into the time allotted for the presentation of our case.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, if I could also -- I have to say in

 3     this particular instance I really agree with Mr. Tieger.  The Prosecution

 4     called this witness in the Srebrenica component of its case and have

 5     about three or four relatively compact areas in which they want to -- in

 6     which they did examine him, but he's -- he was in his position throughout

 7     the whole war.  We have ethnic cleansing, Sarajevo, hostages, all of

 8     those are topics that Dr. Karadzic wants to explore with this witness.

 9     And I think that the best solution and probably the fairest to the

10     Prosecution and the witness and everybody given the timing is that

11     Dr. Karadzic try to conclude what would normally be within the scope of

12     the direct examination, and then at another time take up all these other

13     issues.  Because I think that Mr. Tieger is correct, and also from our

14     side, measuring the length of his testimony by the length of the direct

15     will really not allow us to have all the benefit of all the witness's

16     evidence that we feel we need.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  There's one further matter I need to

18     consult my colleagues.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE KWON:  This is what we are going to do.  Thanks to the

21     understanding and indulgence of interpreters and court reporters, we'll

22     be sitting till 4.30 today after having a half an hour break at 3.00.

23     And then on Monday, Mr. Karadzic, you will have about two hours, which

24     means we should conclude this witness's evidence, including the

25     re-examination, in two sessions.

Page 25669

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  But you should remain on relevant issues, relevant

 3     to the indictment.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   I regret -- I'm sorry to have heard that General Simic is on his

 7     death-bed, but before I go on to this document I wanted to ask you

 8     whether you know whether General Simic was in any way -- or did he

 9     receive anything negative from me after this response, the tone of which

10     is very strident?  Was the relationship identical, was it a respectful

11     relationship?

12        A.   I didn't even know of this response until today, but I know that

13     General Simic, after this event, continued to have your photograph and

14     his in his office.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this please be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2156, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Can we now see 1D03912.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, you said that I visited you in the eastern part of

23     Republika Srpska in Drvar, and you were at the forward command post there

24     and you were involved in Bihac, or rather, the counter-offensive, the

25     defence against the 5th Corps.  Do you remember that on that occasion I

Page 25670

 1     took the decision according to which General Mladic should be the special

 2     advisor for the co-ordination of joint defence?  This was a sort of

 3     replacement of a kind.  Can you see this decree of mine that relates to

 4     this matter?

 5        A.   What you spoke of just a moment ago happened on the

 6     3rd of August, two days after the session of the Supreme Command.  There

 7     was you and Krajisnik and Subotic and that chief of state security, his

 8     name escapes me now, Krnjajic.  When you started speaking about this, I

 9     asked you whether all the attendees were welcome, and you sent away

10     Krnjajic and you and Krajisnik stayed on.  Everything you put to me now

11     is correct.  It is true that I refused to assume the duty of Chief of

12     General Staff.  Krajisnik's comment was the following:  The general is a

13     reasonable man.  Tomorrow he's going to receive an order in writing and

14     he probably will not refuse an order from the Supreme Command.  And the

15     next day this arrived, so you have it with the date of the

16     4th of September, or rather, the 4th of August.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Exhibit D2157.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             65 ter 10891.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Mladic did not agree with this decree of mine, right, just like

24     many others didn't?  Can you take a look.  This is the Main Staff of the

25     Army of Republika Srpska writing to the corps commands, and then the

Page 25671

 1     command of the East Bosnia Corps is citing in the first paragraph what

 2     the Main Staff did.  Please read this if you haven't read it before.

 3     Read the -- at least the first paragraph.

 4        A.   I think there's no need for me to read it.  I don't know when I

 5     read this, but it would be a good thing for me to comment upon it.

 6        Q.   Before your comment, just let us take a look at a few particular

 7     sentences.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page now,

 9     please.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Would you please take a look at this sentence "organisational

12     solutions."  It's around the middle.  It's the seventh line in the second

13     paragraph:

14             "Organisational solutions according to which the supreme

15     commander directly commands the army do not exist in the theory and

16     practice of armed struggle."

17             Do you remember that that was the position of General Mladic

18     stated in this letter sent to the corps?

19        A.   Yes, but that was not only General Mladic's position.  That is

20     also a legal provision that we spoke about yesterday, and your advisors

21     completely missed the point and they proclaimed you the supreme commander

22     of the Army of Republika Srpska and automatically linked you to this,

23     which Mladic is denying now.  Although, as far as this document of

24     Mladic's is concerned, I have quite a bit of criticism.

25        Q.   Thank you.  The third paragraph from the top:

Page 25672

 1             "Proceeding from patriotic, human, and soldierly options, I

 2     cannot accept arbitrariness of the president of the RS, abuse of office,

 3     and anti-constitutional action."

 4             In other words, he refused my order.

 5        A.   Yes.  This is Mladic's position that it is completely contrary to

 6     the one taken on the previous day.  He issued this document on the 5th,

 7     and we discussed this order of yours on the 4th, or rather, this decree

 8     of yours.  On the 4th when Mladic read your decree to the generals,

 9     because he and I received them along parallel lines, this is what he said

10     verbatim, "I think that Mane," that is my nickname, "can bring this to an

11     end and I can withdraw."  But in this sentence he is taking a position

12     that is the total opposite:  He does not want to withdraw.  I found out

13     about this letter late.  I didn't know about it during the

14     struggle - perhaps I can say that now - against you and against the

15     Main Staff.  I initiated the petition of the group of generals sent to

16     the Assembly so that the Assembly could annul your decision, guided by

17     the following:  The Assembly appointed Mladic and they can relieve him of

18     his duty.  So this is something that I did not know about; namely, that

19     Mladic at the collegium of the Main Staff asked us to accept his

20     replacement; and here he addresses soldiers and subordinate commanders,

21     asking them to protect him so that there would be no replacement.  That

22     was a great disappointment for me.  If we can see this comment and the

23     signature of General Novica Simic underneath Mladic's --

24        Q.   This is a quotation and then Simic says that this should be

25     forwarded.

Page 25673

 1        A.   Could you please zoom in because I cannot read this, and I really

 2     am interested in this comment.  I am surprised by this comment, too,

 3     because Simic, together with 21 of us -- there were 21 signatories of

 4     that petition that was addressed to you not to have Mladic replaced.  And

 5     now he supports this letter of Mladic's?  I mean, I don't know.  All

 6     right.  Never mind.  Let us not deal with Simic now.  I think that I've

 7     answered your question, namely, what I think about this document.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.  And

10     before the break I would just like to tender this petition that

11     General Milovanovic, spoke about.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2158, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll have a break for half an hour and resume

15     at 3.30.  I thank, again, the staff for their understanding.

16                           --- Recess taken at 2.59 p.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 3.31 p.m.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20             A CLSS translation has come back for D2146, that was the

21     1st Krajina Corps document from 1 November 1992 that we saw earlier.  So

22     I think it doesn't need to be marked for identification.  We have one

23     available.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  And now I'm not sure whether it was yesterday

25     or the day after yesterday, I forgot to mention that the CLSS would take

Page 25674

 1     a look into the translation of directive number 4, whether it's "together

 2     with" or "with."  So I will ask CLSS to take a look into it again.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

 5                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.  As for

 7     interpretation, perhaps I could point out to the interpreters what it is

 8     that I was getting at in this sentence that was in dispute.

 9             Could we now please have 1D03901.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   General, you mentioned the petition that you initiated and we

12     will have it before us in a moment and let's see who signed it.

13             Is this that document, General?  Do you recall?  It's dated 5/6

14     August 1995.

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Let's take a look at the third paragraph, for

17     instance:

18             "In line with this, the Decision by the President of the RS

19     relieving the Commander of the VRS ... was discussed and some other

20     system, organisational and personnel changes in the VRS were discussed."

21             So is this a reference to the transformation of the Main Staff to

22     become a General Staff of the Supreme Command?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in the fourth paragraph -- actually -- yes, the

25     fourth paragraph said that people individually and unanimously expressed

Page 25675

 1     their view on this and then it says that no one consulted the -- that the

 2     VRS general could not accept or implement the decision in the preparation

 3     of which no one from the VRS was consulted; is that correct?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see the signature

 6     page, please.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Mladic's name appears there but he didn't sign this but the other

 9     generals did; correct?

10        A.   Yes.  If you allow me, I'd like to explain how this petition came

11     about.

12        Q.   Yes, please go on.

13        A.   When Mladic summoned the generals and when I said the sentence

14     that he said then when -- in opening the statement and that he said that

15     he was thinking of withdrawing and thinking that I could complete that

16     job, his job, I protested immediately and I did not explain why it was

17     that I did not want to accept this.  And my explanation to him was not

18     the same as the one that I gave you.  I said to him, What fool would

19     accept to command army which was in strategic retreat, and what fool

20     would bear the responsibility for everything that had happened to us?

21             Mladic agreed with my position, but then he asked me, What am I

22     to do?  I suggested that the generals of the VRS should refuse to

23     implement this order of the Supreme Command, fully aware of the

24     consequences that might ensue.  And then he asked me how we were to carry

25     that out, what was my idea.  And I said that by nightfall I would summon

Page 25676

 1     all the generals to come to Banja Luka and present the problem to them,

 2     although ten of those generals were already there.  So I told him that I

 3     would present the problem to them and ask them that we all sign a

 4     petition addressed to the National Assembly, with the demand that your

 5     decision on removing Mladic be annulled.  The transformation of the

 6     Main Staff into a General Staff was not even mentioned then, although

 7     that, too, was a bad decision.  Changing the essence of an institution

 8     such as the Main Staff in the final phases was not a good idea.  He told

 9     me to do what I thought was best.  We did what we did.  I sent a telegram

10     to all the generals.  I prohibited General Miletic from coming, he was my

11     deputy on the Main Staff, and General Galic who was in the midst of some

12     operation on Majevica.  I think 18 generals came, there were 18 of us.

13             In the course of the afternoon, following my telegram, I received

14     a telegram from the Supreme Command.  I can't recall if you signed it to

15     the effect that the generals were prohibited from going to Banja Luka.

16     Now, out of all the generals who had been invited, only General Milosevic

17     did not show up; he was the commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  We

18     explained to the men what the issue was, and as it says here

19     "unanimously" and so on, all of that is as it was.  All of these people

20     signed the petition.  Gvero and Tolimir were supposed to take this

21     petition to the Assembly.  General Galic met up with them in Zabare at

22     the forward command post and signed the petition there.  General Miletic

23     awaited in Han Pijesak, I believe, and he, too, signed the petition.  On

24     the following day Milosevic reported to me and asked where he could sign

25     the petition, and I asked him, Why didn't you do it last night?  Why

Page 25677

 1     didn't you show up?  And he said, Well, the supreme commander forbade --

 2     he sent a telegram to that effect, he forbade me to go.  So where could I

 3     go and sign this?  However, Gvero did not let him sign it.  So this is

 4     how this petition came into being.

 5             I learned of Mladic's paper much later, his address to the army

 6     where he is appealing with the subordinate commanders not to let him go.

 7     I was terribly disappointed.  The day before he offered to resign from

 8     this post of commander of the Main Staff, or rather, commander of the

 9     army, and now, on the other hand, he was addressing the subordinates,

10     asking their support for his remaining the commander of the army.

11             So this is the background of this whole story with the petition.

12        Q.   Thank you, General.  I hope that everyone noted that the first

13     addressee is the National Assembly and the second addressee is the

14     president of the republic.  We can see that on the first page.  If

15     necessary, can we get back to page 1.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I would like to tender this

17     document.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2159, Your Honours.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Were you told that on that very day, on the 6th at the Assembly

22     session, I criticise -- I criticised extensively some of the generals and

23     I said that they weren't my officers.  This was recorded in the minutes.

24     Did anyone report it to you?  That was my reaction to Milutinovic's and

25     Gvero's interventions there.  I was very sharp in my discussion on

Page 25678

 1     that -- at that Assembly session, and you probably received information

 2     thereof.

 3        A.   That evening or the next day, Gvero informed me that the Assembly

 4     had adopted our petition and annulled your decision.  And, frankly

 5     speaking, I was happy because that meant I was off the hook.  I wouldn't

 6     have to be tried before a court.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Now, could we please pull up 1D05436 and just for

 8     your information, Gvero misinformed you.  It was not -- my decision was

 9     not overturned.  Actually, they were split, the votes were split.

10     Dobrica Cosic and everybody else were calling for that decision to be

11     rescinded.

12        A.   Well, I'm not aware of that but I'm grateful because if it had

13     come to me being tried I would have witnesses.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Would you please take a look at this and would you

15     agree with me that this is a communique, it's not a decision, it's a

16     communique which I signed and said that, "Taking into consideration the

17     appeal of his holiness the Patriarch Pavle," I did not mention the

18     Serbian Assembly but it certainly was a very important element in this

19     decision, but I inform that I decided to suspend the changes.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please show the date, that

21     was the 11th of August.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see that.  It's

23     handwritten.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Do you recall this, that this was my explanation?

Page 25679

 1        A.   I don't remember this document.  This is the first time that I

 2     see it.  And this would have been in my favour still, well done.

 3        Q.   Well, were you aware that I publicly decided to suspend these

 4     changes, correct, and I wouldn't have been able to implement them;

 5     correct?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2160, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             Could we now have 1D05300.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   We'll move to a new topic, General, the position of our army

15     vis-a-vis the UNPROFOR.  First of all, do we agree that under

16     international law - and that's what was done - the UNPROFOR was in our

17     country pursuant to our decision and it had a mandate that we accepted

18     and that they could not have been in our country, on our territory,

19     without our approval?

20        A.   The presence of UNPROFOR on the territory of the SFRY was sought

21     by the, I believe, already Rump Presidency of the SFRY in order to

22     protect the Serbian people in Croatia.  When the conflict broke out, at

23     first inter-ethnic and later also inter-religious in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

24     the Federal Presidency decided, but I don't know at whose proposal,

25     whether it was at the proposal of Alija Izetbegovic or yours, that

Page 25680

 1     UNPROFOR should also come to Bosnia and Herzegovina and it would have

 2     three mandates.  I cannot give you the exact order of these three

 3     mandates, but I believe that I can name them.  One of them, one of the

 4     missions was the escort of humanitarian aid convoys.  The second mandate,

 5     I believe, was the role of observer in order to establish who was

 6     triggering a conflict or a particular operation and who engaged in

 7     disproportionate fire.  And I can't recall the third.  Can you help me?

 8        Q.   Well, I believe the third role was mediation and also the issues

 9     of water-supply, electric supply, and so on.

10        A.   No, no, that's not what I meant.  I will probably -- it will

11     probably come to me later.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Will you please take a look at this.  Was this very

13     early on - this is the 21st -- the 22nd of November, 1992, a document

14     that you drafted, where you call for a civilised relationship of friendly

15     relationship of our military personnel towards UNPROFOR.  And in the

16     first few paragraphs you explain why this was necessary.  And then you

17     order to corps commands what they were to -- what steps they were to take

18     and so on.  I can't recall everything.  Can you recall this?

19        A.   Well, can I just see the signature, please.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the last page, please.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   This is a copy from the East Bosnia Corps, but I believe that all

23     corps received this; correct?

24        A.   Yes.  A similar document was also sent by General Gvero.  That's

25     why I wanted to see the signature.  He was the chief of the department

Page 25681

 1     for morale, guidance, religious, and political affairs.  That's why I

 2     wanted to see whether the document that we have before us was issued by

 3     me or by him.

 4        Q.   On page 2 you can see that you ordered your staff to show a

 5     positive attitude towards UNPROFOR; right?

 6        A.   Yes, because at that time I believe that UNPROFOR was an

 7     objective representative of the United Nations.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2161, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   We have to skip a few things.  I would like to call up 1D5313.

15     This is a document which was issued in August 1993; again, one of your

16     documents.  Can we zoom in for the benefit of the General.  On the

17     1st of August, 1993, this was issued to provide for the delivery of

18     humanitarian aid, and then you issue an order.  There are several bullet

19     points, for example, the first, the second, the third, and the sixth are

20     of some interest; the other ones are of a technical nature.  Please look

21     at the document and can you tell us in your own words what the order

22     entailed?

23             Under bullet point 3 you said the civilian authorities should

24     inform the civilians of the position of the president of RS, the RS

25     prime minister, and the VRS GS commander that the approved movement of

Page 25682

 1     UNPROFOR teams and humanitarian aid convoys must not be prevented or

 2     blocked; is that correct?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   We can see that my position, the position of prime minister, and

 5     the position of the command of the Main Staff were identical in this

 6     matter; right?

 7        A.   Yes, and all those positions were in line with the spirit of what

 8     UNPROFOR requested and demanded.

 9        Q.   Now let's look at bullet point 6, where it says:

10             "Familiarise yourself fully with the quality of personnel at all

11     check-points, urgently remove all those who might provoke incidents or be

12     profiteers and those who fail to respect the requests and orders of their

13     superior officers."

14             This was yet another way you used in order to secure an

15     unhindered deployment of humanitarian aid; right?

16        A.   Yes, and I also wanted to represent the Army of Republika Srpska

17     as an organised army.

18        Q.   And can we now go to the last page for the benefit of the

19     General.  And, again, under bullet point 5 you ask the civilian

20     authorities to help the city of Sarajevo with the supply of electricity,

21     gas, and so on and so forth; is that correct?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 25683

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2162, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I would like to call up

 3     1D5304.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   This is another of your orders.  Please pay attention to the

 6     date.  It was issued on the 2nd of April, 1993, in the midst of the

 7     Podrinje crisis when large combat operations were going on in Podrinje;

 8     right?

 9        A.   Yes.  I apologise.

10        Q.   However, despite the fighting you issue an -- issued an order to

11     corps commands and the commands of independent units to pay a lot of

12     attention to the convoys of humanitarian organisations and UNPROFOR.  I

13     believe that in the examination-in-chief you made a distinction between

14     UNPROFOR convoys that supplied UNPROFOR and those that they escorted and

15     were organised by the organisations that provided humanitarian aid to the

16     civilian population; right?

17        A.   Yes.  We discovered through UNPROFOR convoys, not through the

18     convoys organised by humanitarian organisations that UNPROFOR is involved

19     in illegal dealings.

20        Q.   We will come to that, General, sir, but now look at --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

22             Did you ask a question about convoy, Mr. Nicholls, in your

23     examination-in-chief?  I don't think General did deal with the convoy

24     issue at all?

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  No, Your Honour.  Just at the beginning of my

Page 25684

 1     examination I asked him about the role of - if I get the name

 2     right - Milos Djurdjic and he explained that he was on the commission for

 3     humanitarian aid and that is related to the topic.  But I didn't speak

 4     about convoys.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Do you agree with me, General, sir, that under bullet point 2 you

 8     assigned tasks to escorts and you assign patriots, educated people,

 9     professionally capable members of the VRS to be convoy escorts; right?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   There are many other interesting things in here, but let's now

12     display the last page of this document for the benefit of the General.

13     He will see who the author of the document was and when it was

14     dispatched.  This is your document, is it not?

15        A.   Yes, on the 17th of June it was sent.  I can't see the -- I can't

16     see the month very well.

17        Q.   It was on the 2nd of April?

18        A.   No, it was on the 17th of August.

19        Q.   The 17th of June.

20        A.   I'm not sure whether it's the 17th of June or the 17th of August.

21     The two figures are very similar.

22        Q.   On page 1 there is a different date, the 2nd of April.  I don't

23     know why there is a different date on the stamp.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?  It's not

25     very legible, is it?  It must have been April; right?

Page 25685

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, the cover page -- page 1 says in typing "2nd of

 2     April," but this seems like 17th of June or August, as the General read

 3     out.  But it's a matter for later assessment.  We'll admit this.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2163, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that this clock is

 6     showing a wrong time, 20 minutes later than it actually is.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  That shows some wishful time.

 8             We have about half an hour more for today.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

10             And now I would like to call up 1D5301.  I have only a

11     translation on the screen and can we see the Serbian version as well.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Here, General, sir, it says in the English - this is also your

14     document - that you issued on the 9th of April and you explain some

15     details about inspection of humanitarian aid and UNPROFOR convoys, and

16     you say that the Main Staff on the 8th of April -- or, I apologise, on

17     the 2nd of April, dealt with the question of the movement of humanitarian

18     aid and UNPROFOR convoys through the territory of Republika Srpska.

19     Given the conduct and attitude of UNPROFOR and the humanitarian

20     organisations and in order to take efficient measures, I hereby order,

21     and then you go on to say -- I'd better read in English:

22             [In English] "1.  Perform an individual analysis of the quality

23     of each member of the group for inspections of humanitarian aid convoys.

24     Expel all from the group who have compromised themselves for personal

25     profit or any other cause.

Page 25686

 1             "2.  Appoint as leader of the working group an officer of proven

 2     honesty who is ethical and professionally capable."

 3             [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.

 4             Can we now go on to the following page to show the signature and

 5     the date.  It was sent on the 9th of April.  This is also your document

 6     but it has been translated into English.  You go on to say to reduce the

 7     possibility of the number of incidents happening by choosing the best

 8     people to those positions; right?

 9        A.   Yes.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

11             JUDGE KWON:  I think we can locate the B/C/S version of this

12     later on.

13             With that understanding, we'll admit this.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2164, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             I would like to call up 1D5320.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you agree, General, that our army, our people's army,

19     comprised some people who were not exactly professional in their conduct.

20     That's why you had to remove them and replace them by better people and

21     that you sought the best people for this duty because it was to be

22     expected that our people's army was not really a professional army;

23     right?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   This is also one of your documents.  It was issued on the

Page 25687

 1     25th November, 1993.  You sent it to all corps, and you say in this

 2     document:

 3             "Checks on humanitarian aid convoys.

 4             "Order."

 5             You say:

 6             "So far, there have been no serious problems with receiving,

 7     checking, and ensuring safe passage as a result of the professional

 8     conduct by those involved in this process."

 9             And then in the second paragraph you say:

10             "Apart from this, there are still individual cases of

11     unprofessional, improper, uncivilised and even arrogant behaviour leading

12     to undesirable incidents ..."

13             In the following paragraph in the last sentence, you say, "In

14     order to eliminate the aforementioned defects, I order ...," and there

15     follows a list of orders to amend the situation.  Do you remember that

16     document of yours?

17        A.   I don't remember this particular order.  However, I remember many

18     other similar orders.  Wherever a problem appeared, I reinstated my

19     previous orders.  I reminded the existing commanders of their duty or I

20     briefed those who had been appointed in the meantime, all with a view to

21     raising their awareness.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Exhibit D2165.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D00275.

Page 25688

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   This will show us how I was very often unjust towards you and the

 3     Main Staff because foreigners thought that this -- that was a position of

 4     our entire army and not only of the individuals that you finally

 5     eliminated from the ranks of the army.  Do you remember this, where it

 6     says my earlier order to quickly and without any stagnation made the

 7     requests of humanitarian organisations, had not been respected with

 8     regard to humanitarian issues.  And then under number 3 it says:

 9             "The announcements for the public are too frequent and too long,

10     thus they lose effectiveness."

11             Do you agree and do you remember that I often showed suspicions

12     about our own army based on the criticism of the foreigners who were

13     involved in the process?  And this was not -- that was not fair conduct

14     on my behalf, the criticism was not justified.

15        A.   Yes.  The lack of fairness resulted from the fact that you

16     accepted information from individuals without taking into account their

17     ranks.  Whoever told you something about the way the convoys were

18     escorted, that was your reaction towards the Main Staff.  Let me remind

19     you of a situation when I attacked you, when I criticised you.  That was

20     on the 27th of March, 1994.  And I asked you how you could strike an

21     agreement with Yasushi Akashi about our artillery around Sarajevo to

22     surrender to UNPROFOR.  Mr. Koljevic was present and you were taken by

23     surprise that I was privy to that information.  And I had received that

24     information on that same day in the morning at a meeting with General van

25     Baal.  He was the Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Page 25689

 1     On that day I held a regular meeting with him -- that person -- that man

 2     simply wanted to cheat me, to -- in other words, I received information

 3     from somebody who was not competent to share that information with me.  I

 4     was supposed to receive it from either you or from General Akashi.

 5     However, he was overly ambitious.  He wanted to do something very

 6     strange.  And this is what happened to you:  Very often you received

 7     information from people who were not competent.  For example, a driver

 8     from UNPROFOR who didn't like being stopped by anybody, and then he would

 9     tell you, We were ill treated by the Serbs, and then you criticised the

10     Main Staff.

11        Q.   Thank you, General.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2166, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Could we now see 1D5311.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   This is an order of yours and the date is ten days after this.

19     But while waiting for it, General, do you know that Mr. van Baal

20     testified here and stated that you told him that they shouldn't let trams

21     through because you would order snipers to be active.  In his notes that

22     wasn't found and that was another disappointment concerning

23     General van Baal.  What do you say, did you ever order or did you ever

24     tell him that you would order snipers to target trams?

25        A.   It's a miserable army if it has a general such as

Page 25690

 1     General van Baal.  We met on the 27th of March, 1994.  And this had been

 2     ordered by Krajisnik, or rather, Krajisnik had organised this regular

 3     meeting of ours.  The subject of the meeting was supposed to be the

 4     passage of humanitarian convoys.  Once a month we would meet.  The chiefs

 5     of staff from UNPROFOR would meet with me and we would analyse things and

 6     try and deal with the missions, and so on and so forth.  On that morning

 7     at the meeting, I was attacked by van Baal.  Similarly, General Ramsay

 8     did the same before him in relation to Markale.  On the 26th, one day

 9     earlier, snipers opened fire on a tram in Marin Dvor.  And first of all

10     he asked me whether I knew about that.  I said, No, that happened a day

11     before, and the corps command probably didn't inform me of the fact.  How

12     did that happen?  Well, he said, The Serbs opened fire on the tram.  I

13     said, Where was the tram?  He said, In Marin Dvor.  Marin Dvor was a

14     centre for the Muslim part of Sarajevo.  I said, General, how do you know

15     they were Serbs?  I wasn't claiming that they weren't, but, How do you

16     know they were Serbs?  Well, his answer was more or less, It can't be

17     anyone else.  I said, do you know how far Marin Dvor is from the VRS

18     positions, what the maximum or minimum distance would be?  He didn't know

19     so I told him.  The soldier who was closest to Marin Dvor was 5 and a

20     half kilometres away.  Which -- what kind of sniper can fire on targets 5

21     and a half kilometres away?  You know, General, there were two shots that

22     entered the tin above the entrance of the tram.  So the tram was targeted

23     from above.  Later I found out that two women had been wounded; one of

24     them was a Croat, the other was a Serbian.  Neither was Muslim.  I told

25     him -- not just him.  Whenever I met anyone from UNPROFOR, I asked them

Page 25691

 1     to influence the Muslim side since they had declared a state of war.  You

 2     know what the procedure is in urban places.  There's no public gathering

 3     because they complain that we were shelling them all the time, opening

 4     fire from all sorts of weapons.

 5             Secondly, football matches shouldn't organised, the theatres and

 6     cinemas shouldn't be opened, people shouldn't gather at squares, the

 7     lights are turned off at night.  I said on that occasion, Well, please,

 8     influence the Muslims.  So they put a stop to urban transport because

 9     people are concentrated here in a very small area.  And in accordance

10     with the Geneva Conventions, a country that has declared a state of war

11     has to apply this procedure.  He laughed cynically, and he asked me,

12     Well, what will happen if we don't do this?  And I said, I can't

13     guarantee that some idiot won't open fire.  When he testified in the

14     Slobodan Milosevic case - I don't know whether it was in this courtroom

15     or somewhere else, but it was in this building - I followed the

16     proceedings and I can't put this in a different way.  I'm a general and I

17     say what I think I should say.  General van Baal lied in front of the

18     Tribunal.  When I -- when he said I said, We'll open fire.  Fortunately

19     for me or for someone else, on one occasion, probably after the war at

20     the time of the bombing of Yugoslavia, or rather, Serbia, in 1999, I told

21     Milosevic about this, so he knew about it and he could refute what was

22     said at the time.  In your case, I don't know when he testified, I didn't

23     follow that, but people told me that he made the same claim.

24             On the 27th, when I attacked you for reaching an agreement

25     according to which we were to surrender our artillery, have it withdrawn

Page 25692

 1     20 kilometres from Sarajevo, well, you said that that wasn't the case,

 2     that we'd never spoken about that, and that you wouldn't have agreed to

 3     that without having consulted the Main Staff.  Then I asked for your

 4     protection, if you remember.  When you were at those meetings, those

 5     peace conferences, I asked you to try to influence the mediators and the

 6     warring parties, to make sure that there wouldn't be public gatherings so

 7     that we could reduce the losses sustained, the Muslim losses.  They

 8     complained about losses; we didn't.

 9             A few days afterwards, a few days after that meeting at the

10     beginning of April, van Baal called me to a meeting at the Corlic [phoen]

11     sports airport in Cazinska Krajina.  He wanted us to discuss the

12     5th Corps.  I didn't ask for your approval or for the approval of Mladic

13     either, but I quite simply didn't want to do that.  He wanted to take me

14     to Cazinska Krajina where Atif Dudakovic was in power so we could discuss

15     Atif Dudakovic's corps.

16             Furthermore, he would often call me.  On one occasion, I

17     said - and I think it's somewhere in the transcripts of my

18     interviews -- he thought I was his secretary, or rather, he behaved as if

19     I were his secretary.  Every 15 to 20 minutes he would call me day and

20     night.  He needed something, he didn't understand something, but what was

21     at stake?  Well, in fact, when General Rose, his boss, left Bosnia and

22     Herzegovina, he would call Alija Izetbegovic, he would call you - I don't

23     know whether he called Mate Boban, whether he was alive at the time - and

24     you'd dismiss him.  He wasn't on your level and that was fine.  And then

25     he would call the commanders of the warring parties, Ratko Mladic,

Page 25693

 1     Rasim Delic, Milivoj Petkovic, and they would give him the cold shoulder,

 2     too.  Then he would call me.  He wanted a meeting, and so on and so

 3     forth.  So he was trying to prove something about himself, about his

 4     capabilities, but he had no such capabilities.

 5        Q.   Thank you, General.  Please, could you now have a look at your

 6     order here dated the 22nd of June, 1993.  Say that some idiot apparently

 7     opened fire on UNPROFOR or I believed their report, and you are

 8     prohibiting anyone from opening fire; isn't that correct?  Can we have a

 9     look at page 2 in the English version.  Do you remember that you often

10     prohibited such activity?

11        A.   Yes.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Exhibit D2167.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             Could we see 1D5372, please.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   General, please have a look at this.  It's the command of the

18     Drina Corps, Chief of Staff, I can't see the name, but have a look at

19     this on the 30th of December, 1993, in the second paragraph -- in the

20     first paragraph an attack on the area of Bljeceva from Srebrenica is

21     mentioned.  1.400 people went out and launch an attack.  In the second

22     paragraph it says that UNPROFOR is abusing its convoys, bringing supplies

23     to Muslims in Gorazde.  The SNB has information that UNPROFOR members

24     brought a large quantity of fuses for shells from Gorazde to Sarajevo on

25     the 8th of December, 1993, and that written messages, money, packages,

Page 25694

 1     and similar are being transferred.  Do you remember that we remained

 2     silent for a long time and we would look away when there were cases of

 3     abuse.  We're not saying it was the command that was involved, but there

 4     was such cases that related to their vehicles and whether the command or

 5     individuals were responsible for these cases, well it's not that

 6     important.

 7             Does this reflect what you were aware of?  Does this reflect the

 8     issue you had to deal with?

 9        A.   Yesterday, I started explaining this and then you interrupted me.

10     You said that there wasn't time to discuss the matter.

11             The first legitimate activities relating to the delivery of

12     assistance to the Muslim enclaves, we discovered this in UNPROFOR

13     convoys, in fact, not in humanitarian organisations convoys.  So this was

14     done in the following manner:  At the check-points -- or check-points

15     would report to their superior commands, and then the corps commands

16     would relay the information to us, to the Main Staff.  In the part of the

17     report on goods that were being transported, I noticed in several such

18     reports, in fact, that a certain quantity of ammunitions for the needs of

19     UNPROFOR was also being provided.  And so on one occasion when a new

20     UNPROFOR convoy was announced, I asked the UNPROFOR Chief of Staff who

21     was in contact with me about the matter.  I think it was General Ramsay.

22     I asked him whether they were involved in military activity of any kind

23     during the previous week, combat training, anything that would involve

24     engaging the troops.  And he said, No.  So I said that, Last week you

25     replenished your reserves of ammunition and your reserves of fuel, but

Page 25695

 1     you did not use them.  So why are these things being delivered in the

 2     convoys again?  Why is ammunition and fuel being transported in these

 3     convoys again?  I don't know what his answer was.  It didn't make much

 4     sense.  It was something to the fact that they were planning to do

 5     something and had to replenish these supplies.  But I came to the

 6     conclusion, although I couldn't prove it, that they were providing

 7     weapons and ammunition to the Muslims.  I said this to General Rose, and

 8     he was surprised.  He said it was impossible.  Later we found reservoirs

 9     with dual containers in UNPROFOR vehicles.

10        Q.   I'll now refer to a protest that you lodged --

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But could this be admitted?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  No -- I'm not objecting to a document.  Just for

14     the incident -- and I'm sorry to interrupt.  The incident which the

15     witness has just described, this particular convoy and the conversation

16     he had with General Rose, I just wonder for our record when this was and

17     where the convoy was going.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, General, could you help us?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The convoy was entering Gorazde.  I

20     can't remember the exact time, but this soon became a mass phenomenon.

21     And particular humanitarian organisations, in particular UNHCR, started

22     acting the same way as UNPROFOR convoys.  This concerns these three

23     Eastern Bosnian enclaves at least.  I think that the date is not that

24     important.  What is important is that after the report from UNPROFOR,

25     after those mixed commissions that we have discussed today on disarming

Page 25696

 1     Muslim troops in the enclaves, so it was from May 1993 up until

 2     January 1994, the number of Muslim troops in those enclaves in

 3     January 1994 was about 16.500, and these troops were armed and they were

 4     part of the 28th Division whose command was in the centre of Srebrenica.

 5     Two brigades were in Srebrenica.  One of those -- that division's

 6     brigades was in Zepa.  The 81st Division with its HQ in Gorazde was

 7     established.  After the Operation Zvijezda 94, it remained there.  That

 8     was when the Gorazde safe haven had been reduced to a circle, the

 9     diameter which was 3 kilometres.  No one can convince me of the fact that

10     UNPROFOR wasn't familiar with the existence of that army.  No one can

11     convince me that UNPROFOR did not organise the delivery of weapons and

12     ammunition to the Muslims in those enclaves.  The parachute operation

13     delivering supplies to enclaves from the air was no more than a

14     smoke-screen that UNPROFOR created to conceal the delivery of weapons.

15     Sometimes these deliveries ended up on the Serbian side and our troops

16     could hardly wait for a parachute to land on their side.  They expected

17     to find food and other such things, but in one package they found

18     ammunition for a 12.7-millimetre machine-gun.  It was in these flour

19     packages.  The soldier who found it saw that the packages were very

20     heavy, that's how he discovered it.  One such package was sent to the

21     UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo as proof that weapons and ammunition were

22     being delivered to the enclaves.  We never heard about the results of the

23     investigation, though.

24        Q.   Thank you, General.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted, please?

Page 25697

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted as Exhibit D2168.

 2             We'll call for the day here today.

 3             General, we'll continue on Monday morning at 9.00.  I hope we

 4     will be able to conclude your evidence during the course of the morning

 5     on that day.

 6             The hearing is adjourned.

 7                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.31 p.m.,

 8                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 5th day

 9                           of March, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.