1 Monday, 5 March 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Today we'll be sitting
7 pursuant to Rule 15 bis with Judge Morrison being away due to his
8 official engagement.
9 Good morning, General.
10 Good morning, Mr. Karadzic. You have two hours today to conclude
11 your cross-examination. Please continue.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning,
13 Your Excellencies. Good morning to everyone.
14 WITNESS: MANOJLO MILOVANOVIC [Resumed]
15 [Witness answered through interpreter]
16 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
17 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
18 A. Good morning.
19 Q. The Chamber should perhaps be aware of the following - you
20 mentioned this - unfortunately, General Simic passed away two days ago.
21 Could we now see 1D5302. Not Simatovic. His name is
22 Novica Simic.
23 I don't think, I have the Serbian translation at this point in
24 time, or, rather, the Serbian original, but, General --
25 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you check. Do you follow the proceedings?
1 Do you hear me, Mr. Karadzic?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can hear you.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Good morning, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
4 Wasn't General Simic on the list of our witnesses -- or Mr. Nicholls?
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning. Good
6 morning, General.
7 He was indeed, Your Honours. We knew that, unfortunately, he was
8 ill, but we -- I didn't have that information before, but, yes, he was on
9 the witness list.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
13 Q. General, do you remember this protest of yours that you lodged on
14 the 30th of March, 1993, because -- I'll read it out in the English:
15 [In English] "We strongly protest because of open units of the
16 humanitarian convoy escort troops and Muslim forces.
17 "Four days ago, in area of village Pelemis, English APC opened
18 fire with four rounds of anti-tank rockets to our forces and destroyed
19 one tank and one AAA vehicle 'Praga'."
20 "We hope that you are aware in the fact that Muslim in Tuzla
21 paint their army and civilian vehicles in white, and they put UN signs on
22 them. With UN signs ... arms they fire to our forces in the area the
23 Kladanj and Olovo.
24 "We expect and demand your efficient steps against responsible
25 persons in English battalion and against every other abuse of UN signs.
1 On that way, you will improve safety of UNPROFOR forces and humanitarian
2 convoy escort forces on field. Your passive attitude may contribute to
3 unwanted consequences."
4 [Interpretation] Could the interpreters read the text from the
6 Do you remember, this General?
7 A. Yes. This was document that was sent to General Valgren, the
8 commander of the UNPROFOR forces for the former Yugoslavia. You can see
9 that it was sent four days after the event. During the previous four
10 days, I contacted the Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR over the phone. He was
11 the commander of UNPROFOR at the time for Bosnia-Herzegovina. However,
12 they did not react and I thought it would be appropriate for me to
13 contact the commander of UNPROFOR for the former Yugoslavia. I don't
14 remember his reaction or his answer.
15 Q. Thank you, General. Am I correct if I said that you reacted in
16 writing and over the phone only when there were more serious violations
17 or, rather, incidents, only when there was a notable bias towards our
18 enemies and other incidents, incidents that we did not react to?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2169, Your Honours.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now have a
25 look at 1D05318.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Could you have a look at this order of yours that is based on the
3 report according to which humanitarian organisations are being used to
4 deliver fuel to the enclaves to be used for military needs, and you
5 didn't stop the convoys, but you requested that the fuel be checked.
6 Have a look at paragraph number 1 and paragraph number 5 and tell us --
7 or tell me what are the reasons for these measures of precaution.
8 A. Yes. On Thursday, on the last day, I also spoke about the fact
9 that we obtained information according to which fuel from the tanks was
10 being delivered to the enclaves and fuel as well as ammunition and
11 weapons. Food and clothes are considered strategic equipment. So I
12 don't know whom they were delivering this to in the enclaves, but I had
13 the right to suspect them of delivering these things to the Muslim army.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2170, Your Honours.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. If we remember the telegram from Thursday in which Oric said, As
20 soon as the food arrives, we'll take Bratunac, here we can see as soon as
21 the fuel comes, we saw that the international forces pretended that they
22 had training and that's how they justified the delivery of ammunition.
23 So does this justify the suspicions we had with regard to the
24 international community providing our enemies with assistance?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you. Could we now see 1D5338. And while waiting for that,
2 General, do you agree that we noticed that as a rule every time a convoy
3 would enter the demilitarised zones the Muslim forces were a lot more
4 combative and the attacks they launched would be more fierce?
5 A. I couldn't say given the time that has passed, but I do know that
6 they continued attacking us from the enclaves and UNPROFOR was aware of
7 the fact.
8 Q. Thank you. Please have a look at this. This is a document of
9 yours sent to the command of the Sarajevo Romanija and Drina Corps dated
10 the 8th of November, 1994. And you say that UNPROFOR wants to deliver
11 certain goods in containers and often they don't say what the containers
12 contain, and so on and so forth, and your order is that each request
13 should be examined, and if quantities of goods have not been specified,
14 you should reject them. There were cases of abuse when in the lower part
15 of the container there was a lot of ammunition, weapons, and other
16 prohibited items. Do you remember this? Was this also a reason for our
17 concern with regard to the free passage of convoys?
18 A. No. This can't be a document of mine. I was at Plitvice at a
19 meeting with Martic on that day and with Fikret Abdic. A deputy of mine
20 must have drafted this because the document hasn't been signed. Someone
21 should have probably put "for" at the bottom, General Miletic or someone
22 who was replacing me.
23 Q. Okay. This number 09, 09, does this show that it was some kind
24 of a forward command post, the protocol number at the top.
25 A. 09, it's the personnel administration of the Main Staff. The
1 duty officer in the command of the Main Staff was probably someone from
2 that administration, and he's the person who drafted this document.
3 Q. Thank you, but the document is an authentic one. You have no
4 doubts about that. It's being sent to Bresa, Domar, Caura.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour, it saves time, I'm not challenging
6 the authenticity of this document.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could it be admitted?
8 And did someone from the staff who drafted it, that should be noted.
9 JUDGE KWON: Let's admit it as Exhibit D2171.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D5324, please.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. This is the second day after Christmas. It's dated the
13 8th of January, 1994. I'm writing to you about the decision of the
14 Main Staff. It's following a decision of mine the Main Staff has to
15 establish a single system for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Since in
16 the meantime there has been certain disagreement between some organs
17 regarding the implementation of this decision, we reiterate that this
18 decision remains in force, and so on and so forth. Have a look at the
19 next at the last paragraph. We point out that if you don't respect this
20 decision and act wilfully, you will act to the detriment of the
21 reputation of Republika Srpska, and so on and so forth. Do you remember
23 A. I don't remember this one dated as this one is, but we received
24 various warnings of the same or similar kind, various warnings in
25 writing, over the phone, and so on and so forth.
1 Q. Thank you. Can I agree -- would you agree that some of my
2 warnings, some of my criticism, wasn't justified because I believed
3 foreign elements, and often they were not right?
4 A. [No interpretation]
5 Q. Excuse me, General.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
7 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm sorry, Your Honours. I just wonder if we
8 could have some foundation or basis for how the general is meant to
9 answer the question of what Mr. Karadzic's motivation was at the time,
10 and -- I don't have the --
11 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation].
12 MR. NICHOLLS: It's the part I objected to is "... because I
13 believed foreign elements." How does the witness know what Mr. Karadzic
14 believed unless there's some basis given?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I could answer.
17 JUDGE KWON: General, could you answer the question as far as in
18 the capacity as the recipient of this letter, or would you like
19 Mr. Karadzic to reformulate his question?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already said that given the
21 principle of the chain of command, it's not for me to assess whether
22 documents that come from the supreme commander are justified or not.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Thank you, General. And can I put the question in this way:
25 When I trusted foreign agencies and this wasn't justified, wasn't the
1 result that there was some tension between the civilian and military
2 structures, because I took their criticism to be justified, but that was
3 not the case.
4 A. Yes. I've already spoken about this in the course of my
5 testimony here. You often accepted information from people who weren't
6 responsible for such matters.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2172, Your Honours.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we have a look at
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Please have a look at the order by General Zivanovic seven days
15 following directive 7. He ordered all subordinate brigades to treat
16 humanely the members of UNPROFOR. He mentions numerous complaints, which
17 is in the third line when he refers to the peacekeeping mission, and
18 further down he says there have been cases of robbery against UNPROFOR
19 personnel before, but such cases have become ever-more frequent in recent
20 months. It has happened that groups of armed and uniformed persons stop
21 UNPROFOR vehicles. Then he goes on to say that it has also happened that
22 some UNPROFOR personnel have been physically abused as have citizens of
23 Republika Srpska who, at that moment, were in contact with UNPROFOR
24 personnel at the Mostar junction on the Sarajevo-Kiseljak road. A group
25 of armed persons disarmed the UNPROFOR officers, et cetera, et cetera.
1 Such acts have inexplicably become manifestations of patriotism
2 and heroism. He further goes on to say that he orders all the commands
3 to engage all available forces to undertake investigative measures as
5 Can we change the page in the Serbian.
6 The goal is to have the perpetrators of these grave crimes found
7 and prosecuted, and the property should be returned to UNPROFOR.
8 General, was this order by Zivanovic in keeping with the policy
9 of the VRS concerning UNPROFOR, irrespective of our complaints as to the
10 conduct of UNPROFOR?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2173, Your Honours.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. General --
18 JUDGE KWON: Because you asked the question, you put -- because
19 you put like this: This order was issued seven days following the
20 directive 7. So you are telling us that directive 7 was issued or
21 notified to the Drina Corps seven days before this order. Is it your
22 case, Mr. Karadzic?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think he was notified, but
24 it seems that this was the prevailing feeling in the VRS and that nothing
25 much has changed in our position vis-a-vis UNPROFOR.
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps general could clarify.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Can you explain this, General?
6 A. This order was issued six days following the publication of
7 directive 7 and has nothing to do with its contents. This was a result
8 of a process which developed in the VRS to the effect that our personnel
9 stole vehicles from UNPROFOR, and not only vehicles; for example, I had
10 an unpleasant incident, was at a meeting with General Hayes upon his
11 arrival in Bosnia. We met in Sokolac, and he presented me with a
12 bullet-proof vest. But when we were about to go our own ways, he
13 returned from his car and he said, General, someone broke into my car and
14 stole things from the car. My bullet-proof vest was also stolen.
15 We managed to find the perpetrator. It was one of the drivers
16 from Pale. So such occurrences began taking place. This was
17 General Zivanovic's reaction. I couldn't see what he referred to in the
18 order specifically, but he wasn't referring to directive number 7. We
19 were simply trying to put a stop to such conduct in the VRS.
20 Perhaps I can also add this: UNPROFOR applied certain measures.
21 For example, I was stopped in Brod, near Foca, and they scratched my
22 vehicle with a nail. They were basically trying to scrape the top layer
23 of paint to see whether there's white paint underneath and to determine
24 whether this had been their vehicle that was stolen.
25 Q. Thank you, General, for your explanation. Can we agree that such
1 incidents did not enjoy the support of command structures and that
2 efforts were made to put a stop to it?
3 A. Not only that they did not enjoy the support, but quite could the
4 contrary. Such incidents were sanctioned. People were disciplined.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
7 JUDGE KWON: Did we not admit it? It was to be admitted 2173.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 1D5427.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. General, do you recall that UNPROFOR was present in our country
11 with our approval, which we provided concerning their initial mandate
12 which was not supposed to be changed without our agreement? And since
13 you haven't begun your answer yet, that mandate completely excluded any
14 possibility of their taking sides or engaging in combat against any of
15 the warring parties.
16 A. Yes. The other day I did not explain to you the third mandate of
17 UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina which had to do with the protection of
18 protected areas. However, they assigned a fourth mandate to themselves,
19 although I had never seen a Security Council Resolution as to that. They
20 basically began -- became involved in the conflicts or clashes between
21 the warring sides. They simply took upon themselves to determine who was
22 to blame.
23 Q. Thank you. Do you remember this document of November 23rd?
24 After NATO air-strikes which were guided from the ground, as well as your
25 reaction to any -- to the phone calls made by UNPROFOR commanders from
1 the field, as a result of that you ordered a change of disposition
2 towards UNPROFOR, because they became enemy with everything that
3 entailed. Was this a legitimate position to take?
4 A. Yes. It is true I ordered this without having consulted the
5 Main Staff or you since General Rose acted inhumanely and less than
6 chivalrously. He struck at me, at my forces, because I approached the
7 non-existing delineation of the protected area of Bihac. I need to say,
8 and I believe I mentioned that in my book, that the borders of the
9 security area of Bihac were received by my office one day following this
10 order, that is to say on November 24th, which is one and a half year
11 following the establishment or formation of the protected area borders
12 around Bihac. The line went along the positions of my forces.
13 According to such borders as they were delineated, he had no
14 reason to attack my forces, whereas, as a matter of fact, he did.
15 Q. Can we also agree that such borders could only be set by the
16 joint commission of the warring sides, and once an agreement is reached
17 to that effect, any combat or fighting activity from the area needs to
19 A. Yes. I discussed it the other day. The Security Council, after
20 the commanders of the warring sides signed an agreement for Srebrenica,
21 Zepa, and Gorazde, unilaterally declared Tuzla, Sarajevo, and Bihac
22 protect areas without setting borders, and it did not mandate UNPROFOR
23 with disarming the Muslim forces in the area. So in Tuzla, the
24 2nd Muslim Corps was in full function with its staff units, and that
25 corps pulled out front brigades and located them in Tuzla for periods of
1 rest, which is considered a combat activity.
2 Next, in Sarajevo their Supreme Command was in function, the
3 Muslim forces command, as well as the 1st Muslim Corps, which was 50 to
4 70 armed men -- 70.000 armed men strong. In Bihac, the 5th Muslim Corps
5 grew in size.
6 On the day this Resolution was put in place about Bihac as a safe
7 area, it numbered three brigades, and under this regimen it increased to
8 the size of a corps of 22.000 soldiers who were equipped with the latest
9 equipment as -- and, as such, was one of the most modern units in Europe
10 at the time.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2174, Your Honours.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at 1D5332.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. General, do you agree with this position of mine: Aiding and
18 rooting for the Muslim side was a bad call to make because it provided
19 for a continuation of the war which could not be resolved by any other
20 means than a conference?
21 A. Well, whether it was a bad call to make is something I cannot
22 say, but they were definitely doing them a favour, and by having done so,
23 UNPROFOR consciously extended the war. And I have explained that when I
24 discussed Mount Igman and Bjelasnica which, to me, were the most
25 unbelievable areas to be proclaimed safe areas.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the second page in
2 the English.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you remember this document, General? We see your signature at
5 the bottom. There you inform, on top of other things, that the bombing
6 of Serbian positions at Gorazde was greeted with anger, and that you had
7 to take measures to pacify the soldiers and to prevent them from taking
8 revenge not only against UNPROFOR but foreigners as well, and you
9 informed the Main Staff about this from a forward command post?
10 A. Yes. It was my forward command post near Brcko at
11 Kosa Vranovaca.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you can this be admitted.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2175, Your Honours.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 1D5331.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. General, let's have a look at how long our anger lasted. On the
18 19th of April, you say that based on the order of the president, you
19 imposed the status quo ante, which means the situation as it had been
20 before the enemy activities by NATO and UNPROFOR were taken. You order
21 that things should continue as they had before we broke any relations --
22 we broke off any relations with them.
23 A. I do remember that; however, we broke relations with UNPROFOR
24 also pursuant to your order, although I don't remember whether it was an
25 oral or written one. It was at the time when General Mladic was away,
1 because he attended his daughter's funeral and was allowed to take a
2 leave for some 40 days. It was following our operation Zvezda 94. At
3 first, you ordered that we cease all contact and relations, and some
4 eight days following that initial order, you backtracked, it seems.
5 Q. It seems that Mr. Akashi, was very persuading so I gave up on my
6 position. Do you recall in any case that General Mladic said that close
7 support is received by UNPROFOR when engaging our forces and that we
8 could engage them freely whenever it happened and that we never approved
9 to any such guided air attacks with close support?
10 A. I'm not sure I understand your question who was to engage whom.
11 Q. Let me clarify. General Mladic, and it's in the various minutes
12 of UNPROFOR, told them that if our soldiers attack you, you are hereby
13 authorised by me to engage them. No one has the right to attack you.
14 This is something referred to as close-air support. If they are in
15 danger, they are entitled to defence. However, their expansion of
16 mandates to include air-strikes, which had nothing to do with support
17 provided to them but were aimed at changing the situation in the theatre
18 of war, was an enemy act. Do you agree with that?
19 A. I agree with the last part of your question, which is also a
20 conclusion. Physically threatening UNPROFOR -- VRS soldiers, physically
21 threatening UNPROFOR, or UNPROFOR threatening VRS soldiers, and that was
22 a case that you could read about in my letter to Valgren, well, it really
23 wasn't even necessary to warn about such things. It's part of the code
24 of conduct for armed individuals. Armed individuals have to defend
25 themselves if they are attacked. So I cannot confirm or deny that
1 statement of General Mladic's at some meeting because I wasn't usually
2 present at those meetings when Mladic was there, nor was he present at
3 meetings when I was leading a delegation. So as to whether he said that
4 or not, I cannot say. I can't confirm that, nor can I deny it, but I do
5 know that there was such a position in the Main Staff.
6 Q. Thank you. Could you now tell us whether it's logical and
7 justified if someone acts like an enemy and is armed, that person is then
8 considered to be an enemy, and in April 1994 did UNPROFOR in a one-week
9 period -- well, was UNPROFOR treated as an enemy during that period, and
10 capturing them was a matter of capturing prisoners of war. It wasn't a
11 matter of taking hostages.
12 A. In your order after the 11th of April, after the first bombing,
13 in fact -- I've already spoken about this, but on that occasion you broke
14 off the relationship between the VRS and UNPROFOR, as you considered
15 UNPROFOR to be the enemy regardless of this order of yours dated the 19th
16 when you re-established contact, well, I can say that I never did this.
17 UNPROFOR received the approval of the Security Council, the authorisation
18 to engage NATO forces when the UNPROFOR commander believed that this was
19 appropriate and necessary. So from my personal point of view, and this
20 was in the case of the supreme commander in the Main Staff, for me from
21 that day until the end of the war, up until the 14th of September, 1995,
22 in fact, I considered UNPROFOR to be the enemy. Because in spite of the
23 fact that they hadn't declared war on the -- on Republika Srpska, they
24 were one of the warring factions.
25 I'm afraid I haven't understood what the purpose of your question
1 was, but it's not for me to put questions to you, so that would be my
3 Q. Thank you, General. I'd just like to intervene for the sake of
4 the transcript. You said even if that was not the case with the
5 Supreme Command and the Main Staff, the Main Staff and the
6 Supreme Command did not consider them to be the enemy, but you,
7 nevertheless, personally considered them to be the enemy; isn't that
8 correct? So that opinion differs from the opinion or the position of the
9 Main Staff and the Supreme Command. That was not recorded.
10 A. There was a difference between the Supreme Command and the
11 Main Staff on the ones hand and myself on the other hand. You no longer
12 believed that UNPROFOR was our enemy, but my personal conviction was that
13 they were still the enemy.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2176, Your Honours.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5334, please.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Do you remember this letter of yours that you sent to me -- or,
21 rather, to the Supreme Command but addressed to me, where you protest
22 because we easily agree to the presence of UNPROFOR soldiers. It's the
23 3rd of May, immediately after this crisis. We accept their presence at
24 our lines where we are not in a good strategic or tactical position, and
25 in the last -- or the penultimate paragraph you say you're surprised that
1 the Main Staff hasn't been consulted and you ask me to take your opinion
2 into consideration before taking a final decision.
3 Do you remember that I acted in this way, and I believe that they
4 didn't go there in the manner that they wanted to deploy there? They
5 weren't able to do exactly what they thought they were going to do.
6 A. Yes. I personally intervened, personally contacted you on a
7 number of occasions because I had information -- or, rather, proof from
8 the field to the effect that the UNPROFOR intelligence was working for
9 its own needs and for the Muslim army. They were providing information
10 on us to them, but they never provided us with any information about the
11 Muslims. I always wanted to warn you not to trust UNPROFOR with regard
12 to everything, because in these places, in these bottleneck places, there
13 was the increased level of threat for the VRS. And I did contact you on
14 one occasion because when politicians are negotiating with the enemy,
15 with the warring faction, and generals attend those negotiations, or
16 should attend those negotiations, because the politicians dilute the
17 essence of combat activities. They make concession and so on and so
19 Q. Thank you, General.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted?
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2177, Your Honours.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D5345.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. While waiting for that, General, I'll show you two Muslim
1 documents which confirm that they are receiving intelligence on our
2 positions, intelligence from UNPROFOR.
3 I don't know where the Serbian version is, but this is also a
4 document of yours dated the 2nd of March, 1995.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I be assisted in finding the
6 Serbian version. Could it be found anywhere? If not, I'll read this
7 part in the box which says the following:
8 "Information on the enemy offensive carried out"--
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: We can print a copy, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE KWON: You found the B/C/S version. Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. So in this paragraph, you state that the enemy received accurate
14 information on our forces and their deployment, and so on and so forth.
15 And when carrying out this attack, the enemy used the element of surprise
16 by attacking Vlasic, Srbobran, and it says they had very detailed
18 Please have a look at this information on the enemy offensive
19 carried out against Mount Vlasic on the 24th and 25th of February. It's
20 the first paragraph. And then we'll have a look at something else.
21 When you've read through that passage, have a look at the
22 conclusion. It's the third page in the English version, "Conclusion and
24 Here you say that although they had prepared everything, they
25 weren't successful when launching that offensive. Our forces reorganised
1 themselves and managed to neutralise this element of surprise that was
2 made possible by NATO and UNPROFOR. Do you remember this document?
3 A. I do remember this document, but I'm not sure whether that is
4 your only question.
5 Q. No. I want to ask you whether this is confirmation of the
6 information we had, information that UNPROFOR was acting as an
7 intelligence service for our enemy. Is this also the act of an enemy?
8 A. Yes. This is another confirmation of my personal conviction that
9 UNPROFOR was our enemy. There's the saying the friend of my enemy is
10 also my enemy; or the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2178, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE KWON: General --
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have a look at --
17 JUDGE KWON: General, did you have some specific proof as to your
18 information that the UNPROFOR was acting as an intelligence service, or
19 did some of the UNPROFOR officials confirm such information at the time?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I had proof. The
21 interceptions of the VRS, there was information on our mutual
22 conversations, and UNPROFOR would provide those intercepts to the Muslim
23 army. The most obvious proof is this document that Mr. Karadzic has just
24 shown. They knew exactly what our weakest points were thanks to the
25 information that UNPROFOR provided them with.
1 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have look at two
3 documents, or could we put two documents on the ELMO, in fact. They
4 refer to this matter. We didn't upload them. I didn't think the -- this
5 subject matter would be on the agenda. I'd just like to do this very
6 briefly to deal with these two documents that comes from the Muslim side,
7 and I would also request the other party for its indulgence.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. If you'd like, I can read it out aloud:
10 "With regard to your request from your communications dispatch,
11 we hereby inform you that in order to check our previously obtained
12 information, we spoke to Colonel Roger from the British Battalion. In
13 the course of the conversation, Roger confirmed ..."
14 Could it be clearer?
15 A. [No interpretation]
16 Q. Our information obtained from officer Allen was confirmed. He
17 said that the regrouping of the aggressor was noticed. Three brigades
18 were regrouping in the wider Trnovo sector. He said that we shouldn't be
19 concerned by this because in his assessment it was a matter of 1.500 or
20 1.600 enemy soldiers. And then it refers to the situation in Srebrenica
21 and so on and so forth. Chief of sector Midhat Senovic.
22 So did we know, as a result of having intercepted their
23 conversations -- well, here, two UNPROFOR officers are mentioned who
24 provided information on the deployment our forces.
25 A. Yes. This document's date is two days prior to the Muslim
1 offensive, the purpose of which was to raise the blockade of Sarajevo,
2 or, rather, to occupy Sarajevo. Those three brigades mentioned here were
3 probably Serbian forces that were regrouping for a counter-offensive or
4 for the defence of the Serbian part of Sarajevo.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this marked for
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour. I believe Mr. Reid was able to
10 find a translation, if Mr. Karadzic would like to put it on the ELMO. I
11 don't know. It's up to him.
12 JUDGE KWON: Can we take a look briefly. Why don't we put it on
13 the ELMO.
14 Yes, we'll admit it.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As D2179, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I have the next document now,
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. On the 1st of July it says:
21 "We are hereby inform you that on the 1st of July, in the
23 Oh, there's a translation of that as well, is there?
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: No objection. If I can have the ERN number, we
1 can check for -- to see if we have a translation, but I can't see the
2 whole number at the moment.
3 JUDGE KWON: Can you see -- could you --
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you please show us the number
5 at the top of the page. A bit more. A bit more. 543-84635, is it? Can
6 we please see it? We cannot see it on the ELMO. It's the upper
7 right-hand corner. Yes. Thank you. 8460.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Gordon Riley. They were invited for a brief get-together, and he
10 is prepared to give us part of the information he obtained through a
11 telephone conversation with General Smith. On this occasion,
12 Colonel John said that Karadzic is terrorists with a view to discrediting
13 their forces around Sarajevo within the next few days, and he did not
14 know what the precise date would be, would carry out an attack in the
15 territory of Sapna Kalesija. As the conversation continued --
16 JUDGE KWON: Could you give the B/C/S version to the General and
17 put the English translation on the ELMO.
18 Yes. Yes, we can read it.
19 What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, sir, is this pre-eminent intelligence to the benefit of
22 our enemy? Is this a hostile act?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2180, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please call up P2137.
4 It's been admitted as a Prosecution document. I'm not sure that this is
5 it. P -- or, actually, 65 ter 3656.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. General, could you please focus on this document, which is
8 another document of yours from the time when our positions were massively
9 bombed at the end of May 1995, and what is ordered here is the deployment
10 of members of UNPROFOR. Could you please take a look at this document.
11 Do you agree, General, that they had been taken prisoner, these
12 members of UNPROFOR, and that they were treated as prisoners of war, and
13 that is the status that they, themselves, invoked, and they enjoyed the
14 rights of prisoners of war?
15 A. May I give a brief history of this document?
16 Q. Could you please just look at page 2 and then --
17 A. Okay.
18 Q. Paragraph 4, the second subparagraph:
19 "During the transportation and reception of UNPROFOR staff, make
20 sure that they are treated properly with military respect, treat them as
21 prisoners of war and provide them with food and water, just like what the
22 members of the Army of Republika Srpska have."
23 And further down, it says:
24 "The above-mentioned order of the Main Staff of the
25 Army of Republika Srpska concerning the deployment of UNPROFOR staff has
1 been approved by the President of Republika Srpska and local and foreign
2 media were also informed about it."
3 Tell us what is important in relation to this document.
4 A. Well, after this comment of yours, nothing really matters any
5 longer. I can just say yes.
6 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that it wasn't only troops on the ground
7 that had ordered bombing? There were forward air controllers on the
8 ground, and they led the gunners from the aircraft to our targets.
9 A. I don't know whether members of UNPROFOR acted as forward air
10 controllers bringing missiles to our targets, but I know that after the
11 actual fire, members of UNPROFOR came to these positions to see what the
12 effect of the fire were; that is to say that they joined in the campaign
13 of bombing the Army of Republika Srpska.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted? I beg your
16 pardon. This is actually already been admitted as a Prosecution
18 1D5343. Can we have that, please.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Do you remember that during the bombing civilian bridges were
21 also hit and that there were civilian casualties? In a small Fiat car
22 some persons were killed.
23 A. Yes, but I don't remember the individual case of the little Fiat
24 and the bridge, but I know that in the Main Staff after these three days
25 of bombing we analysed the effects, and we established then that about
1 110 civilians were killed. Most of them were shepherds.
2 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to ask you to take a look at this
3 document dated the 30th of August, 1995. That is another document of
4 yours, and may I remind you this is actually the beginning of the second
5 massive bombing in that year.
6 JUDGE KWON: Are we looking at the correct translation? It seems
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The translation is not the right
9 one, no. The translation has a different date. The date of this
10 document is the 30th of August, 1995. 1D5343 is the number of the
12 It's the wrong translation. We've uploaded the wrong document
13 under this number. So then can we remove the English page until we find
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. General, sir, do you remember this document when in the early
17 morning hours this massive bombing started that led to the final decline
18 in our combat capacity? You speak about the consequences here, and in
19 paragraph 2, you say:
20 "Due to the realistic threat of the enemy (NATO, UNPROFOR, and
21 the Muslim-Croat coalition) will continue combat activities against the
22 Army of Republika Srpska from the ground and from airspace. Take
23 immediate measures for the entire manpower to be protected to a maximum
24 degree from these attacks."
25 Was it clear that this was a coalition - NATO, UNPROFOR, and the
1 Muslim-Croat coalition - and that this meant co-ordinated action?
2 A. Yes. However, this co-ordinated action started a bit before the
3 30th of August. It seems to me that often I write or speak in vain.
4 The Croatian armed forces - on the 4th of June, 1995, at the same
5 moment when I started a new counter-attack towards Bihac - carried out an
6 aggression against the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina from
7 Livanjsko Polje towards Glamoc and Grahovo. Fire support of the Croatian
8 forces during those 110 days, while Operation Storm went on, was given to
9 the Croats by the Rapid Deployment Corps. That was the name of the
10 Euro corps.
11 I was hit in that area from the broader area of Duvansko Polje -
12 nowadays it's called Tomislavgrad - under the command of French
13 General Sobiru [as interpreted]. And I thought that we were friends.
14 Part of this corps attacked the Serb forces defending Sarajevo in that
15 offensive of theirs from the 16th until the 25th of June under the
16 command of American General Sylvester, who was the Chief of Staff of this
17 Euro corps. This Euro corps consisted of French and Spanish troops. The
18 commander was a Frenchman, which is only natural. However, the
19 Chief of Staff was an American, Sylvester. A few years later this
20 Sylvester came to Bosnia as a SFOR commander.
21 Look at the book of Mr. Carl Bildt and you will see that what I'm
22 saying is correct. I think that it's called "Peace Mission in Bosnia,"
23 whatever. It doesn't matter.
24 So co-ordinated action of the forces of the European Community,
25 the then-European community. This was a test corps for Europe to see
1 whether they it could have its own armed forces. These activities that
2 started on the 30th of August started a day earlier. There were
3 reconnaissance flights and reconnaissance sorties, and this went on for
4 17 days. There were 17 days of bombing. This was pure air support to
5 the Croatian forces; that is to say the forces of the regular army of
6 Croatia and the forces of Alija Izetbegovic. To be more specific, his
7 5th and 7th Corps.
8 Mr. Karadzic, I have to use part of your time to say this: There
9 is this general misconception in the world and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
10 that is the Split declaration achieved between Alija Izetbegovic and
11 Franjo Tudjman in the town of Split on the 22nd of July. There is this
12 belief that this Split declaration led to Croatian Operation Storm, and
13 the greatest misconception, and I spoke about that when I first testified
14 here in this courtroom, was that Operation Storm was on on the 4th and
15 5th of August, when Knin and Petrinja fell. Storm started on the
16 4th of June, 1995, and it went on. Later on it was transformed into
17 Operation Maestral, Breeze in order to have this area occupied, Visoko
18 Krajina; that is to say including Kljuc and Petrovac.
19 And then the third stage of that operation, Oluja, was
20 Juzni Potez. That was the name of the operation. The Croats were rather
21 successful and they wanted to take Banja Luka. You and I defended
22 ourselves on the approaches to Banja Luka.
23 I'm saying this because it is believed that Operation Storm
24 started by the Split declaration, which is not correct. Tudjman deceived
25 Izetbegovic by way of the Split declaration in order to have Izetbegovic
1 allow the passage of Croatian forces through Bosnia and Herzegovina so
2 that Tudjman would relieve the Croatian Army of the attribute of
3 aggressor, which is indeed what it was because they had attacked
5 That is what I wished to say.
6 Q. Thank you, General.
7 JUDGE KWON: I note the time. We'll sit till 1.45 today. It's
8 time to take a break if it is convenient.
9 But before that, General, on transcript page 25 and line 5, you
10 testified that you know after the actual fire, meaning air-strike,
11 members of UNPROFOR came to these positions to see what the effect of the
12 fire were. Could you expand on that? Who did what? Where? Do you have
13 some specific reports of such incidents?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Do you have in mind this last story
15 of mine or something I had said before? I need a time reference.
16 JUDGE KWON: You said that -- when asked about the report dated
17 27th of May, you said that you were not sure if the UNPROFOR members was
18 acting as an air controller, but you added that there were incidents that
19 UNPROFOR members came to the sites to confirm the result of it.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have proof. The bombing began on
21 the 24th of May. It lasted on the 24th, 25th, and 26th of May. My
22 reaction followed the -- the end of that operation. NATO did not
23 interrupt their operation out of mercy for the Serbs but because they
24 could no longer sustain losses.
25 To be specific, my statement that UNPROFOR members attended the
1 scene of combat, following that combat to ascertain effects, and they did
2 so as early as the 24th of May when the bombing began. A few minutes
3 before it all began, I was called by General Rupert Smith for the first
4 and last time. We had never been in contact before. He told me,
5 Unfortunately, General, I cannot change that decision. We will begin
7 It wasn't clear to me at all why he called me and not Karadzic,
8 Mladic, or someone else. I told him, General, you did your part, and let
9 me do mine.
10 A few minutes after the first strikes at Jahorinski Potok, which
11 was a warehouse at Pale, a lieutenant who commanded the warehouse
12 facility called me. He told me that two missiles had hit the target
13 which was the entry to the facility and another building and that eight
14 sheep that were grazing around the facility were killed and that his
15 guard dogs are going crazy because of the blasts.
16 He also told me that he captured eight soldiers of the Russian
17 UNPROFOR contingent and that he tied them to the nearby lightning rods
18 around the warehouse. I went completely mad. I told him, How can you
19 can you tie up living people? And he said, General, no worries. I had
20 report it had to General Rupert Smith first and then I called you. I
21 asked him to release them, but the lieutenant was quite far from me. I
22 reported it to the supreme commander, and Mr. Karadzic started shouting
23 at me to deal with it, especially because the soldiers in question were
24 Russian, and indeed they were released later that afternoon.
25 That is my proof that UNPROFOR could ascertain the effects of
1 their strikes. I did not assert that they guided fire because I didn't
2 see that. I did not have such knowledge. I do know, however, that
3 UNPROFOR through or around or released radio location devices around
4 bridges, such as a small bridge at Bisina. A radio locater is a type of
5 device which guides Tomahawk missiles. They were used on en masse when
6 Serbia was bombed in 1999. I hope this answers your question.
7 JUDGE KWON: So, General, did you mean to say that those eight
8 Russian UNPROFOR soldiers were there to ascertain the effects of
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] According to the lieutenant's
11 words, when they arrived, they first wanted to know what happened and
12 what the damage was. They wanted to know whether the missiles had
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll take a break for 20 minutes and
15 resume at 10 to 11.00.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Your Excellencies, we
19 have received a translation of the last document, but we haven't had the
20 time to upload it. Could we place it on the ELMO instead and have it
21 marked for identification?
22 JUDGE KWON: If we have English translation which can be
23 confirmed to be the correct one, there's no need to mark it for
25 Could you bring it to Mr. Nicholls so that he can confirm whether
1 it is the correct one.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 30th of August, 02/2/281.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm sure it's correct, Your Honour. Thank you.
4 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2181, Your Honours.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. General, could we briefly discuss the topic of Sarajevo. Could
9 we have 1D05411 in e-court.
10 JUDGE KWON: I wonder the LiveNote for parties are working or
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Not for me, Your Honours.
13 THE ACCUSED: No.
14 JUDGE KWON: But we can follow in the common monitor, but --
15 MR. NICHOLLS: It is for me now, Your Honours. Sorry.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Mine is also working.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's continue.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mine is not working, but I don't
19 have time to control the transcript anyhow.
20 So 1D05411, please.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. General, this is a document pertains to your request to UNPROFOR
23 to establish a joint commission since the Muslims have accused us of
24 having targeted Markale. It says January, but I think it should be
25 February. So the 5th of February. That's the date of the document.
1 In item 1, you see:
2 [In English] "Establish immediately a mixed expert military
3 commission of the representatives of UNPROFOR, the Army of Republika
4 Srpska and the so-called Army of BH, which will at the latest at 0800
5 hours on the 6th of January," I suppose it's February, "under the
6 protection of UNPROFOR begin to establish the ballistic and every other
7 circumstances ..."
8 [Interpretation] And so on:
9 Item 2:
10 [In English] [As read] "The role of the mixed expert, military
11 commission has to be documented (TV camera, photo shot, sketches, scan,
12 and so on) with all the necessary facts and figures.
13 "The results and the findings of the mixed expert military
14 commission, as soon as it finishes, must be presented to the world public
16 [Interpretation] Page 2, please. In item 5:
17 [In English] "If you do not accept our request for establishing
18 the mixed exert military commission, the Army of Republika Srpska will
19 stop every co-operation with UNPROFOR and the humanitarian organisations
20 until the case is objectively and completely explained and the world
21 public informed."
22 [Interpretation] General, is it correct that we did not try to
23 avoid this? Quite the opposite. We demanded an investigation because we
24 were an interested party and we wanted to take part.
25 A. Yes, but I think it would be better if I told you what took place
1 that afternoon, and I believe through that exercise you may receive some
2 follow-up questions you may have intended to put.
3 Q. Thank you. I hope I will be accorded a couple of minutes more by
4 the Bench.
5 A. Sometime late in the afternoon on the 5th of February, I was
6 called by the UNPROFOR Chief of Staff for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. --
7 actually, General Agnes Ramsey [as interpreted]. He told me, General
8 your Serbs created a massacre today at the market-place in Markale. When
9 I asked him what it was about, he said that the Serbs used a mortar shelf
10 82-millimetre calibre to kill 96 Muslim civilians and wounded
11 213 civilians.
12 I asked him if he is a professional or a contracted general. He
13 said that he was a professional and that when we met we exchanged CVs and
14 that we rose through the ranks in almost the same way. He was one year
15 older, so to say, in terms of rank as compared to me.
16 I told him that I did not claim the Serbs had not done it, but
17 that I was surprised that in such a small area there were so many people.
18 There is a ballistic law or rule which is that an 82-millimetre mortar
19 shell, as well as a defensive hand grenade, create the same effect upon
20 explosion if the density of people at the impact site is bigger than four
21 persons per square metre, which means they literally have to stand
22 shoulder to shoulder. In such a case, a shell like that kills seven to
23 eight people and wounds 16 to 18 people, whereas any other people that
24 may be there are protected by the bodies of the killed and wounded.
25 He told me something to this effect: You can say or believe what
1 you want, but the Serbs did it.
2 I went back to my argument that I did not claim that the Serbs
3 did not do it, and I offered what we can see in the document. I offered
4 that he, I, and one of the Chiefs of Staff of the so-called Army of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, if possible, not Jovan Divjak because he is a Serb,
6 attend the scene the next morning, since this was in the evening of the
7 5th of February already. We were to go there together with ballistic
8 experts in order to ascertain objectively who did that. I asked him not
9 to accused the Serbs publicly before that.
10 He asked me, and I don't know whether he was being cynical as it
11 all went through an interpreter, but he was quite insolent when he asked
12 me whether I dared go to Sarajevo. I told him that I would, because it
13 was his duty to protect me. He said it was fine. He also said that I
14 should wait at the forest ranger's house at 8.00 in the morning at
15 Trebevic. They usually waited there for us to take us to any
16 negotiations in Sarajevo itself. I believed it to be an arrangement.
17 However, since I did not trust that general much, I was afraid that he
18 would share that information with his boss, so I drafted the document
19 before us, and I trust what Mr. Karadzic read out. I believe it is
21 I wrote the document and sent it to the BiH UNPROFOR commander,
22 because both Mladic and Karadzic were in Geneva or London that day at
23 peace talks.
24 I asked General Rose -- or, rather, the UNPROFOR command to
25 provide me with an answer until -- before 6.30 p.m. I did not receive a
1 reply. Somewhere past midnight, at around 2.00 in the morning,
2 General Ramsey called me, and he said, General, there will be no visit of
3 ours. My boss wouldn't have it. I don't know whether he meant Rose or
5 Q. Thank you, General.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted and then
7 we'll show the next document which speaks about this subsequent phone
8 call of his.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be admitted.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2182, Your Honours.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 1D5412.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Can you confirm that this is your communique following the
14 cancellation of your visit? You say that General Ramsey stated that the
15 Muslim side refused to take part in the formation and work of the joint
16 expert commission. Towards the end, it says the UNPROFOR command refuses
17 that the Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR and the Chief of Staff of the
18 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Chief of Staff of the VRS attend the
19 scene together in order to establish the facts and consequences of this
21 General, did we have the right to participate and be familiar
22 with the results of this investigation, or we were to reject the --
23 reject any guilt for this act unless we were allowed to take part?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2183, Your Honours.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5414, please.
5 Q. Again I have only the English version, but I think you can
6 remember that you wrote to General Rose again on the 27th of May, 1994,
7 and you were bitter because -- and you were also concerned because of the
8 increasing -- increasingly frequent violations of the truce by the Muslim
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page, please.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. And here you can see that it says that you were bitter by the
13 extremely false and abject behaviour of the -- it would be better if I
14 read it out in English:
15 [In English] [As read] "I am embittered and extremely -- by
16 extremely false and abject behaviour of the Muslim side in the area of
17 Sarajevo. On one hand they demand Sarajevo to be a safe area, ask
18 protection and special measures, sign the cease-fire; whilst on the other
19 hand they open the fire towards Serb territory, most often uncontrolled
20 and against the urban settlements and civilian population, carry out
21 unprovoked attacks, move their positions by digging roads and trenches,
22 move and regroup their troops and violate the agreed cease-fire on the --
23 in other ways. I am embittered because such a behaviour causes Serb
24 population suffering and material destroying."
25 [Interpretation] Item 2 says that you were disappointed by
1 UNPROFOR's inability to undertake effective and adequate measures and so
2 on and so forth.
3 General, my question now is whether we ever intended to terrorise
4 the civilians in the Muslim part of Sarajevo. Did we ever do this in any
5 manner, through sniper fire, through use of the artillery? Was this a
6 plan of ours and did we act in accordance with such a plan?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Thank you. General, is it true that in Sarajevo the Muslim
9 artillery often used more projectiles than we did, and many of the
10 projectiles that they fired were, in fact, attributed to our side?
11 A. According to reports from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command,
12 yes, but as a witness, this is not something I can confirm or deny,
13 because I was not an eyewitness.
14 Q. Thank you. In this particular case, in the case of Markale, did
15 the Serb side launch an investigation, because initially you did not
16 dismiss the possibility of doing this. So did our army carry out an
17 investigation into whether our side opened fire and, if so, what were the
18 results of that investigation?
19 A. Yes. Our commission carried out the investigation under the
20 leadership of Colonel Ljuban Kosovac. He was a member of that mixed
21 military group or commission that had been established for the Sarajevo
22 area, and he used his prerogative to enter Sarajevo. There's a detailed
23 report drafted by that group in this book that has been admitted into
24 evidence. This commission was somewhat unsettled by the loss of that
25 mine stabiliser, because it was first recorded as Muslim evidence. It
1 had been dug out from a depth of 25 centimetres in the ground, and later
2 it disappeared. The commission's position in general was that it wasn't
3 a projectile that had come from the Serbian side. And second position
4 was that the explosion hadn't been caused by a shell, a grenade. The
5 position was that the explosion occurred at the level of the ground. And
6 I can't remember the number and date of that report, but it is referred
7 to in this book.
8 Q. Thank you, General.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document please be
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2184, Your Honours.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see 1D5171, and I'd ask
14 the Chamber and the OTP for their indulgence and for their understanding
15 in showing these documents I need to show, because General Milovanovic
16 knows much about our war, about our crisis.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This is a book by General Rasim Delic. Could we now see page --
19 well, it's the second page in the e-court system. Could we have a look
20 at the right side, page 101. Could we zoom in.
21 General, I'll read this out. It says: The looting on the
22 24th of October announced that the situation be increasingly complex for
23 the passage of the convoy with arms and equipment for the ABiH through
24 territory under HVO control. Local HVO control against ABiH units were
25 likely to escalate. In addition, given our previous experience of an
1 attempt of raising the blockade showed that the ammunition was being used
2 irrationally. Use of Prazina; for example, in one day fired from Igman
3 about 300, 130-millimetre shells on enemy targets. These features could
4 have been targeted with 82 or 120-millimetre mortars. Similarly, in two
5 or three days' time, from Igman, several thousand 120-millimetre shells
6 were fired from Igman. That's twice as many as could be set aside for
7 other army units, and so on and so forth. So where could these shells
8 from Igman have fallen? And these 130-million howitzer shells, where
9 could they have fallen, General? Only on the Serbian part of Sarajevo;
10 isn't that correct?
11 A. Since the Muslim artillery weren't trained, as was the case for
12 my men, many of those shells could also have fallen on parts of Sarajevo
13 that were under Muslim control.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted?
16 JUDGE KWON: You know the practice of the Tribunal, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now see
18 1D5414. I think that was the previous one. I apologise. Could we see
19 1D5415. [Microphone not activated]
20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. This is a document of yours dated the 22nd of July, 1994. You
23 mentioned the area of Sarajevo where Muslim forces have intensified
24 provocative and other action. Then you mentioned these various places.
25 Are these all Serbian places in Sarajevo, General: Grbavica Rajlovac,
1 Vogosca, Nedzarici, and so on and so forth?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted, please?
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2185, Your Honours.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. I'm going to have to skip many documents that you drafted. Could
10 we see 1D5417, please. And while waiting, General, is it correct that in
11 Sarajevo there were 50- to 70.000 Serbs who lived under Muslim control,
12 and in terms of the way in which they were dressed, in terms of the way
13 that they looked, it was impossible to distinguish them from Muslims?
14 You could not identify them as Serbs in the street.
15 A. It's true that there were Serbs in that area, 22 times 11
16 kilometres, that segment, but I can't say how many. I don't know.
17 Q. Thank you. I wanted to ask you, even if we were criminals, would
18 we have terrorised the population -- or, rather, if we had terrorised the
19 population, the civilians, would we have terrorised those thousands of
20 Serbs in Sarajevo, too, and does this make the claim that we did this
21 even more incredible?
22 A. Somewhere I wrote or somewhere I stated that we couldn't open
23 fire on such parts of town because we didn't know how many Serbs there
24 were in those areas.
25 Q. Can we scroll up, please. Here you informed the UNPROFOR command
1 on everything, on the violations of the agreement, and here you say in
2 the Sarajevo area the Muslim forces carried out provocative action. They
3 used snipers along all the lines of demarcation, especially from Igman,
4 Stupski, Butmir, Dobrinja, and so forth -- and so on and so forth. Can
5 you tell the Chamber, as briefly as possible, something about the Muslim
6 snipers, and what sort of actions did they undertake in relation to the
8 A. Yes. They -- in that book of mine that you have admitted, I
9 found a piece of information, according to which the Muslims first --
10 were the first to use snipers in Sarajevo. On the other hand, the
11 Muslims -- or, rather, there was a factory called Zrak that remained
12 under their control, and as early as April, they took about 540 sniper
13 rifles. The factory continued to function during the war. It produced
14 sniper rifles, mostly for the needs of the Muslim army. And while I was
15 saying this, I remembered where I noticed that the Muslims were the first
16 to use snipers. They used snipers when attacking the command of the
17 2nd Military District. That was on the 2nd of May, 1992.
18 Q. Thank you, General. For the sake of the transcript, I'd like to
19 clarify the following: Did you want to say that they started using
20 snipers before the Serbs in Sarajevo?
21 A. They started using them when they first took action against the
22 JNA, when they took action against the command of the 2nd military
23 district. So this was some -- well, about a month and a half before the
24 Serbs started using such means.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2186, Your Honours.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Unfortunately, General, the book wasn't admitted, so there's some
6 important documents of yours that I will have to skip given the time that
7 I still have at my disposal unless I am allocated additional time. Could
8 we see 5159, please. This is your book. 1D5159.
9 That's the first page, the title page of your book. Could we
10 have a look at page 7. I don't know which page it is in the e-court
11 system. It's the introduction. You can see it here. It's the first
12 page in the Serbian version, and it's the first page in the English
13 version too. And here it says that there are 55.000 captives and other
14 Serbs in Sarajevo and other large places of the Federation of Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina. Then 536 Muslim camps for Serbs, and there are 26 such
16 dungeons in Sarajevo.
17 General, did we know that in Sarajevo, apart from the tunnel, the
18 basement, the central prison -- prison in Viktor Bubanj barracks, did we
19 know that there were also private prisons where anyone who wanted to
20 could keep Serbs imprisoned?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you. I have to skip some pages, although it would really
23 be a good thing if the Trial Chamber had the entire book. Can we have
24 page 14 from the book? Yes. It's here. After "Gavrilo Princip," you
1 "We were first attacked by mortar fire from the brewery on the
2 22nd of April, 1992."
3 And then a bit further down you say, as you said, on the 2nd of
4 May there was an attack using all kinds of weapons, and so on and so
5 forth. Then also tear-gas was used, power was cut, water, telephone
6 lines, a truck full of explosives.
7 General, actually, all of this, was this not repetition of all
8 those things that had been done against JNA barracks in Slovenia and
9 particularly Croatia? Were lives of people truly threatened? And you
10 say further down that you could have lost your life three times on that
11 day yourself.
12 In English it's page 3, actually.
13 A. This is testimony of a lieutenant-colonel because I didn't take
14 part in this. The name rings a bell. If the Trial Chamber wishes for me
15 to do so, I can refer to the man's name and surname, but we have to do
16 this in private session, because when I was writing the book the man
17 asked me not to disclose his name because part of his family still lives
18 in the Muslim area -- or, rather, in the Federation of
20 Until the Trial Chamber decides whether we are going to move into
21 private session, I am going to say in support of this that this is an
22 absolute copy of the tactics that were applied by Croatia -- or, rather,
23 in Croatia against members of the JNA, and I know with full certainty
24 that the Patriotic League sent their own chosen men, special forces, for
25 training in Croatia in 1991; so a year before the conflict broke out in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. They completed their special forces training and
2 they returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Sarajevo, for this kind of
3 activity, blockades, power cuts, and so on.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If the Trial Chamber is interested
6 in the name of this officer, we can move into private session.
7 JUDGE KWON: It's for you, Mr. Karadzic, to decide.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then, please, briefly.
9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: By the way, where do we find that passage
10 in English?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 3. That's what it was
12 supposed to be. Page 3, where there's a reference to Gavrilo Princip.
13 It's somewhere around the beginning of the second paragraph:
14 [In English] "... should be examined in brief."
15 [Interpretation] It's around the 12th or 15th line from the top:
16 [In English] "The first we were attacked on mortar fire from the
17 brewery, 22nd of April, 1992."
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I've found it. In the middle of the last
19 paragraph, yes, if it is correct. Yes. Please continue.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could I now ask for
21 page 26 from this book, and the chapter it pertains to is the war
22 objectives of the warring parties.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Actually -- actually, before the war objectives of the warring
25 parties, do we agree that this is what it says here: On the 2nd of May,
1 all the things that were attacked. Although disagreement had been
2 reached on the 12th of May, the Assembly made a decision to establish the
3 army. On the 26th -- or, rather, I think on the 27th of May -- it's
4 actually the next page. Twenty-seven. In English it's page 5.
5 You are saying that that round of talks failed because of
6 Vasa Miskin in Crni -- or, rather, the shell that allegedly fell there,
7 and then on the 4th of August war was declared on the Serbs. Do you
8 agree that the first declaration of war against the Serbs was on the 20th
9 of June, 1992. Effective as of the 22nd of June, whereas this is
10 probably ...
11 A. Officially, a state of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was declared on
12 the 4th of August, 1992. Mobilisation was carried out on the
13 4th of April, 1992, two days before the recognition of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And on the 20th of June, Alija Izetbegovic declared
15 war on the Serbs.
16 Q. Thank you, General. When war was declared on the Serbs -- or,
17 rather, on Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in
18 the SAOs, as he said, is Bosnia thereby transformed into a theatre of
19 war? And is the responsibility for that to be borne by the side that
20 declared war?
21 A. Yes. A crime against peace was committed, according to the
22 Charter from 1945, the UN Charter.
23 Q. Thank you. Can we have page 32 in Serbian now, where you speak
24 about the war objectives of the warring parties. So it's the Serb
25 objectives and the beginning of the Muslim objectives. In English it's
1 page 6.
2 You said here for the Serbs:
3 "The objectives were to remain part of Yugoslavia so that both
4 the Serbs in BH and equally those in Croatia would not become national
5 minorities ... so that all Serbs would live in one state in the Balkans
6 as a constituent people."
7 And you say:
8 "As by different tricks, roses [as interpreted] and deceit, the
9 Muslim-Croat coalition (and that is the only thing in which they act in
10 unison) and with the blessing of the international community did not
11 allow them to do that. The Serbs resorted to the only option available,
12 namely to defend themselves in territories where they constituted a
14 Do you remember, General, in your interview to the OTP on the
15 27th of March -- actually, 2001. You said in response to the question
16 that had been put to you, What were the tasks put before the military by
17 the political leadership, you referred to two tasks, to save people from
18 genocide and to keep the territory until a political solution is found.
19 Is that in accordance with what is written here, and do you
20 confirm this today as well?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you. Towards the bottom, it says for the Muslims. First
23 they agreed to remain in Yugoslavia, and then -- and then "they changed
24 their mines," under quotation marks, and their objective was to create an
25 Islamic state in the territory of Europe, and do we agree that that
1 conclusion is indubitably drawn from Mr. Izetbegovic's
2 Islamic Declaration?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you. Can we have page 35. Seven in English. You say that
5 the main cause of the war conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina lies in the
6 attempt of the Muslim-Croat coalition to forcibly lead the Serbian people
7 out of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- the Serbian people from Bosnia-Herzegovina
8 out of Yugoslavia and to establish state domination over it, and you
9 speak about the number of persons that were killed by the Ustasha in the
10 Second World War.
11 General, do you agree - and that is what Lord Owen wrote in his
12 book -- book as well, that as soon as World War II insignia appeared in
13 Croatia as manifested by the HDZ and also rhetoric from the Second World
14 War, the Serbs were already in fear, and the place where you were born is
15 on the Croatian border?
16 A. Yes, but I would like to raise a crucial question here. All the
17 representatives of the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this is a question I
18 have for them: Why did they not behave that way when they were there?
19 And then in their memoirs they write the truth? General Rose in his
20 memoirs -- I mean, General Rose did not act the way he wrote his memoirs,
21 and when he testified here he testified again along the lines of what he
22 did while he was in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 I am calling upon them to exhibit their Honour as military men,
24 officers, and gentlemen.
25 Q. Thank you, General. You speak of national armies in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can we have page 40 now, towards the bottom.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, did you find the passage on page 7 of
3 the previous one?
4 MR. NICHOLLS: No, Your Honour.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Third paragraph.
6 [In English] "The basic cause ..."
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Please take a look at this. Towards the bottom you say this led
10 to the following: The Rump Presidency of the FRY, Slovenia and Croatia
11 had already left, reached agreement with the Presidency of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina that parts of the JNA remain here for the following
13 five years, that is say until 1997, as a factor of peace among the three
14 peoples. However, the agreement was first violated by the
15 Muslim-Croatian coalition by use of arms against the JNA and declaring --
16 and declaring mobilisation of their constituent peoples.
17 Can we have the next page in Serbian. In English the page is
19 And then the FRY, the decision of the withdrawal of Montenegrins,
20 and Serbs from JNA unit with the dead-line for compliance being the 19th
21 of May, 1992, so Serbs in BH, both as civilians and as soldiers, were
22 betrayed by both sides. The Muslim-Croat alliance committed that
23 betrayal by declaring war on the Serbs, and the FRY left us without
24 protection. General, it is correct that the Serb side said that they had
25 the right to remain in the federal state -- or, rather, that they had the
1 right for the federal state to defend them, protect them? The Muslim
2 leadership, already on the 23rd of December, 1991, do you remember that?
3 They asked the JNA -- at this meeting with the JNA, they asked for the
4 JNA to remain as a factor of peace in Bosnia.
5 A. Yes, and that is the reason why the Serb side was the last one to
6 establish its own army as the 7th armed force in the territory of the
7 former Yugoslavia.
8 Another thing, the armed forces of the Serb Republic of
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina, in addition to the Macedonian army, are the only
10 armed force that did not take political power; rather, they committed
11 themselves to defending it. All other armed forces created in the
12 territory of the former Yugoslavia, that is to say Slovenia, Croatia, and
13 the Muslim-Croat coalition, brought their own political leaderships to
14 power. That is to say the Serb armed forces -- or, rather, the Army of
15 Republika Srpska was a defensive army with a defensive strategy, from a
16 strategic point of view. And, of course, active combat activities, minor
17 ones, were only engaged in with a view to improving one's own positions.
18 I have to say one more thing. Not a single activity of the
19 Army of Republika Srpska, starting with platoons all the way up to the
20 level of brigades and corps, up to the army as a whole, was not carried
21 out without having been provoked beforehand. That is explained in this
22 book starting with Operation Corridor in 1992 and finally the
23 counter-attack in Bihac.
24 Q. Thank you. These were counter-offensives; right? If you agree,
25 General. Our actions were always responses to threats.
1 A. In military terms, that is termed responses to challenges.
2 Q. Thank you. Can we look at page 43 now. While we're waiting,
3 General, perhaps I asked you this already: Can we agree that all seven
4 armies were borne out of the JNA, the officers, the reservists? Is it
5 true that the JNA is the mother and mainstream of all of those seven
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's page 9 in English, actually.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The JNA and the TO of the SFRY were
9 the backbone used to create all the armed forces in the territory of the
10 former SFRY.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Thank you. The fact that the Muslims and Croats saw many people
13 join their armies, thus creating a false impression that the JNA became
14 an armed force of the VRS only because it took place at once and not
15 gradually as was the case with the other armed forces. In other words,
16 whatever was left is what we kept as ours.
17 A. Yes. It can be demonstrated by looking at the creation of the
18 1st Corps of the Army of BiH in Sarajevo and our Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
19 The military equipment and weapons were practically divided in two, but
20 the Muslims had taken their weapons by force from the JNA, whereas the
21 VRS simply kept certain assets without any use of violence as the JNA was
22 withdrawing. Not a single JNA member was killed in order to keep a
23 howitzer or a gun behind.
24 Q. Thank you. Under (a) on this page you say that the Muslim army
25 was being formed and people were leaving the JNA to join it as early as
1 1991 and 1992. On the next page you discuss criminals and gangs which
2 established the Patriotic League. Can we go to the next page in Serbian.
3 They also created the Green Berets and also several smaller militant,
4 paramilitary groups such as Jamiski Golubovi [phoen], Laste, Seve, the
5 jihad warriors, et cetera, and all those groups united again the JNA;
7 A. Yes. And you can see that in his book, too. Rasim Delic
8 addresses the criminal groups of Juka Prazina and others in
10 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that Rasim Delic also informed us that
11 the criminal in question, Juka Prazina, had 3.000 shells at his disposal
12 which he fired in only two days? So the criminal was part and parcel of
13 the Muslim army. Do you agree?
14 A. Yes. I stated that as well, that upon formation the
15 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina kept the military groups -- the paramilitary
16 groups which reported to -- directly to the staff and the Supreme Command
17 of the Muslim army rather than the corps. In other words, the supreme
18 corps command was aware of their existence and supplied ammunition and
20 Q. You say that the Croats and Muslims joined together against the
21 Serbs, thus forming the well-known Serb-Croat Muslim coalition, but the
22 very next year Serbs had to pull many of them out by their roots and
23 vehicles from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you remember that we were trying to
24 save Croats from the Lasva valley and there were tens of thousands of
25 them? We fed the Croats in Vares and transported them to Kiseljak. We
1 took Croats from Konjic as well; in other words, we often played UNPROFOR
2 in this conflict between Croats and Muslims.
3 A. Yes. And you, too, should recollect that we all had, too -- had
4 arguments about that, you and I. We were feeding and helping them at the
5 same time when they were attacking us in such areas where they were not
6 under Muslim attacks.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have page 45 in the
9 Serbian, which is the next page.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. There is one paragraph which is particularly interesting to me.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could Mr. Karadzic provide
13 an exact reference.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. I'd like to ask you this: Do you agree that the following model
16 existed: First, Serbs were terrorised for almost a year. Monuments to
17 writers were destroyed such as to Copic and Andric? Then, at the very
18 beginning of the war, Serbs were attacked and our civilians and men
19 for -- fit for military service fled. What followed was the return of
20 the men fit for military service and combat. Such was the case with
21 Zvornik where the Serbs had initially fled as well as from Bratunac,
22 Visegrad, Foca, and there was similar scenarios and other places.
23 After a year-long campaign of terror, it seemed that they won the
24 first round after which the Serbs returned and there was combat.
25 Does this reflect what you know about the period, and was this
1 model followed?
2 A. Yes, I have such knowledge, but I'm not certain about the model
4 Q. Thank you. Here you write about the 1st Corps, which used Serbs
5 in Sarajevo en masse as a human shield, and that some 10.000 Sarajevo
6 Serbs went missing or were killed. And if we go by first and last names,
7 some 8.000 people have been identified so far as Serbs.
8 A. Yes. I wrote this in 2005 when we still didn't know the exact
9 number of missing Serbs in Sarajevo. In the meantime, the fate of many
10 was discovered. I even mentioned somewhere that an additional 5- to
11 8.000 Serbs were still missing, whereas the figure now stands at only
12 some 200. So, for the most part, my answer is yes.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, can you tell me
15 how much time I have left?
16 JUDGE KWON: How much do you need to conclude, Mr. Karadzic?
17 It's about time for you to conclude.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's why I'm asking. If I
19 could have at least half an hour, but I could use an hour as this is an
20 invaluable witness. I would need a lot of time to go through his
21 documents alone.
22 JUDGE KWON: Given the circumstances regarding the courtroom
23 today, in particular that another trial that involves Judge Lattanzi
24 starts only 3.00, the Chamber has decided, upon the agreement of staff,
25 that we will go till 2.30 or 2.40 today, and we'll extend this session to
1 20 past 12.00. So, Mr. Karadzic, please conclude your cross-examination
2 by that time. You have 20 minutes.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. You're
4 full of understanding in the case of this witness. Thank you.
5 Can we go to page 48 of the book.
6 JUDGE KWON: I lost track of following the passage in English.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Stevanovic will assist us all.
8 The page we have had before was good, and I believe we'll be able to find
9 the right now one as well. We're looking for item (c) in the Serbian,
10 the Army of Republika Srpska.
11 Yes. Here we have paragraph (c).
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. There you write, General, that the last seven in a row, national
14 armed force to be formed was the VRS. And you wonder why it had not been
15 done before, and you find only one reason, which is the attempts of the
16 political leadership and the Serbian people as a whole to work out the
17 situation so as to avoid an armed conflict between the three peoples in
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you agree that we all hoped we could get away
19 without a war?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Thank you. Page 59 in the Serbian, please, and we'll locate the
22 right page in English. Towards the bottom you discuss the VRS.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could Mr. Karadzic wait
24 for the interpreters until we find the right piece of text.
25 MR. KARADZIC:
1 Q. [No interpretation]
2 [Interpretation] Here we have the examples --
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please slow down.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 12 in the English. That's
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. In the middle, we see Corridor 92. Here, you summarise the
8 motive and our responses. The Corridor 92 operation was provoked by an
9 operation against Banja Luka. Then under 2, Operation Podrinje 93 was a
10 response to the massacres of Serbs in Kamenica, Cerska, Kravica,
11 Bratunac, Skelani, and different villages at mount Sjiemic [phoen].
12 Under 3, Operation Lukavac 93 was a response to the occupation of Trnovo
13 Rogoj, et cetera, and the massacres of Serbs in the villages around Foca
14 and Trnovo. 4, the VRS counter-attack towards Bihac in November 1994 was
15 an answer to the counter-strike of the Muslims from that area.
16 General, we had only four large operations, and all were a matter
17 of life and death for us, for without them we would not have survived.
18 Do you agree?
19 A. Yes. These were the four offensive operations.
20 Q. Do you agree that in Sarajevo the front lines remained more or
21 less in the same positions as they had been established by the Serb TO
22 forces when engaging the paramilitary groups there? The only changes
23 that took place were minor and were to the benefit of the Muslims and
24 say -- and we didn't take many parts of Sarajevo, although we could have.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you. Page 62, please. The chapter about the plight of
2 civilians as a general category, not only Serb civilians. Page 13 in the
3 English. This is the right chapter.
4 There you discuss the accusations against us, such as the
5 shelling of Sarajevo, et cetera. Civilians, especially Serbs in
6 Sarajevo, suffered, although when referred to victims in general, only
7 Muslims are referred to by their international patrons. 150.000 Serbs
8 fled from Sarajevo and over 2.000 of them went missing. Do you agree,
9 General, that throughout the war the figure of between 300.000 and
10 350.000 killed Muslims was something that was frequently heard? And
11 about 80.000 or 60.000 raped Muslim women. It was all in the function of
12 waging war. As it turns out, there were only 17 or 18 Muslim women who
13 had been raped, whereas there were more Serb women who had been raped,
14 and the overall losses amounted to about 100.000.
15 A. Yes. I remember Haris Silajdzic's statement in Vienna. I don't
16 know the date. He said that the VRS raped 150.000 Muslim women. That
17 evening, my courier asked me who raped his Muslim woman, because he had
18 not raped any.
19 Q. So you're trying to say if we go by the figures, he would have
20 raped one; correct?
21 A. Yes. You can find an official report issued by the Muslim
22 Supreme Command dated the 31st of August, 1994, which reads the Muslim
23 army in the past 29 months of war lost 235.627 fighters. If anyone were
24 to analyse this rationally, what were their total figures of fighters
25 when international standards say that any military formation which lost
1 over 40 per cent of personnel is considered neutralised, incapable of
3 Q. Thank you?
4 MR. NICHOLLS: I just wonder if we're going to get any basis for
5 the conclusion put out that there were only 17 or 18 Muslim women who had
6 been raped during the course the entire war?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will show that today. We don't
8 have time now, but we will show that international commissions were able
9 to register only as few.
10 JUDGE KWON: That all boils down to the efficiency of your
11 cross-examination. It's all worthless statements coming from you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'll restrain myself.
13 Can we see the next page here.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. You speak about murders and setting up your own population
16 to die --
17 JUDGE KWON: I just refrain, but when you referred to the
18 previous passage, did you say 2.000 of them went missing out of 150.000
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If you're referring to the Serbs,
21 150.000 fled and 10.000 went missing or were killed. And that's what it
22 says here on the page.
23 JUDGE KWON: But you said 2.000 missing. That's -- in the -- in
24 this page, General, you said 10.000 of those who fled Sarajevo proven to
25 have been killed and those 5- to 7.000 nothing is known of. So when you
1 say 10.000 of those proven, what did you mean by "proven"? What proof do
2 you have?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm afraid I don't understand your
4 question, but this is what I said: About 150.000 Serbs were driven out
5 of Sarajevo, and more than 10.000 have been provable to have been killed,
6 and about 5- to 7.000, well, nothing is known about them. I apologise
7 for mentioning the figure of 2.000, but I said that out of that figure --
8 JUDGE KWON: No, no. General Milovanovic, it was not you that
9 mentioned 2.000, but my question is: What did you mean by "being proven"
10 that 10.000 people have been killed?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were two commissions working
12 on this evidence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their figures are not
13 totally identical. I don't know within which context I mentioned the
14 figure of 2.000.
15 JUDGE KWON: Well, I'll leave it at that. Let's continue,
16 Mr. Karadzic.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Thank you. If I can be of assistance, General. You said you
19 wrote the book in 2005, and at the time there were 5- to 7 .000 missing,
20 and you said that out of those 5- to 7.000, now, one doesn't know
21 anything about the fate of 2.000 of them. You rely on the information of
22 the commissions with regard to the figures on those who were killed. Is
23 it true that in Sarajevo there is an association of Serbs that is
24 involved in carrying out such investigations and it is from this
25 association that these figures were obtained?
1 A. I'm claiming, yet again, that I said that searches are still
2 being conducted for 1.200-odd individuals. Two thousand, I don't know
3 where I got that figure from, but this figure is one that I got from the
4 association of families for those who went missing in Republika Srpska.
5 I think Mitrovic was at the head of that commission, and that was
6 information from him. Searches were still being conducted in order to
7 locate about 1.200 Serbs whose fate remains unknown.
8 JUDGE KWON: Let's move on. So I would like you to spend the
9 remaining time efficiently on relevant issues. You have five minutes,
10 Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. I can't deal with the whole book, but in general terms, General,
14 is it correct that for the purpose of various conferences or for other
15 needs the Muslim side sacrificed its own people in order to tarnish our
16 image and to gain the international community's sympathy?
17 A. Yes. I stand by everything that I stated in this book that
18 concerns the Vaske Miskin Street and Markale I, as well. I'm not sure
19 about Markale II. Furthermore, wherever I stated that the Muslims wanted
20 to interrupt the conference if the Serbs seemed to be in a better
21 position, or if they rejected what the Serbs were saying, well,
22 gentlemen, somewhere I said -- I wrote that the Muslims accepted the
23 Dayton agreement because they were counting on the Serbs not respecting
24 it. That's what Rasim Delic said in Tehran in the period from the time
25 the Dayton agreement was reached up until the time that it was signed in
2 Q. General, I have another three minutes, so if you agree with my
3 questions, please answer by just saying yes or no.
4 In the case of Markale II, are you not certain about that case
5 because you weren't there, but you were in the western part of
6 Republika Srpska at the time?
7 A. Yes. And Markale II provoked that 17-day period of NATO bombing.
8 Q. Thank you. General, did you ever hear about or even participate
9 or support, but did you ever hear about us having a project according to
10 which we should expel the Muslims or Croats in the territory in which we
11 were in the majority? So did you ever hear about such a project, not to
12 say participate in such a project or support it?
13 A. I never heard about such a project.
14 Q. Thank you. Do we agree that their entire villages and hamlets
15 with Muslim inhabitants and in Serbian towns there were always Muslims
16 right up until the end of the war, especially Muslims who didn't have
17 family members in the ABiH? They remained there and lived with us until
18 the end of the war.
19 A. Yes. For example, the Satorovici village near Rogatica could be
20 an example; another example would be Janja in Bijeljina; another example
21 would be Gradiska.
22 Q. And in Gradiska, Srbac, Derventa, Kobas, Dubocac, and so on and
23 so forth; isn't that right? Kobas, Dubocac, and in Gradiska?
24 A. I mentioned the inhabited places I am sure of. These are places
25 that I visited in the course of the war.
1 Q. Thank you, General. You mentioned the attack of a village -- on
2 a village. Did the VRS or did some unit act according to an order or
3 with the knowledge of a command to commit a crime? Did any such unit act
4 in order to conceal the perpetrators of a crime? Are you aware of the
5 fact that some unit from the VRS -- I'm not talking about individuals or
6 personal vendettas. Are you aware of any units acting in a criminal
7 manner and attempting to conceal the crimes perpetrated? Are you
8 familiar with any such cases?
9 A. No.
10 Q. General, were our military courts fully operational during that
11 period of time and was everything documented so that proceedings are now
12 instituted on the basis of the documents that relate to crimes committed
13 by individuals in the course of the war?
14 A. I know that these things were documented, but I'm not really
15 familiar with the operations of the military courts.
16 Q. But during the war, the military courts functioned all the time;
17 isn't that correct?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, you can answer the question.
19 I'll hear from you afterwards.
20 Yes, please answer the question, General.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think I have answered the
22 question. Everything was documented, but I'm not sure that the courts
23 functioned continually because I didn't monitor the situation throughout
24 that period.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour, I had no objection. It's just in the
2 question at line 61 [sic]. From what I heard in my headphones, I think
3 something got missed in the transcript, if I'm correct, which is that
4 Mr. Karadzic said to the effect of courts were fully operational during
5 that period of time and everything was documented so that proceedings are
6 now being instituted. In other words, are happening now. That's missing
7 from the question, unless I misheard.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.
9 Your last question, Mr. Karadzic.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, we haven't yet spoken about the Sanski Assembly. You
12 weren't there. I don't think you were there. I'm not sure.
13 A. Yes, I was.
14 Q. You were. General, do we agree that the words spoken in the heat
15 of that political combat shouldn't be taken literally? Such words should
16 be taken cum grano salis, given that it's all a matter of political
17 speeches and exaggerations. Such words should be taken with a grain of
19 A. Yes, but there was more political exaggeration than military
21 Q. Thank you, General. I hope we won't have to call you for the
22 Defence case, and I apologise for being somewhat confused on occasion
23 because of my desire to obtain as much information from you as possible.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.
25 JUDGE KWON: Well, we'll have a break for 40 minutes. So we'll
1 resume at five past 1.00 and then we'll have about 90 minutes session.
2 You'll have more than 30 minutes, I take it?
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour, because of the schedule that
4 Mr. Tieger spoke about, I'll be as -- as brief as possible, because we
5 are under some constraints for the next couple days.
6 JUDGE KWON: Hmm, yes. Very well, 40 minutes.
7 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.24 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 1.07 p.m.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 Re-examination by Mr. Nicholls:
12 Q. Good afternoon, General.
13 A. Good afternoon.
14 Q. I have limited time, so please try to answer briefly, if you can.
15 The first thing I want to ask you about is something you said about
16 Sarajevo. This is at T-25690, and it refers to the conversation you had
17 with General van Baal about sniping when you said words to the effect of
18 I can't prevent some idiot from shooting.
19 Now, in the transcript, at line 19 of that page, you say:
20 "The soldier who was closest to Marin Dvor was 5.5 kilometres
21 away, which -- what kind of sniper can fire on targets 5.5 kilometres
23 Do you remember that, talking about that?
24 A. Yes.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 12446, please. While that's coming
1 up, this is a document from the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade command
2 dated 3 September 1992, and it's signed -- we don't need to go to the
3 last page now, but it's signed by Dragomir Milosevic.
4 Could I go to page 4 of the English. And it should be page 2 of
5 the Serbian language, please.
6 Q. All right. Now what I'm asking about, General, is the line and
7 where some of the VRS forces are deployed according to this document:
8 "The 1st pb is defending the following front line: Metalka, left
9 bang of the Miljacka River up to Strorjorad the right side of Duraskovica
10 street ..."
11 Do you see that in your version? I think it's under point 2, 2.
12 A. Is it the second paragraph where it says the
13 2nd Infantry Battalion or something else?
14 Q. It --
15 A. Metalka, left bank of the Miljacka River.
16 Q. Yes, thank you. Exactly. Now I'd like to show you 23643,
17 please. That's a photograph, General. And while it's coming up, I will
18 tell you that this is a photo taken from the Metalka building. And do
19 you recognise the building we see through the window with some yellow
20 facade on it?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we be told what the scale is,
22 how much this has been enlarged? It's not the normal scale, this
23 photograph taken from Metalka.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: This is a normal photograph taken from Metalka so
25 the scale is whatever a camera captured when it's just taking a normal
1 photo. And I will show another picture in a minute.
2 Q. We can see the frame of the building. Do you recognise the
3 building with the yellow facade, General?
4 A. I am not familiar with Sarajevo. I don't know Sarajevo, but I
5 think this is the Holiday Inn Hotel, which I saw after the war. So on
6 the basis of the front of the building, I assume that it is the
7 Holiday Inn.
8 Q. Yes. Now could I show 23641, please. Maybe this photo will help
9 Mr. Karadzic. This is a photograph taken from the tram tracks we saw in
10 the previous photo toward the Metalka building in the back.
11 My question, General, is you said 5.5 kilometres were the closest
12 snipers. How far away does that building look from the area we just saw
13 by the Holiday Inn? Estimate.
14 A. First of all, I did not say the sniper who was furthest away. I
15 said the soldier who was closest to that location was 5.5 kilometres
16 away. Since that is the centre, well, I don't know this building, and
17 judging by the photograph, the distance, as far as I can see, is about a
18 hundred metres.
19 Q. Yes, General, but I just wonder if your opinion changed at all.
20 If you accept my representation that that's the Metalka building, did not
21 the document we just look at from 3 September signed by
22 Dragomir Milosevic say that that is where the line was being defended?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I just ask something? This
24 is the Prosecution's witness. I don't mean to assist, but the gentleman
25 spoke about Marin Dvor, not the Holiday Inn, and in Marin Dvor area, the
1 lines are located on Zlastiste on Trebevic. Not everything should be
2 situated in the Holiday Inn area. The Holiday Inn area and Marin Dvor
3 are not the same areas.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, we can argue about that later, but the
5 Marin Dvor area is in the vicinity of the Holiday Inn.
6 Q. General, can you answer my question, which, before I was
7 interrupted, was that if this is the Metalka building, didn't we see that
8 this is an area that was defended by VRS troops?
9 A. I cannot answer your question, because van Baal said to me that
10 the tram was at Marin Dvor. Marin Dvor was designated by UNPROFOR as the
11 centre of Sarajevo, the centre of the ellipsis, and my logic was that it
12 was 11 kilometres wide, so the closest soldier of the Army of
13 Republika Srpska could have been only 5.5 kilometres away from that tram
14 that had been hit. So this is a different situation that I was unaware
15 of, and I cannot answer your question.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. Your Honour, I would move to admit
17 these three documents, although the witness did dispute the -- whether he
18 was able to comment.
19 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure we need to admit it, but do you have
20 any objection, Mr. Robinson?
21 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, I don't think they've met the
22 qualifications for admission, but if you think it would assist you to
23 understand his answers, we don't really have a problem for context.
24 JUDGE KWON: Do we have not already a sufficient number of photos
25 regarding these incidents, Mr. Nicholls?
1 MR. NICHOLLS: I'll withdraw it, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 MR. NICHOLLS:
4 Q. And you brought me to my next question, General, which is about
5 the ellipsis --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon. I'm so sorry.
7 If the Prosecution does not wish to tender that report, the Defence would
8 like to tender General Milosevic's report.
9 JUDGE KWON: Are you tendering that report, Mr. Nicholls.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE KWON: 12 --
12 MR. NICHOLLS: 446.
13 JUDGE KWON: 12446. Yes. That will be admitted.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
15 Q. You referred to the ellipsis just now --
16 THE REGISTRAR: Excuse me. Just a second. As Exhibit P4498,
17 Your Honours.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: As well at page 41 today, and I just wanted to ask
20 you a question about that, those dimensions. Could I have D718, please.
21 Excuse me. It's D718. That's it. Thank you. And if we can blow-up in
22 the centre a little bit.
23 Q. Now, looking at this centre where we have 1K for the 1st Corps
24 and the lines drawn there around Sarajevo, is this shape we see in the
25 centre marked 1K encircled in the blue and red, is that the ellipsis
1 you've been talking about?
2 A. I don't know. The blue does not resemble an ellipsis. However,
3 the yellow, I don't know why it's yellow. That is what -- is more
4 reminiscent of an ellipsis.
5 Q. Okay. So my question is the 11 by 22 ellipse that you've
6 referred to on a few occasions is greater than what we see in this 1K --
7 this area marked 1K. Is that -- do I understand you?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you. I'm done with that, which is already an exhibit.
10 I'd like to bring up P02955. Now, in your cross-examination at
11 25560 to 25562, there was a discussion about the sort of great
12 humanitarian of the Drina Corps, Miladen Prstojevic. I just wanted to
13 show you this document dated 17 December 1992. 02955 should be
14 available. Yes. Could we just go to the last page to begin with so that
15 General Milovanovic can see who signed it. All right. We can go back to
16 the first page now. In both languages. And scroll down.
17 The third paragraph there, can you read that to yourself and I'll
18 read out the English. I'm only interested in the first part:
19 "With the arrival of paramilitary organisations to the Zvornik
20 municipality, particularly the arrival of Arkan and his people, the
21 territory was liberated from the Turks. Turks made up 60 per cent of the
22 municipality's population and it has now been cleansed and replaced with
23 an ethnically pure Serb population."
24 Do you see that, sir?
25 A. Yes. Yes, I see that.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we kindly ask Mr. Nicholls to
2 ask the witness to go on reading.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you please zoom in a bit.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: And I know what Mr. Karadzic is getting at, I
5 think. The continuation of the paragraph shows: Problems caused by the
6 paramilitaries which are now taking place in this ethnically pure Serb
7 municipality, thievery, et cetera.
8 Q. Now, sir, my question is: You spoke a lot about this man
9 Miladen Prstojevic and his humanitarian bent. Do you see anything where
10 he speaks negatively about the fact there that the municipality is now a
11 hundred per cent Serb? Is that the way you view it? That's my question.
12 A. I never said that Colonel Prstojevic was a big-time humanitarian
13 as you've been claiming, but I said that he was one of the more literate
14 officers that I sent to the Drina Corps to conceptualise the work of the
15 corps at the time. When Prstojevic wrote this, if I'm not mistaken, this
16 is the 17th of December, 1992, Colonel Prstojevic was commander of the
17 outer ring for the protection of the Main Staff. At that time, from the
18 11th to the 16th of December, the Main Staff was attacked by a sabotage
19 terrorist group that had infiltrated the area, and no one took
20 responsibility for their deeds and misdeeds; the Muslims or the HVO, no
22 Q. Let me stop you an sec, and go to the back page so you can see
23 what the stamp says.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: We can zoom in on it, can we?
25 Q. Does that help you with his position at the time he wrote this?
1 A. Yes. Well, I've said that he's an operations officer in the
2 Drina Corps, the head of the organ for operations and training --
3 Q. Okay.
4 A. -- as is written here.
5 Q. All right. I just wanted to get that this was the Drina Corps,
6 not Main Staff.
7 I don't want to cut you off. Did you have something else you
8 needed to finish? I just wanted to show you that stamp first.
9 A. No, I have nothing to add.
10 Q. All right. Now, at T-25572, Mr. Karadzic said:
11 "It is my intention to show you documents and to show you that
12 directive 4, whatever its contents, had no negative consequences for the
13 civilians on the ground."
14 So I want to look at some documents from the Drina Corps after
15 directive 4 was issued and after Zivanovic's order implementing
16 directive 4 was issued that we looked at. The first one is 65 ter 30868.
17 This is an intercept from 8 February 1993. The speakers are Zivanovic
18 and Gaborovic. It's the one that begins at 10.45. Okay. Read it to
19 yourself, please, General, and then I'll ask you to read out loud the
20 last three lines spoken by Zivanovic, who we say is Milenko Zivanovic,
21 and Gaborovic. And the parts I'm talking about where Zivanovic starts
22 saying "Hold tight the positions," do you see that?
23 A. Yes, I see that, but it would be a good thing if you could zoom
24 in a bit. It's very small.
25 Q. Okay. What it says in my translation is:
1 "Hold tightly the positions. Are the Turks' houses burning?"
2 And Gaborovic then says:
3 "They are burning. They are burning."
4 And the commander of the Drina Corps says:
5 "Way to go. As many as possible."
6 Is that what it says in your language in the original Serbian?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, just very simply, have you seen this document before?
9 A. No, and I don't know who this Gaborovic is. According to what
10 Zivanovic is saying to him, I assume that he's an engineering man,
11 because he is asking him to have some obstacles placed.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we ask Mr. Nicholls what this
13 has to do with directive 7?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. Directive 4 is mentioned.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, and I -- there have been quite a few
16 interruptions so far.
17 Q. Now, General, just very quickly, in your view as an officer, a
18 life-long military man and an officer on the Main Staff, does this
19 statement and what we see here from the Drina Corps commander imply
20 negative consequences for civilians?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 JUDGE KWON: What's the date of it?
24 MR. NICHOLLS: It's the 8th of February, 1993, Your Honours, and
25 you can't see that on that page, but if we go back in the transcript, and
1 I'm not sure if all the pages in the transcript are in e-court, but I
2 have a hard copy. We can see that it's the 8th of February, 1993.
3 Do we have a previous page in e-court in Serbian?
4 JUDGE KWON: No. We have only one page in e-court.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: I can put the previous page on the ELMO, if
6 Your Honours wish.
7 JUDGE KWON: It won't be necessary. We take your word.
8 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
9 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. We object to the admission or the marking
10 for identification of this intercept. The witness hasn't confirmed
11 anything about it.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, Your Honours, the witness knows who
14 commander -- Drina Corps commander Zivanovic is and knows that this is a
15 date shortly after directive 4 was issued during the period of Proboj. I
16 think it can at least be marked for identification. I wasn't going to
17 tender it.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE KWON: I'm a bit confused, Mr. Nicholls. If you're not
20 going to tender it, what's the point of marking it for identification at
21 the moment?
22 MR. NICHOLLS: I would tender it, Your Honour, but we don't have
23 either interlocutor here at the moment. I would tender it, but perhaps
24 with a different witness at this time.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, why don't you tender it when you use
2 it later on.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 MR. NICHOLLS:
6 Q. I'd now like to show you, General, 21259. This is a short time
7 later, ten days later, 18th of February, 1993.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: And if we go to the second page, perhaps, of the
9 Serbian or the bottom so that the General can see who signed it or whose
10 name it is under. Could we scroll down to the bottom. Yeah.
11 Q. And while we're here, maybe you could read just to yourself
12 paragraph 5, General.
13 A. I've read this, but I don't understand what the significance of
14 it is.
15 Q. Let's go to the first page. First of all, is this your document?
16 A. Yes, it's my document judging by the number 02, and also the
17 signature. However, it was sent by teleprinter, hence there is no
18 handwritten signature.
19 Q. Okay. Well, the relevance I'm getting to now is this is based on
20 directive 4, the amendment to directive 4 from 7 December and the
21 explicit request by the supreme commander. And what we saw in paragraph
22 5 was that in the supreme commander's opinion, further combat activities
23 and future appearance of RS territory depends on the execution of this
24 task. And then we can see what the tasks are, liberation of Orasje.
25 So my question is looking at this, you talked about how the
1 people in directive 4 meant that once the people moved out, that was your
2 view, then the army should be moved out. What does this document tell us
3 about the supreme commander's view that directive 4 was necessary and
4 crucial -- was necessary to the future appearance of RS territory?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Incomplete. It also says for
6 continuation of struggle, not --
7 JUDGE KWON: I think you are trying to feed the witness. I think
8 General is capable of answering questions.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I had no objections as far as the
10 General is concerned. It's Mr. Nicholls who is changing this. He is
11 leaving out parts that are important. In my view, that is leading.
12 JUDGE KWON: I don't see the leading part.
13 Why don't you continue, Mr. Nicholls. What was the question?
14 MR. NICHOLLS:
15 Q. General, the question I asked you was: What does this document
16 tell us about the supreme commander's view of the combat operations
17 related to directive 4 regarding, as it says, the future appearance of RS
19 A. Nevertheless, you will have to allow me to read the document,
20 because this is just an excerpt, paragraph 5, that you asked me about.
21 On the basis of that only, I cannot conclude what the commander had in
22 mind. There's a reference to Orasje and Gradacac here and I do not
23 recall them being mentioned in directive 4. Directive 4 introduced the
24 Drina Corps into the system, the war system of the Army of
25 Republika Srpska.
1 Q. Why don't you read the whole document. You can go to page 1, and
2 when you're done we can go to page 2.
3 A. Very often you keep changing the page, going up and down, and now
4 it's the last page. Please put the first page first and then I can read
5 it. Yes. This should be right.
6 You can change the page now.
7 I can start answering now.
8 Q. All right. I'll ask the question again and try to make it a
9 little clearer. The first paragraph of this document says, and it's to
10 the 1 kk and East Bosnia Corps: Based on directive operative number 4
11 the amendments to directive 4 and the explicit requests by the supreme
12 commander to carry out the tasks here. And the last paragraph says: In
13 the supreme commander's opinion, future combat activity and future
14 appearance of RS territory depends largely on the execution of this task.
15 So the question is very simply again: What does this tell us
16 about the supreme commander's view that directive 4 related to, put it
17 that way, the future appearance of the RS territory?
18 A. Directive 4 does not pertain to the future Republika Srpska.
19 However, this document extends -- or, rather, by way of this document,
20 the commander is extending - how should I put this? - the authority of
21 directive number 4. He is of the intent that the territory of
22 Republika Srpska should extend to Orasje and the Sava River valley,
23 whereas in the other parts of the front, Doboj, and whatever else he
24 mentioned, Gradacac and whatever, he asked for enemy forces to be kept
25 there. He is not asking for the taking of new territory. He is asking
1 that the enemy forces be engaged so as not to be able to help them in
2 Orasje and in the Sava River valley.
3 Q. Thank you. You just said directive 4 does not pertain to the
4 future Republika Srpska.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I please have P02085.
6 Q. I wasn't going to use this, General, but let's look at it again.
7 This is the 24 November 1992 document pursuant to directive 4, signed by
8 General Zivanovic, that we looked at before. And if I go to page 2 of
9 the English and page 3 of the Serbian. Page 2 of the English, please.
10 All right. I'm focusing on the bottom (c), section (c):
11 "Morale and psychological preparations: Before initiating any
12 kind of operation," again, this is pursuant to directive 4, "inform the
13 unit members about the important aim of that operation and underline that
14 the outcome of minor actions and of the whole operation is of crucial
15 importance for the realisation of the aim of the Serbian people, namely
16 the creation and establishment of a Serbian state in these areas."
17 So now I'll just ask you if that -- if you can add to your answer
18 having seen the way the Drina Corps commander viewed directive 4. Does
19 it pertain to the future Republika Srpska?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I need to
21 intervene. Have I been accused of establishing Republika Srpska? What
22 sense is there in putting to the witness legitimate orders and present
23 them as a criminal offence?
24 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic. Your objection is overruled.
25 Can you answer the question, General?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. This was a standard item in
2 all psychological and morale preparations of the army in the execution of
3 a task. The goal is to have each and every soldier be clear about the
4 task. I don't know what the order pertains to directly, but the corps
5 commander is asking his superiors -- his subordinates to acquaint all
6 members of the unit with the importance of the activity and to point out
7 that the entire operation depends on the implementation of even smaller
8 operations which ultimately should lead to the realisation of the aim of
9 the Serbian people which is the creation and establishment of a Serbian
11 During my testimony, I said that the political goal of this RS
12 leadership was that if we were unable to remain within Yugoslavia, we
13 could at least be in a position to establish our own ethnic community. I
14 see nothing wrong with the corps commander ordering his subordinate
15 commanders to inform the last soldier in the field with the purpose of
16 this operation so that he should know what it is that he's fighting for.
17 MR. NICHOLLS:
18 Q. Okay. Thank you. You said you didn't know what this order
19 pertained to directly, this order that President Karadzic just said was
20 legitimate. Let's look at page 1 again, please, the first paragraph.
21 I won't read it out loud again. The first sentence by the
22 number 1 in paragraph 1, do you remember this order now, General?
23 A. I think on Thursday -- well, during my testimony, in any case, we
24 have already discussed this document, and I believe I found it to be
25 incorrect in terms of directive number 4, because this is the date of
1 directive number 4. Following this document, we looked at a document by
2 Colonel Prstojevic, where he amended this item of the order where it says
3 that the Muslim local population should be forced to abandon the area of
4 Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde. He invoked international
5 humanitarian law and disseminated it to the soldiers. Colonel Prstojevic
6 took upon himself not to implement the corps commander's order when it
7 came to the civilian population.
8 Q. Let me move on to another document, General, P0 --
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, are you tendering 65 ter 21259,
10 General Milovanovic's order to SRK and IBK?
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted as Exhibit P -- what's
13 the number?
14 THE REGISTRAR: P4499, Your Honours. Thank you.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I say something?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, General.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is not my order to the
18 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and East Bosnia Corps but to the 1st Corps and
19 the East Bosnia Corps.
20 JUDGE KWON: Correct. My mistake. Thank you, General.
21 MR. NICHOLLS:
22 Q. Thank you, General Milovanovic. Could I have P03162, please.
23 This is the 2nd of March order by somebody you know,
24 Commander Svetozar Andric. I shouldn't say order, my error. Regular
25 combat report. Just take a look at this, General. The part I'm going to
1 ask you about is this:
2 "Our forces which are moving in the wider area of Kamenica,
3 Gajici, and Grobici worked according to plan without major problems. The
4 village of Gobelji has been burnt and tomorrow the plan is to do
6 And the question I have is the same one I asked you earlier. In
7 your view, does this imply negative consequences for civilians on the
9 A. Could you please repeat your question?
10 Q. Yes. Does burning down villages imply negative consequences for
11 civilians on the ground?
12 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I'm going to object to that
13 question as being argumentative. It's practically a rhetorical question.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Could you reformulate the question,
15 Mr. Nicholls?
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes.
17 Q. General, Mr. Karadzic said to you that he was going to show that
18 directive 4 had no negative consequences for the civilians on the ground.
19 This is from the 2nd of March, 1993. It's in the area spelled out in
20 directive 4. It's after Proboj has begun. Could you give me your
21 comment on the last sentence of paragraph 2: Our forces are moving in
22 the wider area of Kamenica, et cetera. It talked about the burning of
23 the village of Gobelji and that the plan is to do Paljevine the next day.
24 A. This sentence is not in the spirit of directive number 4, but is
25 in the spirit of Zivanovic's order which stems from directive 4 that
1 Colonel Prstojevic tried to alleviate.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 65 ter 21929, please. Sorry, 21955.
4 Q. This is a special operative report, Drina Corps command, also
5 from 2nd of March, 1993. I'm going to ask you the same question as
6 before about Mr. Karadzic's assertion of directive 4.
7 MR. NICHOLLS: If we can scroll down in the English, please.
8 Q. We see another reference to the village of Gobelji being
10 MR. NICHOLLS: You may have to scroll down for the General,
11 please. Or go to the next page, actually.
12 A. Which part of the text were you interested?
13 Q. "In the course of the day, special units of the 1st Birac Light
14 Infantry Brigade took and destroyed the village of Gobelji, thus fleeing
15 up the left flank of the main forces in the attack on Cerska."
16 The next page in the Serbian, I think. Should be under the
17 number -- should be the top of page 2 in the Serbian, I believe.
18 A. The 1st Birac Brigade.
19 Q. Did you find the section, General?
20 A. Yes, I did, and it reads:
21 "During the day, special units of the 1st Birac Light
22 Infantry Brigade took and destroyed the village of," I can't read the
23 name, "thus freeing up the left flank of our forces -- the left flank of
24 our forces in their attack on Cerska. Upon entering the village, our
25 soldiers came across weapons and other military equipment as well as food
1 and cattle that was left behind by the enemy when fleeing from our
2 troops. Unless the Zvornik Brigade continued their -- continues their
3 attack on the aforementioned facilities or elevations, Udrc will no
4 longer present any danger to any unit."
5 What is the question?
6 Q. Thank you. The question is in the document we saw earlier, we
7 saw that Colonel Andric reported that Gobelji has been burnt. In this
8 document we're looking at now, it says this village of Gobelji has been
9 destroyed. Can you comment on the destruction of this village, the
10 burning of this village when the document we see here now says that when
11 the VRS entered the village there was nobody left there, everybody had
12 already left?
13 A. I didn't see any residents mentioned, but I did see in the
14 document that the army had left leaving behind the weapons, ammunition,
15 food, and cattle left behind by the enemy when fleeing. I can only
16 presume that it was a fortified village which became a military facility;
17 much the same way I mentioned the villages of Amcici [phoen] and Delijas,
18 which had been turned into military facilities.
19 Now, whether the Muslims had previously evacuated the civilians
20 or whether the civilians fled together with the army, that's another
21 matter. I suppose that the village was fortified and thus a military
22 target. It was an enemy's resistance point, as we call it.
23 Q. But what would be the military justification, if you can explain
24 to us, help us, to burning the village or destroying it?
25 A. The justification is this: If it is a fortified village, first
1 of all, it became a military target. The houses were turned into bunkers
2 and fortified firing positions. One cannot eliminate a fire position
3 other than destroying it and bringing down its walls. It doesn't say
4 here that they torched it but that they destroyed it.
5 Sir, if we go by the text, we cannot see whether the village had
6 been fortified. If we look at the second part of the sentence that --
7 that weapons, ammunition, food, and cattle were found, I conclude that it
8 was a military target. It is another matter whether there were civilians
9 there. Why did then the enemy commander allow that civilians mix with
10 the soldiers in a military target?
11 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender that document, Your Honour?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This was already admitted.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: Oh, thank you. I didn't realise that.
14 JUDGE KWON: Could you give the number.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 21955 has been already
16 assigned Exhibit P3161. Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: Let me go to 65 ter 21928, please. 65 ter 21928.
19 Q. This is from the 4th of March, 1993, so it's still in the same
20 period. It's a regular combat report from Vinko Pandurevic, who was
21 described by you as a -- I think as a rising star, something like that,
22 in the Drina Corps a couple days ago. And the part I'm interested in is
24 "Activity in the direction of Konjevic Polje - Duge Njive -
25 Rasevo. Duge Njive and Glodi have been taken and facilities in Glodi
2 Tell me when you've had a chance to read the document.
3 A. I can't read this. It is too blurry. I can only make out single
4 words. It is unclear.
5 Q. All right. Let's try blowing up the section just above number 3.
6 "Activity in the direction of Konjevic Polje," that's the part I'm asking
8 A. Yes. I've read the part just above number 3 with the white
9 circle. It was probably a hole in the paper so that it could be included
10 in a binder. It says:
11 "Along the axis Konjevic Polje-Duge Njive-Krajinik," or something
12 else, "Rasevo, Duge Njive, and Glodi were taken and the structures or
13 facilities in Glodi torched. The conditions to execute combat activities
14 are very difficult and visibility is poor."
15 If you're interested in this part of the sentence which mentions
16 the torching of structures in Glodi -- well, I don't know what is of
17 interest to you.
18 Q. Yes, that's the part I'm asking about in light of the intercept
19 we saw earlier with General Zivanovic saying, Way to go, about Muslim
20 houses burning. This is now Vinko Pandurevic and Svetozar Andric
21 reporting similar things. What's your view on that in relation to what
22 Mr. Karadzic said about directive 4?
23 A. First of all, it doesn't say who set the village on fire. Second
24 of all, the village of Glodi was a Serb village. If you know or if you
25 have heard of the plight of Serbs in that village from Glodzansko Brdo,
1 it was done by Oric's soldiers before the new year's 1993. So sometime
2 in December 1992. I do know that our centre for documenting war crimes
3 asked for information from me about the plight of Serbs in Glodzansko
4 Brdo. I don't know the date any more, so I can't see from this document
5 who torched the village. It could have been done by both Serbs and
6 Muslims, but I don't think the Serbs would have torched their own
8 Q. Wasn't there a mosque in Glodi?
9 A. I don't know.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: I tender this document, Your Honour.
11 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I don't think that this witness has
12 been able to confirm anything in this document.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes Mr. Nicholls. We'll not admit this through this
16 MR. NICHOLLS: All right, Your Honour. But the witness does know
17 Vinko Pandurevic, does know the date, time, and does know the region, so
18 I think he has impliedly confirmed that, although he didn't recall the
19 exact incident.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE KWON: Well, I see the point, but I would like you to
22 tender that document at a later stage. Thank you.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
24 P04253, please.
25 Q. This is another Vinko Pandurevic document. It may help clear up
1 a question you just posed. It's a supplement to a regular combat report.
2 Please just read the whole thing and tell me when you've read it.
3 Now, the last sentence states -- this is to the Drina Corps
4 command from Vinko Pandurevic, and he states:
5 "We propose that houses should not be torched when taking control
6 of Konjevic Polje, but that they should be inhabited by people from Tuzla
7 and other areas."
8 A. I've read it.
9 Q. And my question is: Can you help us interpret -- what does this
10 last sentence mean, a proposal to the Drina Corps commander not to torch
11 houses in this instance?
12 A. Well, it's an intelligence proposal, a good proposal. He's
13 asking for the houses not to be torched so that they could be used to
14 accommodate other people. But I don't see why he's making such a
15 proposal. Did someone order him to torch the houses and now he's issuing
16 this order not to torch them? But in any event, the proposal is quite
17 clear here. It says when taking control of Konjevic Polje, the houses
18 should not be torched.
19 Q. Well, in light of the documents we've looked at and the Andric
20 report about burning Gobelji and the intercept we saw about burning Turk
21 houses, let me ask you, why -- why would it be necessary to propose to
22 the command not to burn homes?
23 A. Well, Vinko probably had in mind the fact that previously houses
24 had been torched, so now he's requesting that houses shouldn't be
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have P --
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, the Chamber reconsiders our position
3 regarding 65 ter 21928. Given the content of this document and given the
4 fact that it was drafted at the same time in the Drina Corps area, and
5 the Chamber is of the opinion that witness gave some context to that
6 document, on that basis we'll admit that.
7 Exhibit P4500. I'll ask you to give the number.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter 21928 should be assigned
9 Exhibit P4500.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours. P2086. This is from the
11 3rd of March, 1993, a letter from Sadako Ogata to dear Dr. Karadzic.
12 Q. Actually, unfortunately, I don't think we have a Serbian version,
13 so I'll have to read it to you.
14 3rd of March, 1993. "United Nations High Commissioner for
15 Refugees" is what it says on the top, General:
16 "Dear Dr. Karadzic,
17 "The reports I receive on the situation in Cerska are appalling.
18 A large number of civilians are blocked in areas which are under military
19 attack. The number of casualties is reportedly high. It is therefore
20 imperative that immediate relief be brought to the victims.
21 "I therefore urge you to authorise UNHCR access, without delay,
22 to the Cerska area. The purpose of UNHCR's intervention will be:
23 "- to bring assistance to the civilian victims;
24 "- to help evacuate the injured; and
25 "- to help evacuate the civilians, especially those who are most
2 "I am counting on your urgent response to this request.
3 "Yours sincerely, Sadako Ogata."
4 And it's address to Dr. Karadzic in Pale.
5 Now this is just in the middle of the Drina Corps and
6 Zvornik Brigade documents we've been looking at. Can you comment on or
7 explain to us if what we've been seeing after directive 4 -- you talked
8 about the Muslim population moving of its own accord, leaving of its own
9 accord, why are these reports reading Dr. Karadzic of an appalling
10 situation for civilians in Cerska?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How can this witness say what the
12 reasons are for which Ms. Ogata wrote something of this kind? This is a
13 new examination-in-chief, and I would request that I be granted more time
14 for my cross-examination.
15 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. -- Mr. Karadzic.
16 Yes, General, did you want to say something?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I'm not aware of this letter,
18 the exchange of letter between Mr. Karadzic and Sadako Ogata. I do know
19 who this person is, but I do also know that on the basis of Muslim
20 reports to the international community, General Philippe Morillon, the
21 UNPROFOR commander, went to Cerska, and he stated that the civilian
22 population in Cerska was not abused there. They weren't killed,
23 tortured, and so on and so forth. I assume that Ogata sent him there to
24 see whether those Muslim reports were accurate and she probably sent the
25 letter to Mr. Karadzic before Morillon established what the situation in
1 Cerska actually was.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: All right. Could I have 65 ter 22824, please.
3 Q. This is a RS Republika Srpska press office communique from the
4 Republika Srpska cabinet of the president, dated 20th of July, 1995, and
5 it states:
6 "President of the republic and the supreme commander of the
7 Srpska armed forces promoted extraordinarily Major-General
8 Milenko Zivanovic, up until recently the commander of the VRS
9 Drina Corps, to the rank of lieutenant-general marking the termination of
10 his active military service. President Karadzic appointed former Chief
11 of Staff, Major-General Radislav Krstic, the commander of the
12 Drina Corps, who, together with General Zivanovic, is the main architect
13 of the Serbian victories in Srebrenica and Zepa.
14 "President Karadzic congratulated the Main Staff of the VRS, the
15 command of the Drina Corps, and the staff of the police armed forces on
16 the brilliant victory in Srebrenica and Zepa as well as crushing the
17 Muslim offends -- offensive in Serbian Sarajevo."
18 On your direct examination with Mr. Karadzic, you said that
19 Zivanovic should not have been a commander. We had the explanation of
20 directive 4 and Zivanovic's order implementing directive 4 which said
21 expressly to force out the Muslim population, and we've seen these
22 documents from when he was command of the Drina Corps in 1992, his
23 subordinates burning villages and him cheering that on. Do you know why
24 he was extraordinarily promoted at the end of his career? I'm just
25 asking if you know the reason.
1 A. I don't know. Was it my duty to comment on this document? And I
2 also shouldn't comment on the decision from the supreme commander.
3 Q. Well, didn't you go to a celebration for General Zivanovic's
4 retirement and attend that, and you come all the way from the west to go
5 to that celebration?
6 A. Yes, that's correct. I went to that celebration, and I heard
7 about this decree. As far as I am concerned, I don't really know what is
8 in dispute in this document.
9 Q. Well, my question is if you knew about this decree and knew about
10 the promotion, if you -- you know, you were -- you were the Chief of
11 Staff of the Main Staff and the deputy commander. If you could tell us
12 why General Zivanovic was promoted rather than possibly being removed or
13 prosecuted for those things we've seen today and yesterday?
14 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I think that that
15 question is a little bit misleading because the document also indicates
16 that this marks the termination of his active military service, so to --
17 to characterise this as a promotion without calling the witness's
18 attention to that I think could be misleading.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, it is a promotion and I think the witness
20 can read this very well. There is nothing misleading about it, that this
21 was a retirement party, as well, that the general attended. And I called
22 it a retirement celebration.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was customary to act in this
24 manner if this was provided for by the law. It was customary to promote
25 someone when retiring so that he could be given an award or something
1 like that and so he could have a better pension. So I don't really see
2 what this has to do with me, what sort of role I had to play with regard
3 to the creation of this document. What does this have to do with the
4 trip to the Han Pijesak restaurant and so on and so forth? What does
5 this have to do with this decree from the supreme commander?
6 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender this, Your Honour?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P4451, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, could you give the number again.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the exhibit number is 4501.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you.
13 MR. NICHOLLS:
14 Q. Now just let me ask you if -- if you're aware, was -- do you know
15 about General Svetozar Andric also being promoted to become
16 Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps at the same time that Krstic became
17 commander on the 13th of July? Do you know about that?
18 A. I knew about Andric being appointed as the Chief of Staff of the
19 corps. General Mladic asked me about this, and I was against it. I
20 suggested two other men, General Miletic and Colonel Dragisa Masal.
21 General Mladic said that Miletic was out of the question because he was
22 needed in the Main Staff. He was needed there to be my deputy. And as
23 for Colonel Masal, he dismissed him in advance, saying that when Masal
24 enters Bihac, he should contact him, and he would then be appointed as
25 the Chief of Staff of the corps. I was against Svetozar Andric for the
1 simple reason that this man wasn't up to the task. He couldn't play that
2 role. There were others who were better colonels than he was, and as for
3 me dismissing Andric, that was also because during that period I saw that
4 there was fighting around Srebrenica and Zepa, and I saw Andric with
5 Brada -- I saw Andric with a beard, and I said that the VRS prohibited
6 men from wearing beards apart from in the case of men who wanted to grow
7 a beard for 40 days after the death of a family member. I told Mladic
8 that was the main reason for which I dismissed him, because the colonel
9 had grown a beard as a brigade commander. Mladic laughed, but things
10 remained as he wanted them to be.
11 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, this document that we're looking at,
12 20th of July -- yes, 20th of July, 1995, extraordinarily promoting
13 Zivanovic, and Krstic becoming the Drina Corps commander. This is 20th
14 of July. In are view, between the 13th of July, 1995, and the 17th, 18th
15 of July, 1995, how many Muslim prisoners were executed in the zone of
16 responsibility of the Drina Corps by Serb forces?
17 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I'm wondering how this
18 arises from the cross-examination.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, there was a huge run-through at the end of
21 the direct that was intended to show that the VRS only waged a defensive
22 war, that the crimes in Sarajevo were committed by the Muslims, that the
23 international community overblew these things and was fooled by it. And
24 essentially the point was that the Serbian side had nothing to do with
25 the start of the war, didn't committed any crimes during the war, and
1 only was defensive in its actions. So I'm simply asking -- this is --
2 this is an event, it's clear what our case is, that Karadzic did not ask
3 about. I think it's fair to put it to the witness.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, if we're going to open up -- if
5 we're going to open up this area, I hope you give Dr. Karadzic time to
6 re-examine, but I still maintain this is beyond the scope of the direct,
7 the cross.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: If I can [indiscernible] I'm not the one opening
9 up the area. The area was opened up by the Defence to the suggestion
10 that crimes were not committed by the VRS during the war other than small
11 isolated incidents which they tried to punish through their courts. That
12 was the clear theme of the cross.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may say the following:
14 Mr. Nicholls seems to have forgotten that this is a Prosecution witness,
15 and he is saying that I conducted an examination-in-chief. Mr Nicholls
16 had his examination-in-chief.
17 JUDGE KWON: It was a slip of the tongue, Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was said on a number of
20 MR. NICHOLLS: I meant cross-examination. Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will allow the question. We agree with
22 Mr. Nicholls.
23 Can you answer the question, General?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't because at the time between
25 the 13th and 19th of July I wasn't in the Main Staff. I was in Drvar and
1 in Mrkonjic Grad.
2 MR. NICHOLLS:
3 Q. Well, you -- you testified on cross-examination about different
4 things you learned afterwards and what you learned from a
5 lieutenant-colonel about Sarajevo and put in your book, so --
6 JUDGE KWON: It wasn't about Srebrenica. Let's move on,
7 Mr. Nicholls.
8 MR. NICHOLLS:
9 Q. Well, thank you, General --
10 JUDGE KWON: I said it wasn't ...
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Yeah, okay.
12 Q. Thank you, General. If you can't answer that question, that's my
13 last question.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I have five minutes?
15 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic. But on behalf of you,
16 Mr. Karadzic, shall I ask the General to tell us the name of that
17 lieutenant-colonel in private session, if you -- if you like.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have nothing against that. But
19 could the book please be admitted, General Milovanovic's book? It would
20 really be of assistance to the Chamber.
21 JUDGE KWON: No. We'll not admit it in its entirety, as we ruled
22 upon it. But, Mr. Nicholls, do you have objection to the admission of
23 those pages? I think seven or eight -- ten portions of book that were
24 shown to the witness and on which witness commented?
25 MR. NICHOLLS: I do, Your Honour, because the witness was shown
1 those pages. The parts that were read out to him, he adopted, are
2 already in the transcript. I don't know that there's a reason to go
3 through those. The cross-examination on those pages was so cursory and
4 jumping around, sentences and parts of paragraphs, that I don't think
5 it's necessary. I think the record would be clearer and more accurate of
6 what the witness's testimony is if we just simply go with what was stated
7 in court.
8 JUDGE KWON: To the contrary. The record would be clearer if we
9 have the text with it, because it was so cursory. So we'll admit those
10 pages. The Registrar in consultation with the parties will finalise the
11 exact pages.
12 Questioned by the Court:
13 JUDGE KWON: General, the Chamber has a couple of questions for
14 you before we conclude today.
15 Mr. Karadzic showed you several pages -- several documents that
16 related to the humanitarian convoy, and separate from those documents we
17 heard evidence and also were presented with documents that you signed.
18 So in a nutshell, what was your role or what was your responsibility as
19 regards those humanitarian convoy and/or military convoy of the UNPROFOR?
20 A. Up until mid-1994, the time at which a committee was formed
21 within the government of Republika Srpska for delivering humanitarian aid
22 to the enclaves, up until that time the Main Staff was responsible for
23 letting convoys pass through in a timely fashion. The procedure had been
24 agreed on with UNPROFOR. According to this procedure, before sending in
25 the convoys they were to provide a request 24 hours in advance. They
1 were to provide the request to the Main Staff, and they were to state
2 what was being delivered, to whom, how many vehicles were involved, the
3 name of the leader of the convoys. The person in charge of the convoy
4 and so on and so forth, also had to be provided. The Main Staff
5 provided -- authorised the passage of convoy had to ensure that combat
6 ceased on convoy's axis of advance. It also had to secure the convoy.
7 The VRS had to ensure that the convoy could pass unhindered through the
8 territory of Republika Srpska.
9 As I was the Chief of Staff, I wasn't forced to do this. It was
10 my duty, in fact, to have contact with UNPROFOR and to let the convoys
11 pass through or not to authorise them to pass through.
12 When this committee was established with Nikola Koljevic, the
13 vice-president at its head, the situation changed. I no longer had to
14 scratch my head whether I would let the convoy through or not. I
15 received orders from the president of the committee to let the convoys
16 pass through, and then it was for me to see how to secure the convoy. I
17 was still responsible for securing or providing security for the convoys,
18 but I didn't have to decide on whether or not to provide authorisation
19 for the free passage of these convoys and that made my life a lot easier.
20 JUDGE KWON: It is my understanding that it is the Prosecution
21 case that Mr. Karadzic directed and/or authorised the restriction of
22 humanitarian aid to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croat enclaves located in
23 the territory controlled by Serb forces. More specifically, between
24 March and July 1995, the VRS and the RS authorities restricted
25 humanitarian aid and relief supplies to the Bosnian Muslim inhabitants of
1 Srebrenica and Zepa and that following that express orders in directive
2 7, the VRS deliberately restricted the delivery of supplies, materials,
3 and human resources to the UNPROFOR unit in the Srebrenica enclave.
4 So could you tell us what you know about the process in which
5 humanitarian convoys were allowed or not allowed, as briefly as possible?
6 A. From mid 1994 onwards, the VRS -- or, rather, the Main Staff did
7 not take any decisions on providing authorisation for the passage of
9 JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt you. Even if the state committee
10 agreed and permitted the convoy, did the VRS not have the power or
11 discretion to -- not to allow the convoy on an alleged military ground?
12 A. No, the Army of Republika Srpska kept the right to check the
13 convoys. It could only stop a convoy and send it back if goods were
14 found in the convoy, goods that hadn't been listed in the declaration
15 submitted by UNPROFOR, so if fuel, weapons, or ammunition or strategic
16 equipment of any kind was found in the convoy.
17 JUDGE KWON: Okay. With the indulgence of staff, I will ask --
18 explore one more topic with the witness.
19 Shall we upload Exhibit P838. It's directive 7, General, if you
20 remember. You told us that you didn't read the document, but now with
21 hindsight, can you explain to us why there's a gap of how many days or --
22 a bit less than ten days between the date of signature and the date of
23 dispatch to the subordinate unit?
24 Did you hear anything about it later on, why it was so?
25 A. I don't know the reason for that gap. The attached document that
1 I signed, I believe it was on the 17th of March. That was nine days
2 after the directive was issued. I only sent that directive to the
3 1st Corps, the 1st Krajina Corps, which means that it was sent to the
4 other corps. Why the supreme commander didn't send it to the 1st Corps,
5 I don't know. Perhaps since I was the main person in command in the
6 1st Corps area, perhaps they thought they would receive it through me,
7 but I didn't receive it. But, Your Honour, these days, since I had a few
8 days, three days, to think about all sorts of things, over this three-day
9 period I also thought about the reasons for which I wasn't in a position
10 to read that directive, why I didn't see the directive. Generally
11 speaking, I'm a curious general. I really did not see the directive. I
12 had -- I didn't see the directive until the testimony, but when it
13 arrived, I just signed an order for the courier to deliver it, but this
14 is really a question that should be put to the Main Staff or, rather, to
15 General Mladic.
16 JUDGE KWON: Earlier today, you referred to this date of
17 signature, i.e., 8th of March, 1995, as a date of publication of this
18 directive. What's the basis in concluding that that day this directive
19 was published?
20 A. Between the 6th and 12th of March I wasn't in the Main Staff.
21 The directive was signed or registered - that's what it says in the
22 heading - on the 8th of March.
23 JUDGE KWON: Could we upload Exhibit D -- P, P, yes, P2242,
24 page 33.
25 Before you testified here, we heard evidence from Mr. Karadzic's
1 assistant that she kept a diary or agenda as regards various appointment.
2 I just -- I remember having seen the item on 16th of March, 1995. Can we
3 see the page 33 in English as well. Do you see the item in the -- in the
4 bottom part? No, it's -- can you not find the English page? Page 33, I
5 take it.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, it would perhaps
7 be best if we looked for it on the basis of the date, March.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. There's a typo. It says May. I'll find it
9 for you. Yes, we have it. In English it says 16th of May, 1996. But
10 it's -- I take it that's a typo.
11 Second item, 11.00 hours, General Milovanovic, Tolimir and
12 Zubovic, from 11.05 to 15.05. So you stayed there about four hours and
13 then and by the next item at 1300 hours, Gojko Dursun and Gutic, and
14 General Subotic might have joined but I leave it at that. Do you
15 remember having met Mr. Karadzic on 16th of May, 1995? On the
16 16th March. I beg your pardon. While -- leaving at that, why don't we
17 upload Exhibit D2149. This is what you wrote about the meetings you had
18 with Mr. Karadzic. It's English page 53 and B/C/S page 35.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, could we just
20 confirm that this is a mistake when it says May, and the month is, in
21 fact, March? It says 1996.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, 1996. That's why I'm somewhat
24 JUDGE KWON: No, it's March 1995. I think we went through this
25 earlier on. We can come back, if necessary. But shall we upload
1 Exhibit D2149; B/C/S 35, English 53.
2 You remember this document, General, your meetings with
4 A. We need to see the next page so that we can see the 16th of May,
6 JUDGE KWON: 16th of March.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's March.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see the date, the 16th of
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes, it's the bottom of page in B/C/S and the
11 middle of English page. I read it:
12 "I had a meeting with Karadzic in Pale because of some documents
13 that needed to be signed and which were made by General Staff operations
15 I take it that General Staff should read "Main Staff":
16 "... which were made by the Main Staff operation administration
17 for the purpose of the Supreme Command since they did not have people
18 skilled for that. We discussed general situation ..." and blah, blah.
19 When I read this, it might have been the directive 7. Otherwise,
20 what other document could it be, General? Could you explain it to me?
21 A. I don't know which documents might be concerned, but directive 7
22 certainly wasn't concerned because it was signed on the 8th of March and
23 the date here is the 16th of March. So that was the time when I returned
24 from Gradiska, after dealing with the situation at the front line, the
25 situation that followed the Croatian Operation Flash. No, in fact that
1 was not the case. That was in May. I don't know which documents are
2 involved, but it couldn't have concerned directive number 7 because it
3 had already been signed.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The reason I asked this question was that it
5 was signed off by you on the 17th of March, the next day, but you still
6 don't -- you still remember this is not related to directive 7?
7 A. What did I sign on the 7th of March?
8 JUDGE KWON: 17th of March you signed the cover letter to the
9 1st Krajina Corps sending the directive 7.
10 A. Yes. I did that on the 17th of March, but not on the 7th. On
11 the 7th I was in Bosanska Krupa.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. So my question was before sending off that
13 directive whether you met with Mr. Karadzic, discussing it. That's just
14 my speculation having read this document. So I'm -- I give you -- offer
15 you the opportunity to clarify.
16 A. I don't know which documents we discussed on the 16th of March,
17 in spite of the fact that the next day I signed that additional document,
18 that cover letter. I complained that we didn't have security. He
19 criticised Generals Mladic and Djukic, and then I can't see the remainder
20 of the text.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That's sufficient, unless my colleagues
22 have questions for you.
23 That concludes your evidence, General Milovanovic. On behalf of
24 my Chamber and the Tribunal, I would like to thank you for coming to
25 The Hague to give it again, and now you're free to go.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 JUDGE KWON: We'll rise all together. Tomorrow we'll sit in the
3 afternoon. We'll resume at quarter past 2.00.
4 [The witness withdrew]
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.56 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 6th day
7 of March, 2012, at 2.15 p.m.