1 Wednesday, 7 March 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Good morning Mr. Tieger.
6 Yes, please.
7 MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. Thank
8 you, Mr. President. I wanted to raise quickly two matters. First, I
9 also wanted to add to the expression of gratitude to the Bench and
10 particularly to Judge Lattanzi for sitting late last night in order
11 ensure that the witness can leave as needed. I also wanted to add that
12 in light of those efforts, we consider it highly unlikely that it is
13 necessary to have an extended sitting today, and thereby further
14 inconvenience the court personnel and also unnecessarily result in
15 Judge Lattanzi's absence in order to complete the witness given the
16 allocated or projected times. So we would suggest that we revert to the
17 original schedule, concluding at 1.45. If for some reason we haven't
18 concluded with the witness by that time, then we obviously have the
19 option to continue.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Thank you very much. I think it's fair
22 Any observation, Mr. Robinson?
23 MR. ROBINSON: No. We agree.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll do so.
25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. And secondly, looking at
1 the schedule over the next two days, I think it's clear, based on the --
2 on our experience and the projected times that we'll be lucky to conclude
3 the next three scheduled witnesses by the end of the week, and in -- and
4 even in the unlikely event that we were in a position to commence with
5 Witness 122, it would only be the very beginning of his testimony. In
6 light of that, could we, for a number of logistical reasons, ask the
7 Court for a bit of predictability and simply have confirmation that
8 Witness 122 will commence on Monday so he doesn't need to be brought here
9 needlessly and repeatedly? I've also discuss that with Mr. Robinson as I
10 did the previous matter, and I believe he agrees with that.
11 JUDGE KWON: I think that's fair enough, too, given that I'm not
12 sure whether we can surely finish Mr. Ristic this week.
13 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.
15 Unless there are any other matters, we'll bring in the next
17 [The witness entered court]
18 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
19 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, sir. If you could take the solemn
20 declaration, please.
21 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
22 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
23 WITNESS: ROBERT DJURDJEVIC
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, sir. Please make yourself comfortable.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Examination by Mr. Tieger:
4 Q. Good morning, Mr. Djurdjevic.
5 A. Good morning, Alan.
6 Q. Can we begin -- well, first of all, I should have you state your
7 full name for the record.
8 A. Robert Djurdjevic. It's not as scary to pronounce as it looks.
9 Q. Well, we'll keep that in mind for the transcript and for the
10 proceedings. I'd like to begin by calling up what we have termed
11 65 ter 22306, which is the sworn interview that was conducted on the 18th
12 of December, 2002.
13 While we're waiting for that to actually come up on screen, let
14 me begin by -- actually, I see it now.
15 I believe you've had a chance to review the transcript of that
16 proceeding during which you were interviewed by representatives of the
17 Office of the Prosecutor. Can you confirm, Mr. Djurdjevic, that it
18 actually reflects the statement you gave at that time, that that
19 information was true and correct to the best of your knowledge, as
20 reflected by the fact that you were sworn at that time, and that if asked
21 about the same matters again here in court you would provide the same
23 A. Yes. My answer is I have reviewed it, and I stand by it. It is
24 accurate as best as I can remember both then and now.
25 Q. Thank you, sir.
1 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I would tender 22306 and the
2 associated exhibit.
3 JUDGE KWON: First we'll admit the interview as 92 ter statement.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P4513, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE KWON: And the associate exhibit. It has only one.
6 MR. TIEGER: Yes, I believe that's right.
7 JUDGE KWON: I take it there's no objection to it.
8 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE KWON: That will also be admitted as Exhibit P4514.
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I'll offer up a quick
11 summary and then we'll move on to the -- some additional questions.
12 Q. Mr. Djurdjevic, I'm just going to very briefly and quickly
13 summarise some of the information in the statement for benefit of the
14 public, which doesn't have it before them, and then I will move on to
15 some additional questions.
16 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, Your Honours, during the conflict,
17 the witness met on numerous occasions with various Serbian and Bosnian
18 Serb political and military leaders including the accused on a number of
19 occasions. He kept a detailed record of these meetings in various trip
20 diaries, portions of which were sometimes used as a basis for
21 publications in the witness's newsletter and later a web site.
22 On the 14th of July of 1995, the witness met with the accused.
23 Immediately prior to his meeting with the accused, Mr. Karadzic had been
24 meeting at length with Miroslav Deronjic and a delegation from
25 Srebrenica. During the witness's meeting with the accused the discussion
1 also focused on Srebrenica as well as Zepa. During that meeting, the
2 accused disparaged what they were watching on CNN and Sky News, utilised
3 large maps in his office showing various army placements to refer to
4 Srebrenica and Zepa and explained that the military strategy involved
5 driving things to the boiling point.
6 During their meeting, the accused received a call from a field
7 commander who was defending the major road north of Srebrenica, a call
8 about fighting around Konjevic Polje and Kasaba.
9 That concludes the summary, Mr. President.
10 Q. Mr. Djurdjevic, I know some of your background is encompassed in
11 the interview, but perhaps I can just touch on that briefly. Is it
12 correct that you were born and raised in Serbia, graduated from the
13 University of Belgrade in 1968, and then came to North America, that is,
14 first Canada and then the United States in 1970?
15 A. That is correct.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
17 be asked to approach the microphone and speak directly into it. The
18 interpreters are having difficulty to hear him.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. You are probably hearing at the same time.
20 And please put a pause between the questions and answers, please.
21 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Q. You became involved and quite successful at business, and then in
24 1989, you became re-involved with the former Yugoslavia; first having
25 contact with and becoming friendly with President Milosevic, beginning by
1 offering business-related advice; is that right?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. In addition with the advent of the conflict, is it correct that
4 you became concerned about reporting in the mainstream media and began
5 writing yourself in defence of the Serb position?
6 A. Yes, I was. I had reluctantly stepped into those shoes because,
7 frankly, when I left Yugoslavia or former Yugoslavia, as it was known
8 then, in 1970, I never suspected that I would ever be coming back, and I
9 had pretty much erased that name from my life, because of the issues I
10 had with Communists at the time and the reason I left. And I had not
11 gone back for almost 20 years, and it wasn't really until my wife kept
12 putting these clippings of the Western press in front of me and asking me
13 to corroborate the stories repeatedly that I finally and reluctantly
14 decided to look into it on my own and see where the truth is. That's how
15 that first trip took place in 1989 and then led to many others over the
16 next 12 years.
17 Q. And those efforts eventually took the form of a web site called
18 Truth in Media as a platform for articles?
19 A. That's right. That was my communications vehicle when the
20 internet became available to -- through which to publish the -- my
22 Q. Now, you just alluded to the numerous trips you took to the
23 former Yugoslavia, and during those trips, as indicated in the interview,
24 is it correct that you met with many Serbian and Bosnian Serb political
25 and military leaders?
1 A. Yes, that is correct. And also many others, like, for example,
2 the foreign ambassadors in Belgrade. I would always stop by and meet all
3 of the major powers first before I would go into the field trips.
4 Q. And did you record those meetings contemporaneously in various
5 trip diaries referring to those specific trips?
6 A. I did, religiously, because even though I have to say I've been
7 gifted with a pretty good memory, I found it important to record
8 everything almost verbatim as I could remember it as soon as the meeting
9 or an event had taken place.
10 Q. Now, is it correct that the diary entries summarised the meetings
11 and various aspects of the meetings that you had, sometimes paraphrasing
12 what people had said and sometimes quoting them verbatim?
13 A. That is correct. Both -- both statements are correct.
14 Q. All right. Now, as you noted in your interview of 2002 and also
15 in the associated exhibit, you met with Mr. Karadzic on July 14th, 1995;
16 is that right?
17 A. Yes, I did.
18 Q. And that was during a trip that is reflected in a journal called
19 "War Drums are Beating," covering a trip from the 5th of July to the
20 31st of July; is that right?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. Where did that trip start?
23 A. Well, obviously from my home.
24 Q. Sorry. I mean where did you first arrive in the former
1 A. Let's see if I remember. Back then we were still under the
2 embargo so I would have to have gone through Hungary, flown to Hungary,
3 probably, and then gone by land, meaning by land travel, from Budapest to
4 Belgrade. Then I remember I had gone to Montenegro first. I believe my
5 daughter was with me at the time, so I dropped her off at my sister's
6 place in Montenegro, and then I came back to Belgrade from where I picked
7 up this trip to Bosnia.
8 Q. And you, therefore, had a number of meetings before your meeting
9 with Mr. Karadzic on the 14th of July?
10 A. I did, in Belgrade, yes.
11 Q. Okay. Now, one of those meetings was with Momcilo Perisic; is
12 that correct?
13 A. Yes, General Perisic.
14 Q. Okay.
15 MR. TIEGER: And could I call up, please, 65 ter 06972, page 9 of
16 the e-court. Okay. And if we could turn back to the previous page very
18 Q. We see the header there meeting with General Momcilo Perisic,
19 Chief of Staff -- Chief of General Staff, Yugoslav army and the time and
20 place. That's a reflection of the meeting that I just asked you about;
21 is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And if we could turn to the next page, please. Now, here you're
24 indicating a portion of your discussion with Mr. Perisic; is that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. General Perisic. And we see a graph here, the source of which we
2 see is General Perisic. What does that graph depict?
3 A. As I recall, the graph depicts the military budgets of the
4 Serbian - meaning Yugoslav, I think they were still calling themselves
5 Yugoslavs at the time - army and versus their enemy in wartime, the
6 Croats in this case, and the point that -- that General Perisic was
7 making -- he was actually appealing to me to organise some sort of
8 financial help for the -- from the diaspora, from the Serbs living
9 abroad, to help out with the war effort and to -- in support of that
10 plea, he was sharing some of these figures. He said that the Croatian
11 military budget was 5.3 billion as composed to -- as compared to Serbia's
12 2.6, but more importantly, that the trend was up as far as the Croats are
13 concerned and drifting downwards as far as the Serbian budget is
14 concerned. So that's what those two lines reflect.
15 Q. Okay. And is it a correct understanding of what he was conveying
16 to you and what the chart indicates that the positions, the relative
17 strength of the military in 1991 and 1992 was that the Serbs were much
18 stronger, the Serb strength was declining, the Croat and Muslim strength
19 was increasing, and that at some point just after 1995 they would
20 converge, and that trend would continue to the disadvantage of the Serbs?
21 A. That's exactly what this chart communicates and that's what he
22 communicated as well. He said at the moment we're still stronger but if
23 the trends were to continue, then the enemy would get the upper hand.
24 Q. Thank you. Did he also speak with you about --
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, now, you can continue, please.
1 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry not to remind myself to pause. Thank you,
2 Mr. President.
3 Q. Did General Perisic also speak to you about the relative impact
4 or lack of impact of the sanctions that had been imposed? And in that
5 regard, could we turn to the next page in e-court.
6 Mr. Djurdjevic, looking at that first paragraph, is that a
7 reference to your discussion with General Perisic about the -- how --
8 about what effect the sanctions had or did not have?
9 A. Yes. If it pleases the Court, may I clarify something here?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, by all means, Mr. Djurdjevic.
11 THE WITNESS: I think this would be a good place to explain my
12 methodology, if you'd like, in keeping these notes and conducting these
13 interviews. As you can see from this paragraph, General Perisic told me
14 that this has to stay between us. In other words, sometimes the person
15 I'm communicating with, usually the head of state, head of the army would
16 confide in me and share confidential information for reasons that they
17 only know why, but if they prefaced it with this way, it would stay
18 between us and I would always honour that. And for that reason, these
19 diaries that you're now looking at had been under embargo for I believe a
20 period of five years at the Stanford University archives because I did
21 not want them in my discussions with the chief protagonists of the
22 Balkans wars in any way to affect the outcome of those wars. And so what
23 we're now looking at is an after-the-fact recount of a historical record.
24 In other words, I had honoured what he had asked me to do and did not
25 publish any of that information. It only came out into the public domain
1 for the first time in 2002 when I had that interview with the
2 investigators of this court, and they had previously -- they told me they
3 had previously gone to Stanford University to look up these records and
4 read these diaries because the embargo had elapsed. So I thought it
5 would be important for you to know that.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Djurdjevic.
7 Can we see the first page of this diary. We see there -- is it
8 your handwriting at the bottom part, "Until three years after the
9 Yugoslavia --"
10 THE WITNESS: Three years. Yeah, I thought it was maybe five.
11 But, yes, that is my handwriting and my initial.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, back to you, Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Q. And thank you for the explanation, Mr. Djurdjevic. Back to that
15 portion of your discussion with General Perisic. Did he indicate to you
16 that the sanctions had not affected the support by the Yugoslav army for
17 the Bosnian Serb Army?
18 A. Yes, he did, and I recall being very surprised by it because I
19 knew that the United Nations monitors were posted on the border, and so I
20 asked him, So how did you get around those, and replied something, like,
21 you know, We leave that discussion for after the war.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I would tender those two pages and
24 I'll also be making other references so I presume we can add to those as
25 we go.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit -- yes, Mr. Robinson.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Well, there's some irrelevant material in that
3 interview with Mr. Perisic -- or General Perisic, so I would prefer that
4 we just admit those portions of the pages that have been discussed in
6 JUDGE KWON: Just for the convenience, we'll admit those two
7 pages, and the Chamber will have no reference to other part.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Very well. Thank you.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Unless it is raised later on by any
10 other parties.
11 MR. ROBINSON: We get the message, yes.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. Mr. Djurdjevic, I want to move on to your --
14 JUDGE KWON: We give the number.
15 THE REGISTRAR: That was Exhibit 4515 and the new 65 ter number
16 will be 06972A.
17 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
18 Q. Mr. Djurdjevic, I want to move on to your meeting on the 14th of
19 July. Is it correct that you crossed into Bosnia on the 13th of July via
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. Now -- and I may refer back to at least one of the meetings you
23 had prior to that meeting, but let me move on to the meeting now. You
24 mentioned at pages 22 through 23 of the 2002 interview that you spent
25 most of the afternoon, from about noon onwards, in Mr. Karadzic's office
1 and saw various comings and goings including a delegation led by the
2 person who was or was supposed to be the appointed mayor of Srebrenica.
3 MR. TIEGER: And can I call up again 65 -- the previous exhibit,
4 that is 65 ter -- what's the new 65 ter -- well, previous 65 ter 06972,
5 and specifically page 35 of the e-court.
6 Q. There we see a reference to the meeting with Dr. Karadzic and the
7 time, I believe you make clear, you ultimately got in but also a
8 reference to the fact that throughout the afternoon Dr. Karadzic had been
9 meeting with the mayor designate of Srebrenica, Miroslav Deronjic, and
10 other people from there, that is Srebrenica, who were supposed to
11 constitute the civilian authority in the newly liberated area. He
12 apologised - he meaning, I take it, Dr. Karadzic -- apologised for having
13 kept me waiting but he said this was pressing government business for the
14 RS. And is that an accurate reflection of what you recorded at the time?
15 A. It is.
16 Q. Now, did you know by that time something about Srebrenica and
17 specifically did you know by that time whether or not the civilians from
18 Srebrenica, that is the Muslim civilians from Srebrenica, were gone?
19 A. Yes. I heard that people -- that I have -- that I was talking to
20 say that. I never made it to Srebrenica, you know, to see for myself,
21 but, yes, I did hear several people tell me that by the -- by that day,
22 July 14th, Muslim civilians had been evacuated.
23 Q. And can -- in that connection, can we turn to e-court page 28,
24 which reflects a portion of your meeting the previous day with
25 Professor Koljevic. I'm going to direct your attention to the top of
1 this page. But just so you can orient yourself, perhaps we can turn to
2 the previous page.
3 A. Okay. We're now the day before and my meeting with Dr. --
4 Professor Koljevic.
5 Q. [Microphone not activated] Okay. And now if we could --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
7 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, thank you.
8 Q. If we could turn down to the bottom of the page. There's a
9 reference to a proposed visit of Dr. -- of Professor Koljevic to
10 Srebrenica. And now turn to the next page, please. And there we see the
11 entry, "But one of the phone calls shattered this plan. ZM ...," and can
12 you tell us who that is?
13 A. That was the Chief of Cabinet for Professor Koljevic.
14 Q. "ZM took the call, then put the receiver down when he was
15 finished. 'There are no civilians left any more,' ZM announced, 'Mladic
16 had shipped them all out already.'"
17 Does that accurately record what you learned on that occasion
18 about what had transpired in Srebrenica?
19 A. Yes, it is.
20 Q. Now, when you --
21 MR. TIEGER: And I tender these pages as well, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE KWON: That will be added to the previous exhibit.
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
24 Q. Mr. Djurdjevic, when you finally made it into Mr. Karadzic's
25 office for your meeting on the 14th, what was the main focus or topic of
2 A. Well, actually we had covered a lot of ground during this meeting
3 that lasted probably at least two hours, but the -- obviously the focus
4 was on Srebrenica. That was the news of the day, and for much of the
5 meeting Dr. Karadzic had been watching the Western media reports about
6 that which were being displayed on two TV screens. I don't mean that he
7 was being disrespectful. He would often mute the sound so we could have
8 a conversation while the reporting went on, but every once in awhile when
9 something looked interesting he would stop the conversation. We would
10 watch to see what was happening.
11 Q. Thank you. And, Mr. Djurdjevic, just by way of courtroom
12 dynamics, you will sometimes find me pausing. That's to allow the
13 translation in French to catch up.
14 A. I've got that. I've experienced this in translations, foreign
15 languages, especially with Japanese, taking a long time.
16 Q. Now, sir, with the focus on Srebrenica, did Mr. Karadzic tell you
17 whether the actions in Srebrenica had resulted from an order, and if so,
18 did he name or describe the order?
19 A. Would you mind repeating that? I missed the introduction to
21 Q. Sure. I -- I just referred to the fact that the discussion was
22 about Srebrenica, and, in light of that, asked if Mr. Karadzic had told
23 you whether the military action in Srebrenica had resulted from an order,
24 and, if so, did he name or describe the order, and perhaps I can turn
25 your attention to page 39 of this exhibit.
1 A. Yes. The answer is yes. And, yes, he did say that. He
2 described it as his order number 7.
3 Q. And here we see the entry under "Current military situation,"
4 covering this particular portion of your meeting on the 14th of July.
5 The diary entry is:
6 "RK said that the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa were a part of
7 what he called 'my order number 7.' He said that their objective is 'to
8 raise the temperature to the boiling point.'"
9 And then he went on to talk about his expectations or concerns
10 about what the Croats might do in the Krajina to relieve pressure on
12 A. That is correct. And to me, the latter one was really the most
13 significant part of that statement because it foretold the future,
14 actually. That did happen some weeks later in August of 1995. It was
15 quite a prescient comment.
16 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I would tender this -- this page.
17 JUDGE KWON: Page 39 in e-court?
18 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
19 JUDGE KWON: Correct? I was --
20 MR. TIEGER: Yes, that is correct.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. Now, Mr. Djurdjevic, you indicated that in addition to explaining
24 that the attacks were part of "my order number 7," Dr. Karadzic told you
25 that the objective was to raise the temperature to the boiling point.
1 Did you hear a similar reference or similar references from other
2 Bosnian Serb leaders as well?
3 A. Yes, I did, and, in fact, it struck me interesting that I heard
4 it from three top civilian leaders of the country: First, Dr. Koljevic,
5 then President Karadzic, and then later on also from the speaker of the
6 parliament, Mr. Krajisnik. So I concluded from that they were all
7 speaking in one voice, that they were all on board with the same
8 strategy, and I remember wondering -- I wondered where it originated, who
9 was a follower and who was the leader in this thought process.
10 Q. I'm going to direct your attention to those references in just a
11 moment, but in connection with your comment about speaking in one voice,
12 can I turn your attention to 65 ter 23639, e-court page 10. This is from
13 a trip diary that was entitled "War on Ice." And that reflected a trip
14 from November 28th through December 5th, 1995.
15 And if we could just move down the page slightly.
16 There you record at the bottom of that entry regarding
17 Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic a comment by Professor Koljevic:
18 "The international community thinks that because I speak English
19 well and have taught Shakespeare at American universities I am somehow
20 different that Karadzic or Krajisnik ... that's nonsense. I believe in
21 the same things as Karadzic or Krajisnik."
22 Is that an accurate -- that's unquote, by the way. Is that an
23 accurate reflection of what Professor Koljevic told you at the time, and
24 was that consistent with your experience with him overall?
25 A. Yes and yes.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. TIEGER: I tender that page, Mr. President.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be added as well.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. And, Mr. Djurdjevic, I indicated I would bring you to the
6 references that you had alluded to a few moments ago. First, can we turn
7 back to 65 ter 06972, at page 29, please.
8 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Could we remain on this page a bit.
9 Mr. Djurdjevic, what -- what did you understand it to mean when
10 Koljevic said they will have to go, and what was the reason for that?
11 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, we are now in December of 1995. It
12 was the time of what is now known as the Dayton agreement being
13 formulated and signed. For all intents and purposes, the war was over,
14 and I believe that Professor Koljevic was making a statement about how do
15 we, meaning the country, go forward from here and that he was expressing
16 his opinion that the two heads of state, one head of state, the other one
17 head of the army, were no longer suitable for the period that was ahead
18 for the peacetime leadership in the country.
19 JUDGE KWON: Then how did you understand the same thing when he
20 said he believed in the same thing as Karadzic or Krajisnik?
21 THE WITNESS: I believe that he was talking there about his
22 ideology, about his belief in the right of the Serbian minority, in the
23 Bosnian Serb Republic to do the same thing that other parts of the former
24 Yugoslavia have done, to secede, to have their on country, to make their
25 own decision, to exercise their rights to sovereignty, because that was
1 the reason that these three people, specifically Dr. Karadzic,
2 Professor Koljevic and Mr. Krajisnik ended up in the leadership positions
3 at the outset of the war. They were not professional politicians. All
4 of them were almost cajoled into these roles, kind of reluctantly stepped
5 into it, just like -- reluctantly [indiscernible] became a war
6 correspondent under the need -- press of the needs that the nation had at
7 the time. They answered their call, and they found themselves to be
8 ideologically on the same page. That's what I believe he was talking
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes.
11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. And again, if we could turn back to 65 ter 06972, to page 30 of
13 the e-court. Looking at the last entry on that page, Mr. Djurdjevic, is
14 that a reference to bringing the war to a boiling point made by
15 Mr. Koljevic, in -- who also said -- who also predicted the end of the
16 war in one to two months, six months at the outside?
17 A. Yes, that's correct.
18 Q. Thank you. And we could also turn to page 46 of the e-court.
19 You had also made a reference to Mr. Krajisnik talking about raising the
20 temperature to the boiling point. And if we could scroll down a little
21 bit farther under the section "War's end," we see the entry:
22 "As was the case with NK," presumably meaning Nikola Koljevic,
23 "and RK," Radovan Karadzic, "MK," Momcilo Krajisnik, "also talked about
24 raising the temperature to the boiling point." And also continued to
25 indicate that his assessment, as we saw also with Professor Koljevic, was
1 that the war would end in one or two months; is that correct?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. Okay, and those both accurately reflect what you were told and
4 what you recorded contemporaneously?
5 A. Yes, that's what I had also alluded to a few minutes ago when I
6 said that I heard these three things in three different meetings, three
7 different individuals using the same terminology.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. TIEGER: And I would tender those pages, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. They will be added.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. Mr. Djurdjevic, in your interview in 2002 and in the associated
13 exhibit, you refer to the phone call that Mr. Karadzic received from the
14 field commander, the large maps with the military positions, his
15 reference to his order number 7. With regard to Mr. Karadzic as a
16 military commander and -- had you noted in previous visits his interest
17 and detailed involvement in military matters?
18 A. At times I had.
19 MR. TIEGER: Can we turn to 65 ter 23637, page 36.
20 Q. Mr. Djurdjevic, this is an entry from your trip diary of May 22nd
21 through 31st, 1994, a trip you entitled -- or the trip diary you entitled
22 "When the going gets tough, the tough get going." And if we can turn to
23 the previous page, we can see the bottom of at that page. The entry
24 begins with a conversation that Mr. Karadzic is having on the phone
25 during which he says:
1 "Don't worry about it. The winners always write the history of
2 war. We will be the winners, that's for sure."
3 Now we continue on to the next page:
4 "There's absolutely no doubt about it so just carry on,
5 et cetera."
6 And then you continued to describe what you had heard during the
7 course of your visit that day. As you describe it:
8 "As I listen to RK," that is Radovan Karadzic, "speak all day as
9 if he were an expert military commander," quote, now quoting
10 Dr. Karadzic, "'we'll take this hill here, this road there, we'll give up
11 this town,' et cetera," he would say. And then you offer some
12 observations about your concerns about his military background and
13 ability to serve as a military strategist. In any event, I wanted to ask
14 you if that accurately reflects what you heard on that occasion during
15 your meeting with Dr. Karadzic first?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it does, and as you can see, for the benefit of
17 the Court, in italics the comments made in italics really reflect my
18 opinions. So you can kind of regard that as kind of editorial comment,
19 if you like, rather than parts of the conversations that I've had. And
20 as -- as you can see from those notes, I was wondering just where and,
21 you know, what the point of that was; and then kind of musing also,
22 considering how our top military strategist botched up the war in
23 Vietnam, for example, perhaps it is best that nonprofessionals do lead
24 the armies rather than professionally trained army officers.
25 Q. Thank you, sir. And I can turn to the page but perhaps you and
1 the Court and the Defence will accept my representation or confirm it
2 that this is a meeting of May 27th, 1994, which began, according to the
3 entry at page -- page in the hard copy, page 24, began at 11.40 and
4 actually went from 11.40 to 18.15 with Dr. Karadzic's wife, Ljilja,
5 attending the luncheon part.
6 MR. TIEGER: And with that, Mr. President, I would tender that
8 JUDGE KWON: Two pages.
9 MR. TIEGER: Yes, those two pages. Thank you.
10 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted. We give the separate number
11 for that?
12 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
13 JUDGE KWON: So we'll give a number per article.
14 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
15 JUDGE KWON: That may be fair enough. Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. In that event, 65 ter 23639
17 will be Exhibit P4516, and 65 ter 23637 will be P4516 [sic].
18 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
19 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure transcript -- could you confirm the
21 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 23639 will be Exhibit P4516, and
22 65 ter 23637 will be Exhibit P4517.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's proceed.
24 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. Mr. Djurdjevic, I want to leave that
25 July meeting and ask you about three additional meetings, two of which
1 took place during the same July 1995 trip and one of which was on a
2 different trip.
3 First, is it correct that on the same day you met with
4 Dr. Karadzic, you almost immediately, before you went to his office, you
5 also met with Aleksa Buha, the Foreign Minister of Republika Srpska?
6 A. That is correct.
7 MR. TIEGER: And if we could turn to page 32 of 06972.
8 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I'm confused with our 65 -- did we
9 see 65 ter number 23639 at all, "War and ice"?
10 MR. TIEGER: Yes, that was used, Mr. President --
11 JUDGE KWON: What page was used?
12 MR. TIEGER: That would have been page 10. I don't know if we
13 used it -- another page for context, but it was page 10, I believe. I
14 think we only used that page. That was a reference to Professor Koljevic
15 explaining that his views were the -- or positions, attitudes, are the
16 same as Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Then the exhibit number for 6972 was
18 Exhibit P4515; correct? Not 16. Thank you. Please continue.
19 THE WITNESS: I can see, Your Honour, you're both Registrar and
20 the Chief Judge.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. My apologies. It was confusing.
22 Yes, please continue, Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. Mr. Djurdjevic, at the bottom of that page we see a reference to
25 your meeting with Mr. Buha, and if we could turn to the next page.
1 There we see a discussion about the Contact Group plan, that is
2 Mr. Buha raising with you the issue of the Contact Group plan, and
3 explaining to you that according to him, the US special negotiator
4 Charles Redman had drawn a map that had Doboj -- gave Doboj to the
5 Muslims and did so according to Redman to ensure that the Serbs would
6 reject the plan.
7 First of all, is that an accurate reflection of what Mr. Buha
8 told you?
9 A. It is.
10 Q. Do you recall if, at that time or any other time, Mr. Buha
11 suggested any other reasons why Doboj might have been designated as a
12 Muslim area or falling within the authority of the Muslim authority other
13 than an effort to foil the negotiations?
14 A. I don't believe we discussed it at all except in this context.
15 Q. Did you happen to know the pre-war demographics of Doboj, that is
16 whether it was a Muslim majority area or a Serbian majority area?
17 A. I have no idea. I still don't know.
18 Q. Finally, although I don't see a reference here and so I think I
19 know what the answer is, did Mr. Buha explain to you why it would foil or
20 scupper the plan if the Serbs didn't get Doboj?
21 A. He didn't explain. I just assumed it was a town important to the
22 Serbs. For what reason, I don't know.
23 Q. Now, Mr. Djurdjevic, I wanted to ask you if you learned during
24 the course of your various meetings with political and military officials
25 that at least in some areas or on some occasions Muslim villages had been
1 razed by Serb forces?
2 A. Yes. I can say that. The answer to that question would be yes.
3 As far as any warring party is concerned, I've heard stories from all
4 sides alleging that Muslim or Serbian or Croat villages for that matter
5 have been razed by the opposing forces, but specifically I don't know
6 what you're referring to.
7 Q. Well, let me assist, if I may then. If we could turn to
8 65 ter 23636, page 7. First of all, perhaps -- let me indicate to you
9 and we could turn back two previous pages. This is an entry from
10 September 10th, 1993, and it begins with your trip to Bosnia from
11 Belgrade with Dr. Karadzic's personal driver and security guard, and then
12 the conversation continues from there. And I wanted to bring your
13 attention to the excerpt two pages away under "Churkin Church" on page 7
14 of the e-court. That's it. And there we see RC, that is Dr. Karadzic's
15 driver, saying that he showed Vitaly Churkin, the Russian special
16 representative -- some of the Muslim villages were completely razed
17 during the fighting, and in addition, showed Churkin a pile of rubble and
18 said, Look what they did to our church. And then you learned from him
19 that, in fact, that was a mosque not a church.
20 First of all, is that an accurate reflection of what you learned
21 from him on that occasion?
22 A. It is.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I would tender that page.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll give the separate number for that.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P4518, Your Honours.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. And -- and, finally, I'd like to turn back to what is either, I
4 think, P4515, but, in any event, is 069 -- was previously 65 ter 06972,
5 at page 48. And again if we could turn back a page. Just so you can
6 see, Mr. Djurdjevic, that's a meeting with Colonel Petar Salapura.
7 A. Okay.
8 Q. And can you tell us who that was, please?
9 A. I believe he was head of the intelligence services for
10 Republika Srpska.
11 Q. And -- and do you recall during that meeting that
12 Colonel Salapura indicated to you when, in his view, the war would be
13 over? And perhaps we can turn to the next page.
14 A. If you can let me do that, please.
15 Q. And see the entry at the top of the page?
16 A. Yes, I remember that.
17 Q. Quoting Colonel Salapura:
18 "This war will not be over when some politicians sign a peace
19 treaty. This war will end when one of the three nations in Bosnia
20 becomes extinct. We have to make sure we're not the one."
21 Does that accurately reflect what Colonel Salapura told you?
22 A. It does.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. TIEGER: And I would tender that page, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be added to Exhibit P4515.
1 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. And that, Mr. Djurdjevic,
2 concludes my examination-in-chief.
3 JUDGE KWON: So we, in total, admitted his article or part of
4 article, from one, two, three -- five items, including the associated
5 exhibits? Four, I think.
6 MR. TIEGER: Yes. That refers to the --
7 JUDGE KWON: Or five.
8 MR. TIEGER: Because we have some aggregated references. I think
9 that would be right, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 Yes, Mr. Karadzic. We have about more than 15 minutes until we
12 have the first break. Can you start now. Yes, please continue.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning,
14 Your Honours. Good morning to everyone.
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
16 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Djurdjevic.
17 A. [Interpretation] Good morning.
18 Q. I'd like to thank you and Mr. Tieger for meeting with the
19 Defence. I hope this will help us to conclude very briefly. I'd like to
20 start with the latest item. On page 25 today, Mr. Tieger showed you that
21 the driver carried out something that was silly around the church and the
22 mosque. He did something silly. But did the Muslims and Croats destroy
23 Serbian mosques, and did they destroy the [indiscernible] Tomic monastery
24 at the beginning of the war? According to the knowledge you have,
25 wherever they took a village or a town of some kind, did they destroy our
2 THE INTERPRETER: The witness is kindly asked to wait for the end
3 of the interpretation.
4 JUDGE KWON: The witness will not -- the interpreters were not
5 able to catch up with you because you started while interpretation was
6 going on. So one tip is to look at the transcript. When the
7 transcribing is over, that's the time you can start, or you use the
8 microphone in English, but I'll leave it to you, Mr. Djurdjevic.
9 THE WITNESS: Is it okay if I answer in English?
10 JUDGE KWON: Absolutely, there's no problem.
11 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you. I guess -- I'll get the timing
12 right eventually.
13 Dr. Karadzic, my answer is: Yes, I've heard stories, said
14 earlier, of all warring parties, all three warring parties, destroying
15 each other's churches, villages, in the course of the war, and that
16 includes the Muslims destroying the Serbian churches.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Thank you. Did you gain the impression that the destruction of
19 churches or the unnecessary destruction of villages was part of a civil
20 war, of personal vendettas, or was your impression that these were the
21 policies that I was, in fact, pursuing?
22 A. In fact, I have never heard you condone any such acts. More
23 often than not, when we would have our conversations, I've heard you
24 condemn any militant actions that were not directly focused on the
25 military objectives in a given campaign. So, no, at no times have I
1 heard you encourage; on the contrary, I've heard you condemn any acts of
2 violence against your enemies.
3 Q. Thank you. They asked you about Doboj. I'd like to ask you the
4 following: If I tell you that the Serbs formed a relative majority in
5 Doboj, together with the Yugoslavs at the time, were, on the whole, only
6 Serbs, and they were a significant majority, if I tell you that Doboj is
7 a link to a large Serb population on the Ozren mountain, does this, to
8 you, seem to be a significant factor for the survival of
9 Republika Srpska? Would you consider Doboj to be of significance for the
10 survival of Republika Srpska?
11 A. As I have said before, I got the impression that it was important
12 to the Serbs. I just didn't know why. So thank you for explaining it.
13 Q. Thank you. Did you know when municipalities are referred to this
14 does not necessarily mean the entire municipalities? And the Serbian
15 side took into consideration the fact that the Muslim part of a
16 municipality might belong to a Muslim constituent entity -- or, rather,
17 municipalities in the course of the war were divided along the
18 confrontation line. It doesn't mean that the Serbs had control over an
19 entire municipality. They had control, on the whole, over the Serbian
20 parts of a given municipality.
21 A. Dr. Karadzic, I have followed the war more from a
22 macro-standpoint than from the micro-viewpoint, and frankly, I'm not
23 familiar with the territory or the counties enough to know the difference
24 and the boundaries between this or that ethnic group in each county.
25 Q. Thank you. When you spoke about military skills, would you agree
1 that in every country the president or the leader has strategic command,
2 strategic control, over the army? And my thoughts about returning
3 territory, towns, my thoughts about negotiations, is one of a president's
5 A. Absolutely. I think in any civilised country that I know of, the
6 military is subject to civilian rule; and, therefore, in your wartime
7 situation, you were the Commander-in-Chief.
8 Q. Thank you. As you correctly noticed, I haven't got a military
9 education or background. Did you gain the impression that the tactical
10 and operative matters were dealt with by the army, but the political
11 leadership only dealt with strategic issues when it was necessary to
12 negotiate; for example, when it was necessary to try and put an end to
13 the war?
14 A. That's a difficult question to answer with a yes or no answer,
15 because as you know, I have been following this war for many years and
16 have seen a number of situations in which the wishes of the civilian
17 leadership conflicted with those of the military command. I do know
18 that -- I remember having conversations with the military leaders, Mladic
19 in particular, and some other generals who were frustrated at times to
20 have to follow the civilian rule and sometimes stop, for example, a
21 military campaign to allow you and others in the civilian government to
22 negotiate probably some sort of a diplomatic solution rather than try to
23 solve everything on the ground through fighting.
24 So I'm not sure where I would draw the line between strategic and
25 tactical involvement of the civilian government, and that's why I'm
1 saying it's a difficult question to answer. I guess in the wartime
2 conditions, I'm thinking back in our country, World War II, other wars
3 that have been fought. I'm sure that there had been times that
4 President Roosevelt and Churchill and so -- similarly what may have
5 seemed like tactical decisions, and yet they were civilian leaders. So
6 as I said, this is a bit of a grey area as to where the jurisdiction of
7 the civilian government ends and the military begins and vice versa.
8 Q. Thank you. When you heard from some of us that things should be
9 brought to a head, did you take this to mean that our intention was to
10 act in such a way to bring things to a boiling point in order to put an
11 end to the war?
12 A. Yes, I do believe that you -- all of you, all of your civilian
13 leaders, believed that at the time. I also recall a conversation I had
14 the night before we met on July 14th with Professor Koljevic in which he
15 shared with me an anecdote about his brother, who I believe was a
16 playwright or something like that, being invited to a reception in
17 Belgrade. And at that reception, the representative of Her Majesty's
18 government of Britain allegedly said to Professor Koljevic's brother that
19 Her Majesty the Queen would not have any problems if the Serbs resolved
20 the situation militarily on the ground. Now, this conversation had taken
21 place before the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa. So obviously
22 Professor Koljevic concluded that this was a kind of a kind of a green
23 light being given by Britain for the Serbs to engage in the military
24 solution that would bring the war to a quick end.
25 To me, at the time, this felt like a trap that ultimately you saw
1 as well and foresaw, because it had only escalated the war at one end in
2 order to give the enemy advantage on the other side -- on the other side,
3 the Krajina in the southern part of the Bosnian Serb Republic. And that
4 led to what is now known as Operation Storm, which ultimately did lead to
5 both the end of the war and NATO's involvement through bombing in August
6 and I believe September of 1995.
7 Q. Thank you. I'd like to remind you of something that
8 General Perisic told you, namely that we were still stronger, but that if
9 this continued we would lose. Do you agree that given that Yugoslavia
10 was under sanctions and that Republika Srpska was under even worse
11 sanctions, the Republika Srpska could not accept the war continuing for a
12 long time, because if they did so that would mean we would fail, if we
13 accepted the war continuing as it had done for three and a half years up
14 until that point in time.
15 A. Yes, I do believe and have said that many times in our
16 conversations between you and I and many other leaders that I've spoken
17 with that the time is not the friend of the Serbian interests. The time
18 is on the side of the enemy, and that the longer the war lasted, the more
19 advantage your opposition will gain. That chart that General Perisic
20 talked about, and that later on I reproduced, merely reflects that in a
21 graphical way how militarily the opposing forces would strengthen both
22 internally and externally through weapons that were being shipped to
23 them. And therefore the longer the war lasted, less of a chance would be
24 for the Serbian side to prevail.
25 JUDGE KWON: Since you read English, Mr. Djurdjevic, could you
1 take a look at the transcript and supplement what's missing from there.
2 I remember you started with "I remember" something, something like that.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes. I think I said I remember that in the
4 conversations between you and I.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Djurdjevic.
6 Yes. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic -- or, I note the time. If
7 it is convenient, we can take a break now.
8 THE ACCUSED: As you like it, sir.
9 JUDGE KWON: For 20 minutes. We will resume at 10.40.
10 --- Recess taken at 10.18 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 10.43 a.m.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Djurdjevic, do you agree that the assessments that I had that
16 I shared with you at the time, according to which the Croats would attack
17 Krajina through Bosnia, according to which the war would come to an end
18 in two and three months' time, did all these assessments of mine, in
19 fact, prove to be correct?
20 A. Yes, you were right. As I said, you were very prescient.
21 Q. Now I'd like to remind you of a conversation with
22 Professor Koljevic in December. Do you agree that as early as
23 November 1995, as early as the 21st of November, the Dayton agreement was
24 concluded and it stated that those who were accused would not be able to
25 hold official positions? Was that the basis for Koljevic's request that
1 Ratko Mladic and myself should leave our positions?
2 A. That may well have been the reason for his opinion. I cannot
3 speak for him. I don't know what his reason was. Personally, I was not
4 aware of that provision, and so I just -- I cannot speculate, really, as
5 to what he may have thought and why.
6 Q. Thank you. But now that you know that that was a provision of
7 the Dayton agreement, it seems more reasonable.
8 JUDGE KWON: It's a pointless question. Just move on to your
9 next topic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellency, the witness
11 initially thought that Koljevic thought that wartime leaders wouldn't be
12 appropriate leaders for peacetime. That's why I put this question to the
13 witness, but the basis for the question is a legal basis. It relates to
14 the indictment. But very well, I'll move on.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. In the course of our meeting, you said that I monitored the
17 reporting of some leading international channels, and when I asked you in
18 the interview whether this was a semi-private, a semi-official meeting at
19 which we would watch things together, when -- you, in fact, said that
20 when I watched those leading international channels, the only sort of
21 information I could obtain would be misinformation; isn't that correct?
22 A. That is true. That is why, in fact, I felt the need to
23 continuously visit the country where the war was being fought, so that I
24 would not get disinformed, so that I would have a chance, first-hand, to
25 find out what the full truth is.
1 Q. When you said that I could only obtain false information, does
2 that mean that the conclusion you drew was that the media was not
3 conveying the truth, but, rather, that they were biased, and they were
4 biased against the Serbs?
5 A. There's no question about that. There's no question that I
6 believed that then and I do believe it now, and that that was the reason
7 that I originally and subsequently got involved in direct reporting the
8 part of the truth about the war in the Balkans that the American public
9 and the Western public in general had not seen from the mainstream media
10 which at times I jokingly called the lame-stream media. And,
11 Your Honour, if I may say, the reason for the non-profit organisation
12 under which I reported my findings from the war, "Truth in media," was
13 not chosen lightly. And similarly, the reason I'm here as a voluntary
14 witness, I have been told by the US attorney before I gave that
15 deposition in 2002 that as a member of the media, under the US law I
16 cannot be subpoenaed, but I volunteered to be here. And some of you may
17 wonder why I gave up the sunny beaches of Hawaii to come here in the dead
18 of winter, but the reason is that what I said to you at the outset: That
19 I'm here to speak the truth and nothing but the truth is not just an oath
20 for me. It's the very same reason why I travelled through wartime
21 conditions, because that is actually my sole purpose, and that is my sole
22 commitment. So for that reason, I've also counselled at times
23 Dr. Karadzic when he asked me for opinions about the Western media, what
24 can or cannot be believed, because I found that often times
25 disinformation was passed on to the American public and other Western
1 public not by outright lying but the deception by omission, by omission
2 of the salient facts, and I saw it as my mission to fill in these gaps so
3 the full truth be known. Because without the full truth, there cannot be
4 a full reconciliation, and without the reconciliation, there cannot be
5 real peace and harmony.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Djurdjevic.
7 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. You've been living in the democratic world for years. You went
11 there because you objected to the previous system in place. You are, so
12 to speak, part of the diaspora. Do you agree that the diaspora condemned
13 Milosevic's sanctions on the Drina against Republika Srpska?
14 A. I don't think that I can say the diaspora speaks with one voice.
15 I can say for myself that I have condemned that, that I had seen that. I
16 perceived that as a sign of betrayal of the common interest and the
17 common good by Milosevic. And I'm not aware of any public statements by
18 the diaspora per se, because as I said I don't think there's such thing
19 as one voice in which the diaspora speaks.
20 Q. Thank you. I had the majority of the diaspora in mind. The
21 reason for putting this question to you is the following: Did
22 General Perisic have any reasons -- or, rather, could he consider this
23 attitude of the diaspora to be an indication that the sanctions weren't
24 in force or that it was possible to bypass the sanctions in some way?
25 A. Again, I cannot speculate as to General Perisic's motives for
1 making that statement. What you're saying seems plausible. What I can
2 say is that I got a distinct impression that he was cultivating or was in
3 a good relationship with the military part of your state, of the
4 Bosnian Serb Republic, specifically Mladic and the military leaders, and
5 was actually speaking disparagingly of you and the civilian leaders. I
6 recall him saying at one stage that the biggest mistake that Milosevic
7 had made was when he agreed to have Karadzic head up the Bosnian
8 Serb Republic, things like that. He also accused you of some other
9 improprieties that seemed pretty far-fetched, that even the Bosnian Serb
10 military leaders that I spoke to had discounted. But there was clearly
11 no love lost, I would say, between Perisic and yourself and other
12 civilian leaders of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and he was trying to give
13 me an impression that he was still in very good relationship with the
14 military part of the Bosnian Serb Republic despite the sanctions.
15 Q. During that and previous visits, were you able to observe that
16 there was this ideological rift within the body of the Serbian people?
17 It was very much alive, and the left and the right had frequent
18 frictions. Could you view what Perisic told you in that light? Could
19 you put it in that context as well?
20 A. Yes. I think that would be a fair assessment. It has been my
21 observation that by and large the military leadership of all factions
22 that I have met with was still pretty much Communist -- leaning toward
23 the Communist ideology. They were trying to adjust to a new environment
24 in which there was no longer Soviet Union and the world power -- polarity
25 of the two world powers, but they were still thinking with the Red Star
1 on their foreheads. And I had actually witnessed with you in our
2 discussions in earlier meetings several situations which highlighted
4 I remember, for example, you telling me a story on one of those
5 trips, it was before 1995, I would venture to guess maybe it was that one
6 in September of 1993, about an incident in which the Serbs, the
7 Serbian Army under General Mladic, had made advances, I believe it was on
8 Igman and Bjelasnica, when they were conducting an offensive toward
9 Sarajevo, and that's when you ordered them to stop so that you could --
10 you and other civilian leaders could engage in diplomatic negotiations
11 and try to come up with a solution in a peaceful way. And you were
12 lamenting the fact that Mladic had apparently signed a cease-fire
13 agreement with the, I guess, Muslims - I guess that's who they were
14 fighting at that point at that location - and had then advanced anyway,
15 and you were really angry, miffed at him, because you said to me that
16 when a Serbian officer gives his word of honour, that has to be the word
17 of honour. And the Communists have never word what it means to have
18 honourable agreements, and so you were very angry that he had -- you said
19 you were not angry that he had taken the territory that he did, but that
20 he should have concluded his military campaign first and then signed the
21 cease-fire agreement, rather than sign the cease-fire agreement, break it
22 in order to grab more land. So that's just one example that comes to
23 mind where this Communist ideology: The power, might makes right. The
24 power -- military power rules had clashed with your beliefs as a
25 political leader of the country.
1 Q. Thank you. Could we have 23638, page 4, where you discuss the
2 very Mount Igman episode. The bottom part. Page 4 in hard copy. This
3 seems to be page 8 in e-court, but in hard copy it's page 4. Yes, we
4 have it.
5 At the bottom, does this part relate to what you said?
6 A. Before I look at the details, would someone please tell me what
7 meeting and what time-frame we're looking at?
8 Q. It's a meeting with Sloba Mamlic, Major. It's on the next page.
9 The date was the 13th of May, 1996; that is to say, following everything.
10 A. What I'm looking at here is Srebrenica and Zepa. That's not what
11 I was talking about. I was talking about Igman and Bjelasnica in 1993.
12 Q. We have the very page. The previous one was only put on the
13 screen so that you could be able to see that it was May 1996.
14 You heard this from Major Mamlic; correct?
15 A. Yes. That refers to that incident, I believe. However, there is
16 another reference to it contemporaneously, but this accurately also
17 reflects the same incident.
18 Q. I hope you didn't hold these sharp words against me.
19 A. No, I mean you're just a reflection on the truth, that is, that I
20 report the truth as I hear it, and that's what Major Mamlic had said.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, this part of
23 this page?
24 JUDGE KWON: When we admit part of this article we'll also admit
25 the cover page as well in order to follow what it is about. So we will
1 admit this page and the previous page in order to find who Mr. Djurdjevic
2 was meeting with. So we'll admit three pages as next Defence exhibit.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2190, Your Honours.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. When mentioned that Perisic thought that Milosevic had made a
6 mistake by having accepted me to hold the position I had in Bosnia, do
7 you agree that despite mutual respect, Milosevic and I were ideologically
8 opposed and that he did not appoint me in any way? I did not even run
9 for the position in 1990, and he never came to terms with the fact that
10 in Bosnia there was this centrist government.
11 A. I'm not sure that I quite follow the gist of the question, but I
12 will try my best to answer this way: When you and I first met, which was
13 in 1992, I did have the impression that the interests of Milosevic and
14 your government at the time were closely aligned; in other words, at the
15 outset of the war. Then as time went on and subsequent meetings,
16 Milosevic began to shift and change, and by that stage, even by 1992, I
17 had already concluded after several meetings with him that he was a
18 turncoat Communist, that he could not be trusted to stay the course. And
19 it was just a matter of time, in my own opinion, as to when he would
20 begin to shift and change his positions. When that happened, and the
21 first sign of that happened actually in the summer of 1994 when he
22 buckled under the Western pressure and sanctions and imposed the
23 sanctions against the Bosnian Serb Republic, that was a clear public sign
24 of falling out between the leadership of the two Serbian factions: The
25 one in the former Yugoslavia in Belgrade and the leadership in the
1 Bosnian Serb Republic. So I don't really know how you got to be in the
2 position of president of the Bosnian Serb Republic. I was not intimately
3 familiar or following the war back in 1994 from the Sarajevo standpoint.
4 All I know is from what Professor Koljevic had told me, that you had not
5 really volunteered for that, that you were kind of pushed to do that,
6 that you accepted the responsibility and took the meddle because you felt
7 that your nation was in danger of being overrun when the country of
8 Yugoslavia began to fall apart. But just exactly who approved whom and
9 how you got to be there, I have no idea.
10 Q. Thank you. Perhaps then there's no point in asking you whether
11 you could observe that during any elections President Milosevic always
12 supported our opposition, including Biljana Plavsic once she became our
13 political enemy.
14 A. To which elections are you referring?
15 Q. Starting with 1996 onwards, as long as he was alive. Let me
16 remind you, he supported Ivanic against Krajisnik. He supported Drago
17 Ilic, his socialist party member as well as Zivko Radisic. He supported
18 Biljana and Dodik. They were always our opponents. He never supported
20 A. I actually didn't know that but it's entirely consistent with
21 everything I knew about the man, and it's consistent with that comment
22 that Perisic had made. Perisic then being his -- Milosevic's chief of
23 the army, and it is also consistent with my perception of Milosevic as
24 the man who even in our first meeting in January 1990 when the
25 Soviet Union was still standing, looking strong, did not fully understand
1 how the game of geopolitics is played. And I was going to say that by
2 1996, he has certainly lost his compass, but now that I think back about
3 that, meaning in January 1990, I don't think he ever had a compass that
4 worked when it came to global politics and geopolitics, and so he was, I
5 think, always go -- he was always going by his gut feel. And when he
6 felt the headwinds were too strong, he would turn the other way. So it's
7 not surprising he supported your opposition in 1996, even though you were
8 very closely working together and collaborating in 1992.
9 Q. Thank you. Mr. Djurdjevic, let us reach July 1995 as quickly as
10 we can. Is it correct that you had to choose the route you would take
11 and that between Zvornik and Pale you took the longer road, which was in
12 poorer condition because the main road was dangerous to travel along
13 because of the combat which took place on the 13th?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. Thank you. You met Professor Koljevic. Had you met him before
16 that occasion?
17 A. Yes, I have met him before. I believe the first time in 1993,
18 but this was the first time that I had really spent an extended time with
19 him, like several hours, all evening. We had dinner together, too, and
20 also a good part of the following morning. So it was really the first
21 time that I spent a long time with him.
22 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that Professor Koljevic was an
23 exceptional personality, especially in terms of the humane side of his
24 nature? He was quite positively disposed towards Muslims and Croatia,
25 especially when it came to their humanitarian needs.
1 A. There's no question that that's true. Professor Koljevic gave
2 the appearance and came across as a person who wouldn't hurt a fly. He
3 was completely harmless, and he was a very caring man. When we were
4 talking about that night when momentous events were taking place on the
5 ground in Srebrenica, the night of July 13th, he was very excited to be
6 able to go there the following day, looking forward to going there the
7 following day to extend his hand of friendship to the Muslims in
8 Srebrenica and to promise them, to assure them that they would be treated
9 the same way by the Bosnian Serb government as were the Serbian
10 civilians. And if you followed my war diary from that point on,
11 unfortunately that never happened, because by that stage all the
12 civilians had been evacuated from Srebrenica by General Mladic and the
13 trucks that he had laid on. But professor -- if Professor Koljevic had
14 his way, he would have held a press conference there on the 14th of July
15 to announce to the world how magnanimous the Serbian government is and to
16 ensure the civilians of Srebrenica that they had nothing to fear. That
17 is what he had told me at the time, but as I said, that never came to
19 Q. Thank you. In your view, was Professor Koljevic the right person
20 to be in charge of the co-ordinating body and committee in charge of
21 co-operation with UNPROFOR and other humanitarian organisations? Was
22 there anyone better than him in our -- among our leaders?
23 A. Dr. Karadzic, in all fairness, only you can answer that question.
24 I don't know all the people that you had at your disposal. All I can say
25 is that Professor Koljevic, to me, seemed very appropriate for the job,
1 if for no other reason because he spoke excellent English. He was a
2 scholar, he was not a soldier, and therefore he instilled a certain
3 amount of respect in people that he was dealing with.
4 Q. Thank you. Could we have 65 ter 22306. On page 21, you discuss
5 a possible departure of Professor Koljevic and yourself for Srebrenica.
6 Was it your impression that both Professor Koljevic and I believed that
7 at least the local population of Srebrenica would not leave, that they
8 would choose to stay and that there was reason enough for you to go to
10 Page 21, please.
11 A. The answer to your question is yes. That's clearly the
12 impression I had the night of the 13th when I witnessed first-hand the
13 conversation that Professor Koljevic had on the phone with you, in which
14 he outlined to you his plan to go to Srebrenica, the plan that I've just
15 explained, to show goodwill toward the Muslim civilians.
16 And as for your concurrence with that plan, you did concur. You
17 did agree. So the impression I got was that two of you were thinking
18 alike, that you were on the same page.
19 Q. Thank you. Did you know at the time that in addition to the
20 local population in Srebrenica there were many refugees from the nearby
21 municipalities, and was it your impression that we did count on some
22 people leaving but that we hoped that most of the local population would
23 stay? In other words, were you able to observe a difference of position
24 or intention between those refugees and the locals?
25 It's at the top of the page:
1 [In English] "But there was still hope that they --"
2 [Interpretation] Does this refer to our expectations that a
3 sufficient number of civilians would remain behind so as to be able to
4 take care of them?
5 A. To answer your first question, no, I could not make a distinction
6 between a domestic and refugees. I didn't know that that was the case,
7 and we never discussed -- Professor Koljevic and I never discussed that
8 distinction. We just talked about the civilian population in general in
10 And as for the second question, yes, it's a bit of a
11 contradiction here, because on the 13th, the night of the 13th, in our
12 conversation at Professor Koljevic's office, he had already told me, as
13 well as his Chief of Cabinet, that Mladic [Realtime transcript read in
14 error "Milosevic"] had evacuated all civilians and yet both he and you
15 had held out hope that we would still be able to go, perhaps because you
16 thought that the domestic population was still there. I don't know that.
17 But clearly the morning of the 14th, as you see in this transcript,
18 Professor Koljevic and I had still intended to go to Srebrenica figuring
19 that there are some civilians left. However, that changed at some point
20 later on that day when it became obvious that that would be pointless.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Mr. Djurdjevic, could you check
23 whether any part in the beginning of your answer is missing.
24 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honour, this immediate answer?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE WITNESS: They would make the trip. That's the missing part.
2 There's still hope that they would make the trip.
3 THE ACCUSED: I think his Excellency thinks of the transcript.
4 THE WITNESS: Oh.
5 JUDGE KWON: Page 44.
6 THE WITNESS: Well, excuse me. First of all, there's a mistake
7 here. It says "Milosevic" when we're talking Mladic. Milosevic had
8 nothing to do with Srebrenica evacuations. That's the first mistake.
9 And in then in the continuation it says, "... had evacuated all civilians
10 but that you" --
11 JUDGE KWON: So did you begin your answer with, "That was the
13 THE WITNESS: Could you back up the transcript a bit?
14 JUDGE KWON: It's impossible.
15 THE WITNESS: Okay. See if I can figure it out. Yes.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That's fine. Please continue,
17 Mr. Karadzic. Yes. I had the impression that you started answering the
18 question while the interpretation was going on, but that can be looked
19 into later on. Yes.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. I believe you said that was the case when you referred to what I
23 said, that there was still hope of some civilians being there; correct?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Thank you. Given the lack of information, do you agree that you
1 were able to observe that at the time it was impossible to establish
2 telephone communication and that you, too, had serious problems when
3 trying to arrange meetings with me or Mladic and that was the reason why
4 we had incomplete information?
5 A. What I can say is definitely true, that all day that I had spent
6 at your office on July 14th, the secure lines were down and that I could
7 not communicate with General Mladic, with whom I was trying to set up a
8 meeting, because my primary purpose, actually, for that trip in July 1995
9 was to meet with him. When he couldn't make it on our appointed time on
10 July 13th, he had sent General Gvero to meet with me instead, and his
11 officers have said that he would try to make time for us to meet the
12 following day, which was the 14th, and that I was to call to see when and
13 where we could meet. So all day long I had been trying to -- they gave
14 me the number to use for the secure lines to do that. So all day long
15 I've been trying to call that, the secure lines, and all day long they
16 were down. And I know that also I witnessed -- I know that you and your
17 office have both the open and secure lines and that you were not able to
18 communicate on the secure lines either.
19 Q. Thank you. As regards directive number 7, or my order number 7,
20 is it possible that you wanted to know what this operation was about and
21 what was going on in Eastern Bosnia, and that's how it came to be that
22 directive number 7 was mentioned? Is it possible that you were
23 interested in finding out what was going on?
24 A. What I recall is that that directive number 7, order number 7,
25 came up in the context of our discussion when you said that the objective
1 of the military campaign is to bring things to a boiling point, and my
2 impression was that you were letting me know that the initiative, i.e.,
3 the order, had come from you. What directive number 7 was, I have no
4 idea. I just remember you mentioning that reference.
5 Q. Thank you. Could it have been mentioned in the context of your
6 queries about any disagreements between the military and civilian
7 structures in Republika Srpska?
8 A. Yes. I believe that would be the proper context, because then
9 immediately after that we had got into the conversation that I actually
10 did want to have with you about the disagreements between the military
11 leaders, Mladic in particular, and your government in which you had
12 shared with me the information that was new to me at the time. And that
13 is that in collusion with Milosevic, I believe in April of that year,
14 April of 1995, General Mladic was planning to stage sort of a coup d'etat
15 to displace you as the head of government and that you had gone to the
16 military leadership whom you had assembled and faced them up with that
17 information to -- about which you said that many of these officers were
18 completely taken aback and surprised to learn that. You then also told
19 me that you had asked Mladic to come to your office for a private meeting
20 in which you had asked him to set three hours aside to carry out, and you
21 said that in that meeting you had once again asserted your authority as
22 the chief commander, as civilian commander, Commander-in-Chief, and
23 that -- you know, I got the impression -- you got the impression that
24 therefore that rift had been smoothed out. However, before I left your
25 office that evening, as we were leaving, you said something that made me
1 wonder about that, because you said, I think we're going to need to
2 pension Mladic off. And that's what got me the impression that perhaps
3 things were smoothed out at the surface, but deep down there were still
5 Q. Thank you. Can we now call up 65 ter 16077, page 37 in e-court.
6 And that page you speak about that.
7 Did you see that our misunderstandings did not concern crimes but
8 only the concept of civilian control, and did you see for yourself that I
9 had the impression that I did not have enough control over the military?
10 A. Excuse me, do I need to look at the exhibit before answering
11 that, or can I just answer it?
12 JUDGE KWON: By all means. If necessary, please take a look at
13 whatever pages you want to. Shall we show you the first page --
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The previous one, please.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Can we take a look at the first page. It starts with the words
17 "Koljevic," and so on, and "visit to Srebrenica," and then it's on
18 page 36. Yes. That should be the right page, the one that we have now.
19 Do you remember that?
20 A. [Interpretation] Yes. [In English] Yes, I do remember. Yes, I
21 do remember.
22 Q. No, this is not the right page now. The next one, please. Ask
23 for it to scroll down when you need that.
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. I just want to ensure that we
1 understand this in context, and that is we correctly understand that it
2 is the accused's case that whatever conflict or tensions existed between
3 himself and General Mladic had nothing to do with crimes but had to do
4 instead with some other matters.
5 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure I understood you.
6 MR. TIEGER: Well, I understand he's drawing -- he's asking the
7 witness to draw a conclusion in that regard based on -- on his
8 presentation of that dichotomy, and I just want to make sure that's
9 properly understood if that indeed is his case to the witness and before
10 this Court.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Maybe this is a good time to
13 just visit this issue of what is our case, because every time
14 Dr. Karadzic puts a factual assertion to a witness, he's being asked
15 whether that's his case or not, and that's not what we're doing. It's
16 not our case every time we're testing the witness with some factual
18 Our case is that the Prosecution hasn't proved that the crimes
19 that are charged against Dr. Karadzic as to each and every element and
20 that we're not going to say anything in this courtroom at any time during
21 the trial that will relieve the Prosecution of the burden of proving each
22 and every element of each and every charge. So there's nothing in
23 Dr. Karadzic's questions that he puts to a witness that is intended or
24 should be used to relieve the Prosecution of their burden of proof of
25 anything in the trial. That starts with wither anybody was killed in
1 Srebrenica, the reasons for why they were killed, who may have killed
2 them, why Dr. Karadzic did what he did, whether he punished and for what
3 reason. All of those things -- nothing that we are doing during this
4 part of the case when we're questioning witnesses is intended to assist
5 the Prosecutor to relieve him of the burden of proving all of the aspects
6 of the case.
7 So I think it's -- I wanted to make that clear because this keeps
8 coming up. So it's not Dr. Karadzic's case that he didn't punish
9 General Mladic for crimes or that he didn't want to punish General Mladic
10 for crimes or that their disagreements had nothing to do with crimes.
11 That's not our case. And it doesn't relieve the Prosecution of the
12 burden with respect to the issue of Dr. Karadzic's knowledge of any
13 crimes of Mladic or failure to punish those crimes. So I hope I help the
14 Court with that intervention.
15 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, speaking for myself, Mr. Robinson, not
16 really. Nobody is suggesting that the queries are designed to relieve
17 the burden upon the Prosecution, which is plain and straightforward. But
18 it's very useful to know during extended cross-examinations when the
19 Court is being required to sift matters what it is that they are being
20 asked to conclude, and it is not very helpful if the Court isn't given
21 that information.
22 MR. TIEGER: And if I may just add one point. That's part of
23 what underlies the submission I made a moment ago. Of course,
24 Prosecution never shrinks from its duty and is happy to embrace it.
25 That's Mr. Robinson stating the truism about the Prosecution's burden of
1 proof doesn't address the issue at all. And to expand on the point that
2 His Honour Judge Morrison just made, that issue is further amplified when
3 the accused not only obscures what is being addressed to a witness but
4 affirmatively stakes out a position that is apparently the basis for the
5 proposition being put to the witness and the assertions impliedly being
6 made, and that's why I raise the issue.
7 JUDGE KWON: So the question that triggered your intervention was
8 whether witness saw that our -- I quote:
9 "Did you see that our misunderstanding did not concern crimes but
10 only the concept of civilian control ..."
11 MR. TIEGER: Yes. That was the original trigger for this
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE KWON: So we'll resolve this in this way: I'll ask you,
16 Mr. Karadzic, to clarify what you meant when you say "crimes":
17 "Did you see that our misunderstanding did not concern crimes but
18 only the concept of civilian control?"
19 What did you mean? Do you consider there were crimes that were
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. You're right. All of you are
22 right. I'm going to be much clearer now.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Djurdjevic, did you see for yourself --
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please clarify to the Court. We put
1 the question. Please answer to us. What did you mean?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. I thought you were
3 asking me to redefine my question, to put a clearer question.
4 This is what I meant: Did the witness know that I knew of some
5 crimes, and was my dissatisfaction with the military due to some crime or
6 was this a doctrinary conflict because of control? I'll explain that in
7 my next question. So to the best of this witness's knowledge, what was
8 the reason for the misunderstandings.
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: We will, we'll leave it at that. Please continue.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. I'd like to ask you -- actually, it's obvious here, isn't it,
15 that I said that the army had to be an instrument of the state, not a
16 state in its own right?
17 Can we now have the next page.
18 JUDGE KWON: Before we go any further, is this exhibit --
19 document the same one we looked at during the in chief? But why is the
20 page number different? This is -- this is a document of 113 pages, and
21 one we looked at is of only 70 pages.
22 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. I believe I can explain that.
23 Two of the two versions of "War Drums are Beating," the trip journal from
24 July 5th to July 31st were uploaded. One, the longer version,
25 encompasses the entire trip. However, portions of that trip took place
1 after the witness left Bosnia and went on to Western Europe and there are
2 also some articles attached to that that are part of that same journal.
3 So because it wasn't clear whether -- how they would be used and whether
4 the focus would be as expected on the Bosnian portion or the Bosnian and
5 Serbian portion of the trip, we thought we would give the Court and the
6 parties sufficient flexibility by uploading both the entirety of that
7 trip diary and only that portion, the shortened portion, that related to
8 the trip within Serbia and Bosnia.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. So this 65 ter number 16077 is a longer
10 version of 65 ter 6972. I put it for the record, and let's continue.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. I'd now like to ask you to take a look at the first three or four
14 paragraphs of these notes of yours. Do you agree or do you remember that
15 I complained about the following: As far as humanitarian aid is
16 concerned I spent more time talking to my own people rather than our
17 adversaries, and I complained that Professor Koljevic was not given due
19 A. Yes. I did get the impression that what was at stake here was a
20 power play as to who is in charge. I have never discussed with you or
21 with Mladic, for that matter, issues of crimes being committed because I
22 was not aware of any at that time. And it's also accurate what you said,
23 that you told me that Professor Koljevic had to spend more time
24 negotiating with his own army the permissions to -- for the UNPROFOR
25 convoys to pass and that that was unnecessary and humiliating for someone
1 in the position like Professor Koljevic, who was the representative of
2 the civilian government in that war.
3 Q. Thank you. Was it quite clear to you, Mr. Djurdjevic, that both
4 Koljevic and I were in favour of allowing the largest possible quantities
5 of humanitarian aid to be delivered in an unhindered way?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Thank you. So as for this paragraph entitled "Mladic's coup
8 d'etat," could that be admitted in full?
9 JUDGE KWON: Should we add that to the pre-existing Prosecution
10 exhibit, or do you like to be kept as a separate Defence exhibit?
11 Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: It can be added. That will be fine.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be added to Exhibit P4515.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Although you've already given an answer, I would like to be
17 clearer in respect of that confusing question of mine that made the
18 Prosecutor react. Did you see for yourself -- actually, did you think
19 that I knew of any crimes, and did you have any awareness of crimes, and
20 did you think that we had any awareness of crimes at the time when we had
21 this clash with the military?
22 A. My answer is no. I just said in my previous comment that I was
23 not aware of any crimes at that point.
24 Q. Now that we're on this page, can we scroll down and then can we
25 tender the entire page later.
1 You remember that during the offensive against Sarajevo, my
2 daughter's wedding took place, and you say here that I asked elderly
3 people whether we should postpone the wedding, and they said that we
4 shouldn't do that. Is it correct what you say here, that it should not
5 be postponed but, rather, should be carried through?
6 A. Yes. I confirm everything that I've said in this paragraph.
7 Q. Within that framework, as you lived in the diaspora, in a
8 democratic world, and also on the basis of your own experience, did you
9 come to the conclusion that I was an autocrat; or, on the contrary, did
10 you think that people could talk to me, could tell me the truth? Do you
11 not refer to that here?
12 Look at what this -- this -- this Miocic, I think, says:
13 [In English] "... said because most people around
14 Radovan Karadzic are hoping to get ahead by kissing up to him, rather
15 than telling him the truth. Yet RK is a kind of a person to whom you can
16 tell the truth, and he won't bite your head off for it."
17 [Interpretation] Those were his words, right, that the truth can
18 be told to me? Did you see that for yourself? And on the whole, the
19 democratic diaspora, did they all have some impression of me? Did you
20 personally have some impression of me?
21 A. Thank you. I'm glad you added this last part, because I can't
22 speak for the diaspora. Yes, I do with what you said, and, yes, I did
23 put that theory to the test when I asked you the testy question about
24 your daughter's wedding, which was actually brought to my attention by
25 General Perisic first in our meeting in Belgrade before this trip when he
1 spoke about you disparagingly, that here you were in the middle of the
2 war and a major offensive taking place and you and your daughter and the
3 wedding guests were partying. That's how, to paraphrase, he had put it.
4 So I put that to a test and you explained just like I said in this -- in
5 my notes, that you had asked for opinions of elders in your community and
6 they counselled you to have a wedding but to keep it quiet.
7 JUDGE KWON: If you could remind me again of who ZM referred to.
8 THE WITNESS: Yes. ZM is the initials of the Chief of Cabinet
9 for Professor Koljevic.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. You said that. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 11. 65 ter 23636.
12 I hope that this entire page, then, will be admitted under the number
13 that had already been assigned.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. In hard copy it's page 11, and I don't know what page it is in
17 e-court. Can we go to where it says page 11. Ah, yes, that's fine.
18 Could you please focus on this bit, "Truth and Communist Officers
19 in RS."
20 Is that what you were saying in relation to Igman, and, generally
21 speaking, that once we took upon ourselves certain obligations we had to
22 honour them at any cost?
23 A. Yes, that is exactly it. In our previous reference to that, we
24 used my discussion with Major Mamlic, and, if you recall, that's when I
25 said there had been other references to that same incident in my diary,
1 and this is exactly it. This is the one I was referring to.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this page be added as well?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be added to Exhibit P4518.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, let us not expose
6 ourselves to the danger of the Prosecution assisting the Defence.
7 Can we have the previous page, just for the sake of
9 May I proceed?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please. Yes.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Actually, you've already spoken about this, but when was the
14 first time that you heard of some killings in relation to Srebrenica?
15 Did you learn anything about that while you were in Pale, and when did
16 you hear about it in general? And from whom?
17 A. After my visit to Bosnia in July 1995, as Mr. Tieger had pointed
18 out, I continued my trip out of the country. I went to Vienna, and then
19 from Vienna to Germany, and then to Poland, I believe, travelling with my
20 daughter from that point onwards, from Vienna onwards, and I do believe
21 that it was at some point in Germany. I recall that we were in church -
22 It could have been in Berlin, I'm not a hundred per cent sure which
23 church and just exactly where - where I saw a poster talking about a
24 massacre in Srebrenica, and they were collecting donations for the
25 victims in Srebrenica. Because we were travelling, I had not really kept
1 up with it hour-by-hour or day-by-day news, and besides, I rarely watch
2 TV anyway for the reasons we've already discussed before, so that was the
3 first time that I recall that I'd become aware of anything to do with
4 alleged crimes being committed in Srebrenica.
5 Q. Thank you. Thank you. I just need to check a few things and
6 then I'll go back to ...
7 During this time that we spent together on the 14th of July, you
8 observed that there was a delegation there from Srebrenica, the civilian
9 authorities of Srebrenica visiting me, headed by Mr. Deronjic. Do you
10 remember that I informed you that we had talked to that delegation about
11 technical matters pertaining to civilian control and authority in
13 A. Yes, I do remember that.
14 Q. Thank you. Did you notice that during day I went from one room
15 to another and then yet another one, because at the same time I had
16 several different visitors? And did I ask you also to excuse me because
17 I had to leave you every now and then in order to see other visitors?
18 A. I don't recall you leaving me in your office and going out to do
19 other things, but, yes, I do remember the comings and goings all day long
20 in and out of your office, different people coming in, going out, and
21 this delegation from Srebrenica was, I believe, just leaving as our
22 meeting had commenced. And there were quite a few of them. I don't
23 remember exactly how many, but it was more than just a mayor that -- or
24 would-be mayor that you were meeting with. So, yes, you were one busy
25 man on that day.
1 Q. Thank you. You said that someone informed me of the fighting in
2 the northern part of the area. Do we agree that this was on the 14th and
3 that fighting was far away from Srebrenica, to the north, in the
4 direction of Zvornik?
5 A. What I recall is that you took a phone call from someone, some
6 military commander, telling you that there is fighting going on as the
7 column -- alleged a large column of 10.000 or so Muslim fighters was
8 trying to make their way from Srebrenica toward Tuzla. Just where
9 exactly that was I don't know. I don't think you told me or anyone else
10 has. But your response to that was, Oh, it is probably more like 2- or
11 3.000. In other words, you felt the commander was exaggerating the
12 strength of the troops.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Djurdjevic, I'm intervening because I had the
14 impression that Mr. Karadzic was moving away from this topic, but in
15 answer to his question that -- I quote: "Do you remember that I
16 inform --" it's about his meeting with the mayor, Mr. Deronjic. I quote:
17 "Do you remember that I informed you that we had talked to that
18 delegation about technical matters pertaining to civilian control and
19 authority in Srebrenica?"
20 And your answer was:
21 "Yes, I do remember that."
22 What are those technical matters?
23 A. Your Honour, I'm not aware of the details of that conversation,
24 because I was not present there. I walked into his office just as that
25 delegation had left. I can only surmise it had to do with the establish
1 of a civilian authority because they had just militarily taken that city
2 and the technical matters to me meant logistical issues to do with
3 setting up the government there.
4 JUDGE KWON: Could you tell us exactly what Mr. Karadzic told you
5 at the time?
6 THE WITNESS: Well, if you want the exact quote, could we go back
7 to my diary as of that point?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a minute. We'll find this
10 page now.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, can you help us?
12 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. You want to be on -- it's page
13 34 of the hard copy, which I believe is page -- I can check on my notes.
14 Page 30 -- probably page -- I'd try page 36 of the e-court. That's if
15 we're talking about 4615.
16 JUDGE KWON: Shall we try page 35. No, we -- okay.
17 Is this it now? Next page.
18 MR. TIEGER: If you can scroll up, I think that's at least one of
19 the references you had in mind. Up by I mean higher in the page, not
20 lower in the page.
21 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes. Do you read that part?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm reading it now. Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Well, I guess it don't shed any more light in regards the
24 specific terminology. So as best as I can recall, what I told you is
25 exactly what he had said. My impression was that they were setting --
1 trying to set up the civilian government in Srebrenica and that that's
2 what these technical issues and logistical discussions were about. This
3 also corroborates what Professor Koljevic had told me, that it was his
4 intention, if you recall, the day before and the morning of July 14th, to
5 go there as a representative of the civilian government and with his
6 presence accomplish the same, to carry the message that the local
7 civilians will be dealt with fairly by the Serbian government.
8 JUDGE KWON: And probably Mr. Robinson will advise you,
9 Mr. Karadzic. While you are entitled to put leading questions to the
10 Prosecution witness to strengthen the probative value of evidence you are
11 going to get from the witness, it's better for you to let the witness say
12 the words.
13 I note the time. It's time to take a break for half an hour, we
14 will resume at 12.30.
15 --- Recess taken at 12.02 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you. Mr. Djurdjevic, do we agree that in the course of the
20 interview we had, you confirmed that I did not get involved in your work.
21 I didn't try to influence your work as a journalist, and my associates
22 didn't do this either. In brief, did you gain the impression that I was
23 in favour of freedom of speech, in favour of the media having access to
24 accurate information?
25 A. The short answer is yes. I have never felt pressured in any way
1 and always felt free to speak and write what I saw and felt.
2 JUDGE KWON: So we can continue, yes.
3 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you,
5 Your Excellency, for your well-intentioned suggestions, but since it's
6 quite difficult to advise me, because sometimes the questions I put are
7 moral rather than legal -- well, as a result, I would like Mr. Robinson
8 to put several questions to Mr. Djurdjevic, questions that he is better
9 placed to phrase than I am, with your leave.
10 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any objection to that, Mr. Tieger?
11 MR. TIEGER: Well, I don't want to create an unnecessary problem
12 if this is some kind of one-off exception that doesn't erode the general
13 principles under which we've been operating, but I frankly -- it's a very
14 vague explanation, and I can't quite understand exactly why this
15 exceptional approach is required and why the accused doesn't continue
16 with his -- I don't know the nature of the subject matters that would
17 require that, and if there is a legal submission to be made which is
18 normally the province of Mr. Robinson, I can't understand why it's being
19 put to this witness.
20 JUDGE KWON: Could you help us in that regard, Mr. Robinson.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. There are some questions,
22 actually only two, that I really believe very important that this witness
23 be asked concerning Dr. Karadzic and the issue of what did he know and
24 when did he know it, which to me is most important issue in the
25 Srebrenica part of the case. And Dr. Karadzic, when we discussed it, he
1 is uncomfortable asking these questions sometimes himself. I have to
2 tell you that frequently we disagree about whether he should be defending
3 the Serb people, as he likes to do, or defending himself, as I think he
4 should do. This is one issue where he -- we -- I felt that there are
5 some questions that would really assist him in defending himself, and I
6 think he feels more comfortable if I put those questions to the witness.
7 JUDGE MORRISON: I know I've said it before, but I can't resist
8 saying it again: The Serb people are not on trial, Serbian culture is
9 not on trial. So with the greatest of respect, your view, Mr. Robinson,
10 as to the object of the trial is preferable. I just find the concept of
11 Dr. Karadzic being shy is not immediately easy to encompass.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, did you say two topics? Two
14 MR. ROBINSON: Two questions, yes.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said, this is for the purpose of
17 the transcript, that sometimes I give priority to moral issues rather
18 than to legal ones. It wasn't that I put moral questions. And that is
19 why it is difficult to advise me.
20 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Robinson, the two questions that you have in
21 mind that you want to ask, would it be possible for you to put those
22 words -- to put your words in Dr. Karadzic's mouth so that the question,
23 the very question that you want to ask, he would ask?
24 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. I can easily do that. I have them written
25 down. I can hand him the piece of paper and he can do that.
1 JUDGE BAIRD: If this would not be a problem, would it be
3 MR. ROBINSON: It would be possible, as far as I'm concerned.
4 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: That would resolve everything.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Mr. Djurdjevic, in the course of our meeting, in the course of
8 your stay in Pale and Republika Srpska, did you have any information
9 according to which prisoners from Srebrenica should be killed or
10 according to which prisoners from Srebrenica were killed?
11 A. As I've already testified, during that visit during July 1995, I
12 do not recall any knowledge of crimes being committed of any kind, of the
13 prisoners being executed or the civilians. These are the allegations and
14 charges of which I became aware after the fact.
15 Q. Thank you. And my second question now. Given what you knew
16 about me, given what you think about me, would you say that I wanted to
17 inflict harm on innocent victims, that I wanted innocent victims to be
18 killed, prisoners, civilians, and so forth?
19 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 MR. TIEGER: I object to that question. That goes well beyond
22 the province of any witness, particularly a fact witness offering, sort
23 of, speculations about the inner workings of -- and possibilities or
24 potentialities of the accused with respect to crimes. And maybe if
25 that's going to be the rule, maybe we are going to start asking questions
1 of witnesses who have encountered Dr. Karadzic in other circumstances
2 about what they think, based on what they know, if he's capable of such
3 crimes. I'm sure those questions would be objected to, and I'm sure
4 those questions would be sustained.
5 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I think the question he intended
6 was: Did he have any inkling from his visit to Pale on the 13th and 14th
7 of July, 1995, that Dr. Karadzic favoured the commission of any such
8 crimes, and I think he could answer that.
9 MR. TIEGER: That was asked and answered earlier in respect of --
10 at page 28.
11 JUDGE KWON: Page 28.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it's now been correctly
13 interpreted "inclined," whereas my question was not properly interpreted.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Just a second.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The Chamber will allow the question as
17 reformulated by Mr. Robinson.
18 Do you remember the question, Mr. Djurdjevic?
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do, and my answer is based on everything I
20 have known about Dr. Karadzic and my opinions I've formed on him, and
21 specifically what I have seen and witnessed on July 13th and 14th, 1995,
22 in my visits there in Bosnia, I cannot conceive a circumstance where
23 Dr. Karadzic would be party to any such crimes.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies. I
25 have no further questions.
1 Thank you, Mr. Djurdjevic.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger, do you have re-examination?
3 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, Mr. President, one moment.
4 [Prosecution counsel confer]
5 Re-examination by Mr. Tieger:
6 Q. Mr. Djurdjevic, let me return to a page reference that I made
7 just a moment ago. That was at page 28, where you indicated in response
8 to a question about your impressions, Dr. Karadzic and his policy, that
9 they were formed in part about the fact that you heard Dr. Karadzic --
10 that your answer was, "On the contrary, I heard you condemn any acts of
11 violence against your enemies" was part of the answer.
12 And I wanted to ask you this question: Did you ever hear
13 Dr. Karadzic personally or via other sources condemn the murder of
14 thousands of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in July of 1995?
15 A. Mr. Tieger, as I've just said, at the time I was with
16 Dr. Karadzic, I was not aware of any murders of either prisoners or
17 civilians. I hadn't learned about these allegations only after I had
18 left Bosnia.
19 Q. I heard at that answer, sir, and I certainly appreciate that. My
20 question is slightly different. You testified about hearing Dr. Karadzic
21 condemn crimes which you indicated as part of your basis for forming your
22 impression of him. I'm asking if you ever heard him condemn crimes in
23 Srebrenica and specifically the murder of thousands of Bosnian Muslims?
24 A. Do you mean subsequently to July 1995?
25 Q. Correct.
1 A. No, I have not.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. No further questions.
3 Questioned by the Court:
4 JUDGE KWON: You referred to -- Mr. Djurdjevic, to
5 order number 7. Did you, yourself, have the opportunity to read it at a
6 later stage, directive number 7?
7 A. No. I still have no idea what it was.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 A. Lucky number 7, but I don't know. It's purely speculation.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Very well. Unless my colleagues have
11 questions for you, you are -- yes, Mr. --
12 THE WITNESS: May I just say something?
13 JUDGE KWON: We usually do not hear from the witness but ...
14 THE WITNESS: I just wanted to, first of all, say, to commend you
15 for the work you are doing here, and I hope that you realise that the
16 work that's being done in this courtroom goes well beyond the Balkans,
17 and if the full truth and reconciliation can take place in this
18 perennially troubled region, it could serve as a model for conflict
19 resolution elsewhere in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Somalia. And it's my
20 hope and prayer when your work is done, that that's the legacy that you
21 leave behind.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Djurdjevic. On behalf of this
23 Chamber as well as the Tribunal as a whole, I would like to thank you for
24 your coming to The Hague to give it. Now, you're free to go.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
1 [The witness withdrew]
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger. Please call your next witness.
3 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me one moment, Mr. President.
4 [Prosecution counsel confer]
5 MR. TIEGER: It seems that whoever was bringing the next witness
6 scheduled it on the basis of the allocated times. I understand the
7 witness won't be arriving until approximately 10 after 1.00. I might
8 note that meanwhile, Mr. Mitchell might be able to raise a small matter
9 that he intended to, in any event.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes, Mr. Mitchell.
11 MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, Mr. President. You recall last night
12 with Mr. Manning there was some discussion about a particular blindfold
13 and whether or not it had a knot to it, and --
14 JUDGE KWON: On which he indicated arrow or something.
15 MR. MITCHELL: Correct. The proper full-sized version of that
16 has now been uploaded into e-court and given 65 ter 23646. So I'd like
17 to tender that if I can.
18 JUDGE KWON: Could we upload it?
19 MR. MITCHELL: Certainly. Now, while that's coming up,
20 Mr. President, Mr. Manning actually said at transcript page 25878 he was
21 being asked questions about -- my apologies, 23647.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this stay here, too, so that
23 we can see that it's on the forehead, not covering the eyes.
24 MR. MITCHELL: Well, what I was going to come to,
25 Mr. President --
1 JUDGE KWON: Just -- yes. Could we rotate 270 degrees. Yes,
2 Mr. Mitchell.
3 MR. MITCHELL: I was going to suggest, Mr. President, that
4 we tender -- there's actually four items I'd like to tender, this shot in
5 the grave, the photo from the morgue, which is 23647 --
6 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we look at them one by one.
7 MR. MITCHELL: Certainly. So this is --
8 JUDGE KWON: 23646?
9 MR. MITCHELL: Correct. So if we can now go to 23647. If we
10 can -- this is the photo that we looked at yesterday. We can rotate it
11 back 90 degrees to the left. That's the angle we were looking at.
12 JUDGE KWON: The first picture was taken where?
13 MR. MITCHELL: In the grave itself.
14 JUDGE KWON: And then this was taken at the morgue.
15 MR. MITCHELL: Correct. So the first photo was taken by
16 Mr. Peccerelli and his team. This photo was taken at the morgue by
17 Dr. Clark and his team.
18 Now, the next photo is 23648, and this is the material once it's
19 been taken off and washed.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 MR. MITCHELL: And the last one is -- and this was something that
22 Mr. Manning was specifically asked to see, which was the autopsy report,
23 to see its description, and that's 23649. And this was one of the
24 autopsies that was overseen by Dr. John Clark. You can see both in the
25 summary and also in the body it describes the strip of cloth that was
1 knotted behind and there was some issue - this is how it first came up -
2 whether there was a knot or not behind the head, and Mr. Manning actually
3 asked to see the autopsy report.
4 JUDGE KWON: Could we upload two at the same time, the first two
5 photos, one taken from the grave and one taken at the morgue. I'm not
6 sure if it is possible. It's possible.
7 MR. MITCHELL: That's 23646 and -647.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Karadzic. We rotate it.
11 MR. MITCHELL: And just to be clear, Mr. President, the reason we
12 know this is the same body is you can see the LZ 01-596 tag on both
14 JUDGE KWON: 596. As Mr. Karadzic indicated, that is strip is on
15 his forehead in the grave, but was it changed at the morgue?
16 MR. MITCHELL: Mr. President, I think Mr. Manning and everybody
17 testified that -- all these experts testified that these artefacts would
18 move during transport --
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 MR. MITCHELL: And that's why they were photographed and logged
21 at every stage. So, you know, these photos explain exactly where the
22 blindfold was in the grave, where it was at the morgue, and its
23 description. I can't offer you any more than that.
24 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Fair enough.
25 Any objections to admission of these four items?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, apart from the fact that I
2 think that the autopsy findings don't relate to this, because we are
3 looking for a ribbon that was sewn or was of a piece, not something that
4 was tied into a knot, because the one -- the findings in the autopsy
5 refer to a ribbon that was tied into a knot.
6 JUDGE KWON: It's different. It's a separate issue from
7 admitting it, but just given the time we still have, could we take a look
8 at the autopsy report, 23649. I think there's a passage that he was
10 MR. MITCHELL: I think if we go to -- that's the summary on the
11 front page. You can go to page 5 in e-court, which are the handwritten
12 notes of the pathologist who did the examination. And down the bottom of
13 the page under "Blindfold," that's the description that was given at the
14 time the body was on the autopsy table.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. So those four items will be admitted
16 separately or in one item. They are separated. We'll admit them all.
17 MR. MITCHELL: They're separate items, yes.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we admit them all.
19 MR. MITCHELL: Thank you.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 23646 will be Exhibit P4519;
21 65 ter 23647 will be Exhibit P4520; 65 ter 23648 will be Exhibit P4521;
22 and 65 ter 23649 will be Exhibit P4522.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Shall we adjourn for 15 minutes? That's
24 the best course of action.
25 We will resume at quarter past.
1 --- Break taken at 12.58 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 1.15 p.m.
3 [The witness entered court]
4 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, sir. If you could take the solemn
6 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
7 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
8 WITNESS: PETAR SKRBIC
9 [Witness answered through interpreter]
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please make yourself comfortable.
11 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Examination by Mr. Tieger:
14 Q. Good afternoon, General Skrbic.
15 A. Good afternoon.
16 Q. General, just to let you know, we have approximately 30 minutes
17 left before we have to adjourn, so I don't want you to be startled by the
18 what may otherwise seem like the abrupt conclusion of today as we're
19 going through your testimony, but we'll try to cover as much ground as we
21 First of all, would you state your full name for the record,
23 A. My name is Petar Skrbic.
24 Q. Thank you. And is it correct, sir, that you have appeared before
25 this Tribunal previously and, in particular, in September of 2007, from
1 the 17th to the 19th, when you testified in the case of Popovic et al.?
2 A. Yes, that's correct.
3 MR. TIEGER: I'd like to call up 65 ter 22391.
4 Q. And while that is being called up, ask you, sir, whether you have
5 had the opportunity to review your testimony in the Popovic case.
6 A. Yes, Mr. Tieger. I listened to the CD, and I heard all of it.
7 Q. I understand that you have certain clarifications you wanted to
8 make to that that you brought to our attention and that we memorialised
9 and also provided to the Defence. If I can just cite for them you and if
10 you can confirm if it's an accurate understanding of the corrections or
11 clarifications you wanted to make.
12 The first was at -- although I know you made them with respect to
13 the audio, it is reflected at page 15465 of the transcript where you
14 corrected the date when you joined the VRS, which was 17 December 1993,
15 not 17 November 1993; correct?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. The second is that, and this is reflected at page 15521, that you
18 used the word "responsibility," but did not use the word "responsibility"
19 in a legal sense but instead in the sense of a job or duty or role; is
20 that also correct?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. And more specifically, as indicated in the supplemental
23 information sheet, that appears or is reflected at page 15521, line 23,
24 and 15522, line 6.
25 Moving on to the next one, this is reflected at page 15540. You
1 explained that the office for co-operation with foreign military
2 representatives was not in the cabinet of the Main Staff. It was
3 actually under the immediate control of the commander of the Main Staff
4 but separate from the cabinet. And is that also correct?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. The next one is reflected at page 15545 at line 6, and you
7 explained that Tomo Kovac was not minister of defence. He was minister
8 of the interior. Is that also a correction you wanted to make?
9 A. Yes, that's right, exactly.
10 Q. Next is reflected at pages 15475, beginning at line 24 and
11 continuing on to page 15476, line 1. That regards the 12 July 1995
12 document, which is 65 ter 01887 in this case, and you explained that that
13 document is actually addressed to the -- addressed to the
14 Secretariat of Defence of Zvornik, not originating from there, and that
15 would be clear if you could see the Ministry of Defence header. Is that
16 also correct?
17 A. That is true as well.
18 Q. And finally at page 15468, line 23, to page 15469 line 2, you
19 wanted to clarify a matter of who your superior was at any given time,
20 and you explained that from 17 December 1993 to 24 July 1994, your
21 immediate superior was Grujo Boric; and from 24 July 1994 until after the
22 end of the war, your immediate superior was the head of the Main Staff,
23 General Ratko Mladic. And is that also correct?
24 A. I would like to clarify one thing. He was not the chief
25 [Realtime transcript read in error "commander"] of the Main Staff but the
1 commander [Realtime transcript read in error "chief"] of the Main Staff.
2 The rest of the information is accurate.
3 Q. Thank you. General, with those clarifications, can you confirm
4 that 65 ter 22391, your testimony in the Popovic case, accurately
5 reflects your statement at the time and is accurate information and that
6 if asked about those same matters here in court, you would provide the
7 same information?
8 A. Precisely.
9 Q. Thank you, sir.
10 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I would tender 22391 and the
11 associated exhibits.
12 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Robinson?
13 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE KWON: We'll first admit the transcript in the Popovic et
15 al. case. Give the number.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P4523, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: A few questions with regard to associated exhibits.
18 65 ter number 1886 -- oh, yes. No problem.
19 What was the point of 15442, instruction about contacts with
20 international organisation? It's transcript page 15543. Very well. All
21 of the associated exhibits will be admitted into evidence and be given
22 numbers in due course by the Registry.
23 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, I would like to call your
25 attention to 30925B which is an intercept that should be marked for
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That's correct.
3 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I will read a very brief
5 summary and then move on to some additional questions. General, these
6 summaries are not intended to capture the totality of the information
7 provided in your testimony but just a brief picture of what that was.
8 In 1995, the witness was assistant commander for organisation,
9 mobilisation, and personnel of the Main Staff in the VRS. His -- he was
10 directly subordinated to General Ratko Mladic. He testified about the
11 structure and organisation of the Main Staff and of aspects of the VRS.
12 The witness also testified that on the evening of 11 July 1995, he
13 received an order that originated from General Mladic to organise buses
14 and, among other things, conveyed to the Ministry of Defence a request
15 for buses to be provided also by the Ministry of the Defence. He spoke
16 with Momcilo -- Mojmilo Kovacevic of the Ministry of Defence by telephone
17 and then in writing subsequently on 12 July. The witness also testified
18 about a meeting with the accused he attended on 14 July 1995.
19 Q. General, the Trial Chamber has before it your Popovic testimony
20 which details your background and your various positions within the
21 military. As you explained in Popovic, your work on the Main Staff
22 beginning in 1994 was as assistant commander for organisation,
23 mobilisation and personnel.
24 Now, you further explained at transcript 14468 that the
25 organisation had basically been established by the time you arrived. You
1 explained at 15468 what mobilisation entailed and the extent to which the
2 Ministry of Defence was involved in responsibility for call-up papers and
3 so on. And you also explained that personnel entailed, among other
4 things, the education of officers, assignments, preparation of documents
5 for promotion, reassignment, decorations, and so on.
6 So I'd just like to show you one document perhaps by way of
7 understanding at least some aspects of your personnel duties, and if I
8 could quickly call up 65 ter 03739.
9 General, this is a document from you dated December 25, 1994,
10 which was pursuant to the order of the commander of the VRS. That's
11 General Mladic; right?
12 A. That is correct.
13 Q. And this -- is it correct that this document concerns staffing or
14 bringing to establishment the 10th Sabotage Detachment of the Main Staff
15 of Republika Srpska; that you are pursuing the transfer of six soldiers,
16 two of whom are from the Hercegovina Corps, four are from the Drina Corps
17 to be transferred to the 10th Sabotage Detachment?
18 A. Yes. It concerned the bringing up to establishment levels of the
19 10th Sabotage Detachment pursuant to the order of the commander of the
20 VRS. So it concerned staffing levels. The people mentioned in the
21 document were being transferred to the 10th Sabotage Detachment.
22 Q. And under whose -- what -- was the 10th Sabotage Detachment under
23 a corps or was it -- it refers here to the 10th Sabotage Detachment of
24 the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska. Is the -- does that mean that
25 the 10th Sabotage Detachment is directly under General Mladic's command?
1 A. Yes, that is correct.
2 Q. And as the order indicates, it says "pursuant to the order of the
3 commander." Is it correct that you received that order and then
4 implemented it for the commander?
5 A. Precisely. I refer to that particular number.
6 Q. Thank you, General.
7 MR. TIEGER: I would tender that document, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted as next Prosecution
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P4524, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, could I draw your attention to
12 transcript page today 73, lines -- lines 15 to 17. In answer to your
13 question whether Mladic was his immediate superior, was the head of
14 Main Staff, the witness was recorded to answer like this, but I'm not
15 sure whether it is correct.
16 MR. TIEGER: That's a very good catch because I understood it to
17 be -- his clarification to be a bit different as well.
18 JUDGE KWON: So your answer is like this, General, so could you
20 "I would like to clarify one thing. He was not commander of the
21 Main Staff but Chief of the Main Staff. The rest of the information is
23 There must be something wrong. Do you remember answering that
25 A. Yes, Your Honour, I do. I simply switched the term. He was not
1 the Chief of the Main Staff but the commander of the Main Staff.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
4 Q. General, I believe that some of your previous answers suggested
5 this, but I want to clarify both your role and the role of other
6 assistant commanders. So could -- could you as assistant commander take
7 steps to deal with the corps, the Drina Corps, the Hercegovina Corps, the
8 1st Krajina Corps, and so on, could you take those steps without the
9 approval of the commander of the Main Staff?
10 A. No, Mr. Tieger.
11 Q. If you found that someone was not following correct procedure or
12 not following the orders that you had made pursuant to orders of the
13 commander, did you directly deal with those persons or did you report it
14 to the commander of the Main Staff?
15 A. When there were problems, we reported them to the commander of
16 the Main Staff, General Mladic.
17 Q. And you alluded to this earlier, that assistant commanders
18 implement -- well, you implemented the orders of the commander of the
19 Main Staff. Is it also true of the other assistant commanders in the
20 Main Staff?
21 A. As far as I am familiar with their competencies, I believe the
22 same practice was followed by the other assistants.
23 Q. And would you say and have you said that assistant commanders
24 were experts at implementing General Mladic's orders?
25 A. Yes. That is what I said.
1 Q. And finally, at the top of this hierarchy of command and control,
2 who is at the very top of that, of that hierarchy, starting at the bottom
3 with the lowliest soldier up to the top level of exercising command and
4 control? No, just in -- in the overall structure of Republika Srpska.
5 A. In the Army of Republika Srpska, the army commander was the
6 commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, General Ratko Mladic. However,
7 at the helm of the armed forces of the VRS, which includes the army and
8 members of the Ministry of the Interior, that is to say the police, is
9 the supreme commander, the president of the republic,
10 Dr. Radovan Karadzic. So the first strategic level is the republican
11 president. The second level is the command of the Main Staff. The third
12 level were the corps commanders, and so on and so forth, down to the
13 simple soldiers. That was the hierarchical structure.
14 Q. Thank you, General. Let me turn now to something you testified
15 about in the Popovic case, and you indicated that in July of 1995, you
16 were posted at the rear command post in Han Pijesak, and discussed at
17 page 15468 of the Popovic transcript -- excuse me. That was discussed at
18 page 15468. Let me perhaps assist by calling up 65 ter 01913.
19 This is a document that was discussed during the course of your
20 testimony in Popovic, and you -- and let me just indicate what the
21 document is quickly. It's a 12 July 1995 document directed to the
22 Ministry of Defence that indicates with the utmost urgency order of the
23 Sarajevo and Zvornik Ministry of Defence secretariats to mobilise through
24 various municipalities all buses available. At least 50 buses need to be
25 mobilised and must be sent to Bratunac sports stadium by a certain time
1 on the 12th of July at the latest.
2 Now, General, you explained at pages -- at page 15472 of the
3 Popovic testimony that this resulted from your telephone call the evening
4 before with -- first with someone from the Main Staff and then with the
5 Ministry of Defence, and explained also that the order to do so emanated
6 from General Mladic. That was at page 15473. I'd like to ask you just a
7 few questions before we break about that.
8 First of all, with respect to the phone call that you received
9 from the Main Staff, can you tell us approximately when you received it
10 on July 11th?
11 A. As far as I remember, it was late in the evening that I received
12 the phone call.
13 Q. Okay. So on page 1873 -- let me ask you for some clarification
14 on that. I know at page 18731 of your testimony in the Tolimir case, you
15 refer to the afternoon and then most probably the evening hours. So is
16 it correct we're talking about sometime in the -- not necessarily the
17 afternoon but sometime around evening?
18 A. Yes. That was a better way to put it.
19 Q. And did -- did -- is what you received, was that a request or an
20 order? In other words, were you instructed or ordered to take steps with
21 respect to this -- to the buses?
22 A. I received an order. It was conveyed to me as an order.
23 Q. And I'm not asking you who conveyed the order, but from whom did
24 that order come? Who was the source of that order?
25 A. The commander of the Main Staff.
1 Q. And can you tell the Court how you knew that the order --
2 understanding you didn't speak directly with General Mladic, how you knew
3 that the order came from General Mladic.
4 A. Mr. Tieger, in principle, I know that such orders could not
5 arrive from anyone other than the commander of the Main Staff,
6 General Mladic. That was one thing. Another thing, it was a phone call,
7 and it was the specific phone which only received phone calls from the
8 commander. I believe in the Tolimir case I stated it was line number
9 250. Therefore, that was sufficient indication that the order arrived
10 from the commander of the Main Staff. If you're interested in any names,
11 I'll gladly explain.
12 Q. And finally General, did the person who called you from extension
13 250 inform you that it was a decision by the commander, General Mladic?
14 A. Yes, that's right.
15 Q. Thank you, sir.
16 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I note the time.
17 Q. General, as I indicated we were going to adjourn at approximately
18 this time, so I will leave it with that last question.
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll rise for today and resume tomorrow
20 at 9.00.
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
22 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 8th day
23 of March, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.