1 Friday, 20 April 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Good morning, Mr. Butler.
7 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.
8 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. I just
11 need a minute. [Microphone not activated]
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
13 JUDGE KWON: Microphone, please.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.
15 Good morning to everyone.
16 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
17 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Butler.
18 A. Good morning, sir.
19 Q. If you agree, with your leave, I'd like to deal with
20 July [as interpreted] 1995 -- or, rather, with the year 1995 now. Let's
21 see what your understanding was with regard to the year 1995, what
22 conclusions you draw about that year.
23 Are you aware of the fact that in Sarajevo the Muslim side
24 launched a large-scale offensive on the 15th [as interpreted] of June,
1 A. Yes, sir. It was one of many offensives that the Bosnian Muslims
2 had launched that year. One was in the zone of the 2nd Corps, one was in
3 the zone of the 1st Corps.
4 Q. Thank you. Could we see 1D2985. Perhaps it has been admitted
5 already. 1D2985.
6 Have you ever seen this document? Did you come across this
7 document on the 17th of July? According to this document UNPROFOR and
8 its services provided information on a large-scale offensive in the
9 vicinity of Sarajevo, and you can see the contents on page number 1.
10 Have a look at that. And on page number 2, you can see other details
11 about this.
12 So you're aware of this. You knew about it, didn't you?
13 A. Yes, sir, in the sense again I didn't see this specific document
14 or I don't recall seeing it, but certainly I'm aware of the fact that at
15 that particular time the Bosnian 1st Corps was launching major military
16 operations out of the area.
17 THE ACCUSED: I see Mr. Nicholls.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic. Excuse me. Just that
20 the document is dated 17 June. Mr. Karadzic said -- or the transcript
21 says 17 July.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted? I
24 see it's already been admitted.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Did you come across any documents according to which the
2 28th Division under Naser Oric's command, although he wasn't in the
3 enclave, launched large-scale offensives against the Serbian territories
4 in order, amongst other things, to assist the 1st Corps in Sarajevo?
5 A. Yes, sir. I mean, I wouldn't categorise them as large-scale
6 offensives. However, I am aware, and I have seen documents that reflect
7 that the 28th Division was ordered by 2nd Corps to conduct raids and
8 other attacks out of the enclave for the primary purpose of engaging the
9 Bosnian Serb military forces in that area in order to prevent them from
10 being transferred from the Srebrenica area to the Sarajevo area.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we see 1D3900,
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. As you can see here, the 2nd Corps is congratulating the
15 28th Division command, and in particular the 285th Brigade, on
16 successfully having undertaken action which aided in raising the blockade
17 of Sarajevo and so on and so forth.
18 In paragraph number four it says:
19 "Take all steps to prevent people from leaving the area of
20 Srebrenica and Zepa. Which for you at this moment is one of the most
21 important task if not the most important one," et cetera.
22 So it says that the aggressor forces, the Serb forces control the
23 Caparde and Kladanj axis or roads. Is this what you had in mind and were
24 you aware of -- of this matter, of the fact that they were congratulated?
25 A. Yes, sir. I believe -- I believe I saw this document previously,
1 I believe, if I'm correct, during the Tolimir trial.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could it be admitted?
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2233, Your Honours.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now see
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Would you agree that here the president of the municipality, of
9 the Muslim municipality, Suljic, Osman Suljic, agreed to launching a
10 campaign on the 1st of July, 1995. He said he agreed to that and that he
11 would accept everything that was stated in his name.
12 A. I'm not sure what you refer to in the phrase of "launching a
13 campaign" on 1st July. I assume given that we're talking about
14 psychological and propaganda activities, we're talking about some form of
15 a media or propaganda campaign, but certainly it is an endorsement by
16 that individual of whatever that is.
17 Q. Thank you. And this psychological and propaganda activity was
18 directed against the Serbs and against the United Nations. Isn't that
20 A. Yes, sir. That's what it says.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could it be adopted --
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2234, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now see D1062.
1 D1062. It's already been admitted.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. Butler, do we agree that this is dated the 30th of June?
4 It's an operations report on what they did in order to help with the
5 raising of the blockade of Sarajevo. They eliminated 13 Chetniks or,
6 rather, Serbs. They confiscated weapons. Under item 2 it says they
7 eliminated 7 Chetniks, obtained a significant amount of weapons. Three,
8 it says in order to divert enemy forces from the Sarajevo theatre and
9 stretch them out towards Srebrenica and Zepa, a number of successful acts
10 of sabotage were carried out on the 26th of June, 1995, at the following
11 locations: In the area of Han Pijesak and Vlasenica municipalities, 20
12 to 40 kilometres deep inside territory temporarily occupied by the enemy;
13 Visnjica settlement and Bajta [phoen] stronghold, Crna Rijeka area. Do
14 we agree that in Crna Rijeka area the Main Staff of the VRS was there?
15 In fact, the man staff of the VRS was located in Crna Rijeka; isn't that
17 A. To get to both of your questions, yes, I agree with your
18 interpretation of the document as to what it's describing. It is
19 recounting a series of raids by members of the 28th Division against
20 Bosnian Serb military installations or other villages, and I also agree
21 that Crna Rijeka was the headquarters of the VRS Main Staff.
22 Q. Thank you. Have a look at paragraph 3. It says that 40 Serbs
23 were killed there and they have information according to which the Serbs
24 had a total of 71 soldiers who were killed. One was captured and
25 several -- a certain amount of livestock was also confiscated. And in
1 the village of Visnjica, if you remember this, they admitted that
2 civilians were victims. Do you remember the name of that village,
3 Visnjica, and that date, the 26th of June?
4 A. Yes, sir. Again I am familiar with that. Not all of the
5 specifics, but I am familiar with that particular reference being
6 mentioned in a number of Bosnian Serb military documents.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Excuse me, Your Honour, if there's questions on
9 this document I wonder if Mr. Butler could also see page 2 and see who
10 signed it and get an idea of the whole document.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Butler, do you remember that when Naser Oric was absent,
13 Ramiz Becirevic replaced him as staff commander?
14 A. Yes, sir. He was the acting commander of the 28th Infantry
16 Q. Thank you. Under item 4 you can see that it mentions how the
17 Serbs, their enemy, ceased to send forces to the surroundings of
18 Sarajevo, and they attracted some forces from Zepa and Srebrenica, and
19 then it mentions how the fighting continued, in what manner fire was
21 A. Yes. I mean, paragraph 4 relates a number of particular issues
22 that they were talking about, and as well as some of the things that were
23 occurring to them. So this is just simply a recap of the overall
25 Q. Thank you. So do you remember when that order was issued, the
1 order for combat that we had a look at yesterday, and we were wondering
2 whether it was a matter of an operation or of combat. Was it on the 2nd
3 of July?
4 A. Yes, sir. That was one of two orders that was issued on the 2nd
5 of July, 1995, pertaining to Krivaja 95.
6 Q. Thank you. Could we now see 1D5541, and I apologise if it has
7 already been admitted, but this is the number that I have. I apologise
8 to everyone, because the translation of this document has not yet been
9 completed. I'll read it out and the interpreters will follow.
10 This is the Presidency of the transitional Municipal Council of
11 Srebrenica, dated the 9th of July. It says: "Urgent." It's being sent
12 to Alija Izetbegovic, Haris Silajdzic, Rasim Delic the Supreme Commander,
13 and Sead Delic the 2nd Corps commander, and it says the conclusions from
14 the session of the Presidency, the Presidency of the municipality, with
15 regard to the critical situation that has developed in the enclave.
16 "On the basis of information from the 28th Division command, our
17 lines have fallen in the southern part of the enclave in the Pusmulici
18 sector. This has created the conditions allowing the aggressor to
19 rapidly enter the town itself. Once that line fell, the population from
20 Slapovici and Pusmulici moved out. There were about 4.000 of them."
21 Mr. Butler, do you agree that these 4.000 people were previously
22 included in the number of the population in the enclave, because this
23 transfer of the population prior to the fighting was something that took
24 place within the enclave itself?
25 A. It is my understanding that these 4.000 people were already
1 residing in the enclave at the time this occurred.
2 Q. Thank you. And then the paragraph goes on to say that:
3 "There's general chaos in the town and the displaced -- or the
4 refugee population is on the streets. The shelling from a number of
5 directions which continues. No one knows how many wounded and dead there
6 are in the town. The Muslims from Podrinje are threatened with a
7 terrible catastrophe, and this is why we're begging you to help the
8 people of Podrinje. Also, organise rapidly a session of the government
9 and of the Presidency. The UNPROFOR forces in Srebrenica are panicking
10 and trying to protect themselves. They are withdrawing towards the camp
11 in Srebrenica, whereas one --"
12 MR. NICHOLLS: I can save Mr. Karadzic some time in reading. We
13 can bring up a translation. Mr. Reid's found it.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
16 JUDGE KWON: Shall we put it on the ELMO.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, so I don't have to read it
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. So they're asking the government and the Presidency to inform
21 them by 1400 hours on the 9th of July, 1995, and it's signed by
22 Osman Suljic, president of the interim Municipal Council of Srebrenica.
23 Have you already come across this document?
24 A. I'm not sure whether I -- I mean, I -- I understand the
25 circumstances and am familiar with that. I just don't recall if I've
1 ever seen this particular document before.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could it be admitted.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2235, Your Honours.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now see
6 1D5540. And would Mr. Nicholls be so kind as to produce the translation
7 again if he has one -- apparently, we do have a translation of this
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Yes. On the very same day, on the 9th, this was drafted a little
11 later, probably, because he requested that a report be submitted by
12 2.00 p.m. Now here it says that there are no forward food reserves apart
13 from the fact that the army has food reserves for one week.
14 Where did the army obtain such food reserves, food reserves for
15 one week? Would you agree that humanitarian aid in this case has been
16 taken advantage of, that it's been put to the wrong use?
17 A. Yes, sir, I do agree. And I believe that there's been evidence,
18 certainly in other cases I've been involved in, which reflects that the
19 28th Infantry Division did divert some of the UNPROFOR and other
20 international aid to be used for the purposes of the 28th Infantry
22 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that on that day it was in the
23 evening after 22.20, General Krstic informed the Main Staff that he had
24 the opportunity of liberating Srebrenica, of entering Srebrenica, and
25 half an hour later Tolimir sent a telegram back to him with my approval.
1 So it was only on the 9th in the evening that the Serbian forces
2 considered the possibility of entering Srebrenica. Would you agree with
3 that? Do you remember those documents? Perhaps I don't need to produce
5 A. Yes, sir, I do recall the documents, and I -- again I agree with
6 your assertion. The base Krivaja 95 operations plan does not reflect the
7 objective of taking the town of Srebrenica, and I believe that based on
8 the documents that you've just noted that the goal of taking the town of
9 Srebrenica was arrived at, as you've described, on the evening of 9
10 April [sic] 1995.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could it be admitted.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2236, Your Honours.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry. Sorry. Just for the transcript it says
15 9 April 1995.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It should read 9 of July.
17 THE WITNESS: Hope I didn't misspeak. Yes. 9 July, sir.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you. Now, if you agree, I'll skip a few days to the 10th
20 and the 11th, because your testimony and report is more important for the
21 events that happened after those dates, from the 13th onwards; isn't that
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see 65 ter document 35042,
24 please. And the number of intercept is 0415-0111. 1011, and the date is
25 the 12th of July.
1 JUDGE KWON: This is of 998 pages document. Could you tell the
2 page number.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The number I have is 0415/1011, but
4 I'll find the page number now. In the meantime could we see the
5 intercept that concerns the conversation between myself and
6 General Zivanovic, and the date is the 8th of July.
7 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry. No objection. Mr. Reid says that the page
8 Mr. Karadzic is looking for for the intercept, this one, is 888.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Correct.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you very much for
11 your help. Can we have that page called up then, please.
12 JUDGE KWON: But we don't have English translation for it.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. No. 0415-1011. That would be
14 the right number. So this isn't it.
15 12th of June -- well, never mind. While we're looking for that,
16 could we please have the intercept from the 8th of July.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: That's tab 26, if Mr. Butler needs a hard copy.
18 JUDGE KWON: Do you have exhibit number, Mr. Nicholls?
19 MR. NICHOLLS: 4484.
20 JUDGE KWON: Where Tri Sise is mentioned.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes. I believe that, if I'm correct, that's the
22 recording, not intercept that Mr. Karadzic is referring to.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, precisely.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Butler, do you agree that this is a conversation in which I
1 wish to receive a bit more information from General Zivanovic in terms of
2 how things have been developing?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Do you agree that means that I did not find the regular combat
5 reports to be sufficient?
6 A. Well, sir, what I would say is in the regular combat report come
7 once every 24 hours. Obviously, as you're aware, the situation around
8 Srebrenica was dramatically changing in a very dynamic manner every
9 several hours, so it's unsurprising that you would - and again, as I've
10 testified previously - call to the relevant military commander in order
11 to fully apprise yourself of the situation as it was occurring.
12 Q. Thank you. Did you find this part here that I'm asking how the
13 situation is evolving, I'm asking whether they're satisfied, is that the
14 essence of this conversation?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in
16 Serbian now.
17 THE WITNESS: Well, that is the first part. The second part of
18 the conversation is that General Zivanovic uses this conversation as an
19 opportunity to raise with you the fact that he believes he, and in this
20 sense the Drina Corps because he's referring both to General Zivanovic
21 and, of course, his Chief of Staff, General Krstic, will need additional
22 forces to continue forward, and the second part of the discussion
23 reflects not only your awareness of what forces they're talking about but
24 the fact that they're currently deployed in other operations around
25 Sarajevo. So it is a two-part conversation in that regard.
1 Q. Thank you. Do you know that at the time shells were falling in
2 Pale? That's where I lived. That's where my daughter was getting
3 married around the middle of that month. Do you know that Pale is part
4 of Sarajevo and that we were in danger? We were in danger of being
5 overcome by the corps that had three or four times more soldiers than we
7 A. I am aware that Pale is often referred to as Serb Sarajevo. I
8 understand the military situation that was occurring in and around the
9 area. I did not know, and I do not know, whether or not artillery shells
10 fell on Pale as part of that.
11 Q. You certainly knew that before the war Pale was part of
12 metropolitan Sarajevo, one of the ten municipalities that it consisted
14 A. I take -- I take it that's the case. Prior to the war in this
15 respect, I mean, I don't -- I did know very little about how
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina was organised politically of that nature, so again I
17 take you at your word that Pale was -- was what it was part of.
18 Q. Thank you. Yes. Yes. We have it in English now towards the
19 bottom of the page. I am saying: "Tell me, will it continue tomorrow?"
20 Do you agree that I'm actually putting a question, not issuing an
21 order? In the English version it is the fifth or sixth or seventh line
22 from the bottom "Tell me, will it continue tomorrow?"
23 A. Well, sir, in the context of this conversation, you are both
24 requesting information and issuing orders. I mean, several lines above
25 that you issue the phrase "All right, General. Full speed ahead. Tell
1 Krstic to go full steam." So -- and in this conversation you are both
2 requesting information and receiving information as well as giving
4 Q. Wouldn't it be more correct to say that I was supporting their
5 decisions? First I receive information as to what it was that they had
6 decided from an operative and tactical point of view, and then I give
7 support; right?
8 A. In the context of how the operation existed at that time, and it
9 was written in the operations planned for Krivaja, the fact that the
10 military commanders would independently make the decisions with respect
11 to what axis of advance they wanted to utilise and what forces they would
12 be deploying that were already under their control, I agree. They were
13 advising you of what their intentions were, and then you were endorsing
14 them. They didn't -- they didn't have to advise you of what your --
15 their intentions were in this case, because they were already empowered
16 to conduct those operations. So they were keeping you informed, and you
17 were endorsing those actions.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Butler, where can we find the phrase "full speed
19 ahead" in this intercept.
20 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I believe I said -- I hope I said "full
21 steam ahead." If you -- from the bottom of the second page of the
22 English language translation it is ten lines up.
23 JUDGE KWON: Second page.
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
25 JUDGE KWON: Because you said above that line.
1 THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry. I got my pages mixed up. I was
2 looking at page 2 and it's ten lines up from the bottom, sir.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. So after all, it appears after that
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. That's right.
6 JUDGE KWON: "Will it continue."
7 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Thank you. After that, I say: "All right. I have heard
10 somewhere that they were fleeing, going somewhere." Do you agree that
11 this bit where I say "I've heard somewhere" means that they were not the
12 ones who informed me but that I happened to hear something somewhere?
13 A. Again, sir, all I can infer is what you've just said, that you
14 happened to hear something somewhere. I can't infer whether it was
15 through contacts with the military, and as I noted previously, you were
16 receiving information from the police forces as well as the RDB. So you
17 certainly had opportunities to hear information like that. Like I said,
18 all I can infer is that from some source you heard that.
19 Q. Thank you. Do you see the next part where I say -- actually, he
20 is saying something about Gvero and the public, and I say after that:
21 "All right. Have someone prepare these instructions for journalists, and
22 I am going to approve --" I don't know. I refer to the minister or
23 something. Well, you did notice all of this, didn't you, that it was
24 necessary to provide accurate information to journalists? Did you come
25 to that conclusion?
1 A. No, sir. In fact, when you take this intercept and couple it
2 with a document that I believe I discussed during my direct testimony,
3 the context of this discussion is providing information to Serbian
4 journalists in Vlasenica and Milici for the purpose of their transmission
5 on the airwaves because they understand that the Bosnian Muslims inside
6 the enclave monitor those news reports. And again, I look at this as
7 part of the propaganda portion of the military operation where the
8 discussion relates to seeking to create a climate among the Bosnian
9 Muslims that there is no need for them to fight. They can either flee or
10 surrender, and that is what I take this part of the conversation to be
11 because it does marry up with another document from -- that I -- that
12 chronologically comes down the line to discuss just that.
13 Q. Thank you. Do you remember whether the US Army allows enemy
14 journalists to get close to the front line, or is it CNN or somebody else
15 who receives favourable treatment and is allowed to report from the front
17 A. I -- I am certainly not an authority on -- on US military media
18 policies. I can't comment on that.
19 Q. Thank you. Could we now please take a look at -- actually, let
20 us try to see or establish or see what you established in relation to
21 prisoners of war. 35042 would be the 65 ter number, page 937.
22 I don't know if we have a translation. It's short anyway, so
23 I'll read it out to you.
24 Do you know -- or actually, did you see any of these intercepts
25 that the Croatian Secret Service recorded at this point in time?
1 MR. NICHOLLS: I believe we have this somewhere, Your Honour.
2 This looks familiar to me. I'll try to find it.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we should have. But in the meantime, could you
4 read it, Mr. Karadzic, given it is very short.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Please take a look at this. This is the 13th of July, 1995, at
8 "Colonel Ljubo Beara, Main Staff of the VRS is sending the
9 following to Kasaba, four buses, two trucks, and one trailer truck to
10 transport Muslim captives. They will be sent to the camp in Batkovici
11 where 'selection' will be carried out distinguishing between war
12 criminals and ordinary soldiers."
13 You will be able to find the English translation.
14 Did you know that Beara at 11.25 sent to Kasaba four buses, two
15 trucks, and one trailer truck along with this order showing his intention
16 to have the prisoners sent to Batkovici?
17 MR. NICHOLLS: D2197, Your Honours.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes. To the answer to your first question, I am
19 aware of this intercept. I am aware of what it says. However, I'm also
20 aware that it did not happen.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Oh. Mr. Butler, let's take it step-by-step, minute by minute if
23 necessary. Let us see when the situation changed.
24 In your opinion, how many prisoners were there in Nova Kasaba?
25 Actually, not in your opinion. What was it that you established, not
1 taking into account statements or, rather, the bragging of those who were
2 taking prisoners. How many people were there at the stadium in
3 Nova Kasaba on the basis of aerial images and so on?
4 A. I have never done a calculation as to looking at that block of
5 individuals in Nova Kasaba and trying to make a determination as to how
6 many people that actually might be at that time. I don't have the
7 necessary skills to do that. I'm not sure whether the investigation has
8 or has not done that. My accounting for the number of people at various
9 locations is on the basis of the intercepted communications by
10 individuals who were dealing with those issues.
11 Q. Thank you. If we were to call up an image, if you don't take my
12 word for this, we're going to call up an image. I did the counting.
13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Could we move into private session
14 very briefly.
15 [Private session]
23 [Open session]
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. So if you do not trust me, then we can call up an aerial image.
2 The 13th of July at 1430 hours at the stadium in Nova Kasaba there is a
3 group of prisoners of war. Eleven lines times 7, less than 100, and on
4 the sides there are probably senior commanders. That's an additional 100
5 to 150 men. So this number from the aerial image, does it tally with the
6 capacity of the vehicles mentioned here, the buses, trucks. Would 1.000
7 or 2.000 people fit into these vehicles that Beara is sending to Nova
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, one, it's a big compound question. And I
10 have some, but this one, I think, has too many parts. And I think that
11 we -- to understand the question, we need to see the aerial to know were
12 these 7 lines by 11 and senior commanders, et cetera, are being put to
13 the witness.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. While I have no doubt Mr. Butler would be
15 capable of answering a compound question, but it's prudent to upload the
16 aerial image first and then let's proceed one by one. Let's proceed one
17 by one, yes.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the other party help us
19 identify the number. It's the video, Srebrenica video trial.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. While we're waiting, Mr. Butler, I want to tell you what my
22 position is. I condemn the killing of a single man unless in combat, but
23 even when people get killed in combat, I feel sorry. It would be better
24 if they were only wounded. However, what I'm challenging here is this
25 game of numbers that is immensely dangerous for peace in the Balkans.
1 These exaggerations are tenfold or so. I believe that you would be the
2 right witness through whom we can establish the truth, because you dealt
3 with this case. So for the sake of providing you with this information,
4 I'm trying to tell you that I'm not an insensitive man, and I condemn
5 each and every killing, but let us see how many killings occurred.
6 JUDGE KWON: This is not a time for your argument. It's Exhibit
7 P4308. It's page 28 in hard copy and probably 38 in e-court.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency. I just
9 thought that I should do this because of Mr. Butler. I don't want to
10 think that I'm defending someone. I'm not defending anyone. I just want
11 to establish what happened.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. To the best of your knowledge, is this that stadium?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Thank you. Can we zoom in a bit, the stadium itself, the central
16 part. Actually, sorry. Before that let's take a look at this. It says
17 13th of July, 1995, 1400 hours; right?
18 A. Yes, sir. That's approximately 1400 hours is how it's labelled.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we zoom in a bit
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Butler, that here in this aerial image we can
23 see each and every individual. Obviously it is guards who are standing
24 in front of. There are four plus two of them. And now please do make an
25 effort and kindly note that there are 11 lines here times 7, in the
1 central part of this image. So does this look like thousands of
3 A. Sir, with all due respect, I don't believe that, it's certainly
4 not my eyesight, but that image quality that we're looking at -- that I'm
5 looking at right now gives me the ability to either confirm or deny your
6 number count. I -- I can't tell. I mean, you've given a number of what
7 you believe it looks like. I can't tell off the quality of this image
8 that I'm looking at right now whether -- whether you're correct or
9 whether you're not correct, sir. I'm sorry.
10 Q. Thank you. Can we go back to the total now. Do you agree that a
11 provincial football stadium would not be longer than 60 or 70 metres and
12 would not be wider than 40 metres? This is certainly not
13 Wembley Stadium, is it?
14 A. No, sir. But I -- again, being an American, maybe I'm kind of
15 missing the point on this, but doesn't it have to be somewhere at least
16 about 100 metres long? I mean, isn't that the point of the game? I
17 mean, I have no idea. I've never walked the measurement of how big or
18 how long Nova Kasaba stadium may or may not be.
19 Q. No way, not 100 metres. Eighty metres are the best fields and
20 this is a lot less.
21 Do you see now how big the area is where the prisoners are
22 standing? Can we speak of thousands here? Can we even speak of hundreds
23 in the plural?
24 A. Again, sir, what would I tell you is that looking at this
25 particular image, one, I can't -- from an image without any form of an
1 index on it that allows you to estimate scale, I can't tell you how big
2 or how small Nova Kasaba football field is. I suppose one could do a
3 rough analysis by taking a measurement of a known object like a vehicle
4 or a house and then you could extrapolate that. And I again also can
5 tell you that based on the image I'm looking at, I can't give you a
6 number. If I were to take a number off of -- off of the top of my head,
7 looking at that clump of individuals in the centre as well as the lines
8 on the side, my ballpark estimate would be several hundred at this point
9 in time.
10 I would also --
11 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry to interrupt. No objection, just if
13 Mr. Karadzic wants to, I would let him know that the page earlier, wider,
14 has vehicles and other reference points that
15 Mr. Butler [Overlapping speakers].
16 JUDGE KWON: Before going on, I know your position is that the
17 number itself is not critical or relevant, but do you have any position
18 as to the number of prisoners that are shown in this aerial image on the
19 part of the Prosecution, Mr. Nicholls?
20 MR. NICHOLLS: No, not an exact number, Your Honour. However,
21 the intercept at 1402 says more than a thousand down here at the stadium.
22 I -- my position would be that without more expert analysis, we can't
23 tell. This could, in my submission, be a thousand or more, especially if
24 you look at the wider angle and you can see the buses. It may be
25 something that he should be able to do the measurements and call an
1 expert if he wishes.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Shall we show him the previous page.
3 Did you refer to this page, Mr. Nicholls, or after that?
4 MR. NICHOLLS: That is the one just if Mr. Karadzic wishes,
5 because the witness brought up a question about vehicles, and here you
6 can see some actual vehicles on the road.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.
8 Q. If we have a look, we can see two buses. How long is a normal
9 bus, an ordinary bus, Mr. Butler, if you know anything about that?
10 A. I'm afraid I don't, sir. I have no idea how long a normal bus
12 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that this bus with the length it is
13 could fit two or three busloads when lined up next to this group of
14 prisoners, maybe even more than three? We could measure, if necessary.
15 A. Well, if that's with a we have to do, I can do it the old
16 fashioned way.
17 Q. This bus on this scale is 6 millimetres long. Let's not change
18 it. And here the length of this group 15 millimetres. So less than
19 three buses --
20 A. I take it that first block of individuals, the lengthwise is two
21 buses and the scale going up is one and roughly one-quarter bus. So what
22 does that measure out to you, sir?
23 Q. How many people can fit, these people here, obviously, sitting?
24 How many people can sit down in an area like this. In this large group,
25 it's less than 100, 11 times 7.
1 A. I have no idea how many people could fit in a space that size,
2 sir. I just don't know.
3 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, I'm just speaking for myself, but
4 this seems to be pretty unproductive to engage in this -- what is no more
5 than speculation. Now, there are so many variables. I mean, how big are
6 the people? How close are they sitting together? It doesn't really
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, your Excellency. I will
9 leave this topic, but I'm just trying to say that these things are more
10 objective than my bragging on the telephone about what a hero I am and
11 how many people I captured. We have information that Beara is sending
12 two trucks and a trailer --
13 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm going to object.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- and we have on the other hand
15 the bragging.
16 JUDGE KWON: You'd like to give testimony yourself, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll see. Maybe at the end I will
19 Let us look at P4532.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. We are still on the 13th of July, which is very important. Look,
22 please. On the 13th of July at 13.55, and we will see that on the
23 reception stamp, at 11.25, Beara sends the means of transport, and at
24 13.55, the Main Staff issues this order. And in the preamble it says:
25 "Based on the instructions received and following the defeat
1 suffered in the Srebrenica enclave, the able-bodied men from the enclave
2 fit for military service were tasked with crossing over to Tuzla and
3 Kladanj in groups -- in groups and carrying weapons. Among them are
4 inveterate criminals and villains who will stop at nothing just to avoid
5 being captured and reach Muslim-controlled territory."
6 The text below talks about the taking of prisoners, and the order
8 "The corps command and brigade commands shall engage all
9 available men fit for military service to detect, block, disarm, and
10 capture detected Muslim groups and prevent them from crossing over to the
11 Muslim territory. Along the whole road, Zvornik, Crni Vrh, Sekovici,
12 Vlasenica. Organise ambushes, et cetera.
13 "2. In Serbian villages on the axis of the group's movement
14 protect and secure the people.
15 "3. Detain the captured and disarmed Muslims in appropriate
16 facilities that can be secured by fewer troops. Immediately report to
17 the superior command."
18 So at half past 1.00, the intention of the Main Staff is to place
19 the captured people in facilities that do not need large security
20 details, and the superior commands are to be informed.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next point in
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
24 Q. Point 6:
25 "Through the competent authorities and Ministry of the Interior
1 make sure that all available manpower is engaged in the co-ordinated
2 execution of the above-said tasks."
3 Do you recall, Mr. Butler, that you noted yourself that the army
4 realized all the seriousness of the threat posed by these groups only on
5 the 13th? Only then did they realise how large these groups were and
6 their capacity to break through and inflict losses on the Serbian side.
7 A. Yes, sir. There was that period, as I've discussed earlier,
8 where the Main Staff and the senior officers were discounting the initial
9 reports from the field as to the size of the column that had been able to
10 successfully cross the Konjevic Polje-Nova Kasaba road and proceed north
11 into the Zvornik Brigade area.
12 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Butler, that from the 11th to the 14th, I was
13 preoccupied only with establishing the civilian authorities in
14 Srebrenica, issuing orders to appoint a civilian commissioner to
15 establish a police station, to provide protection and security for people
16 and property? Until the 15th, I had no information about the dangers.
17 Have you found a single document warning me of danger?
18 A. The danger of what, sir? You used the phrase "danger." What do
19 you refer to?
20 Q. In the same context. The danger posed by the 28th Division,
21 which is in the sector between Srebrenica and Tuzla, our sector, the one
22 we're talking about.
23 A. Okay. So I just wanted to be clear because the way that you
24 predicated your question, I just thought for a second that you were
25 referring to the danger of the prisoners being killed, and I just wanted
1 to make sure I'm clear on what I'm answering.
2 The military documents reflect that by the afternoon of the 14th,
3 that the military commands are starting to become more aware of this,
4 that by the evening of the 14th, they're already giving orders to start
5 to remove forces from Zepa that will start going out the morning of the
6 15th. I can't agree with your first assertion that you were solely
7 preoccupied with establishing the civilian authorities in Srebrenica
8 because I believe that the army must have co-ordinated with you and
9 sought your permission to begin all of the things that they needed to do
10 in order to begin a major military operation against the Zepa enclave.
11 So that is something that had to have been briefed to you by the army
12 with respect to what was happening down there, and I believe you would
13 have had to have approved that before the army would have undertaken
15 I also believe that on the 13th, while the army may not have been
16 reporting it, certainly Mr. Dragomir Vasic - in his reports up the police
17 chain of command to the police staff - and the RDB were providing reports
18 as to what they believed the seriousness of the military situation was,
19 and unlike the Main Staff, Dragomir Vasic did believe that the military
20 situation that was developing was far more serious than the army had
21 taken account for.
22 So I can't speak to you what you did or did not know on a certain
23 time, but what I do believe is that even if the army was down playing or
24 did not recognise themselves the gravity of the military threat to
25 Zvornik, I believe that the threat to Zvornik was properly manifested by
1 the reports that Mr. Vasic was forwarding and other reports that were
2 coming up the police and the RDB chain.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Butler -- yes. I was waiting for the French and
4 B/C/S translation to be completed.
5 Did you find any VRS Main Staff report or MUP report that went to
6 the president dealing with the danger of the column before 15?
7 THE WITNESS: The Main Staff reports do go to the president, and
8 I believe they talked about it on the 15th. The MUP reports from Vasic
9 go as high as the police staff --
10 JUDGE KWON: The MUP report.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes.
12 JUDGE KWON: Proper MUP report.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes. I -- I don't --
14 JUDGE KWON: Not CSB in Zvornik or --
15 THE WITNESS: The reports that were done by Mr. Vasic went to the
16 police staff. I do not know if -- and I cannot talk about how they may
17 have gone further up the chain of command to President Karadzic at that
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that in the regular combat reports they
22 say that certain groups of fighters are surrendering to the VRS, and they
23 don't see the situation as dangerous, so they don't report it to me as
24 dangerous; correct?
25 A. At that point in time, they are talking about -- and I believe
1 the point in time we're talking about now is the 13th and 14th period,
2 you see a number of military reports where they do routinely talk about
3 the apprehension of large numbers of prisoners. Those are incorporated
4 in, I think, one or two Main Staff reports that go to you. There are no
5 numbers associated with it, but it reflects, you know, large numbers.
6 But there is nothing in the Main Staff reporting to you that I take away
7 that the VRS believes that having these prisoners in their custody is
8 somehow dangerous.
9 Q. How did you come up with that, Mr. Butler? Let's stick to the
10 chronology. I'm asking you did the army warn me that there was something
11 extraordinary and unusual before the 14th of July? Well, let's put it
12 differently. Do you know that on the 14th of July I declared the state
13 of war in that area?
14 A. Yes, sir. On the 14th of July, 1995, you issued a decree
15 declaring a state of war to exist in the Srebrenica municipality. That
16 does not include Bratunac, and it does not include the Zvornik
17 municipality. It's solely that, the Srebrenica municipality.
18 Q. And do you know that I did not do that at the prompting of the
19 army but after I visited the civilian authorities of Bratunac,
20 Srebrenica, and Skelani, who informed me that any of these towns may fall
21 if the 28th Division decides to act?
22 A. I'm sorry, you said "after I visited the civilian authorities."
23 Are you referring to you physically visited the civilian authorities of
24 these individuals prior to issuing that decree, or is that a translation
1 Q. It must be interpretation. Do you know that on the 14th of July,
2 I received a visit of the delegation of the civilian authorities of
3 Bratunac, Srebrenica, and Skelani, and among them was the civilian
4 commissioner Deronjic?
5 A. I have some memories of Deronjic in his statement, but I'm not
6 aware of other individuals visiting you, so I mean I guess the fairest
7 answer I can give on that is I'm not aware of the visits that you had on
8 14 July. They're not -- they're not in the military documents and other
9 material I would work at -- I mean, I'm generally not aware of them.
10 Q. Thank you. The Trial Chamber is aware of this, as is the OTP,
11 all about this 14th of July. Did you wonder why, prompted by what,
12 Karadzic declared the state of war?
13 A. My presumption of your declaration of a state of war and the
14 establishment of a war Presidency for the municipality of Srebrenica was
15 for you and for the municipal authorities to gain a better -- or gain
16 better control of the then chaotic situation in the town of Srebrenica as
17 part of the process of re-establishing Serbian political and civilian
18 control over the town, restarting the utilities. Those declarations give
19 the War Presidency additional extraordinary powers that they can use in
20 order to assist in that manner.
21 Q. Did you notice that in these orders and decrees the decisions
22 relate to the Serbian municipality of Srebrenica? Did you make any
23 conclusion as to the meaning of this? What does that mean, the Serbian
24 municipality of Srebrenica?
25 A. I didn't draw any conclusion one way or another about that, sir.
1 It's the municipality of Srebrenica. The fact that after the Serbs
2 occupied or liberated the municipality they would call it the Serbian
3 municipality of Srebrenica, it seems natural to me.
4 Q. I have to remind you that before the war an agreement was reached
5 that in mixed municipality, two municipalities would be set up, one
6 Serbian and one Muslim. In many places, written agreements were signed.
7 Is it the case that on the 11th of July I appointed a
8 commissioner for the Serbian part of Srebrenica, now that you know there
9 were supposed to be two municipalities? It says Deronjic was appointed
10 for the Serbian municipality of Srebrenica.
11 A. Well, sir, the -- I don't know the -- your first assertion, so I
12 can't comment on what agreement may or may not have been made during the
13 war. I assume that when you talk about this, you know, your appointment
14 of Mr. Deronjic for the municipality of Srebrenica. If there was a
15 Muslim municipality of Srebrenica in existence on 12 and 13 of July, it
16 would have been a very empty place. There was nobody there.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: And could I request a cite, please, to the written
18 agreement to divide Srebrenica into two municipalities, if there is one.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect, I will lead
20 evidence of that, but we already know that negotiations did take place,
21 and it's obvious that I held it to be true on the 11th that there would
22 be two municipalities. However, the negotiations took place before the
23 war in all municipalities. In Bratunac an agreement was signed. I'm
24 just trying to see if this expert knows why my decrees apply to the
25 Serbian municipality of Srebrenica.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: I --
2 JUDGE KWON: We heard the answer. So you referred to the one in
3 Bratunac. That's the explanation.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: The Bratunac one I understand. I was asking about
5 Srebrenica. A separate municipality.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The agreement was not signed for
7 Srebrenica, but the agreement was reached. It existed, and we will show
8 that. I believe it's already been shown.
9 Could we now look briefly at P04460.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Have a look, please. Can we see item 6, which relates to the
12 Drina Corps.
13 JUDGE KWON: Page 3.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. 15th July. The Main Staff informs me several groups have
16 surrendered. Is this supposed to alarm me that several groups had
17 surrendered? There is no mention of the number or any warning of danger.
18 On the 15th, I'm being notified that several groups have surrendered.
19 I'll find it in a moment.
20 Yes. It says: "Earlier today, several enemy groups have
21 surrendered to members of the VRS in the area of responsibility of the
22 Zvornik Infantry Brigade."
23 Have you found it?
24 [In English] "During the course of today's day, several enemy
25 groups have surrendered to the VRS members."
1 A. Yes, sir, I have that line.
2 Q. [Interpretation] Is this supposed to alarm the president of the
3 republic, who has a thousand other things to do, or is this just regular
4 information in keeping with your own conclusion that the army was not
5 aware of the seriousness of the situation or the threat posed by the
6 28th Division?
7 A. Let me answer -- this is a two-part question. Let me answer the
8 second part first. If you look at this in time sequence as to when this
9 document was published, you can tell from parts of the language that they
10 are an incorporating Colonel Pandurevic's interim combat report on the
11 15th of July, 1995. So this is part of that reporting chain up.
12 The second issue is I would again note that the military was not
13 your only mechanism to receive information, particularly information that
14 would potentially alarm you. I recall that on the 15th of July, 1995,
15 there is an RDB report from the Zvornik municipality which reports over a
16 hundred prisoners have escaped from a facility in Pilica. Even though it
17 turns out that that report was ultimately erroneous, I would think that a
18 report noting that a hundred prisoners of war had escaped would raise
19 some alarm at some levels of the police leadership and may have
20 ultimately reached you.
21 So again my point is while I cannot comment on what information
22 you may or may not have actually known at any given time, you were not
23 solely dependent upon the military to ascertain what was going on in any
24 given area. From the armed -- the other components of the armed forces,
25 you did have the police reporting -- or at least the police staff had the
1 police reporting and Minister Kovac had the police reporting as well as
2 the RDB reporting.
3 Q. Just one question if I may. Do you agree that the army and the
4 police have a rivalry between them, and I should be informed of military
5 issues by the army?
6 A. I am aware that the military had many issues with the police
7 forces, in part because members of the MUP were being paid regular
8 salaries while most members of the army were not, and as a result that
9 led to significant morale issues as well as soldiers deserting to the MUP
10 whenever they thought they could get a job there.
11 I agree with your assertion that military report on military
12 matters, police will report on police matters. I will also remind you
13 that at the times that we're talking about these reports, most of the
14 police forces, even though they were under the control of the army - they
15 had been resubordinated for the operations - they were still continuing
16 to report those military operations up the police chain. And finally, as
17 noted in the RDB reporting, the RDB itself did not limit itself to
18 reporting on just police issues. They also reported on their
19 understanding of the military issues.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour. The question about this
22 document, page 32, lines 15 to 19, just to summarise, was -- there's
23 nothing in here which -- which should alarm the president who is so busy
24 with a thousand things to do. The army was not aware of the seriousness
25 of the situation or the threat posed by the 28th division. If that's
1 being put to the witness, I think he should be allowed to look at the
2 entire section on the situation in the zone of the Drina Corps before
3 answering on what this report says.
4 This is at your tab 102, Mr. Butler, but I don't think -- I think
5 he needs to see the whole section before it's put to him that nothing
6 here is alarming.
7 JUDGE KWON: You mean the next page.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE KWON: Shall we show him the next page?
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. If I can just clarify something. I was referring to Mr. Butler's
12 finding according to which the army --
13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
14 Having seen the remainder of the document, would you like to add
15 anything, Mr. Butler?
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. If you look at the second page of the
17 document, it also notes the situation on the territory, that there -- not
18 only -- the most alarming part that I would look at, of course, would be
19 the fact that major roads, the Vlasenica-Zvornik road is un-safe due to
20 the enemy groups which are seeking to break out. From a civil point of
21 view that certainly would be of relevance to the president.
22 JUDGE KWON: All right. Let us leave at it that. But before we
23 break there is one matter I want to deal with. The Chamber is seized of
24 the Prosecution's bar table motion for the admission of documents related
25 to the hostages component with appendix A which was filed on the 18th of
1 April, 2012. This motion includes the accused's submission in relation
2 to each of the document.
3 So, Mr. Robinson, I take it therefore that the Defence is not
4 going to file a further response. Am I correct in so understanding?
5 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President. We would like to be heard
6 since the Prosecution has given its rationale for why those particular
7 objections ought to be disregarded. We would like to be heard at least
8 on some of them before the Trial Chamber makes a decision, so we planned
9 on filing a response to that motion as well as the other bar table
10 motions that will be coming.
11 JUDGE KWON: The crux is that you would like to reply to the
12 response of the Prosecution.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Well, we would like to respond to the motion.
14 JUDGE KWON: But what's the point of incorporating Defence
15 response in that motion itself?
16 MR. ROBINSON: Well, the process that we have going right now is
17 so that both parties can be aware of the position of the other party
18 before the motion is made to the Chamber. And so when we put in a little
19 box in that column our objection, we're not really stating a full legal
20 argument, but then the Prosecution when it files its motions is making
21 their legal argument as to the relevance of those things. So we think
22 that we ought to have the opportunity to inform the Chamber more fully
23 and more formally as to the basis of our objections when we have a
25 JUDGE KWON: When can I expect to have your response?
1 MR. ROBINSON: Monday.
2 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.
3 Given the time, we'll take a break now. We'll have a break for
4 30 minutes and resume at five past 11.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, for planning purposes, the Chamber is
8 minded to rise for this session at quarter past 12.00, and instead sit a
9 bit longer period than usual in the third session.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. I
11 believe that you noticed that the Prosecution took more than eight hours,
12 and if we take into account the material that is being admitted through
13 this witness and the reports, I would need a little more time than the
14 time that was allocated to the Prosecution -- or, rather, used by the
16 JUDGE KWON: The Prosecution did not use all the eight hours that
17 they estimated, but notwithstanding that, as long as you stay on relevant
18 issues, the Chamber is minded to give some leeway, but -- that's --
19 again, I emphasise you should be focused and stay on relevant issues.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I appreciate that.
21 Could the witness please be shown D2212.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. There's something I'd like to clarify, Mr. Butler. I asked you
24 about reports according to which some groups should surrender. Should
25 such reports be a matter of concern for the president? Should they alarm
1 the president, or were such reports submitted as a matter of course?
2 A. Again, I can't speak to the issue of alarm, but within the
3 context of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, historically the documents
4 that I have reviewed reflect a great interest by the Bosnian Serb
5 political and military leadership to exchange prisoners that they had
6 taken in order to get prisoners from -- who -- to get Bosnian Serbs who
7 had been imprisoned in Muslim prisons, either captured or for a variety
8 of other reasons. So the issue of prisoner exchanges did receive the
9 highest level attention of the Republika Srpska government, including you
10 personally, and there's documents which, of course, reflect that.
11 Regardless of the numbers that are in dispute, the fact is that
12 hundreds if not thousands of prisoners were falling into the custody of
13 the army -- or I should be more clear, the armed forces of Republic
14 Srpska because it was not just the army, it was the police forces as
15 well, from the period of 12 July onward through at least the 22nd of
16 July. And those numbers of prisoners would have dramatically changed the
17 calculations and the leverage that the Republika Srpska would have had in
18 order to retrieve those Bosnian Serbs who were imprisoned by the Muslims.
19 So in that respect, I believe that the issues of prisoners of war
20 would have been of great importance to the senior military and political
21 leadership of the country, the pinnacle of that being you, sir.
22 Q. Thank you. Could you please have a look at the report from
23 Doctors Without Borders. I don't know whether this document can be
24 broadcast. I don't see that it's marked as a Rule 50 document.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be scrolled up a bit.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. On the 11th of July, we have a report from Doctors Without
3 Borders on the events, but what I want to show you is the part where it
4 says that Mladic is in Bratunac and he is offering food and water. Let
5 me just find that line.
6 JUDGE KWON: Just to let you know, Mr. Karadzic, this is just --
7 this is a public document.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we see page 5.
9 I'm looking at the wrong page.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. So this is a report for the 11th of July in which all the events
12 are described. Franken the deputy commander was at a meeting. They were
13 co-operating productively and so on and so forth. And then it's the
14 second paragraph towards the end, it says:
15 [In English] Commandant Mladic BSA is in Bratunac and offering
16 medicine and food, asks UN to organise buses for evacuation."
17 [Interpretation] He's saying that the UN could organise the
18 buses. This is at 22.50, and it's after the second meeting that was held
19 in the Fontana Hotel; isn't that right?
20 A. Yes, sir. I take it from the time on this and the context of
21 what was discussed, the Dutch -- I guess it was Major Franken at the
22 time, was back briefing this particular individual as to what the results
23 of that meeting were and how it would impact that organisation. So that
24 is at least the first part under where it looks to be "News."
25 Q. Thank you. Could we now have a brief look at P4769.
1 Can we agree that this is a telegram from General Tolimir that
2 was delivered at 22.30, and it says:
3 "If you are unable to find adequate accommodation for all POWs
4 from Srebrenica, we hereby inform you that space has been arranged for
5 800 prisoners of war in the first plpbr in Sjemec."
6 It says they could work on the farm and General Tolimir on the
7 13th of July offers accommodation for 800 prisoners. He found a place
8 where they could be provided with accommodation. Are you familiar with
9 this document?
10 A. Yes, sir. I testified with relation to this document in the
11 Tolimir case.
12 Q. Thank you. It doesn't look like Tolimir wants them to be there
13 so that they could be killed. It seems more like he wants them to be
14 able to live there so that they could work on the farm; isn't that right?
15 A. I disagree with your assertion on that because it is my awareness
16 that at the time in question this particular farm, in fact, was not a
17 working farm. I believe that in the Tolimir case that there was
18 information that suggested that nobody was using this particular farm at
19 the time. If that is in fact the case, I don't believe that that was a
20 genuine assertion by General Tolimir that they would be working on
21 agricultural projects.
22 Q. Mr. Butler, I think that your answer doesn't show that you are
23 unbiased. Do you know that there was a farm for sheep, horses, and pigs
24 there, and what would have enabled the army to live had there not been
25 such a farm? This is a confidential telegram. It's not a propaganda
1 leaflet. So I really have the impression that you are striving to assist
2 the Prosecution. You're fighting for the Prosecution's side, and you
3 won't admit certain facts that are quite clear in this document.
4 A. Well, sir, again, I can tell you I understand what the document
5 says, and I can tell you that I'm testifying with respect to that
6 particular paragraph on the basis of knowledge that I have about the
7 situation as it's been described at that farm. If I am incorrect or if
8 there is other evidence, I expect the Trial Chamber will take that of
9 note, sir.
10 Q. Thank you. With regard to this document, my question is whether
11 Tolimir is saying they should be killed, or is he saying that
12 accommodation should be provided? And I'm not asking you about your
13 opinion. I'm interested in the facts themselves.
14 A. Well, yes, sir. I agree with you in that particular context. He
15 is not saying that they're going to be killed. And I guess when I
16 testified about this document in the Tolimir case, the thing that struck
17 me the most about it was it is one of the few documents that I'm aware of
18 that actually assigns a number of prisoners. In this particular case
19 it's talking about 800 prisoners of war. So again in the correlation of
20 trying to determine how many prisoners are in the custody of the VRS and
21 of the MUP at various points of time during the whole Srebrenica crime
22 base review, I found this to be a very interesting document.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you. Could we
24 now see 65 ter document 31023, and it's half an hour later. 65 ter
25 number 31023B.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Did you know that there was even a farm in Crna Rijeka near the
3 Main Staff, and it had been established by the army. This doesn't relate
4 to this document, but I'm just asking you whether you were aware of the
5 fact that there were military farms whenever that was possible. Did you
6 know that there was a farm in Crna Rijeka next to the Main Staff?
7 A. To answer the first question, yes, sir, I'm aware of the practice
8 that, where possible, military units had their own farms in order to
9 provide sustenance and other support to the brigade. I did not know that
10 there was a farm in Crna Rijeka that was -- that belonged to the
11 Main Staff or belonged to the military there.
12 Q. Thank you. Now, let's have a look at this intercept. It doesn't
13 have to be broadcast. I don't know whether it's public or not. It's
14 602. It says at -- on the 13th at 2005, a conversation between
15 General Mladic and a certain Ljubo was recorded, and we couldn't hear
16 him. Is it reasonable to assume that the Ljubo in question was, in fact,
17 Colonel Beara?
18 A. Yes, sir, that is -- I believe I've testified to that related to
19 this intercept in previous cases.
20 Q. Are you familiar with this intercept?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. Is it true that it says here that Mladic spoke on the phone, and
23 he thought that it was a safe line. Obviously it wasn't. Mladic ordered
24 Beara and suggested that they provide food. He said that there should be
25 sufficient food. He should see where it could be found, and he should
1 obtain food so that the people were not hungry.
2 A. [Overlapping speakers] Yes, sir. Yes, sir. That's what it says.
3 Is there another question, or did I miss a question? I apologise if I
5 Q. Well, I wanted to ask you whether that's what you can see in the
6 intercept. And when you compiled your report, did you have this
7 intercept in mind? Did you refer to this intercept in your report?
8 A. Yes, sir. And again, I've testified to this as well. There are
9 multiple meanings that one might infer from this intercept. As a matter
10 of being conservative, I think in most cases - I hope in all cases - what
11 I've noted is the fact that there are a lot of police forces out there
12 that are in those particular areas, and as noted by the laws of the
13 Republika Srpska with respect to the Ministry of the Interior, that it is
14 the responsibility of the army to feed and provision the MUP forces that
15 are operating under their command in various areas.
16 So at its most benign interpretation, Beara is raising the point
17 that there are police officers there who have not been fed. They don't
18 have their own logistics. And Mladic is making it known, Yes, solve it
19 so that there's no food problems. And he's talking about giving an order
20 to Krle, which would be the Drina Corps, to ensure that that happens and
21 bring the stuff over to Malinic's. That would logically be a place to
22 bring food and be able to further distribute to the police forces.
23 There's clearly a more sinister way to look at this as well, but I don't
24 think I need to go there.
25 JUDGE KWON: The last part of the question is whether you
1 referred to this intercept in your report.
2 THE WITNESS: I believe I did, sir.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Butler, with all due respect, your interpretations are really
5 quite odd. How do you see that it concerns the police? How could the
6 policemen remain hungry?
7 [In English] Excellent. Just keep working and feed them all.
8 There are a lot of hungry mouths."
9 [Interpretation] Why would the police be hungry? This concerns
10 prisoners, Mr. Butler. And Beara, who was a security officer, why would
11 he be responsible for providing food for the police since this is a
12 matter for logistics, not for security?
13 A. Well, sir, the reason I mention that is particularly with the
14 intercepts, some of them are open to multiple interpretations. My
15 practice when analysing both military documents, as well as the
16 intercepts, as a matter of fairness on the issue was if there were
17 multiple interpretations, I would lean towards giving it an
18 interpretation that had the most -- or the best military context.
19 I don't necessarily disagree with your interpretation of this.
20 However, in the context of my previous testimony where many of these
21 individuals were accused of this, your interpretation effectively at this
22 point, you know, notes that Colonel Beara and General Mladic are aware
23 that there are a large number of prisoners, that they are hungry. The
24 guidance is that solve it so there is no lack of food. And if one looks
25 at the end result, they did. That is not an interpretation that I
1 believe I could make before various Trial Chambers on this particular
3 Q. Sir, this is the 13th at 11.00. Don't confuse --
4 MR. NICHOLLS: I object to him cutting off the witness.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. -- matters --
7 JUDGE KWON: You can ask a question at any time, Mr. Karadzic.
8 Do not interrupt while the witness is answering a question, Mr. Karadzic.
9 Will you continue, Mr. Butler.
10 THE WITNESS: Actually, sir, I completed my answer at that point.
11 That was my last comment. I didn't believe that I could make that type
12 of an interpretation of this intercept before the various tribunals that
13 I testified before, given the context of the accused who were in the
14 stand at the time.
15 JUDGE KWON: So you believe that Mladic and Beara were not
16 discussing about feeding the prisoners in real sense.
17 THE WITNESS: No, sir. Again, what I believe is there are two
18 interpretations to this. And as a matter of fairness, I assigned this --
19 in my analytical review of the material, I'm noting for the Trial Chamber
20 that there are two possible interpretations, and again to be
21 conservative, I believe that, you know, from my perspective the most
22 conservative interpretation is potentially a discussion related to the
23 police forces who are there, who would be dependent on the military for
24 resupply, including food.
25 JUDGE KWON: The reason for that was because of the end result.
1 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I don't understand your question, sir.
2 JUDGE KWON: The reason for such belief on your part, was it due
3 to the end result, as you stated earlier on?
4 THE WITNESS: Well, again, sir, if I were to give it the second
5 interpretation, then it would, of course, radically change the meaning of
6 the comment, "solve it so there is no lack of food."
7 JUDGE KWON: As indicated by Mr. Karadzic. Would it not be
8 possible that while they were discussing about real feeding, but they
9 changed their mind afterwards?
10 THE WITNESS: I don't believe so, because if one were then to go
11 back and look at the corresponding Bratunac Brigade documents, it is
12 absolutely clear that there are no orders given as reflected in the
13 documents to start providing food and other provisions to these
14 prisoners. Given the numbers of individuals that are falling into
15 military custody on the 13th of July, even if I use a minimum number in
16 the morning of perhaps a thousand, the Bratunac Brigade itself only had
17 3.000 -- 3.500 soldiers at the time. So that is a significant percentage
18 in terms of the food reserves that the Bratunac Brigade might have.
19 One would expect if that was in fact the case, there would be
20 documentation and orders and perhaps even intercepts reflecting the
21 various activities of the staff members of the Bratunac Brigade and the
22 Drina Corps to bring truckloads of rations for all of these prisoners. I
23 don't see that in the material.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Butler, do you know that the Bratunac Brigade was mostly
2 outside the area of responsibility and that it was old men who were
3 guarding the prisoners that night in Bratunac?
4 A. Yes, sir. My understanding is that the four battalions of the
5 Bratunac Brigade were involved in various military operations. Some of
6 them were in Potocari. Some of them that were along the load -- road
7 from Bratunac to Konjevic Polje, and that the number of prisoners that
8 were coming into Bratunac on 13 July 1995 greatly exceeded the ability of
9 the remaining brigade units, which would be the military police and some
10 of the rear services units, to guard them and that there was, in fact, a
11 call for all able-bodied men residing in Bratunac to report for duty
12 guarding prisoners.
13 Q. Thank you. Do you know which formation or which institution
14 provided food and water to the prisoners in Potocari and the prisoners in
15 Sandici? Was it the brigade or was it the civilian protection?
16 Also, did you try to find traces of feeding in the civilian
18 A. I am aware that there was some food and some water that was
19 brought into Potocari on the 12th. I believe that -- I'm familiar with
20 some testimony that it came from the Bratunac Brigade, or at least the
21 Bratunac Brigade rear services organ had a role in it. I don't know if
22 it originated from the Bratunac Brigade or whether it came from the
23 civilian protection services.
24 Q. Sir, we had a protected witness here from the civilian protection
25 who told us the same thing that I've been telling you; namely, that that
1 had been their job, not the job of the rear services of the
2 Bratunac Brigade, no way. What do you say to that?
3 A. Again, sir, I don't comment on what witnesses may or may not have
4 said. I mean, that's not my role before this Trial Chamber, sir.
5 Q. Yes, but it considerably differs from what you concluded, and it
6 actually challenges it. So the civilian protection, which is part of the
7 armed forces, they dealt with food and water, and your expectation is
8 that this was done by the military. Since you did not find any traces of
9 the army providing that, you conclude that that had not been provided.
10 Isn't that right?
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nikolic.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Just for some clarity - I'm not objecting - but
13 providing food and water to civilians gathered in Potocari is a different
14 thing from providing food and water to persons -- prisoners who have been
15 taken. So I just want to know which we're talking about when the
16 questions are put.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We're going to give a number now.
19 JUDGE KWON: But before that, did you say in lines 7 to 8 on this
20 page that civilian protection is part of the armed forces?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency. According to our
22 laws, civilian protection is also part of the armed forces. However,
23 they are not part of the combat units. In wartime, it is under the army
24 or under the defence forces. It's part of the defence system. That
25 would be the right wording.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Take a look at what Witness 480 said, that they provided food and
3 water to prisoners in buses and in Sandici and that that was their job.
4 Let me ask you this now, Mr. Butler. Have you come to realise
5 that Colonel Beara dealt with prisoners of war? Did you establish that?
6 A. The documents establish that a -- as the chief of security for
7 the Main Staff, one of Colonel Beara's responsibilities would have been
8 related to issues of prisoners of war, and I believe that the evidence
9 led through various Srebrenica-related trials here has laid out in great
10 detail Colonel Beara's involvement in the issue of prisoners from the
11 period 12 through the 20th of July, 1995.
12 Q. Thank you. Have you come a cross a document that shows that
13 Beara dealt with logistics, especially providing supplies to the police?
14 A. No, sir. And again in this document I don't take it that he is
15 going to engage in logistics issues. He's just as part of the
16 conversation noting that. And again, orders are given over there at
17 Krle's for material to be sent, and again in the context of the phrase
18 "Krle," an abbreviation for General Krstic, I take that to be some orders
19 are going out to the Drina Corps.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be
22 JUDGE KWON: If it hasn't been, we'll receive it now.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2237, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
6 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Could you please help us with this now: Quite simply, let us
9 establish when most people were being taken prisoner. Until when were
10 most people taken prisoner? Was that on the 13th of July?
11 A. Well, chronologically speaking, the men start getting separated
12 in Potocari beginning on the afternoon of the 12th. So at that point in
13 time, I would categorise that as the start of the process where the
14 military-aged men start to come into the custody of the armed forces,
15 either the police or the army.
16 As the evening of the 12th wears on and goes into the morning of
17 the 13th, the police and military forces that were originally along the
18 road from Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje, and down, start to capture
19 significant numbers of men from the column. The numbers from the 13th
20 are relatively apparent from intercepts and other pieces of information.
21 I am aware that prisoners were also captured in that same area on
22 the 14th, as well as in subsequent ways the 15th, 16th, and 17th. I
23 would have to say, though, again I don't have a number, and I don't
24 believe a number of prisoners captured strictly on the 14th of July along
25 that area has -- has ever surfaced. So it's hard to say whether the peak
1 day of prisoners being captured by the armed forces is the 13th or the
3 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that according to our regulations, this
4 was the procedure: Taking people prisoner, bringing them to a collection
5 point or a collection centre, then reporting to the higher command. Is
6 that what is written, and is that what was done in this case?
7 I'm just talking about the 13th. I'm interested in the 13th.
8 A. The process, at least as far as the military was concerned, was
9 that upon capturing a prisoner, the prisoner was to be brought to a
10 designated facility. He was to be safeguarded in a designated facility
11 where he would then be -- his identity established, he would be
12 interrogated for any potential useful combat-related information, and
13 then ultimately turned over to the appropriate authorities where he would
14 then be sent to the main prisoner of war holding facilities, Batkovici
15 being one of them.
16 On the 13th, the picture on the ground was that prisoners were
17 being captured at various locations. They were being assembled at
18 various areas, and I believe Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje, Sandici, and
19 there are some smaller areas where they were being assembled, and then as
20 the 13th wore on, a large group of those prisoners were brought to the
21 Kravica warehouse facility. Other prisoners were taken other places. I
22 believe there's one, perhaps at least two, small-level executions which
23 occur on the 13th of July. And then as the evening continues to wear on,
24 of course, by 1700 the beginning of the Kravica warehouse massacre, and
25 as the evening continues on, those prisoners who are still remaining at
1 Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje, Sandici are then put into buses and trucks
2 and taken to other locations. Some of them were outside the Kravica
3 supermarket in trucks. Most of them apparently were brought into the
4 town of Bratunac on vehicles or buses and stored there, though I'm in --
5 I am aware of one case at Sandici where apparently after all the buses
6 and trucks stopped there were still some prisoners and they were
7 summarily executed at that site.
8 So that is my recounting of what the prisoner situation looked
9 like on 13 July 1995, sir.
10 Q. I kindly ask you -- I mean, if I put shorter questions, could you
11 please give shorter answers that pertain only to what I'm asking?
12 So is it correct that prisoners, in addition to Kravica on the
13 13th of July, were also brought to Bratunac?
14 A. Yes, sir. That is correct.
15 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that in addition to Kravica and
16 Bratunac, that is close to Kravica, there were no other collection
18 A. There were multiple collection points in the town of Bratunac.
19 I'm aware that prisoners were held in the town of Kravica. I do not know
20 if on the evening of the 13th whether or not there were prisoners at
21 Nova Kasaba or Konjevic Polje. I know they were collection sites during
22 the day. I do not know if prisoners were stored there during the evening
24 Q. Did you not see for yourself that they were all transported to
25 Bratunac, and did you notice that the civilian authorities of Bratunac
1 were complaining? They were saying, "You're taking them prisoner in the
2 area of Vlasenica, Milici, Zvornik, and you're bringing all of them to
3 Bratunac." Do you remember that that was an objection that had been
4 raised, "Why are you bringing them all to Bratunac?"
5 A. In the context of the 13th of July, I agree that the civilian
6 authorities in Bratunac were complaining about the prisoners that were
7 all being brought to that location. And that -- it started even earlier
8 than the 13th.
9 Again, I can't comment as to whether those were the only
10 locations, because I just do not know about -- prisoners were clearly
11 being taken through the evening of the 13th and the morning of the 14th.
12 I just have no information about whatever happened to them, because I
13 don't know if there were any survivors of people taken prisoner at that
15 I am aware also that as part of the response to that, the first
16 convoy loads of prisoners left Bratunac at 2000 hours on 13 July. So
17 even though the municipal authorities were planing about the spiraling
18 number of prisoners in town, there were steps taken to at least take some
19 of the prisoners from Bratunac and move them up to the Zvornik
21 Q. Thank you. So whoever was taken prisoner was in Bratunac that
22 night. According to your findings, how many persons were involved?
23 A. No, sir, I didn't say that. Again, if you -- you and I both
24 agree there were prisoners stored at Kravica as well. So not every
25 prisoner taken was in Bratunac that night. I don't know -- I mean, I
1 don't know if I've ever come across an accurate number of prisoners were
2 in Bratunac that evening. I will leave that to other people's testimony
3 to that account. Obviously I'm not in Bratunac on that day. I can't
4 make any firsthand observations.
5 Q. Thank you. Did you come across the information that I had
6 received, the extent to which they had sent information to me from
7 Bratunac? They said that they were so burdened, they had so many
8 prisoners on the night of the 13th. Is it correct that they said around
10 A. That number wouldn't -- wouldn't surprise me if it were 2.000.
11 It might in fact even be more. Again, as I've noted before when you
12 asked, I am aware of the fact that the civilian authorities in Bratunac
13 were greatly concerned about the security issues. I know that there were
14 issues raised in reports, but I have no information or I can't testify as
15 to whether or not municipal authorities in Bratunac personally called you
16 and provided you with these issues other than the one document which is
17 purported to be a conversation between you and Mr. Deronjic.
18 Q. Thank you. And what does it say, about 2.000? And perhaps
19 during the night there may be even more of them; right?
20 A. I recall during the night there may be even more of them. I
21 think Mr. Deronjic does, in fact, say several thousand. I mean, I don't
22 know if it gives the number 2.000 or just says several thousand, but
23 again, that's why 2.000 is probably sticking in my mind.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: Just for precision, I don't have it in front of
25 me, but that intercept says "will be more," not "maybe."
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
2 Q. But did you notice that 2.000 was mentioned in that conversation?
3 A. Again, sir, is might have been actually giving the number. I
4 just don't recall it off the top of my head right now, but I'm not
5 disagreeing with your categorisation of the number.
6 JUDGE KWON: Just what's the exhibit number for that,
7 Mr. Nicholls? Or Mr. Karadzic?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am staying away from everything
9 that has to do with Mr. Deronjic, for well-known reasons, but I think
10 that this has already been admitted.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, you can come back to me.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll get to that.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you know what the Muslim authorities thought? How many
15 inhabitants were there in Srebrenica? How many got out to Tuzla, and how
16 many were missing? Propaganda.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: 4618 to answer your question, Your Honour.
18 THE WITNESS: I don't know. Again, the numbers of the
19 individuals in the enclave run a range. I believe in one of the
20 documents the Muslims actually put a number that they have. I know that
21 the UN has had numbers. I know that the VRS believes, and they have a
22 certain number as well. So there's a range of numbers with respect to
23 who was in the enclave. So I can't tell you exactly what the Muslim
24 authorities thought, how many inhabitants were there.
25 I am not sure I know how many got to Tuzla. I think there's an
1 accurate accounting of the women and children and elderly that were taken
2 through the lines at Kladanj. I have heard various numbers as to how
3 many members of the column ultimately arrived in Tuzla, but I've never
4 done an analysis on that myself to determine whether or not it's a valid
6 And as for the number of the missing, I believe -- or the dead in
7 this particular context, I believe that that's already been the subject
8 of testimony by forensics experts.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Thank you. Do you remember whether you saw a telegram from the
11 secret service from Tuzla dated the 17th of July, namely that on the 16th
12 of July, 10.000 soldiers arrived in Tuzla? Of course, it goes without
13 saying that not all of them had been armed. Ten thousand soldiers of the
14 28th Division. Did you take that report into account?
15 A. I don't recall seeing a report like that. If you have it as a
16 document to show me, I would take a look at it.
17 Q. Thank you. Perhaps we're going to call it up if we have enough
18 time. This has already been admitted.
19 Now I'd like to show you 1D5024. This is a record of the session
20 of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 11th of August, 1995.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could that please be displayed in
22 e-court. I beg your pardon. We actually have this document now.
23 JUDGE KWON: We can move on. This was already discussed. "Two
24 thousand, but there will be more during the night."
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now take a look
1 at -- actually, there is a translation too. There is. Maybe it hasn't
2 been uploaded. Could it please be placed on the ELMO then. Could you
3 please place on the ELMO the part where it says 42.000, the response of
4 the president, 42.000 and 35.000.
5 [In English] For the usher. For the usher.
6 [Interpretation] Serbian is page 6. In Serbian, it's page 6.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Here Silajdzic says -- in fact, the president asks. Then it says
9 he knows how many soldiers there had been. And the president says, You
10 can ask Selo to provide a report about that. Silajdzic says, Here is
11 what it's about. First of all in Srebrenica they provided one number for
12 UNPROFOR, and we knew another number. The president says, 42.000 for the
13 UNPROFOR, but realistically it was 35.000.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page in Serbian, please. The
15 English can romaine the same.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
17 Q. And now Silajdzic says he's afraid it's not 35 but a little more
18 than 36.000. And 31.000-something left -- remained, actually, because
19 5.000 left to join friends and family, et cetera. And he says:
20 "The most unfavourable number --"
21 The president says:
22 "The most unfavourable number is 5.000, meaning that nobody was
23 excluded, isn't it?"
24 And Silajdzic says:
25 "I'm afraid this is right."
1 The president says:
2 "There is hope that there are some of them here -- here and there
3 after all.
4 "Some of them are in Serbia. Some run away to Serbia via Zepa
5 and 35.000 remained. 31.000 at least had made it to Tuzla, maybe more."
6 And then it says the number of killed is around 3.000. We
7 intercepted a conversation --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic slow down and tell us where
9 he's reading from.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters can't catch up with
11 your speed.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm in a hurry. I thought there
13 was a translation.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. So this one asks: Is it 300? And the other one says, No, add a
16 zero, one Chetnik says to another.
17 So, Mr. Butler, this is one month after the event, a transcript
18 from the Presidency session where we see that there was 36.000 population
19 in Srebrenica at most. At least 670 went to Zepa towards Serbia. At
20 least several thousand left for Tuzla.
21 Can you tell us how many got killed in the fighting?
22 MR. NICHOLLS: And I'm sorry, I don't mean to interrupt, but just
23 because the way the question was framed, we should go on to the next
24 statement to put that 3.000 number that was quoted in context. It's on
25 page 7 of the English. It's just been put that they were talking about
1 3.000 max as the number of dead. I won't say anything else, but
2 Mr. Butler should be able to read the next two paragraphs.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Yes, I agree. It is reckoned that there are many left in the
5 woods, that many are still fighting. Is it consistent with your
6 knowledge that -- that many of them remained for months in the forests
8 A. Yes, sir. I mean, I'm going to try and run through all the
10 I agree and I've testified before that even after the bulk of the
11 column got out that there were -- there were groups sometimes numbering
12 in the hundreds who were trapped behind the lines and as a result were
13 wandering back there.
14 As to your other question, no, I never did an analysis as to how
15 many people from the column were killed as a result of the combat
16 operations. I know that forensically in the post-conflict years those
17 are individuals that are referred to as surface remains and that numbers
18 of those individuals have been determined.
19 So to back up one step, the casualties that were taken as part of
20 the column activities in the fighting of the column, were not
21 particularly my concern. From an analytical perspective, once I came to
22 the conclusion myself that the column was a legitimate military target
23 for the VRS to engage, the casualties that occurred in that column would
24 not be considered to be casualties from the other Srebrenica-related war
1 My goal in looking at the column, the route that the column took,
2 and the combat that occurred was not related to the number of casualties
3 in the column but was only done so I would be able to assist the
4 investigation team in distinguishing where combat activities were taking
5 place on any given day so that the team would understand where the combat
6 operations were occurring and where the mass executions were occurring so
7 that all concerned would understand that people in certain graves were
8 not combat casualties because the column was nowhere near where those
9 locations were.
10 Q. Thank you. My last question before the break. Do you know where
11 in the area of which brigade in which part of that sector did the
12 fiercest fighting take place with the greatest losses involved for both
13 the Serbian and Muslim side? Was it in the place where the column was
14 exiting towards Tuzla?
15 A. There are two answers to that question. With respect to the
16 Zvornik municipality, by far the largest number of casualties for the
17 column and the Zvornik Brigade occurred in the zone of the
18 4th Infantry Battalion which is correspondingly Baljkovica, where a lot
19 of the column went out. Counting all of the other individuals of the
20 column who remained trapped inside of the Pobudje area, Nova Kasaba,
21 Konjevic Polje, and along the road there, as the military documents
22 report, they're killing hundreds if not thousands of individuals from the
23 column at that particular location in the Bratunac municipality. So
24 there are two answers depending on which column element you're talking
1 Q. Thank you. I'm now talking about the victims of the column that
2 was fighting. Is it true that at the very beginning, in the area of the
3 Bratunac Brigade, Pobudje, the minefield, the shelling, there were
4 several hundred casualties that were not buried, they remained on the
6 A. My understanding in both the Zvornik and the Bratunac
7 municipalities is that because of the presence of many unmarked
8 minefields and things of that nature, that the surface remains as we
9 refer to, the people who died in the column both in Bratunac and Zvornik
10 were not buried at all during the course of the conflict. Those remains
11 remained on the surface and ultimately they began to be forensically
12 collected after the war.
13 Q. Mr. Butler, I can agree about Pobudje, but do you have any proof
14 that remains were collected from the surface in the area of Zvornik? My
15 claim is that they were buried and they were not collected, and there
16 were hundreds if not thousands of dead, and there were many more
17 casualties in the area of Zvornik than in the area of Bratunac as you
18 must know?
19 A. As to your first assertion, I don't know that that was done. I
20 know that surface remains were recovered in the Zvornik area, and I know
21 that many officers of the Zvornik Brigade were particularly concerned
22 about going into minefields to retrieve dead bodies, particularly dead
23 bodies of Muslim soldiers, and they weren't going to do that. I assume
24 that Muslims who were killed in and around the combat positions of the
25 4th Battalion would have been removed, Baljkovica, the headquarters of
1 the 4th Battalion, and buried at some location, and those numbers, given
2 the ferocity of fighting on the 16 July, would have numbered some
3 hundred. I don't know if I've ever seen an answer of how many were
4 killed that day, and they were buried somewhere. So I think -- I said
5 there is a great deal of forensics evidence with respect to individuals
6 in various graves. I don't know where any surface remains of those
7 individuals killed in the Zvornik municipality would be buried. I don't
8 know if those have been discovered forensically yet or not, or whether
9 those have been accounted for forensically.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, very well. Can this be
11 admitted, the transcript of the session of the Presidency of BH.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2238, Your Honours.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
15 Q. May I now ask -- just a moment, can we see 65 ter 01984.
16 While we're waiting, Mr. Butler, when you were talking about
17 killing in Bratunac on the 13th, do you mean the killing in a
18 schoolhouse, some sort of gym hall?
19 A. What I am talking about is that in the town of Bratunac on 13
20 July, there has been a good deal of information that individuals who were
21 guarding Muslims at these various locations were taking these people and
22 either in some cases individually or in small groups killing them at or
23 near the locations where they were being detained. I believe that --
24 again, I don't follow the proceedings in this trial, but I believe that
25 in previous cases there has been considerable testimony related to the
1 sanitation people recovering bodies of those prisoners in the town of
2 Bratunac on various days.
3 Q. Thank you. I only wanted to see what you meant when you say the
4 massacre in Kravica. Did you establish what led to it? In fact, is it
5 the case that you established that the atmosphere was very relaxed there,
6 and in that atmosphere one prisoner approached a guard to ask for a light
7 for his cigarette, and then he seized the soldier's rifle and opened
9 A. I did not, and nor was I asked to, establish a cause of that
10 particular massacre or any particular massacre. I am aware of the story
11 that relates to what may have triggered the massacre. I did not
12 investigate that one way or another. My role again was to identify
13 various military documents, which I did find, which shows that several
14 members, I think two of the Special Police Unit at Sekovici and one of
15 the Bratunac red brigade -- Red Berets unit were wounded at Kravica at
16 approximately 1700 which I used to place that unit early on, the 2nd
17 Sekovici unit, at that location at that time.
18 Again I've heard the story. I do not know whether it's true or
19 not. And of course I've heard the other part of the story, which is as a
20 result of the injuries that those police officers received, that that was
21 the predicate event which then led the police forces to begin firing into
22 the warehouse, ultimately leading to the massacre. Frankly, it had been
23 described as an impulse event, and I believe that if you look at the
24 chronology of the killings, as well as the scope of what happened in the
25 warehouse, that I do not believe that that is the case.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, given the time we'll break now.
2 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, just one quick matter. I think this
4 may be obvious but I need to confirm it with the Court. Today is the day
5 we would normally file our monthly witness list. In light of the fact
6 that our previous filing encompassed all of the remaining witnesses, I
7 presume that an additional filing is not necessary today. I spoke with
8 Mr. Robinson. He agrees with that.
9 JUDGE KWON: That's fair enough, Mr. Tieger.
10 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, Your Honours. Can I just inquire what the
12 plan is for the rest of the day? I'm just thinking about timing. I will
13 have some -- I think I will have some redirect, so I was just
14 wondering --
15 JUDGE KWON: My understanding is that Mr. Butler may be -- may
16 need to stay over the weekend, but -- do you think you can complete your
17 cross-examination in the -- in the remainder of today, Mr. Karadzic?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I doubt it, Your Excellency. All
19 the more so because Mr. Butler is putting for the his opinions on things,
20 although he wasn't in Kravica. He just stated his opinion that he
21 doesn't believe something that is obvious and confirmed, so I do have to
22 deal with it in more detail. No. In fact, I'm sorry, I misspoke. Not
23 his opinions, but his beliefs. Belief is something that depends on our
24 will. We believe what we want to.
25 JUDGE KWON: We have to rise now, but is my understanding
1 correct, Mr. Butler, that you can stay -- you can be with us on Monday.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I am available for testimony next week.
3 I am at the indulgence of the Court, sir.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much. We will take a break for an
5 hour and resume at 1.20.
6 --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 1.21 p.m.
8 JUDGE KWON: Judge Morrison cannot be with us for this session
9 due to his urgent matters, so we'll be sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis.
10 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now see 65 ter
12 document 1984. The previous one should be removed.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. My learned colleagues have a look at this. Are you familiar with
15 this document in which an order is issued to search the terrain on the
16 13th of July, to search the depth of the terrain? And under 3 it says
17 that a white tape has to be used for markings for the purpose of
19 A. I believe it notes that under paragraph 5. I think you said 3 in
20 the transcript, sir. But paragraph 5 notes that: "Men who participate
21 in this search ... will wear a white band on their right shoulder as an
22 identification mark."
23 Yes, sir.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you know that our troops usually used such
25 markings because our race and the race of our enemy at the time is the
1 same? We had the same ethnic characteristics.
2 A. Yes, sir, and in fact, many were even wearing the same former JNA
3 uniforms, so as a result, one of the practices of the VRS was, was to --
4 in order to able to distinguish their troops from potential enemy
5 soldiers was that their troops would wear various coloured ribbons or
6 armbands on a particular sleeve to aid in battle-field identification.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could it be admitted?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2239, Your Honours.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now have a
11 look at the following document, 1D5536, and I'm not sure whether this can
12 be a public document.
13 I think there is a translation, but I'm not sure. Apparently
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. You see here on the 12th of July the Muslims intercepted a
17 conversation. I'll read out the first part. It says the aggressor EIPED
18 intercepted a conversation, recorded it between President Izetbegovic and
19 the chief or the head of the municipality in Srebrenica, Avdic, on the
20 situation in Srebrenica. In the private conversation we also found out
21 that the aggressor EIPED has recordings of the conversation between
22 President Izetbegovic and Naser Oric, but this is at 2000 hours. It says
23 Goran Mauk [phoen] from the Serbian Army spoke about what is happening in
24 Srebrenica at the time. He said, That's correct. Peace is abandoning
25 Srebrenica, and this is what Osman Suljic asked for who -- he has been
1 the president of the municipality up until now. This is a request
2 because of the terror of Naser Oric's supporters, and he left Srebrenica
3 a month ago at the same time when he ordered an attack on all Serbian
4 positions. So he issued the order and fled around Srebrenica. He issued
5 those requests to the Serbian troops, a request that the population
6 should be allowed to leave peacefully, and this is being done.
7 So the consequence of all these attacks ordered by Naser Oric and
8 the ABiH as well as the NATO Air Force, the purpose of these attacks is
9 the liberation of Srebrenica. And then he says, I'm gathering
10 information on the civilian population and on the number of Muslim
11 soldiers who surrendered and so on and so forth. And then he swears a
12 little and he mentions the figure of 6.000, who are leaving towards the
13 north, 6.000 civilians who are leaving by heading northwards. And then
14 at 21 it says unidentified individuals, so I won't read that through.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page. [In
16 English] Next page, please.
17 Q. [Interpretation] The one in the middle, the paragraph in the
18 middle. At 2100 hours, Boro Djurdjevic, a journalist from the
19 Serbian Army, spoke to an unidentified person who couldn't be heard, and
20 Boro Djurdjevic said the following: [As read] Everything has been
21 completed. We had to do that. We regret the fact but, well, that's what
22 happened. And then he says he left a month ago and then we wouldn't
23 allow him to return. They are obviously referring to Oric. And then
24 something is said about what happened. And towards the bottom at 1745
25 hours, the office of the president of the so-called Republika Srpska was
1 called by a certain Mirko from abroad in order to convey information or
2 to say that it was possible for him to inform the aggressor forces in
3 advance of NATO attacks. He suggested if messages were obstructed again,
4 they could be conveyed through Kipa, probably the Belgrade-Pale axis is
5 concerned. Mirko doesn't speak Serbian very well, and the radio
6 interceptors who followed him didn't think that English was his mother
7 tongue either.
8 Have you already seen this intercept?
9 A. I believe that I -- I may have. Particularly I recall the third
10 part about the conversation with -- pertaining to Mirko and the fact that
11 there was a belief that they could give early warning on potential NATO
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could it be marked for
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D2240, Your Honours.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you could we now see 1D5087.
18 Looks like we don't have a translation for this either.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Were you informed of these reports from the 2nd Corps command
21 from the ABiH submitted to the ABiH Main Staff? It's on the fall of
22 Srebrenica. The analysis was made on the 28th of August, 1995.
23 A. I may have seen this report before, but I'm fairly sure that it
24 was not put in one of my -- my narrative reports.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we scroll up, please.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. I'll read out the part where it says that an assessment was made
4 according to which there would be a limited attack in order to take
5 control of the road that the Chetniks could use for the needs of the
6 mine. This was on the 6th of July, around 4.00, an all-out artillery and
7 infantry attack was launched against the Srebrenica enclave and so on and
8 so forth.
9 Can we see the next page. So just as you did, they concluded
10 that the task was to take control of the road; isn't that correct?
11 A. My conclusions are based on what the objectives are laid out in
12 the Krivaja 95 plan, which is to reduce Srebrenica to the urban area. I
13 don't believe that that corresponds to what's described here as what the
14 ABiH believed was simply taking control of a road in order to access a
16 Q. Thank you. I hope we'll have time to show a map from the
17 agreement. I'll read out the part that concerns what they did here. In
18 this part it says the command of the 28th Division knew about the
19 existence of the tunnel. This is the tunnel that was entered by our
20 sabotage troops, but they thought that it had been filled in. However,
21 Becirevic designated several groups. From the 2nd Corps command and the
22 General Staff, an order was issued stating that sabotage action should be
23 taken to draw the attention the enemy and to carry out reconnaissance of
24 the enemy in the depth. Becirevic designated several whose task was to
25 carry out reconnaissance and to take action only if necessary, and all
1 the groups carried out their task of reconnaissance without engaging in
2 combat, and they all returned.
3 One group set off in the direction of Kragivoda, and their task
4 was to engage in combat. So on that occasion they destroyed one vehicle
5 and killed three soldiers. One group was infiltrated in the Rupovo Brdo
6 area. They also engaged in combat and killed four Chetniks. All
7 sabotage and reconnaissance units from Zepa were issued the task to enter
8 the Han Pogled, Han Pijesak, and Sokolac area and reach the
9 Han Pijesak-Vlasenica road. According to the decision of the commander
10 of the Brigade 285, nine groups were formed which carried out these
11 tasks. These tasks engage in combat and killed about 60 Chetniks. One
12 group entered the village of Visnjica and set fire to several houses.
13 When these sabotage units returned from the Zepa area, the level
14 of morale was raised in the area of Srebrenica and elsewhere. Two or
15 three days before the units withdrew in the afternoon the command of the
16 28th Division was informed that they had broken through the defence line.
17 Assistance was requested. And then the last sentence says heavy weapons
18 that weren't surrendered to UNPROFOR were used throughout the combat
19 period. One mountain gun remained at its gun emplacement.
20 Can we see the next page, please.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's very difficult to follow the line
22 of questioning. What's the point of reading all this?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I didn't think I was going to
24 read out that much. There are only a few things that have been marked
25 that I wanted to read out, and these parts concern the attitude towards
1 the civilians, and it also -- they also concern the contents of this
3 Well, maybe I exaggerated a little with all these details.
4 Could we scroll up. I'll skip something.
5 It says given that the Chetniks at the time had already broken
6 through to Zabojna [phoen], Sabovo [phoen], Srebrenica on the previous
7 evening, the people broke into all the warehouses in the town. They took
8 all the food reserves and head off in the direction of Potocari and
9 panicked. That is where UNPROFOR troops sent them to under the pretext
10 that they also had the intention of going to Potocari.
11 Q. Mr. Butler, did you notice that they took all the food reserves,
12 and in fact it was said that there were no such food reserves?
13 A. I -- it wasn't part of my research to look at the issue related
14 to the civilians moving up to Potocari in that respect. I don't know if
15 they did or did not break into the various warehouses where food were
16 stored and took them with them or not. I just have no way of knowing
18 Q. Thank you. Can we see the next page. It says almost all the
19 civilian population - it's the second paragraph - almost all the civilian
20 population from the town and surrounding villages set off on the 11th of
21 July, 1995, around 1500 hours towards the main military base of UNPROFOR
22 in Potocari, and by 2000 hours on at that day, about 20.000 refugees had
24 Mr. Butler, can I remind you of a calculation? There were 20.000
25 in Potocari, 10- to 15.000 passing through the forests, and there was a
1 total of 35.000. So let me remind you of those figures and do those
2 figures tally now?
3 A. I take it that the point that you're seeking to make is that
4 there were a total of 35.000 people in the former enclave of Srebrenica,
5 20.000 of them went to Potocari, and that the column strength was between
6 10- and 15.000? Is that what you're -- okay.
7 I agree again 10- to 15.000 is within a range of numbers that I
8 believe is associated with the column. I think that the 20.000 figure is
9 low for the number of civilians that went to Potocari. I believe that
10 some of the Bosnian Serb military sources have a higher number than that,
11 and I believe - excuse me - that the UN's count has an even still higher
13 Q. Should one trust the Muslim authorities? Should they know who is
14 where? This is a report from the 2nd Corps. That was towards the end,
15 two months -- or, rather, a month and a half after the event in question.
16 A. Again, sir, I -- I don't trust anybody's numbers with respect to
17 these types of estimates simply because I know that there are multiple
18 numbers, each from what purports to be a reliable source. That's why
19 normally you'll here me speak in ranges.
20 So again I take your point that one would think that the military
21 and civilian leadership in Srebrenica would have the most accurate
22 numbers by virtue of being the civil, political control body for the
23 Bosnian Muslim government in the enclave, but again I have to point out
24 the fact that there are other numbers.
25 Q. Thank you. Let's have a look at the following part where it says
1 that although he wasn't an official representative of the civilian
2 population, at 2215 Mandic was called to go to Bratunac for negotiations,
3 and the Chetnik General, Mladic, was there on behalf of the Chetnik side.
4 And then Ljubisav Simic, the leadership of the Bratunac Serbian
5 municipality, Deronjic, and so on and so forth.
6 Then it says it was suggested to the Chetniks that authorisation
7 should be given for the evacuation of the civilian population under
8 UNPROFOR escort to the free territory.
9 Did you take this into consideration when you described the
10 manner in which the population was moved out from Potocari?
11 A. Again, setting aside this document, and perhaps going more
12 authoritatively to the transcripts of the second meeting and the third
13 meeting at the Hotel Fontana on the 11th and 12th of July, 1995, what was
14 said in those meeting and the promises made in those meetings is part of
15 the record.
16 At this juncture, I trust that the Court has heard extensive
17 testimony with respect to how those convoys departed Potocari, as well as
18 the Dutch Battalion escorts that were initially escorting them and, over
19 time, they lost the ability to do that. So I think those particular --
20 again, I never -- I don't characterise for the most part that movement.
21 Again, I believe that there is more than ample information out there
22 about that from more authoritative sources than me.
23 Q. Fair enough, Mr. Butler, but then I shouldn't be worried by the
24 fact that at one point in time you used the term "deportation" and at
25 another point in time you use the term "evacuation." You would leave
1 this to others who dealt with civilians, wouldn't you? But the Defence
2 is concerned, because in legal terms there's a difference between
3 deportation and evacuation. But in any event, you did not concern
4 yourself with the meaning of these terms, did you?
5 A. I am aware from a legal sense there is a difference in the phrase
6 "deportation" and -- or "forcible transfer," as well as the term
7 "evacuation." I understand that it is a legal issue that is before this
8 particular Trial Chamber, so -- I mean, questions that I have been asked
9 as to my opinion as to whether I believe that the Muslim population had a
10 realistic chance to stay or not to stay, I believe I've already given
11 answers to, and I don't believe that I'm the person who can qualify what
12 the actual movement out of Potocari was in a legal sense.
13 Q. [In English] Fair enough. Thank you. [Interpretation] Fair
14 enough. Thank you. Can we see the next page.
15 In the third -- or, rather, fourth paragraph it says on the night
16 between the 11th and 12th of July, 1995, a decision was taken on breaking
17 through in the direction of Tuzla. And then a little lower down it says
18 the commanders were ordered to line up the units and to form a column.
19 This was all on the night between the 11th and 12th of July, 1995.
20 Then a little lower down it says that there were about 6.000
21 armed troops, not counting the troops from Zepa.
22 And now let's have a look at the following passage.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll up a little more,
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
1 Q. It says that there were perhaps dozens of women. There weren't
2 many women and children. Perhaps there were -- there was about a dozen
3 women. As the column was moving forward, the commanders had received
4 instructions. Amongst other things, they were instructed to leave the
5 dead soldiers behind but to take the wounded with them.
6 In the course of your work, did anyone emphasise the fact that
7 the dead were to be left behind?
8 A. I -- I am aware that the -- what had in fact happened was that,
9 of course, the wounded were carried forward where they could be and that
10 the remains of soldiers or members of the column who had fell were left
11 where they are. I don't know that anyone emphasised that, but I mean I'm
12 aware that that's the case.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could this be admitted?
14 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, Your Honour. I was conferring. No, I
17 don't agree that this document be admitted, at least until -- I have no
18 objection to it being marked for identification until we have a
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll mark it for identification.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D2241, Your Honours.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now see
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. There is a map on page 3. It's an integral part of the agreement
1 on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica, and I won't ask to see whether it
2 was necessary for Zepa and Srebrenica to be separated, but the road
3 between them was to be free and under Serbian control.
4 JUDGE KWON: I was told that it hasn't been released.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [Microphone not activated]
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. This is the agreement on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica. It
8 was reached on the 18th of April, 1993. An agreement reached between
9 Mladic and Seferovic, the two generals. Can we see the next page.
10 Here we can see the signatures. So this is an agreement on
11 implementation. It's perhaps somewhat different in relation to the
12 agreement reached on the 18th.
13 Just a moment. Can we see the part that contains the map. I
14 think it's page number 3.
15 JUDGE KWON: Where do you see the signatures, Mr. Karadzic?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The signatures are on the original
17 Your Excellency, but this is the English translation. The original is
18 obviously in Serbian. It was signed by Gvero and some deputy of
19 Halilovic's, Divjak.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Can you see that as far as Srebrenica is concerned, you can see
22 the boundaries of the settlement, and these more regular lines mark those
24 Can you see the boundaries traced by these regular lines?
25 A. I see a boundary here that looks like a dotted and dashed line.
1 I believe that's the boundary you're referring to, sir.
2 Q. Yes, yes. Do you see the village of Pusmulici to the south which
3 is located outside those boundaries?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. Thank you. And can you see that these two zones are separated?
6 A. I take it what you're saying -- again, the village of
7 Pilici [sic] is outside that designated area around the urban area of
9 Q. Thank you. And to the south can you see the area that's been
10 delimited there, and can you see that there's a free stretch of territory
11 between those two areas, a stretch of territory that isn't included in
12 this drawing?
13 A. I'm not tracking what you're -- which -- what you're referring
15 Q. Are these two enclaves contiguous, or are they two distinct or
16 separate enclaves? What would you say if you have a look at this map
17 that is attached to the agreement on implementation?
18 A. The -- I'm only seeing one designated enclave or one designated
19 area by that dotted and dashed line. I'm not seeing the second one. I
20 mean, are you referring to in that case the area of terrain that's kind
21 of diagonally crossed or -- I mean, I don't know what -- you're talking
22 about a second one.
23 Q. Yes, but is the enclave here attached to Zepa? Is the Srebrenica
24 enclave attached to Zepa?
25 A. No, sir.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, could this agreement on
2 implementation together with the map be admitted?
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: No objection, Your Honour. I was still just
5 trying to find where the map is appended to the agreement, but I don't
7 JUDGE KWON: You do not dispute the authenticity of this
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Not of the agreement, and this is a map which he
10 has pulled. I haven't yet found that this map is actually attached to
11 the same document signed by Gvero, which it was said that it was. I'm
12 still looking at that.
13 JUDGE KWON: But I find it somewhat strange that the signature is
14 lacking in this document.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Yeah. I mean -- at this point I do not have an
16 objection. I may have some more comments on this agreement and map as I
17 look into it. I do not believe we were notified of this map and
18 document, so I'm a little bit behind in trying to figure it out, but at
19 this time I don't object to its admission, but I may have a submission on
20 it later.
21 JUDGE KWON: More specifically, my question was whether this is a
22 draft or this is a signed agreement given that the signatures were
23 lacking, but whatever the factual situation it was, we'll receive it.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2242, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we briefly see
1 P4491, which was admitted during your examination-in-chief. 4941.
2 Sorry, I got the number wrong. It's a P number, P4941, a Prosecution
3 exhibit. Page 4 in e-court.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Do we agree that Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde are marked here
6 and delineated?
7 A. Yes, sir. There are -- there are delineated -- there are
8 delineated lines in this that would reflect the former safe areas of --
9 or Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we zoom in on the right side,
11 Eastern Bosnia.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do we agree that on this map, too, we see clearly that the
14 enclaves were not agreed to be joined? There is a passage between them,
15 and the passage is under Serbian control.
16 A. Again, the -- the fact is that the Srebrenica and the Zepa
17 enclaves were considered to be by the United Nations separate enclaves.
18 They were not one large enclave. The second one -- I mean, the
19 presumption, obviously, is that if the enclaves are not under
20 United Nations' control, that outside the territory, outside the enclave,
21 would of course be Bosnian Serb.
22 Q. Did you notice in that report, the Muslim report on the fall,
23 that Pusmulici village fell, but it wasn't even supposed to be in the
24 area, because we see on the map it was supposed to fall outside the area.
25 Do you agree, therefore, that the Muslim side expanded the area so much
1 that Zepa and Srebrenica ended up being joined?
2 A. I -- again as I have testified, I am aware that there was a
3 difference in opinion between certainly the VRS as -- and the United
4 Nations as to what the actual demarcated boundaries of the enclave were.
5 I do not know who was responsible for what ultimately would be the rough
6 boundaries which correspond to where the United Nations' observation
7 posts were, whether that was something that was Bosnian Muslims were
8 behind or whether that was something that the UN themselves decided.
9 Regardless of where the markings were, even though the enclaves
10 were physically separated, the overall concern of the VRS is that
11 military troops from the 28th Infantry Division at Srebrenica, as well as
12 the brigade of the division in Zepa, did have constant communication back
13 and forth and could travel through various paths and valleys back and
14 forth between the Srebrenica and the Zepa enclave. So when you read in
15 the military documents where the military is talking about the context of
16 cutting the enclaves in two and separating the enclaves, what they mean
17 in a military text or context is that they need to stop these Muslim
18 military forces that are going back and forth between the two.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: And if I can just ask for some clarity, is
20 Mr. Karadzic's case that on 2nd July, 1995, that there was only one large
21 enclave, that the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves were not separate - and he
22 referred to the village of Pusmulici being outside - is his case that
23 Muslims were not allowed to live outside the boundaries of this -- of
24 these two smaller enclaves and were not allowed to have villages or exist
25 outside these enclaves, which is what it appears to be saying?
1 MR. ROBINSON: Again, Mr. President, we object to -- there's no
2 need for Dr. Karadzic to state his case. He's putting questions to this
3 witness on cross-examination, so we don't believe that he should be
4 required to state his case.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We agree with Mr. Robinson. Let's move on.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. First of all, I'd like to ask you, were you aware, did you
8 familiarise yourself with the manipulations done with dead bodies when
9 bodies were collected to be placed in other areas at a convenient moment?
10 Are you aware that the Muslim side engaged in that sort of thing? It
11 delayed the burials in order to be able to use these bodies in a
12 different place?
13 A. No, sir, I'm not aware of that.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5192, please, is the next
15 document I want.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. If the translation does not appear, I'm sorry. Maybe page 2 is
18 the translation. I see this has been used somewhere. There must be a
19 translation. It seems to be accepted in this case as an MFI.
20 This is dated 20th March. Look at paragraph 5 that begins with
21 the date 27 March.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please zoom in for the
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. It talks about an attack by the Wasps who killed 12 Serbian
1 fighters. It says they mounted an attack on the Vozuca front and on that
2 occasion captured or killed 12 Serbian fighters. In a counter-attack by
3 the VRS, the source claims they suffered losses of about 160 fighting
4 men. They do not bury their fighters at cemeteries so that none of the
5 families know about their relatives lost, and the hodzas prohibit
6 funerals from being organised.
7 This supports my thesis that bodies were manipulated. It says
8 here that 160 fighters were killed there, and our intelligence service
9 found out in March 1995 that these bodies had been relocated. Do you now
10 see how it was possible to manipulate -- to manipulate the bodies?
11 A. Sir, what -- what it says is that a source is that -- a source of
12 information that they're reporting up is saying that. That is one
13 isolated report of which I have no way to either confirm or deny. That
14 is the belief of the source, and it's being reported up through the
15 intelligence chain of the Drina Corps to the Main Staff. I don't know
16 whether they even assign any credibility to that particular source or
17 not. So it's just information.
18 Q. Thank you. I won't put it to you that weapons were shipped from
19 Iran via Split to the Tuzla airport.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since this is an MFI document, I'll
21 call another one. Could we see 1D5190.
22 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. This is also from the intelligence section of the Drina Corps.
25 They are informing the Main Staff, and it says confirmation was received
1 that enemy forces from the 28th and 21st Divisions raised their combat
2 readiness and are reinforcing their forces at the forward end. By active
3 reconnaissance and scouting of our positions, they're trying to
4 infiltrate sabotage groups among the disposition of our units. The units
5 of the 28th Division are intensively scouting our positions and mounting
6 sabotage actions against the firing positions of the artillery in order
7 to cause fear, panic, and disorganisation in our ranks.
8 And then it says we have unconfirmed information that the Dutch
9 Battalion in Srebrenica returned to the Muslims all the weapons that had
10 been taken away from them, around 1500 rifles. It says the forces of the
11 Dutch Battalion plan to recover the observation point in Zeleni Jadar by
12 force by 14 June 1995.
13 Did you have in your hands this document which speaks volumes
14 about the preparations made and the co-operation between the
15 28th Division and the Dutch Battalion of the UNPROFOR?
16 A. I'm not sure that I've seen this document before or not. Again,
17 it's an intelligence report of intelligence information that's being
18 passed on, and I would again remind you that according to the text of the
19 report itself, they're not able to -- to even confirm the information
20 that they're forwarding, and I'm not aware that the Dutch Battalion did,
21 in fact, turn 1500 rifles over to the 28th Infantry Division in June of
23 Q. Do you know that the Dutch Battalion offered it to them, but they
24 refused, saying they had more modern weapons? And do you know that there
25 were weapons shipments throughout the period of existence of the
1 protected area?
2 A. Two separate questions. I am aware that approximately on the 9th
3 or I believe it may even be as late as the 10th of July the issue was
4 raised whether or not the weapons that were held by the UN should be
5 returned to the Muslims. I don't know that they ever did that, because I
6 think the Muslim position was no, they wanted the UN to defend them at
7 that juncture.
8 As to your second question, during the entire course of the
9 existence of the enclaves, I believe it's well documented that Bosnian
10 2nd Corps did provide weapons. They were smuggled in over land through
11 many known smuggling routes, ammunition, things of that nature.
12 Again, as I've testified previously, the 28th Infantry Division,
13 notwithstanding the disarmament agreement, was never disarmed and
14 represented a military fighting force at the beginning of July 1995.
15 Q. Thank you. Since we will be seeing each other again on Monday,
16 we will go through that list which made you believe that the change from
17 O to T was related to localities. But now I'd like to go through your
18 summary. Could you please take a hard copy of your report. Maybe it
19 will be easier.
20 One of the first things in the first paragraph and the second
21 paragraph, you say that the Muslim forces organised themselves very
22 quickly after the Serbian action. Do you stand by that view that the
23 Muslim forces started to organise themselves only after the Serbian
24 attack, as you put it? It says facing the forces of Bosnian Muslims who
25 quickly organised themselves. Do you know that the Muslim side had their
1 own Patriotic League and organised their own forces even before the war
3 A. Sir, perhaps if it would assist, if you could tell me which
4 report and the number of the paragraph that you're referring to.
5 Q. I'm talking about the revised narrative, the summary, paragraph
6 number 1, year 2002.
7 A. Which -- which paragraph again, sir?
8 Q. The first one. You say that municipal Territorial Defence and
9 later units of the VRS and commands that tried to expand the control of
10 the Bosnian Serbs in that territory were facing the resistant forces of
11 the Bosnian Muslims who were speedily organising themselves.
12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters also cannot find this text.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Have you established when the Muslim armed forces were organised?
15 Do you know that the decision to form the Patriotic League was made on
16 the 30th March 1991, implemented on 30th April of 1991, and already in
17 June every municipality had both a staff and a brigade in July 1991?
18 A. I am not aware of the specifics related to the establishment of
19 the Patriotic League and various dates. I am aware that during 1991,
20 many of the municipal organs split to reflect one for the Serbs and one
21 for the Muslims during various points of time. So I mean that's as close
22 as I can get to an answer. I don't know any of the details with respect
23 to each municipality and by what dates what various staffs or brigades
24 were established by.
25 Q. Do you know that only the Serbian side did not have an organised
1 army, because it relied on the federal army, the JNA, to protect it?
2 A. My understanding is that somewhere around November/December of
3 1991, even while the JNA was still present in Bosnia, that there were
4 various local Territorial Defence units that were set up and ultimately
5 placed under the command of municipal Crisis Staffs. I do agree that of
6 all three parties to the conflict, to the largest extent the Serb side
7 believed that its interests in protected by the Yugoslav national army.
8 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 2 you say that in November, not long
9 after the establishment of the Drina Corps, the VRS started a campaign of
10 expulsion of Bosnian Muslims, including Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas.
11 Does this look -- doesn't this look like a ready-made judgement,
12 Mr. Butler? It certainly sounds like an indictment, but when you say it,
13 then it also sounds like a judgement. A verdict.
14 Why in November 1992 and the spring 1993, why didn't it start
16 A. The goal of my report, and even the part about the executive
17 summary where the events of 1992 and 1993 are discussed, are simply to
18 set the context so that the reader of the report would understand how all
19 of the parties got to the month of July 1995, how the people who were
20 scattered throughout Eastern Bosnia came to be in a United Nations
21 enclave, how the military forces moved, where they were habitually
22 assigned, and also reflects the various reports and the operations that
24 Again, I'm not -- as I noted in my reports, I'm not writing a
25 definitive history of the conflict in Eastern Bosnia. I am writing about
1 the military aspects with respect to what happened in Srebrenica in 1995.
2 There are -- there is a lot of context --
3 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
4 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I was checking whether the LiveNote is
6 working. It's working on the common drive but not in the personal
7 computer, but we can continue. Please continue.
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I note that there is a lot of
9 information with respect to what has happened in Eastern Bosnia from 1991
10 to July of 1995 that, I presume, the Trial Chamber has heard or will here
11 that is not in my report, and that in and of itself would add many
12 volumes to my report. But again, the limited goal that I undertook was
13 simply to be able to set the context so that a reader of my narrative
14 would understand in relatively short order how the situation in July 1995
15 was created.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My LiveNote is also not working,
17 but I hope it will be repaired.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. If I understood you correctly, Mr. Butler; am I to conclude that
20 you did not study or establish the facts that are contained in your
21 report and relate to the period before July 1995?
22 Did you get interpretation?
23 A. I did, sir. I was just waiting for -- it looks like there's some
24 technical problems.
25 JUDGE KWON: Would it be okay to continue?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I can, unless Mr. Butler is
2 waiting for a check of the transcript. If my question has been
3 interpreted and he's able to answer, we can continue.
4 JUDGE KWON: There seems to be a technical difficulties, so that
5 the Registry cannot publish documents through e-court. Shall we take a
6 brief break so that we can check?
7 We'll rise for five minutes.
8 --- Break taken at 2.27 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 2.38 p.m.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. If I understood correctly, Mr. Butler, you did not study anything
14 before July 1995. You only took this on in order to better understand
15 July 1995; right?
16 A. Correct, sir. While I have some history -- or have some of the
17 historical background from Eastern Bosnia in there in the narrative, the
18 primary focus of the narrative relates to the recounting of events for
19 July of 1995.
20 Q. Thank you. Then I will not challenge what you took from others.
21 In order to better understand, I challenged it on prior occasions.
22 Tell me, on what basis did you conclude that the killing in
23 Cerska took place on the 13th of July?
24 A. The Cerska killing is a somewhat problematic date identification.
25 It was in this context primarily testimonial based, and again, I used it
1 simply to set the context. A particular witness who testified about
2 seeing buses rolling down the Cerska Valley road, as well as earth moving
3 equipment going in afterwards, and when one looks at that particular
4 statement that we used and counted back the days, the conclusion was that
5 it occurred on the 13th of July.
6 Q. Very well. However, that was not proven in some other way. For
7 instance, somebody being seen alive on the 17th of July and then found in
8 an undisturbed grave.
9 A. Yes, sir. I am aware of that, that there is DNA evidence that
10 would conflict with that 13 July date. Again, that information was not
11 available to anyone when that first estimate of the 13 July came out, and
12 I do concede that an identification exactly when the Cerska grave was
13 installed is problematic, at least as far as my review of military
14 documents is concerned.
15 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 4, chapter 4, you accepted that
16 Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans, on behalf of his superiors, asked for the
17 withdrawal of the Dutch Battalion, the Muslim population, and Doctors
18 Without Borders; right?
19 A. Correct, sir. I mean, I summarised that in 4.4.
20 Q. Thank you. 4.7 and 4.8, this is where you point out -- or,
21 rather, you convey the transcript of the conversation between
22 General Mladic and others at the second meeting, and then on the 12th of
23 July; right?
24 A. In paragraph 4.7, I source that information in part from not only
25 the tapes or the transcripts of those meetings -- the video-tapes of the
1 meetings that were subsequently made into transcripts, I should say, but
2 I also cite it to the report that the DutchBat commander sent to his
4 Q. Thank you. Before I go back to this topic, I wanted to ask you
5 the following: Did you notice, for example, the daily reports that are
6 sent from the brigade to the corps do not reach me in the same form? For
7 example, also police reports. A lot of detail is lost by the time these
8 reports reach the minister and then even more detail is lost if they're
9 sent further up to me.
10 A. I -- I can -- on the military side, I believe it is clear that
11 when one looks at the reporting from the brigades to the Drina Corps and
12 then what is then ultimately incorporated to the Main Staff is obviously
13 summarised. Part of the job of the staff is to select those topical
14 issues which they believe are relevant that the higher headquarters needs
15 to be aware of.
16 With respect to the police reports, clearly we have the RD
17 reports and the -- the RDB reports as well as the MUP reports from Vasic
18 that are going at least to the police staff. I'm not sure I can comment
19 on what information from the police staff or those reports that went
20 directly to Mr. Kovac, what Mr. Kovac may or may not have relayed to you.
21 Q. Thank you. Do we agree -- or, rather, have you established that
22 POWs in Kravica were guarded by the police, not by the army?
23 A. My understanding is that while there were some army soldiers
24 present, the majority of the forces that were guarding the people in
25 Kravica on 13 July 1995 were comprised of the 2nd Sekovici Detachment
1 personnel and personnel from the 1st PJP company from Zvornik.
2 Q. Thank you. Have you seen a report about this event? It's more
3 than an incident, so I'm not going to call it an incident. Did you see a
4 report that was sent to anyone or me in particular?
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, just what's the incident? Because before
6 we were talking about the wounding of the -- of Mr. Tudoric [phoen] and
7 some of the Serb forces, or are we talking about the mass execution?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm going to call it "event," the
9 wounding and everything that happened after the wounding. So
10 Mr. Nicholls is not going to be assisted by me in any way in formulating
11 what this event was.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm not asking for formulating the event, and he's
13 helped clarify it a bit. It's just if you say the incident at Kravica,
14 the way the cross has gone that could have referred to several different
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Did you see a report that was being sent to someone, or to me in
19 particular, in order to provide me with this information about the
20 dramatic happenings in the building of the cooperative in Kravica around
21 1700 hours?
22 A. I am not aware that through the normal military reporting
23 channels that either the army or the MUP reported that there was a
24 massacre at Kravica at 1700 hours on the 13th of July, or in the case of
25 the MUP that they were primarily responsible for it. There is that, of
1 course, one written notation that comes well after the fact by Mr. Vasic,
2 talking about the job that the first PJP company was involved in. So in
3 that respect, given that there were no written reports that I'm aware of
4 passed up either to the police or the army staffs, I don't know how you
5 would have gotten that in a written form. Obviously I cannot speak to
6 what verbally any individual in Bratunac may or may not have told you.
7 Q. Thank you. Did you observe my presence in Bratunac or Srebrenica
8 in the month of July 1995?
9 A. I do not know if you were in Bratunac or Srebrenica during the
10 month of July 1995. I believe the first time that your presence is noted
11 is as a result of a 2 August 1995 daily report from the Bratunac Brigade
12 which reflects the fact that you and General Krstic were meeting in
13 Srebrenica on that day.
14 Q. Let me correct you. It's just two days. On the 2nd of August I
15 was in Drvar, and I tried to change the formation of the Main Staff into
16 the staff of the Supreme Command, and it was on the 4th that I was in
17 this region attending a religious ceremony; isn't that right?
18 A. Again I'll take your word at that. It's been a lot of years
19 since I looked at that document, but I believe it's cited in my report,
20 so it's easily verifiable one way or another.
21 Q. I would like to ask you to look at paragraph 5.7, where you say
22 that Vasic, the chief of the CJB, that over 100 trucks have already been
23 provided. Now it seems to me that the English translation says, "Have
24 already been provided." And the Prosecution cares very much about the
25 actual hours involved, whether it was after the third meeting at 10.00 or
1 whether it was after 8.00 after the meeting in the Bratunac Brigade.
2 However, now I'm going to ask the interpreters to confirm or deny
3 this. When you say "obezbediti" in our language, doesn't that mean
4 "secured"? So it was found out where it exists, but it hasn't actually
5 been provided yet. So the information was that these 100 trucks exist.
6 Do you see the difference between these two different meanings,
7 between "secured" and "provided"?
8 A. I take your point with respect to at the time that Mr. Vasic was
9 writing this report that there were not already 100 trucks on the ground
10 at Bratunac. I think if you read that in conjunction with 5.5, it notes
11 that all through the evening hours the Ministry of Defence, at the
12 request of the army, had been looking to essentially secure and identify
13 weeks that could be sent to Bratunac.
14 In the case of any discrepancies in language, I would again, you
15 know, invite the Court to go back to the original document. Like -- like
16 I said yesterday, I'm at the mercy of CLSS with respect to English
17 language translations from Bosnian Serb documents. So if there is any
18 question about the discrepancy of the language, you know, please refer
19 back to the original document I cite.
20 Q. Thank you. I fully accept that, but quite simply that would be a
21 major undertaking, because after all these are nuances in translation
22 that are involved and meanings are quite different. But thank you at any
24 You see, 514 here. That is something that concerns me, although
25 you have kindly said that you do not deal with qualifying the evacuation
1 of the population. So this is what 514 says:
2 "To support this continuing movement the Ministry of Defence
3 issued an order on the 13th of July 1995 to the local Secretariat of
4 Defence for the Bijeljina municipality," and so on and so forth.
5 So let me ask you the following: On the basis of your experience
6 and your theoretical knowledge, was this not a major risk for us, to have
7 so many civilians, 20.000 civilians, relocated from their homes in a
8 small area, in an area where personal revenge is highly likely?
9 A. Yes, sir. It is a risk. And as time goes on, it notes to be
10 that. To mitigate that risk, many civilians from the local population
11 were not permitted to enter Potocari on the 12th and the 13th, and there
12 was a variety of military and police forces sent there also to ensure
13 control. So while there are some instances individualistic killings in
14 Potocari that occur on the 12th, in the evening of the 12th and the 13th,
15 I don't believe they compare in number to the same types of
16 individualistic killings that you see in and around Bratunac that is
17 occurring where there are less military and police forces to guard the
18 prisoners and that the local population has freer access to them.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Thank you --
22 JUDGE KWON: We will stop here today. You have spent almost the
23 same time as the Prosecution did for its examination-in-chief, all be it
24 minus five or nine minutes. How much more would you need on Monday to
25 conclude your cross-examination?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellencies, taking
2 into account the reports, although Mr. Butler has just made things easier
3 for me now that I focus only on July 1995, because that is his authentic
4 research, so I would really like to have two sessions if that would be
5 possible. I think that would be a very good thing.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber will give you a session on
9 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I'll need to move into
11 private session for a request related to a filing.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Could the Chamber move into private session.
13 MR. TIEGER: I don't --
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second we're still in open session.
15 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 [Private session]
16 [Open session]
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for your understanding, Mr. Butler.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
19 JUDGE KWON: We will rise for this week and resume on Monday at
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.01 p.m.,
22 to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd day
23 of April, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.