Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 27717

 1                           Friday, 20 April 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Good morning, Mr. Butler.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 8                           WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  I just

11     need a minute.  [Microphone not activated]

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, please.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

15     Good morning to everyone.

16                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:  [Continued]

17        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Butler.

18        A.   Good morning, sir.

19        Q.   If you agree, with your leave, I'd like to deal with

20     July [as interpreted] 1995 -- or, rather, with the year 1995 now.  Let's

21     see what your understanding was with regard to the year 1995, what

22     conclusions you draw about that year.

23             Are you aware of the fact that in Sarajevo the Muslim side

24     launched a large-scale offensive on the 15th [as interpreted] of June,

25     1995?

Page 27718

 1        A.   Yes, sir.  It was one of many offensives that the Bosnian Muslims

 2     had launched that year.  One was in the zone of the 2nd Corps, one was in

 3     the zone of the 1st Corps.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Could we see 1D2985.  Perhaps it has been admitted

 5     already.  1D2985.

 6             Have you ever seen this document?  Did you come across this

 7     document on the 17th of July?  According to this document UNPROFOR and

 8     its services provided information on a large-scale offensive in the

 9     vicinity of Sarajevo, and you can see the contents on page number 1.

10     Have a look at that.  And on page number 2, you can see other details

11     about this.

12             So you're aware of this.  You knew about it, didn't you?

13        A.   Yes, sir, in the sense again I didn't see this specific document

14     or I don't recall seeing it, but certainly I'm aware of the fact that at

15     that particular time the Bosnian 1st Corps was launching major military

16     operations out of the area.

17             THE ACCUSED:  I see Mr. Nicholls.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.  Excuse me.  Just that

20     the document is dated 17 June.  Mr. Karadzic said -- or the transcript

21     says 17 July.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted?  I

24     see it's already been admitted.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 27719

 1        Q.   Did you come across any documents according to which the

 2     28th Division under Naser Oric's command, although he wasn't in the

 3     enclave, launched large-scale offensives against the Serbian territories

 4     in order, amongst other things, to assist the 1st Corps in Sarajevo?

 5        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, I wouldn't categorise them as large-scale

 6     offensives.  However, I am aware, and I have seen documents that reflect

 7     that the 28th Division was ordered by 2nd Corps to conduct raids and

 8     other attacks out of the enclave for the primary purpose of engaging the

 9     Bosnian Serb military forces in that area in order to prevent them from

10     being transferred from the Srebrenica area to the Sarajevo area.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we see 1D3900,

12     please.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   As you can see here, the 2nd Corps is congratulating the

15     28th Division command, and in particular the 285th Brigade, on

16     successfully having undertaken action which aided in raising the blockade

17     of Sarajevo and so on and so forth.

18             In paragraph number four it says:

19             "Take all steps to prevent people from leaving the area of

20     Srebrenica and Zepa.  Which for you at this moment is one of the most

21     important task if not the most important one," et cetera.

22             So it says that the aggressor forces, the Serb forces control the

23     Caparde and Kladanj axis or roads.  Is this what you had in mind and were

24     you aware of -- of this matter, of the fact that they were congratulated?

25        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe -- I believe I saw this document previously,

Page 27720

 1     I believe, if I'm correct, during the Tolimir trial.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could it be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2233, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now see

 6     1D5542.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Would you agree that here the president of the municipality, of

 9     the Muslim municipality, Suljic, Osman Suljic, agreed to launching a

10     campaign on the 1st of July, 1995.  He said he agreed to that and that he

11     would accept everything that was stated in his name.

12        A.   I'm not sure what you refer to in the phrase of "launching a

13     campaign" on 1st July.  I assume given that we're talking about

14     psychological and propaganda activities, we're talking about some form of

15     a media or propaganda campaign, but certainly it is an endorsement by

16     that individual of whatever that is.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And this psychological and propaganda activity was

18     directed against the Serbs and against the United Nations.  Isn't that

19     so?

20        A.   Yes, sir.  That's what it says.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could it be adopted --

22     admitted.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2234, Your Honours.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now see D1062.

Page 27721

 1     D1062.  It's already been admitted.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Mr. Butler, do we agree that this is dated the 30th of June?

 4     It's an operations report on what they did in order to help with the

 5     raising of the blockade of Sarajevo.  They eliminated 13 Chetniks or,

 6     rather, Serbs.  They confiscated weapons.  Under item 2 it says they

 7     eliminated 7 Chetniks, obtained a significant amount of weapons.  Three,

 8     it says in order to divert enemy forces from the Sarajevo theatre and

 9     stretch them out towards Srebrenica and Zepa, a number of successful acts

10     of sabotage were carried out on the 26th of June, 1995, at the following

11     locations:  In the area of Han Pijesak and Vlasenica municipalities, 20

12     to 40 kilometres deep inside territory temporarily occupied by the enemy;

13     Visnjica settlement and Bajta [phoen] stronghold, Crna Rijeka area.  Do

14     we agree that in Crna Rijeka area the Main Staff of the VRS was there?

15     In fact, the man staff of the VRS was located in Crna Rijeka; isn't that

16     correct?

17        A.   To get to both of your questions, yes, I agree with your

18     interpretation of the document as to what it's describing.  It is

19     recounting a series of raids by members of the 28th Division against

20     Bosnian Serb military installations or other villages, and I also agree

21     that Crna Rijeka was the headquarters of the VRS Main Staff.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Have a look at paragraph 3.  It says that 40 Serbs

23     were killed there and they have information according to which the Serbs

24     had a total of 71 soldiers who were killed.  One was captured and

25     several -- a certain amount of livestock was also confiscated.  And in

Page 27722

 1     the village of Visnjica, if you remember this, they admitted that

 2     civilians were victims.  Do you remember the name of that village,

 3     Visnjica, and that date, the 26th of June?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.  Again I am familiar with that.  Not all of the

 5     specifics, but I am familiar with that particular reference being

 6     mentioned in a number of Bosnian Serb military documents.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Excuse me, Your Honour, if there's questions on

 9     this document I wonder if Mr. Butler could also see page 2 and see who

10     signed it and get an idea of the whole document.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Mr. Butler, do you remember that when Naser Oric was absent,

13     Ramiz Becirevic replaced him as staff commander?

14        A.   Yes, sir.  He was the acting commander of the 28th Infantry

15     Division.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Under item 4 you can see that it mentions how the

17     Serbs, their enemy, ceased to send forces to the surroundings of

18     Sarajevo, and they attracted some forces from Zepa and Srebrenica, and

19     then it mentions how the fighting continued, in what manner fire was

20     opened.

21        A.   Yes.  I mean, paragraph 4 relates a number of particular issues

22     that they were talking about, and as well as some of the things that were

23     occurring to them.  So this is just simply a recap of the overall

24     situation.

25        Q.   Thank you.  So do you remember when that order was issued, the

Page 27723

 1     order for combat that we had a look at yesterday, and we were wondering

 2     whether it was a matter of an operation or of combat.  Was it on the 2nd

 3     of July?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.  That was one of two orders that was issued on the 2nd

 5     of July, 1995, pertaining to Krivaja 95.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now see 1D5541, and I apologise if it has

 7     already been admitted, but this is the number that I have.  I apologise

 8     to everyone, because the translation of this document has not yet been

 9     completed.  I'll read it out and the interpreters will follow.

10             This is the Presidency of the transitional Municipal Council of

11     Srebrenica, dated the 9th of July.  It says:  "Urgent."  It's being sent

12     to Alija Izetbegovic, Haris Silajdzic, Rasim Delic the Supreme Commander,

13     and Sead Delic the 2nd Corps commander, and it says the conclusions from

14     the session of the Presidency, the Presidency of the municipality, with

15     regard to the critical situation that has developed in the enclave.

16             "On the basis of information from the 28th Division command, our

17     lines have fallen in the southern part of the enclave in the Pusmulici

18     sector.  This has created the conditions allowing the aggressor to

19     rapidly enter the town itself.  Once that line fell, the population from

20     Slapovici and Pusmulici moved out.  There were about 4.000 of them."

21             Mr. Butler, do you agree that these 4.000 people were previously

22     included in the number of the population in the enclave, because this

23     transfer of the population prior to the fighting was something that took

24     place within the enclave itself?

25        A.   It is my understanding that these 4.000 people were already

Page 27724

 1     residing in the enclave at the time this occurred.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And then the paragraph goes on to say that:

 3             "There's general chaos in the town and the displaced -- or the

 4     refugee population is on the streets.  The shelling from a number of

 5     directions which continues.  No one knows how many wounded and dead there

 6     are in the town.  The Muslims from Podrinje are threatened with a

 7     terrible catastrophe, and this is why we're begging you to help the

 8     people of Podrinje.  Also, organise rapidly a session of the government

 9     and of the Presidency.  The UNPROFOR forces in Srebrenica are panicking

10     and trying to protect themselves.  They are withdrawing towards the camp

11     in Srebrenica, whereas one --"

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  I can save Mr. Karadzic some time in reading.  We

13     can bring up a translation.  Mr. Reid's found it.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we put it on the ELMO.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, so I don't have to read it

18     out.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   So they're asking the government and the Presidency to inform

21     them by 1400 hours on the 9th of July, 1995, and it's signed by

22     Osman Suljic, president of the interim Municipal Council of Srebrenica.

23     Have you already come across this document?

24        A.   I'm not sure whether I -- I mean, I -- I understand the

25     circumstances and am familiar with that.  I just don't recall if I've

Page 27725

 1     ever seen this particular document before.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could it be admitted.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2235, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now see

 6     1D5540.  And would Mr. Nicholls be so kind as to produce the translation

 7     again if he has one -- apparently, we do have a translation of this

 8     document.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Yes.  On the very same day, on the 9th, this was drafted a little

11     later, probably, because he requested that a report be submitted by

12     2.00 p.m.  Now here it says that there are no forward food reserves apart

13     from the fact that the army has food reserves for one week.

14             Where did the army obtain such food reserves, food reserves for

15     one week?  Would you agree that humanitarian aid in this case has been

16     taken advantage of, that it's been put to the wrong use?

17        A.   Yes, sir, I do agree.  And I believe that there's been evidence,

18     certainly in other cases I've been involved in, which reflects that the

19     28th Infantry Division did divert some of the UNPROFOR and other

20     international aid to be used for the purposes of the 28th Infantry

21     Division.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that on that day it was in the

23     evening after 22.20, General Krstic informed the Main Staff that he had

24     the opportunity of liberating Srebrenica, of entering Srebrenica, and

25     half an hour later Tolimir sent a telegram back to him with my approval.

Page 27726

 1     So it was only on the 9th in the evening that the Serbian forces

 2     considered the possibility of entering Srebrenica.  Would you agree with

 3     that?  Do you remember those documents?  Perhaps I don't need to produce

 4     them.

 5        A.   Yes, sir, I do recall the documents, and I -- again I agree with

 6     your assertion.  The base Krivaja 95 operations plan does not reflect the

 7     objective of taking the town of Srebrenica, and I believe that based on

 8     the documents that you've just noted that the goal of taking the town of

 9     Srebrenica was arrived at, as you've described, on the evening of 9

10     April [sic] 1995.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could it be admitted.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2236, Your Honours.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry.  Sorry.  Just for the transcript it says

15     9 April 1995.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It should read 9 of July.

17             THE WITNESS:  Hope I didn't misspeak.  Yes.  9 July, sir.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now, if you agree, I'll skip a few days to the 10th

20     and the 11th, because your testimony and report is more important for the

21     events that happened after those dates, from the 13th onwards; isn't that

22     correct?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see 65 ter document 35042,

24     please.  And the number of intercept is 0415-0111.  1011, and the date is

25     the 12th of July.

Page 27727

 1             JUDGE KWON:  This is of 998 pages document.  Could you tell the

 2     page number.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The number I have is 0415/1011, but

 4     I'll find the page number now.  In the meantime could we see the

 5     intercept that concerns the conversation between myself and

 6     General Zivanovic, and the date is the 8th of July.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry.  No objection.  Mr. Reid says that the page

 8     Mr. Karadzic is looking for for the intercept, this one, is 888.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Correct.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Thank you very much for

11     your help.  Can we have that page called up then, please.

12             JUDGE KWON:  But we don't have English translation for it.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No.  No.  0415-1011.  That would be

14     the right number.  So this isn't it.

15             12th of June -- well, never mind.  While we're looking for that,

16     could we please have the intercept from the 8th of July.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  That's tab 26, if Mr. Butler needs a hard copy.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have exhibit number, Mr. Nicholls?

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  4484.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Where Tri Sise is mentioned.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes.  I believe that, if I'm correct, that's the

22     recording, not intercept that Mr. Karadzic is referring to.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, precisely.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Mr. Butler, do you agree that this is a conversation in which I

Page 27728

 1     wish to receive a bit more information from General Zivanovic in terms of

 2     how things have been developing?

 3        A.   Yes, sir.

 4        Q.   Do you agree that means that I did not find the regular combat

 5     reports to be sufficient?

 6        A.   Well, sir, what I would say is in the regular combat report come

 7     once every 24 hours.  Obviously, as you're aware, the situation around

 8     Srebrenica was dramatically changing in a very dynamic manner every

 9     several hours, so it's unsurprising that you would - and again, as I've

10     testified previously - call to the relevant military commander in order

11     to fully apprise yourself of the situation as it was occurring.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Did you find this part here that I'm asking how the

13     situation is evolving, I'm asking whether they're satisfied, is that the

14     essence of this conversation?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in

16     Serbian now.

17             THE WITNESS:  Well, that is the first part.  The second part of

18     the conversation is that General Zivanovic uses this conversation as an

19     opportunity to raise with you the fact that he believes he, and in this

20     sense the Drina Corps because he's referring both to General Zivanovic

21     and, of course, his Chief of Staff, General Krstic, will need additional

22     forces to continue forward, and the second part of the discussion

23     reflects not only your awareness of what forces they're talking about but

24     the fact that they're currently deployed in other operations around

25     Sarajevo.  So it is a two-part conversation in that regard.

Page 27729

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that at the time shells were falling in

 2     Pale?  That's where I lived.  That's where my daughter was getting

 3     married around the middle of that month.  Do you know that Pale is part

 4     of Sarajevo and that we were in danger?  We were in danger of being

 5     overcome by the corps that had three or four times more soldiers than we

 6     did.

 7        A.   I am aware that Pale is often referred to as Serb Sarajevo.  I

 8     understand the military situation that was occurring in and around the

 9     area.  I did not know, and I do not know, whether or not artillery shells

10     fell on Pale as part of that.

11        Q.   You certainly knew that before the war Pale was part of

12     metropolitan Sarajevo, one of the ten municipalities that it consisted

13     of.

14        A.   I take -- I take it that's the case.  Prior to the war in this

15     respect, I mean, I don't -- I did know very little about how

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina was organised politically of that nature, so again I

17     take you at your word that Pale was -- was what it was part of.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Yes.  Yes.  We have it in English now towards the

19     bottom of the page.  I am saying:  "Tell me, will it continue tomorrow?"

20             Do you agree that I'm actually putting a question, not issuing an

21     order?  In the English version it is the fifth or sixth or seventh line

22     from the bottom "Tell me, will it continue tomorrow?"

23        A.   Well, sir, in the context of this conversation, you are both

24     requesting information and issuing orders.  I mean, several lines above

25     that you issue the phrase "All right, General.  Full speed ahead.  Tell

Page 27730

 1     Krstic to go full steam."  So -- and in this conversation you are both

 2     requesting information and receiving information as well as giving

 3     direction.

 4        Q.   Wouldn't it be more correct to say that I was supporting their

 5     decisions?  First I receive information as to what it was that they had

 6     decided from an operative and tactical point of view, and then I give

 7     support; right?

 8        A.   In the context of how the operation existed at that time, and it

 9     was written in the operations planned for Krivaja, the fact that the

10     military commanders would independently make the decisions with respect

11     to what axis of advance they wanted to utilise and what forces they would

12     be deploying that were already under their control, I agree.  They were

13     advising you of what their intentions were, and then you were endorsing

14     them.  They didn't -- they didn't have to advise you of what your --

15     their intentions were in this case, because they were already empowered

16     to conduct those operations.  So they were keeping you informed, and you

17     were endorsing those actions.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Butler, where can we find the phrase "full speed

19     ahead" in this intercept.

20             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.  I believe I said -- I hope I said "full

21     steam ahead."  If you -- from the bottom of the second page of the

22     English language translation it is ten lines up.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Second page.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Because you said above that line.

Page 27731

 1             THE WITNESS:  Oh, I'm sorry.  I got my pages mixed up.  I was

 2     looking at page 2 and it's ten lines up from the bottom, sir.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  So after all, it appears after that

 4     inquiry?

 5             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  That's right.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  "Will it continue."

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Thank you.  After that, I say:  "All right.  I have heard

10     somewhere that they were fleeing, going somewhere."  Do you agree that

11     this bit where I say "I've heard somewhere" means that they were not the

12     ones who informed me but that I happened to hear something somewhere?

13        A.   Again, sir, all I can infer is what you've just said, that you

14     happened to hear something somewhere.  I can't infer whether it was

15     through contacts with the military, and as I noted previously, you were

16     receiving information from the police forces as well as the RDB.  So you

17     certainly had opportunities to hear information like that.  Like I said,

18     all I can infer is that from some source you heard that.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Do you see the next part where I say -- actually, he

20     is saying something about Gvero and the public, and I say after that:

21     "All right.  Have someone prepare these instructions for journalists, and

22     I am going to approve --" I don't know.  I refer to the minister or

23     something.  Well, you did notice all of this, didn't you, that it was

24     necessary to provide accurate information to journalists?  Did you come

25     to that conclusion?

Page 27732

 1        A.   No, sir.  In fact, when you take this intercept and couple it

 2     with a document that I believe I discussed during my direct testimony,

 3     the context of this discussion is providing information to Serbian

 4     journalists in Vlasenica and Milici for the purpose of their transmission

 5     on the airwaves because they understand that the Bosnian Muslims inside

 6     the enclave monitor those news reports.  And again, I look at this as

 7     part of the propaganda portion of the military operation where the

 8     discussion relates to seeking to create a climate among the Bosnian

 9     Muslims that there is no need for them to fight.  They can either flee or

10     surrender, and that is what I take this part of the conversation to be

11     because it does marry up with another document from -- that I -- that

12     chronologically comes down the line to discuss just that.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember whether the US Army allows enemy

14     journalists to get close to the front line, or is it CNN or somebody else

15     who receives favourable treatment and is allowed to report from the front

16     line?

17        A.   I -- I am certainly not an authority on -- on US military media

18     policies.  I can't comment on that.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now please take a look at -- actually, let

20     us try to see or establish or see what you established in relation to

21     prisoners of war.  35042 would be the 65 ter number, page 937.

22             I don't know if we have a translation.  It's short anyway, so

23     I'll read it out to you.

24             Do you know -- or actually, did you see any of these intercepts

25     that the Croatian Secret Service recorded at this point in time?

Page 27733

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  I believe we have this somewhere, Your Honour.

 2     This looks familiar to me.  I'll try to find it.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we should have.  But in the meantime, could you

 4     read it, Mr. Karadzic, given it is very short.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Please take a look at this.  This is the 13th of July, 1995, at

 7     11.25.

 8             "Colonel Ljubo Beara, Main Staff of the VRS is sending the

 9     following to Kasaba, four buses, two trucks, and one trailer truck to

10     transport Muslim captives.  They will be sent to the camp in Batkovici

11     where 'selection' will be carried out distinguishing between war

12     criminals and ordinary soldiers."

13             You will be able to find the English translation.

14             Did you know that Beara at 11.25 sent to Kasaba four buses, two

15     trucks, and one trailer truck along with this order showing his intention

16     to have the prisoners sent to Batkovici?

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  D2197, Your Honours.

18             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  To the answer to your first question, I am

19     aware of this intercept.  I am aware of what it says.  However, I'm also

20     aware that it did not happen.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Oh.  Mr. Butler, let's take it step-by-step, minute by minute if

23     necessary.  Let us see when the situation changed.

24             In your opinion, how many prisoners were there in Nova Kasaba?

25     Actually, not in your opinion.  What was it that you established, not

Page 27734

 1     taking into account statements or, rather, the bragging of those who were

 2     taking prisoners.  How many people were there at the stadium in

 3     Nova Kasaba on the basis of aerial images and so on?

 4        A.   I have never done a calculation as to looking at that block of

 5     individuals in Nova Kasaba and trying to make a determination as to how

 6     many people that actually might be at that time.  I don't have the

 7     necessary skills to do that.  I'm not sure whether the investigation has

 8     or has not done that.  My accounting for the number of people at various

 9     locations is on the basis of the intercepted communications by

10     individuals who were dealing with those issues.

11        Q.   Thank you.  If we were to call up an image, if you don't take my

12     word for this, we're going to call up an image.  I did the counting.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Could we move into private session

14     very briefly.

15                           [Private session]

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23                           [Open session]

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 27735

 1        Q.   So if you do not trust me, then we can call up an aerial image.

 2     The 13th of July at 1430 hours at the stadium in Nova Kasaba there is a

 3     group of prisoners of war.  Eleven lines times 7, less than 100, and on

 4     the sides there are probably senior commanders.  That's an additional 100

 5     to 150 men.  So this number from the aerial image, does it tally with the

 6     capacity of the vehicles mentioned here, the buses, trucks.  Would 1.000

 7     or 2.000 people fit into these vehicles that Beara is sending to Nova

 8     Kasaba?

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, one, it's a big compound question.  And I

10     have some, but this one, I think, has too many parts.  And I think that

11     we -- to understand the question, we need to see the aerial to know were

12     these 7 lines by 11 and senior commanders, et cetera, are being put to

13     the witness.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  While I have no doubt Mr. Butler would be

15     capable of answering a compound question, but it's prudent to upload the

16     aerial image first and then let's proceed one by one.  Let's proceed one

17     by one, yes.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the other party help us

19     identify the number.  It's the video, Srebrenica video trial.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   While we're waiting, Mr. Butler, I want to tell you what my

22     position is.  I condemn the killing of a single man unless in combat, but

23     even when people get killed in combat, I feel sorry.  It would be better

24     if they were only wounded.  However, what I'm challenging here is this

25     game of numbers that is immensely dangerous for peace in the Balkans.

Page 27736

 1     These exaggerations are tenfold or so.  I believe that you would be the

 2     right witness through whom we can establish the truth, because you dealt

 3     with this case.  So for the sake of providing you with this information,

 4     I'm trying to tell you that I'm not an insensitive man, and I condemn

 5     each and every killing, but let us see how many killings occurred.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  This is not a time for your argument.  It's Exhibit

 7     P4308.  It's page 28 in hard copy and probably 38 in e-court.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.  I just

 9     thought that I should do this because of Mr. Butler.  I don't want to

10     think that I'm defending someone.  I'm not defending anyone.  I just want

11     to establish what happened.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   To the best of your knowledge, is this that stadium?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Can we zoom in a bit, the stadium itself, the central

16     part.  Actually, sorry.  Before that let's take a look at this.  It says

17     13th of July, 1995, 1400 hours; right?

18        A.   Yes, sir.  That's approximately 1400 hours is how it's labelled.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we zoom in a bit

20     more.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Butler, that here in this aerial image we can

23     see each and every individual.  Obviously it is guards who are standing

24     in front of.  There are four plus two of them.  And now please do make an

25     effort and kindly note that there are 11 lines here times 7, in the

Page 27737

 1     central part of this image.  So does this look like thousands of

 2     prisoners?

 3        A.   Sir, with all due respect, I don't believe that, it's certainly

 4     not my eyesight, but that image quality that we're looking at -- that I'm

 5     looking at right now gives me the ability to either confirm or deny your

 6     number count.  I -- I can't tell.  I mean, you've given a number of what

 7     you believe it looks like.  I can't tell off the quality of this image

 8     that I'm looking at right now whether -- whether you're correct or

 9     whether you're not correct, sir.  I'm sorry.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can we go back to the total now.  Do you agree that a

11     provincial football stadium would not be longer than 60 or 70 metres and

12     would not be wider than 40 metres?  This is certainly not

13     Wembley Stadium, is it?

14        A.   No, sir.  But I -- again, being an American, maybe I'm kind of

15     missing the point on this, but doesn't it have to be somewhere at least

16     about 100 metres long?  I mean, isn't that the point of the game?  I

17     mean, I have no idea.  I've never walked the measurement of how big or

18     how long Nova Kasaba stadium may or may not be.

19        Q.   No way, not 100 metres.  Eighty metres are the best fields and

20     this is a lot less.

21             Do you see now how big the area is where the prisoners are

22     standing?  Can we speak of thousands here?  Can we even speak of hundreds

23     in the plural?

24        A.   Again, sir, what would I tell you is that looking at this

25     particular image, one, I can't -- from an image without any form of an

Page 27738

 1     index on it that allows you to estimate scale, I can't tell you how big

 2     or how small Nova Kasaba football field is.  I suppose one could do a

 3     rough analysis by taking a measurement of a known object like a vehicle

 4     or a house and then you could extrapolate that.  And I again also can

 5     tell you that based on the image I'm looking at, I can't give you a

 6     number.  If I were to take a number off of -- off of the top of my head,

 7     looking at that clump of individuals in the centre as well as the lines

 8     on the side, my ballpark estimate would be several hundred at this point

 9     in time.

10             I would also --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry to interrupt.  No objection, just if

13     Mr. Karadzic wants to, I would let him know that the page earlier, wider,

14     has vehicles and other reference points that

15     Mr. Butler [Overlapping speakers].

16             JUDGE KWON:  Before going on, I know your position is that the

17     number itself is not critical or relevant, but do you have any position

18     as to the number of prisoners that are shown in this aerial image on the

19     part of the Prosecution, Mr. Nicholls?

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  No, not an exact number, Your Honour.  However,

21     the intercept at 1402 says more than a thousand down here at the stadium.

22     I -- my position would be that without more expert analysis, we can't

23     tell.  This could, in my submission, be a thousand or more, especially if

24     you look at the wider angle and you can see the buses.  It may be

25     something that he should be able to do the measurements and call an

Page 27739

 1     expert if he wishes.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Shall we show him the previous page.

 3     Did you refer to this page, Mr. Nicholls, or after that?

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  That is the one just if Mr. Karadzic wishes,

 5     because the witness brought up a question about vehicles, and here you

 6     can see some actual vehicles on the road.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.

 8        Q.   If we have a look, we can see two buses.  How long is a normal

 9     bus, an ordinary bus, Mr. Butler, if you know anything about that?

10        A.   I'm afraid I don't, sir.  I have no idea how long a normal bus

11     is.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that this bus with the length it is

13     could fit two or three busloads when lined up next to this group of

14     prisoners, maybe even more than three?  We could measure, if necessary.

15        A.   Well, if that's with a we have to do, I can do it the old

16     fashioned way.

17        Q.   This bus on this scale is 6 millimetres long.  Let's not change

18     it.  And here the length of this group 15 millimetres.  So less than

19     three buses --

20        A.   I take it that first block of individuals, the lengthwise is two

21     buses and the scale going up is one and roughly one-quarter bus.  So what

22     does that measure out to you, sir?

23        Q.   How many people can fit, these people here, obviously, sitting?

24     How many people can sit down in an area like this.  In this large group,

25     it's less than 100, 11 times 7.

Page 27740

 1        A.   I have no idea how many people could fit in a space that size,

 2     sir.  I just don't know.

 3             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, I'm just speaking for myself, but

 4     this seems to be pretty unproductive to engage in this -- what is no more

 5     than speculation.  Now, there are so many variables.  I mean, how big are

 6     the people?  How close are they sitting together?  It doesn't really

 7     help.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, your Excellency.  I will

 9     leave this topic, but I'm just trying to say that these things are more

10     objective than my bragging on the telephone about what a hero I am and

11     how many people I captured.  We have information that Beara is sending

12     two trucks and a trailer --

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm going to object.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- and we have on the other hand

15     the bragging.

16             JUDGE KWON:  You'd like to give testimony yourself, Mr. Karadzic.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll see.  Maybe at the end I will

18     testify.

19             Let us look at P4532.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   We are still on the 13th of July, which is very important.  Look,

22     please.  On the 13th of July at 13.55, and we will see that on the

23     reception stamp, at 11.25, Beara sends the means of transport, and at

24     13.55, the Main Staff issues this order.  And in the preamble it says:

25              "Based on the instructions received and following the defeat

Page 27741

 1     suffered in the Srebrenica enclave, the able-bodied men from the enclave

 2     fit for military service were tasked with crossing over to Tuzla and

 3     Kladanj in groups -- in groups and carrying weapons.  Among them are

 4     inveterate criminals and villains who will stop at nothing just to avoid

 5     being captured and reach Muslim-controlled territory."

 6             The text below talks about the taking of prisoners, and the order

 7     says:

 8              "The corps command and brigade commands shall engage all

 9     available men fit for military service to detect, block, disarm, and

10     capture detected Muslim groups and prevent them from crossing over to the

11     Muslim territory.  Along the whole road, Zvornik, Crni Vrh, Sekovici,

12     Vlasenica.  Organise ambushes, et cetera.

13              "2.  In Serbian villages on the axis of the group's movement

14     protect and secure the people.

15              "3.  Detain the captured and disarmed Muslims in appropriate

16     facilities that can be secured by fewer troops.  Immediately report to

17     the superior command."

18             So at half past 1.00, the intention of the Main Staff is to place

19     the captured people in facilities that do not need large security

20     details, and the superior commands are to be informed.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next point in

22     English.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

24        Q.   Point 6:

25              "Through the competent authorities and Ministry of the Interior

Page 27742

 1     make sure that all available manpower is engaged in the co-ordinated

 2     execution of the above-said tasks."

 3             Do you recall, Mr. Butler, that you noted yourself that the army

 4     realized all the seriousness of the threat posed by these groups only on

 5     the 13th?  Only then did they realise how large these groups were and

 6     their capacity to break through and inflict losses on the Serbian side.

 7        A.   Yes, sir.  There was that period, as I've discussed earlier,

 8     where the Main Staff and the senior officers were discounting the initial

 9     reports from the field as to the size of the column that had been able to

10     successfully cross the Konjevic Polje-Nova Kasaba road and proceed north

11     into the Zvornik Brigade area.

12        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Butler, that from the 11th to the 14th, I was

13     preoccupied only with establishing the civilian authorities in

14     Srebrenica, issuing orders to appoint a civilian commissioner to

15     establish a police station, to provide protection and security for people

16     and property?  Until the 15th, I had no information about the dangers.

17     Have you found a single document warning me of danger?

18        A.   The danger of what, sir?  You used the phrase "danger."  What do

19     you refer to?

20        Q.   In the same context.  The danger posed by the 28th Division,

21     which is in the sector between Srebrenica and Tuzla, our sector, the one

22     we're talking about.

23        A.   Okay.  So I just wanted to be clear because the way that you

24     predicated your question, I just thought for a second that you were

25     referring to the danger of the prisoners being killed, and I just wanted

Page 27743

 1     to make sure I'm clear on what I'm answering.

 2             The military documents reflect that by the afternoon of the 14th,

 3     that the military commands are starting to become more aware of this,

 4     that by the evening of the 14th, they're already giving orders to start

 5     to remove forces from Zepa that will start going out the morning of the

 6     15th.  I can't agree with your first assertion that you were solely

 7     preoccupied with establishing the civilian authorities in Srebrenica

 8     because I believe that the army must have co-ordinated with you and

 9     sought your permission to begin all of the things that they needed to do

10     in order to begin a major military operation against the Zepa enclave.

11     So that is something that had to have been briefed to you by the army

12     with respect to what was happening down there, and I believe you would

13     have had to have approved that before the army would have undertaken

14     that.

15             I also believe that on the 13th, while the army may not have been

16     reporting it, certainly Mr. Dragomir Vasic - in his reports up the police

17     chain of command to the police staff - and the RDB were providing reports

18     as to what they believed the seriousness of the military situation was,

19     and unlike the Main Staff, Dragomir Vasic did believe that the military

20     situation that was developing was far more serious than the army had

21     taken account for.

22             So I can't speak to you what you did or did not know on a certain

23     time, but what I do believe is that even if the army was down playing or

24     did not recognise themselves the gravity of the military threat to

25     Zvornik, I believe that the threat to Zvornik was properly manifested by

Page 27744

 1     the reports that Mr. Vasic was forwarding and other reports that were

 2     coming up the police and the RDB chain.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Butler -- yes.  I was waiting for the French and

 4     B/C/S translation to be completed.

 5             Did you find any VRS Main Staff report or MUP report that went to

 6     the president dealing with the danger of the column before 15?

 7             THE WITNESS:  The Main Staff reports do go to the president, and

 8     I believe they talked about it on the 15th.  The MUP reports from Vasic

 9     go as high as the police staff --

10             JUDGE KWON:  The MUP report.

11             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Proper MUP report.

13             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  I -- I don't --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Not CSB in Zvornik or --

15             THE WITNESS:  The reports that were done by Mr. Vasic went to the

16     police staff.  I do not know if -- and I cannot talk about how they may

17     have gone further up the chain of command to President Karadzic at that

18     juncture.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall that in the regular combat reports they

22     say that certain groups of fighters are surrendering to the VRS, and they

23     don't see the situation as dangerous, so they don't report it to me as

24     dangerous; correct?

25        A.   At that point in time, they are talking about -- and I believe

Page 27745

 1     the point in time we're talking about now is the 13th and 14th period,

 2     you see a number of military reports where they do routinely talk about

 3     the apprehension of large numbers of prisoners.  Those are incorporated

 4     in, I think, one or two Main Staff reports that go to you.  There are no

 5     numbers associated with it, but it reflects, you know, large numbers.

 6     But there is nothing in the Main Staff reporting to you that I take away

 7     that the VRS believes that having these prisoners in their custody is

 8     somehow dangerous.

 9        Q.   How did you come up with that, Mr. Butler?  Let's stick to the

10     chronology.  I'm asking you did the army warn me that there was something

11     extraordinary and unusual before the 14th of July?  Well, let's put it

12     differently.  Do you know that on the 14th of July I declared the state

13     of war in that area?

14        A.   Yes, sir.  On the 14th of July, 1995, you issued a decree

15     declaring a state of war to exist in the Srebrenica municipality.  That

16     does not include Bratunac, and it does not include the Zvornik

17     municipality.  It's solely that, the Srebrenica municipality.

18        Q.   And do you know that I did not do that at the prompting of the

19     army but after I visited the civilian authorities of Bratunac,

20     Srebrenica, and Skelani, who informed me that any of these towns may fall

21     if the 28th Division decides to act?

22        A.   I'm sorry, you said "after I visited the civilian authorities."

23     Are you referring to you physically visited the civilian authorities of

24     these individuals prior to issuing that decree, or is that a translation

25     issue?

Page 27746

 1        Q.   It must be interpretation.  Do you know that on the 14th of July,

 2     I received a visit of the delegation of the civilian authorities of

 3     Bratunac, Srebrenica, and Skelani, and among them was the civilian

 4     commissioner Deronjic?

 5        A.   I have some memories of Deronjic in his statement, but I'm not

 6     aware of other individuals visiting you, so I mean I guess the fairest

 7     answer I can give on that is I'm not aware of the visits that you had on

 8     14 July.  They're not -- they're not in the military documents and other

 9     material I would work at -- I mean, I'm generally not aware of them.

10        Q.   Thank you.  The Trial Chamber is aware of this, as is the OTP,

11     all about this 14th of July.  Did you wonder why, prompted by what,

12     Karadzic declared the state of war?

13        A.   My presumption of your declaration of a state of war and the

14     establishment of a war Presidency for the municipality of Srebrenica was

15     for you and for the municipal authorities to gain a better -- or gain

16     better control of the then chaotic situation in the town of Srebrenica as

17     part of the process of re-establishing Serbian political and civilian

18     control over the town, restarting the utilities.  Those declarations give

19     the War Presidency additional extraordinary powers that they can use in

20     order to assist in that manner.

21        Q.   Did you notice that in these orders and decrees the decisions

22     relate to the Serbian municipality of Srebrenica?  Did you make any

23     conclusion as to the meaning of this?  What does that mean, the Serbian

24     municipality of Srebrenica?

25        A.   I didn't draw any conclusion one way or another about that, sir.

Page 27747

 1     It's the municipality of Srebrenica.  The fact that after the Serbs

 2     occupied or liberated the municipality they would call it the Serbian

 3     municipality of Srebrenica, it seems natural to me.

 4        Q.   I have to remind you that before the war an agreement was reached

 5     that in mixed municipality, two municipalities would be set up, one

 6     Serbian and one Muslim.  In many places, written agreements were signed.

 7             Is it the case that on the 11th of July I appointed a

 8     commissioner for the Serbian part of Srebrenica, now that you know there

 9     were supposed to be two municipalities?  It says Deronjic was appointed

10     for the Serbian municipality of Srebrenica.

11        A.   Well, sir, the -- I don't know the -- your first assertion, so I

12     can't comment on what agreement may or may not have been made during the

13     war.  I assume that when you talk about this, you know, your appointment

14     of Mr. Deronjic for the municipality of Srebrenica.  If there was a

15     Muslim municipality of Srebrenica in existence on 12 and 13 of July, it

16     would have been a very empty place.  There was nobody there.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  And could I request a cite, please, to the written

18     agreement to divide Srebrenica into two municipalities, if there is one.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect, I will lead

20     evidence of that, but we already know that negotiations did take place,

21     and it's obvious that I held it to be true on the 11th that there would

22     be two municipalities.  However, the negotiations took place before the

23     war in all municipalities.  In Bratunac an agreement was signed.  I'm

24     just trying to see if this expert knows why my decrees apply to the

25     Serbian municipality of Srebrenica.

Page 27748

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  I --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  We heard the answer.  So you referred to the one in

 3     Bratunac.  That's the explanation.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  The Bratunac one I understand.  I was asking about

 5     Srebrenica.  A separate municipality.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The agreement was not signed for

 7     Srebrenica, but the agreement was reached.  It existed, and we will show

 8     that.  I believe it's already been shown.

 9             Could we now look briefly at P04460.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Have a look, please.  Can we see item 6, which relates to the

12     Drina Corps.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Page 3.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   15th July.  The Main Staff informs me several groups have

16     surrendered.  Is this supposed to alarm me that several groups had

17     surrendered?  There is no mention of the number or any warning of danger.

18     On the 15th, I'm being notified that several groups have surrendered.

19     I'll find it in a moment.

20             Yes.  It says:  "Earlier today, several enemy groups have

21     surrendered to members of the VRS in the area of responsibility of the

22     Zvornik Infantry Brigade."

23             Have you found it?

24             [In English] "During the course of today's day, several enemy

25     groups have surrendered to the VRS members."

Page 27749

 1        A.   Yes, sir, I have that line.

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] Is this supposed to alarm the president of the

 3     republic, who has a thousand other things to do, or is this just regular

 4     information in keeping with your own conclusion that the army was not

 5     aware of the seriousness of the situation or the threat posed by the

 6     28th Division?

 7        A.   Let me answer -- this is a two-part question.  Let me answer the

 8     second part first.  If you look at this in time sequence as to when this

 9     document was published, you can tell from parts of the language that they

10     are an incorporating Colonel Pandurevic's interim combat report on the

11     15th of July, 1995.  So this is part of that reporting chain up.

12             The second issue is I would again note that the military was not

13     your only mechanism to receive information, particularly information that

14     would potentially alarm you.  I recall that on the 15th of July, 1995,

15     there is an RDB report from the Zvornik municipality which reports over a

16     hundred prisoners have escaped from a facility in Pilica.  Even though it

17     turns out that that report was ultimately erroneous, I would think that a

18     report noting that a hundred prisoners of war had escaped would raise

19     some alarm at some levels of the police leadership and may have

20     ultimately reached you.

21             So again my point is while I cannot comment on what information

22     you may or may not have actually known at any given time, you were not

23     solely dependent upon the military to ascertain what was going on in any

24     given area.  From the armed -- the other components of the armed forces,

25     you did have the police reporting -- or at least the police staff had the

Page 27750

 1     police reporting and Minister Kovac had the police reporting as well as

 2     the RDB reporting.

 3        Q.   Just one question if I may.  Do you agree that the army and the

 4     police have a rivalry between them, and I should be informed of military

 5     issues by the army?

 6        A.   I am aware that the military had many issues with the police

 7     forces, in part because members of the MUP were being paid regular

 8     salaries while most members of the army were not, and as a result that

 9     led to significant morale issues as well as soldiers deserting to the MUP

10     whenever they thought they could get a job there.

11             I agree with your assertion that military report on military

12     matters, police will report on police matters.  I will also remind you

13     that at the times that we're talking about these reports, most of the

14     police forces, even though they were under the control of the army - they

15     had been resubordinated for the operations - they were still continuing

16     to report those military operations up the police chain.  And finally, as

17     noted in the RDB reporting, the RDB itself did not limit itself to

18     reporting on just police issues.  They also reported on their

19     understanding of the military issues.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  The question about this

22     document, page 32, lines 15 to 19, just to summarise, was -- there's

23     nothing in here which -- which should alarm the president who is so busy

24     with a thousand things to do.  The army was not aware of the seriousness

25     of the situation or the threat posed by the 28th division.  If that's

Page 27751

 1     being put to the witness, I think he should be allowed to look at the

 2     entire section on the situation in the zone of the Drina Corps before

 3     answering on what this report says.

 4             This is at your tab 102, Mr. Butler, but I don't think -- I think

 5     he needs to see the whole section before it's put to him that nothing

 6     here is alarming.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  You mean the next page.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we show him the next page?

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   If I can just clarify something.  I was referring to Mr. Butler's

12     finding according to which the army --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

14             Having seen the remainder of the document, would you like to add

15     anything, Mr. Butler?

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  If you look at the second page of the

17     document, it also notes the situation on the territory, that there -- not

18     only -- the most alarming part that I would look at, of course, would be

19     the fact that major roads, the Vlasenica-Zvornik road is un-safe due to

20     the enemy groups which are seeking to break out.  From a civil point of

21     view that certainly would be of relevance to the president.

22             JUDGE KWON:  All right.  Let us leave at it that.  But before we

23     break there is one matter I want to deal with.  The Chamber is seized of

24     the Prosecution's bar table motion for the admission of documents related

25     to the hostages component with appendix A which was filed on the 18th of

Page 27752

 1     April, 2012.  This motion includes the accused's submission in relation

 2     to each of the document.

 3             So, Mr. Robinson, I take it therefore that the Defence is not

 4     going to file a further response.  Am I correct in so understanding?

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.  We would like to be heard

 6     since the Prosecution has given its rationale for why those particular

 7     objections ought to be disregarded.  We would like to be heard at least

 8     on some of them before the Trial Chamber makes a decision, so we planned

 9     on filing a response to that motion as well as the other bar table

10     motions that will be coming.

11             JUDGE KWON:  The crux is that you would like to reply to the

12     response of the Prosecution.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, we would like to respond to the motion.

14             JUDGE KWON:  But what's the point of incorporating Defence

15     response in that motion itself?

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, the process that we have going right now is

17     so that both parties can be aware of the position of the other party

18     before the motion is made to the Chamber.  And so when we put in a little

19     box in that column our objection, we're not really stating a full legal

20     argument, but then the Prosecution when it files its motions is making

21     their legal argument as to the relevance of those things.  So we think

22     that we ought to have the opportunity to inform the Chamber more fully

23     and more formally as to the basis of our objections when we have a

24     dispute.

25             JUDGE KWON:  When can I expect to have your response?

Page 27753

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Monday.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Thank you.

 3             Given the time, we'll take a break now.  We'll have a break for

 4     30 minutes and resume at five past 11.00.

 5                           --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, for planning purposes, the Chamber is

 8     minded to rise for this session at quarter past 12.00, and instead sit a

 9     bit longer period than usual in the third session.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  I

11     believe that you noticed that the Prosecution took more than eight hours,

12     and if we take into account the material that is being admitted through

13     this witness and the reports, I would need a little more time than the

14     time that was allocated to the Prosecution -- or, rather, used by the

15     Prosecution.

16             JUDGE KWON:  The Prosecution did not use all the eight hours that

17     they estimated, but notwithstanding that, as long as you stay on relevant

18     issues, the Chamber is minded to give some leeway, but -- that's --

19     again, I emphasise you should be focused and stay on relevant issues.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I appreciate that.

21             Could the witness please be shown D2212.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   There's something I'd like to clarify, Mr. Butler.  I asked you

24     about reports according to which some groups should surrender.  Should

25     such reports be a matter of concern for the president?  Should they alarm

Page 27754

 1     the president, or were such reports submitted as a matter of course?

 2        A.   Again, I can't speak to the issue of alarm, but within the

 3     context of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, historically the documents

 4     that I have reviewed reflect a great interest by the Bosnian Serb

 5     political and military leadership to exchange prisoners that they had

 6     taken in order to get prisoners from -- who -- to get Bosnian Serbs who

 7     had been imprisoned in Muslim prisons, either captured or for a variety

 8     of other reasons.  So the issue of prisoner exchanges did receive the

 9     highest level attention of the Republika Srpska government, including you

10     personally, and there's documents which, of course, reflect that.

11             Regardless of the numbers that are in dispute, the fact is that

12     hundreds if not thousands of prisoners were falling into the custody of

13     the army -- or I should be more clear, the armed forces of Republic

14     Srpska because it was not just the army, it was the police forces as

15     well, from the period of 12 July onward through at least the 22nd of

16     July.  And those numbers of prisoners would have dramatically changed the

17     calculations and the leverage that the Republika Srpska would have had in

18     order to retrieve those Bosnian Serbs who were imprisoned by the Muslims.

19             So in that respect, I believe that the issues of prisoners of war

20     would have been of great importance to the senior military and political

21     leadership of the country, the pinnacle of that being you, sir.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please have a look at the report from

23     Doctors Without Borders.  I don't know whether this document can be

24     broadcast.  I don't see that it's marked as a Rule 50 document.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be scrolled up a bit.

Page 27755

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   On the 11th of July, we have a report from Doctors Without

 3     Borders on the events, but what I want to show you is the part where it

 4     says that Mladic is in Bratunac and he is offering food and water.  Let

 5     me just find that line.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just to let you know, Mr. Karadzic, this is just --

 7     this is a public document.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we see page 5.

 9     I'm looking at the wrong page.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   So this is a report for the 11th of July in which all the events

12     are described.  Franken the deputy commander was at a meeting.  They were

13     co-operating productively and so on and so forth.  And then it's the

14     second paragraph towards the end, it says:

15             [In English] Commandant Mladic BSA is in Bratunac and offering

16     medicine and food, asks UN to organise buses for evacuation."

17             [Interpretation] He's saying that the UN could organise the

18     buses.  This is at 22.50, and it's after the second meeting that was held

19     in the Fontana Hotel; isn't that right?

20        A.   Yes, sir.  I take it from the time on this and the context of

21     what was discussed, the Dutch -- I guess it was Major Franken at the

22     time, was back briefing this particular individual as to what the results

23     of that meeting were and how it would impact that organisation.  So that

24     is at least the first part under where it looks to be "News."

25        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now have a brief look at P4769.

Page 27756

 1             Can we agree that this is a telegram from General Tolimir that

 2     was delivered at 22.30, and it says:

 3             "If you are unable to find adequate accommodation for all POWs

 4     from Srebrenica, we hereby inform you that space has been arranged for

 5     800 prisoners of war in the first plpbr in Sjemec."

 6             It says they could work on the farm and General Tolimir on the

 7     13th of July offers accommodation for 800 prisoners.  He found a place

 8     where they could be provided with accommodation.  Are you familiar with

 9     this document?

10        A.   Yes, sir.  I testified with relation to this document in the

11     Tolimir case.

12        Q.   Thank you.  It doesn't look like Tolimir wants them to be there

13     so that they could be killed.  It seems more like he wants them to be

14     able to live there so that they could work on the farm; isn't that right?

15        A.   I disagree with your assertion on that because it is my awareness

16     that at the time in question this particular farm, in fact, was not a

17     working farm.  I believe that in the Tolimir case that there was

18     information that suggested that nobody was using this particular farm at

19     the time.  If that is in fact the case, I don't believe that that was a

20     genuine assertion by General Tolimir that they would be working on

21     agricultural projects.

22        Q.   Mr. Butler, I think that your answer doesn't show that you are

23     unbiased.  Do you know that there was a farm for sheep, horses, and pigs

24     there, and what would have enabled the army to live had there not been

25     such a farm?  This is a confidential telegram.  It's not a propaganda

Page 27757

 1     leaflet.  So I really have the impression that you are striving to assist

 2     the Prosecution.  You're fighting for the Prosecution's side, and you

 3     won't admit certain facts that are quite clear in this document.

 4        A.   Well, sir, again, I can tell you I understand what the document

 5     says, and I can tell you that I'm testifying with respect to that

 6     particular paragraph on the basis of knowledge that I have about the

 7     situation as it's been described at that farm.  If I am incorrect or if

 8     there is other evidence, I expect the Trial Chamber will take that of

 9     note, sir.

10        Q.   Thank you.  With regard to this document, my question is whether

11     Tolimir is saying they should be killed, or is he saying that

12     accommodation should be provided?  And I'm not asking you about your

13     opinion.  I'm interested in the facts themselves.

14        A.   Well, yes, sir.  I agree with you in that particular context.  He

15     is not saying that they're going to be killed.  And I guess when I

16     testified about this document in the Tolimir case, the thing that struck

17     me the most about it was it is one of the few documents that I'm aware of

18     that actually assigns a number of prisoners.  In this particular case

19     it's talking about 800 prisoners of war.  So again in the correlation of

20     trying to determine how many prisoners are in the custody of the VRS and

21     of the MUP at various points of time during the whole Srebrenica crime

22     base review, I found this to be a very interesting document.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Thank you.  Could we

24     now see 65 ter document 31023, and it's half an hour later.  65 ter

25     number 31023B.

Page 27758

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Did you know that there was even a farm in Crna Rijeka near the

 3     Main Staff, and it had been established by the army.  This doesn't relate

 4     to this document, but I'm just asking you whether you were aware of the

 5     fact that there were military farms whenever that was possible.  Did you

 6     know that there was a farm in Crna Rijeka next to the Main Staff?

 7        A.   To answer the first question, yes, sir, I'm aware of the practice

 8     that, where possible, military units had their own farms in order to

 9     provide sustenance and other support to the brigade.  I did not know that

10     there was a farm in Crna Rijeka that was -- that belonged to the

11     Main Staff or belonged to the military there.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now, let's have a look at this intercept.  It doesn't

13     have to be broadcast.  I don't know whether it's public or not.  It's

14     602.  It says at -- on the 13th at 2005, a conversation between

15     General Mladic and a certain Ljubo was recorded, and we couldn't hear

16     him.  Is it reasonable to assume that the Ljubo in question was, in fact,

17     Colonel Beara?

18        A.   Yes, sir, that is -- I believe I've testified to that related to

19     this intercept in previous cases.

20        Q.   Are you familiar with this intercept?

21        A.   Yes, sir.

22        Q.   Is it true that it says here that Mladic spoke on the phone, and

23     he thought that it was a safe line.  Obviously it wasn't.  Mladic ordered

24     Beara and suggested that they provide food.  He said that there should be

25     sufficient food.  He should see where it could be found, and he should

Page 27759

 1     obtain food so that the people were not hungry.

 2        A.   [Overlapping speakers] Yes, sir.  Yes, sir.  That's what it says.

 3     Is there another question, or did I miss a question?  I apologise if I

 4     did.

 5        Q.   Well, I wanted to ask you whether that's what you can see in the

 6     intercept.  And when you compiled your report, did you have this

 7     intercept in mind?  Did you refer to this intercept in your report?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.  And again, I've testified to this as well.  There are

 9     multiple meanings that one might infer from this intercept.  As a matter

10     of being conservative, I think in most cases - I hope in all cases - what

11     I've noted is the fact that there are a lot of police forces out there

12     that are in those particular areas, and as noted by the laws of the

13     Republika Srpska with respect to the Ministry of the Interior, that it is

14     the responsibility of the army to feed and provision the MUP forces that

15     are operating under their command in various areas.

16             So at its most benign interpretation, Beara is raising the point

17     that there are police officers there who have not been fed.  They don't

18     have their own logistics.  And Mladic is making it known, Yes, solve it

19     so that there's no food problems.  And he's talking about giving an order

20     to Krle, which would be the Drina Corps, to ensure that that happens and

21     bring the stuff over to Malinic's.  That would logically be a place to

22     bring food and be able to further distribute to the police forces.

23     There's clearly a more sinister way to look at this as well, but I don't

24     think I need to go there.

25             JUDGE KWON:  The last part of the question is whether you

Page 27760

 1     referred to this intercept in your report.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I believe I did, sir.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Mr. Butler, with all due respect, your interpretations are really

 5     quite odd.  How do you see that it concerns the police?  How could the

 6     policemen remain hungry?

 7             [In English] Excellent.  Just keep working and feed them all.

 8     There are a lot of hungry mouths."

 9             [Interpretation] Why would the police be hungry?  This concerns

10     prisoners, Mr. Butler.  And Beara, who was a security officer, why would

11     he be responsible for providing food for the police since this is a

12     matter for logistics, not for security?

13        A.   Well, sir, the reason I mention that is particularly with the

14     intercepts, some of them are open to multiple interpretations.  My

15     practice when analysing both military documents, as well as the

16     intercepts, as a matter of fairness on the issue was if there were

17     multiple interpretations, I would lean towards giving it an

18     interpretation that had the most -- or the best military context.

19             I don't necessarily disagree with your interpretation of this.

20     However, in the context of my previous testimony where many of these

21     individuals were accused of this, your interpretation effectively at this

22     point, you know, notes that Colonel Beara and General Mladic are aware

23     that there are a large number of prisoners, that they are hungry.  The

24     guidance is that solve it so there is no lack of food.  And if one looks

25     at the end result, they did.  That is not an interpretation that I

Page 27761

 1     believe I could make before various Trial Chambers on this particular

 2     document.

 3        Q.   Sir, this is the 13th at 11.00.  Don't confuse --

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  I object to him cutting off the witness.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   -- matters --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  You can ask a question at any time, Mr. Karadzic.

 8     Do not interrupt while the witness is answering a question, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             Will you continue, Mr. Butler.

10             THE WITNESS:  Actually, sir, I completed my answer at that point.

11     That was my last comment.  I didn't believe that I could make that type

12     of an interpretation of this intercept before the various tribunals that

13     I testified before, given the context of the accused who were in the

14     stand at the time.

15             JUDGE KWON:  So you believe that Mladic and Beara were not

16     discussing about feeding the prisoners in real sense.

17             THE WITNESS:  No, sir.  Again, what I believe is there are two

18     interpretations to this.  And as a matter of fairness, I assigned this --

19     in my analytical review of the material, I'm noting for the Trial Chamber

20     that there are two possible interpretations, and again to be

21     conservative, I believe that, you know, from my perspective the most

22     conservative interpretation is potentially a discussion related to the

23     police forces who are there, who would be dependent on the military for

24     resupply, including food.

25             JUDGE KWON:  The reason for that was because of the end result.

Page 27762

 1             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, I don't understand your question, sir.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  The reason for such belief on your part, was it due

 3     to the end result, as you stated earlier on?

 4             THE WITNESS:  Well, again, sir, if I were to give it the second

 5     interpretation, then it would, of course, radically change the meaning of

 6     the comment, "solve it so there is no lack of food."

 7             JUDGE KWON:  As indicated by Mr. Karadzic.  Would it not be

 8     possible that while they were discussing about real feeding, but they

 9     changed their mind afterwards?

10             THE WITNESS:  I don't believe so, because if one were then to go

11     back and look at the corresponding Bratunac Brigade documents, it is

12     absolutely clear that there are no orders given as reflected in the

13     documents to start providing food and other provisions to these

14     prisoners.  Given the numbers of individuals that are falling into

15     military custody on the 13th of July, even if I use a minimum number in

16     the morning of perhaps a thousand, the Bratunac Brigade itself only had

17     3.000 -- 3.500 soldiers at the time.  So that is a significant percentage

18     in terms of the food reserves that the Bratunac Brigade might have.

19             One would expect if that was in fact the case, there would be

20     documentation and orders and perhaps even intercepts reflecting the

21     various activities of the staff members of the Bratunac Brigade and the

22     Drina Corps to bring truckloads of rations for all of these prisoners.  I

23     don't see that in the material.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 27763

 1        Q.   Mr. Butler, do you know that the Bratunac Brigade was mostly

 2     outside the area of responsibility and that it was old men who were

 3     guarding the prisoners that night in Bratunac?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.  My understanding is that the four battalions of the

 5     Bratunac Brigade were involved in various military operations.  Some of

 6     them were in Potocari.  Some of them that were along the load -- road

 7     from Bratunac to Konjevic Polje, and that the number of prisoners that

 8     were coming into Bratunac on 13 July 1995 greatly exceeded the ability of

 9     the remaining brigade units, which would be the military police and some

10     of the rear services units, to guard them and that there was, in fact, a

11     call for all able-bodied men residing in Bratunac to report for duty

12     guarding prisoners.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know which formation or which institution

14     provided food and water to the prisoners in Potocari and the prisoners in

15     Sandici?  Was it the brigade or was it the civilian protection?

16             Also, did you try to find traces of feeding in the civilian

17     protection?

18        A.   I am aware that there was some food and some water that was

19     brought into Potocari on the 12th.  I believe that -- I'm familiar with

20     some testimony that it came from the Bratunac Brigade, or at least the

21     Bratunac Brigade rear services organ had a role in it.  I don't know if

22     it originated from the Bratunac Brigade or whether it came from the

23     civilian protection services.

24        Q.   Sir, we had a protected witness here from the civilian protection

25     who told us the same thing that I've been telling you; namely, that that

Page 27764

 1     had been their job, not the job of the rear services of the

 2     Bratunac Brigade, no way.  What do you say to that?

 3        A.   Again, sir, I don't comment on what witnesses may or may not have

 4     said.  I mean, that's not my role before this Trial Chamber, sir.

 5        Q.   Yes, but it considerably differs from what you concluded, and it

 6     actually challenges it.  So the civilian protection, which is part of the

 7     armed forces, they dealt with food and water, and your expectation is

 8     that this was done by the military.  Since you did not find any traces of

 9     the army providing that, you conclude that that had not been provided.

10     Isn't that right?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nikolic.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Just for some clarity - I'm not objecting - but

13     providing food and water to civilians gathered in Potocari is a different

14     thing from providing food and water to persons -- prisoners who have been

15     taken.  So I just want to know which we're talking about when the

16     questions are put.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We're going to give a number now.

19             JUDGE KWON:  But before that, did you say in lines 7 to 8 on this

20     page that civilian protection is part of the armed forces?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency.  According to our

22     laws, civilian protection is also part of the armed forces.  However,

23     they are not part of the combat units.  In wartime, it is under the army

24     or under the defence forces.  It's part of the defence system.  That

25     would be the right wording.

Page 27765

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Take a look at what Witness 480 said, that they provided food and

 3     water to prisoners in buses and in Sandici and that that was their job.

 4             Let me ask you this now, Mr. Butler.  Have you come to realise

 5     that Colonel Beara dealt with prisoners of war?  Did you establish that?

 6        A.   The documents establish that a -- as the chief of security for

 7     the Main Staff, one of Colonel Beara's responsibilities would have been

 8     related to issues of prisoners of war, and I believe that the evidence

 9     led through various Srebrenica-related trials here has laid out in great

10     detail Colonel Beara's involvement in the issue of prisoners from the

11     period 12 through the 20th of July, 1995.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Have you come a cross a document that shows that

13     Beara dealt with logistics, especially providing supplies to the police?

14        A.   No, sir.  And again in this document I don't take it that he is

15     going to engage in logistics issues.  He's just as part of the

16     conversation noting that.  And again, orders are given over there at

17     Krle's for material to be sent, and again in the context of the phrase

18     "Krle," an abbreviation for General Krstic, I take that to be some orders

19     are going out to the Drina Corps.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this document be

21     admitted?

22             JUDGE KWON:  If it hasn't been, we'll receive it now.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2237, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

25   (redacted)

Page 27766

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Could you please help us with this now:  Quite simply, let us

 9     establish when most people were being taken prisoner.  Until when were

10     most people taken prisoner?  Was that on the 13th of July?

11        A.   Well, chronologically speaking, the men start getting separated

12     in Potocari beginning on the afternoon of the 12th.  So at that point in

13     time, I would categorise that as the start of the process where the

14     military-aged men start to come into the custody of the armed forces,

15     either the police or the army.

16             As the evening of the 12th wears on and goes into the morning of

17     the 13th, the police and military forces that were originally along the

18     road from Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje, and down, start to capture

19     significant numbers of men from the column.  The numbers from the 13th

20     are relatively apparent from intercepts and other pieces of information.

21             I am aware that prisoners were also captured in that same area on

22     the 14th, as well as in subsequent ways the 15th, 16th, and 17th.  I

23     would have to say, though, again I don't have a number, and I don't

24     believe a number of prisoners captured strictly on the 14th of July along

25     that area has -- has ever surfaced.  So it's hard to say whether the peak

Page 27767

 1     day of prisoners being captured by the armed forces is the 13th or the

 2     14th.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that according to our regulations, this

 4     was the procedure:  Taking people prisoner, bringing them to a collection

 5     point or a collection centre, then reporting to the higher command.  Is

 6     that what is written, and is that what was done in this case?

 7             I'm just talking about the 13th.  I'm interested in the 13th.

 8        A.   The process, at least as far as the military was concerned, was

 9     that upon capturing a prisoner, the prisoner was to be brought to a

10     designated facility.  He was to be safeguarded in a designated facility

11     where he would then be -- his identity established, he would be

12     interrogated for any potential useful combat-related information, and

13     then ultimately turned over to the appropriate authorities where he would

14     then be sent to the main prisoner of war holding facilities, Batkovici

15     being one of them.

16             On the 13th, the picture on the ground was that prisoners were

17     being captured at various locations.  They were being assembled at

18     various areas, and I believe Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje, Sandici, and

19     there are some smaller areas where they were being assembled, and then as

20     the 13th wore on, a large group of those prisoners were brought to the

21     Kravica warehouse facility.  Other prisoners were taken other places.  I

22     believe there's one, perhaps at least two, small-level executions which

23     occur on the 13th of July.  And then as the evening continues to wear on,

24     of course, by 1700 the beginning of the Kravica warehouse massacre, and

25     as the evening continues on, those prisoners who are still remaining at

Page 27768

 1     Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje, Sandici are then put into buses and trucks

 2     and taken to other locations.  Some of them were outside the Kravica

 3     supermarket in trucks.  Most of them apparently were brought into the

 4     town of Bratunac on vehicles or buses and stored there, though I'm in --

 5     I am aware of one case at Sandici where apparently after all the buses

 6     and trucks stopped there were still some prisoners and they were

 7     summarily executed at that site.

 8             So that is my recounting of what the prisoner situation looked

 9     like on 13 July 1995, sir.

10        Q.   I kindly ask you -- I mean, if I put shorter questions, could you

11     please give shorter answers that pertain only to what I'm asking?

12             So is it correct that prisoners, in addition to Kravica on the

13     13th of July, were also brought to Bratunac?

14        A.   Yes, sir.  That is correct.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that in addition to Kravica and

16     Bratunac, that is close to Kravica, there were no other collection

17     points?

18        A.   There were multiple collection points in the town of Bratunac.

19     I'm aware that prisoners were held in the town of Kravica.  I do not know

20     if on the evening of the 13th whether or not there were prisoners at

21     Nova Kasaba or Konjevic Polje.  I know they were collection sites during

22     the day.  I do not know if prisoners were stored there during the evening

23     hours.

24        Q.   Did you not see for yourself that they were all transported to

25     Bratunac, and did you notice that the civilian authorities of Bratunac

Page 27769

 1     were complaining?  They were saying, "You're taking them prisoner in the

 2     area of Vlasenica, Milici, Zvornik, and you're bringing all of them to

 3     Bratunac."  Do you remember that that was an objection that had been

 4     raised, "Why are you bringing them all to Bratunac?"

 5        A.   In the context of the 13th of July, I agree that the civilian

 6     authorities in Bratunac were complaining about the prisoners that were

 7     all being brought to that location.  And that -- it started even earlier

 8     than the 13th.

 9             Again, I can't comment as to whether those were the only

10     locations, because I just do not know about -- prisoners were clearly

11     being taken through the evening of the 13th and the morning of the 14th.

12     I just have no information about whatever happened to them, because I

13     don't know if there were any survivors of people taken prisoner at that

14     time.

15             I am aware also that as part of the response to that, the first

16     convoy loads of prisoners left Bratunac at 2000 hours on 13 July.  So

17     even though the municipal authorities were planing about the spiraling

18     number of prisoners in town, there were steps taken to at least take some

19     of the prisoners from Bratunac and move them up to the Zvornik

20     municipality.

21        Q.   Thank you.  So whoever was taken prisoner was in Bratunac that

22     night.  According to your findings, how many persons were involved?

23        A.   No, sir, I didn't say that.  Again, if you -- you and I both

24     agree there were prisoners stored at Kravica as well.  So not every

25     prisoner taken was in Bratunac that night.  I don't know -- I mean, I

Page 27770

 1     don't know if I've ever come across an accurate number of prisoners were

 2     in Bratunac that evening.  I will leave that to other people's testimony

 3     to that account.  Obviously I'm not in Bratunac on that day.  I can't

 4     make any firsthand observations.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Did you come across the information that I had

 6     received, the extent to which they had sent information to me from

 7     Bratunac?  They said that they were so burdened, they had so many

 8     prisoners on the night of the 13th.  Is it correct that they said around

 9     2.000?

10        A.   That number wouldn't -- wouldn't surprise me if it were 2.000.

11     It might in fact even be more.  Again, as I've noted before when you

12     asked, I am aware of the fact that the civilian authorities in Bratunac

13     were greatly concerned about the security issues.  I know that there were

14     issues raised in reports, but I have no information or I can't testify as

15     to whether or not municipal authorities in Bratunac personally called you

16     and provided you with these issues other than the one document which is

17     purported to be a conversation between you and Mr. Deronjic.

18        Q.   Thank you.  And what does it say, about 2.000?  And perhaps

19     during the night there may be even more of them; right?

20        A.   I recall during the night there may be even more of them.  I

21     think Mr. Deronjic does, in fact, say several thousand.  I mean, I don't

22     know if it gives the number 2.000 or just says several thousand, but

23     again, that's why 2.000 is probably sticking in my mind.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  Just for precision, I don't have it in front of

25     me, but that intercept says "will be more," not "maybe."

Page 27771

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 2        Q.   But did you notice that 2.000 was mentioned in that conversation?

 3        A.   Again, sir, is might have been actually giving the number.  I

 4     just don't recall it off the top of my head right now, but I'm not

 5     disagreeing with your categorisation of the number.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just what's the exhibit number for that,

 7     Mr. Nicholls?  Or Mr. Karadzic?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am staying away from everything

 9     that has to do with Mr. Deronjic, for well-known reasons, but I think

10     that this has already been admitted.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, you can come back to me.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll get to that.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you know what the Muslim authorities thought?  How many

15     inhabitants were there in Srebrenica?  How many got out to Tuzla, and how

16     many were missing?  Propaganda.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  4618 to answer your question, Your Honour.

18             THE WITNESS:  I don't know.  Again, the numbers of the

19     individuals in the enclave run a range.  I believe in one of the

20     documents the Muslims actually put a number that they have.  I know that

21     the UN has had numbers.  I know that the VRS believes, and they have a

22     certain number as well.  So there's a range of numbers with respect to

23     who was in the enclave.  So I can't tell you exactly what the Muslim

24     authorities thought, how many inhabitants were there.

25             I am not sure I know how many got to Tuzla.  I think there's an

Page 27772

 1     accurate accounting of the women and children and elderly that were taken

 2     through the lines at Kladanj.  I have heard various numbers as to how

 3     many members of the column ultimately arrived in Tuzla, but I've never

 4     done an analysis on that myself to determine whether or not it's a valid

 5     number.

 6             And as for the number of the missing, I believe -- or the dead in

 7     this particular context, I believe that that's already been the subject

 8     of testimony by forensics experts.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember whether you saw a telegram from the

11     secret service from Tuzla dated the 17th of July, namely that on the 16th

12     of July, 10.000 soldiers arrived in Tuzla?  Of course, it goes without

13     saying that not all of them had been armed.  Ten thousand soldiers of the

14     28th Division.  Did you take that report into account?

15        A.   I don't recall seeing a report like that.  If you have it as a

16     document to show me, I would take a look at it.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Perhaps we're going to call it up if we have enough

18     time.  This has already been admitted.

19             Now I'd like to show you 1D5024.  This is a record of the session

20     of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 11th of August, 1995.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could that please be displayed in

22     e-court.  I beg your pardon.  We actually have this document now.

23             JUDGE KWON:  We can move on.  This was already discussed.  "Two

24     thousand, but there will be more during the night."

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now take a look

Page 27773

 1     at -- actually, there is a translation too.  There is.  Maybe it hasn't

 2     been uploaded.  Could it please be placed on the ELMO then.  Could you

 3     please place on the ELMO the part where it says 42.000, the response of

 4     the president, 42.000 and 35.000.

 5             [In English] For the usher.  For the usher.

 6             [Interpretation] Serbian is page 6.  In Serbian, it's page 6.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Here Silajdzic says -- in fact, the president asks.  Then it says

 9     he knows how many soldiers there had been.  And the president says, You

10     can ask Selo to provide a report about that.  Silajdzic says, Here is

11     what it's about.  First of all in Srebrenica they provided one number for

12     UNPROFOR, and we knew another number.  The president says, 42.000 for the

13     UNPROFOR, but realistically it was 35.000.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page in Serbian, please.  The

15     English can romaine the same.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

17        Q.   And now Silajdzic says he's afraid it's not 35 but a little more

18     than 36.000.  And 31.000-something left -- remained, actually, because

19     5.000 left to join friends and family, et cetera.  And he says:

20             "The most unfavourable number --"

21             The president says:

22             "The most unfavourable number is 5.000, meaning that nobody was

23     excluded, isn't it?"

24             And Silajdzic says:

25             "I'm afraid this is right."

Page 27774

 1             The president says:

 2             "There is hope that there are some of them here -- here and there

 3     after all.

 4             "Some of them are in Serbia.  Some run away to Serbia via Zepa

 5     and 35.000 remained.  31.000 at least had made it to Tuzla, maybe more."

 6             And then it says the number of killed is around 3.000.  We

 7     intercepted a conversation --

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic slow down and tell us where

 9     he's reading from.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters can't catch up with

11     your speed.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm in a hurry.  I thought there

13     was a translation.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   So this one asks:  Is it 300?  And the other one says, No, add a

16     zero, one Chetnik says to another.

17             So, Mr. Butler, this is one month after the event, a transcript

18     from the Presidency session where we see that there was 36.000 population

19     in Srebrenica at most.  At least 670 went to Zepa towards Serbia.  At

20     least several thousand left for Tuzla.

21             Can you tell us how many got killed in the fighting?

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  And I'm sorry, I don't mean to interrupt, but just

23     because the way the question was framed, we should go on to the next

24     statement to put that 3.000 number that was quoted in context.  It's on

25     page 7 of the English.  It's just been put that they were talking about

Page 27775

 1     3.000 max as the number of dead.  I won't say anything else, but

 2     Mr. Butler should be able to read the next two paragraphs.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Yes, I agree.  It is reckoned that there are many left in the

 5     woods, that many are still fighting.  Is it consistent with your

 6     knowledge that -- that many of them remained for months in the forests

 7     fighting?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, I'm going to try and run through all the

 9     questions.

10             I agree and I've testified before that even after the bulk of the

11     column got out that there were -- there were groups sometimes numbering

12     in the hundreds who were trapped behind the lines and as a result were

13     wandering back there.

14             As to your other question, no, I never did an analysis as to how

15     many people from the column were killed as a result of the combat

16     operations.  I know that forensically in the post-conflict years those

17     are individuals that are referred to as surface remains and that numbers

18     of those individuals have been determined.

19             So to back up one step, the casualties that were taken as part of

20     the column activities in the fighting of the column, were not

21     particularly my concern.  From an analytical perspective, once I came to

22     the conclusion myself that the column was a legitimate military target

23     for the VRS to engage, the casualties that occurred in that column would

24     not be considered to be casualties from the other Srebrenica-related war

25     crimes.

Page 27776

 1             My goal in looking at the column, the route that the column took,

 2     and the combat that occurred was not related to the number of casualties

 3     in the column but was only done so I would be able to assist the

 4     investigation team in distinguishing where combat activities were taking

 5     place on any given day so that the team would understand where the combat

 6     operations were occurring and where the mass executions were occurring so

 7     that all concerned would understand that people in certain graves were

 8     not combat casualties because the column was nowhere near where those

 9     locations were.

10        Q.   Thank you.  My last question before the break.  Do you know where

11     in the area of which brigade in which part of that sector did the

12     fiercest fighting take place with the greatest losses involved for both

13     the Serbian and Muslim side?  Was it in the place where the column was

14     exiting towards Tuzla?

15        A.   There are two answers to that question.  With respect to the

16     Zvornik municipality, by far the largest number of casualties for the

17     column and the Zvornik Brigade occurred in the zone of the

18     4th Infantry Battalion which is correspondingly Baljkovica, where a lot

19     of the column went out.  Counting all of the other individuals of the

20     column who remained trapped inside of the Pobudje area, Nova Kasaba,

21     Konjevic Polje, and along the road there, as the military documents

22     report, they're killing hundreds if not thousands of individuals from the

23     column at that particular location in the Bratunac municipality.  So

24     there are two answers depending on which column element you're talking

25     about.

Page 27777

 1        Q.   Thank you.  I'm now talking about the victims of the column that

 2     was fighting.  Is it true that at the very beginning, in the area of the

 3     Bratunac Brigade, Pobudje, the minefield, the shelling, there were

 4     several hundred casualties that were not buried, they remained on the

 5     surface.

 6        A.   My understanding in both the Zvornik and the Bratunac

 7     municipalities is that because of the presence of many unmarked

 8     minefields and things of that nature, that the surface remains as we

 9     refer to, the people who died in the column both in Bratunac and Zvornik

10     were not buried at all during the course of the conflict.  Those remains

11     remained on the surface and ultimately they began to be forensically

12     collected after the war.

13        Q.   Mr. Butler, I can agree about Pobudje, but do you have any proof

14     that remains were collected from the surface in the area of Zvornik?  My

15     claim is that they were buried and they were not collected, and there

16     were hundreds if not thousands of dead, and there were many more

17     casualties in the area of Zvornik than in the area of Bratunac as you

18     must know?

19        A.   As to your first assertion, I don't know that that was done.  I

20     know that surface remains were recovered in the Zvornik area, and I know

21     that many officers of the Zvornik Brigade were particularly concerned

22     about going into minefields to retrieve dead bodies, particularly dead

23     bodies of Muslim soldiers, and they weren't going to do that.  I assume

24     that Muslims who were killed in and around the combat positions of the

25     4th Battalion would have been removed, Baljkovica, the headquarters of

Page 27778

 1     the 4th Battalion, and buried at some location, and those numbers, given

 2     the ferocity of fighting on the 16 July, would have numbered some

 3     hundred.  I don't know if I've ever seen an answer of how many were

 4     killed that day, and they were buried somewhere.  So I think -- I said

 5     there is a great deal of forensics evidence with respect to individuals

 6     in various graves.  I don't know where any surface remains of those

 7     individuals killed in the Zvornik municipality would be buried.  I don't

 8     know if those have been discovered forensically yet or not, or whether

 9     those have been accounted for forensically.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, very well.  Can this be

11     admitted, the transcript of the session of the Presidency of BH.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2238, Your Honours.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

15        Q.   May I now ask -- just a moment, can we see 65 ter 01984.

16             While we're waiting, Mr. Butler, when you were talking about

17     killing in Bratunac on the 13th, do you mean the killing in a

18     schoolhouse, some sort of gym hall?

19        A.   What I am talking about is that in the town of Bratunac on 13

20     July, there has been a good deal of information that individuals who were

21     guarding Muslims at these various locations were taking these people and

22     either in some cases individually or in small groups killing them at or

23     near the locations where they were being detained.  I believe that --

24     again, I don't follow the proceedings in this trial, but I believe that

25     in previous cases there has been considerable testimony related to the

Page 27779

 1     sanitation people recovering bodies of those prisoners in the town of

 2     Bratunac on various days.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  I only wanted to see what you meant when you say the

 4     massacre in Kravica.  Did you establish what led to it?  In fact, is it

 5     the case that you established that the atmosphere was very relaxed there,

 6     and in that atmosphere one prisoner approached a guard to ask for a light

 7     for his cigarette, and then he seized the soldier's rifle and opened

 8     fire?

 9        A.   I did not, and nor was I asked to, establish a cause of that

10     particular massacre or any particular massacre.  I am aware of the story

11     that relates to what may have triggered the massacre.  I did not

12     investigate that one way or another.  My role again was to identify

13     various military documents, which I did find, which shows that several

14     members, I think two of the Special Police Unit at Sekovici and one of

15     the Bratunac red brigade -- Red Berets unit were wounded at Kravica at

16     approximately 1700 which I used to place that unit early on, the 2nd

17     Sekovici unit, at that location at that time.

18             Again I've heard the story.  I do not know whether it's true or

19     not.  And of course I've heard the other part of the story, which is as a

20     result of the injuries that those police officers received, that that was

21     the predicate event which then led the police forces to begin firing into

22     the warehouse, ultimately leading to the massacre.  Frankly, it had been

23     described as an impulse event, and I believe that if you look at the

24     chronology of the killings, as well as the scope of what happened in the

25     warehouse, that I do not believe that that is the case.

Page 27780

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, given the time we'll break now.

 2             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, just one quick matter.  I think this

 4     may be obvious but I need to confirm it with the Court.  Today is the day

 5     we would normally file our monthly witness list.  In light of the fact

 6     that our previous filing encompassed all of the remaining witnesses, I

 7     presume that an additional filing is not necessary today.  I spoke with

 8     Mr. Robinson.  He agrees with that.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  That's fair enough, Mr. Tieger.

10             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, Your Honours.  Can I just inquire what the

12     plan is for the rest of the day?  I'm just thinking about timing.  I will

13     have some -- I think I will have some redirect, so I was just

14     wondering --

15             JUDGE KWON:  My understanding is that Mr. Butler may be -- may

16     need to stay over the weekend, but -- do you think you can complete your

17     cross-examination in the -- in the remainder of today, Mr. Karadzic?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I doubt it, Your Excellency.  All

19     the more so because Mr. Butler is putting for the his opinions on things,

20     although he wasn't in Kravica.  He just stated his opinion that he

21     doesn't believe something that is obvious and confirmed, so I do have to

22     deal with it in more detail.  No.  In fact, I'm sorry, I misspoke.  Not

23     his opinions, but his beliefs.  Belief is something that depends on our

24     will.  We believe what we want to.

25             JUDGE KWON:  We have to rise now, but is my understanding

Page 27781

 1     correct, Mr. Butler, that you can stay -- you can be with us on Monday.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, I am available for testimony next week.

 3     I am at the indulgence of the Court, sir.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.  We will take a break for an

 5     hour and resume at 1.20.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 1.21 p.m.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Judge Morrison cannot be with us for this session

 9     due to his urgent matters, so we'll be sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis.

10             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now see 65 ter

12     document 1984.  The previous one should be removed.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   My learned colleagues have a look at this.  Are you familiar with

15     this document in which an order is issued to search the terrain on the

16     13th of July, to search the depth of the terrain?  And under 3 it says

17     that a white tape has to be used for markings for the purpose of

18     identification.

19        A.   I believe it notes that under paragraph 5.  I think you said 3 in

20     the transcript, sir.  But paragraph 5 notes that:  "Men who participate

21     in this search ... will wear a white band on their right shoulder as an

22     identification mark."

23             Yes, sir.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that our troops usually used such

25     markings because our race and the race of our enemy at the time is the

Page 27782

 1     same?  We had the same ethnic characteristics.

 2        A.   Yes, sir, and in fact, many were even wearing the same former JNA

 3     uniforms, so as a result, one of the practices of the VRS was, was to --

 4     in order to able to distinguish their troops from potential enemy

 5     soldiers was that their troops would wear various coloured ribbons or

 6     armbands on a particular sleeve to aid in battle-field identification.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could it be admitted?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2239, Your Honours.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now have a

11     look at the following document, 1D5536, and I'm not sure whether this can

12     be a public document.

13             I think there is a translation, but I'm not sure.  Apparently

14     not.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   You see here on the 12th of July the Muslims intercepted a

17     conversation.  I'll read out the first part.  It says the aggressor EIPED

18     intercepted a conversation, recorded it between President Izetbegovic and

19     the chief or the head of the municipality in Srebrenica, Avdic, on the

20     situation in Srebrenica.  In the private conversation we also found out

21     that the aggressor EIPED has recordings of the conversation between

22     President Izetbegovic and Naser Oric, but this is at 2000 hours.  It says

23     Goran Mauk [phoen] from the Serbian Army spoke about what is happening in

24     Srebrenica at the time.  He said, That's correct.  Peace is abandoning

25     Srebrenica, and this is what Osman Suljic asked for who -- he has been

Page 27783

 1     the president of the municipality up until now.  This is a request

 2     because of the terror of Naser Oric's supporters, and he left Srebrenica

 3     a month ago at the same time when he ordered an attack on all Serbian

 4     positions.  So he issued the order and fled around Srebrenica.  He issued

 5     those requests to the Serbian troops, a request that the population

 6     should be allowed to leave peacefully, and this is being done.

 7             So the consequence of all these attacks ordered by Naser Oric and

 8     the ABiH as well as the NATO Air Force, the purpose of these attacks is

 9     the liberation of Srebrenica.  And then he says, I'm gathering

10     information on the civilian population and on the number of Muslim

11     soldiers who surrendered and so on and so forth.  And then he swears a

12     little and he mentions the figure of 6.000, who are leaving towards the

13     north, 6.000 civilians who are leaving by heading northwards.  And then

14     at 21 it says unidentified individuals, so I won't read that through.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page.  [In

16     English] Next page, please.

17        Q.   [Interpretation] The one in the middle, the paragraph in the

18     middle.  At 2100 hours, Boro Djurdjevic, a journalist from the

19     Serbian Army, spoke to an unidentified person who couldn't be heard, and

20     Boro Djurdjevic said the following: [As read]  Everything has been

21     completed.  We had to do that.  We regret the fact but, well, that's what

22     happened.  And then he says he left a month ago and then we wouldn't

23     allow him to return.  They are obviously referring to Oric.  And then

24     something is said about what happened.  And towards the bottom at 1745

25     hours, the office of the president of the so-called Republika Srpska was

Page 27784

 1     called by a certain Mirko from abroad in order to convey information or

 2     to say that it was possible for him to inform the aggressor forces in

 3     advance of NATO attacks.  He suggested if messages were obstructed again,

 4     they could be conveyed through Kipa, probably the Belgrade-Pale axis is

 5     concerned.  Mirko doesn't speak Serbian very well, and the radio

 6     interceptors who followed him didn't think that English was his mother

 7     tongue either.

 8             Have you already seen this intercept?

 9        A.   I believe that I -- I may have.  Particularly I recall the third

10     part about the conversation with -- pertaining to Mirko and the fact that

11     there was a belief that they could give early warning on potential NATO

12     attacks.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could it be marked for

14     identification.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D2240, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you could we now see 1D5087.

18     Looks like we don't have a translation for this either.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Were you informed of these reports from the 2nd Corps command

21     from the ABiH submitted to the ABiH Main Staff?  It's on the fall of

22     Srebrenica.  The analysis was made on the 28th of August, 1995.

23        A.   I may have seen this report before, but I'm fairly sure that it

24     was not put in one of my -- my narrative reports.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

Page 27785

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we scroll up, please.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   I'll read out the part where it says that an assessment was made

 4     according to which there would be a limited attack in order to take

 5     control of the road that the Chetniks could use for the needs of the

 6     mine.  This was on the 6th of July, around 4.00, an all-out artillery and

 7     infantry attack was launched against the Srebrenica enclave and so on and

 8     so forth.

 9             Can we see the next page.  So just as you did, they concluded

10     that the task was to take control of the road; isn't that correct?

11        A.   My conclusions are based on what the objectives are laid out in

12     the Krivaja 95 plan, which is to reduce Srebrenica to the urban area.  I

13     don't believe that that corresponds to what's described here as what the

14     ABiH believed was simply taking control of a road in order to access a

15     mine.

16        Q.   Thank you.  I hope we'll have time to show a map from the

17     agreement.  I'll read out the part that concerns what they did here.  In

18     this part it says the command of the 28th Division knew about the

19     existence of the tunnel.  This is the tunnel that was entered by our

20     sabotage troops, but they thought that it had been filled in.  However,

21     Becirevic designated several groups.  From the 2nd Corps command and the

22     General Staff, an order was issued stating that sabotage action should be

23     taken to draw the attention the enemy and to carry out reconnaissance of

24     the enemy in the depth.  Becirevic designated several whose task was to

25     carry out reconnaissance and to take action only if necessary, and all

Page 27786

 1     the groups carried out their task of reconnaissance without engaging in

 2     combat, and they all returned.

 3             One group set off in the direction of Kragivoda, and their task

 4     was to engage in combat.  So on that occasion they destroyed one vehicle

 5     and killed three soldiers.  One group was infiltrated in the Rupovo Brdo

 6     area.  They also engaged in combat and killed four Chetniks.  All

 7     sabotage and reconnaissance units from Zepa were issued the task to enter

 8     the Han Pogled, Han Pijesak, and Sokolac area and reach the

 9     Han Pijesak-Vlasenica road.  According to the decision of the commander

10     of the Brigade 285, nine groups were formed which carried out these

11     tasks.  These tasks engage in combat and killed about 60 Chetniks.  One

12     group entered the village of Visnjica and set fire to several houses.

13             When these sabotage units returned from the Zepa area, the level

14     of morale was raised in the area of Srebrenica and elsewhere.  Two or

15     three days before the units withdrew in the afternoon the command of the

16     28th Division was informed that they had broken through the defence line.

17     Assistance was requested.  And then the last sentence says heavy weapons

18     that weren't surrendered to UNPROFOR were used throughout the combat

19     period.  One mountain gun remained at its gun emplacement.

20             Can we see the next page, please.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it's very difficult to follow the line

22     of questioning.  What's the point of reading all this?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I didn't think I was going to

24     read out that much.  There are only a few things that have been marked

25     that I wanted to read out, and these parts concern the attitude towards

Page 27787

 1     the civilians, and it also -- they also concern the contents of this

 2     report.

 3             Well, maybe I exaggerated a little with all these details.

 4             Could we scroll up.  I'll skip something.

 5             It says given that the Chetniks at the time had already broken

 6     through to Zabojna [phoen], Sabovo [phoen], Srebrenica on the previous

 7     evening, the people broke into all the warehouses in the town.  They took

 8     all the food reserves and head off in the direction of Potocari and

 9     panicked.  That is where UNPROFOR troops sent them to under the pretext

10     that they also had the intention of going to Potocari.

11        Q.   Mr. Butler, did you notice that they took all the food reserves,

12     and in fact it was said that there were no such food reserves?

13        A.   I -- it wasn't part of my research to look at the issue related

14     to the civilians moving up to Potocari in that respect.  I don't know if

15     they did or did not break into the various warehouses where food were

16     stored and took them with them or not.  I just have no way of knowing

17     that.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see the next page.  It says almost all the

19     civilian population - it's the second paragraph - almost all the civilian

20     population from the town and surrounding villages set off on the 11th of

21     July, 1995, around 1500 hours towards the main military base of UNPROFOR

22     in Potocari, and by 2000 hours on at that day, about 20.000 refugees had

23     gathered.

24             Mr. Butler, can I remind you of a calculation?  There were 20.000

25     in Potocari, 10- to 15.000 passing through the forests, and there was a

Page 27788

 1     total of 35.000.  So let me remind you of those figures and do those

 2     figures tally now?

 3        A.   I take it that the point that you're seeking to make is that

 4     there were a total of 35.000 people in the former enclave of Srebrenica,

 5     20.000 of them went to Potocari, and that the column strength was between

 6     10- and 15.000?  Is that what you're -- okay.

 7             I agree again 10- to 15.000 is within a range of numbers that I

 8     believe is associated with the column.  I think that the 20.000 figure is

 9     low for the number of civilians that went to Potocari.  I believe that

10     some of the Bosnian Serb military sources have a higher number than that,

11     and I believe - excuse me - that the UN's count has an even still higher

12     number.

13        Q.   Should one trust the Muslim authorities?  Should they know who is

14     where?  This is a report from the 2nd Corps.  That was towards the end,

15     two months -- or, rather, a month and a half after the event in question.

16        A.   Again, sir, I -- I don't trust anybody's numbers with respect to

17     these types of estimates simply because I know that there are multiple

18     numbers, each from what purports to be a reliable source.  That's why

19     normally you'll here me speak in ranges.

20             So again I take your point that one would think that the military

21     and civilian leadership in Srebrenica would have the most accurate

22     numbers by virtue of being the civil, political control body for the

23     Bosnian Muslim government in the enclave, but again I have to point out

24     the fact that there are other numbers.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Let's have a look at the following part where it says

Page 27789

 1     that although he wasn't an official representative of the civilian

 2     population, at 2215 Mandic was called to go to Bratunac for negotiations,

 3     and the Chetnik General, Mladic, was there on behalf of the Chetnik side.

 4     And then Ljubisav Simic, the leadership of the Bratunac Serbian

 5     municipality, Deronjic, and so on and so forth.

 6             Then it says it was suggested to the Chetniks that authorisation

 7     should be given for the evacuation of the civilian population under

 8     UNPROFOR escort to the free territory.

 9             Did you take this into consideration when you described the

10     manner in which the population was moved out from Potocari?

11        A.   Again, setting aside this document, and perhaps going more

12     authoritatively to the transcripts of the second meeting and the third

13     meeting at the Hotel Fontana on the 11th and 12th of July, 1995, what was

14     said in those meeting and the promises made in those meetings is part of

15     the record.

16             At this juncture, I trust that the Court has heard extensive

17     testimony with respect to how those convoys departed Potocari, as well as

18     the Dutch Battalion escorts that were initially escorting them and, over

19     time, they lost the ability to do that.  So I think those particular --

20     again, I never -- I don't characterise for the most part that movement.

21     Again, I believe that there is more than ample information out there

22     about that from more authoritative sources than me.

23        Q.   Fair enough, Mr. Butler, but then I shouldn't be worried by the

24     fact that at one point in time you used the term "deportation" and at

25     another point in time you use the term "evacuation."  You would leave

Page 27790

 1     this to others who dealt with civilians, wouldn't you?  But the Defence

 2     is concerned, because in legal terms there's a difference between

 3     deportation and evacuation.  But in any event, you did not concern

 4     yourself with the meaning of these terms, did you?

 5        A.   I am aware from a legal sense there is a difference in the phrase

 6     "deportation" and -- or "forcible transfer," as well as the term

 7     "evacuation."  I understand that it is a legal issue that is before this

 8     particular Trial Chamber, so -- I mean, questions that I have been asked

 9     as to my opinion as to whether I believe that the Muslim population had a

10     realistic chance to stay or not to stay, I believe I've already given

11     answers to, and I don't believe that I'm the person who can qualify what

12     the actual movement out of Potocari was in a legal sense.

13        Q.   [In English] Fair enough.  Thank you.  [Interpretation] Fair

14     enough.  Thank you.  Can we see the next page.

15             In the third -- or, rather, fourth paragraph it says on the night

16     between the 11th and 12th of July, 1995, a decision was taken on breaking

17     through in the direction of Tuzla.  And then a little lower down it says

18     the commanders were ordered to line up the units and to form a column.

19     This was all on the night between the 11th and 12th of July, 1995.

20             Then a little lower down it says that there were about 6.000

21     armed troops, not counting the troops from Zepa.

22             And now let's have a look at the following passage.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll up a little more,

24     please.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

Page 27791

 1        Q.   It says that there were perhaps dozens of women.  There weren't

 2     many women and children.  Perhaps there were -- there was about a dozen

 3     women.  As the column was moving forward, the commanders had received

 4     instructions.  Amongst other things, they were instructed to leave the

 5     dead soldiers behind but to take the wounded with them.

 6             In the course of your work, did anyone emphasise the fact that

 7     the dead were to be left behind?

 8        A.   I -- I am aware that the -- what had in fact happened was that,

 9     of course, the wounded were carried forward where they could be and that

10     the remains of soldiers or members of the column who had fell were left

11     where they are.  I don't know that anyone emphasised that, but I mean I'm

12     aware that that's the case.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could this be admitted?

14                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, Your Honour.  I was conferring.  No, I

17     don't agree that this document be admitted, at least until -- I have no

18     objection to it being marked for identification until we have a

19     translation.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll mark it for identification.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D2241, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now see

23     1D5527.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   There is a map on page 3.  It's an integral part of the agreement

Page 27792

 1     on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica, and I won't ask to see whether it

 2     was necessary for Zepa and Srebrenica to be separated, but the road

 3     between them was to be free and under Serbian control.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I was told that it hasn't been released.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [Microphone not activated]

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This is the agreement on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica.  It

 8     was reached on the 18th of April, 1993.  An agreement reached between

 9     Mladic and Seferovic, the two generals.  Can we see the next page.

10             Here we can see the signatures.  So this is an agreement on

11     implementation.  It's perhaps somewhat different in relation to the

12     agreement reached on the 18th.

13             Just a moment.  Can we see the part that contains the map.  I

14     think it's page number 3.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Where do you see the signatures, Mr. Karadzic?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The signatures are on the original

17     Your Excellency, but this is the English translation.  The original is

18     obviously in Serbian.  It was signed by Gvero and some deputy of

19     Halilovic's, Divjak.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Can you see that as far as Srebrenica is concerned, you can see

22     the boundaries of the settlement, and these more regular lines mark those

23     boundaries.

24             Can you see the boundaries traced by these regular lines?

25        A.   I see a boundary here that looks like a dotted and dashed line.

Page 27793

 1     I believe that's the boundary you're referring to, sir.

 2        Q.   Yes, yes.  Do you see the village of Pusmulici to the south which

 3     is located outside those boundaries?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  And can you see that these two zones are separated?

 6        A.   I take it what you're saying -- again, the village of

 7     Pilici [sic] is outside that designated area around the urban area of

 8     Srebrenica.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And to the south can you see the area that's been

10     delimited there, and can you see that there's a free stretch of territory

11     between those two areas, a stretch of territory that isn't included in

12     this drawing?

13        A.   I'm not tracking what you're -- which -- what you're referring

14     to.

15        Q.   Are these two enclaves contiguous, or are they two distinct or

16     separate enclaves?  What would you say if you have a look at this map

17     that is attached to the agreement on implementation?

18        A.   The -- I'm only seeing one designated enclave or one designated

19     area by that dotted and dashed line.  I'm not seeing the second one.  I

20     mean, are you referring to in that case the area of terrain that's kind

21     of diagonally crossed or -- I mean, I don't know what -- you're talking

22     about a second one.

23        Q.   Yes, but is the enclave here attached to Zepa?  Is the Srebrenica

24     enclave attached to Zepa?

25        A.   No, sir.

Page 27794

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, could this agreement on

 2     implementation together with the map be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  No objection, Your Honour.  I was still just

 5     trying to find where the map is appended to the agreement, but I don't

 6     object.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  You do not dispute the authenticity of this

 8     document.

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  Not of the agreement, and this is a map which he

10     has pulled.  I haven't yet found that this map is actually attached to

11     the same document signed by Gvero, which it was said that it was.  I'm

12     still looking at that.

13             JUDGE KWON:  But I find it somewhat strange that the signature is

14     lacking in this document.

15             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yeah.  I mean -- at this point I do not have an

16     objection.  I may have some more comments on this agreement and map as I

17     look into it.  I do not believe we were notified of this map and

18     document, so I'm a little bit behind in trying to figure it out, but at

19     this time I don't object to its admission, but I may have a submission on

20     it later.

21             JUDGE KWON:  More specifically, my question was whether this is a

22     draft or this is a signed agreement given that the signatures were

23     lacking, but whatever the factual situation it was, we'll receive it.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2242, Your Honours.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we briefly see

Page 27795

 1     P4491, which was admitted during your examination-in-chief.  4941.

 2     Sorry, I got the number wrong.  It's a P number, P4941, a Prosecution

 3     exhibit.  Page 4 in e-court.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Do we agree that Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde are marked here

 6     and delineated?

 7        A.   Yes, sir.  There are -- there are delineated -- there are

 8     delineated lines in this that would reflect the former safe areas of --

 9     or Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we zoom in on the right side,

11     Eastern Bosnia.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Do we agree that on this map, too, we see clearly that the

14     enclaves were not agreed to be joined?  There is a passage between them,

15     and the passage is under Serbian control.

16        A.   Again, the -- the fact is that the Srebrenica and the Zepa

17     enclaves were considered to be by the United Nations separate enclaves.

18     They were not one large enclave.  The second one -- I mean, the

19     presumption, obviously, is that if the enclaves are not under

20     United Nations' control, that outside the territory, outside the enclave,

21     would of course be Bosnian Serb.

22        Q.   Did you notice in that report, the Muslim report on the fall,

23     that Pusmulici village fell, but it wasn't even supposed to be in the

24     area, because we see on the map it was supposed to fall outside the area.

25     Do you agree, therefore, that the Muslim side expanded the area so much

Page 27796

 1     that Zepa and Srebrenica ended up being joined?

 2        A.   I -- again as I have testified, I am aware that there was a

 3     difference in opinion between certainly the VRS as -- and the United

 4     Nations as to what the actual demarcated boundaries of the enclave were.

 5     I do not know who was responsible for what ultimately would be the rough

 6     boundaries which correspond to where the United Nations' observation

 7     posts were, whether that was something that was Bosnian Muslims were

 8     behind or whether that was something that the UN themselves decided.

 9             Regardless of where the markings were, even though the enclaves

10     were physically separated, the overall concern of the VRS is that

11     military troops from the 28th Infantry Division at Srebrenica, as well as

12     the brigade of the division in Zepa, did have constant communication back

13     and forth and could travel through various paths and valleys back and

14     forth between the Srebrenica and the Zepa enclave.  So when you read in

15     the military documents where the military is talking about the context of

16     cutting the enclaves in two and separating the enclaves, what they mean

17     in a military text or context is that they need to stop these Muslim

18     military forces that are going back and forth between the two.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  And if I can just ask for some clarity, is

20     Mr. Karadzic's case that on 2nd July, 1995, that there was only one large

21     enclave, that the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves were not separate - and he

22     referred to the village of Pusmulici being outside - is his case that

23     Muslims were not allowed to live outside the boundaries of this -- of

24     these two smaller enclaves and were not allowed to have villages or exist

25     outside these enclaves, which is what it appears to be saying?

Page 27797

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Again, Mr. President, we object to -- there's no

 2     need for Dr. Karadzic to state his case.  He's putting questions to this

 3     witness on cross-examination, so we don't believe that he should be

 4     required to state his case.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We agree with Mr. Robinson.  Let's move on.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   First of all, I'd like to ask you, were you aware, did you

 8     familiarise yourself with the manipulations done with dead bodies when

 9     bodies were collected to be placed in other areas at a convenient moment?

10     Are you aware that the Muslim side engaged in that sort of thing?  It

11     delayed the burials in order to be able to use these bodies in a

12     different place?

13        A.   No, sir, I'm not aware of that.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5192, please, is the next

15     document I want.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   If the translation does not appear, I'm sorry.  Maybe page 2 is

18     the translation.  I see this has been used somewhere.  There must be a

19     translation.  It seems to be accepted in this case as an MFI.

20             This is dated 20th March.  Look at paragraph 5 that begins with

21     the date 27 March.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please zoom in for the

23     interpreters.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   It talks about an attack by the Wasps who killed 12 Serbian

Page 27798

 1     fighters.  It says they mounted an attack on the Vozuca front and on that

 2     occasion captured or killed 12 Serbian fighters.  In a counter-attack by

 3     the VRS, the source claims they suffered losses of about 160 fighting

 4     men.  They do not bury their fighters at cemeteries so that none of the

 5     families know about their relatives lost, and the hodzas prohibit

 6     funerals from being organised.

 7             This supports my thesis that bodies were manipulated.  It says

 8     here that 160 fighters were killed there, and our intelligence service

 9     found out in March 1995 that these bodies had been relocated.  Do you now

10     see how it was possible to manipulate -- to manipulate the bodies?

11        A.   Sir, what -- what it says is that a source is that -- a source of

12     information that they're reporting up is saying that.  That is one

13     isolated report of which I have no way to either confirm or deny.  That

14     is the belief of the source, and it's being reported up through the

15     intelligence chain of the Drina Corps to the Main Staff.  I don't know

16     whether they even assign any credibility to that particular source or

17     not.  So it's just information.

18        Q.   Thank you.  I won't put it to you that weapons were shipped from

19     Iran via Split to the Tuzla airport.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since this is an MFI document, I'll

21     call another one.  Could we see 1D5190.

22                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   This is also from the intelligence section of the Drina Corps.

25     They are informing the Main Staff, and it says confirmation was received

Page 27799

 1     that enemy forces from the 28th and 21st Divisions raised their combat

 2     readiness and are reinforcing their forces at the forward end.  By active

 3     reconnaissance and scouting of our positions, they're trying to

 4     infiltrate sabotage groups among the disposition of our units.  The units

 5     of the 28th Division are intensively scouting our positions and mounting

 6     sabotage actions against the firing positions of the artillery in order

 7     to cause fear, panic, and disorganisation in our ranks.

 8             And then it says we have unconfirmed information that the Dutch

 9     Battalion in Srebrenica returned to the Muslims all the weapons that had

10     been taken away from them, around 1500 rifles.  It says the forces of the

11     Dutch Battalion plan to recover the observation point in Zeleni Jadar by

12     force by 14 June 1995.

13             Did you have in your hands this document which speaks volumes

14     about the preparations made and the co-operation between the

15     28th Division and the Dutch Battalion of the UNPROFOR?

16        A.   I'm not sure that I've seen this document before or not.  Again,

17     it's an intelligence report of intelligence information that's being

18     passed on, and I would again remind you that according to the text of the

19     report itself, they're not able to -- to even confirm the information

20     that they're forwarding, and I'm not aware that the Dutch Battalion did,

21     in fact, turn 1500 rifles over to the 28th Infantry Division in June of

22     1995.

23        Q.   Do you know that the Dutch Battalion offered it to them, but they

24     refused, saying they had more modern weapons?  And do you know that there

25     were weapons shipments throughout the period of existence of the

Page 27800

 1     protected area?

 2        A.   Two separate questions.  I am aware that approximately on the 9th

 3     or I believe it may even be as late as the 10th of July the issue was

 4     raised whether or not the weapons that were held by the UN should be

 5     returned to the Muslims.  I don't know that they ever did that, because I

 6     think the Muslim position was no, they wanted the UN to defend them at

 7     that juncture.

 8             As to your second question, during the entire course of the

 9     existence of the enclaves, I believe it's well documented that Bosnian

10     2nd Corps did provide weapons.  They were smuggled in over land through

11     many known smuggling routes, ammunition, things of that nature.

12             Again, as I've testified previously, the 28th Infantry Division,

13     notwithstanding the disarmament agreement, was never disarmed and

14     represented a military fighting force at the beginning of July 1995.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Since we will be seeing each other again on Monday,

16     we will go through that list which made you believe that the change from

17     O to T was related to localities.  But now I'd like to go through your

18     summary.  Could you please take a hard copy of your report.  Maybe it

19     will be easier.

20             One of the first things in the first paragraph and the second

21     paragraph, you say that the Muslim forces organised themselves very

22     quickly after the Serbian action.  Do you stand by that view that the

23     Muslim forces started to organise themselves only after the Serbian

24     attack, as you put it?  It says facing the forces of Bosnian Muslims who

25     quickly organised themselves.  Do you know that the Muslim side had their

Page 27801

 1     own Patriotic League and organised their own forces even before the war

 2     began?

 3        A.   Sir, perhaps if it would assist, if you could tell me which

 4     report and the number of the paragraph that you're referring to.

 5        Q.   I'm talking about the revised narrative, the summary, paragraph

 6     number 1, year 2002.

 7        A.   Which -- which paragraph again, sir?

 8        Q.   The first one.  You say that municipal Territorial Defence and

 9     later units of the VRS and commands that tried to expand the control of

10     the Bosnian Serbs in that territory were facing the resistant forces of

11     the Bosnian Muslims who were speedily organising themselves.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters also cannot find this text.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Have you established when the Muslim armed forces were organised?

15     Do you know that the decision to form the Patriotic League was made on

16     the 30th March 1991, implemented on 30th April of 1991, and already in

17     June every municipality had both a staff and a brigade in July 1991?

18        A.   I am not aware of the specifics related to the establishment of

19     the Patriotic League and various dates.  I am aware that during 1991,

20     many of the municipal organs split to reflect one for the Serbs and one

21     for the Muslims during various points of time.  So I mean that's as close

22     as I can get to an answer.  I don't know any of the details with respect

23     to each municipality and by what dates what various staffs or brigades

24     were established by.

25        Q.   Do you know that only the Serbian side did not have an organised

Page 27802

 1     army, because it relied on the federal army, the JNA, to protect it?

 2        A.   My understanding is that somewhere around November/December of

 3     1991, even while the JNA was still present in Bosnia, that there were

 4     various local Territorial Defence units that were set up and ultimately

 5     placed under the command of municipal Crisis Staffs.  I do agree that of

 6     all three parties to the conflict, to the largest extent the Serb side

 7     believed that its interests in protected by the Yugoslav national army.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 2 you say that in November, not long

 9     after the establishment of the Drina Corps, the VRS started a campaign of

10     expulsion of Bosnian Muslims, including Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas.

11     Does this look -- doesn't this look like a ready-made judgement,

12     Mr. Butler?  It certainly sounds like an indictment, but when you say it,

13     then it also sounds like a judgement.  A verdict.

14             Why in November 1992 and the spring 1993, why didn't it start

15     earlier?

16        A.   The goal of my report, and even the part about the executive

17     summary where the events of 1992 and 1993 are discussed, are simply to

18     set the context so that the reader of the report would understand how all

19     of the parties got to the month of July 1995, how the people who were

20     scattered throughout Eastern Bosnia came to be in a United Nations

21     enclave, how the military forces moved, where they were habitually

22     assigned, and also reflects the various reports and the operations that

23     occurred.

24             Again, I'm not -- as I noted in my reports, I'm not writing a

25     definitive history of the conflict in Eastern Bosnia.  I am writing about

Page 27803

 1     the military aspects with respect to what happened in Srebrenica in 1995.

 2     There are -- there is a lot of context --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I was checking whether the LiveNote is

 6     working.  It's working on the common drive but not in the personal

 7     computer, but we can continue.  Please continue.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  I note that there is a lot of

 9     information with respect to what has happened in Eastern Bosnia from 1991

10     to July of 1995 that, I presume, the Trial Chamber has heard or will here

11     that is not in my report, and that in and of itself would add many

12     volumes to my report.  But again, the limited goal that I undertook was

13     simply to be able to set the context so that a reader of my narrative

14     would understand in relatively short order how the situation in July 1995

15     was created.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My LiveNote is also not working,

17     but I hope it will be repaired.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   If I understood you correctly, Mr. Butler; am I to conclude that

20     you did not study or establish the facts that are contained in your

21     report and relate to the period before July 1995?

22             Did you get interpretation?

23        A.   I did, sir.  I was just waiting for -- it looks like there's some

24     technical problems.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Would it be okay to continue?

Page 27804

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I can, unless Mr. Butler is

 2     waiting for a check of the transcript.  If my question has been

 3     interpreted and he's able to answer, we can continue.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  There seems to be a technical difficulties, so that

 5     the Registry cannot publish documents through e-court.  Shall we take a

 6     brief break so that we can check?

 7             We'll rise for five minutes.

 8                           --- Break taken at 2.27 p.m.

 9                           --- On resuming at 2.38 p.m.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   If I understood correctly, Mr. Butler, you did not study anything

14     before July 1995.  You only took this on in order to better understand

15     July 1995; right?

16        A.   Correct, sir.  While I have some history -- or have some of the

17     historical background from Eastern Bosnia in there in the narrative, the

18     primary focus of the narrative relates to the recounting of events for

19     July of 1995.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Then I will not challenge what you took from others.

21     In order to better understand, I challenged it on prior occasions.

22             Tell me, on what basis did you conclude that the killing in

23     Cerska took place on the 13th of July?

24        A.   The Cerska killing is a somewhat problematic date identification.

25     It was in this context primarily testimonial based, and again, I used it

Page 27805

 1     simply to set the context.  A particular witness who testified about

 2     seeing buses rolling down the Cerska Valley road, as well as earth moving

 3     equipment going in afterwards, and when one looks at that particular

 4     statement that we used and counted back the days, the conclusion was that

 5     it occurred on the 13th of July.

 6        Q.   Very well.  However, that was not proven in some other way.  For

 7     instance, somebody being seen alive on the 17th of July and then found in

 8     an undisturbed grave.

 9        A.   Yes, sir.  I am aware of that, that there is DNA evidence that

10     would conflict with that 13 July date.  Again, that information was not

11     available to anyone when that first estimate of the 13 July came out, and

12     I do concede that an identification exactly when the Cerska grave was

13     installed is problematic, at least as far as my review of military

14     documents is concerned.

15        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 4, chapter 4, you accepted that

16     Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans, on behalf of his superiors, asked for the

17     withdrawal of the Dutch Battalion, the Muslim population, and Doctors

18     Without Borders; right?

19        A.   Correct, sir.  I mean, I summarised that in 4.4.

20        Q.   Thank you.  4.7 and 4.8, this is where you point out -- or,

21     rather, you convey the transcript of the conversation between

22     General Mladic and others at the second meeting, and then on the 12th of

23     July; right?

24        A.   In paragraph 4.7, I source that information in part from not only

25     the tapes or the transcripts of those meetings -- the video-tapes of the

Page 27806

 1     meetings that were subsequently made into transcripts, I should say, but

 2     I also cite it to the report that the DutchBat commander sent to his

 3     superiors.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Before I go back to this topic, I wanted to ask you

 5     the following:  Did you notice, for example, the daily reports that are

 6     sent from the brigade to the corps do not reach me in the same form?  For

 7     example, also police reports.  A lot of detail is lost by the time these

 8     reports reach the minister and then even more detail is lost if they're

 9     sent further up to me.

10        A.   I -- I can -- on the military side, I believe it is clear that

11     when one looks at the reporting from the brigades to the Drina Corps and

12     then what is then ultimately incorporated to the Main Staff is obviously

13     summarised.  Part of the job of the staff is to select those topical

14     issues which they believe are relevant that the higher headquarters needs

15     to be aware of.

16             With respect to the police reports, clearly we have the RD

17     reports and the -- the RDB reports as well as the MUP reports from Vasic

18     that are going at least to the police staff.  I'm not sure I can comment

19     on what information from the police staff or those reports that went

20     directly to Mr. Kovac, what Mr. Kovac may or may not have relayed to you.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do we agree -- or, rather, have you established that

22     POWs in Kravica were guarded by the police, not by the army?

23        A.   My understanding is that while there were some army soldiers

24     present, the majority of the forces that were guarding the people in

25     Kravica on 13 July 1995 were comprised of the 2nd Sekovici Detachment

Page 27807

 1     personnel and personnel from the 1st PJP company from Zvornik.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Have you seen a report about this event?  It's more

 3     than an incident, so I'm not going to call it an incident.  Did you see a

 4     report that was sent to anyone or me in particular?

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, just what's the incident?  Because before

 6     we were talking about the wounding of the -- of Mr. Tudoric [phoen] and

 7     some of the Serb forces, or are we talking about the mass execution?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm going to call it "event," the

 9     wounding and everything that happened after the wounding.  So

10     Mr. Nicholls is not going to be assisted by me in any way in formulating

11     what this event was.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm not asking for formulating the event, and he's

13     helped clarify it a bit.  It's just if you say the incident at Kravica,

14     the way the cross has gone that could have referred to several different

15     things.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Did you see a report that was being sent to someone, or to me in

19     particular, in order to provide me with this information about the

20     dramatic happenings in the building of the cooperative in Kravica around

21     1700 hours?

22        A.   I am not aware that through the normal military reporting

23     channels that either the army or the MUP reported that there was a

24     massacre at Kravica at 1700 hours on the 13th of July, or in the case of

25     the MUP that they were primarily responsible for it.  There is that, of

Page 27808

 1     course, one written notation that comes well after the fact by Mr. Vasic,

 2     talking about the job that the first PJP company was involved in.  So in

 3     that respect, given that there were no written reports that I'm aware of

 4     passed up either to the police or the army staffs, I don't know how you

 5     would have gotten that in a written form.  Obviously I cannot speak to

 6     what verbally any individual in Bratunac may or may not have told you.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Did you observe my presence in Bratunac or Srebrenica

 8     in the month of July 1995?

 9        A.   I do not know if you were in Bratunac or Srebrenica during the

10     month of July 1995.  I believe the first time that your presence is noted

11     is as a result of a 2 August 1995 daily report from the Bratunac Brigade

12     which reflects the fact that you and General Krstic were meeting in

13     Srebrenica on that day.

14        Q.   Let me correct you.  It's just two days.  On the 2nd of August I

15     was in Drvar, and I tried to change the formation of the Main Staff into

16     the staff of the Supreme Command, and it was on the 4th that I was in

17     this region attending a religious ceremony; isn't that right?

18        A.   Again I'll take your word at that.  It's been a lot of years

19     since I looked at that document, but I believe it's cited in my report,

20     so it's easily verifiable one way or another.

21        Q.   I would like to ask you to look at paragraph 5.7, where you say

22     that Vasic, the chief of the CJB, that over 100 trucks have already been

23     provided.  Now it seems to me that the English translation says, "Have

24     already been provided."  And the Prosecution cares very much about the

25     actual hours involved, whether it was after the third meeting at 10.00 or

Page 27809

 1     whether it was after 8.00 after the meeting in the Bratunac Brigade.

 2             However, now I'm going to ask the interpreters to confirm or deny

 3     this.  When you say "obezbediti" in our language, doesn't that mean

 4     "secured"?  So it was found out where it exists, but it hasn't actually

 5     been provided yet.  So the information was that these 100 trucks exist.

 6             Do you see the difference between these two different meanings,

 7     between "secured" and "provided"?

 8        A.   I take your point with respect to at the time that Mr. Vasic was

 9     writing this report that there were not already 100 trucks on the ground

10     at Bratunac.  I think if you read that in conjunction with 5.5, it notes

11     that all through the evening hours the Ministry of Defence, at the

12     request of the army, had been looking to essentially secure and identify

13     weeks that could be sent to Bratunac.

14             In the case of any discrepancies in language, I would again, you

15     know, invite the Court to go back to the original document.  Like -- like

16     I said yesterday, I'm at the mercy of CLSS with respect to English

17     language translations from Bosnian Serb documents.  So if there is any

18     question about the discrepancy of the language, you know, please refer

19     back to the original document I cite.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I fully accept that, but quite simply that would be a

21     major undertaking, because after all these are nuances in translation

22     that are involved and meanings are quite different.  But thank you at any

23     rate.

24             You see, 514 here.  That is something that concerns me, although

25     you have kindly said that you do not deal with qualifying the evacuation

Page 27810

 1     of the population.  So this is what 514 says:

 2             "To support this continuing movement the Ministry of Defence

 3     issued an order on the 13th of July 1995 to the local Secretariat of

 4     Defence for the Bijeljina municipality," and so on and so forth.

 5             So let me ask you the following:  On the basis of your experience

 6     and your theoretical knowledge, was this not a major risk for us, to have

 7     so many civilians, 20.000 civilians, relocated from their homes in a

 8     small area, in an area where personal revenge is highly likely?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.  It is a risk.  And as time goes on, it notes to be

10     that.  To mitigate that risk, many civilians from the local population

11     were not permitted to enter Potocari on the 12th and the 13th, and there

12     was a variety of military and police forces sent there also to ensure

13     control.  So while there are some instances individualistic killings in

14     Potocari that occur on the 12th, in the evening of the 12th and the 13th,

15     I don't believe they compare in number to the same types of

16     individualistic killings that you see in and around Bratunac that is

17     occurring where there are less military and police forces to guard the

18     prisoners and that the local population has freer access to them.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic --

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Thank you --

22             JUDGE KWON:  We will stop here today.  You have spent almost the

23     same time as the Prosecution did for its examination-in-chief, all be it

24     minus five or nine minutes.  How much more would you need on Monday to

25     conclude your cross-examination?

Page 27811

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellencies, taking

 2     into account the reports, although Mr. Butler has just made things easier

 3     for me now that I focus only on July 1995, because that is his authentic

 4     research, so I would really like to have two sessions if that would be

 5     possible.  I think that would be a very good thing.

 6                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber will give you a session on

 8     Monday.

 9             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

10             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'll need to move into

11     private session for a request related to a filing.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Could the Chamber move into private session.

13             MR. TIEGER:  I don't --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second we're still in open session.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 27812

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16                           [Open session]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for your understanding, Mr. Butler.

18             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

19             JUDGE KWON:  We will rise for this week and resume on Monday at

20     9.00.

21                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.01 p.m.,

22                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd day

23                           of April, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.