1 Monday, 23 April 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Good morning, Mr. Butler.
7 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.
8 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
9 JUDGE KWON: Before you begin, Mr. Karadzic, Judge Baird has a
10 couple of questions for the witness.
11 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Butler, as I studied your evidence over the
12 weekend, I realized that there were certain areas where -- small areas
13 where I might need some assistance. Now, it's possible I might have
14 passed them along the way, but all the same, I would need your assistance
15 in these very small areas.
16 My first question has to do with the opening of the corridor for
17 the passage of the column. Now, Pandurevic and Muminovic arrived at this
18 truce and Pandurevic opened the corridor, and in his report he said he
19 let out 5.000 individuals. He -- if I might paraphrase here, he conceded
20 for a certain number of soldiers getting out, but those who passed
21 through were unarmed. So I apprehended that he was saying fundamentally
22 the bulk of that 5.000 was civilians.
23 Now, Borovcanin -- Borovcanin's forces were part of the forces
24 that Pandurevic was using to fight the column, so he was, as it were, in
25 medias res, he was in the middle of things, and between 6.00 and 8.00 on
1 July 16, Pandurevic submits his interim report. At 1300 hours on the
2 16th, Borovcanin submitted his report. And in his report, Dr. Butler, he
3 stated that Pandurevic opened a 1-kilometre-wide corridor to allow the
4 Muslim soldiers to get out. He said the bulk of the enemy column, and
5 his understanding was about 2.005, soldiers managed to break through to
6 Nezuk. So Borovcanin had a different view of the composition of the
8 What I'm wondering, Mr. Butler, is how did his superiors react to
9 this -- their superiors react to the striking difference in the two
11 THE WITNESS: Well, sir, what I believe if you look at the
12 sequence of events that follows is that Colonel Pandurevic, by his own
13 admission in the interim combat report, made a decision to let the column
14 through and that he sought to downplay the fact that he had allowed
15 soldiers to escape by seeking to characterise or to downplay the amount
16 of soldiers.
17 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes.
18 THE WITNESS: I mean, the first thing that comes to mind is
19 Colonel Pandurevic and his people weren't close enough to know whether or
20 not those soldiers got out unarmed or not.
21 The second point is, as noted by the commission that came up on
22 the 17th to investigate matters, one of the roles of that commission on
23 the 17th of July was to determine whether or not Colonel Pandurevic's
24 actions were so out of line as to potentially relieve him of command of
25 the Zvornik Brigade or make that recommendation to General Mladic. The
1 army was not happy with that decision to let these soldiers go, the
2 motivation, of course, being that by letting them go, they will face them
3 again in the future.
4 So that is a fundamental difference in how the column is
5 described by Colonel Pandurevic who has a particular reason to want to
6 characterize the column as either unarmed or more civilian in nature,
7 because he is responsible ultimately for letting it go, versus
8 Colonel Borovcanin who did not make that decision and consequently there
9 are no ramifications against him for whether or not the column managed to
10 fight its way out or not.
11 JUDGE BAIRD: But were there ramifications against Pandurevic?
12 THE WITNESS: Well, yes, sir. And I believe that if you look at
13 the 18 July 1995 interim combat report, that is Colonel Pandurevic's long
14 explanation in part as to why he let the column go, the fact that his
15 brigade had taken a significant number of casualties not only during the
16 operations against the column but even previously to that and that this
17 was Colonel Pandurevic explaining to his superiors what his
18 justifications were.
19 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes. My question is did they accept it? Was it
20 accepted at all?
21 THE WITNESS: Colonel Pandurevic was not relieved of command of
22 the Zvornik Brigade, so his explanation was accepted.
23 JUDGE BAIRD: I see. I see. Thank you.
24 Now, my second question touches to a certain extent also on the
25 column. You said that the column was allowed to pass between the 16th
1 and the 17th, and the lines were then re-closed with hundreds, if not
2 more, trapped behind those closed lines, and now reports from the
3 Zvornik Brigade that prisoners were being taken from the 18th to the
4 21st. Now, you said those prisoners have not been accounted for, and you
5 deduced that somewhere in close proximity to where those prisoners were
6 capture, they were summarily executed by either the soldiers or the
7 police who captured them.
8 Now, are you saying then, Mr. Butler, that there would have been
9 several execution sites?
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I believe that there were a number of
11 small-scale execution sights. One example that I cite is that on both
12 the 16th and 17th of July, 1995, that is vehicle log from one truck from
13 the 7th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade where the driver of that vehicle
14 actually noted down numbers of prisoners that were being transported by
15 that truck on that day. You see no accounting of those particular
16 prisoners anywhere at the Zvornik Brigade headquarters.
17 If one assumes that these people were handled in what would have
18 been the appropriate manner, even in accordance with the VRS's
19 regulations, that truck would have travelled to the Zvornik Brigade or
20 another designated area. Those prisoners would have been dropped off
21 there under the guard to the higher headquarters, which would be the
22 Zvornik Brigade, and they would be accounted for and ultimately moved
23 toward Batkovici. In effect, the same thing that you start seeing
24 happening on the 22nd of July, 1995, but you see no evidence of that.
25 The truck goes to a remote location and then returns back to the
1 battalion headquarters.
2 So I believe that there are a number of examples from the period
3 of the 17th of July till the 21st of July where there are various combat
4 reports that -- or other documents that reflect the Zvornik Brigade or
5 the police forces in the Zvornik Brigade area encountering Muslim groups,
6 and there's no accounting for any prisoners being taken by any of them
7 until the July 22nd report by the Zvornik Infantry Brigade where for the
8 first time they produce a number that says, "We have captured this many
9 prisoners," and perhaps more importantly, actually asked the Drina Corps
10 command for instructions as to how to handle them.
11 JUDGE BAIRD: But there was never any tangible evidence to
12 support this deduction, was there?
13 THE WITNESS: Again, the only actual noted execution would be
14 what I believe is referred to as the Nezuk execution, which occurred
15 by -- which was occurred by a group of soldiers from the 16th
16 Krajina Brigade who were operating under the command of the
17 Zvornik Brigade at the time. So I believe that is again one vignette
18 story that talks about the fact that a group of soldiers were apprehended
19 and were summarily executed shortly after their captured by the unit that
20 captured them. My belief is that that story played out on a number of
21 occasions until the 22nd of July.
22 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Butler, I thank you very much indeed.
23 Dr. Karadzic, thank you.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE KWON: Was Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic's interim report
2 on the 18th of July referred to by Mr. Butler admitted into evidence?
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour. It is P00181.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.
7 Good morning to everyone.
8 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
9 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Butler.
10 A. Good morning, sir.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at the interim
12 combat report that was just mentioned, P181.
13 JUDGE KWON: In the mean time while we are waiting, Mr. Nicholls,
14 how about the -- the report about the execution by 16th 1st Krajina Corps
15 members? Have you admitted that document.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm not sure. I'll look, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE KWON: Otherwise you'll deal with it --
18 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes.
19 JUDGE KWON: -- during your re-examination [Overlapping speakers].
20 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour. Yes.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Just bear with me, please. Do we agree, Mr. Butler that, on the
23 18th of July, this report stated that allegedly another brigade of theirs
24 had still not pulled out? Given the fact that the sentence following
25 this one states, as was confirmed in other documents, that they had
1 divided themselves up into brigades at the very beginning of the
3 A. Yes, sir, that is, I think, referring to the last -- the middle
4 lines of paragraph 1 where it is noting -- this is again
5 Colonel Pandurevic's explanation of what he believes that the enemy
6 situation is and how the brigade -- or how the 28th Division sought to
7 withdraw out of the former Srebrenica safe area.
8 Q. Thank you. Here he mentions their brazen behaviour and
9 unexpected moves they made. Were you able to observe that there were
10 instances of fake surrenders during which a surrendering Muslim soldier
11 would detonate a bomb, thus killing himself and the Serb soldiers
13 A. Again, sir, my analysis is based off of the documents. I don't
14 know whether that did or did not occur or if testimony has been heard
15 relative to that. I am aware that there are some reports with respect to
16 the - excuse me - the situation and that event occurring in the Bratunac
17 area on the 12th and the 13th from the column there, but I don't believe
18 that I've ever heard reports of that occurring from the column in the
19 Zvornik Brigade area.
20 Q. Thank you. Did you wonder what such unexpected moves meant and
21 this brazen conduct as described in the report?
22 A. I take it when one looks at the various reports from
23 Colonel Pandurevic in context, it's his belief that despite the fact that
24 militarily his forces were in place and should have had -- been able to
25 defeat parts of the column or at least stop various parts of the column's
1 attack, because of the casualties that were occurring, that the column or
2 the leadership of the column was so desperate to escape from behind the
3 territory of the VRS that they were making attacks that caused
4 significant casualties, and they were just not being deterred by those
5 casualties. So it was, as Colonel Pandurevic himself notes, a very
6 desperate battle by -- against enemy forces that were extremely
7 determined to break out. So that is what I take by his various reports
8 with respect to the brazen and unexpected moves.
9 Q. Thank you. And you also took note of the fact that in
10 General Pandurevic's words, who -- he was still colonel or
11 lieutenant-colonel at the time, that he suggests that there were more
12 losses than -- than were captured enemy personnel.
13 A. Well, I'm not sure where he may make that suggestion, but I can
14 certainly concur with the fact that in light of the casualties and the
15 combat that was going there, I take it that the enemy losses in both
16 killed and wounded far exceeded any number of prisoners that were at
17 least documented by the Zvornik Brigade as being captured on the 16th and
18 the 17th and the 18th of July.
19 Q. Thank you. So it is the second paragraph of item 1. The enemy
20 suffered significant casualties and dozens were captured. This would
21 reflect, more or less, what you have just said; correct?
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. Thank you. In the documents you studied, did you come across a
24 piece of information that General Karisik of the police spoke with me? I
25 don't know. It is mentioned in the documents, and I will probably be
1 able to show it during my Defence case. In any case, he asked me to
2 protect Colonel Pandurevic for having made that move.
3 First of all, did you come across the piece of information that
4 General Karisik informed me about that?
5 A. For your first question, no, sir, I am not aware that
6 General Karisik did or did not inform you. I have not seen a document to
7 that -- to that -- that would reflect that, so I do not know that that
8 would have occurred.
9 As part of your second question, in light of the information that
10 I am aware of, that particularly General Mladic was very unhappy with
11 Colonel Pandurevic's decision, it would not surprise me to know that
12 individuals who were supporting Colonel Pandurevic would have approached
13 you directly on this issue.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, no objection. Mr. Karadzic may be thinking
15 of D02002. That's an intercept which refers to Karisik talking to the
17 JUDGE KWON: While you are on your feet, Mr. Nicholls, with
18 respect to the question by Mr. Karadzic to Mr. Butler whether there were
19 instances of fake surrenders during which a surrendering Muslim soldier
20 would detonate a bomb, have we seen such document, and which also would
21 tell him not to take prisoners or something to that effect?
22 MR. NICHOLLS: No, Your Honour, not that I'm aware of. There's
23 one incident in the Sandici area where -- where there were reports of a
24 Muslim who was surrendering throwing a hand grenade. I think there was
25 actually testimony about that from a protected witness not very long ago,
1 but there's no report I'm aware of, written report, saying don't take any
2 prisoners because of this danger.
3 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I will leave it at that.
4 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Just one moment,
6 please. Yes.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Is it correct that Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic even went up the
9 ranks and in 1996 made it general, made it to become a general?
10 A. Yes, sir. Colonel Pandurevic, like most officers in the VRS, at
11 the conclusion of the war received a one-grade promotion to the rank of
12 colonel, and in -- I believe it was December or late November of 1996,
13 when then President Plavsic essentially reorganised the Main Staff to
14 become a General Staff and relieved General Mladic and most of the
15 Main Staff officers of their positions, then Colonel Pandurevic was
16 appointed to be the assistant commander for morale, legal, and religious
17 affairs. Essentially he took General Gvero's job and was subsequently
18 promoted to the rank of general-major.
19 Q. Thank you. Let me ask you this: Did you come across an
20 instruction about arresting and detaining POWs, an instruction which was
21 supposed to be issued on the 15 of April, 1995, by the Drina Corps
23 A. I am aware of a number instructions through the various course of
24 the conflict that were published by various military levels as to the
25 proper handling of prisoners of war once they would be captured. Again,
1 I may very well have seen that 15 April 1995 document. If you wish to
2 show it to me I can comment on it, but I don't remember the details of it
3 off the top of my head, sir.
4 Q. Thank you. Can we have a look, then, at 65 ter 2063.
5 As you probably know from other cases, as well as from theory and
6 practice, what measures can be taken in terms of POWs; correct?
7 A. I don't -- I don't understand your question, sir.
8 Q. It's a general question.
9 A. Well, I guess -- I mean, there -- there's two things. I mean, a
10 general sense certainly -- and as reflected by this particular document,
11 there were -- or there was an established process in place for dealing
12 with prisoners for two particular reasons. One, they wanted to, of
13 course, safeguard the prisoners, and they wanted to obtain information of
14 intelligence value. The second thing that they are aware of is that
15 there's what we would call an operational security issue, recognition
16 that down the line that a prisoner may be exchanged in the future and as
17 a result that prisoner should not be taken places or shown things that
18 might be of a sensitive military nature, so that in the event that that
19 individual is exchanged, that prisoner doesn't himself become a source of
20 information about what he learned about the VRS after his capture.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that POWs are not to be shown to the
22 media? They are not supposed to be exposed to any humiliation before the
23 public or in the media as part of their status of prisoners of war.
24 A. Yes, sir, I'm aware of those as general provisions of the
25 Geneva Conventions and associated protocols, and I believe they're also
1 codified as such in the SFRY regulations on the application of those
3 Q. Thank you. Could I ask you to look at the document. Have you
4 taken note of it?
5 A. At least the page that I'm -- I can look at. If you're going to
6 ask me any additional questions, I would like to see the second page as
7 well, please, sir.
8 Q. Could I ask all the participants to go through the document
9 briefly so that I don't need to read it out loud.
10 A. Could we go to the third page of the document, please, sir, at
11 least in English.
12 Q. Just feel free to -- to ask them to leaf through the document
13 once you have read it.
14 A. Next page, please, in English. Okay, sir.
15 Q. Thank you. Can we now go back to page 1. Is it true that from
16 the security administration of the Main Staff they had received a warning
17 that there were violations, because it says here -- it outlines in detail
18 the procedure during the detention or arrest of persons violating rules
19 and regulations.
20 [As read] "We submit to you the instruction inform -- inform
21 military police unit with instruction and act upon the provisions
23 This is what Popovic is passing on from the Main Staff.
24 Now, these provisions, are they consistent with what you know
25 about the internationally laid out procedures that govern the treatment
1 of POWs?
2 A. In the sense that even though they talk about the arrest and
3 detention of POWs and other persons, in that context I take it they're
4 talking about RS and, you know, Republika Srpska citizens who might be
5 arrested for some crime related to the military as well. Yeah, these --
6 these instructions as such, there's nothing in these instructions that I
7 see that would suggest that they violate the SFRY applications on the
8 rules of the law of war.
9 Q. Thank you. Nevertheless, would you agree with me that the first
10 sentence of the "instruction" speaks about POWs and is issuing a warning
11 that violations have been noticed in the treatment of POWs; that is to
12 say, the soldiers of the enemy army? And also under item 1, it reads
13 under 1:
14 "All prisoners, members of the enemy army are to be handcuffed
15 on their hands, tied with anything available immediately after their
16 capture. They are to be searched and all items are to be seized apart
17 from their clothing and footwear."
18 Is this correct?
19 A. Yes, sir. This is what instruction 1 says.
20 Q. Therefore, is it reasonable to assume that if you find personal
21 papers on somebody such as ID, passport, watches, ammunition, et cetera,
22 would it be reasonable to assume that this person had not been captured
23 beforehand? And I'm talking about the belongings found on dead bodies.
24 A. Well, sir, again, these particular instructions apply to what
25 should have happened in the context of individuals being captured and
1 treated in an appropriate manner. Now, whether or not the failure to
2 comply with those types of instructions or to make, as you've noted, the
3 fact that an individual may have -- still have papers on him or may still
4 have a watch and everything else and is subsequently found in a grave
5 somewhere, I don't know that that would be proof that that person could
6 not have been a prisoner at some point prior.
7 Q. Can one deduce, then, that those on whom -- whose bodies nothing
8 was found had been captured previously?
9 A. Again, sir, I don't -- I don't deduce one way or another whether
10 or not the presence of a watch or a document or family items would or
11 would not prove that. If I actually had to take a criteria of equipment
12 to use, what I would suggest is that the presence or the absence of
13 military weapons and equipment in a particular grave site would be a more
14 determinative factor. For example, while -- because soldiers may be
15 rushed or lazy or sloppy, they may not confiscate identity cards, they
16 may not track these people, they may miss personal items, I would suggest
17 that under no circumstances would soldiers searching prisoners that
18 they've just captured allow the prisoner to remain with weapons or
19 ammunition or other items of immediate military value.
20 Q. Thank you. Very well. Did you ever see that an enemy soldier,
21 whether he was killed in combat or in killing, have you ever seen such
22 soldiers being buried together with his arms and weapons, or were those
23 weapons confiscated as trophies?
24 A. Generally speaking, my experience is that clearly individuals who
25 are battle-field casualties are not buried with their weapons. They may
1 be buried with other military equipment that was either damaged or is
2 otherwise too covered in biological materials as to be effectively
3 cleaned. So in that particular sense, the -- you know, you wouldn't
4 normally see those individuals buried with weapons.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can Mr. Butler please
6 be shown item 3 on the next page -- or, rather, on the next page, because
7 my copy is rather bad.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Do you agree that this is a description of how to transport the
10 prisoners, how to prevent them from escape, and the possibility of
11 observing that you yourself noticed? It includes the possibility to have
12 them blindfolded, their hands tied, and even their feet could be tied?
13 A. Correct, sir. Securing a prisoner in that manner to prevent
14 potential escape, as well as to prevent the prisoner from observing
15 things would be an acceptable practice.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2243, Your Honours.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Did you base your findings exclusively on the documents that were
22 accessible to you, or did you yourself check the veracity of these
23 documents, or did you acquire some documents on your own?
24 A. To answer the last question first, any documents that I may have
25 acquired, I did so under the umbrella of the Office of the Prosecutor as
1 a result of my participation in searches, interviews, things of that
3 As to the second question, as to the veracity of the documents,
4 one, setting aside the fact that in almost all of the cases, particularly
5 of the documents that we used in the early portions of the trials in the
6 Krstic and the Popovic -- I'm sorry, the Krstic and the Blagojevic cases,
7 those documents came out of searches and seizures that the Office of the
8 Prosecutor made from inside the military facilities of the
9 Zvornik Brigade and the Bratunac Brigade. So we were, of course, able to
10 assume at face value that the documents that we'd seized were at least in
11 fact authentic. We found multiple copies of other documents as they
12 passed them forth back to headquarters. So we were able to, you know,
13 continue to authenticate and verify many of the documents.
14 And finally, in my particular opinion, the documents that we have
15 reflect the situation that's occurring on the ground during those
16 particular days. It corresponds very closely to those incidents and
17 issues. So, you know, that is the third component of it.
18 And finally, during the course of interviewing various officers
19 of the VRS, many of these documents were shown to these officers who
20 acknowledged that they were either part of creating or producing these
21 documents, and they also sought to explain what these documents meant in
22 a military context to us.
23 Q. Thank you. In view of your experience elsewhere in the world and
24 your expertise with regard to the military, did you notice that in this
25 particular instance the fact that we had people's army and we had local
1 soldiers who had already suffered casualties and lost family members on
2 both sides, so my question is did you notice any other formal -- of
3 behaviour other than strictly military behaviour?
4 A. Certainly in armed conflict soldiers who are raised locally are
5 going to have personal issues and experiences with conflicts. I suggest
6 to you that that is known not only within the VRS but in all professional
7 military forces. This is why the officer corps of those armies receives
8 the training that it does and why it has the responsibilities that they
9 do to enforce discipline and to enforce the rule of law among the
10 soldiers that they're responsible for commanding.
11 What happened with respect to the personal experiences of
12 individual soldiers within the Republika Srpska and in Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina in losing family members in a conflict is not radically
14 different from what happens in other areas of armed conflicts globally.
15 The fact is that professional militaries recognise that. Professional
16 militaries study history as well as anyone else does, and that in almost
17 all armies - and I say in this particular context certainly within the
18 JNA and the regulations that were adopted by them by the VRS - that fact
19 was recognised and that they had the appropriate regulatory,
20 disciplinary, and even legal means to enforce discipline among their
21 soldiers to prevent or at least mitigate the impact of those issues.
22 I would note that that was made clear by the Main Staff as early
23 as 1992 when guidance was published to the corps reflecting the various
24 criminal and military disciplinary issues that commanders could
25 anticipate facing through the course of the conflict. Not only did they
1 deal with certain issues with respect to desertion, failure to serve, but
2 there's also a particular component in there with respect to the
3 obligations of commanders in preventing or investigating war crimes. So
4 these are not unanticipated events by any military, and they certainly
5 were not unanticipated by the officer corps of the Army of Republika
7 Q. Thank you. Maybe I wasn't quite clear when I put my question.
8 Do you believe that the VRS was a professional army?
9 A. The VRS as a total, as most militaries are, are made up of
10 soldiers, most of who are conscripts. They're not professional.
11 However, I believe that the officer corps of the VRS not only was
12 professional in the sense that many of the officers of the VRS were also
13 serving officers of the federal army. Even those VRS officers who were
14 reserve officers had some amount of training prior to the conflict from
15 their -- the rank that they held within the JNA. So I do believe in that
16 particular context the officer corps was professional.
17 Q. Thank you. Did you notice how many troops did the VRS have and
18 how many professional officers they had?
19 A. I couldn't give you a troop number off hand, but certainly the
20 percentage of soldiers to officers, I mean probably you have a situation
21 where 10 per cent of the force, maybe 15, were officers, and the
22 remainder were soldiers. And frankly, more importantly, one of the
23 issues that the VRS systemically had that was problematic was that there
24 was a lack of junior officers at the company -- or at the platoon and the
25 company level, and as noted by the records, many of those junior-level
1 officers were not really officers at all. They were conscripts who had
2 shown the necessary ability and the willingness to take those lower
3 levels of command and were given those lower levels of command because of
4 a result of it. They were often not properly trained in that manner.
5 Q. Thank you. If I tell you that the Army of Republika Srpska for
6 the most part always had --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the figures.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat your question, and
9 slow down when you are saying the numbers.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. If I tell you that the Army of Republika Srpska mainly had
13 between 210.000 and 225.000 troops, out of which number professional
14 officers accounted for hardly 2.000, and as you rightly noticed, most of
15 them had higher ranks, would you agree that this is way beyond the
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Way below the
19 THE WITNESS: Again, sir, it -- whether -- whether it was or was
20 not, I would note several factors. First of all, if it falls within the
21 10 per cent range, which I gave earlier, and secondly, I would argue that
22 even though the number of professional officers was low, at least within
23 the context of what the JNA might have in their -- in their view as to
24 what the ratio would be, the fact is that the necessary structures, the
25 necessary laws, the necessary regulations existed to be able to
1 adequately enforce discipline.
2 Q. That's not what I'm asking you about.
3 A. [Overlapping speakers]
4 Q. That's not what I'm asking --
5 A. But what I'm saying is it's not a question of numbers. It is a
6 question of the ability and the willingness of the senior officials to
7 enforce discipline within the structures that exist.
8 Q. Thank you. I'm not asking you anything about from the point of
9 view of enforcement. I am just asking about whether you comprehended
10 what was the essence of the VRS. If I -- my math is correct --
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you didn't simply ask the numbers.
12 You asked whether Mr. Butler agreed -- would agree that that is well
13 beyond the requirements. So you asked about his opinion.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency, but this is
15 not 10 per cent. In his response, he said that this number of officers
16 is consistent with his view that 10 per cent is required.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
18 Q. This is 1 per cent; correct?
19 A. Correct, sir. Clearly I haven't had enough coffee this morning
20 to do math.
21 Q. Thank you. Did you ever notice that the majority of soldiers of
22 the VRS lived and stayed in their own homes rather than in barracks and
23 that rotations took place and that they would spend a number of days on
24 the front line and then a number of days back home?
25 A. Yes, sir. I believe for the majority of the VRS that was the
1 practice that was undertaken. Even though military commanders did not --
2 senior military commanders did not approve of it, the lower-level
3 military commanders in light of the circumstances continued that practice
4 throughout most of the war.
5 Q. Thank you. Have you noticed that in view of the territorial
6 principle of both the VRS and the Army of B and H, that many soldiers
7 knew each other from pre-war peacetime and that they shared some history
8 and some past experiences?
9 A. Again, I can't talk about the big global picture with respect to
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina, but I think that if one looks at strictly the
11 Srebrenica-related crime bases and some of the testimony that has come
12 out and some -- it's even reflected in some of the documents that have
13 come out of particularly the actions related to prisoners or captors
14 knowing exactly who the prisoners are, from what villages they are, and
15 what they did pre-war, there was a great deal of commonality between the
16 military forces in that respect.
17 Q. Thank you. You noticed quite accurately that there were far
18 fewer killings in Potocari and that there were many more police officers
19 in army than in Bratunac. Did it ever happen that individuals would go
20 to detention places seeking specific people from specific villages with a
21 view to either liberating them or taking them elsewhere? So here we have
22 a completely personal approach. Have you ever noticed this?
23 A. Yes, sir. I mean, it is one of the phenomenons that is noted by
24 a number of witnesses who testified that through the course of their
25 detention in and around the Bratunac area, that individuals from local
1 areas -- or individuals from the local area would be calling out at these
2 various temporary detention places or on vehicles and trucks looking for
3 individuals whom came from certain villages or certain other locations
4 again that, you know, was familiar to them.
5 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 5, item 15, of your amalgamated
6 statement, you speak about the collection of additional resources of the
7 MUP of Republika Srpska, because they were tasked with completing the
8 transportation of the remaining civilians from Potocari. Did you know
9 that one additional unit, the so-called Jahorina Detachment, was deployed
10 in Potocari, forming a circle defence in order to protect the Muslim
11 civilians from unauthorised and irresponsible attacks.
12 For the benefit of other participants, I can say that this was
13 corroborated by Witness KDZ084.
14 A. Again, sir, I am aware that on the 12th of July, it was not only
15 Sekovici police, it was the 1st PJP and 1 Company from the Jahorina
16 training area that were in Potocari. I'm not familiar with the witness
17 testimony in that particular case, so I can't comment one way or another
18 as to what the company's individual actions were.
19 Q. Thank you. Were you able to observe that during the night
20 between the 12th and the 13th of July in Potocari there were no VRS
21 personnel whatsoever?
22 A. I don't know that, sir. I know that there was a police presence
23 there. I know that there was a military presence there during the day.
24 I have no information which would confirm or deny that the VRS completely
25 left the compound at Potocari during the evening hours of 12 July 1995.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: And I just ask the basis for putting that
2 assertion, the factual basis.
3 JUDGE KWON: Well, I took that to be a question, but I can ask
4 Mr. Karadzic whether it is your submission that there was no military
5 between the 12th and 13th of July?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, we heard about
7 that here from some witnesses that the military wasn't present. I can't
8 give you an exact reference at this point in time. I simply wanted to
9 see with this witness if he was aware of it.
10 JUDGE KWON: Then why don't you ask him whether he knew that
11 whether there was any presence of military without necessarily causing
12 some confusion.
13 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. In your paragraph 5.24, Tisca-Luke, you say that the refugees
17 were forced to get off the vehicles and continue to the Muslim-held
18 territory on foot. Do you believe that a bus full of refugees could
19 approach the confrontation line, and who would then be held responsible
20 if such a bus were to be hit by a Zolja, a hand-held rocket launcher?
21 A. First off, in that particular context where the individuals were
22 taken and coming off the buses, the road was blocked for the most part
23 for vehicle traffic going back and through, so I assume that they left
24 the buses there and had to walk those final several kilometres because
25 the road had on both sides had been made so it was impassable to vehicle
2 Q. Thank you. So they were not forced. It was the only way for
3 them to cross over to the Muslim side?
4 A. Correct, sir.
5 Q. Thank you. Did you see in certain UNPROFOR reports that the
6 first several groups were awaited with distrust and dissatisfaction as
7 the Muslim army didn't know what the whole thing was about, and that
8 there were even tensions between those arriving and those who awaited
10 A. I would agree with your second assertion that certainly the
11 Muslim forces on the ground there would not have been immediately aware,
12 particularly from the first wave of buses that came in, what was going
13 on. Those individuals were, if I recall, accompanied by a Dutch United
14 Nations officer who was able to lay out the framework of what was
15 happening and why these people were showing up at this particular
17 Q. Thank you. Did you take a certain position in terms of the cause
18 of death of those found in mass graves?
19 A. I believe that throughout the investigative process with respect
20 to the mass graves identified in the Zvornik area that forensically those
21 courses of death have been termed. As I noted in my report and the
22 analysis and testimony, my role in that part was not to analyse the fact
23 that -- how they died, but was to be able to look at all the other
24 military operations that were occurring in context and be able to provide
25 information back to the investigative teams as to whether or not the
1 locations of the primary grave sites corresponded to locations of known
2 combat activity, and it was my opinion - and remains my opinion - that of
3 the four main primary sites in the Zvornik Brigade area, which would be
4 Orahovac, the Petkovci dam, the Drina River site at Rocevic, and
5 Branjevo Farm, that none of those locations saw significant combat
6 activities or any combat activity for that matter, to be clear, on the
7 day that those individuals were killed at those sites.
8 Q. Did you follow testimonies in this case in order to update your
9 knowledge, and did you follow the recent testimony by Drazen Erdemovic
10 and Amor Masic?
11 A. I am familiar with the testimony of Mr. Erdemovic from previous
12 trials. I have followed no testimony for -- related to this specific
13 case here. My current workload just does not allow me the time and
14 ability to do that.
15 Q. Thank you. Do you allow for the possibility that some graves
16 were filled up in stages? For example, the grave at Branjevo Farm had
17 previous burials and the burials came in stages. Erdemovic confirmed it
18 as having been informed of it at the time on the 16th of July.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: For the record --
20 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer --
21 MR. NICHOLLS: -- Mr. Erdemovic did not confirm that the grave
22 was filled up in stages. Another complete misstatement of the record.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please be precise when you cite the
24 evidence given by a witness.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said that Erdemovic confirmed
1 it -- [In English] Erdemovic confirmed it as having been informed of it
2 at the time on the 16th of July. [Interpretation] I didn't say that
3 Erdemovic could see that. Apparently a guard had told him that there had
4 been burials previously. We can find that in Erdemovic's testimony.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Be precise.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Do you know that other sources, as well as Witness Masovic,
9 confirmed that more graves contained the bodies of those who had been
10 killed as early as 1992?
11 A. Again, sir, what I can say is I do not know what individual
12 witnesses have testified. I am aware that as part of the overall
13 forensics process that, particularly now, there has been for the last
14 five or at least eight years, maybe even longer, a robust process by
15 which to DNA and identify the remains in the graves and, of course,
16 cross-index the identities of those individuals in the graves with when
17 they were identified as missing off of the various ICRC and other lists.
18 So I expect that there is a scientific way that has been undertaken to be
19 able to distinguish individuals who were killed in July of 1995 versus
20 individuals who were killed -- or at least -- or at least identified as
21 missing in earlier stages of the war.
22 Q. Thank you. Do we agree that the DNA methods cannot ascertain
23 either the time of death or time of burial or cause of death?
24 A. Again, sir, you're now kind of migrating out of an area which I
25 have anything other than a layperson's experience with. What I can say
1 is I am aware that there are other investigative and forensic techniques
2 that the investigation teams through the years have used to ascertain
3 those issues, but again, I have no particular expertise in those.
4 Q. Thank you. I'd like to draw your attention to paragraph 7.72.
5 Do you recall what alternative measures to accommodating prisoners were
6 proposed by Colonel Pandurevic? It is page 80 in of the Serbian of your
7 amalgamated statement.
8 A. Well, sir, referring to that, and this brings us back to the
9 15 July 1995 interim report, my interpretation is that he's talking about
10 the prisoners in this context, and I don't believe he's offering an
11 alternative to accommodating them other than potentially letting them go.
12 There's nothing in this document which suggests that he's suggesting that
13 they move to another location or anything else. It simply says, "If no
14 one takes responsibility, I will be forced to let them go."
15 I am, of course, aware that Colonel Pandurevic himself offers a
16 different interpretation to this, and I just thought I needed to mention
17 that under -- under the circumstances.
18 Q. Sir, I'll read out the second quotation by Pandurevic from item
19 7.72, and I would kindly ask the interpreters to interpret it in the
20 spirit of the Serbian language, especially in the terms of the phrase "I
21 would be forced let them go." It says following:
22 "This command can no longer take care of these problems, as it
23 has neither the material or other resources. In case no one took over
24 this responsibility, I would be forced to release them" or "to let them
1 [In English] I suppose this -- this is "to release them," better,
2 more accurate than "to let them go."
3 [Interpretation] Obviously, the genus of the language would
4 require the term "to release them" instead of "to let them go through."
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not see a semantic
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. In other words, Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic is saying, "If I
9 can no longer take care of them, I will set them free."
10 A. That is, frankly, how I interpret this particular comment. Again
11 given the time of what is occurring and where the prisoners are, even at
12 this particular time that he's aware of this and he's writing this, there
13 are still prisoners still alive at Rocevic who have not been killed, as
14 well as prisoners that are alive at Branjevo and at the Dom of Kulture.
15 So when I evaluate this with other information and documents
16 relating to this, I take this that Colonel Pandurevic is aware of the
17 prisoners. He is aware that they are being executed. He is aware of the
18 significant drain that the obligations to guard these prisoners, kill
19 these prisoners, and then bury them is having on his military unit. And
20 it's a time when he has no military reserves left. The threat of the
21 column continues to grow each hour. It is a reflection on his part that
22 he has actions that he can take relating to the prisoners that would not
23 make his superiors at the Drina Corps and the Main Staff happy. So he is
24 seeking to use that issue as leverage to get additional resources to deal
25 with the situation in Zvornik.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, no objection, but that's -- just to make it
2 easy for the record, that's P00138 is exhibit number of the report we're
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Thank you. Mr. Butler, with all due respect, aren't you
6 speculating a bit too much given the fact that we have a crystal clear
7 text? There are no forces at his disposal to take care of the prisoners,
8 and unless another command took care of them, his only alternative for
9 him was to set them free. How do you come to your conclusion that he was
10 aware of the killings? Let's stick with the text. How does this text
11 imply he was aware of the killings?
12 A. Well, sir, again taking this document in context with all of the
13 other things that are occurring and what Colonel Pandurevic knew and
14 should have known, first of all, Colonel Pandurevic does not return to
15 his area until the morning of the 15th of July. So I do take it that
16 he's not going to have an immediate awareness of what has been happening
17 in the Zvornik Brigade area other than what he has received in reports
18 and various telephone calls.
19 I understand that shortly after his return to the Zvornik Brigade
20 area, and in fact his headquarters, there is a meeting that he sets up
21 with all of the relevant military and police commanders who are now
22 engaged in the Zvornik area, and that all aspects of what has been
23 happening on the ground are going to be briefed to him by all of these
24 individuals. So they're going to tell him what the situation is with the
25 enemy forces. They're going to tell him what the situation is with all
1 of the friendly forces, the police and military forces. I understand
2 that the issue of prisoners being stored in the area also came up. So
3 Colonel Pandurevic, just by virtue of being a competent and diligent
4 military commander, is going to have all of this information.
5 Now, the next piece of information that I relate to is the last
6 sentence or, I guess, the only sentence of the paragraph above that, the
7 obligations of security and restoration of the terrain, the phrase is
8 "asanacija," which is a medical term relating to the burying of bodies
9 and biological wastes. Who's -- if they're not killing the prisoners,
10 just who is Colonel Pandurevic concerned about burying? So he must know
12 Q. That would be my next question. The remark in the brackets
13 "SIC," is something you inserted or does it figure in the original text
14 next to "asanacija terena"?
15 MR. NICHOLLS: I say we should bring up the report and -- then,
16 Your Honour, the one we're talking about. We might as well look at the
17 report rather than quotes from the report -- in Mr. Butler's report. I'm
18 speaking of the interim combat report.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, while we're waiting for that document, do you
20 remember who put that "sic"?
21 THE WITNESS: I am not sure. Like I said, I have to look at the
22 document. I know that from previous cases that it's not a clean
23 translation between the phrase or the word in Serbo-Croatian "asanacija"
24 and the English translation "restoration of the terrain." I put it in my
25 English language one to highlight that fact that one should go back to
1 the Serbo-Croatian explanation of "asanacija." You know, in English
2 "restoration of the terrain," you know, could reflect, you know, moving a
3 hole on a golf course somewhere. It doesn't accurately reflect the type
4 of activity which was done which is most accurately reflected in the
5 definition of "asanacija" in various JNA military lexicons or
6 dictionaries. So that is why I put the phrase "sic" in English, to
7 prompt somebody to go back and look at that.
8 Q. Thank you. Are you familiar with the legal provision in our body
9 of law concerning "asanacija terena" following floods, combat, et cetera,
10 and what does it entail? Could you provide us with a brief answer if
11 possible, as I have a small number of other documents I wish to cover.
12 A. Yes, sir. It's not a legal term. It's -- basically it's a
13 technical term at least in a military context. It reflects to burying
14 the bodies of individuals who are killed, and of course it could apply to
15 a nonmilitary context, but essentially it is the disposal of biological
16 waste projects that are a result of combat, flood, or other disasters in
17 a proper manner to preclude diseases from breaking out as a result of
19 Q. Thank you. Were you able --
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Karadzic. How much more time
21 would you need to conclude your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic?
22 THE WITNESS: I will do my best to conclude in 15 to 20 minutes,
23 and I believe Mr. Nicholls will need some time as well. I will do my
24 best to conclude in 15 to 20 minutes.
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll continue in the next session.
1 Before we break, I would like -- I'm minded to give a couple of rulings.
2 On the 11th of April, 2012, the accused filed a motion to admit
3 transcript excerpts pursuant to Rule 92 ter, Branko Djeric, in which he
4 requested that the Chamber admit pursuant to Rule 92 ter transcript
5 excerpts of the previous testimony of forthcoming Prosecution witness --
6 actually next witness, Branko Djeric, which are favourable to his case
7 and which have been omitted from the amalgamated statement proposed for
8 admission by the Prosecution.
9 The Prosecution filed its response on the 19th of April, 2012 in
10 which it states that, as requested by the accused, it contacted the
11 witness in order to confirm whether these excerpts accurately reflect his
12 testimony, and the witness indicated a preference for answering any
13 additional questions and review any additional materials in court.
14 The Prosecution therefore submits that the motion is moot and
15 that in any event, the excerpts may not be admitted pursuant to Rule
16 92 ter at this stage.
17 The Chamber notes that the Prosecution seeks to tender a 30-page
18 amalgamated statement pursuant to Rule 92 ter. In order for this
19 statement to be admitted, the Prosecution shall go through the
20 Rule 92 ter formalities, including asking the witness to confirm whether
21 the amalgamated statement accurately reflects what he would say if asked
22 the same questions again.
23 If the accused wishes to ask the witness about those parts of his
24 previous testimony that have not been included in the amalgamated
25 statement and which he considers to be favourable to him, then he may do
1 so by posing these questions directly to the witness during his
3 The motion is therefore denied.
4 Because of the witness's position and his proximity to the
5 accused, as well as the number of areas on which the accused wishes to
6 cross-examine the witness, the Chamber expects the accused to conclude,
7 complete, his cross-examination in four hours' time.
8 On a separate note, on the 17th of April, 2012, the Prosecution
9 filed the Prosecution motion pursuant to Rule 92 quinquies to admit a
10 transcript of prior testimony of Mr. Milan Tupajic and associated
11 exhibits. The Chamber would be assisted by hearing from the accused as
12 soon as possible and therefore orders pursuant to Rule 127 that the
13 accused file his response, if any, no later than Wednesday, 25 of April,
15 That should be possible, Mr. Robinson.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Actually, Mr. President, you know, we usually file
17 these responses ahead of the dead-lines. This is a particularly
18 problematic motion, and we -- I actually tried to -- I worked on it this
19 weekend, and I think it's going to make me the rest of this week, because
20 this is the first -- at least there's been no public decision on this
21 Rule before, and I think our response is going to be very comprehensive,
22 and we believe that -- I think it's just going to take us longer. So if
23 you could give us until the 1st of May, which is the next day after the
24 weekend, I think we would actually need that in this case because it's an
25 issue of first impression and has a number of elements which we dispute.
1 JUDGE KWON: That's fair enough, Mr. Robinson. Then I expect you
2 to file it by 1st of May, Monday next week.
3 MR. ROBINSON: That's actually Tuesday, because Monday is a
4 holiday, but we will file it on the 1st of May.
5 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
6 And lastly, Mr. Tieger, we'll hear from you very soon about the
7 submission from the Defence on the commencement of the Defence case.
8 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President, one way or another.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll take a break now for half an hour
10 and resume at 11.00.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. May we move into private
16 session, please.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 [Private session]
11 Page 27847 redacted. Private session.
13 [Open session]
14 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE KWON: With respect to the issue raised by Mr. Robinson,
16 are parties in discussion as to the confidentiality, provisional
17 confidentiality, of the exhibit admitted during the testimony of specific
18 witness, for example, 122?
19 MR. TIEGER: It's proceeding in two ways, Mr. President. We're
20 proceeding apace on the formal response. Mr. Robinson and I have also
21 had brief discussions about it to see if there was some avenue, some
22 middle ground, that might obviate the need for a specific decision by the
23 Chamber. We, unfortunately, haven't come to any meeting of the minds on
24 that as yet.
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
1 [The witness takes the stand]
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. So isn't this correct: We don't have the note that we have in
5 your document as far as sanitisation of the terrain is concerned?
6 A. I'm sorry, I don't understand what you mean, "We don't have the
7 note that we have in your --" I don't -- I'm not tracking the question.
8 I think it's probably a translation issue.
9 Q. Oh, probably. I -- I meant sic, I meant that note. It is not in
10 the original. Let's see how it's been translated in the document itself,
11 "asanacija," sanitisation. Restoration, is that it, restoration of the
13 A. Yes, sir. As I understand it, the phrase "asanacija" is
14 translated into English as restoration of the terrain.
15 JUDGE KWON: And you put "sic."
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, to highlight the fact that I don't
17 believe that the English language translation, even though I understand
18 it's the literal translation, accurately reflects what the true
19 definition is. And again, that's why I always default back to "I
20 believe" in my narrative. There is a footnote there where I actually use
21 the definition that we pulled out of one of the Yugoslav National Army
22 lexicons to explain exactly what the term is.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Thank you. What you saw in the law, in our law, that has to do
25 with "asanacija," did that have to do with burying executed persons or
1 assination [as interpreted] -- or "asanacija" in the sense of restoring
2 the area after fighting or after a natural disaster?
3 A. If you couple the phrase and with Colonel Pandurevic's report on
4 the 15th and the engineer vehicle log which talks about the involvement
5 of the engineer equipment, the locations that it's occurring, and the
6 fact that it's nowhere near the battle-field in the various times, the
7 conclusion - and I believe the only logical conclusion that can be
8 drawn - is that that particular phrase and the "asanacija" that occurred
9 in the mass graves are individuals who are a result of the executions
10 that occurred in the Zvornik Brigade area from the 14th through the 17th
11 of -- or the 16th of July, 1995.
12 Q. Thank you. Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic, does he mention that
13 the enemy has sustained major losses?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. So, if we take that report as well, that report of
16 Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic, how do we decide that "asanacija" is
17 execution rather than being the burial of these multitudes of people who
18 had lost their lives?
19 A. Well, sir, I would remind you that first of all, the significant
20 battles which were occurring on -- or they were winding up on the 15th of
21 July, 1995, that he's discussing, the first of the two mass graves is
22 already installed both at Orahovac and Petkovci. So just by virtue of
23 chronology alone the graves at Orahovac and at Petkovci cannot apply. I
24 would also that for the graves in other locations, Rocevic and Branjevo,
25 which were installed, started -- or basically, you know, were dug up --
1 or dug into initially, so I guess it's installation on the 16th and 17th
2 of July, for those bodies to be populated in -- for those graves to be
3 populated with bodies, what would have had to have happened is that
4 during the actual course of conflict, an area that was littered with
5 mines and ordnance and combat operations, that Colonel Pandurevic's
6 troops were essentially going into where the heart of the column was, the
7 heart of the enemy forces, to retrieve dead bodies of soldiers and to
8 essentially truck them through half of the Zvornik municipality.
9 And I would suggest that simply as a matter of military common
10 sense, that policing up the battle casualties of your opponent in the
11 middle of a battle as its occurring does not happen. So given when those
12 particular graves are known forensically to have been installed and
13 correlating with the military documents and everything else, I suspect
14 that the military situation would not have settled down to a point where
15 friendly forces, the VRS, for example, in this context, would have been
16 able to begin sweeping the battle-field and policing up, should they
17 choose to do so, policing up the remains of dead Muslim soldiers until
18 well after the 23rd or 24th of July, 1995.
19 So for all of those reasons, it is my opinion that the
20 individuals that are in the four identified mass graves -- or the four
21 identified mass grave sites in Zvornik are not battle casualties.
22 Q. Mr. Butler, I can only envy the State Department and the OTP for
23 that kind of loyalty, but let us see whether you see think that this was
24 static fighting or was the column on the move. Why would it be necessary
25 to do anything while the column was on the move and they were leaving
1 their dead behind?
2 MR. NICHOLLS: I just say I object to that kind of argumentive
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Move on, Mr. Karadzic.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. The question is: Do you claim that the Army of Republika Srpska,
7 with a view to burying soldiers of the enemy army, would have to move
8 through a maze of bullets in order to get the dead out, or was fighting
9 taking place on the move? How long did a single column stay in a
10 particular place?
11 A. Well, sir, I would remind you that again with the size estimates
12 of the column seeking to break through at between, you know, low numbers
13 would be that Borovcanin used 2.500. There are much higher numbers, so
14 between 3- and 7.000 people. My position is it's not one coherent
15 battle, that it is a series of a large number of smaller battles that are
16 occurring through various points of time as these individual parts of the
17 couple are being encountered.
18 So, you know, as -- as noted by Colonel Pandurevic's own reports,
19 he does not have precise knowledge of where the enemy forces are at any
20 given time. He's just giving assessments as to where he believes they're
21 going. So in that particular environment to send, you know, burial
22 recovery teams out into that type of military environment, quite frankly
23 from a military point of view is ludicrous. No competent commander would
24 do that.
25 Q. Thank you. But is he talking about what was happening then or is
1 he talking about what is to happen? Is he saying here that there aren't
2 any forces for "asanacija"? That is to say that "asanacija" in the
3 plural is what awaits him? Look at what he says.
4 A. His phrase is the additional burden is the large number of
5 prisoners distributed throughout the schools, as well as obligations of
6 security and restoration of terrain.
7 I take that comment in a temporal sense as happening at that
8 time. I do not read that as a future sense. I mean, given the context
9 of an interim combat report reporting on the immediate and pressing
10 issues, the fact that Colonel Pandurevic is going to be concerned at some
11 future date about "asanacija" does not make sense.
12 Q. Do you have any proof of the following: That Pandurevic knew
13 about the execution after he returned to his brigade on the 15th, or is
14 that yet another assumption?
15 A. Well, sir, again I have not followed the testimony in this
16 particular case, (redacted)
25 JUDGE KWON: Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.
1 [Private session]
5 [Open session]
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We are now in open session.
7 Mr. Karadzic.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 JUDGE KWON: I think because we are going to move the previous
12 part, we can continue, but, yes, Mr. Karadzic, move on to another topic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Just a moment, please.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Let me ask you in general terms, Mr. Butler. In your report,
16 what should be done for the following: In all those places where you
17 say, "I believe," and "I assume," if we were to turn that into the
18 affirmative, if we were to say "I know"? So could we do that?
19 A. I would remind you that obviously I'm not a first-hand witness to
20 what was occurring. As I note in many of the issues of various places in
21 my report, there are a number of places where I draw conclusions based on
22 inferences that I believe are not only reasonable inferences, I believe
23 it's the only logical inference that can be drawn.
24 Certainly in those particular instances, the Trial Chamber, I
25 believe, is more than capable of reviewing those reports, and they have
1 in the past, and making those determinations as to whether or not those
2 opinions or those conclusions are beyond the scope of what the
3 Trial Chamber requires out of an expert witness.
4 Q. Thank you. Did you rule out all other possible explanations?
5 A. Well, yes, sir. Much of my military analysis in this context was
6 looking at various alternative situations. I mean, a perfect example was
7 the issue relating to the Kravica warehouse massacre on 13 July 1995.
8 You noted the fact that I had a certain belief. Frankly, I based that
9 belief because of my ability to rule out the other possibilities. I
10 mean, with Kravica, it's not particularly difficult to do.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Excuse me.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: Could we go into private session, Your Honour,
14 please. I'm sorry.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 [Private session]
2 [Open session]
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We are now in open session.
4 Yes, Mr. Butler.
5 THE WITNESS: When one deconstructs that particular crime base
6 and what happened at that time, once the shooting starts there are four
7 things that are ultimately happen -- or could potential -- four potential
8 outcomes for the individuals in the warehouse: As a result of the
9 immediate shooting they're killed, it's an instant fatal injury; they're
10 injured and their injuries are so severe that despite medical attention
11 they will still die; the third option is that their injuries, with
12 medical attention, will allow them to survive; and the fourth possible
13 outcome is they will either not be injured or their injuries will be so
14 slight that they will not require any medical attention.
15 So you have four potential outcomes. And then if we use the
16 figure of a thousand, just to keep the math simple for me, in one
17 category of individuals who suffered almost instantaneous injury that was
18 fatal, you have the number 997, and then all the way in the other
19 category of individuals who were -- either suffered no injuries or such
20 minor injuries that they were able to subsequently escape, you have the
21 number three.
22 Simply by random distribution alone you would expect to see
23 individuals inside the warehouse who were subsequently wounded and then
24 later died after receiving medical treatment or were wounded and survive
25 after medical treatment. So as part of excluding the issue that this was
1 a one-time impulse event as a reaction and that there was no ultimately
2 premeditated plan to kill the individuals in the warehouse,
3 investigatively we looked for evidence that wounded Muslims from the
4 Kravica warehouse were brought to any medical facility. There are no
5 record of them at the Bratunac facility, at the United Nations medical
6 facility, at Milici, at Zvornik. There's no effort whatsoever to bring
7 any wounded Muslims to be medically cared for. So even if I accept in
8 argument the fact that the individuals at the Kravica warehouse, that the
9 event was predicated by an impulse act of a potential escape, at some
10 point shortly thereafter, somebody made a decision that the ultimate goal
11 was that everyone inside that warehouse would ultimately be killed.
12 So this is an example - I'm sorry if it's a bit long - of how we
13 did look at, or certainly I did look at, from an investigative and
14 military analytical sense all of the various alternatives before I came
15 to a conclusion that not only the most likely alternative but the only
16 logical one was related to a criminal act in that particular case.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. In your report, did you present to the Chamber and other
19 participants all these options and alternatives and processes through
20 which you arrived at your conclusions? Did you explain this process of
21 how your deduction and other cognizance exercises were carried out?
22 A. No, sir. In the context of my written document, I did not. That
23 was ultimately raised in various trials. Questions of my process and my
24 methodologies and the assumptions that I used in various issues were
25 raised both by the Prosecutors and by various legal counsel for the
1 Defence in a number of cases so that the Court could completely
2 understand the basis by what I was finding in my various -- the
3 conclusions that I made in various reports.
4 Q. Mr. Butler, how can the Chamber arrive at a conclusion since you
5 are providing speculations only? You claim that there was plan to kill
6 all those people in the cooperative even though you know that there were
7 only a few guards. You know that one of the prisoners approached the
8 guard, tried to snatch a rifle from him, and it obviously shows that this
9 was not planned beforehand. Nevertheless, you are presenting to the
10 Chamber as a fact that that was planned, I don't know on the basis of
11 which, and in addition to that you are working for the Prosecution.
12 A. Well, sir --
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, proceed.
14 THE WITNESS: Setting the issue of bias aside, again I would
15 remind you that the basis of my analysis, and again even setting the
16 witness testimony aside, is based off the probabilities of various events
18 The fact is I believe that there were more people there guarding
19 the prisoners. It was not just a few people guarding nearly a thousand.
20 Knowing the weapons that were used, because that evidence is available
21 forensically from post-conflict evaluations of the Kravica warehouse.
22 Again, when you lay all of those things out in context, even if I were to
23 assume that the initial predicate event was a reaction to an attempt by
24 Muslims to escape - and that were the only intent - you would see
25 outcomes for other people in the warehouse that would reflect injuries
1 that were treated at various medical centres. The fact is that did not
2 occur. There's no evidence of that, and I know that investigatively that
3 was looked at. So I'm telling you that I know things as a certain fact.
4 I was not at the Kravica warehouse, but I believe that based on all of
5 the information and looking at these groupings, the statistical groupings
6 that were occurring, the only logical inference that can be drawn is that
7 at some juncture a decision had been made that everyone inside that
8 warehouse would be killed. Once that decision occurs, it is no longer an
9 impulse reactive event. It becomes a premeditated plan.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Butler, first of all, there was no attempt to escape. A
12 rifle was snatched and fire was opened at the guards. Have you ever
13 established the number of the guards that were guarding these thousand
14 prisoners? Has everyone ever established the number of the guards?
15 JUDGE KWON: I think the witness has answered this question. Why
16 don't you move on. It's time for you conclude, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you know if there were 1.000 prisoners or a hundred or so
20 prisoners? If there were 1.000 of them, where had they come from?
21 A. I don't have an exact figure off the top of my head.
22 Investigatively, I'm aware that the number of prisoners that are
23 associated with the Kravica warehouse runs from a range of 500 up to a
24 thousand. I just chose the number thousand to make the math a little
25 simple for the example that I used. And my understanding
1 investigatively, is that the prisoners who came from -- who were in the
2 Kravica warehouse on 13 July 1995 were those prisoners who had been
3 brought in either by vehicle or had walked from Sandici and
4 Konjevic Polje. There may have even been prisoners brought in from as
5 far as Nova Kasaba.
6 Q. All of this in the area of "maybe," Mr. Butler; right? Did you
7 see in photo images these thousands of prisoners in Kravica and on the
8 meadows? Have you ever established the exact number of imprisoned
9 people, or did you go along with the Muslim propaganda?
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, this is all beyond his -- his evidence
11 in chief he gave. He came as a military expert or military analyst to
12 help the Chamber understand the military context.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Tell me, Mr. Butler, do you think that -- but let's start with
16 this: Once the column has passed through, under whose control was the
17 territory of the Zvornik Brigade?
18 A. Even before the column passed through, the territory of the
19 Zvornik Brigade is under -- is under the control of the VRS, specifically
20 the Zvornik Brigade and its commander.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you believe or do you have any proof that the
22 hygiene and sanitation measures involving the burial of enemy soldiers
23 was carried out in single graves wherever the bodies were found, or were
24 they collected and then buried in common graves?
25 A. My understanding is that as a result of the fact that many of the
1 areas that the casualties from the column were located in had unmarked
2 minefields and things of that nature with very few exceptions. It is my
3 understanding that most of the people who fell as part of the column were
4 not recovered until after the end of the war when mine -- mine
5 identification units were going through those areas to mark off the areas
6 for mines. That's why I believe that forensically there are distinctions
7 made between those individuals who are fallen in the category of the
8 surface remains, which would be most of the column, versus those
9 individuals who are believed to have been victims of mass executions in
10 various places.
11 Q. Mr. Butler, I am a bit concerned about what you believe. With
12 the exception of Pobudje, which was in the area of the Bratunac Brigade,
13 did you acquire any proof that there were surface remains found in the
14 area of the Zvornik Brigade, and if you did, where were they found? As I
15 said, with the exception of the Pobudje Brigade area of responsibility.
16 No dead bodies were found, Mr. Butler.
17 A. Again, sir, I don't know the specifics of the surface remain
18 retrieval. I -- that was not an area that I was required to delve into.
19 It didn't have any bearing particularly on what I was doing, so I have no
20 information one way or another other than my general understanding of
21 when surface remains started to be recovered. I believe that there are
22 aspects of the investigation related to Srebrenica which will reflect the
23 more accurate numbers related to those.
24 Q. Thank you. Based on the route of the lorries, your conclusion is
25 that they were transporting dead -- dead bodies.
1 Now, as for other supplies such as those of ammunition, food, and
2 other supplies, was that also carried out by lorries?
3 A. I apologise, sir. I -- I don't understand your question. In
4 which context are you referring to where you talk about -- I'm not
5 making -- I don't assert that lorries were trans -- or moving the dead
6 bodies with the exception of those vehicles that have been specifically
7 identified as moving people from schools to grave sites. There were
8 vehicles that were also carrying ammunition and other supplies. We have
9 a comprehensive list of all of the vehicles belonging to the
10 Zvornik Brigade. So it's pretty easy to distinguish from those documents
11 what vehicles were carrying what.
12 Q. Thank you. You said today that you managed to reconstruct the
13 routes of individual lorries on the basis of which you concluded that
14 those lorries were used for the transportation of corpses; is that
16 A. No, sir. What I said today was that in one particular instance
17 which occurred on the 16th and 17th of July, by looking at the vehicle
18 record of one lorry, we were able to determine that prisoners were
19 carried from a position that corresponded to the 7th Battalion
20 headquarter to a remote location, and then that vehicle returned, that it
21 did not bring the prisoners to the higher headquarters of the
22 Zvornik Brigade like it was supposed to.
23 There are other vehicle records which talk about issues related
24 to the bringing of prisoners to other places relating to the mass
25 executions, and I believe that many of those records have been
1 corroborated by testimony of various vehicle drivers who do describe what
2 they were carrying on various days.
3 Q. Have you noticed or could you discern whether these drivers were
4 aware of where they were taking those prisoners? Maybe they were taking
5 them to a point where they would be exchanged.
6 A. As a general practice, the vehicle drivers, because they were
7 required personally to account for the vehicle miles and the fuel that
8 was used in the vehicles, kept generally accurate records of where they
9 were going and what they were doing in those vehicles.
10 Q. My question was: What were they told? What were they told about
11 the destination of the prisoners, and did you hear that they were
12 surprised that it had to do anything with executions, because they were
13 told that they were taking those people to be exchanged. Did you know
15 A. I am aware that generally a number of individuals who were
16 dealing with prisoners were initially told that they were taking people
17 to various sites to be exchanged, and I agree with your assertion that
18 many of those people were quite surprised to learn when they arrived at
19 various locations that the prisoners were not being exchanged.
20 Q. Thank you. Did you read a report by the Dutch institute NIOD
21 relating to the Srebrenica events?
22 A. No, sir, I have not.
23 Q. Do you believe that it would have been useful if you had read it,
24 because we are talking here about a competent institution that dealt with
25 the same thing --
1 JUDGE KWON: I feel like it's time to cut you off. You said you
2 would need 15 minutes, and now you are turning this witness -- trying to
3 turn this witness to a fact witness. Conclude your cross-examination.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I finished -- I'll
5 finish shortly. I'm only going to show the witness one more document.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Have you read a report by the UN Secretary-General on the fall of
9 A. Yes, sir, I have.
10 Q. Do you agree with that report?
11 A. I don't know whether I agree with it or not, because the
12 conclusions -- I mean, there are many conclusions the report draws. I
13 draw on the report because I believe it is a useful factual summary of
14 the events that occurred up until the beginning of July 1995.
15 The one note that I make and the one reason why I do hold a
16 reservation on the United Nations report is that that report was in fact
17 published prior to the trial of General Krstic, and I am sure that the
18 United Nations did not have access to much of the evidence that was later
19 used by the Office of the Prosecutor in the case relating to Krstic and
20 other accused in the subsequent years. So kind of like my own reports
21 which go up to the year 2003, while it may very well be accurate, it's
22 got -- it has to be recognised that there is a larger body of information
23 now available and that that should be factored into the general
24 conclusions as well.
25 Q. Are you aware of a recently given statement by Mr. Akashi and
1 Mr. Bildt that pertain to Srebrenica? And, of course, the statements
2 given by Mr. Stoltenberg, which speak of the fact that the war could have
3 ended earlier and in which he also describes the conduct of the Serbian
5 A. Again, sir, I may have at some point been aware generally of a
6 statement, at least by Mr. Bildt, who I think gave one many years ago to
7 the Tribunal. I have not followed the proceedings here, so I do not know
8 what, if any, of those individuals might have said about anything related
9 to this particular case.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, your last question.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I please have 1D5556. And this
12 is going to be my last question.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Butler, while we are waiting, you are, of course, familiar
15 with the term "reductio ab absurdum," [as interpreted] which means that
16 it would have been better to have the whole process rather than only the
18 A. I'm not familiar with the term, but I take it it's leading
20 Q. It should read "deductio ab absurdum," absurd deductions. But
21 let's leave that aside. Have you ever seen this document that was in
22 possession of the OTP?
23 A. Without an English translation, I -- I couldn't tell you whether
24 I've ever seen this document or not just by the appearance of it, sir.
25 Q. Thank you. It was disclosed to us by the OTP only three days
1 ago, so we didn't have time to translate it.
2 Can we now have page 2, and I'm going to read it to you. It says
3 Geneva, 19th July, and paragraph 3 says:
4 "In his speech, Bildt ascribed more critical comments and
5 responsibility (for the fall of Srebrenica) to the offensive actions
6 carried out by the BH Army and the HVO while he underlined that the
7 Bosnian Serbs genuinely were more in favour of the cessation of
9 Now, did you know anything about this? Have you ever heard about
10 these views of Mr. Bildt?
11 A. Sir, I've heard an awful lot of points of view from a lot of
12 individuals at various political levels in the international community
13 about Srebrenica. They're not relevant to my analysis.
14 Q. Thank you. I regret to say that you have been biassed, but
15 nevertheless, Mr. Butler, I would like to thank you for your testimony.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Is this document being tendered?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, certainly. I apologise.
19 MR. NICHOLLS: So I think we'll have no objection, but it should
20 be marked, Your Honour, first. We need to take a look and see what it is
21 exactly. I don't believe we have a translation yet.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 MR. NICHOLLS: Actually, Your Honours, let me reconsider. The
24 witness wasn't able to speak to it at all and said it wasn't relevant to
25 his --
1 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber sees no basis to admit this document
2 through Mr. Butler.
3 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
5 Re-examination by Mr. Nicholls:
6 Q. Mr. Butler, I want to -- do you have your narratives with you?
7 A. I actually do not today, sir. I apologise.
8 Q. All right. If there's no objection, I'll provide you with a
10 JUDGE KWON: We can upload it so that we can follow easily as
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. I don't have the e-court page because
13 this is something that just -- that came up today. If I could have
14 paragraph 8.8. It's page 81 of the narrative revised.
15 JUDGE KWON: Revised narrative.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, which is P04914.
17 Q. And where I'm going with this is you discussed the vehicle log
18 and report when you talked about prisoners and executions around the 16th
19 of July, and I'd like to just go to the 8.8 of your report and make sure
20 that we're talking about the same thing.
21 It's e-court page 86. Thank you, Ms. Raveling.
22 And you discuss this at page 4 of the transcript, for the record,
23 where you said there was a vehicle log for one truck from the
24 7th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade, and we're talking about soldiers
25 from the Krajina Corps. Is this the section you were referring to?
1 A. Yes, sir. Within the context of the discussion on prisoners
2 being known to be in the custody of the VRS on the 16th and 17th. This
3 is the document I'm referring to from the 7th Battalion.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 65 ter 02600, please. Page 3 of the
6 English -- page 4 of the English, page 3 in Serbian. And while we get
7 that -- and I'd like to look at the entries for 16 and 17 of July.
8 Q. To save time, I won't go to the page, but it's in this. It's the
9 vehicle work log of a TAM 2001 number M5342, which you also refer to in
10 your footnote to the section of the report. Is this the vehicle log that
11 you were discussing in your testimony this morning as well as in that
12 section of your narrative?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. Can you just explain a little bit more why you cited this vehicle
15 log and what it shows. I just want to give you the chance to expand a
16 little bit on the answer you gave to Mr. Karadzic this morning about the
17 relevance of this vehicle log and the document I'll show you in a minute
18 to, as you said, the issue of prisoners in the Zvornik Brigade zone in
19 the 16th and 17th and what did or did not happen to them.
20 A. Well, yes, sir. I mean, in the context of my military analysis,
21 there was a relatively clear understanding of the prisoner issues related
22 to the individuals who had brought -- been brought up to the
23 Zvornik Brigade area from the Bratunac Brigade municipality. What was a
24 lot less clear was despite the fact that there are notations that the
25 Zvornik Brigade is taking prisoners from the column, that there is no
1 accounting for those prisoners in most documents. So this is one of the
2 documents that I use to make the point that particularly on certain days,
3 low-level units, in this case, you know, companies that were reported to
4 battalions, there was prisoners being taken on various days.
5 Now, if the -- if the processes and procedures that were supposed
6 to be in place were followed, you would logically see an accounting for
7 these prisoners at the higher headquarters when these prisoners arrived
8 and were accounted for. And this is one of the documents I used to
9 illustrate the point that there were individuals from the Zvornik Brigade
10 who were known to have been in custody of prisoners that were taken from
11 the column, and again in this case the 7th Infantry Battalion is nowhere
12 near any of the identified other holding areas from where the mass
13 executions occurred, so the prisoners could only come from the column,
14 and yet there is no -- there is accounting for them anywhere.
15 Q. And just here we can see, I think it's -- it's obvious, but the
16 section you're talking to -- about, for the 16th of July the notation we
17 have number of people transported 1 plus 10, and transported food,
18 ammunition, prisoners, and other things, and then on the next day again,
19 transfer of prisoners. Is that what you're referring to?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender this, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be admitted.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P4977, Your Honours.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: And could I have P04589. This is a Drina Corps
25 corps command report. 06-244, which you cite in footnote 485 of your
1 report on this section. That's paragraph 8.10. So maybe we could bring
2 up the report quickly, same page, and see paragraph 8.10.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Can you repeat the number again, Mr. Nicholls?
4 MR. NICHOLLS: At paragraphs 8.10, same page. I think it was
5 page 86 of the English of the narrative. P04914, page 86. And if we
6 could blow that up so the witness could see his report.
7 Q. All right. So in 8.10 you relate a Zvornik Brigade regular
8 combat report to this incident, and now I'll bring that report up,
9 please. That's P04589. And again while it's coming up the question will
10 be just how this report fits into the vehicle log and the point you're
11 making in this section of chapter 8 on prisoner issues.
12 A. In this particular context it's not necessarily that specific
13 vehicle log. This is in relation to the battle-field killings that
14 occurred that I believe investigative we call the execution at Nezuk.
15 One of the survivor accounts of that execution was that he either by
16 looking at the patch of the soldiers' -- of the uniform of the soldiers
17 who executed him or by learning it from one of the soldiers, did
18 recognise that the soldiers who had him in custody were from the 16th
19 Krajina Brigade, a unit that clearly is not normally part of the
20 Zvornik Brigade structure.
21 So what this particular document does or talks about in that
22 context is that it notes that the presence of a company of the 16th
23 Krajina Brigade in the Zvornik Brigade zone performing various duties.
24 So this particular document actually talks about the fact that 13
25 soldiers were eliminated, two were captured, members of the
1 16th Krajina Brigade and a platoon were involved in that, and this
2 particular document serves to a large degree to corroborate parts of the
3 story of the Nezuk survivor as to how he came into the custody of the VRS
4 and what happened afterwards.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: Can we go into private session briefly.
7 [Private session]
8 [Open session]
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
10 MR. NICHOLLS:
11 Q. Now, just briefly, Mr. Butler, the log we looked at - I won't
12 bring it up again, and I'm done with this document - talked about
13 bringing of food, bringing of prisoners. You were asked on the 20th of
14 April at T-27767 by Mr. Karadzic about whether the proper way under VRS
15 regulations was to bring prisoners to a collection point, and on the same
16 day at 27733, you were asked about an intercept talking -- which was put
17 to you that Colonel Beara is requesting trucks and trailers to take
18 prisoners to Batkovici. So my question is looking as you did at the bulk
19 of the evidence seized, vehicle log, et cetera, orders, you've already
20 explained what you didn't -- what you didn't see in relation to some of
21 these topics, but did you see any military, environmental, or other
22 reason, looking at all the evidence, for the prisoners who were brought
23 to Zvornik and just halted there before they were killed could not have
24 continued on to Batkovic camp?
25 A. No, sir. I mean, the narrowest portion of the road from a
1 military perspective to where the front lines would be would be in the
2 Zvornik and Karakaj area. The fact that bus and trucks filled with
3 prisoners were easily able to continue northward, and in fact did,
4 through Petkovci and Rocevic and Branjevo, there's no military reason why
5 they could not have continued all the way to Petkovci. I mean, the road
6 was not threatened in any sense. So the fact that they did not go to
7 Petkovci was by -- I'm sorry, they did not go to Batkovic was by design.
8 It was not as a result of military necessity.
9 Q. All right. Now, Mr. Karadzic asked you questions about whether
10 truck drivers were told that prisoners would be exchanged when they were
11 bringing them sometimes to kind of remote mountain top areas like Bisina,
12 for example. Did you find any evidence that prisoners were somehow taken
13 and actually were exchanged during the 14th, 15th, 16th of July in
14 Zvornik municipality?
15 A. No, sir. I mean to the contrary. As -- as I've noted earlier,
16 by the 14th and 15th, I think by the early morning of the 15th, certainly
17 the police and the military forces are aware that a senior police
18 official had been captured by the column, and I know that there was a
19 number of discussions that went back and forth relating to whether or not
20 this senior RS police official was still alive and whether or not it
21 would be possible to exchange him. At that point in time, one would
22 think that, you know, Colonel Pandurevic and the Zvornik Brigade still
23 had, you know, several thousand prisoners alive that had there actually
24 been an intent to exchange those prisoners for this police captain, that
25 they would have easily had the ability to do so. So there's no evidence
1 of those types of exchanges occurring in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade
2 during that period.
3 Q. Now, one point you made during your cross-examination just now
4 was about the killings at the Kravica warehouse, that there was no
5 evidence whatsoever that you found that any prisoners were provided with
6 medical care and either died or survived after medical care. What I want
7 to ask you is just to round that out, what about the other major
8 execution sites, Orahovac, Branjevo, Petkovci, Pilica, Kozluk. In any of
9 those cases did you find that any prisoners had survived and been
10 provided medical care?
11 A. Well, there are two instances that I'm aware of. One instance is
12 well documented where four individuals who apparently survived the
13 Branjevo Farm massacre were later recaptured by the VRS. They were
14 interviewed, and there were actually stories that were made as a
15 statement as to where they were captured and everything else to
16 camouflage the fact that they were massacre survivors, and I believe
17 those four individuals are still missing. I believe I documented that in
18 my narrative under the -- I have an addendum to chapter 8 about prisoner
19 issues. I am aware of a second issue where a prisoner survived an
20 execution I believe in Kozluk, escaped to Serbia, and then was later
21 brought back and is now again missing.
22 I'm not aware of -- with the exception of one instance, a child
23 survivor of Orahovac, who did make it to the Zvornik Brigade medical
24 centre. That is the only instance I'm aware of where people from mass
25 executions, who survived them initially, received any medical care.
1 Q. Thank you. And the Kozluk survivor, I'll lead for a minute, is
2 that Resid Sinanovic?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Let me move on now quickly to some questions about the corridor
5 that came up today. There were some questions from His Honour as well as
6 some follow-up questions by Mr. Karadzic.
7 We looked at P04956. We don't need to bring it up now, but
8 that's an intercept from the 16 July in which the Drina Corps is calling
9 down to the Zvornik Brigade saying they need permission from the main
10 head of state, and they're talking about the opening of the corridor.
11 Mr. Karadzic in his questions talked about getting information
12 from Karisik and that he supported Mr. Pandurevic's decision.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: I'd like to look at P01412, please. That's the
14 56th session of the RS Assembly session -- 52nd session, excuse me, on
15 5th August 1995. And if we could go to 19 in English and 17 in Serbian.
16 That's it. If we can now go to page 19. Second paragraph.
17 Q. This is Mr. Karadzic speaking:
18 "As you know we had success in Srebrenica and Zepa. There were
19 no objections or remarks on that success. Of course, many stupid things
20 were done afterwards because many Muslim soldiers were wandering around
21 in the woods and we suffered casualties then. Still, we did not suffer
22 any casualties during the action."
23 And then if I can continue now to e-court English page 23,
24 Serbian page 20. What I'd like you to look at is the bottom of the
25 second paragraph. Mr. Karadzic continues:
1 "The Turks from Gorazde could get there whenever they want. The
2 same as 9.000 armed Turks in the woods and mountains could have taken
3 Srebrenica again."
4 We scroll down in the English.
5 "They could have burned Milici, Vlasenica and Zvornik. People
6 from that area can tell you about it because it could have happened if
7 they were smart enough and if they had a command. It's a landing
8 division with 9.000 men. It could have been a landing operation. Only
9 our men and dear God could save us. About 50 to 60 of our men got killed
10 there trying to block them but several thousands of soldiers eventually
11 managed" - turn the page - "to pass. And now Srebrenica division has
12 been formed, lined up in Tuzla in order to get back to Srebrenica. We
13 were not able to surround and destroy that enemy because we were in a
14 hurry to get to Zepa, and we assigned two generals to Zepa to waste 15
15 days in negotiations with jackasses and idiots who are wasting their time
16 instead of letting Rajko Kusic finish all of it or maybe General Krstic
17 who proved to be very good."
18 So my question is the 50 or 60 men that Mr. Karadzic speaks about
19 who got killed trying to block these men from Srebrenica who were the
20 Srebrenica Division in Zepa, what does that refer to?
21 A. Those would be casualties primarily from the Zvornik Infantry
22 Brigade, but there were some police casualties that were incurred on the
23 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th trying to block the column from successfully
24 escaping the territory of the RS. I think most of the casualties
25 occurred the evening hours of the 15th and the morning hours of 16th July
2 Q. Okay. Now, second question: Does this provide you with any
3 information either way about the knowledge of the leadership of whether
4 the men in that -- or whether the -- I should say the people in that
5 column who managed to pass were soldiers or civilians?
6 A. No, sir. I mean, I believe that everybody knew that the people
7 who were in the column were for the most part either armed or unarmed
8 soldiers or -- or at least military-aged men.
9 As I've discussed earlier, in the -- you know, when -- when you
10 look at the context of what happened on the 15th of July, you know,
11 Colonel Pandurevic is not interested in letting the column pass. He's
12 interested in doing a military solution because he believes he has the
13 means to and he understand that that's the intent of his superior
14 commanders. He only makes the decision out of military interest to let
15 the column pass on the afternoon of the 16th for a discrete period of 24
16 hours because he essentially has no choice. I mean, he has no ability
17 militarily to stop it. His units are obtaining significant casualties.
18 He doesn't believe that the Serbian blood being expended to that point is
19 worth the gain, so he does so.
20 And, of course, by doing that and essentially defying his
21 instructions from his superior command, he now has a motive to downplay
22 what the actual impact of that would be with the fact of how many
23 soldiers had been let out or military-aged men had been let out, and also
24 to misrepresent the characteristics of that column, and this is where he
25 starts talking about civilians being part of the column.
1 And again going back to the earlier point, the other people there
2 who -- aren't saying that. They're all noting accurately that what we
3 were engaged in in that context was combat against a column of, you know,
4 military-aged men, a significant percentage, you know, maybe up to
5 one-half, who were armed.
6 Q. Thank you. And then last question on this and I'll move on. But
7 in this session we see on the 6th of August where then President Karadzic
8 says there were no objections or remarks on the success in Srebrenica and
9 Zepa, and then complains that this group of men were not surrounded and
11 By that time, has -- as far as you know, has word spread about
12 the mass executions in the Zvornik Brigade AOR? So this is 6th of
14 A. Absolutely, sir, and this is why I believe that this particular
15 document, especially for me, was -- was very important, and of course I
16 was glad to get access to it naturally after I had written my reports,
17 because this particular meeting comes two days after President Karadzic
18 is seeking to essentially dismiss General Mladic from the command of the
19 Main Staff.
20 Now, in light of my knowledge of the earlier indictments for
21 President Karadzic and that he was indicted under 7(3), it's inescapable
22 that -- you know, here we have, less than three weeks after Srebrenica,
23 an attempt by the president of the republic to fire General Mladic who
24 many would view as responsible in part for Srebrenica as well, and
25 obviously that would have an impact on 7(3) and, in getting back to the
1 earlier question, to Rule 68 obligations.
2 So a big part of what I tried to do as part of my research while
3 I was here is to find whether or not there was any evidence whatsoever
4 that one of the motivations for President Karadzic really trying to
5 leave -- relieve General Mladic of command was as a result of the orders
6 he gave which resulted in the deaths of thousands of people at
7 Srebrenica, if there was a way to divorce that somehow. If this was
8 President Karadzic's reaction that, you know, this is what he was trying
9 to do. And you know, this as well as all of the evidence that I've come
10 across to date, there's no information that suggests that.
11 The reasons that he fired or sought to fire General Mladic had to
12 do with a variety of other issues, and nowhere is he saying, you know,
13 One the reasons why I wanted to terminate General Mladic's service as the
14 commander of the Main Staff, as well as other officers involved in
15 Srebrenica, was because I do not agree with the illegal activities that
16 occurred there and this is my way of seeking to remove them from
17 positions of authority.
18 So I see this as a very significant document in trying to address
19 what were or were not the motives of President Karadzic for trying to
20 remove General Mladic from the command of the Main Staff on the 3rd and
21 4th of August of 1995.
22 Q. All right.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 65 ter 02269, please.
24 Q. And while that's coming up, I'll tell you, Mr. Butler, this is
25 the VRS Main Staff military prosecutor's office guidelines for
1 determining criteria for criminal responsibility, and I just want to
2 confirm you were discussing a document at pages 7 and 8 today, in the
3 context of the discussion Mr. Karadzic was asking you about, whether
4 there were command and control issues because of the nature of the VRS
5 conscripts. Let me put it generally like that. My question is: Is this
6 the document you were referring to when you said that commanders were
7 provided with information as early as 1992 about ways to deal with these
8 problems of revenge, crimes, et cetera?
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. Could we go to -- I may have miscited you.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: It's page 7 of the English, sorry. Page 23 of the
12 B/C/S. I'd like to go to there quickly.
13 Q. If you look at the second paragraph under heading 3, criminal
14 offences against humanitarian and international law. There's a
15 discussion of crimes against humanity and how they occur. Is that the
16 part you were talking about?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: And if I could go to page 8 of the English, which
19 should be page 25 of the Serbian. Now at the top. Look at the first two
20 paragraphs. It's generally about the responsibility of officers,
21 including for officers learning of crimes. Is that -- were you
22 discussing this section as well? I just want to see if I'm correct in
23 the part you were referring to.
24 A. Yes, sir. And this is again where I note the fact that it's not
25 the actual number of the officers which is responsible for the discipline
1 of the soldiers. It is the willingness and ability of those officers to
2 use the various criminal and -- law and military disciplinary systems in
3 order to implement proper discipline within the armed forces.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender this, Your Honour?
5 JUDGE KWON: Cover page and those two pages.
6 MR. NICHOLLS: It's actually, Your Honour, the English is nine
7 pages. I would -- I would prefer to tender the entire --
8 JUDGE KWON: But the B/C/S version is 36 pages.
9 MR. NICHOLLS: I believe that's because of blank pages inserted.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mm-hmm.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: It's not a very good scan but we're talking about
12 nine pages of text.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
14 MR. ROBINSON: We don't object to tendering the entire document,
15 Mr. President.
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll admit it.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P4978, Your Honours.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. This would be a good time, Your
19 Honour, for taking the break.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I, Excellencies, just one
22 JUDGE KWON: That means you have more questions.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: I do have more questions, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE KWON: How much more, Mr. Nicholls?
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Probably about 20 minutes, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE KWON: We better take a break now. We'll have a break for
2 now and resume at 1.30.
3 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 1.33 p.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.
6 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Q. All right. Almost -- almost done, Mr. Butler. Just a few more
8 topics I'll try to move through quickly. The first thing is I'm going to
9 ask you to cast your mind back to around March, April 2009. You were
10 asked on 19th of April why there was no report in this case, and you
11 answered that you weren't asked to write one. I'd ask you to just think
12 about that.
13 In March at a Status Conference, 24th of March, we told the Court
14 we were -- that we thought you were preparing a report and would prepare
15 one, and on the 15th of May, 2009, when we filed your 94 bis notice, we
16 noted on it that it had been impossible to complete one by the dead-line.
17 So just try to think back. Do you remember whether we had discussions
18 about doing an addendum and updating the various reports and whether you
19 had time to do it or not?
20 A. In the context of the question from Mr. Karadzic, he asked if I
21 was ever doing a specific report on the Supreme Command, and to my
22 knowledge I was not asked specifically to do that. I was asked and
23 having asked in the past whether or not it's possible to do updated
24 versions of a variety of other reports, and my answer back generally is
25 that my current work schedule just does not give me the opportunity to
1 take the time that I need to be able to do that. So I expect that, yes,
2 at some time you possibly did ask me to update some of the other reports
3 and narratives, and I probably told you I was just not able to do that,
4 but again I don't believe we ever specifically discussed a Supreme
5 Command specific report like the Main Staff report.
6 Q. Now -- thank you. You've helped me with that. Now a completely
7 different topic, and that's Directive 4. At 27652 to 653, in
8 cross-examination Karadzic put it to you that he hadn't read Directive 4.
9 He said:
10 "Thank you, but I tell you that if I had read this directive -
11 which I didn't, because I didn't sign it," and then he continued.
12 And he also asked you:
13 "You have no proof that I read this directive or commented upon
14 it; correct?," on the same section.
15 So I'm going to ask you some questions about that now.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: And first could I have P00970 at page 240 in
17 English and 207 in the Serbian original. That's the 50th Assembly
18 session, 15 and 16 April, 1995.
19 Q. And what I'm going to do, Mr. Butler, is show you a few documents
20 and then I'll ask you a question putting them all together rather than
21 each one.
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. So I will be asking you about these.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I only say this: These
25 questions may be a result of my imprecision. I asked about the time when
1 the directive was created and not whether I learned about it later on.
2 Perhaps this can save us some time.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, if Mr. Karadzic will stipulate that he read
4 Directive 4 and approved it, then I can skip this whole line, because
5 that's what I'm seeking to establish, that he read it and that he
6 approved it for the Main Staff.
7 JUDGE KWON: I don't think Mr. Karadzic would agree to it.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. I could only comment on how I
9 did not sign many of the directives, but at the time of this directive's
10 creation and implementation, I was not familiar with it and there is no
11 proof I was.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: In that case I'll continue because that's exactly
13 the point.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.
15 MR. NICHOLLS:
16 Q. Right now here this is General Mladic speaking at the 50th
17 Assembly session and we won't go into it, but that was a long contentious
18 session we know. The one -- the part I want you to focus on, it's in the
19 top paragraph. General Mladic says:
20 "Some of these decision were only presented to you,
21 Mr. President, and others you participated as a member of the Supreme
22 Command. Some of the directives you signed, not all of them, though.
23 Before we constituted and oriented ourselves, I used to sign them."
24 So keep that in mind.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: I now would like to look at P01415. That's the
1 Assembly session from October 1995, page 84 in English, page 108 in the
2 Serbian. And while it's coming up --
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think we had this in
4 Serbian, what Mr. Nicholls just presented.
5 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let -- let us show the accused the B/C/S
6 version of Mladic's words.
7 MR. NICHOLLS: I hope I have it correct. I had 207 in e-court.
8 It was a little bit hard to find because of the time.
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let us continue with this 1415 first
11 MR. NICHOLLS: I have a hard copy I can give to Mr. Karadzic.
12 So then 1415, e-court, page 48 in the e-court, page 108 in the
13 Serbian, please.
14 JUDGE KWON: I was told that we have P970 in the monitor.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, I'd like to move on to the next one if
16 possible. 1415.
17 Q. And just to save time while it's coming up I'll read out the
18 portion we'll see that I want you to focus on. This is
19 President Karadzic speaking.
20 "I have examined, approved, and signed seven directives. No one
21 submitted the 8th and 9th to me, not even to read it let alone to sign
22 it, because General Gvero and the others wrote whom they should obey. I
23 cannot be held responsible for the events from the 8th and 9th Directive.
24 I will not stand for that."
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Can we follow? I think I saw that
1 passage in the previous page, but it moved. Yes.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: I didn't see it I'm afraid, Your Honour. My notes
3 say it's page 84 of the Serbian -- of the English. That's the correct
4 page. It's in the paragraph which begins: "We must look at army
5 publications," second paragraph on the screen.
6 JUDGE KWON: So you referred to the passage that it says, "I have
7 examined, approved, and signed seven directives."
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour, and then says, "... but not the
9 8th and 9th.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 MR. NICHOLLS:
12 Q. Have you had a chance to read that, Mr. Butler?
13 A. Yes, I have.
14 Q. All right. Now the third document is D02149, a Defence exhibit.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: And if I could have the English page 13 and the
16 Serbian page which is 8.
17 Q. And what this is, Mr. Butler, the Defence put into evidence
18 General Manojlo Milovanovic's notes of meetings and conversations with
19 President Karadzic during the war period. And I would like you to read
20 his 10 November entry at the top there. You can see particularly point
21 2, General Milovanovic has written that Karadzic will soon receive
22 Main Staff directive number 4 regulating the activities of the newly
23 formed Drina Corps, et cetera. I will -- and I therefore ask him to
24 review and approve it. And then he continues his notes:
25 "In the following days the Supreme Commander had offered
1 suggestions, verbally approved Directive number 4, and returned it for
2 the Main Staff commander's signature in view of the fact that this
3 directive provides for issues of a purely military organisation."
4 Have you seen that Mr. Butler?
5 A. I've read it, sir. Yes.
6 Q. I want to skip ahead to P04248. Just to remind us we saw this
7 before but this is the timetable. Keeping in mind that Directive 4 was
8 dated and issued the 19th of December, we've seen General Milovanovic's
9 notes from -- sorry, 19th of November, 1992, we've seen Milovanovic's
10 notes from earlier in November. This military -- this timetable for the
11 military and political seminar four days after directive 4 was issued,
12 opening speech by the president and then the briefing by
13 General Zivanovic. This is the 23rd of November. I won't bring it up
15 But at P02716, Mr. Karadzic's notebook, we saw from that day, the
16 23rd of November, he wrote "Colonel Zivanovic," and then, "Tasks:
17 Vitinica, Sapna, Teocak, Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, Gorazde." Do you
18 remember that? We looked at that entry.
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. Now I want to move to the next day, 24 November, and then I'll
21 ask you to some questions.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: P02058.
23 Q. This is a Drina Corps demand document, 24 November 1992, very
24 urgent decision for further operations. I'll wait for it to come up.
25 Are you familiar with this document, sir?
1 JUDGE KWON: For the record, it's Exhibit P2085.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, Your Honour.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I believe I've seen this document at
4 some juncture during the past couple of years.
5 MR. NICHOLLS:
6 Q. Okay. And we that this is pursuant to the directive of the
7 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, strictly confidential -- I'll
8 skip, 19 November 1992 directive, Directive 4:
9 [As read] "Launch an attack using the main body of troops and
10 major equipment to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses,
11 exhaust them, break them up, or force them to surrender and force the
12 Muslim local population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica,
13 and Gorazde," the same four places we saw written in Mr. Karadzic's
14 notebook from the day before.
15 So my question is: Putting together all these documents I've
16 shown you, General Milovanovic's notes, the Assembly sessions, and the
17 fact that this conference was held the day before Zivanovic issued the
18 Drina Corps Directive 4 implementation, from your military analysis, what
19 does that show about the Supreme Commander's involvement in the issuance
20 of Directive 4 and the subsequent order?
21 A. Again, in -- in the context of the documents that have just been
22 reviewed, whether he signs Directive 4 or not, the Supreme Commander
23 cannot be ignorant of what the goals of objectives of that directive are
24 specific to the Drina Corps in light of the fact that he attends a
25 Drina Corps conference where to a large degree the details as to how the
1 Drina Corps and its subordinate brigades are going to implement that plan
2 are discussed.
3 So I mean I don't see -- like I said, I mean obviously there is
4 no signature from President Karadzic on the document, but in light of
5 what happens with respect to the fact that he's at this particular
6 conference and he's being briefed by the relevant commanders as to their
7 military goals and intentions in light of the plan that they've received,
8 the Supreme Commander can't be ignorant of that. He has to know this.
9 What point in time or what day he may have read Directive 4 I can't
10 possibly say, but he had to know what the Drina Corps's roles and
11 missions are in order to participate intelligently in the conference that
12 occurs on 23 November of 1992.
13 Q. Thank you. I want to quickly move on to another small topic. It
14 was put to you on 20th of April at T-27725 to 27726 that it was only on
15 the 9th of July that the Serbian forces considered the possibility of
16 entering Srebrenica and you agreed discussing the Krivaja 95 operation
17 plan. What I want to show you is a couple documents from earlier in the
18 year to put some context into what the VRS's intentions may have been
19 regarding Srebrenica and the enclaves.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: So if I could have 65 ter 02071, please. And
21 while it's coming up, I'll also say it was -- you were questioned about
22 Muslim forces attacks in June and that the Krivaja 95 could have been
23 reaction to those attacks.
24 This document from the 15th of May, command of the Drina Corps,
25 it's signed by then a -- the deputy, Krstic, which states:
1 "Urgent order to stabilise defence around Zepa and Srebrenica
2 enclaves and establish conditions for the liberation of the enclaves."
3 Can you just tell us what this document adds to the picture, if
5 A. Even though we discussed as a pin point in time the Krivaja 95
6 operation, I mean, going back to Krivaja 95, the genesis for the intent
7 there was incorporated in Directive 7 and 7.1, which came out in March of
8 1995. After that, you had a series of orders in the intervening months
9 from the VRS and other units dealing with how they were going to
10 implement various portions. This particular one talks about military
11 operations to potentially cut the lines of communication of the
12 28th Division between Srebrenica and Zepa.
13 So there was always -- you know, since -- since March of 1995,
14 there was always that intent to do that. I guess the question is again
15 going back to at what point in time did an actual assault on the town of
16 Srebrenica become feasible as a military operation, and that's where I
17 believe my testimony is that while it's not implicit in Krivaja 95's
18 operations plan, by the 9th they had achieved such military success that
19 that became a viable military objective.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender that, Your Honours?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I ask Mr. Nicholls to ask the
22 witness to read out the first paragraph, because it's part and parcel of
23 the document and it is also important to providing an answer to
24 Mr. Nicholls's question as to why.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: No, I don't want to read out the first paragraph.
1 I mean, the whole document if it's admitted will be there. Just for
2 time, I don't --
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I agree. We will receive it.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P4979, Your Honours.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 65 ter 02072, document from the next
6 day, also Drina Corps, also signed by Deputy Krstic.
7 Q. Just tell us what this is just to fill out this little chapter.
8 A. Yes, sir. Again as noted in Directive 7, they wanted to
9 implement these plans against the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves as early
10 as possible. One of the problems that they had was they did not have the
11 adequate amount of forces. At approximately this time, Muslim military
12 forces in both the 1st and 2nd Corps are carrying out large-scale attacks
13 against corresponding VRS army and police forces, and at this particular
14 point, they're noting that, you know, it's [indiscernible] to disregard
15 the previous order because they do not have adequate military forces
16 available in order to conduct them.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. Would I tender this, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P4980, Your Honours.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have P00168, please.
21 Q. I'm going to ask you about a different topic now, Mr. Butler.
22 This is from T-27734 to 35, a long discussion between you and
23 Mr. Karadzic about the numbers of prisoners on the 13th of July and the
24 aerial photo from Nova Kasaba, and I won't go through all that again, but
25 it was put to you that commanders brag about the number of prisoners
1 they've taken and that there were far fewer.
2 This document, the same time as the aerial, 1400, dated 13 July
3 1995, from commander of the 65th Protection Unit, Milomir Savcic, and it
4 states at the beginning:
5 "There are over a thousand members of the 28th Division of the
6 so-called BiH Army captured in the area of Dusanovo (Kasaba). Prisoners
7 are under the control of the Military Police Battalion of the 65th
8 Protection Regiment. Assistant commander for security and intelligence
9 affairs of the Main Staff VRS proposes the following."
10 Now when it says "assistant commander for security and
11 intelligence affairs proposes," who is that, even though it doesn't say
12 his name?
13 A. That would be General Tolimir, sir.
14 Q. Okay. And my question is again based on your military analysis
15 and experience and looking at all these documents that you have regarding
16 the Srebrenica operation, when General Tolimir is making a proposal for
17 what to do and how to treat a group of prisoners, is it feasible that
18 he's got inaccurate, inflated information from the documents you've seen
19 in the other evidence through bragging of lower commanders?
20 A. No, sir. I mean, given the context of who this is being sent to
21 as a proposal, I mean, it's being sent to the commander of the
22 Main Staff, you know, one would think that General Tolimir would seek to
23 be operating off the most accurate information that he was able to obtain
24 before making such a proposal to his superior, General Mladic.
25 Q. And just very quickly as a follow-up, you talked quite a lot over
1 the last few days about the logistics involved with so many prisoners,
2 whether it's for ultimately a murder operation or the logistics that
3 would be involved for transporting them, providing food, water, medical
4 care, et cetera, just how important is it to have an accurate prisoner
5 count when a force is taking thousands of prisoners for the logistical
6 purposes you've talked about?
7 A. It's -- it's critical, because the number of prisoners that in
8 your -- that fall into your custody have a direct impact on so many
9 different military issues that have to be accomplished. The number of
10 prisoners has an impact on how many people have to be detailed to guard
11 these individuals, how many vehicles have to be detailed to move these
12 individuals to whatever designated location, how much water needs to be
13 ordered, how much food needs to be ordered, what -- what or how much
14 medical support might be required. All of these types of what we would
15 call life-support measures require some form of an accurate accounting of
16 how many prisoners, even your best estimates of how many prisoners that
17 are going to be falling into your custody or are falling into your
18 custody so your rear-service professionals can deal with these conditions
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: If I could have 65 ter 01952.
22 Q. This is my last topic. It's very quick, Mr. Butler.
23 Again on the 20th of April at 27748 to 27749, there was a
24 discussion essentially about reporting to the president. And
25 Mr. Karadzic asked you about some reporting on the 15th of July and said:
1 [As read] "Is this supposed to alarm the president of the
2 republic who has a thousand other things to do?"
3 And is part of your answer you said:
4 [As read] "The second issue I would again note that the military
5 was not your only mechanism to receive information, particularly
6 information that would potentially alarm you."
7 And then you discussed a report of prisoners escaping from
8 Pilica. First question --
9 A. The document that's up here has no correspondence to that. 0 --
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: This time I think I read it out correctly. It
12 should be 019 --
13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I was waiting for the French translation
16 to be completed. Now you can continue, Mr. Nicholls.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour. I apologise, Your Honour.
18 Q. The first question I was going to ask is in that part of your
19 testimony you referred to a 15 July report of prisoners escaping from
20 Pilica. Is this the document, the MUP document, you were referring to?
21 A. Yes, sir. If you look at the last paragraph of this particular
22 document, you'll note it says that on the morning of 15 July, a group of
23 about a hundred captured Muslims from Srebrenica managed to escape from
24 Gornja Pilica, Zvornik municipality.
25 My understanding is that ultimately that that report turned out
1 to be inaccurate, but in the context of what we were discussing, my -- my
2 opinion is that, you know, a report of a hundred prisoners of war
3 essentially who escape well behind enemy lines in -- in the northern
4 Zvornik municipality would be in a report that would be of sufficient
5 gravity so that it would be rapidly escalated and there would at least be
6 inquiries as to -- excuse me, whether or not the information is accurate
7 and, if so, what was being done to resolve the situation.
8 Q. Thank you. And may I -- and as you say, this report goes
9 directly to Tomo Kovac, the deputy minister.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender this Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P4981, Your Honours.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us just check this. Is this
14 being sent to the president?
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we'll -- we can see that.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: I have no further questions now. Thank you very
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, Excellencies, just a bit of
19 time, a very little bit of time.
20 JUDGE KWON: Before you put the question, let us know what kind
21 of question you are going to ask the witness, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it is a fact that one needs
23 to spell out precisely whether civilians were mentioned at the meeting
24 and whether I denied insight into the forth coming action in Directive 4,
25 or am I claiming that I did not deal with the details that are contained
1 in that directive. Also let us take a look at this telegram which is
2 being sent on the 13th of July from -- at 1400 hours from Borike that is
3 120 kilometres away. Does the time correspond to the footage we saw? So
4 when the Prosecution is testifying, then they can twist things any which
5 way they want.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will allow you to put the second
8 question, only the second one, to the witness.
9 Further cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
10 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Butler, is it correct that that previous
11 document, the telegram of Commander Savcic is being sent from Borike,
12 which is far away from Srebrenica and Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba, and
13 also that it is being sent at 1400 hours exactly? If necessary, we're
14 going to have the document called up.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, can we have the previous
17 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit P168.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Please, Mr. Butler, could you focus on this. Is it correct that
20 the telegram is being sent from Borike at 1400 hours?
21 A. This is what it says, yes, sir. And if you look at that first
22 paragraph it says IKM, 65th Motorised Protection Regiment, Borike, at
23 1400 hours. So that is a -- the situation as they understand it at that
25 Q. Thank you. Do you know where Borike is?
1 A. I believe I have a general idea. It's related to the Zepa
2 enclave, but I could not tell you in terms of distance how far away it is
3 from -- I believe your earlier question would be how far away it is from
4 Nova Kasaba or Konjevic Polje.
5 Q. Do you know that Borike is above Rogatica and that there is a
6 farm there at Mount Sijemic [phoen] where Tolimir offered accommodation?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. That aerial image, does this also bear the same date and the same
9 time, 1400 hours?
10 A. Again, sir, I believe, if I recall correctly, the image is dated
11 13 July 1995, and I believe the image is approximately -- the stamp on
12 the image is approximately 1400 hours.
13 Q. Also, does the content of this telegram correspond to what we see
14 in the image?
15 A. Again, sir, would I go back to the fact that from the image alone
16 I have no way of knowing how many people might be in that square. I
17 understand what number you've raised. I can't -- I can't agree or
18 disagree with it because I don't believe that the image that I was able
19 to look at would give me any indication of just how many people were
20 there other than a wild guess. All I would say again is that Nova Kasaba
21 falls under the jurisdiction of Major Malinic who is Lieutenant Savcic's
22 subordinate. Major Malinic would have, obviously, a vested interest in
23 accurately reporting to his superior, and that information is then being
24 used in a proposal by General Tolimir to his superior General Mladic.
25 So again, you know, for a variety of reasons, military officials
1 have a vested interest in trying to pass forward the most accurate
2 information possible because they know that the information that they're
3 passing forward will be used by their superiors in various decisions that
4 have to be made in the future.
5 Q. That's the way it should be. Is that the way it was?
6 A. Well, sir, again taking you to a similar example we discussed as
7 part of my testimony, subordinates who were in the field engaged in
8 military operations were purporting the numbers of individuals that they
9 were encountering in the column on the 12th and 13th, and so even despite
10 getting what turned out to be accurate information - because those
11 superiors did not believe or discounted the numbers because they couldn't
12 conceive them to be feasible - they made decisions that were ultimately
13 incorrect because they had not accepted the full accounting of the
14 numbers from their subordinates. So the reality is that even though
15 factual and accurate information is transmitted up the chain of command,
16 there are situations where military commanders might elect to discount or
17 ignore or misinterpret that information for a variety of reasons.
18 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry to interrupt. Just in fairness,
19 Mr. Karadzic said is it correct that the telegram is being tent from
20 Borike at 1400 hours. Mr. Butler can't see the bottom of the document
21 and the handwriting portion in answering that question in English.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. And the English probably the next page.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: Next page, yes.
24 THE WITNESS: So I guess the document was drafted on the 14th --
25 at 1400 but ultimately not sent until 1510 hours, so an hour and a half
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Although in Serbian it says "handed over" or "had handed in." So
4 I don't know whether that would be sent. At any rate, this is what
5 Colonel Savcic has, information from 1400 hours.
6 Thank you, Excellencies, I really wouldn't want to take advantage
7 of your goodness any further. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE KWON: Well, Mr. Butler that, concludes your evidence. On
11 behalf of this Chamber as well as the Tribunal, I would like to thank you
12 for your coming to The Hague again to give it. Now you are free to go.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, sir.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, for the transcript, I
15 would just like to say that the Defence is surprised by the extent to
16 which the Prosecution has been turning their own employees into expert
17 witnesses who are supposed to be comprehensive and impartial. So the way
18 I see it, the Prosecution is testifying on its own behalf.
19 [The witness withdrew]
20 JUDGE KWON: No. You had another opportunity to raise it, and
21 this is not the proper time for you to reiterate it.
22 We can continue, Mr. Nicholls?
23 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. TIEGER: We'll need to switch, Mr. President. That always
25 takes about five minutes or so. Or no more than that, but we'll need to
1 do it.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The Chamber prefers to have a short break.
3 We'll break -- rise for five minutes.
4 --- Break taken at 2.15 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 2.26 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue with the next witness, we will
7 issue two oral rulings.
8 First, the Chamber notes the urgent motion filed confidentially
9 by the United Kingdom on the 20th of April, 2012, seeking an extension of
10 time of 14 days to respond to the accused's motion to compel production
11 of seven documents filed by him on the 24th of January, 2012. The
12 Chamber also notes the accused's response to the urgent motion filed
13 publicly on the 23rd of April, 2012, in which he opposes the extension of
14 time and urges the Chamber to dispose of the original motion to compel
15 production of seven documents. He also asks that the urgent motion for
16 an extension of time be reclassified as public.
17 Given that the UK's urgent motion reveals that the parties
18 involved have been engaged in discussions right up until 19th of April,
19 2012, namely one day before the UK's dead-line to respond, and that both
20 the accused and the UK indicate that further negotiations may still take
21 place in the near future, the Chamber has decided to grant the UK's
22 motion for the extension of time. The Chamber therefore invites the UK
23 to file its response by no later than 7th of May, 2012.
24 As for the accused's request for reclassify the urgent motion,
25 the Chamber has decided not to grant this request due to the detailed
1 submissions made by the UK therein regarding the ways in which the
2 parties involved have been trying to resolve this issue and the
3 sensitivity of the documents in question. The Chamber also does not
4 consider it feasible to order the UK to file a public redacted version of
5 the urgent motion as the extent of the required redaction would strip the
6 motion of much of its content.
7 Finally in this regard, the Chamber instructs the Registry to
8 forward this ruling to the UK Embassy in The Hague.
9 The Chamber will now issue an oral decision on the accused's 70th
10 motion for finding of disclosure violation filed on 29th of March 2012.
11 The motion alleges that Prosecution violated Rule 68 of the Rules of
12 Procedure and Evidence by the disclosures on 28th of March, 2012, of
13 three potentially exculpatory documents.
14 The Prosecution filed its response to the motion on the 12th of
15 April, 2012. The Chamber finds that the three documents were disclosed
16 by the Prosecutions as soon as practicable. The first document was
17 intended for use with KDZ493 who was a witness for whom delayed
18 disclosure of 30 days prior to his expected testimony had been granted.
19 This document was disclosed within one week of the Chamber's decision
20 which granted the Prosecution motion not to call KDZ493. With respect to
21 the second and third documents, the Chamber notes the Prosecution's
22 submission that it only recently obtained the documents and also only
23 received the Rule 70 provider's consent for their disclosure on the 16th
24 of March, 2012. The documents in question were disclosed within two
25 weeks of that date.
1 Given that these three documents were disclosed by the
2 Prosecution as soon as practicable, the Chamber finds that the
3 Prosecution did not violate its disclosure obligations under Rule 68 of
4 the Rules and dismisses the motion in its entirety.
5 That said, let us bring in the next witness.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, sir.
8 If the witness could take the solemn declaration, please.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
10 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
11 WITNESS: BRANKO DJERIC
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Djeric. Please be seated and make
14 yourself comfortable.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: Thank you very much.
18 Examination by Mr. Tieger:
19 Q. Good afternoon, sir. Could we simply begin by asking you to
20 state your name for the record.
21 A. Good afternoon. My name is Branko Djeric.
22 Q. Mr. Djeric, is it correct that you have testified before this
23 Tribunal in two previous cases, in the case of Prosecutor v. Krajisnik in
24 July of 2006 and in the case of Prosecutor v. Stanisic/Zupljanin in
25 October and November of 2009?
1 A. That is all correct.
2 Q. Is it also correct that you have recently had the opportunity to
3 review certain excerpts from those testimonies and that during the
4 process of reviewing those materials you also added a few clarifications
5 or additional information?
6 A. That is correct.
7 MR. TIEGER: Can I call up 65 ter 90330, please.
8 Q. Mr. Djeric, you'll see on the screen before you a document that
9 bears a signature and the date of April 5th, 2012 -- it's two signatures,
10 actually, yours and Mr. Hogan's. Can you confirm that this is the
11 document which contained the excerpts from your previous testimonies and
12 added the few additional clarifications?
13 A. Yes, I can confirm that this is my signature.
14 Q. Thank you. And can you also confirm, Mr. Djeric, that this
15 document accurately reflects those portions of your previous testimonies
16 and that if you were asked about those same matters here in court you
17 would provide the same information?
18 A. I would provide the same answers.
19 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. I tender the document, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P4982, Your Honours.
22 MR. TIEGER: And with the Court's leave, I'll proceed to read a
23 brief summary.
24 Mr. Djeric was the prime minister of Republika Srpska from 1992.
25 Although he resigned in October 1992, he remained acting as the prime
1 minister until mid December 1992.
2 Although the Republika Srpska had a collective Presidency in
3 1992, it was a party state, which was in practice run by Mr. Karadzic and
4 the party. For example, when the government was formed, it was
5 Mr. Karadzic and the party who selected the candidates whom the witness
6 would propose to the Assembly for ministerial positions. The government
7 was a technical attachment, not a body that could create policies.
8 Mr. Karadzic considered himself to be the government, and he and the
9 people around him set the policy for the state. The minister of justice,
10 Momcilo Mandic, and the minister of interior, Mico Stanisic, largely
11 bypassed the government and reported directly to Mr. Karadzic. Mandic
12 and Stanisic ignored Mr. Djeric and Stanisic threatened to kill him.
13 Stanisic and Mandic were also involved in crimes.
14 The witness wanted to replace Mandic and Stanisic but was
15 prevented by Mr. Karadzic.
16 Finally, in October 1992, the witness resigned because he
17 considered that the government was not functioning. The witness had
18 concerns about crimes being committed by Serbs. He wanted something to
19 be done about this, but Mr. Karadzic disagreed, taking the position that
20 these matters could be dealt with later.
21 Mr. Karadzic dealt with the overall issues related to detention
22 camps through members of the government with whom he dealt directly.
23 Crisis Staffs were party organs. Representatives of the municipalities
24 often came to the Presidency building to see Mr. Karadzic and
25 Mr. Krajisnik. Representatives of Sarajevo municipalities more often met
1 with Mr. Krajisnik, and representatives from Banja Luka more often met
2 with Mr. Karadzic. Biljana Plavsic sought out and approved of
3 paramilitary formations, a view she expressed at the 22nd Assembly
4 session in Zvornik in November 1992. The witness testified that her
5 opinion on this was not unusual and, as a rule, the Presidency approved
6 of it.
7 That concludes the summary, Mr. President, and I have no
8 additional questions for the witness.
9 JUDGE KWON: You are tendering two associated exhibits,
10 Mr. Tieger?
11 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, Mr. President.
12 JUDGE KWON: The first one, 65 ter 5542, which was discussed in
13 para 25 of his amalgamated statement, I don't think he said anything. I
14 think he said he doesn't remember such documents.
15 MR. TIEGER: That's precisely the point, Mr. President. He was
16 shown those documents and said those are the nature of the documents that
17 he did not that -- he's not disputing their existence or their
18 authenticity, but those are the types of materials to which he did not
19 have access and which --
20 JUDGE KWON: So it's because he --
21 MR. TIEGER: [Overlapping speakers] And in that sense they --
22 JUDGE KWON: The contents of the documents has been described
23 sufficiently in that para. I'm not sure that document forms an
24 indispensable and separable part. If you'd like to tender it, probably
25 you better deal with it with the witness again.
1 MR. TIEGER: I'm not sure what additional information we could
2 elicit. I mean, the -- the situation would presumably be the same, that
3 this is not a document which the witness remembered at the time he was
4 shown in court, and I wouldn't expect him to have any further data about
5 that at this point.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE KWON: So we'll stand by our practice that this document
8 will not be admitted as associated exhibit. So we'll admit 1527, which
9 is an order from this witness.
10 Very well. Mr. Djeric, as you noted that your evidence-in-chief
11 was admitted in -- in the written form in lieu of your oral testimony,
12 and now you'll be further examined by Mr. Karadzic in his
13 cross-examination. Do you follow, Mr. Djeric?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I understood it, this is an
15 abbreviated version of my previous testimony.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. You signed the so-called amalgamated
17 statement, which is an excerpt from your previous testimony. That was
18 admitted in lieu of your testimony in chief by the Prosecution to save
19 some time.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
24 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Professor Djeric.
25 A. Good afternoon, Doctor.
1 Q. Since we haven't got much time left today, I simply wanted to go
2 through a couple of general matters for the benefit of the Chamber.
3 First of all, do you agree that save for the fact that we may
4 have heard of each other, we hadn't known each other before the
5 multi-party system was introduced; that is to say, before the changes
6 made to our system?
7 A. That is correct. We did not know each other.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
9 be asked to approach the microphone.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, just a second.
11 Mr. Djeric, would you be kind to come closer to the microphone so
12 that the interpreters could hear you clearer.
13 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that following that period we did not
16 come -- become close personally, rather, we had fair business
18 A. Yes. We were on official terms.
19 Q. Thank you. Is it correct or do you recall that as part of the
20 SDS there was a cadre commission which, among others, proposed you to be
21 made part of the joint BiH government as part of the Serbian quota, and
22 the posts in question were won by the SDS at the elections?
23 A. I don't know that. I don't remember that. I don't know how the
24 commission worked. I only know that I arrived on your invitation, and I
25 came to see you as the party president. I never met any president of the
1 personnel commission. It was an internal party matter since I was not a
2 member of that party.
3 Q. Thank you. I am waiting for the interpretation, and could you
4 please do the same.
5 Do you know Mr. Rajko Dukic?
6 A. I did know Rajko Dukic, but it has nothing to do with this. I
7 knew Dukic as a company manager of the bauxite company from Milici.
8 Q. And you had known him long before the period in question;
10 A. Well, not long before, but somewhat before.
11 Q. If I told you that he was the president of the personnel
12 commission of the SDS, would you accept that?
13 A. I really don't remember that. I don't know what is there for me
14 to accept or not.
15 Q. Professor Djeric, I'm trying to establish the following: How
16 come that you, who were not a member of the SDS, were proposed to me as a
17 member of the joint government, and I called you to a meeting to see you,
18 whereupon I agreed with that proposal? Did you know that I could reject
19 the proposals of the personnel commission but provided I had sound
20 reasons to do so?
21 A. I don't know about that. I wasn't familiar with the personnel
22 policy of the party, and there's nothing I can say with that -- in that
24 JUDGE KWON: Both Mr. Karadzic and Professor Djeric, you are
25 speaking the same language that should be translated into the working
1 language of the UN, i.e., French and English. I would ask you to put a
2 pause between question and answer. Would you please bear that in mind in
3 the future.
4 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Is it correct, Professor Djeric, that you were nominated for the
8 position of development minister because of your theoretical knowledge
9 rather than due to your managerial competencies as you had not worked in
10 any company for a long time?
11 A. That is correct. When I came to see you, you agreed with the
12 proposal. In other words, you accepted me as a potential development
13 minister provided that the prime minister designate Jure Pelivan agreed.
14 Q. In your system could Jure Pelivan not agree provided he had firm
15 reasons to do so?
16 A. Well, you see, I'm not very familiar with it. You are much more
17 familiar with it as the party president and the people who were members
18 of the parties which created the system.
19 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that then, as today, we held
20 Professor Aleksa Milojevic in high regard?
21 A. You did much more than the rest, you and Momcilo Krajisnik.
22 Q. Is it correct that in the RS government, Professor Milojevic was
23 given the mandate that you assumed in the joint government of
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. Do you agree in terms of that analogy that such mandates are
2 given to experts who are held in high esteem?
3 A. I don't know what was the influence of that particular factor,
4 and what exactly was the importance of Mr. Milojevic's ties with the RS
5 leadership, and especially with Mr. Krajisnik. So I have to speak openly
6 and clearly. That's why I say that.
7 Q. Did you have any ties with me when you were nominated minister in
8 the joint government and later on prime minister?
9 A. I did not. There were no personal ties or friendly ties or any
10 other ties save for the official ones.
11 Q. Thank you. If you try to recall the composition of the Serb
12 component in the joint government, would you agree that save for
13 Velibor Ostojic and perhaps an assistant minister or two, the rest were
14 not members of the SDS? Or perhaps I should assist you? Ranko Pejic or
15 Ranko Nikolic who was the justice minister in the previous system as
16 well. Then Ranko Pejic and Momcilo Pejic were the officials in the
17 previous system, Professor Nadezhdin [phoen] was an eminent professor at
18 the school of veterinary sciences but was not a member of the SDS. Do
19 you agree that the personnel commission proposed experts to me
20 irrespective of their party affiliation?
21 A. There's nothing I can say in that regard. I don't know who
22 proposed people to you. The only thing I can confirm is that most of
23 that cadre was outside the SDS. They were intellectuals, so to say. The
24 mechanism of making proposals is something I wasn't privy to. It was a
25 party matter, and I could not observe it directly.
1 Q. Thank you. I won't go into the proposal mechanisms then.
2 Do you agree that the deputy prime minister was Miodrag Simovic,
3 who was also not an SDS member, and he had been an official in the
4 previous system?
5 A. I don't know whether he was an SDS official, but I do know that
6 he was a deputy prime minister and that he had been an official in the
7 previous political system.
8 Q. Thank you. If I told you that Mr. Velibor Ostojic, who passed
9 away in the meantime, was one of the founders of the SDS and had a
10 membership card with the number 2, while mine had the number 1, would you
11 agree that in such party systems it would have been more logical for
12 Ostojic to act as a deputy prime minister rather than Mr. Simovic?
13 A. I can agree with that. That was the practice of -- in such
15 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that it was customary for a party leader
16 to be nominated or run for president or prime minister, and in
17 parliamentary systems, he always ran for prime minister. Is that
19 A. Yes, there is such practice.
20 Q. Do you agree that in 1990 I did not run for any position, and if
21 you could observe that, I suggested other party leaders in various
22 municipalities not to run for positions but to work for the party alone?
23 A. I know that you did not run at the time. These are facts that
24 can easily be confirmed or verified.
25 Q. Thank you. Were you witness to the initial agreement of the
1 three parties in power and the increase of tensions until the system
2 caved in or broke down?
3 A. Your question is not clear to me. Was I witness to what? I
4 followed it from a distance, but I wasn't in the focus of negotiations,
5 talks, or anything like that. I wasn't close to the centre. I could
6 simply follow things from outside, but I wasn't in the middle of such
7 talks or arguments. There's nothing I can say about that. I wasn't a
8 direct participant.
9 Q. Thank you. It is understood that you were not in the political
10 part of the government but, rather, in the expert part. However, during
11 government sessions, could you observe that for a while there was a good
12 working relationship and that later on it deteriorated?
13 A. That is correct, and it can be checked in documents and explained
14 by many facts, one I which would be the fact that the ministers in the
15 joint government, some ministers, worked alongside me and creating a
16 government programme. A programme was created and accepted by all
17 institutions as a sound one. It was a development programme for the
18 entire country. It was accepted and approved as a solid document, and it
19 couldn't have been solid without good co-operation and a good working
20 atmosphere of everyone involved in terms of further development of the
21 country, and I use that to illustrate my previous statement.
22 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that that was the reason why the SDS
23 proposed you for the government, so that you could work on the future
24 development of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
25 A. Well, I suppose as much. That is my assumption, and I believe it
1 was the only argument in my favour, in the favour -- in favour of my
2 nomination, as I have stated before.
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do we agree then that all three parties approached the change of
7 system, not only of regime but of system, of the system of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina in good faith and that that was another reason why we
9 nominated experts to the government rather than party men? We acted in
10 good faith, hoping that Bosnia-Herzegovina would survive and that the
11 socialist system should be changed in favour of a multi-party system,
12 including its economic basis?
13 A. I agree, and I would say that there is a number of arguments that
14 corroborate it.
15 Q. Thank you, Professor.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, you are probably
17 thinking it is time; correct?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Before we rise, Mr. Robinson, just I was
19 wondering if the Defence is also minded to file a response to the second
20 motion, Prosecution motion for the admission of -- a bar table motion for
21 the admission of intercepts?
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, and I'm happy to let you know
23 that that will be filed tomorrow.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 Mr. Djeric, we will adjourn for today and resume tomorrow at
1 9.00, but could I advise you that as a witness you are not supposed to
2 discuss with anybody else about your testimony. Do you understand that,
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I already know that,
5 actually, from what happened before, but it is by no means superfluous to
6 say is once again.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.00 p.m.,
11 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 24th day
12 of April, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.