Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 29035

 1                           Thursday, 18 October 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Before entering the courtroom, I was told by the Registrar that

 8     today marks the 300th trial day.

 9             Well, before we begin today the Chamber would like to deal with

10     one pending matter.  On the 11th of October, 2012, the Registrar issued a

11     decision on the accused's indigency in which he determined that the

12     accused should financially contribute to his own defence.  On the

13     15th of October, 2012, the accused filed a request for an extension of

14     time, namely, until 26th of November, 2012, in which to file an

15     application for a review of the Registrar's decision.

16             In support of this request, the accused argues that the extension

17     is needed because the issues involved in the review are complex, his

18     defence case has commenced, and he is presently litigating a number of

19     issues before the Appeals Chamber.  The accused also seeks access to a

20     confidential and ex parte decision from another case because it is

21     referred to in footnotes 40 and 58 of the confidential and ex parte

22     appendix 2 to the Registrar's decision.  The Chamber notes that in

23     footnote 40 of that appendix, the Registrar expresses willingness to

24     disclose the said decision if ordered to do so by the Chamber.  The

25     Chamber also notes that on the 15th of October, 2012, the Prosecution

Page 29036

 1     informed the Chamber and the accused via e-mail that it did not intend to

 2     file a response to the accused's request.

 3             Having considered the accused's request, the Chamber has decided

 4     to grant the extension of time sought; thus the accused shall file his

 5     application for a review of the Registrar's decision by no later than

 6     26th November 2012.  The Chamber also orders the Registry to provide the

 7     accused with the confidential and ex parte decision referred to in

 8     footnotes 40 and 58 of the confidential and ex parte appendix 2 to the

 9     Registrar's decision.

10             Further, there is one matter I would like to clarify with the

11     accused in relation to the associated exhibit with Mr. Kovacevic's

12     evidence.  One of the items was noted as 1D2337 in his notification, but,

13     actually, if we look at the paragraph 49 of the Statute [sic] it refers

14     to 1D8452.  But the trouble is that the 1D8452 does not appear on

15     e-court, and I'm not sure the correct document may be 1D2337.  So in the

16     meantime if the Defence could check it out.

17             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

18             Oh, I'm sorry, I forgot to give the witness a warning we

19     discussed.

20             General Kovacevic, before you start giving evidence, I would like

21     to draw your attention to a particular rule here at the

22     Yugoslav Tribunal.  Under this rule, Rule 90(E), you may object to

23     answering a question from the Prosecution or the accused or from the

24     Judges if you believe that your answer will incriminate you.  When I say

25     "incriminate," I mean that something you say may amount to an admission

Page 29037

 1     of your guilt for a criminal offence or could provide evidence that you

 2     have committed an offence.  However, even if you think your answer will

 3     incriminate you and you do not wish to answer the question, the Tribunal

 4     has the discretion to oblige you to answer the question.  But in such a

 5     case, the Tribunal will make sure that your testimony compelled in such a

 6     way shall not be used as evidence in other case against you for any

 7     offence other than false testimony.

 8             General, do you understand what I have just told you?

 9             THE WITNESS:  [No interpretation]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Have you heard the translation?  Has the microphone

11     been activated?  Yes, could you repeat your answer.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

16                           WITNESS:  BLAGOJE KOVACEVIC [Resumed]

17                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

18                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

19        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Kovacevic.

20        A.   [In English] Good morning.

21        Q.   Listening to Dr. Karadzic read a summary of your evidence

22     yesterday, I was struck by a couple of things I wanted to clear up with

23     you, kind of preliminary things, before we begin, if that's okay.  First,

24     when you met with me a couple of days ago - and thank you for that - you

25     clarified your present occupation and said that you were actually at this

Page 29038

 1     time working with the Federal Ministry of Defence as an advisor in

 2     education and training; is that correct?

 3        A.   [Interpretation] Yes, it is.

 4        Q.   How does that make you an active officer within the armed forces

 5     of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 6        A.   Some of the personnel of the armed forces are also employees of

 7     the Ministry of Defence.

 8        Q.   And your rank is actually brigadier, not brigadier-general; is

 9     that correct?

10        A.   I did say that I was a brigadier.  That is actually the highest

11     rank for the officers that we have.

12        Q.   And also in reading out a summary of your evidence, Dr. Karadzic

13     said this, he said:

14             "Passage of humanitarian convoys was completely unhindered by

15     Serb forces."

16             And then I looked at paragraph 39 of your statement, I saw that

17     you really hadn't said that but what you said on the subject of

18     humanitarian aid was pretty specific.  So just to avoid any wrong

19     impressions, I thought I would read to you what you said at paragraph 39.

20     You said:

21             "At Grbavica there was a passage through which humanitarian

22     relief convoys passed, and I know that Adra, which was a Muslim

23     humanitarian organisation, and Caritas, which was a Croatian organisation

24     crossed over to the other side of town unhindered via the bridge near the

25     school of economics."

Page 29039

 1             So you were actually referring to passage at a specific location

 2     of two specific charities into Grbavica and nothing wider than that;

 3     correct?

 4        A.   That's correct, yes.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  And now just one more sort of preliminary thing.  The

 6     summary of your evidence referred to something called the 110th Brigade

 7     of the ABiH 1st Corps, which you said in your statement at paragraph 18

 8     was commanded by Dusan Topalovic.  But given your position at the time of

 9     the conflict and what you said you knew about Muslim units in Sarajevo,

10     you must have known that there was never actually any 110th Brigade in

11     Sarajevo and Topalovic's brigade was called the 10th Mountain Brigade;

12     isn't that right?

13        A.   There may have been a mistake in the transcript.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the designation

15     of the unit.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that Dusan Topalovic was its

17     commander.

18             MS. EDGERTON:

19        Q.   I'm sorry, but I think the interpreters didn't hear the first

20     part of what you said about the unit, the designation of the unit.  Could

21     you just repeat that for them.

22        A.   There may have been a mistake in the transcript.  The 1st Corps,

23     the 1st Brigade, was 1.0, which means 10, the 10th Mountain Brigade.  I

24     know that for a fact and I know that Dusan Topalovic, Caco, was its

25     commander.

Page 29040

 1        Q.   Thank you.  That was just to clarify the designation of the

 2     brigade as it appeared in your statement.  And Topalovic was killed and

 3     his unit was eliminated in October 1993; correct?

 4        A.   The unit was not eliminated.  The unit was reformed, reorganised

 5     in a way.  However, in its essence it remained the same.

 6        Q.   And was Topalovic killed in October 1993?

 7        A.   I heard that.  I learned that from the media.  I can't claim that

 8     he was.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Now, just to focus on your time in the

10     1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade for a while, you said you were chief of

11     operations and training in that brigade.  What does that mean?  What was

12     your job there?

13        A.   At that time my job was to organise the training of the units of

14     the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade.

15        Q.   And what does the chief of operations do?

16        A.   A brigade does not have the chief of operations.  Operations and

17     training are one and the same; they are unified.

18        Q.   So who planned operations within the brigade?

19        A.   The brigade staff plans operations.

20        Q.   Now, I remember you told me a couple of days ago that you were

21     number three in the brigade.  Does that mean that you were part of the

22     brigade staff?

23        A.   Yes, I was a staff member.

24        Q.   So you were involved in the planning of brigade operations?

25        A.   Yes, I was, indeed.

Page 29041

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Now, just to move on to some of the areas of tactical

 2     responsibility of your brigade, I'd just like to give you a couple of

 3     landmark locations and have you confirm whether or not those were within

 4     your brigade's area of responsibility.  And the first location I'd like

 5     to ask you about is the Orthodox church at Veljine.  Was that within the

 6     area of tactical responsibility of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade?

 7        A.   I'm not familiar with the term Veljine.  Do you mean Veljine

 8     church?  It was in the zone of responsibility of the

 9     1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade.

10        Q.   Yes, that's the -- that's the church I mean.  Thank you.  How

11     about the Slavisa Vajner-Cica barracks at Lukavica?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   The length of Ozrenska Street?

14        A.   Ozrenska, Ulica is much longer.  So one part of the street was

15     under the control of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade, but the other

16     part wasn't.

17        Q.   How about the skyscrapers at what's now Grbavicka Street, that

18     would be skyscrapers in particular at number 6, 6A, and number 8.

19        A.   I'm not familiar with their numbers, the numbers of the

20     skyscrapers, but I'm familiar with the names of the streets.  One was

21     Milutina Djuraskovica Street and there was a skyscraper there on the

22     left-hand side and it was in the zone of responsibility of the

23     1st Brigade.

24        Q.   Maybe I can show you a picture because it's easier sometimes to

25     see pictures.  We don't know the addresses always of these buildings.

Page 29042

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I have 65 ter 23858, please.

 2        Q.   These skyscrapers, Brigadier, were they in your area of

 3     responsibility?

 4        A.   Is this on the left bank of the Miljacka river?

 5        Q.   It's on the south bank of the Miljacka river.

 6        A.   My zone of responsibility was not there so I don't know whether

 7     those facilities were occupied were not.  They could have also been some

 8     sort of interspace between various units.

 9        Q.   These are within your brigade, Brigadier, and these are the

10     skyscrapers at Grbavicka 6 , 6A, 8, and 8A.  Were they in your brigade's

11     area of responsibility?

12        A.   In that case, yes, they were.  If they are on the left bank of

13     the Miljacka river, then, yes, they were.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  We don't need that picture anymore.

16        Q.   The Vrace monument, was that in your area of responsibility?

17        A.   Yes, it was.

18        Q.   Osmice?

19        A.   If you are referring only to the bed and breakfast facility

20     Osmice, then yes, but not the entire Osmice.

21        Q.   The bed and breakfast facility, yes, thank you.  Zlatiste?

22        A.   Zlatiste is also a feature which also featured a tower.  The

23     tower was in our hands, under our control, but Zlatiste as an area was

24     not, not an entire area.

25        Q.   And how far east did your brigade's area of responsibility go?

Page 29043

 1        A.   It's very difficult to talk about the area of responsibility.  It

 2     is, indeed, a military term; however, our units were undermanned so in

 3     effect they had no depth.  So instead of talking about zones of

 4     responsibility, you should rather talk about front lines.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask to clarify something in

 6     the transcript.  In the transcript it says that "they didn't go

 7     in-depth," whereas the general, or rather, the brigadier said that they

 8     did not have the necessary depth and I think that there is a major

 9     difference there.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That will be clarified by the CLSS later

11     on.

12             Let's continue.

13             MS. EDGERTON:

14        Q.   Taking onboard your comment, can you tell me how far to the east

15     the area or zone or line held by your brigade extended?

16        A.   The average depth of defence for the brigade was conditional upon

17     the deployment of the units in the zone.  The command post and the

18     artillery positions were in-depth, about 2 to 3 kilometres, not more than

19     that.

20        Q.   I keep asking you about east and you keep telling me about depth.

21     I wonder if we have a problem understanding one another?

22        A.   Looking from the point of view, the 1st Sarajevo Brigade was

23     eastwards from Sarajevo.

24        Q.   Did it go as far as --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

Page 29044

 1             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that Brigadier Kovacevic

 3     said that it didn't occupy the area east of Sarajevo.  I believe that his

 4     answer was negative rather than positive, and that may have an impact on

 5     the further course of Madam Edgerton's cross-examination.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 7             Shall I ask the witness to repeat his answer?

 8             Yes, Mr. Kovacevic.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 1st Sarajevo Brigade did not

10     have a front line facing Sarajevo from the east.  It was rather from the

11     south.  That was part of the front line.  The front line, however, was

12     fragmented, so you cannot really say that it was in the east or in the

13     west.  It would be impossible to state that.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

15             MS. EDGERTON:

16        Q.   I'll just leave that and come back to that later.  Thank you.

17     Brigadier, your brigade, let's talk more about your brigade and its units

18     and its battalions, your brigade had among its battalions a mixed

19     artillery battalion and an anti-aircraft battalion; correct?

20        A.   Correct, yes.

21        Q.   Where was the command post of the mixed artillery battalion?

22        A.   It was in Tilava.  And to be more precise, it was in Uzdojnice.

23        Q.   Were those the firing points or the firing positions of that

24     battalion or were there additional positions?

25        A.   Everything was there, the basic positions, the reserve positions.

Page 29045

 1     In other words, the unit spent the entire war there.

 2        Q.   And what heavy weapons did it have at those locations?

 3        A.   What do you mean when you say "heavy weapons"?  It was a standard

 4     type of unit.

 5        Q.   If I was to be more precise perhaps I could say:  What heavy

 6     weapons of 120 millimetres and above did it have at those locations?

 7        A.   I know that it had a 122-millimetre howitzer battery,

 8     155-millimetre battery, and VBR Plamen battery 128-millimetre.

 9        Q.   How many weapons form a battery?

10        A.   In principle, between four to eight pieces, but not necessarily.

11     Depends largely on any given situation.

12        Q.   And what's a Plamen?

13        A.   This is the small multi-rocket launcher used for closer-range

14     fire.

15        Q.   And were there any 120-millimetre mortars also located with the

16     mixed artillery battalion at these locations?

17        A.   In a mixed artillery battalion there were no 120-millimetre

18     mortars.  However, I know that there was an agreement on the

19     concentration and control of weapons, and according to that agreement

20     that type of weaponry was transferred from all infantry battalions to

21     that particular battalion.  All that time at the command post of that

22     battalion there was an observer mission of the United Nations.  I

23     remember Sanja Zverovic [phoen] who was their permanent interpreter.  The

24     rest of the staff changed.  I must also add to this that due to frequent

25     incidents in Sarajevo very often it was insisted upon UNPROFOR to confirm

Page 29046

 1     whether fire was opened or whether it wasn't opened.  The log-book that

 2     was kept at that command post would be very good material for this type

 3     of exercise.

 4        Q.   We'll come back to this in more detail, but when you just

 5     referred to a log-book do you mean an artillery log-book?

 6        A.   Each unit keeps its own record.  Here I was referring to the

 7     log-book kept by UNPROFOR observers in which they recorded each and every

 8     fire opened from any point and from any zone where they were.

 9        Q.   Oh, but I was referring to an artillery log-book.  Did the

10     brigade, since you know what kind of log-books seem to be kept there, did

11     the brigade keep an artillery log-book that noted each and every fire

12     from every point and what the results of that engagement of fire might

13     have been?

14        A.   A brigade keeps a field diary and it records the operations of

15     all units, not only artillery.  And the results achieved can only be

16     assumed.  You cannot enter into a log-book the impact of a specific

17     projectile.  The people simply wouldn't know that.

18        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  We'll leave that for the moment and just

19     continue on with the battalions in your brigade.  You confirmed you had

20     an anti-aircraft battalion, and where was that located?  Where was its

21     command post?

22        A.   The PVO battalion was practically pointless because in 1992 or

23     July of 1992, due to the hand-over of the airport to the United Nations,

24     in the area of the Sarajevo airport all PVO pieces of weaponry were

25     withdrawn by us from the area around the airport.  To all intents and

Page 29047

 1     purposes there was no effectively functional PVO artillery in Sarajevo,

 2     only some of the 20-millimetre guns or 30-millimetre guns served as

 3     anti-infantry weapons because it is possible to use them for that

 4     purpose.

 5        Q.   Thanks for that answer, but I actually asked you something

 6     completely different and that was where the headquarters was located.

 7        A.   In practical terms it did not operate at all.  It was attached to

 8     the artillery unit.  It existed there as a matter of formality, but it

 9     was not there practically.

10        Q.   And the 20- and 30-millimetre guns that were used as

11     anti-infantry weapons, where were they then deployed?

12        A.   They were deployed on the outer ring, as we used to call it,

13     around Sarajevo towards Trnovo, then some of them were in Praca towards

14     Gorazde.  Some of them were in Nisici, conditionally speaking, facing

15     Olovo.  So these artillery pieces could be more effective in an open area

16     rather than in urban areas.  They cannot be used in urban areas.

17        Q.   So they were within the battalions?

18        A.   Yes, they were given to infantry battalions, that's right.

19        Q.   And you also had a tank battalion within the brigade; correct?

20        A.   Yes, there was an armoured battalion in the brigade.  It was

21     deployed, or rather, one company was deployed at the old airport called

22     Butmir, where now is situated the base of the European forces in

23     Sarajevo.  Another company was in Jahorinski Potok at Pale a little bit

24     further from Pale towards Praca.  And there was another company in

25     Trnovo.

Page 29048

 1        Q.   And how many tanks did the armoured battalion have?

 2        A.   In principle, three or four and 27 tanks, but in this specific

 3     instance that was not the case, there were fewer than that.

 4        Q.   And what kind were they, T55s?  T34s?

 5        A.   All the tanks were T55.

 6        Q.   All right.  I want to go on to another topic now and it's the

 7     topic of snipers, because in your statement you said, "There were no

 8     trained professional snipers in my unit."  And I'm actually not sure what

 9     we're supposed to understand for that.  And you use the word "unit" a lot

10     in your statement, so sometimes we can only guess what you're referring

11     to.  So here when you said that, did you mean to refer to your brigade or

12     your battalion or something else?

13        A.   When I spoke in my statement, you can make a clear distinction in

14     terms of what the unit was at the time when I was the chief of the

15     operations and training department in the brigade.  I was describing the

16     situation and what I was doing there at the time.  When I was the

17     battalion commander I described the situation pertaining to that

18     position, so I don't know what is it you don't understand so please can

19     you be more specific in your question.

20        Q.   Sure.  When you said there were no trained professional snipers

21     in my unit, were you referring to the battalion or the brigade?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we show the passage to the witness?

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Absolutely.  So it's paragraph 36 of P2331.  And

24     of course he'd need to see the version in his own language.

25             JUDGE KWON:  So could you read out the passage para 36 or -- yes,

Page 29049

 1     para 36 and for the benefit of the witness could you kindly read out that

 2     passage.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:

 4        Q.   Brigadier, in paragraph 36 you said:

 5             "There were no trained professional snipers in my unit.  The

 6     story about snipers in Sarajevo is unnecessary, if one knows and takes

 7     into account the fact that snipers fire at salient targets at greater

 8     distances.  At all positions in Sarajevo, and in particular my unit, fire

 9     could be opened by weapons of any type including shot-guns because the

10     distances are very small.  I had information that there existed snipers

11     in the units of the 1st ABH Corps ranged against us."

12             So by "unit" here, are you referring to the brigade or the

13     battalion?

14        A.   Here I was referring to the battalion because I spoke from that

15     position, but I can also tell you what is the case with the brigade

16     because I am familiar with that too since I was the person in charge of

17     training units.  I had never organised nor conducted any training of

18     snipers.  Snipers in units are selected on the basis of their physical

19     and psychological features and traits, based on their inclinations, and

20     they are subjected to special shooting training.  They are giving a

21     special VES, which is a military specialty recorded in their military

22     card, and I can categorically assert that in the 1st

23     Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade there were no such personnel.

24             When I said that it was unnecessary, you can see in the maps that

25     you have shown me that the separation lines were 20 to 50 metres on the

Page 29050

 1     average.  Any person who knows anything about weapons will understand

 2     that optical devices cannot be used at these ranges.  That all small

 3     infantry weapons can be used in such situations, that is true, and that

 4     from the military point of view setting up sniper fire is completed

 5     pointless.

 6        Q.   So when we talk about, for example, the group of snipers that

 7     were commanded by Nebojsa Ivkovic who operated in the area of the

 8     2nd Battalion, who are we talking about then?  Are we talking about

 9     specially trained snipers or are we talking about pretty good

10     sharpshooters who could fire at targets with small infantry weapons?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance with the

12     interpretation?  Sharpshooters are those who fire; that's how it's

13     translated in our language.  And that's not what the witness received in

14     terms of translation because this specific term is very rarely used.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Thank you.

16             Now can you answer the question?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can you please repeat the question

18     because of this.

19             MS. EDGERTON:

20        Q.   Sure.  In these buildings that we showed you the picture of

21     earlier on at Grbavicka Street, for example, there was a sniper unit that

22     was operational commanded by Nebojsa Ivkovic and others.  Now -- so when

23     we talk about that unit what type of shooter are we talking about, a

24     sniper or sharpshooters firing at targets with small infantry weapons?

25        A.   Nebojsa Ivkovic was never in the 3rd Infantry Battalion, never.

Page 29051

 1     I heard of this man towards the end of the war.  I saw him at Grbavica

 2     and I also don't think that he had any role in the 2nd Battalion either

 3     but I'm not sure of that.  I have to tell you that the

 4     1st Sarajevo Brigade had never issued such order because otherwise I as

 5     the commander of the battalion would have received it.  There were

 6     individuals, however, who wanted to portray themselves as being some sort

 7     of specialists in order to boost their image.  I suppose that's how he

 8     represented himself, but I don't know that in the 1st Sarajevo Brigade

 9     there was no organised sniper group, and, frankly speaking, I don't know

10     what the purpose would be of such a group.

11        Q.   Are you disputing that the brigade had firing positions in the

12     buildings on Grbavicka Street?

13        A.   No, I'm not disputing that they had firing positions.  However, I

14     dispute that they had sniper groups; that was not the case.  The brigade

15     did not organise such things.  I know that for sure and I'm positive,

16     otherwise I would have received an order to that effect.

17        Q.   For people in these firing positions, were they equipped with any

18     special arms that would help them carry out their mission?

19        A.   I know for sure exactly what kind of weapons were issued to

20     1st Sarajevo Brigade.  Not a single piece out of establishment or beyond

21     establishment was issued to the 1st Sarajevo Brigade.

22        Q.   Can you explain to us what we're supposed to understand when you

23     say "establishment," establishment weapons?

24        A.   Well, probably you had an opportunity to see how the units are

25     formed.  It is very exactly specified, the manpower, the weaponry, and

Page 29052

 1     how units are formed.  Brigades are not group kind of motley crew in

 2     which everyone does whatever they please.

 3        Q.   Maybe we can try again and I can help you with this by showing

 4     you a document.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Can we see 65 ter 23823, please.  And we should

 6     have it available in translation and the original language.  It's

 7     dated -- it's from Veljko Stojanovic, commander of the 1st Sarajevo

 8     Mechanised Brigade, dated 29 October 1993 to General Galic.  I think you

 9     need to collapse the text on the right-hand side of the page and give us

10     the original document.  Thank you.

11        Q.   So, Brigadier, this document is issued by your brigade's

12     commander, Stojanovic, responding to General Galic's order and informing

13     General Galic that the brigade possesses four M48 7.9-millimetre rifles

14     with optical sights; two 7.62-millimetre semi-automatic rifles with

15     optical sights; three M48 7.62-millimetre machine-guns with optical

16     sights; 12, 7.9-millimetre sniper rifles; ten M76 7.9-millimetre sniper

17     rifles; two 7.62-millimetre rifles with passive infrared sights; four

18     silencers; and four 7.62-millimetre rifle silencers.  And

19     Colonel Stojanovic says within your brigade they had no separate sniper

20     unit but had sniper guns among soldiers within the brigades and they were

21     active when they were at the front lines.  So are these establishment

22     weapons?

23        A.   Yes.  May I comment on this?

24        Q.   Of course.

25        A.   The 1st Sarajevo Corps and the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade

Page 29053

 1     didn't have units only facing the city.  Only a few units were deployed

 2     there.  The majority of units were deployed in the manoeuvre area towards

 3     the outer ring.  And this is where this type of weapons is prominent and

 4     it is only natural for the commander to know whether all these weapons

 5     were provided.  So there is nothing special about it.  There was nothing

 6     extraordinary that was not regularly brought to these units.  The

 7     Croatian and the Muslim forces had identical weaponry.

 8        Q.   Are you saying that brigade units at the confrontation line in

 9     Sarajevo did not possess any of these weapons?

10        A.   Please.  An optical sight can be mounted on any kind of rifle,

11     including hunting rifles.  But each person having this kind of weapons

12     does not mean that this person is a sniper.  In that case you can say

13     that all hunters are snipers if you apply that logic.

14        Q.   Just talking about units deployed on the inner ring - just

15     talking about that for a moment - who used these weapons, what would

16     their mission be?

17        A.   I told you a moment ago at distances where the front part of the

18     1st Sarajevo Brigade was deployed in populated areas, these are places

19     where due to the closeness of the ranges it was impossible to use optical

20     devices.  I cannot explain maybe to the detail to you what urban

21     operations mean.

22        Q.   Units, the inner ring who used these weapons, who planned their

23     fire?

24        A.   There can be no planning on fire.  A soldier is either in a

25     trench or within a facility.  He's observing the area in front of him and

Page 29054

 1     whatever appears there that poses a danger he will open fire; if there's

 2     no danger, there's no need for that.

 3        Q.   What kind of reporting did these units have to make?  Did they

 4     have to report every kill?

 5        A.   The person who fires a shot, he doesn't know whether he made a

 6     kill or not.  So how can he send a report to that effect?  This is beyond

 7     comprehension.

 8        Q.   Are you saying that a person firing a rifle shot wouldn't see

 9     target impact?  I don't quite understand.

10        A.   I understand that you don't understand me because you were not in

11     this position.  A soldier on the line makes his own decision whether he

12     will shoot or not based on the risk assessment that he himself makes.  If

13     he were really in danger and if he waited to send a report and then wait

14     for an order to open fire, he would have been killed a hundred times in

15     the meantime.  So that is completely pointless and senseless.  Generally

16     speaking, when the chain of command is set up, an order is issued what

17     kind of regime fire is going to be applied.  And most often amongst our

18     ranks we had to wait because we were forced to prove that we were not the

19     ones who opened fire first but rather did it in self-defence.

20     Unfortunately, due to that we suffered losses.

21        Q.   Let's go on to -- thank you for that.  Let's go on to one other unit

22     within your battalion.  In your statement at paragraph 43 you talked about

23     volunteers in the ranks of your unit and by that - and since we're talking

24     about your battalion - are you -- do you mean to refer to Slavko Aleksic?

25        A.   I was not referring to him alone.  He was one of the volunteers.

Page 29055

 1  Actually, he was not a volunteer, he was the man who lived at the Jewish cemetery

 2  and he felt the need to portray himself as a Chetnik which was basically

 3  contrary to what he was actually doing because he had been mobilised, just like

 4  everybody else, in a regular procedure, and he was in that position.  I don’t

 5  think that his political orientation as a radical should be linked to what he

 6  was doing.  It has nothing to do with it.  Slavko Aleksic was not a member of

 7  the paramilitary.  You can check this and find evidence of it because, just

 8  like all the others, it can be found in the basic VOB8 book, including all

 9  the members of his unit.  It was no paramilitary.  They were people who for

10  political reasons portrayed themselves as Chetniks and radicals but were local

11  people.  There were volunteers from other countries among them as well.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There's an error in the transcript again.

13     It should say he represented himself as a Chetnik and a radical, not Chetnik

14     and volunteer.  And earlier the witness said he had not been a volunteer.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That’s right.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, very well.

17             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

19        Q.   Aleksic --

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness confirmed what I said

21     but it's not recorded in the transcript.

22             JUDGE KWON:  In any event, the -- CLSS will sort it out later on.

23             MS. EDGERTON:

24        Q.   Did Aleksic's unit have mortars?

25        A.   No.

Page 29056

 1        Q.   What kind of fire-arms did they have?

 2        A.   Infantry weapons without any large calibres, nothing larger than

 3     a light machine-gun or a machine-gun.

 4        Q.   Did they have sniper rifles?

 5        A.   Just like all other units.  That was called anti-armoured

 6     company.  They had hand-held launchers for anti-armour combatted and they

 7     had only rifles within that unit, nothing else.

 8        Q.   What were their mission?

 9        A.   Their exclusive and standing mission was not to allow passage

10     through the Jewish cemetery, and their defence line was the entry into

11     the Bosut barracks, which is on the edge of the Jewish cemetery, until

12     the roundabout road in Sarajevo.  That's where they started the war and

13     where they finished it, at the wall of the Jewish cemetery.

14        Q.   Who provided equipment and materiel to Aleksic's unit?  How did

15     they get their supplies?

16        A.   Aleksic got weapons just like all other units.  His was a regular

17     unit within the battalion and within the brigade.  It was a regular supply.

18     This was not a paramilitary unit.  In his unit, apart from local residents

19     of the local commune of Kovacici, practically the Jewish cemetery, there

20     were also a few volunteers.  Maybe that's the element that introduces the

21     confusion, but all units are supplied in the regular way, including his.

22        Q.   Does "the regular way" mean through the battalion command and

23     then to the brigade command?

24        A.   Yes.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  I'd like to go to another document, but before I

Page 29057

 1     do that, Your Honours, could I ask that the last one 65 ter 23823 be

 2     marked as a Prosecution exhibit, please.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P5930, Your Honours.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have a look now at 65 ter 23874.  It's a

 6     request from Slavko Aleksic.

 7        Q.   So, Brigadier, on the screen in front of you is a document from

 8     Slavko Aleksic's anti-tank company dated September 16, 1993, to you

 9     personally, asking for, among other things, 7.62 automatic rifles; ten

10     crates; 7.62 Brownings; incendiary bullets; a 7.9 sniper rifle; an

11     82-millimetre mortar; slow-burning fuses; TNT, and so forth.  Do you see

12     the document?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   So why did you say Aleksic's unit had no mortars?

15        A.   Well, he's requesting them.  He didn't have a mortar.  That

16     doesn't mean that the request was approved.

17        Q.   Well, it's directed to you.  Did you approve it or not?

18        A.   Let me tell you this, I had a constant problem because they were

19     not a permanent unit, not a permanent force.  They were just mobilised

20     and their military knowledge was not very good.  These people were

21     megalomaniacs.  They were afraid.  They wanted to have all sorts of

22     things in reserve.  But I was a man who knew these things and I never

23     approved this.  And this went on all the time.  I never approved any of

24     this.  They asked for planes.  This is a regular thing.  None of this was

25     approved because I couldn't approve that they get something that I didn't

Page 29058

 1     have.  I told you a moment ago that the supply to our units was very

 2     professional in the way it was done and it's in all our reports.  It's

 3     standard practice.  Nobody could by-pass the standard procedure.

 4        Q.   Brigadier, do you expect us to take seriously that they asked for

 5     airplanes?

 6        A.   What I'm saying is they also wanted air support.  I'm telling you

 7     this seriously.  He's thinking:  We'll be captured, killed.  They panic.

 8     And of course sometimes they were in danger but not that kind.  You have

 9     no idea about this, but I've lived through a lot of things.  These were

10     not professionally trained troops for warfare.  These were local

11     residents who were fearful.  The basic issue is:  Who will help me on the

12     line when I am in danger?  And I give them everything.

13        Q.   Now you also said in that same paragraph that these volunteers --

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Again there is an error in the

15     transcript.  The witness didn't say "I provided it all."  It was their

16     question and indeed the interpreter didn't understand this because it was

17     not clear from the witness.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  But Mr. Karadzic is saying the witness said

19     actually they said in their requests:  Give us everything.

20             JUDGE KWON:  There is a phonetic mark there which will be

21     clarified by the court reporters later on.

22             Thank you.  Let's move on.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  Could I have this document

24     65 ter 23874 as an exhibit, please.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 29059

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P5931, Your Honours.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:

 3        Q.   I want to go on to another topic and it's about something you

 4     said at paragraph 24 of your statement.  You said:

 5             "It was only in the Muslim mass media that I saw that the

 6     possible victims of combat between our units and adversary units of the

 7     1st BiH army corps had been civilians.  On our side we had such cases,

 8     notably on 6 January 1994 when the Muslims executed an attack on the

 9     Jewish cemetery and the Vrbanja bridge."

10             So just one more clarification, these civilian victims you're

11     mentioning here in this paragraph, you mean to refer to victims in

12     Bosnian-held territory; right?

13        A.   No.  In the first part when I said that I got information from

14     the media about losses on the Muslim side - and I'm saying the same thing

15     now - I didn't know what was going on in Sarajevo and whether it was

16     really so.  I watched that on television.  But since I know how a media

17     war is conducted - and this time the enemy side did not hide it, they

18     openly announced it - I knew that many incidents were rigged but that was

19     all I knew.  I didn't know anything else.  The only other way was to find

20     out from people who crossed over to our side from defectors and they

21     would tell us what had happened there.  How truthful that was only they

22     know; I myself wasn't there.  And this case on the 6th of June

23     [as interpreted], 1994, that I mentioned on our side was just to

24     illustrate.  Whenever there are combat operations in a populated area,

25     considering that the civilians lived practically along the lines, not far

Page 29060

 1     behind the lines, civilians suffer much more than troops.  Civilians find

 2     it harder to get under cover and they suffer disproportionally.  That was

 3     just one case and there were many of them during the war.

 4        Q.   I actually just want to make a transcript correction or a

 5     clarification.  You referred to a case on 6 June 1994.  Did you mean to

 6     refer to the case on 6 January 1994 that you mentioned in your statement?

 7        A.   January.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now you just said you didn't know what was going on

 9     in Sarajevo and whether it was really so.  And I wonder if by saying

10     that, do you mean to say that you had no forward observation of anything

11     that was going on in the city?

12        A.   In Sarajevo, an urban area, that is impossible.  There is no room

13     to organise any such thing ahead of the lines.

14        Q.   So you had no forward observation of any targets you might be

15     seeking to engage?

16        A.   Only what can be seen from the line at a distance of 20 metres.

17        Q.   But, Brigadier, you've said in your statement that you took

18     measures to avoid collateral damage when determining whether or not to

19     engage a target.  How does -- how can you say you do that when you have

20     no forward observation of your targets?

21        A.   Quite simply.  My unit which is in contact cannot put anything

22     ahead of them, nothing forward, because 20 metres ahead they would be

23     already in Muslim territory.  That's impossible.  Considering that it's a

24     city, you see the street, you cannot see through buildings.  A rifle

25     cannot shoot through a building.  It can shoot through passages, along

Page 29061

 1     the street, and that's it.  A hand-grenade can be thrown outside a

 2     building.  You can set a mine in front of a trench, and that's it.

 3        Q.   So if you fired your weapons with no forward observation, I'm

 4     actually really curious about what measures you did take to avoid

 5     collateral damage.

 6        A.   You are asking an impossible answer.  The separation line, I

 7     repeat, is on average 20 to 50 metres.  The interval, the space in

 8     between in urban areas are houses.  You cannot see through houses.  You

 9     can only see through streets leading to some area.  You can only see if

10     one house is much taller than the others, but not far ahead.  And to

11     claim that somebody could see from Grbavica what was going on in

12     Bascarsija, that person is crazy; or even 100 metres ahead across the

13     Miljacka river, that's impossible.  It can't be seen.  You can't see that

14     sort of thing in a city.  Get out of this building into the street and

15     look around, you can only see the street.  You can't see behind the next

16     building.  And what need is there to guide infantry shooters?  They can

17     see for themselves.  Not every bullet hits the target.  There are also

18     ricochets, there are misses, et cetera.

19        Q.   I actually think I'm not asking for an impossible answer because

20     you said in your statement at paragraph 32, and I'll read it to you:

21             "When executing combat actions and opening fire at military

22     targets located at civilian zones, we took measures to reduce collateral

23     civilian damage."

24             And then you gave one example, one example.  So I'm actually

25     asking you for some other examples.

Page 29062

 1        A.   Quite simply - and that's true - the order not to open fire

 2     without need avoids unnecessary casualties, that's one; two, to shoot at

 3     a target which is a threat, not to shoot any-old-how, that's another

 4     measure; refraining from senselessly open fire when there is no reason.

 5     Those are the measures.  Those are simple things, nothing spectacular,

 6     nothing special.  Those are normal things.  We were not philosophers

 7     there to create some odd conditions.  Those are the things you are able

 8     to do in a situation like that.  It's more like appealing to the

 9     conscience of the soldier in the trench, to be composed, to be smart, to

10     protect himself without endangering unnecessarily others.

11        Q.   So can we understand from that that it was up to the soldier

12     himself to judge the threat and whatever danger he might be facing in

13     determining whether he was going to respond and how he was going to

14     respond?  Is that what you're saying?

15        A.   Please.  The soldier in the trench, if he were to wait for

16     somebody else to make the decision whether he's going to defend himself

17     or not would have never been able to defend himself.  It is natural that

18     the enemy will catch you out in any moment of inattention to incur

19     losses, to inflict losses.  Everything else is a lie and an illusion.

20     Nobody else but the person in the trench who is in danger has to make

21     that decision.  But he doesn't decide whether there will be combat or

22     not.  That's why there is a command.  He only decides about himself.  The

23     squad commander decides about the squad, the platoon commander decides

24     about the platoon, and so on.  That's why we have hierarchy.  That's why

25     we have organisation.  We must admit that this works better where we have

Page 29063

 1     professional trained units.  Where the men are not so well trained, it

 2     works less well, there are more mistakes, and we can talk about the

 3     quality of units.  That's what makes a difference between them, whether

 4     they're trained or not, whether the personnel in the trenches is able as

 5     a unit or as a group to execute a mission or not.  That's how we have to

 6     evaluate them.

 7        Q.   How about -- you talked about the soldier in the trench.  How

 8     about the soldier who fires the 60- or 82-millimetre mortar, is it up to

 9     him to decide when he should fire and what might be the appropriate

10     response to the threat?

11        A.   That's not the same thing.  A mortar is a collective weapon.  In

12     the army there are weapons handled by individuals and weapons operated by

13     crews including artillery weapons.  Artillery weapons cannot be used

14     without the order of the commander, such are mortars and artillery

15     weapons.  That's how they are different from a personal weapon.  A

16     personal weapon is issued to a soldier and he decides on how to use it.

17     Collective weapons are issued to a unit and the commander decides how

18     they are used.  An individual cannot decide without the commander how to

19     use a mortar.

20        Q.   So -- but in your statement at paragraphs 23 and 28 you said,

21     effectively, it had been ordered from the SRK command that fire was to be

22     opened only if lives were directly threatened.

23             So did that apply only to the soldier in the trenches or the

24     soldier with the infantry weapon, or did it also apply to the soldiers

25     handling the mortars?

Page 29064

 1        A.   If a corps commander issues such an order - because you mentioned

 2     the corps commander - then he obviously has information that it is a

 3     larger operation and the area of responsibility of the corps is under

 4     threat; then all resources are put into operation.  Any commander who

 5     makes the decision probably has information about what's going on ahead

 6     of him, so all people are put at readiness.  But placing them at

 7     readiness does not mean that they go into action.  Action starts only

 8     when the order comes from the command.

 9        Q.   I'll read to you what you said in paragraph 23.  You said:

10             "It had been ordered many times from all SRK command levels that

11     fire was to be opened only if lives were directly threatened and then

12     only at targets endangering the security of the unit."

13             So then if I was to read that I would think that whoever fired

14     the weapon was left to decide when they should fire and what might be the

15     appropriate response; isn't that correct?

16        A.   This is about placing a unit at readiness in expectation of some

17     action.  They are placed at readiness.  I said a moment ago, a soldier

18     looks around him.  It's a narrow belt, 20 to 50 metres, not more, as far

19     as a soldier can see and he doesn't have to see much farther.  And in

20     that narrow area he will certainly be able to make a decision if he is in

21     danger.  He will report if he has time; if he doesn't have time to

22     report, he will of course defend himself.  But collective weapons act

23     only upon an observed target upon orders.  If that soldier in the trench

24     sees a group ahead of him, he reports it and then the command decides how

25     to take action, whether to open fire, and how to open fire.

Page 29065

 1        Q.   But you've just said, and I've pressed you on that point --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, shall we move on?

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, thank you.

 4        Q.   In your statement you said at paragraph 44:

 5             "It was frequently the case that fire would be opened from mobile

 6     mortars located near civilian buildings like the hospital compound, the

 7     Presidency, and the TV building to provoke a reaction from the Serbian

 8     side."

 9             About these mobile mortars, what routinely were the size of those

10     mortars?

11        A.   I worked in the school centre Marsal Tito before the war.  In the

12     school centre Marsal Tito there were collective weapons for the training

13     of recruits, among them a large number of 60-millimetre mortars,

14     82-millimetres, and 120-millimetres.  There were also other weapons,

15     tanks, T55 armoured personnel carriers, recoilless guns and other guns --

16        Q.   Brigadier, Brigadier, I asked you about the size of the mobile

17     mortars you spoke about in paragraph 44.  I didn't ask you anything about

18     the Marsal Tito stocks.

19        A.   Part of the assets were taken from the Marsal Tito and mounted on

20     trucks.  On each truck you can place a platform for a mortar that can

21     then fire successfully.  You fire one or two shells and then the truck

22     moves.  Those are the tactics of creating an image that there is a large

23     number of mortars, sowing panic and confusion.  But most often fire is

24     opened suddenly and the first projectiles kill the most people before the

25     others flee.  Since in Sarajevo, especially in the neighbourhood of

Page 29066

 1     Grbavica, there was a tunnel --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kovacevic, that was a sufficient answer.  She

 3     asked about the size of the mobile mortar.

 4             Shall we take a break now, Ms. Edgerton?

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  How much long longer would you need for your

 7     cross-examination?

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  No more than one session and possibly less.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             We'll break for 30 minutes.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton, please continue.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

15        Q.   Brigadier, we left on the subject of mobile mortars and I just

16     want to stay with that subject for a little while more because in your

17     evidence today you said that collective weapons acted only on an observed

18     target or orders.  So from this can we take that any response to a report

19     that a mobile mortar had fired would be ordered by a command level?

20        A.   When it comes to the fire opened on such targets, there has to be

21     information as to where from such fire was opened.  Secondly, there were

22     duty crews on the weaponry in all of our units and they could easily

23     observe.  If fire was not returned immediately, then any further attempt

24     to that effect became pointless because the target, being a mobile

25     mortar, the main objective was to damage such a target, move the area --

Page 29067

 1     move from the area rapidly, and provoke the enemy's side response.

 2     Things were done so that fire was opened and targeted the area in front

 3     of such facilities that had to be protected.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to intervene.  From line 17

 5     onwards the message of the witness's answer has not been conveyed

 6     properly.  Line 17 [In English] "... the target, being a mobile ..."

 7     [Interpretation] It was not target but [In English] mobile mortar to

 8     damage the other side and the sense to respond was while it was there.

 9     So, please, from 17 to 21.  It is not catched what the witness meant.

10             JUDGE KWON:  It's difficult to follow what you said at the moment

11     and it's also distracting.  If you have some translation issue, you could

12     intervene later on.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The meaning is completely lost, the

14     entire passage consisting of four or five lines.  And as we read the

15     transcript the meaning of the witness's answer is completely wrong.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Instead of me intervening, could you repeat your

17     question, having heard Mr. Karadzic's intervention?

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Perhaps I could try it in a different way.

19        Q.   Did you or your superiors sign-off on the engagement of every

20     response to mobile mortar fire?

21        A.   You don't respond by signing anything off.  I said that all

22     units, including artillery units, had some of the weaponry and hardware

23     on standby which can react almost immediately.  In professional terms,

24     this is called permanent measures of combat-readiness and those measures

25     are in place in every unit.  When you observe a mobile mortar and when

Page 29068

 1     you observe fire being launched from a mobile mortar, as soon as the

 2     report is sent that a mobile mortar opened fire, a duty officer who

 3     doesn't necessarily have to be the commander -- so the duty officer can

 4     order the use of an appropriate piece of weaponry that can adequately

 5     react to that mobile mortar fire.

 6             I have to tell you when it come to Zlatiste, my zone of

 7     responsibility, and when it comes to Osmice, the view of Sarajevo from

 8     those two areas is fantastic and we did not even need any optical sights

 9     to observe any such movements or activities.  And why did I mention the

10     military hospital?  Because it was in Marin Dvor, immediately behind the

11     front line, behind the military hospital through the tunnel, through

12     Gorice, is where traffic used to run before the war.  And during the war

13     that was exclusively used as shelter for such hardware for the tank that

14     was there all the time and opened fire on our positions, for example, in

15     Trebevic.

16        Q.   Now, Brigadier, that's interesting --

17             THE ACCUSED:  May I just -- lines 8 [Interpretation] On line 8

18     "Grbavica" is missing as an urban part and the witness mentioned both

19     Trebevic and Grbavica.

20             MS. EDGERTON:

21        Q.   Now, Brigadier, that additional information is interesting, but

22     to go back to the question I asked you it was about whether this process

23     you've described for approval of engagement of a target had to be

24     followed in the case of every response to a mobile mortar, and I take

25     from your answer that the answer is sometimes but not always; is that

Page 29069

 1     correct?

 2        A.   Always.  However, you failed to notice that I'm talking about the

 3     chain of command and I said that there were officers on duty as well as

 4     hardware on duty.  It doesn't have to be the commander who approves that.

 5     It can be the duty officer who is always there, always on duty.

 6        Q.   And how -- what kind of measures would you take, since these

 7     mobile mortars you've described would be located near civilian buildings,

 8     what kind of measures would you take in your response to protect against

 9     collateral damage?

10        A.   I have to tell you that wherever the mortar is, wherever it is

11     it's a legitimate target according to the international rule of war.

12     Whoever opens fire from a building, irrespective of who the inhabitants

13     are, whether they are civilians or not, this is a legitimate military

14     target.  They mustn't do that; still, they did it, in order to provoke a

15     response and then the deaths of civilians would be represented as

16     torturising the civilians of Sarajevo.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the last part

18     of his answer.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kovacevic, could you repeat your last part of

20     your answer.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I repeat.  The weaponry would be

22     placed near facilities such as hospitals and buildings inhabited by

23     civilians.  Fire would be opened from there in order to provoke a

24     response by the VRS.  When such a response was provoked, there were

25     indeed collateral casualties and damage.  And then in reports the deaths

Page 29070

 1     of civilians would be represented as purposeful sniping, terrorising, and

 2     shelling of the citizens of Sarajevo.  And I repeat, according to the

 3     rules of war every target from which fire is opened is a legitimate

 4     military target, irrespective of what it contains; what's in that

 5     building, for example.  If fire is opened from that building, it becomes

 6     a legitimate military target.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Now, Mr. Kovacevic, could you kindly and carefully

 8     listen to the question and try to answer that question.  The question was

 9     not whether mobile mortars were legitimate targets or not.  In your

10     statement, para 32, you stated that when executing combat actions and

11     opening fire at military targets located in civilian zones, you said:

12             "We took measures to reduce collateral civilian damages."

13             So Ms. Edgerton's question was whether -- what kind of measures

14     did you take when responding to such mobile mortars?  It sounds as if you

15     didn't take any measures.  What is your answer?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said it a while ago.  Measures

17     were as follows:  Nobody could open fire without an order issued either

18     by the duty officer or the unit commander, and that's a full measure

19     because the unit commander did not fire blindly.  First elements had to

20     be calculated.  Everything had to be put in order for a specific target

21     to be hit and not the entire area, and that's the most important measure

22     that protects from collateral damage.  Second of all, it was up to the

23     commander to decide whether to respond because fire was not always

24     returned, it was returned only when the lives of the people were at risk,

25     either on the positions or the civilians in the area of Grbavica.  It

Page 29071

 1     could happen or it could be construed that after a mortar fire was opened

 2     there was a prolonged fire on the area.  If the effect was not immediate,

 3     there were no measures taken, these were the only measures that could be

 4     taken.  There were no other measures that could be put in place.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 7        Q.   Now, you've kind of referred to targets and you just said

 8     everything had to be put in order for a specific target to be hit and not

 9     the entire area.  So maybe you could explain, did you actually -- did you

10     have target lists or was the identification of targets kind of an ad hoc

11     thing?

12        A.   No.  Every unit in front of it had the list of targets as those

13     targets from which they could expect threats, and then it was recorded on

14     maps very precisely.  All the elements were identified in order to allow

15     those units to open fire on those targets in a fast and effective manner.

16        Q.   So you just said "all the elements were identified," so maybe you

17     could tell us what the target lists looked like.  What information did

18     you have about the targets?

19        A.   Let me put it simply:  Our targets were units in front of us.

20     The basic principle was for the artillery to target artillery, and

21     infantry would target infantry, and anti-tank units engaged the enemy's

22     anti-tank units.  That was the rule for the engagement and for the

23     selection of targets.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In lines 6 through 9 the witness

25     said the elements were measured before fire was opened, before an

Page 29072

 1     operation was launched, which probably means or wanted to say much in

 2     advance.  Maybe Madam Edgerton could verify with the witness whether he

 3     indeed said that the elements were identified without action.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Kovacevic, do you confirm what Mr. Karadzic

 5     just said?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's what is known as the

 7     preparation of the battle-field.  Everything is calculated in advance.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That might have been interpreted as "in

 9     a fast and effective manner."

10             Yes.  Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

12        Q.   Now, just talking about targets and the information you had about

13     the targets, you talk in your statement about the presence of civilians

14     in ABiH-held territory.  Does that factor onto your target lists at all?

15        A.   Yes, absolutely.

16        Q.   How?  Do you put that information on your target list?

17        A.   Very simply.  If this was simply a manoeuvre ground, not an urban

18     area, one infantry platoon would be a legitimate target for an artillery

19     battery, for example.  Since that platoon was in a settled area, it was

20     not a legitimate target for artillery fire because if it had been it

21     would have resulted in a massacre of civilians.

22        Q.   I don't quite see that you answered my question at all.  Do you

23     put information about civilians and the presence of civilians on your

24     target lists?  How do people know whether there are civilians located in

25     the area of a military target?

Page 29073

 1        A.   You could see to a large extent from the position.  You could see

 2     which buildings were inhabited by civilians.  You could observe that.

 3     You could see that.  Second of all, on our side we had a lot of displaced

 4     Serbs who were engaged as a labour force in the BiH units.  They were

 5     used to dig trenches, and then after that they would sometimes defect,

 6     they would escape to our side.  And when they reached us, they would

 7     provide us with the exact information as to what was where because they

 8     had been employed as labour force in those exact areas.  Based on such

 9     information, we corrected our own elements, the elements that we had

10     previously identified.

11        Q.   But you had nothing more up-to-date than that?  Because the

12     information from people who cross over to your side gets pretty stale

13     pretty quickly.  In fact, it's stale as soon as they across over to your

14     side.

15        A.   That's correct.  However, the number of those who crossed over to

16     our side was continuous.  They kept on coming.

17        Q.   Did you put the information from those people about civilians in

18     your target lists?

19        A.   I have to tell you that we faired with caution when it came to

20     that information.  We did not take all of that information at its face

21     value.  We did not dare blindly trust such statements and information

22     because some of that could have been a trap.

23        Q.   How often did you update your target lists?

24        A.   It was a continuous process.

25        Q.   Now, that must have been very difficult without forward

Page 29074

 1     observation because you'd given evidence earlier that you actually had no

 2     forward observation.

 3        A.   No, we did not have forward observation.  However, I repeat, from

 4     Trebevic, for those who know the area and the city, without any optical

 5     sights one could determine what the situation in Sarajevo was pretty

 6     accurately.  And not only from Trebevic, but from all the elevations

 7     around Sarajevo and within Sarajevo itself.  Sarajevo is a relatively

 8     small city, but truth be told it was rather densely inhabited.  And in

 9     certain areas of Sarajevo the front line could be reached with a simple

10     infantry weapons.

11        Q.   Now, if Sarajevo was densely inhabited, as you've just said,

12     maybe I could ask this:  Did you have any no-fire zones?  Was there any

13     area -- any area of the city not to be targeted?

14        A.   There were such areas.

15        Q.   Well, what were they?

16        A.   For example, Cengic Vila, it never came under fire.  It was well

17     sheltered from all sides.

18        Q.   So that was a no-fire zone for you.  Were there any others or was

19     that the only one?

20        A.   It was not the only one, but only from Cengic Vila fire was never

21     opened against us.  There was no front line in Cengic Vila.

22        Q.   Oh, so this wasn't actually a no-fire zone; it was a zone in

23     which you hadn't identified any military objects?

24        A.   Cengic Vila was mostly inhabited by civilians, there were no

25     institutions, there was no military, and there was no need to open fire

Page 29075

 1     on Cengic Vila.  Nobody really felt the need to open fire on Cengic Vila

 2     or any such areas.

 3        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  I'd like to go on to another area in your

 4     statement.  You indicated at paragraph 34 that:

 5             "There had been instances of individuals opening fire without us

 6     knowing whether that fire had caused any consequences.  In any case, we

 7     punished such breaches of discipline."

 8             Now, that was from paragraph 34 of your statement.  What kind of

 9     breaches of discipline and cases of individuals opening fire without you

10     knowing whether that had caused any consequences are you actually talking

11     about?

12        A.   I can give you some very specific examples.  When a soldier, for

13     example, gets drunk and then, irrespective of his position, he opens fire

14     from a weapon that he had been issued with, he can provoke a reaction

15     from the other side.  And that reaction may have consequences.  This

16     would be the most common example of a breach of discipline.  There are

17     also cases when a soldier on the front line of his own will for reasons

18     known to nobody else but him opens random fire and causes damage on the

19     enemy side and provokes reaction against either our unit or the city

20     itself.

21             The following example of the lack of -- of the breach of

22     discipline is the wilful abandonment of one's unit or the front line.  Of

23     course there is also theft or similar breaches of discipline.  I don't

24     want to go any further, but according to all our rules that were obeyed

25     in peacetime and in war time, such people would be processed according to

Page 29076

 1     the disciplinary rules and the rules of engagement during the war.  It

 2     depended on the gravity of the crime what the punishment would be.

 3        Q.   So did any one of those incidents, those breaches, deal with the

 4     killing by gun-fire or injury by gun-fire or sniper fire or -- of the

 5     civilians by your forces, civilians in Bosnian-held territory?

 6        A.   I cannot say precisely - and that's what I said in my

 7     statement - what exactly happened over there because I was unable to go

 8     there.  However, there is one thing that I know because I saw it most

 9     often on television because I was able to watch BH TV channel, I can

10     believe that but I don't have, necessarily, to believe it because I know

11     that many things were staged.  There were such instances, however, I

12     don't know to what extent those were truthful ones and it's not up to me

13     to judge.

14        Q.   How about shelling?  Did you ever investigate a case of shelling

15     civilians in Bosnian-held territory, shelling by your forces?

16        A.   I did not investigate any shelling because I didn't have --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please speak a little bit

18     more slowly.

19             MS. EDGERTON:

20        Q.   Could you repeat your answer a little bit more slowly, please,

21     Brigadier.

22        A.   I did not conduct such investigations because I didn't have any

23     artillery pieces in my unit, and I am an infantry officer and I wouldn't

24     be competent to carry out any expert investigation relating to artillery

25     pieces.

Page 29077

 1        Q.   So when you say "unit," right now you're talking about your

 2     battalion.  Does the same apply from your time when you served in brigade

 3     command?

 4        A.   Yes.  When I was serving on the brigade command, I also couldn't

 5     be involved in the artillery matters because that was the duty of the

 6     chief of artillery.  He was a professional who proposes a decision for

 7     engagement to the commander with respect to artillery.  So he was chief

 8     of artillery and part of the staff.

 9        Q.   So in neither your battalion nor in your brigade were you aware

10     of any investigations whatsoever conducted in cases of shelling and

11     sniping civilians by VRS forces in Bosnian-held territory?

12        A.   While I was in the brigade I know, definitely know, that the

13     chief of artillery was maintaining constant contact with UNPROFOR

14     observation team --

15        Q.   That's not my question.

16        A.   Let me finish, please -- which was deployed at the command post

17     of the artillery unit, and everything they did was something that the

18     commander of artillery unit was aware of, the chief of artillery was

19     aware of, and the brigade commander was aware of.  As an infantry

20     officer, I myself wasn't involved in these processes because I don't have

21     the necessary skills relating to the use of artillery.  As for the

22     battalion, I didn't have any artillery pieces and therefore I couldn't

23     have done any such thing.

24        Q.   Thank you.  I take it from your answer that that's a no and we'll

25     move on.  We've talked about or you've talked about in your statement

Page 29078

 1     that Bosnian attack on the 6th of January, 1994 - and that's at

 2     paragraph 24 of your statement - and just to refresh your memory, I'll

 3     read you that sentence.  You talk -- you say:

 4             "On our side we had such cases, notably on 6 January 1994, when

 5     Muslims executed an attack on the Jewish cemetery and the

 6     Vrbanja bridge."

 7             So I'd like to read you something about this attack on

 8     6 January 1994 and that's from 65 ter 23902.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I really have to intervene.

10     Madam Edgerton, with all due respect, gave an answer instead of the

11     witness.  The witness didn't say that there were no investigations at the

12     level of the brigade, but, rather, that that was done by professional

13     people in co-operation with UNPROFOR.  Your conclusion when you said the

14     answer is no refers not -- only to the battalion and not to the brigade.

15     I'm talking about line 18.

16             JUDGE KWON:  He answered that:

17             "... everything they did was something that the command of

18     artillery unit was aware of, the chief of artillery was aware of, and the

19     brigade commander was aware of."

20             He didn't refer to any specific example, so that's why

21     Ms. Edgerton said "no" and the witness didn't respond to that comment,

22     but it's a comment.

23             We can move on.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

25             65 ter 23902, please.  We should have an English original as

Page 29079

 1     well.

 2        Q.   Brigadier, this is a UN military observer because you've just

 3     been talking about a UN military observers, this is a UN military

 4     observer sitrep for Sector Sarajevo for 5 and 6 January 1994.  And over

 5     on paragraph 7 of that document, page 2, in English, and I'm not sure

 6     quite which paragraph in B/C/S, the bottom of page 2 in B/C/S and it will

 7     go over on to page 3.  Could we go to page 2 in English.  Thank you.

 8     I'll read you what paragraph 7(a) of this document says on the situation

 9     in Sarajevo for the day of this attack you referred to.  It says:

10             "The UNPROFOR units reported that the BiH launched an offensive

11     into the Serb-held areas of Grbavica today.  It is as yet unclear as to

12     what if any ground has been gained by the BiH.  This action led" --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Next page for the B/C/S.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, pardon me.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Probably now.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I'll just wait until the next page comes up before

17     I continue.

18        Q.    "...  this action led to the Serb forces issuing an ultimatum on

19     the local radio station, stating that unless Bosnian forces ceased the

20     attack then a massive retaliation would take place in the form of an

21     artillery attack.  The whole town of Sarajevo was put on alert of the

22     impending attack ..."

23             So your forces' response to this attack on 6 January that you

24     talk about in your statement was to threaten the massive retaliation

25     against the city as a whole; correct?

Page 29080

 1        A.   That was not my response.  I don't know -- this came from.  I was

 2     not in charge of the radio, so therefore I couldn't dictate what the

 3     radio would broadcast.  I cannot comment on everything that was happening

 4     all around Sarajevo.  I can only speak about Grbavica and what was

 5     happening there.

 6        Q.   So if that's the case, when you say at paragraph 27 of your

 7     evidence "we did not fire at civilians ...," you're only referring to the

 8     situation with your battalion in Grbavica; is that correct?

 9        A.   I told you a while ago, when you asked me about the brigade I'm

10     answering about the brigade and also when you asked me about the

11     battalion I'm talking about the battalion.  Nothing beyond that.

12     Sarajevo is a rather wide area and I'm reluctant to comment on what other

13     people did.

14        Q.   Paragraph --

15             MS. EDGERTON:  We can remove that document.  Thank you.

16        Q.   At paragraph 27 of your statement, you said:

17             "The members of my unit were perfectly aware of what consequences

18     might befall the Serb army if indiscriminate fire was opened at civilian

19     targets."

20             I'm thinking of showing you some documents in that regard but

21     before I do that, what do you understand "indiscriminate fire" means?

22        A.   Indiscriminate fire on Sarajevo meant uncontrolled firing of

23     artillery projectiles randomly without any specific target in mind or

24     without any need for that.  Indiscriminate fire would also involve any

25     senseless firing upon people just for the purpose of terrorising them.

Page 29081

 1     At some periods, anything that would disrupt everyday life and work would

 2     also be senseless unless it posed a threat to a unit in question.

 3        Q.   All right.  Now let's go to P15 -- pardon me, P01587, a UN

 4     military observer daily sitrep for Sector Sarajevo for 7 and

 5     8 January 1994.  I'm going to read you what this document says at page 2,

 6     paragraph 2 -- sorry.  Could you go back to the first page.  It

 7     appeared -- thank you.  If you could go down to paragraph 2 it refers to

 8     175 outgoing mixed rounds from Serb-held territory causing 35 wounded,

 9     including seven women and one child, and ten killed, including two women

10     and one child, and says that:

11             "Approximately 50 per cent of impacts recorded were on the front

12     line.  The remainder were directed at residential areas or areas of

13     regular civilian usage."

14             Now could you please go over to paragraph 9 which I think is on

15     the second page.

16             Paragraph 9 says:

17             "It appears that the reason for the high level of casualties

18     inside Sarajevo is due to the shelling by the BSA," Bosnian Serb army,

19     "of guns of an area used extensively by civilians as a means of avoiding

20     sniper areas.  This area is always very busy with civilian foot track

21     [sic]."

22             So what you've just heard from me now as reported in this

23     document, does that fit within your definition of indiscriminate fire?

24        A.   I have to tell you that I can't see from this document where this

25     occurred.

Page 29082

 1        Q.   Does that make any difference to your being able to answer my

 2     question?

 3        A.   Looking at this I can conclude that this happened on the front

 4     line of the 1st Corps of the ABH and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the

 5     VRS.  This is a very large area.  This does not show where these

 6     casualties happened and how, and since I wasn't there I can hardly

 7     comment on it.  I can only offer you my opinion.  This is a report that

 8     doesn't say much to me as an officer.  Why is that?  Because we said a

 9     while ago that the separation lines in urban areas, that close to them or

10     on the very lines themselves, civilians live.  It doesn't say that

11     civilian targets were engaged here but only that there were some

12     civilians killed as well.  And I just said a minute ago that any action

13     can result in civilian casualties in urban areas, any action whatsoever.

14             Secondly, I noticed that the term "sniper fire" is being used out

15     of the context and meaning of any proper military definition of "sniper

16     fire."  It seems that every short fire is ascribed to snipers, and that

17     is not the case.  The snipers constitute the fewest number of members of

18     a unit.  However, every action is described as being sniper fire.  I have

19     no doubts that this is the correct number of casualties, but we need more

20     specific descriptions and more details saying whether the civilians were

21     really the target or whether this was a result of a mistake.  So it's

22     difficult to conclude what exactly happened here.  So this speaks about

23     casualties on one side only.  I think that there was fire coming from

24     both sides, so if there are no casualties from the other side, in my mind

25     this is a one-sided report.

Page 29083

 1        Q.   What would you do if there was a mistake and civilians in

 2     Bosnian-held territory were killed or injured when - as you've said

 3     earlier - you had no logs or reports back on what happened with the

 4     target -- when the target was engaged?

 5        A.   All I can tell you is that if we are talking about something that

 6     I didn't do, I would say from where I'm sitting now that I would act

 7     according to the rules, which means obeying disciplinary rules and

 8     criminal code, nothing else.  That was an obligation.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  We'll move on to another area.  It's related to

10     paragraph 16 of your statement where you said:

11             "Later in the war all 80-millimetre and higher-calibre weapons

12     were removed to a distance 20 kilometres away from Sarajevo and were

13     controlled by UNPROFOR."

14             Do you still stand by that?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Maybe we could have a look at the map that's P1593, please.  And

17     it's a map from -- obtained from the VRS archives in Banja Luka in 2006

18     reflecting the 20-kilometre exclusion zone around Sarajevo.  And could my

19     colleague please go to the very centre of the city where there's a T

20     marked and enlarge the two red boxes below that T that appear on the

21     right and immediately below it.

22             Brigadier, this map depicts with legends and keys the weapons

23     held at weapons collection points inside the 20-kilometre zone and

24     outside the 20-kilometre zone.  And could you just enlarge further those

25     two red boxes so that the brigadier can read it, and probably one more.

Page 29084

 1             Now, you see that in the area of Lukavica Tilava there's a

 2     weapons collection point or area where ten 120-millimetre mortars are

 3     housed or maintained, two 105-millimetre howitzers, two VBR Plamen

 4     128-millimetre multiple rocket-launchers, 15 T55 tanks.  Do you see that?

 5        A.   Yes, yes, I do.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  And could my colleague just go up to the red

 7     square just above this.

 8        Q.   A weapons collection point in Grbavica this red square shows that

 9     four 82-millimetre mortars; five 60 -- sorry, I correct my own mistake,

10     82-millimetre BaT is the acronym; five 60-millimetre mortars; four

11     82-millimetre mortars; one Top 76-millimetre B1 gun; and one T55 tank,

12     among other things, are maintained at a weapons collection point in

13     Grbavica, both locations far inside the 20-kilometre exclusion zone.  So

14     now having seen this map, do you still stand by what you said in your

15     statement?

16        A.   Everything is correct.  The pieces of artillery that were pulled

17     out to the area 20 kilometre of Sarajevo remained in the hands of the

18     Army of Republika Srpska.  These assets referred to here were those that

19     were collected really and at specific locations, and they were no longer

20     in our hands.  We could only gain access to them with the permission of

21     UNPROFOR.  Because this implies the weapons that were collected under the

22     auspices of UNPROFOR and there is a major distinction between those

23     weapons and the other weapons that one has in one's hands.

24        Q.   But actually, Brigadier, the establishment of the total exclusion

25     zone didn't decrease the combat-readiness of your artillery at all, did

Page 29085

 1     it?

 2        A.   Yes, considerably.

 3        Q.   Well, let's have a look at 65 ter 23926, please.  Brigadier, this

 4     is a document dated May 1995 which lists the artillery assets ready to

 5     provide fire support for planned SRK actions that month, and it shows

 6     clearly where your brigade assets were located.  In item 1 --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I find it very strange I can't find the English

 8     translation for this.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  I do as well.  Just a moment, please,

10     Your Honours -- your indulgence, please.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the date, please, and

12     all the other necessary elements of the document, such as who the author

13     is and who the signatory is --

14             MS. EDGERTON:  The date's on the second page.

15             JUDGE KWON:  It may come.  If we see the next page there is a

16     signature, but I'm not sure about the date.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  And the translation just now been released.  My

18     apologies, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             Yes, some dates on second page, 2.  Yes, please go on.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

22             If we could go back over to the first page and I'll wait for my

23     colleagues to get the English translation called up.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Now it's uploaded, yes.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Wonderful.

Page 29086

 1        Q.   So it shows in your brigade's area of responsibility the location

 2     of artillery and other assets.  The fire support for the

 3     1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade is four 120-millimetre -- or it includes

 4     four 120-millimetre mortars from the region of Palez; 76-millimetre B1

 5     gun from the area of the barracks at Zlatiste; and two T55 tanks from the

 6     areas of Zlatiste and Vrace.  So this shows, Brigadier, pretty clearly

 7     that your brigade's combat-readiness wasn't affected at all, was it?

 8        A.   Please, this is a prediction.  This is not what is actually

 9     happening.  In order for these assets to arrive in the area specified

10     here, they first have to be taken out and that cannot happen without that

11     being recorded.  If force were used to get hold of those weapons, I'm not

12     sure whether this would pass in Sarajevo unnoticed.  This is something

13     that is anticipated.  This hasn't been done in actual fact and it's --

14     just indicates the necessity for these assets to be located there.  Those

15     assets had not been at these positions prior to this.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the second page in

17     Serbian to see what's written there?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From which date, 14 May 1995, I see

19     that this is a preparation for defence from the announced offensive when

20     the Muslim forces were going to try to break out of Sarajevo.  That's

21     when the offensive started and lasted until the end of the war.  This is

22     the objective for the defence and the task to cut off the road towards

23     Trebevic.  I see the date is 14 May 1995.  In the middle of this month,

24     the offensive of Muslim forces from Sarajevo started on all fronts and

25     lasted until the end of August when a cease-fire occurred, and that was

Page 29087

 1     the end.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:

 3        Q.   Let's go on now to 65 ter 23921, please, a document from the VRS

 4     Main Staff signed by General Mladic on the regrouping of fire support in

 5     and outside the 20-kilometre zone.  Now, at the paragraph entitled

 6     "positive solutions," which is on page 2 of the English and in B/C/S at

 7     the bottom of the first page, we see that within the perimeter of the

 8     20-kilometre zone the fire support equipment was grouped with the

 9     possibility of artillery support for companies in the first line of

10     defence and sectors for the regrouping of equipment outside the

11     20-kilometre zone were chosen with the possibility of use and speedy

12     transfer of the focus of fire support to another axis.  The armoured

13     mechanised units of your brigade, the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade,

14     are trained and drilled for operating the available equipment and can

15     start it up or use it on the given or chosen axes within one and a half

16     hours.  So it seems clear here that General Mladic himself finds the

17     establishment of the total exclusion zone does not decrease the

18     combat-readiness of your artillery at all.

19        A.   I can suppose that at the highest level talks were held that

20     weapons be returned to units because of the obvious danger from the

21     announced offensive of the Muslim forces for the final show-down with the

22     forces of the VRS in the area of Sarajevo.  To be quite honest, I don't

23     know the outcome of those talks, but according to this order which I see

24     for the first time I see that those weapons were still where they

25     were - under supervision - and the plan envisages their use which is

Page 29088

 1     quite logical and legitimate.  At a certain point when there is a danger,

 2     the time is reduced, these weapons should be recovered as soon as

 3     possible.  Certain positions should be occupied.  That's how I understand

 4     this document.  I see it for the first time, but this is my understanding

 5     of it.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I have that as a Prosecution exhibit,

 7     please, Your Honours?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P5932, Your Honours.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  And just one more document --

11             Just your indulgence for a moment, Your Honours.

12        Q.   To go on to another area.  You gave evidence, paragraph 15 of

13     your statement, that you had no knowledge to the effect that the final

14     objective for Sarajevo of the Serbian authorities was a division of the

15     city.  And I'd like to show you another document by General Mladic, P3052

16     dated 14 December 1993.  It's called supplement to directive 6.

17             Now, this document issued on the basis of a decision dated

18     14 December 1993, by the highest officials of the Serbian people orders

19     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps along with other forces to undertake a number

20     of actions.  And at the very last line of this first paragraph, we see

21     the objective behind the operation is to provide conditions for the

22     division of Sarajevo into two parts.

23             Seeing this, General, do you stand by your statement in

24     paragraph -- or paragraph 15 of your statement?

25        A.   I do.  This is a military exit to the dominant features of Hum

Page 29089

 1     which was held by the VRS until 17 May 1992, and Hum as we all know is in

 2     the central part of Sarajevo.  And from there you can have a significant

 3     influence on the front line in Sarajevo, a military objective, perfectly

 4     realistic, to take control of that area which is - because that is a

 5     dominant feature - a hill on which there stands a TV repeater, and with

 6     this success the units of the VRS that were in contact with Muslim forces

 7     would have a significant burden taken off their shoulders.  Putnik and

 8     Hrasnica are in the south-west of Sarajevo separated by the airport.

 9     They have practically no influence on Sarajevo, but communication between

10     Ilidza would be ensured and the eastern part of Sarajevo which was

11     non-existent at the time because it had turned over the airport in June

12     1992 and it had no physical contact with the eastern part of Sarajevo

13     anymore.  I don't understand this order as a political division of

14     Sarajevo between Serbs and Bosniaks.  I understand it as in the first

15     part of the operation taking control of important features and in the

16     second part the integration of two territories in a narrow

17     space - because this is a narrow space - the integration of Putnik and

18     Hrasnica with the eastern part of Sarajevo.  That's how I understand this

19     order.  I don't understand it as having the objective to separate the

20     Serb and Bosniak parts of Sarajevo.

21        Q.   That's an interesting interpretation --

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just add, it was not recorded

23     that the witness said speaking of Hum and that area that it was

24     uninhabited.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Did you say that, Mr. Kovacevic?  Hum area --

Page 29090

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did say it.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  The witness is speaking

 3     much too fast.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Hum, Zuc, and Orlic alike were

 5     uninhabited then and still are uninhabited.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  It is my observation, Mr. Kovacevic, you are

 7     speaking a bit too fast for the interpreters to follow.  Could you speak

 8     a bit slower.

 9             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

11        Q.   And we'll go on to one final area and it's an area you mentioned

12     at the early part of your statement, paragraph 8, where you said:

13             "At all the positions where I had been not a single offensive

14     action had been executed but exclusively defensive ones.  These positions

15     were established at the beginning of the war and they remained as such

16     until the end of the war."

17             And so I'd like you in that regard to have a look at another

18     document, 65 ter 09139.  It's a letter from Dragomir Milosevic to

19     Ratko Mladic on 19 May 1996.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  We need to go over to B/C/S page 4, I think the

21     fifth full paragraph on page 4, and English page 2, the last full

22     paragraph on the page.  My page numbering is off, Your Honours.  If you

23     could just give me a moment's indulgence, I may move on in the interest

24     of speed.

25             The English page I see in front of me is page 4 and in the

Page 29091

 1     English I needed page 2, and in the B/C/S that's page 3 and I need page 2

 2     in the B/C/S.  Wonderful.  Thank you.

 3        Q.   So at the fifth full paragraph on the page on the left-hand side

 4     of the screen and in the last full paragraph, the English page on the

 5     right-hand side of the screen, Dragomir Milosevic writes to

 6     General Mladic:  When engaging in combat, I spared myself from nothing.

 7     I fought with ... commitment and was involved, personally involved, in,

 8     among other things, liberating Soping at Grbavica II and he personally

 9     stormed and, together with the police and a platoon of soldiers,

10     liberated the Zlatiste facility, liberated the Bistrik tower and the Mala

11     tower at Mrkovici.  He did everything to foil incursions from Sarajevo

12     along any axis.  And it was thanks to him that Ozrenska Street was

13     preserved.

14             Now, this language of liberating, does that sound like an

15     offensive or a defensive action to you, Brigadier?

16        A.   If you read this - and I believe you have - at this time when

17     this was going on that was 1992.  At that time, I was in Pazarici and

18     after that in Blazuj.  So I wasn't at these positions.  And, if you look

19     at what is offensive and what is defensive, all these features are taken

20     by one squad, Bankovici Kula [phoen] can hold ten people, not more.

21     Zlatiste Kula can hold 15 people.  The facility of Osmice is a small

22     restaurant.  All these things are along roads.  I can understand and I

23     know that the objective was to keep primarily the road from Lukavica

24     towards Pale across Trebevic and that's why these small features were

25     taken.  If that's an offensive, then so be it, but I don't see it that

Page 29092

 1     way.  An offensive is a broader term.  The same about Mrkovici, that's on

 2     the road from Pretis, Radana -- Radane towards Pale.  I've never seen any

 3     of these features enumerated here larger than could be taken by a

 4     platoon.  You cannot call them offensives.  It doesn't qualify as an

 5     offensive.

 6             And, finally, let me say, this line remained identical at the end

 7     of the war, almost identical.

 8        Q.   Well, if that's -- if you think we can't call that an offensive,

 9     maybe we'll have another look at another document from Dragomir

10     Milosevic.  It's D568, and it's a speech that he gave on the ceremony of

11     presenting the war flags in 1996.  And the page that we need to see is

12     page 3 in both languages.  Now here General Milosevic says:

13             "We carried out -- furthermore, we carried out operations in

14     order to improve our tactical positions and extend free Serb territories

15     in the areas of Otes, Mojmilo, Zlatiste, Kijev, and then towards Praca

16     and Gosinje."

17             Now, does that characterise offensive or defensive action,

18     extending free Serb territories?

19        A.   I don't want to sound as a teacher.  The term "operation" is used

20     here.  Operations are carried out by the largest units and there is no

21     reference here to "combat, battle," as the main terms.  None of these

22     features listed here does have a size that cannot be occupied by one

23     company, one infantry company.  These are small features, the occupying

24     of which gives a small tactical advantage, but the person who wrote this

25     does not understand terms like "battle, combat" especially "operation."

Page 29093

 1     Armies conduct operations.  Which forces carried this out?  Spreca and

 2     Gosinje?  I really don't know.  I wasn't there so I don't know.

 3        Q.   Okay.  How about we look at one last document.  It's

 4     65 ter 23939, and it's an order to attack dated 30 November 1992 to the

 5     1st Rajlovac Brigade, which you should be familiar with, Brigadier,

 6     because for a period of time in 1992 you commanded the

 7     1st Rajlovac Brigade.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I was informed that it hasn't been released yet.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment, please,

10     Your Honours.

11                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

12             MS. EDGERTON:  I take this on my shoulders completely,

13     Your Honours.  It's 23839, and my apologies to my colleagues.

14        Q.   Do you recognise this document, Brigadier?

15        A.   I do.

16        Q.   This document in paragraph 1, when it talks about information of

17     the enemy -- about the enemy says:

18             "There are no civilians in the neighbourhood next to the Sokolje

19     mosque but there are in the area from the mosque towards Brijesce."

20             And over this paragraph 3 of the English and still at the bottom

21     of page 1 on the B/C/S, we see the tasks -- can we go back to page 1 of

22     the B/C/S.  We see the tasks of the brigade.  And there it says:

23             "Our brigade has been instructed to launch an attack from its

24     starting positions to the right of Lemezovo Brdo - Zabrdje - Smiljevici

25     towards Svabino Brdo and Brijesko Brdo, cut off the village, surround the

Page 29094

 1     enemy forces in the village of Sokolje, thoroughly mop up the villages of

 2     Sokolje, Brijesce, and Brijesko Brdo, reach the Zuc-Skravnik refuse

 3     dump-Brijesko Brdo line and link up with our forces in the village of

 4     Vecici where it will switch till defence, regroup its forces, built

 5     fortifications," et cetera.

 6             Now, is this an offensive or a defensive action?

 7        A.   This is an offensive action of limited nature.  I should like you

 8     to show a map for us to see what this area looks like.

 9        Q.   I think you've actually answered my question perfectly clearly.

10     Thank you very much, Brigadier.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  I have no further questions, Your Honours.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, can I understand that as

13     saying that I answered in the affirmative, that it's an offensive?  I

14     said in fact it was an offensive action of limited nature.  It refers to

15     taking control of one feature and that's why I wanted the map.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I think the Chamber understood your answer.  We can

17     move on.

18             If necessary, Mr. Karadzic may take up that issue further in his

19     re-examination.  I take it you are not tendering this document?

20             MS. EDGERTON:  No, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  I

23     should only like to give the opportunity to General Kovacevic to finish

24     what he was saying.

25                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

Page 29095

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] What are these features:  Zuc, Brijesko Brdo,

 2     Smetliste [phoen]?

 3        A.   It's a sharp point, a wedge, that was going into a populated area

 4     of Rajlovac.  That's where from the factory Orlovo and the transformer

 5     station were exposed to constant fire and we wanted to stop this

 6     terrorising.  And this sharp point called Sokolje which is about

 7     300 metres wide on the average, we wanted to cut it off and to straighten

 8     this line.  This is very precise and we can see on the map clearly what

 9     is achieved by that.  This is a very limited objective.  When the entire

10     operation is done, it involves only one platoon.  So it can't even be

11     called an operation.  It's called improving one's tactical position.

12     That's why I insisted earlier on distinctions between terms such as

13     "combat, action, battle, and operation" and "tactical correction of the

14     line."

15        Q.   Thank you, sir, for your answer.  Thank you for coming here to

16     testify.

17        A.   Thank you, too.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kovacevic, I'm asking this purely out of my

19     personal curiosity.  In paragraph 43 of your statement you stated that

20     among the volunteers in your unit were included the persons from Korea.

21     Do you remember them?  Were they from North Korea or South Korea?

22             THE WITNESS:  [Interpretation] From Kobe.

23             JUDGE KWON:  From Kobe?

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Japan?

Page 29096

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Then "Korea" was written by

 2     mistake.  I'm sure I said they were from Kobe.

 3             THE ACCUSED:  Kobe/Korea is probably the reason why.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  You overlapped with the translation.  Your comment

 5     was not noted.

 6             THE ACCUSED:  In our pronunciation, Kobe -- from Kobe or from

 7     Korea is only one letter, one sound.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             That concludes your evidence, Mr. Kovacevic.  On behalf of the

10     Chamber -- before letting the witness go, do you have any comments,

11     Mr. Robinson?

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, excuse me, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Going back to the associated exhibit that you

15     called our attention to, it may require an explanation from the witness

16     so I just wanted to let the Chamber know this is 1D2337 which is now

17     Exhibit 2332.  In fact, the numbers were mixed up and so the number that

18     was referred to in paragraph 49 of his statement reflects a different

19     number, but it's the same document.  If you want us to have him confirm

20     that, we can do that, but that's the situation.

21                           [Defence counsel confer]

22             JUDGE KWON:  So both documents refer to the same document?

23             MR. ROBINSON:  They're both the same document, yes.  I'm informed

24     now that we've uploaded 1D845 -- we've uploaded that same document as

25     1D8452, but if you would like to have the witness confirm it, we can do

Page 29097

 1     that.  If it's not necessary --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I take your word, Mr. Robinson.

 3             So I'd like to thank you on behalf of this Chamber,

 4     Mr. Kovacevic, for your coming to The Hague to give your evidence.  Now

 5     you're free to go, but we will rise all together.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We'll resume at 1.00 -- oh, I'm sorry, quarter past

 8     1.00.

 9                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

10                           [The witness withdrew]

11                           [The witness entered court]

12                           --- On resuming at 1.17 p.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness take the solemn declaration,

14     please.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

16     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

17                           WITNESS:  DUSAN SKRBA

18                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, sir.  Please take your seat and make

20     yourself comfortable.

21             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

23                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Skrba.  Shall I address you

25     "colonel" or "general"?

Page 29098

 1        A.   "Skrba" will be fine.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have in e-court

 3     1D6030.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Have you reviewed the statement that you gave to the Defence team

 6     and is this a statement that you see in front of you?

 7        A.   Not in the Serbian language.

 8        Q.   Has anyone read this statement to you in English and does it

 9     accurately reflect what you said?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   If I were --

12             MS. WEST:  My apologies for interrupting Mr. Karadzic.  I think

13     this witness, Your Honour, Mr. President, will need a 90(E) warning and

14     perhaps it should be given now before he starts giving testimony.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any objections?

16             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Skrba, before you go further I would like

18     to draw your attention to a particular rule here at the Tribunal.  Under

19     this rule, which is Rule 90(E), you may object to answering a question

20     from the Prosecution or the accused or from the Chamber if you believe

21     that your answer will incriminate you.  I mean by "incriminate" that

22     something you say may amount to an admission of your guilt for a criminal

23     offence or could provide evidence that you have committed an offence.

24     However, even if you think your answer will incriminate you and you do

25     not wish to answer the question, the Tribunal has the discretion to

Page 29099

 1     oblige you to answer the question.  But in such a case, the Tribunal will

 2     make sure that your testimony compelled in such a way shall not be used

 3     as evidence in other case against you for any offence other than false

 4     testimony.  Do you understand that, sir?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the first I hear of this,

 6     and I will abide by it.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8             Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Instead of this statement, if I were to put the same questions to

12     you today, would you give me the same answers as contained in your

13     statement?

14        A.   Yes.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, can I ask for

16     1D6030 be admitted into evidence along with other documents, that is to

17     say the totality of 92 ter package.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Witness's Rule 92 ter statement will be

19     admitted.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2341, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  And I take it you are tendering two documents as

22     associated exhibits?

23             Any objection, Ms. West?

24             MS. WEST:  No.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, they will be also admitted.  Shall we give the

Page 29100

 1     numbers.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour 65 ter 1D8567 will be

 3     Exhibit D2342 and 65 ter 1D8568 will be Exhibit D2343.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             I would like now to read the summary of Mr. Skrba's statement in

 8     English.

 9             [In English] Dusan Skrba was born on 24 of February 1949 in

10     Kasindol, Ilidza municipality, Sarajevo.  Before the war he worked in the

11     Sarajevo work unit of Univerzalpromet Prokuplje.  He served the army in

12     1970/1971 in Zadar in the school for reserve officers, combat arms

13     artillery.

14             Dusan Skrba saw a line-up of the Green Berets before the war

15     started in October or November 1991 outside of Sarajka department store

16     in the centre of Sarajevo.  He also had knowledge that the

17     Patriotic League had had a line-up in Hrasnica in October 1991.

18             On March the 15th, 1992, he was called by the JNA to report to

19     Slavisa Vajner-Cica barracks in Lukavica where he was charged with

20     manning establishment units.

21             Starting on April the 4th, 1992, infantry attacks by Muslim units

22     on the barracks took place on a daily basis.  All types of infantry

23     weapons including rifle, grenades, and hand-held rocket-launchers and

24     hand-grenades were used.

25             During the crisis in May 1992 connected to the pull-out of JNA

Page 29101

 1     members from barracks in the city of Sarajevo and cadets from the

 2     Marsal Tito barracks, Dusan Skrba was ordered to prepare in the event of

 3     an attack on the units and the pull-out routes.  When Muslim forces

 4     attacked the Marsal Tito barracks he was ordered to open fire on those

 5     units at Marin Dvor.

 6             On 27th of May, 1992, the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade was

 7     formed.  This brigade consisted mostly of hardware and was insufficiently

 8     manned.  Dusan Skrba became the commander of the mixed artillery

 9     battalion.  The zone of responsibility of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised

10     Brigade was from Kozja Cuprija bridge and Bembasa to the old airport and

11     the Zeljeznica river as it is marked on the associated exhibit 1D08567.

12             On 1st of July, 1992, UN observers were deployed to his command

13     post and remained there until the end of the war.  Every time before

14     opening fire Dusan Skrba would inform the UN observers and show the

15     points from which Muslim forces had attacked.  He would submit a report

16     on the spot to the UN members in each instance fire was opened.  The UN

17     observers never complained to him about his reports, his work or the work

18     of his units.

19             The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps' objectives were to protect its front

20     lines which were in Serbian ethnic areas and to prevent the breakthrough

21     of the 1st Corps for Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina outside of the city

22     section of Sarajevo under Muslim control.  This would have made available

23     a large number of enemy personnel in other fronts.  During the war,

24     according to his knowledge, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps conducted

25     exclusively defensive actions, with the sole exception of

Page 29102

 1     Operation Lukavica 93, the goal of which was to join the Herzegovina and

 2     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps towards the mountains.

 3             Dusan Skrba had information and data that units of the 1st Corps

 4     of BH army were deployed in the depth of the territory of the city and

 5     that they also encompassed civilian zones of the section of the city

 6     under the control of the Muslim authorities, such as Velesici, Ciglane,

 7     Bjelave, City Hall, Dobrinja IIIB and Bistrik.

 8             His unit and he personally always took every measure not to open

 9     fire on civilian targets in the city.  Fire was to be opened exclusively

10     at observed firing positions and military targets for the purpose of

11     self-defence all on the order of the superior command in respect of

12     specific military targets.  Neither he nor any other members of his unit

13     or their subordinate or superior commands ever intended to cause civilian

14     casualties or terrorise civilians in the territory under Muslim control

15     or attack means of public transportation.  They never received or issued

16     any verbal or written orders to that effect.

17             Although the brigade has a number of aerial bombs in stock, they

18     were never used in the zone of responsibility of this unit.

19             Regarding incidents in which three mortar shells landed in the

20     area of Alipasino Polje on January the 22nd, 1994, Dusan Skrba identifies

21     as the Butmir agricultural state what the Defence considers to be the

22     most probable place of firing.  He also states that fire could be opened

23     from that direction at Nedzarici and Alipasino Polje.

24             Regarding incident in which a salvo of three 120-millimetre

25     mortar shells hit the Dobrinja residential area on the

Page 29103

 1     4th of February, 1994, Dusan Skrba claims that no fire was opened that

 2     day and could not have been opened without his command which he did not

 3     issue and without it being reported to the UNPROFOR observers.

 4             Regarding incidents on Safeta Zajke Street and Majdanska Street

 5     on 24th of May, 1995, Dusan Skrba claims that no aerial bomb was ever

 6     fired from Prljevo or Lukavica.

 7             Regarding Markale II incident, Dusan Skrba claims that fire could

 8     not have been opened that day from 120-mortars since all of 120-mortars

 9     and the higher-calibre weapons were not in the hands of

10     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps but are either out of the 20-kilometres zone or

11     in the UNPROFOR control.

12             I don't have questions, additional questions for that witness.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. West.

14             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.  During the

15     cross-examination I'm going to be using a number of maps, and for -- of

16     course they're all uploaded in e-court.  But for the ease of the

17     participants, I have hard copies and I would ask the usher's assistance

18     to deliver these, please.

19             JUDGE KWON:  For planning purposes, can I know how long you would

20     take, Ms. West?

21             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I would believe that at least two full

22     sessions.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  We apologise for taking our copies of the maps

24     before Your Honours.  It's like eating before the guests, but anyway

25     apologies.

Page 29104

 1             MS. WEST:  May we have D2342, please, in e-court.

 2             Mr. President, may I proceed?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4                           Cross-examination by Ms. West:

 5        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Skrba.

 6        A.   Good afternoon.

 7        Q.   My name is Kim West.  I'm one of the attorneys with the

 8     Office of the Prosecution.  I'm going to ask you a series of questions

 9     today and very likely it will go to Monday as well.

10        A.   I understand.

11        Q.   Thank you.  In front of you on the screen is a map I know you've

12     seen before.  And if we could zoom into the area right in the middle.

13     This is a map that was provided to us noting your area of responsibility.

14     Do you recognise this?

15        A.   Marked in colour red?

16        Q.   That's correct.

17             MS. WEST:  And if we could zoom into that area in colour red.

18        Q.   Is this an area that you marked noting your area of

19     responsibility?

20        A.   Roughly speaking, that would be it.  That's our area of

21     responsibility.

22        Q.   All right.  And this is quite small, so may I have 65 ter 09390E,

23     and what I've done is I've just taken a more detailed map so we can go

24     through it a bit easier.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, I know Mr. Reid is busy

Page 29105

 1     multi-tasking there but we would like to receive the list of exhibits

 2     that they're going to use during the cross-examination.

 3             MS. WEST:  And, Your Honour, for the record, yesterday I

 4     introduced the larger map.  This is based off of that same map.

 5        Q.   So, sir, now looking at this, this is just a blow-up or what we

 6     just saw, and you on the screen in front of you have the ability to

 7     circle spots that I direct you to.  And if we could ensure that the

 8     witness can do that.  First place I want you to circle is your command

 9     post.

10             Sir, you see the location right in the middle?  It's Uzdojnice.

11     I've mutilated that word, but it's right in the middle.  Can you tell us

12     what's there?

13        A.   Uzdojnice was a command post of the mixed artillery battalion and

14     also of the units that were deployed in that area.  Shall I mark it as

15     well?

16        Q.   Please.

17        A.   So that's the command post.  Do I need to mark where other units

18     were deployed?

19        Q.   So tell me -- can you mark the area of Lukavica and tell us what

20     was in Lukavica.

21        A.   Well, Lukavica was in front of our forward line, and this area

22     here is in front of the Slavisa Vajner-Cica and Slobodan Princip Seljo

23     barracks.  This is Energoinvest.  And further on you have the Cica

24     barracks, but you can't see it on this map.

25        Q.   Okay.  So put a circle around Lukavica.

Page 29106

 1        A.   I can only circle the industrial part of Energoinvest and also

 2     the electrical engineering faculty, and what you see here is part of the

 3     industrial complex of Energoinvest.

 4        Q.   Now, on this map as well towards the right-hand lower corner we

 5     see a place called Tilava.  Do you see that?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   What was located there?

 8        A.   An infirmary was in Tilava and the local commune centre.  Shall I

 9     mark it?

10        Q.   Please.

11        A.   [Marks]

12        Q.   Sir, if you can sign your name on this and put the date as well.

13        A.   Today is the 18th.

14             JUDGE KWON:  This will be next Prosecution exhibit.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P5933 , Your Honours.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I make a suggestion while we

17     still have it here.  The witness said that only the faculty and

18     Energoinvest company can be seen here.  Can we then mark these areas with

19     letters F and E in order to make sure that these were not barracks but

20     rather other types of facilities.  So can we put a rectangle instead of a

21     circle.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Fair enough.

23             Could you put E and F.

24             THE WITNESS:  [Marks]

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 29107

 1             That will be saved.

 2             MS. WEST:  Thank you.

 3        Q.   Now, Mr. Skrba, was any particular headquarters located at

 4     Lukavica?

 5        A.   What do you mean at Lukavica?

 6        Q.   Well, in regard to -- well, let me back up.  In regard to the

 7     place where you were located the most, is that one of the circles you put

 8     on the screen?

 9        A.   Well, yes, Uzdojnice and Palovac, the subordinate command.

10        Q.   And how often --

11        A.   And there was also the corps command post, but it cannot be seen

12     in this map.

13        Q.   That's fine.  Thank you.  Mr. Skrba, we know that you were

14     involved in artillery matters for the 1st Sarajevo Militarised Brigade

15     command, but can you tell us from whom you took your orders?

16        A.   We were receiving orders from the artillery chief from the

17     brigade command.

18        Q.   Did you also receive orders from the artillery corps command?

19        A.   No, not directly.  Everything went through the artillery chief of

20     the brigade.

21        Q.   And starting in 1992, can you tell us the name of that person,

22     the person from whom you took those orders?

23        A.   Captain, or rather, on the 27th of May, when I became the

24     commander of the MAD Savo Simic was my superior commander.

25        Q.   And at some point did your superior commander change?

Page 29108

 1        A.   The brigade commander remained the same person and Savo Simic

 2     took a new position towards the end of 1994 so I took over both duties.

 3        Q.   Now, the orders that you received, they were both in writing and

 4     verbal; is that correct?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And in --

 7        A.   Only in writing.

 8        Q.   Only in writing.  Thank you for that clarification.  In

 9     paragraph 14 of your report you speak about the order of the superior

10     command in respect of specific military targets.  In that regard can you

11     tell us -- describe for us how specific, how detailed, military targets

12     would be in these orders?

13        A.   Well, it depends.  Every target had to be marked and described in

14     terms of its size, location, and what kind of enemy assets were there,

15     whether there was manpower or equipment and everything else.

16        Q.   And so when you received orders to target something, this is the

17     type of specific information you would expect to receive?

18        A.   We always expected specific information, the location, the place,

19     and the size of the target.

20        Q.   Why was that detail important to you?

21        A.   Those details were important so that we should be able to plan

22     what kind of artillery fire we should open, individual fire with one

23     weapon or group fire with a whole unit using weapons of a specific

24     calibre.

25             MS. WEST:  May we have P1511, please.

Page 29109

 1        Q.   I want to look at an example of not an actual order but an

 2     example of some language, and this is not a -- you will not have seen

 3     this before, but I want to know if this is consistent with your

 4     experience.  This is an intercept dated the 29th of May, 1992, and the

 5     Trial Chamber has heard some evidence on this.  It's a discussion -- it's

 6     a conversation between General Mladic and a person named Potpara.  That

 7     name, Potpara - excuse my pronunciation - do you recognise it?

 8        A.   No.

 9        Q.   Okay.  In the course of this conversation Mladic is asking the

10     other individual:

11             "Mladic:  Is he shooting at you?"

12             Potpara says:

13             "No, not at the moment.

14             "Mladic:  Are you shooting?

15             "Potpara:  We returned fire.

16             "Mladic:  Returned fire!  Excellent!  Where?"

17             And then Potpara says:

18             "Up there, towards the museum and towards the hospital up there

19     and Crni Vrh.

20             "Mladic:  Yes.  What weapons did you use?

21             "Potpara:  82.

22             "Mladic:  82.  Did you shoot at the target?

23             "Potpara:  Those who were observing ...

24             "Mladic:  Pardon?

25             "Potpara:  These observers told us it was good.

Page 29110

 1             "Mladic:  Fire at ... at a good target.

 2             "Potpara:  Okay.

 3             "Mladic:  Don't let them well ... disturb you.

 4             "Potpara:  Good.

 5             "Mladic:  As soon as the mother fuckers attack you, fire at them.

 6     Can you hit the railway station?

 7             "Potpara:  Yes, we can.

 8             "Mladic:  Hit them with something.  And scatter them around.

 9             "Potpara:  Okay.

10             "Mladic:  Bye."

11             Sir, my question for you regards this language "scatter them

12     around."  Would you consider that language to be detailed enough in

13     describing a target?

14        A.   I'm sorry, this does not relate to me because I did not have

15     command over this 82.  That weapon was not at the disposal of my unit.

16        Q.   Indeed.  And as I said earlier, this si not a conversation that I

17     expected you to recognise.  I am using it only as an example to talk

18     about what you mentioned as detailed targeting language.  So, for

19     example, the language "scatter them around," if you had received an order

20     like that, would you consider that to have been detailed enough for you

21     to pick a target?

22        A.   I never got an order of that kind and I don't think it's precise.

23        Q.   What was the process by which you challenged an order?

24        A.   I asked for a written approval.

25        Q.   I mean what --

Page 29111

 1        A.   With the proviso that if I asked for an explanation or approval

 2     in writing for taking a target, I always made sure through my observers

 3     and artillery observers, our people on our forward lines on higher ground

 4     who did reconnaissance and scouting, if they gave me a report and

 5     assurance of what kind of target that was, only then could an order be

 6     issued to prepare fire and open fire.

 7        Q.   And did you do that on every occasion?

 8        A.   I could say 99 per cent of cases.

 9        Q.   Can you tell us about the process by which you deployed the

10     people underneath you, your men.  For example, did you have fixed firing

11     locations and did you deploy them out to those locations?

12        A.   Artillery's an idiosyncratic unit with special training and of

13     course at every position we had to have trained people able to operate

14     that weapon and people who were able to observe targets, prepare

15     co-ordinates, so that we could prepare fire and only then proceed to open

16     fire and aim at a certain target because there are several ways of

17     opening fire:  There's simple preparation, abbreviated preparation, and

18     full preparation.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And we'll get there.  But just tell me, how many

20     different firing locations did you have in your area of responsibility?

21        A.   In this place I had four units and four firing positions, and I

22     didn't change them throughout the war until we relocated 20 kilometres

23     back.

24             MS. WEST:  May we have again 65 ter 09390E, please.

25        Q.   Sir, I'm going to ask you to locate your firing positions, but,

Page 29112

 1     first, tell me, is this map too small an area for you to do that?

 2        A.   All right.  I'll show this within smaller lines.  It can fit in.

 3        Q.   So I see four lines.  Do those represent your four firing

 4     positions until they were relocated?

 5        A.   Yes, yes.  Those four, yes.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And for how long did they remain in those four places?

 7        A.   Until we moved 20 kilometres further behind, further from the

 8     circle around Sarajevo.

 9        Q.   Tell me when you did that.

10        A.   That was sometime in August 1995.

11        Q.   So up until August of 1995, those were your four permanent firing

12     locations?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And during -- from 1992 until August of 1995, were there any

15     other firing positions anywhere else in your area of responsibility over

16     which you had command?

17        A.   In my area of firing responsibility, there were no other

18     artillery units but those four.

19        Q.   Can you sign this and again put the date on it.

20        A.   Yes, I can.  Just a little correction.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Or we can delete it with the assistance of the

22     usher.

23             MS. WEST:  Thank you.

24             And may this have an exhibit number, please.

25             JUDGE KWON:  This will be saved and given the next Prosecution

Page 29113

 1     exhibit number.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P5934, Your Honours.

 3             MS. WEST:

 4        Q.   Mr. Skrba, in paragraph 10 of your report you talk about the

 5     1st ABiH Corps and the type of weapons that they had.  But I now would

 6     like to talk about the type of weapons that you had.  Can you tell us

 7     whether you had any mortars?

 8        A.   Yes, 120.

 9        Q.   How many?

10        A.   Twelve pieces.

11        Q.   What else did you have?

12        A.   MD30 howitzers, 120-millimetres.

13        Q.   How many?

14             THE INTERPRETER:  122-millimetres, interpreter's correction.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Six pieces.

16             THE ACCUSED:  [No interpretation]

17             MS. WEST:

18        Q.   What else?

19        A.   And Weber 128-millimetres, four pieces, four.

20        Q.   What else did you have?

21        A.   That's it.

22        Q.   Did you have any multiple-barrelled rocket-launchers?

23        A.   That is it VBR, the last thing I mentioned, 128-millimetres, four

24     pieces of them.

25        Q.   Sorry, it says something different.  Thank you.

Page 29114

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West, if you don't mind could we take a short

 2     break of five minutes.

 3                           --- Break taken at 1.58 p.m.

 4                           [The witness stands down]

 5                           --- On resuming at 2.05 p.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  For the remainder of today's session, the Chamber

 7     will be sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis, with Judge Morrison being away

 8     due to his urgent personal business.

 9             By the way, could the Chamber move into private session briefly.

10                           [Private session]

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 29115

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We received some responses to

13     our motions for protective measures for witnesses that are coming up in

14     the month of November, and we would like to advise the Chamber that it's

15     going to be our practice to contact the witness after we receive the

16     response of the Prosecution to see if there's any further information

17     they wish us to provide to the Chamber; and if so, to seek leave to reply

18     so that you have that information.  So I would appreciate it if you would

19     give us a few days.  We expect we would file on Monday any replies, but

20     if you would hold off on making your decisions until we have had some

21     opportunity to reply and that would generally be our practice throughout

22     the case.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  That's been noted.

24             Let's bring in the witness.

25                           [The witness takes the stand]

Page 29116

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Ms. West.

 2             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3        Q.   Mr. Skrba, when we stopped we were speaking about

 4     rocket-launchers, and you indicated that your unit had four.  Can you

 5     tell us what was their purpose?  In what type of situation did you use a

 6     rocket-launcher?

 7        A.   They are rarely used and for them you need a lot of ammunition so

 8     that during the war we didn't use them much, perhaps once or twice, and

 9     that's all.  They're used solely to neutralise enemy personnel on attack,

10     infantry attack of course.

11        Q.   But nonetheless you had four; correct?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And you said you've used them once or twice.  Please tell us

14     about the two occasions when you used them.

15        A.   Once it was used by the JNA while they were still in Lukavica

16     before they left for Serbia.  I believe it was on the 3rd or 4th of May.

17     I didn't command or decide there.  And once or twice in 1993 we used them

18     in the direction of Mount Igman when we performed the operation

19     Lukavac 93.

20        Q.   And so in your memory you've now spoken about three situations

21     where they were used.  Is that the extent of your memory?

22        A.   Well, there were those three situations, otherwise during the

23     whole war they were used in only three situations regarding my positions

24     and my weapons.

25        Q.   And so we say regarding your positions.  Are we talking about

Page 29117

 1     those four firing positions you spoke about earlier?

 2        A.   Yes, yes.

 3        Q.   And did you have one at each of those firing positions or did you

 4     have -- or how were they spread out?

 5        A.   All the four were in one place as I marked on that last document.

 6     They were grouped in one place.

 7        Q.   In your statement at paragraph 24 you said:

 8             "On August 28th there were no 120-millimetre mortars and those

 9     mortars and those of larger calibre which were in my zone of

10     responsibility had already been relocated outside the city of Sarajevo."

11             In August of 1995 I understand your testimony is that

12     120-millimetre was located outside, but what about the smaller mortars?

13     Were they still within your area of responsibility?

14        A.   They were not in my area of responsibility.  They belonged to the

15     battalion.

16        Q.   But nonetheless there were smaller mortars within the area south

17     of Sarajevo?

18        A.   Battalion commanders deployed them and positioned them in their

19     area of responsibility.  I did not have insight either in their

20     deployment or their number.

21        Q.   Can you tell us generally what you used 120-millimetre mortars

22     for?  What was their best purpose?

23        A.   120-millimetres are mainly used to destroy personnel on slopes,

24     be it forward or back slants because it can land a shell from up high.

25        Q.   And can you tell us typically when you fired from 120-millimetre

Page 29118

 1     mortar, how many times did you fire?

 2        A.   It depended on the target and on the type of attack.  It also

 3     depended on the trajectory of the shell from the place it was fired to

 4     the target.  It could be one minute, two minute, five-minute distance.

 5     You could adjust that.

 6        Q.   But it would be -- would it be normal to fire only once?

 7        A.   What do you mean when you say "only once"?  You mean only one

 8     shell?

 9        Q.   Correct.

10        A.   Only rarely would it be one shell.  It would be one or two or

11     more.  Only if you had previously fired at the same target would you fire

12     just one shell in the second go, but normally before that you would have

13     to check all the firing elements.

14        Q.   Now, you said that they were mainly used to destroy personnel.

15     What type of ordnance did you mainly use to destroy buildings?

16        A.   Well, you would need tanks or Maljutkas for that or other

17     ordnance and other hardware, cannons.

18        Q.   Now, in paragraph 12 of your statement you said that:

19             "According to my knowledge, the SRK conducted exclusively

20     defensive actions."

21             So in other words, does this mean that you only fired in

22     retaliation to ABiH fire?

23        A.   Exclusively in response to the BiH army fire.

24        Q.   And so let's talk about that response time.  Can you tell us --

25     can you walk us through the process of your response.  When you're first

Page 29119

 1     fired upon, what was the first thing that you did?

 2        A.   The first thing was -- I received report from the observation

 3     post that fire was open on the forward line.  My observers would inform

 4     me about that.  And then directly from the brigade command, I would

 5     receive a report that in a certain sector an attack was either expected

 6     or was underway.  It would have been either an artillery or an infantry

 7     attack.  And when those two reports corresponded, then we determined the

 8     location of the target, the co-ordinates of the target, we calculated the

 9     elements, and the time that lapsed would be five, ten, or ten minutes.

10     And then if the shelling continued, then we would respond in order to

11     calm the situation down.  It would be one shell first, and then the

12     observers would observe and see whether that first shell fell where we

13     wanted it to fall.  If not, then we corrected our firing elements in

14     order to proceed.  In 90 per cent of the situations, we used only one

15     piece to fire our shell.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The intervention on the transcript.

17     The witness said:  We fired one shell in order to calm the situation

18     down, not only to correct the firing elements, but also to calm the

19     situation down and that was not recorded.

20             MS. WEST:  I believe it was, but we can go on.

21        Q.   So let's back up.  You said before you fired your first -- the

22     first response, about five or ten -- it would take about five or ten

23     minutes.  So there would be a short period of time before you retaliated;

24     is that right?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 29120

 1        Q.   And the first thing you'd hear about it would be from your

 2     observers; correct?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   And then you'd hear from the brigade command that there was an

 5     attack expected or underway?

 6        A.   Or I would inform them.  I would inform the duty officer in the

 7     command, because I had my observers so I knew what was going on, I would

 8     inform them and I would await instructions as to what to do next.

 9        Q.   So in other words, you would confirm that there had been a firing

10     and then you would determine the location of the target and then you

11     would retaliate?

12        A.   And I requested their approval.  I expected them to tell me what

13     to do, whether to respond with fire or to wait.

14        Q.   If we go to paragraph 14 of your statement, you talk a little bit

15     more about this, and there you say you took measures to not open fire on

16     civilians.  And then down in paragraph 16 -- and maybe we can have both

17     the B/C/S and English of paragraph 16, please.  You continue to talk

18     about that.

19                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

20             JUDGE KWON:  I'm told there's no B/C/S version, Ms. West.

21             MS. WEST:  May I have a moment, please.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, there's a draft statement that

23     has a B/C/S translation of this paragraph, but it's under a different

24     65 ter number.

25             MS. WEST:  And perhaps that 65 ter number might be 1D05641 for

Page 29121

 1     the B/C/S version.  I think it would be helpful if we could have the

 2     B/C/S version of this paragraph, please.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             MS. WEST:  Thank you.

 5        Q.   Sir, you see this in front of you as well.  On the left is your

 6     version and on the right is the English.  This paragraph begins:

 7             "We had standing orders to the effect that fire must not be

 8     opened on civilian targets in the city.  I, personally, and my unit

 9     during combat actions and when opening fire on military targets which

10     were in civilian zones took measures to reduce collateral civilian

11     casualties."

12             And then the next sentence is:

13             "For instance, if tank fire from the sector Velesici or Ciglane

14     was opened at us we would respond with proportionate fire at the place

15     from which the fire on our unit was opened."

16             Mr. Skrba, is this proportionate fire that you speak about in

17     that sentence, is that what you meant by measures, when you spoke about

18     the measures you would take?

19        A.   Well, yes, if they fired two or three shells we retaliated with

20     one or two shells in our turn, in order to stop them from proceeding with

21     their activities.

22        Q.   So if they -- and if they fired from a tank, you would return

23     with a tank fire?

24        A.   Well, our tank could not reach those places from which they

25     opened tank fire.  That's why I tended to use 122-millimetre howitzer

Page 29122

 1     instead.

 2        Q.   Okay.  I say "tank" because that's the example you use in this

 3     sentence, but if you -- if they fired with 122-millimetre how -- go

 4     ahead.

 5        A.   Well, they opened fire from Velesici and Ciglane from tank and

 6     from howitzers and they fired on our forward positions, and then if we

 7     did not return fire immediately they would just go on.

 8        Q.   Okay.  But let's go back to what we were talking about which is

 9     proportionate fire.  For example, if they fired from a 130-millimetre

10     cannon, would you fire proportionately with the same type of weapon and

11     the same number of shells?

12        A.   Madam, they didn't have 130-millimetre cannons down there in the

13     city.  It has to be told that they didn't, so we didn't retaliate with

14     that.  We didn't retaliate with that kind of hardware.

15        Q.   Thank you.  That's just an example, but the point I'm

16     making - and I want to make sure I understand what you're saying in your

17     statement - when you say proportionate fire, and you gave me an example

18     of them firing two or three shells and you firing back I think you said

19     first one shell and then you would follow-up, when you say

20     "proportionate," are you talking about the number of shells or the type

21     of weapon or both?

22        A.   One or perhaps two in order to stop them, in order to stop their

23     fire.  That's what I meant when I said "proportionate."  It was our way

24     of preventing them.  We would fire one or two shells to that location,

25     either to drive them away or simply to stop their fire.

Page 29123

 1        Q.   And when you speak about this in paragraph 16 and you indicate

 2     just before this you took measures to reduce collateral civilian

 3     casualties, it is this proportionate analysis you're talking about that

 4     you applied, isn't it?

 5        A.   Usually we would retaliate with one or two shells; however, there

 6     were also cases that, for example, from the military barracks, from the

 7     military hospital, or from the Kosevo Hospital that they opened fire from

 8     120-millimetre hardware.  We did not retaliate in those cases because we

 9     knew what kind of facilities those were and that also includes the

10     military hospitals in Marin Dvor and Kosevo.  We did not retaliate

11     against those because we were always afraid of inflicting major civilian

12     casualties if we had done that.

13        Q.   So is it your testimony that you have never fired at a hospital

14     in Sarajevo, that your -- the 1st Sarajevo Militarised Brigade never

15     fired at a hospital?

16        A.   That's correct and the answer is no.

17        Q.   And were there other targets -- or, excuse me, locations in this

18     city that you would consider completely off limits?

19        A.   I don't know how familiar you are with Sarajevo.  99 per cent of

20     the population around Sarajevo were Serbs and there were five UNPROFOR

21     teams who supervised every firing position, the positions where the

22     hardware was grouped and they monitored whether fire was opened from

23     there.  I can't tell you what was in Hrsaj [phoen], Brajlovici [phoen] or

24     Ilidza.  I can also talk about my area of responsibility.

25        Q.   So if we can go to paragraph 18 of your statement which talks

Page 29124

 1     about specific areas.  In paragraph 18 you said:

 2             "Of the military targets in the city under Muslim control I will

 3     list the following military targets in civilian areas ..."

 4             And then you list several places, Velesici, Ciglane, Bjelave,

 5     City Hall, Dobrinja, and Bistrik, and I want to now speak about those in

 6     particular.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West, could you leave five minutes at the end of

 8     today's session.  Thank you.

 9             MS. WEST:  May we have P5926, please.

10        Q.   So this is a map of Sarajevo that contains all six of those

11     locations.  And, sir, in front of you, you have a booklet, as everyone

12     does which for the record is 65 ter 23918 and if we can turn to that,

13     it's on the desk in front of you.  You'll also see it on the screen.  And

14     we'll have page 1 of this.  Sir, directly in front of you on the desk

15     underneath that map, take that off, there's a binder and I want you to --

16     yes, I want you to look directly at that.  This reflects five of the

17     areas that you spoke about in paragraph 18.  We see Velesici, Ciglane,

18     Bjelave, the down-town area and Bistrik.  And then if you turn to page 2

19     you mentioned a sixth place, and that will be Dobrinja.  Do these all

20     look accurately placed for you?  Does this look like an accurate

21     representation of where they were located?

22        A.   I don't see any of their firing positions anywhere here.

23        Q.   And you won't.  This is solely a map.  So we're going to go to

24     page 3 of this map, and this is a blow-up of Velesici.  And then if you

25     go to -- and so what we're on is 65 ter 23918 and we're on page 3, but I

Page 29125

 1     think everybody in the courtroom probably has it.

 2             Page 3 is Velesici and, actually, if you can just turn quickly to

 3     page 4, it's a satellite image of Velesici.

 4             Mr. Skrba, could you describe the general nature of the area of

 5     Velesici?  Was it industrial?  Was it residential?

 6        A.   Velesici is a residential area with family houses and apartments.

 7     In the northern part there is a small industrial area in the direction of

 8     the railway station.

 9        Q.   And were there also schools in the area as well to support the

10     residents?

11        A.   Most probably.  I can't remember there were, but I believe that

12     there were elementary schools there.  I can't remember where they were,

13     whether there were any and where they were.

14        Q.   Now, in your statement you mentioned a tank from Velesici.  I

15     think you now have it up on the screen in front of us.  Can you mark on

16     the screen where the tank was located.

17        A.   It's very difficult for me to get my bearings, although I'm a

18     good topographer.  It was somewhere above the tobacco factory, somewhere

19     in that region, but I can't see the tobacco factory marked here.

20        Q.   So, Mr. Skrba, as we continue I'm going to ask you for the

21     locations of all the things that you mentioned in paragraph 18.

22             MS. WEST:  And, Mr. President, may I make the suggestion that we

23     pause here, Mr. Skrba can take this with him, he can take a look at it,

24     and we can continue tomorrow.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I see no problem.  Thank you, Ms. West.

Page 29126

 1             Very well.  Mr. Skrba, we'll continue tomorrow and can I remind

 2     you that during the course of your testimony you are not supposed to

 3     discuss with anybody else about your testimony.  Do you understand that,

 4     sir?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, yes, I do.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  The witness can be excused.  Have a nice evening.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, we're continuing on Monday;

 8     correct?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, on Monday, yes.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Just, I didn't want the witness to think he was

11     needed tomorrow.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes, that's very kind.

13             Mr. Skrba -- okay.  Did I say "tomorrow"?

14             MS. WEST:  My apologies, I said "tomorrow."

15             JUDGE KWON:  We'll not be sitting tomorrow.  We'll continue on

16     Monday morning.  I hope you have a nice weekend.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18                           [The witness stands down]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, going back to your statement about

20     your potential reply to the Prosecution's response in respect to

21     protective measures, although I just said I noted your response -- your

22     statement, there are a couple of points that I find it difficult to

23     follow.  First, take -- please don't take it for granted that the Chamber

24     will allow your reply every time, but at the time when I heard your

25     statement I thought that there are -- there were new information in the

Page 29127

 1     Prosecution's responses, but I'm not sure that was the situation.  The --

 2     first of all, you should obtain all the information you -- when you filed

 3     the motion firsthand, and then unless there's new information that

 4     warrants your further reply then you can contact the witnesses and file

 5     further information.  But that should not be the practice, model

 6     practice, every time.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We understand that and we

 8     will endeavour and have endeavoured to get all the information from the

 9     witness at the beginning, but the Prosecution's responses have generally

10     been that more information is required and the motion should be denied

11     because inadequate information has been provided.  And so we want to give

12     the witness the opportunity to see if there's anything that they -- now

13     hearing from the Prosecution that they would like us to tell the Chamber.

14     We think that this is an important part of the process for witnesses,

15     because if you do deny the protective measures, as you've done every time

16     so far, we want them to have the opportunity or at least the feeling that

17     they got to say everything that they wanted to say before such a decision

18     was taken.  And particularly in some cases where we don't support the

19     protective measures, we think it's important that the witness's situation

20     be fully conveyed to the Chamber.  So that's -- you see we filed very,

21     very infrequent replies before this Chamber, but in this particular case,

22     while we will endeavour to get all the information in advance, we feel

23     it's important that the witness be given a full opportunity to bring

24     anything that they think is important to the Chamber's attention.

25             JUDGE KWON:  That's exactly the situation I was concerned about.

Page 29128

 1     You can expect the Prosecution's response to the effect that your motion

 2     was not supported with sufficient material, or et cetera.  You should

 3     prepare everything at the beginning -- in the beginning.  Please bear

 4     that in mind.

 5             Very well.  The hearing will be adjourned for the week and will

 6     resume next week on Monday.  Thank you.

 7                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.42 p.m.,

 8                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 22nd day of

 9                           October, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.