1 Monday, 12 November 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. I think we are hearing
7 French on English channel. I think it has been corrected.
8 Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.
9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I was also having some
10 volume difficulties, but I think those are resolved.
11 Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning, Your Honours and
12 everyone in the courtroom.
13 WITNESS: SAVO SIMIC [Resumed]
14 [Witness answered through interpreter]
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
16 Q. Good morning, Witness.
17 A. Good morning.
18 Q. In paragraph 15 of your statement, you note that the SRK was
19 mainly engaged in defensive operations and then provide a few details in
20 connection with that assertion. I wanted to ask you a few questions
21 about that.
22 First of all, you mention Lukavac 93 as the only offensive
23 operation that you recall, and in connection with our discussion on
24 Thursday before we adjourned, I wanted to call that up briefly.
25 MR. TIEGER: That's 65 ter 23948. And if we could turn to page 3
1 of the English and turn one more page in the B/C/S, please. And we'll
2 need one more, I'm sorry.
3 Q. And directing your attention to item 2, Colonel, we see that
4 among the objectives of Lukavac 93 was to prevent the unblocking of
5 Sarajevo and create conditions for its take-over. Correct?
6 A. Could we zoom in a bit, please, because it's not very legible.
7 The copy isn't very good.
8 First of all, the heading of the document says that it's the
9 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps document. I didn't see the year, whether it's
10 1993 or 1994. It wasn't quite clear --
11 Q. Colonel, if you need us to return to the front page, we can do
12 that. And I think for your purposes you'll want to read down to the
13 bottom of page 3 and up to the top of page 4.
14 MR. TIEGER: But let's go back to the front page so the Colonel
15 can see it.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's still not very clear, but
17 that's not a problem. Let's go back to item number 2.
18 MR. TIEGER: So return to page 3 of the B/C/S toward the bottom.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here it says the SRK acting
20 together with two brigades from the 1st KK has the following task: Mount
21 a decisive and active defence to prevent a breakthrough of the Muslim
22 forces on the axis Rajlovac-Rajkovica-Kiseljak.
23 Q. Right. And my question was whether or not one of the objectives
24 of Lukavac 93 was to prevent the unblocking of Sarajevo and to create
25 conditions for its takeover. So in that connection, if you could look to
1 the bottom of page 3 and then read on to the top of page 4 to confirm
3 A. It's clear that the offensive was to prevent the unblocking of
4 Sarajevo --
5 MR. TIEGER: And if we could go to the top of page 4, please.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And then -- yes, that was the SRK's
7 objective, prevent the unblocking of Sarajevo, and Lukavica 93 had this
8 objective, to join the SRK with the Herzegovina Corps in order to create
9 good links with the south and south-eastern part of Republika Srpska.
10 That was the purpose of Lukavica 93, and I -- it says prevent the
11 unblocking of Sarajevo and join up with the Herzegovina Corps.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. Okay. And I'll be asking you a couple of questions in a minute
14 about the joining up of that region of the country, but I'd like to move
15 on to something else.
16 MR. TIEGER: If I could tender this document, Mr. President.
17 MR. ROBINSON: No objection, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P5981, Your Honours.
20 MR. TIEGER:
21 Q. Now, Colonel, before the winter of 1992 there were efforts
22 undertaken to secure and -- in the terms of the -- used by the VRS,
23 liberate portions of what was considered to be Serbian territory; is that
25 A. Before winter 1992, as far as I can remember, there was an
1 attempt to liberate the road to Trnovo and to join up with -- the
2 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps with the Herzegovina Corps. But nothing
3 succeeded. Only Kijevo was liberated which is behind Sarajevo, behind
4 Krupac. But no one continued in the direction of Trnovo, so that action
5 wasn't successful as far as I remember. That was in the month of
6 November or December.
7 Q. By the beginning of the winter of 1992, there was -- the VRS did
8 not consider that it had great need for offensive operations because it
9 considered that it had achieved many of the military goals of the war and
10 that much of the territory that was sought to be liberated had, in fact,
11 been and was under control of the Bosnian Serbs; correct?
12 A. I don't know what the Main Staff of the VRS thought or the
13 political leadership of Republika Srpska. So I don't know how I could
14 answer that question.
15 Q. Let's turn to P01005 momentarily, please. Okay. And we can
16 turn -- this is a document dated the 9th of September, 1992. If -- it's
17 issued by the SRK command, as you can see, and it indicates at the bottom
18 of page 1:
19 "As winter is around the corner and for the most part we have
20 achieved the military goals of the war and do not expect major movements
21 of the front line ..." turn to the next page, "along certain axes in our
22 favour, which the commanders know ..."
23 And then there is an order in accordance with that assessment.
24 So, Colonel, this reflects the assessment of the SRK command that most of
25 the military goals had been achieved and therefore the need for further
1 offensive operations to obtain territory or for other purposes was no
2 longer what it had been; correct?
3 A. In the SRK from the beginning of the war until the end, the lines
4 didn't move on either of the sides. Only on certain axes the tactical
5 position of our forces were improved or the positions of the Muslim
6 forces. Since winter was approaching, it's obvious that this order was
7 issued so that the troops could prepare for the winter. The winters are
8 hard and cold in Sarajevo and it was necessary to protect the army from
9 precipitation and low temperatures. And as a result, shelters were built
10 and fuel was prepared for heating soldiers --
11 Q. Colonel, I appreciate your attention to detail but we'll move a
12 bit quicker if you can simply focus on my question. Just to give you an
13 indication of that, I'm focusing on your comment that the operations were
14 largely defensive and I wanted to get underneath that to see why, not to
15 identify the preparations were made for winter. But thank you.
16 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, I would normally have tendered that,
17 but it's in evidence, as you can see. I should note, however, that it
18 was admitted as a source document, so now I think it should be admitted
19 as any other document.
20 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for that notation. It will be done.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Q. And in connection with the objectives that P1005 refer to, it is
24 correct that by -- that the Bosnian Serb military forces controlled
25 approximately, if not more than, 70 per cent of the territory of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?
2 A. Well, probably, if that's what it says in the document. At that
3 time that was probably the case as far as the SRK is concerned. As far
4 as I know, in the field, from the very beginning of the war, the
5 positions changed very little on both sides in the Sarajevo area. So
6 there were no drastic changes when it comes to the positions of both the
7 sides concerned and the objective was to maintain the blockade and to
8 prevent the Muslim forces from breaking through from Sarajevo, and that's
9 what I spoke about on Thursday and I told you about what this related to.
10 Q. Now, Colonel, a moment ago you mentioned the interest in linking
11 up with the Herzegovina Corps. It was -- it is correct, isn't it, that
12 Lukavac 93 was aimed at, among other things, linking Herzegovina, the
13 other parts of Republika Srpska, and therefore having a contiguous or
14 unified or compact territory and thus achieving one of the broader goals
15 of the war; correct?
16 A. I think that the main objective was to establish a link between
17 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the Herzegovina Corps, to have better
18 communications between the south and south-eastern part of
19 Republika Srpska and this was also the purpose of support, to facilitate
20 command, and to make it easier for the VRS as a whole.
21 Q. Maybe we're talking about the same thing in slightly different
22 way, but in that connection let me turn to a couple of documents. First
23 D00568, page 4 of the English and of the B/C/S.
24 A. I apologise, but I can't read this document. I can't see
1 Q. We'll have that blown up for you in a second, Colonel.
2 A. It's fine now.
3 Q. Okay. And I'm directing your attention to what would be
4 essentially the second paragraph. I think you can see the reference to
5 Lukavac 93.
6 MR. TIEGER: And if we could split screen with the English so the
7 Judges can see it in English, please.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we be told what this is.
9 MR. TIEGER: Well, I'm surprised the accused doesn't know that
10 because he introduced it. It's a speech of Major-General Milosevic at
11 the ceremony of presenting war flags.
12 Q. And on that occasion General Milosevic said - and we can scroll
13 up on the English, please:
14 "Our entire struggle was somehow crowned by the 'Lukavac 93'
15 operation that took place in the area of Jahorina, Treskavica,
16 Bjelasnica, and Igman," et cetera, et cetera.
17 And then he goes to say:
18 "Soldiers were exceptionally motivated because we were achieving
19 our strategic goal and that was the linking of Herzegovina to other part
20 of RS because without that, we did not have a state."
21 MR. TIEGER: And similarly, I would like to turn quickly to
22 65 ter 10743, page 37 of the English and page 18 of the B/C/S. That's an
23 interview with -- lengthy serialised interview in "Nin" with
24 General Mladic in 1994.
25 And that is at page 18 of the B/C/S, page 37 of the English,
1 please. And toward the bottom, please, in English.
2 Q. Okay, Colonel, I think you'll see the reference to Lukavac 93 in
3 the middle of the page with the paragraph that begins: "From February
4 until 27 July 1993 ..." And there General Mladic continues discussing
5 Lukavac 93 at the -- we see at the bottom of the page in English.
6 "This made it possible to join Herzegovina territorially --" and
7 I'm quoting now:
8 "This made it possible to join Herzegovina territorially with the
9 Sarajevo-Romanija basin and to achieve another one of our strategic
10 aims - unification of the regions of Republika Srpska."
11 So, Colonel, I know when you were answering my question earlier
12 you were speaking in terms of linking up the corps perhaps from military
13 perspective, but it's correct, is it not, that one of the objectives of
14 Lukavac 93 was achieving this broad strategic aim of unification of the
15 regions of Republika Srpska?
16 A. I think that that is what I said, something to that effect.
17 Linking up, establishing a link between that part and the south part of
18 or the south-eastern part of Republika Srpska, creating such a stretch of
19 territory was an objective and it was also necessary to link up the corps
20 in order to co-operate, provide support, and so on and so forth. But in
21 any event, it was a matter of uniting ethnic areas where Serbs lived in
22 order to make communications easier, co-operate more easily, and to
23 maintain all communications, all linguist.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I would either tender that portion of
1 10743 or leave it to the Court if it considers --
2 JUDGE KWON: Given that it was read out, I'm asking you whether
3 it's really necessary.
4 MR. TIEGER: Well, I was noting that. I actually thought that
5 might be the Court's view, so I'm satisfied. Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. Colonel, let me move on to a different subject. At a number of
9 paragraphs in your statement, I think specifically 17, 20, and 29, you
10 address some of the circumstances in which orders to use artillery were
11 given and in which artillery fire was undertaken. So, for example, in
12 paragraph 17 you refer to opening fire based on requests from adjoining
13 1st Motorised Brigade units, pursuant to an order or approval by the
14 brigade or corps command on noticed artillery positions and enemy firing
15 positions. In paragraph 20 you referred to those situations when you had
16 to respond to observe firing positions -- to enemy fire from the town and
17 observe firing positions and your selection of the most precise weapon.
18 And in paragraph 29 you refer to the information that you acquired from
19 observers and the details you demanded when there were shots from the
20 depth of enemy territory, information that you say you required before
21 you would consider authorising return fire. You again emphasise that you
22 would select the weapon which was capable of the most precise fire. And
23 I wanted to ask you some questions in connection with those paragraphs.
24 First of all, by way of clarification, Colonel, when you referred
25 to authorising return fire or selecting the most precise weapon, which of
1 your roles that you described on Thursday were you referring to when you
2 gave such authorisation or orders? In which capacity were you
3 functioning when you referred to the circumstances reflected in these
5 A. I had the chief of the artillery of the Sarajevo-Romanija Brigade
6 in mind. I asked my subordinates, my professional subordinates, and they
7 also requested this from their own men and they acted in this manner too.
8 Q. And just so I understand exactly what you're saying here, are you
9 suggesting in any way that this was limited to your efforts and that what
10 you did was exceptional or anomalous or are you asserting that, as far as
11 you were concerned, this was -- this reflected what the corps obligations
12 and practices were?
13 A. I can speak for myself as chief of the artillery. I was
14 professionally responsible for the artillery in the 1st Sarajevo Brigade,
15 and this concerned my acts and the acts of my subordinates and this was
16 also requested by the command brigade. They requested this of me. When
17 I was an official of the artillery, I had a chief of artillery who
18 decided about everything. He was above me and I assisted him. I think
19 the same procedure remained in place, it didn't change at the time, that
20 concerns officials from the corps command and my chief of artillery.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I could just comment on the
22 transcript. It doesn't say: When I was an official in the corps.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Simic, do you confirm that, having said so?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. When I was an official
25 in the artillery organ of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. Let me follow-up on a few of the points you make in that
4 statement, then. First of all, you talk about selecting the most precise
5 weapon and I take it that would be from the list of weapons that you
6 provided earlier in your statement; is that right?
7 A. Yes, that's correct.
8 Q. All right. Well, I'd like to ask you, then, under what
9 circumstances you would use which of those weapons and what it was that
10 would make one of those weapons the most precise weapon on one occasion
11 but not the most precise weapon on another occasion. So let's start, for
12 example, with mortars.
13 A. What weapons I would choose depended on the target itself, on the
14 type of the target, the position of the target, as well as the position
15 of the artillery assets and units and where they were. Bearing in mind
16 the position of the target, the firing positions of the artillery
17 weapons, you would choose the unit and the weapon that would be more
18 precise in order to avoid unnecessary collateral damage and the
19 destruction of civilian facilities, i.e., to bring the precision to a
21 Q. Well, there seems to be a suggestion there that on some occasions
22 a mortar might be more precise, which I understand to mean more accurate
23 in this context, than a howitzer and on some occasions more precise than
24 a rocket, but on other occasions it would be different. Is that what
25 you're saying or are you saying something else?
1 A. If you are targeting at sheltered targets, if they're on the last
2 angle, it is impossible to target them with artillery weapons such as
3 howitzers and cannon. They would miss and those targets would not be
4 hit. A mortar is ideal for such targets.
5 Q. And by a sheltered target, I take it you do not mean a protected,
6 reinforced target, you mean something like a trench; correct?
7 A. No. What I had in mind was the configuration of the terrain. If
8 a howitzer fires at it from the other side of the slope, it would
9 overreach the target, whereas the mortar has a different trajectory and
10 that's why it's more accurate on -- in firing targets on the bottom part
11 of the slope as you're looking from our own positions.
12 Q. Well, let me ask the question in this way then: What types of
13 targets are mortars good for? What are they intended for?
14 A. Mortars are good to support our forward troops because they're
15 more accurate, whereas the targets in front of the forward lines were
16 mostly on the bottom part of the slope from our position and that's why
17 mortars were more accurate in targeting those targets that directly
18 threatened the positions of our units.
19 Q. Well, Colonel, mortars are generally speaking anti-personnel
20 weapons; correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Okay. They're not intended as heavy weapons to blow up
23 buildings; right?
24 A. No, that's not the intention. But they can be used to destroy
25 trenches and inflicting losses to the troops as well as the destruction
1 of some lighter structures belonging to the enemy side.
2 Q. But more specifically, for example, you wouldn't use a weapon
3 against, for example, a reinforced command post, wouldn't do much good;
5 A. It depends on the reinforcement of the facility, how well
6 reinforced it is. I wouldn't use mortars if shells are not supposed to
7 achieve any effect due to the level of reinforcement of such a facility.
8 Q. What about, for example, a sniper in a building, would a mortar
9 have any significant utility there?
10 A. I would never use those.
11 Q. Now, I -- by the way, I wanted to ask you one thing before we
12 began and that is: Looking at paragraphs 17, 20, and 29, there's an
13 emphasis on the -- returning fire or responding, as you said: When we
14 had to respond, in paragraph 29, to enemy fire at observed positions.
15 And then, of course, as I mentioned, in paragraph 29 you go on to discuss
16 the information that you considered necessary before returning such fire
17 to such locations. And I wanted to ask you if those -- if that
18 particular example reflected in those paragraphs reflects the only
19 circumstances under which you and, insofar as you're aware based on your
20 earlier answer, the corps considered it appropriate to use artillery
21 against targets in depth, that is, use artillery against targets in
22 Sarajevo. Was that it or was there more?
23 A. I never used artillery in depth, i.e., in Sarajevo, unless our
24 positions were threatened by their mortars and by their artillery from
25 the city. They would skillfully position those in various
1 positions - and that's in my statement, I don't need to go over that
2 again. They were very skilful at positioning their firing positions next
3 to the facilities which were supposed to be protected, i.e., which were
4 not supposed to be targeted, because they knew that if there was no
5 pressing need, we would not open fire on such positions and that was
6 indeed the case. On several occasions while I was the chief of
7 artillery, I sought approval from the brigade commander to open fire on a
8 firing position and that was denied several times; rather, I would be
9 told: Wait, maybe it would die down, order your troops to seek shelter,
10 and that was communicated to our troops. In other words, I was not given
11 approval to open fire on such positions although we suffered quite a
12 number of losses from such fire -- from the fire opened from those
14 Q. Okay. So you began by directly answering my question but didn't
15 quite complete it because you say you never used artillery in depth, that
16 is, in Sarajevo unless your positions were threatened. And I take it to
17 mean that unless there was -- there had been outgoing fire from those
18 positions or there was outgoing fire from those positions at the time
19 that you considered whether or not to use artillery?
20 A. This is precisely what I said. We didn't open fire on enemy
21 positions from which they had fired until it was really absolutely
22 necessary to do so, but in that we also bore in mind that we had to
23 reduce the number of civilian casualties to a minimum if we opened fire
24 on such positions.
25 Q. So command posts, communications centres, places where --
1 barracks, places where people assembled, police stations, factories,
2 those kinds of things, those were not targets unless somehow, according
3 to you, fire was launched from that facility?
4 A. Those are all legitimate military targets. They could be
5 targeted, and if there was an ongoing combat those were targeted. Their
6 units that were being assembled, lined up, their command posts, their
7 communication centres because the main goal was to incapacitate the unit
8 for further combat. Their rear units, supply units, their depots, all of
9 those were legitimate military targets that could be targeted. However,
10 we had to have precise information about those targets and we did. We
11 knew that they had been precisely identified.
12 Q. Well, Colonel, do you consider the fact that something has a
13 military aspect, such as the facilities -- some of the facilities I
14 mentioned before, means that it can be shelled under any circumstances?
15 Once you identify the fact that it has a military aspect, as you say, it
16 becomes a legitimate military target and can be targeted?
17 A. I have just told you that legitimate military targets in combat,
18 i.e., in mutual engagement, we targeted them because they were legitimate
19 targets and they could be fired upon. I don't see any ambiguities here.
20 Q. What information did you require before targeting, that is,
21 before firing mortars, howitzers, rockets, whatever it was in the
22 particular circumstance against such structures or facilities when there
23 was what you call combat?
24 A. We received information from the intelligence organ of the
25 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps about the deployment of certain elements of the
1 combat order of the enemy forces. We would record that on our maps. We
2 had all the prepared elements for those targets, but we continued
3 observing the sector in order to establish whether the facility was
4 properly described, for example, as a command post. If we could observe
5 the movement of vehicles and troops and if we could monitor through our
6 surveillance means that that was indeed a target that we could fire
7 upon -- so if there was fire, we knew exactly what we were targeting at
8 and where the position in question was.
9 Q. I take it that when you refer to "combat," you're referring to --
10 you say "mutually engaged." So you're referring to fire coming -- it
11 being exchanged between the VRS and the forces of the ABiH?
12 A. Yes, that's correct.
13 Q. And not necessarily from the particular facility that was
14 targeted -- that was ultimately targeted by the SRK?
15 A. I'm afraid I did not understand the last portion of your
17 Q. Well, from your statement, as I mentioned earlier, one could --
18 well, one I think could only get the impression that the only fire into
19 Sarajevo occurred when there was outgoing fire from a particular position
20 and it was only that particular position when it was -- when it fired,
21 when it was observed, and when your observers provided you with some sort
22 of specific information about it that it was fired upon. But now I
23 understand you to be saying that once there was what you called combat,
24 that all of -- that all kinds of facilities were open for shelling .
25 A. No. I didn't say that all the facilities were open for shelling.
1 I mentioned just legitimate targets containing command posts, observation
2 posts, communications centres. Not all the facilities. I'm talking
3 about legitimate targets, legitimate military targets, that's the
4 facilities that I mentioned. I did not have in mind any of the civilian
5 facilities in the town. I did never -- I never said that we could target
6 just any facility.
7 Q. Colonel, I'm sorry if it sounded like I was mis-characterising
8 your words. I realise that that's not what you were saying a moment ago.
9 My point was that the statement suggests that you would only fire
10 where -- fire at locations where fire had been taken. Now I understand
11 from what you're saying that once fire came from the city that there
12 were -- that other targets that you considered to be legitimate military
13 targets then could be fired -- then could be and were fired upon.
14 A. The brigade commander, if we are referring to the period when I
15 was the chief artillery in the brigade, the brigade commander decided on
16 what facilities would be fired upon, i.e., it would be the commander of
17 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps who did that. I opened fire on the observed
18 enemy targets from the positions where the fire had come from, and both
19 commanders had a list and were aware of the deployment of their forces,
20 the deployment of the targets, and they could issue an order to fire upon
21 those legitimate military targets.
22 Q. Now let me ask you about such orders. Would it be -- when such
23 orders came, did they identify specific military targets, that is,
24 specific buildings or facilities or objects, or did they simply identify
25 a particular area of the city which should be shelled?
1 A. First and foremost, it would be the type of target. For example,
2 the brigade command post, the corps command post, the division command
3 post, the observation post of such and such unit, the firing position of
4 that unit, the communications centre of that unit, the type of target was
5 specified in order to select the type of weapons to use. And after that,
6 the part of the city, i.e., the position where that target could be
7 found. I have already told you that we had information about all those
8 targets from before, and if we were told to open fire on the command post
9 of the division, we knew in advance where that command post of that
10 battalion could be located. And that's how we prepared fire and that's
11 how we carried out our firing activities.
12 Q. Can we agree that it would be inappropriate and, indeed, illegal
13 to simply order firing at some general area?
14 A. I'm not aware of any such orders. I don't know if there were
15 any. I never received any such orders, orders to that effect.
16 Q. You appreciate that doesn't quite answer my question; right?
17 A. I would consider this to be illegal. Firing upon a city without
18 a specific target, that would be inflicting terror on the civilians, on
19 the population of the city of Sarajevo. I myself never did that. I
20 myself never received an order to that effect.
21 Q. Let me return for a moment to the precision of the weapons. You
22 had talked about mortars and alluded to the difference in use against
23 potential targets between a mortar with high trajectory and a howitzer.
24 Let me ask you about rockets and multiple-barrel rocket-launchers. Under
25 what circumstances did you consider them to be the most precise weapon
1 for use including potential use in depth?
2 A. Multiple-barrel rocket-launchers, for example, are suitable to
3 open fire upon surface targets, targets on the surface. They cover a
4 larger surface of the enemy target. We used multiple-barrel
5 rocket-launchers to open fire on targets mostly during Lukavac 93, on
6 Igman, in front of the forward defence lines of our forces if the
7 position of our weapons were suitable for firing upon such targets, for
8 example, if we were on the flank slope or the forward slope, and this was
9 done because they were very precise and they have an elliptic trajectory
10 and there were no aberrations and their shells were dispersed a little
11 and that's why we chose targets that could be fired upon from such
12 weapons. Those would be targets of -- on the surface, not sheltered. A
13 multiple-barrel rocket-launcher is not intended for destroying
14 facilities; it is intended to destroy manpower in an open area or
15 manpower in trenches which are not covered.
16 I've already told you about mortars. Howitzer also, they could
17 target any target in depth, save for those that were on a rear slope.
18 But it depended on the position of our own weapons and on the position of
19 the enemy trenches, whether they could target targets in front of the
20 forward slope or not. It all depended on the conditions on the ground.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Colonel said: Manpower is being
22 destroyed while attacking our forces, and this was not recorded.
23 MR. TIEGER: Okay. That can be checked.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Simic, do you confirm that?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I said in the course of the
1 enemy attack as well as in trenches with light cover or with no cover at
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Colonel, under what circumstances, if any, would you consider
7 rockets to be an appropriate weapon in -- to be deployed against a
8 densely populated urban area or in the context of a densely populated
9 urban area?
10 A. I am not aware of any such case. I never opened fire on densely
11 populated areas. I don't know of any such cases. I don't know of any
12 cases when multiple-rocket launchers were deployed in a densely populated
14 Q. Would that be different for individual rockets as opposed to
15 sending off a salvo of ...?
16 A. Individual rockets, guided or semi-guided, 9K11, they could be
17 used against individual targets.
18 Q. But not rockets like the 122 Grad or the 128, those would not be
19 appropriate, correct, for use against a densely populated urban area?
20 A. I didn't use them, so I don't know, especially I don't know
21 anything about Grad. I had a multiple-rocket launcher in the brigade. I
22 don't know whether fire was opened from the other weapons that you
24 Q. You mention in your statement - and you emphasised it again
25 today - that you considered that the ABiH forces used mobile weaponry,
1 such as mobile mortars. Those -- that weaponry I think by
2 definition - as you indicated - is intended to be used and then to move
3 locations as quickly as possible; right?
4 A. Yes, that's right.
5 Q. And so, first of all, how did you distinguish between a shell
6 that had been fired from a mobile position or a fixed position. And,
7 secondly, did you fire back against mobile weaponry; and if so, for what
9 A. As we observed from our observation posts, we established that
10 they had mobile mortars. They used railway tracks along the railway
11 below the tobacco factory in the direction of Alipasino Polje. There was
12 a railway track over there and on the railway track they positioned
13 mobile mortars. We observed that they opened fire from one position,
14 then they would move the weaponry, and they would fire from a different
15 position. They had firing positions prepared in advance and they had
16 their targets prepared in advance. They needed little time to move their
17 weapons and to take position and open fire. When we established that, if
18 they opened fire from one position, if they fired one or two shells from
19 there, we knew it would move because we knew where it would move to and
20 we were waiting for them to appear there and that's where we opened fire
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On the next position where it was
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. And what --
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Simic, I take it your answer was not properly
2 reflected in the transcript. Do you confirm what Mr. Karadzic said?
3 Could you clarify, Mr. Simic?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can. We fired at the
5 following position in the direction of its movement because we had
6 already discovered which position would follow. It wasn't just one,
7 there was several of them.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 MR. TIEGER:
10 Q. What information did you require about the area where the
11 intended fire or the target of the intended fire was to take place? You
12 spoke about observers and requiring particular information. What kind of
13 information was that, apart from the location of the fire you say? What
14 else did you need to know before you would launch a shell or a series of
15 shells? And let me give you a particular example. You spoke in your
16 statement about mortars positioned on buildings. So let's take that as a
17 context, what information did you need?
18 A. We had organised observation posts at elevated positions around
19 Sarajevo. I have already said in my statement where those posts were
20 located and there were observers who had their areas of observation and
21 they had been trained. For their work they had optical sights, laser
22 devices to measure distance, equipment for observation, laser devices to
23 establish distance, devices to determine the target where it was in
24 relation to the observation post. They had good communications, safe
25 communications, with the unit command, or rather, the brigade command
1 that they were subordinated to.
2 These artillery observers informed about the nature of the
3 target. A mobile mortar, for example, from a certain sector, from roofs
4 as you mentioned, these observers observed the positions throughout the
5 day, they were at the post continually, they had shifts, and they would
6 easily observe any changes in their areas of observation. They would
7 notice if a building had been hit when they saw a flash, for example, and
8 then suddenly they would see that something was missing. They would
9 observe that location and then they noticed that the tiles were being
10 removed from the roofs, that you could just put a barrel through a hole
11 so that it could be fired and then you would see a flash and then the
12 hole would be closed as soon as it had fired. And that is how we
13 established that we were dealing with a mortar position.
14 As to whether the house was inhabited or not, whether there was
15 anyone there or not, well, they were responsible for the fact that they
16 didn't take into account where they placed their firing positions. I and
17 my subordinates never allowed civilians to walk around firing positions,
18 and especially not children. Boys, 13, 14 years old are curious, they
19 want to see weapons, but we did not allow children to approach firing
20 positions. In case of enemy action, we didn't want any civilian
21 casualties. And they had to take care of their own civilians, as far as
22 I'm concerned. This was a matter of directly putting civilians at risk.
23 Q. What about the use of artillery, that is, the use of shelling,
24 intended to punish the population of Sarajevo for the fact that firing
25 had taken place from within Sarajevo? Was that a lawful or appropriate
1 military tactic?
2 A. We never had the intention of firing on civilians or punishing
3 civilians in Sarajevo. We always took care to protect civilians, to
4 avoid civilian casualties, and to avoid destroying civilian buildings.
5 We never wanted to do such things in the course of shelling. As I have
6 already said, I think that firing positions were deliberately established
7 by the Muslim army in the vicinity of facilities that should have been
8 protected. They thought that in this way they were protected.
9 Q. Now, you said that in your statement before, Colonel. I wanted
10 to know if it was illegal to use shelling against Sarajevo in order to
11 send a punitive message that the -- that any further military manoeuvres
12 or outgoing fire should not take place?
13 A. I never received such orders and I'm not aware of any such orders
14 having been issued in order to punish the civilians, in order to open
15 fire on facilities in the town without there being any need to do so.
16 Q. And you never heard of the use of massively disproportionate fire
17 back into Sarajevo - and by that I mean two or three outgoing shells and
18 dozens and dozens and dozens of incoming shells from the VRS into
20 A. No, I never heard about such cases. I didn't do such things
21 because we didn't even have enough ammunition. We had to save ammunition
22 because in the second part of the war, the Muslim forces had far more
23 ammunition and they fired on Serbian positions far more than the Serbian
24 artillery on their positions.
25 Q. I wanted to ask you about a couple of other matters. We recently
1 heard evidence from a former member of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised
2 Brigade who explained to the Trial Chamber, among other things, about a
3 road that was held within VRS-controlled territory but which was
4 "constantly under fire" and therefore "under control of the BH army."
5 That can be found at transcript pages 29189 through 90.
6 Am I correct that this tactic, that is, keeping a road under --
7 constantly under fire, is something that's referred to generally as fire
8 control and were you familiar with that approach to the use of artillery
9 by either of the ABiH or the VRS?
10 A. Yes, if you're referring to the Hresa-Vogosca road. It's the
11 only road and link to the south and south-western [as interpreted] part
12 of Sarajevo, Serbian Sarajevo at the time. I know that that road was
13 under sniper fire from the Muslim forces in several areas and also it --
14 mortars fired on it. There were casualties. It was difficult to use
15 that road to get to Vogosca, Ilijas, Ilidza, and so on and so forth. The
16 Muslim forces frequently fired on that road.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have a comment on the transcript.
18 The witness said "north-west" not "south-west."
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Simic, probably it's about the Hresa or
20 Hresa-Vogosca road is the only part linking to the south and
21 south-western part of Sarajevo. Is it correct?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] North-west, north and north-west.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. I didn't direct your attention to the use of fire control on any
1 particular road. I'm just asking if you're familiar with the concept
3 A. Yes, I am.
4 Q. And am I correct that that's something that would be appropriate
5 or lawful in the context of a road that was -- a communication road that
6 was outside the city and controlled by the opposite side's forces but
7 would not be lawful in the context of a road in a densely populated urban
9 A. Yes, that's correct. It wouldn't be correct to fire on a densely
10 inhabited area. All the streets, all the roads, are used by the
11 inhabitants, by civilians, so it wouldn't be lawful to fire on the
12 civilians, to fire on those streets; and we didn't act in this way.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, for planning purposes, the Chamber has
14 been requested to take a break at 10.15, that is now, for some technical
16 MR. TIEGER: Okay, Mr. President. Thank you for letting me know.
17 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at
18 quarter to 11.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 10.50 a.m.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Harvey.
22 MR. HARVEY: Mr. President, Your Honours, before we continue, may
23 I just please introduce Mr. Alex Friede, who has been working with my
24 team now since August of this year and has been an invaluable member of
25 the team. Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.
3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
4 Q. Colonel, this Trial Chamber has received extensive evidence from
5 UNPROFOR personnel, military observers, international negotiators,
6 journalists, various citizens, and others that, contrary to what you've
7 told us about the practices of the VRS in connection with the shelling of
8 Sarajevo, that the Bosnian Serb military forces engaged for months and
9 years in the specific shelling of civilian areas, the random shelling of
10 the town including civilian areas, random shelling not intended for any
11 specific point target, and the existence of punitive shelling by pounding
12 the area. Now, against that backdrop, I wanted to inform you that I want
13 to take you to certain documentation, contemporaneous documentation,
14 reflecting what was happening at the time.
15 First of all, we discussed the issue of punitive firing earlier
16 and you provided an answer about that. So in connection with that, I'd
17 like to turn to P01041.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, while we're doing that, I want to
19 object to the comment that Mr. Tieger made in which he purported to
20 inform the witness about testimony that's been given at this trial.
21 Since it was not accompanied by a question, I think it is the kind of
22 improper type of comment that you frequently chastised Dr. Karadzic for.
23 MR. TIEGER: All right. Let me ask a question in that case. I
24 just wanted to move on, but that's fine.
25 Q. Colonel, were you aware of the fact that internationals within
1 Sarajevo present day after day after day were observing what they
2 considered to be punitive fire, disproportionate fire, firing at civilian
3 areas, and a random fire not intended at any point target? Did you know
4 about that?
5 A. Mr. Prosecutor, in my statement I said that UNPROFOR officers at
6 the artillery positions of the brigade group -- well, they were there
7 from the end of June 1992 up until the end of the war. They were on duty
8 day and night at the command position of the mixed artillery battalion
9 and they were accompanied by an interpreter. At the same time, these
10 UNPROFOR were aware of the following. If it was necessary to retaliate,
11 to open fire, to fire in the depth of the enemy territory, they were
12 informed of the type of the target concerned, of the position from which
13 artillery was firing on the target, and they were also informed on the
14 number of shells fired on the target. And they then sent reports to
15 their superiors, to the command, to the superior central - I don't know
16 how to call it - and if they reported objectively, and I don't doubt that
17 that was the case -- well, they were immediately informed of all cases of
18 fire being opened and of what was done. So there's nothing that can be
20 They immediately submitted reports after action had been taken.
21 They asked for co-ordinates for the firing positions. They heard about
22 this two days later, they found out about all the positions, and from
23 that command position they could see from which positions fire was being
24 opened, they listed the weapons, everything was under UNPROFOR control.
25 They had co-ordinates on the targets and information on the nature of the
1 target. As to whether they reported on action against our position, not
2 only our firing positions but the positions of our units, if they were
3 providing support, well, I don't know about that. Perhaps there was some
4 other team that was responsible for such cases.
5 Q. So do I understand you correctly that it's your position that
6 when UNPROFOR or other UN officials complained, as they did repeatedly,
7 to VRS officials about the firing on civilians or civilian neighbourhoods
8 or civilian objects, that they were in a position to know exactly what
9 they were talking about?
10 A. I don't know what sort of complained they filed with the VRS
11 command. I do know that they were informed on our artillery action
12 because all the artillery positions around Sarajevo are checked by them.
13 They were at some positions day and night and others were visited. They
14 knew where our positions were, they could hear where action was being
15 taken from, and they could visit the positions and check things. But at
16 the artillery positions of the 1st Sarajevo Brigade, the brigade
17 artillery, they were present there 24 hours a day with an interpreter.
18 And they were immediately informed of any fire being opened on the unit
19 being -- on the unit opening fire on the target being fired on and on the
20 reasons for which this was done.
21 Q. You said you didn't know what complaints they made. Does that
22 mean that there was no occasion on which your corps commanders notified
23 his personnel that there had been specific complaints by UN officials
24 about the shelling of civilian areas and demand to know what was going
1 A. I know that a request was made for a report from the superior
2 command after the Vase Miskina case, after Markale I, after Markale II,
3 and so on and so forth. This concerned about whether a unit took action
4 and which unit, so the dates of these events are known. UNPROFOR had to
5 make a note of the positions from which fire was opened, if fire was
6 opened from certain positions. So I'm familiar with certain incidents
7 that occurred in town and the superior command requested a report from
8 subordinate units, a report on whether fire had been opened from certain
9 artillery positions.
10 Q. Now, a few moments ago, at page 28, you said there's nothing that
11 can be concealed. Isn't it a fact, Colonel, that a concealment and
12 deception of UNPROFOR and the internationals was undertaken repeatedly by
13 the SRK to mask their intentions, to hide their weapons, and generally to
14 be able to do what they wanted to do despite the presence of the
15 international community?
16 A. When I said nothing was concealed, well, at those positions even
17 if you wanted to hide certain things, it wasn't possible. If you fire an
18 artillery shell from a howitzer, from a gun, if you fire a shell from a
19 mortar, this cannot be concealed. It's not a rifle bullet that doesn't
20 allow you to determine where it was fired from. So if they were on duty
21 in the immediate vicinity of those firing positions or at the command
22 post of the battalion, they were immediately aware of what was going on.
23 We can't say we didn't open fire if the firing position is 200 metres
24 away. So how shall I put it? That would have been crazy. It wasn't our
25 intention to conceal anything. We immediately informed them of
1 everything. Even if we had wanted to, we wouldn't have been able to
2 conceal anything, but I'm not saying that the corps command wanted to
3 conceal anything and to deceive UNPROFOR. It wasn't possible to do that
4 and we didn't have such an intention.
5 MR. TIEGER: Let's turn to P1670, please.
6 This reflects an order dated the 21st of August, 1994, from
7 General Milosevic. And let's turn to the second page in the English.
8 And that refers to an order for the immediate removal of anti-aircraft
9 guns and relocation to new firing positions where they will be
10 camouflaged and sheltered. In item 4 [sic], order that all the heavy
11 weapons in the 20-kilometre zone around Sarajevo be camouflaged and
12 hidden. Move weapons through the 20-kilometre zone only in accordance
13 with the orders so that if the need arises for such movements, they would
14 be concealed from UNPROFOR forces.
15 Turn also in that connection to P00847, which reflects a
16 February very urgent order, February 9th, 1994, to be precise, from the
17 Main Staff, specifically from deputy commander General Milovanovic,
18 ordering the movement of artillery, mainly inoperative weapons, from
19 certain positions and indicating that the commanders of the corps shall
20 put the inoperative weapons unconditionally at the disposal of, and then
21 there's an illegible commander, in order to disguise our intentions. And
22 then if the cease-fire agreement is signed, these inoperative artillery
23 pieces could then be removed while the current basic weapons could remain
24 for use.
25 And finally if we could turn quickly to D00312. Page 7 of the
1 English, please, and it's item 5 of the B/C/S which will be at
2 approximately -- you see the -- keep scrolling through the B/C/S, please.
3 There it is.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can this be zoomed in? Thank you.
5 MR. TIEGER: And if we could go to the next page of the B/C/S.
6 Right, and it's toward the bottom of that paragraph.
7 Q. This is an analysis of combat-readiness. This was tendered by
8 the Defence. And at this particular part of the analysis it indicates
10 "UNPROFOR observers and units have been stationed near our
11 positions; they have been observed closely in order to prevent them to
12 come to our positions and collect intelligence data."
13 Colonel, contrary to your suggestion that there was never any
14 intention on the part of the command to deceive UNPROFOR or the UNMOs in
15 any way, there was a willingness, interest, and effort to do so; isn't
16 that right?
17 A. Mr. Prosecutor, about the first document, that document refers to
18 anti-aircraft defence weapons. It would be the chief of the
19 anti-aircraft defence in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that is -- was in
20 charge of that. At that time I was the commander of the mixed
21 anti-artillery regiment and my weapons were on positions also under the
22 control of UNPROFOR and they were inactive. So I wouldn't be able to say
23 anything about the first document.
24 As for the last paragraph in the last document under number 5, as
25 far as I understand it says that in the course of the war, not a single
1 unit of ours has been taken by surprise by the infiltrated enemy DTGs,
2 and I believe that this concerns the DTGs. This doesn't concern
3 UNPROFOR. The intention is to prevent DTGs to come in contact with our
4 troops. This does not apply to UNPROFOR. It does not apply to
5 preventing UNPROFOR from coming to our positions. I think this is the
6 way to understand it.
7 I'm not familiar with any order. No order arrived at my position
8 to conceal my artillery. When I was in charge of artillery during the
9 periods that I mentioned in the statement, all that artillery was under
10 control of UNPROFOR forces from day one to the last day. There are
11 reports to that effect which can easily be verified.
12 Q. Let me make sure I understand you clearly, Colonel, do I
13 understand you, then, that your position is that you didn't hide your
14 weaponry but you're not in a position to know what others did?
15 A. That's correct. I did not need conceal anything. What I had was
16 on display. At the beginning of the war, when UNPROFOR arrived in
17 June 1992, we displayed everything to them, they made a record of
18 everything, and the weapons could not be moved from those positions.
19 When we did move them, the UNPROFOR knew from what position to what
20 position, they knew and they immediately established that those were the
21 weapons that they were aware of. They had the serial numbers and they
22 could check them at any moment. Those were not rifles that you can put
23 on your shoulder and move them as you wished. Those were heavy artillery
24 weapons and UNPROFOR inspected our positions and our weapons every day.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to slow down
1 when answering questions. Thank you.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. Colonel, I don't know if you received this in B/C/S, but you have
4 been asked to slow your rate of speech down so the interpreters can keep
6 A. Very well.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What the witness said has not been
8 recorded. They could also see whether the weapons had been approached or
9 not. The witness said that and it was not recorded.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Simic.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.
12 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Approached by who, Mr. Simic?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The crews. If fire had to be
14 opened, crews would approach those weapons and the UNPROFOR knew about
15 that, they were informed about that, and they could observe that
16 themselves. Howitzers were not moved every day from one position to the
17 next. We did change firing positions from time to time, and UNPROFOR was
18 made aware of that.
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. Colonel, let's return to where we were before we discussed
21 briefly the issue of concealment and that was the issue of the
22 contemporaneous documentation bearing on the question of the nature of
23 the artillery fire against Sarajevo.
24 MR. TIEGER: And I had just asked before we moved to the issue we
25 just discussed to call up P01041 and I'd ask that that be called to the
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can this be zoomed in, please.
3 MR TIEGER:
4 Q. This is an intercepted telephone discussion involving
5 General Mladic on the 25th of May, 1992, and General Mladic says:
6 "If a single bullet is fired at you or at 'Jusuf Dzonlic'
7 barracks or at 'Marsal Tito' barracks, or if a single soldier is wounded,
8 either at the front or in the barracks, I will retaliate against the
10 And he goes on to note that "Sarajevo is going to shake."
11 And, Colonel, I put it to you that contrary to your suggestion
12 that there was no punitive fire or at least that you claim not to have
13 been aware of it, that from the outset of the war, at this very -- from
14 the very early stage of the war, that was a feature of the shelling of
15 Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serb forces.
16 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I still claim -- I was a battery commander at
17 this time when this document was drafted. I never communicated with
18 General Mladic; I was not in a position to do so. So I don't know
19 whether he ordered any such thing. I cannot say anything about this
20 document. No order from anybody arrived at my address to retaliate
21 against the city and to punish civilians. So my firing positions were
22 never involved in any such thing. No such thing was ever done from my
23 firing positions.
24 Maybe General Mladic did say that in order to avert the attention
25 of the other side, to warn them, to make them stop firing at our
1 positions. At that time in June, a major enemy offensive was launched
2 from the city. Maybe that's why this order was issued. I can only
3 speculate what General thought when he said that because no such order
4 ever reached me.
5 Q. Well, there are a number of ways possibly of being aware of
6 whether or not this position articulated by General Mladic on the
7 25th of May came to fruition or not. So let me show you a couple of film
8 clips to see whether or not that happened, and then I'm going to ask you
9 how it was that you weren't aware of whether or not General Mladic's
10 threat that Sarajevo would shake came to pass or not. So if we --
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would it be fair on the witness to
13 show him the entire document.
14 JUDGE KWON: I think it's for you to take up that issue later on
15 in your re-examination.
16 Let us continue.
17 MR. TIEGER: Okay. And I'd like to look at P931 and P932 ,
19 [Video-clip played]
20 "Every night in Sarajevo you think it can't get worse, but it
21 does, making a mockery of the attempts of mediators to bring peace to the
22 city which is enfolded in war" --
23 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, shall we stop here. Now I note that
24 the B/C/S translation has started. Let's continue -- or shall we begin
25 again? I think that's fair.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 "Every night in Sarajevo you think it can't get worse, but it
3 does, making a mockery of the attempts of mediators to bring peace to
4 this city which is enfolded in war.
5 "Less than 24 hours earlier, the Serb commanders had put their
6 signatures on yet another agreement affirming a truce never adhered to
7 and their readiness to re-open the airport. Now the Serb gunners in the
8 hills show where their true commitment lies. Under a sickle moon, the
9 city rocks to the explosions.
10 "Lit up by fire and the mass of glowing sparks adrift across its
11 roofs" --
12 JUDGE KWON: Shall we stop again? I don't think -- did you hear
13 the translation, Mr. Simic?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not a single word of the
16 THE INTERPRETER: May it be noted that the interpreters have not
17 been provided with the transcript of the video-clip.
18 JUDGE KWON: I think it was translated into French but not into
19 B/C/S. I'll leave it to you, Mr. Tieger.
20 [Prosecution counsel confer]
21 JUDGE KWON: Can I confirm with the B/C/S booth whether it was
22 impossible to translate without the transcript?
23 THE INTERPRETER: The B/C/S booth confirms this.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: Okay. I'll try to proceed without it. We can
1 get -- meanwhile maybe we can -- in case its turns out to be necessary on
2 the responses, we'll move to get it to the translators if we can do that
3 within two minutes. Meanwhile I think I can proceed without it.
4 Q. Witness, you saw the images. This is a broadcast of the
5 7th of June, 1992, and it refers to the firing of shells from Serb
6 gunners in the hills and that this night-time firing indicates that a
7 mass of glowing sparks, sparks drifting across roof-tops, et cetera. And
8 I don't know whether or not you could actually hear the shells being
9 fired, but I presume you could. Let me try to move on to a shelling that
10 took place on the 9th of June, two days later, and that's P932.
11 [Video-clip played]
12 "No district spared.
13 "All shaking as every ten seconds the rocket shells and mortars
14 land. The fire so heavy, so incessant, that the deadly streams of light
15 crisscross each other."
16 JUDGE KWON: Let us stop here again. If this is not translated,
17 it's fair to play it without sound because the English transcription is
18 transcribed in the LiveNote.
19 MR. TIEGER: Well, I think we need the sound for the sounds of
20 the shells, if no other reason, and I'm -- if necessary, I'll wait the
21 minute or two to get to the booths so this can be translated.
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
23 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
24 JUDGE KWON: So --
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies --
1 MR. TIEGER: And --
2 JUDGE KWON: Could we come to this issue later on because the
3 transcription could be provided to the booth very soon.
4 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.
5 Q. I'm going to return to that video momentarily, Colonel.
6 Meanwhile, I want to bring your attention to a couple of other issues,
7 and that's the issue of -- of specific targets versus shelling areas and
8 scattering shots around the city. So in that connection I'd like to turn
9 to P0518.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The B/C/S booth has now
11 received the transcript of the second video.
12 Could the same courtesy be extended to the French booth, i.e.,
13 they need a transcript as well. Thank you.
14 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, P0 -- I'm sorry, P01518, my apologies.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Zoom in.
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. Again, this is General Mladic, this time on the 28th of May, now
18 discussing where to fire of the artillery into Sarajevo with
19 Mirko Vukasinovic. And as you see, General Mladic tells him: "Shoot at
20 Velesici, also at Pofalici, there's not much Serb population there." And
21 then tells him: "Shoot there, around Dobrovoljacka Street, up around
22 Humska," and they talk about Djure Djakovica Street. And then
23 General Mladic explains:
24 "Apply artillery" -- it's translated as "reconnaissance" here,
25 the word may be closer to "observation" or "monitoring," "so that they
1 cannot sleep, that we roll out of their minds ..."
2 All right I'm going to show you two more quickly along the same
3 lines. Next 1511.
4 General Mladic again, this time on the 29th, this time speaking
5 to Mr. Potpara. And he says:
6 "As soon as the motherfuckers attack you, fire at them. Can you
7 hit the railway station?"
8 He says:
9 "Hit them with something and scatter them around."
10 And finally P1521. If we can turn the second page of the English
11 and the second page of the B/C/S.
12 General Mladic again, again with Vukasinovic, telling him to fire
13 at Velesici and then asking: "Can you also shell Bascarsija?" And when
14 he receives an affirmative answer from Vukasinovic saying: "Fire a salvo
15 at Bascarsija as well."
16 Now, Colonel, I've just shown you three reflections of the kind
17 of shelling and targeting that was going on. First of all, it's true,
18 isn't it, that those documents reflect the shelling of areas and not
19 point targeting ordered by General Mladic?
20 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I just told you a little while ago, according to
21 what I know, I did not receive any such orders. You see who this applied
22 to, you see what firing positions this applies to. They were never under
23 my control, I was never in command of those, I never received any such
24 orders. If there are documents to that effect, I suppose that such
25 orders were issued; however, you can see from Colonel Vukasinovic's
1 answers, we responded, i.e., they returned fire. They fired upon the
2 firing positions from which they had been fired at.
3 That was the end of May and the beginning of June. This was a
4 major offensive by the enemy troops, and I just heard on the clip the
5 cannonade of shells but there was nothing less happening in Lukavica, so
6 it was an exchange of fire on both sides. I'm sure that civilians did
7 get hurt, that civilian facilities did get destroyed, but the culprits
8 should be sought on the other side. According to what I know, it was not
9 our intention to fire -- to shell the city just for the firing sake.
10 Velesici is mentioned here. You shouldn't forget that the Serbian
11 population from Velesici had been expelled and slaughtered. Only small
12 groups managed to break through, and I believe that the audio was to the
13 effect of firing at Velesici because of that, because that population had
14 experienced an exodus in the months of May and June. They had to flee
15 from the territory of Velesici.
16 And here they mentioned targets, the railway station. And from
17 the sector of the railway station not only mortars fired but also tanks
18 and cannons, weapons of a longer range. So the target was not a railway
19 station -- the railway station but a military target in the vicinity of
20 the railway station. This means that those were responses to the enemy
21 offensive that was launched at the time. Fire was opened in order to
22 protect the Serbian population that was pulling out from Zuc, Velesici,
23 and Hum, and other sectors. And I underline once again, according to
24 what I know, and you have to bear in mind that I never received such
25 orders, you can see which units this applied to, and you know what units
1 I was responsible for and you can conclude whether I was in a position to
2 know about this. As for the firing and the cannonade of shells, this was
3 just our response.
4 And now you actually brought me down the memory lane. And now I
5 remember everything that I had to go through in 1992, all the terror, all
6 those horrific things that I experienced.
7 Q. Well, in that connection then let me return to P932 for which
8 there is now a transcript in the booth --
9 JUDGE KWON: Before that because -- Mr. Simic you tried to
10 explain General Mladic's position. I'm asking this. Shall I upload
11 P1511, the previous intercept where Mladic was indicating to hit the
12 railway station, and you explained to us the reason why Mladic was
13 ordering to hit a railway station. But after that he -- Mladic said -
14 could you zoom in a bit further - "Hit them with something" and he
15 continued saying "and scatter them around."
16 What does it mean, "scattering them around"? Why did he need to
17 scatter the shells around? Could you explain that as well, Mr. Simic?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what he had in mind,
19 but I think that they are thinking about the target that they're firing
20 on in the vicinity of the railway station. First he didn't say
21 "destroy," destroy, disperse them so that they stop acting from that
22 sector. I don't know what General Mladic had in mind, but in my opinion,
23 that is what it would be.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.
1 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
2 Q. Colonel, I had asked to play P932 in response to your suggestion
3 that you didn't know whether Mladic's threat that the town would shake
4 had transpired or not. So let me play that again for you.
5 [Video-clip played]
6 "No district spared.
7 "All shaking as every ten seconds the rocket shells and mortars
8 land, the fire so heavy, so incessant that the deadly streams of light
9 crisscross each other. By early Monday morning, the inundation of the
10 hospitals begins. For the doctors and the nurses of the city's former
11 military hospital, already up throughout the night, the beginning of a
12 dark, grim day, the like of which they've never known. Trained fingers
13 which for 24 hours will work without respite, to stem blood, extract
14 jagged metal, preserve life. But so many casualties of" --
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Colonel, you had a chance to see both 931 and 932, the shelling
17 that took place both on the 7th or the broadcast that took place
18 reflecting the shellings that took place. Those broadcasts were on the
19 7th and the 9th. I suggest to you that you would have been well aware of
20 the fact that General Mladic's threat to make the town shake had, indeed,
21 occurred .
22 A. Mr. Prosecutor, as far as I can see from this clip, the first
23 person wounded who was shown here, 30 or 40 years old, wasn't a civilian.
24 I think he had a military boot on his foot, so he was a military target
25 and he was wounded. This happens, one is wounded or killed in war.
1 Unfortunately, there were civilian casualties too. I think the second
2 image showed a boy. Unfortunately, these such things happened too
3 because it's an urban settlement, an inhabited settlement.
4 I won't forget the cannonade of the Muslim artillery in May 1992.
5 I'll repeat that, their intention was to breakthrough the city as soon as
6 possible and to take up positions around the town. That was their
7 intention, their objective, at the time. Hundreds, thousands, of shells
8 hit the surrounding villages. We also sustained casualties at our
9 positions and in particular in villages, in settlements where there were
10 no firing positions, but they fired at random on those targets. So there
11 was fire in retaliation and there were probably civilian casualties.
12 That's what I can say about this. I do remember the period of May and
14 And if I could just add another sentence, I know that during that
15 period I couldn't sleep for two nights, for example. In the course of
16 the day I tried to find half an hour to have a bit of a rest because they
17 were continually requesting support for the forces at the front line not
18 to target the town because these forces hadn't fortified themselves
19 correctly and hadn't secured the line. So it was necessary to maintain
20 the positions that had been taken at the very beginning, and they were
21 maintained until the end of the war and perhaps there were very minor
22 movements forward or backwards. It doesn't mean that they were at rest,
23 that they were inactive, and that we targeted them; that is not the case.
24 Q. You referred to thousands of shells from Muslim artillery. Are
25 you suggesting to this Court, Colonel, that there was basically parity in
1 the amount of weaponry, amount and nature of weaponry, between the ABiH
2 and the VRS at this time and that the shelling by the ABiH was equivalent
3 to or greater than the incoming fire to Sarajevo by the VRS? Is that
4 what you're saying?
5 A. As I have already told you, at the beginning we had more
6 equipment but they soon consolidated themselves and obtained ammunition
7 and weapons. The Viktor Bubanj barracks, the Marsal Tito barracks,
8 Jusuf Dzonlic were abandoned, all of these were abandoned. A column in
9 Dobrovoljacka was cut off in army command. Weapons were taken away. In
10 the Marsal Tito barracks quite a few artillery pieces remained and the
11 school -- moved it from Zadar to the Marsal Tito barracks, 115-millimetre
12 howitzers remained there, tanks, 122-millimetre howitzers, Gvozdiks,
13 personnel carriers and mortars -- a number of mortars remained there. So
14 it's not as if they were unarmed. From the very beginning they fired on
15 us from tanks and cannons and this gradually grew more and more
16 intensive. There were flame-launchers and perhaps an Oganj, but I'm not
17 sure. All of these things were in the Marsal Tito barracks. They
18 remained in the Marsal Tito barracks when the JNA left the barracks.
19 Q. Let's turn to P2668 and see how General Milosevic characterised
20 it in July of 1995.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It doesn't say Gvozdik or
22 multiple-rocket launcher or flame-launcher, perhaps. Oganj is also not
23 included in the transcript so the transcript is not quite correct.
24 MR. TIEGER: Let me just point out these kinds of interventions
25 for the transcript I know are not going to -- I think we're all
1 accustomed to the fact when the speaker is moving quickly, the transcript
2 doesn't always immediately reflect those remarks and that's, as I
3 understand it, remedied through a process after court. But I'm at the
4 Court's disposal for that. I just don't know how many interruptions are
5 useful when we have a speaker who is going on for a long period of time
6 in a fast manner.
7 JUDGE KWON: I -- I note there are several phonetic marks, so I
8 take it that that will be taken care of by the court reporters.
9 Do you confirm, Mr. Simic, having said those things referred to
10 by Mr. Karadzic?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I said multiple-rocket
12 launcher, flame-thrower, I'm not sure about the Oganj. I also mentioned
13 the Gvozdik and the howitzers, the 122 -- the D-30 as well. I didn't say
14 the D-30 but I had that in mind, too. They're the Gvozdiks that are
15 120-millimetre -- that have 122-millimetre calibre as well. So I
16 mentioned all of these items.
17 JUDGE KWON: Again, given that everything you say is to be
18 translated, please slow down in answering the question, Mr. Simic.
19 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER:
21 Q. Colonel, I told you we wanted to look at a warning issued by
22 General Milosevic in July of 1995 to the brigades, and if you look at the
23 beginning of paragraph 4, we see that General Milosevic says:
24 "While we used massive artillery at a time when the enemy had
25 just a few mortars and the occasional gun, we did not manage to settle
1 the war ..."
2 That's a reference to the period in 1992, including the period
3 we've just been looking at, Colonel, isn't it, and a reflection of the
4 fact that there was a dramatically disproportionate array of weaponry at
5 the disposal of the two forces?
6 A. I'm not disputing the fact that it was disproportionate at the
7 beginning of the war. I said this on two or three occasions. At the
8 beginning of the war that was the case, but gradually they armed
9 themselves in various ways. Certain witnesses will testify about this
10 after me, witnesses who are familiar with how they obtained weapons and
11 ammunition. I only heard about this and wouldn't want to go into it.
12 Q. Who are those witnesses, Colonel?
13 A. Well, I say there will probably be witnesses from those areas who
14 will be called here, that will probably be the case, perhaps brigade
15 commanders who controlled the passage of convoys of alleged humanitarian
16 aid, of what was supposed to be humanitarian aid. But amongst the
17 humanitarian aid they would find ammunition and weapons and so on and so
18 forth in their areas of responsibility. I heard about that, there was
19 such cases -- I only heard about it so I can't confirm this, but there
20 will probably be someone who personally experienced this. I don't know
21 who these witnesses will be, but I assume that they will include brigade
23 Q. Well, let's look at some of the other things that
24 General Milosevic had to say to the troops in 1995. He notes in the
25 first paragraph that for the first time, for the first time, we are faced
1 with the fact that on top of having the advantage in manpower, now the
2 enemy has an advantage of artillery. And then he goes on in the second
3 paragraph to note the following:
4 "Despite being aware that we are facing problems in ammunition
5 production, especially of specific types, we are continuing with this lax
6 behaviour and are spending ammunition as if we had it in abundance,
7 trying at any cost to outfire the enemy artillery. That is why we very
8 often fire at inhabited settlements and specific buildings when there are
9 no combat actions whatsoever, spending vast quantities of ammunition,
10 without paying attention to the fact that we will not have anything to
11 stop the enemy when it comes to mounting a decisive defence."
12 And then he goes on in the third paragraph to note roughly --
13 essentially the same thing, expressing that it is inexplicable that some
14 brigades are spending much more ammunition firing at inhabited
15 settlements where there is no combat than others who are repelling fierce
17 Now, contrary to your suggestion earlier, I think at page 24,
18 that there wasn't the massive use of artillery against Sarajevo by the
19 VRS because of a lack of ammunition, General Milosevic confirms precisely
20 the opposite, that the SRK was expending vast amounts of artillery and
21 doing so against inhabited settlements where there were no combat
22 actions. That's the reality, isn't it, Colonel?
23 A. Mr. Prosecutor, all artillery units had to face up to this lack
24 of ammunition. They tried to save ammunition. In 1995 I was an official
25 in the artillery organ and I visited the positions. I gathered
1 information with regard to the amount of ammunition available and I
2 conveyed orders from the chief of artillery and from Commander Milosevic
3 according to which ammunition should be saved. Only well-observed
4 targets should be fired on if fire could be adjusted. This was in order
5 to save ammunition and to be as effective as possible. There are
6 probably cases, as stated in this document, where certain troops spent
7 more ammunition than necessary and they probably targeted targets that
8 they shouldn't have. I can't say whether this was the case or not, but
9 the general did issue warnings and said that it was necessary to save
10 ammunition, to use ammunition sparingly.
11 Q. I had asked you earlier about both offensive operations and I
12 wanted to turn quickly to P5940. This refers to the Talis 2 operation in
13 1995, and again, Colonel, this would appear to be an offensive operation,
14 indicating that the VRS forces shall continue fighting further to the
15 Main Staff directive with the objective of seizing the Lukavac
16 village-Siljak-Mocevici village line. So would this be another offensive
18 A. This isn't an offensive operation. It's an offensive action, the
19 purpose of which is to improve the tactical position in Lukavica and
20 Siljak sector and so on and so forth. That is where the Muslim forces
21 moved our positions back in the direction of Trnovo and this order in
22 particular concerns improving the tactical position in the Zlatiste
23 sector, the Debelo Brdo and Brajkovac sector, so that's to the south or
24 south-east of Sarajevo, roughly speaking. So it concerned improving the
25 tactical position, moving the line by a hundred or 200 metres, even less
1 in certain areas, perhaps 50 metres in certain areas. So that order
2 concerned the 9th of May, 1995. It's not a matter of operation. That
3 would include all the brigade -- all the corps brigades which would have
4 different tasks. Here it says improve the position, take back positions
5 at Siljak, Proskok and so on and so forth, and take Debelo Brdo,
6 Brajkovac, Rajlaca [phoen].
7 Q. The order also refers to placing a major part of Stari Grad under
8 fire control with the objective of ultimate victory. Now, I asked you
9 questions about fire control earlier and you indicated that it would not
10 be lawful or appropriate in the context of an urban area.
11 A. As I understand it, you said that most of Stari Grad should be
12 placed under fire control. In order to control their fire, it was
13 necessary to improve the tactical position of our forces so that we could
14 control their fire coming from the inside because that part of town on
15 Zlatiste was a road that was targeted by snipers and mortars from their
16 positions. This was continually the case. In order to establish control
17 over that road and control the fire they opened from the inside -- well,
18 I think that's what we had in mind not to establish fire control. We can
19 establish fire control, or rather, we can control matters. It doesn't
20 mean we will fire. To have control and to open fire doesn't mean the
21 same thing.
22 Q. So you can have fire control without fire? Is that what you're
23 trying to say?
24 A. You can have control. In order to prevent them from taking
25 action, we can have control over the town. We can observe it without
1 taking action, without firing on the town if fire isn't opened from the
2 other side. Since we knew where our positions were and a breakthrough
3 couldn't be achieved, they wouldn't try to do anything if they didn't
4 believe that they could be successful in their attempt, if they didn't
5 believe they could attain their objective.
6 Q. Well, how are you going to convey the message that they can't be
7 successful in their objective if there is a moratorium on any fire in
8 order to achieve fire control?
9 A. If you mean the ban on opening fire, the Serbian forces never or
10 almost never broke the truce. They weren't the first to do that. This
11 was always done by the other side in order to provoke the units of the
12 VRS, to provoke them to react, and they did this deliberately. This was
13 the case from the very beginning of the war. Even if there were
14 negotiations on moving the artillery at the time, if there was anything
15 that was to their benefit --
16 Q. No, no, Colonel, stop -- please --
17 A. Very well.
18 Q. I apologise for that, but I'm asking you about this particular
19 order and this particular effort toward the objective of achieving
20 ultimate victory. And I'm not going to ask you another rhetorical
21 question. I'm going to put it to you more directly that this was an
22 order to achieve control over Stari Grad through the use of artillery
23 fire in the same manner as the fire-control discussion we had before
24 about keeping a road under fire control by firing at it constantly.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see item 4 in the English
1 version --
2 MR. TIEGER: Wait, wait, wait --
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- item 4 that the Prosecution is
4 referring to now.
5 JUDGE KWON: Are you referring to para 4, Mr. Tieger, or
6 number 2?
7 MR. TIEGER: It's also in -- I directed the witness's attention
8 to para 2. It's also in para 4 with the same language.
9 JUDGE KWON: Well, then it's fair to show para 4.
10 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
11 JUDGE KWON: It's here now but not in English.
12 Do you remember the question or shall I ask Mr. Tieger to repeat
13 his question?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, paragraph 2 and
15 paragraph 4 show quite clearly what Mr. -- what General Milosevic said.
16 Mount a decisive defence of the positions obtained and improve tactical
17 positions and breakthrough to certain elevations above Sarajevo in order
18 to establish control over Sarajevo, the Stari Grad that you're talking
19 about, in order to gain control and to have a better view of that part of
20 the town. That's what he has in mind. He doesn't mean establish
21 artillery control. To control and to open fire is not the same thing.
22 In paragraph 4 it says: I have decided to use the main units of the
23 corps to mount a decisive offence of the positions and to breakthrough to
24 Debelo Brdo and Grdonj. These are hills above Sarajevo. It's not in the
25 town; it's above the town. One of the places is near
1 Lukavica-Zlatiste-Pale road and the other near Hresa-Vogosca road. So it
2 was necessary to establish control of those hills that were making it
3 difficult to use those roads. That's what it says quite clearly in
4 paragraph 2 and paragraph 4 in this decision from the corps commander. I
5 don't understand what is not clear here.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. So your -- Colonel, your testimony is that the -- that
8 establishing -- the language establishing fire control is not a reference
9 to artillery use but instead a reference to the physical control of roads
10 above Stari Grad?
11 A. It says achieve control of the Stari Grad, achieve firing
12 control. It doesn't say the artillery. It says we should be able to
13 control that part, that the road is practicable. We need to control that
14 part. It doesn't say fire on the Stari Grad from artillery and infantry
15 weapons. It says place under control, it means establish control over
16 the situation and have an advantageous position, which would be the case
17 if we took those elevations. So it was an offensive action, not an
18 operation, because it was in a small part of the front. That's where the
19 action was taken. It has nothing to do with an attack launched on
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I just suggest something. In
22 the document it says "shallow," but the transcript never uses this term.
23 The Colonel often mentions shallow incursions. It's not a breakthrough,
24 it's an incursion.
25 JUDGE KWON: I think that's again a subject for you to take up in
1 your re-examination. I think we can continue.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. And, in fact, Colonel, the person responsible for fire control of
4 Stari Grad -- well, first of all, let me -- there were no military
5 targets in Stari Grad that you named in your statement, were there?
6 A. As far as I can remember, from the very beginning of the war,
7 from Bistrik and from the other side of Sedrenik and from that sector,
8 mortar fire was opened on Serbian positions in Miljevici, Lukavica,
9 Grbavica, as well as Mrkovici and Kresa and so on and so forth. In other
10 words, I remember that there were such things. At the end of the war, in
11 1995, they provided support to their forces from those areas; in other
12 words, there was mortar fire opened from Stari Grad, from that part of
13 the city.
14 Q. And I'm referring in particular to paragraph 23 of your
16 And as it happens, Colonel, the person responsible for placing a
17 major part of Stari Grad under fire control was the deputy chief of
18 artillery, you; correct?
19 A. I could not be responsible for placing Stari Grad under control.
20 I could not be the deputy chief of artillery. I was a desk officer in
21 artillery. It must have been somebody above me. When it comes
22 specifically to this operation on Debelo Brdo, Rajkovac, I was
23 responsible. Probably the chief of artillery was absent. So I was
24 not responsible for placing Stari Grad under control but on that
25 particular axis, Zlatiste-Kula and an elevation which is specified in the
1 order, on that axis - I could show you that on a map if you have one - in
2 the Rajkovac sector I was responsible for that. I was not responsible
3 for placing Stari Grad under control. It doesn't specify so in the order
4 nor was I responsible for that.
5 Q. Colonel, because of the time I want to move on to the issue of
6 air bombs which you address in paragraphs 21 through 22 of your
7 statement. And in that statement you appear to be a proponent of the
8 precision and accuracy of air bombs, emphasising that the weapons were
9 very precise, just like standard artillery weapons. In terms of
10 direction, there was almost no deviation in relation to the recorded
11 elements. First of all, I wanted to ask you what you -- what your
12 experience was with air bombs. You note in your statement that you
13 personally observed the effects of a modified air bomb twice. That's in
14 paragraph 22. Apart from those instances, what other experience or
15 responsibilities did you have in connection with air bombs?
16 A. Mr. Prosecutor, what I stated under 21, I would like to repeat
17 that the first time I encountered an air bomb was in the second half of
18 1994. That was the first time I came across modified air bombs and air
19 launchers. That was the first time I observed their activity on the
20 forward line of the enemy in Nisici plateau. Based on that experience
21 and based on my second experience in the Trnovo sector, I don't know when
22 that was, I believe that it was either in November or December, before
23 the final cease-fire was agreed, that was the command post of the
24 81st Infantry Battalion of the Muslim forces. And based on those two
25 instances about the behaviour of the weapons during fire, they hit the
1 target that I requested, I saw the weapons at the time which could not be
2 made by laymen but by professionals. They possessed everything else that
3 the other classic artillery weapons had, optical sights, mechanisms for
4 moving the launcher in height, and that also required trained crew and
5 that's how targets were hit. I don't know whether there were any other
6 experiences. I don't know. I shared with you my experience, my personal
7 experience, and what I saw and I claim that with full responsibility. I
8 don't know if there were any other different experiences in other areas;
9 I wouldn't be able to tell you about that.
10 Q. Okay, Colonel, the question was: Apart from seeing air bombs
11 used twice, did you have anything else to do with them? And then you
12 proceeded to tell me again, as is contained in your statement, that you
13 saw them twice and then you repeated most of what is contained in
14 paragraphs 21 through 22. My question was: Apart from that, did you
15 have anything to do with air bombs?
16 A. As far as I can remember, no. I was not in charge, I was not
17 involved, nor was I able to be involved in any shape or form with that
19 Q. And let's be clear about what we're talking about when we're
20 talking about air bombs, though I think some aspects of your statement
21 make clear. In paragraph 22 you identify the reason why you think air
22 bombs came into use and that was because the VRS had them in stock. It
23 wasn't possible to use them in the conventional way by dropping them from
24 airplanes. And it was a handy way to compensate for some of the -- of
25 what you referred to as the classical artillery ammunition the VRS
1 lacked. So what we're talking about here is basically this, that you're
2 talking about bombs that are intended to be dropped from airplanes;
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. With huge explosive potential?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. VRS is unable to deliver them with airplanes and so it devised a
8 way to deliver them in another manner and that was by using rockets to
9 propel them?
10 A. Yes, rocket engines from a launch pad. That's how they were
11 launched and that's how they were able to hit targets, something to that
12 effect, yes.
13 Q. How were the rockets affixed to the air bombs in order to get
14 them to the -- to get them to wherever the alleged target was?
15 A. It was not a rocket -- an air bomb became a rocket. It was
16 rendered capable of becoming a rocket. A rocket engine was attached to
17 the back of the air bomb, there was a stabiliser attached to that, and a
18 certain quantity of rocket gunpowder which was activated by electricity.
19 An air bomb, when it became a rocket, was attached -- it was affixed to a
20 launch pad. There was a device that held it to the launch pad. When it
21 was activated, the fuel was activated, and that's what propelled the air
22 bomb which became a rocket because it had rocket propellant and that's
23 how it could fly all the way to the target. If you had all the tables
24 where the professionals had calculated how far the rocket would fly and
25 with which quantity of fuel, that's the elements that we took into
1 account, the length. And there is also the classical targeting because
2 there were devices for moving the launcher in height and precision tools
3 for targeting. So there was no difference in sights or setting up
4 targets, but just the fuel. The air bomb would become a rocket if
5 provided with --
6 THE INTERPRETER: The witness is speaking too fast.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Simic, interpreters noted that you are speaking
8 too fast. Could you repeat from the part when you referred to: "... air
9 bomb would become a rocket if provided with ..." from there. After you
10 said: "There is no difference in sights or setting up targets, but just
11 the fuel," could you repeat from there.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well. The Prosecutor asked me
13 how that rocket was affixed to the air bomb. It was not that the rocket
14 was attached to the air bomb, but in factual terms the air bomb became a
15 rocket when a rocket engine was attached to the rear of that bomb and it
16 had rocket charge and that changed its purpose and it was no longer an
17 air bomb but a rocket. That's what we can call it. Although we did not
18 call it a rocket because it was launched in a similar way as any other
19 rockets in multiple-rocket launchers called Plamen and Oganj.
20 MR. TIEGER: All right. Let's take a look at 65 ter 40099.
21 [Video-clip played]
22 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
23 "The detachment devised and in practice proved the application of
24 utility in sabotage uses. The 21st Detachment for the first time used
25 the mobile rocket-launcher."
1 May it be noted that the interpreters were not provided with a
2 transcript of this video.
3 "An exceptional fire-power of the detachment reflected in the
4 ability to launch 18 shells and 152, 57-millimetre rockets."
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. All right. Colonel, is that one of the ways in which air bombs
7 became -- as you put it, became rockets?
8 A. Yes. That would be the way. However, I never saw such a
9 launcher with five launching pads. I never saw that. I saw just the one
10 with the one launch pad. I suppose that the sabotage detachment of the
11 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had that, but I never saw it. This is about
12 57-millimetre rocket-launcher. I'm not familiar with this weapon, but
13 that's how it was done. A rocket engine was affixed to the air bomb and
14 that's how an air bomb became a rocket, if we're talking about air bombs.
15 I believe that my explanation, the way I provided it, is very much
16 reflected in the video-clip that we have just seen.
17 Q. In addition to screwing a rocket into the back end of an air
18 bomb, were rockets also affixed to air bombs -- to larger air bombs by
19 welding them -- welding a number of rockets, that is, three or four, to
20 the body of the air bomb and launching it in that fashion?
21 A. I don't know anything about that. It's a technical issue how
22 things were affixed to each other. Maybe you should ask the experts who
23 were involved. I only know that it was indeed affixed, that it was
24 placed on the launch pad, one air bomb, and that's how it was activated,
25 just as we saw in the video-clip, by electricity. As far as I know,
1 nothing was affixed -- nothing else was affixed to air bombs because any
2 additional element, if you added anything else to the rocket that would
3 have a bearing on its accuracy. The air bomb would become heavier, the
4 elements from the table would not correspond to its properties, and it
5 would become inaccurate. It would not hit the target. The tables did
6 not envisage attaching anything to that air bomb, just the rocket fuel
7 could be affixed to it and that was all that was envisaged by firing
9 Q. Okay.
10 MR. TIEGER: I tender that video, Mr. President.
11 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
12 JUDGE KWON: Do you know the source of it or -- and the timing,
13 Mr. Tieger?
14 MR. TIEGER: Yeah, I do have that somewhere, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it with the understanding that they will
16 be forthcoming later on.
17 Let's give the number.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, that's Exhibit P5982.
19 [Prosecution counsel confer]
20 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Mr. President, just a little guidance on the
21 timing of the break. Do you want to go till 12.30 and then -- or do you
22 want [overlapping speakers] --
23 JUDGE KWON: How much -- I'm sorry, I was overlapping.
24 MR. TIEGER: Yes, I won't finish by 12.30 in any event, so I'm
25 entirely in the Court's hands on that.
1 JUDGE KWON: We'll take a break at 12.30 --
2 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
3 JUDGE KWON: -- if it is okay with you.
4 MR. TIEGER: That's fine.
5 Q. All right. So, Colonel, I understand that you don't have any
6 particular understanding of or grip on the use of air bombs that involved
7 more than one rocket? You don't deny that that -- that those were used;
8 you're just not familiar with it?
9 A. Yes, that's correct.
10 Q. Now, with respect to the use of a single rocket stuck into the
11 back end of an air bomb, let me ask you this question: Is it your
12 position that -- well, first of all, before I get to that, let me ask you
13 something about the optical -- the built-in sighting mechanism that you
14 referred to and the lack of deviation from any elements. Now, I'm not
15 sure precisely what you were referring to as the built-in sighting
16 mechanism because that may involve a term of art. Are you referring to
17 the device that's affixed to, for example, both a mortar at the top of
18 the tripod and also a rocket-launching system so that the firing table
19 calculations can be -- so you can adjust the elevation of the launcher
21 A. Yes, precisely. The sighting mechanism is for aiming at targets;
22 without it, you would just shoot, aim for nothing. We had a sighting
23 mechanism in order to hit the target. We wanted not only to fire the
24 bomb but also to hit the target. That's why there was sighting
25 mechanisms. You could -- they were similar to sighting mechanisms on a
1 mortar. You could apply elements to them, you could set your target, and
2 there were devices like on the classical mechanisms on the lower part of
3 the launcher to adjust the elevation and to adjust the trajectory. I
4 don't have to be familiar with any specific weapons, but when I come to a
5 new weapon, when I see that it has all of those elements, when I have a
6 trained crew, then I use that piece of weaponry just like any other
7 classical piece of weaponry. You do your corrections and so on and so
8 forth. The air bombs were precise, they did not deviate much, they had a
9 rocket engine that could stabilise it throughout flight just like a
10 rocket in a multiple-rocket launcher.
11 THE INTERPRETER: The witness is speaking too fast.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Simic, interpreters were not able to keep up
13 with you again. Could you slow down and repeat your question -- repeat
14 your answer, please. From -- they stopped after they translated you
15 saying that:
16 "The air bombs were precise, they did not deviate much, they had
17 a rocket engine that could stabilise it throughout flight, just like a
18 rocket in a multiple-rocket launcher."
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.
20 I'm trying to speak slowly; however, they were accurate, as I have just
21 told you, because they had rocket engines and stabilisers that they had
22 allowed them a stable flight. There were no -- there were no deviations
23 in trajectory, just like in rockets that were launched from
24 multiple-rocket launchers. When it came to distance, it had a similar
25 dispersion picture as a rocket. It -- targets were over-targeted or
1 short-targeted but not much. The deviations were marginal.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that the second
3 element -- there are two targeting elements, one is distance and the
4 other is direction, and I don't see that this has been recorded properly.
5 The direction has not been recorded properly. It was omitted from the
7 JUDGE KWON: Did you say that, Mr. Simic, those two elements,
8 distance and direction?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. I was talking about
10 direction where there were marginal deviations, if any at all, and there
11 were also marginal deviations when it came to distance so the target
12 could be either short-targeted or over-targeted but only marginally.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Okay. So the process with the air bombs that you assert you're
16 familiar with, that is, the ones where the rocket was screwed into the
17 back end of an air bomb, was that the -- the relative co-ordinates of the
18 target would be identified, then someone would open up the rocket firing
19 tables to find out the elevation that should be used to achieve that
20 distance, then would use that device you talked about to elevate the
21 launcher to the correct number of mils as indicated by the rocket firing
22 table, and then it would be fired or perhaps some directional adjustment
23 could be made as well. Is that basically it?
24 A. Yes, that's precisely so.
25 Q. So you're not suggesting that the addition of a -- an air bomb to
1 a rocket would somehow improve its precision and accuracy; you're just
2 suggesting that it didn't make any appreciable difference?
3 A. I don't understand your question. If I understood you properly a
4 while ago and if things were interpreted properly to me, I explained that
5 when something is attached to an air bomb and -- the only thing that is
6 attached to it is a rocket engine which propels it to take it to the
7 target, nothing else. And the firing tables had been prepared in advance
8 and based on the quantity of the fuel that has to propel the air bomb to
9 a certain distance and that's the elevation that you take. Based on the
10 weight of the air bomb, that's how you decide the quantity of the fuel or
11 the gunpowder that has to propel it to the target. Nothing else is
12 attached to it but the rocket engine that propels it to the target. I
13 don't what else. What I'm saying is that nothing else is attached to the
14 air bomb but the rocket engine which is necessary to launch the air bomb
15 in the first place.
16 I don't know what you're saying in your question. Why are you
17 saying that something else is affixed or attached to it? I don't know if
18 anything else is attached to it or --
19 Q. Stop, please. Stop. You don't have to ask rhetorical questions.
20 We can get this straightened out very quickly. It's not the bomb itself
21 that has a firing table because it's normally dropped out of an airplane,
22 right; it's rocket that has a firing table?
23 A. Correct. However, in view of the situation that we discussed
24 just a while ago, we -- I told you how we launched it. It could not just
25 be launched arbitrarily. All the other elements had to be provided in
1 advance in order to launch an air bomb. You had to have firing tables,
2 and those firing tables are made by experts. I was not involved in
3 compiling firing tables so I wouldn't know what they entailed. But just
4 like any other artillery weapons experts are familiar with the type of
5 shells, you determine distances for a certain type of ammunition, there
6 are firing tables for every artillery weapon. And that's how things were
7 done for air bombs as well. That was done subsequently when those
8 launchers were crafted, and when launching of air bombs started in that
9 way, firing tables were devised. They were compiled, they had to be
10 prepared in advance because everything else would have been just shooting
11 blindly, shooting in the air, I don't know where. Firing tables were
12 compiled in order to hit the target and they accompanied every piece of
13 weaponry, of course.
14 Q. Did you ever see one of these firing tables?
15 A. Yes, on those two occasions -- actually on just one occasion.
16 The first time I saw those firing tables, I saw how elements were
17 calculated and applied to the weapon that was used on the Nisici plateau.
18 Q. And was it a Plamen? Oganj? Grad? Or another firing table?
19 A. A firing table for Plamen whose rocket weighs 21 or
20 22 kilogrammes and had a rocket propellant cannot correspond to a bomb
21 that weighs 220 kilogrammes or any other. I don't know how experts
22 calculated all that, but I saw special firing tables for that particular
23 launcher that was used there.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, I see the time.
25 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE KWON: It's about time to take a break, but can I ask how
2 much longer would you need to conclude your cross-examination?
3 MR. TIEGER: Estimating 30 to 45 minutes.
4 JUDGE KWON: I just noted that you spent more than four hours,
5 which you estimated, just for information.
6 MR. TIEGER: Yes, I noted that as well. It's one of the reasons
7 I was -- I repeatedly noted that -- it was not to be impolite but to note
8 that the witness did have a tendency to speak on for a period of time.
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll have a break for 45 minutes and
10 resume at quarter past 1.00.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.31 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 1.50 p.m.
14 JUDGE KWON: The proceedings have been delayed due to technical
15 difficulties again.
16 There are a couple of matters that I'd like to deal with before
17 we go further in the absence of the witness.
18 First, in relation to the witness after the next one, i.e.,
19 Dusan Zurovac, the Chamber notes the following. The Chamber has received
20 three signed versions of the witness's statements dated respectively the
21 2nd, the 5th, and the 9th of November. The first of these signed
22 statements made reference to 11 associated exhibits, the second to
23 20 exhibits, and the third to 29 exhibits. None of the nine additional
24 associated exhibits sought for admission in the third version of the
25 statement are on the accused's 65 ter list. The third version of the
1 statement also adds 12 short paragraphs related to scheduled incidents F4
2 and F10.
3 The Chamber is concerned that the accused's Defence team met with
4 the witness three times over the course of one week to produce three
5 signed statements, adding new material along the way and even after the
6 date when the witness was scheduled to testify. The accused's
7 explanation in the latest Rule 92 ter notification that "revisions were
8 made necessary by the discovery of additional documents and information
9 concerning the area of the witness's responsibility" is not sufficient or
10 satisfactory. It is incumbent on the Defence team to provide one signed
11 statement which reflects the evidence the witness will provide. This
12 practice of producing multiple signed versions of a witness statement is
13 not an adequate use of the Defence team's time and resources.
14 The Chamber also notes that a large portion of the witness's
15 statement relates to Mostar, a municipality not covered in the
16 indictment, and to crimes committed by Serbs; it also touches upon the
17 witness's publications in relation to "his research concerning the
18 suffering of the Serbs in BiH."
19 Accordingly, the Chamber orders that Dusan Zurovac be led live
20 only on matters related to this indictment.
21 Next matter is related to the ICMP and I can deal with in public
23 Mr. Robinson, I note that your motion for a binding order against
24 the ICMP is still pending before the Chamber and that we are still
25 waiting to hear from you on the final results of the ICMP's inquiries
1 with the family members of the victims regarding disclosure of their
2 genetic data. I also note that the last we heard on that is your e-mail
3 to the ICMP on the 20th of September, 2012, in which you referred to
4 30 cases awaiting consent. Since it is now November, I wonder if you can
5 tell us what the update on that is and whether you have received the
6 final numbers from the ICMP.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. I received a
8 communication from the ICMP about ten days ago, in which they advised us
9 that they had made some progress. They provided additional material and
10 I believe that the number of cases in which they have not yet resolved is
11 still about a dozen or less. So they're -- and they promised that they
12 would be trying to conclude those within a short period of time. So I
13 definitely have it on my list of things to do, that as soon as they give
14 me the final numbers and the final information, I'm going to advise the
15 Chamber in writing about that.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is something I would like to
18 say, Your Honours, but in open session.
19 JUDGE KWON: We are -- I think we are open session, but due to
20 technical difficulties the -- on the monitor, the "private session" logo
21 may appear. And I have to correct my reading of the transcript. Let me
22 check. At page 65 , line 22, I think I misread. It should read "crimes
23 committed to the Serbs."
24 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, with all due
1 respect, I have to say that I have to prepare for submission. I am under
2 the impression that I'm not being treated fairly. The restrictions
3 imposed on the Defence are far greater than those that were imposed on
4 the Prosecution. Above all, with regard to context, the Prosecution
5 submitted documents and elements from municipalities that are no longer
6 included in the indictment. I can't do that and, furthermore, I haven't
7 been granted protective measures for certain witnesses. This makes the
8 situation a lot more difficult. And in the case of crimes committed
9 against the Serbs, this is particularly the case. I'm not saying this as
10 a tu quoque remark, but it has to do with the context and the
11 understanding the civil war. Not everything was done under my command.
12 Events followed their own order, so my concern is such that I really have
13 to make a submission to you in regard to this issue. I believe that the
14 restrictions imposed on the Defence are far greater than those imposed on
15 the Prosecution. On the other hand, the Prosecution has been position to
16 threaten the witnesses simply by showing them or referring to
17 Rule 92(E) -- or 90(E), rather, simply by virtue of interrogating
18 witnesses to whom it was said that they were suspects. So there is no
19 possibility of there being parity between the Defence and the
20 Prosecution --
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm stopping you here, but it's not
22 appropriate to discuss it in a vacuum. We'll deal with it as it arises
23 during the course of your examination.
24 Let's bring in the witness.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, before we do that I have
1 a few matters I would like to also put on the record. First of all, you
2 issued a decision on the Prosecution's interviews of Defence witnesses on
3 the 8th of November, 2012, which in paragraph 14 you directed the
4 Prosecution to give timely notice to the accused of witnesses that it
5 wishes to interview to give us an opportunity to speak to those
6 witnesses, which we appreciate. However, we were informed by the
7 Prosecution on Friday, the day after you issued this order, that it had
8 contacted already one of the witnesses without giving us advanced notice
9 and the Prosecution indicated that that was inadvertent and they were the
10 ones who brought that to our attention, and we fully accept that
11 representation. However, I wanted to put it on the record and ask
12 Mr. Tieger to make sure that all members of the Prosecution, not only in
13 his team but any other teams that might have any potential need to
14 contact these witnesses, to comply with the Trial Chamber's order.
15 Secondly, Mr. President, you issued on the 1st of November, 2012,
16 the decision on the accused's motion for protective measures for
17 witnesses KW289, KW299, KW378, and KW543, and I wanted to put on the
18 record that after being informed that their requests for protective
19 measures had been denied, witnesses KW299 and KW543 declined to testify
20 and will not be called. Thank you.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I say another thing about the
23 witness who is to appear. Your Excellencies, I asked for time from the
24 beginning of the 1st of March and I'm not free so I can't speak to the
25 witness in a timely fashion. I only have access to the witness once the
1 witness appears to testify. All my investigators don't know all the
2 things that I know when you put all their knowledge together. They don't
3 know what I have to ask the witness about. I'd like some flexibility
4 with regard to this. I'm still receiving 66(B) rule documents. When am
5 I going to integrate all of this into my strategy, go over all of this?
6 Could you please consider this again? I should have sufficient room to
7 update everything when seeing the witness because I don't have sufficient
8 time. I'm trying to calculate how many witnesses I'll be able to call
9 and I'll be spending matters that --
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we're not going there. But just
11 simply speaking for myself, you have to accept some consequences of your
12 decision to represent yourself, and it's absolutely not necessary for you
13 to proof every and each witness. We'll just leave it at that.
14 Shall we bring in the witness.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE KWON: Given that the third session was delayed to start at
17 ten to 2.00, unless there's a serious objection from the parties the
18 Chamber is minded to sit till 20 past 3.00.
19 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President, and we'll try to move as
21 quickly as we can.
22 Q. Colonel, I had asked you a question earlier that I believe was --
23 well, it was clearly misunderstood so let me try again because that will
24 get us right into the subject -- one of the last subjects I'd like to
25 address with you and that was the following. First of all, the air bomb
1 delivery system that we've discussed was dependent upon the rockets for
2 propulsion; correct? I'm just taking a step at a time.
3 A. Firing air bombs - not aircraft bombs, that's something else -
4 that depended on the rocket engine. The rocket engine consisted of the
5 rocket fuel.
6 Q. Okay. That -- as we discussed before, the underlying rocket that
7 was used for the purpose of this propulsion, without with regard to the
8 science of how the rocket propelled itself and the air bomb along with
9 it, had a certain inherent accuracy to it even before it was affixed to
10 the air bomb; correct?
11 A. Yes, as I have already said.
12 Q. And my simple question - at least I hope simple question - is
13 that the inherent accuracy of that rocket was not going to be improved by
14 the -- by being affixed to the air bomb; correct?
15 A. I don't understand the question. The rocket, the air bomb -- I
16 said that when you attach a rocket engine to the air bomb and the rocket
17 engine consists of the gunpowder charge which makes it possible to launch
18 it to hit the target -- well, that's what I said. There's nothing to be
19 improved. I don't understand the question. I have explained this on
20 several occasions. It's not a rocket of any kind. All I said is that
21 the air bomb became a rocket as of the time that a rocket engine was
22 attached to it. It's not a rocket. It's turned into a rocket because it
23 has a rocket engine.
24 Q. We saw in the video pre-existing rockets which were screwed into
25 the back of an air bomb and you agreed that was one of the mechanisms of
1 delivery for air bombs; right?
2 A. Mr. Prosecutor, that isn't a rocket; it's a rocket engine. There
3 is a difference. The rocket consists of the rocket engine and the
4 charge. The charge was in the air bomb in this case and the rocket
5 engine is the gunpowder that is used for the charge in the shell and it
6 delivers the shell to the target. That's the rocket. A war head with an
7 explosive charge and a rocket engine, that's it. There's no rocket here.
8 The rocket consists of the war head and the rocket engine. I think I've
9 been clear. I don't know else I could explain this.
10 Q. Colonel, the accuracy of a rocket such as a Plamen or Oganj or a
11 Grad is not dependent upon the charge, it's dependent upon the rocket
12 system, isn't it? So I'm not talking about the charge, I'm talking about
13 the rocket.
14 A. Well, naturally. The precision of any rocket depends on the
15 charge, the amount of charge that is used. In places where the
16 ammunition is produced, tables are made. You measure the quantity of
17 gunpowder in grams, it's even more precise. It depends on the rocket
18 engine. For example, if you have 2 kilogrammes and 2 and a half grams of
19 gunpowder in the rocket engine -- well, that's not okay. You don't --
20 that doesn't correspond to the firing tables. In places where the
21 ammunition is produced, you have to precisely measure the gunpowder
22 charge. In this case, you have a sort of rod form of gunpowder so that
23 it burns more slowly and because the weight is greater. This is done so
24 the air bomb can reach its target. And in the case of the Plamen
25 multiple-rocket launcher and the Oganj, you also used this rod charge and
1 not powder -- not a powder charge. I think I've been clear. So it all
2 depends, you can't just use any kind of powder as a charge so that
3 everything is in accordance with the firing tables.
4 Q. So your position is that rockets use various charges just like
5 mortars or howitzers to determine the distance they'll travel?
6 A. Naturally.
7 Q. All right. Let's -- apart from that, let me try once more with
8 the previous question, and if that's not successful, I'll move on to
9 something slightly different. Irrespective of how you consider the
10 rocket works, do you -- well, I'm going to move on to something else.
11 You've already told us that in your view, the dispersion of the
12 air bombs that were attached to these rocket engines was essentially the
13 same as the underlying rocket systems themselves. So I'd like to look at
14 the firing table for one of those underlying systems.
15 MR. TIEGER: So if we could turn, please, to 65 ter 24036. This
16 is a firing table for a Vulkan or a Grad system, and if we could turn
17 quickly to page 5 of the -- 6 of the English and page 5 of the B/C/S.
18 No, I'm sorry, it's page 5 of the English. Excuse me.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we be told whose instructions
20 these are, from which army?
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: I'm not sure I can say at the moment. What I do
23 know is that both the Grad and the -- this is applicable to both because
24 you have both the Russian system of calculation of mils and the European
25 system and you have calculations for both the Grad and the Vulkan which
1 are essentially identical.
2 Q. That indicates at page 5, Colonel, that the use of these
3 projectiles, which are identified here by their technical number, for
4 distances up to 5 kilometres is "possible in extraordinary cases and only
5 in situations where there are no friendly troops in the direction of fire
6 since a significant amount of short rounds are possible caused by a large
7 dispersal of the projectile at these ranges."
8 MR. TIEGER: Next I'd like to look at some of the specific firing
9 table range of error data available, and in that connection I'd like to
10 look at B/C/S page 12 and we can identify the specific -- if we can blow
11 that up, please, and just have that on a single page. Okay. At the top
12 of the page we see "daljinar" for the range finder both at 1 to 6.000
13 which would be for the Grad and 1 to 6400 for the Vulkan.
14 Q. And if we look to the immediate -- to the right, Colonel, I think
15 you can see "po daljini" and "po provcu" so you can see error by distance
16 and error by direction. And why don't we scroll down, for example, to --
17 as you can see at 1600 we have 250 metres by distance, 9.2 by direction.
18 And if we go down to 5.000, for example, at the next page, and we can see
19 it descending that way. A slight decrease in the error by distance and
20 an increase in the error by direction. So at 5.000, we have 215 metres
21 by distance and 29 by direction.
22 Now, first of all, Colonel, can you confirm that these -- that
23 this range of error is -- does not refer to the diameter of the error but
24 to the radius, that is, it essentially is that figure on either side of
25 the intended target. So in the case of 5.000 metres, it would be
1 215 metres by direction short or long and 29 metres by direction to
2 either side.
3 A. I'm not familiar with these firing tables. I'm not familiar with
4 the Grad or the Vulkan system either, but as a rule, the firing tables
5 look something like this. In the firing tables there are certain
6 deviations for the distance and for the direction when you fire at a
7 certain distance. As you increase the range, these errors, this range of
8 errors, also increases. When you fire the first projectile, this is
9 taken into account. It was quite small, but as you said multiple-rocket
10 launchers and air bombs had greater deviations in the distance than in
11 direction. You mentioned 200, 250 metres with regard to the distance and
12 20 to 30 metres with regard to the direction. So 20, 30 metres is not a
13 huge error for such an air bomb with such a destructive capacity. I
14 think that as a rule firing tables were compiled in this way, but I'm not
15 familiar with these weapons, but these adjustments are taken into
16 consideration when projectiles are fired and this is the purpose for
17 which firing tables are used.
18 Q. Thank you for that, Colonel. Are you also aware that the firing
19 table figures discount the extreme -- because when firing tables are
20 assembled based on many, many, many tests, they discard the most extreme
21 firings and try to identify a range of error within sort of a middle
22 ground, in the top 50 per cent, for example. You're nodding so it
23 appears you're aware of that?
24 A. I know that firing tables are compiled based on a number of test
25 shots in order to establish an average. I don't know how averages are
1 established, but I know that these tables are based on trials.
2 Q. And you know that to establish a useful figure, many, many, many
3 trials are required to come up with a meaningful average?
4 A. Yes. However, firing tables are not compiled by crews who work
5 on the launchers. It is professionals who are trained for that who do
6 that because there is a series of parameters that have a bearing on the
7 validity of a firing table which will be produced for use in various
9 MR. TIEGER: I'd like to tender this document, Mr. President.
10 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, there's absolutely no basis for
11 tendering the document with this witness.
12 MR. TIEGER: Why would that be? I think there's an ample basis
13 for doing so, but I can lay a further foundation if necessary. The
14 witness talked about whether or not rockets were or should be used in
15 certain conditions, he talked about the relationship between the rockets
16 and the air bombs. These -- this data would be admissible on either
17 ground, and certainly in light of the fact that both of those factors are
18 relevant here, these tables are also relevant in addition to the general
19 discussion that took place about the table.
20 JUDGE KWON: Did the witness lay some foundation on this
21 document, Mr. Tieger?
22 MR. TIEGER: He said --
23 JUDGE KWON: You have not told us yet --
24 MR. TIEGER: He recognised -- yes, Mr. President --
25 JUDGE KWON: No, no, we haven't heard yet where this document was
2 MR. TIEGER: It's a firing table produced by the Croatian
3 government in response to an RFA, so therefore reflecting systems used in
4 the former JNA and in the various military establishments that developed
6 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat.
8 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, Mr. -- I'm sorry to interrupt
9 Mr. Karadzic, but I see there's an ambiguity in what I said. I didn't
10 mean it was produced by the Croatian government. I meant we made an RFA
11 to the Croatian government and we received this in response. This is a
12 JNA firing table to the best of our understanding.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I remember properly, the witness
15 said that he was not familiar with these systems. He said that this is
16 the way that tables are compiled; however, the figures contained in these
17 particular tables mean nothing to the witness.
18 MR. TIEGER: Well, first of all -- let me lay further foundation,
19 then. First of all, not that I think it's necessary, but first of all,
20 the witness did affirm, as I think is very obvious, that this is a firing
21 table and a type of firing table that he is --
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Sorry to interrupt.
23 Why don't you put those questions to the witness so that we can
24 get some foundation of this document from the witness.
25 MR. TIEGER:
1 Q. Colonel, you still have that in front of you. You've used firing
2 tables in the past, I take it, and in particular in connection with
3 rockets. I know you had rocket experience from actually the earliest
4 phase of your JNA career.
5 A. Yes, I used firing tables for the weapons that I used and on
6 which I was trained and on which I trained my subordinates. At the
7 beginning of my career, I was the commander of a battery of multi-rocket
8 launchers Plamen and I had the firing tables. These are not JNA firing
9 tables, they would be in Serbian. This is Croatian, pure Croatian, as
10 far as I can tell, but it's neither here nor there. I said that in
11 principle this is what firing tables normally look like, and this
12 particular firing table applies to the kinds of weapons that I'm not
13 familiar with. When I was in the JNA, I never heard of these types of
14 weapons nor did I see them during the war. I still don't know what
15 Vulkan looks like, or Grad. I only heard that Grad looks like the Oganj
16 multiple-rocket launcher, that it is mobile, mounted on a vehicle;
17 however, I've never had an opportunity to see one.
18 Q. Okay. Can we -- you're aware of the fact, however, that Grad
19 rockets were used extensively in the air bomb production process, that
20 is, the VRS air bomb production process?
21 A. Mr. Prosecutor, for the umpteenth time I repeat, Grad rocket and
22 air bombs, I didn't say that they were used. I don't know where Grad
23 rockets were used, in what part of the theatre of war. If we at all had
24 that type of rockets, I never saw them. Rockets on the one hand and air
25 bombs on the other, I've already said rockets and air bombs have nothing
1 to do with each other. I have told you that an air bomb becomes a rocket
2 with an engine, with a gunpowder charge. This is an air bomb and the
3 rocket engine propels it to its target. This is the -- all I can say. I
4 have no other explanation. There is no rocket that is attached to an air
5 bomb. Gunpowder rod is attached to the rocket.
6 MR. TIEGER: Well, it -- I'm getting a little far afield and
7 moving into my next questions, but in any event I think the witness's
8 answers previously are sufficient to justify the admission of this firing
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we ask Mr. Tieger to ask the
11 witness to read from the left upper corner what kind of charge is in
12 question here.
13 JUDGE KWON: I don't think that's necessary at the moment. I'll
14 consult my colleagues.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President ...
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Robinson, now we did hear you object to the
19 application for admission, but we didn't get the grounds of objection.
20 May we have them, please.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President -- Judge Baird. I don't mean
22 to elevate you to --
23 JUDGE BAIRD: Never mind.
24 MR. ROBINSON: The grounds are simply that the witness hasn't
25 confirmed anything about this document, so he doesn't know about this --
1 these rockets and he isn't capable of confirming whether these firing
2 tables are accurate, whether they're applicable to the weapons that the
3 VRS had or used. And so absent that kind of foundation, in line with
4 your previous guide-lines that you've been following throughout the whole
5 trial, this doesn't fall within a document that can be admitted through
6 this witness.
7 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you very much indeed.
8 MR. TIEGER: May I respond to that because I think it's --
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The Chamber has another question for
10 you, Mr. Tieger.
11 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger, even if this document was admitted,
12 what practical use is it going to be to the Trial Chamber, other than the
13 fact it is a document we've not been asked to nor would we seek to use
14 the figures and the calculations in it because they are not relevant to
15 any evidence we've heard --
16 MR. TIEGER: That -- I'm sorry, Judge Morrison, I didn't realise
17 you weren't finished. That's precisely the point. I wanted to respond
18 in connection with that underlying point to something raised by
19 Mr. Robinson, which is to say that the -- it's -- this can't be admitted
20 unless it's shown that they're applicable to the weapons the VRS had or
21 used. This is not an abstract document and Mr. -- we have noted
22 throughout that when it serves the purpose of general impeachment, it's
23 certainly sufficient to note that this document is what it purports to
24 be. In connection with the assertion that we don't have evidence to that
25 effect, I was a bit surprised to hear that since paragraph 155 of
1 1D25159, an expert report submitted by the Defence, refers to the
2 modified aircraft bombs, "bearing in mind that the components fitted into
3 the system FAB-150 and 250 aircraft bombs and 122-millimetre Grad rocket
4 motors had been manufactured," et cetera, et cetera. It was the Defence
5 in part which placed this very squarely at issue and made it relevant,
6 and that's precisely one of the ways in which the Court should be
7 entitled to use this firing table in assessing the use of the air bombs.
8 JUDGE KWON: Can you not produce that -- this firing table when
9 Mr. -- Dr. Subotic is going to testify?
10 MR. TIEGER: Well, I believe I could, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 MR. TIEGER: But it seemed to be entirely relevant right now
13 talking to a commander who told the Court about the impropriety of
14 using -- the underlying rockets in urban areas and now talked about the
15 precision of air bombs which we know depended upon those underlying
16 systems. And so I thought it was quite relevant for the Court to have
17 that information and available to it right now.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, the Chamber is not satisfied that this
20 witness has given sufficient foundation about this document to be
21 admitted at the moment. In addition, I note that this was not translated
22 in full, but that's not the reason for postponing the admission. Let's
23 move on.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, if I could just take
25 this opportunity for a moment to ask the Trial Chamber to consider
1 imposing some time-limits on the Prosecution's cross-examination so that
2 we have some parity and Dr. Karadzic alluded to this. We are feeling
3 here on the Defence side that there is sometimes decisions of the
4 Trial Chamber that disadvantage us vis-a-vis the Prosecution. And you
5 wanted him to be specific. So this is a very specific example of a
6 cross-examination that has taken 10 to 20 times the length of the direct
7 examination and which exceeded the estimate --
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, I'll cut you off here. The Chamber
9 expressly stated that it will monitor the conduct of the trial for some
10 time, and as for the Prosecution case, the Defence was at liberty in
11 terms of amount of cross-examination for the first phase of the
12 proceeding. It took some time to impose time constraint -- restraint to
13 the Defence after -- yes, it took a while since the start of the
14 Prosecution case to start imposing some time-limit.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Well, by calling this to your attention, I hope
16 you'll consider this for the future depending on how things evolve.
17 JUDGE KWON: I guarantee the Chamber is more keen to the overall
18 time of the proceedings. Thank you.
19 Let's move on, Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. And in the interests of
21 time, I'm not responding to what I consider to be an unfair and specious
22 objection, but I'll move right on.
23 Q. Mr. Witness, I have just a few very discrete areas to cover.
24 First of all, at page 55 I had asked you earlier about your own
25 involvement with air bombs one way or another and you said you weren't
1 involved in any shape or form with air bombs.
2 And in that connection I wanted to call up P1300. Okay. This is
3 a document dated the 11th of July, 1995. It refer -- is sent to various
4 brigades discussing the needs of the corps and orders that the
5 above-mentioned units shall issue a FAB 250 and 105 kilogrammes to
6 Major Simic on July 12th as follows, it lists them, and it says then:
7 "Major Simic shall obtain 2 aerial bombs of 250 kilogrammes from
8 the corps reserve which are currently located ..." et cetera, et cetera,
9 et cetera. He "shall prepare the deployment plan for the air bomb
10 launcher and make all preparations for the action according to the
11 'Talas 1' plan."
12 Colonel, I put it to you that your answer about not being
13 involved in any way, shape or form, or any shape or form in air bombs was
14 not accurate and the claim -- and the fact that you were involved in air
15 bombs explains your insistence on their alleged precision.
16 MR. ROBINSON: I'm going to object, Mr. President. That's
17 another one of Dr. Karadzic's sins of multiple questions within one.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. Major, you were involved with air bombs despite your claim to
20 this Trial Chamber not very long ago that you were not involved in any
21 shape or form; correct?
22 A. Mr. Prosecutor, you can see from this document that
23 General Milosevic ordered me to take over air bombs and deploy them
24 across the brigades that had launchers. I was supposed to take them over
25 and distribute them. Under 2, you can see -- or rather, under 3, you can
1 see that:
2 "Major Simic shall prepare the deployment plan for the a/b
3 launcher and make all preparations for the action according to the
4 'Talas 1' plan."
5 I would like to see that Talas 1 order. I don't know what that
6 refers to. I've done a lot of things from -- I did a lot of things from
7 1992 to 1995. I can't remember all the details. If I saw this plan, I
8 could tell you what it applies to, but if there was a plan, it doesn't
9 mean that it was ever acted upon.
10 I stated that I observed the actions of air bombs on two
11 occasions, I mentioned what the targets were. I'm not contesting that I
12 may have been involved in the planning and delivery of those air bombs.
13 If I had taken them over from a certain position, then I may have
14 deployed them upon the order of the corps commander to the specific
15 brigades. I would like to see the Talas 1 order to see what that order
16 applies to. I don't remember. That was at a time when the Muslim
17 offensive was taking place in the Sarajevo theatre of war in 1995 --
18 Q. Colonel, you are venturing far afield from the question I asked.
19 Two final matters. In paragraphs 29, 30 -- basically 30 through
20 32, you offer certain views on Markale I and Markale II, basically to the
21 effect that both incidents involved, in your view, an individual shot
22 without adjusted fire and therefore it was impossible that the shell
23 which landed could have been fired by the Bosnian Serb side; correct?
24 You don't have to repeat it. I'm just using that as a predicate. That's
25 the position you take in your statement; right?
1 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I claim that Markale I and II could not be hit by
2 a mortar shell fired from any of the Serb positions.
3 Q. So it's your position that a -- that single shots into Sarajevo
4 don't have any possibility of hitting their intended target; correct?
5 A. In my statement I stated even if we were to assume that the
6 target was hit by a mortar shell, it could not have been done from the
7 first go. The first shell fired from any position could not have hit
8 that target. Second of all, even if that first shell had hit the target
9 of Markale, knowing how large the market-place is, I'm sure that any
10 artillery -- no artillerymen could see the market from his observation
11 post. This would have been a blind shot. After the smoke appeared after
12 the explosion, it would have appeared somewhere else carried by wind. So
13 that shot would have been unreliable. It would have not been accurate.
14 Let's assume that the first shot had hit the target. We could
15 not have observed it. There's no observation post anywhere from which
16 you could see the Markale market. I still claim that the first shot
17 could not hit that target. On the assumption that it had hit the market,
18 which I claim it didn't, but if it had, it would have gone unobserved
19 from any of our observers on any of our observation posts.
20 Q. So I take it you take the position that any single shot, any
21 single random shot into Sarajevo has no military purpose because it's not
22 going to hit a -- its intended target, that the person firing it doesn't
23 know where it's going to land?
24 A. No, this is not what I am claiming. I am talking specifically
25 about the Markale market. It's a small market between various buildings,
1 among buildings, those buildings are very high. And I told you, even if
2 the first shell had hit that target, it would have gone unobserved.
3 Second of all, for a shell to land within such a small area among the
4 buildings, it should have been fired from a shorter distance because of
5 the angle. The angle has to be at least 85 degrees, so the angle had to
6 be almost vertical in order for that shell to land among the buildings in
7 that small area which could not be observed from any of the Serbian
8 observation posts. This is what I'm saying. I'm not saying that any
9 individual shell fired during the war was just a randomly fired shell.
10 Q. Last brief topic I wanted to raise with you arises out of
11 paragraph 25 when you say:
12 "The incident of 27 May 1992, in Vase Miskina Street was
13 explained to me ..."
14 And that's preceded by the words "incident G1." How did you
15 know -- what made you think that the incident of 27 May 1992 in
16 Vase Miskina Street was incident G1? Did you see that somewhere or did
17 someone tell you that?
18 A. I was told that by the Defence team. They told me that it was
19 the G-1 incident. I don't know why it was marked that way. That's how
20 it was marked. I don't know why, based on what. It's just known as G-1.
21 Q. What was it marked on?
22 A. I didn't hear you properly or perhaps I didn't understand you
24 Q. Yes, who marked it and what was it marked on?
25 A. When I provided my statement, when I provided my statement about
1 the incident which is known as G-1 in Vase Miskina Street, I provided my
2 opinion about that incident and that was marked as G-1. I don't know
3 why. I don't know how. I don't know that.
4 Q. So I take it you did not look at the indictment to see that G-1
5 is an incident that took place on or about the 28th of May and that, in
6 fact, whoever told you it was G-1 on the Defence did not accurately
7 advise you that the Vase Miskina Street incident is not included in the
8 indictment, as Dr. Karadzic himself noted at T6394 through 95.
9 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I was asked to provide a statement about the
10 incident in Vase Miskina Street. I did provide a statement. I don't
11 know how it was marked. I did not have an occasion or the need to get
12 familiar with the indictment; therefore, I don't know what it contains.
13 Q. Thank you, Witness. I have nothing further.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
15 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have re-examination?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellencies.
17 Could we look at P1041.
18 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
19 Q. [Interpretation] While we are waiting, Colonel, sir, did you hear
20 from the Defence team about Vase Miskina for the first time or had you
21 heard about it before?
22 A. I heard about it before immediately after the event. I watched
23 the Muslim television and I saw the images on TV.
24 Q. Thank you. In the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, did you take some
25 investigative measures in order to establish what had happened?
1 A. At the time I was a battery commander. I don't know what the
2 corps command did at the time. I know that requests were made to check
3 whether fire was ever opened from our positions, from our mortars. This
4 is as much as I can remember. I was a battery commander for a battery of
5 multi-rocket launchers and I don't know how the investigation evolved.
6 Q. Thank you. This document was shown to you by Mr. Tieger;
7 however, he did not show you the entire document. First of all, could
8 you please tell us where are the speakers? Where are the people who were
9 intercepted in this conversation? What about this unknown male person,
10 if you look at the last line of the intercept?
11 A. The unknown male person, Marsal Tito barracks.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please move to the following
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. And while we are waiting, can you tell us what was happening with
17 Marsal Tito barracks at the time? Have a look at the top. What is
18 Mladic being informed of? What are the Muslim media conveying?
19 A. NN, unidentified male person, he says:
20 "They say that the Marsal Tito barracks is carrying out a break
21 through. That's probably the media.
22 "General Mladic: Okay.
23 "Unidentified male: Blow up the bridge, the Bratstvo-Jedinstvo
25 "Mladic: Do not worry. They dare not come close to the
1 Brotherhood and Unity Bridge or the barracks."
2 Q. Thank you. Have a look at the bottom, third line from below,
3 from the bottom, let's see what Mladic says there.
4 A. "You too can," is that what you have in mind?
5 "You can take more than they can. I don't want to kill the
6 people or to destroy the town. I don't want innocent people to come to
7 harm. If anyone wants to open fire, he should stay in Sarajevo and
8 should let the army take positions. They should pull out the civilians,
9 and if they want a fight, we'll fight. It would be better to fight
10 somewhere in the hills than in town."
11 Q. Thank you. And it says "the people have to live somewhere,"
12 that's stated down below; isn't that correct?
13 A. Yes, it is.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page, please.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Have a look at the first line. What does Mladic say there?
18 Could you read that out?
19 A. "We aren't in favour of a fight. We are in favour of peace. If
20 they want peace, they will have it; if they don't, well, that's not a
21 problem, we can always go to war."
22 Q. Thank you. Colonel, how does this intercept tally with the
23 information you had and with your experience?
24 A. As far as I can remember, at that time the Tito barracks was
25 besieged, it was completely surrounded, and pressure was exerted on the
1 men in the barracks and the barracks was preparing to leave, for an
2 agreement to leave, to abandon -- not the barracks, I mean the troops
3 were preparing to leave the Tito barracks. As far as I can remember, it
4 was around June that the men left the Marsal Tito barracks.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see D207.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. And this intercept has also been shown to you, the one we're
9 waiting for now. And another one was shown to you that relates to this
10 one. Could we see the last three lines. Could you read it out, please.
11 A. Yes, Mr. President.
12 "Mladic: Look, they want to attack the barracks in order to
13 provoke us to take action on the town."
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Sorry, could we see the English
15 version, page 2 in the English version.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Please continue, Colonel.
18 A. "Potpara: Yes, very well.
19 "Mladic: Tell the people so that the people are aware of this."
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we have a look at
21 page number 4, page number 8 in the English version.
22 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, just for clarification, this is not
23 an intercept, to the best of my recollection, that was shown to the
24 witness previously.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I corrected myself. I said an
1 intercept that relates to the one that you were shown.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 Proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Number, or rather, page 8 in the English, the third line from the
6 bottom, Mladic intervenes and can we see what Potpara says.
7 A. "Ah, we won't take any risks, we won't risk people's lives.
8 "Mladic: I am of the same opinion. If they want peace, they'll
9 have peace. Last night I issued an order as soon as I arrived ... there
10 was this large-scale attack against the units and you. I somehow managed
11 to calm the people down in that shooting and to place things under
12 control to prevent action from being taken. What they're producing now,
13 they probably have some sort of mime artists or some sort of good
14 imitators that makes it possible for them to successfully imitate my
15 voice, your voice, and everyone else's voice."
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next two pages --
17 or the next two lines.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The next two lines.
19 "Mladic: It seems that they're creating a farce down there,
20 they're deceiving their people about some sort of commands of mine --
21 well, no, that's out of the question."
22 And then Mladic says:
23 "Let them deceive their people. You should convey this from
24 soldier to soldier. They shouldn't play around and put their lives at
25 risk. No one had a reserve life. We won't fire on the town. If they
1 don't violate the agreement, if they don't threaten you, but be extremely
2 careful. Don't trust them at all."
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Thank you, Colonel. How does this fit in with your experience of
5 the VRS in relation to the town of Sarajevo?
6 A. Well, this is about the fact that orders were issued to members
7 of units in the Tito barracks and in the town of Sarajevo, orders
8 according to which they shouldn't expose themselves to provocations by
9 the Muslim forces, they should exercise restraint, they should preserve
10 the lives of their subordinates, they should be cautious and observe the
11 situation because they couldn't trust the other side. This was proved on
12 a number of occasions.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we briefly see P1518, please.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Colonel, while waiting for that to appear, tell us what is the
16 purpose of observing fire?
17 A. Mr. President, the purpose of observing fire is to observe the
18 target and action taken against the target in order to adjust firing so
19 that one could fire on the target with as much precision as possible so
20 as not to waste shells, to disperse shells, and inflict harm on civilians
21 and civilian facilities.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page, please.
24 I apologise. That's not the one. I've mixed them up. Engage in
25 artillery observation.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Can observation be brought into line with random fire?
3 A. No, not at all. If you're observing artillery fire, then random
4 fire is out of the question.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see D192, please.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Here the Prosecution showed you images from Van Lynden. I'd like
9 to show you a document. I can't find the page right now. Van Lynden
10 said that these clips had been put together, it wasn't a direct
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 3 in both the
13 Serbian and the English version.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. These are the minutes from the Presidency of the Republic of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina of the 17th of June, 1992. What important event took
17 place on that date, on the 17th of June, 1992?
18 A. On the 17th of June, if my memory doesn't fail me, around that
19 time we liberated the Zlatiste-Pale road. It was around the 16th or
20 17th. I don't remember what happened exactly. I can't remember right
22 Q. Thank you. Have a look at what Halilovic says, please. I see
23 that Halilovic is talking about Sarajevo. Isn't that correct?
24 A. Could we zoom in a bit, please. It's difficult to read.
25 Q. What is the situation that Halilovic describes?
1 A. As far as I can remember, Halilovic was the head, the chief, of
2 the Muslim General Staff or Main Staff, Sefer Halilovic, if we're talking
3 about him.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 6 in the Serbian
5 version and page 5 in the English version, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. What we have in yellow is what I'll read out. This is what
8 Halilovic said, his conclusions about Sarajevo.
9 "In the course of a two-month period of activity, the aggressor
10 sustained a lot of losses in manpower and especially in terms of
11 equipment lost. He lost about 20 tanks, 20 personnel carriers, six
12 multiple-rocket launchers, five howitzers, seven 120-millimetre mortars
13 and there was a certain number -- a certain amount of equipment was lost
14 and burned, three tanks, six armoured carriers, five howitzers
15 155-millimetre ones, six mortars, and a significant amount of infantry
16 weapons. Because of important losses in terms of equipment, the
17 intensity of artillery and rocket attacks on Sarajevo diminished."
18 Who inflicted these losses on the Serbs?
19 A. Well, only the Muslim forces could have done that. If we're
20 talking about the Sarajevo battle-field anyway.
21 Q. Thank you. Under 2, a bit lower down, five, six lines lower
23 "The disposition of forces of the TO in the Sarajevo region, the
24 Territorial Defence region of Sarajevo, consists of the following: The
25 regional TO staff in the Sarajevo region, two 120-millimetre batteries,
1 12 pieces; 105-millimetre howitzer batteries, five pieces; an artillery
2 platoon that consists of three pieces of 122-millimetre pieces; an
3 armoured mechanised platoon, or rather, a group; one tank; and five
4 armoured carriers; 16 TO staffs, municipal staffs; 16 TO detachments;
5 about 500 independent platoons; about 450 independent companies; and
6 about 100 anti-sabotage platoons."
7 Did you know anything about the forces facing you, the SRK, from
8 the town of Sarajevo?
9 A. Mr. President, we were well aware of that and that is why we
10 defended ourselves. We mounted a decisive defence at our positions. It
11 is a fact that they weren't as empty-handed as it was said and this can
12 be seen from the document.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we see page 11 in
14 the Serbian version and then page 10 in the English version which
15 continues on page 11 in the English version.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. In the lower part it says that 91.720 individuals who are
18 registered, 95 were armed, defence is resisting, significant objectives
19 were attained, Chetnik forces in Pofalici, Zuc, and Mojmilo were routed.
20 In the last few days of the war there were significant successes by the
21 artillery units when mounting a defence of the town of Sarajevo. Thank
23 Was it necessary to tell -- was it possible to say whose
24 artillery was concerned in Van Lynden's images?
25 A. Mr. President, I couldn't tell whose artillery it was, whose
1 artillery was opening fire. On the basis of this document, one can see
2 that at the time they were well armed and equipped with artillery pieces.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a look at 1D20069,
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. You were asked about Stari Grad, the old part of town here.
8 Bascarsija is perhaps what one had in mind. Please have a look at this,
9 the Municipal Assembly of the armed forces, Stari Grad, the 16th of July,
10 1992. Under 2:
11 "The units of the Stari Grad OS participated in the liberation
12 and capturing of the Bistricka Kula facility which is a dominant feature.
13 We are working on engineering fortification of the position at this
14 facility and on all the other defence lines."
15 And then further down:
16 "Action is being taken to establish new units, for example, the
17 Stari Grad Brigade and the already-existing units are to become part of
18 this brigade."
19 My question, Colonel, is as follows: Could you tell us without
20 me reminding you of the fact which brigades there were once the war had
21 broken out, which brigades there were or which brigades were deployed in
22 Stari Grad, in fact?
23 A. Mr. President, unfortunately I can't remember, I really can't.
24 Q. Do you know where the 105th Muslim Brigade was deployed?
25 A. I have really forgotten everything. It's been over 20 years
1 since these events, and I haven't been involved in these issues, I wanted
2 to get everything as soon as possible, so I have forgotten many things
3 and I could not confirm where certain brigades were, in fact, deployed.
4 Q. It would be leading if I said that the 105th and the 115th were
5 in the --
6 MR. TIEGER: Yes, it would be and I don't think --
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not asking for a response. I'm
8 not asking for a response.
9 Could this document please be admitted into evidence.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. In general terms and in principle, the document you have just
12 seen, how does this document tally with what you know about the arms that
13 the people in Stari Grad had?
14 A. It shows that in all parts of the city their units were deployed
15 by establishment as they had them. They were equipped with equipment and
16 manpower. They were better equipped and had more manpower than we had.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this now be admitted?
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2414, Your Honours.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 I would like to call up P847.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. The document has already been shown to you, it was shown to you
1 earlier today as well. Could you please look at bullet point 3.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this part below bullet point 2
3 be zoomed in?
4 It says here:
5 "If a cease-fire agreement is signed, the artillery weapons
6 should be moved further away from Sarajevo ..." and so on and so forth.
7 A ban on moving weapons and military positions and so on and so forth.
8 Bullet point 3:
9 "As long as there is a threat of NATO air-strikes against our
10 forces, do not turn the infantry, artillery, and OMJ away from the
11 Muslims and UNPROFOR and do everything to maintain direct contact
12 including full fortification."
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Could you please tell us, Colonel, sir, what were the
15 circumstances when General Milovanovic issued this order and how does the
16 cover-up of weapons and air-strikes correspond to each other?
17 A. Mr. President, that was when NATO air-strikes and rapid reaction
18 artillery were active against the VRS. The order was issued in order to
19 be as close and in -- in direct contact with Muslim forces in order to
20 preserve manpower and equipment because we knew that they wouldn't strike
21 if we were close to Muslim positions.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I'd like to call up 1D03408.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. You were asked, Colonel, sir, about the number of shells and
1 about the proportionality of response. I would kindly ask you to look at
2 the date, the 16th of June, 1995, at 9.30. Do you know where was the
3 102nd Muslim Brigade deployed at the time?
4 A. Not off the top of my head. If it is specified in the document,
5 then my memory will be jogged, I suppose.
6 Q. I'm going to read. It says:
7 "Our forces knew information," this is 2.1, "or our forces were
8 in combat-readiness, they were at the ready and at the starting position
9 at the envisaged time. And at 0436 hours, the attack was launched along
10 the axes ..." which are all enumerated.
11 Please look, what rounds they used. I'm referring to
12 bigger-sized calibre. My calculation is that they fired 549 shells
13 without [as interpreted] 12.7, which should have also been banned.
14 Could you please read this. 60-millimetre shells, 34;
15 82-millimetre shells, 63; 120-millimetre shells, nine; 12.7-millimetre
16 rounds, 810 - I did not take that into my calculation; 105-millimetre
17 shells, seven; M-57 RB, 11, and so on and so forth.
18 What is this NG rounds, 20 of them were used?
19 A. It must be -- I don't know what this is.
20 Q. Is this nitroglycerin?
21 A. I don't know.
22 Q. Possibly. It may be nitroglycerin.
23 What can you tell us, how many brigades of this kind existed
24 within the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the city of
1 A. The city of Sarajevo -- I don't know how many brigades did the
2 1st Corps have. It must have had at least three-plus brigades. I
3 believe that it had more than three brigades. In any case, judging by
4 this document, they were really well equipped and they were very active.
5 You can see that this was their attack, this was their assault. It was
6 an operation that was carried out in 1995 in the month of June and it was
7 intending to break through from the city of Sarajevo.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic -- yes, Mr. Tieger, any objection?
10 MR. TIEGER: No, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be admitted.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2415, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: How much more do you have for your re-examination,
14 Mr. Karadzic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Two more documents, very briefly,
17 JUDGE KWON: I have a couple of matters to deal with at the end
18 of today's session, but let's continue. Let's see how it evolves.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D20059.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. What was the position of Fikret Prevljak in 1995, do you
23 A. I can't remember.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D20059. Can this be blown up a
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Was this document issued on the 16th of June at 10.00? The year
3 is 1995.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. It says:
6 "Between 0700 and 1000 hours, our newly reached lines of defence
7 on elevation 625, Lalovici, on the lines of Zlatiste, Sucura Kuca above
8 Hladivode, and elevation 830 were exposed to constant and fierce
9 artillery, tank and mortar fire from weapons of all calibre. There were
10 intermittent combined artillery and infantry attacks on the
11 above-mentioned lines in half-hour intervals.
12 "The newly reached lines on elevation 830 and elevation 625 and
13 in the sector of Zlatiste were integrated and the unit from the Sucura
14 Kuca line withdrew to its initial position at 0810 hours because of
15 fierce artillery fire. At the firing position in the sector of Tesanovo
16 hill, we destroyed a tank with a TF-8 projectile at 0950."
17 Can you please tell us what was going on from 7.00 in the morning
18 to 10.00 in the morning? Who was acting, who was reacting?
19 A. Mr. President, on that day in June, an attack was launched on all
20 the defence lines of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, both from the inner
21 ring as well as the outer ring, in co-ordination of the 1st Corps and the
22 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And during
23 the initial period of that operation, the Muslim forces had certain
24 successes on all the front lines, starting with the southern front line
25 as well as the northern and the north-western part of the front line.
1 Certain positions were broken through; however, we rapidly consolidated
2 our forces, we received artillery support, we managed to return them to
3 their initial positions. Some of those positions took days to be
4 reclaimed and that defensive lasted for quite a long time.
5 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us where did the Serbian shells
6 fall and could they be seen from the town? Those that fell on Zlatiste
7 and Sucura Kuca.
8 A. I don't understand what you mean when you say "Serbian shells."
9 Q. When we attempted to return positions and the artillery fire on
10 our trenches that they had taken over, could that be seen from the city?
11 A. Maybe from the opposite side. Those shells were falling on the
12 forward line, i.e., on the deployment of the Muslim forces which were
13 engaged in attack in order to return to their initial positions.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, and I am on
15 to my last document?
16 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Tieger?
17 MR. TIEGER: Not to the document in the abstract, which appears
18 to be authentic in the sense we've been using them, but I was waiting for
19 some kind of relevance to the cross-examination to appear in the course
20 of the questions and answers, and I think we're on a document admission
21 exercise that is using unnecessary time and a bar table submission would
22 appear to be more appropriate for matters like this. I don't see how
23 this arises from the cross that was -- with this witness.
24 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be allowed to respond --
1 JUDGE KWON: Whatever the ...
2 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
3 JUDGE KWON: We almost adjourned. They say it's okay now. There
4 has been a technical difficulty which has been now resolved.
5 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Tieger asked about the
7 number of shells and about where the shells fell and where they were
8 falling. I wanted to ask the witness where the fierce fighting was going
9 on, could the Serbian shells be seen from the city and could anybody
10 actually ascribe them to the Serbian side. I was interested where they
11 were falling and whether they could be discerned from the city itself.
12 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is of the view that we have a basis to
13 admit this.
14 We'll give the number.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2416, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE KWON: Can we go for a further five minutes? I'm asking
17 the Registrar.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one last document and one last
20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 23920.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. The command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, i.e.,
25 General Milosevic, which is what you see on the second page, under 2 it
2 "I forbid arbitrary and uncontrolled opening of fire. Fire is to
3 be opened only at useful targets - live targets, i.e., such targets which
4 serve to inflict real losses on the enemy and does not represent
5 'attempts of intimidation.'"
6 Colonel, sir, how does this tally with what you know about the
7 tactics of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the attitude towards the city?
8 A. Mr. President, you can see from Article 2, which is part of the
9 corps command -- commander order, that only military targets should be
10 fired upon in order to achieve effects, i.e., to achieve losses on the
11 enemy side which is why fire is opened in the first place.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. -- Colonel, sir.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellencies. I have no
14 further questions.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Thank you for having come to testify.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And of course, this document.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Exhibit D2417.
19 Just before we adjourn, Mr. Tieger, the Chamber is seized of the
20 Defence motion for image distortion of -- for witness Trifunovic, so I
21 wonder whether we can have your response by tomorrow so that we can issue
22 the decision before witness comes. I will deal with the remainder
23 thing -- remaining thing tomorrow morning.
24 So, Mr. Simic, that concludes your evidence and I -- on behalf of
25 the Tribunal, I'd like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give
1 it. Now you are free to go.
2 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]
3 JUDGE KWON: We will rise all together.
4 [The witness withdrew]
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.25 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 13th day of
7 November, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.