1 Tuesday, 13 November 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.14 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Proceedings were delayed
6 again today due to technical difficulties.
7 I would like to go back to an issue Mr. Robinson raised yesterday
8 with respect to the Prosecution's contact with Defence witnesses. At the
9 end of your submission, Mr. Robinson, you stated, I quote, it's
10 transcript page 30105, lines from 11 to 14, it reads:
11 "However, I wanted to put it on the record and ask Mr. Tieger to
12 make sure that all members of the Prosecution not only in his team but
13 any other teams that might have any potential need to contact these
14 witnesses to comply with the Trial Chamber's order."
15 So I was wondering what you meant by "any other teams"? Did you
16 mean to say that, for example, Mladic team should also comply with our
17 Chamber's order?
18 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I did, Mr. President, because the Prosecution
20 is one so they have to comply with disclosure obligations and other
21 things regardless of whether they come into contact in the context of one
22 case or another. In particular, this matter arose in relation to the
23 Tolimir case because we were advised that the two witnesses who the
24 Prosecution wanted to contact first and one of whom who they had
25 inadvertently already contacted were to be contacted --
1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
2 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
3 JUDGE KWON: This is simply unacceptable.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Maybe we can move to courtroom 2.
5 JUDGE KWON: Probably we have to just adjourn. We have to rise.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is also unacceptable that ...
7 [In English] It appears to be that what Mr. Robinson said is
8 unacceptable, but I assume that Excellency Kwon said about technical ...
9 JUDGE KWON: We'll rise until we are further informed.
10 --- Recess taken at 9.18 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 10.16 a.m.
12 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, again. I have to find out which
13 computer is mine.
14 Does it mean that we lost all of the previous transcript for
16 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
17 JUDGE KWON: I have to check until where it has been recorded.
18 So shall we start again?
19 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think where I left off was
21 that we consider the Prosecution to be one for purposes of contacting our
22 witnesses -- [Microphone not activated].
23 JUDGE KWON: Microphone, please.
24 MR. ROBINSON: My microphone is on.
25 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry. It's my fault. I inadvertently the
1 priority switch. Yes, please continue.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, so Mr. President, it's our position that
3 since the Prosecution is one, that the Prosecution has to comply with
4 your order regardless of whether it's a member of the Karadzic team or
5 the member of another team. And I had indicated to you that the issue
6 first arose last week when I was advised by one of the members of the
7 Prosecution team that people from the Tolimir team wanted to interview
8 two witnesses who are on our list. And so they contacted us pursuant to
9 your order and we contacted the witnesses and now we've advised the
10 Prosecution that they're free to make contact with the witness. So the
11 system worked well except for the inadvertent contact by the Prosecution,
12 and we believe that that system should continue to be in place for any
13 contacts by members of any Prosecution team. Thank you.
14 JUDGE KWON: Just two questions, preliminary questions. First
15 one is for you, Mr. Robinson. When you refer to inadvertent contact by
16 the Prosecution team, did you mean the contact of the Tolimir team with
17 Defence witnesses?
18 MR. ROBINSON: Actually, it was an investigator who's working on
19 this case but also working on Tolimir case, and I was advised by the
20 Prosecution that he had made contact with the witness without fully
21 understanding the extent of the Trial Chamber's order.
22 JUDGE KWON: So it concerned the investigation -- an investigator
23 in the Karadzic OTP team?
24 MR. ROBINSON: Yes.
25 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Tieger?
1 MR. TIEGER: Well, not entirely, Mr. -- technically, yes, that's
2 true, but it was the same investigator who's been working for the Tolimir
3 team and this was a contact made for the -- at the behest of the Tolimir
4 team. And in fact, this was a matter in which the OTP acted very
5 efficiently on both fronts, it seems to me, that is, notifying members of
6 the team and, indeed, members of other teams about this Court's order,
7 but also this particular investigator in the Tolimir team moving quickly
8 on the contact. So when there's -- as Mr. Robinson is well aware,
9 there's nothing purposefully violative of the Court's order. Quite the
10 contrary. Everyone -- the Karadzic team acted as quickly as possible to
11 alert people. So this was just a matter where the Tolimir team asked
12 this particular investigator to undertake contact before the investigator
13 had been made aware of the terms of the Court's order. So I -- and I
14 think Mr. Robinson fully appreciates that. There's no suggestion to the
15 contrary, as far as I'm aware.
16 If I may also --
17 JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Tieger, probably this question is not meant
18 for you, but what sounds odd to me is this: Why does the Tolimir team
19 need to interview witnesses at all, given the stage of its case?
20 MR. TIEGER: Well, I -- I can't -- I'm not in a position to
21 answer on behalf of the parties who -- of Mr. McCloskey in this case who
22 is the head of the Tolimir team or anyone else who is involved in this
23 particular effort. But I can think of various reasons why that would be
24 the case. If these particular witnesses are thought to have information
25 or to be about to bring information to the attention of this
1 Trial Chamber which somehow implicates some evidence or significant
2 evidence in the Tolimir case, that might well be something that the
3 Tolimir team would want to know early rather than late.
4 The Court is well aware of the fact that, for example,
5 115 motions are brought well after judgement, so sometimes there can be
6 reasons to move with alacrity when there's any indication that there is
7 information that may be in existence that hasn't previously been brought
8 to the attention of the parties or the Trial Chamber.
9 In any event, that's one of the possibilities. I don't want to
10 speak for them, but let me simply say if there's any suggestion that they
11 were acting at the behest of the Karadzic team, that is not at all the
12 case. So they weren't -- so this was an independent interest on their
14 If I could -- as long as I'm up on my feet, if I could add one
15 thing, Mr. President, and that is that we essentially share the -- what I
16 think is the Trial Chamber's puzzlement about the theoretical basis for
17 Mr. Robinson's position. There are some matters in which the OTP is one,
18 but Trial Chambers have reserved the right to establish procedural
19 standards and rules for how those -- their cases will be run; and
20 therefore, it's very obvious that the OTP is subject to varying rules and
21 standards and guide-lines and practices from case to case. And we do not
22 consider that the -- this Trial Chamber intended to bind other
23 Trial Chambers in their determination of how the OTP in those cases
24 should make contact with witnesses. The ultimate absurdity of that
25 argument, it seems to me, is the fact that some of the witnesses on the
1 Defence witness list are also witnesses, as I understand it, for the
2 Prosecution in the Mladic case. So the attempt to blur those
3 distinctions and act as if there aren't separate Trial Chambers in
4 existence and separate trials running I think is clearly inappropriate,
5 as reflected in that example.
6 Having said that, we don't want there to be unnecessary problems
7 and problems where they don't need to exist. And that's why we are
8 willing to contact other teams and to the extent possible see if we can
9 ensure that contact is -- that we co-ordinate this and we don't make
10 contact before notifying Mr. Robinson. So we're happy to be as
11 accommodating as possible and eliminate problems where they don't need to
12 arise, but we reject the notion that we are under any obligation to do
14 JUDGE KWON: I hope this is just a storm in a teacup, but when we
15 order the Prosecution to give notice to the Defence we never meant to
16 include the other OTP teams. But the crux of the reasoning why the
17 Chamber ordered the Prosecution to give notice to the Defence when they
18 would like to meet with the witnesses whose contact detail they have
19 already is out of courtesy and some practical reasons. So if the
20 Prosecution is minded to co-operate on a voluntary basis, we would
21 encourage very much that such practice continue in the future as well.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE KWON: Then unless there's anything to be raised, then
24 we'll bring in the next witness.
25 In the meantime, I think it has been circulated, but to make
1 sure, we'll sit for the first session till quarter past 11.00 and we'll
2 have a 15 minutes' break, after which we'll have a second session which
3 will last until 12.50. And then we'll have a 40 minutes' lunch break and
4 we'll sit from 1.30 to 3.00, at which time the Chamber has to rise.
5 MS. GUSTAFSON: Your Honour, while the witness is coming in, I'd
6 just like to suggest that this witness be provided with a caution under
7 Rule 90(E). Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 JUDGE KWON: Just out of an abundance of caution, I state this
11 because I'm not sure whether what you stated is recorded or not.
12 Mr. Karadzic, what you said was correct. What I said
13 "unacceptable" was the technical difficulties but not what Mr. Robinson
15 THE ACCUSED: Thank you. Thank you, Excellency.
16 [The witness entered court]
17 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, sir.
18 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
19 JUDGE KWON: Would you take the solemn declaration, please.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning. I solemnly declare
21 that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
22 WITNESS: BOZO TOMIC
23 [Witness answered through interpreter]
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please take a seat and make yourself
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tomic, before you start giving evidence I would
3 like to draw your attention to a particular rule here at the Tribunal.
4 Under this rule, Rule 90(E), you may object to answering a question from
5 the Prosecution, the accused, or from the Judges if you believe that your
6 answer will incriminate you. When I say "incriminate," I mean that
7 something you say may amount to an admission of your guilt for a criminal
8 offence or could provide evidence that you have committed an offence.
9 However, even if you think your answer will incriminate you and you do
10 not wish to answer the question, the Tribunal has the discretion to
11 oblige you to answer the answer. But in such a case, the Tribunal will
12 make sure that your testimony compelled in such a way shall not be used
13 as evidence in other case against you for any offence other than false
14 testimony. Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understood that fully.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Tomic.
21 A. Good morning, Mr. President.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D6087 in
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. While we're waiting for the document to appear on the screen,
1 Mr. Tomic, I'd like to ask you whether you provided the Defence team with
2 a statement?
3 A. Yes, I did.
4 Q. Do you see that statement on the screen before you now?
5 A. Yes, I do.
6 Q. Thank you. Did you sign the statement?
7 A. Yes, I did.
8 Q. I have to remind myself and I have to ask you to make pauses
9 between what we're saying for the benefit of the interpreters.
10 Does this statement accurately reflect what you knew and what you
12 A. Yes, it does fully.
13 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today in
14 this courtroom, would your answers be more or less the same?
15 A. My answers would be identical to the answers that I gave for the
16 purpose of this statement.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, may I tender this
19 statement into evidence as well as the 92 ter package to be admitted
20 through Witness Mr. Bozo Tomic.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson, 65 ter list.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, exactly. We would ask for permission to add
23 the map that the witness marked, which is 1D0034, to our 65 ter list.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 Any objection, Ms. Gustafson?
1 MS. GUSTAFSON: No, and there's no objection to the admission of
2 any of the associated exhibits.
3 JUDGE KWON: Could we upload the second one, the 1D20540, so that
4 we can take a brief look. What's the date of this document, Mr. Karadzic
5 or Mr. Robinson?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 9th of May, 1993.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, English translation says it's 3rd of May, so it
8 may have to be corrected. Shall we upload it, 1D20540.
9 Yes. Your statement, Mr. Karadzic, that the date is 9th of May
10 seems to be sufficient. We'll continue on that basis. So we'll admit
11 the statement as well as four -- five associated exhibits.
12 Shall we give the number.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. 65 ter number 1D6087, the
14 statement, will be Exhibit D2418. 65 ter number 1D134 will be
15 Exhibit D2419. 65 ter number 1D20540 will be Exhibit D2420.
16 65 ter number 1D20544 will be Exhibit D2421. 65 ter number 1D20301 will
17 be Exhibit D2422. And 65 ter number 1D20548 will be Exhibit D2423.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to read a
21 brief summary of Mr. Tomic's statement in English.
22 [In English] Bozo Tomic was a member of the command of the
23 2nd Battalion of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade. He did his
24 military service in the JNA in 1981 and 1982 in Pula and then on the
25 island of Molat. He left the JNA with the rank of private first class.
1 After the events in March 1992, when the Serbian wedding guest
2 was killed in Bascarsija and barricades were set up in the city, he found
3 out that many Muslims had been summoned for some military exercises.
4 Sometime later he was told that there were training camps for Muslim
5 paramilitary units on Mount Igman. He lived on Ozrenska Street in a Serb
6 majority area. In early April 1992, he and several of his neighbours
7 agreed on the need to organise themselves to protect their families and
8 property. Roughly at the same time, members of the Serbian
9 Territorial Defence told him and them to organise guards on the streets,
10 to be particularly vigilant at night, and they received signs of
11 recognition to distinguish people outside the neighbourhood and their
12 basic task, as before, was to protect their houses and families. He was
13 elected squad commander.
14 From the very beginning of the conflict, Muslims opened fire on
15 them from the sector of Sanac and Pero Kosoric Square from multi-storey
16 buildings. All residential buildings in Pero Kosoric Square and
17 individual houses above and under Tranzit Street, as well as other
18 civilian buildings, were used for military purposes by establishing in
19 them enemy firing positions. Muslim sniper fire had disastrous
20 consequences on the Serbian side, both soldiers and civilians alike, and
21 not even children were spared. Because of this, his unit built
22 protection out of tarpaulin, nylon, cardboard, hard material, among
23 others, to conceal movement and hinder reconnaissance and enemy fire.
24 The Muslim forces ranging against them continuously planned and executed
25 offensive combat operations against his unit's line of defence.
1 They never received any order or instructions referring to the
2 expulsion of non-Serbs from their houses and apartments. Around
3 mid-May 1992, as the war grew in intensity, several Muslim families from
4 Ozrenska Street moved completely unhindered and without duress to the
5 part of the town under Muslim control. They had no -- the Serbs in this
6 company had no intention of causing civilian casualties, of exercising
7 psychological influence on civilians under Muslim control, neither did
8 his superior commands. They never received any oral or written order
9 from higher commands or civilian authorities to carry out attacks against
10 civilians under control of the Muslim authorities. Likewise, he never
11 issued any such orders. They only carried out defensive actions and
12 never opened fire into the depth of the enemy territory, firing only on
13 the line of disengagement and exclusively on military targets which
14 directly threatened them.
15 Because of the difficulty of the front and the small number of
16 men in Ozrenska Street, they contacted the brigade command asking for
17 reinforcements for the line and the engagement of a work detail to
18 fortify the line. The work detail was comprised of Muslims who came from
19 Kula penal and correctional facility and were treated properly. There
20 were no professional soldiers in his unit. It was a real people's army
21 comprised of the people from Ozrenska Street and the neighbourhood.
22 By the end of the war, about 220 people were killed and several
23 hundreds wounded in the zone of responsibility of the 2nd Battalion.
24 [Interpretation] For the time being, I have no questions for this
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
2 Mr. Tomic, as you have noted that your evidence in chief was
3 admitted in writing in lieu of your oral testimony. Now you will be
4 asked by the Prosecution in its cross-examination.
5 Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
6 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:
8 Q. Good morning, Mr. Tomic. I'd like to start by asking you a
9 couple of questions --
10 A. Good morning.
11 Q. I'd like to start by asking you a couple of questions about the
12 background to the conflict. At paragraph 4 of your statement you said:
13 "With the war in Croatia, a different atmosphere began to be felt
14 in Sarajevo. My experience was that it was loaded with a negative
15 charge, sincere socialising stopped and divisions along ethnic lines were
16 felt. Speeches of Muslim and Croatian politicians in the Assembly
17 created an atmosphere of mistrust and fear."
18 What particular speeches of Muslim and Croat politicians in the
19 Assembly created, in your view, an atmosphere of mistrust and fear?
20 A. Well, right this minute I can't remember all the politicians and
21 their speeches, but the president of the Party of Democratic Action,
22 Mr. Izetbegovic, and the president of Herceg-Bosna or the Croatian
23 Democratic Union, Mate Boban, were very unpleasant. I'm speaking from
24 the point of view of the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And
25 you could guess that there was this so-called unprincipled coalition
1 between the Muslim and Croatian people. All -- and they saw
2 Serbs - although it was illogical - as their common enemy. In any case,
3 fear and anxiety were rising and particularly in view of their memories
4 from the Second World War Serbs felt that they had to unite and organise
5 themselves because they could not feel safe in that country. The
6 practice of out-voting one people in the Assembly was another reason for
7 this rising anxiety and fear. I had personal experience as well at my
9 Q. Thank you.
10 A. Muslims and Croats united on one side and --
11 Q. Thank you. I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Tomic, but I think
12 we're straying away from the question which was about speeches of
13 politicians in the Assembly. And I understand from your answer that you
14 can't recall any specific statements, but they were very unpleasant; is
15 that right?
16 A. Well, Mr. Izetbegovic was always prepared to sacrifice peace for
17 a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. We Serbs are not naive and especially
18 with our experience from previous wars, we knew what that meant. We
19 didn't need anyone to explain to us what it meant when he said that we
20 will sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that
21 unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina of his vision, Serbs had nothing good to
23 Q. Okay. And what about statements of Serb politicians in the
24 Assembly, do you recall any speeches of Serb politicians in the Assembly
25 that added to this atmosphere of mistrust and fear in Sarajevo?
1 A. If I remember well, I could say that it was taken out of the
2 context of the speech of the president of the republic, Mr. Karadzic, is
3 something that I understood as a warning especially after the
4 Lisbon Agreement or the Cutileiro Plan as it was known. I, myself, my
5 neighbours, and my friends thought that it was a good basis for an
6 agreement that could spare us from a horrible war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
7 And if I remember correctly, Mr. Izetbegovic even put his initials on
8 that document; however, upon returning to Bosnia-Herzegovina --
9 Q. Mr. Tomic --
10 A. -- he reneged on it and I believe it was after he was influenced
11 by some other factors, especially foreigns.
12 Q. Again, I think we're moving away from the topic, but you did
13 allude to a speech of Mr. Karadzic and I assume you're talking about his
14 speech from October of 1991 where he stated that Bosnia was taking the
15 same highway of hell and suffering that Croatia and Slovenia went through
16 and warned of the possible extinction of the Muslim people if it came to
17 war. Is that the speech you're referring to?
18 A. Well, yes, that speech. But I'm saying in Slovenia there were
19 far fewer Serbs as a minority than in the Serbian population of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I understood him as saying that Serbs, of course,
21 would suffer a lot in case of war, but Muslims would suffer the most. If
22 I had heard something like that from Mr. Izetbegovic, I would - although
23 a Serb - be grateful for such a statement and I would understand it as
24 meaning that all of us should make certain compromises to avoid war.
25 However, I also have to say, as I did in my statement, I played football
1 every day at the Grbavica stadium and some friends with whom I used to
2 play without even knowing their ethnicity --
3 Q. Sorry, Mr. Tomic --
4 A. -- were missing. You can only imagine how I felt when I
5 learned --
6 Q. Again I interrupted you because we are moving away from the
7 question. If you could try to focus as specifically as possible on the
8 precise question.
9 Now, notwithstanding your apparent claim that you would be
10 grateful for a statement from Mr. Izetbegovic warning the Serb people of
11 their possible extinction, Mr. Karadzic's warning to the Muslim people of
12 their possible extinction when it came to war added to the atmosphere of
13 mistrust and fear in Sarajevo, didn't it?
14 A. Muslims probably understood it that way; I did not. And, you
15 see, I can't answer your questions with a yes or no. I need to explain
16 certain things. This is not a mathematical problem where I only have to
17 explain a formula.
18 I have to say one thing. Alija Izetbegovic and the Muslim
19 leadership had already called upon their young people not to join the
20 Yugoslav People's Army. I and most Serbs saw Yugoslavia as our homeland
21 and that was therefore something unusual, something that was happening
22 for the first time that Muslims were not joining that army, while at the
23 same time making paramilitary units, organising training camps, and I
24 later found out that they had started preparing as early as 1991 --
25 Q. Sorry, Mr. Tomic.
1 A. -- we were not doing that.
2 Q. Again, I understand you feel the need to explain, but that really
3 isn't responsive to the question, which you did answer in the first line
4 of your answer. Thank you.
5 Okay. I'd like to move on now to April 1992, and you stated that
6 you lived in Ozrenska Street and in the immediate vicinity of the MUP
7 school. So your home and the MUP school, they were in Vraca, in the
8 municipality of Novo Sarajevo; is that right?
9 A. Yes, that's right.
10 Q. Thank you. And the clashes of the MUP school that you referred
11 to in paragraph 6, those clashes were in connection with the Bosnian MUP
12 special forces taking over the school in Vraca; is that right?
13 A. I don't know any details, but I know that members of the special
14 unit whose purpose was to intervene in case of emergencies in the whole
15 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there too Muslims and Croats left and
16 went elsewhere, whereas only Serbs remained. That night of the 4th
17 April, from the direction of Sanac and from the direction of Pero Kosoric
18 Square and the Tranzit company, fire was opened onto our area. One Serb,
19 a member of that special unit, was killed and two were wounded. I myself
20 was not involved. It was an operation of those so-called special forces,
21 and I did not participate; but I learned that one of them got killed.
22 And it was an internal conflict within a unit --
23 Q. Thank you.
24 A. -- of Bosnia and Herzegovina and because of various disagreements
25 and --
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tomic. I understand from your answer that,
2 indeed, the MUP special forces were there and there was an operation
3 involving them at the time. I think that's sufficient to answer my
4 question so I'll move on to the next question.
5 You said at paragraph 7 of your statement:
6 "We found out that members of the Serbian TO were in the Pajaco
7 restaurant at the beginning of Ozrenska Street."
8 Now, Pajaco, as I understand it, that's also in the immediate
9 vicinity of your house and the MUP school in Vraca; is that right?
10 A. It's closer to the MUP school, whereas my house is perhaps
11 300 metres from that restaurant called Pajaco.
12 Q. Thank you. And Pajaco, was that the headquarters of the
13 Novo Sarajevo Serbian TO?
14 A. I don't know whether it was the headquarters of Novo Sarajevo TO,
15 but I know that when I went there to inquire with my neighbours whether
16 we needed to organise ourselves, we were told that they were members of
17 the TO and we were issued with weapons. Of course, we were under a lot
18 of pressure and we were very anxious, expecting something to happen, so
19 we wanted to get armed to be able to protect our families and our
20 neighbourhoods, all of us who lived in Ozrenska Street. Whether that was
21 the headquarters of Novo Sarajevo TO, I really don't know. I know that
22 some people were there, and when we were issued with weapons, my comrades
23 selected me to be some sort of squad commander and I was given an
24 automatic rifle. Every day at dusk we would go there to take certain
25 distinction marks, as is the custom in every army, to be able to tell
1 that we were from that area, both Muslims and Serbs, only for the purpose
2 of protecting the local population, all of us who lived there.
3 Q. Okay. And --
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could -- just a comment on the
5 transcript. The witness said: In order to be able to protect our
6 families, all of us who lived there regardless of faith and ethnicity.
7 And that was not recorded in the transcript.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tomic, do you confirm that?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's what I said.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 Let's continue, Ms. Gustafson.
12 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
13 Q. Just on that point, Mr. Tomic, you stated that this was the -- in
14 your statement that this was the Serbian TO. Were there Muslims and
15 Croats going to Pajaco restaurant, where - as you state - the Serbian TO
16 was located?
17 A. I don't know if any Muslims went there. I went with a group of
18 my neighbours and they didn't even have enough weapons for all of us.
19 They gave us some to be able to have them at guard duty at night and of
20 course that line was not properly organised according to --
21 Q. Thank you.
22 A. -- all military regulations. So I went there with people from my
23 closest circle. I don't know if there were any Muslims involved.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: By the way, Mr. Tomic. Ms. Gustafson is asking
1 questions following your statement. Do you have your statement with you
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not this minute.
4 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to have one in hard copy?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It would be a good idea if
7 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, that will be done.
8 Yes, please continue, Ms. Gustafson.
9 MS. GUSTAFSON:
10 Q. Mr. Tomic, you've stated several times now in your answers that
11 it was at Pajaco that you received -- you and your neighbours received
12 weapons. Who at Pajaco was distributing weapons to you and your
14 A. I know that Budo Obradovic, Momir Garic were there. I didn't
15 even know all those people because it's impossible to know them all. And
16 we were told that our task was - and I said before it was also our
17 desire - to protect our families. We were expecting that something could
18 happen any time. We just wanted to prevent war. I don't know the names
19 of all those people. And I'm saying again there were not enough weapons
20 for all of my neighbours, so sometimes somebody would have to borrow a
21 weapon and of course --
22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tomic.
23 A. -- there were not enough automatic weapons, not even
25 Q. Again, we're straying away from the topic. I wasn't asking you
1 about the quantity of weapons. Now, you mentioned Budo Obradovic and
2 Momir Garic. Were Budo Obradovic and Momir Garic distributing weapons
3 and giving you tasks from Pajaco?
4 A. My neighbours and I had heard that there was something at Pajaco.
5 I don't know if it was the --
6 Q. Sorry, Mr. Tomic --
7 A. -- headquarters Territorial Defence --
8 Q. You're now repeating your earlier answer. My answer [sic] was
9 very specific. It was:
10 "Were Budo Obradovic and Momir Garic distributing weapons and
11 giving you tasks from Pajaco?"
12 If you could answer that with a "yes" or a "no," please.
13 A. I've already said, let's not exaggerate. I don't know if Budo or
14 Momo gave me the weapons, but they were there and we were given a
15 specific task. We wanted to and they advised us to protect our families,
16 to prevent incursions from outsiders, strangers, that's what it was
17 about. There was no real military organisation yet. We were just
18 self-organising. I cannot tell you specifically whether Budo or Momo or
19 Marko or whoever gave me the weapon. All I know that there was this -- I
20 don't know if it was the headquarters of Novo Sarajevo TO or it was only
21 for the local commune, I really don't know.
22 Q. Thank you. And when you said you didn't know if it was Budo or
23 Momo who gave you the weapons, you're referring to Budo Obradovic and
24 Momir Garic; is that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I must say, the witness said in
2 line 3: Or somebody else, and that was not recorded. All that was left
3 was whether it was Momo or Budo -- or somebody third is what the witness
5 JUDGE KWON: I think that's the case -- do you confirm that,
6 Mr. Tomic?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm saying I can't even
8 remember whether one of the two or both were there on that particular
9 day. Perhaps they had been there, but it's pointless for me to claim
10 now, 20 years later, that either of them specifically gave me the weapon.
11 JUDGE KWON: And it's confirmed by Ms. Gustafson but I'd like to
12 confirm with you once again, Momir Garic's nickname was Momo?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's how I know him, as
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
17 Q. Now again you've referred both in your statement and several
18 times in your answers so far to Momir Garic and Budo Obradovic at Pajaco.
19 I understand from that that they were either the commanders or the
20 leaders of your TO unit in Novo Sarajevo; is that a correct
22 A. I don't know. I can't speculate. I don't know what their
23 assignments were. I just told you the truth about how we went there and
24 received weapons. There was no military organisation yet. Only later
25 did the 1st Omladinska Brigade -- sorry, 1st Romanija Brigade came and
1 towards the end of May the 1st Mechanised Sarajevo Brigade was
2 established and we joined it - me and my comrades - and remained till the
3 end part of that 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade.
4 Q. Okay. Well, you said that when you went to Pajaco you were given
5 a specific task, and that was at lines 3 and 4 of page 20; and also in
6 your statement you said you were told at Pajaco to organise guards in the
7 street, et cetera. Who at Pajaco gave you these tasks?
8 A. That was said once. We didn't need telling twice --
9 Q. Mr. Tomic --
10 A. -- we organised ourselves to go every day and take --
11 Q. -- whether it was -- whether you were told once or multiple
12 times, that's not the question. Who told you? Who gave you these tasks?
13 A. I'm telling you again, we received tasks, instructions, but we
14 had asked ourselves to be given them.
15 Q. Yes, and who gave you the tasks?
16 A. Perhaps one of those two, but I'm telling you we asked ourselves
17 for our own safety and the safety of our families and all the inhabitants
18 of that street in order to feel safe, because at night it happened in
19 some parts of the city that outsiders, perhaps criminals or robbers,
20 would --
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tomic.
22 A. -- barge in and we had to protect ourselves from looting.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance? The
24 interpretation the witness received was in a continuous form of the verb
25 "to give," "who gave you instructions" instead of the one-time form
1 [In English] "Who used to give us -- to give you," "who used to give
3 JUDGE KWON: Very well. That may be the reason -- but,
4 Mr. Tomic, could you concentrate on answering the question.
5 Let's continue, Ms. Gustafson.
6 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
7 Could we have -- sorry, Exhibit D2419 on the screen.
8 Q. Mr. Tomic, the map that you're about to see on the screen is the
9 map that you marked in connection with your statement where you indicated
10 with a red line the Serbian positions in Ozrenska Street.
11 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could zoom in on the red line which is
12 roughly in the middle of the page and a little bit down. If we could
13 zoom in a little more. And maybe one more time so the line is clear.
14 And if we could move the map to the right and up -- sorry, the other way,
15 and down so we can see. Yeah, great.
16 Q. Mr. Tomic, can you see the line, the red line, that you drew?
17 A. That's -- if that's the line going through the football stadium
18 and via Tranzit and this elevation Sanac and along Ozrenska Street, yes,
19 I drew that line.
20 Q. Thank you. Are you able to mark where you, in particular, were
21 positioned in April 1992 on Ozrenska Street on this map?
22 A. That's precisely the part going above Tranzit, above that road
23 and the football stadium, going towards this hill, Sanac, and up to
24 Ozrenska Street and further. Until May 1994, I was a member of the
25 3rd Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Romanija Brigade. A friend
1 of mine and I were in command of a platoon of about 60 men. We had our
2 area of responsibility within the 3rd Company. That's precisely the line
3 I marked on the map that went, as I said, from Tranzit and covered
4 Tranzit, while a neighbouring platoon was at the beginning of the
5 stadium, that is to say, closer to the police school and Grbavica.
6 Just to make one thing clear, the street that goes from Grbavica
7 towards Miljacka was Djuraskovica Street. There was company Strojorad
8 and it goes along the left bank of the Miljacka river and that was the
9 area of responsibility of the 2nd Battalion whose commander I was from
10 1994 until the end of the war. So that's the line I also marked that
11 goes down towards Lukavica. That's one of the longest streets in the
12 city, Ozrenska Street.
13 Q. Okay. I understand from your answer - and correct me if I'm
14 wrong - that the positions you held in April, basically you continued to
15 hold the same positions when you were a member of a platoon of the SRK
16 and that those -- that position covered the entire length of the line
17 that you've drawn on this map in red. Do I understand that correctly?
18 A. Well, as I said, our battalion had within the 3rd Company of the
19 1st Romanija Brigade its area of responsibility. It was a stretch about
20 several hundred kilometres, and until 1994 I spent all my time there,
21 leaving Sarajevo a few times going towards Trnovo and the Niksic plateau.
22 So there were trips like that in order to reinforce our unit, but most of
23 the time I spent there, on this stretch of several hundred metres. And
24 the task of our platoon was to hold that defence line. And during the
25 war, that line did not move. There were no offensive actions in my unit,
1 we were not advancing, and as time went by --
2 Q. Mr. Tomic --
3 A. -- we only fortified it --
4 Q. I'm sorry, I really have to ask you to limit your answers to the
5 specific questions that I ask.
6 JUDGE KWON: I take it you need more time to finish your cross?
7 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, Your Honour, I do.
8 JUDGE KWON: So we'll take a break now for 15 minutes and resume
9 at 32 past 11.00. But I have to note that I forgot to mention that we
10 were sitting for the first session pursuant to 15 bis due to
11 Judge Lattanzi's official function. She will join us from the next
13 --- Recess taken at 11.16 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 11.36 a.m.
15 JUDGE KWON: Well, this may be the first time for four Judges to
16 be fit into Courtroom 2.
17 Ms. Gustafson, please continue.
18 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
19 Q. Mr. Tomic, I'd like you now to watch a video and this is P5062.
20 It has no sound so I'd just like you to watch what appears on your screen
21 and we will stop it at 28 seconds and then I'll ask you a question.
22 [Prosecution counsel confer]
23 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry, if we could just have a moment.
24 [Video-clip played]
25 MS. GUSTAFSON:
1 Q. Now, Mr. Tomic, in this video you've seen Mr. Karadzic and
2 General Mladic entering a military position and now we can see the view
3 from that position. This is a shot from a position at Ozrenska Street
4 looking out over Grbavica; is that right?
5 A. Well, I'd said from some other position a bit to the right of
6 Ozrenska. According to the buildings I can see here, I assume it's some
7 sort of observation post, that it is from that location that the
8 positions were observed.
9 Q. And when you say "to the right," what do you mean? Do you mean
10 to the east or to the west?
11 A. Perhaps a little to the east.
12 Q. So you believe this is east of Ozrenska Street in Vraca?
13 A. I would say that it's in Vraca, given the angle of observation
14 and the buildings you can see because there are no such elevations in
15 Ozrenska. So I would say that it is somewhere to the right. That is how
16 I would interpret this photograph, this image.
17 Q. Okay. But Ozrenska Street is -- runs along a hill and overlooks
18 Sarajevo; right?
19 A. But I'm just speaking about the angle from which this image was
20 recorded. I would say that it's an elevation in relation to
21 Ozrenska Street, so to the right or to the east of Ozrenska Street in the
22 direction of Vraca, perhaps in the direction of Trebevic, let's say, but
23 I don't know exactly.
24 Q. Okay.
25 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could continue playing this video and
1 that was, for the record, 28 seconds.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 MS. GUSTAFSON: And we've stopped at 52 seconds.
4 Q. Mr. Tomic, can you confirm that this is another view of Grbavica,
5 and those three high-rises with the white on the edges, that's Soping?
6 A. Yes. In the distance towards the horizon you can see the Hum
8 Q. Thank you. Okay, we're finished with that video.
9 Mr. Tomic, you have emphasised, both in your statement and in
10 your evidence earlier today, that in April, when you were a member of the
11 Novo Sarajevo TO, that your tasks were solely about protecting your homes
12 and neighbourhoods and that there was no offensive action. It is the
13 case, is it not, that in April there was a TO offensive towards the north
14 of the positions that you have marked on your map as the line of defence
15 and into -- in particular an offensive in the Grbavica area. Is that
17 A. In the area of the unit that I was a member of at the time when
18 it entered the 1st May unit there were no defensive or offensive actions,
19 but in second part, yes, in Grbavica at the time because there were a lot
20 of Serbs living there. People organised themselves down there to protect
21 themselves, their families, and their property, and in order to be safe
22 in that area.
23 Q. I'm talking about a Novo Sarajevo Serb TO offensive on the
24 21st of April, 1992, in Grbavica. Was there or was there not such an
1 A. I didn't participate in any such offensive. I was at the lines
2 that I have marked, at the positions I marked. Our task was to hold the
3 positions there, to protect the area where we lived, my neighbours, my
4 friends, from the street. So I did not participate in that offensive.
5 Q. So you recall that offensive, the 21st of April offensive, in
6 Grbavica; is that right?
7 A. Well, I can't remember the date, but I know it was towards the
8 end of April. I wouldn't say that it's the 21st, but if you say so, it's
9 quite possible. However, I did not take part in that offensive. I
10 wouldn't say that it was an offensive operation. The people organised
11 themselves and did the same things that we did in Ozrenska Street.
12 Q. Well, in fact, the TO from Vraca went down to Grbavica and
13 attempted to take territory in Grbavica. That's an offensive; right?
14 A. No, there were a lot of Serbs in Grbavica and even the
15 municipality of Novo Sarajevo itself before the war was inhabited by a
16 majority of Serbs. The municipality covered a large area, and the
17 majority of the inhabitants in Grbavica were Serbs. They organised
18 themselves as did we. They were there. There were no forces from the
19 outside, no members of the Territorial Defence from the outside. They
20 all had their responsibility in given sectors, in certain areas of the
21 Vraca local commune where they lived because the municipality covered an
22 entire area and Ozrenska Street was part of Vraca local commune, part of
23 the area was part of the Hrasno local commune, I would say.
24 Q. Sorry, I'm not able to follow your answer. Do you agree or
25 disagree that members of the TO from Vraca went down to Grbavica to
1 attempt to take territory?
2 A. As I said, I don't agree because I know that in Grbavica there
3 were a lot of Serbs who lived in the area and they also organised
4 themselves as did we in Ozrenska Street and in other parts of Sarajevo.
5 Q. Okay. I'd like you to listen to an intercept which is
6 Exhibit D1202.
7 And, Mr. Tomic, this is an intercepted telephone conversation
8 from the 21st of April, 1992, if you could listen to it and then I'll ask
9 you some questions.
10 [Intercept played]
11 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
12 "MG: Good afternoon.
13 "NN: Good afternoon.
14 "MG: May I speak to Danilo?
15 "NN: Danilo?
16 "MG: Yes.
17 "NN: Danilo who?
18 "MG: Veselinovic.
19 "NN: Well, you got the wrong number, my son. Where are you
20 calling from?
21 "MG: And is Prstojevic there?
22 "NN: Who are you and where are you calling from?
23 "MG: I'm calling from Novo Sarajevo.
24 "NN: And you are?
25 "MG: Momo.
1 "NN: Momo who?
2 "MG: Garic.
3 "NN: I beg your pardon?
4 "MG: Garic.
5 "NN: Tell me, Eric.
6 "Come on Garic, come on --
7 "MG: Wait, wait, wait a second. Garic. This is Garic.
8 "NN: Oh, Garic. Go ahead.
9 "MG: Is Veselinovic there?
10 "NN: No, Veselinovic is not here, but here is --
11 "MG: Well, can you just -- how can you help us, please?
12 "NN: Tell me, speak up.
13 "MG: The army refuses, those tanks, we are encircled. Do you
14 have any armour, any manpower? Please, I'm begging you.
15 "NN: Garic, Prstojevic is here.
16 "MG: Let me talk to him.
17 "UMP: They dumped the armour, three men in 'Palma' --
18 "NP: Hello.
19 "MG: Prstojevic?
20 "NP: Yes.
21 "MG: This is Garic.
22 "NP: Good morning.
23 "MG: What's up? Listen.
24 "NP: Nothing special.
25 "MG: How can you help us as soon as possible?
1 "NP: Help who?
2 "MG: Us.
3 "NP: Who? Where is that?
4 "MG: Novo Sarajevo.
5 "NP: Yes, but where? What is your location?
6 "MG: Just a second. In Vraca. We need some men in Vraca
7 urgently, please.
8 "NP: But wait a second, where are you in Vraca exactly? Are you
9 down near the MUP or up there?
10 "MG: We are -- somebody will wait for these men at the pass.
11 "NP: Are you up at the pass and further up on the right side?
12 "MG: I will wait for the men at the pass.
13 "NP: Wait a second, Garic. Are you at the pass and further up
14 on the right side, towards Vraca?
15 "MG: We went down to the town, all the way to the Miljacka,
16 however, they are too strong there. They are encircling us and the army
17 refuses to move.
18 "NP: Wait a second. Are you fighting there?
19 "MG: We are fighting fiercely. We have many casualties.
20 "NP: Tonight, is that right?
21 "MG: Well, no, we started this morning here ... forget about it,
22 now we are encircled, as it seems.
23 "NP: Mm-hmm.
24 "MG: How can you help us? I also called Velibor in Nedzarici
25 and he will try to do something, but that is not enough. That is not
2 "NP: All right. What are the Special Forces doing?
3 "MG: They refuse to leave the barracks. The Special Forces
4 refuse to leave the barracks area. That's it. The reserve police force
5 also promised to do everything they can but they went back.
6 "NP: Aha.
7 "MG: That's it. What are we going to do?
8 "NP: You know, it's day-time and it's the south, and it is
9 difficult to fight during the day in the south.
10 "MG: Yes.
11 "NP: And if they encircle you ... okay, we cannot allow that.
12 First of all, we must not allow the encirclement and second --
13 "MG: Yes, yes.
14 "NP: -- one can strike very well during day.
15 "MG: Yes.
16 "NP: So you have to organise yourself and get help from people
17 from the nearest surroundings.
18 "MG: There is nobody closer than you.
19 "NP: You have Vraca, Petrovici, and that area.
20 "MG: There is nobody here. They've all gone down.
21 "NP: They've all gone down?
22 "MG: Yes.
23 "NP: Well, if everybody's gone down, those must be very strong
25 "MG: Well, them. We are stretched thin on other sides, Zlatiste
1 up there.
2 "NP: Yes.
3 "MG: So that is the problem. That is the problem.
4 "NP: Withdraw. I don't know now, at this hour, things here are
5 going --
6 "MG: What?
7 "NP: I don't know if we can give you any specific help right
9 "MG: Yes.
10 "NP: At this moment.
11 "MG: All right. All right.
12 "NP: Where are you fighting exactly? Where exactly are you?
13 "MG: Vrbanja, Grbavica, Ivan Krndelj, and all the way to
15 "NP: And you went down, is that right?
16 "MG: Yes, yes.
17 "NP: Aha.
18 "MG: Yes.
19 "NP: Well, if nothing else, withdraw a little bit. Be
20 resilient, I mean.
21 "MG: Yes.
22 "NP: Withdraw and mobilise all those people.
23 "MG: Yes, yes, everybody has been mobilised.
24 "NP: Don't forget that it is difficult to send men to fight in
25 an unknown area.
1 "MG: Yes, yes, all right. All right.
2 "NP: All right then.
3 "MG: All right. Bye."
4 MS. GUSTAFSON:
5 Q. Now, Mr. Tomic, the -- here you heard Momo Garic calling from
6 Novo Sarajevo and specifically from Vraca. He's trying to reach
7 Prstojevic. He explains that he is encircled. He describes his
8 position. He said:
9 "We went down to the town all the way to the Miljacka river."
10 He says:
11 "We are fighting fiercely, we have many casualties."
12 He's describing, is he not, a Novo Sarajevo TO operation where TO
13 members from Vraca have gone down to fight in an offensive operation in
15 A. Well, I don't know. Perhaps someone from the Territorial Defence
16 participated in it. But in Grbavica there was a sufficient number of
17 locals, Serbs above all, who organised themselves, and I traced a red
18 line. You can see how large the area of Vraca is. The unit I was in
19 wasn't directly above Grbavica. If we left our positions, the area would
20 have remained empty. That line would have been penetrated and the entire
21 area of Grbavica would have been encircled from all sides. So it wasn't
22 possible for us to leave the defence line where we were located because
23 the line was there, from the direction of Hrasno, behind Tranzit. The
24 line was there and it was gradually fortified for the purpose of
25 security, so we couldn't have participated in those operations. Our unit
1 couldn't have done that. That would have resulted in leaving an area
2 empty of -- that would have resulted in abandoning an area and the
3 Muslims could have entered it. Someone may have assisted them, but I'm
4 not familiar with that. I'm telling you that there were a sufficient
5 number of people there who formed units later on and became part of the
6 1st Romanija Brigade in 1992.
7 Q. Okay. Well, in this intercept, Prstojevic -- by the way, did you
8 know Nedjeljko Prstojevic, the commander of the Ilidza Crisis Staff, did
9 you know him? I see you nodded, shook your head?
10 A. No, I didn't.
11 Q. Okay. Well, Prstojevic says: "So you have to organise yourself
12 get help from people from the nearest surroundings."
13 Garic says: "There is nobody closer than you."
14 Prstojevic says: "You have Vraca, Petrovici, and that area."
15 Garic responds: "There is nobody here, they've all gone down."
16 Prstojevic asks: "They've all gone down?"
17 And Garic says: "Yes."
18 Here Mr. Garic is clearly describing a TO operation in which
19 everyone from Vraca, Petrovici, and that area have gone down to Grbavica;
21 A. Well, let me repeat what I said, that couldn't have been done.
22 You couldn't leave the left or right flank without any men, just leave.
23 Garic at that time certainly sustained significant casualties and he's a
24 bit panicky, as you could see. He was asking for assistance. That's
25 what I understood from the conversation that was intercepted, but it's
1 not possible for everyone to go to just one part of the defence line.
2 Then the right and left flank are abandoned and it can be penetrated --
3 Q. Okay, Mr. Tomic.
4 A. -- the area can be penetrated and what have you achieved then?
5 Q. I understand your position is that notwithstanding these
6 statements, that this was simply not possible.
7 I'd like to move on now and talk about the time after your unit
8 was absorbed into the SRK, which I understand from your statement is what
9 happened. Now, you said earlier today that you were within the
10 3rd Company of the 2nd Battalion. The Chamber has heard some evidence
11 that the 4th Company of the 2nd Battalion was positioned on
12 Ozrenska Street. Is it possible that you were a member of the -- that
13 your platoon belonged to the 4th Company or can you otherwise explain --
14 reconcile that?
15 A. I'd just like to make something clear. The SRK was in the entire
16 area of Sarajevo and it had a lot of brigades within it. The brigade
17 that was formed in May 1992 was the 1st Romanija Brigade, and the company
18 that I was a member of was the 3rd Company of the 3rd Battalion of the
19 1st Romanija Brigade. The platoon I was a member of was the 2nd Platoon
20 of that company. Subsequently, in spring, towards the end of May 1993,
21 the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade was established and that
22 3rd Battalion was then the 2nd Infantry Battalion in the 1st Sarajevo
23 Mechanised Brigade, and all those brigades in Sarajevo formed the SRK,
24 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. So my battalion or the company didn't
25 become part of the SRK because you have platoons, company, battalions,
1 brigade, and then the corps. That is the hierarchy that is established.
2 That's how things work --
3 Q. Mr. Tomic --
4 A. -- in accordance with the establishment. So I was part of the
5 3rd Company --
6 Q. Thank you. I understand your evidence now is that you were a
7 member of the 3rd Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Romanija
8 Brigade, which later became the 3rd Company of the 2nd Battalion of the
9 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade.
10 Can you explain where the 4th Company was positioned in relation
11 to the 3rd Company? Because, as I said earlier, the Chamber's received
12 evidence that the 4th Company was also on Ozrenska Street.
13 A. That's correct. The 4th Company was there. In relation to the
14 3rd Company, it was to the left or to the west if you look at the map and
15 it linked up with the 5th Company, whose area of responsibility was
16 towards Mojmilo and Lukavica, and the 2nd Battalion was there - not in
17 terms of establishment but a battalion from Dobrinja -- it was another
18 battalion from Dobrinja, it wasn't the 2nd Battalion, but they were
19 linked up. So the 4th Company was also in Ozrenska Street.
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tomic. Again, if you could really try to focus on
21 the specific question that I ask. Now I'd like to ask you about some of
22 the locations where you indicate in your statement you were fired at from
23 and that's at paragraphs 9 and 10 of your statement. And you included
24 residential buildings and Pero Kosoric Square. That's a square in
25 Hrasno; right?
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. And the Loris building, that's also in Hrasno?
3 A. Well, it's in the direction of the Zeljeznicar football stadium.
4 The red line that you see here shows that it's right next to the
5 Milutin Djuraskovic Street, perhaps 50 metres from the Zeljeznicar
6 football stadium in Sarajevo.
7 Q. Okay. And the Plavi Neboder, or the blue skyscraper, where was
9 A. Plavi Neboder, there were five of them, they were all on
10 Pero Kosoric Square. These are all high positions in relation to our
11 positions and sniper fire can cover the entire area of Ozrenska Street
12 from there. These are skyscrapers that had about 20 floors.
13 Q. Okay. So all of these locations were quite close to your
14 positions on Ozrenska Street. Is that right? And if so, how close were
15 they approximately?
16 A. I'm talking about the time that I spent there in 1994, before I
17 became a member of the battalion command. I spent all of that time in
18 Sanac. It's within range of ordinary rifles and all large-calibre
19 weapons, of course. The line of demarcation between us and the Muslim
20 troops -- well, there was a distance of about 20 metres between us in
21 certain areas. I'm talking about the area of this platoon exclusively,
22 the platoon I was a member of from 1992 up until 1994 up until the end of
23 May. But I know that in these other areas there was only the Miljacka
24 river that represented the line of disengagement. So it was in the range
25 of any kind of rifles or infantry weapons and even a house that I lived
1 in, where my parents also lived, was in range of those infantry weapons
2 and we spent the entire war time-period in that house.
3 Q. Okay. And the -- I understand then that the units positioned on
4 this line and generally positioned on Ozrenska Street were exposed to a
5 great deal of fire and were in a dangerous situation. Would you describe
6 it as basically facing constant danger at those positions?
7 A. Precisely so. The line that went along Ozrenska Street, it was
8 interrupted at places wherever possible due to the configuration of the
9 terrain. There is a huge number of houses there and each of the houses
10 was a possible target, a possible place of incursion, or things like
11 that. Along the entire length of Ozrenska Street, the distance between
12 the two armies was 20 to 50 metres at the most. So you could even throw
13 a stone -- we could throw stones at each other. Ozrenska Street had over
14 200 dead, unfortunately a lot of civilians among them died as a result of
15 sniping or mortar fire that came from the other side.
16 Q. Okay. And you said also in your statement that:
17 "We never opened fire into the depth."
18 When you say "we" here, are you talking just about your platoon
19 or would you -- would you say that that's the case for all the units on
20 Ozrenska Street?
21 A. I have to make a distinction here. Before 1994 I was a member of
22 that unit and I can tell you for a fact that there was no fire opened in
23 depth. After 1994 I can talk as a member of the battalion command and I
24 can say that there was a strict order not to open fire in depth unless we
25 were attacked; then we could use all means because we would be in full
1 combat-readiness, we would all be on the line, and we would all be
2 defending ourselves, so the situation was different then.
3 Q. Okay. So your position is that while you were a member of the
4 platoon, there was no fire opened in depth. Do you mean that your --
5 nobody from your platoon opened fire into the depth?
6 A. Yes, that's correct.
7 Q. Okay. You also identified some targets in the depth, that's at
8 paragraph 19 of your statement and you talked -- you mentioned
9 specifically schools on the right bank of the Miljacka and artillery
10 pieces that were placed close to residential buildings. Did the units at
11 Ozrenska Street face incoming fire from any of these positions in the
12 depth that you're talking about?
13 A. From Grbavica to -- or rather, from Soping, we set temporary
14 observation posts, and since those were skyscrapers with 20 or so floors
15 we could observe the other side. We could only observe, we couldn't do
16 anything else, otherwise we would reveal our positions. And we could see
17 all those facilities that I mentioned, and from all of them fire was
18 opened on us. Later on we learned that they were involved in some dirty
19 dealings. For example, they would affix a mortar to a little lorry, they
20 would come to a building, fire a few shots, and then that lorry would be
21 hidden behind a school or behind a building. Our observers saw that. It
22 was impossible to find them later and it would have been in vain to open
23 fire on those targets which were mobile, as it were.
24 Q. So you talked, just to follow-up on that, about the mortars on
25 lorries. When you say it would be in vain to have opened fire on those
1 targets, was that because by the time you're able to open fire on a
2 mobile mortar like that it would have moved to another position; is that
4 A. The unit, or rather, the platoon at the beginning of the war and
5 the battalion throughout the war did not have that kind of calibre, did
6 not have that kind of tools with which it could return fire. Sometimes
7 when there were skirmishes when they made attempts to break through our
8 defence line, and sometimes they managed to do that, we asked for
9 artillery support on the targets we observed and in places where members
10 of the Muslim army gathered on their side. In other words, we did not
11 have weapons that we could use against them; on our front line we only
12 had infantry weapons, nothing else. Our biggest calibre was M84. We had
13 some machine-guns M53 and 7.62-millimetre weapons. We didn't have
14 cannons, we didn't have mortars with which we could jeopardise the
15 targets we had observed.
16 Q. Okay. When you're saying that we only had -- our biggest calibre
17 was an M84, we had no cannons or mortars, are you talking about your
18 platoon or are you talking there about the battalion?
19 A. I'm primarily talking about the platoon before 1994. Later on in
20 the battalion there were some weapons that could be used to provide
21 support in certain positions during fierce combat and during attacks from
22 their side. Then we indeed could ask for support and we received it. In
23 companies there was a 60-millimetre mortar, smaller-calibre mortar. We
24 didn't have bigger-calibre mortars, and in practical terms, it was
25 impossible to use it because of the separation line where the distance
1 was anything between 20 or 30 metres, not more. You couldn't ask for
2 support from a bigger calibre because we would have threatened the lives
3 of our soldiers because of the closeness between the two armies along the
4 separation line that separated the two. Nobody is perfect. Nobody can
5 aim so precisely.
6 Q. Okay. So just to be clear, it is your possible that before 1994,
7 nobody in the battalion had a bigger-calibre weapon than an M84; is that
8 a correct understanding?
9 A. I can't say this for a fact. I was in one of the units of the
10 battalion. Perhaps in the battalion somebody had that; as far as I know,
11 they didn't. But I don't know for a fact because I was not a member of
12 any of the other units. It was impossible to move. I didn't know what
13 the other units of the battalion were doing on the rest of the separation
14 line. When you want to protect yourself from a mortar, there's no
15 perfect way to do that. But when you moved along secure ways which were
16 marked, where there were no roads, there were warnings to be aware of
17 sniping, and people adhered to that --
18 Q. Mr. Tomic --
19 A. -- so in time there were less losses because people became more
20 careful, more cautious.
21 Q. Sorry, again, I'd like to interrupt you because we're moving away
22 from the question that was asked. You did say in your statement at
23 paragraph 23 that the UN military observers you dealt with never had any
24 complaints about the firing of your battalion. And you said:
25 "We in our unit did not even have any artillery weapons, and as
1 for mortars, we only had 60-millimetre mortars."
2 Now, I understand from that that you're talking about the
3 2nd Battalion and that your evidence is that in the entire 2nd Battalion
4 there were no mortars of a calibre greater than 60 millimetres. Is that
6 A. Yes.
7 MS. GUSTAFSON: Okay. I'd like to now look at 65 ter 24044,
9 Q. Mr. Tomic, the document you're about to see is a document from
10 the 4th Company of the 2nd Battalion on Ozrenska Street. So I understand
11 from your earlier evidence this is not your company but it's the company
12 further down the street. It's a list of weapons in the company dated the
13 22nd of October, 1993, at a time when you were also based on
14 Ozrenska Street. And you can see that the list includes a PAM
15 anti-aircraft machine-gun; three 60-millimetre mortars; an 82-millimetre
16 mortar; a number of M84 and M53 weapons; three rocket-launchers; some
17 M48s; and a Broving or Browning 12.7-millimetre heavy machine-gun.
18 Now, this document shows not only did the 2nd Battalion have an
19 82-millimetre mortar, but the 4th Company, just down the road from you on
20 Ozrenska Street, had one; right?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the date for that?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was in 1993. I was a member
23 of the platoon. I don't know what the company left my platoon had
24 along -- not along Ozrenska Street but next to it. If I understand this
25 properly, this was in 1993, and in 1994, at the beginning of June I
1 became a member of the command of the 3rd Battalion of the
2 1st Romanija Brigade.
3 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson referred to the date. Let's continue.
4 MS. GUSTAFSON:
5 Q. Mr. --
6 A. The year is 1993. I apologise, Your Excellency. In 1993 I was
7 still not a member of the battalion command so I was not in a position to
8 know whether those things existed in the 4th Company, whose member I was
9 not at the time.
10 Q. But, Mr. Tomic, you've said that in 1994 no one in the entire
11 battalion had a mortar greater than 60 millimetres. And we see from here
12 already in 1993 the 4th Company had an 82-millimetre mortar.
13 A. I don't know whether you know that in 1994 the United Nations
14 forces put a ban on the possession of weapons on the front line greater
15 than 60 millimetres. All those weapons were moved in the depth of all
16 the lines and members of UNPROFOR even attended some places from which it
17 was potentially possible to open fire. So there was a ban on the
18 possession of higher-calibre weapons in those areas. I don't know when
19 that became effective. I know that it was in 1994 and the list of the
20 weapons that existed in the 4th Company dates back to 1993.
21 Q. Okay. Now, earlier you said that -- you said that the separation
22 line where you were was 20 or 30 metres, not more. So these weapons on
23 this list, in particular the mortars, those would have been used for
24 firing at targets in the depth, beyond the confrontation line; right?
25 A. 62-millimetre mortar is the only one that can provide support in
1 fighting along the line which is only 30 metres deep. You can't use any
2 greater calibre because shrapnel can fall on both sides. That's why the
3 company that I belonged to before 1994, i.e., in that platoon, we did not
4 have a calibre higher than 60 millimetre. And we're talking about 1993,
5 you mentioned the 4th Company, I can see that this is the 4th Company. I
6 didn't know that they had an 82-millimetre mortar that you mentioned and
7 you showed me on this list of the weapons that the 4th Company allegedly
9 Q. Right. Okay. So the 82-millimetre mortar on this list could
10 only be used for firing at the depth; is that right?
11 A. I can't speculate. I don't know whether they used it at all.
12 Maybe they just had it at the ready for defence because there were many
13 attempts at breakthroughs, there were lots of casualties in 1992 and
14 1993. I don't know whether they opened fire from it or not. I can't
16 Q. Okay. I'd like to follow-up on that, but just before we leave
17 this document I'd like to confirm a couple more things with you. An M84
18 automatic weapon, that -- the effective range of that weapon is up to a
19 thousand metres when it's mounted on a tripod; is that right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And for an M53, its effective range is 1500 metres when it's on a
23 A. Well, yes. There were such M53s, but they were not -- they were
24 out of order, obsolete, which was made in 1953, it was not even safe to
25 use. Unfortunately we did not have more M84s, that's why we had M53s,
2 Q. Okay. And a 12.7-millimetre Browning heavy machine-gun, its
3 range is about 1800 metres and 1500 metres for a point target; is that
5 A. Yes, but I don't understand what your question is. Nobody will
6 shoot at random if there is direct fighting. You use the weapons that
7 you have on the defence line if you're attacked, but if the range of that
8 weapon is what it is, why would you shoot arbitrarily and waste
9 ammunition? We had a standing order to be careful about the use of
10 ammunition which had to be economical. Why is the range important here?
11 Why is it important whether this is 1200 or 1800 metres? I claim with
12 full responsibility that the distance between the two armies along our
13 separation line was 50 metres, 80 at the most at very few places, I'm
14 talking about the battalion in which I spent the entire war.
15 Q. Okay. And early -- a few moments ago you said you couldn't
16 speculate on whether the 82-millimetre mortar of the 4th Company was
17 being used. You said maybe it was just on standby. So I'd like to look
18 quickly at two more documents.
19 MS. GUSTAFSON: The first is 65 ter 24043.
20 Q. And we can see this is a document from the 8th of June, 1993,
21 from the 4th Company to the battalion command, reporting on the status of
22 ammunition. And you can see it lists that there are seven
23 60-millimetre -- what's translated as grenades and six 82-millimetre
24 grenades. That's a reference to mortar shells; right?
25 A. I suppose so, yes. I suppose that's that.
1 MS. GUSTAFSON: Okay. And if we could now turn to 65 ter 24045.
2 Q. This is a document also from the 4th Company of the 2nd Battalion
3 about six months later on the 3rd of December, 1993, stating at the top
4 "ammunition," and it includes one crate of 60-millimetre shells and two
5 crates of 82-millimetre shells. And at the bottom it says:
6 "We have none of the above-mentioned ammunition. I request that
7 you deliver this ammunition to me."
8 Now, these documents show that the 4th Company had ammunition for
9 82-millimetre mortars and was using it; right?
10 A. I don't know whether they were using them, but I know that this
11 document was drafted in 1993. I know that some platoon commanders or
12 company commanders were afraid that they would not have enough and that's
13 why they created reserves. This was in 1993. This is not my company but
14 I'm aware of that situation. Sometimes you have to stock on certain
15 things, for example, when you prepare food for winter you will want to
16 stock up. This is a digression, but I know that some commanders did that
17 to have what they needed in cases when it was needed. I don't know
18 whether that was the case, but I suppose it was.
19 MS. GUSTAFSON: I'd like to tender the last three documents that
20 I've used, please.
21 JUDGE KWON: Just one question, Ms. Gustafson. I see the name
22 here Dusan Zurovac, is he the next witness?
23 MS. GUSTAFSON: I believe so, yes.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Robinson.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, even though the witness hasn't
1 really confirmed them, we think that under the Chamber's ruling they're
2 sufficiently related to his testimony that they can be admitted.
3 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, I would add to that, Your Honour, it's
4 direct impeachment of the witness's assertion that nobody in the
5 battalion had an 82-millimetre mortar.
6 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive them, three of them.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. 65 ter number 24044 will be
8 Exhibit P5983; 24043 will be Exhibit P5984; and 65 ter number 24045 will
9 be Exhibit P5985.
10 MS. GUSTAFSON: Okay. I'd like to look at one further document,
11 which is 65 ter 1D20334.
12 Q. Again, Mr. Tomic, this is a report -- daily report from the
13 4th Company of the 2nd Battalion, and it describes a commando raid in the
14 area of the 4th Company position. It says:
15 "Our commando group successfully took house after house, and so
16 the line of disengagement in this locality was moved some hundred metres
17 into the enemy depth. The enemy had artillery support, probably from
18 Velesici, as we ascertained later when we analysed the trajectories of
19 the shells that destroyed two civilian structures in the immediate
20 vicinity of the command."
21 And it says:
22 "Our side didn't have any casualties ..."
23 And it says:
24 "Quite a lot of ammunition was expended" including ten mortar
1 Now, it's my understanding that these shells would not have been
2 fired at the line of engagement because the commandos were there taking
3 houses one by one. Are you able to tell us based on your knowledge of
4 the situation what these ten mortar shells would have been fired at in
5 this operation?
6 A. Again, I can't speculate. That happened in 1993. This is not my
7 unit. Maybe there was an attempt to break through from the Muslim side.
8 Maybe they had to fortify the line or return the line. This is what I
9 would say that would have happened in my unit if there was such attempts
10 and if we had to return the line. I don't know whether they used shells
11 and whether they fired them in the depth of the territory, as you say.
12 All I claim is that it would be ineffective to fire shells in depth if
13 your line was threatened. Nobody in their right mind would do that,
14 especially not if they had some experience before that. That was in
15 1993, in June. What would that person have gained by firing shells in
16 the depth of the territory when their line was threatened? But again,
17 this was the 4th Company. I was a member of the platoon in the
18 3rd Company. That was my area of responsibility, so I believe that it is
19 abundantly clear where I was at the time. That was very far from me,
20 perhaps even a whole kilometre. I can't be sure. Maybe even
21 1500 metres.
22 MS. GUSTAFSON: I'd like to tender that document.
23 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be admitted.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P5986, Your Honours.
1 MS. GUSTAFSON:
2 Q. Now, Mr. Tomic, I'd like to move on to another topic which is the
3 departure of non-Serbs from your neighbourhood that you speak about in
4 your statement. And at paragraph 13 you said:
5 "After the start of the conflict, near the MUP school I noticed
6 that the Muslims from our street had withdrawn to their houses and that
7 they were moving around much less. I went to the houses of my Muslim
8 neighbours Suad Jazic, Senad Sabit, and Ibro Surkovic, and others. I
9 wanted to know how they were feeling, if they had any problems, and if
10 they were all right. All of them were scared and confused."
11 Now, one of the factors contributing to their fear or the fear of
12 non-Serbs in your area was the fact that non-Serbs from Serb-controlled
13 parts of Sarajevo were being expelled; right?
14 A. I don't know whether there were any expulsion drives at that
15 moment. I'm sure that they did not feel safe. They were afraid. I
16 would have felt the same if I had been on the other side, because my
17 sister with her son and her husband was on the other side and she felt
18 the same until the end of May when she moved to the Serbian side and
19 after that left Bosnia and Herzegovina all together. I believe that that
20 would have been my motive for departure because I had lived with those
21 people, with Senad Sabit, who were my friends. That's why I tried to
22 help them as much as I could. I wanted them to feel safer if at all
23 possible. I knew two other men, friends of mine, who were Croats. They
24 left the area - I don't know how, during the night. Later on they
25 contacted me after having left Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were both
1 married. They are Croats. They were my very good friends and I wish
2 them all the happiness like I do mine. It is absolutely understandable
3 that people felt -- didn't feel safe.
4 Q. There were at this time, were there not, expulsions of non-Serbs
5 from Serb-held parts of Sarajevo?
6 A. I am not aware of that. I'm talking about the street or the part
7 of the street where I was and about specific people that I knew with whom
8 I was very good friends. Whether it happened elsewhere, I suppose it
9 did, on both sides. Everybody wanted to leave that area on the eve of
10 any war. If you were in Syria now, you would want to flee. It's a
11 normal human reaction, a normal desire to save yourself and your family.
12 I cannot talk about any other parts of the city. I'm just talking about
13 my street and the part of the street where I lived. These things did not
14 happen there. I said in my statement I might have been on guard duty or
15 elsewhere when my neighbours left the place. I'm sorry about that. I
16 know, however - I was told later by friends of mine - that they were all
17 safe and nothing bad happened to them, which is the most important thing
18 in war, to survive.
19 THE ACCUSED: They were escorted. [Interpretation] Again
20 something is missing from the transcript: They were escorted. The
21 witness said: They were escorted out so that nothing bad should happen
22 to them.
23 MS. GUSTAFSON:
24 Q. Now, Mr. Tomic --
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes --
1 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry.
2 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
3 MS. GUSTAFSON:
4 Q. Mr. Tomic, your answer suggested that these people were simply
5 fleeing a war zone, but they were going from one side of the
6 confrontation line to the city of Sarajevo, which was hardly escaping a
7 war situation. These people, non-Serbs, were leaving your neighbourhood
8 because of fear of what was happening around them, which was the
9 expulsion of non-Serbs; right?
10 A. No. Emphatically no. Because I said my own sister was on the
11 other side and in the same way she left voluntarily. Nobody made her.
12 She was just thinking about her son and his safety and logically she
13 wanted to save him from the war. My sister was not driven out either,
14 nor were these other people. But I'm talking about the period when it
15 was possible to cross from one side to another. It could have been until
16 the end of May. Later on the city was completely blocked. Many who
17 wanted to leave -- Serbs, Muslims, and Croats alike wanted to leave but
18 it was no longer possible. Why? Because the Muslim leadership did not
19 allow the Serbs to leave --
20 Q. Mr. Tomic --
21 A. -- I'm sure that many Muslims would have left Sarajevo even then
22 if it had been possible, but it wasn't.
23 Q. Once again, we're moving away from the question.
24 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to D92 and specifically page 66 of
25 that exhibit.
1 Q. Mr. Tomic, this document is part of a speech that Mr. Prstojevic,
2 who we -- was referenced in an earlier exhibit speaking with Momo Garic,
3 was speaking in the Assembly, in the RS Assembly, in July 1992. And the
4 B/C/S is not a very good quality so I will read out to you the relevant
5 part. He says:
6 "Namely, when the Serbs started the uprising in Sarajevo and when
7 they seized control over certain territories, there was no government or
8 at least it was not known where it was then. Moreover, we even did not
9 know if Mr. Karadzic was alive during the first couple of days. When we
10 learnt that he was alive and when he visited us in Ilidza and encouraged
11 us, the Serbs from Sarajevo retained control over the territory, and even
12 extended their territory in some areas, driving the Muslims out of the
13 territories where they had actually been majority."
14 Now, this in a nutshell is what was happening in the early days
15 of the war in Sarajevo and this is why the people -- the non-Serbs in
16 your neighbourhood were afraid; right?
17 A. I don't know. I see this document for the first time. I really
18 never met Mr. Prstojevic myself, and of course this could be -- of course
19 it is his speech, but what he meant I don't know. He was at Ilidza, as
20 you say, so I don't know anything about this nor do I know that he spoke
21 before the Assembly. I must say that I have never been a member of the
22 SDS, but for me he was the leader of the movement because he was
23 concerned about the survival of the Serb people. Why Mr. Prstojevic said
24 this and spoke about some sort of expansion of the territory, I don't
25 know. We had no offensive actions and we were just holding this defence
1 line and the line did not move throughout the war. I am not aware of
2 this speech, I'm not familiar with it, never heard it before.
3 Q. Okay. But you did, in particular, at the end of the war or near
4 the end of the war advocate for the Muslims who had left Grbavica to be
5 prevented from returning there, didn't you?
6 A. I don't know to what passage that relates, but I'm saying no.
7 How can they return? The war was still on. You said "towards the end of
8 the war," does it mean that the war was still ongoing or the war was
10 Q. Well, the war was basically over, and just after the
11 Dayton Agreement was signed, which provided for Grbavica to be returned
12 to the Federation side, you advocated for the Muslims to be prevented
13 from returning there; right?
14 A. No. I don't know if you have this information. A large number
15 of Muslims spent the entire war at Grbavica; that is true, that is
16 correct. At that point when the Dayton Accords have been signed, it's
17 true what you say, Serbs had to leave Sarajevo. And how would we be in a
18 position to prevent the Muslims from returning? I can't understand. How
19 would we be in that position? How could we prevent them from coming back
20 when the Dayton Accords have been signed, the demarcation lines were
21 drawn, and it was clear which parts of Sarajevo belonged to whom. We had
22 almost nothing; they had almost everything.
23 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to 65 ter 22851, which I believe
24 is an admitted exhibit and I'll just find the exhibit number now. If we
25 could go to page 169 in the English and the B/C/S.
1 THE REGISTRAR: It's Exhibit P1489, Your Honours.
2 MS. GUSTAFSON: I'm sorry, if we could go to the B/C/S transcript
3 rather than the original Cyrillic if that's possible.
4 Q. Mr. Tomic, this is an extract of General Mladic's military
5 notebook, and it's -- records a meeting with SRK officers on the
6 22nd of December, 1995, and this is shortly after the Dayton Agreement
7 was reached.
8 And if we could go to the second page -- or sorry, the next page.
9 And it says: "Second Lieutenant Bozidar Tomic." That's you; right?
10 A. Yes, my name is Bozo, but that's what they called me, Bozidar.
11 They also wrote Aleksandar, Aco, Sasa. I'm sorry, but I don't really see
12 what's written here.
13 Q. Can you see it now? Under your name it says:
14 "People at Grbavica want to stay.
15 "Guarantees that the Muslims and their police and authorities
16 will not come ..."
17 Now, this is a reference to you seeking guarantees that the
18 Muslims would not return to Grbavica; right?
19 A. No. At that meeting I was present - that's a fact, that's
20 true - and I sought guarantees that their police would not come to
21 mistreat us because at that moment, all of us, the population of Grbavica
22 and Vraca and I suppose other parts of the city where there were Serbs,
23 Vogosca and Ilijas and such, wanted to remain in their homes, in their
24 city. And we sought guarantees - maybe this was wrongly recorded, I
25 don't know - not that Muslims would not come back to their homes; it was
1 their indisputable right. I have to tell you, for seven years I was
2 unable to get some of their families out of my own house, but we didn't
3 want their authorities to come and make arrests among us. That's
4 natural. I didn't mean that Muslims should not come, but that their
5 police would not come to make searches and arrests. How could we feel
6 safe at Grbavica even if we were allowed to stay in our homes? I suppose
7 you know and you have that information that in my battalion
8 Mr. Hrvatcevic, a captain who was deputy battalion commander when I was
9 assistant commander, went to the international police force to work as an
10 interpreter and he was arrested just a few days after he had started
11 working. He was arrested, imprisoned, and mistreated, and spent four
12 years in Zenica. How could we feel safe if their police and army were to
13 arrive and make arrests and search houses --
14 Q. Mr. Tomic --
15 A. -- knowing that we were members of the VRS.
16 Q. -- again, I think we're straying from the question. I understand
17 your position is that notwithstanding this reference to the Muslims and
18 their and authorities, you were just referring to police and the
20 I would like to move on now to talk about another topic --
21 A. Certainly.
22 Q. In general, your statement suggests that in your view the units
23 that you belonged to and that were around you were familiar with the --
24 or complied with the laws of war. Were you familiar with the
25 Geneva Conventions?
1 A. I had opportunity to read it once, but again, our soldiers were
2 familiar with that, we were given this to read, and we always received
3 strict orders. We in the battalion got orders from higher levels. It
4 was strictly prohibited to open fire at civilian targets, against
5 civilians, women and children in the city. Those are always the orders
6 we received from our higher command, and the commander and his deputy
7 issued such orders to company commanders and down -- further down to
8 lower levels.
9 Q. Okay. So you would agree that the Geneva Conventions require,
10 among other things, that civilians and prisoners of war be treated
11 humanely and acts of violence and cruel treatment against such persons
12 are prohibited; right?
13 A. Absolutely agree.
14 Q. Okay. And were you aware of any breaches of those conventions by
15 any members of your units or other SRK units?
16 A. I cannot speak about other units. I know that in my unit,
17 although I can't claim with any certainty because the battalion had over
18 1.000 troops, it's too much for one establishment battalion, but the
19 length of our line and the configuration of the line, required that
20 number of troops. With time it varied --
21 Q. Mr. Tomic --
22 A. -- and was reduced because of our losses, et cetera --
23 Q. I'm not asking about the configuration of your line. Are you
24 aware of any breaches of the Geneva Conventions by any members of the
25 units that you belonged to?
1 A. Not that I know of.
2 Q. Okay. And are you aware of any inquiries or investigations for
3 any of the units that you belonged to of any breaches of the
4 Geneva Conventions or more generally of the laws of war?
5 A. There were no such cases in my unit. I'm saying again, I don't
6 know but there were discipline procedures instituted against troops. The
7 military police would intervene but that referred to breaches of public
8 order, robberies, drunkenness, et cetera. If that happened with a
9 soldier, then the military police would arrest that soldier. I don't
10 know about the other things.
11 Q. Okay. Thank you. I'd like to move on and talk about the -- or
12 ask you some questions about the work detail that you discuss in your
13 statement, and that's at paragraph 15. You describe a -- you said the --
14 because of the difficulty at the front and the small number of men in
15 Ozrenska Street you contacted the brigade, and a group of Muslim
16 prisoners from Kula came and assisted in a work detail to reinforce a
18 Now, how many days or weeks did this work detail spend at your
19 Ozrenska Street positions fortifying the line ?
20 A. Since that was a period - it was still 1992 - we were unable to
21 do this in any good way, we asked for help and perhaps seven or eight of
22 them came. And again, I'm talking about the unit where I was in 1992.
23 They were there for ten, maximum 12 days. I can't remember precisely
24 anymore, but I know they were with us in our midst. They helped us and
25 we fortified that line at Sanac together, the red line I drew on the map.
1 Q. And what exactly did they do in terms of fortifying the line?
2 Were they digging trenches? Building bunkers? What was their task?
3 A. Since that was in the immediate vicinity of the Pero Kosoric
4 Square and the high-rises from which they were able to control the area,
5 coming to that area was not safe for members of the VRS. So to just go
6 there we had to make trenches and communicating trenches on arrival and
7 we had to set up bunkers for the men whose job was to observe and to
8 monitor and to scout and keep the line. Most of those communicating
9 trenches which were perfectly visible from the high-rises, we had to put
10 a cover over them. It's pointless to make communicating trenches if they
11 can see you arriving. And one company commander was killed in that way
12 when coming to inspect the line.
13 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson, we need to take a break now. We'll
14 break for 40 minutes and resume at 1.30.
15 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.51 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I point to one thing on the
18 record, an imprecision on page 51, line 25. The witness said he had
19 never been a member of the SDS but he knows that it - the record says
20 "he" - it was a leader. That cannot be understood from the current
21 LiveNote. In other words, it does not refer to a person, it refers to
22 the SDS. And in our language "SDS" would be of the male gender.
23 JUDGE KWON: So you refer to SDS when he was leader of the
24 movement and concerned about the survival of Serb people, you meant the
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, of course. The SDS had the
2 force of a movement in the Serbian movement. It does not refer to anyone
3 individually, but the SDS as a political party which had the force of a
4 movement for the Serbian people.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 Let's proceed, Ms. Gustafson.
7 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
8 Q. Mr. Tomic, just before the break I was asking you questions about
9 the work detail of prisoners from Kula, and I understood from your last
10 answer that this work detail was working on building bunkers and trenches
11 and covering those trenches. Is that correct?
12 A. Yes, digging communicating trenches as access to the trenches
13 themselves where there was soldiers whose job it was to observe. In view
14 of the vicinity of the positions from which fire was opened, these
15 communicating trenches had to be covered from the top so that troops
16 would be safe coming to and leaving the line.
17 Q. Okay. And you said in your statement that you knew nothing else
18 about these persons, other than that they were in prison at Kula. And
19 it's also clear from your statement that you knew they were Muslim. Did
20 you understand them to be civilians or prisoners of war?
21 A. I have no precise information that would enable me to give you a
22 precise answer. I know that we approached the higher command, the
23 brigade command, and to the extent they were able to, they sent us people
24 for perhaps around 15 days until the line was completely fortified and we
25 didn't need it anymore. I'm talking only about the unit where I was.
1 There was no more need to engage anyone from the side. I don't know if
2 they were prisoners, as you say, or civilians or -- I really don't know.
3 Q. Okay. Now you've said that this work was being carried out in
4 the immediate vicinity of Pero Kosoric Square, from which you've
5 explained you faced incoming fire and were in constant danger, that this
6 was between 20 and 50 metres away from the other side, and you've also
7 said that this work was being carried out specifically because the VRS in
8 that location was in danger. So I assume from all of that information
9 that the Muslim prisoners engaged in this work detail were exposed to
10 great danger of death or injury in carrying out this work; is that right?
11 A. That's not right. As soon as they arrived on the site, they
12 started digging, and as soon as they would reach a certain depth we would
13 cover that part. We did not subject them to great danger or danger of
14 death by putting them there as sitting ducks. We were concerned about
15 their security and we wanted them to fortify the line as soon as possible
16 for our security and their own. When you come to a certain locality, you
17 dig deep into the ground, and the earth that was dug out and the trench
18 you dug out are immediately covered from view so that it would not be
19 visible from Pero Kosoric Square or any other positions from which they
20 could open fire on us and on the men working. So we did take care about
21 their safety. Of course we told them not to try anything. We gave them
22 the same food we had, we gave them cigarettes.
23 And in that location, in the unit where I was, I was assistant
24 platoon commander as I said before and the red line you showed on the map
25 was the area of responsibility of that platoon, a length of about 300,
1 400 metres. There were really no incidents there. And from what I heard
2 from some of those people who came there wanted to go out of wherever
3 they were, to be in open air, they had better food, they got cigarettes
4 from us, and we sometimes engaged in informal conversation about everyday
5 things. But we never put them in any kind of danger. They were told
6 that they were there to do their job. Nobody abused them in my unit,
7 nobody mistreated them, and we were concerned about their safety as much
8 as our own because our objective was to fortify the line as soon as
9 possible to avoid further losses and we had already suffered losses in
10 coming and going from the line.
11 Q. Okay. Well, now you've just said in that location where you were
12 assistant platoon commander, there were really no incidents there;
13 whereas earlier in your testimony when I asked you if you were in
14 constant danger, you said something like particularly so. You agreed
15 with that proposition wholeheartedly. Now in addition you've just said
16 that as soon as these prisoners arrived on the site they started digging
17 and "as soon as they would reach a certain depth we would cover that
18 part." Now, even assuming that these prisoners would be protected once
19 the trench was covered - I would think that would be a -- not a
20 particularly safe assumption - before that trench is covered, when they
21 have started digging, these prisoners were exposed to fire from the front
22 line which was, as you said, 20 to 50 metres away, weren't they?
23 A. Not from the moment of arrival to the line. The line of
24 separation was 20 to 50 metres, but in order to reach those trenches the
25 layout of the terrain would show that very clearly. It's an elevation
1 and as soon as you reach the top, you are potentially a target of enemy
2 fire. To avoid that -- we were actually with them while they were
3 working. They could not do those works alone on any part of the line.
4 There were always our own troops to take care of their safety and to
5 prevent any untoward action on their part. They were told to behave when
6 they arrived.
7 And when I said there were no incidents, there were no incidents
8 with the labour platoon. Nobody physically abused them, mistreated them,
9 beat them, or threatened them, but they were told in advance just to do
10 their job and everything would be all right, and that's how it was. The
11 layout of the ground is such that it's an elevation, and when you come to
12 the forward line you have to go there. It was as dangerous for them as
13 it was for us. The Serb soldiers from the labour platoon were not any
14 safer and that's the reason why we asked for someone to be sent, why they
15 fortified the lines, and from that moment on, it was not necessary to
16 engage them any longer. And they no longer came to my unit where I was
17 assistant platoon commander.
18 MS. GUSTAFSON: Okay if we could have 65 ter 1D02771, please.
19 Q. Now, Mr. Tomic, this is a report from the command of the
20 2nd Battalion, your battalion, to the administration of the Kula prison.
21 And it says that:
22 "Around 12.30 in the morning on the 21st of May, 1993, two Muslim
23 prisoners who had been building bunkers with another nine prisoners
24 escaped to the enemy side from the positions of our 4th Infantry Company
25 in Ozrenska Street."
1 And if you skip to the third paragraph, it says:
2 "While they were working, Mitrovic guarded them with another two
3 soldiers who were at the position there in a trench about 10 metres away
4 from the prisoners. According to Mitrovic, the place where the work was
5 carried out was constantly under infantry and rifle grenade fire from the
6 enemy, and observation was difficult because it was dusk."
7 If we can go to the next page in the English. It says:
8 "Mitrovic found out about the escape when one of the prisoners
9 ran to his trench and said to him, 'Zeka and Trifun have run away.'
10 Mitrovic and the two soldiers who were with him immediately opened fire
11 after the prisoners, but they did not prevent the escape."
12 And then in the last paragraph it says:
13 "We add that the work was carried out at night because that place
14 was under constant enemy fire so it was impossible to carry out the work
15 during the day. In addition, it is in the immediate vicinity of enemy
17 Now, this is a 4th Company report so it's from a position on
18 Ozrenska Street down the street from where you were positioned, but this
19 report explaining that the work of a detail of Muslim prisoners from Kula
20 was being carried out under constant infantry and rifle grenade fire to
21 the point that they were working at night because of the intensity of the
22 fire. This report basically describes the conditions that Muslim
23 prisoners from Kula faced in work details on Ozrenska Street; right?
24 A. It says the 4th Infantry Company. That's not my area of
25 responsibility. It's about 1500 metres from me, from my line. Doesn't
1 this detail, that they were working by night, tell you that somebody was
2 worried about their safety. It was too dangerous by the day, and I quite
3 understand the commander or the assistant company commander to want to
4 fortify that line because people were killed. So it was done by night.
5 People were even buried by night at that time. You hear about those two,
6 they escaped. I was not there but I heard about this incident, this
7 escape. But somebody was obviously worried about their safety so they
8 brought them to work there by night because it was too dangerous by day.
9 But again, it was not in the area of my unit. I only know from other
10 people about this escape by people from the labour platoon and I see the
11 signature is the assistant commander for security, lieutenant or
12 lieutenant second class Dragan Maletic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the third line there is a
14 passive form: People were buried. Whereas the witness said: We buried
15 our casualties by night.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's continue.
17 MS. GUSTAFSON:
18 Q. Now, Mr. Tomic, the use of these Muslim prisoners to carry out
19 work such as building bunkers and digging trenches on the front line at
20 Ozrenska Street, not only did it violate basic provisions of the Geneva
21 Conventions requiring the humane treatment of prisoners of war and
22 civilians; it also violates the prohibition in the Geneva Conventions of
23 using either prisoners of war or civilians in work that is directly
24 related to military activities, doesn't it?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is misleading. [In English]
1 This is misleading.
2 JUDGE KWON: On what basis? I assume --
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said that roads were
4 accessible, not the forward line, and he never said they were digging the
5 forward lines and trenches there. They were digging only for road works.
6 MS. GUSTAFSON: That's absolutely false.
7 JUDGE KWON: I think -- please continue. You can take up that
8 issue in your re-examination, but I don't think Ms. Gustafson was
10 He can answer the question.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you please repeat the
13 MS. GUSTAFSON:
14 Q. Certainly. This use of Muslim prisoners to carry out work such
15 as building bunkers and digging trenches on the front line at
16 Ozrenska Street, not only did it violate basic provisions of the
17 Geneva Conventions requiring the humane treatment of prisoners of war and
18 civilians, it also violates the prohibition in the conventions of using
19 either prisoners of war or civilians in work that is directly related to
20 military activities, doesn't it?
21 A. Our motivation and our desire was primarily to protect personnel.
22 Throughout the war, we had problems filling our ranks due to a great
23 number of casualties and woundings. We did not have enough people, and
24 that's why we asked for assistance from a higher command to send people
25 in a way that would provide a solution once and for all. They were
1 digging access to the line, and of course with the bunkers that we were
2 fortifying, they were helping it all. But we used them as we needed to,
3 to be able to observe a position and open fire from those bunkers if we
4 were attacked. So they did not give us conceptual solutions as to how to
5 do that. They helped us only in one part. Their work was completely
6 safe. We were as concerned about their safety as we were about ours.
7 They received the same food as we did, and as soon as they were done they
8 would leave. That's how it was arranged in my unit.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we be shown where in the
10 document is it stated that they were digging trenches on the forward
11 line, on the first line?
12 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, this -- the question wasn't about this
13 specific document, but the document says that these prisoners were
14 building bunkers.
15 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue.
16 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you. I'd like to tender this, please.
17 MR. ROBINSON: No objection, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be admitted.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P5987, Your Honours.
20 MS. GUSTAFSON:
21 Q. Mr. Tomic, I'd like to move on to another part of your statement
22 where you said at paragraph 23 that UN military observers would come to
23 the battalion command, so this is at a time when you were in the
24 battalion command, to investigate firing incidents, and you said you
25 would take them to the alleged fire positions where they would be assured
1 that the Serbian side did not commit the alleged fire and they never had
2 complaints about your unit.
3 Now if we could go to Exhibit D2421 which is a document you
4 discuss in your statement at paragraph 26. And this is an order to --
5 from the battalion command to the 4th Company which states that foreign
6 military observers have received permission to monitor the cease-fire in
7 the battalion's zone of responsibility. In the second paragraph it
8 explains when the monitoring will commence and the licence plate numbers
9 of the vehicles that will be used. And the substance of the order is in
10 the final paragraph where it says:
11 "Facilitate the movement of the military observers in your zone
12 of responsibility, but prevent their direct access to our positions and
13 their surveillance of the same without permission. If they should
14 request it, seek the approval of the battalion command. If they are
15 found at positions without approval, detain them and report to the
16 battalion command."
17 Now, the standing order in this document is to prevent the access
18 and surveillance of the unit's position and sets out the steps to be
19 followed if such access is requested. Is that a fair reading?
20 A. Just one correction. You said a moment ago that I was battalion
21 commander. At this time, look at the signature, this is deputy battalion
22 commander Mr. Hrvatcevic, while Mr. Petrovic was commander. I was
23 assistant battalion commander. It says enable military observers to
24 move. It even lists vehicles to be given to them, to make everything
25 possible for them. But if they come directly into the trench, we cannot
1 be absolutely sure, although they are coming as an unbiased impartial
2 organisation, we could never be sure whether they could pass on the
3 information to the other side. Why am I saying this? Because this was
4 the B team of military observers, whereas the A team was in the city in
5 the PTT engineering building, and a Jordanian man was the boss of both.
6 He co-ordinated both A and B teams. A was on the Muslim side; B was on
7 the Serb side. The order was clear: Enable their movement. But please,
8 to allow them to come into every trench to see how many people we have,
9 how many weapons we have, I don't know who would have allowed that. They
10 were told they can come anywhere they like.
11 And on the Muslim side, there were always violations of the
12 cease-fire. They repaired their fortifications, et cetera. And when we
13 asked them - we from the battalion command - based on reports from lower
14 units, when we asked them to check on those incidents and violations,
15 they would have to call the A team, and this happened a thousand times,
16 the Muslims would stop their works. And in their eyes, there was always
17 this impression that we were making things up, until one time when they
18 actually realised it was true. Their crew went out and found the Muslims
19 doing that. But it was necessary to get the green light from the
20 Jordanian man for either crew to go out on the site and verify our claims
21 or theirs.
22 Of course, they were allowed to move, but there are certain
23 limits and rules of conduct. I don't see from this order, although I
24 know about the commander and the deputy commander, perhaps this was a --
25 I came to the command in the beginning of June --
1 Q. Okay, Mr. Tomic --
2 A. -- this is 26th of May, but I know about this --
3 Q. -- I think again we're straying a little far from the question.
4 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to P1822. This is a UN military
5 observer report. If we could go to page 2 of the report, this is from
6 the 11th of August, 1994, and it describes a follow-up investigation
7 after the shooting of an 11-year-old girl in Sarajevo by a
8 12.7-millimetre weapon. And it says:
9 "UNMO patrols were sent out on both sides of the confrontation
10 line in the Grbavica area."
11 And in paragraph 2 it states that:
12 "The team was able to bearing on a point which coincided with a
13 new 12.7-millimetre position that was known to the team."
14 And in paragraph 3 it says:
15 "The UNMO patrol was sent to the location but was delayed by
16 Bosnian Serb army forces who insisted that the patrol get clearance ...
17 clearance that they had already received."
18 And then it says:
19 "Finally after some time going back and forth ... the patrol was
20 allowed to the site. By this time the 12.7-millimetre gun had been
21 removed. The soldiers at the position stated it had been taken away for
23 Now, this is clearly in the area of the 2nd Battalion and this
24 document - noting the superfluous clearance demands and the delays that
25 were sufficient that the suspected weapon in question had been
1 removed - this reflects an effort by forces within your battalion to
2 obstruct the effective monitoring of the cease-fire; right?
3 A. No, that is not correct and I'll explain why. I was right there.
4 I think the incident involves two little girls, if that's the same
5 incident. There were two girls there. When I was in the battalion
6 command we received a report from the company command that two little
7 girls, perhaps around 10, were hit. And then I informed the B team of
8 military observers by courier - the man number one in that team was a
9 Swedish captain - and they went out. I can only understand this as an
10 expression of anger of troops who happened to be there. But I was
11 personally there with the Swedish captain. We went down there. We took
12 the girls to the Kasindol hospital and we were all horrified over that.
13 It looked as if somebody took the scalp off these girls. It's a
14 destructive calibre --
15 Q. Mr. Tomic, I think you're misunderstanding. I think you're
16 confusing this -- the incident described here with an incident you
17 describe in your statement about the killing of two Serb girls from the
18 Muslim side, and incident with the Chamber has received evidence occurred
19 on the 11th of March, 1995, and I'd refer to D2294 and P879 as
21 This is an incident that's describing the alleged striking of a
22 young girl from the Bosnian Serb side of the confrontation line into
23 the -- so the victim in question was on the Muslim side of the line.
24 A. In Grbavica? It says here that the incident happened in
25 Grbavica, if I'm not mistaken.
1 Q. I don't think that's right. It gives a grid reference in
2 Sarajevo, but the -- and the investigation took place in Grbavica. So I
3 understand -- if that's the case, do you not have a recollection of this
5 A. No, I'm not familiar with this. You're right, I obviously had in
6 mind another incident. I'm not familiar with this case. What happened,
7 sniper, 12.7 -- I don't even know that such a weapon existed.
8 Q. So then you can't comment on the extent to which the Bosnian Serb
9 army obstructed --
10 A. No, really --
11 Q. -- sorry, you can't comment on --
12 A. No, I can't. I'm not familiar with this case. I've never seen
13 this before.
14 Q. Okay. And I'd just like that ask you a more general question.
15 You've said -- you've emphasized in your statement and in your evidence
16 today your view that the Bosnian Serb side scrupulously complied with the
17 laws of war. Did you ever hear anything from any source that the SRK was
18 targeting civilians in Sarajevo, particularly through shelling and
19 sniping? Did information to that effect ever come to your attention at
20 the time?
21 A. I personally didn't.
22 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr. Tomic.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Gustafson.
24 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellencies. I have to shed
1 light on some of the things that appeared during cross-examination. Can
2 we look at D426. D426.
3 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
4 Q. [Interpretation] Earlier today you were shown one part of a
5 document --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D426, D426.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Earlier today you were shown a part of a document in which
9 Mr. Prstojevic addressed the president. Let's look at bullet point 3 to
10 see what my position was with regard to the civilian population. Could
11 you please read bullet point 3 aloud. Please read it out aloud.
12 A. You want me to read it out? Under 3 it says:
13 "To spare the civilians of all attacks."
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Thank you.
16 And now I would like to call up D92.
17 This was also shown to you before.
18 Could we get page 87 in Serbian and 86 in English.
19 This was not shown to you. This is an excerpt from an Assembly
20 session. Could you please look at line 9 from the top in the Serbian
21 version of the document. Line 9 from the bottom. Can we scroll up a
22 little to display that line.
23 It says here:
24 "In that state which we are building, we have to provide them
25 with all the rights that we ourselves have ..."
1 How does this tally with your notions of our policies, of my
2 policies, with regard to other ethnic communities and people? How does
3 this correspond to what you know about my position with regard to other
4 ethnic groups?
5 A. Mr. President, are you asking me?
6 Q. Yes, yes.
7 A. I can't see anything here. Any democratic system in the world
8 would be happy if something like that were said. It says here that we
9 guarantee all rights to everybody unless they harbour hostile intentions.
10 This is an encouragement to all those who want to live in
11 Republika Srpska. This can only encourage them to stay in their homes
12 and to continue living where they have always lived.
13 Q. I have just shown you bullet point 3 which was issued before this
14 Assembly session. This is the Assembly session.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we now look at D7154 --
16 D1754. D1754, please.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Look at bullet point 3, it's not very legible. I'm going to try
19 and read it.
20 There has to be an English translation because this document has
21 been admitted into evidence already.
22 Bullet point 3, I'm going to read that:
23 "Forced transfer of people and other illegal measures against
24 civilian population must be prevented; certificates on property selling
25 or written statements by refugees that they will not return, if any, are
1 not legally valid and are out of force."
2 I believe that this was issued in August, on the 17th of August.
3 How does this fit with your understanding of our policies?
4 A. This is the only correct understanding. There is no forced
5 transfer. I claimed in my statement that no such things ever happened.
6 Are you talking about the document that was issued on the
7 13th of June, 1992? That's a document that I have in front of me.
8 Q. It says:
9 "According to our official act of June 13 ..."
10 That was the first such document and this one was issued on the
11 19th of August. If we scroll up we will see it.
12 A. The way I perceive it is as an encouragement and a guarantee to
13 those who decide to stay, who have never harboured any hostile
14 activities, who are not involved in acts of terrorism. It says here that
15 forced transfer should be banned, that property looting should be banned,
16 and if anybody engaged in such activities they would be duly punished.
17 That's how I perceive this.
18 Q. Thank you. You were shown something that concerned my speech in
19 the Assembly.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up D1270.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. You were suggested outside of any context that I had delivered a
23 speech which was war-mongering or intimidating.
24 Let's look at page 116 in Serbian, or rather, in English and in
25 Serbian it's 122.
1 This was issued on the 14th of October when there was out-voting
2 and when a declaration on sovereignty was passed. Do you remember that?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. I'm going to read the first paragraph.
5 "Before any explanation of the proposal is proposed, I don't know
6 whether I'm going to explain it or somebody else, I have to clarify one
7 thing which arises from the interpretation of what is being said from
8 this place. And this concerns the issue of war or peace. For the
9 umpteenth time I have to repeat that Serbs are not threatening to wage a
10 war. Serbs only declared that they would not be able to accept any
11 decision which is issued by means of out-voting and to their detriment."
12 And one more thing on this page, a little bit further down,
13 somewhere in the middle of the page it says:
14 "Serbs never attacked Muslims nor will they ever attack Muslims.
15 There is no such a feeling towards Muslims; however, the case that could
16 arise from decisions passed by out-voting, the case that could arise that
17 will not be launched by anybody but it will follow its own logic of what
18 we've spoken here. This is not chaos; order lies in our hands. Chaos is
19 not in anybody's hands. The main characteristics of chaos is the fact
20 that nobody generates it. It follows its own logic and it is
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page.
23 It should be 117 in English.
24 MS. GUSTAFSON: Could I just ask that Mr. Karadzic indicate where
25 in this transcript it says that Serbs never attacked Muslims nor will
1 they ever attack Muslims. I couldn't find that part.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic --
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Towards the end --
4 MS. GUSTAFSON: [Previous translation continues] ...
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- spilling over to page 117 in
7 [In English] Serbs never attacked -- [Interpretation] Last line.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Further on it says, talking about chaos -- can we move to the
10 following page both in Serbian and in English.
11 It says here: What else could the Serbs offer, although we
12 wholeheartedly accept Mr. Izetbegovic's proposal. I can see that there
13 are no positions [as interpreted] to that in the Croatian Democratic
14 Union. Let's think about that. Let's talk to the world about
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, about Croats, Muslims, and Serbs. Let's convey a
16 message that there won't be a war. Serbs will not be forced to accept
17 one option and Muslims and Croats another one. We can send the message
18 that there won't be a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We can guarantee that
19 there won't be chaos because order is in our hands. Chaos is no longer
20 in anybody's hands. On this occasion I convey warm messages and
21 greetings to Serbs, Muslims, and Croats, to common people who don't even
22 know what sovereignty is, who don't know what the change of a
23 constitutional and legal position is, who are not aware of the projection
24 of things that will be Bosnia in two or four or five years. My message
25 to them is to support us in our intention for the war not to take place.
1 I'm conveying warm messages, not war messages, but warm messages,
3 Once again let's convey warm messages and greetings to all the
4 three peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Let's tell them that we are
5 taking all measures to avoid war, to avoid out-voting and so on and so
7 In your experience, would you call this war-mongering or would
8 you call this a message against war?
9 A. It would be a message anti-war. In my statement and during my
10 examination I remember the Lisbon Agreement and we sincerely hoped that
11 war would be avoided. I suppose that all the members of the other
12 peoples hoped the same. I really didn't -- never understood why the
13 Muslims had given up on that agreement which was a guarantee of security
14 for everybody, which was a guarantee that war would not take place and
15 everything could have ended up peacefully.
16 War is terrible for everybody. I no longer live in my own city,
17 a city where I have lived all my life. This is tragic and it is tragic
18 for everybody who left their homes, especially those who lost somebody in
19 that war.
20 Q. Thank you. Earlier today you were shown some of the diary notes
21 by General Mladic, page 53.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 65 ter 7845.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Your answer was that that did not concern Muslims but rather the
25 Muslim police who might jeopardise safety and security. Please look at
1 the document. This is an UNPROFOR report on a visit to Grbavica. It
2 says on the 9th of March, 1993 -- [In English] Visit protection officer
3 to Grbavica on March the 18th, 1993. [Interpretation] And then bullet
4 point 4: Minorities.
5 [In English] "There are approximately 1.200 Muslims still in
6 Grbavica. The males are not drafted, but those of a certain age have to
7 do work for -- between 100 and 150 Muslims have indicated a willingness
8 to leave to the other side [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.
9 Is it true that at that time there were about 1200 Muslims, that
10 you did not mobilise them, but some had work obligation? And was it only
11 Muslims who had work obligation or was it everybody?
12 A. I didn't have any precise information. I know that there were a
13 lot of Muslims and I've already said that today. I know that a lot of
14 Muslims lived in Grbavica, especially in the part where there were
15 expulsions. Many people lived there. I didn't know this
16 information - it's UNPROFOR information. There was a work obligation for
17 everyone who was not a member of military units. Although I had nothing
18 to do with this personally, I know that some reported for work. When
19 humanitarian aid convoys arrived, they would help with the unloading of
20 the goods, they were still receiving them at the time. Since that was
21 the situation in Sarajevo, there weren't enough goods, people were
22 willing to work on humanitarian products in order to receive some
23 humanitarian aid which they received as did all the other inhabitants. I
24 didn't know that there were so many of them, but there certainly were a
25 lot of Muslims.
1 Q. Here it says that they registered a hundred and 150 of them who
2 wanted to cross over. Was this prevented when such wishes were
4 A. No. This information is from 1993. As I said, at the time I was
5 in my unit's sector. I know that there was a large group that crossed
6 over, perhaps 200 people, but I have no idea. I know that they managed
7 to cross over. One part of that group crossed over the Bratstvo i
8 Jedinstvo Bridge and the other part crossed over a smaller bridge across
9 the road from Hotel Bristol. That bridge linked the left bank and the
10 right bank in the vicinity of Hotel Bristol.
11 Q. Thank you. And later you were in the battalion. Did Muslims
12 remain living there - I won't ask you about the number - throughout the
13 war, as well as Croats? Did they remain in Grbavica, those who didn't
14 want to leave?
15 A. Yes. Many of them remained there, especially Muslims. I don't
16 know how many Croats, though, I don't have any exact numbers, but I know
17 for certain that they continued living there.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document please be
20 admitted into evidence.
21 MS. GUSTAFSON: No objection.
22 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 JUDGE KWON: How is this related to Mladic -- the part of the
25 Mladic diary that we saw earlier on? Mladic diary was dated 1995, after
1 the Dayton, and this is 1993.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency. But there it
3 said that Mr. Tomic was against the return of Muslims, Muslim civilians,
4 and in the other place it said the police and the authorities, not
5 civilians. So this shows that civilians always lived there throughout
6 that period.
7 JUDGE KWON: This document shows that there were 1200 Muslims in
8 1993. In any event, I'll leave it at that. Let's continue. We'll admit
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2424.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D3709.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. If I can draw your attention to the fact this is an order to
14 carry out combat operations in the Grbavica sector. It was signed by the
15 commander of the 1st Motorised Brigade, the 1st Muslim Motorised Brigade.
16 It was authorised by the commander of the 1st Corps, Mustafa
17 Hajrulahovic, Talijan. The 2nd of January, 1993, is the date.
18 Now I would like to remind you of your testimony according to
19 which you weren't afraid of civilians returning, you were afraid of armed
20 forces returning, armed forces, the police and the Muslim authorities.
21 Could we now see the next page. In the English version too.
22 Please, let's have a look at the part in a box that says:
23 "Task." The 31st of December, it's just before the new year,
24 New Year's Eve, and it says:
25 "Task. Take the the sector to the right, Tranzit to the left,
1 the bridge by Elektroprivreda, carry out an attack on the following axis:
2 11 Plavi, the southern part of the state in Grbavica, Palma, the Soping
3 and Strojorad, four large skyscrapers, with the objective of routing the
4 enemy on these axes and taking control of important features."
5 Can we see the following page, please. And could we see the
6 following page in the English version.
7 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues]...
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We only have this part translated
9 in English.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Have a look at item number 6, paragraph number 6, fire support.
12 The artillery shall provide fire support in the enemy's depth at the
13 command post, post where the reserves are deployed, in accordance with
14 the requests from the battalion commander. Can we see the following
15 page, it's the same page in the English version?
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, before you continue with this
17 question, can you explain what this document is about and then can you
18 also explain why the format of the document looks like this? It seems
19 like you cut and pasted this document from somewhere else.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, this is an IDS
21 document. It's a Muslim order for an offensive on Grbavica. We only
22 have this part translated --
23 JUDGE KWON: No, no, Mr. Karadzic --
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- the most salient part --
25 JUDGE KWON: You didn't explain -- answer my question, my
1 question why the fonts per paragraph look -- differs. Para 3, para 4,
2 and para 6, they all look different.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, it's -- it was
4 typed on a Muslim machine. They added things to it. It took a while to
5 compile the order. It wasn't all done in one go, but the original is
6 theirs. It's signed on the first page so it's their document. The
7 question is when they added certain elements and to which parts of the
8 order. You also have a stamp at the end of the document, at the bottom
9 of the document, and it also bears a signature.
10 JUDGE KWON: I also see the ERN number. Is it from the
12 MS. GUSTAFSON: It certainly appears to be the case from the ERN
14 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's continue.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a look at the next
16 page, please, in the Serbian version, the same page in the English
17 version. Could we have a look at the last paragraph just above
18 "logistics support," could we scroll up a bit. I'll read it out.
19 "Since taking such a fortified settlement is impossible without
20 destroying and torching features which are strong fortifications at the
21 same time everything has to be destroyed and torched. To carry out the
22 operation in -- safely because of the brazenness, the lack of principles,
23 one shouldn't trust a single captive and especially not captives bearing
24 weapons of any kind."
25 I'm waiting for the interpretation.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Tomic, is such an approach of the ABiH towards captives,
3 settlements, and features, did such an approach have an influence on you
4 and on the inhabitants of Grbavica when it came to waiting for the Muslim
5 police and authorities after the Dayton --
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
7 Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
8 MS. GUSTAFSON: I'm not sure a sufficient foundation for that
9 question has been asked. I mean, it is -- the question assumes -- first
10 of all, this witness's knowledge of this specific attack; secondly, that
11 it was effectively carried out. I mean, we know nothing about that at
12 this point.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 Would you like to respond to Ms. Gustafson's observation or would
15 you like to reformulate your question?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll rephrase my question.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. During this period of time were you in Grbavica, the 2nd of
19 January, 1993?
20 A. Throughout the war-time period, as I have already said, until I
21 went to the battalion command I was in a unit sector above the Tranzit
22 and the stadium in Sansa [phoen] sector. I was in the command battalion
23 from June 1994. I never saw this document, but there were a lot of Serbs
24 who fled at lines in our area of responsibility. And we obtained a lot
25 of information from them about this. So it wasn't even necessary for me
1 to see such a document.
2 Naturally I was concerned about my safety and the safety of my
3 family and of my friends. So I don't know who had a diary. We didn't
4 sign things. I didn't sign things like my statement -- well, I stand
5 behind everything I said at Mr. Mladic's meeting. I didn't receive the
6 minutes, I didn't sign anything. I didn't say the Muslims could not
7 return, but in January 1996 if we remain there, if their police or
8 military arrived -- well, what would have happened? No one would have
9 been safe and especially not those who were members of the VRS.
10 Q. Thank you. Were there such attacks and how many such attacks
11 were there on Grbavica and on your area, Novo Sarajevo?
12 A. Well, I couldn't say, I couldn't give you a precise number, but
13 there were many attacks on all the lines. Sometimes this was simulated,
14 but most of the attacks would be carried out against some other line, but
15 we kept increasing the level of combat-readiness, we were often at full
16 combat-readiness, so people were very tired, exhausted, because there
17 were constant attacks.
18 Q. Thank you. And was there such destruction of buildings, such
19 torching of buildings and features?
20 A. Where you have this -- these special types of ammunition,
21 whenever possible they would torch things. When I was visiting a command
22 line I entered the nearest -- the building that was nearest to the
23 Strojorad, the skyscraper nearest to it. This was at the end of 1994. A
24 soldier of ours who was living there and remained there, his family had
25 been settled in the inner part of Grbavica, he told me that only that
1 skyscraper was on fire 44 times. This is close to the Miljacka river, to
2 Strojorad. That is where a line of disengagement was, in fact. It was
3 about 30 or 50 metres from the bank of the Miljacka. So they used these
4 flares, as I said, this type of ammunition.
5 Q. How do you understand this advice, don't trust a single POW?
6 A. I don't know how the interpreter will translate this, interpret
7 this. I'm trying to be as precise as possible. The proverb is:
8 Gestures are sufficient for a clever person. How can I draw any other
9 conclusion from this? It concerns people who have weapons with them. I
10 don't know where -- what the rules are, but that is how I interpreted
11 this. It means: Eliminate everyone.
12 Q. Thank you. I think in Latin one says "sapienti sat," what you
13 just said. Thank you.
14 Can we see the last page, the signature. To be frank,
15 Zlatko Lagumdzija isn't the politician, is he? This is a commander. It
16 says: Commander Zlatko Lagumdzija. It's not the politician
17 Zlatko Lagumdzija; is that correct?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just want us to be frank. It
19 wouldn't be fair if we suggested in public that this was the name of the
20 politician because there is a well-known politician whose name is
21 Zlatko Lagumdzija.
22 Could this document be admitted into evidence, please.
23 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson.
24 MS. GUSTAFSON: I don't think the witness was really able to
25 confirm that anything like what is described in this document took place
1 and it would certainly be news to the Court that there was, in fact, a
2 major offensive in Grbavica at the date that this document states.
3 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, the witness has indicated
4 that this is consistent with his observations and concerns about police
5 coming into Serb areas, and I think that on that basis - since he's
6 indicated it's consistent with his understanding - that it's admissible.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE KWON: And I take it that the Prosecution is not
9 challenging the authenticity about this document?
10 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, Your Honours, we -- we have to look into
11 it. I agree with Your Honour's observations that it's an odd-looking
12 document, but I simply can't comment at the moment.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The special type of
14 ammunition the witness referred to earlier was, in fact, armour-piercing
15 incendiary bullets, not flares.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 In terms of relevance, the Chamber tends to agree with
18 Mr. Robinson, but given the authenticity issue as well as the English
19 translation, simply it is lacking. So we mark it for identification.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D2425, Your Honours.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. And now I would like to
22 call up 1D500.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. This is my last question about your concern and the concern of
25 Serbs in Grbavica with regard to those who may be allowed to return.
1 Unfortunately, this is yet another untranslated document.
2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter notes that on-site translations
3 in the courtroom cannot be taken as official translations.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This bulletin of the staff of the
5 Supreme Command of armed forces which was issued on the 11th of October,
6 1993. Can we please look at page 3 in e-court.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Could you please read the part of the document which is in a
10 A. "Among the combatants of the 101st Motorised Brigade who are
11 mostly not satisfied with the work of the command of this unit, there has
12 been a rumour going on recently that the command in the locality in the
13 zone of responsibility of this battalion should be taken over by
14 Musan Topalovic - Caco. The commander of the 1st [as interpreted]
15 Motorised Battalion, Enis Srna, who, according to some unverified
16 sources, is in cahoots with Caco, commented upon this rumour with the
17 following words: 'In tactical terms it is better for one person to be in
18 charge of Grbavica so that it could be cleansed.'"
19 Q. Did you ever hear of the people who are mentioned in here?
20 A. I did hear about Musan Topalovic, Caco. I did not hear about
21 Enis Srna. That name doesn't ring bell.
22 Q. Who they cleanse Grbavica from [as interpreted], what does this
24 A. I believe that it is more than clear. This is a threat addressed
25 at the Serbian population, at us.
1 Q. Could you please tell the Trial Chamber who was Musan Topalovic,
2 Caco, what was his reputation?
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes -- no, just a second, Mr. Tomic.
4 Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
5 MS. GUSTAFSON: This doesn't seem to relate to the
6 cross-examination. I'm not sure what the connection is supposed to be.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 Mr. Karadzic, could you explain that?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the question is whether there
10 was any reason for the Serbs in Grbavica to be afraid of Musan Topalovic,
11 Caco -- [No interpretation].
12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not understand the
14 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This arises from contesting that
16 the Serbian population in Grbavica was afraid of the arrival of the
17 Muslim police and the army, i.e., the authorities. Now I'm asking the
18 witness whether he knows Musan Topalovic, Caco, and whether his
19 reputation gave enough reason for fear among the Serbian population.
20 MS. GUSTAFSON: Whether or not the Serbian population in Grbavica
21 was afraid or not was not an issue that was raised in cross-examination.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will allow the question.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Can you please answer or should I repeat?
1 A. You don't have to repeat. I never met Musan Topalovic, Caco,
2 personally, but everybody in Sarajevo was aware of his reputation and, of
3 course, our fear was justified. We were afraid if something like that
4 should happen, we knew what would have happened to us, especially us who
5 were members of the Army of Republika Srpska. So the fear was justified,
6 it was present and justified.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be marked for
8 identification pending translation.
9 JUDGE KWON: Any observation, Ms. Gustafson?
10 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, Your Honours, I -- since Your Honour's
11 allowed the question I won't object to the marking of the document.
12 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
13 We'll mark it for identification pending English translation.
14 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated]
15 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the number.
16 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D2426.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honours. Can I
19 have a five-minute break to go to the bathroom if at all possible. I
20 need three minutes -- a couple of minutes.
21 JUDGE KWON: You have further questions, Mr. Karadzic?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Three or four short questions, but
23 I think that the witness should be allowed to go to the toilet.
24 JUDGE KWON: Five minutes.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.
1 --- Break taken at 2.45 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 2.49 p.m.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, I thought that was the last
4 question from you, but please continue.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, let it then be my last
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. Tomic, you were asked about M84 and M53 Brownings and so on
9 and so forth and about their ranges. When it comes to these weapons,
10 were they used in the Ozrenska zone of the entire battalion, could they
11 be used for sniper fire and killing civilians in Sarajevo?
12 A. Those weapons were used only in support in case of attack, to
13 allow us to defend ourselves, because M84 is a good weapon, a well-tested
14 weapon. In my statement I already stated that M53 is not a reliable
15 machine-gun. From those weapons you couldn't open sniper fire. They
16 don't have optical sights. For example, M53 doesn't have that.
17 Q. Thank you. Thank you for coming to testify. I have no further
18 questions. I would have a lot more questions but they're not that
19 pertinent, I suppose.
20 JUDGE KWON: Witness has answered the question already, but
21 please refrain from asking leading questions, Mr. Karadzic.
22 Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
23 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry, I have to add that that was -- the issue
24 of sniping was never raised either in direct or in cross-examination and
25 it's totally unfair to put that as the last question.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, the subject was raised, Mr. Witness, but
3 if the line of separation was only 50 to 80 yards, you wouldn't need
4 optical sights, would you, because a competent rifle shooter over 50 or
5 80 metres would be able to shoot with his eye on the sights without an
6 optical enhancement. Do you agree with that?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be heard? May I respond?
8 JUDGE MORRISON: No, this is to the witness.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond to Madam Gustafson's
10 objection? This is what I would like to respond to.
11 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure you followed. Judge Morrison was
12 asking a question to the witness.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But -- but, no, no, not to
14 Judge Morrison, no, not to Judge Morrison. I would like to respond to
15 Madam Gustafson. In cross-examination Madam Gustafson laid a foundation
16 for the incident that happened in Krndelja Street and so on and so forth.
17 Those were sniping incidents. I wanted to establish what that was about
18 because that was about precision and range.
19 JUDGE KWON: It's moot already now, so I'll leave it at that.
20 So, Mr. Tomic, do you remember Judge Morrison's question?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I remember the question
22 properly, His Excellency Judge Morrison stated, as a matter of fact, that
23 at such short distances you don't need optical sights and I fully agree
24 with that. However, I was answering Mr. Karadzic's questions and I said
25 that one could not open in -- fire a single shot from those weapons. You
1 could only fire bursts of fire, and those weapons were not used to open
2 fire in depth. They were only used in cases of attack and in cases when
3 you wanted to repel an attack. M53 and M84 weapons were not used because
4 they opened bursts of fire and they're not as precise as the types of
5 weapons which fire single shots. Although His Excellency,
6 Judge Morrison, is absolutely right. At such short distances we did not
7 use optical sights because they were not needed. There is a good line of
8 visibility at distances of 50 to 80 yards as Mr. Morrison said.
9 JUDGE KWON: Well, that seems to conclude your evidence,
10 Mr. Tomic. On behalf of the Chamber I would like to thank you for your
11 coming to The Hague to give it. Now you're free to go.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to thank you, and on
13 my behalf I would like to commend the services that have looked after my
14 arrival and stay here in The Hague and everything else. Once again,
15 thank you very much.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll rise all together.
17 I was informed by the Registry that the -- due to technical
18 difficulties, Courtroom 1 will be closed down for renovation in terms of
19 a switchboard. So tomorrow we'll be sitting in the afternoon in
20 Courtroom 3 after Mladic trial, i.e., from 2.15 to 7.00. On Thursday,
21 we'll sit in the morning from 9.00 to quarter to 2.00 in Courtroom 3. So
22 I appreciate the Registry's endeavour to get the proceedings to go on.
23 Given the time and given that the Chamber needs to rise at 3.00
24 sharp, so we'll adjourn for the day.
25 [The witness withdrew]
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.57 p.m.,
2 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 14th day of
3 November, 2012, at 2.15 p.m.