1 Monday, 3 December 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.21 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon.
7 Good afternoon, sir.
8 THE WITNESS: [Microphone not activated]
9 THE INTERPRETER: The microphone is not on.
10 JUDGE KWON: Could the usher turn on the microphone of the
12 Would the witness take the solemn declaration, please.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
14 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
15 WITNESS: VLADE LUCIC
16 [Witness answered through interpreter]
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Lucic. Please be seated and make
18 yourself comfortable.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
21 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honour. I'd just like to suggest
22 that this witness be advised of his rights under Rule 90(E). Thank you.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 Mr. Lucic, before you start giving evidence, I would like to draw
25 your attention to a particular rule here at the Tribunal. Under this
1 Rule, Rule 90(E), you may object to answering a question from the
2 Prosecution or the accused or from the Judges if you believe that your
3 answer will incriminate you. When I say "incriminate," I mean that
4 something you say may amount to an admission of your guilt for a criminal
5 offence or could provide evidence that you have committed an offence.
6 However, even if you think your answer will incriminate you and you do
7 not wish to answer the question, the Tribunal has the power to compel you
8 to answer the question. But in such a case, the Tribunal will make sure
9 that your testimony compelled in such a way shall not be used as evidence
10 in other case against you for any offence other than false testimony. Do
11 you understand what I have just told you, sir?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understood.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Excellency.
16 Good afternoon to everyone in the courtroom.
17 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
18 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Colonel Lucic.
19 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D6088 in
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Colonel, sir, have you provided a statement to the Defence team
24 and is that statement before you now?
25 A. Yes, I have provided a statement and I can see it on the screen.
1 Q. Thank you. I am waiting for interpretation and I would kindly
2 ask you to do the same so that we would have everything in the
4 Does the statement accurately reflect what you said?
5 A. Yes, it does. Basically everything is in it in the way I put it.
6 Q. Thank you. If I was to ask you today in the courtroom the same
7 questions, will your answers to those questions be the same in essence as
8 they stand in the statement?
9 A. Yes, in essence, although perhaps certain dates may vary up to
10 between 10 and 15 days since I couldn't recall everything exactly.
11 Q. Thank you. Did you sign the statement?
12 A. I did.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I seek to tender
14 this statement under 92 ter.
15 JUDGE KWON: And I take it that you are also tendering three
16 associated exhibits?
17 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Is the Trial Chamber minded
19 to admit those associated exhibits? If so, we can add them to the 65 ter
21 JUDGE KWON: Actually, at the moment not. The Chamber is not
22 satisfied that those three exhibits referred to in para 35 that do form
23 an indispensable and inseparable part. So if the accused is minded to
24 tender those documents, he should lead live with the witness.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we're not minded to tender those, so we'll
1 withdraw them.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 We'll give the number for the 92 ter statement.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D6088 becomes Exhibit D2516,
5 Your Honours.
6 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, I didn't ask your opinion, but I take it
7 you didn't object to the admission? Thank you.
8 Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I wanted to read out a
10 summary of Colonel Lucic's statement in the English language.
11 [In English] Vlade Lucic is a retired colonel. After graduation
12 from the military academy in 1975 he was posted to serve in Maribor,
13 Slovenia, where he worked as an officer of the JNA. He was then
14 transferred to Celje, Slovenia. After the secession of Slovenia from
15 Yugoslavia in 1991, his unit, a motorised brigade, was relocated to Cacak
16 in Serbia, where he worked until May 1992, when he received orders to
17 report to the Sarajevo Corps and assigned to the 216th Mountain Brigade
18 under the command of Colonel Dragomir Milosevic, who ordered him to take
19 over the command of the infantry battalion. Colonel Milosevic drove him
20 to Grbavica where they came under strong Muslim fire. This unit was made
21 up mostly of troops from Sokolac, nearby municipality.
22 He was the commander of the 2nd Battalion from May the 18th,
23 1992, until the end of January 1993. He immediately noticed that the
24 lines were not covered with enough men, that the defence was not linked
25 in, and that the establishment of weapons were missing. At that time,
1 the JNA Marsal Tito barracks were under the blockade with JNA soldiers
2 inside, cadets, and all the weapons in it. They had the task to lift the
3 blockade if possible, but they could not do so because the Muslim forces
4 kept their positions under continuous fire. On 22nd of May, 1992, the
5 1st Romanija -- Infantry Romanija Brigade was established. It was
6 created from what was originally the 2nd Mountain Brigade. Only the
7 title changed and everything else remained the same. After January 1993
8 he was moved to the command of this brigade to operation and training
9 duties where he remained until the end of the war.
10 The 1st Corps of the BH Army was in the parts of the city of
11 Sarajevo which were under Muslim control during the period from April
12 1992 to 1995. During the entire war, Colonel Vlade Lucic's unit's line
13 of defence was established at all -- was not established at all towards
14 Gorazde across Mount Gosina, 50 kilometres in length. The strategy and
15 objectives of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in relation to the city of
16 Sarajevo was to prevent the penetration of the BH Army into the Serbian
17 territory, as this would have been fatal for the Serbian population and
18 its soldiers and would have had a huge impact on the development of the
19 war situation in other fronts and on the course of the war in BH in
20 general. The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps mainly conducted defensive
21 operations due to the lack of manpower, while the Muslim units were
22 almost always on the offensive. His unit's offensive operations were
23 mainly designed to recapture lost positions and to neutralise their
24 weapons and manpower in locations from which they were engaging civilian
25 and military targets on the Serb side.
1 He and his unit were aware of the international conventions that
2 protect the civilian population in the war, so they opened fire in
3 self-defence and only against military targets, while the Muslim forces
4 ceaselessly fired at civilians, especially those fleeing their terror in
5 the city towards the Serbian territory. Soldiers in his unit who
6 violated these legal norms were subjected to disciplinary action in case
7 of mild breaches and to criminal sanctions in cases of severe breaches,
8 but the necessary investigations were first conducted by persons
9 authorised to do so by law.
10 Vlade Lucic and his unit had knowledge that the VRS general
11 headquarters and the civilian authorities of the Republika Srpska had
12 extended offers to the city of Sarajevo to be fully demilitarised and
13 that the heavy weapons be put under the control of the United Nations,
14 but they didn't know that the ultimate objective of the Serbian
15 authorities was to -- that the city of Sarajevo be split up, nor did they
16 know about the initiative to put Sarajevo airport under the control of
17 the UN in June 1992, but he believes that humanitarian reasons were
18 behind this.
19 They had -- the army, his own brigade had a pretty good
20 intelligence and information about the zones of responsibility of the
21 1st Corps of BH Army, including the depth of the territory which also
22 comprised civilian areas of the city under Muslim control, so they had
23 knowledge that Muslims were using snipers from the tall buildings on the
24 opposite side where civilians lived, as well as using mortars mounted on
25 mobile off-road vehicles. They also had intelligence about the positions
1 of the opposing forces in the dominant high spots in and around the city
2 under the control of the Muslim forces, from where they targeted
3 civilians and soldiers. This rendered Grbavica, Vrace, Lukavica, and
4 other places no-go areas on the Serb side. Likewise, they had knowledge
5 that the 1st Corps of the BH Army had a huge numerical advantage and was
6 armed with all kinds of cutting-edge weapons and artillery and that they
7 had large quantities of ammunition and shells. Muslim mortars targeted
8 their positions -- Serb positions from the train station, from the tunnel
9 in Ciglane settlement, from the grounds of the Kosevo Hospital, and from
10 local -- other locations which were mostly civilian zones and civilian
11 facilities. Because they knew that Muslims were misusing civilian
12 buildings for military purposes, they had to -- they had that fact in
13 mind when returning fire and took care not to endanger the lives of
14 civilians in the territory of the opposing side.
15 Vlade Lucic's unit had no intention of causing civilian
16 casualties through fighting. It also did not have any intention of
17 terrorising civilians who were under the control of the Muslim
18 authorities. They never received any orders from the higher commands or
19 civilian authorities to carry out attacks on the means of public
20 transport. It was meticulously explained to his own soldiers and
21 commands that military targets were and, especially, that civilians must
22 not be attacked. They engaged the enemy only on orders and, if
23 necessary, only in direct military objectives. Vlade Lucic filed reports
24 to inform his superior command and the peacekeeping force located on the
25 battle-field of Muslim attacks from civilian zones and called their
1 attention to the fact that the opposing units were not choosing their
2 victims and that in the most cases they killed civilians.
3 As to the commanding officers in his unit, they were mostly
4 reserve officers, that means persons with higher education who had
5 graduated from the school for reserve officers while doing their
6 mandatory military service in the JNA. They were also a very small
7 number of professional officers in the JNA. Privates were mostly local
8 people referenced to as people's army who were deployed mainly according
9 to their military or professional specialities. His unit did not have
10 volunteers from other countries in its ranks, but he heard that there
11 were some in other units and that superior commands and civilian
12 authorities had taken a negative stance in relation to them. During the
13 period when he was the commander of his unit, he was the only
14 professional officer and does not believe that the shortage of the
15 professional personnel had a major impact on the quality of command
16 because they conducted further training for the command personnel and
17 worked on establishing professionalism in commanding, although of course
18 it would have been better if the commanders had in fact been professional
19 officers. They sometimes had problems in achieving effective control
20 over the members of his unit which is normal but those problems were
21 never ignored. Ammunition supply in his unit was solid or at a
22 satisfactory level, yet still under strict control by command and
23 commanding officers and therefore there was no ammunition misuse, least
24 not in his unit. Within his unit there were snipers as per the unit
25 establishment, and if they engaged targets they were only military
1 targets so that civilians in the city under Muslim control did not come
2 under sniper fire. On the contrary, Muslim snipers killed, especially in
3 Grbavica, a very large number of civilians of different ethnic
4 backgrounds, but mostly Serbs fleeing to Serbian territory.
5 The general stance of the superior command of the VRS and of the
6 civilian authorities of the Republika Srpska was not to prevent but
7 rather to enable the humanitarian organisations to deliver humanitarian
8 aid to the civilians under Muslim control. They ensured free and safe
9 passage for humanitarian convoys through the territories under their
10 control. Vlade Lucic's unit did not have specific knowledge that
11 humanitarian convoys were misused for military purposes for the benefit
12 of the 1st Corps of BH Army, but Muslim forces would intensify their
13 operations using weapons they did not have until then, which may indicate
14 that they were, in fact, misusing said convoys to obtain weapons.
15 They also had no knowledge of the existence of a black market in
16 which humanitarian aid goods were being sold in the territory under
17 Muslim control. They did however learn from the media and fleeing
18 Serbian citizens about the existence of criminal groups with the units of
19 the BH Army 1st Corps terrorising the Serbian civilian population by
20 imprisoning them in and in detention camps, levying unfounded accusations
21 against them, raping them, and so on. They also repeatedly violated
22 cease-fire agreements.
23 Supreme Commands and civilian authorities took a liberal stance
24 with regard to the freedom of movement of civilians toward the city and
25 out of the city under Muslim control. On the contrary, it is a notorious
1 fact that the Muslim authorities did not allow civilians to leave the
2 territory under their own control. His unit and the civilian authorities
3 of the municipality in which his unit's zone of responsibility was
4 located co-operated well and did not have any problems. He is not aware
5 of there being a Serbian municipal policy of persecution, murder, and
6 discrimination based on ethnic, religious, or other differences. He also
7 has no knowledge about the relationship of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps
8 headquarter with republican civilian authorities or the president of the
10 With regard to aerial bombs, modified aerial bombs, fuel air
11 bombs, and other air-to-surface missiles, Vlade Lucic does not know that
12 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had or used in combat operations such bombs or
14 And that would be it, a short summary, and I don't have any
15 questions for now.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you introduced the witness as a
17 retired colonel. Could you ask him when he retired from the army, until
18 when he served in the army?
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Colonel, sir, when did you leave the army and when did you
22 A. I retired in 2002. Following that I was a contracted officer in
23 the VRS until 2005.
24 Q. Thank you. That means that you had gone -- undergone all the
25 checks carried out by international forces for all the personnel who were
1 to serve in the armed forces after the war, or rather, did you undergo
2 such checks?
3 A. I suppose as much. No one called me to perform any kind of
4 particular checks, but given the fact that I was employed I believe I had
5 undergone some checks.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, by your leave I would
8 like to offer Colonel Lucic a hard copy of his statement for perusal
9 during his testimony.
10 JUDGE KWON: I don't see any problem.
11 Show it to the Prosecution and hand it over to the witness.
12 Mr. Lucic, as you have noted, your evidence in chief was mainly
13 admitted in writing in lieu of your oral testimony. Now you'll be
14 cross-examined by Ms. Gustafson representing the Office of the
17 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honours.
18 Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:
19 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Lucic.
20 A. Good afternoon, Madam Prosecutor.
21 Q. I have very limited time today so I would like to ask you to
22 focus your answer as specifically as possible on the precise question
23 that I ask. In your statement you explained how you served as the
24 commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Romanija Brigade up until the
25 end of January 1993, and you described your area of responsibility as
1 being from the Vrbanja bridge along the Miljacka river as far as the
2 stadium, all areas within Grbavica. You also explained that you only
3 commanded a part of the battalion, that's at paragraph 36 of your
4 statement. And the Chamber has received evidence that 2nd Battalion
5 units actually stretched along Ozrenska Street and in the direction of
7 So my question for you is: Who commanded that part of the
8 battalion, along Ozrenska Street and towards Lukavica?
9 A. Madam Prosecutor, in that part of Ozrenska Street facing Lukavica
10 there was another unit that did not belong to my unit.
11 Q. By "another unit," do you mean a unit that didn't belong to the
12 2nd Battalion of the 1st Romanija Brigade?
13 A. Yes. The area of responsibility is generally given to a brigade,
14 whereas a battalion is a lower-ranking unit within a brigade. It just
15 has its combat disposition. It does not have an area of responsibility.
16 Q. Okay. So according to you what was the unit that was positioned
17 along Ozrenska Street and towards Lukavica? What unit was that?
18 A. The 3rd Battalion was the unit deployed there, as far as I can
19 remember, and it was mobilised in that area too.
20 Q. Okay. You also explained that when Dragomir Milosevic took you
21 to the command in Grbavica in May 1992 you were ordered to take over from
22 the Commander Beronja and that Beronja's deputy, Dragan Tupajic, remained
23 your deputy commander. Had Beronja and Tupajic previously been officers
24 in the 216th JNA Brigade?
25 A. At the time Captain Beronja was a professional officer and he was
1 deployed in the centre of military schools at the Marsal Tito barracks,
2 whereas Dragan Tupajic was a civilian who had a different profession but
3 at the same time he was a reserve officer. And his war time assignment
4 was the 216th Brigade. Captain Beronja in peace time served in the
5 barracks, but his war time assignment was also in that brigade.
6 Q. Okay. And you said at paragraph 4 that the unit was made up
7 mostly of troops from Sokolac. Were those troops also from the
8 216th Brigade previously?
9 A. Yes, for the most part.
10 Q. Okay. And then you explained in your statement that around
11 February of 1993 you moved to the command of the 1st Romanija Brigade to
12 operations and training duties where you remained until the end of the
13 war, and that's at paragraph 6 of your statement. Were you the assistant
14 commander for operations and training? Was that your position in the
15 brigade command?
16 A. No. The brigade command is considerably bigger than battalion
17 commands that are below it, and it has its professional services involved
18 in different activities. I was in this department, if you will. At the
19 time it was called the department for teaching and operations. It played
20 no command role whatsoever. It is a professional organ and it was not
21 part of the inner circle, if you will, of the command that comprised the
22 commander, the deputy commander, and so on.
23 Q. So what exactly were you duties? If you could briefly explain
24 your duties when you were in the brigade command in this position in the
25 teaching and operations department.
1 A. For the most part, these were professional duties starting with
2 organising work at the command post, then providing security for the
3 command post; organising duty service, then also communication between
4 duty officers who communicated with lower-ranking units, subordinate
5 units all the time; then also checking on the professionalism of the
6 units, carrying out training, and other tasks that were given to us by
7 the commander.
8 Q. Okay. When you were within the brigade did you -- was it part of
9 your duties to read and be familiar with orders that came to the brigade
10 from the corps command?
11 A. Yes, the orders that pertained to that department and that were
12 sent to us by the commander, we read them and we acted accordingly.
13 Q. Okay. But if they were operational orders, that was something
14 that would be outside of your area and you wouldn't necessarily have been
15 familiar with those kinds of orders from the corps command; is that
17 A. For the most part we were aware of all orders because there was
18 team-work involved. We were supposed to stand-in for each other too, but
19 it wasn't necessary because there were orders that pertained to other
20 professional organs in the command, but then we were not made aware of
22 Q. And did you participate in meetings of the brigade command?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And how often were those meetings held?
25 A. When I arrived in the unit in 1992, these meetings took place
1 very frequently, every day, because most of the personnel did not know
2 one another. So - how should I put this? - they arrived in the unit
3 ad hoc. The situation made it necessary, therefore, to have meetings
4 every day until the brigade command was positioned in another location.
5 At that point in time, meetings were not held every day any longer.
6 Q. Okay. At paragraph 22 of your statement you said there were not
7 very many professional officers, but you explained that you didn't
8 believe that shortage - I'm referring to paragraph 22 - you didn't
9 believe that the shortage of professional personnel had a major impact on
10 the quality of command. At paragraph 23 you said you sometimes had
11 problems in achieving effective control over members of the unit which is
12 normal but the problems were not ignored. And you said it in example
13 when a number of men abandoned the unit and causing you recruitment
15 My question is: Did you ever have an instance either when you
16 were battalion commander or when you were a member of the brigade command
17 whether any member of your units was suspected to be involved in any
18 serious violations such as unlawfully targeting civilians? Do you recall
19 any instance like that within your units?
20 A. In my unit there were no cases of unlawful firing. Fire was only
21 opened in necessary defence, but there were other crimes in the unit and
22 appropriate measures were taken against the perpetrators of these crimes.
23 Q. And when you say "in my unit," are you referring to both the
24 battalion and the brigade, in both cases you say there were no instances
25 of unlawful firing. Is that right?
1 A. When I speak of my unit I'm referring to the battalion, and I
2 claim that there was no unlawful firing there. But at meetings I had
3 never heard of any unit within the brigade opening fire unlawfully. But
4 of course I cannot fully assert that because I was not present in all
5 those units.
6 Q. Okay. So you never conducted any inquiries or initiated any
7 investigations into any suspected instances of unlawful targeting of
8 civilians I take it?
9 A. Well, if the question were to be raised in the brigade command as
10 to whether someone had violated a cease-fire or opened fire
11 unnecessarily, of course we would discuss that in our unit too and we
12 would always reach the conclusion that no such thing happened.
13 Q. And how many times did that happen when a question was raised in
14 the brigade command as to whether someone had violated a cease-fire or
15 opened fire unnecessarily? How many times did that issue come up?
16 A. I don't know whether a specific investigation was carried out
17 with a view to a particular case, but at every meeting that was raised,
18 that fire should not be opened, that that was prohibited, and that units
19 should only protect themselves if attacked, that means self-defence.
20 Q. Okay. But that's not exactly my question. My question was: How
21 many times at the brigade command was there a specific issue of somebody
22 opening fire unnecessarily? Did that -- did any specific instances ever
23 get raised at the brigade command?
24 A. I am not familiar with any such thing, that anyone had violated
25 the rules for opening fire. So I'm not aware of any such thing, but it
1 was on the agenda, namely, that fire should not be opened. Sometimes
2 there would be a smaller attack launched against the unit and then the
3 unit would respond and then the command would look into that, whether it
4 was necessary to respond.
5 Q. Okay. I'd like to move on to another topic. At paragraph 17 of
6 your statement you said that mortars targeted your positions from the
7 train station, the tunnel, and the Ciglane settlement, the
8 Kosevo Hospital, and other locations in civilian zones. And I understand
9 from that that these -- this was when you were in the battalion command
10 and they were targeting your positions in Grbavica; is that right?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And again at paragraph 19 you said that you had intelligence that
13 behind the unit opposite you there were certain military targets such as
14 heavy weapons and communications means, but you couldn't engage those
15 targets because your unit was an infantry unit. Again, are you talking
16 here about your battalion being an infantry unit?
17 A. Yes. My unit, the battalion, was an infantry unit, an infantry
18 battalion with infantry weapons.
19 Q. Right. But even though it was an infantry unit, you still had
20 smaller-calibre mortars, like 60-millimetre mortars; right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And with a 60-millimetre mortar from Grbavica you could easily
23 reach targets in the depth of Sarajevo; right?
24 A. Well, we didn't experiment in terms of what the range of the
25 mortars was. The range is well-known. But basically they were there
1 only to prevent attacks, that is to say penetration into Grbavica.
2 Q. Okay. When you say "the range is well-known," the -- a
3 60-millimetre mortar could reach -- you could fire over 2 kilometres with
4 a mortar like that; right?
5 A. No.
6 Q. What, in your opinion, is the range of a 60-millimetre mortar?
7 A. 60-millimetre mortar shell has a minimum range of 80- to 100
8 metres and they were not used. I mean, the purpose was just to prevent
9 attacks in front of the company. They did not fire in-depth and also
10 they did not fire unless they were attacked.
11 Q. You've said that the minimum range is 80- to a hundred metres,
12 but you didn't give a maximum range. I put to you that the maximum range
13 of a 60-millimetre mortar is over 2 kilometres. Do you agree or disagree
14 with that?
15 A. Well, that's possible theoretically, but in practice that was
16 never carried out because what is needed there is - how should I put
17 this? - fuses that regulate range.
18 Q. Okay.
19 MS. GUSTAFSON: Could we please have 65 ter 24065A, please.
20 Q. Mr. Lucic, the document that is going to come up on your screen
21 is a JNA fire tabling for an M57 60-millimetre mortar.
22 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could go to page 13 in the B/C/S and
23 page 11 in the English.
24 Q. This is the page with the ranges for the fourth charge, and you
25 can see at the bottom of that page the maximum range is 2.538 metres for
1 that charge; right?
2 A. Yes.
3 MS. GUSTAFSON: I'd like to tender this document, please.
4 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Document 24065A receives number P6015,
7 Your Honours.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just ask that the witness be
9 asked about the first line that has to do with fuses and could he say
10 whether they had such fuses?
11 JUDGE KWON: It's a subject for you to take up in your
12 re-examination, Mr. Karadzic.
13 Let's continue, Ms. Gustafson.
14 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
15 Q. And, Mr. Lucic, you clearly then had weapons capable of firing
16 back at these positions, such as the tunnel in Ciglane, the
17 Kosevo Hospital, and other civilian areas from which you stated that you
18 received fire in Grbavica. Is it your position that even though you were
19 being fired at by mortars from these locations and you had weapons
20 capable of reaching those firing positions, that you didn't fire back?
21 A. As for information concerning from where they fired at our
22 positions in Grbavica, we received that from our intelligence organs and
23 observers too, but these were not the only locations from where fire was
24 opened. However, we did not fire back. We did not respond to the fire
25 that came from those locations because that was not our task.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The transcript does not say: And
2 our observers. So there's probably a difference between intelligence and
3 observers because this belonged to their battalion.
4 JUDGE KWON: I think it's there in the transcript: From our
5 intelligence organs and observers too.
6 Let's continue, Ms. Gustafson.
7 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
8 Q. Mr. Lucic, you said -- just now you said that was not your task.
9 Another Defence witness, a Mr. Izo Golic, has provided a statement to the
10 Defence. He stated that he was in command of 120-millimetre mortar
11 platoon within the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade.
12 MS. GUSTAFSON: And his statement is at 1D06301.
13 Q. And he stated that the 120-millimetre mortar battery was
14 positioned at Ivanici and then at Petrovici and that they fired at
15 positions in the city of Sarajevo from which the Muslim side fired on the
16 battalion in Grbavica, and that can be found in paragraphs 16 and 18 of
17 that statement.
18 So based on what you've said about that not being your task, to
19 fire into the depth of Sarajevo, and what Mr. Golic said in his
20 statement, do I understand that you would communicate to other units
21 within the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade when you received fire from the
22 depth of the city and those units were responsible for returning fire at
23 those locations; is that right?
24 A. My command in these cases communicated only with the superior
25 command, with the brigade command, that is. The 120-millimetre battery
1 was not within the battalion and it was not subordinated to the battalion
2 either. It received its tasks also from the brigade command.
3 Q. Okay. So you would communicate to your brigade command when you
4 were receiving fire from mortar positions in Sarajevo, and then the
5 brigade command would issue instructions to the 120-millimetre mortar
6 battery to return fire at those positions. Is that how it worked?
7 A. No. The brigade command was also at the location from which
8 there was optical visibility in terms of this area. So when fire was
9 opened that could be noticed without providing any kind of information.
10 In such situations there was a duty officer who would provide information
11 to some while we were at the positions there, at the defence line.
12 Q. Okay. So in essence, however it was -- however the information
13 was obtained, it was other elements of the 1st Romanija Brigade that was
14 responsible for firing at positions inside -- in the depth of Sarajevo;
15 is that right?
16 A. No, that is not my opinion. I don't know what fire they were
17 responsible for and when they fired, because my position was in town on
18 the Miljacka river, where visibility is 30 to 50 metres in front of the
19 line, and then perhaps also 30 or 20 metres behind. All these units with
20 120-millimetre mortars were behind Vrace, the hill of Vrace. So it's not
21 that there was any link between us. I mean, optical visibility or some
22 other kind of link which would enable us to be in contact.
23 Q. Okay. You said:
24 "I don't know what fire they were responsible for and when they
25 fired ..."
1 That's clear. When you were in the brigade command, you
2 explained that you -- your duties were not operational. So is it correct
3 then that you also were not involved in deciding what to fire on in the
4 city and when with artillery or mortars?
5 A. No, I did not take part in that, but since the brigade command
6 and the staff of the brigade are comprised of professional services as
7 well, I was in the subordinate command, but I am not aware of any kind of
8 selection of targets that was supposed to be engaged. Rather, targets
9 from where fire was opened at our units were targeted. If there was a
10 cease-fire, then not a single target was targeted.
11 Q. Okay. You said at paragraph 12 of your statement that you knew
12 that the VRS Main Staff and the civilian authorities of the RS had
13 extended offers for the city of Sarajevo to be fully demilitarised and
14 that heavy weapons be put under the control of the UN.
15 Now, in fact, while the Bosnian Serb leadership did make such
16 offers and in fact entered into agreements to that effect, they at the
17 same time sought to undermine the effectiveness of these agreements by
18 deceiving the UN monitors; right?
19 A. No. I never heard about this. It was a sincere intention to
20 remove the weapons with higher calibres from the area around Sarajevo to
21 a further distance so that it would not be fired from those weapons onto
22 the city. That was an order -- rather, not an order but the information
23 we were aware of because the units needed to be prepared for a possible
25 Q. Okay. I'd like to look at P847, which is an order from the
1 Main Staff precisely on that point, for preparation of a possible
2 evacuation. This is a 9th of February, 1994, order from the Main Staff.
3 And you can see at the beginning it says:
4 "Due to the likelihood of reaching a cease-fire agreement around
5 Sarajevo and in order to take urgent measures ..."
6 The order is:
7 "1. In the course of today and tomorrow the command of the SRK
8 shell artillery from other positions towards Sarajevo, mainly inoperative
9 weapons, which shall be put at the appropriate firing positions around
11 And then in the next paragraph it says:
12 "If a cease-fire agreement for Sarajevo is signed these
13 (inoperative) artillery pieces would again be removed from Sarajevo,
14 while the current basic weapons would remain at the firing positions."
15 And then further instruction is to bring in the inoperative
16 weapons at night and pull them out if an agreement is reached only during
17 the day and in good visibility to make it as evident as possible to - I
18 think that should be - UNPROFOR and the Muslims.
19 Now, this order in preparation for reaching a cease-fire
20 agreement is aimed at deceiving the UN monitors by leaving inoperative --
21 removing inoperative weapons from the area and leaving the operative
22 weapons in place; right?
23 A. I'm not aware of this order. It is the first time I see it. As
24 in 1994, the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade was not on the defence lines
25 around Sarajevo, it was rather located in the Nisici plateau area with
1 defence positions which were to prevent the Muslim forces from breaking
2 through from the area of Zenica and Tuzla. These were the units of the
3 3rd and 4th Corps of the BH Army, and as for what was happening around
4 Sarajevo I'm not aware of that. But I have never heard of this
5 information, that there was an intention to deceive anyone. But the
6 weapons that were supposed to be withdrawn were registered and then they
7 were withdrawn indeed with UNPROFOR monitoring the process.
8 Q. Okay. On that note I'd like to look now at P1654, and this
9 document is the agreement that was, in fact, reached, that the Main Staff
10 had anticipated. And this document exists only in English, so I will
11 read the operative parts to you. It's called "Points of Agreement." And
12 it says that the following points were agreed at a meeting between
13 Mr. Akashi and Dr. Karadzic. And under number 3 it says:
14 "The establishment of a permanent armed UNPROFOR presence for
15 control purposes ... at seven mutually agreed heavy weapons regrouping
16 sites and at Lukavica Romanija Corps HQ. This is to be accomplished if
17 possible by" midnight "19 February 1994 and no later than" midnight "on
18 the 20th of February, 1994."
19 And the agreement was entered on the 18th of February. And do
20 you recall this agreement to regroup VRS weapons around Sarajevo into
21 sites that could be monitored by the UN?
22 A. My unit was at a distance of about 70 kilometres from Sarajevo at
23 the time and its line of action was directed to the opposite direction
24 from Sarajevo. There was not a single unit that was directed towards
25 Sarajevo. And as for this information, this is something I see for the
1 first time. However, I do know, thanks to the meetings, that it was
2 ordered that the artillery weapons were to be grouped and placed under
3 UNPROFOR monitoring, and I know that UNPROFOR made lists and checked all
5 Q. You just said your unit was 70 kilometres from Sarajevo, but your
6 unit had positions, among other places, at Hresa, which is in the near
7 vicinity of Sarajevo, certainly within the 20-kilometre exclusion zone;
9 A. Yes, the brigade did have positions facing Sarajevo up until
10 1994, and then the units, that is to say the battalions, were
11 transferred. Some battalions remained there but they were now part of
12 the composition of other units. When the command of the brigade moved to
13 the Nisici plateau and the battalions which remained were resubordinated,
14 so the command over them was taken over by the command which also
15 remained there.
16 Q. Okay. Let's look now at 65 ter 23963. This is an SRK list dated
17 the 21st of February, 1994. So this is one day after the dead-line for
18 moving heavy weapons to the agreed monitoring sites had passed from the
19 document we just looked at, and it is titled: "List of technical and
20 material equipment that was not pulled out."
21 And you can see there is a list for each of the brigades, and if
22 we go to page 2 of the English, for the 1st Romanija Brigade it refers to
23 a number of heavy weapons, including a series of weapons that are listed
24 to be in Hresa and hidden in 3rd Infantry Battalion houses and similarly
25 other weapons hidden in 4th Infantry Battalion houses.
1 Now, these references to weapons that are not pulled out,
2 including weapons that are hidden, in a report or a list issued the day
3 after the dead-line expired for the weapons to be regrouped to monitoring
4 sites reflects SRK efforts and 1st Romanija Brigade efforts to avoid
5 implementing this exclusion zone agreement; right?
6 A. I'm not aware of this list. As I already noted, when I moved to
7 the brigade in 1993 I was mostly focused on organising defence towards
8 Gorazde and Nisici plateau. So this was the outer ring directed in the
9 opposite direction from Sarajevo. So I'm not aware of these battalions,
10 the 3rd and the 4th. As far as I know, they were composed of the local
11 population which did not move from those positions. And the units which
12 left for the Nisici plateau, these were the battalions also formed on the
13 territorial principle but in depth, as, for example, the Jahorina or
14 Sokolac battalions and so on. And I am not aware of any orders like
15 these or that anyone hid anything. I don't know anything about this.
16 MS. GUSTAFSON: Okay. I'd like to tender this document, please.
17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, we object because although it
18 contradicts the testimony of the witness in some way, it's also not
19 something that he would necessarily know about. So it's not directly
20 impeaching and therefore wouldn't be admissible with this witness.
21 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson, would you like to respond?
22 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, it -- I disagree entirely. It impeaches
23 the witness on a number of aspects, including the assertion that -- which
24 seemed to shift over time, that the brigade was 70 kilometres away from
25 Sarajevo as well as the denial that there were any efforts to deceive UN
1 monitors. I think it's a direct impeachment and completely admissible.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with Ms. Gustafson and will
4 receive it.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Document 23963 becomes Exhibit P6016,
6 Your Honours.
7 MS. GUSTAFSON:
8 Q. And at paragraph 24 of your statement, Mr. Lucic, you said that
9 ammunition was under strict control of the command and there was no
10 ammunition misuse, at least not in your unit. Were you aware of any
11 ammunition misuse by the brigade when you were at the brigade command?
12 A. No, I was not aware of anything like that. The ammunition was
13 used strictly in a professional manner. There were professionals on duty
14 who had to register the consumption and supply with specific sorts of
15 ammunition in the units. But at the meetings in the brigade, one of the
16 items was always under logistics that there was not a sufficient amount
17 of ammunition and that we really needed to economise with it so that we
18 would not find ourselves in a situation that the unit cannot be supplied
19 with ammunition and an attack might occur. So the unit commanders always
20 made sure that they would have a reserve that would not be used.
21 Q. Do you recall hearing anything at the brigade command about the
22 fact that vast quantities of ammunition were being spent firing at
23 inhabited settlements where there were no combat actions whatsoever?
24 A. No, at the brigade command I did not hear anything about that.
25 Q. And that would constitute not only ammunition misuse, but
1 unlawful activity, wouldn't it, if you were firing vast quantities of
2 ammunition at inhabited settlements where there were no combat actions
4 A. Yes, that would be unlawful and unacceptable and it did not
5 happen in my unit. And as far as I know, it also did not happen in the
7 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to P2668, please.
8 Q. Mr. Lucic, this is a 19 July 1995 warning from the SRK to
9 brigades including the 1st Romanija Brigade. And if you look at the --
10 it's a warning about the rational expenditure of artillery ammunition and
11 in the second paragraph it says: In spite of problems in ammunition
12 production we very often fire at inhabited settlements and specific
13 buildings when there are no combat actions whatsoever, spending vast
14 quantities of ammunition ...
15 And next paragraph it says:
16 "It is inexplicable that some brigades spend much less ammunition
17 in repelling three or more fierce attacks during the day than others that
18 fire at inhabited settlements when there are no combat actions."
19 Now I take it from your earlier answers that even though this
20 warning was sent to your brigade, you didn't see it and you don't recall
21 any discussion at the brigade about it; is that right?
22 A. I have no seen this order and this has to do with artillery units
23 so that I am not aware of it. But at the time when this order was
24 written in 1995, I wish to inform you again that my unit, the 1st
25 Romanija Brigade, was not facing Sarajevo. Its line of defence did not
1 include any populated places. These were mountains and meadows and so on
2 facing away from Sarajevo, but it's possible that this relates to some
3 other units. In 1995 the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade did not have any
4 artillery directed towards the 1st Corps positions in Sarajevo.
5 Q. Now, Mr. Lucic --
6 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson, given the timing shall we take a
7 break now? Yes. We'll break for 25 minutes and resume at 4.00.
8 --- Recess taken at 3.35 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 4.01 p.m.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger, good afternoon to you.
11 MR. TIEGER: Good afternoon, Mr. President. I'd just like to
12 raise a very quick housekeeping matter with respect to one exhibit. We
13 noted that a page is missing from P794, it's the last page, and we know
14 that was an inadvertent omission because that particular page was
15 explicitly referenced and quoted during the testimony of that witness.
16 So I spoke with Mr. Robinson about it. We agreed that the simplest
17 expedient is simply to add the page that was omitted, so if the Registry
18 could unlock that, we can add the appropriate page.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I see no problem.
20 While we are dealing with this, Mr. Robinson, Friday, 30th
21 November, the Prosecution filed its motion to exclude the evidence in
22 part of witness Milan Pejic. And the witness is the fifth witness
23 scheduled for this week. Also yesterday I noted an amended version has
24 been filed. So could the accused be -- could be kind enough to respond
25 to the motion by the end of close of business today?
1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, it's already been filed, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE KWON: Oh, thank you.
3 Yes, Ms. Gustafson, please continue.
4 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
5 Q. Mr. Lucic, at paragraph 33 of your statement you said you were
6 not aware of there being a municipal policy of persecution in the zone of
7 responsibility of your unit. But when you were based in Grbavica as a
8 battalion commander there were large numbers of non-Serbs being expelled
9 from Grbavica into the city; isn't that right?
10 A. No. Firstly, my unit did not have a zone of responsibility.
11 Higher position, larger units had that. It only had a defence line which
12 did not cover any territory, but just the shelters from which defence was
13 conducted and I'm not aware that there were any expulsions -- not that I
14 wasn't aware, but there weren't any expulsions.
15 Q. Okay. Well, you've just said that you didn't have a zone of
16 responsibility, but your statement says that you're not aware of a policy
17 of persecution within the zone of responsibility of my unit, that's at
18 paragraph 33. But your -- it's clear from your evidence you were based
19 in Grbavica. If several hundred Muslims had been expelled in a single
20 day in Grbavica, is that something you would have been aware of?
21 A. The zone of responsibility here refers to my superior unit, and
22 as for expulsions I never heard that there was any -- that there were any
23 expulsions on such a large scale throughout the time I spent in Grbavica
24 or in general. I mean, there was a general freedom of movement for
25 civilians and my unit did not have any authority as regards the
2 Q. Okay. If we could go to Exhibit P1266. The document you're
3 about to see, Mr. Lucic, is a UN report from the 30th of September, 1992.
4 And the report is titled: "Expulsion of Muslim Citizens From
5 Grbavica ..." and in the first paragraph the drafter of the report
6 explains that Mr. Abdelrazek of the UN requested this UN police unit to
7 attend the Bristol Hotel. And in the fourth paragraph the drafter
8 describes what happened. It says that there was a crowd of approximately
9 25 people and then an additional 50 people waiting to leave the area.
10 There was shelling and gun-fire could be heard and the people were in a
11 panic. And then it says that the writer was able to confirm that
12 approximately 300 Muslim civilians have been expelled by the Serbs during
13 the day from the area of Grbavica. It says 150 of them were gathered at
14 the Bristol Hotel with the remainder at the Assembly building.
15 And on the next page of the English, I see we've already gone to
16 the next page of the B/C/S, it says that the Muslims travelled to the
17 area by foot and used two different bridges, Vrbanja Most and the other
18 one just behind the Bristol Hotel. And if we go down to the second-last
19 paragraph, which would be on the next page of the B/C/S, it says that the
20 writer found it very strange that this specific area of the town was
21 under shelling. Based on the information and observations it appeared
22 evident that the shelling was directed towards the Muslim civilians; all
23 of them were confined in a specific area and the Serbians were well aware
24 of that. And in the last paragraph the writer explains that they were
25 later able to establish that the total number of people expelled during
1 the day was between 500 and 700 persons.
2 Now, as you've made clear in your evidence, you were stationed in
3 Grbavica at the time as a battalion commander. Are you saying you were
4 not aware of this event where 500 to 700 Muslim civilians were expelled
5 by foot from Grbavica to the other side of the river?
6 A. Madam Prosecutor, it is not quite clear to me. You have
7 mentioned the Bristol Hotel and they were gathering there. Was it in
8 order to cross or why did they gather at or near the Bristol Hotel? I --
9 this is not clear to me.
10 Q. Well, the report states that they had been expelled to the
11 Bristol Hotel, and my question was whether you were unaware of the fact
12 that in the area where you were stationed as battalion commander, that
13 500 to 700 Muslim civilians had been expelled from Grbavica in a single
15 A. I was not aware of this, not at all, that there were any
16 expulsions. I am aware that there were individuals who crossed over to
17 the other side, but I don't remember when UNPROFOR came to Grbavica.
18 Specifically, we did not have anything to do with civilians, regardless
19 of the ethnicity. The soldiers had a defence line at Miljacka and
20 shelters. They would stay in shelters. And when there was troop relief,
21 then they would be in basements as shelters, and when they were relieved
22 they would go to their homes. So I don't know what went on in the
23 settlements. There were civilian authorities there.
24 Q. Okay. So did you ever hear about Batko or the nickname for
25 Veselin Vlahovic who was committing crimes against non-Serbs in Grbavica?
1 Did you -- were you aware of his activities at the time?
2 A. No, I have not heard of this Batko.
3 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to 65 ter 18392.
4 Q. This is a report from the Vrace reserve police station of the
5 31st of May, 1992, and if we could go to page 2 of the English and stay
6 on the same page in the B/C/S. And this is the second-last paragraph in
7 the B/C/S and about the middle of the page in the English. And the
8 police are explaining that there are some people in the territorial
9 jurisdiction of our station undertaking operations on their own without
10 any authority. They're carrying out searches. They're armed and in
11 uniform, taking private and socially owned property, securities, and gold
12 coins. And it says they blackmailed some people into giving them foreign
13 currency to avoid being slaughtered or expelled. And it says foremost
14 among them are members of the military police formed as part of the
15 Novo Sarajevo Battalion, and it lists the names including
16 Veselin Vlahovic whose nickname the Chamber has received evidence of was
17 Batko. So this is a report from the Novo Sarajevo area at the time where
18 you were operating as a battalion commander there. Is this also
19 something you were not aware of, that this group was operating as members
20 of the military police in uniform committing these crimes?
21 A. No, I was not aware of this, but at meetings held at the command
22 I said that they were held on a daily basis. There were warnings that in
23 certain units any crime ought to be prohibited, or rather, prevented,
24 prevented any sort of criminal offences, and in this period, that is to
25 say between the 20th of May and in the next two months, there were 17
1 criminal proceedings in our units that the professional organs were in
2 charge of because of a variety of crimes. But as for these groups who
3 disguised themselves as units, I haven't heard of them. There was a
4 military police unit in the brigade and in addition to the civilian
5 police they also carried out their tasks. I'm not aware of what they
6 were doing because this is the sort of information, data, that I had no
7 access to and the same goes for this specific Official Note.
8 Q. You just said there were 17 criminal proceedings in your units.
9 What were those proceedings for, what crimes?
10 A. Those activities were not undertaken in my unit, but when there
11 was a meeting in the command, when the security organ briefed all those
12 present, the offences included theft, assaults on military personnel or
13 civilians, attempted murders, and a number of other criminal offences
14 that have prescribed sentence by law.
15 Q. So that was -- you said that you heard about that at a meeting in
16 the command and that briefing by a security organ. Was that security
17 organ of the SRK?
18 A. It was the brigade security organ. The crimes had to do with the
19 soldiers, members of the brigade. We did not have any information about
20 civilians involved in criminal offences and what the police was doing. I
21 have no idea exactly what the percentage was in the total number of
22 offences pertaining to civilians.
23 Q. Okay. And if we could go to page 3 in English of this document
24 and page 2 in the B/C/S.
25 At paragraph 28 of your statement you said civilians were given
1 full freedom of movement to go in and out of the city, and I'd like to
2 show you the last part of this document where it says from the aspect of
3 intelligence it may be said that on the first line of combat and in the
4 interior controlled by our forces, there were occurrences of persons
5 crossing the first line of combat uncontrolled. And they give the
6 example of Olga Mijacic who works as a nurse in the former military
7 hospital and goes to and from work as do others who have close relatives
8 in the Green Berets and over whom control should be established.
9 Now contrary to your evidence about full freedom of movement,
10 this document shows that the Novo Sarajevo authorities are controlling
11 the movement of civilians in and out of the city; right?
12 A. As far as I can see in the document, this was not about
13 controlling the movement of civilians, but controls, checks. A vehicle
14 is mentioned and it was checked whether the person driving the vehicle
15 was indeed the owner or whether he stole it.
16 Q. Mr. Lucic, I think you might be looking at the wrong part of the
17 document. I'm talking about the last paragraph where they talk about the
18 problem of uncontrolled movement of persons across the line of combat,
19 giving the example of a nurse named Olga Mijacic who goes to and from
20 work. And her -- it says her -- in relation to her and others that
21 control should be established. That's the passage I'm referring to.
22 A. I don't know where the nurse in question lived and in which
23 hospital she worked. In any case, my unit did not control any civilian
24 movement. Those who came over the bridge and over the Miljacka river and
25 those going to the other side, we had no competence whatsoever. Of
1 course under such restricted visibility circumstances, the soldiers had
2 to monitor in order to prevent any military intrusion if there were
3 people belonging to the military trying to cross over the river;
4 otherwise, it was only the civilians.
5 Q. Okay. Olga Mijacic, that would be a Serb name; right?
6 A. She could be a Serb, a Croat. Olga could also be a Russian. I'd
7 rather not draw any conclusions about her ethnicity based on her first
8 name. She may be a Montenegrin as well, particularly if we look at the
9 last name, Mijacic.
10 Q. Okay.
11 MS. GUSTAFSON: I'd like to tender this document, please.
12 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We will receive it.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Document 18395 receives number P6017,
15 Your Honours.
16 MS. GUSTAFSON:
17 Q. Mr. Lucic, at paragraph 30 of your statement you talked about air
18 bombs and modified air bombs and you said that you didn't know that the
19 SRK had or used in combat such bombs or missiles. And I just want to get
20 your position on that clear. Are you saying that the SRK didn't -- did
21 not have or use any of these weapons, or are you saying that the SRK may
22 have had and used these weapons but you personally don't know anything
23 about it?
24 A. The corps, as per establishment, does not have such weapons. As
25 a rule, such weapons belonged to the air force. In any case, I have no
1 knowledge of the corps having them or using them.
2 Q. And if your brigade, the 1st Romanija Brigade, had air bombs, is
3 that something that you would have been aware of, given your membership
4 in the brigade command and your participation in their meetings?
5 A. I don't know if the brigade had them and I don't know where they
6 were stored and how many. These were not establishment assets and we had
7 no plans at the unit level to use them under any circumstances.
8 Q. Okay. So given that they're not establishment assets, if you
9 did, in fact, have them at the brigade is that something that would be
10 important enough to be discussed at the brigade meetings do you think?
11 A. I'm sorry, I did not hear the question.
12 Q. I'll try again. Can you hear me now?
13 A. I can hear you.
14 Q. Okay. You just said that air bombs were not establishment
15 assets. So my question is if your brigade did obtain air bombs, given
16 that they're not establishment weapons, would that have been something
17 that would likely to have been discussed at the brigade command, at the
18 meetings you attended?
19 A. We wouldn't discuss it because these were not establishment
20 assets. For routine supply, the brigade could not have received such
21 weapons. Perhaps warehouses are a different issue because there were
22 different things there from units which had withdrawn from Slovenia and
23 Croatia. But air bombs is ammunition and you need a means, a vehicle,
24 which is the plane. We didn't have that, it had not been planned and we
25 did not have it available. There was no need for the brigade to have it
1 because it had its own establishment assets. The weapons we had sufficed
2 to implement the tasks we had received.
3 Q. Okay. So to be clear, is it your position that the
4 1st Romanija Brigade did not have any air bombs?
5 A. The 1st Romanija Corps [as interpreted] did not have such assets,
6 air bombs. As for the warehouses and logistics, that is not something
7 I'd be aware of in terms of what kind and quantities of ammunitions may
8 there have been in the warehouses.
9 JUDGE KWON: I take it the witness said Romanija Brigade, not
11 Yes, let's continue.
12 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could look at P12 -- sorry, P1300, please.
13 Q. Mr. Lucic, this is an order from the SRK to brigades including
14 the 1st Romanija Brigade dated the 11th of July, 1995, and it orders
15 units to issue air bombs to Major Simic on the 12th of July and
16 specifically instructs the 1st Romanija Brigade to issue a 250-kilogramme
17 air bomb to Major Simic. And if we could also look at P1315. This is
18 another order from the SRK to brigades, including the 1st
19 Romanija Brigade. This one's dated the 27th of August, 1995, and it
20 explains that on orders of the Main Staff we are obliged to return air
21 bombs from the Pretis factory from which they were pulled out, and it
22 says that the units in the north-west section of Sarajevo return the air
23 bombs as follows. And the 1st Romanija Brigade is instructed to return
24 205-kilogramme [sic] air bombs and two 250-kilogramme air bombs to the
25 Pretis factory. And it's clear from these documents that your brigade,
1 in fact, had multiple air bombs; right?
2 A. Madam Prosecutor, if I understood this properly, Pretis was a
3 civilian factory and as far as I can see the bombs were there and then
4 were taken out due to the possibility of an attack. As for Major Simic
5 who was mentioned in the first document, he was not a member of the
6 1st Romanija Brigade and I didn't know him at the time. As regards the
7 take-over of air bombs and their return, I was not privy to that because
8 I was in the operational part. I was focused towards the defence lines
9 or working with the defence lines, whereas these are purely logistical
10 matters. I was not involved in any transport of bombs. There is a lot
11 of gunpowder, a lot of explosive material in the bomb and it is dangerous
12 even to the person who possesses it. By using such bombs effects
13 multiply and for security reasons it is unsafe for any units to be in the
14 possession of such a bomb.
15 In any case, I am not familiar with this and I am unaware of any
16 information concerning the bombs.
17 Q. Okay. You said these were purely logistical matters and you were
18 in the operational part. In terms of the operational aspects of air
19 bombs, your brigade was constructing an air bomb launcher, wasn't it?
20 A. I'm not familiar with that. The brigade had neither possibility
21 nor capacity to create and mount such a launcher. The brigade consisted
22 of soldiers, officers, and their personal weapons as well as the unit
23 weapons. That was it. I don't know whether anything of this kind was
24 made, and if it was it should have been put together in a plant somewhere
25 where they had the means to produce it.
1 Q. Okay.
2 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to P1285.
3 Q. This is a request from the SRK command, again going to the
4 brigades, including the 1st Romanija Brigade, requesting information by
5 the 13th of June, 1995, including information on the number of aerial
6 bomb launchers. And if we could now go to P1297. And this is the
7 response from your brigade command to the SRK command saying that:
8 "We do not have an air-bomb launcher (one is currently being
10 Now, that's right that your brigade was manufacturing an air bomb
11 launcher as this document states; right?
12 A. Well, no. As far as I can see, the document was signed by
13 Major Branimir Curkovic. He was assistant commander for logistics. He
14 was in charge of supplies for the brigade in terms of materiel and
15 equipment, which he received from civilian structures and through
16 military supply lines. I have no idea where he could have manufactured
17 this, but in any case the launcher was not manufactured in the brigade.
18 As for the rest of the items, it is only the 23-millimetre aircraft gun,
19 which we call anti-aircraft gun, could also be used to target ground
21 Q. Okay. Earlier you said that you -- as you said you participated
22 in daily meetings of the brigade and you said that for the most part you
23 were familiar with orders coming from the corps command to the brigade.
24 And we've seen now a number of communications back and forth between the
25 command and your brigade about the existence of air bombs, the fact that
1 brigades had them, and the existence of air bomb launchers. Now, this is
2 all going on at a time when you were a member of the brigade command.
3 You must have known, even if you weren't personally involved, that the
4 SRK had air bombs and air bomb launchers; right?
5 A. No, I didn't know about this. Since the operational part was not
6 situated close to the command, it was closer to the units engaged in
7 defence. As for orders like this one - and I see that this was a coded
8 telegram from the communications centre, such documents were taken by the
9 officer to the commander, who then sent it directly to the officer
10 responsible. In this case it would be the assistant commander for
11 logistics. And it seems that this was communication between the
12 assistant commander for logistics and the command. Such documents as
13 this one were not received by other command organs. At the time in
14 question, I was a desk officer in charge of education and training. We
15 gave way to such officers who were familiar with the field and we had a
16 reserve officer in the field who was familiar with the terrain. That is
17 why I did not attend each and every meeting. This was not discussed by
18 the command in its full composition, but this was strictly communication
19 between the commander and the officer responsible for that particular
20 area of activity.
21 Q. Okay. I'd like to move on to another issue that you address in
22 your statement. At paragraph 26 you said that you knew that the general
23 stance of your superior commands and the civilian authorities was not to
24 prevent but rather to enable humanitarian organisations to deliver aid to
25 the city. The Chamber has received evidence that in February of 1994 the
1 UN brokered an agreement to create blue routes which allowed for
2 humanitarian aid to be delivered across the airport into the city. And I
3 refer to Harland's evidence at P820, paragraphs 89 to 90. Are you aware
4 of this agreement on the creation of the blue routes?
5 A. In general, I am familiar with that. I'm not familiar with the
6 contents of the agreement, but I did know that there were routes that
7 were to be used for the supply of humanitarian aid. I was also familiar
8 with the command position that it should not be restricted in any way and
9 that we were obliged to assist UNPROFOR if such assistance was requested.
10 Q. Okay. But the airport was not in your brigade's area of
11 responsibility; right?
12 A. It was not in our area of responsibility at any time.
13 Q. So if there was an order to close the blue route across the
14 airport, you wouldn't -- your brigade wouldn't have had anything to do
15 with implementing that order; is that right?
16 A. It wouldn't, but such order never arrived and I don't know of any
17 other units receiving such orders. In Sarajevo, for example, from my
18 unit at least 50 per cent of all brigade unit members had relatives in
19 that area who remained in Sarajevo and it was in their interest to have
20 the aid reach the city.
21 Q. Okay.
22 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to P1639, please.
23 Q. This is an order dated the 23rd of July, 1994, from the
24 Main Staff to the SRK commander, and it orders the SRK command to carry
25 out all necessary preparations for the closure of the blue road, which
1 goes across the airport, in order to prevent the transit of the Muslims
2 as well as to prevent members of UNPROFOR and other humanitarian
3 organisations from getting across the Sarajevo airport and going towards
4 Igman and Lukavica and vice versa.
5 Now, I take it this is an order that you were not aware of, given
6 your answers to my earlier questions?
7 A. I wasn't aware of this order. In any case, these are just
8 preparations. As for any passage across the airport, it was used by the
9 units at Bjelasnica and Jahorina. I wasn't aware of this order and I
10 don't see whether it was implemented or not. I only see that
11 preparations are mentioned.
12 Q. Okay. If we could go to P879. And page 3 of this document.
13 This is a Main Staff report, and in the middle of the page under heading
14 "II - Situation in the Territory," the second -- the second sentence
16 "Due to sniper fire and the death of two girls, any movement of
17 humanitarian organisations and convoys is prohibited until further
19 Is this another instance of you not being aware of orders or
20 activities relating to humanitarian convoys?
21 A. This document, I suppose if the general -- if the
22 General Staff -- well, I didn't see it at the top who sent the document
23 and who was supposed to receive it, in any case this was three levels
24 above my command. I didn't see this order. In any case, it is stated
25 that convoys should not be prevented from passing through.
1 Q. Well, I believe it states the opposite but I'll move on. You
2 talked about snipers in your statement and you said that in your unit
3 there were snipers, as per the unit establishment, but if they engaged
4 targets these were only military targets. And when you were a battalion
5 commander operating in Grbavica there were SRK snipers positioned in the
6 tall buildings near the river; is that right?
7 A. I don't know about that. At our positions the soldiers were in
8 combat groups of between five and ten in immediate physical vicinity, and
9 the soldier who had been issued with a sniper was one of the group. Such
10 people were not professional snipers but mobilised soldiers who were
11 issued with sniper rifles. In the unit, in any case, were very few of
12 them, perhaps one per company. Due to very short distances, commanders
13 liked to exchange sniper rifles for automatic rifles which were way more
14 efficient in case of close attack since the lines were only between 30
15 and 50 metres apart. A sniper rifle is not as useful as an automatic
16 weapon if there is a group of enemy soldiers attacking you from
17 relatively close by.
18 Q. Okay. Just to be clear on your answer, you had snipers, you said
19 you had soldiers issued with sniper rifle, and my question to you was
20 that their positions -- do you deny that they were positioned in
21 buildings in Grbavica close to the river?
22 A. Yes -- no, they were positioned within the unit; that is to say,
23 shelters that had been dug out on the river-banks.
24 Q. I'd like to go now to P1060 which is an UNPROFOR document.
25 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson, your time was up, but how much longer
1 would you need to conclude your cross-examination?
2 MS. GUSTAFSON: I'm nearly done, Your Honours. I think less than
3 ten minutes.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 MS. GUSTAFSON:
6 Q. This is a protest from the UNPROFOR command to General Galic and
7 it's dated the 18th of February, 1993. And this is just about the time
8 that you left your position as battalion commander and moved to the
9 brigade. And it says that on 15 and 16 February the location of the
10 Ukrainian Battalion was exposed to sniper fire from Grbavica and it was
11 determined that the sniper fire was coming from tall buildings near the
12 river-bank. Did you hear about this incident, that General Galic was --
13 received a complaint about when you were either at the battalion command
14 or at the brigade command?
15 A. I had not heard of that because I had left. I think seven days
16 before that I left Grbavica, but in my view this document is quite
17 arbitrary. First of all, from the barracks you cannot see skyscrapers at
18 Grbavica. But these tall buildings that are on the other side of the
19 Miljacka, like Elektroprivreda and other buildings that are in the view
20 if you look at Grbavica --
21 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the end of the
22 answer. Could the witness please approach the microphone.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Lucic, the interpreters were not able to hear
24 part of your answer because you seem to be answering a bit far from the
25 microphone. Could you come closer to the microphone and repeat your last
1 part of your answer which starts from the -- relate to -- which is
2 related to Miljacka, like Elektroprivreda.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From Grbavica, across the Miljacka
4 river, towards the barracks, there are quite a few tall buildings that
5 practically block these buildings at Grbavica. I did not climb up on
6 these buildings, but I think that from Grbavica you cannot target the
7 barracks because the barracks is the lowest facility surrounded by tall
8 buildings in that part of town near the Miljacka.
9 MS. GUSTAFSON:
10 Q. Okay. I'd like to show you a portion of a video that's been
11 admitted into evidence which is P806. There's no sound on the video so
12 I'd just like you to watch the images on your screen.
13 [Video-clip played]
14 MS. GUSTAFSON: We can stop there.
15 Q. This -- just for the record, this is between 1 minute, 58
16 seconds, and 2 minutes and 15 seconds of Exhibit P806. And this is a
17 video that was taken when a journalist who was also a witness in this
18 case, Mr. Van Lynden, visited a sniper position in an apartment block in
19 Grbavica very close to the Miljacka river in September of 1992. And I
20 refer to his evidence at P926, paragraphs 94 to 101. And contrary to
21 your evidence a few moments ago that you did not have snipers near the
22 river in buildings but that they were in shelters dug out on the
23 river-banks, it's clear from this video that, in fact, you -- the SRK had
24 snipers positioned in buildings in Grbavica; right?
25 A. I cannot conclude where this footage was taken as I look at it.
1 You cannot see the location. You can only see it indoors here. I have
2 my reservations. With regard to this, possibly it was not even taken in
3 Grbavica; I cannot see that it is Grbavica.
4 Q. Okay.
5 MS. GUSTAFSON: I'd like to now go to P1644 and page 2 of the
6 English and page 1 of the B/C/S. If we could -- I'm told we need to
7 switch from Sanction, whatever that means. Thank you.
8 Q. This is a protest letter from General Rose of UNPROFOR to
9 Mr. Karadzic copied to General Mladic. It's from the 7th of October,
10 1994, at a time when you were within the brigade command. And it's a
11 more general complaint about the SRK targeting civilians. Did
12 information of this kind ever filter down to the brigade command along
13 the lines that the SRK were targeting civilians?
14 A. No, [realtime transcript read in error "but"] such information
15 never arrived. On the contrary, since there were quite a few reserve
16 soldiers, at every meeting we were reminded of what military targets were
17 and when targets could be engaged: Only when a unit is attacking your
18 unit, or rather, your territory.
19 Q. The transcript reads: "No. But such information arrived," which
20 I think does not reflect the witness's answer. I'll leave it at that for
22 Okay. So you said also in your statement at paragraph 34 that
23 you thought that the foreign media was biased and malicious and
24 detrimental to the interests of the Serbian people. So I take it from
25 that that you were aware of foreign media reports indicating that the
1 Bosnian Serb side was targeting civilians in Sarajevo; is that right?
2 A. Well, I was not fully informed, but on the basis of what I could
3 see in terms of their reporting what was regularly said was that there
4 was an aggression going on, an attack of vast forces against civilians,
5 the population there; however, I was present, I was there, and I know
6 that it was the exact opposite, that these were locals who were formed
7 into units and who defended themselves and their villages, to put it
8 simply. They defended certain areas, certain positions, and nothing more
9 than that, with the objective of not allowing the Muslim forces to
10 penetrate, because that would have unforeseeable consequences for the
11 population and for our corps.
12 Q. Okay. And you concluded that this information was biased, as
13 you've said. Is one of the reasons that you concluded that this was
14 biased information the fact that you didn't receive any similar
15 information about an aggression on civilians from your superiors in the
16 chain of command?
17 A. No. Had fire been opened at civilians, that would have been
18 condemned in an exemplary fashion and also prevented in that way. At any
19 rate, all condemned this as a crime and took energetic measures. I'm not
20 aware of any specific case. As for media being partial, I can give you
21 an example from 1992 -- well, it's sort of off-the-cuff because I do not
22 remember the name of the lady journalist who came from New York. I think
23 that originally -- I mean, that her origins were Serb. And she came to
24 see for herself to see what was going on because she heard terrible
25 things about Serbs, that they were awful criminals, and that her husband
1 even wanted to leave her because of that. She spent a few hours in my
2 unit and she could see everything in Grbavica and she toured everything
3 on her own and she even went to see where people lived, look, see, this
4 is where I live. And then she realised that this was not aggression,
5 this was defence, especially in Grbavica units were formed on the basis
6 of place of residence. So if in one or two --
7 JUDGE KWON: Your answer was more than sufficient.
8 Shall we conclude, Ms. Gustafson?
9 MS. GUSTAFSON: That was my last question. Thank you, Your
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Lucic, for answering my questions.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency, a few questions.
14 Could we please have 1D01827 in e-court. I believe that there's
15 a Serbian version, there's got to be one.
16 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
17 Q. [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, what was suggested here was that
18 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps made efforts to cheat on the agreement in
19 terms of notifying what was withdrawn. I'll have to read this out to you
20 now because we don't have the Serbian version.
21 "Sarajevo-Romanija Corps
22 "Strictly confidential
23 "19th of February, 1994."
24 They're writing to the president of the Republic first of all and
25 then secondly to the VRS Main Staff and it's signed by General Galic.
1 I'm going to read it in English and then they'll translate it.
2 [In English] "Concerning the performing the withdrawal and
3 dislocation of weapon of calibre bigger than 12.7-millimetres, we inform
4 you that we have obstructions [as read] by the Mayor of Hadzici
5 municipality Mr. Ratko Radic.
6 "According to the special report of Igman Infantry Brigade
7 command strictly confidential number ..." so and so "the Mayor of Hadzici
8 municipality, after the meeting of the Command of the infantry brigade
9 during which the way of realisation was discussed concerning the
10 dislocation of weapon, he invited in his cabinet the Deputy of Brigade
11 Commanders ..." and so on and so and so "on that meeting a mistrust was
12 demonstrated concerning the opinions, emphasizing that both the
13 Supreme Command and Corps commander should deliver written order about
14 withdrawal and dislocation of weapons ..."
15 [Interpretation] And what is being asking for are written orders
16 and also it says that the civilian authorities, the mayor, expressed
17 their lack of confidence. How does this fit into your own experience
18 since one day after the signing General Galic is informing me in the
19 Main Staff of the problems that he has with the local civilian
20 authorities with the removal of weapons. How does this fit into your
21 experience and what were the reasons for this lack of confidence, this
22 distrust and fear on the part of the civilian authorities?
23 A. Since, Doctor, as far as I can see this pertains to Hadzici.
24 Hadzici was practically under siege by Ilidza. My opinion is that
25 civilians reacted there because when the army would withdraw and if the
1 weapons were to be removed, then that would mean that they would have to
2 leave their homes and withdraw with the army. I don't know what the
3 context is here and what weapons this pertains to, but this is how I
4 understand it.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
7 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson.
8 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, we don't have the original so maybe it
9 would be better to MFI it so we can see the original.
10 JUDGE KWON: This is a document from other trial, I take it?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think so, yes, Excellency. But
12 we got hold of it in the court records. There must be an original.
13 We'll find it.
14 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure what has been the practice of this
15 Chamber. Have we marked for identification pending the provision of
16 original when there's a dispute?
17 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
18 MR. ROBINSON: We have done that, but I think also there's been
19 some few cases when it was identified that a document had been admitted
20 in the Galic case and it was admitted without being marked for
21 identification. But if there's any uncertainty about it, we don't mind
22 if you mark it for identification and we'll try to run it down.
23 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's give the number -- MFI number.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D1827 receives number D2517,
25 Your Honours.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D02310, could we
2 please have that document now. 1D02510. No, I'm afraid, 1D -- yes,
3 that's it.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Again, since we don't have the original for this document as
6 well, we are dealing with the 22nd of February, 1994, and it's the
7 command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that is lodging a protest with
8 General Rose and General Soubirou. And now I'm going to read out a few
9 sentences out in English.
10 [In English] "We submitted protest more times and informed you
11 regularly about the activities performed by Muslim forces concerning the
12 disregard of the agreed cease-fire.
13 "These activities are still continued beside this and UNPROFOR
14 does not perform an adequate measures.
15 "We give you the newest disregard of the agreed cease-fire:
16 "On 21st of February, 1994, at 17.35 in the region of Reservoir
17 near Rajlovac, hand-grenade ...
18 "During the same day at 18.45 infantry fire was open from region
19 of Stanica's houses over Kasindolska Street.
20 "On 22nd of February in the region of Djukica Potok an infantry
21 fire was open and there was performing of engineering fortifying ..."
22 And so on.
23 [Interpretation] And now:
24 [In English] "The agreement about return of the Muslim forces on
25 the positions from 9th February, 1994, when the agreement was reached."
1 [No interpretation]
2 [In English] "To destroy all new built fortification structures,
3 built after that day.
4 "Unless the activities of Muslim forces are not prevented, we
5 will be forced to return the same."
6 [Interpretation] What was your experience in relation to the
7 removal of Muslim weapons from the 20-kilometre zone? And also in view
8 of the observance, or rather, non-observance of cease-fire agreements?
9 A. My experience and the experience of my unit is negative with
10 regard to these issues. I will give the following example. While the
11 unit was in Grbavica, most soldiers and civilians lost their lives during
12 the cease-fires because once a cease-fire was declared people would start
13 moving about freely and then they would get killed. I had about 26
14 casualties in Grbavica and over 37 wounded, so during those two months a
15 soldier would be wounded or killed every day. This happened either to
16 the action of mortar shells or sniper activity, so that's what I'm
17 talking about, the period when there had been a cease-fire and when no
18 weapons were supposed to be used. Also when we went towards the 3rd and
19 4th Corps and also around Sarajevo they were very active. They were
20 digging towards the lines of defence. They were building fortifications,
21 bunkers for protection and for firing, and for the most part they opened
22 fire regardless of cease-fire agreements.
23 Q. Thank you. You were shown document P1639 and that had to do with
24 the temporary closure of blue routes, although this was not in the area
25 of your battalion.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D6808, could we please have a look
2 at that now, please.
3 Can I tender that previous document, Excellency?
4 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson.
5 MS. GUSTAFSON: I think it's the same situation as the previous
6 document, this one should be MFI'd.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D2510 receives number D2518,
9 Your Honours.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. This is -- I think this is a UN report, or rather, a report as to
13 what is being published in the media. So it is Vecernje Novosti of the
14 28th of July, 1994, and they're carrying Zametica's statement. He's an
15 advisor of the president of the republic and this has to do with the
16 temporary blockade of Sarajevo. And it says here in the heading:
17 "Muslims are to be blamed for the blockade," and I'm going to read it out
18 briefly in English.
19 [In English] "Jovan Zametica, the 'RS' President's advisor,
20 commented on Dr. Karadzic's decision to block roads to Sarajevo, saying:
21 'Two roads to Sarajevo: Butmir-Dobrinja and Ilidza-Lukavica, were to be
22 closed due to smuggling of weapons.' An additional reason for such a
23 decision, explained Zametica, was Muslim sniper attack which had
24 continued unabated since the start of the cease-fire. 'In addition to
25 this, Muslim forces have not stopped their war operation regardless of
1 the signing of the agreement in Geneva,' he said."
2 [Interpretation] The last paragraph:
3 [In English] "Zametica rejected the allegation by some agencies
4 that the 'RS' blocked humanitarian convoys. 'The humanitarian convoys
5 are taking the same routes like before, with the usual checking of the
6 vehicles. This is a precautionary measure, as the convoys have been
7 misused,' he added. When asked about UNPROFOR's reaction to the
8 decision, he answered that UNPROFOR had been duly informed about that."
9 [Interpretation] Do you remember and how does this fit into what
10 you know about our relations? Were there more blockades or more abuses
11 and did we block this whenever there was an abuse?
12 A. Well, specifically at this time I was already at the Nisici
13 plateau --
14 JUDGE KWON: Witness started answering the question.
15 Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
16 MS. GUSTAFSON: The witness's answers previously made it clear
17 that these -- when he was shown documents about what was going on at the
18 level of the Main Staff and the Presidency, that this was two layers
19 above him, he didn't -- hadn't seen these orders, didn't know about them.
20 Now he's being shown a newspaper article, again from two levels above
21 him, and it's -- I mean, I just don't -- this is -- basically amounts to
22 inappropriate leading of information that the witness has already stated
23 was not in his remit.
24 JUDGE KWON: I was about to make a comment to the same effect,
25 Mr. Karadzic. When you would like to put this kind of article, put the
1 foundational question first and then proceed to read out the article. If
2 you just read out the entire article on your own, I don't see the
3 probative value of such exercise at all.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I will
5 correct that now.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Colonel, sir, in your statement you mentioned that according to
8 the information you had at your disposal, the relations of the army and
9 the civilian authorities to humanitarian issues was permissive and
10 positive; in other words, they allowed it to be distributed. It was
11 presented to you here that there were some blockades. It's the document
12 P1639. I am now presenting to you that -- I'm now presenting to you the
13 statement of my advisor which has to do with the temporary blockade for
14 the reasons which are stated herein. Can you --
15 JUDGE KWON: Did the witness say that he knew about the blockade
16 at all at the time? And what's the point of asking for the development
17 from -- which aspired from that?
18 But first of all, did you know Mr. Zametica, Mr. Lucic, at the
19 time? Who was he or what was he?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I didn't know him. I was in my
21 unit and specifically I did not know him, though I have heard this last
22 name, Zametica, but I did not know that he was an advisor.
23 JUDGE KWON: Did you know what Vecernje Novosti was?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, from the papers. You don't
25 need any distance or a different level if you are to read the papers, and
1 Vecernje Novosti, it's a daily newspaper which is printed and it's
2 available to anyone.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I read another paragraph that
4 perhaps might explain? The following paragraph, and I shall read it in
6 [In English] "Borba reported that 'RS' President Karadzic denied
7 that the Serbs yesterday closed the roads to Sarajevo for civilian
8 traffic. Karadzic stated that the traffic over Sarajevo airport would be
9 temporarily closed, as the Muslims did not comply with the agreement on
10 the exchange of prisoners of war and they continued to attack all the
11 fronts in B&H."
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Does this fit in our experience with our agreements and in what
14 way, I mean the agreements that we had with the other side?
15 A. Well, I could not comment on the temporary blockades --
16 MS. GUSTAFSON: [Previous translation continues]...
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- because I am not aware of this,
18 but I can comment the other part, namely, that the BH Army continued with
19 the attacks. This is correct because they carried out the offensives,
20 the 3rd and 4th Corps, they wanted to link up with the 1st Corps in
21 Sarajevo, and the 1st Corps from Sarajevo wanted to link up with these
22 two corps via the territory that was held by the Serb forces, or rather,
23 where the Serbian population lived and also in the direction of the
24 enclaves. That was also the thrust of their activities. And there was
25 no significant stopping in that; they just continued doing that all
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. All right. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see D697, it
5 has been admitted already, D697.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. We have seen that that was in the end of July. Let's see what
8 was going on in early August, what I ordered the MUP of Republika Srpska
9 and the army as well.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, D698, please. You see, 698.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. The date is the 8th of August and I would ask you to focus your
13 attention on the second paragraph.
14 "Regardless of frequent cases of abuse and dishonest activities
15 by these organisations, by which they put themselves directly on the side
16 of our enemies and lost any markings of neutrality, we must improve
17 communication with these organisations and cherish correct and decent
19 And the title is: "Improving relations with UNPROFOR ..."
20 How did you see their correctness and how about this order of
21 mine, how does it fit with your experience about our efforts to maintain
22 good relations?
23 A. This order is not -- it is probably meant to be sent to the
24 General Staff. It was not distributed in the units in this form, but I
25 am aware of the contents of the order. So generally speaking, in our
1 unit there was always an order and it was always practice to co-operate
2 with UNPROFOR, specifically along the Sarajevo-Praca-Visegrad axis, or
3 rather, Gorazde, where our units were located. The soldiers who were the
4 local population reported that there were members of the UNPROFOR whom
5 they knew, drivers and other personnel, who were from these areas. But
6 this was not a reason, though we reported this to the command, but this
7 was not a reason not to have good relations with UNPROFOR. The order was
8 always not to make any obstacles for them in their work, so we provided
9 assistance and we persisted in this. And on the occasion of signing
10 agreements, the UNPROFOR forces were the ones who helped us most because
11 they made sure that the lines were separated at a 2-kilometre distance.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see D701.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if you have more questions we'll take
15 a break now.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would need just a few minutes.
17 Perhaps we should better not take the break, I will soon finish.
18 JUDGE KWON: Please continue then.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Can you please confirm and have a look at what I sent to
21 Professor Koljevic, the Main Staff of the army, the Ministry of the
22 Interior, and the co-ordination committee of the government for the
23 humanitarian relief on the 17th of August, that is to say a week after
24 the previous document. I hereby order that relations be normalised. I
25 am only interested in what is on the following page. This has been
1 admitted and the parties can see what it relates to. Please have a look
2 at item 4.
3 "All humanitarian activities in the territory of the
4 Republika Srpska should be conducted in accordance with the international
5 humanitarian law."
6 Does this fit with your experience with the authorities and in
7 what way?
8 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer the question, yes, Ms. Gustafson.
9 MS. GUSTAFSON: Again, I mean, this is an order that has nothing
10 to do with the witness or, in fact, the SRK as far as I can see. It's
11 just -- it's simply leading to put this to him and ask how it fits with
12 his knowledge.
13 JUDGE KWON: Absolutely, Ms. Gustafson.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But, Your Honours, this was
15 addressed to the Main Staff and it had to have reached the brigades.
16 JUDGE KWON: He said he didn't know the orders or situation above
17 him, and reading out the question and asking whether it was consistent
18 with his knowledge -- it's such -- it -- it is such a leading question
19 that any answer in the positive form would reduce it probative value.
20 But what is your question, Mr. Karadzic, about this? Let me see.
21 Mr. Lucic, did you know that Mr. Karadzic issued this kind of
22 order at the time?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Specifically, talking about this
24 issue, I wasn't aware of it. But generally speaking, the contents of his
25 orders would reach the subordinate units, namely, that the UNPROFOR
1 convoys and other convoys, those sent by the Red Cross and so on, which
2 were passing through the territory should not be obstructed and that they
3 should be allowed free passage because there were other convoys as well
4 from Central Bosnia, for example, which were transport convoys and which
5 should not be in danger in any way. And there was this order to take
6 legal measures against all those who did not observe this, and this was
7 the contents that reached practically every single soldier.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may add, Your Honours, the
9 Prosecutor showed P1639, which is also from a level higher than that of
10 the battalion, that was the order of General Milovanovic and the
11 Main Staff --
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- and this comes from the civilian
14 authorities --
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, witness said that he didn't know about
16 the document. And then as to how to approach such matter, you may
17 consult Mr. Robinson in the future.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we then please see
19 D230 page 7 of the document. Thank you. Page 7, please.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. It was mentioned by the Prosecutor the incidents -- the shooting
22 incidents when the barracks was targeted and so on. So can you please
23 focus on, or rather, let me read paragraph FreBat.
24 [In English] "1X APC fired by RPG when it coming back from Igman
25 at 11 [as read] 1615 minutes, numerous shells from down-town (Tito
1 barracks to Poline at 11 [as read] 1615, after Bosnian fired from Tito
2 barracks to BSA side, Serbs fired from Poline to Hotonj with tanks and
4 [Interpretation] Did they shoot at the Serb positions from the
5 Marsal Tito barracks and is it legitimate to return fire?
6 MS. GUSTAFSON: Your Honours.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
8 MS. GUSTAFSON: This is apparently an attempt to re-direct on a
9 document that dated from February 1993 about the Ukrainian Battalion
10 being targeted in the area of the Marsal Tito barracks. Now I see this
11 document appears to be the 19th of June, 1995, so the question about
12 whether it's legitimate to fire back in relation to a document from two
13 years previously is just not useful, it's not relevant.
14 JUDGE KWON: Can I hear your response, Mr. Robinson?
15 MR. ROBINSON: I'll let you hear from Dr. Karadzic on this.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to ask the witness whether
18 there was firing from the Marsal Tito barracks and whether it was a
19 legitimate target. It doesn't matter that they fired from close to the
20 position where the Ukrainian Battalion was because that wasn't our
21 responsibility, but was the Marsal Tito barracks a nursery or was it a
22 legitimate target?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the barracks was a major
24 facility and --
25 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry, Your Honours, could I get a ruling on the
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please wait till we give our ruling.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with Ms. Gustafson. Please move
5 on to your next question.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Just one more question, Colonel. What was your view of the
8 allegations in the media and the accusations that sometimes came from
9 UNPROFOR, how did that correspond to what you knew?
10 A. Well, quite often there was information in the media that did not
11 correspond to the situation on the ground where the unit was. It was
12 incorrect or tendentious or did not really picture the real situation.
13 Q. And the reports of the United Nations and UNPROFOR?
14 A. Well, I did not come across these reports, but I can say that the
15 reports depended quite a lot on the location at which UNPROFOR was
16 stationed. So sometimes the reports if, for example, he was specifically
17 at the Marsal Tito barracks, then the reports could be subjective, that
18 the situation was not realistically portrayed, who was targeting and from
19 where if there was any firing going on.
20 Q. Thank you, Colonel, sir.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Lucic, that concludes your evidence. On behalf
24 of the Chamber, I thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it. Now
25 you are free to go and have a safe journey back home.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you and good-bye.
2 JUDGE KWON: We'll rise all together and resume at 6.00.
3 [The witness withdrew]
4 --- Recess taken at 5.34 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 6.03 p.m.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness take the solemn declaration,
9 MS. EDGERTON: And ...
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
11 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
12 WITNESS: DRAGAN MALETIC
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please be seated and make yourself
16 Good afternoon, Ms. Edgerton.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Your Honours,
18 keeping in mind your guidance last time I appeared before you, I'd like
19 to ask the witness be advised of his rights under Rule 90, please.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 Good afternoon, Mr. Maletic.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.
23 JUDGE KWON: Before you start giving evidence, I would like to
24 draw your attention to a particular rule here at the Tribunal. Under
25 this rule, Rule 90(E), you may object to answering a question from the
1 accused or the Prosecution or from the Judges if you believe that your
2 answer will incriminate you. When I say "incriminate," I mean that
3 something you say may amount to an admission of your guilt for a criminal
4 offence or could provide evidence that you have committed an offence.
5 However, even if you think your answer will incriminate you and you do
6 not wish to answer the question, the Tribunal has the power to compel you
7 to answer the question. However, in such a case the Tribunal will make
8 sure that your testimony compelled in such a way shall not be used as
9 evidence in other case against you for any offence other than false
10 testimony. Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Maletic.
13 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: Thank you.
15 [Interpretation] Could I ask for 1D6232.
16 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
17 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Maletic.
18 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see 1D6232 in
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. Maletic, did you give a statement to my Defence team?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Is that the statement which you see on the screen before you?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Both of us have to wait for interpretation because we speak the
2 same language. Have you read and signed this statement?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Does this statement accurately reflect what you said?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. If I were to ask you the same questions today in the courtroom,
7 would your answers to these questions be essentially the same?
8 A. Yes, they would be the same.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this statement according
11 to 92 ter rule.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we would also ask that four
13 exhibits be added to the 65 ter list which are maps that the witness
14 marked after we had -- we received them after we had filed our 65 ter
16 JUDGE KWON: And as regards the two documents which were referred
17 to in para 5 and 19, I note that they are not translated. So according
18 to the ruling I gave that in order for the accused to tender those
19 documents he needs to deal with those documents with the witness live,
20 otherwise we will not receive them.
21 So any objection? And, Ms. Edgerton, excluding those two items.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Actually, Your Honours, the document referred to
23 in paragraph 27, 65 ter number 11286, is I think actually already in
24 evidence --
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 MS. EDGERTON: -- as --
2 JUDGE KWON: P335.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. And in any case, I don't find it's commented
4 in such a way that makes it an indispensable part of this statement,
5 actually, Your Honours, and I would be objecting to the admission of that
6 document and requesting the sentence referring to it be redacted.
7 And also in paragraph 39 the document referred to there is
8 65 ter number 12231 dated 24 February 1993, and similarly in my
9 submission that document in no way relates to events in June 1992 as
10 discussed in the paragraph, and I would be requesting that that document
11 not be admitted as well.
12 THE ACCUSED: Which paragraph?
13 JUDGE KWON: Para 39. So exclude -- for the moment let us
14 exclude this -- I'm sorry, the one -- 65 ter number 11286 has been
15 already admitted, as indicated by Ms. Edgerton. Do we really need to
16 redact it? The paragraph itself?
17 MS. EDGERTON: No.
18 JUDGE KWON: No. So -- and excluding 65 ter 12231 and those two
19 untranslated documents, the others will be admitted.
20 Shall we give the number to those as well as the statement itself
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours the statement with number 1D06232
23 receives number D2519, and associated exhibits 1D10003 receives number
24 D2520. 1D20283 receives number D2521. And document 1D20284 receives
25 number D2522, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
2 Mr. Karadzic is tendering 1D20284A and 20284B, two maps, so shall
3 we receive them separately?
4 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D25 -- document 1D20284A receives
5 number 2D2523, and document 20284B receives number 2D524, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE KWON: What is D2522? So we'll --
7 THE REGISTRAR: 2D --
8 JUDGE KWON: No, no, we'll give the 1D20284 the number D --
9 Exhibit D2522, and the next one, 1D20284B the Exhibit D2523.
10 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: It was only on that point, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 So, Mr. Karadzic, I'd like to see the document actually
14 65 ter number 12231, if you'd like to tender it, just -- but let --
15 before that please proceed to read out the summary.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will read it in
17 English just for the interpreters to know.
18 [In English] Dragan Maletic was commander of the 1st Company of
19 the 3rd Battalion of 1st Romanija Brigade during the war. He was then
20 appointed assistant commander for intelligence and security of the
21 3rd Battalion and later officer in the quartermaster service of the
22 3rd Battalion's logistics platoon, where he remained until the end of the
23 war. He first learned that the Muslims were arming themselves in January
24 or February 1992. His first meeting encounter with the Green Berets
25 occurred in March 1992 when he was stopped twice by a uniformed policeman
1 and searched by a man wearing civilian clothes and armed with an
2 automatic rifle.
3 The armed civilian seemed to be in charge of the situation. Due
4 to a series of crimes and arrests targeting Serbs, the inhabits of
5 Grbavica started gathering spontaneously in front of their own apartment
6 blocks and organising joint guards at the entrances of the buildings.
7 Mr. Maletic witnessed the attack launched by the Muslim forces
8 against JNA units and facilities. At the beginning of May they were on
9 the bypass road and were informed that a column had been attacked in the
10 Dobrovoljacka Street. Without any preparation, some of the people went
11 there in two or three armoured vehicles to assist the JNA members. They
12 decided to descend from the bypass road to the banks of the Miljacka
13 river. The units of the 1st Romanija Brigade also came to Grbavica at
14 that point. Additional mobilisation was carried out and the
15 3rd Battalion of the Romanija Brigade was thus formed.
16 His unit -- to the best of his knowledge, all Sarajevo-Romanija
17 Corps units were engaged predominantly in defensive actions except for a
18 few cases when they were adjusting their tactical positions as were the
19 cases of the attacks of Sanac and at the 11 Blue Pub, 11th -- "jednaesti
20 plava pub."
21 The opposing unit to his was an HVO unit called Kralj Tvrtko of
22 Croatian community. From the positions along the first line of defence,
23 his unit could only see the enemy's first line of defence across from
24 them. Therefore, his unit exclusively fired and could only do so at the
25 observed enemy firing points situated in front of them. The very
1 configuration of the terrain made it impossible to fire at zones behind
2 the enemy's front lines. On every occasion in which they responded to
3 enemy attacks, they reported to the superior command.
4 The entire area of Grbavica was under enemy sniper fire. They
5 had knowledge about military targets deep within the defence area of the
6 units fighting against them. Heavy weaponry was being fired by the enemy
7 from deep within its territory, from the Debelo Brdo sector. They were
8 also aware that civilian facilities and zones were extensively used by
9 the enemy for the deployment of its troops.
10 Their support command regularly -- their superior command
11 regularly informed them, either through reports or orders, of the actions
12 that were prohibited because they were contrary to the rules of war.
13 They received and had orders prohibiting attacks against civilians. They
14 often also received orders prohibiting attacks in general. It was never
15 his intention to cause civilian casualties during the fighting and he
16 believes the same can be said for the majority of VRS members.
17 Mr. Maletic's unit was composed of locals who had no previous
18 military education. Regardless of this fact, in time, the level of
19 training and other elements of combat training improved thanks to the
20 command and control that had been established at all levels. From
21 interviews with defectors from the Muslim side he was aware that goods
22 from the humanitarian convoys were being sold at a black market in the
23 area of the city controlled by the Muslim authorities. He also knew that
24 many Serbs stayed behind in the Muslim-controlled part of the town and
25 were forcibly mobilised by the authorities and engaged on the first line
1 of contact with the VRS. From these interviews, as well as through
2 Muslim media, Dragan Maletic was also aware of criminal groups active in
3 the Muslim-controlled part of Sarajevo that terrorised the civilians in
4 the area.
5 Regarding paramilitary groups in his area of responsibility,
6 Dragan Maletic knows that higher-ranking commands successfully took
7 measures to neutralise them, proof of which is the fact that they existed
8 throughout the first months of the war.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. I would like us to look at a document concerning paragraph 39.
11 It is 65 ter 12231 and I'll have a question for you, Mr. Maletic. I will
12 look. This is from the 4th Company but of your battalion. Please have a
13 look at the text. Just read it for your sake. Is it correct that the
14 Serb defence was indeed in this much trouble in the area of your
16 A. Yes, it is.
17 Q. You didn't pause before answering. It seems your answer was not
19 A. Yes, that is correct.
20 Q. How does this tally with your statement that there were no
21 offensive operations? Were you able to defend the area and what was your
22 success in doing so and what kind of victims did you have?
23 A. We had many victims and one can clearly see from this report what
24 the situation was like. We only conducted defensive operations.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, the second
1 document is still not in e-court because this is the second afternoon
2 shift, it seems. We'll try to tender that document through another
3 witness. As for this document, could we tender it now, please.
4 JUDGE KWON: But in respect to para 39, as indicated by
5 Ms. Edgerton, the paragraph refers to the event in June 1992 but this
6 document is dated as February 1993. So I didn't see the point. So why
7 don't you put question in form of not leading question, Mr. Karadzic.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Do you have your statement before you?
10 A. I do.
11 Q. Look at paragraph 39, please, and tell the Chamber what the
12 situation was like in that area throughout the war.
13 A. In our battalion the situation was difficult, particularly in the
14 area of the 4th Company. I wanted to say that our enemy used random fire
15 irrespective of whether they would hit civilians or soldiers on our side.
16 Q. How does this document tally with your experience and knowledge
17 as to defensive capabilities, the document that is on the screen?
18 A. It doesn't matter what the date is in 1992, 1993, or 1994. The
19 situation in that zone was very difficult throughout and most of the
20 casualties occurred there.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, does this suffice?
23 JUDGE KWON: When you put the question you could -- you should
24 ask at least who the author was, whether the witness knew him or not.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Can you answer?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps we can scroll up in the
3 Serbian version.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know the man. I know who he is.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you know him personally?
7 A. I did.
8 Q. Who is he?
9 A. Ljubomir Bozic.
10 Q. Thank you. Who was he?
11 A. He was a fighter of the 4th Company. For a while he was acting
12 commander of the company.
13 Q. At the time you were commander of the 1st Company?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive it. We'll give the number
17 Exhibit D2524.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, 12231 receives number D2524.
19 JUDGE KWON: And you're done, Mr. Karadzic?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, for the time
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Maletic, as you have just now noted we have
23 admitted your evidence in chief mainly in writing in lieu of your oral
24 testimony. Now you will be cross-examined by the representative of the
25 Office of the Prosecutor.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
4 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
5 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Maletic.
6 A. Good afternoon.
7 Q. So you can hear me all right in a language you understand?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Perfect. I'm going to start by asking you one question about
10 your statement and your battalion. In paragraph 8 of your statement you
11 noted the area of responsibility of your battalion, saying that -- of the
12 3rd Battalion, saying that it stretched all the way from the Vrbanja
13 bridge to the Slavisa Vajner Cica barracks. And I actually was a bit
14 uncertain about this because this Chamber's already received evidence
15 from the former commander of the 3rd Battalion, who said that the
16 3rd Battalion's area of responsibility ran from the Vrbanja bridge to the
17 far east, including the area of the Jewish cemetery. So I wonder if you
18 might have -- your numbering of your battalion might be a bit off. Could
19 you explain that?
20 A. At the beginning of the war when the VRS was established, it was
21 the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Romanija Brigade. I think the next year the
22 battalion was made part of the Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade, and then it
23 became the 2nd Battalion.
24 Q. Thank you for that clarification. So maybe we can talk a little
25 bit about your time as company commander with the 2nd Battalion. Can you
1 just confirm perhaps a couple of things for me, that your company
2 headquarters was in the former Drvo Rijeka shop?
3 A. Yes, yes.
4 Q. And the battalion commander was, until he was killed,
5 Radomir Stojanovic?
6 A. When our battalion of the 1st Romanija Brigade was established,
7 first it was Plakalovic who was in command for a brief period because he
8 was soon wounded. He was succeeded by Radomir Stojanovic until late
9 1992. Then it was Aleksandar Petrovic until the end of the war.
10 Q. Thank you. And your battalion had two deputy commanders,
11 Milan Hrvacevic and Dragan Siljak?
12 A. Dragan Siljak.
13 Q. That's correct and apart from my pronunciation.
14 A. That was for a while, and then Hrvacevic was moved to the brigade
15 command and Siljak stayed behind.
16 Q. And your battalion headquarters was located in what was then
17 Banjalucka Street; is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Is it also correct that as a rule the battalion commander would
20 meet with his company commanders every morning?
21 A. With the company commanders, well not every morning. There were
22 frequent meetings but not daily. I don't think we met every morning.
23 Q. Did you meet individually or as a group?
24 A. As needed. Sometimes there were briefings, and if a company
25 commander had to go and see the brigade commander that happened as well
1 no matter which side requested such a meeting.
2 Q. And during the period of time you worked as or you served as the
3 assistant commander for intelligence and security, did you also operate
4 from the headquarters on Banjalucka Street?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And did you also attend these briefing meetings that you've just
7 referred to?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And just one more question about your period of time in the
10 battalion command, can you confirm that Zeljko Mitrovic was in charge of
11 the labour squad, the work detail?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And did he also attend these meetings at the battalion command?
14 A. I think he attended seldom.
15 Q. All right. Just before we move on I have one other question.
16 Could you tell us your father's first name, please.
17 A. Djordje -- sorry, Djordjo.
18 Q. Thank you. Now, just in terms of the battalion command we've
19 talked about the commanders and the deputy commanders, so that's
20 Aco Petrovic, Hrvacevic, Siljak, and you've also mentioned
21 Zeljko Mitrovic. So I'd like you to have a look at a document for me.
22 It's 65 ter 24170. Do you see a name list on the screen in front of you
23 in your language?
24 A. I see it.
25 Q. And do you see your name and signature at number 14 on the list.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And do you see the names of the other individuals we've
3 discussed? For example, at number 19, the name of Aleksandar Petrovic?
4 A. I can see it.
5 Q. Hrvacevic at number 8?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Siljak at number 30 and Mitrovic at number 16?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. So based on your answers then, am I correct in thinking that this
10 is a list of personnel at the 2nd Battalion command?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Let's go over to page 2 -- actually, let's go over to page 3 on
13 the list.
14 Now, here on page 3 we see the list continues in two headings,
15 the first one reading technical department and the second one listing
16 snipers and which is at the bottom of the page and setting out a number
17 of names, Dragan Atanackovic, Predrag Boskovic, Nebojsa Ivkovic,
18 Zeljko Jadranic, Marinko Krneta, Dragan Klacar, Slobodan Marjanovic,
19 Zlatko Subotic, Mario Tenzera, Zeljko Todic, and Nada Vojnovic.
20 Now, my question about this list or this part of the list is are
21 these the names of the people in the sniper squad that you referred to at
22 paragraph 31 of your statement?
23 A. I stated the following. There was a sniper squad at the
24 battalion command directly subordinated to the commander. I do not know
25 anything about the type of their assignments and the manner in which they
1 were executed.
2 Q. That's fine but you haven't answered my question.
3 A. Please repeat it.
4 Q. My question was: Are these the names of the people in the sniper
5 squad that you referred to in the paragraph you've just read out?
6 A. I don't know. I'm not familiar with these names. I really don't
8 Q. So looking at 65 ter number 24170, you recognised it as a list of
9 people in the battalion command. Do you have any reason to dispute the
10 accuracy of that list?
11 A. I have no reason to dispute it. I'm saying I don't know.
12 Q. So when we get to the column of people referred to as snipers,
13 you have no information or you're not able to confirm the accuracy of
14 that list of names. Is that how we're to understand your evidence?
15 A. Yes.
16 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment.
17 [Prosecution counsel confer]
18 MS. EDGERTON:
19 Q. Thank you. We'll move on.
20 JUDGE KWON: You're not tendering that document?
21 MS. EDGERTON: Well, since I had actually read out large portions
22 of the document onto the record, Your Honour, I frankly didn't see the
23 point of it.
24 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
25 MS. EDGERTON:
1 Q. Now, paragraph 14 of your statement you said that from the
2 positions along the first line of defence you could only see the enemy's
3 front line across from you, and you said in paragraph 25 the
4 configuration of the terrain made it impossible to fire at zones behind
5 the enemy's front line. So I want to explore that with you a little bit.
6 Can you just, first of all, confirm that your battalion had firing
7 positions in the skyscrapers at Grbavica 6 -- Grbavicka 6, 6A, 8, and 8A?
8 The street name at that time was Leninova?
9 A. Our positions were from the Vrbanja bridge to the
10 Bratsvo Jedinstvo bridge.
11 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last sentence.
12 MS. EDGERTON:
13 Q. After the words Bratsvo Jedinstvo bridge, did you say something
14 additional, Mr. Maletic? The interpreter didn't hear you.
15 A. No. I said that the company was between the two bridges, from
16 the Vrbanja to the Bratsvo Jedinstvo bridge.
17 Q. Right. Did you give that answer because you don't know the
18 street addresses of the buildings I'm referring to?
19 A. I can suppose what building it was. It was at our positions
20 although I don't know the exact address.
21 Q. And can you confirm that you also had firing positions in the
22 Metaljka building?
23 A. Well, there were positions there at first, but access was
24 difficult and we withdrew in depth. So for a while there was a position
25 on or in the Metaljka building, although I don't know when exactly.
1 Q. Were you not the company commander that held this line?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. So I actually find it a little hard to understand that you don't
4 know when exactly there might have been a position in the Metaljka
5 building. Was there a position in the Metaljka building in 1992?
6 A. Yes. At that time there was a position in the Metaljka building.
7 Q. Was there a position in the Metaljka building in 1993?
8 A. I don't remember. I was not the company commander at the time.
9 Q. You were in the brigade command at that time?
10 A. Battalion.
11 Q. Pardon me. You were in the battalion command at that time?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. In the function of assistant commander for intelligence and
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. In order to carry out your function, you would have had to have
17 had detailed information on the security situation in the area of
18 responsibility of your battalion; correct?
19 A. Well, yes. We received general information.
20 Q. So the withdrawal from a front line position like the Metaljka
21 building would not have been part of that general information you might
22 have received?
23 A. As I said, I can't remember exactly when there was the
24 withdrawal, whether it was in 1993 or in 1994. I can't recall such
1 Q. Such a significant detail as leaving a front line position
2 actually undefended, your evidence now is that you can't recall?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Let's move on. Now -- and actually, let's have a look at a view
5 from the Metaljka building to go back to your evidence in your statement.
6 65 ter number 23643. And going back to your statement you said - and
7 I'll remind you - the configuration of the terrain made it impossible to
8 fire at zones behind the enemy's front line.
9 This is a view, Mr. Maletic, from the Metaljka building taken in
10 August 1996 from the 7th floor and looking at the Holiday Inn. You would
11 agree with me, wouldn't you, that this gives a view of far behind the
12 enemy's front line in Sarajevo?
13 A. I don't know where this was taken from.
14 Q. I've just told you where this was taken from. It was taken from
15 the 7th floor of the Metaljka building, and if it's not abundantly
16 obvious to you I can tell you that the view is heading north and the
17 Holiday Inn is the yellow building in the distance. Now, you would agree
18 with me that this shows a view deep and behind the enemy's front line;
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we kindly ask to receive the
21 following information: Has this been zoomed in at all? The river cannot
22 be seen. It's been zoomed in, deep into the territory there. So the
23 image is different.
24 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton stated that it was taken from the
25 Metaljka building and we'll proceed upon that basis. And, if necessary,
1 you can take up the issue later on during your re-examination,
2 Mr. Karadzic.
3 Let us proceed.
4 MS. EDGERTON:
5 Q. Would you be able to answer my question? Does this or does it
6 not show a view in behind the enemy's front line?
7 A. I cannot answer your question because I don't know. I was not
8 there and I cannot answer.
9 Q. Is your evidence now that even though you were a company
10 commander you're not able to distinguish the front line?
11 A. There was no front line there.
12 Q. Where was the front line between the Metaljka building and
13 Bosnian-held territory?
14 A. I've already said that, those were the buildings between the
15 bridges, Unioninvest, the machine -- or rather the school of mechanical
16 engineering, and then a few civilian buildings, that was the front line.
17 And then here in the picture I see the Holiday hotel which I could not
18 see from the front line.
19 Q. My question is: Does this not show a view deep into the enemy's
20 front line? The picture is in full colour on the screen in front of you.
21 A. I see the picture but the situation is unfamiliar to me; that is
22 to say, I don't know from where this picture was taken.
23 Q. I've told you already twice. Do you want me to tell you again?
24 It's taken from the 7th floor of the Metaljka building. Knowing that,
25 are you not able to answer the question?
1 A. I don't understand.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence, Your Honour.
3 [Prosecution counsel confer]
4 MS. EDGERTON:
5 Q. What is you don't understand?
6 A. What is it that I'm supposed to understand? That it's deep
7 into -- I mean, I know where it is here. I know exactly where all of
8 this is. I know where everything is because I lived in that city. I
9 know where these buildings are. I just don't know where the picture was
10 taken from, so I never saw the Holiday from this point of view. I know
11 where it is and I know what it is and I know that behind the enemy lines
12 there are civilian buildings.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Could I tender this as a Prosecution exhibit,
15 please, Your Honours?
16 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President, there's been no
17 foundation at that -- where it was taken from when they can perhaps do
18 that with another witness.
19 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to respond, Ms. Edgerton?
20 MS. EDGERTON: Let me just consult with Mr. Tieger, if I could
21 have your indulgence again, please.
22 [Prosecution counsel confer]
23 MS. EDGERTON: Just before answering further, is there any
24 dispute about this photograph having been taken from the Metaljka
1 MR. ROBINSON: We have no idea.
2 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you try with 65 ter 21215, which we have
3 seen many times?
4 MS. EDGERTON: Very much, yes.
5 Could we go to that 65 ter number, please, 21215.
6 Q. Now, Mr. Maletic, do you see the Holiday building on the image in
7 front of you?
8 A. Yes, yes, I do.
9 Q. Do you see the street that leads directly south and the building
10 at the end of the street? Do you see the Metaljka building?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And do you see the tree line where the Miljacka river runs?
13 A. I do.
14 Q. Do you see that a view from the Metaljka building affords you a
15 line of sight deep behind the enemy's front line?
16 A. [No interpretation]
17 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat his answer; the
18 interpreters did not understand it.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Maletic, could you repeat your answer. The
20 interpreters were not able to hear that.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see the Metaljka building and I
22 see the building of the Holiday hotel; that is to say, I see both
24 MS. EDGERTON:
25 Q. Do you have any dispute that the front line ran along the river
1 of the Miljacka at this location? Are you disputing that?
2 A. No, the front line went up the Miljacka or down the Miljacka.
3 Q. So can you see -- are you prepared to agree that a view from the
4 Metaljka building affords you a line of sight behind the enemy's front
6 A. I don't know. I cannot assess this.
7 Q. Right. Can we move on then to another photograph, please.
8 65 ter number 24125.
9 MR. ROBINSON: And, Mr. President, we wouldn't object if this
10 21215 were tendered.
11 JUDGE KWON: Well, I found it amazing that we have not admitted
12 this yet.
13 But are you tendering that?
14 MS. EDGERTON: In fact, if we could tender this, Your Honours,
15 and I'd like to ask that the first photograph, 65 ter number 23643, be
16 marked for admission and perhaps following that we could discuss and
17 resolve the issue of provenance of that photograph with Mr. Robinson.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I? May I indicate the
19 following, that in that photograph that was considerably zoomed in, it is
20 impossible to guess where the Serb positions were. Zoom is misleading.
21 And therefore, there is no foundation either through the questions or the
22 witness's answers because this doesn't say anything about the Serb
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE KWON: So we'll not receive the previous document, the
1 photo at this moment, 23643. You'll have another time to tender it. And
2 we'll give the number -- Prosecution exhibit number for 21215.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Document 21215 receives number P6018,
4 Your Honours.
5 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
6 Could we then go to the 65 ter number 24125, please.
7 Q. Mr. Maletic, this is a photograph with a view of tram stops taken
8 from the 13th floor of Leninova 6A in August 1996. Do you see the image
9 of the tram through the hole in front of you?
10 A. Yes, I see the tram.
11 Q. Could we now go to 24126, please.
12 Another view of tram stops or the tram route, again from the 13th
13 floor of Leninova 6A taken in August of 1996. Mr. Maletic, do these two
14 photos show an area behind the enemy's front line where you understood it
15 to be?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Could I have these two as Prosecution exhibits,
19 please, Your Honours, 24125 and 24126, unless there is -- unless
20 Mr. Robinson is with respect to these as well objecting on the grounds of
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I think we are. I mean, he's identified the
23 fact that they're -- show behind the Muslim lines, but we don't know from
24 where. So I don't think it's too probative without some more showing of
1 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, the difficulty with that, Mr. Robinson, is
2 how do we understand his evidence if we don't understand it in concert
3 with the photographs?
4 MR. ROBINSON: Well, you can look at the 65 ter number that was
5 referred to, but that's, you know, I think that's the situation when
6 evidence is presented to a witness that's not admissible by itself and
7 you have a 65 ter number to refer to but not as an exhibit, so it's not
8 thought to be what it's purported to be absent that foundation.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just add something? What it
11 was like when I examined the Prosecution witnesses. I was asked to
12 present my case to the witness, not to put questions in terms of facts.
13 So I could not just say: Could one fire at a tram from here? My
14 obligation was --
15 JUDGE KWON: It's out of context. The Chamber --
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not could one fire, or rather, did
17 anyone fire from there? So if the Prosecutor claims that someone did
18 fire from there, then that case should be put to the witness.
19 JUDGE KWON: No, it's -- the case is totally different here,
20 Mr. Karadzic.
21 The Chamber is of the view that these two documents could be
22 received based upon the comments made by the witness. We'll receive
23 it -- we'll receive them.
24 Shall we give the numbers?
25 THE REGISTRAR: Document 24125 receives number P6019 and document
1 24126 receives number P6020, Your Honours.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I've forgotten in the last few
3 minutes to look at my watch and I note it's quite late.
4 JUDGE KWON: My apologies to all.
5 We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.
6 Mr. Maletic, until your testimony is over, you're not supposed to
7 discuss with anybody else about your testimony. Do you understand that,
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
10 JUDGE KWON: Have a nice evening. The hearing is adjourned.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.05 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 4th day of
14 December, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.