1 Thursday, 20 December 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Good morning, Mr. Harvey.
7 MR. HARVEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. May I
8 introduce Mr. Alexander Ivanchev from Bulgaria who has been assisting my
9 team for the last several months. Thank you.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Harvey.
11 Yes, good morning, Ms. West.
12 MS. WEST: Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning,
13 Your Honours.
14 WITNESS: MIHAJLO VUJASIN [Resumed]
15 [Witness answered through interpreter]
16 Cross-examination by Ms. West:
17 Q. Good morning, sir. My name is Kim West. I'm going to spend a
18 little time this morning asking you some questions, and the first thing
19 I'd like to clarify is the period of time in which you were in the
20 Rajlovac Brigade. We know you started in May 1992, and it appears in
21 September of 1992 you were then promoted to chief of engineers; is that
23 A. Yes, I was a member of the Army of Yugoslavia -- or, actually,
24 the former JNA. When it withdrew, I stayed behind as one of the senior
25 officers. It was myself and another commander. I was assistant
1 commander at the time, assisting with the establishment of units in
2 Rajlovac which were tasked to act as a buffer zone. Once the JNA left
3 and until the 15th of September, I was in Rajlovac where I had the duty
4 of deputy commander.
5 Q. And in your statement there are 64 substantial written paragraphs
6 giving your evidence, and it appears that many of them refer specifically
7 to your time in the Rajlovac Brigade. Should we understand your comments
8 to be limited to that time or are they -- some are your comments more
9 general in nature as applicable to the whole war?
10 A. That's what the situation was like. In that situation we were in
11 the most difficult period during the war for the VRS. We had to start
12 from scratch and establish units. Rajlovac as a barracks was practically
13 empty. There were only five or six officers and between 20 and 30
14 workers who came to work and some assistant personnel. The rest left
15 with the JNA units. So we need to make do. We had to get the people we
16 could from Rajlovac and its environs.
17 Q. Sir, I don't see any relationship between your answer and my
18 question, and I don't know if this is a translation problem, but all I
19 want to know is your comments in your statement, do these relate to only
20 your period of time between May and September and the Rajlovac Brigade or
21 do they apply to the whole period of the war?
22 A. The period could be split in two parts while I was in Rajlovac.
23 That's the first period, and the second as I was the chief of engineers
24 in the SRK, which is between the 15th of April when I went to visit the
25 Ilidza Brigade and until the Dayton Accords were signed when the Serbians
1 and people withdrew from that area. I took part in that as well. Later
2 on I participated in the process of delineation or separating the zones
3 of responsibilities between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
4 Republika Srpska around Sarajevo. Since I was the chief of engineers, I
5 was familiar with the situation in the field in terms of which unit was
6 where. That is why that part of the statement probably encompasses the
7 entire period.
8 The initial period was critical until the units were set up
9 alongside their commands.
10 Q. All right. So let's focus on some very specific things from your
11 statement now. Now firstly, paragraph 42, and I know you have your
12 statement in front of you. You can refer to it if you like, but I'll
13 tell you what part I'm focused on. Paragraph 42, you say that the
14 Rajlovac Brigade had no trained professional snipers. Now, for the
15 moment, let's put aside whether you had trained professional snipers and
16 focus on whether you had rifles that were used for sniping. Did you have
17 such rifles?
18 A. When the army left the JNA, I need to go back to that, all
19 quality weapons and special purpose weapons that the JNA units had were
20 taken to Serbia. On the 10th -- or, rather, between the 10th and the
21 12th of May, there was a hand-over of all the assets that were left
22 behind in Rajlovac. It was a single sheet of paper which was exchanged
23 between the TO staff and the JNA. Major Bosnjic [phoen] received all of
24 those assets. On behalf of the Rajlovac municipality, he was tasked
25 with -- well, okay.
1 Q. And I --
2 A. It didn't have such weapons.
3 Q. Okay.
4 A. At least I didn't know that we found anything like that such as
5 sniper rifle or anything of the sort. That's one thing.
6 Q. Okay. Thank you.
7 A. Another --
8 Q. And I appreciate your comments and I understand you're trying to
9 give us some background. Let's first try to answer the question, and if
10 I need more background I'll ask you. Now I understand your testimony to
11 be we -- I didn't know that we found anything like that such as sniper
12 rifle or anything of the sort. So I understand that it's your position
13 that your brigade had no rifles that were used for sniping; is that
15 A. I think it is. I also need to add the following: Before the war
16 there were optical devices that were being produced which could be
17 mounted onto rifles. That is something I need to stress. There were
18 possibilities to purchase rifles with the sights. If mounted on the
19 rifle, one could see 2- or 300 metres more than with the naked eye, but
20 it wasn't done. Perhaps several men had that who had that as part of
21 their personal weapons kit. Therefore, I can't really say anything in
22 particular, but this is sort of what the situation was like.
23 Q. Okay. So you don't deny that perhaps several people may have had
24 those types of rifles with optical sights associated with them.
25 A. I cannot deny that. I saw a few, but it wasn't a unit as a whole
1 or anything. Now, whether such people joined the army, it was all the
2 process of establishment, but officially speaking, in the units that were
3 set up there were no such people, such personnel with that kind of
5 Q. Sir --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness speak closer to the
7 microphones, please. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Vujasin, could you come closer to the
9 microphones so that the interpreters can hear you better.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you.
11 MS. WEST:
12 Q. The Trial Chamber has heard evidence from Prosecution expert
13 witness that the M-76 was a standard sniper rifle and that was at
14 transcript 6940. Do you agree with that proposition?
15 A. When the optical sight was mounted, then it could be used to that
16 end. One could even use a World War II weapon. You could use an M-48
17 rifle, put the optical sight on it and then visibility is increased as
18 well as accuracy. There is such a possibility. I can't deny that.
19 Q. And along those same lines, the Trial Chamber heard evidence
20 recently allowing for this possibility, as you speak of, to attach an
21 optical sight on an M-48, and that was at transcript 31158, and I
22 understand that you believe that to be true as well; correct?
23 A. Yes. Yes, it was possible.
24 Q. And the M-76 and the M-48 were rifles, were weapons that your
25 brigade had in its possession; right?
1 A. Yes. It's a fact.
2 Q. Now, at paragraph 52 and 53, this is the part of your statement
3 that speaks about air-bombs, and it specifically -- you say that you
4 don't know -- you don't know any details about them. You talk about
5 technical issues, and you say you don't know about that. But in
6 paragraph 54, you say that you had no knowledge that aerial bombs or
7 other projectiles for ground targets were modified by the BH Army. And
8 then at the end of the paragraph you say:
9 "I have no knowledge about the use of modified air-bombs or other
10 projectiles for ground targets by units of the BH Army."
11 So just so I can understand, you never saw the BH Army use
12 air-bombs; correct?
13 A. I didn't see them. However, the shells they used to target our
14 positions, positions of the VRS, contained shrapnel, nails, metal
15 shavings, which increases the lethal aspect of the weapon, and it means
16 that they produced it, they manufactured it in the part of town that was
17 under their control.
18 Q. Okay. But that's a separate issue. You've never heard -- you
19 never had information that the BH Army was using modified air-bombs, did
21 A. I didn't.
22 Q. And at paragraph 51, you spoke about your information regarding
23 SRK air-bombs. You said you learned of the existence and production of
24 modified air-bombs for ground targets which were a part of the SRK
25 arsenal during the testing of one such air-bomb. When was that testing?
1 A. I was at Nisici with the corps command at the Nisici plateau, and
2 then an aerial bomb was tested. Up until then I had no knowledge that it
3 was being manufactured. During the test, I realised that it was just an
4 ordinary air-bomb left behind by the JNA. It was found in the
5 warehouses. So it happened to be in the territory of Republika Srpska or
6 in federation territory. It was tested, and certain engines were mounted
7 on it. I was present when one such bomb was fired. I wasn't standing at
8 the point of where -- from where it was fired. I was on the side. But
9 it was never launched, because the engine failed to start. Up until that
10 point, I had no information of such bombs and that certain engines were
11 mounted on them. It was the engines that were the most important thing.
12 Q. I'd like you to focus on the part up until that point. My
13 question was when. When did the testing take place? Give me a date,
15 A. I can't provide you with a date. It was not in 1992. Possibly
16 in late 1993 or in 1994, in that period. Well, one could check that
17 against documents. I suppose it was in late 1993 or early 1994. That
18 was the period when the first -- that first testing I saw was carried
20 Q. And beyond this one occasion when you saw this testing, you have
21 no other information of the SRK using aerial bombs?
22 A. As of that time, I had the duty of the chief of engineers in the
23 corps, and I can't tell you, Yes, on that day an aerial bomb was used. I
24 have no such information.
25 MS. WEST: May we have P1309, please.
1 Q. I think on your screen - thank you - momentarily you're going to
2 see a document - and you do - on the left we'll have B/C/S. And this is
3 a document from April of 1995. This regards the action of Talas 1. You
4 were involved with this, were you not?
5 A. Wave one. It was General Milosevic who was in command at the
6 time, the corps commander. The aim was to retake --
7 Q. Sir, let's stop there.
8 A. Yes. Well, now, I was tasked with --
9 Q. Sir, hold on a second. And I appreciate you wanting to give
10 background, but let's try to first answer my question and then we'll talk
11 about the background. So as I understand it, you were tasked for this
12 action. So you remember this; is that right?
13 A. We had to construct groundwork for tanks, protective barriers,
14 and they had to be camouflaged in case there was a need to use them in
15 the course of operation.
16 Q. And that's exactly right, because we see under number 1 after the
17 listing there's a paragraph in which it says the entire operational
18 building resources from Major Vujasin's building site are to be engaged
19 in organising these positions, and it goes on, and then it says they must
20 be below ground and camouflaged.
21 If we continue a few more paragraphs, it says:
22 "The works shall be directed by Major Vujasin and Dusan Vukadin
23 who will have under his command another person who are duty-bound to
24 provide artillery pieces."
25 So as regards this particular action, should we understood that
1 you had real familiarity with what was going to take place overall?
2 A. Not specifically. I was tasked with setting up positions. Since
3 I was the chief, Vukadin, Dusan was the commander of the battalion, and
4 he had to provide assistance to do that.
5 Q. All right.
6 A. He was the commander, but under me. He was from a unit junior to
7 the corps command.
8 Q. But you --
9 A. It was very important to do that at the time, to have them
11 Q. All right. Very good.
12 A. If I may add something. Could I just have an opportunity to
13 explain the following: What was the reason for doing that. May I?
14 Q. A brief opportunity.
15 A. Well, there is something that you do that the enemy can see with
16 the aim of carrying out operational camouflage. When we made the
17 breastwork, the barriers, when the enemy could see we didn't put any
18 tanks there. Perhaps it would drive up for it to be seen, but it
19 wouldn't act, because there was no need.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. The reason was this: It was between the 1st and the
22 2nd Sarajevo Brigade that each day the enemy approached our positions by
23 some 10 to 15 metres, and the goal was to return those units to their
24 starting position.
25 Q. And I think we fully understand that your task in this plan was
1 very important. Camouflaging obviously was very important. But if we go
2 on on the same piece -- document, a document that was sent to the
3 Engineers Battalion, we see under number 2, and if we could go to the
4 next page in B/C/S, please. It's the same page in English. Under number
5 2 this is after the part regarding your unit:
6 "Proceed forthwith to prepare launchers and make sure that four
7 to six aerial bombs can be launched simultaneously against the designated
8 target, the condition being that they must hit the target, which means
9 that provisions have to be made for more bombs so that, in the event of a
10 miss, the next projectile lands on the target."
11 Sir, keeping in mind your role in this attack was as we
12 understand to be quite important, shouldn't you at the time understood
13 that the overall tact includes aerial bombs?
14 A. I wasn't aware. We needed to make parapets. Now, whether
15 someone indeed intended to use them, that's something I can't say.
16 Q. All right. If we can move to paragraph 18 of --
17 JUDGE KWON: Just one question. Do you know who was
18 Tadija Manojlovic?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
20 JUDGE KWON: Who was he, and what was he responsible for?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Tadija Manojlovic was a retired
22 colonel -- lieutenant-colonel in the JNA. He was with us as a volunteer
23 who received the rank of reserve colonel in the VRS. He was the chief of
24 artillery in the command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
25 JUDGE KWON: Had he something to do with the aerial bomb at all?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I only had to construct the
2 parapets, and it was a way for the artillery to act, which was in his
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please proceed, Ms. West.
5 MS. WEST: [Microphone not activated] Thank you.
6 Q. Sir, in paragraph --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
8 Could Ms. West please slow down when speaking and reading. Thank
10 MS. WEST:
11 Q. In paragraph 18 of your statement, you indicate that the SRK
12 mostly defended itself, but you gave an exception of offensive actions.
13 You said that they were to improve tactical positions. And then you give
14 an example, and your example was a tactical operation with the aim of
15 liberating Serbian houses near Muslim positions in Sokolje when 13 people
16 were killed.
17 As regards to this action, was liberating Serbian houses the only
18 aim, the only goal?
19 MS. WEST: May I have 65 ter 23839, please.
20 Q. This is an order to attack. It's the
21 Rajlovac Light Infantry Brigade, and it speaks about this attack at
22 Sokolje. Now, this is dated November 30, 1992. Is this the attack that
23 you spoke of?
24 A. Was it the corps command at the time? I know that Milos --
25 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last name.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- stayed on as the commander of
2 the brigade and he carried out preparations. This is the first time I
3 see this. So he carried out preparations, and I know that he wanted to
4 free or liberate Serb houses or positions where Serb houses were. As for
5 the population from these houses, they were in the Rajlovac barracks,
6 Bozici and others. September, November, December. Yes.
7 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt. However, we need to continue on with
8 these questions, and let's try to focus on the question I asked, which
9 is: Does this document represent the attack you spoke of in your
10 statement? Yes or no?
11 A. Yes, yes. Yes.
12 Q. Okay. Now, I just want to go through a couple sections of this,
13 and I'm sure you're familiar with it as you mentioned in your statement.
14 MS. WEST: If we can have English page 2. It's B/C/S bottom of
15 page 1. The English page 2 at the bottom. This is speaking about the
16 enemy and what they have. It says they have very good infantry weapons
17 but we can take advantage of the internal conflicts within their ranks to
18 launch a fierce attack and take control of the villages.
19 If we stay at the B/C/S -- bottom of page 1, under number 2, and
20 then we go to the third page of the English this continues, and it
21 says -- it talks about the task. Our brigade has been instructed to
22 launch an attack from its starting positions, and it names the places.
23 Cut off the village, surround the enemy forces in the village of Sokolje,
24 and thoroughly mop up the villages, and it names the villages. And if we
25 can now go to page 5 of the English. And it's page 2 of the B/C/S and
1 this is under a number 5. It's talking about its task, the task of the
2 SRK. It shall co-ordinate the activities with the strike group to take
3 control of the line, the junction below the refuse dump, the junction of
4 roads to Brijesko Brdo, the junction of roads, it names elevations. And
5 then it says systematically cleanse the houses of enemy soldiers and
6 after completing the mopping up operations.
7 Q. Sir, my question for you is: I've just shown you three parts of
8 this document and clearly there's far more, but the language that we see
9 seems to be quite aggressive. So, for example, when it says
10 "systematically cleanse the houses of enemy soldiers," does this mean --
11 does this include their families as well?
12 A. I see from this document that this is an attack order. According
13 to our combat rules, that's the way it's done. An order is issued to
14 units and to each and every individual. This never had to do with
15 families. That's one thing. Then -- I mean, that is my understanding.
16 If people do not put up resistance, I mean, that was the regular thing,
17 to mop up so that there can be freedom of movement for our units. So I
18 don't think that -- no, I don't believe, no.
19 Q. You say:
20 "If people do not put up resistance ... that was the regular
21 thing, to mop up so there can be freedom of movement for our units."
22 Do you mean that if the people, the civilians who live there,
23 don't resist you, you then are going to force them to leave? Is that
24 what you're saying?
25 A. No. No. No, no, no. No.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the fault of the
2 interpretation and the transcript.
3 JUDGE KWON: Shall we give it a try again. Could you repeat your
5 MS. WEST:
6 Q. Sir, I understand you to speak about a attack order, and then you
7 started to talk about the procedure and the way it was done, and this is
8 at lines 6 and 7, and you said this never had to do with families, and
9 then what we understood you to say is if people do not put up resistance,
10 I mean, that was the regular thing, to mop up so there was freedom of
11 movement for our units.
12 Please clarify exactly what you meant when you spoke about people
13 or the families not putting up resistance.
14 A. In our case and everywhere else, not opening fire, I mean, that
15 means that that family, that unit, that house, should not be touched.
16 There was no intention whatsoever. If somebody is not putting up
17 resistance and not firing at the Army of Republika Srpska, they were not
18 the enemy, and they were therefore not endangering the movements,
19 manoeuvres of the Army of Republika Srpska. That's it. That person
20 accepts the government organs and the system starts functioning.
21 Q. Okay. And as regards to those people who just do nothing, do
22 they get to stay in their house?
23 A. Yes, yes. Yes, they do. Yes.
24 MS. WEST: Mr. President, may I tender this document, please?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And over here --
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive is.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter number 23839 becomes
3 Exhibit P6067. Thank you.
4 MS. WEST:
5 Q. Sir, I want to speak about another action taken by the
6 Rajlovac Brigade, and this is when you had just become deputy commander.
7 It was the attack on Ahatovici. Do you remember that?
8 A. I do.
9 Q. And you were the person in charge of the attack, were you not?
10 A. No, I was not.
11 Q. Or what was your position as regards the attack?
12 A. At that time there were village guards.
13 Q. No, sir. Stop for a second. My question is: What was your
14 position in the Rajlovac Brigade at that time?
15 A. I was deputy commander then, and I was at the Rajlovac barracks
16 in Rajlovac.
17 MS. WEST: May we have 65 ter 24344, please.
18 Q. This is a statement to National Security Service, and it was
19 given in December of 1992, so the same year. It was given by an
20 Mirko Lalic, who was a member of the Rajlovac barracks. Do you remember
21 this person? Are you familiar with that name?
22 A. Could I just read this?
23 Q. Please. Sir, I'm going to ask you a question, and --
24 A. Just a bit more, please.
25 Q. Okay. Can we go up a bit. Do you remember Mirko Lalic?
1 A. There was this one Lalic. I think I know who this paper pertains
3 Q. All right. And he's speaking about you, and he's commenting on
4 your successes, and he says at the bottom of page 1 in the English and 1
5 in the B/C/S at the time the Rajlovac Brigade performed one successful
6 action in the Ahatovici settlement. The command of the action was the
7 then-commander of the Rajlovac Brigade, Vujasin. So are we to understand
8 that you had a leading role in the attack at Ahatovici?
9 A. No, no, I did not have a leading role, because when this was
10 done, that is to say this procedure, Ahatovici, I was at a meeting in
11 Lukavica with General Mladic; that is to say, I went there as the ranking
12 officer in the Rajlovac Brigade at the time. So I was there, I mean, and
13 I know full well that the orders were that not a single bullet should be
14 fired anywhere.
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. Because then the Butmir report was being handed over to UNPROFOR.
17 I said to General Mladic also, I said --
18 THE INTERPRETER: The term did not understand what he said to
19 General Mladic.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I ordered now cannot be
21 carried out.
22 Q. Thank you very much, sir. Let's move on.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. I understand that you're saying you weren't there at the time,
25 but nonetheless, would you not consider the event at Ahatovici an
1 offensive by the RSK?
2 A. I would not dare say that it was official, because this was a
3 village with a mixed population, Serb and Muslim, so this is a hamlet of
4 a village. So there were joint guards as I mentioned a moment ago, and,
5 yes --
6 Q. As regards to who lived there, do you agree that before the war
7 in the 1991 census there were over a thousand Muslims living in that
8 area? And the Trial Chamber has heard evidence to this effect. Does
9 that seem about right to you?
10 A. I think so. I think so. It was mixed. Half/half, if you look
11 at it. I mean, in that part and for that local commune. Now, whether
12 there were more of one or the other, I cannot say, but I mean, Muslim
13 Ahatovici were grouped, but these other villages, this local commune,
14 were on the left and the right-hand side and it goes from the -- from
15 Bosna all the way up to the hill to the pass there.
16 Q. The Trial Chamber has also heard evidence that by the end of the
17 war there was only one Muslim family living in Ahatovici. Does that
18 sound about right to you?
19 A. I just know that the population had fled to Rajlovac and from
20 Rajlovac into town and then wherever they wanted to go, that is to say in
21 accordance with their own wishes. As for this family, I cannot say. I
22 don't really know. They could have returned. Whoever wanted to could
23 return after these unfortunate developments --
24 Q. All right. You --
25 A. -- because they had this free will that they could express.
1 However, the set of circumstances then was very difficult. Would you
2 allow me to explain that?
3 Q. No. But you can explain it if Mr. Karadzic deems it important in
4 redirect, but let me ask you another question. Were you aware that as a
5 result of this operation several hundred people from this settlement were
6 detained in different places in Rajlovac? Were you aware of that?
7 A. That I do know, and I barely survived, I and Mirko Krajisnik, in
8 terms of these consequences -- may I proceed?
9 Q. Stop there for a moment and let's just back up. You just said --
10 I asked about people being detained, and you said, as I understand it, I
11 do know and I barely survived in terms of consequences. Are you
12 suggesting you were detained?
13 A. No, not me, taking care that these people do not get hurt. I'm
14 referring to people who sought shelter in the Rajlovac barracks, from
15 Mijatovici Brda, Zenica. These people who were expelled from
16 Central Bosnia, they were all in barracks and officers and soldiers and
17 families and they were all there, whereas these people had fled to our
18 territory so we saved them and we had to provide for them. We had
19 nowhere else to put them up so we were taking care of them so they would
20 not be victimised in any way, and that's what happened. Fire was even
21 opened at Mirko Krajisnik.
22 Q. All right. So you say that when this attacked happened, you were
23 at a meeting elsewhere, but now I understand it that you are suggesting
24 that when these people were detained, you had some -- some role in
25 ensuring that they were safe. Is that what we're to understand?
1 A. Saved, yes. Yes, saving these people who had fled.
2 Q. Sir, the Trial Chamber has heard evidence that a number of these
3 people were maltreated. They were beaten. They were kept in inhumane
4 conditions. Were you aware of that?
5 A. I knew that they were not beaten or anything. There were
6 situations when one individual or two would be beaten up. There was this
7 rage. We had terrible problems to prevent that, to prevent individuals
8 from doing that. We had terrible problems to prevent these unfortunate
9 things happening, and these unfortunate things being done by certain
10 individuals. I mean, people had rifles and how would I know whether
11 they'd open a burst of gunfire at them or whatever. I mean, it wasn't
12 good. It's not even good to think about that, about all the things that
13 could have happened but fortunately did not happen.
14 Q. And these were individuals who were subordinated to you, were
15 they not?
16 A. In the barracks you cannot say that they were subordinated to me,
17 because this was an open-type barracks. There wasn't a classical army.
18 That is to say that units came, groups of 10 to 15 men, and then they
19 joined up to create a brigade. And then this Mirko Lalic also, as we
20 said, came, and then we had people, whatever, to link all of this up in
21 that context. And now these units in Rajlovac, Ahatovici, Brijesce, all
22 of this. I mean, it was basically the armed people. It was the people
23 who were armed. You had to put all of this together. You could not even
24 organise guards because 10 or 15 metres from the barracks there were
25 Muslim forces ready to enter the barracks. So --
1 Q. Thank you. I think we'll move on. And if we can go to
2 paragraph 47 of your statement. This regards gas supply to Sarajevo,
3 which you say the gas supply to Sarajevo went through the zone of
4 responsibility of the Rajlovac Brigade and these valves were never
6 May we have 21151, please.
7 Sir, as I understand it, the valves that were pivotal to the gas
8 supply in Sarajevo went through your zone of responsibility and I want to
9 look at an UNPROFOR document that talks about that very thing. This is
10 September of 1994. There should -- there should be a B/C/S. If the
11 Court can bear with me, Your Honours. Sir, I will read this slowly.
12 You're going to hear it in B/C/S. This regards what happened in
13 September of 1994. And it says the week under review was dominated by
14 the most lengthy and comprehensive shutdown of utilities which Sarajevo
15 has experienced since the dark days of last winter. A combination of
16 storm and water -- excuse me, war damage completely cut the electricity
17 supply on 14 September. With no electricity to operate the pumps this
18 inevitably led to the water supply into the city coming to a halt. On 15
19 December, the gas supply was cut. Information obtained by technical
20 experts of this office, UNPROFOR engineering units and other sources,
21 suggests that the gas supply was almost certainly interrupted by Bosnian
22 Serbs closing valves in the part of the city in which they controlled.
23 So these valves that you spoke of and this document speaks of,
24 are those the valves in the Rajlovac zone of responsibility; correct?
25 A. I cannot link this up now. Where are these valves? As you move
1 towards Olovo, I know that there was that thing that you could see, sort
2 of a station where that could be regulated, but I think that then also
3 the pressure was very low, because the army in Lukavica via Grbavica also
4 had gas, so I cannot believe -- no. I don't think it was closed. So I
5 think that it had a question of -- that it was a question of the weak
6 flow into Republika Srpska, Bosna. That would be it. But I also know
7 that UNPROFOR co-operated with us all the time. And may I proceed?
8 Maybe it doesn't really have to do with this, but --
9 Q. I want to talk a little bit more about this, but I want to go to
10 paragraph 46 of your statement that -- just the paragraph right before
11 and you're speaking generally about utilities. You say Karadzic's stance
12 was to enable full and unobstructed supply of aid, water, electricity,
13 and gas to civilians in the Muslim part of Sarajevo.
14 What is -- what is the basis of your information for that? How
15 do you know that?
16 A. Mirko Krajisnik's brother -- Momcilo Krajisnik's brother Mirko, I
17 mean, that means that this is his brother. Momcilo was president of the
18 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I found out from Mirko that their
19 position was that there has to be this unhindered thing that people
20 should go on living there. It's not the fault of the people if the
21 leadership makes a mistake in some element, and this was the definite
22 position there. That was conveyed to all, to all the people who knew
24 Now, what else happened?
25 Q. Hold on.
1 A. Who were angry.
2 Q. Let's just go to the second paragraph of this document in which
3 it says in spite of extensive efforts being made by UNPROFOR at all
4 appropriate levels, the week ended with gas still turned off and
5 without --
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Shall we upload that document again.
7 MS. WEST: Please.
8 Q. And it's the second paragraph. Without the necessary clearances
9 having been attained to enable work to begin on repairing the electricity
10 lines. A meeting at the technical level at which this office was
11 represented took place at the airport on the 18th. This meeting revealed
12 that there was comparatively little disagreement between the parties on
13 the technical problems involved, but the necessary repair work to restore
14 the electricity and gas supplies still awaited clearance at the political
16 Now, as regards to what you understood Mr. Karadzic's stance to
17 be on the utilities, would you agree with me that he was in a position to
18 either agree that the utilities, in this case gas, would go through, or
19 in fact turn it off?
20 A. No, no. He was not in a position to do that. This was a
21 technical thing. Whether there was an outage or whether there was no
22 electricity, I mean, that's what happened during the war. I can tell you
23 one thing. For example, a wire would break down or something and then a
24 commission would be established from both sides. This Lalic person
25 mostly worked on this, on this combination so that there could be repairs
1 carried out. I mean, how do I put this. Something is repaired and then
2 within an hour again it breaks down where the separation line is. And so
3 we didn't even get down. I mean these people would say we didn't even
4 get down from the pole and there would be a breakdown again, and also the
5 Muslims or whatever, I mean, intentionally. I mean, so this was done so
6 that both sides could be accused. The station in Reljevo worked all the
7 time. Yes.
8 Q. I'll just interrupt you there for a moment.
9 MS. WEST: May I tender this document, Mr. President.
10 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
11 JUDGE KWON: Next P exhibit, P6068.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours, 65 ter 21151 shall be assigned
13 Exhibit P6068. And for clarification of transcript only page 14,
14 lines 20, 21, 65 ter 23839 was assigned Exhibit P6067. Thank you.
15 MS. WEST: Thank you.
16 Q. I'd like to speak about your role as chief of engineers. In that
17 role you performed work solely for the SRK; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And so there were --
20 A. I was a professional command organ, the staff for HQ of the HQ
22 Q. And during this time then, there were no occasions when you did
23 engineering work for other entities like private companies or political
25 A. We were working on the road from Pretis to -- from Vogosca up to
1 Brijesce close to Pale. We were supposed to make the road. The airport
2 was handed over to the UNPROFOR and that part of the Ilijas, Vogosca,
3 Rajlovac, Ilidza, Hadzici municipalities was cut off from Republika
4 Srpska. There was no road so this was a priority job, also the
5 maintenance of the road. This was a private task, and as soon as I
6 became deputy commander of the corps, it was my -- I gave myself this
7 task, and we used the machinery that stayed behind in our territory.
8 That was what we used.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please be asked to start
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you overlapped with the
12 interpretation. Please pay attention to the transcript. Could you start
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Line 9, it was
15 translated as the witness -- as if the witness said I was a professional
16 command organ. However, he said I was an expert organ, and so that would
17 be better interpreted as expert organ, because an expert organ is
18 somebody who carries out but does not make or command -- it's a person
19 who seeks technical solutions.
20 JUDGE KWON: No further explanation.
21 Do you confirm that you said you're an expert organ or
22 professional organ?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Expert organ, if you're asking me.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please proceed Ms. West.
25 MS. WEST: May we have 24367, please.
1 Q. This is a May 1994 document from Milovanovic, and you see it on
2 the screen now, in which the main paragraph he speaks about an order,
3 pursuant to the VRS Main Staff order, and he gives a number. The
4 Chief of Staff had to report to the Main Staff in written form by a date
5 on measures taken against Major Vujasin for not fulfilling his
6 obligations towards the Main Staff. The same document gave the dead-line
7 20 May 1994 for submitting a report, and then he says no -- since no
8 report has arrived on this day, he orders -- he says the Chief of Staff
9 shall submit a statement in written form regarding the following
10 questions. And he goes on to four questions and it has to do with
11 carrying out -- the VRS Main Staff carrying out its obligation to the
12 command and subordination, but at the very end of it, it says the report
13 pursuant to the VRS Main Staff, and it gives a number of the report and
14 the date, should be brought in by Major Vujasin personally to the
15 Main Staff on May 31, 1994. Sir, can you give us any insight as to what
16 this is all about? Do you remember this?
17 A. I had to report to General Mladic. I had to report, and the
18 reason was the inability to implement special tasks which the corps
19 command was set, but I didn't even know that the Main Staff was asking
20 this for the implementation of some tasks. Something cannot be done if
21 it cannot be done. The main thing was to secure movement towards the
22 positions, securing the movement. This was in 1994. That's when this
23 was. So the equipment was used up. We didn't have spare parts. There
24 was firing. There was a lack of fuel, so you could not carry out the
25 task with the assets that you had at your disposal. So in that way, I
1 endangered myself and was exposed to having to go and report back because
2 of all of this.
3 Q. Okay. And you're going to have an opportunity to talk further
4 about this, but I just want to note at the bottom in that last paragraph
5 it cites order strictly confidential 7/13-26.
6 MS. WEST: May we now go to 65 ter 24366, please.
7 Q. So now we have at the top 7-13 -- excuse me, 7/13-26, and this
8 appears to be an order that was earlier than the one we just saw, and
9 let's go through this. In the first paragraph it talks about conclusions
10 from the consultations with the engineering command of the VRS and
11 personal inspection and under number 1 the conclusion is engineering
12 machines and motor vehicles are maximally and rationally used for
13 construction of roads and other facilities for social political
14 communities and companies and firms or for individuals.
15 Number 2, construction work is conducted farther away from the
16 front line and is not related to combat.
17 3, construction works are usually conducted without any
18 economical gain usually even for free.
19 4, certain construction works for individuals or owners of
20 private businesses are usually the source of gossiping at a very high --
21 a very high and responsible officers.
22 And 5, intensive exploitation of engineering --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could Ms. West please slow down. Thank you.
24 MS. WEST: My apologies.
25 Q. And number 5, exploitation of engineering machines and lack of
1 money caused a very high per cent of engineering machines that are not
2 working to overcome the problems.
3 So these are the conclusions made by Milovanovic, and then he
4 orders, forbids commanders to work for social political communities of
5 more than 10 kilometres from the front lines.
6 And then number 2, engineering units shall strictly be used only
7 for combat activities.
8 And if we skip to number 4, he then orders the chief of
9 engineering and the chief of planning shall do some inspections regarding
10 construction, regarding the regularity of contracts and payments, and
11 they should deliver a report to me on May 15th.
12 Now, at the time you were the chief of engineering; correct?
13 A. Yes, yes. Correct.
14 Q. And this report he refers to is the report that you were supposed
15 to give him one month later that he complained about; right?
16 A. No. No. That was something else. This is something else --
17 else. Separate.
18 JUDGE KWON: I was about to ask that, Ms. West. The previous
19 document refers to the number, but it's dated as 15th of March, 1994,
20 while this is April document.
21 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President. I was about to ask him the
22 same thing.
23 Q. It appears that the same number's here but we have different
24 dates. Are you telling us that there were two separate problems, one
25 that is articulated in this piece of paper and a separate one that was
1 articulated in the earlier document?
2 A. Yes, yes. These are two different concepts, and different
3 papers, meaning two different, I can say. I am familiar with this
4 document originally, the machinery or the engineering machines should be
5 used for the purposes of the military and not for the needs of the
6 socio-political community. So this particularly referred to the VRS
7 units in Bosnian Krajina around Novi Prijedor and Banja Luka, in that
8 area, Brcko and so on and so forth, rather, in Bijeljina, because work
9 has -- life began to function already and the equipment was not being
10 active or used at the front. So that's why it was used elsewhere. The
11 equipment that was in the army was confiscated. It was mobilised, and it
12 was a pity for it to be at a standstill if there were other things for it
13 to do, so that's why it was going on this economic basis. And on the
14 basis of the document -- may I continue?
15 Q. Well, let me just ask you about the dates.
16 A. Continue --
17 Q. No, no, no.
18 A. May I continue with this?
19 Q. No. You say that this is later, so it was at a point where --
20 A. No. No. This -- well, let's keep these two documents separate
21 if it's possible.
22 Q. [Overlapping speakers]
23 A. I didn't know the dates, but I didn't know -- yes.
24 Q. Okay. So this document is dated in 1994, and you just described
25 some issues that were going on later in the war or in 1994.
1 MS. WEST: Can we have 24346, please.
2 Q. This is earlier in the war, September of 1992. And we should
3 have both the B/C/S and the English of this. And again it's a
4 National Security Service official note, and if we can go to page 2 of
5 the English. It's page 1 of the B/C/S. This is information received,
6 some of it including information regarding your unit.
7 Now, the top of page 2 in the English, they've received
8 information that lieutenant-colonel who was the brigade commander,
9 Goljanin, that the people of Rajlovac respect and value him but the
10 problem is that the situation in the brigade was chaotic when he arrived,
11 and when he took it over from Vujasin, who is a very destructive man and
12 a demigod. Lieutenant-Colonel Goljanin has big problems at this moment
13 to correct everything that was wrong since the obvious looting and
14 illegal gain had priority over combat activities. And you can see that
15 in the B/C/S. And it gives an example with a person named Captain Kablar
16 and then Sergeant Brezo. Are you familiar with these people?
17 A. I have know Goljanin. I don't know which other captain you mean
19 Q. Captain Kablar.
20 A. Yes, yes, I do know him. Captain Veljancic. Yes, I know these
22 Q. Were you aware of the allegations of looting and illegal gain as
23 referenced here under your command?
24 A. Yes. Yes, I was aware of that, yes. Can I continue?
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. This could not have been prevented. People were left without
2 anything anywhere. A truck of goods would be stolen, and somebody would
3 just get lost with the truck and the goods. These things did happen. It
4 could not be prevented, and if you tried to prevent it, you would enter
5 into conflicts. I can see here that I was accused of being a destructive
6 person, but it means this could not have been resolved.
7 Q. It means you knew about it but you didn't do anything about it;
8 is that right?
9 A. No. I wasn't in a position to prevent such occurrences.
10 MS. WEST: May we have 24345, please.
11 Q. This is another September 1992 National Security Service
12 document, and it's September 23rd, 1992, and it's a short document. If
13 we can go to the second page on both for the relevant portion. And in
14 this document it speaks about a number of people, you being one of them,
15 and in the fourth paragraph it says Captain First Class Vujasin, known
16 for his -- I think this should be demagoguery and destructiveness seems
17 to have been transferred to the general satisfaction of the Serbian
18 troops in Rajlovac.
19 Sir, this is dated September of 1992. Were you transferred in
20 September of 1992 or did you stay on for a while?
21 A. I mentioned in the beginning that I reported to the corps command
22 on the 15th of September and that was when I became the expert organ in
23 the corps command, and now this -- I was in the corps command according
24 to this document.
25 Q. If we go back to your statement, apologies for the moving around
1 and maybe I can just say this, it's paragraph 41 of your statement, and
2 earlier you had testified that you left in September, but in
3 paragraph 41, you comment on a document, P1195, and you say that
4 December 12, 1992, I was replaced by Milos Goljanin as commander of the
5 Rajlovac brigade. So should we understand that between September and
6 December of 1992 you still remained in Rajlovac?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The translation is a problem.
8 The -- the original does not state that. I can read it. Paragraph 41.
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Where are we?
10 MS. WEST: We're in paragraph 41 of his statement, Your Honour,
11 D2686 in which he discusses the time-frame of his period of time in the
12 Rajlovac brigade.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document bears that number but
14 that doesn't mean that the change occurred on that date.
15 MS. WEST: Okay, if that's the objection that can be done in
16 redirect but my question regards this statement.
17 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I'll come back to the document. Yes.
18 MS. WEST: Thank you.
19 Q. I just want some clarification, sir. There is some suggestion
20 that you left in September or some suggestion you left in December. When
21 did you leave?
22 A. I reported to my duty in the corps command on the
23 15th of September.
24 MS. WEST: May we have 1D03259, please. This is the Bozic
25 statement that we -- that we spoke about yesterday -- that the Court saw
2 Q. Sir, while we wait for that, can you tell us why you were
4 A. To the corps command. The corps command was empty. There were
5 no seniors officers --
6 Q. My question's different.
7 A. -- expert officers. Why I was transferred? In order to man the
8 corps command.
9 MS. WEST: May we have 65 ter 17258, please. This seems to be
10 the incorrect document.
11 JUDGE KWON: But before doing so, can we go back to 65 ter 24345.
12 MS. WEST: Yes.
13 JUDGE KWON: You asked the witness about his transfer, but I'm
14 not sure he read out the remainder of that passage, and I would like him
15 to comment, make a comment.
16 MS. WEST: Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: Next page, probably. Yes. You were read out -- you
18 heard the penultimate paragraph, but the paragraph following that reads
19 like this:
20 "The opinion of large number of troops from the Rajlovac garrison
21 is that the mentioned Mihajlo Vujasin is a man who obstructed many an
22 action. For example, the mopping up of Sokolje and Brijesce hill, that
23 he is directly answerable for the troops of TO, BiH getting as near as
24 the garrison gates, et cetera. (redacted)
25 (redacted) He also
1 found out unofficially that he was transferred to Lukavica."
2 Do you have any comment on this?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I? It's just a question of
4 whether this sensitive matter should be broadcast.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I am a man made according to
6 a different measure. I am not someone who accords with the measure of
7 other people. What was happening at the time were these Serbian houses
8 were being freed. In my opinion, even now I think that there was no need
9 for us to expose ourselves to death and getting killed, and this applied
10 to the other side as well. This was Muslim territory and response to
11 pressure and requests from the population which escaped or fled from
12 Sokolje needed to organise the army and to have the people returned.
13 However, those people who came from -- down from up there, who came down
14 from up there were taken to the barracks, and then they staged an
15 uprising at the barracks that I was a demagogue, that I was not on their
16 side, and so on and so forth. So that was this main reason. And they
17 exerted the most pressure for their houses, their villages, furniture and
18 everything else that was up there to be liberated and for them to just
19 sit back and behave like gentlemen.
20 So that was that reason, and then the easiest thing is to declare
21 someone a demagogue. I can continue. And then once Goljanin came a
22 month or two later he wanted to return those positions that were lost in
23 the beginning and he did that but he did have 13 people who were killed,
24 and he personally had to leave the barracks because there was a threat of
25 him also succumbing to the negative influence and for something bad to
1 happen to him. So therefore this is not what it --
2 JUDGE KWON: What I'm interested in is the statement that you
3 obstructed many an action, for example, the mopping up of Sokolje and
4 Brijesce hill. Is that true?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ye. Well, yes. I was not inclined
6 to be going towards those people. This is something that would have
7 required a lot of casualties of innocent people. When you go somewhere,
8 it means the civilians and the soldiers would become casualties and the
9 effect would be not much. So there was practically no need. There was
10 practically no justification for such an action for this act.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I add to the transcript? 32,
12 line 22, they were taken to the barracks, but the witness said they fled
13 to the barracks. And on page 33, the witness said there are civilian
14 casualties on both sides, both national or ethnic communities, civilians
15 on both sides.
16 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Vujasin?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Back to you Ms. West.
19 MS. WEST:
20 Q. Sir, this paragraph that we just spoke of, this village of
21 Sokolje, this is the same village that you spoke about earlier today.
22 This is the village that you said you were there to liberate Serbian
23 houses; correct?
24 A. No, no, no. I don't know exactly what you mean. Exactly which
25 part of my testimony are you referring to? Can you just specify that,
1 please? The Serbian houses, the people who fled from up there, they came
2 to the barracks. I don't have a map here, but I could indicate it on the
4 Q. I think we can move on --
5 JUDGE KWON: I'm looking at the clock. How much more would you
7 MS. WEST: Only briefly, Your Honour. Very briefly.
8 JUDGE KWON: And you have --
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have.
10 JUDGE KWON: How long? I'm considering whether to take a break
11 or just --
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Twenty minutes at least.
13 JUDGE KWON: Twenty minutes. Then we'll have a break after the
15 THE ACCUSED: But I wonder why -- why the transcript always is
16 without translating the escaped. The witness said that people escaped.
17 "Came to the barracks." They escaped.
18 JUDGE KWON: Was the B/C/S word used by the witness? When you
19 say "escaped," what B/C/S word did you have in mind?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] "Pobegli," "pobegli."
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To the barracks, yes, because they
22 were attacked right at the start, right at the beginning.
23 JUDGE KWON: So do you confirm that, Mr. Vujasin? They escaped
24 to the barracks?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do confirm to the barracks,
1 meaning as soon as the JNA army left on the 13th of May, I think two or
2 three days after that they were attacked. So then they had to escape,
3 they had to leave their houses, and they came to the barracks and then
4 they began to form that kind of refugee group. And so the barracks began
5 to fill with refugees from Brijesce and Sokolje, those who were not in
6 the lines.
7 JUDGE KWON: Let's be clear. Were they taken to the barracks or
8 did they flee, they fled to the barracks?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They fled or escaped from the
10 barracks, and they got there from the hill. In any case, they were
11 threatened there. They were threatened up there. So then they fled or
12 escaped, "pobegli," to the barracks. As far as they were concerned, they
13 escaped, and as far as we were concerned in the barracks, they arrived.
14 JUDGE KWON: Please continue if you wish, or if you wish, we can
15 take a break now.
16 MS. WEST: One more document.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 MS. WEST: We can continue. 17258. I believe this is just
19 another number for the Bozic interview we saw yesterday, but I think this
20 will allow the correct version to come up.
21 Q. Sir, this is a -- this is actually a statement of Jovo Bozic to
22 the War Department and National Security Council. We understand you know
23 who he is. This is referenced in a paragraph 41 of your statement. We
24 can go to page 4 of the B/C/S, page 4 of the English, and he makes some
25 comments regarding you and your transfer and I want to share those with
1 you and then ask you a question.
2 It's the last paragraph in the -- in the English. Ex-Chief of
3 Staff of the Rajlovac brigade, Kovacevic, organised parties in the
4 offices, we drank some food, didn't perform his duty. Captain Vujasin,
5 now Major, allowed himself to, instead of doing his duty, decide who was
6 to be a director of high school, formed enterprises, and brought people
7 to leading positions, gave orders on taking out the goods from Rajlovac
8 and in that way cause conflict with civilian authorities. And if we drop
9 down a few sentences it says because of the negligence he caused in the
10 brigade, I personally asked for his release which took three months of
11 persuasion with higher command.
12 Now at page 5 of the English, page 5 of the B/C/S. Speaks on the
13 top about the engineering unit, your unit, which was formed in the
14 brigade under the leadership of Vujasin did not show any activity and
15 even the work initiated by the engineer was abandoned, which again
16 pointed to the poor work of the Captain Vujasin. Despite the order not
17 to remove engineering equipment and working machines from the Rajlovac
18 region without the signatures of the president of the municipality and
19 commander of the brigade, Vujasin took most of these technical equipment
20 unauthorised to Pale when leaving for new duty.
21 Sir, isn't it true that at least part of the reason that you were
22 transferred has to do with a number of the comments that we've seen in
23 these most recent documents and has to do with your incompetence and
24 activity in your job? Isn't at that right?
25 A. I wouldn't agree with that. The reason being that my moral
1 beliefs and the law would not allow me to accept any orders from civilian
2 authorities. I had my guidelines provided by the corps command and it
3 was the only thing that I had to act upon. My departure to a new
4 position had to do with the manning of the corps command, because they
5 were short of officers. There weren't any engineer officers there.
6 Milos Voljevic [phoen] arrived in Rajlovac, who was appointed by
7 General Mladic when Bozic insisted, and because they had connections with
8 the general, and it was also done through Mirko Krajisnik and civilian
9 structures, a new person came who replaced me. I stayed for another
10 month and went to the corps command. From the corps command, which is a
11 superior command, one can see problems better, and I could see all of the
12 things that had to do with the municipal structures, and -- but I focused
13 more on other fronts. I left the Rajlovac Brigade for another place
14 which may have caused some revolt. It was their position that the -- the
15 number one man in the municipality was in charge of everything and it
16 encompassed the Muslim population in Sokolje. So the Rajlovac barracks
17 was in between the two ethnic communities and that is why I was portrayed
18 as that kind of person. Perhaps there's no need for me to go any further
19 than that.
20 Q. Thank you, sir.
21 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. West.
24 We'll have a break. Shall we have just 20 minutes' break instead
25 of half an hour?
1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, that's fine, Mr. President. I'm wondering if
2 Ms. West is going to tender any of those documents that she was referring
4 MS. WEST: I'm not.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll resume at 11.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 10.38 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.
8 JUDGE KWON: Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.
9 [Private session]
20 [Open session]
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are in public session again?
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session, yes.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
1 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Colonel.
2 A. Good morning, Mr. President.
3 Q. Today you were asked how you knew about my position on supplying
4 water and electricity and gas to Sarajevo, and you said that
5 Mirko Krajisnik informed you and his brother, Momcilo, of my position.
6 Is this the same Mirko Krajisnik that they wanted to have shot because,
7 together with you, he was protecting Muslim civilians?
8 A. Yes, Mr. President.
9 Q. Thank you. Save for that information you received, were you also
10 familiar with our position through the activities of the army and in
11 public about the fact that civilians have to be -- well, were you aware
12 of our position on providing supplies to the city through some other
14 A. I learned it from Mirko Krajisnik, and I also learned it from
15 other people as well as through the corps command. Humanitarian
16 assistance could never be cut off, and the utilities such as electricity
17 had to be provided to the city because it was a lifeline for it.
18 Q. You were shown a 19th of September document which states that it
19 was most likely that the Serbs cut those off.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have D703, which is dated
21 the 5th of September. I'm afraid this is handwritten. Actually, it was
22 drafted in English.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. I will read it out in English and you will receive an
25 interpretation. It is my letter to Mr. Akashi, your Excellencies,
1 whereby I thank him for his letter of the 3rd of September, and I say the
3 [In English] "Extracts from my speech, to which you refer, have
4 been reported out of context. We do not, at present, intend to impose
5 any sanctions against the Muslims. A decision to introduce such
6 sanctions, moreover, would not affect normal humanitarian aid provided
7 that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not blocking humanitarian aid
8 destined for the Republika Srpska. Since Yugoslavia is imposing economic
9 sanctions against us, we feel entitled to continue commercial sanctions
10 against the Muslims. As you know, however, the policy does not cover
11 gas, water and electricity supplies to the Muslims."
12 [Interpretation] How does this tally with your knowledge of our
13 position vis-a-vis these matters?
14 A. We received this through our command line. The corps command
15 received it, and the commanders conveyed that information to us. I was
16 also aware of it. This was a 1994 document, therefore it was a developed
17 policy which didn't necessarily need to be sent to us. It was customary
18 to provide gas, water and electricity at all times. UNPROFOR was always
19 there intervening whenever there were cuts. They always went to the
20 corps command. We also wanted to make sure that the people carrying out
21 repairs were always safe and accompanied by UNPROFOR.
22 Q. Thank you. What were the most frequent causes of such failures
23 and cuts of supplies to the part of Sarajevo under Muslim control?
24 A. It was mostly due to fire and combat, or, for example, during
25 transfer, for example, from Kakanj.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 1D2462 in e-court.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. This document is dated one day before the document that was shown
5 to you. Coming from the BH command in Zagreb -- actually, from the
6 Zagreb command to New York, to the UN.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 3, please.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. I will read it out.
10 A. Is this the withdrawing -- withdrawal of weapons outside the
11 20-kilometre zone, TEZ?
12 Q. Yes. I will read it out. It was General Michael Rose writing to
13 General Rasim Delic.
14 [In English] "I call on you immediately to halt all military
15 actions being taken by your forces this evening around Sarajevo in
16 contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 836, in breach of the
17 8th [sic] of February 1994 airport agreement and in clear violation of
18 the ultimatum regarding the 20-kilometre total exclusion zone around
19 Sarajevo ...
20 "This fighting is seriously endangering the civilian population
21 in Sarajevo. If the fighting does not stop immediately, then I will be
22 obliged to take all appropriate measures against your forces, including,
23 if necessary, the use of air-strikes. A similar warning has been passed
24 to the other side."
25 [Interpretation] Did it ever happen that there were air-strikes
1 against Muslim forces?
2 A. You mean based on this document?
3 Q. I mean the threat of that nature.
4 A. No.
5 Q. Thank you. Can we have the next page. On the next page we see
6 the same letter except that it was sent to General Ratko Mladic and I was
7 copied. You can see at the bottom, "Copy to Dr. Karadzic."
8 Can we go to the next page -- actually, the last page.
9 This is UN communique for the public. It says the following:
10 [In English] "Lieutenant General Rose, commander of BH command
11 has warned both sides immediately to halt the current serious outbreak of
12 fighting which is taking place in Sarajevo this evening. First reports
13 which include Cymbeline radar analysis, indicate that this fighting was
14 initiated by infantry attacks by BH Army supported by heavy mortars
15 firing from within the city. These initial attack were followed by a
16 Bosnian Serb Army response using heavy weaponry.
17 [Interpretation] The penultimate paragraph:
18 [In English] "The BH command calls on both sides to halt the
19 fighting immediately this fighting is seriously endangering the civilian
20 population in Sarajevo."
21 [Interpretation] In mid September 1994, what kind of effect did
22 this combat have on the life of civilians in terms of electricity and gas
24 A. This combat did not cause any disruption in the provision of
25 utilities to the city. There was nothing to be gained from that so the
1 supply continued whenever it went through the territory of
2 Republika Srpska, especially in the direction of Sarajevo and Reljevo.
3 There were no cuts on that line.
4 Q. Thank you. What impact did it have on the proper functioning and
5 the technicalities of the electricity grid?
6 A. There is a report when SFOR arrived in our Lukavica barracks.
7 They were in contact with Major Indjic. So whenever there were failures,
8 technical disruptions, we tried to have it fixed. I know that on a
9 number of occasions water was cut off and other utilities.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this document.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter number 1D2462 shall be
14 assigned Exhibit D2688. Thank you.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. On page 4, you were asked about snipers, and you mentioned that
17 optical devices were produced in the Zrak factory.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Who controlled the sites and the factory during the war?
20 A. The factory was controlled by the Muslim side in Sarajevo. It
21 was under their control. There were no Serbs there.
22 Q. Thank you. You were asked whether you had sniper shooters, and
23 you said that sights could be mounted on several different types of
24 rifles. Can you explain to us what makes a sniper shooter? In other
25 words, is an optical device a sight sufficient to consider someone a
1 sniper shooter?
2 A. A sniper shooter undergoes special training. This training was
3 carried out by the JNA. However, the VRS, specifically in the
4 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, we did not have even a single platoon of
5 snipers. By mounting a sight on a rifle, that doesn't make a soldier a
6 sniper shooter. I just tried to explain by saying that it improved his
7 accuracy and visibility, but it could only focus -- it could only assist
8 his particular actions.
9 Q. Thank you. Was there a separation line in your area of
10 responsibility of your unit in an urban area and did your soldiers use
11 sights against civilians?
12 A. We were the underdog. We were always lower in terms of
13 elevation. Even if we wanted to, and even if we had the assets, we would
14 not have been able to use them.
15 Q. Thank you. There was some discussion about gas and you mentioned
16 electricity and water. In Sarajevo, save for rifle sights, was there any
17 other kind of war production, military production?
18 A. I don't know. I know that there were shells that they used
19 against us with unconventional charges. Especially I have in mind the
20 bombs or the shells which had stronger charges in order to have a longer
21 trajectory, which also had iron particles, fillings. Now, where they
22 manufacture that is something I don't know, but I do know they had a
23 number of metal industry facilities which could be reoriented towards war
24 production easily.
25 Q. Thank you. To your knowledge, what kind of utility could be used
1 for that kind of production?
2 A. Gas and electricity. One cannot have any kind of industrial
3 production without it, plus the raw material, that is to say metal which
4 needed to be melted. They had ironworks which could produce such means.
5 Before the war, I know there were such facilities that could carry out
6 such production.
7 Q. What kind of electricity? What amount of electricity is needed
8 to melt metal?
9 A. A lot. One needs a lot of energy and electricity.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 1D20700.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Unfortunately, we do not have a translation. A translation
14 request was made, but there was no time to produce a translation.
15 This is the 24th of November 1992. The staff of the
16 Supreme Command is being informed of the activities in the research
18 Can we go to the bottom of the page. Yes.
19 Can you look at the last paragraph --
20 MS. WEST: My apologies for interrupting but I have two
21 objections here. The first is lack of translation. I'm at a complete
22 loss on how to follow this. And, secondly, I can see that this appears
23 to be one of those occasions in redirect where Mr. Karadzic goes through
24 a document without establishing any foundation at all why this witness
25 would know anything about this particular document, and it's an ABiH
1 document, and then at the end ask, Is this consistent with your
2 knowledge. Considering I don't have an English translation at this point
3 I think we have to stop this questioning on the document until we get the
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I agree with Ms. West's observation. You
6 didn't tell us or -- how this arose from the cross-examination or didn't
7 put a foundational question to the witness, but now that witness has read
8 the document already. But what is your question, Mr. Karadzic, not in
9 relation to this document?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that I laid a foundation
11 when I asked whether we released gas and electricity, and now I'm trying
12 to show that this could not have been manufactured had there not been
13 electricity and gas available. I asked about war production and it has
14 to do with Zrak, and then the second question has to do with the
15 consumption of energy that we are allowing into Sarajevo. And that
16 energy is used for manufacturing ammunition, and we're still letting them
17 have this energy, although we know that they're manufacturing ammunition.
18 JUDGE KWON: You are not giving evidence. So your position is
19 that the witness is in the position to answer the question or to know
20 such a situation. Why don't you put -- pose such question to the witness
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think I have done so, Excellency.
23 Does he know that anything else was manufactured for war in addition to
24 optical sights, and he said shells and that that required a great deal of
25 energy, electricity, gas, so on. Now I'm going to ask how much was
1 manufactured during the first year. And this is a Muslim document.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE BAIRD: Dr. Karadzic, I must confess that Ms. -- the
4 submission by Ms. West carries some force in that she is awkwardly
5 placed. She cannot say anything at all about the document and is very,
6 you know, awkwardly placed to comment one way or the other, and I think
7 there is substance in that objection. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We -- the Chamber sustains Ms. West's
9 objection. Move on to another document or another subject.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency. Then I'm
11 going to deal with this some other time. The witness certainly answered
12 that he was aware of this production.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Could you please clarify one thing for us. In that document that
15 refers to Lalic and another person from state security, there is a
16 reference to the brigade commander and the barracks commander. Is this
17 one and the same thing?
18 A. It has to do with me. In that document in one way or the other,
19 it has to do with me; that is to say, a single individual.
20 Q. Thank you. These misunderstandings of military commands with
21 civilian authorities, was that unique to Rajlovac? Are you aware of
22 similar cases?
23 A. This was a specific case only with regard to Rajlovac whereas
24 elsewhere there weren't such problems because this has to do with
25 Rajlovac specifically.
1 Q. Thank you. Did you hear, for example, that from Ilidza also a
2 man, Despotovic --
3 A. Pero? Pero Despotovic --
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I withdraw it. Okay. I withdraw
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Tell me, please, from Rajlovac did you go to a higher or lower
10 A. I went to a higher position.
11 Q. Thank you. As regards the question regarding Ahatovici, you did
12 not complete your answer. You said the situation around Ahatovici was
14 A. The 15th, 16th, 17th of May. From Pofalici most people had
15 remained in the area, in the area of Rajlovac, that is. So this led to
16 panic, dissatisfaction. Quite a few of them were put up at the Rajlovac
17 barracks, women, children, and these men. Now, when refugees came or
18 civilians from Ahatovici, there was a culmination of this hatred. That's
19 why it was necessary to make sure that the situation was resolved as soon
20 as possible. That is that set of circumstances that I refer to.
21 Q. Thank you. On page 18, it was suggested to you -- actually, it
22 was a two-pronged question, that these civilians were detained in
23 different places in Rajlovac and that they were maltreated, and you said
24 that you knew that and that you prevented that.
25 When you said that you knew that, did that have to do with them
1 being detained in Rajlovac?
2 A. They were concentrated near the barracks in Rajlovac, but the
3 original part of the facility --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other
5 microphones please be switched off. We cannot hear the witness.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Thank you. Let us clarify the matter.
8 JUDGE KWON: I don't think the whole answer of the witness was
10 Could you repeat your answer.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Can you repeat your answer.
13 A. The original part of the facility for the civilians that were
14 there, that is to say a special part of the facilities.
15 Q. Thank you. You mentioned Pofalici. Who came to the barracks and
17 A. People who were refugees, women, children, and also men from
18 Pofalici who had fled because they were expelled through Zuc and they had
19 nowhere to go, and then they found shelter in the barracks.
20 Q. What was the ethnicity of these persons from Pofalici?
21 A. Serb ethnicity. I think there were a few Croats there as well.
22 Q. Thank you. What was the ethnicity of these people from
24 A. Muslim ethnicity and religion.
25 Q. Civilians from Ahatovici, were they your prisoners?
1 A. No, no. Because we were making an effort to free them as soon as
3 Q. What was the attitude of the officials of Republika Srpska who
4 happened to be in Rajlovac at that point in time? What was their
5 attitude towards these Muslim civilians?
6 A. Well, I would say that if it weren't for these people and for the
7 professional soldiers, it would have been a mess. These people who were
8 expelled from Pofalici and then these people came and this was total
9 hatred and the people in Pofalici had their houses burned and people
10 killed, and then there were these people from Ahatovici and that would
11 have been a mess.
12 The position was to have this resolved as soon as possible, to
13 have them released so that they could go and that they be given safe
15 Q. Thank you. In the document that refers to crime in Rajlovac, I
16 mean in that document, on page 1 it says there is not enough strength to
17 deal with real criminals. Did you have enough military police to resolve
18 that, and after going to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, were you in a
19 position to initiate changes in the military police or at least to
20 provide information to that effect that there weren't sufficient forces?
21 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, Mr. Vujasin, yes, Ms. West.
22 MS. WEST: Mr. President, I don't know which document that he's
23 talking about, but whichever document it is, this subject matter was not
24 addressed in cross-examination.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, if I could respond to that.
1 She raised the whole issue of his conflicts with the security agency and
2 with other people, and this can explain a reason for that.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 24346 is the document.
4 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. So even in that document --
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, can we have that
8 document, 24346.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Let us take a look at the third paragraph. It says: There are
11 arrests, searches, and for real criminals there is no strength and will
12 to control or even arrest the real criminals. This is the reason why
13 there was an initiative to disband the military police in Rajlovac, and
14 the corps commander General Galic was made aware of that fact.
15 What can you say about this, the third paragraph, the second part
16 of the third paragraph?
17 A. There weren't enough forces to have proper order in the civilian
18 police and the military police both in Rajlovac. People came who had not
19 been cleared properly. I know there was only one professional policeman,
20 civilian policeman. He was Bozic's relative or son-in-law or something
21 like that. And people who joined the police had not been checked
22 properly. Their quality was not checked properly, and I know that
23 soldiers deserted. They took weapons and -- how do I put this? Later on
24 you see them elsewhere in the police. So it -- the situation was not
25 clear. Now, there wasn't enough strength and then there was this chaos,
1 general chaos.
2 Q. Thank you. Who informed the corps commander about this and do
3 you know whether something was done about it?
4 A. The corps commander was made aware of this, and he knew the
5 situation from me personally and from others, and also he toured the
6 area. He sent his units. Sometimes he came on his own, and sometimes he
7 sent others, and he personally had some problems in Ilidza, for instance.
8 In Blazuj, from the commander of the brigade -- or, rather, the
9 Igman Brigade. I personally know that. He was fired at too.
10 Q. Thank you. Was any kind of intervention carried out? Was there
11 any kind of cleansing in the military police? Did anyone do something
12 about this?
13 A. Something was done about this every day in terms of cleansing the
14 police or getting people who were of sound character, or if not then they
15 should be deployed to other units too, and then it was very hard to do
16 that because of the resistance of these people.
17 Q. Thank you. In this stage which ethnic community was the victim
18 of these criminals?
19 A. I would say here that it was people behind the lines that were
20 victims. So it was specifically the Serb side. Everybody that happened
21 to be there in Rajlovac, they were robbed and persons misappropriated
22 property to their own benefit.
23 Q. Thank you. You mentioned the cleansing of Sokolje and Brijesce
24 that you opposed. What do you mean by this cleansing?
25 A. I personally mean -- well, this is a term that came into being
1 during the war in 1992 in our area; that is to say that the territory
2 should be free for freedom of movement in one's own territory. That's
3 what it means. Now, nothing should be out of control. So cleansing
4 means that this police should be cleansed and done up properly, both.
5 Q. Thank you. And who's supposed to be cleansed from the area
6 that's supposed to be cleansed?
7 A. Criminals and those who put up resistance.
8 Q. What about civilians?
9 A. They are not the subject. They are not the subject. However, I
10 must say that to a large degree they are the victims of that.
11 Q. Thank you, Colonel, sir.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I have no
13 further questions.
14 JUDGE KWON: You are not tendering 24346 either. Very well.
15 Then that concludes your evidence, Mr. Vujasin. On behalf of the
16 Chamber, I would like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give
17 it. Now you are free to go, but probably we will rise all together.
18 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I wanted to raise one housekeeping
19 matter before we adjourned.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.
21 Mr. Vujasin, you may be excused. Please make a safe journey home
22 back -- back home.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I can take this?
24 [The witness withdrew]
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. This is a follow-up to a
2 discussion that Mr. Robinson and I had yesterday, and it concerns two
3 witnesses currently scheduled for portions of the later -- the last two
4 days of January. I related to Mr. Robinson that the OTP would have
5 significant difficulties with the appearance of the witnesses on those
6 particular days because of a particular personnel issue. He understood
7 and agreed to reschedule the witnesses but expressed concern about his
8 ability to ensure that any resulting gap was absolutely filled. He
9 certainly intends to do so but couldn't be completely confident that the
10 full time that had originally been scheduled for those witnesses would be
11 filled by other witnesses in the aftermath of the rescheduling. And of
12 course that would not be fair to him and to his team in their effort to
13 very fairly and collegially resolve this problem. So I propose to bring
14 it to the attention of the Court, to let you know explicitly how we
15 intended to resolve this problem so that there would be no recrimination
16 if, in fact, he wasn't successful in fully filling the portions of those
17 two days that had -- when the witnesses were originally schedule. And I
18 hope that's satisfactory with the Court. We appreciate very much the
19 Defence's accommodation in this regard.
20 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber also appreciates the co-ordination of
21 the parties, and I encourage them to resolve it in a very positive way.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. And one last thing, in a
23 courtroom where a remarkable level of civility and collegiality prevails,
24 I think I'd be remiss if I didn't take this opportunity on behalf of the
25 Prosecution to express our best wishes for the holiday season to everyone
1 involved in these proceedings, including the Judge behind the pole. But
2 we certainly express in our heartfelt way our best wishes to everyone.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
4 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Defence would also like to join
6 these greetings for all the coming holidays, and also I should like to
7 express my thanks for taking into account the need that I expressed for
8 the timing of our recess in terms of Orthodox holidays.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I would also like to take this
10 opportunity to express the Chamber's gratitude, sincere gratitude, for
11 the Registry staff, interpreters, court reporters, and the security staff
12 who made it possible for the Chamber to conduct the proceedings in a
13 smooth way. On behalf of the Chamber, I extend to all greetings for a
14 happy holiday season. And amicus curiae.
15 MR. HARVEY: Whatever our designation may be, on behalf of the
16 stand- by team, Your Honours, I wouldn't want to be thought the Scrooge
17 at this feast and not join in the general well-wishes to all. Thank you.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Harvey.
19 The hearing is now adjourned.
20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11.47 a.m.,
21 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 15th day
22 of January, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.