Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 31941

 1                           Wednesday, 16 January 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Good morning, Mr. Hatchett.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Good morning, Mr. Tieger.  Please continue.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Good morning to you and

10     Your Honours.

11                           WITNESS:  RONALD HATCHETT [Resumed]

12                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:  [Continued]

13        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Hatchett.

14        A.   Good morning, sir.

15        Q.   Let me turn to the statement that you provided in written form

16     and let me turn first to that portion of your statement which indicates

17     that Dr. Karadzic told you during your visit that -- and as reflected in

18     the interview you provided, that ethnic cleansing was not a Bosnian Serb

19     policy but instead just a regrettable consequence of a civil war

20     resulting from civilians who were extremist, intimidating or forcing out

21     people of other ethnicities.  I take it that you did not ask him

22     specifically about in particular municipalities and specifically whether

23     forces of the Republika Srpska Army or Republika Srpska police have been

24     represented in those municipalities and that they had been doing in those

25     municipalities at the time.

Page 31942

 1        A.   That's correct, sir.  I was primarily interested in what

 2     Dr. Karadzic's personal opinion was on these issues.  I mean, it was

 3     obvious to anyone who was following what was going on at this time, that

 4     ethnic cleansing had been taking place on the part of all the parties.

 5     Croats cleansed Muslims, Muslims cleansed Croats, and Serbs cleansed

 6     Muslims and Croats and all.  But my primary purpose here was to get a

 7     better insight as to Dr. Karadzic's positions on these things.

 8        Q.   And were you aware then about evidence indicating the

 9     responsibility of organised forces of Republika Srpska, that is the VRS,

10     the Army of Republika Srpska, or the Republika Srpska Ministry of

11     Interior or police for the -- generally termed the ethnic cleansing of

12     other ethnicities?

13        A.   I was not aware specifically of incidents where the regular Army

14     of Republika Srpska was involved in ethnic cleansing at this time.  This

15     is in September of 1994.  My impression was most of the ethnic cleansing

16     was being done by these militia-type groups like Arkan's Tigers and other

17     type of groups like that.  I was not aware of the specifics of any

18     incidents involving the regular troops of the Republika Srpska.

19        Q.   I'm not going to go into a great deal of detail, but this

20     Trial Chamber over the course of many months of trial has heard a great

21     deal of evidence about events in municipalities and has heard evidence

22     about the role of both the VRS and the Republika Srpska police in the --

23     in force exerted against other ethnic groups.  So let me ask you quickly

24     about just a few of those examples.

25             The Chamber has heard evidence, for example, that in the Prijedor

Page 31943

 1     municipality in north-west Bosnia that in late May the military forces of

 2     Republika Srpska attacked a large Muslim settlement called Kozarac.

 3     Thousands of civilians were rounded up.  Hundreds were killed, and there

 4     was massive destruction in the area as reflected in both eyewitness

 5     testimony and contemporaneous documents of the VRS that this

 6     Trial Chamber has received.  Were you aware of that when you prepared

 7     your statement?

 8        A.   No, sir, I was not aware of that.  But again, what I would point

 9     out was I don't doubt that these kind of incidents took place, but as I

10     said, the important thing that I was trying to elicit in my interviews

11     with Dr. Karadzic is to what extent those incidents reflected the

12     policies or the values of Dr. Karadzic.  I don't doubt that there are

13     those that have served and many have already been tried by this Tribunal,

14     and the Tribunal has found evidence sufficient to convict them of these

15     kind of things, but my question would be whether or not Dr. Karadzic had

16     a role in causing those military actors to act in the way that they did.

17        Q.   I -- I trust you would agree, however, that it would be somewhat

18     easier and more accurate to assess the reliability, credibility, or

19     accuracy of any representations that Dr. Karadzic might make about that

20     policy if you knew what the forces under his control had actually been

21     doing in the municipalities; correct?

22        A.   Well, that's -- the assumption once again, that you just made,

23     that is -- it was that those forces were under his control.  My

24     impression that I have --

25        Q.   Okay.  I want you to finish your answer, but I take it you would

Page 31944

 1     agree with the general premise of the point I made, that if you knew

 2     that --

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   -- it would help you assess.

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Now, please finish your answer.

 7        A.   Now, what I was saying is that my impression from what I observed

 8     there was that there was not a very close working relationship between

 9     the political side of the Republika Srpska and the military side.  My

10     impression was that the military somehow believed that they were an

11     entity unto themselves and they didn't necessarily have to -- to the

12     extent that we are used to in the West, submit themselves to the control

13     of the civilian authorities.  So once again, you know, I would raise the

14     issue of whether or not -- I can see a situation where Dr. Karadzic could

15     have a certain view on these kind of activities and military commanders

16     that theoretically were under his control but not actually, de facto

17     under his control, would have a different point of view on those issues.

18     So that -- that was again why I was focusing on what do you,

19     Radovan Karadzic, think about this.

20             I mean, I had this on videotape for two reasons.  One, I was

21     under contract at this time as an international affairs advisor to a

22     television station in Houston which served an area of about 5 million

23     homes, which was the fourth largest television coverage area in the

24     United States, and I wanted to give them a chance to hear from supposedly

25     the horse's mouth on what they -- what Dr. Karadzic believed about these

Page 31945

 1     things.  So to get him on record saying the things that he had said, it

 2     would seem to me was a valuable way of letting the American people have a

 3     good idea about the nature of the man running the Serbian Republic at

 4     that time.

 5             And the other thing about this is I took these video-tapes and

 6     turned them over to my acquaintances in the Central Intelligence Agency,

 7     and it gave them a chance to judge for themselves, looking at his body

 8     language, the way in which he said certain things, to judge for

 9     themselves what his veracity was on these kinds of issues.

10        Q.   I take it in addition that Dr. Karadzic did not mention to you at

11     that time, nor did you inquire specifically about events in the Zvornik

12     municipality; is that right?

13        A.   That is correct.

14        Q.   So you weren't aware, as this Trial Chamber has received

15     evidence, that after a long period of pressure, Republika Srpska military

16     officials, military vehicles, tanks, took positions while RS officials

17     told the Muslims of Kozluk that they had a very short time to gather

18     themselves and leave and that transportation would be provided for that

19     purpose, resulting in the expulsion of nearly 2.000 people.  And I take

20     it he didn't tell you that only a relatively few days later he, that is

21     Dr. Karadzic, met with local officials in Zvornik who told him that, "We

22     were most active in evicting the Muslims," and, "We have successfully

23     implemented the President's decision to settle Divic and Kozluk with our

24     children."  And that can be found at P1478, pages 246 through 254.  Is

25     that correct, sir?

Page 31946

 1        A.   That is correct.  I was not aware of that, but once again I would

 2     just raise the issue of to what extent was this all initiated at the

 3     decision of the -- President Karadzic and to what extent was it carried

 4     out independently by the Serbian military.

 5        Q.   I trust you would agree that had you had the information I just

 6     gave you that is before this Trial Chamber that might have assisted you

 7     in making [overlapping speakers] --

 8        A.   Well, certainly.  I would have asked a follow-up question then:

 9     How do you explain just -- what you just quoted me, but having no

10     knowledge of it I didn't that follow-up.

11        Q.   Let me turn to some aspects of the proposal that he advanced to

12     you.  Among other things, he indicated that his proposal would include

13     the fact that Bosnia would remain a single country; correct?

14        A.   Correct.

15        Q.   And that's contained at paragraph 16 of your statement where you

16     provide some of the details?

17        A.   That is correct.

18        Q.   Were you aware that this was and had been throughout -- from

19     before the war, throughout the course of the conflict during

20     negotiations, a consistent position and demand by the international

21     community?

22        A.   Yes.  I was aware of that.  It showed to me that he was willing

23     to accept and incorporate into his concept of ending this many of the

24     ideas.  For example, the 49/51 split of territory was also something that

25     was in the international community proposal of the Contact Group plan,

Page 31947

 1     whereas at this time, I think about 72 per cent of the territory of

 2     Bosnia was under the control of the Serbian military.  And so he was

 3     saying, "I am willing to back away from this 72 per cent and go back to

 4     the 49 per cent as you have asked for in the Contact Group plan."

 5        Q.   Well, were you also aware that while Dr. Karadzic was

 6     acknowledging the position and demand of the international community, in

 7     this proposal he was also steadfastly maintaining to his subordinates and

 8     associates that the ultimate objective of Republika Srpska was

 9     unification with Serbia?

10        A.   I'm not aware that it was unification with Serbia proper.  I am

11     aware that he wanted a contiguous territory of Bosnia to be part of the

12     Republika Srpska.  I am aware that he wanted close ties with Serbs in the

13     Krajina and that he wanted close ties with the Serbs inside of Serbia.

14             As far as union, I was not aware of that.

15        Q.   Okay.  So you weren't aware of such evidence as in -- as this

16     Chamber has received as close to your discussion as the 9th much January,

17     1994, where he said, "Our goal is to unite with Serbia."  That's P5525 at

18     page 12.  Or January 17th, 1994, where he said to the Assembly, "Our goal

19     of unification is still valid."  And that's P1387.  Or when he responded

20     later that year or at the beginning of 1995 when accused of squandering

21     the chance to get a Greater Serbia, that "nothing has been squandered."

22     Instead he explained that we're in a tug-of-war with the international

23     community and the rope is on our side and every day we pull it one

24     millimetre to our side.  That's P1405, pages 148 through 149.  You were

25     not aware of that?

Page 31948

 1        A.   I was not aware of the specifics that you just quoted, but once

 2     again, I would point out that what he had made and asked me to take to

 3     our governmental authorities was a proposal, and that proposal would

 4     necessarily involve compromise, which would have involved backing away

 5     from some of the positions maybe that he had established previously and

 6     accepting some of the positions that the international community had had

 7     in their proposals previously.  And it also would have involved the

 8     international community accepting some new realities in the settlement

 9     that they had heretofore not accepted.  For example, the main issue that

10     I saw was that especially the United States had been pressing for a

11     unitary state in Bosnia, that is with a single government in Sarajevo

12     that would control the whole of the territory of Bosnia, whereas

13     Dr. Karadzic's proposal was for a federal Republic of Bosnia, a single

14     Bosnia, but with two constituent parts.

15        Q.   Thank you, Doctor.  And just by way of trying to make our

16     discussion a little bit more efficient because I have limited time, I

17     appreciate that the question involved the issue of negotiations

18     generally, but I had simply been focused on the issue of the unification

19     issue, so I'll ask you to just focus on the questions I ask and we'll

20     either get there or Dr. Karadzic will have a chance to ask you questions

21     in redirect.  Only in the interests of time, sir.

22        A.   All right.

23        Q.   Otherwise, I would be happy to invite an expansive discussion?

24        A.   I knew that there was discussion about unification of all of the

25     Serbian peoples, just as there was discussion at this time by the Croats

Page 31949

 1     about unification of all the Croat peoples.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Now you had referred a moment ago to the amount of

 3     territory the Serbian forces held as being approximately 72 per cent.

 4     You refer to that in your statement as well and also refer to the

 5     characterization of the proposal that Dr. Karadzic made which included

 6     the 51/49 per cent split action generous.

 7             Now, would you agree that the generosity of such an offer would

 8     at least depend upon the -- who lived on the land that was under the

 9     control of the Republika Srpska forces before the war and how that

10     territory was taken?  That would have some effect on whether it was a

11     generous offer or not?

12        A.   Yes.  But again if you look at the maps of the census prior to

13     the war, about 60 per cent of the territory of Bosnia was identified as

14     predominantly Serb in occupation.

15        Q.   Let me look quickly at the map that you provided.  That's D2743,

16     I believe.

17             Can I take it that when looking at the eastern side of the

18     country that those areas in green are supposed to be representation of

19     Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa?

20        A.   That is correct.

21        Q.   Okay.  And the rest of the territory in Eastern Bosnia is

22     territory controlled by the forces of Republika Srpska?

23        A.   Well, it's territory that Dr. Karadzic proposed be part of

24     Republika Srpska.

25        Q.   Okay.

Page 31950

 1        A.   Excuse me.  If I could point out, this is a map that I made

 2     after -- for presentations effects.  The actual map that Dr. Karadzic

 3     gave me was a 1:250000 scale map which was much more accurate than what

 4     is depicted here, and it was that map that I gave to the American

 5     government that they used.  I have moved about five times since this

 6     occurred and I could not locate the map, but the US government had copies

 7     of a map that was much more detailed than what we see in this exhibit

 8     here.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Dr. Karadzic was seeking that territory plus a trade for

10     Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zep.  But do you know the demographic breakdown

11     of Srebrenica and Gorazde?

12        A.   Yeah.  At this time these were heavily Muslim areas, but what he

13     was trying to do was to avoid the islands of Muslims embedded inside

14     of -- of Republika Srpska, because he assumed that those would -- those

15     people would rather be part of the Bosnian Muslim Croat federation, and

16     that's why the green that you see around Sarajevo was the territory that

17     he was willing to trade where there was significant Serbian population.

18     He was willing to trade that territory to the Muslims for the territories

19     in those three enclaves in the east.

20        Q.   Did you know the demographic -- demographics of many of the other

21     municipalities in Eastern Bosnia, in that area; Zvornik, Vlasenica,

22     Bratunac, Visegrad, Rogatica, Foca?  Did you know those before the war?

23        A.   Yes, I knew that.

24        Q.   And did you know that they were predominantly Muslim?

25        A.   Yes, I knew that.  I knew that these existed.

Page 31951

 1        Q.   And do you know what Dr. Karadzic said about why those

 2     municipalities came under the control of the Republika Srpska forces?

 3        A.   No.

 4        Q.   Well, he said the following in front of the Bosnian Serb

 5     Assembly.  That's P00988.

 6             "To tell the truth, there are towns that we grabbed for ourselves

 7     and there were only 30 per cent.  I can name as many of those as you

 8     want, but we cannot give up the towns we made up 70 per cent.  Don't let

 9     this get around, but remember how many of us there were in Bratunac, how

10     many in Srebrenica, how many in Visegrad, how much in Rogatica, how much

11     in Vlasenica, in Zvornik, et cetera?  Due to strategic importance they

12     had to become ours, and no one is practically questioning it any more."

13             Did he tell you that?

14        A.   No, sir, he didn't tell me that.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now, did he -- now, did he also mention that he and

16     other Bosnian Serb officials such as Momcilo Krajisnik had insisted that

17     that area, the Eastern Bosnia area, the Podrinje area, had to be cleaned;

18     that is, had to be Serbian?

19        A.   He wanted that territory to be part of Republika Srpska.  That's

20     what I understood.  And it would have involved trading territories and

21     which would imply movement of populations.

22        Q.   Okay.  And did you know that from 19 -- from as early as 1992,

23     that efforts had been undertaken and directives had been issued to

24     achieve the removal of Muslim population from that area so it could be

25     under Serb control?

Page 31952

 1        A.   Yes, I knew that some Muslims had been taken from that area, yes.

 2        Q.   But I'm -- I'm asking you if you were aware, as this

 3     Trial Chamber has heard evidence, that when -- that Dr. Karadzic not only

 4     acknowledged the objective of ensuring that this area was Serbian but had

 5     discussed that matter with his military forces and that directives and

 6     that orders were issued to achieve that by the military?

 7        A.   I was not aware that Dr. Karadzic gave the orders to the military

 8     for that to occur.

 9        Q.   So you were not aware that as early as 8 November, 1992,

10     Dr. Karadzic met with General Mladic and his corps commanders.  That

11     there was a discussion about which strategic objectives had been

12     achieves.  For example, the Posavina Corridor, and which had not, that is

13     the cleansing of the Podrinje area or Drina area, that's P1481, at pages

14     146 through 147.  And at that same month a directive was issued which

15     provided that one of the corps of the Army of Republika Srpska had the

16     responsibility to inflict the heaviest losses on the enemy forces in the

17     wider Podrinje area and force them to leave the areas with the Muslim

18     population.  You weren't aware of that?

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I think that in order

20     to be fair, Mr. Tieger should alert the witness to whether that directive

21     that he's referring to was something that was signed or authored by

22     Dr. Karadzic, because he's presenting this as if Dr. Karadzic had done

23     that, and in fact I think we know from the evidence that that's not the

24     case.

25             MR. TIEGER:

Page 31953

 1        Q.   Were you also aware that Dr. Karadzic had acknowledged in

 2     Assembly sessions that he, as had General Mladic, that he was aware of

 3     the directives, not to mention the fact that he was present at that

 4     November 8th session?  Were you aware of that?

 5        A.   Well, I know that -- you know, he was in the midst of a war, and

 6     I know that he was a politician, and I know that a politician to stay in

 7     power has to appeal to his constituency, and my point simply is this:

 8     The fighting was going on.  There were similar types of things that you

 9     just described the Serbs having done that were done to the Serbs by

10     Muslims, by Croats, in territories that they were trying to make more

11     ethnically pure as well.  So this was being done in a three-way type of

12     activity, and it is a tragedy, a real tragedy that this was going on.

13     But my point simply is that he was bold enough to recognise that this

14     can't go on, and he was -- and he made a proposal to try to end this kind

15     of activity on the parts of all the parties by coming to a negotiated

16     settlement.

17             And if you take a look at what you proposed in September of 1994

18     and compare it to the Dayton plan that actually ended the fighting, then

19     they're very similar.  What happened was the US government and its

20     Western Allies pocketed his proposal in September of 1994 and brought it

21     out again in 1995 when the offensives by the Muslim armies weren't being

22     as successful as they had hoped, but you know, what I'm saying is I'm not

23     aware of a lot of things that were going on in the areas of the Croats

24     and the Muslims either in terms of crimes against other ethnic groups.

25        Q.   Well, did Dr. Karadzic tell you during the course of these

Page 31954

 1     discussions and the proposal about which you some to be giving him a

 2     great deal of credit, that he'd been told and had reason to understand

 3     that the attainment of half of the territory or nearly half of the

 4     territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a singular achievement, in fact

 5     a fairly unprecedented achievement, because of the ethnic cleansing that

 6     had taken place?

 7        A.   I'm not sure I understand what you're saying.

 8        Q.   Well, he related, for example, to the Assembly, that is Bosnian

 9     Serb parliament, how a British diplomat had told -- had asked him the

10     other day why he wasn't acting triumphant, that in spite of the

11     aggression, in spite of the ethnic cleansing, in spite of the atrocities,

12     the crimes committed by your soldiers, that you are before the moment

13     when the international community will recognise the results of your

14     fight.  Naturally you cannot get off the hook of 51/49 per cent, but how

15     can you not realise that those 49 per cents are a great result and, as

16     Dr. Karadzic said, a great victory of ours?

17        A.   Well, again, that sounds like a political statement.  How can you

18     say that if you started out with 60 per cent and you're now going to

19     settle for 49 per cent that was a great victory.  I think that was a

20     political statement to try to put the best face on a proposal that he

21     believed would ultimately solve the fighting that was going on in that

22     region.

23        Q.   And he also told the Assembly that that was the first time in

24     history that a country was torn apart after recognition and that the

25     international community would accept it.  By the way, those two cites are

Page 31955

 1     P1390, page 39, and P1385, pages 114 through 115.

 2        A.   Well, I would just say that 49/51 split is incorporated in the

 3     current situation in the country.  So he was correct.

 4        Q.   By the way, just to clarify something that was raised by

 5     Mr. Robinson and which I also presume you're not aware of, and I wouldn't

 6     have asked you otherwise, this Trial Chamber in respect of the directive

 7     I read to you, this Trial Chamber's also received evidence that that

 8     directive was verbally approved by Dr. Karadzic.  I take it that's -- you

 9     didn't know about the directive and you didn't know about his approval of

10     it; is that correct?

11        A.   That's correct.

12        Q.   And that's D2149 for purposes of the record.  I think e-court

13     page 13.

14             Now, at the time you were talking to Dr. Karadzic, obviously

15     Srebrenica and Gorazde and Zepa were still not under the full control of

16     the Republika Srpska forces; correct?

17        A.   That's correct.

18        Q.   And that's why you were seeking that trade?

19        A.   That's correct.

20        Q.   Did he describe this to you as he did to the Assembly, that

21     talking about the successful operations in 1992 and then saying, well,

22     after that, that is after packing -- "Packing Muslims in small areas," or

23     "thus achieving their concentration, we couldn't do more."  Did he tell

24     you that?

25        A.   No, he didn't tell me that.

Page 31956

 1        Q.   That's P988, pages 64 through 65.

 2             Now, were you aware at roughly the same time, that is in 1994,

 3     the Contact Group proposal had been -- was underway and had been advanced

 4     to the parties and was under -- had been under discussion?

 5        A.   Yes, of course.  I was aware of it.

 6        Q.   And I take it you were aware that the Contact Group proposal had

 7     not been accepted by Republika Srpska in part because it didn't provide

 8     for the territories that the Bosnian Serbs desired?

 9        A.   That's correct.

10        Q.   Do you know what Dr. Karadzic said about what would happen or

11     what should happen if the Contact Group proposal was not accepted?

12        A.   No.

13        Q.   Okay.  Well, at P1394, in roughly the middle part of 1994, he

14     said, "We have to --" if that plan was not accepted, "We have to prepare

15     ourselves according to the wish of our enemy.  Be ready for -- to make

16     intensive life-and-death war 'until his complete defeat or until our

17     defeat and expulsion from these territories.'"  And he went on to say,

18     "In case of his victory, our enemy would not be generous nor merciful but

19     merciless and ready for our extinction.  Therefore, if we do not accept

20     the plan, we have to accept the logic of our enemy and defeat him

21     mercilessly leaving the mercy after the victory."

22             You didn't discuss that with Dr. Karadzic, I take it.

23        A.   Well, I did.  You know, once again, this is a wartime situation.

24     This is a politician talking to other politicians and to his

25     constituencies.  All I know is that I personally observed Dr. Karadzic

Page 31957

 1     becoming very short, if not irate, when General Tolimir kept pushing and

 2     pushing in the discussions we were having one evening for us -- for me in

 3     particular to agree as a military man that the best solution the Serbs

 4     could hope for was a military victory by overrunning Sarajevo.  And

 5     Dr. Karadzic, as I said, almost in anger cut him off, saying listen, I am

 6     not going to agree for an all-out attack on a major populated area like

 7     this with the intendant loss of life that would occur on all sides when

 8     we know we're not going to be able to keep that territory in a negotiated

 9     outcome.

10             So you know, this was a private, without the politicians around,

11     without a constituency around, this was a private meeting of military and

12     top leadership and the visitors.

13        Q.   A private meeting with a visitor or more visitors from the United

14     States present?

15        A.   Yes, with me present, one other American present -- no, two other

16     Americans present, and two British.

17        Q.   Well, you've just told me about the quote I read you from

18     Dr. Karadzic about being merciless in attaining the objectives that you

19     considered that that might be only a political statement, but are you

20     aware of fact that some months later Dr. Karadzic issued and signed a

21     document known as Directive 7, which included the language:

22             "By planned and well-thought out combat operations, create an

23     unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival

24     or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica or Zepa."

25             Were you aware of that?

Page 31958

 1        A.   I'm not aware of that.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now as a final matter I'd like to turn to the issue

 3     of what Dr. Karadzic told you about the -- what would happen at the end

 4     of the war and the supposed obligation as he considered it of all three

 5     republics, to enable the refugees who wished to come back to their homes

 6     to do so.

 7             First of all, were you aware of the fact that Dr. Karadzic often

 8     spoke of the demographic threat presented by Muslims, that is that they

 9     had a high birth rate and would overwhelm the -- the Serbs were at risk

10     of being demographically overrun by Muslims.

11        A.   Yes.  And I knew that that was the concern of many Serbs and also

12     of the Croats, because -- and that's why both the Serbs and the Croats

13     initially opposed the idea of a unitary state in Bosnia, because they

14     knew that that meant inevitably domination by a Muslim portion of the

15     population, which already had the plurality and would move to a majority

16     very quickly.

17        Q.   We discussed earlier the rejection of the Contact Group proposal.

18     Were you aware that one of the objections by the Bosnian Serbs to the

19     Contact Group proposal was the fact that it provided that there would be

20     no border controls on the borders between the entities and therefore for

21     freedom of movement of goods, services, and persons throughout the union?

22     That was considered a problem as -- by the Bosnian Serbs?

23        A.   Well, I knew that the Bosnian Serbs wanted control of the borders

24     of their entity, but that's as far as I knew.

25        Q.   Right.  Within the country.  So that would mean that they would

Page 31959

 1     be able to control not only the movement of goods and services but the

 2     movement of Muslims or Croats into the Serbian entity; correct?

 3        A.   Theoretically, yes, that would be correct.

 4        Q.   And were you aware that Dr. Karadzic, since 1992, had been --

 5     that is since the issue of possible constituent units within

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina had been discussed, have been stressing the need for

 7     those borders, that the borders of the Serbian entity, the Bosnian Serb

 8     entity, to be as wide, to be as big, and as thick as possible; that is,

 9     to be as impenetrable as possible.  Were you aware of that?

10        A.   I'm not sure I understand what you mean by that.

11        Q.   Well, this Court has received evidence that Dr. Karadzic had said

12     about the Bosnian Serbs entity that the -- that the -- having -- that the

13     external borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina would not be a problem because

14     they would strive to make the borders of the Bosnian Serb entity as wide

15     as possible, that is to have as big an entity as possible, and to have

16     them as thick as possible, that is to make them as -- to have as much

17     control over who came in as they could?

18        A.   All I know is that he was willing to settle for 49 per cent of

19     the territory, and as long as he was given control over the borders of

20     that territory.  That's what I knew.

21        Q.   And those references are at D88 and D456 for the benefit of the

22     Court.

23             Now --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Tieger.

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 31960

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3        Q.   And finally, Mr. Hatchett, I wanted to ask you if you were aware

 4     that -- because you talked about Dr. Karadzic's acknowledgement of the

 5     requirements about the international community or the conditions demanded

 6     by the international community, if you were aware of his explanation of

 7     the need to give the impression that the Bosnian Serbs agreed with the

 8     right of return as well as an explanation of how to frustrate that right

 9     of return?

10        A.   I'm not aware of anything like that.

11        Q.   Well, this Trial Chamber has received evidence that Dr. Karadzic

12     discussed that on more than one occasion.  So on one occasion in 1994,

13     that's in -- that's P1385 at pages 126 through 127, when one of the

14     officials said, "What I would really like to see here is a firm attitude

15     that the Muslims and Croats will not be allowed to return to the areas

16     under our rule."

17             Dr. Karadzic explained that they would not be in a position to

18     ban the return of refugees and in principle all refugees could return,

19     but that he would therefore add one sentence to the proposal, "This also

20     has to be a two-way process."  And that means that the Muslims, for

21     example, from Prijedor, could only return to Prijedor if the Serbs now in

22     Zvornik return to Zenica.  And he discussed that again at P13 -- at P988,

23     at page 29, when the same issue was raised about the right of return, and

24     he said:

25             "That's our intention, to say all right, everyone has the right

Page 31961

 1     to return to his home after the war if that is an overall process.  What

 2     does that mean, an overall process?  That means that the Muslims from

 3     Kozluk can return to Kozluk if the Serbs from Kozluk return to Zenica.

 4     If they don't want to return -- if they cannot return, then we need a new

 5     war to exchange that, and that's why I think we should always insist on

 6     this.  So an overall process, either overall or none at all.  We can act

 7     the Serbian Cyrillic way and tell it to their face or we can be a bit

 8     cunning.  We do have to be a bit cunning."

 9             Were you aware that while Dr. Karadzic was acknowledging to you

10     the right of return that he was discussing ways to frustrate them?

11        A.   Well, that's your interpretation of what that meant, but my

12     interpretation of it is that he was saying that it has -- the policies

13     have to be the same for all peoples.  If the Muslims are going to have

14     the right to return to their homes inside of Serbian territory, then

15     Serbs also have to have the right to return to their homes inside the

16     territory of the Muslims or the Croats.  That's an interpretation that I

17     think is equally valid.

18        Q.   All right.  And you find that to be --

19        A.   You find that to be logical.

20        Q.   And you find that to be cunning as well; is that right?

21        A.   No.  I find it to be logical.

22        Q.   No, but Dr. -- I'll leave it at that, Mr. Hatchett.  Thank you

23     for responding to my questions.

24             MR. TIEGER:  I have nothing further, Mr. President.

25             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

Page 31962

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Mr. Karadzic, do you have

 2     re-examination?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a few questions.  Good morning

 4     to everybody.

 5                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 6        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Hatchett.

 7        A.   Good morning.

 8        Q.   I would like you to tell the Chamber who Mr. James Bissett is.

 9     He was mentioned yesterday during the cross-examination.

10        A.   James Bissett is the former Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Were you aware of our Serbian position on the

12     resolution of the Bosnian crisis before the war and without the war?  Did

13     you know anything about the Lisbon agreement, what we were prepared to

14     do, what we were prepared to accept in order to avoid a war?

15        A.   I understand that in the Lisbon agreement, that the European

16     Union was able to put together an agreement by all three of the ethnic

17     groups, the Croats, the Serbs, and the Muslims, to divide Bosnia into

18     ethnic -- ethnic enclaves of autonomy for each one of the three ethnic

19     groups, is my understanding of what it consisted of.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that at that time in peacetime we

21     accepted for Republika Srpska not to have a territorial continuity and

22     that it should account for only and not more than 44 per cent of the

23     territory?

24        A.   I knew that it was only 44 per cent of the territory, yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Do you understand that priorities and strategic goals

Page 31963

 1     change in wartime as opposed to what was supposed to be --

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Objection.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   -- a good solution in peacetime?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.  I realise that we have been out of court for

 7     some period of time, but the practice of leading questions apparently has

 8     persisted since last year.

 9             THE ACCUSED:  I accept it.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   In that case, I will change direction.  Dr. Hatchett, would you

13     know what was the ethnic composition of the municipalities of Drvar,

14     Bosanska Grahovo, and Glamoc.

15        A.   No, sorry, I don't know the ethnic composition of those.

16        Q.   You were shown a map yesterday, and you saw that those were

17     municipalities that are part of the Republika Srpska.  Did you know that

18     in 1995, we agreed that those municipalities should be in the Federation

19     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although Drvar has a 100 per cent Serbian

20     population, Grahovo has a 75 per cent Muslim population?  Do you remember

21     that, and do you know that they still belong to the Federation of Bosnia

22     and Herzegovina, i.e., the Muslim federation?

23        A.   I know that they're in the Muslim federation today, yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Early today Mr. Tieger quoted me saying that Zvornik

25     and Bratunac would remain in the Republika Srpska, although they had a

Page 31964

 1     majority Muslim populations.  I have to make sure that my question's not

 2     leading.  However, do you accept that under the conditions when I

 3     accepted Drvar, Glamoc, and Grahovo would not be in Republika Srpska, I

 4     had to say something to my MPs in order to heal their wounds after having

 5     heard that?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  I think everyone in the courtroom was aware that

 8     that was -- if it was indeed an attempt to avoid a leading question, it

 9     was singularly unsuccessful.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Very well.  Let me put a general question to the witness.

12     Dr. Hatchett were you able to assess the sum of the sentences spoken in

13     the Assembly before my voters were political speeches, that that was

14     their nature?  What do you think?  If somebody gives a statement like

15     that when MPs have to be persuaded to accept a political agreement,

16     wouldn't you say that this is a kind of political speech a politician

17     delivers normally?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, that's a leading question, but the

19     witness said to the effect that that's a political speech.  I don't see

20     the point of your question here.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I have no further

22     questions.

23             Thank you very much, Dr. Hatchett, for having made an effort to

24     come here and testify in this courtroom.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.  Unless my colleagues have

Page 31965

 1     questions for you -- yes, Judge Morrison has a question for you.

 2                           Questioned by the Court:

 3             JUDGE MORRISON:  This is just curiosity as much as anything else,

 4     Dr. Hatchett.

 5        A.   Yes.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  I was just wondering what stimulated your

 7     initial interest in the Balkan area?

 8        A.   Well, I was a serving military officer, and I was sent back for a

 9     Ph.D. to become a political military affairs officer in Washington and I

10     was specialising in Eastern Europe, and the only Communist country that I

11     could study or visit was Yugoslavia, and so in 1976 as part of my

12     doctoral work, I went to the University of Zagreb and studied for a

13     summer semester, and that got me interested in this -- this region during

14     that time period.

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.  It's -- I have to say [realtime

16     transcript read in error "Sarajevo Romanija Corps"] I many years ago had

17     a similar experience.  The British military wasn't allowed to travel

18     anywhere except Yugoslavia as well.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Dr. Hatchett.  That concludes your

20     evidence.

21             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  On behalf of this Chamber, I'd like to thank you for

23     your coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you're free to go.

24             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

25                           [The witness withdrew]

Page 31966

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, while -- thank you very much,

 2     Dr. Hatchett.  I neglected to introduce to the Chamber our intern, so

 3     with us during this session is our legal intern Katherine Connolly from

 4     the University of Sydney, Australia.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  My understanding is there's a change in the order of

 6     witnesses for today, Mr. Robinson.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We're ready to call the next

 8     witness, Vere Hayes, who has a flight out this afternoon, so we moved him

 9     up in the batting order one person.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  So before -- before he's brought in, can

11     we hear from Mr. Karadzic about the relevance issue, Mr. Pljevaljcic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Before that, on page

13     24, line 24, I have a correction on the transcript.  I can read here the

14     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps as something that Judge Morrison said.  I think

15     he said, "I have to say," and not the "Sarajevo-Romanija Corps."  So I

16     kindly ask for this to be corrected.

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  As mistakes go, it's pretty fundamental.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I believe that

20     you're absolutely right.  Too much importance has been given to the

21     Focatrans crisis.  However, there is a certain deal of relevance insofar

22     as this happened before the elections and it was part of the plan that

23     was published in the "Vox" magazine published in Foca, and that plan was

24     about the future treatment of the Serbs.  With your leave, I could leave

25     that live with the witness, and then the relevant paragraphs could be

Page 31967

 1     deleted, and those are paragraphs from 2 through 16, I believe.  Because

 2     that crisis was a trigger for many subsequent events that nobody either

 3     wanted or ordered.  They simply happened.  They simply arose from that

 4     crisis.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  That sounds -- yes, Mr. Tieger.  Yes, I'll

 6     hear from you first.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Sure, Mr. President.  And I'm not trying to make a

 8     bigger fuss about the Focatrans incident, and this would truly be a storm

 9     in a teacup, I think, if I took too much time, but just want to indicate

10     that I might have some trouble grasping the -- I mean, if it's -- if it's

11     not relevant, I don't see how leading it live makes it relevant.  And I

12     had the impression that Dr. Karadzic somehow thinks that that problem is

13     cured by doing it in that fashion.  I -- I can't see that that's the

14     case.

15             Now, if somehow he intends to elicit evidence that he thinks then

16     makes it relevant, that's a different story, but as -- as reflected in

17     his comments, it -- it seems that it's -- it's not in any way a solution

18     to a problem the Court has raised.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Any response, Mr. Robinson.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, I actually made the same point to

21     Dr. Karadzic when we spoke, and I think perhaps the best solution is to

22     redact those paragraphs.  And if Dr. Karadzic wants to ask questions,

23     they can be objected to by the Prosecution and you could rule on them at

24     that time.

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 31968

 1             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber agrees with Mr. Robinson's observation.

 2     We'll order the paragraphs from 2 to 15 to be redacted.  And I understood

 3     Mr. Karadzic's submission that this statement is too much detail, so he

 4     may ask a question, if necessary, to the extent necessary.  So we'll see

 5     that question formulated and then whether it is objectionable or not is a

 6     matter to be dealt with when it arises.

 7             Yes.  Let's bring in the next witness.

 8             So are you ready, Ms. -- do you have more time to prepare for

 9     Ms. Edgerton?

10             MR. TIEGER:  We managed to log off during the interview.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12                           [The witness entered court]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, sir.

14             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Would you make a solemn declaration, please.

16             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

17     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Hayes, please make yourself

19     comfortable.

20                           WITNESS:  VERE HAYES

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

23        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

24        A.   Good morning.

25        Q.   In the course of proofing, did you give a statement to my Defence

Page 31969

 1     team?

 2        A.   I did.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Can I now call up in e-court 1D05682.  Is this the

 4     statement that you see on the screen?  We don't need two copies of it.

 5        A.   It is.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read it and signed it?

 7        A.   I have.

 8        Q.   Does this statement accurately reflect your words?

 9        A.   It does.

10        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today here

11     in court, would your answers substantially be the same?

12        A.   They would.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies may I tender the

15     statement into evidence pursuant to Rule 92 ter.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll admit his Rule 92 ter statement.  Shall

17     we give the number for that.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  It shall be assigned Exhibit D2745.  Thank you.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, with respect to the associated

20     exhibits, there's a number of them.  Some have already been admitted, but

21     they're contained at page 4 of the revised Rule 92 ter package.  None of

22     them need to be added to our 65 ter list, but one of them, 1D3803, should

23     be admitted under seal because of the Rule 70 conditions by the provider.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Ms. Edgerton, with respect to

25     associated exhibits?

Page 31970

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  No, but I think that 1D3803 is already exhibited

 2     as D190.  I think.  Under seal.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I haven't checked the items that have

 4     been already admitted with the revised notification.  Could you go one by

 5     one which you are tendering?

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  Yes, Mr. President.  It might be easier to

 7     go -- to let you know the ones we're not tendering, but -- there's just a

 8     few, but whichever way --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we go through which items that you are

10     tendering.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Okay.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The first item I take it is 65 ter 6911?

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Actually, the first item that we're tendering

14     is -- we are tendering 6911, but looking at the revised Rule 92 ter

15     notification, the first item is the curriculum vitae, which is 1D05528.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Shall we give the number for that.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  It shall be assigned Exhibit D2746.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please, for the registrar.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  It shall be assigned Exhibit D2746.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  And the next item is 1D05161, a protest letter by

22     General Milovanovic.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  D2747.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  2747.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  The next item is 65 ter number 08639, a UN report

Page 31971

 1     of the 12 April meeting.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  D2748.  Thank you.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  The next item is 1D5672, a Canadian Battalion

 5     sitrep.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  D2749.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  1D5673, report of 19 April 1993 meeting.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  2750.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  1D5671, photograph.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Is D2751.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  1D5525, a news media report.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I don't -- the Chamber has

14     difficulty in seeing the relevance of this document, and the relevant

15     part has been quoted by the witness.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  It was -- it was offered simply to

17     corroborate the fact that he had in fact attended that funeral.

18             JUDGE KWON:  So the Chamber will not receive that.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Very well.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Then next?

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Next is number 1 --

22             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry?  We didn't receive it.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  1D5525 shall be assigned --

24             JUDGE KWON:  No, we'll not receive it.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Oh, "we'll not."

Page 31972

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  1D5670.  Another photograph.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Shall we give the next number.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  D2752.  Thank you.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  16849, VRS agreement.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  If I may, I've had a look at that, and I think that

 7     that document is subsumed within P5041.  P5041 is an English and B/C/S

 8     copy of that same agreement.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  That's fine.  We'll withdraw that, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Next is 06911, implementation agreement.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Shall we give the next number.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  It shall be assigned Exhibit D2753.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Next is 1D5526, news media report.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  D2754.  Thank you.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  And finally the last one, 1D5674, information

18     provided to General Rose.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  D2755.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Thank you for your patience, Mr. Hayes.

22     There are several changes in the notification.  We had to do this like

23     this.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

Page 31973

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would now like to

 2     read the summary of General Hayes's statement in English.

 3             [In English] General Vere Hayes is a retired officer of the

 4     British Armed Forces.  From April to October 1993, he served as Chief of

 5     Staff of the United Nations Command for Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He held

 6     the rank of brigadier.

 7             On April the 8th, 1993, just two days after his arrival, he was

 8     made aware of an incident in which the Bosnian Serbs discovered

 9     ammunition hidden in the truck of one humanitarian organisation, shipment

10     of humanitarian relief which was being transported from Sarajevo airport

11     to Bosnian Muslim-held area of Butmir.  I deliberately didn't mention the

12     name of this organisation.

13             A total of 24 boxes of 9. -- 7.9 millimetre ammunition and a

14     similar number of boxes of 12-millimetre ammunition were found hidden

15     between the containers and drop bed of the trailer.  This organisation

16     found an additional 24 boxes of 7.9 millimetres and 12-millimetre

17     ammunition hidden in the same place in another trailer at Sarajevo

18     airport.

19             Brigadier Hayes had no information to suggest that UNPROFOR or

20     these other humanitarian organisation personnel were complicit in the

21     smuggling of the ammunition.  However, he realized that unfortunate

22     incidents such as this provided the VRS with a reason to be cautious in

23     inspecting humanitarian convoys of this organisation in the future before

24     allowing them to pass.

25             One of the most pressing issues upon his arrive was the fighting

Page 31974

 1     in Srebrenica.  This was the focus of many meetings and negotiations over

 2     the first month of the stay of General Hayes in Bosnia.

 3             On April the 17th, 1993, General Hayes attended marathon

 4     negotiations at the Sarajevo airport concerning the cessation of

 5     hostilities in and around Srebrenica.  At approximately 2.00 a.m. on 18th

 6     of April, 1993, an agreement for the demilitarisation of Srebrenica was

 7     signed.  The agreement called for a total cease-fire in the Srebrenica

 8     area and deployment of an UNPROFOR company into Srebrenica and the

 9     evacuation of seriously wounded and ill persons by air.

10             It was further agreed that the demilitarisation of Srebrenica

11     would be completed within 72 hours of the arrival of the UNPROFOR

12     company.  All weapons, ammunition, mines, explosives, and combat

13     supplies, except medicine, inside Srebrenica were to be handed over to

14     the UNPROFOR.  No armed persons or units would remain within the city

15     once the demilitarisation process was completed.  Neither side was to

16     hinder the freedom of movement and humanitarian aid would continue to be

17     allowed into the city as planned.

18             It was further greed that a working group would be established to

19     work on the -- to work out the detailed implementation of the

20     demilitarisation.  Brigadier Hayes was given the task within the UNPROFOR

21     of leading these efforts.  One of the details which was left to the

22     working group was to delineate the geographical boundaries of the safe

23     area that was to be demilitarised.  This was a major stumbling-block

24     between the parties.

25             At a meeting of -- on 20th of April, 1993, it was finally agreed

Page 31975

 1     that despite their different positions on the delineation of the safe

 2     area, the city itself would be part of it and would be demilitarised.  On

 3     20th of April, 1993, Brigadier Hayes wrote out an operational order under

 4     which to implement the agreement.  He defined the demilitarised area as

 5     urban area of Srebrenica itself, as well as the hills immediately

 6     overlooking the urban area from which a direct line of sight into the

 7     town existed.

 8             On 21st of April, 1993, Brigadier Hayes travelled to Srebrenica

 9     by helicopter with a delegation of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb

10     representatives.  The purpose was to confirm that the demilitarisation

11     had occurred, to agree upon the boundaries of the demilitarised area, and

12     to physically mark the area.  When they arrived in Srebrenica, they went

13     in an armoured personnel carrier to the weapons collections -- collection

14     area.  When Brigadier Hayes alighted, he encountered Naser Oric, the

15     commander of the BiH forces in Srebrenica.  Oric was armed, as were his

16     two bodyguards.

17             Brigadier Hayes talked to Oric for about half an hour and

18     explained the agreement to him.  Brigadier Hayes explained to him that if

19     he remained there when the Serbs appeared, the agreement would not be

20     implemented since he was armed in the demilitarised zone.  When

21     Brigadier Hayes got the Serbs out of the APC, Oric was gone.

22             The Serb and Muslim representatives inspected the weapons

23     collection area, toured the boundaries of what Brigadier Hayes had

24     proposed as the demilitarised area of the city and the overlooking hills,

25     and went to the PTT building where they signed the notes reflecting the

Page 31976

 1     demilitarisation agreement.  The agreed-upon boundaries never extended

 2     beyond the urban area and the location on the hills immediately

 3     overlooking it that gave a direct line of fire into the city.

 4             On May 17 -- the 17th, 1993, Brigadier Hayes attended a funeral

 5     for civilian victims of a Bosnian Muslim attack on the Serb villages --

 6     village of Ratkovici.  The bodies of the victims of the July 1992 attack

 7     had been exhumed from a mass grave.

 8             In early August 1993, the Bosnian government threatened to

 9     withdraw from the Geneva peace talks unless the Serbs pulled back from

10     the positions they had taken on Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica around

11     Sarajevo.  Dr. Karadzic returned from Geneva to try to resolve this

12     situation.

13             Brigadier Hayes attended a meeting on the 5th of August, 1993, in

14     Pale with the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Dr. Karadzic.  This was

15     the first time he met Dr. Karadzic.  He found him to be perfectly civil

16     and reasonable.

17             Dr. Karadzic proposed that Serb forces withdraw from

18     Mount Bjelasnica and Mount Igman as demanded by President Izetbegovic as

19     a precondition for rejoining the talks in Geneva.  He said that Serb

20     forces would be willing to withdraw so long as UNPROFOR would ensure that

21     the army -- BH Army did not occupy the area vacated by the Serbs.

22     Karadzic accepted General Briquemont's suggestion that UNPROFOR monitor

23     the area after Briquemont explained that UNPROFOR did not have sufficient

24     troops to occupy the area.  Dr. Karadzic also proposed opening a route

25     between Zenica and Sarajevo and agreed to General Briquemont's suggestion

Page 31977

 1     that the route from Mostar to Sarajevo through Hadzici also be opened.

 2     Dr. Karadzic agreed to the establishment of a joint commission to ensure

 3     the restoration of utilities and infrastructure in Sarajevo.

 4             After the meeting with Dr. Karadzic, the VRS entered into a

 5     written agreement to withdraw their forces from Mount Igman and

 6     Mount Bjelasnica.  Brigadier Hayes participated in negotiations leading

 7     to this agreement.  The Serbs fully complied with the agreement for the

 8     withdrawal of their troops from Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica.

 9             That would be the summary.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   General Hayes, there's one issue that I would like your

12     assistance in clarifying since you were the author of a map.  Can we call

13     up 1D6304.  You were behind the initiative to draft the map.

14        A.   Yes, I did draft the map, yes.

15        Q.   In this document, the map can be found on page 9.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be magnified.  Can it be

17     also placed -- can it flipped so that we have it in the north-south

18     direction and we can read the letters.  Counterclockwise.  Thank you.

19     Perhaps this will be fine.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, can you please explain to the Chamber what this map

22     depicts?

23        A.   I can.  If might be simpler if I was able to draw, draw it

24     diagrammatically.  I'm afraid I'm not an artist, but I will do my best.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Could you wait until assisted by our usher,

Page 31978

 1     please.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Certainly, sir.  Would it be possible to have a

 3     blank screen so I could draw a diagram?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Or you can write on it as well.  If you'd like to

 5     have a blank --

 6             THE WITNESS:  My thoughts are is it might be easier to understand

 7     if I just draw a diagram on a blank screen.  I think if I draw on this

 8     map we will -- we will not necessarily be able to -- to understand it as

 9     easily.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well, that can be done.  Yes.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  In the meantime, Mr. President, we wanted to

12     tender this document with the map.  So can that be done before we leave

13     this.

14             JUDGE KWON:  We may come back to this document after having heard

15     his explanation because we haven't heard anything about this document

16     yet.

17             THE WITNESS:  Is this screen okay?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it should be coming.

19             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  The difficulty in establishing what would be

20     an agreed safe area was that neither side could come to any compromise

21     about it.  And eventually having looked at the proposals of both sides

22     and listened for a considerable length of time to them, I decided myself

23     that if we just do this -- let's put -- north is up there.  This is the

24     road from Zvornik.  And there is a road that goes out to Zepa at the

25     bottom.  I decided that they had both agreed within what they said, that

Page 31979

 1     the urban area of Srebrenica itself, no matter what they proposed, was

 2     within the agreement.  So that's where the town itself was.

 3             I further decided that if that was to be a safe area, then it was

 4     important that the area that was drawn included certain points - I will

 5     symbolise them with triangles, which is a military symbol to signify an

 6     observation post - on the high ground that gave direct line of sight into

 7     the city.  And I then drew the line of the safe area to encompass the

 8     buildings of the town itself and these high points.  The line of

 9     confrontation was out here diagrammatically.  So you had the Serbs on one

10     side and the Muslims were inside.

11             This area here was the only area that was a safe area.  Between

12     that boundary and the confrontation line was not within the safe area

13     agreement.  No armed person was allowed to stay within this area that I

14     have hatched, and no weapons were allowed to be held within that area.

15     But that did not apply to this area between the limit and the

16     confrontation line.  I hope I have explained that, sir.

17             JUDGE KWON:  So why don't we put some annotation for the future

18     use.  Could you --

19             THE WITNESS:  Certainly, sir, yes.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Could you indicate the urban area with a -- yes.

21     That's --

22             THE WITNESS:  Confrontation line.

23             JUDGE KWON:  That's the confrontation line, yes.

24             THE WITNESS:  I always find it very hard to write on these

25     screens, I'm afraid.

Page 31980

 1             JUDGE KWON:  That's okay.  And the safe area.

 2             THE WITNESS:  What's happening here?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  You can delete as well, if necessary.  Yes.

 4             THE WITNESS:  It's not very tidy, I'm afraid.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.  Shall we keep it and give the

 6     number for the next Defence exhibit.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  It shall be assigned Exhibit D2756.  Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Should a date be placed and

 9     General Hayes' initials?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, point's taken.  We saved it already.  Shall we

11     upload it again, then?

12                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We can note who -- who drew this picture, so

14     it's not necessary.  Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we look at 1D6304

16     again.  Can we have page 9 again.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   General Hayes, is this an accurate map?  Does it depict the town

19     proper, as it were, and the hills overlooking the town?

20        A.   As far as I can tell from that, sir, it's the map that we drew,

21     and that will be the one that we signed as part of the agreement, so it

22     would be accurate.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Was it foreseen that the other safe area, that of

24     Zepa, should be together with this particular area or were they two

25     separate area?

Page 31981

 1        A.   It was intended that if Zepa was made a safe area, it would be a

 2     separate safe area.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Who controlled the other areas -- or, rather, does

 4     this safe area coincide with the boundaries of the municipality of

 5     Srebrenica?

 6        A.   No, it does not coincide with the boundaries of the -- of the

 7     Srebrenica municipality.  I'm not sure who was controlling the areas.

 8     All I can say is that between the area that is marked as a safe area and

 9     the confrontation lines, on the inside, if you wish, the side nearest the

10     safe area of the confrontation line, would have been in the hands of the

11     BiH, and outside those areas, to the best of my knowledge, would have

12     been controlled by the VRS.

13        Q.   Thank you.  One more question.  What was the situation like when

14     it came to the shelling of the safe area at the time you -- you were

15     there after the signing of the agreement?

16        A.   After the agreement had been signed and we had taken both sides'

17     delegations in, we had marked the area on the map, we had marked it on

18     the ground, and we had visited it.  To the best of my knowledge, there

19     was no firing, or there was no shell-fire received in that safe area

20     during the rest of my time in Bosnia-Herzegovina; that is, up until the

21     middle of October, 1993.

22        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into

24     evidence, please?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

Page 31982

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  No objection.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Could we see page 5 of this document.  Page 6, next

 3     page.

 4             General, do you remember whose handwriting this is?

 5             THE WITNESS:  I cannot remember the names of it, but they --

 6     these were written by the representatives of the two delegations that

 7     came in, the BiH representative and the VRS representative.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Can we see the next page.  Who signed on behalf of

 9     behalf UNPROFOR.

10             THE WITNESS:  The UNPROFOR representative there is

11     Colonel Geburt, G-e-b-u-r-t.  He was the lieutenant-colonel in command of

12     the 2nd Battalion of the Canadians, CanBat 2 is the way to which it was

13     referred.  He was the senior officer of the Canadian detachment which was

14     a company-plus strength that went into Srebrenica to oversee the

15     demilitarisation and put observation posts around the safe area.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Do you remember who signed for Bosnian Serbs and for

17     Bosnians.

18             THE WITNESS:  I can't remember their names, sir, but the names

19     are on the front of that document.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you.  We'll admit it.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  It shall be assigned Exhibit D2757.  Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  For the time being I

24     have no further questions for General Hayes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Before you begin, it's better to have a break given

Page 31983

 1     the time.

 2             Mr. Hayes, we'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 7

 3     minutes past 11.00.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Very good, sir.

 5                           --- Recess taken at 10.38 a.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 11.09 a.m.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  If I could just take a moment

 9     to introduce our legal intern who is present with us during this session.

10     Her name is Romina Arnaudova from Bulgaria.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

12             MR TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  If I could just take a

13     moment before Ms. Edgerton commences.  With respect to the redactions in

14     the statement of -- that was previously discussed just before we

15     adjourned, the transcript, as I understand it appears to identify

16     paragraphs 2 through 15, although Dr. Karadzic himself had mentioned 2

17     through 16 which appeared to embrace the Focatrans incident.  We also

18     noted that that discussion continues in paragraphs 18 through 20.  I

19     wanted to bring that to the Court's attention in case the court

20     considered that paragraphs 16 and 18 through 20 also fell within the

21     parameters of the Court's concern.

22             JUDGE KWON:  We'll take a look and come back to the issue.

23             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.

25                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

Page 31984

 1        Q.   Good morning, Brigadier Hayes.

 2        A.   Good morning.

 3        Q.   I would generally like to ask you some questions about the

 4     conversation that we had the day before yesterday, but before doing that,

 5     perhaps you could just confirm to me that your job with UNPROFOR was to

 6     be the principal staff officer at BH command headquarters in Kiseljak;

 7     correct?

 8        A.   Correct.

 9        Q.   So Kiseljak is where you were based and operated from.

10        A.   That's correct, yes.

11        Q.   And Kiseljak is about 25 kilometres from Sarajevo.  Is that

12     correct as well?

13        A.   Correct, through three Serb check-points.

14        Q.   And to travel into Sarajevo -- or you said yesterday that you

15     travelled into Sarajevo often to the airport -- pardon me, the day before

16     yesterday, to the airport for negotiations, occasionally to the PTT

17     building or the residency, but that you weren't in the city of Sarajevo

18     proper - those were the words we used - very often.

19        A.   That's correct.  I travelled in to see the commander in the

20     forward headquarters, to see the French commander of Sector Sarajevo in

21     the PTT building but mainly to the airport for negotiations and Mixed

22     Military Working Group meetings.

23        Q.   And keeping that in mind, I asked you the day before yesterday

24     about your impressions of Sarajevo, and you told me a few things, and I'd

25     like to run through those to see if I've understood your impressions

Page 31985

 1     correctly.  Among other things, you said that you had the feeling that

 2     normality had broken down a bit.  Is that so?

 3        A.   That's correct.

 4        Q.   And that was, among other things, because you saw a lot of dogs

 5     running around and they were eating dead dogs.

 6        A.   That's one incident that particularly stuck in my mind.

 7        Q.   You also mentioned seeing lots of devastation and damaged

 8     buildings.

 9        A.   That's correct, yeah.

10        Q.   You noted that people would not go out very often.

11        A.   That's correct.

12        Q.   And you recalled having seen barricades of containers, cars, and

13     other things at exposed areas and intersections.  Is that also correct?

14        A.   That's correct.  Mainly on the eastern side as we drove in from

15     the south going north towards the residency.  They were beyond the

16     eastern side.

17        Q.   In the context of a discussion about the airport crossings and

18     how they were, in your view, a function of the desperation of people in

19     Sarajevo, you also talked about it being difficult for people to get food

20     and ordinary commodities and noted that they didn't want to go out

21     because of the dangers.  Do I have that right?

22        A.   Yes.  People did cross the airport out of -- or attempt to cross

23     the airport out of desperation to leave Sarajevo, although it was -- any

24     movement across the airfield was banned, as I understood it, in the

25     agreement that had been drawn up between the United Nations and the Serbs

Page 31986

 1     for the use of the airport, but, yes, people did attempt to move out.

 2     And the normal commodities that you would expect in a city were in short

 3     supply, including water.

 4        Q.   I asked you the day before yesterday whether and what kind of a

 5     briefing you had received on the situation in Sarajevo on assuming your

 6     duties, and you advised that there was almost no time for a real

 7     hand-over from your predecessor because of the situation in Srebrenica at

 8     that time.  Correct?

 9        A.   That's correct.  I was required to move to assume the post of

10     Chief of Staff a week earlier than was expected because my predecessor

11     left to go to Vicenza, and so we didn't have a hand-over at the time that

12     I was actually assuming the appointment.  We had meet before for a short

13     period, but again with so much going on, there was little time for much

14     discussion.

15        Q.   And, in fact, you said the day before yesterday that the shelling

16     of Sarajevo was not at that point at the top of the agenda because of the

17     situation in Srebrenica.  It was, if you like, a fact of life.  Do you

18     recall that?

19        A.   Certainly the situation in Sarajevo was not something that I was

20     dealing with at that time, although my first meeting with

21     President Izetbegovic was to discuss the possibility, amongst other

22     things, of getting the sewage system repaired.  So it was not completely

23     forgotten about, but the situation in Srebrenica was the more important

24     one to try to resolve at that time.

25        Q.   All right.  Now, just moving on to the incident referred to in

Page 31987

 1     paragraphs 5 to 8 of your statement on April 8, 1993, involving the

 2     discovery of ammunition in an aid shipment at Butmir.  You had no

 3     personal involvement in that matter, did you?

 4        A.   No.  I was notified of it, but it depends what you mean by no

 5     personal involvement.

 6        Q.   Were you called to go on scene?  Were you involved in any

 7     investigation of the incident?

 8        A.   No.  I was involved in no investigation of the incident, and I

 9     was not called to go and look at what had occurred.

10        Q.   So your involvement or knowledge of the incident was limited to

11     your being notified?

12        A.   That's correct.

13        Q.   Now, in regard to that incident you said at paragraph 8 of your

14     statement that you realised that unfortunate incidents such as this

15     provided the VRS with reason to be cautious in expecting convoys in the

16     future before allowing them to pass.

17             Now, we also talked about this the day before yesterday, and

18     perhaps I could tell you what I understood you to be saying in regard to

19     that passage, and tell me if I've understood you correctly.  You explain

20     that we should take this to mean that you could understand why the Serbs

21     became quite difficult at check-points, but while you could understand

22     it, it doesn't necessarily excuse the fact that Serb forces would hold

23     convoys for up to three days?

24        A.   That's correct.  I can fully understand why they became

25     difficult.  There was paranoia that UNPROFOR was not acting in a way that

Page 31988

 1     they expected or anticipated.  They believed that we would smuggle in

 2     ammunition to Sarajevo and to other Muslim enclaves, and they also

 3     believed that humanitarian aid organisations would do the same.  And so

 4     an incident such as this was -- was grist to that particular mill.  So

 5     that was a bit of a complicated explanation.  It was -- it fed their

 6     paranoia, I'm afraid, but just it didn't -- it did not justify holding

 7     convoys for three days, but then quite often that was because of the

 8     arguments that occurred between the convoy commander demanding freedom of

 9     movement and the Serb check-points insisting that they inspected it.  So

10     there was an immediate clash which often took a long time to resolve and

11     perhaps somebody else like a United Nations military observer would have

12     to go along to try to mediate.

13        Q.   And just in regard to this incident before we leave it

14     altogether, it's correct, isn't it, that UNPROFOR never established --

15     was never able to establish how that ammunition was placed in that

16     shipment?

17        A.   To the best of my knowledge, that's correct.  I was not involved

18     in any further investigation, and I cannot remember anything coming

19     across my desk in relation to it apart from that piece of paper that you

20     already have seen.

21        Q.   And were you aware that -- no.  Actually, I'll move on.

22             Moving on in time in terms of the chronology of events you

23     discussed in your statement to 11 April 1993, can you confirm that

24     Srebrenica was shelled on that day?

25        A.   I can't confirm it.  I mean, I can look in my -- in my diary if

Page 31989

 1     that's permissible.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  By all means.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Srebrenica was being -- was being shelled, and it

 4     was one of the main reasons why it was at the top of the list of

 5     priorities.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:

 7        Q.   And this diary you're looking at, is that a contemporaneous diary

 8     you recorded during your tour?

 9        A.   It is.  It's one that I kept for my own purposes.  It's not very

10     comprehensive, I'm afraid.  I think the only thing I can say about it,

11     from my diary, is to say that there is an entry which says that the

12     parties agreed to attend if there was no more shelling.  I must take that

13     to mean that General Halilovic agreed to attend if there was no more

14     shelling.  From that, I have to conclude that there may have been

15     shelling on that day.  Certainly one incident of shelling in which some

16     children were, sadly, killed gave rise to a press report of body parts

17     being found on the wire being surrounding the area where I think they had

18     been playing.  I think it was a school.  That was the catalyst, really,

19     for getting the situation in Srebrenica up to the top of the agenda.

20        Q.   Now, this incident that you've just discussed, did that incident

21     to your recollection take place on the 12th of April?

22        A.   I can't remember.  I'm sorry.

23        Q.   All right.  Perhaps I could show you something that might help

24     your recollection.  65 ter number 13346.  It's a letter from the UNPROFOR

25     Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Wahlgren, to Dr. Karadzic on the

Page 31990

 1     situation in Srebrenica, dated 12 April 1993.

 2        A.   I see it, yeah.  There's an information copy that has gone to

 3     myself in Bosnia-Herzegovina command, main headquarters in Kiseljak.  So

 4     I will have seen that, though I cannot recollect it at the moment.

 5        Q.   Could we go over, if you've had a chance to look at this first

 6     page, to the second page of this document.  And perhaps we could magnify

 7     it a bit.

 8             Now, this letter from General Wahlgren to Dr. Karadzic refers to,

 9     at paragraph A, the latest casualty estimate in Srebrenica being 35 dead

10     and 68 wounded, but those are only the ones that have approached the

11     hospital.  And at paragraph B, this quotes a report from his people in

12     Srebrenica.  Paragraph B notes that the report says:

13              "I have personally seen and counted 14 dead, including 7 bodies

14     on the road in front of the schoolhouse used as a refugee centre where it

15     appears most casualties occurred.  Two of the seven bodies I saw in front

16     of the hospital were children, and one has been -- or one was

17     decapitated."

18             Does this sound like the incident you just referred to,

19     Brigadier?

20        A.   Yes, it does.  In paragraph A, though, the latest casualty

21     estimate in Srebrenica will refer, in my opinion, to the number of

22     casualties over a period, and not the number of casualties necessarily

23     that will have occurred as a result of any shelling on the 11th.

24             Similarly in paragraph B where -- it would be a United Nations

25     military observer who is submitting this report, I think.  In paragraph B

Page 31991

 1     he says:

 2             "I personally have seen and counted 14 dead, including 7

 3     bodies ..."

 4             Again, that does not mean, in my opinion, that that is the result

 5     of shelling on the 11th.  I think those are figures of shelling over a

 6     number of days rather than on a particular day.  I suspect that the last

 7     sentence in paragraph B is the incident to which I -- to which I'm

 8     referring where he sees -- he reports bodies in front of the hospital

 9     being children.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  Could we have this as a Prosecution

11     Exhibit, please, Your Honours.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  It shall be assigned Exhibit P6077.  Thank you.

15             MS. EDGERTON:

16        Q.   Now, could we just have still on the subject of the 12th of

17     April, 1993, a look at 65 ter number 24415, which is a BH command

18     Kiseljak, and I say this by its cover sheet, a BH command Kiseljak G3

19     operations report on the same meeting you refer to in paragraph 10 of

20     your statement?

21             And before we go further into the document, maybe you want to

22     just have a look at paragraph 10 to refresh your memory.  And we can

23     certainly collapse the B/C/S version of this document.

24        A.   Okay.  I have read that, and in my diary there is -- I would take

25     from my diary that I did not attend that meeting.  I went to the airport

Page 31992

 1     but then moved on to do some other work elsewhere.

 2        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  Now, G3 main Kiseljak -- G3 BH command

 3     main Kiseljak would have come under your command.  Is that the case?

 4        A.   Sorry, G3 plans.

 5        Q.   Yes.

 6        A.   Yes.  G3 plans was a staff branch which was under my command.

 7        Q.   So this is a report.  Can we -- can we take from this and as well

 8     from the hand-written notations at the bottom left-hand corner of the

 9     cover sheet where we see, among other things, COS, that this is a report

10     that would have come across your desk?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now, if we can go to -- slowly through the

13     document --

14        A.   Is it possible to see what that report says?  I may -- what the

15     rest of that -- I've only seen the cover sheet so far.

16        Q.   Absolutely.  I've just asked for us to go slowly through that

17     document to give you an opportunity.

18        A.   Sorry.  I thought you were referring to a different document.

19        Q.   No, no, not at all.  And when you've had a chance to skim this,

20     please let us know so that we can move on to the next page.

21        A.   Yes, I've read that.  All right.  I've read that page.  Yeah,

22     read.  Read.

23        Q.   And there should be one more page -- oh, pardon me.  There should

24     be one more page of relevance with the attendees at this meeting,

25     General Wahlgren, Mr. Thornberry, General Morillon, Mr. Mendiluce,

Page 31993

 1     Ms. Boyd, General Mladic, General Gvero, General Tolimir, and

 2     Major Indic.

 3             Now that you've had a look at this, Brigadier, I wonder if we can

 4     go back to page 3 of this document at paragraph 6.

 5             Now, in paragraph 6, we see about halfway through that first main

 6     paragraph General Mladic say, among other things:

 7             "The complete truth was that Srebrenica was not attacked and that

 8     it was completely quiet in the area."

 9             Which actually quite sharply contrasts with the information you

10     had and the reports we've just seen about shelling in Srebrenica on the

11     11th and 12th of April, doesn't it?

12        A.   Did we have a report of shelling on the 12th of April?  I thought

13     it was on the 11th.

14        Q.   That was the document we just finished, and I refer to the

15     document that we just finished discussing, which was the letter of

16     protest from General Wahlgren to Dr. Karadzic.

17        A.   Was that dated the 12th?  Sorry, we'll just go back to it.  There

18     are sometimes a problem between the date of the document as its

19     transmitted and the information that it is actually containing as a

20     report.  I apologise if I missed it.

21        Q.   Oh, not at all.  P6077 was the number.  Formerly 65 ter -- you

22     have it.  Thank you very much.  You see the cover page of the document --

23        A.   I do.

24        Q.   -- is date --

25        A.   Yup, it's dated the 12th of April.

Page 31994

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And if you go to the next page of the report itself,

 2     I note that --

 3        A.   Yeah.  I suspect that this is a report that has come from a

 4     United Nations military observer on the 11th and has been forwarded by

 5     the force commander on the 12th.  So I suspect that that -- what he's

 6     reporting there is what happened on the 11th, and things -- it was always

 7     very difficult, but I suspect that what General Mladic is saying on the

 8     12th is that it's quiet now.  He would pick his words very carefully.

 9     Sometimes things were lost in translation, but I believe he would be --

10     he was saying it's quiet on the 12th.  And looking at that, I would -- I

11     would think that it is reporting shelling on the 11th, not on the 12th.

12     Though I can't do more than say that's my interpretation of it.

13        Q.   Thank you.  I'll move on then.  Now, I would actually like to go

14     in your statement all the way over to paragraph 41 and the associated

15     news article you refer to in this paragraph which you commented on, and

16     in this news article, which is dated 4 August 1993, you're reported as

17     saying:

18             "There is still a military siege, but there has never been a

19     humanitarian strangulation --"

20             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we upload that document.  Exhibit D2754.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, pardon me, yes, of course.

22             JUDGE KWON:  2754.  Exhibit D2754.  Or 1D5526.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

24        Q.   Now, you're reported as saying:

25             "There's still a military siege, but there has never been a

Page 31995

 1     humanitarian strangulation of Sarajevo."

 2             Now, in that regard I actually wanted to ask you whether you can

 3     confirm that we discussed this remark the day before yesterday, and you

 4     indicated you would like to actually temporarily limit your remark to

 5     your period of service in BiH and no time before or after that.  Do I

 6     have that correct?

 7        A.   That's correct.

 8        Q.   Now, during our meeting, you also said that aid came into

 9     Sarajevo via the Kiseljak route and the air-lift.

10        A.   Correct.

11        Q.   And at the end of July, beginning of August 1993, you said that

12     aid to Sarajevo was actually blocked by fighting in central Bosnia and

13     Herzegovina.

14        A.   That's correct.

15        Q.   Now, I'd like to turn to 65 ter number 01227, which is the third

16     periodic report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the

17     former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Mazowiecki, who was the Special

18     Rapporteur of the commission of human rights -- on human rights, and it's

19     dated 26 August 1993.  And he reports on the situation in terms of

20     humanitarian aid in the area at that time.  If we could go over to

21     paragraph 14 on page 3 under the heading "Blocking of Humanitarian Aid."

22             Now, in that paragraph he says -- he refers to 430.000 people are

23     estimated as being dependent on food aid in Sarajevo and its surrounding

24     areas and says that the main supplier is the United Nations high

25     commission for humanitarian -- or pardon me, for refugees, UNHCR.  And if

Page 31996

 1     we could go over to the next page, paragraph 15, he reads -- he states --

 2     reports that convoys, UNHCR convoys which provide food and fuel for

 3     Muslims, Croats, and Serbs alike in Sarajevo have been obstructed or

 4     attacked by Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat forces, and sometimes also by

 5     government forces.  He refers to a July -- July 1st, 1993, incident where

 6     Bosnian Serb authorities introduce taxes on all aid convoys crossing

 7     their territory, stopping deliveries for five days, until which point

 8     UNHCR was declared exempt.  He refers to a 12-day delay on the 10th of

 9     July when Bosnian Croat authorities refused to issue aid convoys with

10     permits to enter territory under their control, and also in paragraph 16,

11     talks about recent attacks on convoys.  In July 1993, he says nine UNHCR

12     fuel trucks were blocked at Blazuj, which is outside Sarajevo, by over

13     100 heavily armed Bosnian Serb soldiers with a tank and other armoured

14     vehicles, and the fuel from four trucks was confiscated before the convoy

15     was allowed to pass ten hours later.

16             He also refers to a UN aeroplane involved in relief flights

17     having been hit six times since 21 July by fire from positions held by

18     the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

19             Now, looking at this, it seems that Mr. Mazowiecki's report

20     paints a situation somewhat more dire than your remarks on the 4th of

21     August, 1993, suggests, doesn't is?

22        A.   What I said has to be taken in the context of what was happening

23     at that time.  When those remarks were made, the Geneva peace conference

24     was underway, and it was in danger of stalling because of the fighting up

25     on Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica, and because of this depiction of a

Page 31997

 1     siege of Sarajevo.

 2             I discussed what was actually happening at that time with

 3     Mr. Thornberry, and the problem, as is indicated in paragraph 14 of this,

 4     was a fuel convoy.  At that particular time, the main problem for

 5     Sarajevo was getting in sufficient fuel, and the fuel convoy was being

 6     blocked in Central Bosnia by the fighting between the Muslims and the

 7     Croats.  That is what was stopping the aid coming up through

 8     Central Bosnia into Sarajevo.  The air-lift was continuing, and my

 9     remarks were focused on that in particular.  Certainly there was

10     difficulty getting aid into Sarajevo, but it did continue to come in, and

11     it fed.  It fed the citizens of Sarajevo of all three ethnic types, and

12     understandably it also fed the government forces, the BiH, who were in

13     there, as you would expect, because there was -- there was no other

14     source of food apart from the black market.  I hope that puts it into

15     context for you.

16        Q.   Yes.  Thank you very much.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honours.

18             Thank you very much, Brigadier, I have nothing further.

19             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

21             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have re-examination?

22                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

23        Q.   Sir, you were shown a letter that General Wahlgren sent to me.

24     Do you know what my position was as regards Srebrenica after the 12th of

25     April until the 8th of May when the agreement on demilitarisation was

Page 31998

 1     signed?

 2        A.   I'm not quite certain I understand the question, sir.  Are you

 3     talking about the -- referring to your attitude as to what should happen

 4     as regards the fighting around Srebrenica?

 5        Q.   Yes.  Do you remember?  Do you know how operations around

 6     Srebrenica were aborted, how they were stopped?

 7        A.   I understand from looking at that message that you sent that you

 8     directed your forces under commander General Mladic to cease operations

 9     there.  I don't recall seeing it at the time, but I do understand from

10     seeing that particular message that you gave the orders for

11     General Mladic to cease operations there.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Taking into account what you know about Srebrenica,

13     about Igman and Bjelasnica, what was your experience in addressing me as

14     regards military matters?  How did I react to the United Nations'

15     requests?  Were my responses positive or negative to those requests?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.  Before you against, General.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  I wonder if this is actually a matter that was

18     raise the in cross-examination, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Will you move on to another topic, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Well, in that case I

21     don't have any more questions.  All that remains for me to do is thank

22     the general for his testimony.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Unless my colleagues have a question for

24     you, Mr. Hatchett, that concludes your evidence.  On behalf of the

25     Chamber, I would like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give

Page 31999

 1     it.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Now you're free to go.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  And just a slip of the tongue, Your Honour.  This

 6     is Mr. Brigadier Hayes, not Mr. Hatchett.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  My apology, Mr. Hayes.  My apologies.  We are

 8     hearing so many witnesses.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Not a problem, sir.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, the next witness is a protected

12     witness and will require some protective measures as well as some other

13     persons to enter the Chamber, so it may be wise to take a short break to

14     accomplish that.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll do so.  You may leave, Mr. Hayes.

16                           [The witness withdrew]

17             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will now issue two oral rulings, first

18     on the admission of MFI P6072, a press report dated 27th of December,

19     1994, which was used by the Prosecution on the 15th of January, 2013,

20     during the cross-examination of Witness Milosav Gagovic.

21             The Chamber reiterates its consistent practice that any third

22     party statement not prepared for the purpose of criminal proceedings may

23     only be admitted if they are commented upon, confirmed, or adopted by the

24     witness on the stand.  In relation to MFI P6072, Gagovic testified that

25     the portion of the article read to him "refers to that same event," as

Page 32000

 1     that referred to in an earlier part of his testimony.  The Chamber is

 2     therefore satisfied that, contrary to the circumstances surrounding

 3     65 ter 45111C which admission was denied on 5th December and confirmed on

 4     the 11th of December 2012.  In this instance, Gagovic has sufficiently

 5     commented on those portions of MFI P6072 which were read out to him on

 6     the 15th of January, 2013, for the purpose of admission.  The Chamber

 7     shall therefore admit it into evidence the three paragraphs of MFI P6072,

 8     starting with the questions:  "How did you arm the people?  You did that

 9     right in front of the enemy, under sniper rifle?  And it was probably

10     Gagovic."  The remainder of MFI P6072 shall not be admitted into

11     evidence.

12             Next, the Chamber will issue an oral ruling on the accused's

13     request for presence of counsel to Witness Dragomir Milosevic, filed on

14     the 15th of January, 2013.  In the motion, the accused notes that the

15     witness is scheduled to commence his testimony in these proceedings on

16     the 22nd of January, 2013, that the registrar has assigned an attorney to

17     him in connection with this testimony, and that the witness would wish to

18     have his attorney present in court during his testimony.  On the 15th of

19     January, 2013, the Office of the Prosecutor stated that it did not wish

20     to respond to the request.  The Chamber has no issue with the witness's

21     attorney, Mr. Stephane Bourgon, being present during the witness

22     testimony and therefore grants the request.

23             On a similar issue on the motion for modification of order for

24     the temporary transfer of General Galic filed on the 14th of January,

25     2013, the accused states that the dates of Mr. Galic's transfer to the

Page 32001

 1     UNDU should be postponed due to the scheduling of conflicts of

 2     Mr. Galic's attorney.  The motion states that Mr. Galic's attorney is to

 3     be present during his proofing and testimony.

 4             So therefore, Mr. Robinson, could you confirm that this is in

 5     fact a request that Mr. Galic's attorney be present in court?

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  And I take it there's no position from the

 8     Prosecution.

 9                           [Trial Chamber confers]

10             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber grants the request.

11             And unless there's a problem from the parties, on the part of the

12     parties, the Chamber is minded to have an hour break today and adjourn at

13     3.00 instead of 2.45.  Would there be any problem?

14             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  None.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Would five minutes be sufficient for the

17     change of setting?

18             MR. ROBINSON:  I believe so, yes.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  The Chamber will rise for five minutes.

20                           --- Break taken at 11.55 a.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 12.05 p.m.

22                           [The witness entered court]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness take the solemn declaration.

24             THE WITNESS:  [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

25     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Page 32002

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please be seated.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3                           WITNESS:  KW571

 4                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I take it you understand you are referred to as

 6     KW571 instead of your real name.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Your face and your voice will not be heard or be

 9     seen by the public.  Do you also understand that?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do indeed.  Thank you very

11     much.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

13                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Witness KW571.

15        A.   Good afternoon.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up

17     1D7011 [as interpreted] in e-court, and it shouldn't be broadcast.

18     1D7100.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

20        Q.   Witness, could you please take a look the document in front of

21     you and tell us whether this is indeed your name on it?

22        A.   Yes, that is my name.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [no interpretation].

24             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit it under seal.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  It shall be assigned Exhibit D2758, admitted

Page 32003

 1     under seal.  Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Witness, we sent a questionnaire by the Defence team, and did you

 5     answer the questions in it?

 6        A.   Yes, I did, sir.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D05914,

 8     also not to be broadcast.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Is this the first page as the cover page of your answers to the

11     questionnaire that was sent to you?  We have it both in French and in

12     English.

13        A.   Yes.  That is indeed the document I received.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Could the Chamber move into private

16     session briefly.

17                           [Private session]

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 32004

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Can pages 2 and 3 of the document be shown, please.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Not broadcasting.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Is that page 1 of the answers to the questions?

19        A.   Yes, indeed.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show page 2 for the witness,

21     please.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Is that the second page of your answers?

24        A.   Yes, this is page number 2, indeed.

25        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put these same questions to you now,

Page 32005

 1     would your answers be the same as the ones provided here in the document?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.  My answers would be the same.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender the document into

 5     evidence under seal?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Ms. Edgerton?

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll admit it.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  It shall be assigned Exhibit D2759 under seal.

10     Thank you.

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

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25   (redacted)

Page 32006











11  Page 32006 redacted.  















Page 32007

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7             JUDGE KWON:  French translation seems to be overlapped with

 8     English, but could you repeat, Ms. Edgerton.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  I actually don't get any French translation on my

10     microphone, so I'm glad to have had the opportunity to raise that.

11             I would like to ask for private session to raise the point I'd

12     like to make if I may, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Could the Chamber move into private session.

14                           [Private session]

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 32008











11  Pages 32008-32010 redacted.  Private session.















Page 32011

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7                           [Open session]

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session, Your Honours.  Thank

 9     you.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             As you have noted, Mr. Witness, Mr. Karadzic has completed his

12     examination-in-chief, and your evidence was in most part admitted into

13     evidence in writing.  Now you'll be further asked by the representative

14     of the Office of the Prosecutor in its cross-examination.

15             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.  Do you have any questions?

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I will, Your Honours, but I recall Your Honours'

17     scheduling for today, and I wonder if --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  -- this is the time you had marked for the break

20     or I'm in Your Honours' hands.

21             JUDGE KWON:  We will have a break for one hour and resume at

22     1.30.

23                           --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

24                           --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

Page 32012

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.  If I may, I think I

 2     would like to begin the cross-examination in private session for the

 3     reasons I indicated earlier for a very brief period of time.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5                           [Private session]

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 32013











11  Pages 32013-32014 redacted.  Private session.















Page 32015

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5                           [Open session]

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.  Thank you.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 8        Q.   Now, in -- Mr. Witness, in your written evidence, in your answer

 9     to questions 5 and 6, still on translation issues, you used the term

10     "entonnoir."  Did you use that term to describe the mortar's crater?

11        A.   Indeed.  The word "entonnoir" is used in the military jargon in

12     French because it's the shape that is formed by the shell.  But indeed

13     from a generic point of view, this means the crater itself.

14        Q.   And in your answers to question 8 and 9 in the same document, you

15     refer to something called "puits de fusee."  Is this a term used to

16     describe the tunnel created by the mortar's fuse, the fuse tunnel?

17        A.   The fuse tunnel is not created by the shell but by the fuse

18     itself from the projectile, which when exploding moves ahead of the rest

19     and is going to create a tunnel.  This is why it's called a fuse tunnel

20     or a detonator tunnel.

21        Q.   And is that what you mean to describe when you use the term

22     "puits de fusee"?

23        A.   Yes, Madam Prosecutor, indeed.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now, your training with your national forces was

25     within the Engineers Unit and focused on the safe extraction and disposal

Page 32016

 1     of unexploded ordnances; correct?

 2        A.   Indeed, yes.

 3        Q.   And, in fact, although you continue to work in that field, you

 4     don't claim to have any ballistics expertise or specialisation in the

 5     area of ballistics.  You're not here as a ballistics expert; correct?

 6        A.   No, not as an expert in ballistics.

 7        Q.   Now, the training you had -- oh, pardon me?

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  Mr. President, I didn't object.  It was a

 9     compound question there, and I'm not sure that the answer actually was

10     complete, so I was wondering if maybe she can rephrase that or break it

11     up.

12             JUDGE KWON:  We can continue.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Fine.  Thank you.

14        Q.   In terms of your training with your national forces, crater

15     analysis was actually not a part of that programme, was it?

16        A.   At the time in question, no.

17        Q.   And you were only concerned with the soil or terrain in which an

18     ordnance was located to the extent it affected your main mission, the

19     safe removal of ordnances.  Isn't that so?

20        A.   Yes, indeed.  The objective was to remove safely the areas by

21     removing unexploded ordnance.

22        Q.   And the first time you were involved in crater analysis training

23     was when you joined UNPROFOR and arrived in the former Yugoslavia?

24        A.   Yes, indeed, Madam Prosecutor.

25        Q.   And how long was that training?

Page 32017

 1        A.   Two days.  One to two days.

 2        Q.   And the crater analysis that you carried out at the market-place

 3     in Sarajevo was your first and only official investigation of that type

 4     during your tour; is that correct?

 5        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 6        Q.   Just one more question about your written evidence.  In your

 7     answers to questions 5 and 6, you discuss generally about how tail fins

 8     are embedded in craters, and I wonder if I could ask you have you also

 9     seen situations where mortar tail fins are not located embedded in the

10     craters, they're found elsewhere?

11        A.   During our tour, indeed we found other mortar craters where tail

12     fins were embedded, but we also found other craters without any tail

13     fins.  Now, given that the areas were not very safe, we did not go beyond

14     the crater to see whether we would find tail fins and check that it did

15     correspond to mortar shells.

16        Q.   Now, specific to the investigation in question, I just want to

17     ask you about your methodology on one area only.  That's the methodology

18     you used in determining the direction of fire.  Was that methodology

19     something you learned in the two-day training programme you underwent?

20        A.   Yes, indeed.  This is a methodology that was taught and showed to

21     us by the person in charge of training and during the two days and that

22     we attended this course.

23        Q.   In terms of the crater itself, if it had been caused by a device,

24     a static -- that generated a static explosion, how would that crater have

25     been different in shape from the crater you saw?

Page 32018

 1        A.   If we are dealing with a static explosion device, in fact, if

 2     there is fragmentation that is linked to the explosive, it will be spread

 3     in the uniform manner around the load that's on the ground.  On top of it

 4     on the ground you will have traces of powder of explosive that are going

 5     to blacken the area around the impact, whereas in fact on -- as far as

 6     this crater is concerned, the shape of it leads us to believe that the

 7     shell came following a curve, and therefore the projection was regular

 8     all around the shell that hit the ground.  So the projection is regular

 9     and does not match what would look -- what it would look like if it was a

10     static explosion, because, in other words, we would find the shape of the

11     mortar if this mortar had been just placed on the ground, which was not

12     the case here.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Now.  I think you've answered all my questions.

14             Nothing further, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Very well, Ms. Edgerton.

16             Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just two brief questions.

18                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

19        Q.   [Interpretation] Witness, you have been asked whether this was

20     your first and last crater analysis.  Have you received any official

21     rejection of your analysis?  Did any of your superiors dispute it?

22        A.   No, not as far as I know.

23        Q.   Thank you.  You were also asked about the appearance of the

24     crater.  I should like to know when there is enough time and opportunity

25     to drive the stabiliser into the ground with a hammer?

Page 32019

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Perhaps Dr. Karadzic could rephrase.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Could you distinguish between a stabiliser that followed a fuse

 7     after an explosion and a stabiliser that was driven into the ground by a

 8     hammer?

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  I -- pardon me.  I don't think that arises from

10     cross-examination, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Agreed.  I agree, Ms. Edgerton.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Witness, is of any relevance to the -- the extraction of the

14     stabiliser and the trimming of the crater, is it of any relevance if we

15     want to establish the facts?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Again.  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Different question, but completely outside of the

18     cross-examination, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE KWON:  It's difficult to see how it arises from

20     Ms. Edgerton's cross-examination.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Esteemed Ms. Edgerton asked about

22     the crater and its appearance, when a shell explodes on the ground as

23     opposed to a shell that landed.  I'm asking whether the same effect may

24     be achieved by different means.  Can it appear to be the same?  If you do

25     not allow this question, no problem.

Page 32020

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure she raised that.  I think she referred

 2     to static explosion.  If you could assist me, Ms. Edgerton.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Pardon me.  Yes, I'm just trying to locate it

 4     quickly in the transcript.  My question was:

 5              "In terms of the crater itself, if it had been caused by a

 6     device, a static -- that generated a static explosion, how would that

 7     crater been different in shape from the crater you saw?"

 8             JUDGE KWON:  It's different from hammering the crater into the

 9     ground.  Please move on, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I wanted to express my

11     gratitude to the witness for coming here to testify.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             Then, Mr. Witness, that concludes your evidence.  On behalf of

14     this Chamber I thank you for coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you're

15     free to go.

16             But just one matter, Mr. Robinson, before Mr. Witness goes away.

17     The Chamber is still seized of your motion to subpoena this witness.  I

18     take it that's now moot and you are ready to withdraw it.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We withdraw it and thank the

20     witness and the state for their co-operation.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Shall we draw the curtain so that the

22     witness can be excused.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

24                           [The witness withdrew]

25             JUDGE KWON:  I take it the next witness is also a protected one.

Page 32021

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, Mr. President.  And there's also a

 2     representative to accompany this witness.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I've been negligent once again to

 5     identify our intern who is present in court during this session, and I

 6     saw you looking at me, but I was wondering what I did wrong.  I forgot to

 7     worry about the intern.  So anyway, we're pleased to have Claire Markwell

 8     from Durham university who is part of our team and she's joined us during

 9     this session.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Ms. West will be taking my chair, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  While we are waiting for the next witness, the

13     Chamber will give its ruling about Mr. Pljevaljcic's statement.

14             In relation to the statement of Trifko Pljevaljcic, the Chamber

15     held earlier today that paragraphs 2 to 15 be redacted from his

16     statement.  The Prosecution then submitted that paragraphs 16 as well as

17     18 to 20 also fell within the parameters of the Chamber's order.  The

18     Chamber has further reviewed Pljevaljcic's statement in light of the

19     Prosecution's submissions.

20             The Chamber first notes that the English translation of the

21     paragraphs added after the proofing session is poor and at times

22     incomprehensible.  The Chamber considers that paragraphs 18 to 20,

23     indeed, refer to the pre-war Focatrans incident in relation to which the

24     accused, as himself stated, that too much importance has been given and

25     which should therefore be redacted from the statement in line with the

Page 32022

 1     Chamber's earlier order.

 2             Paragraph 16, however, mostly relates to April 1992 and does not

 3     fall within the purview of the Chamber's order.

 4             In light of the fact that only five short paragraphs would remain

 5     in Pljevaljcic's statement after redaction, i.e., paragraphs 1, 16, 17,

 6     21, and 22, and that the English translation of the newly added

 7     paragraphs is problematic, the Chamber considers it in the interests of

 8     justice that the witness be led live and only on those issues which are

 9     relevant to this issue -- to this case.

10             As stated earlier this morning, should the accused wish to ask a

11     question as to the Focatrans incident, the Chamber will decide at the

12     appropriate time whether the question can be posed upon hearing the

13     objection from the Prosecution.

14             You can bring in the next witness.  Good afternoon, Ms. West.

15             MS. WEST:  Good afternoon, Mr. President.  Good afternoon Your

16     Honours and everyone in and around the courtroom.  There is one brief

17     matter to address.  We can do it in the presence of the witness and his

18     lawyers.  It regards paragraph 30 of the statement.

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I was wondering if we could do that in public

23     session, but I'm now assured we can, Ms. West.

24                           [The witness entered court]

25             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness take the solemn declaration,

Page 32023

 1     please.

 2             MS. WEST:  My apologies for interrupting.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

 5     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, sir.  Please be seated and make yourself

 7     comfortable.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

 9                           WITNESS:  KW554

10             JUDGE KWON:  I see three members of the representative from

11     Canada.

12                           [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Two members.  Welcome Mr. Fox and Ms. Soliman.

14             Yes, Ms. West, before we hear the evidence of the witness.

15             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.  If I can direct your

16     attention to paragraph 30 of the statement, and in paragraph 30 the

17     witness indicates an activity that he was involved in once he returned

18     from Bosnia on his first tour in July 1995 and before he returned back to

19     the region in December of 1995.  During that period of time, he tells us

20     that he reviewed what he describes as highly classified intelligence

21     information concerning the events in Srebrenica.  He says that he was

22     seeking to determine if there was any information that the accused had

23     been involved or informed about the executions that had taken place after

24     the fall of Srebrenica.  He then tells us that he found no such

25     information, and he found it significant because given the level of

Page 32024

 1     information he reviewed, had the accused been involved or been informed

 2     of the execution, this witness would have expected it to be reflected in

 3     those materials.

 4             Mr. President, we asked Defence counsel whether they themselves

 5     had access to those materials or had seen those materials, and they

 6     informed us -- we asked on January 7th.  They informed us on the same

 7     date that they did not have the material referred to in paragraph 30, nor

 8     had they seen it.  On this same day, we asked the Canadian government

 9     whether we could see that material as well, and on January 9th, we were

10     advised the witness did not have the material referred to in paragraph 30

11     and that he was drawing on his memory.  They also advised that if we

12     wanted to see the material, we would have to make a formal request for

13     it, but they noted that doing so would take some time to process.

14             That was on January 9th.  We declined to start that process,

15     quite candidly, Mr. President, because understanding how much time it

16     would actually take would only delay this witness.  And further, if this

17     material indeed was highly classified information, the possibility of

18     actually ever receiving that material, I suspect, would be rather low.

19     However, we are now still left with this paragraph, and I now would ask

20     for the paragraph to be excluded from the statement, and my reason is

21     that it is the Prosecution's position that it would be unfair to allow

22     the admission of this paragraph as we wouldn't have any ability to fairly

23     or thoroughly cross-examine exactly what this witness relied upon when he

24     made this very significant statement.

25             Secondly, this would be particularly difficult considering that

Page 32025

 1     we understand that the witness referred -- or reviewed this material in

 2     the fall of 1995, which would have been at a time when the witness hadn't

 3     been given any advantage or perspective that we now have because of the

 4     passage of time, and even if he had seen a document that would have

 5     connected the accused to the events, he may not have been aware of it

 6     because he was so close to the events.  And it's for those reasons that I

 7     would ask that paragraph 30 be excluded.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Could you expand a bit further as to the point that

 9     this paragraph should be deleted instead of going to a matter of weight

10     at the end of the day?

11             MS. WEST:  Your Honour, I'm fully confident that the Court could

12     make that appropriate consideration, but the significance of the

13     statement he makes in this paragraph is quite bold, and without the

14     materials that he's reviewed, I am at a loss as how to handle any

15     cross-examination regarding it, and it's for those reasons that I'd ask

16     that you exclude it.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             Can I hear from you, Mr. Robinson.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  Besides the issue of weight

20     which we feel is quite correct, the Prosecution has had this statement

21     since September 2012 and could have easily made inquiries, requests for

22     binding orders, if necessary, and would likely have been successful in at

23     least having the material identified and if -- if such material was

24     identified, you could be in a position to decide whether or not to

25     disclose it to them.  But to raise it on the day of the cross-examination

Page 32026

 1     I don't think warrants the remedy of exclusion.  So you can give it

 2     whatever weight you wish.  They can cross-examine to the extent that they

 3     can, and even after this testimony, if they still wanted to make a

 4     binding order request, they can do that, and if it's necessary, we can

 5     have the witness back.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I add something from my

 7     amateurish position or layman's position.  On several occasions we heard

 8     hearsay evidence from the evidence.  This is much more reliable than any

 9     hearsay.  We did not insist on them bringing the source of the hearsay to

10     this courtroom.  We accepted what they presented to us.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to add anything, Ms. West?

12             MS. WEST:  No thank you.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West, the Chamber is of the view that all this

15     goes to the issue of weight, so we will not exclude the paragraph at the

16     moment.

17             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Witness.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D7101 in

22     e-court, and the document shouldn't be broadcast.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Witness, what you see in front of you on the screen next to the

25     number KW554, do you see your name and your date of birth, and are both

Page 32027

 1     correct?

 2        A.   Yes, I do, and they are both correct.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to tender

 4     this document into evidence under seal.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  It shall be assigned Exhibit D2760 and it's under

 7     seal.  Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I would like to call up

 9     another document which shouldn't be broadcast, although it might be, as a

10     matter of fact.  1D06001.  If you believe that it may be broadcast, we

11     would not object to that.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, the last page with the signature

13     shouldn't be broadcast.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Witness, did you provide a statement to my Defence team?

17        A.   Yes, I did.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Would that be the statement that you see in front of

19     you on the screen?

20        A.   Yes, it is.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Does your statement truly reflect your words?

22        A.   Yes, it does.

23        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you here

24     today, would your answers be the same as they are in this statement?

25        A.   Yes, they would be.

Page 32028

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Did you sign the statement?

 2        A.   Yes, I did.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we display the last page now,

 4     but that page should not be broadcast.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Is this your signature, sir?

 7        A.   Yes, it is.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to tender

 9     this statement into evidence pursuant to Rule 92 ter.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, are you minded to tender a public

11     redacted version of this statement, redacting the signature part?

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We'll do that.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Any objection, Ms. West?

14             MS. WEST:  No.

15             JUDGE KWON:  I take it there are no associated exhibits.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll admit both versions.

18                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Statement shall be assigned Exhibit D2761,

20     admitted under seal, and the public redacted version shall be admitted as

21     Defence Exhibit D2762.  Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I don't have any

24     questions for this witness, at least for the time being.

25             JUDGE KWON:  For the public benefit -- benefit of the public, are

Page 32029

 1     you going to read out the summary?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, Excellency.  I apologise.

 3             I'm going to read the summary in English, and I don't think that

 4     there are any reasons for this to be read out in private session.

 5             [In English] Witness KW554 was an intelligence officer for the

 6     UNPROFOR in Zagreb.  During his time in UNPROFOR, it was a widely held

 7     belief among Western-oriented intelligence analysts, including himself,

 8     that the Bosnian Muslims were responsible for some of the notorious

 9     shelling incidents which had killed and wounded many people in Sarajevo.

10     It was believed that the Muslims were shelling their own civilians in

11     order to blame the Serbs and obtain foreign intervention in the war on

12     their side.

13             It was widely believed that United Nations forces -- within the

14     United Nations forces that at least one of the market-place shellings in

15     Sarajevo was caused by the Muslims.  On one occasion when discussing the

16     responsibility of the Muslims for the first Markale Market place shelling

17     which had occurred before he arrived in the former Yugoslavia, a US

18     soldier confirmed that the Muslims were responsible for this shelling and

19     displayed that he said -- what he said was a photograph of a person

20     dropping a mortar shell from window overlooking the market --

21     Markale Market place.

22             Concerning the second shelling of the Markale Marketplace, the

23     Witness KW554 was informed that the round had been recorded on a

24     Cymbeline radar but it could not be determined from which side of the

25     confrontation line it had been fired.

Page 32030

 1             He received credible information that the Muslim -- Bosnian

 2     Muslims were violating the Sarajevo weapons exclusion zone in May 1995.

 3     However, it was well known that NATO would never launch air-strikes

 4     against the Bosnian Muslims because the Muslims had the political support

 5     of the United States.

 6             During the time of Witness KW554 in Bosnia, there were personnel

 7     on the ground in Bosnia who were tasked with covertly locating and

 8     recording Bosnian Serb military positions and facilities which might be

 9     potential targets for NATO air-strikes.

10             The personnel engaged in these tasks were either working for

11     UNPROFOR, NATO, or their own national armed forces.  Among those working

12     for UNPROFOR were group -- a group of British soldiers known as JCOs.

13     Several countries had their own soldiers working covertly in Bosnia, and

14     although they reported directly to their national command, they would

15     share information on targets and intelligence with NATO.  The witness

16     knows that national elements were providing information used in compiling

17     the target list for NATO air-strikes because he saw such lists.

18             National elements had forward air controllers on the ground in

19     Bosnia as well.  These forward air controllers operated both inside and

20     outside of the enclaves in Bosnia and covertly gathered information on

21     potential targets for NATO air-strikes.

22             General Rupert Smith, the UNPROFOR force commander and a general

23     in the British Army was aware that there were forward air controllers on

24     the ground in Bosnia and that they assisted NATO to conduct the

25     air-strikes in Pale in May 1995.

Page 32031

 1             The ammunition depot in Pale was an important installation of the

 2     Serbs.  The Muslims were unable to reach it from any other position.  The

 3     NATO bombing of that ammunition depot was a significant setback to the

 4     Serbs in the war and provided a military advantage to the Muslims.

 5             During the time in Bosnia, the Witness KW554, he had frequent

 6     contacts with United Nations military observers, UNMOs.  Although they

 7     were supposed to be unarmed and neutral observers, virtually every UNMO

 8     who he encountered in Bosnia thought he was James Bond and tried to do

 9     sneaking and peeking.  Witness KW554 used them as sources of information.

10     Other national elements also tasked UNMOs to collect information for them

11     from time to time.  Witness KW554 would hide in the trunk when the UNMOs

12     took him through military check-points.  Although UNMOs were supposed to

13     be unarmed, many of them had weapons.  They were like Rambo.

14             When he returned from Bosnia, Witness KW554 undertook a review of

15     highly classified intelligence information concerning the events in

16     Srebrenica in July 1995.  He was seeking to determine if there was any

17     information that Radovan Karadzic had been involved in or informed about

18     the executions which had taken place after the fall of Srebrenica.  He

19     found no information connecting Dr. Karadzic to those events.  He found

20     this significant, because given the level of information in the material

21     he reviewed, had Dr. Karadzic been involved in or informed about the

22     executions, he would have expected it to be reflected in those materials.

23             [Interpretation] That would be a short summary, and I have no

24     questions for the witness.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 32032

 1             Mr. Witness, as you have noted, your evidence in chief has been

 2     admitted in its entirety in writing.  Now you will be further

 3     cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. West.

 6             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7                           Cross-examination by Ms. West:

 8        Q.   Good morning, sir.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  No, it's 2.20.

10             MS. WEST:

11        Q.   Good afternoon, sir.

12        A.   Good afternoon, ma'am.

13        Q.   Thank you for meeting with me yesterday.  One of the questions I

14     neglected to ask you and I'll ask you now is do you speak B/C/S?

15        A.   No, I don't.

16        Q.   Now, you have a copy of your statement in front of you?

17        A.   Yes, I do.

18        Q.   Okay.  If at any time you need to refer to that, you can just go

19     ahead and do that.  Just let me know.

20             The first question I want to ask you regards paragraph 14 of your

21     statement, and in that paragraph you indicate that you were present in

22     the former Yugoslavia in May 1995 when the NATO air-strikes were carried

23     out in Pale, but you were not in Pale; correct?

24        A.   That's correct.

25        Q.   And so any information you have about the situation comes

Page 32033

 1     second-hand.  You didn't observe it yourself; right?

 2        A.   That's correct.

 3        Q.   Nor did any -- did you have any personal conversations with

 4     people who were most affected by the events, like the hostages

 5     themselves?

 6        A.   No, I did have some conversations with some of the hostages that

 7     were -- that were detained.

 8        Q.   Okay.  So for example, Patrick Rechner, who is the team leader in

 9     Pale, you didn't have a conversation with him, though, did you?

10        A.   No, not at that time, no.  I had spoken with him previously

11     though.

12        Q.   But at the time or any time thereafter, you didn't have any

13     conversation with him in which he related to you exactly what happened

14     during the hostage situation?

15        A.   No, I didn't.

16        Q.   And any information that you received about the crisis was not

17     received in realtime, was it?

18        A.   Could you explain to me what you would mean by realtime?

19        Q.   I take it your testimony was admitted in the Ribic case in

20     Canada, and in that case at page 823, in regard this, you said, "I was

21     aware of communications that were going, but once again it's time

22     delayed.  It's within maybe hours or a day or whatever, but it's not

23     minute by minute.  I'm not watching these transmissions at all."  That's

24     what I mean by realtime.  The information you received was delayed, was

25     it not?

Page 32034

 1        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 2        Q.   All right.  But nonetheless, you make some general comments about

 3     the UNMOs in your statement, and I want to look at those to see if those

 4     comments have any relevance to the hostage-taking.  Now let's look at

 5     paragraphs 24 to 27 and those are the paragraphs in which you speak about

 6     the reputation of the UNMOs.

 7             The basis of your opinion for these comments comes from your

 8     interaction with them as sources; is that right?

 9        A.   That's correct.

10        Q.   And the UNMOs with whom you used mostly as sources were Canadian

11     UNMOs; correct?

12        A.   Yes, that would be correct.

13        Q.   And so should we take the comments that you make in this

14     statement to be applicable for the most part to the Canadian UNMOs?

15        A.   For the most part, but I did have contact with other UNMOs from

16     other nationalities.

17        Q.   Okay.  But in paragraph 26 -- in paragraph 26, you say:

18             "Although the UNMOs were supposed to be unarmed, many of them had

19     weapons.  They were like Rambo."

20             Of what nationality were these particular UNMOs, these armed

21     UNMOs?

22        A.   Other than the Canadian -- Canadians that I saw, I do not recall

23     the nationalities of them.

24        Q.   So then should I understand that when you speak about armed

25     UNMOs, you are specifically speaking about Canadian armed UNMOs and no

Page 32035

 1     one else?

 2        A.   No, that is not correct.  I did see other UNMOs from other

 3     nationalities.  I don't recall the countries, but they were armed as

 4     well.

 5        Q.   Well, let me go again to your Ribic testimony at page 717 and you

 6     were asked the question were the UNMOs armed, and your answer was:

 7             "I think I mentioned that they looked like Rambos, some of them,

 8     not all of them.  But they were really misguided.  They were armed.  I

 9     wouldn't say all of them, but certainly the ones that I went with.  They

10     were the ones that tried to who me where to hide the weapons, some of

11     them.  I'm talking about the Canadian ones now specifically."

12             Do you remember saying that testimony that was admitted in the

13     Ribic case?

14        A.   Yes, I do.  I think the point that I was making at that time was

15     about the hiding of the weapons and how to hide them.  That was a

16     Canadian to Canadian only thing.  I wasn't trying to make the statement

17     that other UNMOs weren't -- or I didn't have contact with other UNMOs.  I

18     think when I said the Canadian thing, I was referring specifically to the

19     fact of hiding weapons.

20        Q.   And the particular UNMOs that you speak about that were armed,

21     were any of them part of the group that was taken hostage in May 1995?

22        A.   No, not that I'm aware of.

23        Q.   And in paragraphs 16 through 22, you speak about knowing in a

24     general way about the existence of forward air controllers in Bosnia.

25     Were any of the hostages who were taken into custody in May 1995 some of

Page 32036

 1     these forward air controllers of which you speak?

 2        A.   No, not that I'm aware of.

 3        Q.   If we can go to paragraph 10 of your statement.  Here you say,

 4     and this is talking about the Markale shelling in February 1994, that you

 5     heard that there was a photo showing that one of the mortar shells was

 6     detonated by being dropped from a window overlooking the market-place.

 7             So that's paragraph 10, and there you wrote that you heard about

 8     it.

 9             Then we go to paragraph 11.  In 11 you say -- you're speaking

10     about the same shelling, and you say:

11             " ... a US soldier told me that the Muslims were responsible for

12     the shelling," and he displayed a photograph of a person dropping a

13     mortar shell from a window overlooking the market-place.  "I didn't

14     examine the photo."

15             Now, these paragraphs as you can see are inconsistent.  What is

16     the right version?

17        A.   No, I can see how you would -- would say that.  I saw the picture

18     from a distance, about the distance between what you and I are standing

19     right now.  It was -- I don't know why I said just "I heard," because I

20     did see it.  We had a discussion about the picture, but I did not examine

21     it closely, but from what I was told by my source that I was using at the

22     time or the soldier, that it was a picture of the shelling.

23        Q.   Now, you just said that you were at a distance about where we are

24     right now.  Would you agree that's about 10 feet?

25        A.   Yes, that's correct.

Page 32037

 1        Q.   How big was the picture?

 2        A.   Traditional, I guess the 5 by 8 size picture.

 3        Q.   So at a distance of about 10 feet, a 5 by 8 picture, could you

 4     see anything at all?

 5        A.   No, because he did display it very quick and flashed it as

 6     opposed to holding it still, so I did not see what was on the picture.

 7        Q.   But you would agree that in order for a person dropping a mortar

 8     shell from a window, in order for that to have been -- photo to have been

 9     taken of that, the photographer would have had to have been reasonably

10     close; right?

11        A.   Yes, that is absolutely correct, yes.

12        Q.   And then the photographer and the camera would have had to have

13     survived the explosion that killed about 66 people and wounded over 140.

14     Wouldn't that be correct?

15        A.   Yes, that would be correct.

16        Q.   Now, as regards this particular -- the Markale bombing in

17     February 1994, do you remember what you said about it in your Ribic

18     testimony?

19        A.   No, I don't.

20        Q.   Let me tell you what you said about it, because you didn't

21     comment at all about this -- about this photograph.  Instead at page 768

22     you said you stood in the market-place and you saw the crater that was

23     created, and then you said:

24             "I have stood where the impact of the mortar round in the market

25     was and I have seen the impact on the ground.  Being an ex-artillery man,

Page 32038

 1     I have somewhat of a knowledge on how artillery rounds or mortars

 2     impact."

 3             And then on 7 -- the next page you said:

 4             "The way that the round impacted to me, and I'm not an expert at

 5     this, indicates that it was a fairly vertical trajectory, straight down

 6     as opposed to coming in --" you waved your hand diagonally at this point,

 7     "which is what you would have expected from Serbian guns because they

 8     were on the hills some kilometres away.  So the round would come in on a

 9     diagonal trajectory.  By my terms what I saw didn't appear to be like

10     that."

11             Do you remember saying that?

12        A.   Yes, I do.

13        Q.   Okay.  And so you suggested that the crater you saw looked like

14     it should have been a vertical trajectory as opposed to a diagonal

15     trajectory which would -- diagonal would have supported it being fired

16     from perhaps Serb positions.  Is that what we should understand?

17        A.   Yes, that's correct.

18             JUDGE MORRISON:  I don't want to be a Pedant and I certainly

19     don't want to give evidence, but you estimated the distance between you

20     at about 10 feet.  Well, from where I'm sitting it seems to be

21     considerably more than that, nearer 20 than 10.  If it has to be

22     measured, it has to be measured, but the transcript will only show 10

23     feet, but I don't think that can be right.

24             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Your Honour, for those comments, and

25     appreciate your correcting the record as such, and perhaps we'll get back

Page 32039

 1     to that, but if we can stay on this for a moment.

 2        Q.   As regards this very issue, the issue of the crater and it being

 3     a vertical trajectory or a diagonal trajectory, the Trial Chamber

 4     recently heard evidence from a Canadian UNMO, his name was John Russell,

 5     who was one of the people who examined the crater itself.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  And for the parties' recollection, this was the

 7     testimony regarding the garden hose theory.

 8        Q.   And in his statement, Mr. Russell's statement D2364, at paragraph

 9     22, he said this:

10             "I was struck by how steep of an angle that the round must have

11     come in on to clear the large building adjacent to the crater.  This led

12     me to believe that the round had come from a location closer to the

13     crater than a round fired from further away."

14             Mr. Witness, is this just another way of saying the same thing

15     that you said in Ribic?

16        A.   Yes, I believe so.

17             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, may we go in private session?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19                           [Private session]

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 32040











11  Pages 32040-32047 redacted.  Private session.















Page 32048

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15                           [Open session]

16             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.  Thank you.

17             MS. WEST:

18        Q.   Now, sir, earlier in your testimony I mentioned Patrick Rechner,

19     you said that you had met him once, but that was after the fact; correct?

20        A.   No.  I met him once before in -- in Bosnia.  He had stopped into

21     my office and we just had an informal chat.

22        Q.   All right.  My mistake.  And also as regards Mr. Ribic, had you

23     ever met him?

24        A.   No, I did not meet him specifically, although I knew that he was

25     there, but I did not meet him, no.  Not until after the fact.

Page 32049

 1        Q.   And your knowledge of what had happened in Pale in May and June

 2     of 1995, that knowledge came from people you spoke to; correct?

 3        A.   It would have been from people I spoke to plus from reports that

 4     I would have received from national level reports and from other

 5     countries as well.  It's not just people I would have spoke to in the

 6     theatre.  It would have also been from reports.

 7        Q.   And as to those sources, did you have a sense as to where the

 8     order to take these hostages came from?

 9        A.   No, I didn't.

10        Q.   Sir, I'm going to remind you of your testimony in the Ribic case.

11     It's page 813 to 814 and you were asked:

12             "Is it true that the order to take hostages came from the top

13     level of Serb leadership?"

14             And your answer was:

15             "I received this intelligence information from direct sources.

16     So this is done at a very high level.  This is not a local commander in

17     the field gets to make a decision to take hostages."

18             You go on and speak about this more, but in reminding you of that

19     testimony, do you have -- do you have -- what is your position as regards

20     to where the order came from?

21        A.   I hope I'm not confusing you here.  What I'm -- when I refer to

22     that, I don't know where it came from.  I don't know exactly where it

23     came from.  We like to have exact.  I don't know where it came from.

24     When I talked in the Ribic case, what we tried to have a good grasp on

25     was the knowledge of who was giving orders and when the orders were

Page 32050

 1     given.  So here when I'm talking about levels, I'm specifically speaking

 2     about the military.  Now when I say it's from higher up, higher up within

 3     a military chain of command as in not in a troop or a section level, not

 4     a brigade level -- sorry, not a battalion level but back to a brigade

 5     level.  So I'm referring to the military structure.  It certainly had

 6     nothing to do with the political side.

 7             MS. WEST:  Thank you.

 8             Mr. President, I have no further questions.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one question, Excellency.

11                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

12        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Witness, a moment ago you were shown an

13     intercept of the conversation between me and Mr. Deronjic through a

14     go-between.  Was there anything in that document which hinted at any

15     possible executions?  If you'd like us to, we can call it up again.

16     P04618.

17        A.   Yes, I'd like to just review it just once again if you don't

18     mind.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P04618, please.  The English

20     version, please.

21             THE WITNESS:  No.  I don't see anything in that indicates

22     executions.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you, Witness, for coming here and testifying.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Should we upload witnesses statement paragraph 30

Page 32051

 1     again.  I have a couple of questions for you with respect to the

 2     paragraph, Mr. Witness.  But we'll not broadcast this.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 4                           Questioned by the Court:

 5             JUDGE KWON:  The second sentence reads like this:

 6             "I was seeking to determine if there was any information that

 7     Radovan Karadzic had been involved in or informed about the execution

 8     which had taken place after the fall of Srebrenica."

 9             So my first question is:  What kind of execution were you aware

10     of at the time, or what -- what was that execution like that you were

11     aware of that came to know at the time?  It was in July, wasn't it?

12        A.   That's correct.  At that time, we certainly didn't have the

13     hindsight that we do now, and no, I did not know numbers or didn't know

14     of how many and so forth or the scope.  We had known that Srebrenica had

15     fallen and that the -- I can remember recalling that the -- there was

16     reports that the males had been rounded up, but there was certainly no --

17     there was no absolute evidence at the time that I saw that there was

18     executions other than the reports saying that we had assumed that that's

19     what was going to happen to these people.  I just don't recall.  I hope

20     that answers your question.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Fair enough.  My second question is this:  You said

22     that if -- you were seeking to determine if there was information that

23     Radovan Karadzic had been involved.  Why Mr. Karadzic?  What triggered to

24     try to find whether Karadzic was involved in or not?  Why not anybody

25     else?

Page 32052

 1        A.   That's -- that's a good question.  When -- and I wouldn't say

 2     that it wasn't to try and find anybody else.  One of the main areas of

 3     responsibility that I had when I was deployed in Bosnia was to try to

 4     find and figure out the chain of command and who was giving the orders to

 5     whom.  So when I returned to Ottawa with the BIRT, it was just a natural

 6     evolution for me to -- and I was tasked with it, but it was also a

 7     personal thing that I wanted to find out at what level.  And because of

 8     the material I had a chance to review being highly classified, I would

 9     have assumed that I would have been able to find out who gave the orders.

10     Just -- not just on Srebrenica but also I was looking at who gave the

11     orders in a general picture so we could formulate a proper chain of

12     command.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  That concludes your evidence,

14     Mr. Witness.  On behalf of the Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your

15     coming to The Hague to give it.  I also appreciate the kindness of the

16     representatives of the Canadian government, Mr. Fox and Ms. Soliman.

17             We will rise all together.  The hearing is adjourned.

18                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m.,

19                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 17th day of

20                           January, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.