1 Thursday, 31 January 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.14 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.
9 Good morning, all.
10 WITNESS: SRDJAN SEHOVAC [Resumed]
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 Examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
13 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Sehovac.
14 A. Good morning.
15 Q. I apologise for the delay. It was beyond my control.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would now like to read out a
17 summary of Mr. Srdjan Sehovac's statement in English.
18 [In English] Srdjan Sehovac was born on 7th of May, 1959, in the
19 village of Presjenica, municipality Trnovo. He finished high school for
20 internal affairs in Sarajevo and after that studied on university for
21 security in Skopje. As one of ten best cadets of year 1977, he was in a
22 position to choose a working place and he had chosen national security.
23 Throughout the entire pre-war period he worked in sector for secret
24 following, filming, and photo-documenting of people who were of interest
25 for national security. When he moved to the Serbian MUP, he performed
1 the duty of operative employee in Ilidza. After a while, at the end of
2 1992, he was appointed head of department of Ilidza National Security
3 Service Office.
4 The SNB become aware that the Muslims and the Croats were arming
5 en masse through the BH Territorial Defence and through -- at the
6 beginning of 1991 and, in addition, that the paramilitary units of the
7 Patriotic League and the Green Berets were established. They also
8 received informations that the BH army in Sarajevo was manufacturing
9 ammunition and weapons. The SNB received intelligence that Muslim forces
10 had many more weapons than the VRS.
11 Before the beginning of the war, the Muslims and the Croats made
12 it clear they would jointly act against the Serbs. They produced with --
13 proceeded with referenda and proclaimed independence without the
14 agreement of the Serbs. Further, a large number of foreign nationals
15 joined BH army units and some used to train Muslims to kill Serbs. The
16 SNB were also aware of criminal groups who were in the service of
17 official politics.
18 During the fighting, the Serbs were under a media blockade while
19 the networks of -- in the BH portrayed a false picture, demonising the
20 Serbs and showing the Muslims to be the victims. Anti-Serbian propaganda
21 was omnipresent in Sarajevo; the Serbs lived in constant and great fear.
22 After the killing of a Serb wedding guest in Sarajevo, it became clear to
23 Serbs that laws did not apply to Muslims. Foreign reporters were under
24 pressure from organs in Sarajevo and mainly filed rigged reports; a
25 number of the incidents which the Muslims were responsible for were
1 portrayed as Serb actions.
2 Reports were received daily about shelling which targeted Serb
3 settlements and civilians with many casualties. A number of countries
4 violated the arms embargo. Those countries were mainly Muslim countries.
5 The Republic of Croatia also violated the embargo despite the UN Security
6 Council Resolutions. A member of BH Presidency, Ivo Komsic, also abused
7 his office and violated the embargo.
8 Butmir airport was handed over to demonstrate good will and to
9 calm the conflict down, allowing -- the Serbs handed it over to the
10 United Nations, allowing the unimpeded supply of humanitarian aid.
11 However, humanitarian workers were under the control of Muslim state and
12 military security. They carried messages, weapons, intelligence,
13 financial information, food and other materials, and the aid would be
14 smuggled or sold on the black market and hardly ever distributed
15 correctly. Muslim forces abused their freedom of movement via Butmir
16 airport, launching offensive actions from this location. With the help
17 of the UNPROFOR, they would cross the runway unimpeded, whereas Serb
18 forces would have to take a detour even for humanitarian aid. UNPROFOR
19 forces provided the Muslim side with information regarding the condition
20 of the VRS units and the weak points which were then exploited in
21 offensive actions of the Muslim army.
22 Muslim authorities did not allow Muslim residents to leave the
23 town. In Sarajevo, Muslim forces would frequently fire from and also
24 target civilian facilities including schools and hospitals. The SNB
25 possessed extensive information about the indiscriminate fire which would
1 often kill and wound both children and civilians.
2 The security service, after the multi-party elections, had
3 already begun segregating people on the basis of ethnicity and Serb
4 employees had privileges removed. When Alija Izetbegovic assumed power,
5 he immediately embarked on forming his State Security Service and this is
6 how the SDA and HDZ managed to gain control of all important
7 institutions. JNA facilities and units were under constant surveillance
8 immediately following the end of the multi-party elections. Blockades
9 and attacks followed in April and May 1992.
10 The SNB were aware of Muslim plans for ethnically cleansing Serbs
11 from Ilidza and Sarajevo and passed this information on; however, this
12 could not be acted upon before the war polarised on ethnic grounds.
13 Srdjan Sehovac had information that on a number of occasions,
14 through mass media, President Karadzic ordered that non-Serbs must not be
15 abused and maltreated. There were no indications in any written document
16 or oral order from the higher command of actions being planned for the
17 permanent removal of Muslims and Croats from areas in which the RS
18 effectively exercised power. As far as Srdjan Sehovac is aware, neither
19 he nor the SNB ordered, either orally or in writing, that attacks should
20 be carried out on civilians in the Muslim-controlled part of the city.
21 And that would be the summary. Now I would like to deal with a
22 few documents. I would ask Mr. Robinson to inform about a few documents
23 that we give up --
24 MS. WEST: Pardon me.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. West.
1 MS. WEST: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. I'm sorry
2 for this interruption. I make this point only because I'm not clear that
3 Mr. Karadzic was conscious of this, but as we all know, a motion was
4 filed before regarding a number of irrelevant paragraphs in this
5 statement. When Mr. Karadzic read out his summary, I noted, for example,
6 in particular page 2, line 22, he included some information that was
7 excluded by the motion. So I would only say that now because I'm unsure
8 as to whether this summary was written before the motion and we would
9 just ask Mr. Karadzic to take care next time this happens.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I didn't pay attention to that point.
11 Did you follow, Mr. Karadzic?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, Your Excellency, but
13 this really was made before and the workload is such that we don't have
14 time to change it afterwards.
15 JUDGE KWON: So we'll deal with the associated exhibits at the
16 end of your examination-in-chief. Those -- do you have any objection to
17 the admission of those items not referred to yesterday by me, Ms. West?
18 MS. WEST: None as to the ones not referred by you.
19 JUDGE KWON: If -- but there are certain items to be given up,
20 Mr. Robinson?
21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. With respect to the two
22 documents that you indicated you wanted to know the relevance of, we're
23 not going to lead any evidence on those and we will withdraw, that's
24 number 1D6132 and 1D6134. And there will be three documents that will be
25 led live and the others will be withdrawn.
1 JUDGE KWON: How about the intercept?
2 MR. ROBINSON: That will be one of them that will be led live,
4 JUDGE KWON: And I referred to three -- four documents in total.
5 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct. We will also lead live 1D0921 and
6 that -- the other documents on our list of associated exhibits will not
7 be -- they'll be withdrawn. There will also be one other document that
8 Dr. Karadzic wishes to lead live that was not part of our associated
9 exhibits. So there will be three documents that will be led live and the
10 rest we are withdrawing.
11 JUDGE KWON: Just let me be clear how about 6133 and 6167?
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we are not going to -- we withdraw those.
13 JUDGE KWON: Two items.
14 MR. ROBINSON: So we'll admit all the remaining associated
15 exhibits and give numbers in due course.
16 MS. WEST: And I understand Mr. Robinson indicated there will be
17 another document that's not an associated document that will be used.
18 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct. I'm advised that 1D378 will be
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Sehovac, in what way did the SNB arrive at information?
24 A. Well, you see, in its work, the SNB used mostly well-known police
25 methods. In this war situation, the most frequent method was interviews
1 with refugees or defectors from the territory controlled by Muslim
2 soldiers and using operative technical measures. These measures involved
3 intercept centres and radio reconnaissance centres. We also arrived at
4 information using our people who spoke foreign languages well and were
5 deployed at certain points in the course of the war.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D06136. Can we have
8 pages 2 and 3.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Do you recognise this document, first of all, and this form of
12 A. This document was drawn up in the SNB Ilidza department.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page?
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Can you tell us whether this is your signature and what is on
17 this page?
18 A. This is my signature. All the documents -- when I became chief
19 of the SNB Ilidza department, the procedure was that all documents had to
20 pass through my hands; and then, as there was a narrow circle of people
21 leading the department, we would agree on what to do with the document.
22 They were mostly for information and all things that had to do with
23 military or civilian security were passed on to the persons who had to be
24 informed at that point in time.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please?
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Can you tell us, this first and second conversation that were
4 intercepted, can you tell us what this is all about?
5 A. In this conversation, Vehbija Karic, who was the commander of the
6 1st Corps of the so-called ABiH, Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a
7 certain Mole [as interpreted] from Hrasnica are talking. They're
8 mentioning the kinds of weapons they have, the sort of ammunition they
9 have, how much they have, and where to use that. This is just a summary.
10 As I can't see very well, if we could zoom in a little bit.
11 Q. They're mentioning big babies here. What are those to the best
12 of your knowledge?
13 A. These are large-calibre shells for guns, howitzers, and multiple
14 rocket-launchers or we call them Plamen, flame.
15 Q. And who is saying that this has been used up, the one from
17 A. Yes, Vehbija Karic is asking for support and the other one is
18 saying, "We used it all up," and he's explaining about T-12 and so on.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll up a little? Or
21 scroll down, in fact.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. What is this other conversation on this page?
24 A. It's between Sead Rekic and Vehbija Karic, and he's checking
25 whether they have used up all the shells and how it is that there are
1 none left because there were 40 of them. And the other one is saying he
2 doesn't know who used them up. Fikret, the commander of the so-called
3 army, that is, the unit that was in Hrasnica at the time.
4 Q. So Karic is asking that Fikret should see how many 120 shells are
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Did you know that Hrasnica was supplied with large-calibre
8 weapons and that they were using the ammunition in this way?
9 A. Well, the area we were in was exposed every day. It was below
10 Hrasnica. Hrasnica had their places at Igman and they could see Ilidza.
11 It was -- they had a good view of Ilidza. So every day we could see that
12 they had a lot of ammunition, that these were very destructive shells,
13 because you could see the damage at Ilidza.
14 Q. Yes, it seems that in the transcript it doesn't say that Ilidza
15 was shelled from Hrasnica daily and you said that. So we have to make
16 breaks and speak less quickly, both of us.
17 Can you repeat what you said? You said something that they had a
18 good view?
19 A. Well, you see, the Serbian positions at Ilidza were in a valley
20 and those were the demarcation lines. They were some 50 or a hundred
21 metres different from trench to trench. The Muslims had a certain
22 advantage because they had Mount Igman behind their backs, and from
23 Mount Igman you had an excellent view of all of Ilidza. They could see
24 Vojkovici, Lukavica, Hadzici, Rajlovac, that entire part of Sarajevo with
25 the exception of the part beyond Vrace and that was already under the
1 control of Muslim forces.
2 Q. Thank you. Is S saying that he thinks there are quite a lot of
3 those 120-millimetre shells?
4 A. Yes --
5 MS. WEST: Objection.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- he's saying there are enough of
7 them, yes.
8 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue, yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Can we have the next page.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Can you tell us who -- who is talking in this intercept, what
13 it's about. You don't have to mention every amount and calibre, but just
14 tell us who has these weapons and what this is.
15 A. Well, the conversation is between Vehbija Karic and assistant
16 Nole [phoen] from Hrasnica. It says what the frequency for contact
17 between Hrasnica and Sarajevo is, and there is a list of the shells they
18 have, for what weapon, 20 -- 220, 37-millimetres. And then there are 42
19 [as interpreted], and so on. I can read this out. 130-millimetres,
20 122 pieces; RPG, 120 pieces, and so on.
21 He says that there are no 60-millimetre shells, and that's
22 indicative because those were used every day. That was a movable mortar
23 which could be put on a vehicle and you could drive it around and they
24 frequently fired from it.
25 Q. Thank you. To the best of your knowledge, this 130-millimetre,
1 is that the howitzer? Are those howitzer shells?
2 A. You see, I can't say precisely. I'm not really familiar with
3 artillery weapons, but this is the document. This is what they were
4 saying. It was recorded word for word.
5 Q. How did you make these recordings? How were these conversations
7 A. Well, in the -- on the premises of the SNB where our
8 reconnaissance centre was, there was a room which was equipped for
9 recording. Telephone conversations were mostly recorded on a cassette
10 player, UHER. It records only while the conversation is going on, and
11 then you could listen to the reproduction and there were employees
12 writing this down; and then it was sent on to where we thought it should
13 be sent.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly take a look at the
16 next page.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Who is talking here and what are they talking about in brief?
19 A. This is a conversation between Mirso and a member of the
20 Territorial Defence staff in Hrasnica and Nisko. They're saying: Are we
21 going to talk this evening? At what time? Have you let the people rest?
22 Have you let the men rest?
23 In this second part, it's a conversation between Fikret Prevljak,
24 the commander of the Hrasnica TO, and Mehic, that's UNO 1, that was an
25 operations centre of theirs, where it says:
1 "You have called about those co-ordinates, the position ..." and
2 so on. "I have instructions" --
3 Q. Well, just can you tell us where it says "Rajlovac," what this
4 refers to.
5 A. Well, he says: We covered Rajlovac last night from up there with
6 105 and 155 millimetres. Well, this means, well, the night before there
7 was an attack on Rajlovac and they provided artillery support from the --
8 the elevation at Mount Igman from where you can have a good view of all
9 of Rajlovac, and above Rajlovac there's another hill which was under
10 their control where they also had weapons and fired from artillery
11 weapons and the name of the hill is Sokolj.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this into evidence.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, all the witness said about this
15 document, which seems to be the transcript of intercepted conversation,
16 was that all the documents had to pass through his hands. I'm not sure
17 that statement sufficiently authenticates the intercepts according to our
18 practice. I'd like to hear about how the intercept operators worked,
19 whether he was in charge with interception. How can we guarantee the
20 authenticity of these conversations in terms of, i.e., whether they
21 are -- they were precise or not. Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Sehovac, what was your role in the service, in your
25 department, and what was your participation in controlling what you
2 A. I was head of department, meaning that all of the services acting
3 in Ilidza were under my control.
4 Q. Thank you. What about the operative who did the recording, could
5 he sign in your stead or who was the only person authorised to sign
7 A. The operative recording everything noted it down in handwriting,
8 then we had a typist who would type it up and I signed them. The
9 handwritten notes were signed by the operative. They were mainly
10 attached to the typed-up document.
11 Q. How did you know that it was something for you to sign? How did
12 you know it was correct and truthful?
13 A. One of the basic tasks of the SNB was to monitor the safety and
14 security of citizens and to gather military and other kind of information
15 in order to secure regular life and the defence of an area. It was
16 particular to our area because we were in a way encircled by the enemy.
17 All information of military nature was sent to the command of the unit in
18 the area or the unit that such information pertained to concerning dates,
19 times, and places.
20 Q. Thank you. Was there any interest or possibility on the part of
21 your operatives to send you a counterfeit document?
22 A. Everything was recorded, as I said. We have audio recordings.
23 One could listen to those recordings using a headset much like the one I
24 have now and with the assistance of a simple cassette player. At the
25 time, the technology was obsolete but that's what we had. By that time
1 one could use more advanced surveillance equipment but we didn't have
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, does this suffice in
4 terms of criteria for admitting?
5 JUDGE KWON: Ms. West.
6 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, I will refer
7 you to the amalgamated statement of one of the Prosecution's witnesses,
8 who was a protected witness, but that's P04634. And you will remember
9 this is a lengthy statement, it's 21 pages long, single-typed, of the
10 process by which this organisation intercepted conversations. It goes
11 into great detail as to where those conversations were intercepted,
12 specifically the type of technology that was used to do so, how the tapes
13 were used, whether they were reused, how it was transcribed, what took
14 place after the tapes were used. And further, specific detail as to the
15 actual recording.
16 What we've heard so far is, this gentleman, although the head of
17 the Ilidza SDB, only signed off on these once they were done. He's not
18 the participant, he's not the operator, he's not even the transcriber.
19 And although Mr. Karadzic has now given us a little bit more detail about
20 the method, that detail does not at all meet the standard by which this
21 Court has applied previously. I think to admit this intercept now would
22 dilute the standard that we've used.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, would you like to respond?
2 (redacted) He just
3 testified about the procedures that they used and he gave -- also the
4 amalgamated statement. And he did give more detail but the essence is
5 the same, that an operative listened to the conversation and wrote it
6 down just as this witness has testified to. Then that information was
7 typed up by someone else, same as was done by the Bosnian Muslim side,
8 and then the information was given to the supervisor, who in this case
9 was Mr. Sehovac --
10 JUDGE KWON: But I would have expected to hear from the witness
11 about such detail --
12 MR. ROBINSON: Well, I think he's already said that everything
13 was recorded, that the operator wrote down the notes, and it was typed up
14 and it was given to him. I don't think I've given you any detail that he
15 hasn't already testified to.
16 MS. WEST: Mr. President, I just want to make sure the witness
17 whom Mr. Robinson is speaking about --
18 JUDGE KWON: Pause, pause. Yes. Please continue.
19 [Prosecution counsel confer]
20 MS. WEST: I think we have to be a little bit sensitive to the
21 information that we're talking about. It's a protected witness. I think
22 to the extent that we've now spoken about it, we practically have
23 revealed his identity. I would ask at this point that those comments be
24 redacted. But secondly, I would ask --
25 JUDGE KWON: We are talking about -- okay, I will not comment
1 number of the witness.
2 MS. WEST: Yeah.
3 JUDGE KWON: Let me see. How did we reveal the identity?
4 MS. WEST: If we look at line 17 --
5 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 MR. TIEGER: If -- I just want to say, I mean we're maybe going
8 around in circles we don't want. Maybe this should be in private session
9 if we're talking about this possibility. And also, I would imagine
10 further discussions should not -- about the details should not take place
11 in the presence of a witness who should also not be privy to any
12 confidential information of that type.
13 JUDGE KWON: Could you just give me the line numbers, Ms. West.
17 (redacted) I think if we
18 continue to have this conversation, I would ask that the witness be
19 excused and we go into private session. Or I ask that this conversation
20 end, that the Court take it under advisement and refer to P04634 for the
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excuse me, excuse me. It seems you
23 have not understood some things. I said twice that we used an UHER
24 device to record the intercepts. The operative needn't necessarily be
25 present during the recording process. Once the operative realised that
1 the equipment was on, then he would start noting things down. So there
2 are not only transcripts but also audio recordings.
3 JUDGE KWON: We'll continue with that -- with the redaction of
4 that part of the transcript.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, it is the Chamber's understanding that
7 Mr. Karadzic led everything he could with this witness as regards this
9 MR. ROBINSON: Well, I think if there is something missing that
10 the Trial Chamber or the Prosecution thinks would make this not
11 admissible, he would be prepared to ask further questions. But as far as
12 he's concerned, he's provided the information that's sufficient to allow
13 the Chamber to make a finding that this intercept is authentic and
15 JUDGE KWON: What we are going to do is to mark this intercept
16 for identification and give its ruling later on. So then he may -- if
17 not admitted, he may wish to call this witness again. So that's the
18 point of my question. If there are more details he'll wish to lead, do
19 it now.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, thank you, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D2853, Your Honours.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Sehovac, in early June, were you in Ilidza at your work post,
25 in early June 1993 -- actually, late May and early June?
1 A. I was never absent during the war from my work-place. It was an
2 obligation I had. I think I was there in late May as well as in early
4 Q. Thank you. I wanted to show you a document of yours.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Which is 1D378. I kindly ask for
6 understanding for late notification. Unfortunately we still don't have
7 the translation. Do we? No, this is not the document, even. 1D378.
8 The one we see, I believe, is D1397 or 01397, I think that has already
9 been admitted -- no, that's not it either. We have the right document in
10 front of us, but what is in e-court doesn't seem to be the right one.
11 Let's try again. 1D378.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, the document we are seeing is noted as 1D378
13 on e-court. Probably there seems to be a mistake.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. We'll get to it later.
15 Instead, can we have 1D00921. Sorry, can we stay with this document for
16 a moment although it's been admitted.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Sehovac -- no, you don't know about this. There is only some
19 reference to gathering information about a game played at Dobrinja and
20 your document pertained to it -- that event of the 1st of June, 1993.
21 That's why the confusion. Do you remember that?
22 A. There was a football match between the units of the Army of BH or
23 something like that. I can't recall any further details unless I see my
24 document --
25 MS. WEST: Mr. President --
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- this document does refer to it
2 but I don't know anything more than that.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. West.
4 MS. WEST: Thank you. I do appreciate there are a number of
5 documents here. They found this document, they want to use it. If
6 there's a translation, I have no objection. However, just hearing what
7 he's said, that it refers to a football match in Dobrinja, we've had no
8 notice of this. This is a significant event in the Sarajevo fact
9 pattern. I can't possibly be fairly put in a position now to
10 cross-examine him on this particular issue. If that's what this document
11 has to do with, then I do object.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe I apologised a moment ago
13 because we were late in notifying this document. We were quite flexible
14 in that regard. This document has been known for a while, but the pace
15 of work that we have to cope with is such that we can't double-check
17 JUDGE KWON: No, the question is whether you are going to deal
18 with the football match in Dobrinja. That's the point Ms. West raised.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will only deal with the document
20 that Mr. Sehovac sent to his headquarters and his knowledge, nothing
22 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you come to 1D921 and deal with it and see
23 what happens or ...
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have 1D921.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Do you recognise this document, Mr. Sehovac?
2 A. Yes, I do. I signed it.
3 Q. Where does this document originate from? What is it about?
4 A. This is a report which was sent to my superiors.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page,
6 please, on the screen.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Look at this page. Could you tell us what kind of information do
9 you send to your superiors?
10 A. In the first sentence it says that:
11 "The Ilidza War Department of the National Security Service has
12 certain information which indicates that the enemy is preparing a
13 decisive attack/offensive on positions of our forces in the general area
14 of the Sarajevo battle-field, i.e., on Serbian territories in this area,"
15 and the area in question is Ilidza, "in order to unblock, first and
16 foremost, the core part of the Sarajevo area which is under their control
17 and to take control of roads which are of prime importance for the
18 Muslim-Croat coalition.
19 "Making use, above all, of the blind eye turned by individual
20 members of UNPROFOR, Muslim forces in Sarajevo are carrying on certain
21 military significant communication with their logistics base in Hrasnica
22 and Igman ."
23 And furthermore it says --
24 Q. The last paragraph, could you please tell us what it contains.
25 A. It says here:
1 "In this respect we have information that they are
2 psychologically preparing the members of their units and emphasizing to
3 them that there will be a considerable number of casualties in the coming
4 action. Also, it is more frequently reaching their ears and also being
5 heard in the city that they can seize the territory of the Ilidza Serbian
6 municipality in just one hour, but that they haven't done this -- that
7 they have not done this so far so that there would be no artillery
8 reprisal from the Serbian side ..."
9 Q. Where are they expecting that reprisal, on Hrasnica and in the
11 A. I suppose so, but I can comment upon their erroneous assessments.
12 If they were to cut off Ilidza, Ilidza would have nowhere to go. It
13 would be totally encircled. And in such a case, no retaliation would be
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we take a look at the following
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Again, at the beginning it says
19 that an offensive will be preceded by artillery fire from Igman and that
20 artillery fire will be carried out like never before and then there will
21 be infantry breaches. It says here that the Kosevo hospital is being
22 prepared, i.e., they are relocating the eye clinic from its current
23 building to a smaller one. In the current location of this health care
24 institution, it is possible, according to some estimates, to accommodate
25 up to 1.000 wounded. There are also some of their assessments here as to
1 how many casualties could result from that operation.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Can you go on reading about Jezero?
4 A. There is certain information indicating -- I apologise, where is
5 Jezero? Okay.
6 Q. The third paragraph from the bottom. It's very short.
7 A. "It is indicative that they are digging or have already prepared
8 four rows of trenches in the direction of the Jezero hospital, facing our
9 positions held by units from the Vogosca area."
10 Q. Since we are familiar with these localities, could you please
11 tell the Trial Chamber what the Jezero hospital is. Is a maternity ward
13 A. The Jezero hospital is a maternity ward, the maternity ward of
15 Q. Can you please read the paragraph mentioning UNPROFOR, where it
16 says that they limited their airplane flight.
17 A. "In this context, also indicative is the information that a full
18 (one hundred per cent) mobilisation into HVO units has been conducted in
19 Kiseljak. Further, three days ago UNPROFOR unexpectedly limited airplane
20 flight times so that they do not fly in the first evening hours, but
21 pilots are switching off all the lights on their aircraft which is highly
22 indicative and shows that they are informed about 'events to come.'"
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted,
25 Your Excellency?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2854, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document that I requested has
4 already been admitted into evidence. The document that I requested to
5 see before has already been admitted, it's 378, so I won't waste any more
6 time on that.
7 Thank you, Excellencies. I have no further questions of this
8 witness today. If this document may be admitted, I have no further
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
11 Mr. Sehovac, as you have noted, your evidence in chief in this
12 case has been admitted in most part in writing, i.e., through your
13 statement. And you will now be cross-examined by the representative of
14 the Office of the Prosecutor, Ms. West.
15 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 Cross-examination by Ms. West:
17 Q. Good morning, Mr. Sehovac.
18 A. Good morning, Prosecutor.
19 Q. I understand that you joined the service in 1977 and it was your
20 first job out of university. When did you leave?
21 A. You mean the State Security Service or the service in general?
22 Until the beginning of the war, I was a member of the SDB. When the war
23 started and when the Serbian service was set up, I joined that service
24 and I left that service in late 1999.
25 Q. What do you do now?
1 A. I'm retired.
2 Q. How many people were in your unit at the Ilidza national security
3 service in 1992?
4 A. The operatives that interviewed people worked in a team of 15 to
5 20. There were 15 to 20 lads in the surveillance service and there were
6 about 20 girls in the technical service, including translators,
7 interpreters, as well as other professionals of technical areas of
8 expertise. We hired those that we needed for our work.
9 Q. So let's focus first on the operatives who interviewed people.
10 You say there was about 15 to 20 of those. Now, these people all worked
11 directly for you; correct?
12 A. They worked for the service. I co-ordinated their work. There
13 were mostly lads that graduated from various universities, well-educated
14 people. Since we did not have enough previous experience, I was a
15 co-ordinator. As a more experienced person, I instructed them how to
16 obtain information that might be of interest for the service in
17 conditions of war particularly.
18 Q. You've indicated that you became the chief by the end of 1992.
19 How long did you remain the chief?
20 A. I remained in that position up to sometime in 1994, and then I
21 was transferred to the administration, to the main administration of the
22 SDB. We tried to set up a department that I could run as an expert;
23 however, that department never really took off the ground while I was a
24 member of that service.
25 Q. Okay. Let's go back to your period of time at the end of 1992
1 through --
2 JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt you, Ms. West.
3 Could I be clear again as to the SDB and the SNB. Before the war
4 it was SNB or SDB? Because of a couple of --
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Before the war it was the
6 State Security Service, or SDB; and during the war it was the
7 National Security Service, but that only referred to the Serbian part of
8 the service. When one says "SNB," or the National Security Service, one
9 refers to the service that the Serbian side had during the war.
10 JUDGE KWON: But in your previous answer to the question that --
11 question how long you remained the chief, you answered this way:
12 "I remained in that position up to sometime in 1994, and then I
13 was transferred to the administration, to the main administration of the
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It would have been SNB. I
16 apologise. I misspoke just like I did when my statement was being
17 admitted. It is something that one does automatically. It's a simple
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 MS. WEST: Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, transcript. In the
22 previous answer the witness said that he was transferred in 1994 to the
23 main administration to be the head of a department, to be part of the
24 management staff.
25 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. West, please continue.
3 MS. WEST: Thank you.
4 Q. So let's focus on your time when you were the chief of the SNB
5 from the end of 1992 up till 1994, and you said you had 15 to
6 20 operatives working for you. Was one of those operatives a man named
7 Miladin Bajagic?
8 A. Not Miladin Bajagic but Mladen Bajagic, and, yes, he was indeed
9 one of the operatives.
10 Q. Thank you. In your direct examination you talked about the tasks
11 that the SNB did under you, and you said that they used well-known police
12 methods, they gave interviews, and they used operative technical
13 measures. Tell us what you meant by "well-known police methods."
14 A. Well, you see, I'm sure that you may have noticed from my CV that
15 I joined the police school from elementary school. When we're talking
16 about well-known police methods and measures, I mean the golden questions
17 of crime investigation which need to be answered about any act, be it a
18 crime or a joyous event. I believe that all police forces and courts in
19 the world function along the same lines. I'm sure that you adhere to the
20 same principles and apply the same measures.
21 Q. Of course. And so what you're saying is that these were typical
22 guide-lines you used in your interviews; is that right?
23 A. Yes. Those were the guide-lines, the basis of any interview. We
24 obtained information that we were interested in in that way. And as for
25 other police methods, if, for example, during interview we obtained
1 information about a crime that was committed, then we would refer such
2 individuals to the services that continued interviewing them about such
3 things. We were only interested in information and intelligence about
4 security in our territory, security in the enemy territory. We were
5 interested in their weaknesses and strengths as well as our weaknesses
6 and strengths. And based on that information we could plan our reactions
7 towards anybody who may have abused those weaknesses.
8 Q. Thank you for that, and we'll talk about that a little bit
9 further later. But if we can back up here. As regards to these
10 interviews and guide-lines, you said earlier that you signed off on any
11 document that left your service. By signing off on those documents, was
12 that a process by which you ensured that the interviews that were
13 conducted were conducted according to the guide-lines or, in other words,
14 were acceptable to the security service?
15 A. Well, you see, the interviews that were conducted by our
16 operatives, the operatives had to record the course of the interviews in
17 writing and those records were signed by the operatives. If those
18 interviews were organised ad hoc, where guide-lines could not be fully
19 followed, such interviews would also be taken into account. And if the
20 intelligence obtained through such interviews required urgent action,
21 such information would be typed up; and then that report would be
22 couriered to wherever necessary, since we sometimes did not have any
23 other means of communication available to us.
24 Q. Thank you. I understand.
25 MS. WEST: May we have 1D06108, please.
1 Q. Sir, I've looked through your various reports and in the original
2 statement we had far more, we had close to 80 of the reports, the bulk of
3 which you have signed. And in reviewing those, there appear to be two
4 different types of reports. There's a set of interview reports and they
5 mostly appear to be entitled "official notes." But then there's another
6 set which appear to be analysis, much like one of the documents
7 Mr. Karadzic showed you, 1D0921, and that appears to be based on
8 information that is not from one specific person but an analysis you did.
9 Would you agree that there are two types of reports? Is your answer
10 "yes"? We overlapped.
11 A. Well, you see, whatever you may call these reports, whether you
12 call them official notes, dispatches, reports, whatever jargon you want
13 to use, they looked like bulletins. In any case, they were our means of
14 information, our means of informing certain people of the things that
15 they needed to know, that we touched upon in our interviews. In this
16 case we had so-called reports, official notes, and dispatches. Those
17 were our forms of drafting written documents.
18 Q. All right. Let's first speak about the official notes when they
19 referred to actual interviews and we see one of those in front of us now.
20 Earlier you mentioned that sometimes when the reports had to do with
21 military security, on page 7 today you said you passed that on to the
22 people who should be informed. Was that part of your process, where the
23 reports that you would give would end up going on to your own superiors
24 or going on to the military?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And after the interview before they were sent up, I understand
2 there was a process by which it involved analysing the information,
3 cross-referencing the information, and then checking the accuracy of the
4 information before it was sent up. Is that right? Is that exactly what
6 A. Well, you see, since our operatives most commonly drafted their
7 reports in writing after having verbally reported to me or somebody
8 appointed by me if I was not present, that report was typed up and I then
9 signed the typed-up report. Those things which were considered important
10 were sent to the superiors. If not, the reports would be filed and the
11 operative would be instructed to continue working on the matter, either
12 checking some information or something of the kind. If the matter was
13 urgent - and most of our situations were urgent - then the part of
14 military intelligence would be referred to military bodies.
15 We did not send everything that was written to military bodies
16 because not everything had to be sent. If during our interview we
17 learned that crimes were committed, and you will see that most often
18 those were people who defected from the areas controlled by the Muslim
19 forces, so if we learned about crimes and some other similar things, then
20 that person would be handed over to the crime prevention police who would
21 take their statement according to their rules and regulations.
22 These were just preparatory interviews and there were
23 instructions as to how to obtain the full picture of the opposing side,
24 the full picture of where we are, and -- so as to end up with objective
25 piece of information portraying the right picture of the whole situation.
1 Q. Thank you. I think we have a full understanding of that now. If
2 we can go to the last page of this document before you. This is one of
3 the reports that was provided. It's an interview which you signed off
4 on. And if we look at the last page, we see your signature and we also
5 see at the end it says:
6 "Source: T. G. currently being checked.
7 "Data: Partly verified."
8 And then: "SNB: Data concerning military issues to be referred
9 to the VRS."
10 So should I understand that what this is, is a -- your notation
11 of the verification of the information that was taken in the interview.
12 A. Most often, most often it would be either myself or two other
13 persons in my department. I had two retired officials who were
14 experienced, they had experience from working previously in the SDB
15 before the war. And when it comes to verified or partly verified
16 intelligence, this means that if the intelligence was not verified that's
17 how it was denoted.
18 You will understand another thing, military issues, whether they
19 were verified or non-verified, owing to the circumstances, we had to
20 refer such indicia to military organs and that's how we presented this
21 intelligence to them. The territory, I'm sure you will agree, did not
22 allow any glitches or errors because Ilidza was only 500 metres wide from
23 the Muslim side on the one hand and the other side on the other hand.
24 50 metres away from --
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Sehovac --
1 A. -- a Muslim trench I had two of my children living at that time.
2 Q. My apologies for interrupting, but I just want to move on with
3 this same information. You just mentioned that there were occasions --
4 military issues, whether they were verified or non-verified, owing to the
5 circumstances you had referred them up. So are you telling us that there
6 are a period -- or there are particular interviews that you sent on to
7 the military organs that were not verified?
8 A. No. We sent intelligence to the units that were on the ground
9 directly. For example, the Nedzarici separation line was held by a
10 battalion. The intelligence would be sent to the battalion command for
11 their attention or somebody in the military police, the person who would
12 be in charge of that part. The intelligence would be referred to the
13 higher instances, the staffs of the brigades of the Army of
14 Republika Srpska. Our reports would be sent to them and our reports were
15 based on the intelligence gathered from all over the area. Ilidza was
16 just one of the departments within the SNB of Republika Srpska.
17 Q. Okay. Thank you. You just said:
18 "We sent the intelligence to the units that were on the ground
20 So I have to assume that when you received the intelligence and
21 you thought it was important, you sent it directly, you didn't have any
22 time to do any verifying. Would that be the case?
23 A. No. The intelligence that was put on paper was mostly supported
24 by facts. When it says "partly verified," that refers to some of the
25 segments of the intelligence. The word at the end, "partly verified,"
1 does not need to pertain to some concrete intelligence but just some of
2 its segments that concern the military segment or some other segment of
3 the war situation.
4 Q. Sir, that's exactly what I want to talk about is the information
5 that was put on the paper. Because when I looked through all the
6 documents that you had originally in your statement, you had over 80, and
7 about 40 of them were interviews just like this. And this one that I've
8 shown you plus two others are the only ones that I could find that had
9 any sort of verification information on the end. And I stand to be
10 corrected if you can show me others, but my question to you is: Should
11 we understand this to mean that those approximately 37 other interview
12 reports were never verified?
13 A. No, this is absurd. I don't know why you see it that way. The
14 interviews that were conducted are mostly conducted with the individuals
15 who had arrived from the enemy territory, and you will admit that we
16 could not take their statements for granted, we could not take for
17 granted everything that those people told us. But if you talk to 10, 20,
18 or 50 people, and when we have non-verified information in the first
19 interview and then it is confirmed by another interview, then it is
20 denoted that "partly verified" and after that "verified."
21 Again, there may be non-verified information, but we were not in
22 a position to play with the destiny of those individuals who had
23 undergone torture and terror. We expected to hear from them things that
24 didn't make sense sometimes. So we did not take everything that they
25 said for granted. You will allow me to say that even if you took
1 something to the end or what you may believe is the end, you still
2 continue checking that information. You never take things for granted.
3 Q. Thank you, sir.
4 MS. WEST: Mr. President, I wonder if this is a good time to
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2859 , part of the associated exhibits,
8 Your Honours.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at -- we'll have a
11 bit longer than half an hour. We'll resume at five past 11.00.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 11.13 a.m.
15 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue with your cross-examination,
16 Ms. West, there's a matter the Chamber wishes to deal with briefly in
17 private session.
18 Could the Chamber move into private session.
19 [Private session]
11 Pages 33017-33019 redacted. Private session.
5 [Open session]
6 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson, could you repeat your submission
8 or start again.
9 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We're speaking of the topic
10 of -- well, when it is necessary in our view for the identity of a
11 protected witness to be revealed to a potential Defence witness, and I
12 was indicating that there are some circumstances where the potential
13 Defence witness has been accused or has been --
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I'm not sure I'm hearing you well.
15 Could you speak to the microphone a little bit. Yes. I think --
16 MR. ROBINSON: Okay. So there are situations in our view where
17 it's necessary to disclose to a potential Defence witness information
18 from a protected witness and in some cases the identity of that protected
19 witness. And so we believe that that was the situation with respect to
20 the witnesses that have been discussed in private session.
21 Now the -- as to the question of what remedy there should be,
22 first of all, our investigators are already instructed to tell, whenever
23 they are disclosing the identity of a protected witness, to give a
24 caution to the person who it's being disclosed to that it's not to be
25 disclosed -- disseminated any further. And I'm hopeful or expecting that
1 that had been done in this case.
2 As to any further notifications, we're happy to make those or to
3 ensure that they've already been made in whatever form that the Chamber
4 and the Prosecution feel is appropriate. And I had planned to actually
5 discuss that with Mr. Tieger so that we can understand what they think is
6 best in terms of the protected witness. Sometimes calling attention to
7 somebody as a protected witness on -- in some form could actually
8 aggravate the situation. So I just want to make sure that whatever steps
9 we do take are the ones that are the most consonant with the protective
10 measures and the view of the Prosecution on that.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, could you kindly remind of the exact
12 term the Court ruling used to -- when it issued that the Defence can
13 disclose protected information when it's necessary for its defence.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Actually for that, Mr. President, I would have to
15 go back and look at the protective orders. I'm not in a position to do
16 that, and I know there have been protective orders for different
17 witnesses from different cases, so I would have to do some research on
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
20 Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. With respect to the last
22 point that was raised by the Court, it is one of the issues that I
23 discussed with Mr. Robinson. There may be a kind of lacuna or gap in the
24 specific conditions under which reference may be made to protected
25 witnesses between the earlier generic confidentiality applied to
1 disclosures. I'm fairly confident there was such a provision there for
2 forensic purposes. I do not recall the reiteration of that provision
3 with respect to specific protective measures imposed. So while it may be
4 the case that the general spirit of what the Court had in mind was
5 consistent, I -- neither one of us at the moment are able to cite the
6 Court to that provision. And I raised that point with Mr. Robinson and
7 suggested that that was something he may wish to raise with the Court.
8 With respect to the circumstances under which there is a forensic
9 purpose, generally speaking, I think we can break those down into two
10 kinds of categories. One is, for example -- and we have those broad
11 examples in the two circumstances we were addressing in private session.
12 One is the circumstance where generic reference is made or some reference
13 is made by a witness to events that are relevant to this case and the
14 identity of the witness who provided that information is not critical to
15 the information provided, it doesn't change the nature of the information
16 provided. So certainly inquiry can be made by the Defence about their
17 witness's position on that matter without any reference whatsoever to the
18 witness who earlier provided that information and about which they wish
19 to check. And a reference to or the disclosure of the witness's identity
20 is quite gratuitous under those circumstances.
21 Going to the other extreme, there may be a circumstance where a
22 specific witness talks about an interaction he had with another witness.
23 So that specific event may involve the protected witness. Nevertheless,
24 there seem to be ways to address that issue and elicit the necessary
25 information without specifically disclosing the -- the fact that a
1 witness is protected, a witness testified, a witness provided a
2 confidential statement. The question can simply be asked, for example:
3 Do you know about, did you ever go to this event, did you ever have a
4 discussion, you can ask the question without providing the additional
5 information that the -- that a witness testified.
6 Now, under those circumstances it is conceivable that the person
7 being asked the question might make some kind of linkage and begin to
8 suspect that information was provided to the Prosecutor's office or to
9 the Trial Chamber by the other person involved in the event, but then
10 that raises the question of forensic purpose and how the Court will
11 strike that balance, given the orders that have been issued before. But
12 it is difficult to imagine many, indeed at the moment any, circumstances
13 in which it's necessary to say: This witness testified that, this
14 witness appeared in this particular Trial Chamber and said that. We
15 consider - and I advised Mr. Robinson of this with various
16 examples - that the information can be elicited in other ways.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, would you like to add anything?
18 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think basically we're
19 willing to work with the Prosecution and the Chamber to do whatever is
20 necessary to maintain the protective measures and to continue to obey
21 them. And I think that this case overall has been remarkable for the
22 lack of problems that the protected witnesses or any witnesses have
23 encountered in the case. So it's in that spirit that we're prepared to
24 take whatever measures are reasonable to allow us to prepare our defence
25 and at the same time fully respect the protective measures of witnesses.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: I want to say that I found Mr. Robinson was
3 receptive to our raising the point. I think we can work co-operatively
4 and successfully in this regard. I think we -- his point, for example,
5 regarding what specific steps we want to take is a useful one. It's
6 better to be a little bit cautious about considering the implications of
7 doing one thing than making a dogmatic statement initially in court and
8 then coming to realise there may be more nuanced ways to approach it, and
9 I would make the same caveat about the comments I just made. I think we
10 appreciate the fact that, indeed, in court we've sometimes found
11 ourselves in circumstances where there have been confrontations between
12 examiner and witness that implicated confidential information but the
13 Court was aware that that was an appropriate way to proceed under the
14 circumstance. And we have been working our way through this thicket
15 carefully and I think we can continue to do so. But it is clearly a
16 matter that needs close attention and that we cannot be lax about at any
17 point, whether it's in the investigative process or afterwards.
18 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Robinson, Mr. Tieger, we find your comments
19 very reassuring, very much so. Thank you, both.
20 JUDGE KWON: I rather find this issue important if not serious
21 and the Chamber will leave the matter there and we'll come back to the
22 issue after considering some further elements.
23 Shall we bring in the witness?
24 For planning purposes, how long would you need for your
25 cross-examination, Ms. West?
1 MS. WEST: I would suspect another half an hour or 35 minutes.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Thank you.
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Apology for your inconvenience. There
5 was a matter the Chamber wanted to discuss in your absence.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.
7 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Ms. West.
8 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 May we have P02305, please.
10 Q. Sir, in 1992 and 1993, were you aware of a person named
11 Branislav Gavrilovic?
12 A. Yes, I knew Branislav Gavrilovic by sight. I did have occasion
13 to speak to him. He didn't know who I was but I knew who he was.
14 Q. We're looking at a document now that's on your screen and this is
15 one that's dated February 12th, 1993, and this is a document the
16 Trial Chamber has seen before. And in it, you report on Mr. Gavrilovic's
17 reception of the new commander of the brigade who took the place of
18 Major Dunjic after Major Dunjic's exit. In this report you talk about
19 the threat that Mr. Gavrilovic made on the new commander's life and, in
20 your opinion, it was made because Gavrilovic felt that it would not have
21 the privileges it had had until that time and that it would have to place
22 itself under the brigade's command. Do you remember writing this?
23 A. I didn't write this note myself. It was the operative whom you
24 mentioned a little while ago who wrote it, Mladen Bajagic was his name.
25 But I do remember this document, and when I look at it now, I can clarify
1 that Gavrilovic was the leader of a paramilitary unit. I can
2 additionally explain that when the VRS was established there was an order
3 coming from the Main Staff and the Presidency that all paramilitary units
4 should be put under the auspices of the army. As you can see here,
5 Mr. Gavrilovic tried in various ways to avoid this, but you can also see
6 to what extent he succeeded in this. So I think any further comment
7 concerning this gentleman would be superfluous. He describes here how he
8 went to see the commander, how he could have killed him, and so on and so
9 forth. And as for his strength and the strength of his unit, I can only
10 tell you what I know.
11 Q. This is dated February of 1993. To your knowledge, did he
12 continue to be involved with the military and the police in the Ilidza
13 area subsequent to this?
14 A. Well, you see, throughout the time he was there, Gavrilovic
15 continued to be under the command of the VRS. Maybe he considered
16 himself to be a vojvoda. He was made a vojvoda by Vojislav Seselj. His
17 army was what it was. There were good men there but about 30 per cent of
18 his men were drug addicts, person prone to drink and to committing
19 crimes. The lads who were good lads, so to say, put themselves under
20 command and could be used in combat activities for defence; whereas these
21 other lads, who when there was combat were mainly concerned with avoiding
22 the fighting and getting some loot, they would conceal themselves in
23 trenches, waiting for an opportunity to do what their main purpose for
24 being in the unit was.
25 Q. Sir, did your unit, the 15 to 20 operative workers that you spoke
1 about earlier, ever work with Gavrilovic?
2 A. No, not with him directly, but there were operative workers of
3 mine who were good friends with his men and even with him. And I had
4 occasion to go to Gavrilovic's staff with one of the men simply to see
5 whether he would obey the military command or not. This was Dunjic,
6 Velimir Dunjic at that time. He was the previous commander of the
7 Igman Brigade.
8 Q. Sir, most of the documents that we saw initially with your
9 statement, the 80-plus documents, looking through them, most of them are
10 from 1992 up until about the middle of 1993 and there are only about six
11 or so that are subsequent to the middle of 1993. Can you tell us the
12 reason for that?
13 A. Well, you see, the beginning of the war and the course of the
14 war-time events influenced the frustration of the population. There were
15 many refugees arriving. Not all the lines were closed yet and this made
16 it necessary for us to be more active, to interview these people, receive
17 these people, and do other things. At that point, most of the
18 preparations were being made and in the subsequent period. If you are
19 referring to the documents, that there were fewer documents concerning
20 interviews, because there were fewer people arriving and subsequently --
21 or consequently there were fewer interviews.
22 Q. During the period of time when you were actively -- your unit was
23 actively engaged in interviewing, how many would you typically do in one
24 week? So now I'm talking about 1992/early 1993.
25 A. Well, at that time, a lot of refugee Serbs were arriving who had
1 fled from their homes in various ways and their homes were destroyed.
2 Parts of their families stayed behind for good because they were killed
3 in various ways. So depending on the numbers, who and what they were,
4 you will see in some official notes that 50 persons are referred to and
5 there is only one official note. In that case, they would all be persons
6 from a single village, for example, Visoko. They would most be members
7 of a single family. There were would be one, two, or three families
8 concerned or an entire family would be there. And looking at that and
9 the contents of those notes, you would see that that's what the data
10 mostly refers to. And we were hard-pressed to complete everything, so
11 that's why a single operative would interview an entire family.
12 Q. But do I understand correctly that there are occasions where more
13 than one operative was present for an interrogation or an interview?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Okay --
16 A. If there was one person and we didn't have any others, then one
17 of the new operatives would be there in order to gain experience. For
18 the most part, these were Serbs who could hardly wait to reach Serb
19 territory and they would kiss the ground --
20 Q. Okay --
21 A. -- if they managed to get there alive --
22 Q. Thank you.
23 A. -- so it was easier with them.
24 Q. And I understand earlier from your testimony that as regards
25 methodology you used well-known police methods. Would these police
1 methods include, for lack of a better expression, a good guy/bad guy
2 interviewing technique?
3 A. If you are referring to the attitude towards the people being
4 interviewed, we treated them all the same. If you are referring to the
5 operatives conducting the interview, if there were two, it would be one
6 experienced operative who would be helping train the inexperienced one.
7 And in these interviews it was not normally necessary to prove something
8 or convince someone of something. People would be happy that they had
9 managed to leave and they would be open in their responses.
10 Q. I want to show you an example of what I mean.
11 MS. WEST: Can I have 65 ter 24498.
12 Q. This is a lengthy document and it's a statement of a man who
13 recounts his interview with your service in July of 1993.
14 MS. WEST: And if we can go to page 10 of the English and page 10
15 of the B/C/S.
16 Q. There's a certain part I want to focus on, it's the actual
17 interview. In the first ten pages he just talks about the circumstances
18 of his arrest, which has nothing to do with the interview. But when we
19 get to page 10, he speaks about that interview. And at the top he
20 indicates -- this man's name is Perica Koblar. At the top he talks about
21 having been arrested. And he says that Brne, the officer and two of
22 Brne's men then left the room. He had been arrested by that group. And
23 then when you go down to the second full paragraph he begins to speak
24 about the first interview.
25 And in this interview he speaks about several men who come into
1 the room and one is behind a desk and this is the one who actually gives
2 the interview. And the one who sat behind the desk -- I'm reading from
3 the second full paragraph in the middle:
4 "The one who sat at the desk told me that I shouldn't be afraid
5 but warned me that I should answer every question because they could
6 check everything, they had all the information, and this way I would
7 avoid being beaten."
8 Hold on, I have a question for you. Is a physical assault, a
9 physical assault of these people, part of the well-known police method
10 that you described earlier?
11 A. No, excuse me. I think that this piece of paper you are showing
12 me, it was not something conducted by my operatives. Can you show me the
13 signature to -- for me to see who conducted the interview? I think it
14 may have been a military service --
15 Q. Thank you, sir --
16 A. -- or another one.
17 Q. You're right. You're right. This was not one of your
18 operatives. As I mentioned, this is the recounting of that person --
19 hold on a second. This is the recounting of the person about the
20 interview. So it is not one of yours. I will agree with you. There is
21 no signature on this. What I'm talking about, though, is what you
22 brought up, which is the methodology, and how it was that the operatives
23 in your unit would interview people.
24 If we go a little bit further down this paragraph --
25 JUDGE KWON: But, however, I think it's fair enough --
1 MS. WEST: Yes.
2 JUDGE KWON: -- to show what statement it is. So shall we show
3 the first page first to the witness --
4 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE KWON: -- and the last page. Yes, and the last page. I
6 think that's now enough. What page was it, Ms. West?
7 MS. WEST: Page 10 on both languages, please.
8 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
9 MS. WEST: Thank you.
10 Q. And in the middle of page 10 the interview continues, and towards
11 the bottom of the big paragraph, the individual who was interviewed says:
12 "One of the individuals jumped from the bed, hit me on the head
13 below the left eye with a truncheon. Then he hit me a few more times in
14 the face. I covered myself with my hands and bent down and he continued
15 to hit me."
16 It goes on. He said he felt "the curly-haired young man,"
17 another person, "was also punching me. I did not hear the investigator
18 tell them to stop but he must have indicated that they should stop. Then
19 the investigator asked me again if I had fired a weapon. I replied," and
20 at the end of this paragraph, "the grey-haired man who was sitting on the
21 bed offered me a handkerchief."
22 So my question for you, sir, is back to the good guy/bad guy
23 routine. This is something I asked you about earlier. I don't think you
24 responded. Was that a method, was that part of the normal police methods
25 that you spoke about earlier, something we see illustrated here?
1 A. You see, it's not clear to me who took this statement, which
2 organ did it. I assert it was not done by the SNB and that the SNB did
3 not use such methods. The service was an eye and an ear and nothing
4 else. It did not have any repressive measures. They could be linked
5 only to a piece of evidence and how a person was convinced that something
6 was correct or incorrect in order to get at true information. So I
7 cannot comment on this. This is completely unknown to me. I don't
8 know --
9 Q. Thank you --
10 A. -- where this could have been created or in what part or what was
12 MS. WEST: May we go to page 12.
13 Q. I just want to show you one more part of this. As I mentioned,
14 this is a series of interviews over the course of a couple of days, and
15 on page 12, it's the second paragraph in English. It's also on page 12,
16 I believe, in the B/C/S. This is where the gentleman goes back and he's
17 interviewed by Mladen Bajagic. So this is the person you spoke of
18 earlier as being one of your operatives and also as the author of the
19 report that we saw about Brne Gavrilovic. He said he recognised Bajagic
20 and that Bajagic started questioning him. And he goes on talking about
21 that. And when we get to the bottom of page 12 he says that, again, he
22 was hit with a truncheon.
23 "I was hit in the back with a truncheon which winded," and we're
24 moving on to 13 in the English, "hit me and fell down." Then the
25 officer," and he's speaking about a short, stocky, with receding hair,
1 about 55 years old, with glasses, "came and asked me if I was hurt. I
2 said it did not. And then he told me, 'Let's go to my office and talk a
4 Tell me this, sir: The description of an officer, short, stocky,
5 receding hair, about 55 years old, with glasses, is that somebody who was
6 one of your operatives? Does that description sound familiar to you?
7 A. No. Now that you've explained briefly what this is about, when
8 the military security was established at Ilidza, that is, the military
9 police, we received a request from persons in the military police that we
10 should give them a person who is literate and who could explain to them
11 how to interview people. So it's evident that the ones interviewing
12 people before that, conducting themselves in the way described, and
13 Mladen Bajagic was in the military police for some ten days or so helping
14 them to conduct interviews. But I don't see what person is referred to
15 here because I don't know whether this is a prisoner of war or someone
16 who had defected for some reason. And the person who hit him with a
17 truncheon, I don't think that was Mladen Bajagic because he's not the
18 sort of person who would have done that. And I don't know who was
19 working in the military police at the time.
20 Q. Okay.
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have the following
24 information: To whom was this statement made so that the witness can be
25 more reliable.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, then you may take up that issue in
2 your re-examination.
3 Please continue, Ms. West.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. One concern that I
5 had -- and this is a very lengthy statement and I think it's somewhat
6 unfair to the witness to be asked -- just giving him bits and pieces.
7 For example, if you look yourself on page 12, the second full paragraph,
8 maybe the second sentence of that paragraph, you could see that is a
9 piece of information that's actually quite interesting and consistent
10 with this -- what this witness said. And he hasn't had the opportunity
11 to review. He's just being shown bits and pieces of a document and being
12 asked to comment on it and I don't think it's fair to the witness. I
13 think this should be printed out for him, he should be given at least a
14 few minutes to study it so that his answers can be more fair.
15 MS. WEST: Mr. President. I agree as to that sentence and the
16 witness himself has explained that very circumstance, that Mr. Bajagic
17 was with the military police at the time. I only have one more question
18 for him regarding this document and it's not my intention to admit it.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, let's proceed.
20 MS. WEST:
21 Q. If we can go to the next big paragraph that begins with:
22 "The officer and I were leaving the room and Bajagic came right
23 behind us. He stopped me and asked me if I had recognised him. I said
24 that I had but I was not a hundred per cent sure. He apologised for not
25 recognising me because I would have been beaten less."
1 Now, sir, you've said that Mr. Bajagic was on a ten-day leave of
2 absence with the military police to show -- as I understand it, to
3 explain to them interviewing techniques. Yes, you said to explain to
4 them how to interview people -- hold on a second. Was beating people
5 part of the method by which the SNB interviewed people?
6 A. No. You misunderstood Mr. Bajagic being in the military police.
7 He didn't explain to them what to do and they -- he did not notice them
8 beating people and I don't know that anyone beat people in any context.
9 Q. Were you ever present for an interview when physical force was
10 used on the person interviewed?
11 A. I think only on one occasion. I was there when a lad slapped the
12 person who was interviewing because he didn't respond or he provoked him
13 and the question was just an ordinary question, and he was warned about
14 that. He was told not to do that again.
15 Q. Sir, I want to move on to another -- to a part of your statement
16 in which you make some comments regarding an alliance between the Muslims
17 and Croats. And in answer to question number 10 you said:
18 "Even before the beginning of the conflict, by tying their flags
19 together, the Muslims and the Croats had made it clear they would act
20 jointly against the Serbs."
21 And then also in answer to 36(a) you said:
22 "When the Muslims and Croats tied their flags together, it became
23 clear to all that living together was no longer an option."
24 What is the basis of your opinion?
25 A. You see, the very tying of flags between Muslims and Croats
1 coincided with the decision to hold a referendum where -- in the absence
2 of the third party, because the Serbs were left out. Indeed, a
3 referendum was held on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They
4 indicated loud and clear that they no longer wished to live in the same
5 state which had unified police force and the military and where they all
6 worked together.
7 When you look at Bosnia-Herzegovina today, if you look at the
8 map, you will see that there are divisions between the villages. For
9 example, at Stup, near Sarajevo, there are only Croats. On the other
10 side, only Muslims. In Ilidza and Osijek, only the Serbs. At Butmir,
11 only Muslims. In Hrasnica, Muslims only. In urban environments where
12 there are apartment blocks, there were people living together, though.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 A. By virtue of that alone --
15 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt, but we'll talk a little bit more about
16 this. When you say "the referendum," that was rather early on. Did your
17 opinion as to their alliance continue on? Did you hold this opinion
18 throughout the war?
19 A. You see, I explained well what kind of work I did for the
20 service, at least in written form. The department I worked for didn't
21 change much. There were very few newcomers. Before and after the
22 multi-party elections, a lot of people arrived, though, whom we didn't
23 know, mainly Muslims. My older colleagues --
24 Q. I'm sorry -- I'm sorry to interrupt you again. But my question
25 is whether you continued to hold that opinion that they were aligned
1 throughout the rest of the war. Maybe some way you're going to get
2 there, but if you can just answer my question: Did you continue to hold
3 the opinion? Yes or no?
4 A. No.
5 Q. And so your opinion as to this alliance, when is this true for
6 you, 1992? 1993?
7 A. You see, at such times when there was no alliance between Croats
8 and Muslims, when they fired at each other, others had to force them, for
9 example, as part of the Washington Agreement, to join their forces again
10 and turn against the Serbian people.
11 I'm not clear on your question, though. Do you mean what my
12 personal opinion was of Muslims and Croats or what my position was
13 concerning their flags? Throughout the war their flags were on the same
14 side, acting jointly.
15 Q. I will show you some documents and so we can understand -- make
16 sure that we understand each other.
17 MS. WEST: May I have P01479. This is a document from
18 August 18th, 1992, and it is an excerpt from the Mladic diaries about a
19 meeting at the SR Presidency. And if we go, please, to page -- e-court
20 page 76 and it will be the same in both.
21 Q. You, of course, were not at this meeting, but I want to read
22 something here and get a comment from you. As I said, this is
23 August 1992. This is Mr. Karadzic speaking. And at this meeting,
24 according to these notes, he says:
25 "We will draft a constitution in co-operation with the Croats.
1 "It can happen to us that we must stop at Jajce in the Posavina,
2 but it would be good if a separate peace could be signed with the Croats
3 and a mutual recognition."
4 Does it appear to you that, in August of 1992, Mr. Karadzic was
5 suggesting that an effort should be made for the Serbs and the Croats to
6 align, not the Croats and the Muslims?
7 A. I really cannot comment upon this. I can tell you something
8 else, though, which could refer to this. In my immediate environment in
9 Kiseljak, where I lived, only Croats resided there, and throughout the
10 war there was no conflict. Quite the other way around. Croats moved to
11 the other side and Serbs came there. There were sporadic individual
12 attempts to disturb that kind of peace that was in place at the time, if
13 I may call it that.
14 I think at this point in time in the document, there had already
15 been a conflict between the Muslims and the Croats, but you will have to
16 put the question to Mr. President himself because I really don't know
17 what was in his mind.
18 Q. And you're right, at this particular time there certainly was
19 some tension between the Muslims and Croats in Herceg-Bosna. But then I
20 wonder why it is in your statement in two separate places, and
21 Mr. Karadzic included this in his summary, you made efforts to indicate
22 that you felt that the Serbs and the Croats were aligning themselves
23 against -- excuse me, the Croats and the Muslims were aligning themselves
24 against the Serbs.
25 A. I repeated what you can see in many a document and there were
1 many events in the field which testified to that. From this point of
2 view I don't really know -- well, perhaps I can be specific. There was
3 an example that I can use to counter that argument which is that the
4 Croats in Kiseljak disobeyed the policy and did not wage war on the
5 Serbs. But, for example, from Kiseljak, the very same people went to
6 Jajce, fighting Serbs there and being killed there. So in that kind of
7 war it all depended on one's point of view. There were things that one
8 would believe possible and then there were those that were not so
10 Q. But I'm specifically looking at what you wrote in your statement
11 and it very clearly gives your opinion on this particular alliance.
12 MS. WEST: May I have 65 ter 24454, please.
13 Q. I want to look at what you said in June 1993 about this very same
14 subject matter. This is an information report signed by you and this is
15 an information report all about Zenica. It's several pages long. We are
16 going to go specifically to English page 5 and B/C/S page 4, but I'll
17 just tell you it talks about the ABiH command coming to Zenica, that
18 there's three types of Muslims in Zenica. It's about Serb houses burning
19 in Zenica. And then it talks about the Muslims and Croats there. And
20 particularly on page 5 of the English --
21 MS. WEST: And it's B/C/S page 4 and it's the next page in
22 English. Or maybe it's page 6, pardon me. E-court page 6. So I have
23 page 5 of the English, page 5 of the e-court, and I'm sure we'll get to
24 there -- there shortly.
25 Q. But perhaps if I read this, you might remember. Towards the
1 bottom of this page it says:
2 "Please note that the SNB, within special warfare, to a great
3 extent contributed to the outbreak of the conflict between the Croats and
4 the Muslims and to its deepening."
5 Sir, do you remember this report passing by your desk and you
6 signing off?
7 A. I did sign this report. The text is not literally the way you
8 read it out.
9 "The SNB," it says, "while waging special warfare," which is our
10 local service parlance, "contributed to the escalation of conflict
11 between the Croats and Muslims ..."
12 Let me explain, if you want to know what special warfare is --
13 Q. No, what I would like to know is what you meant by "contributed."
14 A. That things would further escalate, or rather, to prolong the
15 conflict between them. During that time while they fought each other, we
16 could breathe more easily because we no longer had to go through all the
17 attacks that were aimed at our territory.
18 Q. That's exactly right. And in a war with three parties, there's
19 certainly some strategy to be recognised when you align two parties
20 against one, isn't there?
21 A. If you may, you will understand that I am not a military expert.
22 I simply explained the things the way they were and it could only be done
23 through friendship or different sorts of ties. For example, a Serb could
24 tell a Croat in Kiseljak: Look, they are preparing themselves to attack
25 you, the Muslims. And perhaps we could pick up that information with the
1 assistance of our equipment. And it was that kind of assistance that was
2 provided to the benefit of one side and the detriment of another.
3 Indeed, that particular attack took place and the Croats managed to
4 defend that part of their territory.
5 Q. I'd like to look at one more sentence in this document. It's the
6 last page of both documents, it's the last paragraph. And it says:
7 "In the forthcoming period, the SNB shall monitor the relations
8 between the Croats and the Muslims and shall endeavour to deepen and fan
9 their conflicts even more, and we shall inform you timely about further
11 What did you mean "endeavour to deepen and fan their conflict
12 even more"?
13 A. You see, it was a phrase I used. I think I have just answered
14 your question a moment ago in full.
15 Q. Well, would you agree with me --
16 A. It was our piece of information that in the end saved Kiseljak,
17 and that there was no massacre there or at Ilidza or at any other side as
18 regards these two warring factions. Now -- well, there were some
19 massacres in Visoko committed by the Muslims over Serbs or Croats who
20 committed crimes against Serbs. In another area, that's a different
21 matter. Now it's all coming back. The information about the massacre of
22 Croats over Muslims in Stupni Do, CNN portrayed that as a new incident of
23 Serbs slaughtering Muslims. Isn't that also a kind of propaganda, trying
24 to divert the attention --
25 Q. Sir, I think we're --
1 A. -- from the conflict raging on one side to a point the light on
2 to another side.
3 Q. I think we're going far afield of the subject matter here. But
4 my question for you is: If we take this information in this report and
5 those two particular paragraphs I read out to you, aren't those
6 completely in contradiction of what you wrote in your statement?
7 A. I don't think so. You have to realise there was a particular
8 dimension of living in that area. Also, parlance is important and the
9 way language was used. It was about people's lives. As for the term
10 "special warfare" and by what means, as for certain things not really
11 taking place in the end, that's an entirely different matter that can be
12 discussed separately. You, as a professional in these proceedings,
13 should also take into account all relevant factors. A moment ago you
14 said --
15 Q. Thank you, sir.
16 A. -- yourself that there were two or three sides, and then you will
17 allow that this sentence alone means nothing unless put in the context of
18 the full report and the overall situation.
19 Q. Thank you, sir. You answered my question.
20 MS. WEST: I would ask for the admission of the full report,
22 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6095, Your Honours.
25 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no more questions.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency, a few. While
4 we are on this document, I wanted to ask the witness this.
5 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
6 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Sehovac, the waging of special warfare and
7 fanning the conflict which includes one's enemy, are these legitimate
9 A. I think it is legitimate when trying to save lives, no matter
10 whose lives, but this is strictly my opinion.
11 Q. Perhaps I'd like to repeat the question. Yes, I'd like to have
12 it reinterpreted. I asked the following.
13 Can one side legitimately cause rifts among two of its enemies
14 which had previously joined forces?
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's not an issue whether it was
16 legitimate or not. Ms. West raised it to raise the issue of consistency
17 in his statement. We can move on.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Sehovac, you mentioned the Washington Agreement and the
21 alliance of Croats and Muslims against Serbs for most part of war. What
22 was included in the Washington Agreement or what did it establish?
23 MS. WEST: Objection.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's not relevant, it's not the issue
25 raised in Ms. West's cross-examination.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 53, line 1, the witness was
2 put in a position to explain why it was good for Serbs to make peace with
3 Croats and that it was interrupted by way of the Washington Agreement.
4 There were three parties to the conflict and the witness said that most
5 of the time two sides were against the third, the Serbs. And he had to
6 recall the Washington Agreement.
7 JUDGE KWON: Just -- no, no, just a second.
8 Can I hear from you, Mr. Robinson.
9 MR. ROBINSON: Well, I understand the Chamber's position and I
10 think he could be given a little leeway even if this is not the exact
11 point that she was driving at. Nevertheless, she did open up that
13 JUDGE KWON: Ms. West.
14 MS. WEST: Mr. President, I agree with you entirely. My issue
15 had to do with impeachment of his statement. He said one thing, I was
16 showing another. When I asked that question he wasn't responsive. I
17 asked him to pin-point a time and that's when he went into the Washington
18 Agreement. So it wasn't even responsive to my question.
19 JUDGE KWON: I agree with you, Ms. West.
20 Please move on to your next point, Mr. Karadzic.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. Sehovac, we are still on the same topic and please do caution
23 me if you deem it appropriate. Did you know -- did you know what was
24 their relationship and what were the difficulties in their unification
25 against the Serbs?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to have 1D129, please.
2 MS. WEST: Mr. President, I --
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 MS. WEST: This is going to be a question that invites an answer
5 that is well beyond the scope of what I was talking about during the
6 cross-examination. He -- he appears to get -- to try to be getting into
7 the history, as might be relevant to the Washington Agreement, but this
8 witness is not the right witness for this type of discussion.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Robinson, please move on. I
10 agree with Ms. West.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
12 Can we see 24498 again, 65 ter.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. While we're waiting for the document, Mr. Sehovac, such
15 information that would be arrived at by beating people up, would you
16 consider them reliable?
17 A. Well, if people presented some information under duress, one can
18 always look at it from two points of view. They can be fully reliable
19 and yet they can be fully unreliable. It very much depends on what is
20 being asked for or what is being asked of that person. I really can't
21 answer that because we didn't beat people up.
22 Q. Thank you. Was it your goal to provide reliable or unreliable
23 information to your service and your superiors?
24 A. That's what I tried to explain a moment ago. Depending on their
25 nature, information went to the service. Unreliable service [as
1 interpreted] was not sent to them. They were perhaps checked and
2 verified by further activities. Once checked, official notes and the
3 extracts of official notes containing such unreliable information would
4 then be amended and separate documents drafted which would then in turn
5 include accurate and verified information.
6 Q. Thank you. Mr. Sehovac, do you make a difference between
7 arresting someone and detaining someone or taking prisoner someone?
8 A. Arresting someone in police terms means arresting someone who had
9 done something unlawful. Taking prisoner would be in the military
10 domain. The difference is that of terminology. Capturing or taking
11 prisoner is different than arresting someone. Someone could be brought
12 in or arrested as part of an investigation, whereas a captured person
13 depended on the situation, whether it was in military conditions,
14 war-time conditions, or perhaps it could have been someone who had fled
15 to the other side, someone who had been an enemy soldier, and such people
16 would be then captured.
17 I have an example like that of such a defected person who had
18 fled -- actually, who was a Serb. He had been given a Molotov cocktail
19 to throw into a Serbian trench but he managed to flee. He crossed over
20 to Serbian territory and he could provide information because he said
21 that there would be other such Serbs who would be forced to do that
22 unless they managed to flee or they would be killed by snipers.
23 Q. My learned Ms. -- colleague Ms. West at page 45, line 17, said
24 that this Perica discussed the circumstances of his arrest. Kindly read
25 the preamble at the beginning of the statement. Was he a civilian or a
1 member of armed forces who was captured and then fled from the enemy and
2 provided the statement to the enemy side once he had escaped?
3 A. It says very nicely here that he was a member of the armed forces
4 from 16 April 1992 to 17 July 1993, and he provided a statement in
5 relation to his escape from the aggressor prison to the free territory on
6 19 February 1994.
7 Q. Military security service, is that it?
8 A. Yes. He provided his statement voluntarily of sane mind.
9 Q. What brigade is this, the military security service of what
10 brigade is this?
11 A. The 101st Motorised Brigade.
12 Q. Thank you. In other words, what can you tell us about this
13 statement? What can you say about the accuracy of this statement?
14 A. As far as I know, the 101st Motorised Brigade was in Sarajevo.
15 Q. Thank you. We will leave this topic. It suffices that we
16 identified who that was. A.
17 And now, sir, I would like to call up P2305.
18 Do you know where Brne hails from, where is he from?
19 A. As far as I know, Mr. Brne was born somewhere in Vucja Luka,
20 Mokro, or in that area over there, that's where he was born.
21 Q. And that's in the vicinity of which town?
22 A. The closest settlement is Pale and that place is between Sokolac
23 and Pale, i.e., it is in the direction of Sarajevo.
24 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us whether he arrived as a
25 paramilitary or as a volunteer? How did these two categories move about
1 and what distinguished them?
2 A. During that time Brne's unit was a paramilitary unit because it
3 was founded by the radical movement. It was a Chetnik unit and he was a
4 Vojvoda. Volunteers, on the other hand, volunteered and placed
5 themselves under the command of the army in the relevant area.
6 Paramilitary units tried to maintain their independence. In certain
7 cases, they even tried to take over the command in order to exert as much
8 influence among the civilians and among the military and the police.
9 Q. Thank you. Were there any attempts to place them under anybody's
10 command? Did they formally accept that they were parts of some units?
11 Did they pay lip service to that?
12 A. Yes, we issued some documents trying to place them under
13 somebody's command and that depended on the resourcefulness of a
14 particular commander. I believe that I answered that question. His lads
15 were as they were. There were some good lads among them and there were
16 some others prone to drugs, alcohol. There were thieves and burglars who
17 managed to avoid being placed under anybody's command. Those good lads
18 would take people's advice and would place themselves under somebody's
19 command. Brne, I don't know how he ended up. It really largely depended
20 on the command. It differed from one command to the other. Those who
21 could not be placed under anybody's command fled our territory and went
22 elsewhere because he realised that he could not push his agenda, i.e.,
23 most of his bad guys left, one after another, because they could not make
24 any profit from the situation. They could not make the most of the
25 opportunities to plunder and steal.
1 Q. Thank you. What was the attitude of the commands and civilian
2 authorities towards the renegades among Brne's guys?
3 A. As far as I know, civilian authorities tried talking to the
4 command of the army, i.e., to the military -- to the police leadership in
5 order to devise the most acceptable way in order to avoid the escalation
6 of the security situation on the ground. They tried to see how they
7 could place them under somebody's command and they did it with some
8 success, and most conflicts within those units were avoided. The
9 civilian authorities were against those paramilitary units and they tried
10 as best as they could, as much as they could, given their influence with
11 the military and the police, to try and place those paramilitaries under
12 the control of the army.
13 Q. Thank you. This is a document issued by your service and it
14 speaks about the intolerance of that group of the new commander of the
15 Igman Brigade. What was the attitude of that group towards the civilian
17 A. They behaved the same with everybody. They tried to find ways to
18 get a share in the civilian authorities, their share of influence and
19 clout. They were successful at places, perhaps, but as far as I know, at
20 the end of the day they did not exert much influence.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the second page in
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. And as for the Serbian version, I would kindly ask you to look at
25 the end of the second paragraph where it says -- where it says: "He
1 stated, inter alia," and can you then go on reading until the end of the
2 page, and you can do it aloud.
3 A. Please bear with me. I don't know what I'm supposed to read.
4 Q. The tenth line from the bottom, where it says "Brne."
5 A. He said that he could lead half of the Igman Brigade and turn
6 them towards the Chetnik Movement.
7 "It has to be emphasized that they are also bothered by the
8 civilian authorities as well as MUP workers about whom they tell
9 falsehoods and slander them, saying that they are thieves, criminals,"
10 and so on and so forth.
11 All of this corroborates my previous explanation. In this
12 specific case, Brne tried to influence the civilian authorities and the
13 command in order to get his cut, to get his share.
14 Q. Would these authorities or the MUP have covered a crime that this
15 group may have committed? Did they ever commit any crimes?
16 A. I can't speak about any crimes committed by this group because I
17 don't have any information. If we obtained such information, even in a
18 written form, we would immediately forward that to the crime prevention
19 service, i.e., the police organs who shared the premises with us. We
20 asked them to pay attention to that. If we couldn't do it in writing, we
21 did it verbally because we lived and worked very close to each other. So
22 we did not stand up on formalities. The most important thing was for the
23 information to be purposeful and to do its job.
24 Q. And one more question, Mr. Sehovac, we saw that you qualify
25 intelligence as verified, non-verified, partly verified. What is the
1 meaning of partly verified, which part is verified and which part is not?
2 A. Partly verified intelligence is the intelligence that we already
3 had from before and we have some segments of it. For example, let me say
4 that, for example, you don't find something in any of the documents but
5 we obtain information that on a certain day, on the 11th of November, a
6 certain unit would attack a certain area and within that context a trench
7 is being dug out below the road. Or perhaps even more specifically, a
8 partly verified piece of intelligence was the digging of a trench under
9 the runway at Sarajevo airport. At the moment when we learned that that
10 was completed, that intelligence was verified. Or, for example, in
11 another case that Mrs. or Ms. Prosecutor mentioned, I did not see what
12 the gist of the document was, but in any case it was about Lujic and
13 other people, Serbian representatives in the Muslim area. And we saw
14 that intelligence was partly verified. We had some information but we
15 were not sure that it was correct, and some of it was verified, some was
17 Q. And now just one more question, my last question: How did you
18 qualify your sources? You now explained how you qualified your
19 intelligence and how did you qualify your sources?
20 A. Well, in our documents we qualified sources in different ways.
21 Until we could verify the intelligence provided by a source, that source
22 was under scrutiny, i.e., it was reliable until it was not reliable.
23 Q. What do you mean reliable or not reliable?
24 A. In these documents you will see that there are two or three
25 reliable sources of information. There are two or three people and there
1 is some technology. One of them is Kozara, which is the surveillance
2 centre where all of the intercepted conversations were recorded by means
3 of UHER, and there were other technology means which were at that moment
4 at our disposal. For example, we had some success and we were fortunate
5 enough to be able to intercept their fax communication. That was another
6 reliable source because we both received their faxes at the same time.
7 They did not suspect that the -- that this was intercepted, so we
8 received reliable intelligence from that source.
9 Q. Mr. Sehovac, thank you very much. I have no further questions
10 for you and thank you for having to come here to testify in The Hague.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 Questioned by the Court:
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Sehovac, although Mr. Robinson stated that you
14 talked about everything you -- you could give about the intercept we saw
15 earlier on, I'm still wondering whether you could give us some further
16 information on the following, in particular as regards the aspects of
18 First, how many intercept operator personnel you had? How they
19 operated? For example, who monitored or checked the -- whether the
20 transcription was correctly done. What kind of machines you had? And
21 whether tapes and/or audios were kept? And how were they stored,
22 et cetera? Do you understand my question?
23 A. I do. Well, you see, in Ilidza, the old State Security Service
24 had a point from which we intercepted conversations. When Muslims
25 withdrew from the police, that was destroyed but some of the technology
1 remained in place. Those were some adapters that could be connected with
2 UHERs. And let's not go into details of intercepted conversations and
3 think that it was anything else but intercepted telephone conversations.
4 Those intercepted conversations were recorded by means of UHER. UHER is
5 a large cassette recorder that could record five or six hours of
6 conversations and the recording was launched at the moment when a
7 conversation started. When there was no conversation, it was on standby.
8 We managed to repair that particular communications centre.
9 And now as for the methods how we obtained access to telephones
10 lines, I can explain that. In the post office the communications were
11 already restricted. There were no connections with the Muslim part or
12 vice versa. The Muslim part could not get in touch with us because that
13 was under the control of the Sarajevo -- post office at Ilidza. We only
14 had internal communications with Ilidza. In my department I had men, I
15 had experts, who knew about telephone cables and the nodes in certain
16 areas. And in the interspace between the two lines we managed to get
17 access to a cable and we channelled it towards Ilidza, and within that
18 context we were fortunate enough to obtain those things that we are
19 discussing today. Those tapes were guarded. There were people who had
20 worked at the SDB before the war and then they were transferred to the
21 national security and they knew how to guard those tapes. They were
22 aware of all the proper procedures.
23 What happened to the tapes I really don't know. I don't know
24 what happened to the documents. Because there came a period of time
25 after the war when the documents were seized and taken in all sorts of
1 ways. The international community stormed into the security centre.
2 They broke into the strong box and took everything. That's how we lost
3 all our documents at Ilidza. Our common practice was to type all our
4 documents in three copies. One could be would be kept in the strong box,
5 or rather, operatives have them; one was filed; and the third one was
6 sent to the operative service for which it was intended.
7 I don't know whether I've been clear enough, whether I've managed
8 to provide enough explanation as to how things transpired. I tried to
9 tell you what we did at the time. We had all those capabilities. And in
10 my statement you will see that on the eve of the war, just before the war
11 broke out, a new technology arrived. I personally worked in a department
12 where this 2.700 system was housed just above us, on the floor above us.
13 JUDGE KWON: I'm only interested in the intercept you offered,
14 i.e., what we saw earlier on. Do you know who transcribed those
15 intercepts that we saw today and how? And who checked whether it was
16 done correctly?
17 A. Well, you see, it depended on the importance of the conversation.
18 It was the chief of the line. We had a chief of the line of technology
19 at the time who did that. As for most of the conversations, I listened
20 to myself. They were recorded and only later on were they written down
21 so that this would usually be done by two operatives. The tape would be
22 played on the loudspeaker and they would record what had been recorded,
23 they would write it down, that is. They would sign their handwritten
24 document and then I would look at it and have it typed out and sent where
25 it should be sent to, to the archives or somewhere else.
1 JUDGE KWON: Therefore, in case of the intercept we saw earlier
2 on, did you also hear the audio recording yourself?
3 A. In view of the fact that this concerned Karic, the Sarajevo Corps
4 commander, and it concerned Hrasnica, which was a place I had lived in, I
5 listened to that conversation myself and there were two operatives
6 writing it down.
7 JUDGE KWON: We need to rise sharp at ten to 1.00, but do you
8 have any examination for your -- Ms. West, to ask the witness about this
10 MS. WEST: Just briefly.
11 JUDGE KWON: In one minute?
12 MS. WEST: I can do it in 30 seconds.
13 Further Cross-examination by Ms. West:
14 Q. There was more than one intercept that we looked at. Do you
15 remember that? It all seemed to be in one piece of paper, but it was
16 more than one conversation; correct?
17 A. Yes, I remember that there was a conversation with Prevljak, then
18 another person, and you saw intercepts where they would not trust each
19 other. So they would cross-check whether it was true that they didn't
20 have those shells and so on. And this was all on a single tape and I
21 myself listened to those tapes.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That concludes your evidence,
23 Mr. Sehovac. On behalf of the Chamber, I thank you for your coming to
24 The Hague. Now you're free to go. We'll rise all together.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: We'll resume at 1.45.
2 [The witness withdrew]
3 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.50 p.m.
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- On resuming at 1.47 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness make the solemn declaration,
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
9 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
10 WITNESS: MILAN MANDIC
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Mandic. Please make yourself
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 JUDGE KWON: For this session we'll be sitting pursuant to
16 Rule 15 bis, with Judge Morrison being away due to his urgent personal
18 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
21 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Mandic.
22 A. Good day, Mr. President.
23 Q. May I ask you to make a break. You will see on the screen when
24 the cursor stops, then you can begin giving your answer so that we don't
25 create problems for the interpreters and I want everything to enter the
2 A. All right.
3 Q. Mr. Mandic, did you make a statement to my Defence team?
4 A. Mr. President, I did make a statement to your Defence team. This
5 is my personal statement, but I want to take this opportunity to protest.
6 I'm really embittered by the person who threw out paragraphs 13 and 14
7 from my statement because it hurt me as a victim and my family whom I
8 represent and I think this is discrimination against Serbian families and
9 they are victims.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have 1D7055 and we'll deal
11 with that.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Mandic ...
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D7055.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Is this your statement, Mr. Mandic?
18 A. Can you zoom in a little bit? The first page is my statement,
20 Q. Thank you. Can we look at the last page, please, to see whether
21 you signed the statement.
22 A. Yes, this is my signature.
23 Q. Thank you. Mr. Mandic, with the exception of what has been
24 redacted from this statement which is considered to be irrelevant to my
25 case not irrelevant to you or to the picture of the war in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, leaving that aside, is the rest of what you told the
2 Defence team faithfully reflected in this statement?
3 A. Yes, fully.
4 Q. Thank you. Would your responses, if I were to put the same
5 questions to you today live, still be essentially the same as in your
7 A. Yes, they would be a little bit more extensive and more detailed.
8 Q. Thank you. I wish to tell you that I, too, often thought that
9 the sufferings of both sides had to be said, had to be stated, but I was
10 told that this was not relevant to the case I have to answer, although
11 all victims deserve respect. So please accept it in this way.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I wish to tender this
13 statement and then I will read out a summary and deal live with a few
14 documents which I have just received from the witness.
15 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Pelic, any objections?
16 MS. PELIC: No objections, Your Honour. Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: About the associated exhibit?
18 MS. PELIC: No objections to the associated exhibits either.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we would ask leave to add that exhibit to our
21 witness list. We didn't have it at the time -- excuse me, to our exhibit
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that request is granted. We'll admit both.
24 Shall we give the numbers for them.
25 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 1D7055 will be Exhibit D2894 and
1 65 ter number 1D14004 will be Exhibit D2895.
2 JUDGE KWON: As regards that letter which we admitted as an
3 associated exhibit, I should like note for the record that I, indeed,
4 received the letter from the witness and I asked the Registrar to return
5 the letter to the witness.
6 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 I wish to read a summary of the statement made by Mr.
9 Milan Mandic in English.
10 [In English] Milan Mandic was born on 11th of September, 1954, in
11 the village of Obalj, Kalinovik municipality. Before the war he lived
12 with his family in Nedzarici and worked at the PTT Engineering in
14 Milan Mandic is the president of the association of families of
15 the killed and missing persons for Sarajevo and Romanija area. During
16 the war he joined the VRS in the logistics battalion. Milan Mandic felt
17 tension between the different ethnic groups living in Sarajevo in 1990.
18 And with the outbreak of hostilities in Slovenia, three different ways of
19 thinking developed and many people began to split along ethnic lines
20 which could be observed around the town and many feared the outbreak of
22 After the outbreak of the war in Croatia, the Muslims and Croats
23 began to work together provoking the Serbs. Both Muslims and Croats
24 completed military exercises and began appearing in camouflage uniforms
25 armed with rifles. They verbally attacked Serbs during 1991, and during
1 this year, Milan Mandic knows of several brutal attacks on the Serbs in
2 the company in which he worked and, therefore, Serb employees began
3 moving around company premises in groups of two or three.
4 Armed Muslim youths began gathering in the streets and other
5 public places including health centres. Fear and tensions of the Serbian
6 population could be felt everywhere. In 1991, the Muslims began to erect
7 barricades -- 1992, the Muslims began to erect barricades around
8 Sarajevo. These were set up by criminals who had been released from
9 long-term prison terms by Alija Izetbegovic. In March of the same year,
10 Milan Mandic noticed that a number of people were stationed at the top of
11 the buildings with weapons in their hands and he was told by Muslims
12 who -- that they were their own snipers. At the village in which
13 Milan Mandic lived -- as the village in which Milan Mandic lived was
14 encircled by Muslim-controlled villages, he would stand guard of his
15 village at night. On the 4th of April, 1992, the village was attacked
16 three times by Muslims supported by both Green Berets and Red Berets.
17 On his way back from work on 6th of May, 1992, wearing civilian
18 clothing, a shell fell in his vicinity leaving him seriously injured.
19 Following this his family fled, while his mother and father remained in
20 their property.
21 On his discharge from hospital, Milan Mandic joined the VRS and
22 was posted to the front line. His unit only opened fire against the
23 enemy during their attacks or in necessary defence and the fire that was
24 returned was proportionate. All of the unit members were familiar with
25 the international conventions for the protection of the civilian
1 population during war time and these were respected. He was also aware
2 that the superior commands abided by the agreed cease-fires and
3 agreements with the international peace forces.
4 Milan Mandic is engaged in the Alliance of Associations of
5 Families of Detained and Missing Persons who attempted to trace persons
6 who disappeared during the war. There are still a number of active
7 cases, but process of tracing them is slow due to the obstructions placed
8 in the way by representatives of other organisations.
9 Mr. Amor Masovic presented an untruth during his testimony, since
10 the association and Milan Mandic do not support the work of Mr. Masovic
11 for several reasons. The impartiality of the work of the institute led
12 by Masovic is debatable. This is the case because the institute is
13 headed by a politically active person, which is in contravention of the
14 Law on Missing Persons in BH. In addition, Amor Masovic participated in
15 the dislocating and concealing of secondary graves of killed Serbs;
16 therefore, he consequently participated in the concealing of war crimes.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Mandic, I wish to put a few more questions to you in
19 connection with the work of the institute and the commission searching
20 for missing persons and imprisoned persons, especially in view of the
21 fact that Mr. Masovic testified here. Could you please tell us what kind
22 of activity you are in charge of and what are your assessments of these
24 A. First of all, Mr. President, let me tell you that in addition to
25 being the president of the association of families of the missing in the
1 Sarajevo Romanija region, and we cover seven municipalities, I can tell
2 you that I'm also the president of the association of associations or the
3 federation of associations of families of the missing, so we cover all of
4 Republika Srpska and we are all volunteers. We are an NGO. And in July
5 last year, I became a member of the advisory committee of the institute.
6 As regards the work of the institute in charge of searching for
7 the missing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is total anarchy, total chaos
8 there. The institute started working on the 1st of January, 2008, that's
9 when it was fully staffed. And pursuant to the law adopted in
10 December 2004 at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina concerning missing
11 persons and it was established by the ministerial council of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the international commission, ISB, in charge of
13 searching for -- ICMP, that is, they had to make a list, make records of
14 all the missing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So from the 1st of January, 2008,
15 to the beginning of 2009. However, this -- these central records have
16 not been completed and have not even been started according to the Law on
17 Missing Persons because in the Missing Persons Act, it says that the
18 first central records or list of missing persons had to comprise active
19 cases, that is, cases where the persons had not been found yet. And only
20 after that, for purposes of historical research and to hand down a
21 legacy, only after that could one enter those missing persons who have
22 been identified because everything is known about them.
23 And secondly, one of the investigators of the institute, when he
24 visits the municipality he is in charge of to look for someone, he does
25 not know, he cannot get from his chief, Mr. Dusan Pavovic, a list of
1 people who have gone missing on that territory.
2 Another thing, Mr. Masovic, who used to be the president of the
3 commission -- mission of the -- at the level of the Federation of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina and he was the president of the so-called state
5 commission searching for missing persons of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where
6 95 per cent of the Serbs didn't even know that this commission existed,
7 and later on I was able to confirm that it had been registered. So the
8 office for searching for missing people of Republika Srpska, the Federal
9 Commission of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the so-called state commission of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina were all merged into the institute for searching for
11 missing people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And to this day, Mr. Masovic --
12 because the institute has its seat in Pofalici, in the former building of
13 the Energoinvest directors' building, it has a separate department in the
14 building of the Presidency at Skenderija with four offices and there they
15 keep certain documents, and for this reason, it is impossible to get to
16 the central records because he refuses to hand-over his archives to the
17 institute for searching for missing persons.
18 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Chamber who Jovo Rosic was?
19 A. In 2000 Jovo Rosic was the president of the commission for
20 searching for missing persons and he used to be a judge, but
21 unfortunately he died.
22 Q. Of what court was he a judge?
23 A. Jovo Rosic was active in Banja Luka. I don't know which court
24 precisely, but I do know that later on he became a judge.
25 Q. Do you know what he did during the war?
1 A. I don't know.
2 Q. Very well. Can we -- oh, thank you for the documents you handed
3 over to the Defence.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at 1D07057, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. It is Jovo Rosic's document. He was also the minister of justice
8 and the Supreme Court judge if you recall.
9 A. I don't recall that, but I believe you.
10 Q. Can you tell me what Mr. Rosic is asking here and what he is
11 complaining about to the office of the high representative for human
12 rights in Sarajevo? Just tell us what is said on the first page, then on
13 the second, just tell us what he is complaining about and what he is
14 asking for.
15 A. Well, I can tell you that this document goes back to 2000, when
16 the late Jovo Rosic sent this document to the OHR, where the president of
17 the Bosnian commission, Amor Masovic, told him orally that he had handed
18 over two mortal remains of Serb ethnicity to the family and it was not
19 known what the names of those persons were, to whom they had been handed
20 over. There were no written records or anything. So he asked for the
21 records and for the first and last names of those people so that we could
22 take them off the list of missing persons, so that we can put them on the
23 list of those who had been found.
24 Q. Which families, if any, received unidentified bodies or mortal
1 A. Unfortunately unidentified person cannot be handed over to any
3 Q. Can you tell us what is asked for in item 2? That is on page 2,
4 please. Perhaps you can tell us briefly what Mr. Rosic wanted to get
5 from the Bosnian commission. What was done in Dobrinja?
6 A. He wanted to receive photographs and material evidence of what
7 they did. However, the Federal Commission headed by Mr. Masovic never
8 handed that material over. There is mention of the Simon Bolivar school
9 at Dobrinja, which is some 300 metres away from the place where I used to
10 live. They entered the location right away, immediately following the
11 Dayton Accords. They collected all the mortal remains found there.
12 Allegedly, there were also Muslim people who died of natural causes who
13 were buried there as well as those Serbs who were killed around Dobrinja.
14 Unfortunately, my wife's brother was in the work detail there. When
15 sharpshooters were being trained, he was killed in Dobrinja 5 where he
16 had an apartment. He was buried after the Dayton Accords since he had an
17 uncle in Hrasno, which is also in Sarajevo.
18 Q. Thank you. Mr. Mandic, so as to be able to move forward more
19 quickly, can you tell us what was done at Dobrinja in item 2? Perhaps
20 you can read it out loud starting with Dobrinja 1.
21 A. Dobrinja 1, the bus station and the park, in 1996 and 1997,
22 individual graves were excavated by the members of this commission, most
23 likely according to the order issued by the cantonal court in Sarajevo.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to item 4 at the bottom
25 of the page. It should read "the Bosniak commission." It seems I'm
1 rushing again, whereas I shouldn't.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Can you tell us what is the objection or request in item 4?
4 A. Item 4 reads: Location, the old Lukavica road. Demining
5 personnel reported the skeletal remains of two bodies at the
6 aforementioned location and this commission presupposes that one of the
7 people involved is Rajko Mandic.
8 Rajko Mandic was never considered a missing person. That is one
9 thing. Another thing, the old Lukavica road and that general location
10 was where my late father had been buried. Once the Dayton Accords were
11 signed, his mortal remains were dug out and placed somewhere else. He
12 has never been found.
13 Q. What about the end of the sentence, the sanitation and hygiene
14 measures were taken -- well, can you read that sentence out loud.
15 A. The Bosniak commission, without notifying the commission of the
16 Republika Srpska, carried out hygiene and sanitation measures in the
17 location and on orders of the cantonal court took the bodies to an
18 unknown location.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the end of his
20 answer. Could there please be no overlapping. Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What is missing -- that apparently
23 was done all around Sarajevo.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it was done all around
1 JUDGE KWON: Please put a pause between the questions and
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Under whose approval and authority, with the exception of the
6 court's, was this done? That is to say, the digging out and displacing
7 mortal remains.
8 A. Sanitation and hygiene measures in the field were done basically
9 by everyone, the civilian protection, the MUP, the hygiene inspection,
10 and everyone else. At the time, the two investigating judges who worked
11 in the area of Sarajevo, one of them, in 2006, during some excavation
12 attempts at the location, told me that they were not allowed even to
13 use -- to remove any dirt or any earth without the presence of
14 Mr. Masovic.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the last page so as to
17 know who sent the document.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Well, can you tell us what was this letter of yours to the
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina prosecution -- prosecutor's office?
21 A. Let me remind myself.
22 THE INTERPRETER: The witness is reading to himself.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I always sent copies of letters I
24 received to the prosecutor's office of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At this time,
25 the prosecutor was Munir Halilovic. Three prosecutors changed working on
1 the case file of my late father alone.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you. What about the penultimate page, who sent this
4 document on behalf of the RS commission? Since it is in the Cyrillic
5 script can you read out the name?
6 A. Commission president, Jovo Rosic.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted,
9 Your Excellency?
10 JUDGE KWON: Shall we mark it for identification.
11 MS. PELIC: [Microphone not activated]
12 JUDGE KWON: Microphone, please.
13 MS. PELIC: Excuse me. We basically don't have objections, but I
14 would like note that we think that this document has marginal relevance
15 to the case. And also I would like to note that in addition we were
16 notified about this document and additional four untranslated documents
17 yesterday, although the witness was proofed on Sunday. And we repeatedly
18 expressed our concern about the pattern of the untimely notifications by
19 the Defence and they are affecting the Prosecution's ability to prepare
20 the cross-examinations. We, although, recognise that the parties have
21 generally been accommodating on this issue, but the frequency and the
22 extent in which this goes raises the -- raises our concerns. We will, of
23 course, try to be accommodating and will not object in this case to the
24 admission of the document but being marked for identification. Thank
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Pelic.
2 Shall we give the number.
3 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D2896, Your Honours.
4 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can we have 1D07058, and can we have page 2 first and then go
7 back to the first page.
8 Perhaps the Prosecution need to turn their microphone off.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Mandic, this Marko Jurisic as the presiding of the collegium
11 of directors of the institute is asking or seeking from the cantonal
12 inspectorate or administration.
13 A. The hygiene and health inspections carried out sanitation and
14 hygiene measures in this case and he wanted to receive documentation
15 about what they did, when, where, and how.
16 Q. Thank you. Can we see the date, it is the 29th of March, 2012,
17 is it not?
18 A. Yes.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 1, please.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Microphone not activated]
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. While waiting for the document let me ask you this: Were these
24 exhumed graves in any way connected with war crimes?
25 A. Do you mean what was done by the Federal Commission, their health
1 inspection, et cetera?
2 Q. No, I had in mind the way these people died.
3 A. People were killed for two reasons in Sarajevo. In Sarajevo
4 there were no armed Serb soldiers. Everyone knows that. That's one
5 matter. Another one, a man was killed in Sarajevo for being a Serb and
6 because he had property, an apartment at a good location, and that's why
7 he was killed. Everyone was killed so that their property would stay on
8 that side and so that people would get rich overnight.
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
10 MS. PELIC: Your Honour, this is going beyond the scope of the
11 witness's evidence.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, thank you. Ms. Pelic indicated already, but
13 I'd like to raise the problem of dealing with untranslated documents.
14 Not knowing the language is very extremely difficult to follow the line
15 of questions at all. And I can't see whether it can assist, whether it's
16 relevant or not at all. Please bear that in mind, that we do not -- I'm
17 sorry. Bear in mind that we do not understand the language and then try
18 to introduce the crux of the document first if you are to deal with
19 untranslated documents.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. You
21 are completely right. However, we received this document only recently.
22 And even those we have sent for translation quite a while ago have still
23 not been completed.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Mandic, can you tell us what this document is?
1 JUDGE KWON: And I want to hear from you in response to
2 Ms. Pelic's objection that it was beyond the subject matter that was
3 disclosed to her.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said a moment ago that
5 the courts and exhumation commissions could not remove any amount of
6 earth without the presence and approval of Mr. Masovic. They couldn't
7 remove even a spoonful. And you are just about to see how they -- cases
8 which are two years old exceed their statute of limitation in that
9 country, which speaks volumes about the status of Mr. Masovic and a
10 number of other witnesses.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will allow the question. Please
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Mandic, can you tell us what this reply sent to Jurisic is
16 and what is their explanation as to why they cannot deliver the
17 documentation sought?
18 A. Well, the document reads that the dead-line to keep archives is
19 five years. That dead-line has expired and your request to forward such
20 information cannot be met. I asked a team of lawyers to comb through the
21 law pertaining to the city of Sarajevo, the canton of Sarajevo, and the
22 Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to establish how long documents should
23 be kept and who can destroy them. In the law of the Federation of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the cantonal law in Sarajevo one finds that
25 unimportant documents are kept between two and five years and that they
1 can only be destroyed in the presence of representatives of the
2 historical archives. In other words, the archives had to make a list of
3 unimportant documents for destruction but they need to have a clear
4 record of what was being destroyed. The law states that such documents
5 originating from the period between 1992 and 1995 may not be destroyed by
6 anyone and that they have to be kept permanently.
7 Q. Thank you. Since we do not have a translation, having in mind
8 the second page and the reference provided in terms of the 29th of March,
9 please tell us what this is. Is it a reply to the request? And perhaps
10 you can read it out starting with the dead-line for keeping documents.
11 A. On this document?
12 Q. The 9th of April, 2012.
13 A. This seemed to have been submitted on the 29th of March, 2012,
14 that's what I see before me. Yes, just above that there is the
15 9th of April.
16 Q. Can you read out the highlighted part?
17 A. "The dead-line for keeping archival material five years has been
18 expired and we cannot meet your request to forward such information. The
19 municipal civil protection staff of Novi Grad municipality is the
20 institution to provide such information given that collective exhumation
21 was undertaken according to their request. Individual requests by
22 families to exhume the mortal remains of their deceased members cannot be
23 forwarded due to the archival regulations. The dead-line for keeping
24 such case files has expired and the archives as such no longer exist."
25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could Mr. Karadzic kindly
1 repeat his question.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat your question.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Mandic, which institution and who personally in
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina was duty-bound to make sure that the documents on the
7 missing persons be not -- not be destroyed?
8 A. At that point in time it was supposed to be the president of the
9 Federation Commission for Missing Persons and the president of the
10 so-called state commission of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 Q. And that was?
12 A. That was Mr. Masovic.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be marked for
16 JUDGE KWON: Do you have further documents, Mr. Karadzic,
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Only one. Only one through this
20 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D2897, Your Honours.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we now have
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Please tell us who wrote this letter, to whom it was addressed,
1 and what they are requesting in the letter. 07060.
2 A. This is the Institute for Missing Persons. The address is
3 Hamdije Cemerlica 2/15, Sarajevo. I wrote this letter. Do you want me
4 to read it? It gives the reference.
5 Can you zoom in a little bit, please? Well, what is
6 characteristic here, if I don't have to read the entire document, is this
7 is actually a reply. Here I am asking from Masovic who had replied to
8 me, so now I am responding to his letter. I know nothing about law but I
9 also -- but I found this.
10 "Also in your letter there is frequent mention of active
11 cemeteries in the Sarajevo canton and wider. In connection with this, I
12 would like to know what you mean by the word 'wider.'" This could refer
13 to a cemetery anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So a Serb who was missing
14 might have been transferred to Bihac or to Cazin. We had already
15 discovered that Andjelko Simanic, who had gone missing in Sarajevo, was
16 found in Zenica. So that was not news to us. I have been dealing with
17 this for several years.
18 And finally, in the letter it says that the bodies were
19 transferred based on certified agreement of close family members of the
20 missing persons, but I wanted to know who had approved the transfer of
21 bodies that were unidentified. That's why I asked him whether a missing
22 person who is not identified can have a family. No.
23 Q. Well, this dated is in December last year?
24 A. I think so until I see the date. Mr. Karadzic, may we scroll up
25 a bit, or down? Yes, the 19th of December, 2012, and it was handed over
1 personally in the Institute for Missing Persons.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May it be marked for
3 identification, please, and I have no further questions or documents.
4 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll mark it for identification.
5 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D2898, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Pelic, can you start your cross-examination or
7 you want it to be postponed until Monday?
8 MS. PELIC: Thank you, Your Honour, I can start and I will be
9 pretty brief.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 Cross-examination by Ms. Pelic:
12 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Mandic. Do you hear me in the language that
13 you understand?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. You mentioned Jovo Rosic and he was also a member of the
16 Autonomous Region of Krajina Crisis Staff in 1992; correct?
17 A. No, I was not aware of that.
18 Q. In the statement that you gave to the Defence, you said on
19 page 13 -- paragraph 13, which is now redacted, Your Honours, I quote:
20 "I have not been able to trace my father to this day."
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are we going to bring back 13? If
22 a question is being put about paragraph 13, it should be brought back --
23 MS. PELIC: Your Honour, I just want to make a reference and will
24 get to the point clearly, and it's not related to the crimes against the
25 Serbs which are found to be irrelevant by the Trial Chamber.
1 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Ms. Pelic?
2 MS. PELIC:
3 Q. My question is: You stated, sir, that you were not able to trace
4 your father to this day; is that correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. I would like to take you to the Defence document 1D07061.
7 MS. PELIC: If we could call it up in e-court, please.
8 Q. Mr. Mandic, this is the letter that you provided to the Defence,
9 and on page 2 - if we could go, please, to page 2 in e-court, paragraph
10 number 1 - the document states that your father's body was exhumed and
11 identified as your father by ICMP through DNA analysis; correct?
12 A. No. This document was issued by the state agency for
13 investigations and protection, and later on I received an explanation
14 from their representative that --
15 Q. Thank you.
16 A. -- there had been an error.
17 Q. That was not my question. Was your body -- was the body of your
18 father identified by the ICMP as stated in the document?
19 A. No, until today.
20 MS. PELIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I have no further questions
21 and I tender that document.
22 JUDGE KWON: Did you say anything other than noted in the
23 transcript? Because you overlapped.
24 MS. PELIC: I'm sorry, Your Honour. I stated that I have no
25 further questions for this witness. Thank you.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Judge, sir, may I explain this
3 JUDGE KWON: I think you answered the question to the
4 Prosecution. If necessary, Mr. Karadzic may take up the issue.
5 Shall we mark this for identification?
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit -- as MFI P6096.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just briefly in connection with
9 this document and the page we see.
10 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
11 Q. [Interpretation] Can you tell us, Mr. Mandic, where does the ICMP
12 do its work, or rather, where did they identify your father?
13 A. This is not an ICMP document. I immediately went to ICMP with
14 this document and to Mr. Matthew Holiday and they responded right away.
15 And I have an ICMP document saying that to this day they have not done a
16 DNA analysis on the mortal remains of my father. I also asked the
17 Institute for Missing Persons and I have a document from them saying that
18 my late father is still missing and that was a mistake made by
19 Zeljka Kujundzija [phoen]. Unfortunately there were no punitive measures
20 imposed on her, but you can also check in SIPA that I'm telling the
22 Q. Can you tell Their Honours what SIPA is and what does it mean
23 that these bodies were re-exhumed?
24 A. Most probably these were the bodies collected during the
25 sanitation and hygienic measures being done in Sarajevo, and there was a
1 place in Visoko where they buried these bodies, although they also buried
2 in Vlakovo and elsewhere as we have seen. And SIPA is the state agency
3 for investigations and protection of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4 Q. So it's a kind of secret police, is it?
5 A. No, no, they conduct investigations of organised crime, war
6 crimes, and such things. It's a state agency.
7 Q. Under whose influence is this agency?
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm afraid that goes beyond the scope
9 of cross-examination.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I want to
11 establish the origin of this document and illuminate it because it's been
12 admitted into evidence, so I want to establish how trustworthy it is. I
13 didn't tender it.
14 JUDGE KWON: I see "SIPA" at the bottom of the document. Please
15 continue, but not in a leading way.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Can you say something about this institution? Who supervises it?
18 A. Well, it's at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it's a state
19 agency. It employs Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. How objective it is you
20 can see for yourselves and how well it does its job. You can see that
21 from this document. In my hotel I have the ICMP response where they
22 replied to me that my late father's body has not been found to date. I
23 also have a reply from the Institute for Missing Persons of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina which I asked for and they confirmed that my father is
25 still on the list of missing persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So I believe
1 I could sue for this, but this lady Zeljka Kujundzija was never
3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Mandic, I have no further questions.
4 A. Thank you, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Mr. Mandic, that concludes your
6 evidence. On behalf of the Chamber, I thank you for your coming to
7 The Hague to give it. Now you are free to go, but you rise all together
8 with us.
9 Before we adjourn the Chamber wishes to give an oral ruling.
10 The Chamber now turns to the request for presence of counsel for
11 witness Edin Garaplija received on the 29th of January, 2013, wherein the
12 accused submits a request that Edin Garaplija's counsel be present in
13 court during his testimony next week. On the 29th of January, 2013, the
14 Prosecution informed the Chamber via e-mail that it did not wish to
15 respond to the request. On the 30th of January, 2013, the Chamber heard
16 further oral submissions from the parties on this issue.
17 However, the Chamber considers that insufficient information has
18 been provided by the accused as to the basis for the request, in
19 particular whether the need for counsel relates to Garaplija's alleged
20 conviction back in Bosnia or some other matter. Moreover, the Chamber
21 has received limited information about Garaplija's lawyer and also notes
22 that he is not on the Rule 45 list of Defence counsel who have the right
23 of audience at the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Chamber denies this
25 That said, Mr. Robinson, we would advise you to inform
1 Mr. Garaplija of the mechanisms which are there to protect the witness's
2 rights, namely, Rule 90(E) and the safe conduct order issued on the
3 25th of January, 2013. He should be also told that nothing prevents his
4 lawyer from attending the proofing session or watching the proceedings
5 from the public gallery at his own costs. If he still feels that he
6 needs a lawyer in the courtroom, the Chamber would consider a
7 substantiated request for appointment of duty counsel, detailing
8 Garaplija's concerns.
9 MR. ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. President. I'll do that.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 The hearing is adjourned.
12 [The witness withdrew]
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.47 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Monday, the 4th day of
15 February, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.