Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 33168

 1                           Tuesday, 5 February 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Before we begin today,

 7     Mr. Robinson, as regards the request for presence of counsel to witness

 8     General Krstic in which the accused requested that Mr. Visnjic be present

 9     in court during the testimony of the witness, the Office of the

10     Prosecutor informed that it does not oppose the request.  The Chamber has

11     no issue with the witness's attorney Mr. Visnjic being present in the

12     courtroom during the testimony and therefore grants the request.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.  Please continue.

15             Just a second.  I would ask the registrar to -- to inform the

16     witness and the attorney accordingly.  Thank you.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

18                           WITNESS:  DRAGOMIR MILOSEVIC [Resumed]

19                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

20                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:  [Continued]

21        Q.   Good morning, General.

22        A.   Good morning.

23        Q.   Now, we left off yesterday discussing the incident of 7 April

24     1995, and I want to continue with that today, and just want to begin by

25     reminding you a little bit of what you said yesterday.  Yesterday, I

Page 33169

 1     asked you whether the air-bomb fired on Hrasnica on 7 April 1995 was

 2     fired to neutralise a mortar, and then you said, "Not mortar but mortars

 3     and there were four of them."  And that's at transcript page 33162.  And

 4     then I asked you where they were, and you said they were in open areas

 5     that could be described as parks or locations where there were no

 6     buildings, but then you said they were next to buildings, and that's at

 7     33163.

 8             So I'm wondering what location exactly in Hrasnica are you

 9     describing?

10        A.   I hope that there's nothing unclear about it.  Therefore, mortars

11     bases would be placed on a turf, on grass, where you can put one.  You

12     cannot place a mortar on asphalt or concrete.  Of course, there were

13     edifices or facilities that today some distance apart.

14             Well, since Hrasnica is a settlement, this implies that there are

15     buildings there, but in the locality where the mortars were stationed,

16     there were no buildings except that in the surrounding area there were

17     buildings.

18        Q.   General, it's the case, isn't it, that you actually can't tell us

19     what location the mortars you say this bomb was fired to neutralise were

20     at?  You can't tell us what location you mean to describe.

21        A.   I don't see how it can't be told.  If you spot a target that you

22     should fire at, then you act against that target.  I can tell you that we

23     fired at mortars, at those mortars.

24        Q.   My question was where exactly in Hrasnica they were.  Do you know

25     or don't you?

Page 33170

 1        A.   I know they were in a park, an area resembling a park.

 2        Q.   Yesterday, General, you said because you couldn't see Hrasnica

 3     from Ilidza, in order to have confirmation of what was actually happening

 4     there and whether that corresponded to what the commander, the

 5     Ilidza Brigade commander, was saying, "There was an area called Siljak,

 6     and it was above Ilidza, and these are already the slopes of Mount Igman,

 7     and that's from where we could see the force that was inside and the

 8     assets, how they were deployed."  And that's at transcript 33160 to

 9     33161.

10             So just to clarify that, is it correct that you personally went

11     to Siljak to verify the location of the mortars we're talking about or

12     not?

13        A.   The explanation I gave yesterday served the purpose to confirm

14     that I, apart from my obligation to respect and accept the statements and

15     assessments and information available to the brigade commander, and apart

16     from his insistence that fire be opened at those targets so that fire

17     could be curbed being opened at his positions, to personally convince

18     myself, together with brigade commander we jointly found a spot from

19     which we could observe the facts on the ground so that they had find a

20     spot for me from where I could observe the Hrasnica location.

21        Q.   So I take it your answer is yes, you personally, together with

22     the brigade commander, went to Siljak, and you saw this mortar battery

23     that you've been talking about.

24        A.   First of all, a battery of mortars is six.  Now, this was a

25     smaller unit.  There were four mortars.  Yes, I did see them.

Page 33171

 1        Q.   So you then -- and it was -- it was only on witnessing outgoing

 2     fire from this mortar battery -- sorry, these four mortars that you gave

 3     the final order to launch the air-bomb; right?

 4        A.   Yes.  Well, I did not have to see mortars firing.  It was enough

 5     for me to see the mortars in their defensive deployment.  It was by

 6     chance that I saw them firing, so I could see for myself that they were

 7     there and that they were opening fire.

 8        Q.   So your subordinates knew what they were firing at.  You all

 9     agreed that the target was these four mortars in Hrasnica that had been

10     firing on Ilidza; right?

11        A.   That's correct.

12        Q.   Now, would you agree with me, General, that generally speaking,

13     if the mission -- if -- if your soldiers' mission is to neutralise

14     outgoing fire, the time between you giving the final order to launch and

15     the actual launch of the air-bomb should be rather brief?

16        A.   It's relative.  It doesn't have to be brief.  I agreed with the

17     commander this proposal for that bomb to be launched.  There was

18     confirmation and proof that his previous requests were founded.  There's

19     justification that there is a target.  In such a situation, he must

20     observe all other regulations concerning the use of air-bombs, which was

21     far more rigorous and precise demanding so that air-bombs would not be

22     used if all security and safety measures are not put in place not to

23     jeopardise civilian population.  So that period from the moment when I

24     agreed to launch doesn't have to be brief.  Of course, he needed my

25     consent so that he could choose the right moment to carry out that

Page 33172

 1     launch.  What I said does not mean automatically that after I gave my

 2     consent that it would be immediately carried through or maybe at a later

 3     point.

 4        Q.   So how long did it take the crew in this case to respond to your

 5     order?

 6        A.   Well, in this case we cannot tie that with this situation, as I

 7     explained to you what measures had been done preceding to that moment in

 8     the preceding days, days preceding the 7th of April.  He could have done

 9     that on that same day or on subsequent days.  We don't have to be bound

10     by any time period, but this is another situation.  This is not the same

11     as the situation when the enemy's fire's being opened as preparation for

12     an assault.  In such a situation, the crew when reports that they're

13     ready to launch, then the launch will take place at the moment when the

14     threat is highest.

15             In this particular case, there was no launch.  There was no

16     attack, no assault to effect a breakthrough, so this launch did not take

17     place simultaneously.

18        Q.   And you actually don't know how long in this particular case it

19     took the crew to respond to your order, do you?

20        A.   I never talked to the crew.  My duties concerning this situation

21     did not go through the crew.  I issued my consent, and the commander knew

22     at what time they would be ready to launch, knowing his crew and all the

23     circumstances.  And by "him," I mean Colonel Radojcic, brigade commander.

24        Q.   So you would agree that you don't know.

25        A.   I know, but I'm telling you that I was -- I shouldn't have known.

Page 33173

 1     It was no business of mine to know.

 2        Q.   How long, General, then, did it take the crew in this case to

 3     respond to your order to launch the air-bomb on Hrasnica?

 4        A.   I don't want to explore -- explain how much time the crew needs

 5     for launching an air-bomb.  There is a standard number of hours, minutes,

 6     for preparations for launch --

 7        Q.   Excuse me, General.  With respect, the question actually was a

 8     simple one in response to your assertion that you knew how long in this

 9     case it took for the crew to respond to your order to launch the

10     air-bomb.  So I simply asked you then, well, how long was it?  Are you

11     able to tell us or not?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a misleading question.  The

13     witness stated that he did not command the crew.  It wasn't his order to

14     the crew.  The crew received their orders from either chief of artillery

15     of the brigade or from the brigade commander.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Irrespective of that statement, I think the general

17     can answer the question whether he knew or how long it took for the crew

18     to respond to the order to launch the air-bomb.  Whether he knew or not.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I know that the crew

20     needs certain time to launch.  This is a technical matter.  I'm cautious

21     not to err in this respect.  I reiterate:  It depended on at which stage

22     of readiness they were at the moment, had they made certain calculations

23     or not.  If they hadn't made calculations to prepare the asset for

24     launching, then they would need one -- one and a quarter, up to two hours

25     to place the air-bomb on the launcher, to make the calculations, and to

Page 33174

 1     determine all the other details that are necessary so that they could

 2     declare that they were ready to launch.  And whoever manipulates an

 3     asset, they must say, "I'm ready to fire" or "ready to launch," and from

 4     that point onwards the commander who decides or chief of artillery will

 5     then utter "Fire," command fire, or use the term "Launch," or "Act."

 6     They can choose between those expressions.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Back to you, Ms. Edgerton.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you for that clarification, General.  Now to move on, you

10     witnessed the air-bomb launch from Siljak, I take it.  Is that correct?

11        A.   No.  What I saw from Siljak was confirmation whether there was a

12     target as claimed by brigade commander, that he had insisted that there

13     were on the preceding days.  I wasn't there when the air-bomb was

14     launched.  I wasn't there when it was launched.  I did not observe it

15     personally.

16        Q.   Well, then maybe we can go over back to something you said

17     yesterday.  Yesterday, I asked you whether you received information that

18     the mortars were neutralised, and that's at transcript 33163, but you

19     didn't really answer that question.  You just said:

20             "As for some more immediate indicators, then I would perhaps

21     receive further such information or data about the situation as it was."

22             So did you receive information then, not having seen the launch,

23     that the mortars were neutralised?

24        A.   I have an impression that either you did not understand me well

25     yesterday or that you are trying to obfuscate something which is clear

Page 33175

 1     enough.

 2             As I explained yesterday, and what I'm going to say now is what I

 3     wanted to say yesterday if I was not clear, and this is it:  In the order

 4     to the brigade commander, it was said that he should report when he was

 5     ready to launch.  So an order is issued, and then after that preparations

 6     ensue and they can be used on another occasion.  The -- this order to

 7     report back that he was ready to launch serves the purpose that I can ask

 8     him again through such reporting line whether he took into consideration

 9     all the other elements or did a change occur in that area in terms of

10     possible movements of civilians or even removal of those mortars or

11     change in their firing position.  So that order, "Report back when you're

12     ready," is a military mechanism that the brigade commander was familiar

13     with.  It is attached to orders so that the use of air-bomb may be

14     deferred if circumstances changed on the ground in the meantime.

15             He reported back to me that he was ready to launch, and after

16     that he was given consent to do that.  I wasn't there when this happened.

17     I was, you know, in a completely different area.

18        Q.   Okay.  But, General, did you get a report back -- after this

19     substantial asset had been engaged, did you get a report back to the

20     effect that the mortars had been neutralised, the four mortars you've

21     been talking about?

22        A.   First of all, when an air-bomb impacts, it does not necessarily

23     mean it will neutralise.  That would imply that they would be destroyed.

24     The issue of neutralisation or destruction cannot be formulated in -- in

25     terms that it's either or.  Maybe some parts or some assets could be

Page 33176

 1     damaged, some could be destroyed, some could be left intact.  I got the

 2     report back that the action was carried out and that the target was hit.

 3        Q.   So what you're saying is you got a report back that the mortars,

 4     the four mortars, had been, whatever word you want to use, neutralised,

 5     eliminated, damaged, destroyed, hit.  You got a report back saying the

 6     four mortars had been hit; is that right?

 7        A.   This was done through a regular daily combat report sent from

 8     brigade commander to me.  Each brigade would send their daily combat

 9     report to the command of the corps.  This would be, of course, processed

10     in the operations room of a corps command room.

11        Q.   General, did the report say that the four mortars -- did it say

12     the four mortars had been hit?

13        A.   I would know what was said if I had this report in front of me.

14     I probably knew then what exactly stood there.  I can't tell you whether

15     it reported back on destruction, on being -- those being hit.  There was

16     a prescribed form for such reports.  What I got back as a report was that

17     the target was hit after the launch.

18        Q.   Did the report mention the mortars?

19        A.   The mortars were the target to be fired at, to be hit.  So when

20     they say, "We acted against the target," it would be superfluous to

21     specify.

22             I cannot tell you whether they mentioned mortars or not.  I

23     cannot recall exactly the content of that report, but it wasn't necessary

24     for me to hear whether mortars were neutralised or cannon.  This was

25     something which does not have to be specified by the reporting person,

Page 33177

 1     because they knew what had to be done against that target.

 2        Q.   And if they had missed the target, your observation being as good

 3     as you say it was and your concerns for safety being as paramount as you

 4     say they were, that would also have been reported back to you, wouldn't

 5     it?

 6        A.   Yes, yes.  It was important to me.  I maintain that this was

 7     important to me.  I'm trying to read your question in a different manner.

 8     It was important, let it be known, that the plan would be carried out and

 9     that civilians be protected.  Furthermore, if we know, and that is so,

10     that afterwards those mortars did not fire from those positions later on,

11     this means that they were hit.

12        Q.   So you don't remember receiving any reports to the effect that

13     the mortars hadn't been hit, that the target had been missed?

14        A.   No.  No.  The target was hit.  There was a report, a formulation

15     in the report being that they had implemented their mission against the

16     target.  In turn it meant that the goal had been achieved, which was the

17     targeting of mortars.  He needn't specifically say that the mortars had

18     been hit.  It sufficed to include in the report that the target was hit.

19        Q.   Well, General, actually your mission was a failure, wasn't it,

20     because the air-bomb landed on a civilian house and completely destroyed

21     two houses?

22        A.   Yes.  You use that particular indicator based on someone else's

23     scene of crime investigation.  The investigation brought about certain

24     results, whereas the person who engaged the target established something

25     else.

Page 33178

 1             I said that it was their goal to prevent any further fire from

 2     those mortars and that was met.  The mortars were no longer active in

 3     that part.

 4        Q.   General, you've just agreed that the air-bomb landed on a

 5     civilian house.  It didn't land on the mortars at all.  And your

 6     testimony not five minutes ago was to the effect that the mortars had

 7     been hit.

 8        A.   Yes, if one wants to play with words.  The air-bomb need not land

 9     straight on top of the mortar to have it hit.  If one wants to be literal

10     in terms of whether it landed on top of the mortar or not, then that

11     cannot be interpreted in any other way other than literally.  In the

12     immediate vicinity of those mortars there was something else.  In any

13     case, from that point on the mortars could no longer engage.  It was our

14     calculation or our assessment that even if something else is being

15     struck, it was of greater importance --

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpret's note:  I presume the witness wanted

17     to say lesser importance.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- than neutralising the mortars.

19             Ms. Edgerton, you need to bear in mind the following:  Due to the

20     subject discussed here, I received a very long sentence, and it is my

21     understanding that it was the way the Chamber in my case saw things.  I

22     do know, however, that it was my view point which guided my activity, was

23     not to act recklessly or undertake preventive measures and that civilians

24     should not be targeted.  Such was not my position, and such were not my

25     decisions.  I can no longer keep proving things, and I expect that there

Page 33179

 1     should be some degree of understanding, that we did not target civilian

 2     targets.

 3             If it was interpreted as collateral damage, which may occur in

 4     exceptional situations, then it can only be used as an indicator that

 5     such victims as may occur have to be far less than what is -- than what

 6     we try to obtain by protecting ourselves from such fire.

 7        Q.   I'm going to leave this for a minute, and I just want to

 8     underscore something before I move further, General, so that we have no

 9     misunderstanding.  When I ask you a question I mean to be literal, and

10     perhaps that can guide you in the rest of our time together.

11             I'd like to go to P1201, which is the order that you gave the day

12     before the launch.  It's dated the 6th of April, and it's the order to

13     get the launcher ready and pick a target.  So I want to point out a few

14     things to you in this document.

15             Now, first at the top of this document it says:

16             "For the past three days, Muslim forces have been attacking the

17     positions of the 2nd Sarajevo Light Brigade, and the attacks are

18     particularly pronounced in the sector of the Famos factory."

19             So you'll notice that so far there's no discussion of attacks --

20     well, there is discussion of attacks on the 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry

21     Brigade, especially near the Famos factory.  There's no mention of

22     attacks on the territory of the Ilidza Brigade; right?

23        A.   Completely right.  Whatever is stated in the document was the

24     situation at the time.

25        Q.   Okay.  So then just going on, there's also nothing here that says

Page 33180

 1     there have been attacks at the Ilidza area and the entire part of

 2     Stojcevci across the basins, the pools, the institute, the spas, and the

 3     villas, like you said yesterday in your testimony, and that's at

 4     transcript page 33160?

 5        A.   Do kindly try to treat my answers the way I provide them.  You

 6     merely repeated it, and I accept that I stated precisely as you cited it

 7     just now.  However, one needs to know the following:  I said that the

 8     commander of the Ilidza Brigade at the time demanded that I come and see

 9     for myself the extent of danger posed to the area his forces were

10     defending.

11             Perhaps just one additional piece of information was obtained,

12     and that was that they carried out the same attacks against the 2nd

13     Sarajevo Unit.  It was well known what the degree, what the amount of

14     pressure was on the Ilidza Brigade, and it seemed to continue, because

15     they began attacking the 2nd Sarajevo Unit.  That was just another reason

16     to add more weight to our assessment before that and to engage -- and to

17     actually use the full potential of the Ilidza Brigade which was under

18     threat, although that is not specified in so many words.

19        Q.   And if we go further down, this document says to select the most

20     profitable -- pardon me, the highest yielding target in Hrasnica or

21     Sokolovic Kolonija where the greatest casualties and material damage will

22     be inflicted, and it says nothing about neutralising mortars, mortar

23     batteries, mortar fire, or artillery fire, does it?

24        A.   I hope you know all too well that soldiers have to be rational in

25     their descriptions when drafting orders and their contents.  To try and

Page 33181

 1     describe things is superfluous for the brigade commander, because he was

 2     well aware of the nature of his problem and what kind of fire his units

 3     were receiving.  Any irrational description of that sort would undervalue

 4     his role of commander.  He was well aware of his professional duty and

 5     knew how to conduct himself.

 6        Q.   Is what you're saying that to mention neutralising mortars,

 7     mortar batteries, mortar fire, or artillery fire as an objective of this

 8     order would be irrational?

 9        A.   Well, perhaps it would be just an unnecessary extra, because he

10     was well aware of his problem.

11        Q.   All right.  Now, if this mission is to neutralise outgoing mortar

12     fire from Hrasnica, it doesn't make sense, does it, General, to give an

13     order that allows the brigade commander to launch an air-bomb into

14     Sokolovic Kolonija, does it?

15        A.   Sokolovic Kolonija was drawing even more fire with more

16     threatening assets.  Kolonija as a location is much closer to Ilidza.

17     They were under a different kind of threat coming from such forces in

18     Sokolovic Kolonija.  Previous reconnaissance and the decision that was

19     agreed upon between Colonel Radojcic the brigade commander and myself

20     resulted in the conclusion that the matter at hand was actually Hrasnica.

21             In this case, as an alternative or something of a similar sort,

22     he didn't have the right to consider Sokolovic Kolonija which at that

23     point posed no threat, although under such circumstances no new orders

24     were required.

25        Q.   I'll just leave that for the moment and continue still on the

Page 33182

 1     subject of targets, because we've talked about Hrasnica in that line and

 2     now mentioned Sokolovic Kolonija.

 3             You know, General, Colonel Radojcic actually came here to give

 4     evidence as a witness for Dr. Karadzic's Defence, and I asked him what

 5     the target of this air-bomb launch was when he came here, and he said,

 6     "The target of my brigade was only the command post of the 4th and later

 7     the 104th Motorised Muslim Brigade," and he said the command post was in

 8     the Hrasnica school.  And that's at transcript page 31258.

 9             And then a few lines later, he changed that to the post office.

10     And then I asked him who made the decision about what the target was, and

11     he said, "I was the one," at 31262.  And, General, he never said anything

12     about neutralising mortar fire.

13             So my question is given that you actually couldn't hit a pinpoint

14     target with one of these devices, evidenced by this incident on the 7th

15     of April, General, it's actually possible that no one had a real target

16     in mind other than just the centre of Hrasnica, isn't it?

17        A.   No, it is not.  It's not.  That kind of attitude and that kind of

18     situation in which one wouldn't consider the choice of target, that

19     simply didn't come about.  Colonel Radojcic knows all too well what we

20     tried to determine and what we had agreed upon.

21             Now, what he said may be a result of his faulty memory or

22     something else which guided him in his testimony.  I really can't say.

23     But I am aware of the evil that emanated from it, and I know what it is

24     that he was actually trying to gain.

25             I also remember that the evil that he had to face was simply

Page 33183

 1     coming from the system of command commanded by Prevljak, who was the

 2     brigade commander before he moved on to assume command of the

 3     12th Division.  That kind of activity, that kind of behaviour, the Ilidza

 4     area was always in a very awkward situation because of the number of

 5     forces and the kind of attitude that Mr. Fikret Prevljak had.

 6     Colonel Radojcic kept complaining about their behaviour.  He simply

 7     didn't have to face a rational or well-meaning command of the

 8     104th Brigade.

 9        Q.   Just before we leave this subject, I want to go back to some of

10     the things in your evidence yesterday that you agreed with and then ask

11     you a question.

12             You agreed yesterday, at transcript page 33151, line 13, that any

13     effort to avoid firing air-bombs over residential areas was because of

14     the risk they might have landed on those areas.  So that's one thing.

15             And then I asked you a document -- about a document, P1310, and

16     that was the document drafted by Colonel Manojlovic which stated that the

17     firing of a modified air-bomb at the opening of the tunnel was aborted

18     because, among other things, your forces were 500 metres away, and you

19     said that was to make absolutely sure that safety is achieved, and that

20     was at 33153.

21             So what that means, General, is that your colonel had decided

22     that the risk that the air-bomb would deviate from its target by 500

23     metres and hit your own soldiers was big enough that it didn't even

24     justify firing on what you considered to be a military target; right?

25        A.   First of all, I think one needs to be grateful to

Page 33184

 1     Colonel Manojlovic for taking that position and making proposals and

 2     suggestions to undertake all possible protective measures.  There is

 3     never an asset that can be used in a particular situation without a

 4     possibility of some unwanted influence or consequence irrespective of

 5     what asset or what situation we are talking about.  It includes even the

 6     most sophisticated and up-to-date combat means programmed by computers.

 7             This proposal of his was a measure against us doing that.

 8     Perhaps I needn't repeat it all, but the main reason, the main thrust of

 9     his reasoning was this:  If within the command there are people who had

10     to think carefully about what we were going to do, then it was up to me

11     to take their opinion into consideration.  It actually may have involved

12     UNPROFOR, which was some distance away as we mentioned yesterday.

13             Their movement and their engagement in the implementing of tasks,

14     while in all that they were not a static target.  Due to their movement

15     which may well take place at the moment of our firing on the tunnel, it

16     is that which prompted him to be even more cautious, and he called on us

17     to give up on using that asset.  We did, cancelled it, and I'm grateful

18     to him for it.

19        Q.   Now, that caution that we saw in Colonel Manojlovic's document of

20     26 April is not reflected, is it, General, in the order of the 6th of

21     April that we've been discussing, and that was also drafted by

22     Colonel Manojlovic, the order to select the most profitable target in

23     Hrasnica or Sokolovic Kolonija where the greatest casualties and material

24     damage would be inflicted.  The -- that caution that you saw with regard

25     to an order -- an operation that affected your soldiers is not reflected

Page 33185

 1     at all in your order of 6th April.

 2        A.   Of course what you say about this order being mine is correct.

 3     You know that the same order was drafted by Mr. Manojlovic.  However,

 4     that is irrelevant.

 5             What is relevant is that Mr. Manojlovic knew everything.  He knew

 6     how the process of analysing that problem developed between myself and

 7     the brigade command.  He knew what measures were taken in that process.

 8     Thus it was superfluous to deal with what he knew I was aware of and that

 9     he didn't need to include such words and sentences and content which

10     would try to educate us as if we were completely ignorant of the

11     situation.  He knew that all too well.

12        Q.   Yesterday, you also acknowledged having given an order, which is

13     P1309, to prepare for the launch of up to six air-bombs simultaneously at

14     a target with the provision for even more to be launched in case they

15     missed.  So you acknowledged having given that order, and you explained

16     that order.

17             General, isn't it the case that, in fact, you,

18     Colonel Manojlovic, Colonel Radojcic, all knew that these bombs were

19     inaccurate, had a wide margin of error of hundreds of metres off target,

20     and so long as they didn't pose a risk to your forces, you felt free to

21     launch them into urban centres like Sarajevo, city centre, and civilian

22     areas like the settlement of Hrasnica?  And you'll recall when you began

23     your cross-examination yesterday, you described Sarajevo as civilian.

24        A.   Yes, I remember it all.  It is all clear to me.  This assertion

25     or an indicator of yours of us knowing that the asset was imprecise is

Page 33186

 1     something I do not accept.  Quite the other way around.  We knew and of

 2     course we are in a position to know when confirmed by technical experts

 3     with sufficient knowledge in situations where they can deal with

 4     inaccuracies until they have come up with a reliable asset.

 5             I stand by the fact that we knew -- well, perhaps you will not

 6     believe me or this may not be taken judicial notice by the Chamber, but I

 7     do know that we were at some point in a situation that such bombs

 8     achieved more accuracy than, for example, when dropped from aeroplanes.

 9     It was actually confirmed that they frequently missed their target if

10     dropped from aeroplanes.  And there were no such cases in our situation,

11     in our case.

12             I have to go back and say that we have received confirmation that

13     they can be used.  Actually, had there been any doubts, any reservations

14     about that asset, it would never have been used.  That is what I state

15     here now.  We would never have used the assets if we had known that it

16     could achieve great dispersion or miss the target.  Well, it was not our

17     position to use assets in a way so as if to say, "Well, wherever it

18     landed, it's fine."  No officer could allow that.  "We don't have

19     parameters, but let's go ahead with it in any case," that's simply not

20     true.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] An intervention for the transcript.

22     What is missing in the transcript is that the witness said that a

23     projectile could "fall short" or "fall over a target" in line 14.  The

24     witness said that it was also taken into consideration that that kind of

25     asset would not overshoot or fall short of a target.

Page 33187

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Milosevic, do you confirm that?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.  That's what I meant.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             Ms. Edgerton.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:

 6        Q.   I think we've spent long enough on this area, and I'll move on to

 7     a different area, General, and a different part of the city of Sarajevo.

 8             In your testimony in chief to Dr. Karadzic, you said at

 9     transcript pages 32567 to 32568 that the forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija

10     Corps were not at Spicasta Stijena.  So, General, how many times have you

11     actually visited your forces in that area?

12        A.   On several occasions.  I can't be specific, five or four times,

13     but at any rate, that kind of number of times.  Let me confirm why this

14     was so, why I visited those places several times.

15        Q.   Well, with respect, let's -- my question was just about how often

16     you'd been there.  So if you want to come back to that with Dr. Karadzic

17     you can.

18             So I'm wondering whether, General, during your visit to the area

19     if you didn't see the Serb flag flying from the flag pole situated on the

20     ridge at Spicasta Stijena?

21        A.   First of all, I'd never said that I saw that Serbian flag.

22        Q.   Did you see it or didn't you?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we be more specific about the

24     time, the relevant time concerning this question and answer?  When?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

Page 33188

 1             MS. EDGERTON:

 2        Q.   General, Mr. Tom Knustad, a United Nations military observer who

 3     was positioned in Sedrenik gave evidence in your own trial, and his

 4     evidence was received by this Chamber in P00123, and he -- and that being

 5     the transcript of his evidence in General Milosevic's trial, I'll just

 6     give you the transcript page there, it's 2030.  And he said there that

 7     they knew -- his UNMO team knew that Spicasta Stijena was under VRS

 8     control because of the Serb flag that had been erected on the ridge.

 9             General, did you see the Serb flag on the ridge?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we be given an indication of

11     time?  When?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let's be on the same page.  What I

13     can recall from my trial, I know there were photographs of a

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina flag at the Grdonj feature.  First I can't recall

15     Mr. Knustad saying that.  That's one thing.  Secondly, I never paid

16     attention whether there was a flag hoisted or not.  I cannot tell you

17     anything about that.  Please do not ask me anything about the flag on

18     this occasion, because this is the first time I hear a question about

19     that flag.  This is the first time I hear about the existing of a flag.

20     Well, there were -- there was a flag elsewhere at Zlatiste, but not

21     there.  It is not known to me.  I never paid attention.  I never issued

22     an order, nor could I tell you anything about that Serb flag at the

23     Spicasta Stijena.  I cannot tell you anything about that really.

24        Q.   So that's fine.  Now, you said you had visited your troops in

25     that area four or five times.

Page 33189

 1             Now, Mr. Karadzic has actually called two company commanders, two

 2     Mrkovici commanders to testify in his Defence case, Sinisa Maksimovic and

 3     Blasko Rasevic, and these are two people who served on the line, and both

 4     gave evidence that their company held Spicasta Stijena.  And battalion

 5     commander Slavko Gengo at T 29786, transcript page 29786, also confirmed

 6     that Spicasta Stijena was under Bosnian Serb Army control throughout the

 7     whole conflict except for one day around the 18th September, 1994.

 8             So, General, these three men were your own subordinates, two

 9     company commanders and a battalion commander, and they were deployed at

10     that feature, Spicasta Stijena, and gave this evidence under oath.  So,

11     General, on their evidence it appears that your assertion is actually not

12     true, isn't it?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we ask for the precise quote of

14     what was said about where the lines were?  What did these witnesses say

15     where the lines were in relation to Spicasta Stijena, because what has

16     just been said is not something that they said.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm happy to provide the page citations, Your

19     Honour.  More specifically, Mr. Maksimovic gave evidence that

20     Spicasta Stijena was in his area of responsibility, and that's at D2354,

21     paragraph 9; that Muslim forces took it only once in mid-September 1994.

22     That's at D2354, paragraph 10.  And he told this Chamber that the SRK

23     recovered the ridge a couple of days later, and that's at transcript page

24     23 -- pardon me, 29303.

25             Mr. Rasevic, who was also a company commander at Mrkovici from

Page 33190

 1     January 1993 until September 1994, and who was in that area throughout

 2     the war gave evidence that from as early as April 1992, Serb forces took

 3     up positions from Velika Trdzva [phoen] to Spicasta Stijena, and that was

 4     the case throughout his tour as company commander, and to quote from him

 5     at D2527, paragraphs 20 and 29, he said, "Our positions included

 6     Spicasta Stijena."

 7             Would Your Honours like me to somehow be more precise?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  In -- in -- no, my question is, Your Honours --

10     pardon me.  Would Your Honours like more information in regard to what

11     these witnesses have said in addition to the citations I've provided?

12             JUDGE KWON:  I think you can proceed.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

14        Q.   Now, my question, General, was -- so these three men were your

15     subordinates, two company commanders and a battalion commander, and they

16     were deployed in that area, and they gave this evidence under oath.  So

17     my question is:  On their evidence, it appears that your assertion is

18     actually untrue, isn't it?

19        A.   It is not untrue.  First of all, if we're talking about

20     Maksimovic and him saying that he was at the

21     Velika Trdzva-Spicasta Stijena line, the place Velika Trdzva, as you

22     heard from him and noted it down, is located over 1.500 metres from the

23     area that we're talking about here.  Now, that's one thing.

24             So we can only talk about something that refers to Mala Kula, and

25     Mala Kula is a line.  It's an area that our forces reached, the

Page 33191

 1     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps forces reached up to that point.  That is the

 2     main indicator where they were.  From Mala Kula to the positions of the

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina army, there is more than 250 metres.  This is what I

 4     remember and the situation that I was overseeing on several occasions.

 5             Once at a given point in particular I was monitoring it, and this

 6     is what I want to say before this Trial Chamber.  What happened in this

 7     initial period of combat was that the forces of the 1st Corps took

 8     Mala Kula.  They moved our forces and occupied that area.  By capturing

 9     Mala Kula they also captured the area to the left and to the right of it.

10             Now, this was a situation that jeopardised our defence.  We had

11     to pull back, and then we did everything to get those forces out of Mala

12     Kula or from that line to be more precise.  So this is an indicator, a

13     parameter, and my recollection, everything that has to do with that area.

14             This Mala Kula and everything is behind Grdonj hill.  So the way

15     I remembered it and what I experienced in that area is still fresh

16     because it was a sensitive area for several reasons and represented an

17     important point for the corps force as a whole.  We managed to push

18     the -- their forces back.  And what I'm ask now is that when these same

19     fighters, when they went back to Kula, why didn't they advance?  They

20     said they couldn't advance because their area was already on the edge

21     when the ground already begins to slow.  So from Mala Kula up to that

22     edge or the area where the land begins to slope down, I said there was a

23     distance of some 250 metres.  So going forward would mean going into

24     their disposition.  So I stopped there with my fighters.  I said very

25     well.  Now you have resolved the problem.  We tried to record that for

Page 33192

 1     television, but it was very late in the evening hours.  I don't know how

 2     they broadcast that later, because on the fourth night,

 3     Television Sarajevo showed how they had captured this Kula, and then we

 4     went for the option to tell them that this has now been returned to us.

 5             So my evidence and indicators.  While touring that area,

 6     nobody -- well, we that couldn't -- didn't call that area where the

 7     forces were deployed Spicasta Stijena or any other name, because the term

 8     "Spicasta Stijena" is of local origin, and for me who is looking at the

 9     situation from a different aspect, I would not use that local name but I

10     would use the topographical names that you could find on a map, and what

11     you can find on the map is the Grdonj feature, 950 metres, the highest

12     point in that area that was held by the forces of the 1st Corps of the

13     army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And there is a certain plateau which

14     somebody most probably later thought of as Spicasta Stijena.  Actually,

15     that plateau was just in line with this Kula that I'm talking about, and

16     then the front proceeded viewing at it from the four directions to the

17     south, towards those -- I assume they had Sedam Suma.  I really cannot be

18     specific about that right now, this axis going on towards Hladivode

19     however those features were called.

20             In this case, Spicasta Stijena as some kind of practical feature

21     or facility literally associates -- the name means "peak," "spic," so

22     this area which is isolated and elevated and set apart did not exist in

23     the area of responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, but I am not

24     denying that it is a little bit elevated in relation to the other terrain

25     which looks on Sarajevo, but I'm not talking about the edge of this

Page 33193

 1     terrain, but I'm talking about a certain depth from the rear because we

 2     couldn't reach this edge in view of the fact that the actual edge, the

 3     very last angle at which the terrain begins to slope is area that they

 4     held.  And this is what I know, and I am going back now about the flag,

 5     and I really don't know anything much about that.

 6        Q.   There's no need to go back.  Thank you, General.  So listening to

 7     your lengthy explanation, as I told you I want to be literal in my

 8     questions, I'm going to read you what battalion commander Gengo said,

 9     actually said, about Spicasta Stijena.  He was asked at 29786, line 7:

10             "Now I'd like to ask you a few questions, Mr. Gengo, about a

11     location known as Spicasta Stijena.  You know this location?"

12             He answered:

13             "Yes."

14             He was asked:

15             "The VRS held it throughout the 1992 to 1995 conflict; is that

16     correct?"

17             He answered:

18             "Yes."

19             Later on he explained that he believed it was on 18 September

20     1994 it fell under ABiH control for one evening.

21             He was asked:

22             "Now, from Spicasta Stijena you had an excellent view of that

23     part of the city of Sarajevo."

24             He responded:

25             "Only the part known as Sedrenik."

Page 33194

 1             And he was asked -- or pardon me.  If we go down to transcript

 2     page 2987 -- 29787, he explained at line 5:

 3             "My three trenches on Spicasta Stijena were under crossfire from

 4     the enemy, from Kresa on the right, from Borovo on the left.  They were

 5     always under crossfire, and I had to dig those three trenches on

 6     Spicasta Stijena, and I can show you the how the men who defended their

 7     part of the village approached those trenches."

 8             So actually your own battalion commander has directly, before

 9     this Chamber, contradicted the evidence you've just given, hasn't he?

10        A.   I don't know what is contradictory here, what the commander of

11     the battalion was describing.  He knew what it was and where it was.  As

12     for how you understood what -- where this was, I -- I don't know.  Unless

13     he specified that it was along that line that I am talking about, the

14     line of Mala Kula, and that in front of him some 250 metres away and

15     somewhere closer the Bosnia and Herzegovina Army had its positions.

16     Perhaps he wasn't precise and he didn't know that he needed to provide

17     those details to you as well.

18             I'm not denying his story, what he's saying.  I am stating what I

19     know about the situation, when I was getting information about it, and

20     the situation in that area which was important to us.  It's not

21     unimportant.

22             If you wish, I can remind you, although I'm sure you know that

23     very well, that a witness who was testifying in my case said, "No, no,

24     that was not Spicasta Stijena, that was some kind of valley or gorge

25     through which the Muslim forces were passing," and he said that the local

Page 33195

 1     name for that area was Smreka.  He said he went to school there, he would

 2     pass there, and he never knew of any feature called Spicasta Stijena.

 3             I am trying here to say that if it will be taken into account

 4     that the term "Spicasta Stijena" as an association to some sort of

 5     prominent feature, I would say, is something that is imposed, imposed.

 6     It has a different connotation, a different aspect.

 7             I must, I must, explain to the Trial Chamber.  Such a feature

 8     that is prominent, that is at an elevation, it's not usually captured.

 9     It's a highly visible firing point.  Actually, it can be exposed to enemy

10     fire according to a simple recipe, and nobody would want to expose

11     themselves in that way.

12             Further on, if you're prepared to hear me out, I know that one of

13     the witnesses --

14        Q.   General --

15        A.   Please.  Please.

16        Q.   If you're going to start talking about witnesses in your own

17     trial again, I'd actually ask that we move on.  You can talk to

18     Dr. Karadzic in your redirect about witnesses in your own trial.  All

19     right?

20             I'd like --

21        A.   I would ask --

22        Q.   Please, General.

23        A.   I would ask --

24             JUDGE KWON:  I think you answered the question, and we can

25     proceed.

Page 33196

 1             Ms. Edgerton, please continue.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 3        Q.   Now, I'd like to go on to the subject of sniping, and at

 4     transcript pages --

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, Your Honour, I just see it's 10.28, and maybe

 6     before going on to this different area -- I'm in Your Honour's hands.  It

 7     might be an appropriate time for a short break.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 9                           [Trial Chamber confers]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Before we take a break, Mr. Milosevic, so you had

11     your own trial, and then I take it that this -- this issue was one of the

12     issue in your trial as well.  Am I correct, Mr. Milosevic?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Yes.

14             JUDGE KWON:  So whatever the name it might have been, you should

15     know the place where -- which was referred to as Spicasta Stijena in your

16     indictment, and I take it that it is your evidence that specific place

17     was not under Serb control.  Am I correct in so understanding?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know if I understood you

19     correctly.  I am saying what was under our control and what the

20     disposition was, what it looked like, and --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Let me put my question more directly.  This sniping

22     from so-called Spicasta Stijena was included in your indictment.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

24             JUDGE KWON:  So you understood that what place it was, where it

25     was.

Page 33197

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Yes.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Was that place, that specific point which was called

 3     Spicasta Stijena in your indictment was under Serb control during the

 4     war?  At any time.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  I understand.  I'm not

 6     specifying that area, and I don't call it Spicasta Stijena.  I am talking

 7     about the position and the disposition of the units of the

 8     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps which, among other things, executed certain kinds

 9     of fire whereby I'm not ruling out any kind of action as impossible.

10     Quite the contrary.  They did have conditions from that position to

11     execute possible fire, and that possible fire was executed to the degree

12     required for them to protect themselves.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Thank you.  We'll leave it at that, and

14     we'll break for half an hour and resume at 3 past 11.00.

15                           --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

19        Q.   General, in your testimony in chief in the context of a

20     discussion about the anti-sniping agreement on 14 August 1994,

21     Dr. Karadzic asked you what the sniping fire from the Serbian side was

22     conditional on, and your answer was:

23             "When their sniping fire stopped, ours stopped as well and there

24     was no further need for further sniper fire."

25             And that's at transcript 32840 to 32841.  Do you mean by this to

Page 33198

 1     say that sniping by your forces was exclusively military on military?

 2        A.   You put a very clear question, and I'm prepared to answer.  I

 3     have to ask the Trial Chamber regarding the previous situation, not the

 4     details but its about a request that I have to try to give an

 5     explanation.  Not about the events but it has to do with my need, and

 6     then I will answer this question.  I have understood it, and I remember

 7     it.

 8             Your Honours, I would just kindly ask to express a problem that I

 9     have in just a couple of words and to say something further about my

10     testimony.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'm trying and I want

13     to state here, express here, that I'm not here to defend myself, and any

14     indicator that I state, I would not wish for it to be understood or

15     treated as if I were stating things that were untrue or incorrect.  I'm

16     just stating this in order to draw a parallel between the assertions that

17     these gentlemen made in their testimony and some alleged collusion, which

18     is how I'm experiencing it, because my indicators say something else.

19             First of all, it is not my intention to negate the testimony of

20     those who testified here before me, and I would like to note that there

21     is no single event that can be described or confirmed in the same way by

22     two different persons.

23             My views and the way I understood events is one approach, and I

24     just wanted to state that that was my view of things, not any negation of

25     what happened or an attempt to distort events.  This is something that is

Page 33199

 1     a characteristic of my entire testimony here, and I am obliged by a

 2     number of things, including my honour and honesty, to speak the truth,

 3     and I would like to thank you for allowing me to say this.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Milosevic.  I'd like to reiterate

 5     here that you are not here to defend yourself but give evidence in the

 6     case of Mr. Karadzic.  All you have to do is to tell the truth, nothing

 7     but the truth, whole truth to the Chamber as far as you remember.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  That is correct.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:

11        Q.   Do you remember my question, General, or would you like me to

12     repeat it for you?

13        A.   I do remember it, but I wouldn't mind hearing it again.  Could

14     you please put your question again.  Thank you.

15        Q.   The question is:  Do you mean, did you, in responses to

16     Dr. Karadzic related to the anti-sniping agreement mean to say that

17     sniping by your forces was exclusively military on military?

18        A.   This is exactly what I wanted to say, and that is what the

19     practice was.  In that regard, I hope that I will have the opportunity to

20     tell you something in more detail about the reason for such an assertion

21     or what in essence I want to say with that about the events, the

22     occurrences relating to sniper action.  I hope that I will have the

23     opportunity to explain all of that.

24        Q.   So your evidence is that sniping by your forces was exclusively

25     military on military, even though the anti-sniping agreement was

Page 33200

 1     initiated, negotiated, signed, and recognised as a measure to protect

 2     civilians on both sides against sniping.  Is that your evidence?

 3        A.   Of course it was accepted in its entirety.  When the use and the

 4     fire by snipers ceases, that implies that civilians would be protected as

 5     well.

 6             If you want to understand me, the motive and taking the position

 7     and attempts and trying to get the agreement to hold, I was precise in

 8     that way, among other things, because I also felt that my soldiers would

 9     be protected from an exceptionally widespread fire of that type by forces

10     of the 1st Corps.

11        Q.   If sniping is exclusively military on military, then the

12     implication is that there would be no civilian victims.  Are you saying

13     that there would be -- there was -- were no civilian victims of sniping

14     in Bosnian-held Sarajevo?

15        A.   I'm never going to say that there were no civilian casualties

16     regardless of the type of fire which caused them to be casualties.  I

17     hope that you will take that into account.  This would make no sense, and

18     it wouldn't be all right to have anybody claim that there were no

19     casualties.  Then everything would make absolutely no sense, and then

20     there would be no need for us to speak at all if that was the assertion.

21     This is not what I'm saying.

22             I'm saying that the casualties ought to be respected and that a

23     solution ought to be found so that there are no casualties.

24        Q.   All right.  But what makes no sense then to me, General, is if --

25     is how your assertion stands in the face of what you said in your

Page 33201

 1     testimony in chief to the effect that your forces never targeted

 2     civilians.

 3        A.   It stands literally in the way that you're putting it now.  It's

 4     not a fact that anyone -- it's not something that can be ruled out.

 5     There was nobody's accord or approval or secretly even anybody giving a

 6     suggestion that fire should be directed at civilians.  I would like us to

 7     agree on the fact that it's not true that civilians were not exposed to

 8     injuries or were not hit, but there was an attempt by us for the whole

 9     combat structure and in this case sniper operators to tell them that they

10     must not operate in that way and that it constitutes a harmful situation

11     that brings harm to us ourselves.

12             I don't know how far I would need to go into explanations about

13     how each of those soldiers was aware that it was not his need or his

14     commitment, their personal commitment, to fire at civilians, that there

15     was no advantage to be gain -- gained by that in terms of their own

16     defence.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the last sentence.

18             MS. EDGERTON:

19        Q.   Perhaps you could repeat your last sentence, General.

20        A.   The last sentence was that a civilian never attacked a soldier so

21     that a soldier would then be prompted to return fire.

22        Q.   Thank you.  But, General, if the fact that sniping -- that

23     civilians in -- the preponderance of victims of sniping in Sarajevo were

24     civilians, that sniping of civilians in Sarajevo continued incessantly

25     for three and a half years in a widespread fashion across the areas of

Page 33202

 1     operation of a number of military brigades suggests exactly the opposite,

 2     doesn't it, that the sniping of civilians in Sarajevo was a policy, that

 3     it was directed, and specifically -- specifically -- and that it

 4     specifically targeted the most vulnerable residents of the city?

 5        A.   Yes.  You've posed several questions.  First of all, I don't

 6     understand what you mean by saying a series of military brigades.  I

 7     don't know what you mean by that.  A number of military brigades.

 8        Q.   General, sniping against civilians in Bosnian-held Sarajevo

 9     created victims across the breadth of the city, victims exposed to firing

10     positions of any number of brigades of your corps.  How can you, in light

11     of that and evidence that we've heard that this continued throughout the

12     duration of the conflict say that no approval was issued to snipe, no

13     suggestion was issued to snipe?  In fact, it was a policy that was

14     directed, wasn't it, General?

15        A.   It's not a problem for you to stick to what you're saying, but I

16     would like to ask if it's possible when you refer to such events where

17     exactly you have those places or areas from which a number of our

18     brigades opened sniper fire.  Could you please be more specific, more

19     precise, and I know why I'm asking you this.  Why I'm asking for you to

20     do this.

21        Q.   Is it difficult for you to answer my question as to whether

22     sniping against civilians in Sarajevo was a policy, General?

23        A.   It is not difficult for me.  That was not difficult for me to

24     say.  However, in my attempts to depict and describe this whole

25     situation, your questions went into a direction which precluded my

Page 33203

 1     explaining what is really important.  My first assertion is that simply

 2     we think that the regulations and rules concerning the use of snipers,

 3     and I literally mean sniping on the part of individual soldiers who were

 4     issued by a sniper rifle, that rules and regulations were carried out and

 5     implemented to that extent which was sufficient so that anybody who was

 6     in possession of a sniping rifle knew how to conduct themselves.  This is

 7     one of the considerations that I had no occasion to express so far.

 8             Furthermore, the issue of use of snipers was not a centrally

 9     governed issue which would allow the use of sniping only if ordered from

10     a certain level.  The level of units which is allowed to have snipers

11     deployed, and there is an additional consideration is that we recruited

12     for sniping activities only those personnel who had the mental patience

13     and attributes that would allow them to be effective snipers.  That level

14     command was company command.  At no point was it allowed that a conduct

15     or an action by personnel that would be their own conduct, of their own

16     will.  It was always commanded or ordered.

17        Q.   Well, General, just before I lose track of what you've said here,

18     you've talked about rules and regulations and direction ensuring that

19     people -- pardon me.  I'd like to find the cite.

20             I thought I heard the general referring to people in possession

21     of a sniper rifle knowing how to behave, but what you've -- what

22     you've -- what you've said here is you referred to rules and regulations

23     were carried out and implemented to the extent that it was sufficient

24     that anybody who was in possession of a sniper rifle knew how to conduct

25     themselves.

Page 33204

 1             Now, General, this Chamber's received demographic analysis of the

 2     number of civilians killed and injured as a result of sniping in Sarajevo

 3     between 1992 and 1994, and the number of observed and recorded -- so only

 4     those observed and recorded deaths related to sniping was 336.  That's

 5     even before the period that you assumed command of the

 6     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and a total of 1.789 observed and recorded

 7     woundings of civilians in Bosnian-held Sarajevo.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  And those numbers, Your Honours, come from P4997

 9     and P4998, page 5 in both languages.

10        Q.   General, the numbers alone I'd suggest to you contradict your

11     assertion that people in possession of sniper rifles knew how to behave

12     themselves.  It suggests -- or the number suggests they're conducting

13     themselves in a manner specifically geared to keep the civilian

14     population locked down, fearful, and under pressure.  Isn't that the

15     case?

16        A.   I'm not the one who could now dispel that assertion, which is a

17     matter of certain formulation, locked down, intimidated, those people, I

18     mean, et cetera.  The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps did not put those people

19     into such a position and exploited that situation in an arrogant way or

20     in a way which would characterise their attitude as arrogant.  I neither

21     agree with that nor can I accept it.  I do believe that a different

22     approach should be taken to that.  But this is not something I can deal

23     with in terms of that assertion.

24             Neither can I comment those figures before I assumed my position.

25     Or later to the -- there's no sense in depriving those figures of any

Page 33205

 1     sense.  I don't think it would make sense to present things which are not

 2     true, and along these lines we should try to find a solution.  There is

 3     no established situation whereby you could make an assessment that those

 4     people could have met their either death or injury under different

 5     circumstances, but those matters cannot fit with the conduct of sniper

 6     soldiers of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

 7             Please do take this in the right way.  I reiterate that those

 8     soldiers were honourable men and they didn't want to do that.  I have a

 9     number of other pieces of information I can share with you if the

10     conditions are created that allow me to do that.

11        Q.   Are you saying -- are you saying that Bosnian authorities are

12     responsible for the killing and wounding of civilians by your forces, the

13     civilians in Bosnian-held Sarajevo, because they exploited their

14     situation?

15        A.   Of course I do not exclude that action from being possible.  I do

16     not exclude the responsibility of the forces of the Bosnian Army through

17     carelessness or other means that they may have created victims, so to

18     create an atmosphere of being the endangered party or try to prove that.

19     Why in the data expressed by Mr. Sefer Halilovic, BiH Army commander for

20     a period of time, who stated that citizens, civilians, could not walk

21     down the street due to the activities of our snipers.  What prompted him

22     to say that, I don't know, but there are many indicators where things

23     could have unfolded that way and where certain elements of the Muslim

24     forces could have been the causes of such events.  Not necessarily

25     soldiers.  I have information about certain groups who conducted

Page 33206

 1     themselves in that way who created certain circumstances.

 2        Q.   Putting -- putting whatever Mr. Halilovic might say aside,

 3     because he's not come here to give evidence before this Chamber, I'd like

 4     to just tell you what somebody else has said about people not being able

 5     to walk the streets of Sarajevo.  Brigadier-General David Fraser gave

 6     evidence here and said that the problem of sniping was so acute in

 7     Sarajevo that a specialised task force was established and put in place

 8     along Sniper Alley to observe sniping positions, engage snipers who were

 9     firing at civilians from those positions, and they put barriers in place

10     to protect civilians from sniper fire in SRK-held territory.

11             General, I put to you based on that that this isn't a question of

12     creating an atmosphere of being endangered.  In point of fact, civilians

13     in Sarajevo were under direct and constant threat of snipers operating

14     within your forces.

15        A.   I don't know why you persist saying that they could only have

16     been part of our forces.  If one retains this assertion that it only

17     pertained to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, it will be a blind alley.  This

18     conversation will not go much further because that's the way you put

19     things.  I'm trying to provide explanations.

20             I was trying to explain the following:  When there is combat,

21     these are not merry situations, of course, and they do not necessarily

22     exclude the possibility of having an impact on people who have nothing to

23     do with the combat itself.

24             There is also another thing that I do not exclude.  I do not

25     exclude the possibility that a deranged mind on the Serbian side engaged

Page 33207

 1     in such activity.  However, it cannot be put under the idea of a policy

 2     of people engaging in combat in order to protect their area.  They were

 3     trying to do sensical things.  I'm not certain -- or actually, I do know

 4     that many things haven't been cleared up.  It is enough, and that is what

 5     I'm trying to state here, is this:  When there is an attempt of

 6     breakthrough one after another and in the end, for example,

 7     Spicasta Stijena is the main location from which a force was stopped

 8     or -- well, maybe it didn't stop anything, but if they had an intention

 9     to break through or occupy an area, and in that context our will

10     prevailed with respect to sniping activity, then the positions were

11     switched or there was a confusion.  And the same situation applies to

12     Nedzarici.

13        Q.   Are you saying that sniping would increase -- sniping against

14     civilians would increase following Bosnian operations to break out of

15     Sarajevo?

16        A.   No.  It's the other way around.  I'm not saying that.  I'm trying

17     to say that a solution was found so as not to discuss the issue of how

18     aggressive they were, because it would be difficult to explain to the

19     Chamber who had the upper hand.

20             Then we have these items which portray us as the side committing

21     crimes over civilians, and then the topic is directed in a different

22     direction while neglecting what the SRK had to go through throughout the

23     war, because they were exceptionally combative and ready to prevail over

24     the SRK, including the population in the area we covered.

25        Q.   On the subject of sniping still - I'm just going in another

Page 33208

 1     direction - in your testimony in chief, you talked -- you said at

 2     transcript page 32834 that when sniper fire was opened from the other

 3     side and you responded either by crossfire or fire opened in one

 4     direction, you knew that it would happen that due to fire, bullets would

 5     also hit the trams.  So did you mean to say that UNPROFOR and the local

 6     authorities allowed the trams in Sarajevo to run in unsafe situations?

 7        A.   I think their intentions were precisely that.  As regards the

 8     trams, it was confirmed by way of information that the population avoided

 9     using them, although of course they had their needs, too.  However, they

10     had been provided with a guarantee.  They were told that it was the armed

11     forces that were protecting them.  In order to protect a tram passing

12     through, they would open fire at our side.  But it is not clear to me why

13     they wouldn't realise that we would return fire with fire.

14        Q.   So --

15        A.   When opening fire at us, they were not in a position to protect

16     civilians without exposing those civilians to risk.

17        Q.   So I take it your answer to my question is yes, that as far as

18     you're concerned, United Nations officials and local authorities allowed

19     the trams in Sarajevo to run in unsafe situations.

20        A.   I am not prepared to confirm what the authorities -- or actually

21     the officials of the UN were guided by.  I'm simply confirming the

22     practice which took place, and I can confirm that they moved about even

23     when no security was guaranteed.

24        Q.   Well, General, the evidence that's been received by this Chamber

25     says that the practice was the trams were only allowed to run in

Page 33209

 1     cease-fires, and that's from the civilians who rode the trams, at T 6766,

 2     and the tram drivers themselves at P482, P485, and P495.  The people who

 3     were riding and driving the trams say that they were only moving at times

 4     of cease-fire in direct contradiction, isn't it, to what you've just

 5     asserted?

 6        A.   It doesn't contravene what I said.  What somebody had in mind

 7     before a tram moved out is something I cannot discuss.  Of course, one

 8     cannot deny that they thought along the lines of, Well, we're not going

 9     to send people out on the trams when there is combat.  But at the moment

10     such movement begins and they open fire, it means that they take the

11     responsibility for initiating action.  The responsibility is on their

12     side, and they should not initiate their activity at the same time there

13     is tram movement.

14             I don't know whether this is clear or known that the tram lines

15     ran close to their lines of defence where their units were deployed.  So

16     they asked for opening fire, and someone else should bear the blame.

17        Q.   They asked for opening fire, but you've just acknowledged that

18     your forces did open fire on the trams.  Isn't that the case?  You opened

19     fire and you hit them.

20        A.   We opened fire on their forces, not on the trams.  I did not

21     concede to that.  It's not a matter of whether I concede to it or not.

22     That detail alone means nothing.  I was discussing the situation and not

23     confessing to something or denying it.

24        Q.   Well, to be completely literal, did your forces fire at the trams

25     or not?

Page 33210

 1        A.   They did not.

 2        Q.   So when you said in your testimony at 32834:

 3             "In situations when fire was opened from the other side and then

 4     we responded, either crossfire or fire open in one direction.  I know

 5     that it would happen due to fire, bullets would also hit the trams," what

 6     were you referring to?

 7        A.   If on your side or with anyone else there is no clear idea of

 8     what things look like when there is combat, then I can't explain it.  In

 9     this situation, I'm certain of the fact that it is something that is

10     difficult for you to imagine.  You cannot picture what goes on and what

11     kind of fire is exchanged, in what direction and where those bullets fly

12     due to such an effect on the enemy.  Not all of the bullets go where they

13     should or where they were aimed at.  There is a dispersion with any

14     weapon up to the extent of opening up entirely new topics on the

15     efficiency and direction of bursts of fire from an automatic weapon.

16        Q.   So bullets from your side did hit the trams, didn't they?

17        A.   Why are you insisting on this, that the trams were hit by our

18     bullets?  If we put that in a situation where that could have occurred

19     due to other reasons other than the intention of someone hitting the

20     tram, then the assertion that our bullets hit them cannot be placed in

21     terms of blame on our side or on the back of the person who opened fire.

22             I see that you're not prepared to understand that this can happen

23     even when there is no intention on the part of the shooter.

24        Q.   You didn't answer my question, General.

25        A.   Of course I didn't.  I couldn't confirm that we fired at trams.

Page 33211

 1     To the contrary, we didn't, and that is why I didn't confirm.

 2        Q.   General, you said earlier in your answers to me that you didn't

 3     exclude the possibility of somebody deranged taking sniping action that

 4     had not been approved, and on that note I just want to go over to

 5     something that you said in your evidence in chief.  You told Dr. Karadzic

 6     that over the course of your command of the corps, you had signed and

 7     submitted about 70 criminal reports for further procedure, and that's

 8     transcript page 32859 to 32860.

 9             Now, what kind of offences did you -- were those -- did those

10     reports refer to?

11        A.   Ms. Edgerton, I hope that you, as did I, read the document that

12     was offered here.  It includes an analysis of what kind of criminal and

13     misdemeanour reports were submitted.

14        Q.   Well, I just want to know from you if you could give us an idea

15     what kind of offences did you submit reports on.  Failing to report for

16     duty, for example?

17        A.   That's not what it's about.  We're not trying to make things

18     relative.  We didn't submit criminal reports if someone wore their cap

19     improperly.  I was simply trying to get at information -- well, I wasn't

20     trying to say that we initiated proceedings for acts that were

21     irrelevant.  We undertook all measures which indicated criminal

22     responsibility of any kind, including violent crime and other types of

23     crime.  Of course, I'm not well versed in such terms, and I'd rather not

24     dwell on it too long.  And this includes war crimes.

25             I don't know if I have answered sufficiently.  In any case, that

Page 33212

 1     was the nature of the criminal reports submitted.

 2        Q.   All right.  Were any -- was there any one of those criminal

 3     reports that related to firing on civilians in Sarajevo in any regard?

 4        A.   I can't say if there were such criminal reports.  I don't know

 5     that.  I do know what we prevented and on what topics there were

 6     investigations in order to determine any impropriety.

 7             I believe you should take into account that what happened and we

 8     were unaware of in terms of a result of a certain event due to such

 9     activity which had the character, the nature of fighting.  It doesn't

10     mean that we necessarily knew that someone was wounded or injured, and if

11     there was information, we initiated proceedings in order to discover the

12     perpetrators.  If there was something that happened on the enemy side and

13     we were unaware of it, then --

14        Q.   Ah.  I was just trying to see if -- I've interrupted you, because

15     I was just trying to look for information of what might have happened on

16     the enemy side.  So I apologise for interrupting you.

17        A.   That's fine.  It's okay.

18        Q.   You just said it doesn't necessarily -- it doesn't mean that we

19     necessarily knew someone was wounded or injured, but if there was

20     information, you initiated proceedings.  And then you said, before I

21     interrupted you, "If there was something that happened on the enemy side

22     and we were unaware of it ..."

23             Would you like to finish your sentence?

24        A.   Even if I didn't complete that, it is well understood.  If

25     there's something I don't know, if there's something I'm unaware of, no

Page 33213

 1     procedure can be initiated either to praise or discipline.

 2        Q.   All right.  Now, on the subject of these criminal reports that

 3     you say you filed, Luka Dragicevic, who you might remember from your

 4     trial where he came to testify as a Prosecution witness, came to testify

 5     as a Defence witness in your trial, and you remember him.  He was your

 6     morale, religious, and legal affairs officer from December 1994, wasn't

 7     he?

 8        A.   Yes, I remember.  But he didn't testify as a Defence witness.  He

 9     was a Prosecution witness.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Here at the Tribunal.  In the Karadzic case he's

11     testified as a Defence witness.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Okay.

13             MS. EDGERTON:

14        Q.   Now, he was -- he was asked specifically about criminal reports,

15     because, General, you've said you weren't -- couldn't recall whether or

16     not reports had been filed related to allegations of shelling or sniping

17     civilians in Bosnian-held Sarajevo, and here's the question he was asked,

18     and actually, this is what he said in your trial, and that was read out

19     to him at transcript pages 31437 to 31440.  In your trial he was asked:

20             "During the time that you were assistant commander for morale,

21     religious, and legal affairs from the beginning of December 1994 until

22     the end of the war, do you recall any instances where a commander from

23     the SRK reported a criminal violation of the international laws of war to

24     the military prosecutor?"

25             And he said:

Page 33214

 1             "I never learned or heard of something like that happening in the

 2     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in the period you referred to.  As far as I can

 3     remember, if there had been any such thing in these reports from the

 4     Prosecutor's office, then certainly officers from the command would have

 5     received information about that and taken appropriate measures."

 6             And he was asked whether he stood by that answer in this trial,

 7     and he said that he did.

 8             So, General, I'm a bit puzzled because you said you filed

 9     criminal reports on war crimes, and the man whose job it was to deal with

10     these matters now gave evidence in two trials saying that under your

11     command he doesn't recall a single instance of you reporting a criminal

12     violation of international laws of war to the military prosecutor.  So it

13     appears that his evidence in two trials directly contradicts what you've

14     just said.

15        A.   It is your conclusion.  I stand by what I believe, and that is

16     that he said accurately what he knew.  I'll explain.  I don't know what

17     weight will be given to what I'm trying to explain, but it is the

18     following:  Lieutenant-Colonel Dragicevic was from the Technical Corps.

19     His speciality was aviation.  His knowledge in that regard is very

20     narrow.  However, that is no justification.  I simply provide this

21     information as an aside.

22             Next, all those matters I dealt with knowing that his capacity or

23     ability was not sufficient to bring it to an end were dealt with in a

24     different way, that is to say criminal reports were drafted with the

25     assistance and participation of Colonel Marko Lugonja, who was my aide in

Page 33215

 1     such matters.  He was the one who was tasked with discovering and

 2     pinpointing weaknesses and occurrences.  I simply signed such criminal

 3     reports.  But the bearer of submitting those criminal reports was

 4     Mr. Lugonja who had been with the corps from the start.  As you can see,

 5     Colonel Dragicevic arrived in the corps in late 1994 and he was not able

 6     to deal with such matters.  It was important for the command to have a

 7     solution, even though it may not have gone through -- it may have gone

 8     through a person who was not directly connected with the appropriate

 9     service.

10             Let me add this:  It does not mean that he was not supposed to

11     know about it.  What it is that he can't recall is something I cannot

12     discuss.  If he doesn't remember who did it and if he doesn't remember

13     that he knew of someone else doing it, well, perhaps he lost sight of it

14     at the particular moment in time.  I don't know.

15        Q.   So what you're saying now is actually that criminal reports were

16     to whatever extent they were prepared were prepared by your security

17     officer, because that's who Marko Lugonja was.

18        A.   He wasn't in charge of security only.  He was the officer in

19     charge of security and intelligence.

20        Q.   And who did he respond to, then, in the Main Staff?

21        A.   It went along the line -- the lines of the command system.  It is

22     clear he was part of the expert or professional hierarchy.  Within his

23     department he was in touch with the chief of the security and

24     intelligence organ in the Main Staff.

25        Q.   Just give me the name, General.

Page 33216

 1        A.   Of course.  It was General Tolimir.  Zdravko Tolimir.  I'm quite

 2     embarrassed for not being able to remember his name right away.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  We'll go on to a different area, and it's -- relates

 4     to a discussion you had with Dr. Karadzic at transcript pages 32726 to

 5     32728.  There you looked at a document, P1641, which was a document you

 6     wrote dated 10 February, and it was a proposal to General Milovanovic to

 7     set aside certain weapons and artillery pieces into UN collection points,

 8     including a number received from the Drina and Hercegovina Corps that

 9     were out of order and to camouflage others.  And you said to Dr. Karadzic

10     that your proposal was never implemented.

11             So just a couple of questions about that.  Based on your

12     evidence, is it the case that you offered this proposal completely

13     independently?

14        A.   If I may before answering your question, I wanted to say

15     something else that may or may not be related to it.  You will definitely

16     be able find it, or maybe that has already been found in the documents.

17     It was UNPROFOR's conclusion that we took all of the available weapons

18     irrespective of type and calibre and operational use and placed it under

19     the control of the international factors.  That was what I wanted to say

20     prior to answering your question, but could you kindly repeat it?  Yes,

21     whether I was independent in making that proposal.

22             Of course, it was a proposal of mine which may have been a result

23     of my thinking about the situation and the way I interpreted it.  If we

24     stuck to the agreement to the letter and set aside everything, and then

25     there is a conclusion that the enemy's side, for example, not fully

Page 33217

 1     comply or was not under the agreement.

 2        Q.   So --

 3        A.   I tried to explain that.  It's not something that I'm necessarily

 4     proud of, and I'm not trying to tell anything different.

 5        Q.   Does that mean, then, that what you're saying is no inoperative

 6     weapons were received from the Herzegovina and Drina Corps?

 7        A.   I'm not saying anything.  I cannot really confirm how it all

 8     proceeded.  I know what it was that we wanted, but what actually took

 9     place, did we actually receive the weapons or not, I really am not able

10     to say anything any more.

11        Q.   All right.  Let's have a look at P848, please, and it's a

12     document dated 9 February 1994, and it's from the Drina Corps commander,

13     Chief of Staff Skocajic.

14             Now, this document, General, which is dated 9 February 1994, says

15     that based on the document by the Main Staff of the VRS, he hereby --

16     Colonel Skocajic hereby orders that during the course of the night, and I

17     don't have an English one to read in front of me any longer, during the

18     course of the night, one of their brigades shall hand over an inoperative

19     gun to the command of the SRK, that's you.  Another brigade shall hand

20     over an inoperative 105-millimetre howitzer to the command of the SRK.

21     That's you.  And the weapons are to be collected by an SRK representative

22     at an intersection of the road in the village of Sumbulovac.

23             So actually, General, it looks like your proposal which

24     specifically refers to weapons received from the Drina and

25     Hercegovina Corps was something that was order, was an operation that was

Page 33218

 1     ordered by the VRS Main Staff.  It looks like the weapons were delivered

 2     to corps custody, just like you indicated in your proposal, and that in

 3     fact the operation for the camouflage of the weapons was carried out.

 4     Isn't that the case?

 5        A.   It's correct that it was a futile task, a task that could not be

 6     affirmed and implemented in practice.  The attempt and different options

 7     to carry out any action in this way did not absolutely work, and that is

 8     why I said that, because when this was brought in, this gun or this asset

 9     that was inoperative was sent off as scrap metal, and this is not

10     something that UNPROFOR was interested in.  The UNPROFOR command, I

11     repeat there was a very rested general there, General Soubirou, and he

12     wanted fully operational weapons to be brought to the collection

13     centre --

14        Q.   Fine.

15        A.   -- that could be stored there.

16        Q.   So, General, are you saying that no weapons were hidden or

17     camouflaged?

18        A.   Well, I know that the situation that we are talking about here

19     had its other version which did not have any effect at all on any kind of

20     consistency or the correct implementation as agreed in the agreements and

21     accepted by the Main Staff.

22        Q.   General, so did your forces hide and camouflage heavy weapons

23     within the 20 kilometre exclusion zone or not?

24        A.   First of all, the action did not relate to the 20 kilometre

25     exclusion zone.  The 20 kilometres was not even to be under the control

Page 33219

 1     of UNPROFOR, but it was out of the zone for it to be completely away, not

 2     in the vicinity of that area at all.  One action was this and the other

 3     one was placing the weaponry under the control.  This is what I know.

 4        Q.   Maybe -- maybe you're trying to answer my question, but I'm not

 5     sure that I have.  I may misunderstand you.  My question is:  Did SRK

 6     forces hide and camouflage heavy weapons within the total exclusion zone

 7     or not?

 8        A.   They did not hide weaponry but some individual assets.  It's

 9     possible this happened.

10        Q.   In fact, General, when you took command of the

11     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, you issued an order to hide and camouflage heavy

12     weapons in the total exclusion zone, didn't you?

13        A.   I do not remember that, but I don't rule it out.  I don't

14     remember.

15        Q.   All right.  Let's have a look at P1670.  It's a document you

16     wrote dated 21 August 1994.  And -- I'll just wait until the English one

17     comes up.

18             So this is a document that you sent to all units, and in the

19     first part of the document it reports that you received information that

20     during talks with General Mladic, General Rose told him that UN observers

21     had established that UN planes were being fired on from the roof of the

22     MUP building in Ilidza, and General Rose ordered General Mladic that this

23     should be stopped, or if you go over to page 2 of the English but stay on

24     the B/C/S, you see that the firing should be stopped or neutralised.

25             So in this document, you actually order not only that these guns

Page 33220

 1     be removed and that's at paragraph 1; to new firing positions

 2     camouflaged, paragraph 2; and at paragraph 3 you order that all the heavy

 3     weapons around Sarajevo be camouflaged and hidden and moved only at night

 4     so as to conceal that movement from UNPROFOR.  So now, General, do you

 5     remember that you yourself ordered heavy weapons within the total

 6     exclusion zone be hidden and camouflaged?

 7        A.   Well, it's not a question here of whether I remember it or not.

 8     What is stated here in the relevant way from your aspect, it has been

 9     noted or interpreted.  None of these assets could have been used or

10     become relevant unless there was a realistic absolute circumstance

11     bringing the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps into an unfavourable position.

12     Before that, no use of them could be exercised regardless of whether they

13     were camouflaged or not or whether they were placed somewhere.  This is

14     one thing.

15             Secondly, where it says here --

16        Q.   General.  General, so you confirm you ordered heavy weapons

17     within the total exclusion zone to be hidden and camouflaged?

18        A.   No, I don't confirm that.  First of all, I think that the

19     misunderstanding entirely lies in this.  The weapons, I describe that,

20     and if you permit me, I would like to speak of it again, about the

21     deployment and removal or, rather, the placing of these weapons under

22     supervision.  In this overall --

23        Q.   Thank you.

24        A.   Could you permit me, please?

25        Q.   I think actually --

Page 33221

 1        A.   No, no, no.

 2        Q.   -- General, you could do that in your redirect with Dr. Karadzic

 3     if you want to, because I'd like to move on.

 4             Your answer to my question was despite seeing your order on the

 5     page in front of me, you did not confirm -- despite seeing your order to

 6     the contrary, you did not confirm that you ordered heavy weapons within

 7     the total exclusion zone to be hidden and camouflaged.

 8             I want to go on, General, to another topic.

 9        A.   I would kindly ask you to permit me to explain to you -- or,

10     rather, to the Trial Chamber.  If you did not understand that the

11     weaponry was in certain locations and if it is not known that it was

12     permitted, permitted pursuant to the contract to have the crews access

13     the weaponry in order to maintain them, and everything that can be

14     understood from this is that from this position where the weaponry was,

15     it's a broader area, they as such could be used without moving them in

16     the area where they were located.

17             Of course, that is where the main obstacle was.  That was the

18     UNPROFOR forces who were not permitting us to do that.  But don't forget

19     that they tolerated that.  If it was a matter of a given threat, then it

20     was possible to use the weapon from the position where it was.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Milosevic, if you could, please try to answer

22     the question in -- by yes or no.  The question you were asked just now

23     was the one that could have been answered either by yes or no.  If

24     necessary, Ms. Edgerton or Mr. Karadzic would ask you about the reasons.

25             Do you understand that, sir?

Page 33222

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue, Ms. Edgerton.  How much more do you

 3     have?  Just, I'm asking for planning purposes.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, no problem at all, Your Honour.  One more area

 5     and I'd like to come back to a point that General Milosevic has raised in

 6     his rather lengthy answer, and I think subject to the length of the

 7     general's answers, probably after we break that could be maybe half an

 8     hour or 45 minutes further.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Then should we have a break now if it is

10     convenient?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  It would be a new area otherwise, so I'm in

12     Your Honours' hands.

13             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I have a very brief matter I

15     would like to raise with the Chamber in private session.  Could we do

16     that right now or --

17             JUDGE KWON:  In the absence of the witness.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  I think it's -- it can be in the presence of the

19     witness because it concerns him.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

21             We go into private session briefly.

22                           [Private session]

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 33223

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14                           [Open session]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will break for 45 minutes and resume at 14

16     past 1.00.

17                           --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 1.16 p.m.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

21        Q.   General, just to continue on the subject we were on, which is the

22     presence of weapons within the total exclusion zone in a comment you

23     offered to me at page 54 of today's transcript, you said, and that's with

24     respect to weapons in the weapons collection points, you said:

25             "If it was matter of a given threat, then it was possible to use

Page 33224

 1     the weapons from the position where it was."

 2             And in fact, that's exactly what your forces did, isn't it?  They

 3     fired weapons from the weapons collection points in May 1995.

 4        A.   Ms. Edgerton, I owe you an apology, because I did not confirm

 5     whether that was my order and whether what the document says is a result

 6     of some idea of ours or intention.  In any case, the order is mine.  I'm

 7     not denying that.  And in my attempt to give you some explanations,

 8     perhaps one got the impression that I was negating the order at the same

 9     time, but this is not the case.

10             And if the question the way that you put it should get an answer

11     whether fire was launched or not, one cannot get an answer unless one

12     shows what the situation was at the time and what the balance of forces

13     was at the same time and what the situation was at the front.  Things had

14     escalated at that point so much that activating our assets was the only

15     way.  There was no other way out but to use assets in order to defend the

16     theatre.

17        Q.   All right.  So I take it from what you've said the answer to my

18     question is yes.  Did you receive any interpretation, General?

19        A.   I did hear it, yes, but I wasn't expecting to say anything,

20     because what you say is what you say.

21        Q.   So it's correct, isn't it, that in May of 1995, your forces took

22     four heavy weapons from the weapons collection points and used them?

23        A.   Correct.  But you're not asking me where they were used, along

24     which axis, and for what purpose.  And in that case, the answer that the

25     Trial Chamber should hear is not given.  The assets were taken in order

Page 33225

 1     to prevent their offensive which had its engagement and firing over a

 2     broad area.

 3        Q.   Well, General --

 4        A.   Not only along those two key axes.

 5        Q.   All right.  If you feel those are points you'd like to make as

 6     Dr. Karadzic's Defence witness, I would invite you to make them in your

 7     redirect examination and just answer my questions.

 8             The removal and use of these four weapons was in complete

 9     violation of the agreement for the total exclusion zone, wasn't it?

10        A.   First of all, I really don't know which four weapons you're

11     talking about.  Did I see a document?  I would really like to see the

12     document from where you assert that you got the information that the

13     corps took four weapons.  Then I can explain it perhaps.

14        Q.   I can show you a document if there's a need, but let me try --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Ms. Edgerton.  The violation of the

16     agreement for the total exclusion zone itself is not a war crime, is it?

17             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please proceed.

19             MS. EDGERTON:

20        Q.   I could -- I'll show you a document, General.  It's D987, and

21     it's a transcript of an intercepted conversation between Dr. Karadzic and

22     General Milovanovic on the 25th of May, 1995, and the two men are

23     discussing the situation in the theatre and Dr. Karadzic's contacts with

24     Mr. Akashi, and Dr. Karadzic says Akashi's been after me all day and

25     relays to General Milovanovic some aspects of their conversation.  He

Page 33226

 1     said, and it's about two-thirds of the way down the page in English, that

 2     he only wanted the four weapons back.  He's not asking for a meeting or

 3     anything, only that the four weapons be returned, and Dr. Karadzic says,

 4     "Actually, I don't know where those four weapons are."  And Dr. Karadzic

 5     then says -- with Milosevic, and Dr. Karadzic then says, "Right, give

 6     them back something that's old and so."

 7             So now just for information, having seen that weapon -- that

 8     document, the removal -- I'll ask the question again.  The removal and

 9     use of heavy weapons by your forces in May 1995 was in complete violation

10     of the total exclusion zone agreement, wasn't it?

11        A.   Yes.  Yes.  It's four weapons that we're talking about in this

12     case if these are the ones that I know of.  I'm speaking about what I

13     know about.  These were four tanks, four tanks, T-55s.  So those four

14     tanks, regardless of old inoperative things were circulating, a person

15     could not react any other way.  You couldn't take a tank if it was not

16     working.  It is activated of its own operation, steam.  And so with the

17     intention of preventing a breakthrough, that was why we did it.  However,

18     the intervention was of -- of such intensity that we had to take them

19     back.

20        Q.   So as I understand your answer, you agreed that the removal and

21     use of heavy weapons by your forces in May 1995 violated the total

22     exclusion zone agreement; correct?

23        A.   How could I agree in any other way other than the way it was set

24     down by those who drafted the agreement?  So if I did take something,

25     then I violated something.

Page 33227

 1        Q.   And similarly, the use of modified air-bombs which were far and

 2     away in excess of 12.7 millimetres in Sarajevo in 1995 were violations of

 3     the total exclusion zone agreement; correct?

 4        A.   Well, your attempt to bring everything into the context of a

 5     different situation that does not deal with the events in Sarajevo, the

 6     combat and the events and thereby an assertion is made that just remains

 7     in the realm of a plain assertion.  That is not the way to get to data

 8     about what was happening in that area and which measures had to be taken

 9     in order for the units and the territory to be saved.  I hope that there

10     was an attempt throughout the course of my testimony to get such data, to

11     get this picture of the fact that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps cannot

12     allow itself any kind of defeat which would be the result of having one's

13     hands tied.  So we did stick to what certain people in certain situations

14     took as their position.  However, in no situation, there wasn't even an

15     attempt as such to stop the other side from using its own assets,

16     artillery --

17        Q.   Well, General --

18        A.   -- when --

19        Q.   General, since you don't seem inclined to answer my question at

20     all, I'll move on to the final area, and it's about humanitarian aid.  In

21     your testimony in chief, you talked about humanitarian aid with

22     Dr. Karadzic, and you said at T 32893, that in respect of humanitarian

23     aid, you said -- you confirmed that the flow and the activities were not

24     disturbed by the command of the corps and were not obstructed in any way

25     whatsoever, and you took similar positions at transcript page 32984 and

Page 33228

 1     transcript page 329 -- pardon me, 32899.  General, in fact, your

 2     assertion is untrue, isn't it, because in March 1995, due -- or in

 3     retaliation for the sniping of two girls in Serbian Grbavica, your forces

 4     closed all the blue routes around Sarajevo; correct?

 5        A.   I can't recall that, but I do not exclude the possibility that

 6     that action took place, but this does not mean that this was an action

 7     that I decided upon of my own free will or that I took a stand on it.

 8             I'm not trying to hide behind anybody.  I think that this was

 9     ordered to do so.  If such an order came from a certain level, I was in

10     no position to say that I was able not to heed such an order.

11        Q.   All right.  And on 26 May 1995, which is the same day that the

12     air-bombs incident -- one of the air-bomb incidents we've been talking

13     about in your testimony happened, the one on Safeta Hadzica Street, and

14     on 26 May, 1995, on that same day you blocked land access to Sarajevo

15     even further by mining the Sierra 1 and Sierra 4 check-points; correct?

16        A.   I don't know anything about that.  I didn't do it.  I do not know

17     anything about the laying of mines.  I exclude the possibility that this

18     was a result of my decision or anything that I did that would have such

19     an outcome, no.

20        Q.   On that same day, you also ordered the weapons collection points

21     be surrounded and taken over, and you ordered UN peacekeepers in the city

22     to be detained; correct?

23        A.   Yes.  Those forces were captured, that's correct.

24        Q.   And you ordered that the peacekeepers detained not be given

25     access to food and water, didn't you?

Page 33229

 1        A.   That I most certainly did not do.  I would have to see whether it

 2     is stated so, but this was not a result of any of my decisions.

 3        Q.   Sir, let's have a look at 65 ter number 24513, which is an order

 4     you gave dated 26 May 1995.  And it reads in view of the current

 5     developments in the zone of the corps, referring to the NATO air-strikes,

 6     I issue the following:

 7             "Immediately establish a full blockade of UN forces at

 8     check-points and on all roads in the entire zone the corps.  Do not take

 9     into" -- if we could scroll the page up, please.  "Do not take into

10     account any UN requests regarding the supplies of food, water,"

11     et cetera, and you tell all corps units to strictly follow the order and

12     there will be no personal initiative or wilful behaviour.

13             Actually, that's -- that -- now seeing that, it contradicts your

14     denial that you certainly did not do so, but you've said in the next

15     sentence of that answer following your denial that you would have to see

16     where it is stated so.

17             So now having seen where it's stated, are you prepared to agree

18     that this is the case, General, that you forbid your units to give the

19     UNPROFOR detainees access to food and water?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Where -- shall we ask the general to clarify the

21     meaning of the third order?  I'm not sure if it is necessarily related to

22     the detainees.

23             Could you kindly read out the third order, Mr. Milosevic.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Third paragraph:

25             "Do not pay heed to UN requests in connection with supplies of

Page 33230

 1     food, water, and similar."

 2             This pertains to their supplies.  Let me add this.  I'm very

 3     satisfied that I requested this document.  I could have waived that

 4     thinking that Madam Edgerton got that assertion right.  Her assertion was

 5     that somebody, in this case me, prohibited those people given -- being

 6     given food and water, those who were capture.  But this does not relate

 7     to that action where -- to -- it is not connected to the area where they

 8     were detained.  This pertains to their wider needs in terms of supplies

 9     that UNPROFOR would carry out through their supply routes.

10             There are different types of convoys.  There are humanitarian

11     convoys, there are UNPROFOR supply convoys for their own purposes and

12     needs.  They could be taken as combat purposes, although they never

13     conceded being in a combat operation.  There are other types of supplies,

14     presumably commercial supplies, but in this particular case this is what

15     it pertains to.  This was not a prohibition, because it would smack of

16     inhumane actions.  I mean, preventing captured and detained people from

17     being given food and water.

18             MS. EDGERTON:

19        Q.   It's, according to what you've said, prohibition, or it's -- it's

20     another effective blockade of essential supplies for the United Nations,

21     food and water.

22        A.   I don't know how you want it to be understood.  Here there is a

23     direction to the effect that those convoys effectuating regular supplies

24     should be treated in the same way as humanitarian convoys.  They are

25     under the control and they are controlled in terms of what is being

Page 33231

 1     transported, what is being supplied.  This phrase, "do not pay heed to

 2     requests" does not mean any prohibition.

 3        Q.   It means to ignore them, doesn't it?

 4        A.   Could you please repeat that?  Which means what?

 5        Q.   To ignore them.  To ignore the requests.

 6        A.   No.  No.  First of all, it could mean that control should be

 7     stepped up, only that.  In my desire not to play with words or to abuse

 8     such play on words.  This wording does not have to be clear neither to

 9     you nor to me.  I can interpret it in this way:  I didn't want anything

10     else to be done except for to exert greater control on the movement of

11     such convoys.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Could this be a Prosecution exhibit please Your

13     Honours.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6097, Your Honours.

17             MS. EDGERTON:

18        Q.   And, General, still on the subject --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please receive an answer

20     on who signed this so that we don't have to be retrieved at a later

21     point.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you're asking me, if the Chamber

23     allows me to say, I can see here that the signature is that of -- I'm

24     almost certain of Cedo Sladoje.  This is not my signature.  That I'm sure

25     of.  I really cannot recognise.  I can't recall the signatures of my men.

Page 33232

 1     I think it's Cedo Sladoje, but I'm not sure either about that.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:

 3        Q.   So still on the subject of humanitarian aid it's also correct,

 4     isn't it, General, that throughout June and July 1995 humanitarian aid

 5     convoys over Mount Igman were repeatedly attacked by forces under your

 6     control, and you attacked them with tank fire, machine-guns, cannons,

 7     mortars, and light field artillery?

 8        A.   If you could clarify which convoys you mean and what convoys

 9     there were, because convoys were not supposed to go over Mount Igman,

10     particularly not those carrying humanitarian aid.  So I cannot really say

11     anything about that.

12        Q.   Well, General, in fact they had to use Igman road because that

13     was the only way for the UN to bring aid to Sarajevo.  They used it

14     because road access to the city had been closed by your forces.  Isn't

15     that correct?

16        A.   It isn't that my forces closed those.  I do agree with you.  You

17     are right in saying that there were some movements and they were detected

18     and this was regulated that they should take the Igman mountain road.

19     That's correct.

20        Q.   And they took it because they didn't have to ask your forces.

21     Isn't that the case?

22        A.   Yes, yes.

23        Q.   And you asked to find out about which convoys.  I'll show you a

24     couple of documents in that regard, and I think they're all in English,

25     so I'll read you the relevant passages.  The first one is P896.  It's a

Page 33233

 1     Sector Sarajevo weekly sitrep, dated 2 July 1995.  And if you go over to

 2     page 3, paragraph 4.  Oh, I didn't realise it was in -- available in

 3     Srpski as well.  And unfortunately I'm not able to quickly identify,

 4     because I didn't realise it had been translated, what the relevant pages

 5     might be.  I'll just read you the part that I want to direct you to.

 6             At page 3, the fourth full paragraph down, this document reports

 7     on how UNPROFOR was targeted by Serb gunners, particularly on Igman.  It

 8     says:

 9             "The most serious attacks occurred on Igman road.  There were

10     over 30 separate attacks on UNPROFOR and UNHCR vehicles using the road

11     during the week.  International vehicles were hit on five separate

12     occasions.  Most of the attacks were made with 30-millimetre cannons,

13     12.7-millimetre machine-guns, heavy calibre cannons, and mortars."

14             So that's one example of which convoys were attacked.

15             If we could go to another document, P822, and it's another

16     Sector Sarajevo sitrep dated 8 July 1995.  And if you go over to page 3

17     at the top of the page, that document says:

18             "As before, Serb gunners are targeting UN convoys using the Igman

19     road.  Every night convoys using the road are attacked with machine-guns,

20     cannons, mortars, and light field artillery."

21             So, General, these documents are just examples that directly

22     contradict your assertion that the corps command didn't disturb the flow

23     of humanitarian aid into the city in any way, aren't they?

24        A.   I presume that it's clear to you that I cannot follow you with

25     respect to what you're saying to such an extent that I would be able to

Page 33234

 1     answer.  I have grasped pretty much the situation.  I don't want to be

 2     the one who is procrastinating or stealing time or throwing a spanner in

 3     your procedure.

 4             In terms of that person who stated this, did not give us all the

 5     circumstances surrounding those events.  What were the circumstances of

 6     the situation on the ground which resulted in our reactions?

 7        Q.   General --

 8        A.   If you allow me.  First you enumerated those assets used.  I

 9     wanted to hear about those machine-guns, which machine-guns you had in

10     mind.  I'm not sure whether such assets could be used at such distances.

11             Let's walk through these things one by one, because I cannot deal

12     with something which is not clear to me.

13        Q.   Well, General, how about this:  Are you denying that your forces

14     shot at humanitarian aid convoys that had to travel over Igman in June

15     and July 1995?

16        A.   SRK forces opened fire only if that column of this or that kind

17     of transport in connection with the UN or in connection with humanitarian

18     aid, if there were other vehicles, meaning Muslim forces vehicles, be it

19     transport vehicles or other combat assets, APCs or pieces of weaponry

20     being transported being included in such columns.

21             The situation was not such where it is excluded that somebody may

22     be under protection and we are expected to observe such protection,

23     although it is to our detriment by observing it.

24        Q.   So the answer that you gave to Dr. Karadzic in your testimony in

25     chief that said the flow and the activities of humanitarian aid into the

Page 33235

 1     city were not disturbed by the command of the corps and not obstructed in

 2     any way is actually completely incorrect, isn't it?

 3        A.   Humanitarian aid is not aid which arrives and that we could grasp

 4     the situation within one or two days.  The situation had to be reviewed

 5     throughout a longer period, and if we can say that over a long period of

 6     time there were no obstructions, the flow was normal, then, you know, I

 7     think you've lost sight of such circumstances.  You can do that but I

 8     cannot.

 9             At the relevant time and the date we are discussing coincides

10     with a fierce, devilish attack against the SRK forces.  Nobody wanted to

11     take into account that fact or to take the large picture and then draw

12     conclusions.

13        Q.   General, did that entitle your forces to shoot at humanitarian

14     aid convoys?  Yes or no?

15        A.   No.  No, it did not give us the right.  And this was not shooting

16     at humanitarian aid convoys.  It was shooting at those who infiltrated

17     themselves into those columns, into those convoys.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Nothing further, Your Honours.  Thank you.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

20             Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course, your Excellencies.  What

22     I'm worried about is the condition of General Milosevic, whether he's

23     tired or not.  I'm trying to proceed at a slow pace, but it could be

24     possible that I will have to continue tomorrow because I can see some

25     signs of fatigue, and he is a bit older than I am after all.

Page 33236

 1             May I proceed?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] General, sir, taking into account both your and

 5     my age, I will try to proceed slowly to illuminate certain things.  Let's

 6     start with the latest examination.  Did we ever issue our consent for the

 7     use of the Igman road for either humanitarian aid or any other type of

 8     transport ever?

 9        A.   I completely understand what you asked me.  At this point in time

10     I do not know whether you issued such a concept or not, because in my

11     position, even if I knew back then whether that had been issued or not,

12     here from this chair I cannot tell you one way or another because I can't

13     recall.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Otherwise, was consent given for humanitarian aid on

15     different routes in terms of essential supplies, food, et cetera?

16        A.   I know of certain routes -- well, when it comes to other roads or

17     routes, the one that I know best was the one coming from the direction of

18     Kiseljak, and I think that this was the route that was agreed upon, that

19     consent was given for.  Try to understand me:  Throughout my activities

20     there, I was not concerned with such matters to any particular degree.

21     I'm not trying to extricate it from the field of our responsibilities,

22     but combat activities and everything which happened had to be the focus

23     of my attention so that I was not familiar with those details, those

24     matters concerning the movement of such convoys.  But I reiterate that

25     agreement was about a route -- there was agreement about the route coming

Page 33237

 1     from Kiseljak.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did convoys pass through Lukavica, through Pale, into

 3     the city?

 4        A.   Kasindol?  Yes, there were convoys coming through Pale.  You mean

 5     Kasindolska Street?

 6        Q.   Sierra 4.

 7        A.   Well, yes.  Wait a minute.  Now I know what you mean.  The

 8     Kasindolska Street is not a street which you reach if you go through

 9     Pale, no.  It is used if you enter the city from the direction of Ilidza

10     or when you pass by the airport.

11        Q.   Which route did convoys coming from Belgrade through Zvornik take

12     to come into Sarajevo?

13        A.   Of course over Trebevic mountain and then through Lukavica and

14     then they would reach the airport.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Although you dealt with all sorts of affairs in the

16     corps but with combat the most, can you tell me what was the arranged and

17     prescribed procedure if a convoy appeared at our combat lines, if they

18     had to go through our defence lines?

19        A.   There's nothing in that type of regulation that was unclear.  It

20     was well regulated, and there were prescribed procedures to be followed

21     at certain check-points.  Once a convoys is at a check-point -- actually,

22     prior to its arrival at a check-point, there were no procedures to be

23     applied or to stop the convoy at any part of its route.  We could inspect

24     such convoys in keeping with the arrangements.  We could check the cargo

25     and what was on that convoy.

Page 33238

 1        Q.   Did they have to be announced, and did someone need to approve

 2     such convoys?  Did convoys have to have a list of goods and people that

 3     are being transported?

 4        A.   Yes.  You could have asked that straight away.  I forgot.  Of

 5     course there could be no convoy movement unless there had been a request

 6     and approval.  A list, a bill of lading should have been provided per

 7     convoy.  It's a good question.  I'm aware of the general situation,

 8     although I needn't have been aware of the details.  I can speak to what I

 9     know.  Everything had to be announced and approved to let pass through,

10     and then there were also checks at the respective check-points that would

11     be compared to the list of goods.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I see Ms. Edgerton on her feet.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Dr. Karadzic.  I wonder if Dr. Karadzic

14     could be reminded to take care with his leading questions, and it's quite

15     obvious here that the leading nature helped the general remember the

16     situation that they were discussing.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Absolutely.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is why I mentioned to the

19     fatigue working very much against me at this moment.  But this is so well

20     known to everyone here that there was a procedure.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, sir --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Also bear in mind leading questions reduce the

24     weight or probative value of the witness's evidence.  Please continue.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 33239

 1        Q.   General, sir, such convoys which used the Igman route, were they

 2     requested, approved, and checked?

 3        A.   No.  We could not inspect such convoys moving along the Igman

 4     route.  Any control, any inspection of the goods being transported could

 5     not be effected on Mount Igman, and it was not effected.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Territorially speaking, where is the Igman road in

 7     relation to the front lines, the theatre of war?

 8        A.   The entire area was controlled by the forces of the BH Army.  If

 9     we were to look at some other indicators such as Mount Igman as such,

10     that area was part of the demilitarised zone.  No forces of the BH Army

11     should have been there save for the 13 key points in the area of Igman,

12     Bjelasnica, and Treskavica where UNPROFOR forces could have been placed.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at in e-court -- no, no.  Let's recall

14     P822.

15             In this document why is it stressed that night-time convoys were

16     targeted?  Is there anything you can say regarding that?

17        A.   Yes.  If there was a night-time movement of vehicles, one cannot

18     see whose vehicles those are.  If nothing had been announced and approved

19     for UNPROFOR convoys to pass through, then they could find themselves in

20     the situation where they are being fired at, because it may have been

21     assessed that fire was being opened on the forces of the BH Army.

22        Q.   Thank you.  In order to target someone intentionally, what do you

23     need?

24        A.   This kind of assertion, this kind of indication that would

25     confirm who is being targeted, well, one fires when the entire situation

Page 33240

 1     is clear and known.  If it is not, then we can take it that during the

 2     night the enemy was moving its forces about.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Can we briefly see P896.  General, sir, you mentioned

 4     that the time you discussed was hell-like.  Why did you describe it as

 5     such and in what way was it like hell?  What was the context?  What was

 6     taking place?

 7        A.   It's clear to me what you're asking.  In my testimony so far, I

 8     have tried to describe the situation of the SRK between the 15th of June

 9     and in July and part of August.

10        Q.   Can you read out the first sentence under "Highlights," the first

11     and the second.

12        A.   Sorry.  I haven't concluded my previous answer, but I will read

13     this out eventually.  I wanted to say the following:  It couldn't be

14     fully described, the situation that the forces of the SRK were in and the

15     area it defended.  It is very difficult to paint the full picture no

16     matter how hard one tried to describe it, the impression of hell as I

17     referred to it could not be perceived.  We were under some intense

18     attacks of the BH Army, and I tried to tell Ms. Edgerton this.  When the

19     12th Division was firing up to 2.000 shells on us, then one don't measure

20     how and whether they are doing it under the control of UNPROFOR or from

21     something they seized.  In such circumstances, indicators are lost.

22             Now, to go back to your other question.  What did you ask of me

23     to read?

24        Q.   The first two sentences.

25        A.   "The Bosnian offensive around Sarajevo sputters on, though

Page 33241

 1     without any conspicuous success.  Ground taken by the Bosnians seems to

 2     have been retaken by the Serbs."

 3        Q.   What about the last one?  "For the first time..."

 4        A.   Yes.  "For the first time the UNHCR has brought a convoy of

 5     humanitarian aid into the city over Mount Igman.  The Serbs were not

 6     consulted, and the convoy moved under cover of darkness."

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you, General.  Can we next have D2621.  Sorry.

 8     While we're still on this document, what about the penultimate part, the

 9     relationship between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian government is deteriorating

10     and the freedom of movement is restricted.  Can you see it?

11        A.   Yes.  The relationship between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian

12     government are worsening.  The freedom of movement is restricted.  Is

13     this an UNPROFOR document.

14        Q.   Yes, it is.  Can we now go to D2621.  Can you tell us, General,

15     what sort of position did UNPROFOR find itself between the two sides

16     given the offensive?

17        A.   It isn't simple to describe and perhaps the people I wanted to

18     discuss wouldn't accept it, but I believe that at least partially they

19     even serviced those forces, enabling them to carry out their offensive

20     and their activity even more powerfully.

21        Q.   Thank you.  The last two lines in this letter of General Mladic

22     to UNPROFOR command, to General Smith starting with "As of the 30th of

23     July, 1995."  Perhaps we can see page 1 first and then the next.

24        A.   "This testifies to," is this what you're referring to?

25        Q.   Yes.

Page 33242

 1        A.   "This testifies to the Muslim side preventing the movement of

 2     convoys along the route they have been using for the last three years.

 3     They want to create" -- I don't know what this is.

 4        Q.   Can we zoom in?  We are interested in the last two lines.

 5        A.   It's not about the size.  It's illegible.  It is being done

 6     through obstruction and mistaken identification of who was to blame in

 7     providing humanitarian aid to Sarajevo as well as the reason or reasoning

 8     behind your unfounded questions.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is already page 2.  Can we go

10     back to page 1 and zoom in on the last two lines for the general to see.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Just before the general answers could Dr. Karadzic

12     slow down a little bit for the interpretation.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The last sentence:

14             "This testifies to the fact that the Muslim side is preventing

15     the movement of convoys along the route they have been using for the past

16     three years, thus wishing to create the impression with," and that's

17     where the page ends.

18        Q.   Page 2 next, please.  And zoom in.

19        A.   "Trying to create the impression on your part that that route is

20     impossible to follow.  At the same time" --

21        Q.   Perhaps I should read it out.

22             "At the same time, trying to make official the usage of an

23     alternative route over Igman which was not permitted and does not exist.

24     That is something we will never agree to."

25             Was it all right to control the routes and that we never agreed

Page 33243

 1     with the Igman route to be used?

 2        A.   In that regard there was an agreement and your consent was not

 3     provided that they move over Igman.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Can we next have D2619.  General, you were told or it

 5     was suggested to you that we prevented the movement of humanitarian

 6     convoys, preventing UNPROFOR movement.  Is it the same as preventing the

 7     moving of humanitarian convoys?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  No.  That's absolutely not allowed.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if the questions were more

10     precise and if I could intervene during cross-examination, things would

11     perhaps be clearer.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Did I prevent the passage of humanitarian convoys, General?

14        A.   I am unaware of any such decisions of yours to prevent the

15     movement of humanitarian convoys.  Of course there's a difference between

16     humanitarian convoys and other convoys.

17        Q.   Thank you, General.  Are you familiar with this order of mine of

18     the 30th of July, the same day when Mladic forbade or actually

19     communicated that he wouldn't allow any convoys across Igman?

20        A.   Yes.  I am familiar with it the way it is written.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Can we next have 3864.  You mentioned a moment ago

22     that some UN forces, i.e., UNPROFOR, supported or assisted the other side

23     in their combat activities.  To that end, please look at the following

24     document.  This comes from a meeting which you attended too.  3864.

25     That's not it.  65 ter 3864.  It was on the screen a moment ago.

Page 33244

 1             Yes.  They are sending information, a copy of the fax regarding

 2     the respect of the agreement by the Bosnian Serb side.  Can we look at

 3     page 2, please.

 4             The date, we saw that in the front, is September 1995.  Can you

 5     please look at the first paragraph.  Do you recall that meeting attended

 6     by you and General Miletic?

 7        A.   Yes.  Yes, I know of this meeting generally, not because of the

 8     document, but I know of the meeting in practice.  It's all right.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at paragraph 4?  Can we show it to the

10     general, please.  And in the Serbian it's a mistake "artillery howitzer"

11     and it should be "artillery mortar."  I'm going to read it in English so

12     that it can be completely translated.

13             [In English] "Rapid Reaction Forces, General Smith explained yet

14     again that Rapid Reaction Forces is an integral part of UNPROFOR and that

15     they are to be afforded exactly the same -- the same freedom as the rest

16     of UNPROFOR.  General Smith confirmed to the evident surprise of the BSA

17     that he has operational command of the Rapid Reaction Forces and had

18     ordered the artillery and mortar -- mortar attacks.

19             [Interpretation] The fast reaction forces, did they fire in your

20     area of responsibility?

21        A.   Yes, they did on several locations, and I already said that the

22     corps command and the area where it was deployed was forced to move.  And

23     when we're talking about the corps command -- but that was not the only

24     problem.  The problem was that there was also fire at the Zica hospital

25     where some persons who had come to visit their wounded or injured were

Page 33245

 1     actually killed at the reception by that fire.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And must we understand then that the Rapid Reaction

 3     Force -- actually, what was the status or the relationship of the Rapid

 4     Reaction Forces to us?

 5        A.   Well, these were forces that were opening fire at us.  These were

 6     opposing forces.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm sorry, Your Honours, but I'm actually

 9     wondering, and I would appreciate some guidance, on whether indeed this

10     is a proper redirect given the area we're going into.  The question of

11     convoys was raised specifically as a matter of credibility in light of

12     General Milosevic's statement that his corps didn't interfere, and this

13     doesn't appear to have -- this redirect doesn't appear to be related to

14     credibility in any regard or an attempt to bolster it and is going --

15     resembles more to my mind an examination-in-chief on matters that were

16     unrelated to the cross-examination.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, may I respond?  First

18     of all, it was not just a question of the convoys.  It was a question of

19     the prisoners of wars relationship with UNPROFOR, the question of fire in

20     relation to UNPROFOR.  A whole range of allegations that I need to

21     clarify with the general.

22             JUDGE KWON:  How does it arise from the cross-examination?

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, Mr. President, from my point of view the

24     cross-examination dealt with attacks on convoys and this is dealing with

25     that same topic.  Now, whether Ms. Edgerton intended that to go to the

Page 33246

 1     credibility or not is not the determinative of whether something exceeds

 2     or is within the redirect.  So the topic was opened.  He denied they were

 3     attacking convoys, and now the subject is being explored further.  I

 4     don't think there's anything wrong with that.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, the Chamber agrees with Mr. Robinson.

 7             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   General, if the rapid reaction forces were a hostile side and if

11     they're an integral part of UNPROFOR as General Smith claimed, then what

12     would be the relationship of UNPROFOR towards us?

13        A.   It would be the same relationship.  It would be an opposing side.

14        Q.   Thank you.  In your answer to Madam Edgerton's question whether

15     you imprisoned UNPROFOR soldiers, you said yes, we captured them.  Is

16     there a difference as far as you're concerned there?

17        A.   Yes, in terms of terms a person can be captured who is an

18     opponent in a given situation.  They cannot have the status of some other

19     factor or state other than any other opponent when conditions occur that

20     they are captured in battle, in fighting.

21        Q.   Thank you.  So how do you understand the term "hostages" then

22     when we're talking about these relationships with UNPROFOR in 1994 and

23     1995?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I think one goes beyond the scope of

25     the cross-examination.  This issue was not dealt with.  Please move on.

Page 33247

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I think that it's not

 2     beyond the scope.  I think the OTP did mention the capture of hostages,

 3     taking of hostages, but I will drop that subject.  But I would like to

 4     tender the document.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2899, Your Honours.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  We'll check, but I think this is already in

 8     evidence.  We'll -- I'll let my colleague know.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I would appreciate it.

10             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at P2137 now,

12     please.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   You were asked about the assertion that you denied food and water

15     to prisoners, to the imprisoned members of UNPROFOR.  What I would like

16     to ask you now is to look at what the order was by the Main Staff of the

17     27th of May, what the order was and what it states here.  Could you read

18     the first two sentences, please?

19        A.   At the meeting held in Naples on 27th of May, 1995, between the

20     highest NATO military officials led by the US defence minister

21     William Perry, it has been decided that NATO shall continue bombing the

22     warehouses, important command posts, firing positions of the support

23     assets, and other important infrastructure installations in the territory

24     of Republika Srpska.

25        Q.   Thank you.  And what about this order, the first two lines?

Page 33248

 1        A.   Under 1:

 2             "I order corps commands and V i PVO --" ah, all right, "The air

 3     and anti-aircraft defence shall in agreement with the commanders of the

 4     logistics bases place the captured UNPROFOR staff as well as the

 5     representatives of other international humanitarian organisations in

 6     their areas of responsibility and sent from the SRK area of

 7     responsibility at warehouses in the command post sectors," and so on.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  We don't need any more but what it says

 9     here is "captured"?

10        A.   Yes.  Yes.

11        Q.   All right.  Can we look at the next page, please.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  I wonder, Your Honours, if we can have a question

13     instead of having General Milosevic led through the document.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Well, the question would be this:  General, sir, today you denied

16     the assertion by the Prosecutor that you denied water and food to

17     captured UNPROFOR staff.  I would like you to now read the second

18     paragraph in the section of text marked 4.

19        A.   "During the transportation and reception of the UNPROFOR staff,

20     make sure that they are treated properly with military respect, treat

21     them as prisoners of war and provide them with food and water just like

22     the -- just the same as for members of VRS troops."

23        Q.   Thank you.  And did you act differently than it is said in this

24     order?

25        A.   No, no.  Of course the order was respected.  It would even be

Page 33249

 1     superfluous to think of denying food and water to anyone.  That is

 2     something that would be out of the question in any circumstances

 3     whatsoever.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  General, sir, you're asked here about weapons.

 5     According to your understanding, did we have the right to take weapons in

 6     the event of an attack?  Was this regulated?

 7        A.   As far as I know, we had that right, and I cannot quote the

 8     agreement where that is stated, which paragraph, but I do know that

 9     something to that effect was agreed upon.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at D717.  The sides can -- the parties

11     can see it.  I'm going to read it in English in order for you to have a

12     better translation than the one I could provide.  Can we have page 2,

13     please.  This is a document sent by his Excellency Akashi to the

14     United Nations to Stoltenberg, to Geneva, and so on and so forth.  He's

15     sending information about the protocol that we developed, the agreement

16     on the 14th and the protocol on the 19th of February.  I'm going to read

17     it.

18             [In English] "The protocol to the Sarajevo" --

19             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question without having to read out the

20     text of a certain document?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked the general whether we had

22     the right to take weapons back in the event of an attack.  He said that

23     he knew that we had that right but he did not know which agreement

24     regulated this issue.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Ms. Edgerton, do you have still any

Page 33250

 1     observation to make.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, it's -- it's about the practice in

 3     redirect of reading a document to the witness and then putting a question

 4     to the witness based on the length of the document that's just been read

 5     and in my view that's leading with the document at a phase of the

 6     examination where Dr. Karadzic should be trying to avoid that.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies and

 8     Madam Edgerton, before I showed the document I put the question whether

 9     there was regulated, a right to take weapons back in the event of an

10     attack, and the general said that he was aware of that, that he knew that

11     we did have the right to do that, but he did not know where this was

12     stated, in which document, and now I wanted to show him the document.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, I'm going to read what I need to read and then in your

16     answer you can add whatever you would like.

17        A.   Well, if possible, there's no need to read this to me.  I wasn't

18     precise.  I didn't know exactly the content, the text itself, but I knew

19     that this was agreed on in the agreement that we are talking about now,

20     and I think that there is no dilemma because the detail that I was not

21     familiar with did not mean that I did not know the situation as a whole,

22     just that I did not know exactly which section of the document that was.

23        Q.   Still I would like to read it, General, because there is a

24     section that I feel is particularly important and that is why I would

25     like to read it.

Page 33251

 1             [In English] "The protocol to the Sarajevo Weapon Collection

 2     Points Agreement on 14th of February, 1994, attached, recognises the

 3     BSA's legitimate right of self-defence.  If the BSA comes under more

 4     pressure from the BH, their demand to have access to their weapons could

 5     become a more pressing reality under the protocol reference to above."

 6             [Interpretation] Before the question -- well, first of all, tell

 7     me this, General.  Did you come at that time under any pressure from the

 8     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 9        A.   Of course that we were put in a difficult situation which I have

10     repeated several times and have been trying to confirm a number of times,

11     because it seems to me that in the earlier period no attention was paid

12     to this.  So it was not -- there was no attention paid to the indicator

13     which would show that the situation to us was critical.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat his question.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   The provision of this agreement and this right, was that

17     something that was known to the corps command, not just to you, but to

18     the forces?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   65 ter 22936.  I'm going to read the last bit so this can go

21     faster.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please zoom in on the last

23     paragraph.  Let's see.

24             "On the 1st of March, 1994," that's the date, "violation of the

25     cease-fire agreement..."

Page 33252

 1             But the last sentence states:

 2             "In addition we are informing you that you are obliged as to the

 3     international regulation and that in order perform defence activities to

 4     enable us use the means which are at present under UNPROFOR control."

 5        A.   Yes.  This is a request by General Galic.

 6        Q.   How frequent were the violations of the cease-fire agreement?

 7        A.   I hope that this was something that was quite clearly indicated

 8     over the past few days and that Their Honours were able to see that this

 9     was something whereby their firing would fit into the scheme of things.

10     Quite the contrary.  Through their regular engagements, they ignored the

11     agreement and they fired at our targets.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And how frequently did you seek, General, sir, the

13     return of your weapons?

14        A.   Of course we requested them to be returned.  I don't know the

15     number of times we made the request.  In this case I can see that this is

16     a request by General Galic.  I don't know really exactly how many times

17     these requests were made in other circumstances.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

19     document, please.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.  I was told that this is already in

21     evidence.  What's the number?

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2711, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Did you find the exhibit number for D2899?

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Some other parts of that document have been

25     tendered but not the whole document so to speak.

Page 33253

 1             JUDGE KWON:  So we leave it as it is.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, please.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.  We have about three

 4     minutes.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   You were shown the document about our weapons in the exclusion

 7     zone in May 1995.  The 1st Corps of the BiH Army, how did it and did it

 8     respect the decision on the removal of heavy weapons from the city of

 9     Sarajevo?

10        A.   Well, it's quite known that the weaponry was treated differently

11     and that there was quite a different attitude, and it was a question of

12     their success to be able to use those weapons in the way that suited

13     them.  I know some other things.  I cannot talk about them now, but I do

14     know that General Smith, in a different situation, at a different point

15     in time he found those weapons, but he did not reveal that, which somehow

16     indicates something about the protection the Muslim side enjoyed and the

17     fact that they had a privileged position.

18        Q.   Just one more document.  One more document before we finish.  Can

19     we look at 1D03403.  Please zoom in.  There should be a translation.

20     Yes.  The date is the 20th of May, 1995.  At the same time as the other

21     document that was shown to you.  What is the commander of the

22     12th Division, Fikret Prevljak, ordering in items 1 and 2?

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the English

24     translation be brought back on the screen.  Thank you.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Prepare a firing position for a

Page 33254

 1     105-millimetre howitzer.  Can we zoom in, please.  That's good.  So it

 2     reads:

 3             "I hereby order:  Set up firing positions for 105-millimetre

 4     howitzers according to the last order.  Do it immediately and camouflage

 5     the weapons in the area firing positions as well as to protect from being

 6     observed by UN forces."

 7             So he is tasking his special forces to do this and provides them

 8     with weapons.  So it was not the regular soldiers that received it.

 9             Item 2:

10             "Prepare a position in the immediate vicinity of the current

11     position with additional primary axes, the axes being direction of

12     Krivoglavci, Blagovac, Mirkovic, Trebevic, and Lukavica."

13        Q.   Thank you.  General, could you feel this 105-millimetre howitzer?

14     Did you come under fire from that weapon?

15        A.   Yes.  Even more than that.  Even that one howitzer was in the

16     hands of people who hardly -- could hardly wait to have a stronger weapon

17     in their hands.  There were other means that the army of BH had too.

18        Q.   Look at item 4.  Who was responsible for the implementation of

19     this order and where was this brigade deployed?

20        A.   The commander of 102nd Mountain Brigade is responsible for the

21     implementation of this order and a report should be submitted on the

22     implementation of this order at the latest within -- what does it say?

23        Q.   48 hours.

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Where was the 102nd deployed?

Page 33255

 1        A.   The 102nd Brigade covered the largest location which was in the

 2     area of Stup and Stupsko Brdo, which is in immediate contact with the

 3     Ilidza Brigade.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I will not even bother

 5     to ask if they were bombed for having done this.  Can this be admitted?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  It seems to me that Dr. Karadzic didn't put a

 8     single predicate question along the lines indicated for -- by Your

 9     Honours with respect to how to use documents, and in fact the only thing

10     I can see that he told General Milosevic was that, "This document was the

11     same date as another document which was shown to you, 20 May 1995," and I

12     never showed him anything dated 20 May 1995, and once again

13     General Milosevic was led completely through the document before being

14     asked a question.

15             JUDGE KWON:  So you are objecting to the admission of this

16     document.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Did he not confirm about the 105-millimetre

19     mortar -- howitzer?

20             MS. EDGERTON:  He was read a passage -- two passages from the

21     document and then asked if he could feel the 105-million howitzer

22     referred to in the document and whether he came under fire from that

23     weapon.  I take it referring to that specific weapon in an unknown firing

24     position.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we go just a few lines back, you

Page 33256

 1     will see that I asked whether the other side withdrew its heavy weapons

 2     from the exclusion zone.  That was the basis for this document.  If they

 3     didn't withdraw them, we had the right to take our weapons, because it

 4     was a bilateral agreement.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive the document.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2900, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We have to --

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 84, lines 25 and 26.  That's

10     where I laid the foundation.

11             JUDGE KWON:  While Chamber agrees that you made a point, but you

12     didn't indeed ask a question about when -- when you showed the document

13     to the witness.

14             We will continue tomorrow.  How much longer would you need to

15     conclude your re-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid at least another

17     session.  And perhaps once the general has rested, we may even conclude

18     within that one session and we will not ask for more.  And if he is super

19     rested, then less than one session.

20             JUDGE KWON:  And I take it that we'll not hear evidence of

21     Mr. Krstic tomorrow.  I think it's evident.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Are we'll continue tomorrow morning at

24     9.00, Mr. Milosevic.

25             The hearing is adjourned.

Page 33257

 1                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.52 p.m.,

 2                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 6th day

 3                           of February, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.