1 Wednesday, 6 February 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning,
9 Your Excellencies. Good morning to everyone.
10 WITNESS: DRAGOMIR MILOSEVIC [Resumed]
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
13 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. General.
14 A. Good morning.
15 Q. On page 2 of the transcript on Monday, you were asked about your
16 alleged ties with the SDS. You denied having been an SDS man. Is that
17 still your position?
18 A. Of course it is. First of all, I was not a member of the SDS,
19 and there were no ties between us with regard to any military activities.
20 Within my structure, I had my superior command which was, in my view, the
21 only responsible factor that I had to establish any ties with in
22 implementing their orders. It was the Main Staff of the VRS, of course.
23 Q. Thank you. Did you tell them that? Did you tell them that you
24 were not a party man?
25 A. Yes. I tried to make it known to them so that they wouldn't
1 harbour any such feelings or interpretations. I didn't want them to try
2 to achieve such an atmosphere. I knew full well that they couldn't count
3 on me in that regard. I think they simply wanted to count on some people
4 from the Main Staff to try and portray the existence of some party ties.
5 Q. Thank you. I wanted to show you some entries from the Mladic
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have P1473. In the
8 Serbian can we have page 267, and in English 264.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Do you recall a meeting of the 7th of August -- what year is
11 that? Probably 1995.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Where is Ostrelj?
14 A. Well, yes. I think I've mentioned already that Ostrelj is an
15 area or a topographic feature which is close to Drvar. That's all I
16 know. It is somewhere in the territory of Republika Srpska in the
17 so-called Banja Luka Krajina or the Bosanska Krajina.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 Can we look at the next page.
20 Is it stated here that you told him that you were no party man?
21 Let me find that.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next page, please. In the
23 English too. The next page in both versions. This is fine in the
24 English. It is in the last paragraph.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. In the Serbian, look at the last paragraph and what you said?
2 A. "Having arrived --"
3 Q. No, the last item, "I have the feeling."
4 A. "I have a feeling that there is a belief in the General Staff
5 that I am Karadzic's man and that I am an SDS man. No one --"
6 Q. "No one knows."
7 A. Yes. "No one knows how --"
8 Q. "Hurt I have been by this."
9 A. Yes, "Hurt I have been by this."
10 Q. Thank you. So it's not only that you told them that you were not
11 a party man, you also told them that you were hurt by such
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Can we look at 65 ter 9139, which is a letter you were shown by
15 the Prosecution?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please zoom in for the General, the
17 top of the page -- sorry, the bottom of the page. I'm interested in the
18 underlined sentence.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Do you want me to read it out?
21 A. I'm aware of what this is about. The underlined part:
22 "The people from the inner circle of the General Staff of the VRS
23 warned me that there is a general view of myself being an SDS general, a
24 general of the Assembly or a Chetnik general, Karadzic's man, a party
25 man, and such like."
1 Q. You may stop there.
2 A. Yes. All these adjectives were ascribed to me. I'm not really
3 clear as to why they needed it. First of all, there was no basis for it.
4 I do know, however, that perhaps word had reached the General Staff that
5 the SRK forces stood their ground and undertook appropriate measures to
6 protect their area, perhaps creating the impression of the corps being
7 praised, perhaps unduly, and they must have created an opinion in the
8 sense that my successes should be belittled to show that perhaps I was
9 pretentious and so on and so forth. I simply know that I had to take a
10 lot of it in a situation which required activities of different kind, not
11 discussing such topics. One had to bear it all in order to emerge
13 Q. Thank you. You deny that in the last paragraph. General, would
14 it have been something bad that you were an Assembly general or the
15 president's general? Whose generals were the other ones, those who held
16 it against you?
17 A. Let us be clear on it. I would tell them -- well, allegedly my
18 promotion, or so they believed, was proposed by President Karadzic, and I
19 asked him, "Well, who signed your promotional decrees?" It was
20 understood what I meant, but still there was the impression that a decree
21 was signed on my behalf as if it were something special. That was one
23 Another thing, I don't see why there should be any negative
24 consequences stemming from it. If the person has achieved what was
25 required of him -- of him and of his units in -- in combat engagement.
1 Q. Can you read out the last paragraph on page 1, and then we'll go
2 to page 3.
3 A. Very well.
4 "I was none of that. I was a simple Serb, a professional soldier
5 who has dedicated his entire life to the army, thus confirming that I
6 only want to do my job conscientiously."
7 I think that's clear, and I think it was clear to them too.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 3, please. I'm interested in
9 a paragraph there. The one in the middle, just above the underlined
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. "It was my great --"
13 A. "It was my great wish with your approval to leave the VRS
14 honourably and decently, and I am proud of it. I was preoccupied with my
15 job in the army, not with the SDS, but I see now that I may not be
16 allowed to leave honourably."
17 Q. Thank you. Would this position persist if another party had been
18 in power? Well, this calls for speculation. I will withdraw it.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this.
20 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure if it is relevant or not, but since
21 this letter was raised by both parties, General, can I ask you what it
22 was that you said you couldn't carry out? The part of the order you
23 couldn't carry out. Could you tell us in a nutshell.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can, Your Honour. It
25 requires a few sentences so as to make it clear.
1 During that period, there was an assessment and a decision that
2 was made that the SRK as a military structure would practically cease to
3 exist. Because of the restructuring of the entire VRS, the SRK
4 basically -- or its units and its personnel fell under the Hercegovina
5 Corps commanded by General Grubac. There was a hand-over in the units,
6 and there were difficulties with the procedure during some post-war
7 events. There were a lot of inoperative or damaged pieces and so on and
8 so forth. However, we still had to go through the process of hand-over.
9 In a string of attempts - at least that's the way I saw
10 it - there was an intent on his part to undermine my value and the worth
11 of the units I had commanded. He issued an order that I should
12 personally count every single rifle, as if giving me a job, something to
13 do, because I was out of work apparently. And he wanted to make an
14 inventory list and hand it over personally to General Grubac.
15 I hope that people would understand that it was not my job to do.
16 As the corps commander, no one could order me or put me in a position to
17 be in the role of a company officer, because it was the job of such
18 company officers to keep records of company weapons and assets. It could
19 only take place in junior units. I had to resist such an attempt,
20 because I didn't want to see myself reduced to such levels while I had
21 exercised my duty properly. I had to confirm that I refused to do it.
22 It fell in the category of directly opposing an order. I did not
23 hesitate to do it. I said, "There you go. There is a Military Court.
24 Deal with it through the Military Court."
25 If a person in charge of such proceedings wanted to have them
1 instituted, then such a person would need to decide whether it was within
2 my remit to do it or not.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. We will receive it as the
4 next -- as the next Defence exhibit.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2901, Your Honours.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Thank you. General, on Monday, on page 9 of the transcript, you
8 were asked -- it was put forward to you that you did not know of any
9 cases of my orders not being observed or honoured. You answered that you
10 never had occasion to be alone with the two of us, one on one, or with
11 both of us. My question is whether my order of transforming the general
12 headquarters to the Main Staff was put into practice.
13 A. The Main Staff remained as such. It retained its name, the
14 Main Staff of the VRS, of course. It maintained its name. It wasn't
15 transformed into a General Staff. So this order did not take effect as
16 far as I can recall, as far as I know.
17 Q. Thank you. Was my order about the position of General Mladic,
18 was it also honoured?
19 A. Of course it wasn't.
20 Q. Let me show you a document, D2155. 2155. Were you aware before
21 that of tensions between military and civilian structures?
22 A. Yes, I was aware. What could be felt was a climate, an
23 atmosphere of -- which I could label without being tied fast to that
24 characterization. There is a saying, "One people, two masters," which
25 meant -- well, I did feel a certain degree of ignoring of the existence
1 of civilian structures among the people we are discussing. First and
2 foremost, among those -- some of those in the Main Staff. I know that
3 they raised issues, saying that there were activities being carried out
4 that bore the hallmarks of smuggling, black market operations concerning
5 assets and resources, and that there -- there was the Main Staff who
6 wanted to stop such practices, that it was detrimental to the army, and
7 such tensions intensified until a conflict broke out between the two of
9 As far as my explanation went, I did say that I was never there
10 in your company where I could see what were your resentments and who is
11 not observing whose direction.
12 Q. Thank you very much, General. On pages 10 and 11 of Monday's
13 transcript, you were questioned, and you were shown quotations from
14 RS Assembly session mid-April 1995. I would like to ask you if you were
15 there, if you were at the Main Staff, did you receive my letter which was
16 sent two weeks after that Assembly session at Sanski Most? Sent to corps
18 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 MS. EDGERTON: I think that has a very tenuous link to the topics
21 raised in cross-examination, because the cross-examination was solely
22 about what was said during the Assembly session in April of 1995 and
23 involved putting quotes to the witness.
24 JUDGE KWON: But I explore the nature of the conflict or rift
25 between the two persons. I would allow the question.
1 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, quite so.
2 JUDGE KWON: Okay. Please continue.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Was this letter forwarded to you, that letter which I sent to all
5 corps commanders?
6 A. I would like nothing more than to confirm firmly whether it was
7 forwarded to me or not. I'm trying to recall the contents.
8 Q. Can we take a look at page 2, please.
9 A. Yes, yes.
10 Q. You don't have to read it out loud, but could you please read for
11 yourself the second box starting with "Possible coup d'etat," "Military
12 coup." Have you read it?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Does this fit with your knowledge about the tensions between the
15 military and the civilian structures?
16 A. This is exactly what I wanted to say. What follows from this,
17 and I confirm that without reading this paragraph, is that that tension
18 between those actors had been felt before, had long been felt, and now
19 one can conclude that after a long period of tension it had to come to a
20 head in terms of refusal to obey orders issued by the Supreme Command.
21 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to show you a letter, 1D2002, dated
22 20th April 1995.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, we do not have any
24 translation. You could look for yourself. For the benefit of the
25 Chamber and all others, let me explain this. This is an official note by
1 Momcilo Mandic about his --
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, that is not the way in the case of
3 untranslated documents. You are not giving evidence. You need to put
4 the question to the witness.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Well, for the benefit of everybody else in the courtroom, then my
7 question is: Can you tell us what this official note is about?
8 A. I can see this official note, and of course I see what it's all
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: It's not a proper question in redirect,
12 Your Honour.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I'm not sure if it is an official note. Do you
14 follow, Mr. Karadzic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we can take a look at this
16 document. It has its own number, and this person in his capacity as
17 advisor to the president notified a person who no longer was a minister,
18 and this was an official note.
19 JUDGE KWON: No. You are not giving evidence. We do not know
20 what this document is about. You need to put questions to the witness.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked the General what this
22 official note was, what it spoke about, what it is.
23 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, I'm overlapping. That's exactly a
24 leading question.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask the General this:
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Could you please explain this document to the Chamber, its nature
3 and its content?
4 A. Of course I can. It is sufficient to read it. It implies a
5 certain amount of pressure being exerted on certain structures without
6 apparent reason. However, what I can say now is not written here, and it
7 was not discussed, but I do know that some -- I received information.
8 This is how I know. I don't know when exactly or where. I know that
9 some people from the political leadership and from the government would
10 be detained at the Main Staff. They would be intercepted on a road and
11 then detained at the Main Staff for a number of days. I think that this
12 occurred -- I mean -- I mean, I think that this concerned the minister of
14 Q. Could you read out loud the last sentence, please.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, with respect, no. Dr. Karadzic has
16 to find out -- has to demonstrate some link between the witness and the
17 document. The witness has effectively said he knows nothing about the
18 document, and Dr. Karadzic persists to try and have the document read out
19 in court. It's not proper questions in redirect.
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, before saying what you knew with
23 respect to this document, could you tell us first what this document is
24 about, who wrote this document, and what it is? First could you read out
25 the -- the logo, the letters that -- that are behind the logo. Probably
1 "Republika Srpska." Could you read out those lines.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understood. It says in the
3 letterhead below the emblem, "Republika Srpska, Office of the President
4 of the Republic, Sarajevo."
5 After that, on the left-hand side, date, 20th of April, 1995.
6 Number official SL, meaning official, 1/95. Subject, official note. And
7 then the text and the contents --
8 JUDGE KWON: And the signatory? Who wrote this letter?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was signed presumably by the
10 person who wrote it, and it says here "Advisor to the president," I
11 presume president of the republic, "Momcilo Mandic, MA."
12 JUDGE KWON: Why was Mandic using the letterhead of the office of
13 the president?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I couldn't tell. I see from the
15 contents that he encountered a problem and he wanted to notify the
16 president of that. What authority he had in terms of using the official
17 memos, I don't know.
18 JUDGE KWON: And before you put a question, you need to lay some
19 foundation why you are going to put this document to the witness,
20 Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, the General said
22 that he was aware of intentions and misunderstandings between the
23 civilian and military structures, and he labelled it as a situation of
24 one people, two lead -- masters. He did not know of this document, but
25 he heard about civilian authority representatives being detained and
1 arrested. This letterhead is not of the president but of the office of
2 the president, and this person used to be advisor to the president.
3 I wanted to ask the General whether this document, and to what
4 extent, reflected what he knew about conflicts between the military and
5 the civilian structures. And the last sentence of that note is very
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE KWON: I think you could ask the question independent of
9 this document, Mr. Karadzic. Why don't you do that now?
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, did you know -- General, in those tensions which --
12 which side did they favour, certain structures within the military
13 leadership? Loyalty to which side, they declared their loyalty to which
15 A. Let me give you this answer and of course to the Chamber. It is
16 certain, as far as I know, concerning your question who favoured and who
17 aligned themselves to which side. This did not have any particular
18 influence on the structure of the SRK, its forces, its structures. The
19 corps was so busy with combat activities and fighting again the forces
20 that I referred to many times so far, that we could not follow
21 developments or ruptures that would be detrimental to us among those at
22 the top. Those conflicts could not influence us or prevent us in
23 carrying out our defensive duties along the front line. This is the
24 first thing I can tell you, and I stand 100 per cent by that assertion.
25 Furthermore, I'm not asserting this, but I can tell you that I
1 had a feeling that there were people aligning themselves to gain
2 importance in terms of being given authority to influence political
3 circles, and that affiliation was -- and alignment was with the
4 Main Staff much more in this corps than in other corps. If I understood
5 your question correctly, and this is how I deem my answer should be
7 Q. With respect to this document, I would like to -- you to explain
8 what they said to Mladic about who their boss was.
9 A. The last sentence --
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: This is -- the way that these questions,
12 Your Honours, are being posed is a manner that I would submit guides the
13 witness in the formulation of his answers, and Dr. Karadzic should be
14 cautioned to stop leading him.
15 JUDGE KWON: Move on to the next topic, Mr. Karadzic. I think
16 you exhausted this document.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to tender
18 the document. Can it be admitted for identification?
19 JUDGE KWON: No. I don't think we have any basis to do that now,
20 Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. General, sir, yesterday on page 36 and 37 of the transcript, it
24 was suggested to you that the policy of the SRK was to snipe at civilians
25 in Sarajevo, and you denied that; is that correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 65 ter 23822,
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. General, sir, would you please look at the document and
6 familiarise yourself with it, and tell us what you understood to be the
7 target of the snipers in this document?
8 A. It is quite clear why we decided to create conditions to secure
9 the existence of people capable of opposing the opposing side, in this
10 case snipers. Throughout my testimony, I tried to present the degree to
11 which the actions of sniper forces were prevalent of the 1st Corps, and I
12 know that the structure of those people mostly comprised Specials from
13 the Bosna Special Brigade, and then again there was a special structure
14 called Seve. These were people who were fatal for our forces and our
15 composition regardless of whether we're talking about the civilian
16 population or soldiers.
17 I would have a whole range of indicators to present about how
18 many drastic instances there were of sniper action directed at these
19 people that I mentioned, whether it was soldiers or the civilian
21 My escort, a policeman, soldier, who was securing the commander
22 was hit while moving next to me. He was hit directly in the head. I'm
23 trying to tell you here what it means to hit somebody as they're moving.
24 I don't know why he was hit. Maybe he seemed to them to be specifically
25 interesting person. He was very tall and thin, and perhaps they thought
1 that they were killing me or something. I don't know. I just assumed
3 There was an occasion sometimes where suddenly there would be
4 sniper fire from one of their sniper nests, and then we had to find a
5 solution of how to put an end to this. And there was one occasion where
6 they had captured a key feature on the road leading to Trebevic and Pale,
7 and I was present myself when one of the local inhabitants was driving
8 his child to Pale to the hospital. The opposing side -- I saw this with
9 my own eyes. The opposing side's sniper fired and shot and killed that
10 girl. So he did not want to fire at him but at her, even though at that
11 point that other person was closer to the sniper. So we had to introduce
12 some sort of fight against these snipers.
13 It was also an attempt to oppose them, but let's understand each
14 other. This was not easy, through creating a force that would then
15 respond to that type of fire, i.e., enemy snipers. This is a position
16 that I know that we cultivated and that we tried to deal with that in
17 particular. In that case, all I can say is that the existence of our
18 snipers and their possible training and direction was just something that
19 was done for these reasons in terms of the opposing side. There was a
20 large number of very capable snipers on their side. Don't forget that
21 this was Sarajevo where there were different profiles of people, and in
22 particular I'm talking about the Specials from the Bosna Brigade.
23 Q. Thank you, General, sir. Did you sign this on behalf of
24 General Galic?
25 A. Yes. Yes.
1 Q. One more question. This order of yours, could it have been a
2 basis for firing at civilians in any way?
3 A. No, of course it could not have been. This is impossible. You
4 cannot order or issue orders whereby some of those military structures of
5 ours, regardless of which one it was, would fire at civilians.
6 Please. There were mechanisms of internal control. If anyone
7 knows anything about those contacts with people, then it's me, without
8 pretensions of emphasising that is something really important, but it's
9 true. In some contacts with fighters and while directing them how to
10 conduct themselves, they would say to me, "General, don't you worry. We
11 have our own controls here, because in that area there, our mothers, our
12 sisters, fathers, are also moving around." And those who did not have
13 their mother, father, or relatives there, then these others would warn
14 them that when they opened fire, they should not open fire without making
15 sure first not to direct that fire at a civilian.
16 This is something that was taken into account, very much so, and
17 I said a number of times that our soldiers took us to account for making
18 so many warnings to them, but this is something that has its grounds, its
19 logic, its causes, and it's quite normal to do this so that you don't
20 permit people to think the way they want to think but to be disciplined.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we -- I would like to tender
23 this document, please.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2902, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, you stated that there were mechanisms
2 of internal control separate from warnings you gave to them. Could you
3 tell us in concrete terms what those internal control mechanisms were?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, what I meant --
5 completely interpretation, internal, internal control. I'm formulating
6 this in the way that I understood it and how it proceeded, and that's
7 what it is, internal, if I may put it that way. Mutual among fighters,
8 one's own warnings from their own reasons, security reasons so that none
9 of their own would be -- due to some possible carelessness by those who
10 have no relatives in Sarajevo, so that they would not be in the position
11 to execute that action. However, that's not the only one. This is among
12 the fighters themselves. Now, there is also a whole range of these
13 checks and balances that are exercised by the superior officers. The
14 selection of the location for the sniper, warning about what his task is,
15 making sure whether they observe the target, gather the information,
16 whether they observed sniper action. This was not difficult to notice.
17 This could have been done by any commanding officer monitoring the
18 situation on the ground to see where fire was coming from.
19 If I may say this to you: The mechanical engineering faculty,
20 one side of the building where there are no doors, no windows, there is
21 just a wall, that area was on the Muslim side across the Miljacka River,
22 and there were holes drilled through which snipers targeted their own
23 targets, that they wanted to target, including the civilian population.
24 You could monitor this from day to day, how it looked when they drilled a
25 hole and then fired from there and then they would be exposed to fire by
1 our sharpshooters, then he would drill a different hole in order to
2 conceal himself and so on and so forth. And this side of the building
3 was looking like a beehive. I don't know how the building withstood that
4 kind of destruction to its structure. But anyway, that was the source
5 where that was coming from. There was also the Assembly of Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina, that building, the government building. There was also --
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, the topic you are discussing with
8 Mr. Karadzic was whether VRS targeted civilians, and you said this order
9 couldn't be a basis for such order, and you said there were mechanisms of
10 internal control, but you are now talking about different things. Please
11 concentrate on answering the question. If you think you answered the
12 question, I give the floor to Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. General, sir, did you receive, and in what form if you did,
16 reports or charges or allegations about Serb soldiers firing at civilians
17 in sniper action?
18 A. Yes, I did receive them. These were -- let me say this was
19 information that was coming from UNPROFOR.
20 Q. Thank you. And did you take into account information in the
21 media, foreign, domestic, and how did you view that?
22 A. The media are another topic, a separate topic. An atmosphere was
23 being created there that was not even close to what was actually taking
24 place on the ground. Therefore, there was an exaggeration, dramatising
25 of the situation and a constant tendency to create an atmosphere of some
1 wilful brutal behaviour by the fighters on our side. The media was a
2 certain indicator, and we did attempt to think about it and to see what
3 was true and correct of all those things, but there was so much
4 exaggeration that it was not possible to achieve the effect of combatting
5 this and for that media to stop launching these things.
6 All the other information about what was happening in terms of
7 negative actions on our part was checked and efforts were made to
8 establish whether there was data that could indicate whether this was
9 true or not, and then if so, orders were issued to stop with such actions
10 regardless of the intentions of whoever was doing that.
11 Q. Thank you, General. By investigating allegations, did you ever
12 establish that anybody was really guilty, and if you did, what happened
13 to that person and who conducted this procedure further?
14 A. Yes, you just reminded me of something, and I perhaps should
15 repeat that the extent of the activities and the tasks that the corps
16 command had to carry out, in this case, myself at the head of that
17 command, did not give me the opportunity to personally carry out the
18 entire procedure. I had to do it with the assistance of the military
19 police organs or by issuing instructions also to them or to the
20 prosecutor's office. And I said already yesterday that by submitting
21 criminal charges we would start the processing of those who could be
22 accused of those guilty of violations.
23 Q. Thank you, General. In that regard, what can you tell us about
24 the degree and nature of command and control in the SRK?
25 A. I don't know if I need to repeat it, as I believe I have
1 discussed it several times. Any control of behaviour and opening fire,
2 irrespective of its type, especially sniper fire, was such that it could
3 prevent any such behaviour. It was sufficient. I'm not trying to say
4 that it was absolutely excluded, though. It also had to do with
5 potential situations which may arise during combat, and such combat
6 developed from one day to the next or from one hour to the next. In any
7 case, when we were not being fired at, we did not respond with fire, and
8 that includes civilians.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have P1201?
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. While waiting for the document, General, did the military police
13 or the security and intelligence organ, as well as the system of
14 reporting and initiating procedures, did you ever receive any information
15 that any of those did not work properly?
16 A. Could you please repeat your question? It seems to me that there
17 are two questions there.
18 Q. Did you have the military police prosecution and courts at your
19 disposal? Did you have that, and did they function properly?
20 A. We did have it, and they functioned. Of course, there may have
21 been weaknesses, but it was all in operation.
22 Q. Please look at the last sentence of your order.
23 A. "Inform me personally of the readiness to implement this task."
24 To any soldier this sentence is crystal clear, but since you are
25 asking me about it, it seems that an additional explanation is required
1 in this situation.
2 It is a basic principle whereby the commander is issuing a task,
3 and at the same time he wants to know, first of all, whether such an
4 order can be implemented; and if so, there are additional issues and
5 mechanisms to be put in place which would secure the implementation of
6 that activity as envisaged in an earlier procedure specifying when fire
7 could be opened, under what circumstances, and which targets need to be
8 singled out as more or less profitable or causing lesser or greater
10 Once a report comes back that the unit in question is ready to
11 implement the task, they also need to report on its implementation. They
12 need to confirm whether they have been able to observe the target, what
13 was its environment, and whether there is any danger to civilians, and if
14 there is such danger, what is its extent. The commander indeed did that
15 and confirmed.
16 I am not trying to say that this mechanism would remove any
17 responsibility on my side, but I still wanted to hear from this person's
18 mouth to what extent he was able to view the entire situation.
19 Q. Is this an exception, or, rather, how did you make sure that you
20 received information about other orders and their implementation?
21 A. The mutual communication and the functioning of the reporting
22 line in terms of providing information was of the utmost importance,
23 because in a time of war, inaccurate information can be deadly. If
24 anyone engaged in combat according to such information could only expect
25 to be defeated and nothing else. There should simply be no room for
1 inaccuracy when engaging in combat, otherwise, that situation would have
2 been fatal to us under the circumstances. Opinions or assessments had no
3 room in that situation. I could hear their reporting, the enemy's
4 reports on the extent of their reconnaissance and how they followed our
5 activities. So we couldn't do -- act otherwise. We had to have a clear
6 situation in military terms, and only then could we expect to be
7 successful in implementing orders.
8 Q. Thank you, General. You said that mortars are not placed on
9 asphalt or concrete. Can you tell us why?
10 A. I understand it probably requires some explanation here, but it
11 is obvious. A mortar had its base plate, it's a metal plate, which needs
12 to be placed on soft ground, on soil, which excludes sand because it
13 would sink. If placed on asphalt or concrete, it would bounce off once a
14 shell is lowered into the tube and when fired. It could present a danger
15 to the crew.
16 After the first shell is launched, even if placed on soft ground
17 the plate is not stable. That is why we correct fire. So after the
18 first shot was fired, the plate needs to be readjusted again.
19 Q. Thank you. You mentioned at that placing mortars on vehicles,
20 which is what the 1st Corps in Sarajevo did, well, can you tell us how
21 that affected their accuracy? How accurate were they able to be if they
22 placed their weapons on the back of pick-up trucks, for example?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Before you answer, Mr. Milosevic.
24 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
25 MS. EDGERTON: I'm always prepared to be corrected but I don't
1 recall a single question or answer during the cross-examination related
2 to mortars on vehicles.
3 JUDGE KWON: I understood that to be related to the technical
4 aspect whether a mortar can be installed on hard surface. That may
5 include the truck, but I'm not sure it's really necessary, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I simply wanted to address the
7 issue of concrete and soil. I wanted to extend that to the issue of
8 vehicles and trains, and how that affected accuracy as compared to other
9 circumstances. And you understood it well, it is a technical issue.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer?
11 JUDGE KWON: Very briefly, Mr. Milosevic.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course I'll be brief. There's
13 no reason not to be.
14 The surface needs to be of such type that would sufficiently
15 stabilise the mortar. To place a mortar on the back of a truck or train,
16 well, it couldn't be stabilised in that way, resulting in its inaccuracy.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. General, thank you. Yesterday, on pages 58 and 59, you were
19 asked about violations of the TEZ in May 1995. You said that you were
20 forced to defend; is that correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 24511.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Can you tell the Chamber what this document is. You see the
25 first page. What does it discuss? We see the date, the 25th of May,
2 A. It is a regular combat report. I suppose it was sent by the
3 corps command to the Main Staff of the VRS. Of course, it was also sent
4 to the forward command post at Trnovo. It's a regular combat report for
5 the past 24 hours.
6 Q. Can you tell us what was the main event? What was it that you
7 had to defend from? Because you did say you had to defend yourselves.
8 A. Please bear with me.
9 Q. The first paragraph.
10 A. Yes. One can see that the enemy opened fire from different kinds
11 of weapons, that is to say, artillery weapons, mortars, and infantry
12 weapons. We see what locations they engaged, especially the
13 Lukavica Road, which was the road we used regularly. It seems that a
14 Browning weapon was used in particular against our parts of Dobrinja and
15 in Kaponiri, which is an area that had been used for anti-aircraft
16 defence near the airport.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 3. Sorry, the
19 last page.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. According to the agreement about the total exclusion zone, were
22 they allowed to engage from such weapons?
23 A. Well, of course the agreement applied to them too. They
24 shouldn't have, but they used it a lot.
25 Q. Item 8, "Conclusion," what does it tell us about enemy activities
1 and the UN and NATO?
2 A. A report needs to provide information to the Main Staff about our
3 assessments, our forecasts of further activity. In this case, it was
4 assessed that such activities would continue and that it would take place
5 with the support of the units of the UN and NATO, which was to be
6 expected in the forthcoming period. If I take our assessment into
7 account, I can say -- or I can confirm that it did indeed developed that
9 Q. Thank you. I was about to ask you if it indeed happened.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2903, Your Honours.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. General, sir, you mentioned certain wartime events in
15 mid-June 1995. Can you tell us what it was about? You mentioned hell.
16 Briefly, please.
17 A. Yes. That is the problem when one needs to explain that kind of
18 situation in only a few words, which is not an easy task. I repeat --
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
20 MS. EDGERTON: Just to clarify, this is a question now based on
21 Dr. Karadzic's redirect of yesterday and not arising from
22 cross-examination. It's a clarification of that.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. I wanted to lay a foundation for another question. General, did
1 I undertake any measures at the time you were in the middle of that
2 hellish situation? Did I do anything with regard to the area of the SRK?
3 Did I institute a measure on my part as president?
4 A. Yes. Yes, I know. I think I have mentioned it during
5 examination-in-chief. It was then that the state of war was proclaimed.
6 It was my understanding that it was proclaimed in order to create a new
7 situation with greater authority, without going into detail what it
8 actually meant. It was aimed at assisting us in bearing the burden and
9 force of attack in the situation we were in as a result of their strong
11 What I said is what I will repeat. It was never necessary to
12 undertake any special measures because we could feel best what our
13 situation was. Nothing could help us other than properly managing our
14 forces and decisively counter -- and successfully combatting their
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D03232?
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. General, sir, is the authority of civilian structures expanded in
19 times of war and does it affect only the military or the society as a
21 A. The society as a whole. Yes.
22 Q. Could you please tell the Chamber what this decision is about and
23 why was it introduced?
24 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, I don't normally mean to intervene so
2 often, but with respect, I think we're far and away outside the
3 boundaries of cross-examination.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I didn't remember the situation, but the hell
5 issue was raised in his re-examination, as you indicated, and so that
6 topic was -- in my opinion was related to your cross-examination. I
7 didn't check it.
8 MS. EDGERTON: Now, however, we're on the question of the
9 authority of civilian structures in times of war, and this is what I
10 think has pushed the boundaries too far, with respect.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. During the cross-examination
13 there were many topics covered about this time period of June 1995,
14 including dealing with the hostages, attacks on convoys. There are
15 indictment incidents, shelling of -- use of air-bombs during this period,
16 and I think Dr. Karadzic is entitled to show the situation that existed
17 at that time with respect to the attacks and the -- the attacks by the
18 Muslim forces and the offensive that was launched.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll allow the question. Please continue.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. General, sir, could you please relate to us what is stated under
23 item 2? What was the goal? Could you please explain why I was forced to
24 do this? What was the goal of introducing a state of war?
25 A. Yes, I did understand your question, but allow me before
1 answering to provide you with another piece of information.
2 It is obvious that the state of war was declared only in the zone
3 of responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. This is even more
4 important than what you are asking me about. This implies the gravity of
5 the situation, and it did not include the declaration of a state of war
6 throughout Republika Srpska, and this is important for what I'm about to
7 say. And when I try to explain the situation of our forces within the
8 corps concerned, then this is the proper explanation.
9 It says here the aim of declaring a state of war is to enable the
10 full engagement of human and material potential in defence of the
11 republic and final victory over the enemy. This is an additional
12 assistance in support, and at that point I no longer have to beg anybody
13 to be engaged with their capacities, with their assets, et cetera. And
14 this implied for those structures which are not purely military, that
15 they should obey requests coming to them.
16 Q. Thank you, General, sir.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document,
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2904, Your Honours.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. You discussed, General, sir, places where you directed your
23 retaliation against. Let me quote General Fraser on that, on page 8007.
24 It reads here:
25 "[In English] The Muslims fired at Lukavica with mortar, and we
1 protested the Muslim forces for doing that because of our concern with
2 the reaction which followed through which was -- brought a heavy
3 artillery barrage with heavy calibre weapons back at the city."
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I think the first part of your
5 quotation seems to be missing.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question:
7 "[In English] Do you recall -- you alluded to it, but do you
8 recall the nature of the shelling of Lukavica by the Bosnian forces, the
9 type of weaponry and the amount of death occasion -- on that occasion?"
10 Page 8007. The answer was:
11 "The Muslims fired at Lukavica with mortars" and so on.
12 Next question:
13 "And when you say 'back at the city,' was the shelling by the
14 Bosnian Serb forces following the mortar -- the shelling of Lukavica
15 directed at the Bosnian 1st Corps headquarter or was it directed
17 And the answer of General Fraser is:
18 "The shelling did not come back at the Bosnian corps headquarter.
19 It seemed to be indiscriminate across the city."
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Why did not -- why you didn't retaliate against the corps command
22 after they'd fired at your corps command? Where was that retaliatory
23 fire directed at?
24 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
1 MS. EDGERTON: I'm just wondering if it would be of assistance to
2 the General if this could be placed in time just a little bit, which the
3 quote didn't do, but I think Dr. Karadzic, from reading General Fraser's
4 evidence, is in a position to do. It just might assist the General in
5 his answer.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Karadzic.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Well, General Fraser discusses 1995, when the Muslim forces fired
9 at Lukavica, which was your headquarters of the corps command, and he
10 concludes -- well, he states that they protested with the Muslim forces
11 because they expected that the SRK would retaliate. And then he states
12 that you do not retaliate at the 1st Corps command headquarters but
13 elsewhere in the city.
14 Could you please tell us which points was your fire directed at?
15 I'm tying this to your answer to the Prosecution that you did not fire at
16 their command posts.
17 A. Yes, I did understand everything. My explanation stands, and it
18 is this: It is true we did not fire at command posts. Let's take into
19 consideration that those command posts were within the city. Let me
20 remind you that their command corps, the 1st Command Corps was in the
21 centre of the city in Danila Ozme [phoen] Street, that the 12th Brigade
22 was close to Skenderija, very close to tenement buildings, et cetera.
23 From my point of view, it would mean nothing to me if we were to threaten
24 their command post. They had ample structures that they could perform
25 their command duties with if -- even if their headquarters were
2 What we wanted to do is to find those who fired at us, and that
3 was the target for us, for our firing. I will have to try to explain to
4 the Chamber that this term "retaliation" is not proper. This is not
5 appropriate because it sounds too drastic to me, but in essence, it is a
6 legitimate term as a term, as a notion. But this was not retaliation.
7 We were trying to find the targets that we could preclude their firing at
9 Fire in this case, with all due respect to what General Fraser
10 stated, what I do know is that I knew the situation much better than
11 whoever appeared here testifying in this or that case, and I know that
12 their fire was targeted not just at our command post but at civilians and
13 the buildings surrounding the command corps -- command post.
14 JUDGE KWON: Let's clarify the transcript. Page 30, line 13.
15 General, did you say, "It is true that we did fire at command posts"? I
16 understood you told us that: "It is true that we did not fire at command
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I said that we did not fire at
19 command posts, absolutely. Not at all.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I just wanted to correct the transcript,
21 the record.
22 Please continue.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Being mindful of the time, I would
24 need another 15 minutes, Your Excellencies, by your leave, since we've
25 lost quite a lot of time, and with due respect, you did take -- did ask
1 some questions. Should we stop now or should we continue?
2 JUDGE KWON: We'll have break for half an hour and resume at
3 3 past 11.00.
4 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, allow me to
7 introduce another member of our team, Eva Suboticki [phoen], from
8 Belgrade, who is together with us in the courtroom today.
9 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. General, sir, on page 81 of yesterday's transcript, it seems to
13 me, it was suggested to you that retaliation was directed against the
14 centre of Hrasnica and that it took place substantially afterwards. Do
15 you know -- well, the document of the UN states when that retaliation
16 took place.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we take a look at D2817,
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. General, sir, you did not say it was retaliation but silencing
21 those assets, although you avoided the term "retaliation," although it is
22 a legitimate action.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton. Without having to turn to you.
24 It's evidently a very leading question, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. The General stated
1 that he was not talking about retaliation. He was talking about seeking
2 the targets to silence them, and this is what he said. It was suggested
3 to him that that retaliation took place substantially afterwards, as
4 stated on page 81, and that it was retaliation rather than trying to
5 silence those assets.
6 Could we please refer to the relevant page. Next page, please.
7 The Sarajevo Sector. I'm going to read out loud.
8 [In English] "The situation is assessed to remain stable. The
9 level of firing incidents will likely continue to rise. The rocket which
10 impacted in Hrasnica was most likely retaliation for the mortar round
11 fired from Hrasnica some minutes before."
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. So, did this response or retaliation took place in a timely
14 manner or was it postponed?
15 A. It was in a timely manner, and this is corroborated by this
16 document. I can see the content in English.
17 Q. Thank you. General, sir, General Fraser testified here that
18 mortars could not destroy buildings in Sarajevo because such buildings
19 were built of concrete. Are the Turkish part and the Austro-Hungarian
20 part of Sarajevo, are they built of concrete?
21 MS. EDGERTON: Could Dr. Karadzic provide a citation, please.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. That would be page 009 and 00 -- 8010. Can you remember that
24 question about whether concrete was used to build the Turkish and the
25 Austro-Hungarian parts of Sarajevo?
1 A. Of course I do recall the question. It is quite clear that in
2 Turkish times, during the Ottoman times, they could build using stone,
3 not steel or concrete. As far as the Austro-Hungarian part of the town
4 is concerned, they could have used concrete partly.
5 Buildings, however, built of concrete -- well, buildings which
6 are firm and stable do not have to be built of concrete. They could have
7 used other materials.
8 Q. Did you have only mortars at your disposal or did you have at
9 your disposal other pieces of artillery that could have been used to
10 destroy buildings?
11 A. No. We did not use other assets that could destroy whole
12 buildings. It goes for assets that are considered such as missiles,
13 rockets, they're not intended to destroy facilities, buildings,
14 fortifications of that kind. These are first and foremost anti-armour
15 assets which have -- which generate high temperatures on impact to melt
16 steel. None of such assets, such rockets or missiles, could have such an
17 impact on a building. These are primarily anti-armour assets.
18 Q. Thank you. How many buildings in Sarajevo were destroyed? We're
19 not talking about being pockmarked or damaged.
20 A. I don't know of any buildings being torn down or destroyed. What
21 I know about Sarajevo and what I could see for myself, Sarajevo was not
22 destroyed. There were no destroyed buildings there.
23 Q. Thank you. How many mosques did you tear down using artillery?
24 How many schools, kindergartens were destroyed by artillery fire?
25 A. Thank you very much for this question. It means a lot to me to
1 be able to talk about that. The Muslim forces were mindful of this.
2 Within Sarajevo, there are many mosques at different locations and those
3 mosques and their turrets, these are prominent positions and features.
4 For some of their reasons they did not want to use such areas, such
5 localities for opening fire at us, which could not be said of other
6 prominent positions within the city, and therefore they did not create
7 the conditions where we had to return fire at those positions if such
8 fire was intense.
9 Q. Thank you. General, sir, did you have observers where you
10 deployed your artillery?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Did you receive warnings from them to the effect that you opened
13 fire without observing the procedure, without having received information
14 from them?
15 A. No. The situation was this: They could see for themselves.
16 They could observe what was going on close to our artillery assets to
17 warn of movements and activities and provide facts of the situation on
18 the ground. So no such situations occurred apart from regular reporting
19 back on developments in a certain area. Well, sometimes the situations
20 were blown up out of proportion in certain cases.
21 Q. Thank you. I'm not sure about "naduvavanje" [phoen], the way it
22 was interpreted. What did you want to say by that?
23 A. Exaggerating, reporting that something was happening even though
24 it was evident that that data -- or actually such an action could not
25 have even taken place. For example, when one of the observers, I've
1 forgotten his name now, either from the UNPROFOR sector and he happened
2 to be in that particular zone, reported, and it even seems to me that he
3 testified that from Spicasta Stijena, which was created as a myth, as a
4 concept, a "stena" [phoen], as being something in particular, that he saw
5 an air-bomb being launched from that place. First of all, how could that
6 combat asset, the way it was built and in view of its structure, even get
7 to such a -- as it was described, I would say, this Spicasta Stijena and
8 that it was talked about as if it was as great as a goddess. So there
9 was talk about something that could not be accepted, and I don't know who
10 accepted that, and I don't know how the Prosecution can use such an
11 assertion about a spot and about how impossible it was to launch an
12 air-bomb from an elevation like that. I mean, a vehicle would need to
13 approach that point and one would need to take care that the vehicle
14 would not be destroyed.
15 Q. Thank you. And how would you assess the precision of reporting
16 by the military observers according to what reached you?
17 A. Well, there are two assessments. There were, proper, correct,
18 and precise reports, assessment of the situation in the field, what was
19 observed, and also, believe me, there was reporting that was actually
20 meant to satisfy the opposing side without proving that in any particular
21 way. Now I'm talking about my impression and about some data that I had
22 at my disposal, but these times are over now so I can no longer locate
23 them in terms of their precise formulation.
24 Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at D2823 now,
2 JUDGE KWON: Before doing so, I wonder whether the General has
3 answered your question at all, i.e., the question as to:
4 "How many mosques did you tear down using artillery? How many
5 schools, kindergartens were destroyed by artillery fire?"
6 Did you answer the question? Whatever the reason it might have
7 been. How many mosques, schools, kindergartens were destroyed by
8 artillery fire?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we did not destroy any
10 of the schools or mosques. This is what I know, what I am aware of,
11 particularly when we're talking about kindergartens and schools. However
12 much it's clear that those schools were used for wrong purposes, it's
13 also clear that they were not targeted, and they were not destroyed.
14 JUDGE KWON: So how many mosques that were used for the military
15 purpose were destroyed?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I talked about mosques located
17 directly in the city, thus in that area of Bascarsija, in the centre area
18 of Sarajevo. That was that area that was covered with them, and no fire
19 was opened at those mosques. They were not destroyed, nor did my
20 opponents fire from those positions and that is why it was protected and
21 they were not to be fired at.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at D2823
24 for a second, please.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. General, sir, are you able to tell us how, on the basis of this
2 document, it can be concluded that you were at the forward command post?
3 Do you remember this document? It was admitted.
4 A. Yes. It is quite clear and unequivocal, and it's not difficult
5 to explain. I have already said a sufficient number of times that we had
6 the situation when a part of the command, either the commander or
7 somebody from the command, had to be even at two forward command posts
8 besides the main one in Lukavica. When I was at the forward command
9 post, regardless of whether it was at Nisici or the one in Trnovo, which
10 was a settlement, when a report is being processed, thus the operations
11 centre and the command would compile all the relevant data at the command
12 post from the units located in the outside sectors as well as in the city
13 itself, and when they process that they are obliged to submit that to me
14 at the forward command post so that I would know what the status was in
15 the other parts of the front and not only at the section of the front
16 where I happened to be that point of time. That was the established
17 procedure and data that would explain why this would be sent, because all
18 the reports were not sent to the forward command post when somebody was
19 not there at the forward command post, when the commander was not there.
20 But I was quite frequently at the forward command post.
21 Q. Thank you. On page 82 of yesterday's transcript, it was
22 suggested to you that there were no mines being produced at the
23 Aleksa Santic school but only the casings were cast there. Does shell --
24 casting of the casing, is that a part of shell manufacture?
25 A. Well, any part of the -- or any stage of production process of a
1 lethal device would mean that wherever that production took place, that
2 would be a potential military target.
3 Q. Thank you. It was suggested to you, and Brko Zecevic changed
4 this, that some asset which exploded in Dositejeva Street was actually a
5 modified air-bomb launched from Vogosca. What is the range and --
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I think there's been some
8 misstatements of things that I'm alleged to have suggested. First of
9 all, the question with respect to the Aleksa Santic school or the
10 evidence with respect to the Aleksa Santic school didn't even use the
11 word "casting." The evidence that was put to the witness was, at
12 page 33162, to the effect that a previous Defence witness said
13 specifically there was no production going on in the school and the only
14 thing going on was melting in the gym. Nothing to do with the word
16 Now, with respect to Dositejeva Street, although I struggled to
17 find the citation at speed, the reference -- there was, to my
18 recollection, absolutely no suggestion as to the origin of fire of where
19 the bomb might have fallen on Dositejeva Street. The question was simply
20 related to the witness's statement and his examination-in-chief to the
21 effect that if an air-bomb had fallen, the damage would have been much
22 greater. So I think these are a couple of misstatements now that
23 Dr. Karadzic is putting to the witness.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.
25 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. I apologise.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. General, sir, can you melt steel or iron in one place and then
4 take it for casting at a different place?
5 A. Well, I'm not an expert in this, but based on what I know and
6 what seems logical to me, any kind of action that has to do with casting
7 steel or any other materials has its own procedure, and I'm not able to
8 interpret it in any other way other than an action that has to do with
9 the preparation of an asset for use.
10 Q. Thank you. On page 69 of the transcript, you were asked about
11 Dositejeva. I'm asking you now: What is the range of those rockets that
12 would bear an air-bomb and would one that was fired from Vogosca be
13 observed by observers or by just regular citizens? Would it be visible?
14 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, if -- if we're going down the road
15 of technical analysis, I -- which was not raised in cross-examination, I
16 may, I feel I should indicate now, be looking for an opportunity to
17 re-cross on this technical evidence, and that would not be a matter I
18 would be able to do immediately but would need just a little bit of time
19 to prepare.
20 JUDGE KWON: I tend to agree. Could you move on to other things,
21 Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. We will move to a
23 different topic.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, sir, would it happen that something would be ascribed to
1 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that you did not do, practically something
2 that was done by someone else? That the 1st Corps did to itself.
3 A. I did not have the opportunity ever to state my knowledge and
4 activity that I expressed in order to get to something that represents
5 data as to what happened when, and if I am permitted and if I'm given the
6 opportunity to say so now, that would be the following: It was
7 established that on the 4th of February, 1994, it was the 4th or the
8 5th of February, 1994, a mine dropped on the market, the Markale Market.
9 This was something that constituted a horrendous --
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, just a second. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Another area, Your Honours, that was squarely not
12 within the bounds of cross-examination, and if we're going to come to
13 detailed evidence with regard to this incident, I would be requesting
14 Your Honours' leave to re-cross.
15 JUDGE KWON: Well, just -- we won't go there. I'm not sure how
16 this arose from the cross-examination.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, the Prosecution
18 suggested that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps fired heavy weaponry at
19 Sarajevo on the basis of statements by many that explosions were heard
20 and that damage to buildings was visible. I am asking my question on the
21 basis of that.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Were those people able to see something that the
24 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps did not do?
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, this has nothing to do with his
3 cross-examination. If you have nothing else, please conclude your
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. General, sir, did you and I ever discuss the question of, as
8 they're called here, modified air-bombs and their use?
9 A. No. There is no conversation on that topic between you and me.
10 Q. Thank you. At any meetings that were attended both by you and I,
11 was there any mention of air-bombs, about their precision or lack of
12 precision or generally about their use? And it's not whether the two of
13 us discussed it but whether this topic was ever mentioned in any meeting
14 attended by other people.
15 A. There was never any mention, discussion, in-depth consideration
16 of the use of air-bombs and their effects. I do not recall now any
17 specific meeting where that came up as a topic.
18 Q. Was I present at any of such meetings?
19 A. Well, that is why I'm saying that I do not recall anything like
20 that ever taking place.
21 Q. Thank you. General, sir, are you able to tell us briefly --
22 MS. EDGERTON: And, Your Honours --
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 MS. EDGERTON: -- I am asking to re-cross on this topic.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Excellencies. I am not
2 going to go on any more so as not to put the Prosecution in a position to
3 seek more. In any case, after 17 years to seek more.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Thank you, General.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to show a document of
7 Croatian origin, but you would not allow me to show who creates and how
8 evidence is planted as to who committed what.
9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last sentence.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: I have no idea what Dr. Karadzic is talking about,
12 but if I am able to -- if this concludes his testimony and I can
13 re-cross, if I could just have a couple of moments, I need to find a
15 JUDGE KWON: I think he concluded his re-examination.
16 Mr. Karadzic?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. With the remark that I
18 had some documents to show as well, but the conclusion of the
19 Trial Chamber is that this does not arise from the cross-examination, so
20 I am leaving that out. I will not show them.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Before any
22 re-cross-examination, I think the Prosecution should ask for the
23 permission of the Chamber and be specific as to what they want to ask
24 about and why they couldn't ask it during their cross-examination.
25 JUDGE KWON: I don't think the issue regarding the meeting or
1 conversation between Mr. Karadzic and the General on the topics related
2 to air-bombs was discussed in the cross-examination, and since this was
3 raised in his re-examination, it's fair enough for Ms. Edgerton to have
4 one more go if necessary.
5 I think the issue is related to -- to that topic, isn't it?
6 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. The issue is related to Dr. Karadzic's
7 notice or awareness of the use of modified air-bombs.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 MS. EDGERTON: And I still struggle to find the P number in
10 yesterday's transcript.
11 Further Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
12 Q. General, just in relation to the point that you've discussed with
13 Dr. Karadzic where you've given evidence to the effect that during
14 meetings and conversations with him at which you might have been present,
15 you never heard the use of modified air-bombs discussed, I'd like to know
16 are you -- are you disputing -- does that mean that you're disputing that
17 Dr. Karadzic received reports about the use of these assets?
18 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I don't think that's a fair
19 question now. That's going beyond the question. If -- if she has
20 information that at meetings at which he was present or they attended
21 together the topic was discussed, then she can ask it, but now she's the
22 one trying to expand it beyond the scope and that would not be fair.
23 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to respond, Ms. Edgerton?
24 MS. EDGERTON: I will if I can just have your indulgence for a
25 couple of moments to find the citation to the document I'm looking for,
1 I'll be in a better position to deal with it. Please, your indulgence.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps I may assist,
3 Your Excellency. I asked whether I was present anywhere when the
4 imprecision of the air-bombs was discussed. Was my attention drawn to
5 the fact that the weapon was imprecise. Precision was discussed in
7 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. I see that Mr. Robinson is
8 distinguishing, drawing a line between information at meetings and actual
9 notice, and I think given the time it might take to pursue and argue that
10 issue, it's in the interests of everyone to leave it at that and rely on
11 the evidence that was previously adduced.
12 JUDGE KWON: Appreciate it, Ms. Edgerton. Thank you.
13 Then unless my colleagues have questions for you -- yes. Yes.
14 Then that concludes your evidence, Mr. Milosevic. On behalf of the
15 Chamber, I would like to thank you for your coming to The Hague again to
16 give it. Now you're free to go.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE KWON: I also thank you, Mr. Bourgon, and the team.
19 MR. BOURGON: Thank you very much, Mr. President and
20 Your Honours.
21 MS. EDGERTON: And, Your Honours, I'll be giving my chair over to
22 Mr. Vanderpuye and take my leave.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes. Thank you.
24 [The witness withdrew]
25 JUDGE KWON: While we are waiting for the next witness to be
1 brought in, I will give an oral ruling.
2 The Chamber refers to the Prosecution's motion to exclude the
3 evidence of Witness Snezana Kovac filed on the 30th of January, 2013, and
4 the accused's response to that motion filed on the 4th of February, 2013,
5 which includes the accused's motion for admission of Snezana Kovac's
6 statement pursuant to Rule 92 bis. Having also considered the
7 Prosecution response to the Defence motion for admission of the statement
8 of Snezana Kovac pursuant to Rule 92 bis filed on 5th of February, 2013,
9 the Chamber now issues its decision on both motions.
10 At the outset, the Chamber notes that the accused in his response
11 states that the Trial Chamber's time might be better spent hearing live
12 witnesses whose testimony is more significant than that of Ms. Kovac. As
13 a compromise, he then offers that relevant portions of Ms. Kovac's
14 evidence, in this case, only five paragraphs of her statement, be
15 admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 92 bis.
16 The accused is reminded that it is incumbent on him to choose his
17 witnesses carefully and not to prepare statements which contain large
18 portions of irrelevant material. It is also inappropriate for the
19 accused to seek to first tender the evidence of a witness pursuant to
20 Rule 92 ter, and when it becomes apparent that large portions of that
21 evidence might be struck out for lack of relevance to then take a
22 selection of potentially relevant paragraphs from that proposed witness
23 statement and seek to tender that pursuant to Rule 92 bis. Contrary to
24 the accused's submission, this does not constitute good cause for the
25 Chamber to allow the admission of such a statement after the
1 27th of August, 2012, dead-line for the submission of Rule 92 bis
3 In any event, having reviewed Ms. Kovac's original statement and
4 the five paragraphs in Ms. Kovac's revised statement, the Chamber finds
5 that both the original statement and the revised statement are of limited
6 relevance and of such low probative value that Ms. Kovac's evidence
7 should be excluded in its entirety. For the foregoing reasons, the
8 Chamber grants the Prosecution motion to exclude the evidence of
9 Witness Snezana Kovac and denies the accused's motion for admission of
10 statement of Snezana Kovac pursuant to Rule 92 bis.
11 [The witness entered court]
12 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Trifkovic.
13 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
14 JUDGE KWON: If you could make your -- make the solemn
15 declaration, please.
16 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
17 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
18 WITNESS: SRDJAN TRIFKOVIC
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please make yourself comfortable.
20 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
21 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
22 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Trifkovic.
23 A. [Interpretation] Good morning.
24 Q. Kindly pause between questions and answers, and you're free to
25 remind me as well, because we both speak Serbian. The interpreters need
1 some time for their work to be done, especially if they go into French.
2 Dr. Trifkovic, did you provide a statement to my Defence team?
3 A. [In English] Yes, I have. As far as I remember it was in early
4 July last year, 2012.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D21044?
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Do you see your statement --
9 A. Indeed, I do.
10 Q. -- on the screen?
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The witness should be
12 cautioned to pause before answering, otherwise there will be an overlap.
13 JUDGE KWON: You're not using any headphones so please bear in
14 mind that Mr. Karadzic's words are to be interpreted into English, so
15 you're not to overlap with the interpretation.
16 THE WITNESS: Very well.
17 JUDGE KWON: So your answer was not reflected in the transcript.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, I -- yes, I see the statement on the screen.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you. Have you read the statement and signed it?
21 A. Yes, I have.
22 Q. Does it accurately reflect what you told the Defence team?
23 A. Yes, it does, with one small addendum that the precise timing of
24 the meeting on 12th of July of 1995 was given as between 700 [sic] and
25 1840, and in my original statement I said it was around 5.00 and lasted
1 for about an hour and a half. So the only difference between my original
2 statement and the written one is that the timing of that particular
3 meeting was given with greater precision.
4 Q. Please assist us, what paragraph is that and do you have a hard
5 copy of your statement?
6 A. Well, I have a print-out which I believe to be identical to
7 page 1 which I see on the screen and it refers to page 4, paragraph 28.
8 Q. Thank you. Save for that correction, if I were to ask the same
9 questions today, would your answers be basically the same as they are
10 contained in the statement?
11 A. They would be indeed.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this statement
14 under Rule 92 ter.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, but before that, what -- what did you mean by
16 your original statement?
17 THE WITNESS: The verbal statement I gave to a member of the team
18 in Belgrade in July.
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Mr. Karadzic, you are not tendering any
20 associated exhibit.
21 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Vanderpuye, do you have any objection to
23 the admission of his Rule 92 ter statement?
24 MR. VANDERPUYE: No, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2905, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will read out a summary of
3 Dr. Trifkovic's statement in English.
4 [In English] Dr. Srdja Trifkovic is currently foreign affairs
5 editor of the monthly magazine "Chronicles" published in the Rockford
6 Institute in Illinois, USA. He is a former Chief of Staff to Crown
7 Prince Alexander Karadjordjevic based in London, England. In that
8 capacity, Dr. Trifkovic met Radovan Karadzic on two occasions in 1993.
9 Beginning in September 1993, Dr. Trifkovic started maintaining
10 occasional communication with the Republika Srpska leadership in his
11 capacity of the -- of Balkan affairs analyst and journalist. He was
12 granted such access in view of his balanced and professional approach to
13 the complex issue of the Bosnian war. In that capacity, he met
14 Dr. Karadzic on a few occasions in 1993-1994, and again in January, March
15 and July 1995.
16 During the day of 13th of July, 1995, Dr. Trifkovic was in Pale
17 and had a meeting with Professor Koljevic. Professor Koljevic was
18 planning to go to Srebrenica the following day, as he put it, to provide
19 reassurance to the civilians of Srebrenica that they would be treated
21 Dr. Trifkovic met with Dr. Karadzic on 13th of July, 1995, from
22 what was corrected today, from 1700 to 18 hours, 40 minutes. He was with
23 Tomislav Premovic and Slavica Ristic. While in his office, Dr. Karadzic
24 was trying to make a telephone connection with the VRS headquarter in
25 Han Pijesak but was told the line was down. Dr. Trifkovic is sure that
1 Dr. Karadzic did not speak to General Mladic during this meeting but with
2 someone from the VRS command.
3 When Dr. Karadzic picked up the phone, Dr. Trifkovic picked up
4 the receiver that was connected to the same line in order to ask
5 General Mladic for a statement that he could quote in his media
6 appearances, but on the other side of the line was not General Mladic but
7 an officer from the VRS headquarters who informed Karadzic about
8 situation in Srebrenica. Dr. Karadzic then turned on the speakerphone so
9 that other guests could hear what was discussed.
10 During this conversation, Dr. Karadzic was insistent that
11 civilians not be mistreated and the conduct of the Serbs in Srebrenica be
12 above reproach so that this could not be used against the Serbs in media.
13 Dr. Trifkovic met with Dr. Karadzic again in the company of
14 Jovan Zametica on 14th of July, 1994, from 2305 hours until 35 minutes
15 after midnight. There was no discussion about prisoners from Srebrenica
16 during his meetings with Dr. Karadzic. On the base of his impressions,
17 based on his previous meetings with Dr. Karadzic, Dr. Trifkovic would
18 find it hard to believe that Dr. Karadzic would condone executing
19 prisoners, not only for pragmatic reasons but also a matter of principle.
20 And that would be summary. I don't have additional questions.
21 Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Mr. Trifkovic, as you have now noted,
23 your evidence in chief in this case has been admitted in writing in lieu
24 of your oral testimony. Now you'll be cross-examined by the
25 representative of the Office of the Prosecutor --
1 THE WITNESS: Very good.
2 JUDGE KWON: -- Mr. Vanderpuye.
3 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. I believe we're still
4 in morning so good morning to you, Your Honours.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Vanderpuye:
6 Q. Good morning to you, Dr. Trifkovic. The first thing I want to
7 clarify is the record. At page 48 of today's transcript, line 2, you
8 indicated, and I'm sure you misspoke, that the date of your meeting with
9 Dr. Karadzic was on 12 July --
10 A. No, it was actually the 13th, sorry.
11 Q. Thank you for that. Now, you've testified on at least a couple
12 of occasions before this Tribunal; correct?
13 A. Correct. And actually on one of those occasions I was crossed by
15 Q. And that would have been in the Popovic case?
16 A. Beara, yes, September '08.
17 Q. That's correct.
18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Kindly pause between
19 questions and answers. Thank you.
20 MR. VANDERPUYE:
21 Q. You also testified in the Stakic case.
22 A. Yes, at that time I was an expert witness, whereas in September
23 '08 I was actually material witness.
24 Q. And your Stakic testimony was during March of 2003; right?
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. At the very beginning of the questioning by Dr. Karadzic just
2 today, you indicated that you have a statement with you, a printed copy
3 of your --
4 A. It's --
5 Q. -- of the statement that is now in evidence; is that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Or a version of that statement?
8 A. I -- I believe it's actually identical to the one that we have on
9 the screen in front of us.
10 Q. And you indicated that there was a clarification made to a
11 previous statement that you made, an oral one that you gave in Belgrade
12 in July of 2012; right?
13 A. Only on this one particular detail concerning the time of the
14 meeting, paragraph 28.
15 Q. And what was the nature of the clarification? You said that
16 there was more detail about the time --
17 A. That's right.
18 Q. -- what was the time that you originally gave --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Please pause between the questions and the
20 answers, please.
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Are you not hearing the
22 interpreters' note?
23 MR. VANDERPUYE: No, I'm not.
24 JUDGE KWON: That's very strange. They have difficulty following
25 both of you. Please pause between the questions and answers.
1 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE KWON: And slow down, please.
3 THE WITNESS: The --
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. We were -- shall we begin again?
5 Mr. Vanderpuye, could you take a look at the transcript, line 13.
6 So could you repeat your question.
7 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President, I will.
8 Q. What was the particular detail that was clarified from your
9 original statement?
10 A. Only that what I remember saying in my original statement, that
11 the meeting was around 5.00 and went on for approximately an hour and a
12 half. In the written statement it was specified to have been between
13 1700 and 1840 hours.
14 Q. And that time agrees with your present recollection; right?
15 A. Yes. I -- I would not have known with this degree of precision,
16 but it certainly does agree with my overall recollection.
17 Q. Do you know whether or not the oral statement that you gave in
18 July 2012 was reduced to a written statement?
19 A. Well, the written statement that we have here is more or less
20 verbatim transcript of the oral statement that I gave to a member of
21 Dr. Karadzic's team in Belgrade.
22 Q. When was the written statement that you have there in front of
23 you prepared? When was that printed out and given to you?
24 A. Shortly after my oral statement was given. I don't remember
25 exactly, but it could have been a couple of weeks thereafter.
1 Q. All right. So just so I'm clear, you were aware of no
2 contemporaneous written reduction of your oral statement to the Defence
3 in Belgrade in July of 2012 other than what you have before you and what
4 was introduced into evidence in this case?
5 A. No, I'm not aware of any discrepancies or variances between my
6 oral statement and the written version we have here.
7 Q. Thanks. When did you first meet with the Defence in connection
8 with the possibility of your testifying in this case?
9 A. Well, actually, the meet -- my giving the oral testimony in July
10 of last year was the first meeting. Prior to that, there had been some
11 e-mails exchanged.
12 Q. About how far prior to that first meeting did you begin
13 exchanging e-mails with the Defence concerning the possibility of your
14 testimony in this case?
15 A. It was sometime in spring. I can't remember exactly whether it
16 was late April, early May, but sometime in the spring of 2012.
17 Q. And in terms of your contacts with the Defence regarding the
18 possibility of your testimony in this case, was the subject matter of
19 your testimony broached?
20 A. Well, yes. The initial approach concerned the possibility of my
21 testifying about the meetings in the summer of 1995. That was, in fact,
22 the purpose of the initial approach.
23 Q. Was that discussed in the e-mails that you exchanged?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. Approximately -- let me pause for a moment. Approximately how
1 many e-mails were exchanged in that period of time between April and
2 July -- or, rather -- yes, April and July?
3 A. Very few. I was asked if I would be prepared to testify. I
4 replied affirmatively, and then I was informed that a member of the team
5 would be coming to Belgrade and that he would give me a call. So really,
6 I don't think there were more than three or four.
7 Q. You met with the Defence in July 2012 in Belgrade, as you've
8 said. Do you remember what date that meeting took place?
9 A. I -- I really don't. In fact, it could have easily been late
10 June, because I know I received the document in July, but it was summer.
11 I remember positively that it was already quite hot.
12 Q. How many members of the Defence team did you meet with --
13 A. Just one.
14 Q. -- during that summer?
15 A. Just one.
16 Q. And who was that?
17 A. It was Marko Sladojevic.
18 Q. How long did you meet with Marko Sladojevic in July or possibly
19 June 2012?
20 A. For about an hour and a half. It was longer than an hour, it was
21 less than two.
22 Q. And did you discuss with Mr. Sladojevic the subject matter of
23 your testimony or, rather, the subject matter of your statement?
24 A. Yes. In fact, it was on that occasion that I gave my verbal
25 statement which he taped and transcribed and sent back to me in the
1 written form.
2 Q. I'm sorry, did you say that he taped that statement?
3 A. Yes. As far as I remember, he actually was taking -- taping my
4 voice at that time.
5 Q. You didn't receive a copy of that tape, right?
6 A. No.
7 Q. And was he taking notes?
8 A. He was also taking notes, yes.
9 Q. And you didn't receive a copy of those notes, did you?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Okay. And did he take notes throughout the period of time that
12 he was speaking to you regarding the events that you were -- your
13 evidence was to cover?
14 A. Well, he was taking them on and off, but notebook was in evidence
15 all the time.
16 Q. Okay. You met with him for about an hour -- between an hour and
17 two hours --
18 A. That's right, yes.
19 Q. Do you remember where the meeting took place?
20 A. The meeting took place at a law office in Belgrade. It's in a
21 suburban area of Belgrade. The name of the law office I don't remember,
22 but it was in a private villa converted for use as -- as an office.
23 Q. Did you meet with Mr. Sladojevic or any other member of the
24 Defence team at any point subsequent to this meeting that may have --
25 that occurred either in June or July of 2012, to the best of your
2 A. No, not until my arrival here at The Hague when I had a brief
3 meeting with Mr. Robinson on the evening of my arrival on Monday, the day
4 before yesterday.
5 Q. The day before yesterday. Did you meet with anybody besides
6 Mr. Robinson prior to testifying here today?
7 A. I also had a coffee with Mr. Sladojevic and one of the interns at
8 the hotel yesterday afternoon.
9 Q. Did you discuss the subject matter of your testimony with either
10 Mr. Robinson or Mr. Sladojevic between the time that you arrived on
11 Monday and your testimony here today?
12 A. With Mr. Sladojevic the discussion was more about the questions I
13 am likely to be asked rather than my own testimony, and with Mr. Robinson
14 it was simply the confirmation that the testimony in its written form
15 basically stands and that there are no amendments or changes that I wish
16 to make.
17 Q. You didn't discuss the tape recording of your previous statement
18 or the notes that Mr. Sladojevic took during the course of your meeting
19 in Belgrade with either Mr. Robinson or Mr. Sladojevic following your
20 arrival; is that fair?
21 A. That's correct. No, we did not.
22 Q. And you didn't receive it; right?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Okay. Did you have an opportunity to meet with Dr. Karadzic
25 before you testified here today since your arrival?
1 A. Yes. I met Dr. Karadzic yesterday here in the court building
2 between 1505 and 1600.
3 Q. Did you discuss with him the subject matter of your testimony?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You did. And what exactly did you discuss with him concerning
6 your testimony?
7 A. Well, simply recouping the substance of the testimony and
8 confirming that this is more or less what I have to say, and then we
9 actually moved on to different topics that are not really even related to
10 the court case.
11 Q. In terms of, you say, recouping the substance of your testimony,
12 what do you mean by that exactly?
13 A. In particular, the meeting on the 13th of July and that my
14 recollection of the course -- of the most significant detail of that
15 meeting is -- is solid, which it is.
16 Q. What is the most significant detail of that meeting,
17 Mr. Trifkovic?
18 A. That the call that was put through from Dr. Karadzic's office to
19 the BSA headquarters was not, in fact, connected to General Mladic but to
20 some other officer at the HQ.
21 Q. And you discussed that with Dr. Karadzic yesterday, the day
23 A. Yesterday, when we simply -- we didn't really discuss it. We
24 just confirmed that the statement stands and that there are no addenda or
25 changes required.
1 Q. You discussed that same topic with Mr. Sladojevic when you met
2 him back in July or June of last year?
3 A. Well, as I say, when I met with Mr. Sladojevic last summer, I
4 actually made the statement, so I didn't discuss it, so to say. I was
5 really putting the statement together rather than discussing its details,
6 and he was more in the role of taking notes and then preparing the
7 written summary which I received by e-mail a couple of weeks later.
8 Q. Okay. And I just want to cover one last issue and that is in
9 your exchange of e-mails with the Defence, before the meeting that
10 occurred in Belgrade, did you discuss this very important detail
11 concerning the meeting of the 13th of July, 1995, in Dr. Karadzic's
12 office in Pale?
13 A. We didn't discuss the details of the meeting itself, but it was
14 indicated to me that the focus of my requested testimony would be on --
15 on that meeting. In other words, while in the e-mails the details of the
16 meeting were not covered, I was made aware that that particular meeting
17 would be the subject of my testimony.
18 Q. Very well. So prior to testifying here today, it's fair to say
19 that you've had a number of contacts with the Defence team --
20 A. I had --
21 Q. -- concerning your testimony or evidence regarding that 13 July
23 A. Yes. I had one encounter with Mr. Sladojevic in Belgrade, one
24 with Mr. Robinson at the hotel on Monday evening. I met with
25 Dr. Karadzic yesterday afternoon, and I had a brief meeting with
1 Mr. Sladojevic at the hotel again late afternoon yesterday.
2 Q. All right. Thank you. Dr. Karadzic began by indicating that you
3 were an editor for "Chronicles," which is a magazine; yes?
4 A. It's a monthly magazine, yes, and I'm foreign affairs editor.
5 Q. Foreign affairs editor for "Chronicles." How long have you held
6 that position, Doctor?
7 A. Since 1998 with the one-year disruption between the fall of 2008
8 and the end of 2009.
9 Q. So all in all, about 14 years? Is that about right?
10 A. That's right, yes.
11 Q. Now, I just want to jump back for a period of time. Back in
12 1993, you essentially took on a role as a media spokesperson, as it were,
13 for the Republika Srpska leadership; is that fair to say?
14 A. No, it's not fair to say that at all.
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. At no time was there any institutionalised or hierarchical
17 connection, and in all of my media appearances I presented myself as a
18 Balkan affairs analyst with close links to the Bosnian Serb leadership
19 but not as their spokesman or representative.
20 Q. It is a fact, though, that you have been referred to in the media
21 as such a spokesperson; right?
22 A. I have been referred to in the media in all kinds of ways, and of
23 course, such references do not necessarily reflect the realities of the
25 Q. So that's a yes.
1 A. I have been referred in that way to -- and as I said, I've also
2 been referred to in various other ways, complimentary or otherwise.
3 Q. We'll get to those.
4 A. Okay.
5 Q. But you have been referred to in the media as a spokesperson for
6 the Republika Srpska leadership?
7 A. I have been erroneously referred to in the media in that way.
8 Q. All right. And it is also a fact that the RS leadership and
9 Dr. Karadzic in particular never disavowed publicly any such association;
11 A. That I wouldn't know, but my visits to Dr. Karadzic during the
12 two-year period on six or seven occasions were not frequent enough for me
13 to know either whether they're aware of such media references or whether
14 they reacted to them.
15 Q. Did you tell them about it?
16 A. Not specifically. Frankly, I don't think that what some third
17 party may or may not have said about me matters. I think it's far more
18 important in my media appearances, interviews, and writings how I was
20 Q. All right.
21 A. And invariably in those I was presented not as a spokesman but
22 actually as an analyst with links or connections or with close ties.
23 Q. That relationship as a media representative came about as the
24 result of an initiative that was undertaken by Dr. Koljevic back in 1993;
1 A. In September of 1993, Dr. Koljevic and I discussed the
2 possibility of a more formal framework for such a relationship, but in
3 fact it never materialised for a variety of logistic, financial and
4 organisational reasons.
5 Q. That initiative was formalised in a proposal to Dr. Karadzic; is
6 that fair?
7 A. I don't think that "formalised" would be a precise term for
8 something that was still in a preliminary and tentative form. It
9 certainly never reached the form of -- of a detailed proposal.
10 Q. All right. In your testimony in the Popovic case, which I'm sure
11 you recall since you published it on your web page, you said, and this is
12 at page 25212 for the transcript, line 6, beginning at line 6, rather:
13 "I therefore indicated to Professor Koljevic before he formalised
14 the proposal to Dr. Karadzic that I would accept an informal arrangement
15 in which my ability to continue with my other professional pursuits would
16 not be hindered, and which would also enable me to present and articulate
17 positions and analysis in accordance with my own understanding rather
18 than in accordance with anyone's formal instructions."
19 Do you remember saying that, sir?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And you used word "formalised"; right?
22 A. But it doesn't mean that the proposal had ever been formalised as
23 such. What I said, that before Koljevic does so, he should bear in mind
24 and then if you look at the rest of the sentence, it is quite obvious
25 that I did not want to be a formal spokesman, that I, in fact, wanted to
1 be free to articulate my views and positions without any interference
2 from anyone else, which is in fact quite different from being either a
3 spokesman or a representative.
4 Q. We've got that, Dr. Trifkovic. But in fact, what you did is you
5 arranged this particular scenario so that you could give the RS
6 government and leadership plausible deniability.
7 A. Well, first of all, in order to reach this conclusion, we would
8 need to go from what had been discussed between Professor Koljevic and me
9 to what actually came to pass and --
10 Q. Well, let me put it to you this way, then. What you said in your
11 testimony in the Popovic case is, and I quote this, at page 25213,
12 beginning at line 2:
13 "I wanted to give them the ability to obtain plausible
15 Do you dispute that?
16 A. Oh, no.
17 Q. So that's -- that's one of the reasons why you reached this,
18 quote/unquote, "informal arrangement" with Dr. Koljevic in relation to
19 your media representations concerning the RS leadership --
20 A. Let me be very specific about the use of the term "plausible
21 deniability." Because I didn't want to have any line of hierarchical
22 command for my writings and media appearances, because I did not want to
23 be subjected to anyone's articulation of positions which I would be
24 obliged to follow, I didn't need plausible deniability, but in order to
25 dispel any impression that my statements with which they may disagree are
1 their own, the term "plausible deniability" referred specifically to
2 their ability to say in good faith that Dr. Trifkovic does not represent
3 Republika Srpska. And that, again, is tied in to what you said earlier
4 about my being represented by some media as a spokesman, that, in fact,
5 it was very important to avoid any such connection in order to preserve
6 both my independence and their ability to dissociate themselves from me.
7 Q. Thank you for that explanation. Your representation of the RS
8 leadership's positions in the media was something that they never
9 disagreed with you about; right?
10 A. First of all, I don't even know if and to what extent they've
11 been aware of all the media appearances I've had, and I've had quite a
12 few, but at the same time, during my visits to Pale, my primary focus was
13 to find out what's going on, to get Dr. Karadzic's and his advisors'
14 assessment of the political, diplomatic, and military situation, and my
15 media appearances were hardly ever even discussed.
16 Q. That's very interesting, because in your Popovic testimony - and
17 again I refer you and the Chamber to page 25213 - you specifically said
18 you wanted to give them plausible deniability, as I've just said, in
19 order to preserve their ability to distance themselves from your analysis
20 as presented to the media, this is at line 6 and line 7, which by the way
21 did not happen. That's true; right?
22 A. I'm not aware of them ever dissociating themselves from me, but I
23 don't see what is so interesting, because I already dwelt on the subject
24 of plausible deniability. I specifically wanted them to be able to
25 dissociate themselves if necessary.
1 Q. But they didn't?
2 A. Not that I'm aware, no.
3 Q. Ever?
4 A. Ever meaning September '03 to July '05, yes, 22 months.
5 Q. To this day, Dr. Trifkovic?
6 A. I -- sorry, I don't understand the substance --
7 Q. That's all right.
8 A. Are you suggesting that perhaps President Dodik should
9 retroactively disassociate himself from my statements 17 years ago?
10 Q. To this day you have not heard that the Republika Srpska
11 leadership at any point ever dissociated themselves from your
12 representations concerning them during the time that you were speaking to
13 the media in their behalf --
14 A. I'm not --
15 Q. [Overlapping speakers] --
16 A. -- aware of any statements made to the media on their behalf
17 ever, so the question is -- needs to be rephrased. I have never
18 represented them, and I have never made statements to the media either
19 purporting to represent them or doing so in substance.
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The French translation has only now
21 been completed. Please continue, Mr. Vanderpuye.
22 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Q. You maintained contacts with the RS leadership between 1993 and
24 1995; correct?
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. You also made media appearances in which you spoke about the
2 positions of the RS leadership, specifically the events in the Balkans
3 during the war from the Serbian point of view during that period of time;
4 correct? You can answer that yes or no, sir.
5 A. It's -- it's a multilayered question, so I think that a yes or no
6 is not in order.
7 Q. Let me break it down, then.
8 A. Mm-hmm.
9 Q. You made media appearances between 1993 and 1995; correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. During those media appearances between 1993 and 1995, you gave
12 analyses concerning the war?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. You gave those analyses from the position of the Serbian point of
16 A. No.
17 Q. Let me refer you to your testimony in the Popovic case at
18 transcript 252, line 25 and following. 25210, I'm sorry, lines 25 and
20 You begin at the bottom of that page:
21 "I was regularly interviewed, especially when it came to
22 presenting a Serbian point of view in the ongoing conflicts in the former
25 A. True.
1 Q. During that period of time, you maintained this informal
2 relationship with the Bosnian Serb leadership as you have described.
3 A. Before we go on, I really need to come back to your question and
4 then the quote from the Popovic trial. It is one thing to give analysis
5 from the position of the Serbian point of view. It is another to present
6 a Serbian point of view in the context of interviews. In other words, my
7 interviews were meant to provide an overall assessment within which I
8 would present the Serbian point of view not necessarily as my own. Your
9 question would imply that my media appearances were reflecting the
10 Serbian point of view, whereas I insist that my media appearances were
11 value neutral in the analytical sense but they were valuable to the media
12 in that within those appearances I could authoritatively speak about what
13 was the position, for instance, of the Bosnian Serb leadership. There is
14 a distinction between the two.
15 Q. I appreciate that, sir. I'm just reading back what your
16 testimony was four --
17 A. And I am on the basis of that testimony explaining why the answer
18 to your question "you gave those analyses from the Serbian point of view"
19 was no.
20 Q. During the period of time that you had --
21 THE ACCUSED: May I for transcript. The last answer was
22 allocated to Excellency Kwon and it's not.
23 JUDGE KWON: It will be corrected later. Thank you.
24 MR. VANDERPUYE:
25 Q. You gave an interview in November 1994 to the BBC World Service's
1 News Hour. During that period or during that interview you said this:
2 "Nobody is taking into account the fact that Dr. Karadzic's
3 overall strategy had always been that the Serbs do not want to occupy
4 Muslim inhabited areas, that they simply want to separate themselves from
5 the Muslims and to have three republics in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina,
6 possibly in the form of some loose union."
7 Do you remember saying that, Dr. Trifkovic?
8 A. I don't remember that specific programme, but this would be
9 broadly something that I would say when asked about Dr. Karadzic's
11 Q. In fact, you said basically that in your statement at
12 paragraph 20, where you say one of Dr. Karadzic's views was that the Serb
13 side did not want to defeat the Muslims militarily --
14 A. Right.
15 Q. -- but that each constituent nation should become master of its
16 own fate; right?
17 A. Well, that is perfectly consistent with my previous answer. In
18 other words, I don't remember that specific statement in that particular
19 programme, but that would broadly reflect the position of Dr. Karadzic as
20 I understood it.
21 Q. And as you represented it?
22 A. No. I never represented that position. As part of my analysis,
23 I could also have said that President Izetbegovic's overall strategy is
24 that there should be a centralised Bosnian state or that Milosevic's
25 overall strategy -- so in other words, let us please not use the term
1 "representation," because it would be misrepresenting my role and my
2 journalistic activities.
3 Q. When I say "represent," I mean something that you said.
4 A. Oh, in that sense, yes.
5 Q. All right. And you said it to the media.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. On a number of occasions?
8 A. Yes.
9 MR. VANDERPUYE: Okay. I think now's a good time for the break,
10 Mr. President.
11 JUDGE KWON: Now you realise how much of a pause you should put
12 between the question and the answers.
13 We will have a break for 45 minutes and resume at 17 past 1.00.
14 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 1.17 p.m.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Vanderpuye.
17 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 Q. Mr. Trifkovic, when we left off I was asking you about some of
19 the things you said to the media in this particular instance regarding
20 the position or posture of the Bosnian Serb leadership while you were
21 making various -- or giving various interviews and talks and so on. I
22 want to show you 65 ter -- rather, P2085. Let me start by asking you --
23 I don't think we have the English on there yet.
24 This, you can see, is a decision for further operations dated
25 24 November 1992. It is type-signed Colonel Milenko Milanovic, at that
1 time the commander of the Drina Corps. Have you seen this document
2 before, sir?
3 A. Not to my recollection, no.
4 Q. Let me just acquaint you with it a little bit. You can see that
5 it's issued pursuant to the directive of the Main Staff of the Army of
6 Republika Srpska with a -- an order of the -- a directive, rather, of the
7 confidential number 02/5 of 19 November 1992. And it says, at
8 paragraph 1:
9 To launch an attack using the main body of troops and major
10 equipment to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses, exhaust
11 them, break them up, or force them to surrender, and force the Muslim
12 local population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and
14 Are you familiar with this operation, if not this order?
15 A. No, not specifically. I have no idea what this is.
16 Q. To force the local Muslim population to abandon the areas of
17 Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde is not consistent with the things
18 you were saying in the media in 1994, is it?
19 A. It would not have been consistent had I been aware of some other
20 policy in place. It was consistent with not only what I was told and
21 conveyed but what other academic analysts and journalists were made to
22 believe or understand on the basis of meetings with Dr. Karadzic. In
23 addition, you're talking about a document from the fall of 1992, and the
24 quote from that News Night interview referred to sometime two years
25 later. Had I been privy to confidential and --
1 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask that you step back
2 from the microphone, please. Thank you.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Trifkovic, did you hear that? Could you
4 distance yourself from the microphone. You are too close to the
6 THE WITNESS: Had I been privy to top-secret documents from the
7 Republika Srpska military, then indeed it would have made my task so much
8 more interesting because that would indicate a certain degree of
9 contradiction between the military orders and the line taken by the
10 political powers that be.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE:
12 Q. All right. You are aware, of course, that Dr. Karadzic said that
13 he signed off on Directives 1 through 7 at least?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please provide a
16 MR. VANDERPUYE: It's the 54th Assembly session minutes. I can
17 be more specific if the Chamber finds it necessary.
18 Q. Are you familiar with Dr. Karadzic having said that,
19 Dr. Trifkovic?
20 A. I would need to be reminded what specifically are those seven
22 Q. I'll let the Chamber worry about that. At P1415, e-court page 84
23 through 86 in English, and 108 through 111 in B/C/S, Dr. Karadzic said:
24 "I have examined, approved, and signed seven directives. No one
25 submitted the eighth and the ninth to me."
1 A. Apparently this refers to a session of the Republika Srpska
2 National Assembly from October of 1995, and my last meeting with
3 Dr. Karadzic prior to yesterday afternoon was on 14th of July, 1995. And
4 with the beginning of NATO operations in August, my focus was already
5 being transferred into -- back into academic sphere with the beginning of
6 the 1995-1996 academic year. So I am not familiar with the minutes of
7 the 54th session of the Republika Srpska National Assembly, because by
8 that time I was no longer focusing on Bosnian events in -- to the same
9 extent as previously.
10 Q. So the answer is no. You're not --
11 A. The answer is no.
12 Q. -- aware that he said that?
13 A. Yeah, yeah.
14 Q. Let me show you P838. The Chamber's heard a lot of evidence
15 about this document. It's entitled "Directive for Further Operations
16 Number 7," and it is signed by Dr. Karadzic.
17 MR. VANDERPUYE: We will need to go to page 10 in the English and
18 page 8 in the B/C/S, I believe. And here in the English at the bottom
19 you'll see there's a reference to the Drina Corps. Are we on page 8 in
20 the B/C/S? Try 9 or 7, please. Bear with me one moment and I'll get you
21 the B/C/S page.
22 If it's all right with the Chamber, if we could just proceed with
23 the English, I can get through this, I think, relatively quickly. I
24 don't have the correct B/C/S reference in my notes.
25 Q. Dr. Trifkovic, at the bottom of this paragraph you will see tasks
1 that are directed to the Drina Corps, the same corps that Zivanovic
2 commanded, that I showed you in the previous document, and in this
3 particular document it provides for the -- it says:
4 "By planned and well-thought-out combat activities, operations,
5 create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of
6 further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
7 Are you familiar with that language in this document?
8 A. I am familiar with that language which surfaced in subsequent
9 years. I was not familiar with the document at the time.
10 Q. Let me take you to page 14 in the English.
11 JUDGE KWON: It was page 15 in B/C/S, Drina Corps.
12 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. And hopefully this
13 will be page 21 in the B/C/S.
14 Q. In this section you will see in the third paragraph from the
15 bottom, it states that:
16 "The relevant state and military organs responsible for work with
17 UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall through the planned and
18 unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the
19 logistic support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material
20 resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our goodwill
21 while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the international
22 community and international public opinion."
23 Have you seen that language before, and are you familiar with it?
24 A. No, I'm not familiar with it.
25 Q. It's fair to say this is not consistent with what you were saying
1 in 1994 concerning the policies of the Republika Srpska leadership?
2 A. It is not consistent with the position of the Republika Srpska
3 leadership as conveyed to me by the leaders at the time. But let me
4 repeat, I am not familiar with this document or with this language on
5 paragraph third from bottom.
6 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Now, if I could just quickly go back.
7 You indicated that you worked for "Chronicles" magazine. Yes?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And you worked there for about 14 years?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Did you work for or did you have any association with the
12 Lord Byron Foundation during that period of time?
13 A. Yes. I've had all along, in fact, the position of executive
14 director which is an unpaid voluntary position.
15 Q. Okay. And the "Chronicles" magazine is a publication that's put
16 out by the Rockford Institute?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You're aware that the Rockford Institute is a paleoconservative
19 organisation that's been criticised by many people, including its former
20 New York branch director, John Neuhaus?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And he's referred to that movement, paleoconservative movement,
23 as xenophobic, racist, and nativist?
24 A. It's up to Mr. Neuhaus to have his opinions. The fact that
25 people say something about someone doesn't make it so.
1 Q. But he said it; right?
2 A. Yes, indeed.
3 Q. Thomas Fleming is the current president and editor of
4 "Chronicles" magazine; right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And he has been publicly denounced as an anti-Semite and
7 Holocaust revisionist. Yes?
8 A. Such attacks I'm not specifically familiar with. Holocaust
9 revisionist, no. I've heard of him being attacked for anti-Semitism but
10 not for Holocaust revisionism, no.
11 Q. Okay. Let me ask if you're familiar with this, then. A document
12 or an article that he wrote dated 3rd August 2006, he stated:
13 "Theories of history are matters of fact and reason. The fact
14 that so many troublemakers of the past 150 years have been of Jewish
15 extraction - Marx, Freud, the Neoconservatives - is certainly no argument
16 in their favour. Jewish 'intellectuals' continue to be in the forefront
17 of the movements that aim to destroy our religion and culture."
18 It's a document or an article entitled "Mel, poor Mel," referring
19 to Mel Gibson, I'm sure, dated 3rd August 2006.
20 Are you familiar with that language?
21 A. No. I haven't read that article.
22 MR. VANDERPUYE: Let me put up 65 ter 24549, please.
23 Q. I'm just going to refer you very quickly to the bottom -- or,
24 rather, the last paragraph on the page where you can see the quote that I
25 read out.
1 Can you see it, Dr. Trifkovic?
2 A. Yes, except for the last bit of the last sentence.
4 MR. VANDERPUYE: And maybe we can go to the next page.
5 Q. Do you see what I read out?
6 A. Mm-hmm.
7 Q. Okay. Thank you. We'll move on. You continue to work with
8 Mr. Fleming; is that right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Now, you have your own set of writings, and you've been rather
11 outspoken concerning your views of Islam and of Muslims; right?
12 A. Of Islam more than of Muslims, but yes.
13 Q. Okay. And you've written hundreds of articles, papers and
14 similar materials on the subject?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. You've made numerous appearances, interviews, conferences,
17 lectures, and so on, concerning those views and subject matter?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And you've given talks to youth groups, college students in
20 relation to those views; yes?
21 A. Youth groups? College students, yes, but I don't remember youth
22 groups. But if you remind me, I'll happily confirm.
23 Q. Okay. I'd like to show you --
24 A. Not that it matters --
25 Q. I'm sorry?
1 A. Not that it matters. But, okay, let's go on.
2 Q. Okay. And your views are widely considered extreme? Yes?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Okay. Hateful?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Okay. And they're considered bigoted?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Anti-Islam?
9 A. Look --
10 Q. You can answer yes or no?
11 A. No -- well, absolutely not.
12 Q. I'd like to show you a video of -- and it's very short. It's at
13 65 ter 40604. This of a talk that you gave to a group called Youth for
14 Western Civilisation, from 21 October 2010, I believe -- or 2011.
15 [Video-clip played]
16 "Those among us who put their families and their neighbourhoods
17 and their lands before all others are normal people. Those who tell them
18 that their attachments should be global and their lands and
19 neighbourhoods belong to the whole world are sick and evil.
20 "They are the enemy and Jihad's objective allies, and it is up to
21 the millions of normal people to stop the madness. The traitor class
22 wants them to share its death-wish, to self-annihilate its people with a
23 historical memory of a cultural identity and to make room for the
24 post-human, monistic utopia spearheaded by the Jihadist fifth column.
25 This crime, epitomised by Ground Zero mosque, can and must be stopped.
1 "The founders of the United States overthrew the colonial
2 government for offences that were far lighter than those of which the
3 traitor class is guilty.
4 "The alternative is decline, collapse and death, moral and
5 spiritual first.
6 "You'll know if the Ground Zero mosque is built that we are
7 obviously dead."
8 MR. VANDERPUYE:
9 Q. Do you recall that talk, Dr. Trifkovic?
10 A. Yes.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE: I'm not sure if the Chamber could hear very well
12 what was said and I would inquire, Mr. President, because the volume was
13 very low in my headphones.
14 JUDGE KWON: I was just told that unfortunately there was no
15 translation in French. This time because I note that transcript has been
16 uploaded into e-court --
17 MR. VANDERPUYE: That's correct, Mr. President, and I understood
18 that the booths have copies of the transcript.
19 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue, then.
20 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.
21 Q. Mr. Trifkovic, you refer to a traitor class, traitor class. In
22 the context of your talk, I understand that to be people who generally
23 are willing to extend respect and consideration to people of the
24 Islamic --
25 A. No, quite the contrary. I said specifically people who deny the
1 validity and legitimacy of traditional forms of loyalty based upon the
2 family, the community, and the nation. I referred to the traitor class
3 specifically in reference to certain upholders of cultural ideological
4 traits commonly known as -- under the label "multiculturalism" which
5 sometimes goes to the extreme of denying the validity and legitimacy of
6 traditional bonds of culture, language, identity, and the insistence that
7 those loyalties need to become loyal -- sorry, global and universal.
8 Q. The multiculturalists.
9 A. There are various levels of multiculturalism, but certainly I was
10 referring to the form that specifically seeks or upholds the belief in a
11 form of transnational global identity as the preferred final model.
12 Q. All right.
13 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I'd like to tender this
14 particular exhibit.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6098, Your Honours.
17 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you.
18 Q. You wrote an article called "Banned from Canadistan"?
19 A. Mm-hmm.
20 Q. 24 February 2011?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And just so the record is clear, you're referring to having been
23 denied entry into the country of Canada?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. In that article you wrote that:
1 "It appears that my contacts with the Bosnian Serb leaders in the
2 early 1990s -- or, rather, the early '90s makes me 'inadmissible' today.
3 As it happens, I was never one of their officials, senior or otherwise."
4 All right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And that's what you assert here today; correct?
7 A. By the way, that is what the board of immigration reviews agreed
8 with, because on 18th of September, 2012, they adjudicated the case in my
9 favour. And if you wish, I have the PDF of that decision on my laptop in
10 the waiting-room.
11 Q. My question is: That's what you assert here today, Dr.
12 Trifkovic; is that right?
13 A. Excuse me?
14 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
15 stand back from the microphone.
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. You're not hearing the interpreter's
18 MR. VANDERPUYE: I don't hear anything at all. I couldn't even
19 hear when the Registrar announced the P number of the exhibit.
20 JUDGE KWON: Probably the volume. Could you turn up the volume
21 of the headphone? Do you hear me, Mr. Vanderpuye, now?
22 MR. VANDERPUYE: I hear you, yes.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Trifkovic, you're being asked again to put some
24 distance from the microphone.
25 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye. Could you repeat your
3 MR. VANDERPUYE:
4 Q. The question was: Mr. Trifkovic, that's what you assert here
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. By the way, do you walk around with that PDF with you at all
9 A. No, I walk around with my laptop a lot, and it just happens to be
10 on it.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. Had I intended to produce it, I would have said up-front. But
13 since you raised the issue, I just mentioned it in passing and as an act
14 of courtesy.
15 Q. You said that the reasons why you were denied basically boiled
16 down to some spurious reasons.
17 MR. VANDERPUYE: And if we want, we'll put that up.
18 65 ter 24546, and we'll have to go to paragraph 3.
19 THE WITNESS: Absolutely, that's what I said.
20 MR. VANDERPUYE:
21 Q. Okay. And you say in the article:
22 "Why should the Canadian authorities suddenly decide to keep me
23 out of the country now and for transparently spurious reasons," and you
24 answer your own question, saying, "because the Muslims told them so."
25 Your words?
1 A. Exactly.
2 Q. On that's the reason for the title "Canadistan"; right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You mention that the immigration board adjudicated your case
5 recently, yes?
6 A. There were three hearings on April 2nd and 3rd --
7 Q. I don't need the dates.
8 A. Okay. Yes, on September 18th, the case was decided in my favour.
9 Q. You were in contact with Dr. Karadzic in 1994, as you indicated
10 in your statement; right?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. In January 1994, June 1994, September 1994; right?
13 A. I would have to check those dates but --
14 Q. You don't remember?
15 A. Roughly I believe that to be correct.
16 Q. You were in contact with Dr. Karadzic in January 1995,
17 March 1995, and July 1995?
18 A. Correct.
19 MR. VANDERPUYE: For the Chamber's benefit, those references are
20 at P4368, English pages 3, 4, 46, 71, 72 respectively. And March 23rd,
21 1995, can be found at page 37 of P2242, and July at page 90 and 91 of
22 that exhibit.
23 JUDGE KWON: Is it his agenda recorded by --
24 MR. VANDERPUYE: Indeed, Mr. President. For 1994 and 1995.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 MR. VANDERPUYE:
2 Q. You were familiar enough with President Karadzic that you could
3 actually pick up the telephone line in his office in July, as you
4 indicate in your statement, without knowing who was on the other end?
5 A. No. I assumed that General Mladic would be on the other end and
6 I asked Dr. Karadzic to speak to General Mladic and to ask him for a
7 statement about Srebrenica after he has finished talking to him. So my
8 request to pick up the auxiliary line was based on the assumption that it
9 would be General Mladic on the other end and that I would be able to
10 obtain a statement from him.
11 Q. All right. You did pick up the phone line; right?
12 A. Yeah.
13 Q. Now, I asked you before about the types of characterizations of
14 your work you were aware of in the public domain. Have you been
15 characterized in the public domain as a genocide denier?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Have you been characterized in the public domain as a plagiarist?
18 A. No, not that I'm aware.
19 Q. Do you remember testifying in the Stakic trial, Dr. Trifkovic?
20 You can answer that yes or no.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And do you remember being confronted about your report during the
23 course of that trial on cross-examination?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And during the course of that cross-examination, were you not
1 challenged as a plagiarist for having copied the works of other authors?
2 A. It concerned a quote and not my own language.
3 Q. Yes or no?
4 A. No.
5 Q. You weren't challenged as a plagiarist for having plagiarised
6 someone else's work in the Stakic trial? Is that your testimony, sir?
7 A. Yes. But I deny the directness of the assertion.
8 Q. All right. In 2008 you wrote an article, this one was called
9 "Can the West Be Saved?" 10 May 2008. You said in that article:
10 "Today's Europe does not create social and civilisation
11 commonalities except on the basis of wholesale denial of old morays,
12 disdain for inherited values, and an over-rejection of traditional
13 culture. It creates the dreary sameness of antidiscrimination and
15 Your words?
16 A. Except that "Europe" should be in either italics or quotes
17 because it refers to the European Union.
18 Q. Your words?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. You believe that?
21 A. Of course, taken out of context, this does not convey the
22 fullness of what I was talking about, and frankly, I see no relevance to
23 my sworn testimony. I could also believe that Elvis is well and runs a
24 pizza joint in Oahu, or that Neil Armstrong's landing on moon was faked.
25 I don't see how my believes, however eccentric from your point of view
1 they may seem, are relevant to my sworn testimony here today.
2 Q. I'll let the Chamber worry about that.
3 A. Well, we've been going on this way for a fairly long time.
4 Q. Let me ask you this. In that same article you say, and this is
5 talking about respect for the Islamic faith or people of that persuasion:
6 "If such respect continues to be extended by the elite class, by
7 the end of the century there will be no 'Europeans' as members of ethnic
8 groups that share the same language, culture, history, and ancestors, and
9 inhabit lands associated with their names."
10 You go on to say:
11 "The shrinking native populations will be indoctrinated into
12 believing or else simply forced into accepting of the democratic shift in
13 favour of unassimilable and hostile aliens is actually a blessing that
14 enriches their culturally deprived and morally unsustainable societies."
15 Your words, sir?
16 A. My words, indeed, and not at all remarkable in the context of
17 recent writings on the subject, including Mark Steyn and -- do you want
18 me to quote some other authors who have been in the public domain saying
19 similar things?
20 Q. I think my question was clear: Your words, sir?
21 A. Yes, my words.
22 Q. You believe it?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I'd like to tender this article.
1 It's at 65 ter 4568.
2 JUDGE KWON: I haven't seen it.
3 MR. VANDERPUYE: I'll put it up, Mr. President. Thank you.
4 You're referring to the quote, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE KWON: Where is it?
6 MR. VANDERPUYE: I'll give it to you in just a second. I'm
8 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Robinson?
9 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive it.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6099, Your Honours.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, while we have a break here, I have
14 a request that the Chamber reconsider the amount of time that has been
15 allocated to the Prosecution for the cross-examination of this witness
16 and reduce it because I have to say, with all due respect to counsel,
17 this has been one of the most empty cross-examinations that we've had.
18 We've been going on for over an hour now and not even touched this topic
19 of the meeting of the 13th and 14th of July, fishing around about
20 contacts with the Defence for about 15 minutes, articles on his personal
21 opinions. So I think obviously you gave them way too much time for this
22 length of the statement and the scope of it. So I would ask that you
23 give them ten more minutes and let's move on to something more
25 JUDGE KWON: Well, does it not go to his credibility?
1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I think it does, but it's his beliefs and his
2 positions that he's taken are only worth so much time of the Chamber. If
3 you look at the times you told Dr. Karadzic to move on and compare it
4 with what we've been listening to for the last hour, I think you'd have
5 told him that ten times by now.
6 JUDGE KWON: I don't remember the Chamber ever restricted his
7 cross-examination on relevant issues. I'll consult my colleagues.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber made a ruling to allow the Prosecution
10 to use one and a half hours, and the Chamber is not minded at this time
11 to limit his cross-examination in any event.
12 Please continue, Mr. Vanderpuye.
13 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Q. Sir, you wrote an article in January 2007. It's called "Dinesh
15 the Dhimmi."
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Do you remember that one?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And in that article you quoted someone by the name of Bat Ye'or;
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You said that:
23 "Only Islam has the ability to evoke this eagerly cringing
24 attitude. Only Islam has this facility of inducing people to surrender
25 psychologically to it even before it has any actual power over them."
1 Do you remember that?
2 A. This sounds like Bat Ye'or's quote, not mine. Right?
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpretation intervention: Could the
4 document be placed on the screen before quotation.
5 MR. VANDERPUYE: I'm sorry, I didn't hear what was said.
6 JUDGE KWON: The interpreters are asking to upload the document.
7 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, 4578, please. Page 3.
8 THE ACCUSED: First I would like to see the front page to see the
9 title because it's not in the transcript.
10 [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE:
12 Q. At page 3 is the part that I read. Last paragraph, and it begins
13 at just about the third line up from the bottom of that paragraph. It
15 "Of all of the social, ethnic, religious, political
16 movements ..."
17 Do you see that, Dr. Trifkovic?
18 A. Yes.
19 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I'd like to tender this documents
20 is well.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6100, Your Honours.
23 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you.
24 Q. In another article, 65 ter 4572, you call Islam a psychosis. Do
25 you recall using those words, sir?
1 A. Before we proceed, what you quoted in the previous article was a
2 quote and not my own language, but I obviously used it approvingly.
3 Q. You subscribe to it. You believe it?
4 A. Broadly, yes.
5 Q. You referred to Islam as a psychosis. Do you remember that?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. This was an article that you wrote in November 2003. It is
8 65 ter 4572. And that you believe as well; correct?
9 A. The term "Islam is psychosis" was first used in fact by Dr. Quill
10 [phoen] in his writings about his trips in North Africa in the 1840s, as
11 far as I can remember. But, yes, I did say so.
12 Q. Okay.
13 A. And if given a chance, I would like to elaborate what exactly I
14 mean by that term.
15 Q. Let me ask you about a different article. This one's called
16 "Islamic Terrorism in Italy, The Shape of Things to Come." It's from
17 27 February 2002. In this article - it's 65 ter 4573 - you say:
18 "The old liberal secular antipathy to Christianity has converged
19 with the new PC movement and the therapeutic society to produce a climate
20 wherein it is easy for the Muslims to lie about the nature of Islam."
21 Your words?
22 A. Oh, dear. Everything out of context. Yes, my words, absolutely,
23 but --
24 MR. VANDERPUYE: Page 3, for the record.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] These words out of context have not
1 entered the transcript.
2 JUDGE KWON: No, it's there.
3 MR. VANDERPUYE:
4 Q. You go on to say, just under the part where it says, "Britain
5 leads the way":
6 "Islam has never learned to live as a minority. It simply cannot
7 reconstruct itself in Western societies."
8 And on page 5, you say:
9 "If and when the Constitutional Court," referring to Germany,
10 "allows clitoridectomy for Muslim girls, presumably another important
11 step will be made, but that integration will complete only when
12 Pakistanis in Britain, Algerians in France, and Turks in Germany turn the
13 host country into an Islamic society by compelling it to adapt to their
14 way of life."
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I'll tender this as well.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6101, Your Honours.
20 MR. VANDERPUYE:
21 Q. You have a solution to keep that from happening, Dr. Trifkovic,
22 isn't that right? And that's --
23 A. I wish there was one, but --
24 Q. Well, the one you've proposed is to deport citizens, immigrants
25 alike of Islamic background --
1 A. No --
2 Q. -- out of --
3 A. Those engaged in Islamist activities.
4 Q. May I finish my question, sir?
5 A. All right.
6 Q. Thank you. Your solution is to deport citizen and immigrant
7 alike that are Muslims --
8 A. No.
9 Q. -- out of Western countries.
10 A. Absolutely not.
11 Q. Let me play you 65 ter 24539.
12 MR. VANDERPUYE: We'll start this clip at 8.29, and this is from
13 a radio you gave in 2010, I believe.
14 [Audiotape played]
15 "Welcome back to issues, et cetera --"
16 MR. VANDERPUYE: We'll start this at 8.29 so that we can move
17 along quicker.
18 [Audiotape played]
19 "ST: ... Their ways and their habits.
20 "J: With only about 30 seconds, what specifically can be done in
21 France and other Western European countries to stem the tide of Islamic
22 extremism? About 30 seconds, Srdja.
23 "ST: To lower the number of the Muslim diaspora in those
25 "J: How is that done?
1 "ST: By a variety of legal means, above all by the definition of
2 Islamism as a political and not religious affiliation which would be the
3 grounds not only for the denial of citizenship but also for removal.
4 "J: So you're talking about not only new immigration policies
5 based upon Islamist adherence but also perhaps even -- what?
6 "ST: Deportation. Deportation. Let's be quite frank about it.
7 If you support an ideology that is inherently seditious and detrimental
8 to the objectives, goals, and dynamics of a democratic state, then you do
9 not belong. And for any Muslim to claim that, on the one hand, they can
10 be supportive of the mandated violence against infidels and
11 institutionalised discrimination against them that is contained in the
12 Koran and at the same time they can swear an oath of allegiance when they
13 become new citizens, on the other hand, is simply incongruous. To a
14 truly devout Muslim, the Koran and Shari'ah is the only legitimate source
15 of loyalty. Of course they can swear allegiance to the United States
16 because they practice taqiyah --
17 "J: About ten seconds here.
18 "ST: But let me sum it up by saying that the fewer Muslims there
19 are in a non-Muslim society, the more harmonious and the less likely to
20 be hit by terrorist violence it is.
21 "J: Dr. Srdja Trifkovic is director of the --"
22 MR. VANDERPUYE:
23 Q. Do you recall that interview, sir?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. And that's you speaking?
1 A. Yes, it is.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I'd like to tender this exhibit.
4 I think I made a mistake with respect to the -- the 65 ter number is
5 24539A, because it's a clip of the larger recording.
6 JUDGE KWON: I couldn't found -- find it with that number.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, since it was played in full, I
8 don't see the purpose of tendering it.
9 MR. VANDERPUYE: It was played from 8.29 --
10 JUDGE KWON: It's reflected in the transcript.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE: -- through 10.19.
12 JUDGE KWON: There's no need to admit it.
13 MR. VANDERPUYE: Very well.
14 JUDGE KWON: Let's move on.
15 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 Q. Now I want to ask you --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Am I correct if I say that we would
18 need to hear the question regarding this interview and not just hear that
19 he gave an interview.
20 JUDGE KWON: What we heard has been reflected in the transcript.
21 So you'd like to admit it.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. But I didn't understand
23 that. It was not being admitted. However, I didn't hear the question.
24 What is the Prosecutor's question to the witness about the interview,
25 other than just the fact that he gave the interview?
1 JUDGE KWON: No, you heard that. Let's move on.
2 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Vanderpuye, you have about seven minutes.
4 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, sir.
5 Q. You say in your statement that you went down to see Dr. Karadzic
6 in Pale, you left Belgrade -- well, you went there on the 13th of July,
7 1995, and met with him from about 1700 hours to 1840; correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And in fact you left Belgrade on the 12th?
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. With Mrs. Ristic and Mr. Premovic?
12 A. That's right.
13 Q. You arrived in Pale on the 12th and you had some informal talks
14 with Jovan Zametica and Zdravko Miocic; right?
15 A. That's right.
16 Q. And I asked you about that conversation with Mr. Miocic on the
17 12th of July during your testimony in the Popovic case; right?
18 A. Right.
19 Q. And you didn't recall precisely what that conversation concerned;
21 A. Right.
22 Q. I asked you what specifically Dr. Karadzic said to you during the
23 time that you met with him on 13 July concerning what was happening in
24 relation to Srebrenica; right?
25 A. Right.
1 Q. And you are unable to recall what he said because you said you
2 lost your notes and your laptop failed you at some point?
3 A. Right. But I did have broad recollection about his optimistic
4 demeanour and his insistence that civilians be treated properly.
5 Q. Right. You said that you didn't recall exactly what he said
6 because of your lack of precise notes and that you could only provide the
7 best of your recollection at that time after 13 years; right?
8 A. That's right.
9 Q. And I asked you again about the details of what was discussed
10 during the meeting with Dr. Karadzic on the 13th, and you gave this
12 "I have to confine myself to overall impressions because I don't
13 have the minutes, and after all this time, the memories tend to acquire
14 the character of overall impressions rather than specific snippets or
16 A. Right.
17 MR. VANDERPUYE: For the benefit of the Chamber, that's at
18 transcript reference -- Popovic transcript reference 2576 -- 25276,
19 sorry, line 17, through 25277, line 1.
20 Q. Again I asked you about the extent of your recollection of that
21 meeting, and you gave it this way. You said specifically this:
22 "... I recall -- what I recall of that meeting is, first of all,
23 a very long discourse on the end game which he," Dr. Karadzic,
24 "confidently expected to follow that would be favourable to the Serbian
25 point of view; and secondly, the agreement with my insistence that it is
1 both substantially and in terms of media relations extremely important to
2 avoid any incidents in the treatment of civilian -- of the civilian
3 population that would be reminiscent of the early stages of the war."
5 A. Yes.
6 MR. VANDERPUYE: That's at transcript reference 25280, lines 8
7 through 25.
8 Q. In your statement, you've added a couple of snippets, as you call
9 it. One is that you expected General Mladic to call.
10 A. I am sorry, I have not read my 2008 testimony before coming here
11 today, but I believe that I have mentioned it, that episode with a phone
12 call or, rather, the call that was not to be.
13 Q. Do you recall my asking you during the course of your Popovic
14 testimony that -- whether or not during your meeting with Dr. Karadzic he
15 was in contact with anybody else, including any soldiers?
16 A. I don't specifically remember, but I would appreciate being
18 Q. Well, that's at transcript page reference 25272, lines 5 through
19 6. I asked you that question, and in your response you never mentioned
20 that Dr. Karadzic spoke to any soldier, and you never mentioned that
21 Dr. Karadzic ever expected any call from General Mladic. And that's
22 throughout your testimony.
23 A. That's the what?
24 Q. Throughout your testimony, you do not mention at all that
25 Dr. Karadzic or you expected any phone call from General Mladic.
1 A. Since I remember positively mentioning this in this court, is it
2 possible that it may have been stated in the testimony in the Stakic
3 case --
4 Q. I don't believe so --
5 A. -- because --
6 Q. -- but in any event, it wasn't stated in the Popovic case, which
7 is what I'm asking you about.
8 A. Right.
9 Q. You mentioned in your statement at paragraph 30 that one of the
10 reasons why you picked up the phone was to get a quote from
11 General Mladic about the circumstances in which he was involved; is that
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And one of the reasons you went down to Pale to begin with was in
15 order to get certain information for the purposes of your media
17 A. Right.
18 Q. So when you went there - and that's what you said in the Popovic
19 case - did it somehow slip your mind that you wanted to speak to
20 General Mladic, among other people that you wanted to speak to, which was
21 the reason for your going to Pale to begin with?
22 A. The reason I failed to mention that phone call is that it was
23 unimportant, because there was no Mladic at the other end of the line.
24 It simply didn't seem significant, because there was nothing of substance
25 told by whoever replied and told Dr. Karadzic that Mladic is unavailable.
1 But, yes, it was my purpose to obtain as many statements from as many
3 Q. Now, you know that Ms. Ristic and Mr. Premovic testified in this
4 case, do you not?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And how did you learn that? Did the Defence tell you that?
7 A. I actually found it on Google and there were some articles in the
8 former Yugoslav press.
9 Q. Okay. And so you know --
10 A. I also had an e-mail from Mr. Premovic saying that he had just
11 come back.
12 Q. Just come back from The Hague?
13 A. That's right.
14 Q. Did you talk to Mr. Premovic or Ms. Ristic about what they said,
15 what they testified in this case, sir?
16 A. I spoke to Mr. Premovic.
17 Q. And Mr. Premovic told you that he said during this case or his
18 evidence in this case is that Dr. Karadzic spoke to General Mladic?
19 A. He said that he was under the impression Dr. Karadzic spoke to
20 General Mladic but that in retrospect he cannot be certain of that.
21 Q. Okay. And Ms. Ristic --
22 A. I haven't actually --
23 Q. -- did you speak to her?
24 A. No, I have not.
25 Q. Having gone to Pale from Belgrade to find out what the position
1 of the RS leadership was going to be in respect of the events concerning
2 Srebrenica, did it somehow slip your mind that Momcilo Krajisnik was in
3 that office that day during the period of time that you were meeting with
4 Dr. Karadzic too?
5 A. On previous occasions I found Mr. Krajisnik's assessments and the
6 value of his analysis less than impressive. I actually didn't regard it
7 as particularly useful to try and get a statement from him.
8 Q. But you remember him being there. Is that your testimony?
9 A. No, I don't specifically remember him being there, but I wouldn't
10 be surprised. I wasn't specifically seeking him out.
11 Q. You didn't mention him during the course of your Popovic
12 testimony with regard to the events on 13 July?
13 A. Excuse me?
14 Q. You did not mention him during your Popovic testimony with regard
15 to the events that occurred on 13 July?
16 A. Why should I mention him?
17 Q. Because you were asked who else was present during the course of
18 the time that you were meeting with the president.
19 A. But no words were exchanged, no statement was required. I
20 mean --
21 Q. Mr. Trifkovic --
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Vanderpuye --
23 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE KWON: A while ago your time's up, so I would like you to
25 ask your last question.
1 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, sir.
2 Q. Mr. Trifkovic, you referred to this Tribunal in a number of
3 articles as doing the bidding as a political tool for its political
4 bosses and paymasters as a pseudo-legal imposter, as a fraud, as an
5 Orwellian institution whose unanimous decisions are as drearily
6 predictable as those in Moscow in 1936, as an institution that exists
7 solely to proclaim the Serbs collectively as the guilty party for
8 everything that has happened in the Balkans to retroactively justify
9 Western policy. You've said that the Prosecutors at The Hague will try
10 to pit Karadzic against Mladic, and you have said of both Karadzic and
11 Mladic that they will be duly convicted of genocide and crimes against
12 humanity, that they will not come out of gaol alive and the verdict is
13 already written.
14 Is it your expectation here today that knowing all of that and
15 your background and views about Islam and Muslims, is it your expectation
16 that the Chamber should rely on your evidence as credible and reliable in
17 respect of the incidents -- or in respect of what you've stated in your
18 statement concerning the events --
19 A. Yes, absolutely.
20 Q. -- of 13 July?
21 A. Absolutely.
22 Q. No qualms about it?
23 A. No.
24 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further
25 questions. I do want to tender the parts of the Popovic transcript that
1 I have indicated. I can do that at a later time if that would be more
3 MR. ROBINSON: We will be objecting to that, Mr. President, so
4 maybe he can do that in writing. But if there's been some portion of the
5 Popovic case that is inconsistent with his testimony, then it could
6 possibly be admitted, but he used the technique of reading out swathes of
7 the Popovic evidence and having the witness confirm it and there would be
8 no value to admitting the transcript of that part.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. --
10 MR. TIEGER: Just to forestall any unnecessary discussion by way
11 of what I understand to be the practice of the Court, if the witness
12 confirmed it, then I think the Court has taken the position in the past
13 it's not necessary; if there was no such confirmation, then the excerpts
14 are admissible and I don't think Mr. Robinson would indeed object.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit those pages referred to in his
17 cross-examination. If you could liaise with the Registrar as well as the
18 Defence in identifying the -- those page numbers.
19 MR. VANDERPUYE: I will do, Mr. President. Thank you.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 MR. VANDERPUYE: That concludes my cross-examination.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. -- just a second. Yes. We will give the number
23 for that Popovic transcript.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. Exhibit P6102.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency, yes.
2 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
3 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Trifkovic, today, on page 93, it was
4 suggested to you that I expected a call from Mladic. And on page 95 what
5 was read out to you was that it was said that Mladic is unavailable. Are
6 you able to tell us who called and who expected?
7 A. Well, I'm glad you asked this, because it was only subsequent to
8 my testimony in 2008 that this failed attempt at establishing contact
9 seems to have acquired undue significance. My impression is that you
10 were trying to contact Mladic and that you were repeatedly inquiring with
11 the secretary what's up with the lines and that she once or twice replied
12 the lines were down. And you asked her to keep trying, and then she came
13 back at one point saying that he's on the other line and it turned out
14 that it wasn't him.
15 Q. Thank you. On page 89, there was a quote that in your lecture, I
16 think, you made a difference between Islam and Islamism. Are you able to
17 tell us what the difference is?
18 A. It is the key difference and it is also the one distinction that
19 I made in my radio interview. Islamism is a political ideology that
20 seeks to introduce Shari'a as the basis of the legal and political
21 system, and that seeks to uphold the tenets of Islamic scriptures and
22 historical practice as the basis of socio-political and legal order. In
23 that sense, Islamism is a totalitarian ideology on par with Bolshevism or
24 National Socialism. And being engaged in Islamist activities, it is my
25 firm belief is not only incompatible with the values of a democratic
1 society but also should be the grounds for the exclusion of the person
2 just as to this day if you answer positively to the question about the
3 membership in certain fringe political parties, you will be denied a US
5 Q. Are you familiar with the work of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Islamic
6 writers? Do you know any of their work?
7 A. Well, obviously Alija Izetbegovic's Islamic Declaration comes to
8 mind, but I have been acquainted only with certain interesting quotes
9 rather than read the whole book.
10 Q. According to what you know about the text, would that be an
11 Islamic or an Islamist text?
12 A. It is firmly in the latter category because, and I'm quoting from
13 memory but I believe accurately, Izetbegovic stated that there can be no
14 peace and long-term co-existence between Islam and other forms of
15 political organisation, and goes on to advocate a single umma, the
16 community of the faithful, spreading from Morocco in the west to
17 Indonesia in the east. And he goes further to attack the legacy of
18 Mustafa Kemel -- Kemel Ataturk, and to say that in the Ottoman period as
19 a Halifat, Turkey was a great and glorious power, and as a secular
20 republic under Ataturk's successors, it has become a second-rate nation.
21 Q. Thank you. And what is then your position towards Islam in
22 comparison to Islamism?
23 A. That's the key point, that Islam as a domain of the private set
24 of beliefs and practices of individuals can be accommodated into a
25 democratic society, but Islamism with its demand for constant activism in
1 the escalation of special privileges for the members of the Islamic
2 Community in fact will never be satisfied with any given outcome. And
3 historical evidence clearly points that having achieved one level of
4 acceptance and exemptions and special privileges, an Islamist will
5 immediately proceed to the next one. Because just as a convinced
6 Communist will not rest until the world has been subjected to the
7 proletarian revolution, likewise an Islamist cannot accept the division
8 of the world into Dar al-Islam, the world of faith, and Dar al-Harb, the
9 world of war, as a permanent given. He sees his task to expend the
10 sphere of Dar al-Islam at the expense of Dar al-Harb.
11 Q. Thank you. On page 87 of today's transcript, you were denied the
12 opportunity to say what you meant under psychosis. Can you briefly just
13 tell us what you meant under psychosis?
14 A. Well, exactly this Manakian [phoen] view of world as us and them.
15 Dar al-Islam, the world of faith, Dar al-Harb, the world of war or
16 disbelief, and that this constant tension which it creates along the
17 edges where the Islamic world meets non-Islam, it creates conflicts that
18 are manifested from Mindanao in the Philippines and East Timor through
19 the Indian subcontinent, most notably Kashmir, into the Caucasus,
20 North Africa and the Balkans, not to mention the perennial Arab-Israeli
22 Q. Thank you. Well, we will leave that topic now. I wanted to ask
23 you to answer a few questions. Did you know by what means was the crisis
24 in Bosnia and Herzegovina resolved?
25 A. I was fairly familiar with the political events that preceded the
1 outbreak of the war, and I was somewhat acquainted with the mix of
2 military operations and diplomacy that characterized the war years. I
3 was interested to see that there were short bursts of intense military
4 activity followed by prolonged periods of truce during which diplomatic
5 solutions were being attempted, and it is my view that the ultimate
6 outcome of the Bosnia war at Dayton in the fall of 1995 is the kind of
7 solution that could have been obtained at the very beginning with the
8 Cutileiro Plan, which was unfortunately torpedoed by then US ambassador
9 in Belgrade Warren Zimmermann.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. I was curious to see
12 where the question and answer were going, but I can see that they go well
13 beyond any cross-examination of this witness on any factual issues
14 concerning the war, so I would object to any further inquiry along this
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do I need to respond?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor confronted the
19 witness with military document, whereas the witness was familiar with the
20 political position. So I have the right to clarify what the witness
21 meant and what he knew and what is consistent as he said on page 73. He
22 said something was not consistent. So I wanted to ask him what was
23 relevant in that crisis. I don't want to go on to avoid leading.
24 JUDGE KWON: I don't see it's related to -- or it arose from the
25 line of cross-examination.
1 Yes, Mr. Robinson, would you like to assist us?
2 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President. Maybe I should just indicate
3 that this entire re-direct examination is contrary to my advice to
4 Dr. Karadzic, but I don't have anything to help you with or him at this
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
7 Mr. Karadzic, move on to your next topic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Well, this was the
9 introduction for the next topic.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Were you aware of what the political position was? You said
12 there that we said that we were not going to defeat them. Are you
13 familiar with the position of the Serbian side regarding the military and
14 political outcome?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
16 MR. VANDERPUYE: It's the same objection, Mr. President.
17 Dr. Trifkovic was confronted with certain information which was
18 responsive to what he states at paragraph 20 of his statement which was
19 admitted into evidence in this case. The mere fact that he's confronted
20 with documents that contradict what he says in his statement does not
21 open up grounds for redirect on that same topic. The mere challenging of
22 information does not create grounds for redirect examination in our
23 jurisprudence, so I object.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I cannot -- I cannot lay the basis
25 of a document that I want to show if that is so. The witness was shown
1 two directives. I would like you to look at that. These were military
2 documents. I wanted to show political documents and ask the witness what
3 was consistent with his knowledge.
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone should be switched off.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we just lost some lines of question.
8 If it is related to your consistency, that may be put, but I'm not sure
9 whether question was necessarily related to that issue. Could you let us
10 know the question.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course, Excellencies. Directive
12 number 4 was quoted implying that I signed it, and Directive 7 was shown
13 to the witness. These were military documents. What I want to is to ask
14 the witness what his knowledge is about political positions, about the
15 political aspect, how our political actions relate to those directives.
16 And it all has to do with my having possibly misinformed him about our
17 political positions, and I wanted to show documents to see whether his
18 information stemmed from these documents, the political documents, or
19 from the military documents.
20 JUDGE KWON: So political positions in the Republika Srpska.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, of the political leadership of
22 Republika Srpska, because this was something that was disputed. There
23 was an implication that the witness was deceived, that he was deceived by
24 wrong information, that he was misled. This was on page 70 of the
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to respond, Mr. Vanderpuye?
3 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, Mr. President. As I indicated previously,
4 the documents that were shown to the witness were directly responsive to
5 paragraph 20 of the statement that was led by Dr. Karadzic, in particular
6 where it states that one of Dr. Karadzic's views, which I think I read to
7 the witness during the course of the question that Dr. Karadzic is
8 concerned about, one of Dr. Karadzic's views was that the Serb side did
9 not want to defeat the Muslims militarily but that each constituent
10 nation should become master of its own fate. That's in paragraph 20 of
11 the statement. And also, as reiterated in an interview that the witness
12 gave previously, those documents were put to the witness in response to
13 those specific assertions.
14 If Dr. Karadzic sought to adduce from this witness either a
15 distinction between the political and the military views or approaches,
16 he could have done that certainly on direct examination. This is his
17 evidence that we're responding to. There was nothing preventing
18 Dr. Karadzic from leading that evidence in relation to clarifying what is
19 meant in paragraph 20 of the 92 ter statement. So I don't think that
20 merely responding to those -- to that assertion, particularly as respects
21 defeating the Muslims militarily by showing the doctor military documents
22 opens up an avenue for him to then put political documents to the -- to
23 the doctor in response on redirect. I just don't think there's
24 sufficient grounds that have been created during the course of the
25 cross-examination for that.
1 JUDGE KWON: But by showing the military document, you challenged
2 the credibility of witness's statement about Mr. Karadzic's position at
3 the time.
4 MR. VANDERPUYE: With respect to the military defeat of the
5 Muslim -- of the Muslims.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 Mr. Robinson, do you have any observation?
8 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. As much as I hate to see
9 Dr. Karadzic spending his time on this, I think that this is well within
10 the cross-examination and you've already hit the nail on the head. They
11 can't limit it such -- that way. They're trying to show that this
12 witness was misinformed or mistaken as the views of Dr. Karadzic and he
13 can -- it should be entitled to show those views.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with Mr. Robinson's observation.
17 We'll allow the question.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we briefly show the
19 witness D104. D104.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Doctor, it was suggested to you that Directive 4 from
22 November 1992 served as a directive for the expulsion of Muslims. Can
23 you please look to see what the document refers to. The document is
24 dated March 1993, regarding the Geneva Conventions and humanitarian aid,
25 and is this consistent with your information as to the positions of the
1 political leadership?
2 A. Yes. This document would broadly correspond to the kind of
3 information that you --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
5 not overlap with the English translation. Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Trifkovic, could you put a pause. The
7 interpreters are not able to hear you because of the overlapping. Just a
9 THE WITNESS: Article 3 of this document would broadly fit in
10 with the views and positions that you and the late Professor Koljevic
11 expressed concerning the application of the rules of war and the
12 treatment of civilians.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at D43 now,
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. This is a document from April 1993, and it states here in
17 paragraph 1 -- actually, cease all operations against Srebrenica; two,
18 stop the forces of the Army of Republika Srpska; three, facilitate the
19 passage of humanitarian activities.
20 Second paragraph of item 5: Provide protection for all
22 And 7: Carry the order out immediately and fully inform me
24 Is this consistent with your understanding of the political
25 position of the leadership of Republika Srpska?
1 A. Yes, it is broadly consistent with what I understood to be the
2 political position of the Republika Srpska leadership.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at P2276
4 now, please.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. This is a report by the Main Staff of the 7th of July issued
7 after Directive 7, which was shown to you as the source of all the
8 difficulties and as evidence that you did not have correct information as
9 to the positions of the Republika Srpska leadership. Could you please
10 look at this last paragraph: In accordance with the order of the
11 president of the republic to offer maximum protection and safety to all
12 UNPROFOR around Srebrenica and the civilian Muslim population, you must
13 order subordinate units to refrain from, and so on and so forth. You
14 don't have to hear me read it. You can see it in the English.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Is this and in what way is this consistent with the information
17 you had about the position of the Serbian leadership?
18 A. The final paragraph is consistent with the views you expressed on
19 the need for the protection of civilians during the meeting on the
20 afternoon of July 13th.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we briefly look at
22 P --
23 JUDGE KWON: Could you take a look at the second paragraph of
24 this document.
25 "The president of the republic is satisfied with the result of
1 combat operations around Srebrenica and has agreed with the continuation
2 of operations for the take-over of Srebrenica, disarming Muslim
3 terrorists, disarming of Muslim terrorist gangs, and complete
4 demilitarisation of the Srebrenica enclave."
5 Is it consistent with what you knew at the time?
6 THE WITNESS: Well, when I was leaving for Pale, I was not aware
7 that Srebrenica had in fact fallen, and it was only when we were -
8 Mr. Premovic, Mrs. Ristic and I - on the road, that from the soldiers
9 manning the roadblocks between Zvornik and Bratunac we learnt that
10 Srebrenica had in fact fallen.
11 JUDGE KWON: My question was whether it was consistent with what
12 you knew in 1994 of Bosnian Serb leadership as you indicated in
13 paragraph 20.
14 THE WITNESS: I was always aware of dissatisfaction with the
15 failure of the UN to demilitarise the so-called protected zones, even
16 though I cannot pinpoint dates or statements, but I was broadly aware of
17 the frustration with -- which was reiterated on my arrival in July of
18 1995, the frustration with the fact that demilitarised --
19 demilitarisation had not been carried out in the protected zones.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly just show two
22 documents. P2994. This is the one. Document is dated the 11th of July.
23 Could you please look at paragraph 3, where the establishment of civilian
24 rule is being discussed and that of the police. And if you've looked at
25 that, can we then look at paragraph 4.
1 Can we look at paragraph 4 in the Serbian version, please.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. This is a document dated the 11th, Dr. Trifkovic. Is this
4 different from what you heard, learned from us on the 13th of July?
5 A. No. In fact, it's consistent even though I must say that in my
6 meetings with Dr. Koljevic and you, there was no mention of military
7 prisoners. There was no mention of POWs as such. I only recall the
8 insistence on the need to protect and supply the civilians.
9 Q. But would you agree this is confidential? It should say
10 "strictly confidential," but it wasn't translated as strictly
11 confidential; is that correct?
12 A. It says "confidential," yes.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at D2055 now, please.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Could you please take a look at item 4. This document appoints a
16 civilian commissioner who is supposed to care for civilians and property.
17 You don't have to read it out loud. You can read it for yourself.
18 A. I have.
19 Q. How does this fit into your knowledge about the political
20 positions and humanitarian positions of the Republika Srpska leadership?
21 A. My answer is broadly the same as the previous one. While I was
22 not aware of any specific directives concerning the treatment of
23 prisoners of war, I do recall your insistence on the correct treatment of
24 the civilians and Professor Koljevic's stated intention to go to
25 Srebrenica to reassure the civilians and to help arrange the smooth
1 transition to regular authority of the Republika Srpska.
2 Q. Thank you very much, Dr. Trifkovic.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions,
4 Your Honours.
5 JUDGE KWON: Unless my colleagues have questions for you, that
6 concludes your evidence, Mr. Trifkovic.
7 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it.
9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE KWON: You are free to go, but we'll rise all together. I
11 thank the staff for their indulgence as well. We continue tomorrow at
13 [The witness withdrew]
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, may I ask something.
15 Should my limitation of meeting Mr. -- General Milosevic be removed, now
16 no reason for restrictions.
17 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it's for the Chamber to intervene --
19 MR. ROBINSON: It's pursuant to your order, Mr. President, so I
20 think if you don't intervene -- your order is that they be segregated.
21 But since the spirit of the order is to avoid them having contact before
22 his testimony, we would ask that you allow or direct that he be allowed
23 at least to meet with General Milosevic to thank him and say good-bye to
24 him before he leaves.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, do you have any observation to make?
2 MR. TIEGER: No, I don't have a useful one. I mean, my reflexive
3 reaction is one of caution and not to lift the restriction. I just don't
4 know if that's fair under the circumstances. We can get back to you
5 within about 10 to 15 minutes, Mr. President. I know you don't
6 necessarily have to make the order from the Bench and we can upon just a
7 moment's reflection give you some feedback that may be more meaningful
8 than just a seat-of-the-pants reaction. Obviously I don't anticipate he
9 be recalled for any reason. I can't think offhand of how such contact
10 would contaminate other aspects of the case, but I think it's worth
11 thinking about for at least a few minutes before we respond.
12 JUDGE KWON: While the Chamber sees no difficulty with it, I will
13 leave it to the Registrar and the commander of the Detention Unit.
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.56 p.m.,
15 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 7th day of
16 February, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.