1 Tuesday, 19 February 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Would the witness make the
7 solemn declaration, please.
8 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
9 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ambassador. Please make yourself
12 WITNESS: JOSE CUTILEIRO
13 JUDGE KWON: Would the representative of the Portuguese
14 government introduce themselves for the record.
15 MR. DE SERPA SOARES: Good morning, Your Honour. I'm
16 Miguel Soares, the Director General of Legal Affairs in the Ministry of
17 Foreign Affairs of Portugal.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, sir.
19 MS. GROBA GOMES: Good morning, Your Honour. I'm Mafalda Groba
20 Gomes from the Embassy of Portugal in The Hague.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Today we'll continue to sit pursuant to
22 Rule 15 bis. Probably we'll do so for the remainder of the week.
23 Unless there's anything to be raised, we'll continue.
24 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.
1 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
2 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, your Excellency, Mr. Cutileiro.
3 I'd like to thank you for investing this effort to be here. Did you
4 provide a statement to my Defence team?
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D05532 in e-court,
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other
10 microphones save for the witness's and the accused's be switched off
11 because of the background noise. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5532.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Is it the statement you provided to my team, the one you see on
15 the screen before you?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Thank you. Your Excellency, have you read and signed the
19 A. I did, yes.
20 Q. Thank you. The last page, please, in order to be able to
21 identify the signature.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you. Does this statement accurately reflect what you told
24 my team? Are your words recorded appropriately?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you. If I were to ask the same questions today in this
2 courtroom, would your answers be essentially the same as provided in the
4 A. They would indeed.
5 Q. Thank you very much.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I seek to tender
7 this package under 92 ter.
8 JUDGE KWON: Any objections, Mr. Tieger?
9 MR. TIEGER: No, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE KWON: Just two matters for clarification. First as
11 regards 1D604, which was referred to para 24. However, in the
12 notification, it is referred to as 1D694, which I take it to be a typo.
13 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE KWON: And as regards 1D1335, which is being referred to in
15 para 30, it is said to be a letter from Mr. Karadzic to
16 Ambassador Cutileiro, but I think that the case is the other way around.
17 It's a letter -- it seems to be a letter from Ambassador Cutileiro to
18 Mr. Karadzic.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, that's correct, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE KWON: So we'll admit the Rule 92 ter statement for
21 Ambassador Jose Cutileiro. Shall we give the number for that.
22 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D2968, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. And as regards the associated exhibits,
24 they will be admitted and be given numbers in due course by the
1 Yes, please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to read
3 out a brief summary in the English language for the sake of the
4 interpreters to be acquainted with what is going on.
5 [In English] Jose Cutileiro served as a diplomat for the
6 Portuguese Foreign Service since 1974. In February 1992,
7 Lord Carrington, the Chairman of the European Commission's Conference on
8 the former Yugoslavia asked Ambassador Cutileiro to chair talks on future
9 constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
10 The talks began on 13th and 14th February 1992 at the Villa Konak
11 in Sarajevo. On 16th to 18th of March, 1992, the fifth round of talks
12 took place in Sarajevo. At the end of those talks, on March the 18th,
13 1992, the parties agreed to a Statement of Principles.
14 The Statement of Principles provided, inter alia, for a state
15 composed of three constituent units within the existing borders of Bosnia
16 and Herzegovina. Each constituent unit and the central organs of the BH
17 committed to act with respect for human rights, full religious freedom,
18 and protection of minorities.
19 The Assembly would be composed of two Chambers - a Chamber of
20 Citizens, and a Chamber of Constituent Units. A four-fifths of majority
21 of the Chamber of Constituent Units would be required for certain
23 A working group was to be established to define the territory of
24 the constituent units. A map was annexed to the agreement which showed
25 the relative majority in each municipality and would be the basis for the
1 working group, subject to apartments.
2 A referendum would be held to confirm these constitutional
3 principles. By agreeing to those principles, Dr. Karadzic and the
4 Bosnian Serb leaders committed to having religious and ethnic minorities
5 in the areas covered by the Serb constituent units -- unit and to respect
6 the rights of those minorities. The minorities in question were
7 primarily Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.
8 On 30th, 31st of March, 1992, the sixth and final round of talks
9 took place in Brussels. An annex was added to the Statement of
10 Principles on respect for human and minority rights by the national
11 authorities and those in the constituent units. A European Community
12 Monitoring Mission would be established to investigate and report on any
13 violations. Dr. Karadzic agreed to this annex.
14 Shortly after the parties agreed to the Statement of Principles,
15 Ambassador Cutileiro began hearing that President Izetbegovic was
16 disavowing his agreement in public statement he made to the Bosnian news
17 media. The Bosnian government formally rejected the Statement of
18 Principles in June 1992.
19 During the period after the Statement of Principles was agreed
20 to, the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs wanted further negotiations on the
21 unresolved issues while the Bosnian government leaders dragged their
23 Notes of Ambassador Herbert Okun of a meeting on April 18, 1992,
24 in Lisbon in which Ambassador Cutileiro met with Cyrus Vance indicate
25 that Ambassador Cutileiro said that he had grown to distrust Izetbegovic
1 in spite of his avuncular manner, and that he is tricky and slippery and
2 he lies. Alija Izetbegovic says some things in private and another in
4 The notes also indicate that after that meeting they were joined
5 by Portuguese Foreign Minister Pinheiro. During this meeting,
6 Ambassador Okun's notes indicate that Ambassador Cutileiro said that it
7 was absurd to blame the situation in Bosnia exclusively on the Serbs.
8 All sides are to blame. He repeated that Izetbegovic is very
9 untrustworthy. He always goes back on what he agreed to do.
10 Sometimes after the shelling of persons in the bread queue at
11 Vase Miskina Street, Ambassador Cutileiro had the opportunity to speak
12 with the -- a Portuguese army officer, artillery officer, who was
13 stationed in Sarajevo. The officer told Ambassador Cutileiro that he had
14 participated in the investigation of this shelling and was convinced that
15 the shell had come from the area where the Bosnian government had their
17 Ambassador Cutileiro remained in his role as chair of the Bosnian
18 constitutional agreement negotiations until 14th of August, 1992.
19 Ambassador Cutileiro attended a meeting between Lord Carrington and Cyrus
20 Vance and the Bosnian leaders in London on 26 August 1992. During the
21 meeting, Dr. Karadzic expressed his willingness to return territory to
22 the Muslims, and Professor Koljevic said that it was clearly in the
23 interests of the Serbs to return land in exchange for full political
24 autonomy. Dr. Karadzic supported an agreement for the return of all
25 refugees and stated that he had issued instructions to stop his forces
1 from requiring Muslims and Croats to sign paper indicating they were
2 willing to leave and that any such paper would have no validity.
3 Dr. Karadzic also agreed to accept UN monitors at all Serb artillery
4 positions in and around Sarajevo.
5 Ambassador Cutileiro believes that it was a real tragedy that
6 peace was not achieved through the Statement of Principles that he
7 negotiated in March 1992. A comparison of the map annexed to the
8 Statement of Principles of March the 18th, 1992, and the map which is
9 part of the Dayton Agreement of November 1995 shows that after 3.5 years
10 of war, the result was about the same. Countless lives could have been
12 On 16th of February, 1993, Ambassador Cutileiro wrote a
13 commentary published in the "International Herald Tribune" which endorsed
14 the Vance-Owen Plan and noted that President Alija Izetbegovic's
15 reluctance to accept that the real Bosnia is utterly different from the
16 Bosnia of his wishful thinking has contributed as much as have the dreams
17 of Greater Serbia and the Croatian hegemony to the continuation of the
18 war. Ambassador Cutileiro believed this to be true then and believes it
19 to be true now.
20 In a letter to "The Economist" in December 1995,
21 Ambassador Cutileiro wrote:
22 "After several rounds of talks, our principles for future
23 constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina were agreed by all
24 parties - Muslims, Serbs and Croats - in Sarajevo on March 18th, 1992, as
25 basis for future negotiations. These continued, maps and all, until the
1 summer when the Muslims reneged on the agreement. Had they not done so,
2 the Bosnian question might have been settled earlier with less losses of
3 mainly Muslim lives and land. To be fair, President Izetbegovic and his
4 aides were encouraged to scupper the deal and to fight for a unitary
5 Bosnian state by well-meaning outsiders who thought they knew better."
6 Ambassador Cutileiro believed this to be true then and believes
7 it to be true now.
8 [Interpretation] This concludes the brief summary. At this point
9 in time, I have no questions for his Excellency.
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Ambassador Cutileiro, as you have noted
11 now, your evidence in chief in this case has been admitted in writing in
12 lieu of your oral testimony. Now you will be cross-examined by the
13 representative of the Office of the Prosecutor, Mr. Alan Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President, and good morning,
15 Your Honours, and to everyone in the courtroom.
16 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
17 Q. And good morning, Ambassador Cutileiro.
18 A. Good morning.
19 Q. Ambassador, let me begin with a couple of quick clarifications.
20 First of all, is it correct that nothing you say in your statement is
21 intended in any way to justify or legitimise any of the crimes that took
22 place during the conflict?
23 A. Not at all. I mean, I -- I -- the statement is a statement of
24 fact. I was asked about my position towards several points. You -- you
25 have listened and you have seen the quotations from Herb Okun's notes.
1 The quotations also from my articles in the "Herald Tribune" and my
2 letter in "The Economist," and I -- what I did when I answered both the
3 counsel for Dr. Karadzic and yourselves from the Prosecution in Brussels,
4 you asked me about how things had gone and I told you how those things
5 had gone.
6 Q. I understand, Ambassador. Thank you. And just to clarify, it
7 wasn't a suggestion on my part that there was that inference in your
8 statement. It is simply that your name has come up in various contexts
9 during the course of this case as has reference to the negotiations, and
10 on that basis I wanted to clarify what otherwise seemed pretty clear from
11 your statement. So that's why I asked the question.
12 And I'll ask a similar question for the same reason. Do I
13 correctly understand that the agreement in principles was not intended to
14 be a trigger or a signal to any of the parties to take control of or
15 seize territory that they considered to be theirs or wanted to be theirs?
16 A. Not at all. The idea was to convince, to try to help the three
17 parties to get on with the job of getting an understanding among
18 themselves and prevent a very horrible war to go on.
19 Q. Understood. Thank you. Ambassador, at paragraph 35 of your
20 statement --
21 JUDGE KWON: Before doing so, Ambassador, do you have your
22 statement with you now?
23 THE WITNESS: No. No, I don't.
24 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to have a hard copy of your
1 THE WITNESS: I have -- if it is needed here. If you can show it
2 to me in the screen. I have copies of that, but I didn't bring them with
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 THE WITNESS: Thirty-five, yeah. I've seen it.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. You note in that paragraph that had the Muslim side not reneged
8 on the agreement, "the Bosnian question might have been settled earlier,
9 with less loss of mainly Muslim life and land." Now, first of all, this
10 loss of mainly Muslim life and land took place, as you yourself note in
11 the article in "The Economist" that's cited here, after the Bosnian Serbs
12 "went brutally on the offensive." Correct?
13 A. I didn't write anywhere that anybody had gone brutally on
14 anything. You are not quoting me.
15 MR. TIEGER: Let's call up then very quickly 1D ...
16 JUDGE KWON: 5128?
17 MR. TIEGER: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. Okay. That is not
18 the correct cite. I'll return to that in just a moment.
19 Q. Let me move on and we'll find that in the citation I had in mind.
20 Secondly, I wanted to note the following, and again this maybe
21 something that's clear from your statement, but I just wanted to clarify
22 that: The -- there were actually -- there was actually more than one way
23 in which the war could have been averted, I take it. First of all, as
24 you point out in the article, the Muslim side could have continued to
25 pursue the agreement in principle and the cantonisation of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's what you refer to in the article. And --
2 that's one way. And secondly, the other way is that the Bosnian Serb
3 side could have accepted the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an
4 independent and sovereign state. That would be the other way in which
5 war could be averted; correct?
6 A. There might even have been other ways. You didn't mention the
7 Croats. For instance, the Croats might have also their ideas about ways
8 of improving the situation in Bosnia, but we had decided, we the
9 European -- the European Community's conference, as soon as Croatia got
10 its independence, Lord Carrington was convinced that we would have a
11 problem in Bosnia, because Bosnia had the configuration that you know,
12 with three constituent peoples, the Muslims, the Serbs and the Croats.
13 We thought that the Muslims would want -- the government at that time was
14 a coalition government, if you may remember, made of the people that then
15 went into a negotiation with me into fighting on the ground, and that
16 this -- these people and the situation of the country would probably mean
17 that once was -- Croatia was independent, there might be trouble in
18 Bosnia before Bosnia could get her independence. Therefore,
19 Lord Carrington asked me to start talks between the three -- all the
20 parties. I also saw parties from the opposition, but the main parties
21 were those that -- were the coalition government at the time. And the
22 idea was to find a system that would allow the country to be independent
23 with the agreement of the three constituent nations, which is what the
24 constitutional arrangements of Yugoslavia at the time would require.
25 Q. Ambassador, let me just say I --
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. I think that was an amplification that was not necessarily fully
3 contained your statement, and so I appreciate that very much. As a
4 general matter, I'm going to ask you to do two things --
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. -- because I have very limited time to speak with you today.
7 Number one, bear in mind that it's not necessary to repeat information
8 that you've already provided in the statement that's before the Court.
9 And number two, try as much as you can to simply focus on the particular
10 question asked and determine from any follow-up questions whether any
11 elaboration is needed. I really hesitate to interrupt you, but I just
12 want to make sure we can get through the questions I have during the time
13 I've been allotted.
14 A. What I'm trying to say is that the only way of getting an
15 arrangement to Bosnia was to adhere to the -- what had been agreed in
16 March. In that way or in some other way. And if you look at the Dayton
17 Agreement, and if you look at the maps in the Dayton Agreement, you
18 realise, as my letter to "The Economist" shows, that after three years of
19 a lot of tragedies, you didn't move far from what we had foreseen.
20 Bosnia is what it is. It's not another thing. And you -- the Serbs
21 ideally would have preferred that Bosnia didn't become independent. The
22 Croats would have preferred to annex part of Bosnia or to make it some
23 kind of -- and the Muslims, in particular President Izetbegovic and his
24 people, thought that they could have a unitary state. So the -- if you
25 look at the agreement of March 1992 and you look at the Dayton Agreement
1 slate, well, I was there and I didn't think that we could go into other
2 thing -- Martti Ahtisaari who followed me --
3 Q. Ambassador, I'm sorry --
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. -- I really have to try to move forward.
6 A. Move forward.
7 Q. I know you have a wealth of information and ideally we would have
8 as much time as necessary to hear all of your observations about what
9 took place, but if you will permit me to please focus on certain areas
10 given the time constraints I have.
11 First of all, we will be looking at the Dayton map and the map
12 affixed to the Statement of Principles. Before we do, I want to return
13 to what I had asked you before.
14 MR. TIEGER: And if I could call up 1D5129.
15 Q. I had asked you whether the loss of Muslim -- mainly Muslim life
16 took place after the Bosnian Serbs "went brutally on the offensive,"
17 quoting an article by you, I think you're correct, I didn't point you to
18 the article reference --
19 A. Right, right.
20 Q. -- there. But in this case I'm pointing to the article by you in
21 the "International Herald Tribune." And if we could -- I'm just looking
22 at the bottom of the first column that states the Serbs -- it talks about
23 the aftermath of March 18th, and it states:
24 "The Serbs felt confirmed in their paranoid view of history and
25 went brutally on the offensive."
1 A. Hmm. Okay.
2 Q. Thank you. Now, Ambassador, you provided us an eloquent
3 explanation just a moment ago about your role as negotiator and
4 facilitator rather than someone who was attempting to impose his own
5 predetermined solution. Your statement refers to a letter from
6 Dr. Karadzic, dated the 5th of June. That's in paragraph 28 of your
7 statement, and that letter has been admitted into evidence as associated
8 with your statement. In addition to the portions of the letter that are
9 reflected in your statement in paragraph 28, the letter goes on to note
10 that the Serbian people feel cheated. And in the letter, Dr. Karadzic
11 states to you that:
12 "If you cannot keep your promises publicly announced and
13 confirmed by the EC," that is the European Community, "we have to protect
14 Serbian people on their ethnic territories."
15 Now, there -- you sent a response to that letter. That was --
16 that is not referenced in the statement. That's found at P952, and that
17 was on June 12th. And I'll call it up quickly to remind you of that,
18 Mr. Ambassador. And in that letter, you state to Dr. Karadzic that the
19 EC has not made any promises to you. You explain that there were talks
20 on the future constitutional arrangements. You go on to note the
21 agreement on principles, and you further state:
22 "The validity of that agreement, however, can only be upheld if
23 orders and competencies of the constituent units be defined by negotiated
24 consensus and not by force" --
25 A. Mm-hmm.
1 Q. -- "and if 'ethnically cleansed' territories are -- be restored
2 to their antebellum ethnical compositions."
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. That was the letter you sent in --
5 A. Yes, indeed.
6 Q. -- response to the June 5th letter referenced in your statement?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, I think you've referred to this both in your statement and
9 in your remarks thus far, but it's correct that the agreement in
10 principles, that is the agreement that was reached on March 18, 1992, was
11 essentially a preliminary step toward further negotiations and -- and not
12 a final agreement on the resolution of the --
13 A. It's written at the end of the agreement. It says that it's the
14 basis for further negotiations or words to that effect.
15 Q. Were you aware that Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership
16 emphasised to their followers that it was indeed not a final agreement?
17 A. I suppose they did, yes. And that was what it was.
18 Q. So on the very date of the agreement itself, on March 18th, there
19 was a Bosnian -- a session of the Assembly of the Serbian Republic of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the RS Assembly, at which Dr. Karadzic stated:
21 "We have entered into this process with our strategic goals, and
22 we are accomplishing them stage by stage. We would never have signed
23 this paper as a document, never, never, never."
24 So I just wanted to ask you -- and that's found at D90, at
25 page 43, e-court page 43. I just want to know if you were aware of the
1 emphasis that the Bosnian Serb leadership and Dr. Karadzic were placing
2 on the fact that this was not a final agreement.
3 A. No, I was not. What I was aware of was that during -- at
4 different stages of our negotiations, Dr. Karadzic told me that he had to
5 get agreement from his -- what he called his Assemblies, the Serbian
6 Parliamentary Assembly, to agree or not agree to some points even before
7 we reached the Statement of Principles. And -- and then he went, and he
8 usually got that agreement, and I think -- that's what I know. That, I
9 mean, he was representing a group that was the Assembly of the Serbs, and
10 he had to see with them whether what he had proposed to them was accepted
11 by them or not.
12 I suppose it -- all sides would have had their difficulties
13 with -- with their own people, but I was not a member of that Serbian
14 Assembly, as you can imagine, so I don't know exactly what went on there.
15 Q. Were you aware, Mr. Ambassador, that Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian
16 Serb leadership were emphasising their satisfaction with the agreement in
17 principle because it meant the end of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Let me read you a couple of things that were said in that regard
20 by Dr. Karadzic and other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership. For
21 example, in an interview that we'll have an opportunity to see a bit
22 later, Dr. Karadzic said the map was not acceptable, but for the first
23 time this was about the separation of Bosnia into three pieces. That's
24 65 ter 45284.
25 At the 39th Assembly session in 1994, Dr. Karadzic said about the
1 Cutileiro process:
2 "We pulled them into that at that time when they said we accepted
3 the division in three and that it would be based on ethnicity. At that
4 moment, Bosnia was finished for the international community. That was a
5 great achievement. We were happy when they rejected the maps."
6 At the 42nd Assembly session -- and that is, for the parties'
7 reference, P1388. At the 42nd Assembly session, that's P1394, this is at
8 pages 81 and 81, Dr. Karadzic said:
9 "We won it on 18 March thanks to Mr. Krajisnik's skills. That
10 was the first time that Alija said yes to three Bosnias on ethnic basis
11 and that was fatal for him. That was the moment when Bosnia collapsed
12 and we were accepted as a party in the conflict. If they had ignored us,
13 kept silent and acknowledged Bosnia and then afterwards said that some
14 rebels were overthrowing their own state, we would have faced difficult
15 problems. Nobody would have talked to us."
16 And again Dr. Karadzic, this time at the 37th Assembly session at
17 P1385, pages 114 through 115:
18 "This will be the first time in history that a country is torn
19 apart after the recognition and that the international community accepts
21 Ambassador, I take it that you were not aware of these various
22 pronouncements of Dr. Karadzic.
23 A. No, I was not, and the first of them that you read now is from
24 1994. I had left -- I stopped dealing directly with Bosnia in the summer
25 of 1992. I still attended some meetings of the next conference, the
1 Vance-Owen conference. But you -- okay. I just heard what you said.
2 Q. And the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state was not
3 consistent with the agreement in principles, was it?
4 A. You cannot take bits of political discourse during some kind of
5 meeting of an Assembly from one side or the other and present them. When
6 I see that, I'm not surprised by that. I think the three sides had a
7 discourse that was complicated with their own basis, if you want to --
8 Q. With respect, Ambassador --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- I asked you earlier to please focus on my questions because of
11 my limited time.
12 A. Yes. Hmm.
13 Q. So I'm simply asking you whether or not the destruction of Bosnia
14 was considered to be part of the agreement in principles?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 A. The agreement in principle was made to keep -- you see, if I may
18 again disturb you a bit with my going off the point, but it's very short.
19 It's very short. The Europeans, basically, wanted Bosnia to go on. We
20 didn't want any change of the internal borders of Yugoslavia. The Croats
21 and the Serbs were not interested in keeping Bosnia. The Muslims were,
22 and that was it. And the agreement, the agreement, was a way of trying
23 to solve that problem. And if I go back to Dayton, that seems to be the
24 viable agreement.
25 Q. We're going to be -- as I said to you, we'll be looking at the
1 map. Did Dr. Karadzic and other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership
2 tell you that they considered that if they could not get what they wanted
3 from negotiations, they would go to more traditional approaches such as
4 the use of force?
5 A. The use of force was taking place already with each side blaming
6 the other at the very beginning, and -- and nobody -- what Dr. Karadzic
7 told me sometimes is that if we didn't manage to get an agreement, there
8 would be a terrible war.
9 Q. Just citing one remark from the 11th session of the Assembly,
10 again on March 18th, the quote is, and this is by Mr. Krajisnik, a
11 participant in the discussion, and as you are aware, a close confidant of
12 Dr. Karadzic:
13 "Did we not say that nothing was agreed as yet, that this was
14 working material? Our work is not yet finished, gentlemen. This is just
15 one phase. If we cannot achieve our goal and carry out the mandate we've
16 received from this Assembly, then we will do whatever is necessary to
17 protect our interest."
18 That's D90 at e-court page 34. And I take it that that was
19 consistent with what you just told us you were hearing from Dr. Karadzic
20 and other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership about what would happen
21 if the Bosnian Serbs didn't realise the agreement they were seeking.
22 A. It was not put to me like that. It was put to me as if we did
23 not go on negotiating on the basis that we had agreed on in March, things
24 would deteriorate into war.
25 Q. Now -- now, on February 25th, during the course of the
1 negotiations, Mr. Krajisnik also said the following. That's found at
2 D88. He said:
3 "As a participant in the Lisbon talks, I'd like to add a few
5 Then he went on:
6 "Gentlemen, we have two options, one to fight by political means
7 to make the most of the present time as a first phase, or to break off
8 the talks and go for what we have done over the centuries, win our own
9 territories by force."
10 And then he continued:
11 "We have the opportunity to preserve the Serbian people in a
12 single state, to preserve the entire Serbian people in Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina and have it become part of the Serbian empire."
14 And that's at pages 62 through 63 of D88.
15 Did the agreement in principle, Ambassador, envision that the
16 Bosnian Serb entity would become part of the Serbian empire, that is that
17 the --
18 A. Look, what Mr. Krajisnik said, it's a lot of rubbish. I mean, it
19 doesn't make any sense. Perhaps it did to his public at the time, but
20 that was one of the many nonsenses that we had to cope with. The idea
21 was to introduce some kind of common-sense rationality into all that
22 business. That's what the agreement is for. What they said in their
23 Assembly, I wasn't there. I didn't hear him. I'm not surprised, but I'm
24 not shocked either.
25 Q. The short answer, I take it, Ambassador, is that in fact the
1 desire to or objective to unify the Bosnian Serb entity with Serbia and
2 Montenegro was not envisioned by the Statement of Principles?
3 A. On the contrary. It's clear. I suppose it is said somewhere in
4 Statement of Principle that they shouldn't try to -- neither Croats nor
5 Serbs should try to get into either Croatia or Serbia. I mean ...
6 Q. Thank you. Now, we've heard reference to the issue of territory,
7 both in that article in the "International Herald Tribune" we looked to
8 and in various other references here. I take it that it was clear at
9 that time that the issue of what territory would be encompassed by the
10 entities involved was going to be a source of major dispute and major
11 tension; correct?
12 A. Yes. More than that, it was going to be the object of the
13 work -- of a working group that would be set with the help of members of
14 the European Community, as we then were, to try to define precisely the
15 borders of these three constituent units which need not be contiguous,
16 and -- but that work was never done, because meanwhile, things started --
17 parties start, particularly I think the Muslims but also the Croats,
18 going, at least in what they told me, against the agreement. That is --
19 to answer your question, it -- obviously there was a lot of work to be
20 done to get the precise limitations of those three constituent units.
21 Q. Were you aware that Dr. Karadzic immediately upon the Statement
22 of Principles was stating the following, and that was on -- again at the
23 11th session:
24 "We have achieved the quality. This is what Europe recognises.
25 Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina exists. The only remaining question is
1 one of quantity, and it will happen according to our political will, our
2 right to self-determination and organisation. It will happen according
3 to the actual conditions which are up to you," to the -- to his
4 followers, "which are up to you to create."
5 A. Yes, and so --
6 Q. So are you aware at the time of Dr. Karadzic's interest in the
7 quantity of the land that --
8 A. The three of them were interested in the quantity of the land.
9 It's obvious if you are going to divide land, if you have a plot and
10 divide it with someone, you have to know exactly the quantity you have to
11 have. This was, of course, one of the complicated things. The problem
12 was not easy, and at that stage they all looked into that.
13 Q. And did you consider, as Dr. Karadzic told his followers, that
14 that would be up to the actual conditions which the people on the ground
15 would be able to create?
16 A. I don't know what he meant by that.
17 Q. Now, the map that was affixed to the Statement of Principles was
18 a map, as explained in your statement, that reflected the absolute and
19 relative majorities in the municipalities across Bosnia; correct?
20 A. Mm-hmm.
21 Q. And during the course of the discussions, as Dr. Karadzic and the
22 other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership explained the kinds of
23 transformation or "transformation" of Bosnia they had in mind, various
24 members of the international community advised them that the map of
25 Bosnia does not speak in favour of that kind of division. So, for
1 example, at D1284, those are the notes taken by Dr. Karadzic's
2 chef de cabinet at the time of the discussions. Lord Carrington said
3 specifically at page 3 the map of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not speak
4 in favour of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And at page 9 of
5 those same notes, as the Bosnian Serb leadership continued to press for
6 ethnic division, Mr. Darwin told them that "I cannot accept that they've
7 been ethnically clean entities because it is not feasible in the field."
8 A. Certainly. Neither Henry Darwin or myself would have accepted
9 ethnical cleansing to -- either by Serbs or, for that matter, by Croats
10 or by whoever. The idea was that this will not be done, and to us in the
11 conference, I think it was Dr. Karadzic himself who agreed that if we
12 came to a final solution of that, there would be -- people would be --
13 that would have been thrown out from their places would come back to
14 those places.
15 Q. And I'll get --
16 A. We never foresaw, as you can imagine, ethnical cleansing.
17 Q. And I'll be talking with you about that portion of your statement
18 in a moment too.
19 I'd like to look now at a couple of clips from an interview by
20 Dr. Karadzic in which he talks about why the Bosnian Serb leadership
21 accepted the statement in principles and some of his objections to the
22 existing map of the absolute and relative majorities.
23 MR. TIEGER: Those clips are 65 ter 45284A and B.
24 [Video-clip played]
25 MR. TIEGER: We're not getting any sound on that.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger --
3 MR. TIEGER: I was just about to do that, Mr. President. Both in
4 the interest of time and because the -- could we stop that, please.
5 Let's call up the transcript for 65 ter 45284.
6 Q. For both logistical technical reasons, Ambassador, and in the
7 interests of time, I'm going to show you the transcript of that interview
8 and direct your attention to certain relevant portions. On that
9 occasion, standing before those maps --
10 A. And that was when? Can you refresh my ...
11 Q. We don't have a precise date for it but it would have been after
12 Vance-Owen. So it appears to have been sometime in probably late 1993,
13 1994, but there's no specific date listed for that.
14 Dr. Karadzic said, as you saw him:
15 "Here before us is the Cutileiro's preliminary map," et cetera.
16 He went on to say:
17 "We accepted the logic of the map and that's why we accepted it
18 because for the first time it was about the separation of Bosnia into
19 three pieces."
20 That's found at page 1, beginning at line 10.
21 And then he goes on --
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Let us collapse the B/C/S.
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. And he goes on to make the following references in that first
25 paragraph and in the one that follows that. He notes that they
1 acknowledge that there were some Muslims at the foothills of Mount Grmic
2 and Mount Kozara, but they expected they would trade it for something.
3 "Like they expected us to trade something." He indicates down in the
4 next paragraph, again noting that they didn't accept the map:
5 "We weren't satisfied with Eastern Bosnia, with Sarajevo 2. We
6 weren't satisfied with the Neretva River."
7 And if we go to page 2, he again refers to a portion of the map
8 and this time referring, as we see in context here, to north-west Bosnia:
9 "In that regard you can understand now why a green -- a green
10 stain has appeared here."
11 And he talks about Sanski Most and again about Krupa and again
12 about Mount Grmic and Mount Kozara, which is the in the area of Prijedor.
13 Now, Ambassador, first of all, were you aware of the -- some of
14 the specific objections that Dr. Karadzic and/or other members of the
15 Bosnian Serb leadership had to the map that was the working map for the
16 Statement of Principles?
17 A. The map for the Statement of Principles was a preliminary map, so
18 much so, as I told you a minute ago, we had decided to create a working
19 group that was never created. European countries didn't provide on time
20 the people who would help and so on, and it was obvious that the three
21 parties would have objections to bits here or there. So I -- it's
22 perfectly normal. But all this that you have shown to me is in 1993 or
23 1994, well after the end. We're talking of the -- the preliminary map
24 was an attempt to get the very little goodwill that existed among the
25 parties, to put them together and try to build a viable thing out of
1 that, but any line there was by definition not final, because we had to
2 negotiate that.
3 Q. That's -- that's understood, Ambassador. I just wanted to
4 know -- you referred to the objections to bits here and there. I just
5 wanted to know if you were aware at the time of Dr. Karadzic's objections
6 to the bit in Eastern Bosnia?
7 A. Not that I recall, but it was 20 years ago. I -- maybe.
8 Q. Do you --
9 MR. TIEGER: And I tender 65 ter 45284, Mr. President.
10 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
11 JUDGE KWON: Your only question was about -- his objection to
12 Eastern Bosnia with respect to this clip?
13 MR. TIEGER: Mr. -- yeah.
14 JUDGE KWON: I wonder what question did you ask to the Ambassador
15 at all.
16 MR. TIEGER: The whole -- the whole thrust of these questions was
17 what were the objections to the map. Then I asked him about specific
18 things, a specific thing that Dr. Karadzic had said about the map. These
19 are Dr. Karadzic's words regarding that very issue, Mr. President. I
20 think it goes directly to the question of what -- what specific concerns
21 were held by the Bosnian Serb leadership and about -- and what specific
22 territory they were -- they sought.
23 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Given the position of the Defence,
24 we'll --
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we --
1 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6134, Your Honours.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Ambassador, do you know what steps had been taken prior to the
5 agreement in principle by the Bosnian Serbs to begin the process of
6 ethnic separation? And I include in that such things as the
7 establishment of the Council of Ministers, meetings to discuss the --
8 ensuring that Serbian power was felt in certain territories, steps
9 towards dividing the police, and so on. Were you aware of that as those
10 discussions were progressing?
11 A. Not directly at all. We were -- we had several rounds of
12 conversations with the three parties, what -- each of the parties then
13 with their own. I was not there and I got only indirect information.
14 Q. Did you know that on the very date of the Statement of
15 Principles, March 18th, that steps were -- that the Bosnian Serb
16 leadership, that is, at the Bosnian Serb Assembly, immediately suggested
17 that steps be taken toward implementing ethnic division on the ground,
18 that is, toward asserting physical control over the areas sought?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Did you know the various ways in which the Bosnian Serb
21 leadership defined what they considered to be Serbian territory?
22 A. No.
23 Q. For example, did you know that they considered areas where the
24 Serbs had been a majority before World War II should be Serbian
25 irrespective of which ethnic group was the majority in that area now?
1 A. Taken out of context. All that's affirmations of a very
2 nonsensical nature, but we were in Bosnia. The three groups had their
3 own historical memories that were sometimes were very peculiar to an
4 outsider, and everybody was trying to scramble to get what he could from
5 this. So I wouldn't -- I'm not surprised from -- by what I'm hearing,
6 but I don't think that if there had been a strong political will from the
7 top to -- to get this thing through, we might have gotten it through.
8 By the way, in Dayton, if I may go back to that, in Dayton with
9 different perhaps details, certainly many details are different, but
10 we -- we got to that -- the point -- the basic point of this story is:
11 Could we have a unitary Bosnia or did we have to have a tripartite
12 Bosnia? My conviction in the end, during the time I was there, is that
13 only a tripartite thing would work, and that was also the conviction of
14 Dick Holbrooke in the end. That's all.
15 Q. You refer to those as affirmations of a very nonsensical nature.
16 I take it then that --
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And I'm referring to the position that the Bosnian Serb entity,
19 that Republika Srpska territory should encompass those areas where the
20 Serbs were a majority prior to World War II. I take it, then, you were
21 not aware that this position was reflected in the declaration of the
22 proclamation of the state on January 9th, 1992, by the Bosnian Serbs, and
23 are not aware that it was actually reflected in the constitution of the
24 Bosnian Serb Republic?
25 A. It's possible, yeah.
1 Q. Ambassador, you referred several times to the map that was
2 affixed to the Statement of Principles and to the -- and
3 that's 65 ter 19151, which is attached to P782, and the map which is part
4 of the Dayton Agreement, which is 1D5129, and you've stated several times
5 that the result was about the same.
6 MR. TIEGER: I'd like to call up 65 ter 24616. This is a map
7 that combines the two by overlaying the Dayton map on the map affixed to
8 the Statement of Principles.
9 Q. So the black line represents the Dayton line.
10 A. I have difficulty seeing the black -- oh, yes, I can.
11 Q. Now, I referred earlier to both Mount Grmic and Mount Kozara. I
12 told you that Mount Kozara, where that -- where that was, and the
13 reference we saw in Dr. Karadzic's interview to his objections concerning
14 Sanski Most, and in particular we looked at his objections to the
15 Cutileiro map, that is the map affixed to this statement in principles,
16 relating to Eastern Bosnia.
17 A. Mm-hmm.
18 Q. And if we look at 65 ter 24616, we see the following
19 municipalities that were once Muslim majority areas and that were
20 identified as such in the map affixed to the Statement of Principles that
21 now fall within the province of the Bosnian Serbs after the -- as a
22 result -- or after the 3.5 years of conflict, and that includes Zvornik,
23 and Bratunac, and Vlasenica, and Srebrenica, and Rogatica, and Visegrad.
24 A. Mm-hmm.
25 Q. So those are municipalities whose -- the control of which shifted
1 after the conflict began and as a result of the conflict; correct?
2 A. Probably, yes, I suppose.
3 Q. And as this Court is aware, we've seen evidence from the
4 53rd Assembly by Dr. Karadzic explaining why those areas fell within the
5 province of the Bosnian Serbs, and he said in a quote by now well-known
6 by the Chamber --
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we hear the date for the
8 Ambassador to know to which time this relates?
9 MR. TIEGER: Yeah.
10 Q. This is what Dr. Karadzic said in -- at the 53rd Assembly session
11 in 1995, and essentially Dr. Karadzic said, Don't let this get around,
12 but there were municipalities where the Serbs were the minority. He
13 referred to the ratios of 30 per cent to 70 per cent. But that the Serbs
14 had to have them for strategic reasons and no one practically is
15 questioning that now.
16 A. Well, I wasn't there, so I don't know.
17 Q. Now, in paragraph 32, as you've explained before, Dr. Karadzic
18 expressed a willingness to return territory to the Muslims. The quote in
19 your statement is: During the meeting of August 26, 1992, "Dr. Karadzic
20 expressed his willingness to return territory to the Muslims ..."
21 Now, the fact is, Ambassador, that Dr. Karadzic didn't say he
22 would return all the territory taken, did he? What he said was -- well,
23 do you remember that? Do you remember that he didn't -- whether or not
24 he said --
25 A. I remember exact -- it's in the text. There is a letter, I
1 think, in which that is said, and so what are you trying to ask me? I
2 don't understand.
3 Q. Your statement says he was willing to return territory.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. I just want to clarify that he didn't express any commitment to
6 return all of the territory that was conquered or liberated or taken by
7 Bosnian Serbs.
8 A. He didn't say -- he said "territory." He didn't say "all the
9 territory." He didn't exclude it either. The way it was said, the
10 implication of that was, I think, that as we would negotiate, we would
11 come to agreements on different points. But no, he didn't say that he
12 would return all the territory.
13 Q. He said it was difficult to assess which areas could be handed
14 back and that the precise amount of land that may be returned had not
15 been decided; correct?
16 A. Probably, if you have it there.
17 Q. That's found at 1D5127, which I think came in as an associated
19 Now, paragraph 32 also states that, and you mentioned this
20 earlier in your testimony, that Dr. Karadzic supported an agreement for
21 the return of all refugees and stated that he had issued instructions to
22 stop his forces from requiring Muslims and Croats to sign papers
23 indicated -- indicating that they were "willing" to leave.
24 A. Mm-hmm. I suppose.
25 Q. Okay. Now, with respect to the return of people who had fled,
1 there would essentially be, I take it, two extremes on that end of the
2 spectrum. On the one hand, an insistence that everything -- everybody be
3 returned and everything be returned to the status quo ante, and on the
4 other hand -- that is everybody has to come back, and on the other hand,
5 an insistence that the changes resulting from the war, the demographic
6 changes that resulted would have to remain as is. Those would
7 essentially be the two extremes.
8 A. I suppose so, yes.
9 Q. Well, with that in mind, I'd like to look at some of the
10 positions taken by Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership with
11 respect to that issue and -- and ask if you were aware of those.
12 First of all, let me ask you more generally: Were you aware that
13 from an early stage, even preceding the conflict to throughout the
14 conflict and toward -- to the conclusion of the conflict, that
15 Dr. Karadzic insisted that the factual situation that could be or had
16 been created would be decisive and would be a point that the Bosnian
17 Serbs would insist on?
18 A. That was not phrased to me at all like that.
19 Q. Let me just ask you if you're familiar with any of these quotes
20 and then ask you a question about that, because this Court has received
21 extensive evidence that Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership
22 insisted on the enforcement of the factual situation as -- as a means of
23 resolving the conflict and deciding who got what territory.
24 So as early as October 19th --
25 A. Which year?
1 Q. I don't have a correct cite for this. Just one moment.
2 Okay. As early as December 9th, 1991, Dr. Karadzic was stating:
3 "Europe accepts legality when it does not -- it does not accept
4 legality but the factual status. Therefore we have to be wise enough and
5 prepare both the legality and the factual status."
6 During the course of the war, as we see from -- and that was -- I
7 didn't make it -- I'll get the cite for that in the moment. It's P2554,
8 page 78, and P1479, at page 22, Dr. Karadzic stated in August of 1992:
9 "The European Community will accept the factual situation, which
10 is why we must not make any concessions militarily."
11 A. He said that to whom?
12 Q. Mladic.
13 A. To Mladic.
14 Q. Correct. In --
15 MR. ROBINSON: Well, excuse me, Mr. President. If this is a
16 question of whether Mr. Cutileiro heard about these things, how would he
17 have heard about something that Dr. Karadzic said to Mladic. This
18 appears to be an exercise in asking rhetorical questions.
19 MR. TIEGER: Hardly. The Defence has proffered this statement
20 for the purpose of advancing certain propositions inferentially and
21 sometimes directly. I'm now going to juxtapose what Dr. Karadzic was
22 saying to other people throughout the course of the conflict and ask the
23 Ambassador -- and I have throughout this examination juxtaposed the
24 things Dr. Karadzic was saying outside the negotiations and sometimes
25 actually in the negotiations with the positions he took in the
1 negotiations and represented were commitments he was willing to make at
2 various times while he was saying other things to his subordinates and
3 followers. I think that's entirely fair and illuminating.
4 JUDGE KWON: Of course while it is fair, but in order to get the
5 answer correctly, you need to put the quotes in a way so that Ambassador
6 could understand your question.
7 MR. TIEGER: Mr. -- Mr. President, I'm sorry if I wasn't clear,
8 but I thought I indicated I wanted to just identify a few quotes and then
9 put the general proposition rather than doing them one at a time. I
10 thought that made more sense since they form a kind of critical mass --
11 JUDGE KWON: Shall we pause just a second.
12 MR. TIEGER: Are we still pausing, Mr. President?
13 JUDGE KWON: French translation has only now been completed.
14 That's the speed we should proceed.
15 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
16 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. If I could just come
18 back to this for one moment. The question was, "Let me ask you if you're
19 familiar with any of these quotes," and then he asked him, among other
20 things, of -- he quotes the Mladic diary and asks him about something
21 that Dr. Karadzic said to General Mladic. I don't see how that could be
22 asked in good faith to a witness about what -- was said between Karadzic
23 and Mladic. So it seems like this is just a pretext for putting before
24 the Chamber, as we would do in a closing submission, material and then
25 bouncing off the witness whatever the answer. So I don't think that
1 that's a proper technique, and I think if Mr. Tieger's going to do that,
2 he should at least break it down so that we know the cite that he's
3 taking is actually something that the witness might possibly have been
4 expected to know.
5 MR. TIEGER: All right. I'm going to --
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a -- I think the point has been made. Please
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President, and I'm going to --
9 Mr. Robinson rises because I think this -- well, I'm not going to rise to
10 his bait.
11 Q. Ambassador, I'm going to read you one more quote in connection
12 with the insistence on the application of the factual situation and
13 that's in connection with the question of whether or not there was a
14 genuine commitment to refugees returning. Okay. At the 46th session
15 Dr. Karadzic said, and that's in 1994:
16 "Our goal is to create a state. How big it will be, we do not
17 know but it has to be in one piece and in order for the state to exist it
18 has to be in one piece. We have to maintain -- maintain this reality as
19 long as the world accepts this idea. We have created new realities."
20 And then he goes on to speak about Zvornik which is won 60/40 in
21 favour of the Muslims but now is populated by Serbs. And he goes on to
22 say: We request Zvornik based on the right which comes out of the new
23 reality. This war had created the new reality." And he continues and
24 concludes: If you want to give Zvornik to the Muslims, then you have to
25 wage a new war in which -- in order to expel these Serbs back to Zenica,
1 we request Zvornik according to this right."
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Kindly slow down when
3 reading and pause between question and answer. Thank you.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. Okay. Did Dr. Karadzic indicate to you in August of 1992, the
6 time when you're referring to his position to you on the return of
7 refugees, that he would be insisting on the implementation and
8 enforcement of the de facto situation that had been created by the war?
9 A. No.
10 Q. One question about the property relinquishment document, that is
11 the -- you stated that Dr. Karadzic said that he had issued instructions
12 to stop his forces from requiring Muslims and Croats to sign papers
13 indicating that they were willing to leave --
14 A. Sorry to interrupt. I think that is in a letter of his attached.
15 It's not part of my statement as such.
16 Q. It's actually -- it's actually in paragraph 32 of your statement,
17 Ambassador --
18 A. It says --
19 Q. -- if you want to look at that.
20 A. Yeah.
21 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, is the Registry calling up -- thank you.
22 Q. It's the last sentence on that page, sir.
23 A. Oh, yes. Thank you.
24 Q. I take it that the international community did not itself accept
25 the validity of that kind of document under the circumstances of the war;
2 A. Which document?
3 Q. Papers indicating -- papers requiring Muslims and Croats --
4 A. Of course not.
5 Q. Okay. Those documents were not worth the paper they were written
6 on; correct?
7 A. They might be in the place where they were written and by the
8 people passed them between them, but not to us, certainly not.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. TIEGER: I have nothing further, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
12 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps we could let
14 Ambassador Cutileiro go if I am able to finish before the break. To that
15 end, I'd like to have P05174 in e-court.
16 JUDGE KWON: Before doing so, yes, Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: I just note I didn't tender 65 ter 24616, the map.
18 JUDGE KWON: Overlapping maps. Yes, Mr. Robinson. Any
20 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6135, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: How long do you expect, Mr. Karadzic? I'm wondering
24 whether we should take a break now.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not long. Until the break, maybe a
1 minute or two over.
2 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's proceed then. Is it okay,
3 Mr. Ambassador?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, of course.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE WITNESS: It's my first day here, so I'm fresh.
7 JUDGE KWON: Obrigado.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have this map,
9 then, which is P6735.
10 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
11 Q. [Interpretation] Your Excellency, what is the position of Serb
12 territories vis-a-vis your map and the Dayton map? I'm trying to say
13 this: The Muslims were left without some parts of their territory, but
14 the Serbs were left without some too. Is that true?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you. You said that the political speech in front of the
17 Assembly -- well, do you suppose I had to justify the loss of purely
18 ethnic municipalities such as Drvar, Glamoc, Grahovo -- very well. I
19 withdraw that. I withdraw that.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have D1754. D01754.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Your Excellency, you were asked about whether it was true that I
23 said that I had ordered my forces to stop asking for certain paperwork.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we show item 3 to the
1 THE WITNESS: "That forced transfer of people and other illegal
2 measures ..."
3 MR. TIEGER: I'm not trying to stop Dr. Karadzic from pursuing
4 this, but I just want to clarify that cross-examination did not ask
5 whether it was true that he said it.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the date for the
7 witness's sake.
8 THE WITNESS: 19th of August.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Yes. How is this in keeping with what you stated of me informing
11 you of having issued such an order?
12 A. Yes, I suppose -- it's here. At least this is the English
13 translation, so I believe it's an accurate translation.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have D220 next.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
17 Q. Your Excellency, do you recall a platform of mine I presented on
18 the 22nd of April, 1992, whereby I described my vision of solution to the
19 crisis which I sent to the European Union, the European Community?
20 Please have a look at item 5 where I stipulate our position on what you
21 were asked about during cross-examination.
22 A. Yes, I read it here.
23 Q. How is this in keeping with your understanding of my position
24 during the negotiations?
25 A. It fits. I mean, what you told me is what is here.
1 Q. Thank you, Your Excellency. The last document, P5745. [In
2 English] 5745.
3 [Interpretation] Your Excellency, this was a private telephone
4 conversation that was intercepted. You were not privy to it, but I would
5 like you to take a look at page 3 to see what it is that I said
6 privately. You were read out a quote from my Assembly address, and now
7 please have a look at my reply, the fifth item from the stop, beginning
8 with "I, however, accepted." It is a conversation between myself and a
9 Krajina official on -- which date? Please bear with me.
10 A. Yeah, yeah. Yeah.
11 Q. The 25th of February, 1992. What am I talking about with this
12 official, because he was in charge of explaining our position to the
13 Krajina region.
14 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic repeat the quote.
15 MR. KARADZIC:
16 Q. [In English] "I, however, accepted that in its existing borders,
17 Bosnia cannot be integral, but in its existing borders this means that we
18 won't join a single part to either Serbia or Croatia."
19 [Interpretation] Your Excellency, how do you interpret this? Is
20 this consistent with the aims of the conference that you were still at
21 the helm of at the time?
22 A. That is actually touches that one fundamental aspect of the
23 conference itself. The point of the conference was to give as much
24 autonomy as possible to the Serbs and the Croats in the majority Muslim
25 state without, without, infringing the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
1 The understanding of that was sometimes difficult, particularly the
2 understanding of what it meant to be an autonomous part of -- kind of
3 tripartite arrangement. But as for the -- the transcription here of your
4 telephone conversation, yes, that is coherent with -- with what we did at
5 the conference. And as I said, in the beginning, it was one of the
6 points of the conference was to keep the borders. If we -- if not, it
7 wouldn't make sense. It wouldn't even be called -- the thing would not
8 be called principles for the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
9 Q. Your Excellency, thank you very much for coming to testify. I
10 just want to say that even though you were -- even though you were not
11 soft to the Serbs in the least, we did admire your skill and your
12 persistence to preserve peace. Thank you very much.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: I've been trying to find this document, and -- okay.
16 If you give me just a moment. It was mis-cited, so I just wanted --
17 before we excuse the Ambassador, I could just take one quick look at the
18 document which I was not able to call up.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 MR. TIEGER: I can look -- I mean, it is in evidence. I can look
21 at it. I won't hold up the Ambassador or the Court any longer. Thank
23 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
24 That concludes your testimony, Ambassador Cutileiro. On behalf
25 of the Chamber and the Tribunal as a whole, I would like to thank you for
1 your coming to The Hague to give it.
2 My thanks also go to the representatives of Portugal,
3 Mr. De Serpa and Ms. Groba. Now you are free to go. Please have a safe
4 journey back home.
5 We will rise all together. We will have a break for half an hour
6 and resume at 11.05.
7 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 [The witness withdrew]
9 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.
10 --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.
11 [The witness entered court]
12 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness take the solemn declaration,
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
15 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Stanic. Please be seated and make
17 yourself comfortable.
18 WITNESS: MILENKO STANIC
19 [Witness answered through interpreter]
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stanic, do you hear me in the language you
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
23 JUDGE KWON: Before you start giving evidence, I would like to
24 draw your attention to a particular Rule here at the International
25 Tribunal. Under this Rule, Rule 90(E), you may object to answering a
1 question from the accused, the Prosecution, or even from the Judges if
2 you believe that your answer will incriminate you. When I say
3 "incriminate," I mean that something you may say may amount to an
4 admission of your guilt for a criminal offence or could provide evidence
5 that you have committed an offence. However, even if you think your
6 answer will -- your answer will incriminate you and you do not wish to
7 answer the question, the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer
8 the question, but in such a case the Tribunal will make sure that your
9 testimony compelled in such a way shall not be used as evidence in other
10 case against you for any offence other than false testimony.
11 Do you understand what I have just told you?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I am aware of these
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Stanic.
15 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
16 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
17 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Dr. Stanic.
18 A. Good day. Good day, Mr. President.
19 Q. Thank you. And if I can ask you to pause between my questions
20 and your answers, and can we ask both of us to speak out our sentences
21 slowly so that they can be interpreted to all the parties and so that
22 they can be completely recorded in the transcript.
23 Dr. Stanic, did you provide a statement to my Defence team?
24 A. Yes, I did.
25 Q. And can I ask you, please, to look at 1D7232 in e-court, please.
1 Do you see the statement in front of you on the screen?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. We need to make longer breaks. Did you read the statement, and
4 did you sign it?
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the witness the last
7 page, please, so that he can identify his signature.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Dr. Stanic, is this your signature?
10 A. Yes, this is my signature.
11 Q. Thank you. And since you read and signed the statement, do you
12 believe that the statement accurately reflects what you told the Defence
14 A. Yes. This is my statement in its entirety, the way I gave it to
15 the Defence, and it's a statement I signed.
16 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you in the
17 courtroom that the Defence team put to you then, would your answers in
18 essence be the same as those in this statement?
19 A. Yes, they would be the same.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I would like to
22 tender this bundle pursuant to 92 ter.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, I take it you are tendering only two
25 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President. We're asking for
1 permission to add them to our 65 ter list as they weren't in our
2 possession at the time when the list was made.
3 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland, do you have any objections?
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, no. I would only note that 1D25422
5 is P05399.
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well, then. You are tendering only one
8 Yes, we'll admit them, and let us give the number.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 92 ter statement will be Exhibit
10 D2982, and 65 ter number 1D06050 will be Exhibit D2983.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'm now going to read
13 the summary of Dr. Stanic's statement in English, and then after that, I
14 would ask him about two documents that we received from him.
15 [In English] Dr. Milenko Stanic, born on March the 10th, 1962, in
16 Grabovica village, Vlasenica municipality. He completed his primary
17 schooling in the area of Vlasenica, his secondary schooling in Vlasenica,
18 and graduated from the Economic Faculty in Brcko. He completed his
19 masters in Sarajevo and obtained his doctorate in Banja Luka. He started
20 working in the Vlasenica Boksit mine in 1986 and worked there until the
21 beginning of 1991, when he was elected president of the Vlasenica
23 At the beginning of 1993, he transferred to the government of the
24 Republika Srpska in the position of Minister of Trade and Tourism. He
25 left the government to become Director of Customs and was a professional
1 deputy in the Assembly of Republika Srpska for one year.
2 Dr. Milenko Stanic did not consider there to be any inter-ethnic
3 problems in any part of the Vlasenica municipality until the formation of
4 the multi-party system, which was then the -- which was then the
5 intolerance began -- which when -- when the intolerance began. Many
6 Serbs were against the break-up of Yugoslavia while the Muslims and
7 Croats were in favour of it, which caused the tensions. At the
8 multi-party elections, the SDA and SDS won an equal number of seats in
9 the Assembly of Vlasenica.
10 In the beginning, the authorities functioned with great
11 difficulty due to the disagreements over key issues. The Muslim
12 representatives attempted to bring down the established constitutional
13 order, whereas Serbs wished to preserve it. Milenko Stanic considered
14 that many of the moves made by the Muslims were unconstitutional, and
15 they used the pressure of mass gatherings in their -- of their supporters
16 in order to implement this unconstitutional attitudes.
17 Muslims stopped fulfilling their military service for the JNA,
18 and during this period the SDA Muslim party were also arming the Muslim
19 population and creating paramilitary formations. Further, Alija
20 Delimustafic, minister of interior, asked police station in Muslim
21 majority municipalities to compile a list of young men who were eligible
22 for military training so that they could be sent to Croatia for training.
23 In the second half of 1991, the SDA gathered and prevented the
24 Tuzla Territorial Defence representatives from requisition --
25 requisitioning military documentation. The SDA forced its way into the
1 municipal building and very aggressively prevented the files from being
2 requisitioned. A similar incident occurred in -- on 8th of July, 1991,
3 when a large group of Muslims demanded that Dr. Milenko Stanic provide
4 buses for them so that they could collect Muslim soldiers who had been
5 mobilised into the Territorial Defence Vlasenica unit. When the buses
6 arrived, the Muslims asked their fellow nationals to abandon the unit and
7 go home, which almost all of them did, without returning their military
9 Although the Vlasenica municipality did not give its approval for
10 activities regarding the referendum of B and H to be conducted, certain
11 Muslim members inside the municipal government nonetheless became
12 involved. Once it became clear that the Muslims were seriously engaged
13 in these activities, the Serbs proposed that there should be an official
14 decision that Vlasenica continued to exist within the Socialist Federal
15 Republic of Yugoslavia.
16 Tensions and distrust grew amongst both the Serbs and Muslims.
17 To find a solution, the division of the territory between Serbs and
18 Muslims was initiated. The agreement between two nations was verified
19 and adopted at the Municipal Assembly on 13th of April, 1992. Just as
20 the adopted decision on the division of the Vlasenica territory into
21 three municipalities was to be put in practice -- into practice, the
22 Muslim representatives gave up on implementing this decision under
23 pressure from the SDA central leadership. The fear and distrust amongst
24 the population and many people -- the fear and distrust grew among the
25 population and many people, both Serbs and Muslims, left Srebrenica [sic]
1 when the armed conflict began in Bijeljina and Zvornik.
2 Due to the employees -- due to the employees not coming to work
3 because of the uncertain situation and the mass exodus of people, schools
4 and companies were no longer functioning. Representatives were organised
5 to ask the Muslims to return to Vlasenica. However, they did not appear
6 willing to come back.
7 On 21st of April, 1992, the Territorial Defence in Vlasenica was
8 mobilised to prevent property from being looted. No violence was used on
9 this occasion. Serbs who had been expelled by the Muslims in Kladanj,
10 Olovo, and Gorazde started arriving in Vlasenica. Muslims from
11 neighbouring villages also started arriving in the city. They had asked
12 the municipal authorities to provide them with transport to Kladanj and
13 Olovo. The municipal authorities tried to accommodate both Serbian and
14 Muslim requests as far as possible. An issue arose in Vlasenica as the
15 refugees required housing which was not available, so a housing
16 commission was formed to organise temporary accommodation in abandoned
17 Serb and Muslim properties. A reception centre was also created in
18 Susica and buildings belonging to the JNA were used to house refugees and
19 civilians. Permits were issued by the police to allow permanent citizens
20 the ability to move around the area and feel more safe.
21 Due to the departure of a large number of Muslim officials,
22 neither the Assembly nor the Executive Board operated and therefore a
23 Crisis Staff was formed with the task to resolve everyday problems. The
24 Crisis Staff, however, also did not function very well because when the
25 Milici municipality broke away, a number of the Crisis Staff members also
1 moved. Therefore, the Executive Board was reactivated to take over the
2 responsibilities. These issues were further aggravated because the
3 municipality was not able to ask the opinion of the leadership in
4 Sarajevo on many problems because the telephone lines were down and it
5 was not safe to travel by road. Dr. Milenko Stanic does not consider it
6 true that the civilian authorities did not have power and were taken over
7 by the military.
8 Dr. Karadzic never issued him or, as far as he knows, any of the
9 Vlasenica municipality leadership with any order concerning the expulsion
10 of Muslims, the attacks on certain villages, or the carrying out of
11 activities with regard to Muslims. He remembers a speech of Dr. Karadzic
12 held at the funeral of killed combatants of Rogosija. He didn't get an
13 impression there was hatred or call for revenge in that speech.
14 [Interpretation] This would be the summary.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Dr. Stanic, you were kind enough to bring two documents with you.
17 A. If I may just make an intervention on the text that we have
18 heard. There was an error made in the election results; namely, in the
19 first multi-party elections in Vlasenica in 1990, the Serbian Democratic
20 Party won in Vlasenica. It had more deputies than the Party for
21 Democratic Action, and you read out that we had the same number of
22 deputies. Actually, the SDS had 27, and the SDA had 26 deputies. Our
23 results were better or greater by 600 voters than the results of the SDA.
24 So this is just a correction.
25 Q. Thank you, Dr. Stanic. Don't worry, this summary is not an
1 exhibit. Your statement would become an exhibit.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So let us look at 1D --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please be asked to repeat
4 the number.
5 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the number.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D07235. We have to place the
7 document on the ELMO, unfortunately.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Dr. Stanic, you mentioned in your statement that passes were
10 required for free passage through the territory and at various
11 check-points. You kindly brought copies of these passes. Could you
12 please tell us what these passes are.
13 A. These passes could assist the citizens. Of course their value
14 was different, but the citizens themselves pressured not only the local
15 authorities but other organs, the public security stations, the military,
16 to be issued with some kind of document, because they felt that with a
17 document they could move more safely. So in that sense, the local
18 community in Vlasenica issued certain passes at the request of the
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we activate the ELMO, please,
22 because that's where the translation is. Here we can actually remove one
23 page on one side, because both documents being shown right now on the
24 monitor are identical.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. And can you tell us what we are seeing, these copies of the
3 A. The passes were issued to all citizens of all ethnic groups, and
4 I, as the president of the Assembly and later as the minister in the
5 government, had a certain number of passes. Here we're in -- have the
6 opportunity to see a pass issued by the Sekovici military post. Then
7 there's a special pass from 1992. It's in my name. Then we have two
8 passes issued by the ministry. Actually, three passes issued by the
9 Ministry of Defence, also in my name. This is the period when I was
10 working in the Government of Republika Srpska. And then we see a pass
11 from an enterprise or from the Government of Republika Srpska to be able
12 to enter the Famos premises freely, which is where the government was
13 located at the time.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the translation on
15 the ELMO, please. I cannot see the ELMO on my monitors.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Dr. Stanic, are you able to explain to us why you needed these
18 passes as the president of the municipality?
19 A. Because at the time, there were many different check-points held
20 either by the military forces, mostly the police forces. They acted in
21 different ways while monitoring movement. So this pass provided the
22 possibility of passing through these checks without any problem. Some of
23 these passes I used in order to go across the border when I was
24 travelling to the territory of other states. First of all, the Federal
25 Republic of Yugoslavia.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
3 document. We do have a translation, but we cannot upload it, it seems.
4 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: No objection.
6 JUDGE KWON: We will receive it.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2984, Your Honours.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I now ask for
9 1D07236 in e-court, please.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Could you explain what this document means? Unfortunately, we
12 still don't have a translation for this, but you'll be able to explain.
13 It's mostly the names. Could you just read the title and the first
15 A. Yes. This is a list of persons eligible for the exchange of
16 houses and apartments. Owners of apartments and houses who wanted to
17 exchange with refugees from Kladanj, Olovo, Sarajevo, Tuzla.
18 Q. Thank you. Did they do this under some pressure, and at what
19 time did they arrive at the municipality?
20 A. The municipal service in charge of issuing passes required all
21 citizens who wanted to travel somewhere to state for what reason they
22 wished to do so. The municipal service did not have information that
23 anybody was doing this under coercion.
24 In exchanges of residences, there would be involved families,
25 Serb families and Muslim families whose representatives would come to the
1 municipal service in charge of these affairs. The service would accept
2 their applications, record them. It would run checks at the public
3 security stations to make sure that these contracts were done properly,
4 whether they were signed under coercion or some other suspect
5 circumstances, and after these checks were completed, the municipal
6 service gave approvals and organised transportation for these citizens
7 depending on where they wished to go.
8 Q. Thank you very much. Can we see page 2, and then I'll ask you to
9 read the handwritten portion and explain it.
10 A. Yes. This is the second part of the check carried out by the
11 competent public security station. It says:
12 "On the part of the public security station of Vlasenica, there
13 are no legal obstacles for the exchange of apartments and houses of the
14 aforesaid persons. The above-said are persons do not feature in the
15 operative records of the Public Security Station Vlasenica. Signed by
16 authorised officer, Stanisic, L."
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to
18 tender this for identification.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D2985, Your Honours.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I have no further
22 questions for Dr. Stanic at this point.
23 JUDGE KWON: Probably the number should be MFI D2985.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Correct, Your Honour, D2985.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Stanic, as you have noted, your evidence
1 in this case -- your evidence in chief has been admitted in most part in
2 writing in lieu of your oral testimony. Now you will be cross-examined
3 by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.
4 Yes, Ms. Sutherland, please.
5 Cross-examination by Ms. Sutherland:
6 Q. Mr. Stanic, in paragraph --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: My apologies.
9 Q. Mr. Stanic, in paragraph 13 of your statement you said that on
10 the 26th of December, 1991, the Serbs in the local parliament proposed
11 that a decision be adopted that Vlasenica join the Birac Autonomous
12 District. Just to be clear, you mean the Serbian Autonomous District,
13 don't you?
14 A. No, that's not right. It's not the Serbian Autonomous District.
15 It was the Autonomous District of Birac. This term "autonomous district"
16 was accepted at the proposal of Serbian opposition deputies to the
17 Municipal Assembly of Vlasenica. It was the condition for voting in
18 favour of this document and for obtaining the majority for the
19 full-fledged decision of 31 deputies. It was their condition that it be
20 called Autonomous District of Birac instead of Serbian Autonomous
21 District. We had a number of Bosniak deputies --
22 Q. So, Mr. Stanic, this was after the Republika Srpska Assembly
23 passed a decision on the 21st of November, 1991, verifying the declared
24 Serbian autonomous provinces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which included the
25 Serbian Autonomous Region Romanija-Birac, which comprised of the
1 municipalities of Han Pijesak, Pale, Sokolac, Vlasenica, and Sekovici, as
2 well as the parts of this region's other municipalities with Serbian
3 majority. Is that what you're saying? It was after this decision?
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: And that's Exhibit D0083, Your Honours, at
5 English page 33 and B/C/S pages 33 and 34.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask if Dr. Stanic has his
7 statement before him and whether he's able to use it?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have my statement here, but I
9 don't understand the question, the regional districts of Han Sokolac, Han
10 Pijesak. How is Vlasenica and Sekovici connected with these areas?
11 Q. Mr. -- Mr. --
12 A. I would have to see the document.
13 Q. Mr. Stanic, the -- you said that it was called the autonomous
14 district, and I said to you was that after the Republika Srpska Assembly
15 issued the decision verifying the Serbian autonomous provinces in
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina? And then I made reference to the Serbian Autonomous
17 Region Romanija-Birac. But my question is simply: Was what you were
18 talking about earlier after this decision?
19 A. I'm not sure about the date. I know we adopted this decision
20 towards the end of December, and the exact date is in my statement, the
21 26th of December. I don't know when the decision was adopted by the
22 National Assembly.
23 Q. It was on the 21st of November, 1991.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we can have MFI P06112, please.
25 Q. Mr. Stanic, this is minutes of a -- minutes of the 2nd
1 Assembly -- 2nd session of the Assembly of the Autonomous District Birac.
2 We see in English and B/C/S page 2, under point 1, it refers to you as
3 president of the executive -- the English translation says "Executive
4 Board," but I think you would agree a better word -- a better translation
5 is president of the Executive Council of the Autonomous District Birac.
6 And again if we can look at -- and you explained a proposal there under
7 point 1.
8 If I can now take you to page -- English page 5 and B/C/S page 4.
9 And under point 2 it says the president -- in the English translation it
10 says, "President of the Autonomous District Assembly Milenko Stanic
11 said," and then you go on. I think you would agree a better translation
12 is president of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the Autonomous
13 District. Do you agree with that?
14 A. Yes. The Assembly had its organs including the Assembly, the
15 Executive Council and Assembly commissions.
16 Q. And you were the president of the Executive Council?
17 A. Yes. I was president of the Executive Council.
18 Q. And you recall saying -- making these two points, 1 and 2?
19 A. I can't see points 1 and 2. I don't know what you mean. I see
20 proposal number 2.
21 Q. We see point 2 -- you see point 2. You recall you said to the
22 present parties that you considered that -- that candidates to be
23 proposed to the Executive Council. Do you remember saying that?
24 A. Yes. That was standard procedure. Since the Assembly was made
25 up of deputies from all the Assemblies, it was naturally their demand
1 that from every municipality there would be one representative in the
2 Executive Board or the Executive Council. Otherwise, you could not make
3 a proper structure.
4 Q. And, Mr. Stanic, under point 1, if we can just quickly go back to
5 page 2 of the B/C/S, you explain the proposal of the operational
6 programme of the Executive Council. You remember doing that? That was
7 discussed at that meeting.
8 A. I think that Assembly session did not adopt a programme --
9 Q. No. You discussed it. You discussed it.
10 A. I know we agreed that upon the establishment of the Executive
11 Council, we would in that composition draft a programme and verify it at
12 the next session which, however, was not held. So at this Assembly
13 session we did not discuss the programme. It is possible that the
14 introduction which covers proposals by various nominees, we touched upon
15 some issues on which we would work in the future, but the programme was
16 not drafted then, and it was not adopted.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: I seek to tender this document, Your Honour,
18 lift the MFI.
19 JUDGE KWON: The reason for having put this document marked for
20 identification was because of the provenance. It's an excerpt from some
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour. It's --
23 JUDGE KWON: Are you not -- ready to answer the question?
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour. It's an excerpt from
25 Naser Oric's book, and it has been exhibited in two previous trials, and
1 I actually advised the Chamber of that at the very end of the session
2 last Friday.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We don't have any objection
5 to that portion. We would also appreciate being advised of the
6 provenance when the Prosecution advises the Chamber, because we hadn't
7 been advised until hearing it right now. Thank you.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit it in full. So it will be
10 recorded as fully admitted.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND:
12 Q. Mr. Stanic, you also chaired a session of the Executive Council
13 of the Birac Serbian Autonomous District held on the 18th of February,
14 1992, didn't you?
15 A. Right now I can't remember the date unless you show me a
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have Exhibit P06113.
18 Q. Now, you say -- see here this is a Cyrillic document, and it
19 states it's the minutes of the 1st session of the Executive Council of
20 the Birac SAO, which stands for Serbian Autonomous District, does it not?
21 A. That's what it should stand for, but obviously the recording
22 secretary did not pay enough attention to these terms such as "autonomous
23 district." It's true some other municipalities took different decisions
24 than the Municipal Assembly of Vlasenica.
25 Q. You also presented yourself as the president of the Serbian
1 Autonomous District Birac government to the main Belgrade daily, didn't
3 A. I don't remember.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Could we have 65 ter number 24620. And I'm
5 sorry, Your Honour, we don't have a translation at the moment, but -- oh,
6 yes, we do. Thank you.
7 Q. It's the article in the top right-hand corner. It's entitled
8 "Overnight to Serbia," published in "Politika" on the 5th of March, 1992,
9 page 8 of the newspaper. It's talking about tensions in Zvornik and
10 Vlasenica, and you're quoted as saying -- you make a statement about the
11 possible proclamation of the independent BiH, and you say:
12 "In case of proclamation of the independent BiH, it is sure that
13 we will not allow any of its laws or regulations to enter in the Serb
15 And you're introduced there as the president or prime minister of
16 the SAO Birac government. So again we're talking about the Serbian SAO.
17 Do you -- you said that, that you wouldn't allow any laws or regulations
18 to enter into the Serb houses in relation to the independent BiH?
19 A. Reporters have their own way of reporting. As for
20 representation, they put such elements into their reports, but as far as
21 my position is concerned, it was a bit different than you are presenting
22 it. My position was that I repeated several times --
23 Q. Did you -- did you say what you're quoted as being said in this
25 A. In that context that you are presenting, no, but I did say that
1 the laws of a sovereign centralised Bosnia-Herzegovina -- or, rather, the
2 laws of Alija's Bosnia-Herzegovina would not be accepted in Serb houses.
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender this document.
4 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
5 JUDGE KWON: So we're admitting only that part.
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: That portion, yes, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE KWON: Just in case, do we know who wrote it?
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm --
9 JUDGE KWON: Could you read the journalist's name at the end of
10 the --
11 MS. SUTHERLAND:
12 Q. At the bottom of the article, Mr. Stanic, do you see in Cyrillic
13 who the author of the article is?
14 A. Yes. Some person named Pejak [phoen]. I don't know that person.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask distinguished
16 Madam Sutherland to clarify whether Dr. Stanic called himself the
17 president of the SAO government or it was the reporter who added that
18 qualification, because the question implies that Dr. Stanic introduced
19 himself as such, and I don't see it from the article.
20 JUDGE KWON: No, I think -- he answered the question.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I think -- exactly.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive it.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6136, Your Honours.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND:
25 Q. Now, Mr. Stanic, the Serbian Autonomous District of Birac was a
1 functioning body and did issue proclamations and decisions, did it not?
2 Even as late as late April 1992 it was functioning?
3 A. I really don't remember until when it was functioning, but it was
4 not for long. We made a proclamation at the first founding Assembly
5 session in Sekovici, and I believe we did not have more than two sessions
6 of the Executive Council of the region where we discussed mainly economic
7 issues, and another topic was setting up a delegation from that area that
8 would, together with representatives of the Assembly of the Serbian
9 Republic, put forward suggestions in future talks -- or, rather, talks
10 that were already underway on the internal organisation of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. However --
12 Q. Okay. Mr. Stanic, you're basically saying you don't really
13 remember until when it was functioning, but it was not for long. I want
14 to show you a document now that --
15 A. Yes, that's correct.
16 Q. -- that's Exhibit P02615. Now, this is a document from the,
17 again, Serbian Autonomous District of Birac. It's issued by the
18 Crisis Staff in Sekovici on the 29th of April, 1992. And it says:
19 "Pursuant to the decision of the Council for National Security of
20 the Serbian Republic of BH on general mobilisation and on the basis of
21 the estimates of the Crisis Staff of the SAO of Birac on the threat of
22 war, especially in the municipalities of Bratunac and Srebrenica, the
23 Crisis Staff of the SAO Birac hereby brings the following decision," and
24 then proclaiming a state of war. But it's not just --
25 A. Absolutely. This is not an enactment of the Executive Council,
1 and it's not even signed by the Executive Council. It's a document from
2 Sekovici originating from I don't know which organ. I don't know who
3 drafted it. In any case, it's not a document of the Executive Council.
4 Q. But it's a document issued by the Serbian Autonomous District of
5 Birac, is it not?
6 A. No. No. We did not discuss such issues. Of course there were
7 certain members of the Executive Council who tried to abuse their
8 position, mainly in commerce, especially the representative from
9 Sekovici, and that is one of the reasons why we terminated our activities
10 very soon. It's possible that one of these representatives wrote the
12 Q. And we can see the stamp at the top corner. It's been received
13 by the Bratunac Municipal Assembly.
14 A. From whom?
15 Q. Mr. Stanic --
16 A. The point is -- yes?
17 Q. Sorry, go on.
18 A. The point is that the Executive Council did not have its
19 Crisis Staff and could not have produced such a document. The Executive
20 Council held only two sessions, stopped working shortly afterwards and
21 there was no Crisis Staff at the level of the region.
22 Q. Okay. I want to turn now to the Crisis Staff at the municipal
23 level. You state in paragraph 30 that you don't recall the 4th of April,
24 1992, decision establishing the Vlasenica Crisis Staff, appointing you as
25 president of that body.
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we can quickly look at P06121.
2 Q. This is the decision appointing you as the president. You also
3 said that -- in paragraph 43 of your statement that you state that you're
4 not familiar with the contents of the Variant A and B document. We can
5 see from the predicate language of this document that the Crisis Staff of
6 which you're the president is established pursuant to the instructions of
7 the Main Board of the SDS. Do you see that?
8 A. Yes, I see this document.
9 Q. So these instructions of the Main Board were the -- were the
10 Variant A and B -- was the Variant A and B document, wasn't it?
11 A. Why did I state that I don't remember this document? Could you
12 scroll down a little so I can see the stamp. It is evident that this
13 decision was adopted by the Municipal Board, and it was not signed by the
14 president of the Municipal Board, Tomislav Savkic. Another problem is
15 the stamp is not the stamp of the Serbian Democratic Party. It is a
16 stamp of a certain secretariat or a service or a department within the
17 Municipal Assembly. Those were the reasons why I don't remember such
19 Q. You were president of the Vlasenica Crisis Staff, were you not?
20 A. This Crisis Staff was the Crisis Staff of the SDS. The Crisis
21 Staff of the Municipal Assembly was established according to different
22 principles based on the statute of the Municipal Assembly and the then
23 laws. It was basically a continuation of the work of an earlier Council
24 for National Security. I think that was its name. That was the name of
25 the municipal body which dealt with extraordinary situations when the
1 Municipal Assembly was unable to sit.
2 I do not recall that these ten people ever met as a group in
3 order to come to certain decisions. The election of a president is up to
4 those who are nominated, and the members were supposed to choose the
5 president amongst themselves. I was the president of the Crisis Staff of
6 the Municipal Assembly of Vlasenica.
7 Q. Mr. --
8 A. And not of the party Crisis Staff.
9 Q. Mr. Stanic, what -- what instructions, Main Board instructions,
10 are being referred to in -- in the predicate paragraph?
11 JUDGE KWON: Can you show the top part of the document.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Based on the instruction of the
13 Main Board of the SDS of Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding operations under
14 conditions of imminent threat of war, the Municipal Board of the
15 Vlasenica Municipality SDS at a session on 4 April 1992 made the
16 following decision ..."
17 Whoever drafted this document or whoever certified this document
18 invoked some documents which served as the basis. I am not familiar with
19 the basis of this decision. I'm simply not aware of this document.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND:
21 Q. You've never seen the instructions from the Main Board. Is
22 that -- is that your testimony? The instructions that were issued in
23 late December 1991. It's your testimony that you've never seen those
25 A. What I said is that I do not remember whether I read the
2 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... [overlapping speakers] --
3 A. Yes, that's what it says. I do not recall whether I was in
4 attendance --
5 Q. Okay, well --
6 A. -- at the Assembly session.
7 Q. Even if you didn't read the instructions, you knew about the
9 A. Yes. I heard of those documents, but as for the contents, well,
10 partially perhaps. I heard people discuss it, and they must have touched
11 upon the contents.
12 Q. And that was to take over the municipalities?
13 A. You see, throughout 1992 there were constant problems in
14 communication between --
15 Q. No, Mr. Stanic, sorry. I'm talking about --
16 A. -- the local bodies of authority and --
17 Q. I'm talking about before the war, before the conflict started.
18 I'm talking about in late 1991, early 1992. These instructions that
19 you've just told us about that you heard about, that people told you
20 about, and you said that you must have -- it was -- it was -- they --
21 they must have touched upon the contents. I'm talking about the document
22 that instructed the Serb -- the SDS parties in the municipalities to form
23 Assemblies to take over the municipalities. That's what I'm referring to
24 when I'm talking about the instructions. And that's what you're
25 referring to, aren't you, when you say that people talked to you about
1 the contents of these documents, these instructions?
2 A. It wasn't me but the person drafting the document. At the time I
3 was very busy in the Municipal Assembly building. The party was run by a
4 different leadership. I didn't have much time for party matters. There
5 was enough on my hands in the Municipal Assembly. Well, I suppose they
6 invoked a certain document when adopting this decision.
7 Q. Mr. Stanic, you were a member of the SDS in -- in 1991 and 1992,
8 were you -- were you not?
9 A. Yes. I was the first person on the SDS list for the Municipal
10 Assembly in Vlasenica, and I was also the Assembly speaker. I attended
11 the sessions of the Municipal Board when they sat. I do not recall this
12 date, the 4th of April, though, and whether I was present then or not and
13 whether that session took place on that date indeed.
14 Q. And you said that this was -- this Crisis Staff was basically a
15 continuation of the work of an earlier Council for National Security.
16 You said that you thought that was its name. Well, if that was its name,
17 why didn't it continue with that name and not call itself the Crisis
18 Staff of the Serbian municipality of Vlasenica?
19 A. Yes. The Council for All People's Defence, and in crisis times
20 it was to be converted into a Crisis Staff.
21 Q. So this Crisis Staff morphed -- morphed into the Crisis Staff of
22 the Serbian municipality of Vlasenica?
23 A. Not in entirety. Some of the members were never in attendance.
24 For example, the person at number 8, I don't remember him ever taking
25 part in the work. Some of the members were also killed or mobilised at
1 the beginning of the war. In terms of composition and the number of
2 people, there was a difference between the municipal Crisis Staff and the
3 Council for All People's Defence as compared to the party organs. There
4 were similarities, but there were differences as well.
5 Q. Okay. In paragraph 30 you also state that you don't recall the
6 Crisis Staff meeting before the 21st of April, 1992.
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: Can we have 65 ter 24622, please.
8 Q. Now, this is a decision of the Vlasenica municipality Crisis
9 Staff, issued at its meeting of the 19th of April, 1992, and it's a
10 decision on an imminent threat of war. And it endorses the decision of
11 the National Security Council of the Assembly of the Serbian BiH, doesn't
13 A. I'd like to say this: Of course, during proofing I had occasion
14 to see some of the documents shown to me by the Defence. Generally
15 speaking, I can say that in these decisions there are certain problems in
16 terms of dates. As I have stated in my statement, I stand by it. I
17 think the Crisis Staff began sitting on the 22nd of April, that is to
18 say, after the 21st of April. Quite a few documents produced by the
19 Crisis Staff were drafted in the secretariat department of the Municipal
20 Assembly. I wasn't in that building where the municipal secretariat was.
21 I was in the administration building of the bauxite mine, which is some
22 200 metres away from the municipal building. The Executive Board
23 president and I went there after the division of municipality was
24 verified, when the municipality was divided into three parts and the
25 Serbian municipality was established.
1 Now, why they pre-dated these dates is something I don't know.
2 We discussed that issue as well, I believe, on the 22nd rather than on
3 the 19th. I also noticed that a decision of the 30th of March also has
4 certain difficulties.
5 Q. When were you --
6 A. There's another problem here which is the stamp.
7 Q. We will get to that decision. The stamp is the stamp of the
8 Municipal Assembly of Vlasenica, isn't it? In the republic of Bosnia --
9 A. Yes, but --
10 Q. -- Herzegovina. It's the old stamp.
11 A. It is the old stamp, and I think it was kept in the secretariat
12 of the Municipal Assembly, which is in the old Assembly building, and of
13 course this is not my signature.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender this document.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, no objection, Mr. President.
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have 65 ter 23116, please.
17 JUDGE KWON: Shall we give the number.
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honour.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6137, Your Honours.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND:
21 Q. Again, Mr. Stanic, this is pursuant to a decision of the Crisis
22 Staff at its sitting on the 19th of April, 1992, a decision to disarm the
23 active and reserve forces of the Vlasenica SJB?
24 A. Yes, this is nonsense. This is not a document of the Crisis
25 Staff. The stamp is not that of the Crisis Staff, nor is the signature.
1 We didn't even discuss this decision. I believe this document was
2 planted by some services.
3 There was no need to adopt such a decision. On the 21st of
4 April, in the public security station, there were practically no
5 policemen. I know the chief of the station complained, saying that he
6 would -- he was only able to keep the duty policemen on duty. There was
7 no need for this. There must have been previous calls to have illegal
8 weapons handed over, but I see no reason why a decision of this kind
9 would be issued pertaining to the public security station. The Crisis
10 Staff did not make such decisions.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I would seek this tender this
13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We don't have any objection,
14 although I think there's some question as to the validity of the
15 document, but I think that goes to the weight as opposed to its
16 admissibility, so we don't object.
17 JUDGE KWON: What is your position about authenticity,
18 Mr. Robinson?
19 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I -- I'm assuming that the OTP
20 located this when conducting its investigations, and so I don't question
21 the fact that they found it somewhere among the offices in
22 Republika Srpska or in its subsidiary bodies.
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, this -- this document was provided
24 by the chief of the SJB in Vlasenica. Provided it the Office of the
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And in 2009, too.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, you're correct.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will receive it.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6138, Your Honours.
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have Exhibit P03214, please.
7 Q. Mr. Stanic, again this is the decision of the Crisis Staff of the
8 Serbian municipality of Vlasenica, a decision to take over power in the
9 area over the municipality of Vlasenica, and the signature block is
10 "President of the Crisis Staff, Mr. Milenko Stanic." So ...
11 JUDGE KWON: Let's -- let's wait until we see that document.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND:
13 Q. And it also has a stamp.
14 A. Yes. And it is significantly different from the previous stamp.
15 This is exactly what I was talking about. The date is the 19th of April,
16 which is incorrect. I think it was the 22nd of April. It is not signed.
17 I do not recall if we issued a document like this, but the date is
18 definitely incorrect. It must have been after the 21st.
19 Q. Mr. Stanic --
20 A. You see what the problem is --
21 Q. The problem is this document is before the take-over. You -- the
22 take-over occurred on the 20th, 21st of April, 1992, and this document
23 deciding to take over the power precedes the take-over, does it not? So
24 it would be a bit silly to issue a decision after the take-over on the
25 22nd of April, as you say, when the take-over occurred before. Do you
2 A. I said already. After the army came into the town itself on the
3 21st, we started with our first session around the 22nd. Now, why we see
4 decisions dated the 19th --
5 Q. Mr. Stanic, can I just interrupt you. It says -- under point
6 number 1 it says:
7 "The Vlasenica municipality Crisis Staff hereby adopts the
8 decision to take over power ..." not as you're saying if -- if this had
9 occurred on the 22nd of April, it would have said the Vlasenica
10 municipality Crisis Staff power has been taken over already. This is
11 prior to the take-over.
12 A. I see no reason for adopting such a decision. We were the
13 elected authority immediately after the Serb municipality of Vlasenica
14 was established on the 30th [as interpreted] of April when the joint
15 session was held. The Serb deputies remained and elected their people to
16 the bodies and organs. We started setting up our own organs on the
17 13th of April, but the Crisis Staff was only established after the
18 take-over and, for some reasons of their own, the date was pre-dated by
19 some municipal services.
20 Q. But, Mr. Stanic --
21 THE INTERPRETER: The accused overlapped. Could he please repeat
22 his question.
23 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Please do not overlap. Just a
24 second. Let me check that.
25 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 16, it seemed that the
2 witness said the 30th, whereas he said the 13th of April. It is very
3 similar the way it sounds in our language. Could that be checked?
4 MS. SUTHERLAND:
5 Q. You did say the 13th, didn't you, Mr. Stanic, the 13th of April?
6 But --
7 A. Yes --
8 Q. -- but in fact -- but in fact --
9 A. -- after the joint session of the Assembly.
10 Q. Yes --
11 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland. Ms. Sutherland, do you hear in
12 English or in B/C/S?
13 MS. SUTHERLAND: In English, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE KWON: Please do not overlap with the interpretation.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND:
18 Q. Mr. Stanic, but that's not right, is it, because on -- you didn't
19 set up the Serbian Assembly on the 13th of April, did you? That was set
20 up earlier than that. It was actually set up on the 30th of March,
21 wasn't it?
22 A. I said during the introductory part that I had insight into some
23 of the documents given by Defence. Some documents bear the date of the
24 19th of April, which was the session of the Crisis Staff which didn't
25 take place, and the 30th of March when the Assembly did not sit. A
1 session of the Serbian Assembly was held immediately after the joint
2 session on the 14th of April, when we adopted a decision on the division
3 of the municipality into three new municipalities --
4 Q. Okay.
5 A. -- the Serbian deputies remained in the Assembly and adopted
6 certain decisions on the appointment of officials. So that date, too, is
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: Can we have 65 ter number 24621, please. Now,
9 Your Honour, we may not have a translation for this at the moment. It's
10 being -- it's being done as we speak. Oh, here it is. No.
11 Q. Mr. Stanic, here it says during the session of the Serbian
12 municipality of Vlasenica on the 30th of March, 1992, a decision to
13 appoint you as president, and it's signed by Cedo Vrzina.
14 A. No, no, no. Cedo Vrzina. He was the Municipal Assembly
15 secretary, and he was not supposed to sign such documents. The
16 appointment of the municipal president is signed by the speaker Assembly
17 himself, and he was not in that position.
18 In his department is where the documents were created with the
19 wrong dates. I am certain after 22 years that on the 13th of April, the
20 1st session of the Serb Municipality of Vlasenica Assembly was held
21 following the joint session.
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I would seek to tender this
24 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
25 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P6139, Your Honours.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND:
3 Q. Now, Mr. Stanic, you -- the Serbian authorities did then take
4 over power in the days following the 19th of April, 1992, and it was
5 taken over by the --
6 A. The 21st of April.
7 Q. The forces of the JNA and the formed unit co-ordinated by the SDS
8 Crisis Staff. And this is contained in a report of the 1st Vlasenica
9 Light Infantry Brigade commanded by Mile Kosoric. Now --
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The date, please.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let's have a look at the document.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, sorry, P02636. If we can bring
13 that up quickly.
14 Q. Now, this is dated the 19th of December, 1994, with reference
15 back to what occurred on the 20th of April, 1992.
16 Now, I note in paragraph 23 of your statement that you say "he
17 claimed," I presume the person you're talking about by "he" is
18 Mile Kosoric, and you are in fact referring to this document, were you
19 not, in paragraph 23 of your statement?
20 A. I did not invoke this document. I wasn't even aware of it. I
21 can't invoke fake documents. You say paragraph 23? Let me have a look.
22 As regards the document, it is true that it was signed for
23 Mile Kosoric. I have to say that this person throughout 1992 was in the
24 theatre of war in Croatia. So he was not in Vlasenica until I joined the
25 government, which was on the 1st of February, 1993. I think it was in
1 late 1993 that Mile Kosoric came to the Vlasenica brigade command.
2 Now, how can a person who was in Croatia could write about
3 Vlasenica events is something that I'm not clear about.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see -- well, I don't have
5 that in paragraph 23, any of what was said, in the 23rd paragraph of the
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, it says --
8 JUDGE KWON: Does it not start with "he claimed that" --
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: "He claimed that on the 21st of April, 1992, the
10 Serbs in Vlasenica carried out an armed attack on Vlasenica and captured
11 the town."
12 Q. So whose document are you talking about there? Where you say "he
13 claimed," are you talking about Kosoric or are you talking about someone
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In any case, in my original there's
16 none of it, or in the English translation. Whose statement is it then?
17 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Let us upload witness's statement,
18 para 23, both in B/C/S and in English.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND:
20 Q. This was a paragraph that was added to your statement on -- to
21 your previous draft statement, so it must have been something that you
22 said when you signed your statement the other day, on the
23 16th of February, 2013. So, what document were you referring to in this
25 JUDGE KWON: Do you see the passage "he claimed that"? I don't
1 see it here.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: No, Your Honour. This -- this doesn't appear to
3 be the final version of the witness statement. The document that I
4 received on -- after the 16th had a number of track changes, words added,
5 and this entire paragraph has been added.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes. In my hard copy I see the passage, but I don't
7 see it here. Let's check how it happened.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, what time were you minded to break
9 for lunch?
10 JUDGE KWON: So we'll break now, then. Let's sort it in the
11 meantime, sort it out.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE KWON: This is the problem of -- of having a lot of revised
14 statements. Judge Lattanzi's version is different from mine in hard
15 copy, so we'll -- let's sort it out.
16 We'll take a break for 45 minutes and resume at 17 past 1.00.
17 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 1.20 p.m.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, I wonder if the matter has been sorted
21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, it has been sorted out. What
22 happened was that Ms. Sutherland was looking at the track changes version
23 and it was highlighted, and so she believed that it was still included in
24 the statement but, in fact, that was a deletion from the original
25 statement. So that's the problem. But in e-court and what was e-mailed
1 to the parties over the weekend is the final revised statement that
2 everyone should have.
3 JUDGE KWON: When was the last notification filed?
4 MR. ROBINSON: The notification itself was filed on Monday. The
5 statement was e-mailed on Saturday evening.
6 JUDGE KWON: Well, we'll leave it then. Among the Judges, it is
7 only Judge Lattanzi that had the correct latest version. Thanks to her
8 efficient, diligent and committed assistant. Well, let's continue then.
9 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER: I can discuss this with the Defence further, but we
11 also identified a submitted statement that had track changes but did not
12 identify all the deletions. I raise that because I've discussed it with
13 Mr. Robinson, but it occurred to me that we hadn't advised the Court, so
14 perhaps that's something we need to do as well and I can take an
15 opportunity when it presents itself to do so.
16 JUDGE KWON: Please bear in this mind and please do your utmost.
17 Yes. Let's continue, Ms. Sutherland.
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. Mr. Stanic, the document that we had on the screen just before we
20 broke for lunch, P02636, the letter from the commander of the
21 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, talked about the take-over by JNA
22 forces and the unit co-ordinated by the SDS Crisis Staff liberating the
23 town of Vlasenica. Do you recall seeing that?
24 A. I have seen the document now. I can analyse it as such. It's
25 full of important facts. We can go over the document so that I can tell
1 you what is false about it.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the purposes of the transcript,
3 the witness did not say "lazne ne golazne" [phoen], meaning not
4 important, but "false" matters. I understand the interpreter, but I just
5 want to make the correction. [No interpretation]. [In English] Full of
6 "lazne," false facts.
7 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Do you confirm that, Mr. Stanic?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. It's a completely false
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: May we have 65 ter -- sorry, Exhibit P02636 on
12 the screen, please.
13 Q. Mr. Stanic, it says in this document that in accordance with the
14 decision of the Crisis Staff, mobilisation of the former TO was carried
15 out. And it also says in paragraph 4 that:
16 "The SDS Crisis Staff commanded and controlled detachments in the
17 field through their established staff command and control of these units
18 until 28 June 1992, when all the units became part of the 1st Bircani
20 Now, this is consistent with a decision issued by the Vlasenica
21 Serb Crisis Staff on the 19th of April, is it not?
22 A. I understand your intention, and I understand what the grounds
23 were to draft [Realtime transcript read in error "demographic"] those
24 ordered documents of the 19th of April. Precisely this letter which is a
25 document written in 1994, as I already said, by a person who came to
1 Vlasenica in late 1993. The Crisis Staff never interfered in military
2 operations. We adhered wholly to the positions of the Government of
3 Republika Srpska of the 26th of April, or, rather, the instructions to
4 the Crisis Staffs which in paragraph 4 state that it was -- the question
5 of command of the armed forces and the police is exclusively in the
6 domain of the professionals in those areas and that Crisis Staffs must
7 not interfere in such affairs. So it is evident here that the document
8 is false in respect of the date as well, indicating that the Crisis
9 Staffs existed on the 26th of April. I think you have a decision on the
10 forming of the commissioner's office for Vlasenica, and I think that was
11 on the 15th of June.
12 In late May --
13 Q. Mr. Stanic, sorry to interrupt --
14 A. -- May, the Crisis Staffs ceased to exist --
15 Q. I'm talking about a decision. We'll bring it up now.
16 MS. SUTHERLAND: 65 ter 23117, please.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I say something about the
18 transcript. Line 12, page 76, Dr. Stanic did not say "demographic those
19 documents," he said "the ordered documents," meaning that they were
20 deliberately fabricated. The way it is now, it makes no sense.
21 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Stanic?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Absolutely.
23 MS. SUTHERLAND:
24 Q. So, Mr. Stanic, we see in front of us this document issued by the
25 Serbian municipality of Vlasenica, the decision on the establishment of
1 the Territorial Defence headquarters. And under point 2, the staff's
2 task is to name and establish territorial units and to manage them.
3 A. This also is one of those false documents made to order. It was
4 not signed by me. It's not a Crisis Staff stamp. We didn't have any
5 need for a decision like this. The Vlasenica TO staff was formed on the
6 15th of April by an order of the TO commander, Ferid Hodzic, who,
7 pursuant to instructions of the BiH Presidency, carried out a division of
8 the TO staff and the TO armed forces into a Serb and Muslim component;
9 namely, a Serbian TO staff and a Muslim TO staff. I spoke about that in
10 my statement in this annex or addition under number 43.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I seek to tender this document.
12 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
13 JUDGE KWON: Do you recognise whose -- whose signature this is?
14 Can we zoom in, collapsing the B/C/S -- the English.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I cannot tell. I think
16 somebody tried to sign my own signature. There's no name. This is not
17 my signature. I don't know who it was who tried to sign my name.
18 Probably one of those people who were providing these documents pursuant
19 to requests, a request from someone, so that this false story would
20 receive verification in some way.
21 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland, in the English translation we see a
22 passage about handwritten part on the next page.
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE KWON: Can you see it in B/C/S?
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: It should be on the next page, Your Honour
1 06393730. It appears at the top of the page, yes. And in fact, I see on
2 the English translation it says "MA." It should in fact be "MD." We
3 will have that revised. The person that provided us with the document,
4 the person I referred to earlier that gave us the other document.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6140, Your Honours.
7 MS. SUTHERLAND:
8 Q. Mr. Stanic, the -- the -- there was a combat unit of a couple
9 of -- several hundred people strong which were armed by the SDS and
10 trained by the SDS party, wasn't there?
11 A. As far as I know, the SDS did not have officers who could train a
12 party army. A party army did not exist.
13 Q. In late 1991, the SDS party armed this combat unit and it was
14 actually stationed at Milici, was it not?
15 A. I am aware that that unit existed, and I think I talked or
16 addressed a gathering on the occasion of the establishment of that unit,
17 but the position of the Serbian Democratic Party is known. We wholly
18 supported the Yugoslav People's Army, and we did not form party units.
19 But in any event, we did give our support that the Yugoslav People's Army
20 remains as the common component, and they tried to preserve Yugoslavia.
21 That unit was under the control of the Yugoslav People's Army wholly and
22 not under the control of the Serbian Democratic Party.
23 Q. I want to move on to another topic. I will leave that there.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I'm just wondering
25 if -- it seems to me that the time of the Prosecution had expired a while
1 ago. Maybe I'm not calculating that correctly. It was one hour for this
2 witness; correct?
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: One and a half.
4 JUDGE KWON: I think we allotted one and a half hours.
5 MR. ROBINSON: Okay. My mistake then. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Something for the transcript before
7 a new question, if possible. Page 79, line 1. The witness said that he
8 knew that one unit existed, not that unit. [In English] "I am aware that
9 that unit existed" should be "I'm aware that a unit existed."
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stanic --
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. A unit, one unit.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 MS. SUTHERLAND:
14 Q. Mr. Stanic --
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: Can we have Exhibit P03240.
16 Q. While that's coming up, the Serbian Autonomous District Birac was
17 also involved in the moving out of the non-Serb population, wasn't it?
18 A. No. No, it was not. That's not correct.
19 Q. So this document here where Major Svetozar Andric says that:
20 "Pursuant to the decision of the Birac SAR government, which
21 regulates the moving out of the Muslim population from the territory of
22 Birac SAR, I hereby order," and then he says, "setting up a camp in
23 Vlasenica, forbidding the passing of any arbitrary decision on the
24 physical liquidation of prisoners, the security organ of the detained
25 shall conduct operative interviews and the president," I think the
1 English translation says "prime minister" but I think a better
2 translation is "the president of Birac SAR is to establish contact
3 urgently regarding negotiations on the exchange of prisoners."
4 Now, firstly, you're the president of the Birac SAR, are you not?
5 A. That organ doesn't exist. What do you mean a government? We
6 talked about an Executive Council or an Executive Board half an hour ago.
7 The government did not exist. The Executive Board or, rather, the
8 Executive Council existed.
9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last part of
10 the sentence.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was no decision of this kind.
12 I've already said that we held two meetings. We discussed some
13 questions, not these questions, and you can see in item 4 of this
14 decision that I am being ordered to, but how can anybody order me as the
15 president of the municipality to do something?
16 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the rest what the
17 witness said.
18 JUDGE KWON: Probably you were too fast. The interpreters
19 couldn't hear the last part of your answer.
20 THE WITNESS: Okay.
21 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Paragraph 4 of this order saying
23 that the president of the government of Birac should immediately
24 contact -- so any -- nobody can order a representative of a civilian
25 government what to do. So this indicates that this decision has a lot of
1 errors. Nobody from our board reviewed these questions according to the
2 statute or the regulations that we were supposed to review, did not -- it
3 was not provided for that we review these questions, that we deal with
4 them in any way.
5 MS. SUTHERLAND:
6 Q. So you're talking about the board that you say doesn't exist
7 didn't have to review these --
8 A. The government did not exist.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Can I have Exhibit P06030, please.
10 Q. This is a "Javnost" article of the 6th of June, 1992. So when
11 they make reference to the decision made by the government of the Serbian
12 Autonomous Region of Birac, that didn't -- you're saying that this
13 newspaper must be wrong as well?
14 A. I am seeing this document for the first time. I would need to
15 review it in detail. "Javnost" is – whose magazine is that,
16 what is the source of this information? If we have time, I can...
17 Q. It's a very short article, Mr. Stanic.
18 A. Let me look at it, please. Only the first part could be
19 accepted, that we discussed a delegation which, with the president of the
20 National Assembly, would establish the positions in future negotiations
21 about the structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These other articles
22 relating to safe moving in and moving out, this is probably the position
23 of the journalist who reported on the events in his own way.
24 Q. I will leave that there and move on to another topic given the
1 In paragraph 27 of your statement, you said that when the
2 military operations started in the villages around Vlasenica, a large
3 number of Muslims poured into Vlasenica from these villages. And you
4 said that the majority of them were housed in the "holding centre" in
5 Susica. By "holding centre," do you mean where Muslims were detained?
6 A. I'm talking about military operations here. These were areas
7 where conflicts broke out between the warring parties. These are --
8 Q. Mr. Stanic if I can --
9 A. -- suburban neighbourhoods of Vlasenica --
10 Q. If I can interrupt you. If -- in relation to the words "holding
11 centre," did you mean the place where the Muslims were detained? Yes or
13 A. I cannot answer in the way that you seek. I would have to
14 explain the situation so that the Chamber could understand it and you
15 also --
16 Q. In paragraph 27 --
17 A. -- so when we're talking about --
18 Q. Excuse me, Mr. Stanic. In paragraph 27 you say a large number of
19 Muslims poured into Vlasenica, and then you said that the majority of
20 them, i.e., the Muslims, were housed in the holding centre. And I asked
21 you, simply, does the "holding centre" mean where these Muslims were
22 detained in -- in Susica? In Susica camp.
23 A. Yes. The correct name of that paragraph is that a part of this
24 population who had property in the town, houses and apartments, were
25 accommodated in their own houses and apartments, and that other part from
1 the rural area, they were placed in the collection centre by the
3 Q. And why -- why do you refer to them then as prisoners?
4 A. Who's talking about prisoners?
5 Q. I'll show you a document in a moment where you refer to them as
6 prisoners. Why do you refer to them as prisoners if they were in a
7 holding centre or collection centre?
8 Okay, let me -- let me -- let me ask you another question. You
9 said that you didn't know about what was going on in this TO building in
10 Susica -- Susica, where persons were being housed, but you're being
11 economical with that statement, aren't you, because you did know about
12 these people, and you did know about the number of people that were being
13 held there.
14 A. I do have a paragraph here which I clarify that situation. I
15 said what I knew, how the collection centre was formed and why we knew it
16 was a collection centre, but it was under the control. These were
17 military facilities, so I cannot talk about some things that I don't
18 know. I cannot accept whatever anything says and create false documents
20 Q. In paragraph 33 of your statement --
21 JUDGE KWON: Just for the record, the paragraph you referred to
22 seems to be to para 26, not 27, in the latest version.
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, that would be right, Your Honour, if this
24 other paragraph is -- that didn't have the strike-through is deleted,
25 yes. You're correct.
1 Q. Mr. Stanic, in paragraph of what is now 32, you said that -- or
2 in the paragraph that you talk about in your statement where you say that
3 after the war commissioners were appointed on the 16th of June, 1992, and
4 that's actually an exhibit in our case, P05399, which was a document
5 signed by you, your function was basically to co-operate with the
6 War Commission and municipality Assembly deputies who were not militarily
7 engaged, and you said that this work bore mostly a humanitarian
9 You say that, Mr. Stanic, but in reality you were involved in
10 matters relating to the army as well, and after the commissioners had
11 been appointed you met with high-level personnel from the military and
12 the police about issues relating to soldiers and detention facilities,
13 didn't you? Yes or no? You met with high-level personnel from the
14 military and police about issues relating to soldiers and detention
16 Mr. Stanic, did you --
17 A. The question is not clear to me. When you say "high-ranking
18 officers," you need to tell me specifically what you're referring to in
19 order for me to be able to answer.
20 Q. Okay. I'll show you -- I will show you General Ratko Mladic's
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have P01478. If we could go to the
23 entry for the 25th of June, 1992, which is e-court page 227 and in the
24 B/C/S it's 226. Just so that we can see the date of the 25th of June,
25 1992. It must be -- we see here -- on the English we see the
1 25th of June. If we could perhaps go one more in the B/C/S.
2 Q. Mr. Stanic, you spoke at this meeting --
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: Can we go one more page further of the B/C/S,
4 please. Okay. We will go to where Mr. Stanic is talking. It's -- it's
5 on page 232 of e-court and page 231 in B/C/S. Okay. It must be -- it
6 must be page 232 of the actual document, so if we can go forward
7 six pages, please.
8 JUDGE KWON: English e-court page number 232.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Do you see on the screen at the moment,
10 Your Honour, it's got 226 at the very top. That's the actual page of
11 the -- the -- of the notebook. So I think if we go to page 232 --
12 JUDGE KWON: No, no, I see 229 with it, but e-court page 232.
13 I'm seeing president of the SAO Milenko Stanic.
14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour. So whatever page -- I'm
15 sorry, what page is that?
16 JUDGE KWON: 232 --
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: 232.
18 JUDGE KWON: -- in English.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, and it's 231 in B/C/S.
20 Q. Mr. Stanic --
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't see it.
23 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we upload English page 23 -- yes, and I
24 think two pages before in B/C/S.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND:
1 Q. Now, it states here --
2 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you very much.
4 Q. It states here, Mr. Stanic, at this meeting which was held on the
5 25th of June with representatives of the Vlasenica civilian police and
6 military authorities, that you stated here a large number said they
7 wanted to move away. Over 800 prisoners, 200 of whom are women and
8 children who were brought last night pose a problem. And then you're
9 also talking about the number of soldiers who have been mobilised. Now,
10 this is what I'm talking about, a high-level meeting that you attended?
11 A. Yes, it is one of General Mladic's notebooks. I think that many
12 of these things -- well, I didn't have such information. I couldn't
13 discuss such facts, especially the number of mobilised soldiers and
14 pieces of weapons.
15 As regards prisoners, we did stress the problem of the high
16 school centre, and we addressed the Main Staff with it because the school
17 had been closed down. The principal of the high school asked that
18 classrooms be provided for him to get them ready for the next school
19 year, and we kept asking the Main Staff to provide appropriate facilities
20 so that we could ensure the functioning of the high school centre in
21 Vlasenica. And we can only discuss this issue within that framework.
22 I suppose that this note was made by someone from the Secretariat
23 of Defence or of the TO. I don't know if the General himself signed
24 underneath these entries.
25 Q. Mr. Stanic --
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could go to the next page, 230 in the
2 English. We see that Major Slobodan Pajic talks about a battalion was
3 formed. Can we please go to the next page. Down the bottom it says
4 Major Slobodan Pajic, and over onto the following page, the manpower was
5 earlier armed through parties and they were approximately 600 men in
6 territorial based units. So -- and then lists the number of weapons that
7 they have.
8 Then we also have over on page 232, so the following page, we
9 have the chairman of the Municipal Assembly Bozo Milic, who talks about
10 we have 270 empty apartments and 250 houses. So all this is being
11 discussed at a high level with General Mladic.
12 Q. And that's not the only the meeting that you attended, is it,
13 Mr. Stanic? You also attended a meeting on the 30th of June, 1992, at
14 Zvornik with Karadzic, Mladic, Captain Dragan, and around 20 civilian and
15 military officials from East Bosnia municipalities. Do you remember
16 attending that meeting?
17 A. As I said in my statement, in 1992 I met with Dr. Karadzic twice,
18 and I also had in mind this particular meeting in Zvornik, and we greeted
19 each other when he addressed those who attended the funeral of those who
20 were killed in Rogosija.
21 Q. You -- and the meeting in -- for Zvornik is in this same Exhibit
22 P01478, and you were speaking, you were the second person to brief
23 Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic. And that's at e-court page 248 of the
24 English and 246, 247 of the B/C/S. And one of the topics discussed at
25 that meeting was the expulsion of Muslims.
1 Mr. Stanic, you were -- on another topic, if I can direct your
2 attention now to the sale of war booty. You were aware of that
3 occurring, weren't you?
4 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I think that the
5 witness ought to be given an opportunity to comment on what's in e-court
6 recorded at that meeting or else the Prosecution shouldn't even be
7 referring to it. It's not proper to refer to something and then just
8 move on without giving the witness a chance to comment.
9 JUDGE KWON: Fair enough. Let's show him the document.
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: We can --
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stanic, do you know what this document is about?
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: No, Your Honour, we're still on the Mladic
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I'm asking him.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: Sorry.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I attended the meeting in Zvornik.
17 Now, what the General wrote into his notebook concerning that meeting is
18 something I am unaware of. I can have a look certainly.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's proceed.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: May we go to page -- sorry, Your Honour. I've
21 been advised I'm officially out of time, so --
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please proceed.
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 If we can go to page 248 of the English translation, another two
25 pages on, please. Perhaps we can try page -- it's -- I'm sorry, 245 of
1 the notebook. So where we have -- so we need to go back three pages.
2 I'm sorry, it's actually e-court page 248. Okay.
3 Q. Do you see down the bottom:
4 "Mr. Stanic, President of Vlasenica Municipal Assembly.
5 "We have defined the western boundaries in the area of the Birac
7 And it's in --
8 JUDGE KWON: No, we haven't yet had the proper page in --
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm trying to -- I'm trying to find -- there it
10 is, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, here.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND:
13 Q. Do you see down the bottom?
14 A. Yes, I can see it now.
15 Q. So we're actually on the -- on the meeting in Zvornik on the
16 30th of June, 1992. But I'll take you to the page where the matter of
17 expelling of the Muslims and that was Marko Pavlovic speaking at page 250
18 of the notebook, which is in e-court page 251, 252.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if we go over the page, please. And again.
20 Q. So down the bottom of this page 250: "We were most active in
21 evicting the Muslims." We had -- and over the page -- "we had brought
22 peace to Sepak, Divic and Kozluk. Some of them wanted to move out while
23 we demanded it. We had to evict some of the people also for the sake of
24 our 'heroes' who fled from Kovacevici."
25 So that was the reference that I was referring to when I said
1 that expulsions of Muslims were discussed at this meeting that you
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: Now, Your Honour, do I have time to show the
4 witness two more documents?
5 JUDGE KWON: What is your question with respect to this diary at
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, my -- my -- I was -- I took
8 Mr. Stanic to the entries of the earlier meeting and then I also said:
9 "That wasn't the only meeting you attended. You also attended a meeting
10 on the 30th of June, 1992, where the topic of the meeting -- one of the
11 topics at the meeting was the expulsion of Muslims." Mr. Robinson then
12 asked for those pages to be shown to the witness.
13 JUDGE KWON: And what was the witness's answer? I don't
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: That he did attend the meeting. He does recall
16 attending this meeting.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know what the central issue was
18 at that meeting that I put forward. As for the issue of Zvornik, I am
19 not familiar with it. Marko Pavlovic discussed the situation in Zvornik.
20 The greatest problems for the municipalities of Vlasenica, Bratunac, and
21 Milici at the time was the issue of road travel from Vlasenica to
22 Konjevic Polje to Zvornik. We asked the army to put conditions in place
23 so as to enable unhindered economic activity along that road. I heard
24 that the General wrote down that mopping up was required. It is a
25 military term. In civilian authorities we do not use such parlance. We
1 asked that the armed formations in the area should be used to secure the
2 road, since a number of killings had occurred along it, and later on it
3 was completely cut off. So that was our main problem.
4 As regards any other issues, I don't recall having them
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Ms. Sutherland.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour. I have two very, very
10 brief areas.
11 Q. Mr. Stanic, I said to you a moment ago that I wanted to turn to
12 the topic of war booty and that you were aware of the sale of this,
13 weren't you? When you were the RS minister of commerce and supplies.
14 A. Yes, there was a decree which regulated that issue as well.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have 65 ter number 24625, please.
16 Q. This is a document dated the 23rd of June, 1993, and it's a
17 request by -- by you about the public sale of valuables acquired through
18 the war, and that you as minister of trade are seeking to regulate the
19 sale of war booty, noting that such sales as recently held by Executive
20 Boards of Prijedor and Kotor Varos are -- are of massive proportions and
21 with the implementation of the government conclusion of the 20th of
22 March, 1993, on -- that is on placing state war booty under control you
23 can expect a great influx of -- of objects. So what -- what did you mean
24 by massive proportions? Such sales as recently held by the Executive
25 Boards of Prijedor and Kotor Varos.
1 A. Yes. The problem was that there were significant assets left
2 behind in certain local communes and companies. The government of the
3 RS -- or, rather, of the Serbian Republic issued a decree regulating the
4 issue of war booty. It was such property belonging to companies which
5 was found in the territory of Republika Srpska. Some local communes or
6 communities used that property to finance their own needs.
7 Before my arrival at the helm of the ministry of trade, there had
8 been a decree regulating the issue. It was stated that all war booty was
9 to go to the state reserves of the commodity reserves of the RS. It was
10 a separate entity within the ministry of trade. All requests of the
11 commodity reserves to the government went through the ministry that I was
12 heading at that time. Since there were problems and wilful activities in
13 the field that went against that decree, I asked that the government
14 issue their position regarding the issue.
15 Q. And this war booty, isn't this property which is -- which was
16 owned by non-Serbs and which they had to voluntarily, quote/unquote, sign
17 over to the municipal authorities in order to leave?
18 A. If you are familiar with our system as it existed before the war,
19 you know that all companies were public, owned by the state. Physical
20 persons did not have important assets. It was up to the government to
21 deal with property.
22 As for the companies left in those areas, for example, I know
23 that there was -- there was significant quantities of aluminum that was
24 taken out as the JNA units were pulling out and taken to Nevesinje in RS,
25 and that issue had to be regulated. In Sarajevo, too, there were several
1 large depots containing oil and oil derivatives, and that issue, too,
2 fell under the decree.
3 Q. Okay.
4 A. The government did not deal with personal property.
5 Q. Mr. Stanic, I want to move on to the -- to -- in paragraph 38 you
6 said, "I didn't have any contact -- I did not have any occasion to
7 contact Mr. Karadzic until I went into the Republika Srpska government,"
8 and that was in August 1995, wasn't it?
9 Mr. Stanic, I need you to be very brief. Did you go into the
10 government in 1995? Were you a member of the -- were you a member of the
11 Assembly in 1995?
12 A. Not in 1995. I was a member of the Assembly, but I was in the
13 government from the 1st February 1993, and I was an MP from 1995 or even
14 1996. I'm not sure. As for meeting with President Karadzic, I said
15 that --
16 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... [overlapping speakers] ...
17 A. -- I had seen him in 1992 at a funeral.
18 Q. And you also -- and you also saw him at the Zvornik meeting on
19 the 30th of June, 1992.
20 A. In Zvornik, right. That is true. When I said we didn't meet, I
21 meant we never talked one-on-one about any issues. We did not have any
22 meetings in 1992, and even during my term of office at the Municipal
23 Assembly, President Karadzic never stopped by the Municipal Assembly of
25 Q. So then what did you mean in the following paragraph where you
1 say, "I know that he would emphasise at every meeting that our soldiers
2 must not be allowed to commit crimes"? Which meetings are you talking
3 about? Are you talking about meetings when you were minister of trade?
4 Why would you be discussing soldiers not being allowed to commit crimes
5 in trade meetings?
6 A. I'm talking about two orders we received in the month of
7 June 1992.
8 Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Stanic, if I can --
9 A. One was addressed to --
10 Q. -- if I can stop you there. I'm talking about -- you say in your
11 statement: "He would emphasise at every meeting that our soldiers must
12 not be allowed to commit crimes." We just established that.
13 A. I mean this meeting in Zvornik and a series of meetings I had
14 later at the Government of Republika Srpska in the course of 1993 and
15 1994, and also the orders we received in June 1992.
16 Q. And in 1993 and 1994, you were minister for trade?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Very last point. You were aware of the SDS leadership objective
19 to eradicate the borders with the Serbian states, weren't you?
20 A. I know it was the objective and the wish of our people to remain
21 part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That was the basic demand of
22 our people, our leadership, our government, and we aspired towards that
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter number 24624, please.
25 Q. Mr. Stanic, this is a "Drinski" article, which is the VRS
1 Drina Corps monthly bulletin, dated November 1995, and it's an interview
2 with you. And this is an excerpt within this interview where you're
3 talking about the upcoming elections rather than a retrospective on the
4 war, but you hope that a result of the ongoing negotiations will be a
5 monetary and trade union with Yugoslavia that Serbs will be able to have
6 citizens of RS and FRY. And that Serbs will finally be connected to
7 their mother state. You are now in charge of the customs service of
8 Zvornik, and the policy of the SDS is that the customs borders with FRY
9 will disappear and be moved to the border with the Muslim-Croat
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could go to the second page of the B/C/S,
12 please, so the witness can see that page.
13 Q. Do you recall saying that in November 1995, Mr. Stanic, to the
14 "Drinski" bulletin? We can see just above your photograph, the sentence
15 in the second paragraph -- second column, sorry, going down under your
16 photograph, and then also in the top of column 4. Do you recall saying
17 that the policy of the SDS was as I just told you a moment ago?
18 A. I said our wish and the wish of the people was to stay part of
19 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to have good relations with --
20 with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Nowadays we have special
21 relationship with Serbia, and you also know that the issue of borders and
22 customs within all of Europe is radically different. There are no
23 borders and customs between 27 states, and there are also tax and customs
24 policies that stand in the way of normal trade. I expected that. I
25 suggested that, and we see it happening. Customs services have less and
1 less work, and we hope that in the period to follow they will be
2 abolished completely. They have been abolished already in the European
3 Union. Why wouldn't they not be abolished between Republika Srpska and
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Mr. Stanic.
6 Your Honours, I have no further questions. And I seek to tender
7 that document, please.
8 JUDGE KWON: What document?
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: The document we have on the screen.
10 JUDGE KWON: Are you also tendering the previous document?
11 Public auction or sale of --
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes -- yes, Your Honour. The war booty, that
13 was 24625.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
15 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit them all.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibits P6141 and 6142, respectively,
18 Your Honour.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: And, Your Honour, I've been advised that P06139
20 now has a translation and can be admitted and I seek for it to be
21 admitted in full. And P06140, the translation has been rectified.
22 JUDGE KWON: 61 --
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: 6139 now has a translation.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Very well. We'll do so.
25 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. Let me
2 just ask are we free to have translated the rest of this document? Has
3 only the portion that has been translated been admitted into evidence or
4 the whole text?
5 JUDGE KWON: It has been our practice to only admit those
6 portions shown to the witness.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no time now. I can only
8 accept the witness if he accepts the entire interview as his own.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Why would I accept it if I haven't
10 read it? I can see the portion that is excerpted, and I agree that it be
11 admitted into evidence. I did advocate the open borders with Yugoslavia,
12 but there may be other portions that do not accurately reflect what I
13 said. I have no time now to read the entire text.
14 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
15 Q. [Interpretation] All right. Then, we won't go any further.
16 Dr. Stanic, you insisted and we it as a leitmotif in documents
17 beginning with page 55 and onwards, that the region of Birac was the
18 Autonomous Region Birac without the prefix Serbian. Was there any other
19 region that was not Serbian Autonomous Region, but only Autonomous
21 A. I believe there were others. I can't remember any specifically
22 now, but I believe there were such districts in other areas. I believe
23 the Semberija region was also called autonomous district, and there was
24 another in Krajina that was not called Serbian, only autonomous.
25 Q. Thank you. How far did you come in organising the organs of
1 authority of the Autonomous Region of Birac? Which authorities were in
2 place to issue executive orders?
3 A. Not a single body or agency succeeded in fully assuming its
4 responsibility. It was only our attempt to stop the break-up of
5 Yugoslavia and to show Muslims that we would not accept a unitarian
6 centralised Bosnia-Herzegovina. And when we were establishing these
7 bodies, it was not even our intention to put them into operation because
8 we simply did not have the funds to finance so many bodies.
9 Q. Thank you. You were asked about Variants A and B. Did anybody
10 from the central authorities send you any queries or controlled in any
11 way whether you adhered to the provisions of documents A and B?
12 A. Absolutely not. There was a strong grassroot initiative at the
13 time. There was an empty space. The leadership was in a difficult
14 situation after having to leave Sarajevo, and a lot of initiatives came
15 from the local level. We simply could not expect support or assistance
16 from the central level. We made do consulting with other municipalities
17 and looking at our own particular situation. Every municipality was
18 facing different problems.
19 Q. Thank you. Several things are mentioned here. It is said the
20 Crisis Staff of the Serbian municipality of Vlasenica. What does it
21 mean, Serbian municipality of Vlasenica? What is understood by that
23 A. That's a municipality established through joint negotiations
24 between representatives of two peoples. There is a document signed by
25 both parties. It was approved also by representatives of the Muslim
1 people, and it was adopted by an overwhelming majority by the Municipal
2 Assembly. That majority did not mean that only Serbs were meant to live
3 in that area. It implied, of course, that the Muslims living in the area
4 created by these negotiations should remain there or perhaps later decide
5 according to their own wishes to move. There was no mention of
6 ethnically pure municipalities at any point, and I believe there is one
7 of the conclusions that defines this relationship.
8 Q. When it is said that you were appointed president of the
9 municipality or the president of the Crisis Staff of the Serbian
10 municipality of Vlasenica, does it mean that you took over that position
11 in the Muslim municipality of Vlasenica too?
12 A. No. We had serious intentions and goodwill to start implementing
13 that agreement. However, the local representatives of the Muslim people
14 obviously coached by the leadership in Sarajevo and following their
15 instructions abandoned that agreement. We had discussed all these issues
16 in an atmosphere of mutual co-operation, and I believe that agreement had
17 given us a chance to avoid war spreading to Vlasenica.
18 Q. Who was in power in Vlasenica throughout 1991?
19 A. In 1991, the authorities were formed by a joint agreement between
20 the SDA and the Serbian majority in the local parliament.
21 Q. And who was in power in the Serbian municipality of Vlasenica in
23 A. I believe the officials who worked in joint authorities continued
24 to work in the Serbian authorities, including myself as president of the
25 joint Assembly and later president of the Assembly of the Serbian
1 municipality of Vlasenica.
2 Q. I have a list of the population here. Which of Vlasenica's
3 municipalities did Cerska belong to?
4 A. Cerska was --
5 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, excuse me.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm just wondering how this arises out of
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this is how the indictment --
11 actually, the cross-examination today suggests that the Serbs took over
12 power in Vlasenica. However, they continue to be in power, but only in
13 the Serbian municipality of Vlasenica, and here we have a list of
14 settlements in the Muslim municipality of Vlasenica where the Serbs did
15 not take power. The charge of the take-over of power appears in the
16 indictment as one of the gravest charges, even though there was a
17 division of the administration and even though the Muslims who
18 transferred to the Muslim police station is being treated as our
19 dismissal of those Muslims. So what's being suggested is that the Serbs
20 took over power in Vlasenica.
21 What I'm trying to clarify is the -- the circumstances in which
22 there was a changeover of power and did it occur in that sense.
23 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure I follow in terms of how it arises from
24 the cross-examination.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour --
1 JUDGE KWON: I don't think Ms. Sutherland dealt with any issue
2 relating to Cerska.
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: No. And, Your Honour, if -- if Mr. Karadzic
4 wanted to get this information from the witness, he could have done it in
5 his -- in his examination-in-chief.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, it was said
7 take-over of power, and what was shown was Exhibit P03214. From page 68
8 onwards of the transcript we are dealing with the take-over of power by
9 the Serbs, even though it says in all of those documents that it's the
10 government of the Serbian municipality of Vlasenica. So I want to find
11 out from a witness who was in that government what it meant before the
12 war and during the war, what it means, the term "Serbian municipality."
13 When and how did they take over power?
14 JUDGE KWON: I'm fine with you putting questions with respect to
15 that decision to take over power, i.e., Exhibit P3214, but you seem to be
16 asking some question about Cerska. So what is your question,
17 Mr. Karadzic?
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Dr. Stanic, was Cerska an integral part of the municipality of
21 A. Yes, it was.
22 Q. Did you take over power in Cerska?
23 A. Until the end of the war, the area of the old municipality of
24 Vlasenica had a functioning Muslim municipality of Vlasenica. It
25 functioned on a half of the territory. Its headquarters were first
1 located in the Gru [phoen] neighbourhood of Vlasenica. Later it was
2 moved to Cerska itself, and it remained there up until the operations
3 relating to Srebrenica.
4 Q. Thank you. Now I'm just going to read a few things. I'm going
5 to put the question to you. Did you take over power in Cerska, Djurici,
6 Dzemat, Djile, Kerovi [phoen], Gradina, and generally in that half,
7 Puljancici, Macesi, and so on and so forth, Nova Kasaba? At the
8 beginning, did you take over power in Nova Kasaba?
9 A. I said until the end of the war, until operations in Srebrenica,
10 these areas were under the control of the authorities of the Muslim
11 municipality of Vlasenica and by their armed forces.
12 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us who was in the majority in these
13 neighbourhoods that I have just mentioned?
14 A. Of course it was a Muslim-majority population.
15 Q. Thank you. Can we look -- well, today we saw a series of
16 documents produced on the 19th of April. Same typewriter, same manner.
17 It was a very productive day. Are you able to tell us -- well, you
18 expressed your doubts about these documents. Are you able to tell us who
19 and for what reason would produce these documents that you did not see or
21 A. Well, it would definitely be somebody who had reasons to prevent
22 the truth from coming out and from being heard, and that is why I am
23 here, to deny such lies. So far there are been many lies that we have
24 heard in the court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I testified there, and now
25 I have the opportunity to state the truth before the International
2 Certain forces which I assume have something to do with
3 corruption and those kind of problems and who are probably in cahoots
4 with the Prosecution are producing these false documents.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D25422. This
7 is an associated document.
8 JUDGE KWON: Could you expand a bit more about the reason for
9 making up these false documents? So what's the point of those?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course, I can, because today I
11 could understand what the essence is of the intention of the Prosecution.
12 The false document from 1994 signed by Mile Kosoric, an officer of the
13 JNA who only came to Vlasenica at the end of 1993 and who wrote that
14 military detachments were formed under the control of the civilian
15 authorities and the Crisis Staff, this is absolutely not true, and that
16 person could not have known what was going on in Vlasenica at that point
17 in time. And the earlier documents then tie into this document, because
18 on the 21st of April the army entered Vlasenica and the Crisis Staff
19 began to function on the 22nd. It was necessary to show that the
20 civilian authority was the one who organised the army's coming, arrival,
21 and that it was the civilian authorities who were in command of the
22 military forces even though we had an order which we respected in its
23 entirety not to interfere in military operations by the military or by
24 the police, and that is really how it was. That is the truth.
25 JUDGE KWON: Well, I'll leave it at that. Please continue,
1 Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] While we're on this topic, can we
3 look at D407, please. It's a Defence exhibit, D007. This is the
4 previous document. Well, we can leave this document. It's all right.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Sir, are you familiar with this document, and can you please look
7 at item 4, and could you please read it out loud.
8 A. Yes. I'm speaking about this document. It was the basis of all
9 of our actions and conduct. Paragraph 4 states:
10 "TO, Territorial Defence, and police forces are under the
11 exclusive command of professional staff, and therefore it is necessary to
12 prevent any interfering in the command of the TO or use of the police
14 That is the instruction coming from the Government of
15 Republika Srpska, dated the 26th of April, I think.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D25422 now.
18 This document was looked at earlier. It's an associated document.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Dr. Stanic, please, could you please look at this document and
21 tell us whether this document is legal. Is there a protocol? Is there a
22 heading, a signature, a stamp?
23 A. Yes, it does have a protocol, a signature, a stamp.
24 Q. And is this authentic?
25 A. Yes, I think that it is.
1 Q. And what is it that makes this document a legal document?
2 A. Its preamble.
3 Q. I asked about the signature. You said that they were authentic.
4 Is this your signature, and the other one is Djukanovic's?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Thank you. The documents that we saw that don't have a protocol
7 number or a signature, how would you evaluate their legitimacy?
8 A. It's clear that those are mostly disputable documents that bear a
9 different stamp from this one. This is one element. A number of them
10 does not have my signature, and there is a problem also with the
11 corrected dates. It's true that, in May, all the municipal services,
12 including the economic sector and the financial services sector and the
13 municipal secretariat had stamps like this, and they had all stamps of
14 the Municipal Assembly of Vlasenica, and a number of documents were
15 issued by those services so that we were not in the municipal building in
16 the course of the month of May, so we could not control that process.
17 And that is the reason why probably a whole series of documents was
18 created that we did not have access to, that were not reviewed at the
19 organs of the Municipal Assembly of Vlasenica.
20 Q. Thank you. And did you have the Vlasenica Brigade, regardless of
21 what its names were at particular periods of time, and what was your role
22 in supplying that brigade? I'm thinking of the Vlasenica municipality.
23 A. The Vlasenica Brigade was formed a little bit later. I think
24 that I was already in the Government of Republika Srpska when the
25 Vlasenica Brigade was formed. Earlier I think there was the
1 Vlasenica Battalion which was part of the Sekovici Brigade.
2 The question of supply of the Vlasenica Brigade, primarily food
3 and financing, securing salaries for the army, was mostly entrusted to
4 the Executive Board which we had activated quite early on. That was one
5 of our local initiatives. Some municipalities did not have an active
6 Executive Board, and these activities were carried out by the
7 commissioners' offices and then before that by the Crisis Staffs.
8 Q. Thank you. Dr. Stanic, the Birac zone, the Vlasenica
9 municipality and the neighbouring municipalities, Nova Kasaba, Vlasenica,
10 Konjevic Polje, and so on, Cerska, at that time were these areas areas
11 where there was combat? Were they theatres of war?
12 A. Yes, it is clear that they were combat zones, and sometime from
13 early May 1992, even though there were tensions before that, all the way
14 until 1995, June 1995, these were combat areas.
15 Q. Thank you. And you as the president of the municipality, were
16 you also by virtue of your office the president of the council for
18 A. Yes. From the time the municipality was founded, from the
19 multi-party elections in 1990 and practically until the 20th of April,
20 when I tried for the last time to convene the National Defence Council.
21 However, the TO commander whom I invited to that meeting, and that was
22 the last time that I spoke with him, he promised to come and he didn't
23 appear, and the other Muslim officials left Vlasenica earlier than that,
24 so that we simply did not have any other officials, Muslim officials, who
25 would be prepared to take part in the work of the Council for National
2 Q. Thank you. As the president of the Council for National Defence,
3 were you familiar with our obligations towards the civilians. According
4 to international law, did we have any obligations towards them?
5 A. This was something that was regulated by the federal law for the
6 defence which provided the precise duties in extraordinary conditions,
7 what the duties and authority of this Council for National Defence was.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at one more document.
10 This is D1603.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Were you aware that we -- did you know that -- did you know that
13 we were in contact with the Red Cross and the commissioner for refugees
14 regarding the rights of civilians, the wounded, and so on?
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm wondering where this is going as a result of
16 cross-examination, but if Mr. Karadzic can be asked not to lead the
17 witness, it would be appreciated.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it arises from the showing of
19 Exhibit 03240, and it relates to actions towards civilians. Well, I
20 would like to rephrase the question then.
21 JUDGE KWON: But the witness denied the existence of the
22 government at the time, but let's continue. Is this your last question,
23 Mr. Karadzic?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency, the last
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. I'm not trying to change the fact that the government did not
3 exist, but let us see what our attitude or position or conduct towards
4 civilians was. Paragraph 7 of this document. Let's first say what
5 meeting this was exactly.
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: [Microphone not activated] Your Honour, is it
7 possible Mr. Karadzic can lay a foundation question before he --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic --
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Can Mr. Karadzic lay a foundation question
11 before he gets the document read?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked if Mr. Stanic was familiar
13 with the duties of the warring parties and our duties towards civilians
14 in that zone, regardless of the document but generally, because during
15 the cross-examination the question of the fate of civilians was asked,
16 especially transfers, expulsions, and so on and so forth. And --
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour --
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked Dr. Stanic whether this was
19 a combat zone and now you're going to see why.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour -- I'm sorry, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Karadzic's question was: "Well, let us see
23 what our attitude or position or conduct towards civilians was." He's
24 basically just wanting to bring this document up and to show this to the
25 witness. He hasn't laid, in my view, a question -- a foundation
2 JUDGE KWON: Let's conclude your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic.
3 This has been already admitted into evidence.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 10 so -- 7 so
5 that we can see day -- the date and then page 10, just so that we can
6 read one sentence.
7 JUDGE KWON: No. I told you to stop here.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought that you said that I
9 could complete my question and complete my examination. But in any
10 event, thank you.
11 Dr. Stanic, thank you for coming to testify.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I thank
13 the Trial Chamber, and I thank the Prosecution.
14 JUDGE KWON: Just before we adjourn today, Mr. Tieger, just
15 before the winter recess last year, the Chamber received from the accused
16 his Notice of Special Defence as to count 11, i.e., reprisals, dated 14th
17 of December, 2012. I'm wondering if the Prosecution intends to respond
18 to any procedural or substantive issues arising from that Defence notice.
19 MR. TIEGER: We now take on board the fact that any -- that the
20 Chamber would appreciate any potential response within a reasonable time
21 period from this inquiry and we will do so accordingly.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stanic, that concludes your evidence. Only
23 behalf of this Trial Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your coming to
24 The Hague to give it. Now you are free to go.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And thank you for making it
1 possible for me to speak the truth before the International Criminal
2 Tribunal. Thank you.
3 JUDGE KWON: The hearing is adjourned.
4 [The witness withdrew]
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.51 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 20th day
7 of February, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.