1 Tuesday, 26 February 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Today and tomorrow we'll be
6 sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis with Judge Lattanzi away due to her
7 urgent personal matters.
8 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Mr. President and Your Honours. I
10 have two preliminary matters I wish to raise, the first of which should
11 be raised in private session.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Could the Chamber move into private
13 session briefly.
14 [Private session]
11 Page 34223 redacted. Private session.
13 [Open session]
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 Mr. President, the Court is now seized of our motion for relief
17 in regard to the issue of 65 ter summaries and witness statements. I
18 raise a matter -- I mean, the Defence will respond to that. The Court
19 will make its decision in due course, but meanwhile, the problem, of
20 course, continues to arise, so I wanted to bring the Court's attention to
21 two particular upcoming instances where that issue is implicated, and
22 specifically that concerns two witnesses for next week, and that would be
23 Mr. Martic and Mr. Kicanovic.
24 In the case of -- let me take Mr. Kicanovic first. We just
25 received an English statement for him last night. Now, that's in the
1 face of completely formulaic and inadequate 65 ter summary. So our first
2 awareness of what this witness proposes to testify about is essentially
3 taking place now since we just have that statement.
4 We will do our best to be ready to proceed with cross-examination
5 if possible, but that is far from certain, so I wanted to bring the
6 Court's attention to that problem. I raised it with Mr. Robinson. He
7 understand the nature of the problem and agrees fully that if the nature
8 of the statement is such that Prosecution is not in a position to
9 cross-examine, that there should be an appropriate and reasonable
10 deferral of time to commence cross-examination after the direct
12 With respect to Mr. Martic, who is obviously a witness
13 implicating significant issues, we have nothing meaningful and do not
14 anticipate getting anything meaningful until essentially the moment of
15 direct examination. That I believe is a problem in part resulting from
16 logistical issues that the Defence has described earlier, but whatever
17 the cause, the impact on the Prosecution is the same.
18 Again, I have discussed this matter with Mr. Robinson. He fully
19 concurs that under the circumstances a meaningful period of time between
20 any direct examination and the commencement of cross should take place
21 and is necessary to ensure that there is meaningful time to prepare
22 cross-examination. It's difficult to know under the circumstances
23 precisely how long that might be before we are seized of the information
24 to which the witness will testify, but I think it's safe to say that it's
25 likely to be of sufficient breadth and significance that there will have
1 to be a significant period of time between direct examination and
2 cross-examination. So I wanted to raise that with the Court in advance.
3 As mentioned, Mr. Robinson and I discussed that, so adjustments
4 may have been made to the proposed Defence calendar accordingly, but
5 other than that, this is a problem that will, I believe, continue to
6 surface until a broader resolution as proposed by the motion filed by the
7 Prosecution takes place.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
9 Mr. Robinson.
10 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Well, first of all, we've
11 always taken the position that the Prosecution should have as much time
12 as reasonable in order to prepare once they receive the material, so that
13 remains our position with respect to these two witnesses. So for
14 Mr. Kicanovic, if the Prosecution would like more time, we'll postpone
15 his testimony or his cross-examination and that's pretty simple.
16 With Mr. Martic it's more complicated, because we were supposed
17 to meet with him this afternoon, myself and Dr. Karadzic, to - what we
18 described as an introductory meeting - to find out from him if he wants
19 to have a lawyer assisting him and how we can work to prepare his
20 Rule 92 ter statement. The Registry has refused that meeting and said
21 that because of your order separating Dr. Karadzic from Mr. Martic, that
22 that would not be allowed, and so I have asked now if I can meet with
23 Mr. Martic myself, and they wouldn't be able to accommodate that meeting
24 now until Thursday because they have to write him a letter and translate
25 it into his language asking him if he consents to meet with me. So I --
1 JUDGE KWON: Just stopping there, did the Chamber prohibit
2 Mr. Karadzic from proofing his witness?
3 MR. ROBINSON: No. You allowed him to proof the witness, but
4 they don't see this as a proofing session since we're just going to meet
5 Mr. Martic for the first time and find out how he wishes to proceed. So
6 they consider that to be a contact that was disallowed by them. Then
7 they said they will allow one proofing session which obviously has to
8 occur after the Rule 92 ter statement is prepared. So we've had some
9 delay in trying to meet with Mr. Martic and the plan is to prepare -- for
10 me to work with him and prepare a Rule 92 ter statement and to disclose
11 that to the Prosecution.
12 JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt you again. So it is the practice
13 that proofing is limited to just one time.
14 MR. ROBINSON: No, that's not the practice at all, but the UNDU
15 interpreted the purposes of our meeting -- or the Registry interpreted
16 the purpose of our meeting with Mr. Martic not to be included within
18 JUDGE MORRISON: Was any specific reason given for that
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we received a written letter, and they simply
21 said that because the Chamber had ordered Dr. Karadzic separated from
22 Mr. Martic other than for proofing that they wouldn't allow the meeting.
23 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes, but did they -- was there an explanation
24 given as to why such a meeting is not a proofing meeting?
25 MR. ROBINSON: No. So -- but it's -- you know, if -- it's not
1 essential that Dr. Karadzic be part of that first meeting. It's just --
2 it's going to cause some delay. So we don't expect Mr. Martic will be
3 testifying immediately as -- next week as we had planned. We'll do our
4 best once we've met with him to try to accelerate that, and we will
5 give -- after we prepare the Rule 92 ter statement, we'll give that to
6 the Prosecution and figure out when the best time is for him to give his
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may, your Excellency.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Considering that I represent myself
11 and that, so to speak, I am lead counsel, I don't understand why I'm
12 subjected to such restrictions. I would understand it after the
13 beginning of testimony. I absolutely understand, and I try hard not to
14 look at any witness even through the window, but I'm not quite clear why
15 am I restricted to one meeting? I believe there is absolutely no
16 equality of arms here.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson said that it is not the practice, and
18 then this issue is not such an essential issue. Let's leave it there and
19 then the Chamber will take a look when it arises again. I originally
20 formed the impression that it has been sorted out in one way other
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE KWON: Before we hear the evidence of the next witness,
24 there are three matters I'd like to deal with. The first two relate to
25 oral rulings the Chamber is minded to give now.
1 First, the Chamber will issue an oral ruling in relation to the
2 testimony of Desimir Sarenac, scheduled as the sixth witness to testify
3 in March 2013. The accused seeks to tender 230 associated exhibits
4 through the witness and expects to use 15 minutes on direct examination
5 with him.
6 The witness's testimony was initially scheduled for January but
7 was postponed due to the large number of documents that remained
8 untranslated. On 15th of February, 2013, the Prosecution stated that the
9 proposed associated exhibits were being reviewed but that there would be
10 numerous objections to their admission. On the 25th of February, the
11 Chamber and the accused were informed via e-mail that Prosecution would
12 object to the admission of all of the 230 proposed associated exhibits.
13 The Chamber simply cannot accept that such a large number of
14 associated exhibits be tendered pursuant to Rule 92 ter as it is not an
15 efficient use of the Chamber's and the Prosecution's out-of-court time
16 and resources. On several instances during the Prosecution's case, the
17 Chamber proprio motu ordered that certain witnesses through whom the
18 Prosecution was seeking the admission of large volumes of transcript be
19 called viva voce. The same reasoning must be applied to associated
20 exhibits. In the specific instance, the witness's statement is 20 pages
21 long, and the proposed associated exhibits are listed in large blocks to
22 illustrate the witness's brief comments. Just as an illustrative
23 example, paragraph 30 of the witness's statement refers to 102 documents.
24 This is unacceptable. Furthermore, allowing the accused to tender such a
25 high number of associated exhibits would require the Chamber to grant an
1 inordinate amount of time for cross-examination to the Prosecution in
2 comparison to the time used by the accused on chief, which would run
3 contrary to efficient trial management. This is also contrary to the
4 Chamber's recent instruction that the accused should focus and tender
5 only those exhibits which are really of significance to the case against
6 him and to avoid tendering peripheral documents through Rule 92 ter
8 The Chamber thus orders that Witness Desimir Sarenac be led live.
9 The Prosecution shall have the same time for its cross-examination as
10 that used by the accused for its examination-in-chief.
11 Next, the Chamber will issue a decision on the Prosecution's
12 "Motion to Partially Exclude the Evidence of Witness Aleksandar
13 Vasiljevic," filed on the 13th of February, 2013, in which the
14 Prosecution seeks to exclude a number of paragraphs from Vasiljevic's
15 statement tendered under Rule 92 ter on the basis that they are
16 irrelevant to the charges in the indictment. The accused filed his
17 response on the 14th of February, 2013, and, having been granted to do
18 so, the Prosecution filed its reply on the 19th of February, 2013.
19 The Chamber has previously held that detailed evidence on
20 military campaigns during the conflict in Croatia and on events related
21 to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in places other than BiH are not
22 geographically linked to the indictment and are thus beyond the scope of
23 this trial. As such, the following paragraphs are irrelevant to the
24 charges against the accused and the Chamber orders that they be redacted:
25 Part of paragraph 11, starting from the third sentence; paragraphs 12 to
1 18; the first sentence of paragraph 23; paragraphs 29 and 31; paragraphs
2 33 to 37, 40 to 46, 50 to 62; paragraph 65; paragraphs 72 to 83, 97 to
3 111, and 122 to 123.
4 The Chamber reminds the accused once again that it will not admit
5 detailed evidence on crimes against Bosnian Serbs which are not related
6 to the crimes in the indictment. Accordingly, the Chamber also orders
7 that paragraphs 137 and 170 be excluded from the statement. The
8 remainder of the Prosecution's motion is therefore denied.
9 The Chamber hereby instructs the accused to make these redactions
10 and upload the redacted version of the statement onto e-court before
11 Mr. Vasiljevic starts his testimony.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I say something for the record,
13 your Excellency? I know the decision has been made, but I want to say
14 something for the record.
15 JUDGE KWON: No, not this time, Mr. Karadzic.
16 Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.
17 [Private session]
24 [Open session]
25 JUDGE KWON: I take it that the Prosecution is raising -- going
1 to raise some objections with respect to associated exhibits for the next
3 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, Mr. President. As foreshadowed in
5 the message that we sent to the parties and the Chamber, there are a
6 great number of exhibits that are proposed to be tendered as associated,
7 the vast majority of which, as we indicated, have not been commented on
8 at all, and the remaining few do not have sufficient comments, with the
9 exception of one, to fall within the ambit of associated exhibits forming
10 an inseparable and indispensable part of the statement. So that's the
11 concern we raised, and we continue to stand by that position.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Dr. Karadzic will deal with
14 that point.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, it is very clear
17 from the indictment that some experts and witnesses for the Prosecution
18 went back to the 14th century. The following witness produced a large
19 number of documents, and what the Defence offers through him is his own
20 documents. This is the only way how you can put together the entire
21 picture of the developments even before I appeared on the political
22 scene. Nothing depended on me, absolutely nothing, and you can see that
23 from those documents. The restrictions of that kind and the requests by
24 the Prosecution are unjustified.
25 These documents were produced by the witness as part of his daily
1 job, and if this needs additional justifications and explanations, he
2 will do that in cross-examination, but these documents confirm everything
3 that he stated. They don't have to be a particular commented upon. They
4 corroborate whatever he said in his statement.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the point raised by Mr. Tieger and the
6 Chamber is raising now is this: In order to admit a certain document as
7 part of associated exhibits of a Rule 92 ter statement, that document
8 should form an indispensable and inseparable part of the document. The
9 problem is that the statement can be understood without the document,
10 and -- and in some cases it's difficult to understand the -- in what
11 context witness is commenting on that document.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE KWON: So the Chamber is ordering you to lead live with
14 respect to those documents, except for the one with which the Prosecution
16 Could you give the number again, Mr. Tieger? 65 ter?
17 MR. TIEGER: 11585, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted as associated exhibit, but as
19 regards the other associated exhibits, I would like you to lead live, and
20 that does not necessarily mean the Chamber will agree with the relevance.
21 We'll deal with the relevance and admission one by one as you go on.
22 That said, we'll bring in the next witness.
23 In the meantime, Mr. Robinson, did you resolve the issue of
24 1D20195, which was allegedly said to be blank?
25 MR. ROBINSON: It's blank in our description, but it's in e-court
1 as a regular document. I don't know if that will be one of the ones that
2 we'll choose to lead live, but it is in e-court as a regular document.
3 [The witness entered court]
4 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness make the solemn declaration,
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
7 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. Please be seated and make
9 yourself comfortable.
10 WITNESS: VLADISLAV JOVANOVIC
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
13 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, your Excellency.
15 A. Good morning, Mr. President.
16 Q. I have to ask you kindly to make a little pause after my
17 questions. We also need to speak slowly so that all of your words may be
18 fully recorded. This is very important to me.
19 Your Excellency, did you provide a statement to my Defence team.
20 A. Yes, I did.
21 Q. I would like to call up 1D7810 in e-court. 7810. Do you see the
22 statement in front of you?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. Thank you. Did you read the statement, and did you sign it?
25 A. Yes, I did.
1 Q. Is this your signature?
2 A. Yes, it is.
3 Q. Is this statement accurate? Does it accurately reflect whatever
4 you said to the Defence team?
5 A. I believe so.
6 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today,
7 would your answers be the same as they are in the statement?
8 A. I believe so.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to
10 tender the statement with an associated document into evidence, and
11 pursuant to the Trial Chamber's decision, I will lead some of the
12 documents live with the witness.
13 JUDGE KWON: Shall we give the exhibit number for the Rule 92 ter
15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3015, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE KWON: And, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Robinson, I forgot to
17 mention that there are a few exhibits that could be admitted pursuant to
18 Rule 92 ter as associated exhibits. I will name them one by one.
19 1D20199, referred to in para 61. We'll admit it. Shall we give the
20 number as we proceed.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3016, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: 1D20225 referred to in para 40.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3017, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE KWON: 1D20238, referred to in para 31.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3018, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE KWON: 1D20257 -- no. I leave it there. Yes, 65 ter
2 number 11585 referred to in para 72.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3019, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now I'm going to read a
6 summary of Mr. Jovanovic's statement in English.
7 [In English] His Excellency Vladislav Jovanovic was a diplomat.
8 During his career, he was a member of various diplomatic bodies and the
9 ambassador of the SFRY to Turkey. He was the Minister for Foreign
10 Affairs of Serbia and FRY in July 1991 until September 1995. In
11 September 1995, he was appointed ambassador of the Federal Republic of
12 Yugoslavia to the United Nations.
13 His Excellency Jovanovic considers that before the fighting broke
14 out in B and H, that a number of Western countries were working out a
15 possible option for bringing the process to an end and turning Yugoslavia
16 into a series of banana republics, and at meetings with foreign
17 ambassadors before the violence, the independence of Slovenia and Croatia
18 was openly advocated.
19 He considers that the country was dissolving from within.
20 Representatives of Slovenia, Bosnia, and Macedonia were established in
21 addition to the SFRY ambassador. In December 1990, the Serbian people
22 living in Croatia were stripped of their status of constituent people and
23 instead given the title of ethnic minority. The Croatian authorities
24 declared a political war against Serbian peoples. Serbs were dismissed
25 from public services, and this instilled the fear in them and Ustashas
1 also began returning to the SFRY republics. In 1991, the paramilitary
2 formations of the new Croatian government launched unprovoked attack on
3 the JNA, cutting off electricity, water, and food to the barracks. The
4 JNA were constantly provoked, challenged, and assaulted. Negotiations
5 were held, but they were unsuccessful. The Serbs in Croatia felt a need
6 to protect themselves.
7 His Excellency Vladislav Jovanovic's opinion is that The Hague
8 Conference on Yugoslavia, which commenced on 7th of September 1991, had
9 the aim to bring Yugoslavia to an end and that the Carrington paper spelt
10 the end of Yugoslavia. Vladislav Jovanovic argued at the meeting that
11 Yugoslavia must continue to exist and those who wanted to leave could.
12 However, those that wanted to live together should stay together, but
13 this was ignored. This conference, in his eyes, immediately allowed the
14 break-up of Yugoslavia, despite the fact that there were no valid
15 arguments to justify secession, and Slovenia and Croatia did this
16 unconstitutionally. As Serbia's minister, he travelled Europe to explain
17 the arguments put forth by the Serbian side in relation to the secession
18 of the republics. However, he did not receive much support.
19 In BH, an attempt was made to effectively deny the Serbs their
20 status as a constituent people by out-voting them. Ambassador Cutileiro
21 held talks in an attempt to reach an agreement between the sides. This
22 plan was accepted by the Serbs but not by the Muslims. Other plans were
23 drafted. However, they were not acceptable to the parties.
24 His Excellency Vladislav Jovanovic considers that the
25 London Conference was organised against the Serbs and the conference was
1 not interested in resolving problems. Even at this late stage he felt
2 that politicians did not know the true situation in BH and many were
3 unwilling to co-operate. Talks restarted. However, no plans were
4 acceptable to the Serbian leadership.
5 The Muslim and Croatian leadership applied the same model as the
6 HDZ in Croatia and blocked the JNA barracks. Vladislav Jovanovic was
7 also aware that Bosnian Serbs were blamed for incidents that they had not
9 Vladislav Jovanovic met and spoke with President Karadzic on a
10 number of occasions, and in the course of these conversations, he never
11 heard anything about the idea of establishing ethnically pure Serbian
12 national territories in BH. Karadzic supported the Cutileiro Plan that
13 ethnic minorities remain in the cantons and there is no relocation. He
14 emphasised that the policy was not one of shelling and targeting the
15 city. The only plan Vladislav Jovanovic heard Karadzic talking about was
16 one aimed at securing freedom and equality of the Serbs in Bosnia.
17 Systematic killing and inhumane treatment of the Muslims and Croats was
18 not the strategy of the Serbian leadership.
19 His Excellency Vladislav Jovanovic was not aware of the existence
20 of camps in Republika Srpska. He knew that the RS leadership had
21 information about and discovered on a number of occasions that the
22 International Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations were
23 complicit in helping the opposite side with the smuggling of weapons and
25 He also was aware of the total exclusion zone that was set up
1 around Sarajevo. When the Serbs responded to the Muslim's breach, they
2 were bombed by NATO. However, this never happened to the Muslim side.
3 The only way the VRS had to -- of ending the NATO air strikes was
4 capturing members of the UNPROFOR as prisoners of war.
5 Local enclaves were not demilitarised as requested, and attacks
6 on Serbian military and civilians were mounted from these locations.
7 Vladislav Jovanovic first learnt about the crimes in Srebrenica when a
8 meeting of the UN Security Council was called and he ordered that a
9 report from Belgrade be compiled.
10 And that would be the short summary. Now I would like to pose
11 few questions for Minister Jovanovic.
12 [Defence counsel and accused confer]
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Your Excellency, you were a participant in The Hague Conference
15 on Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1991; is that correct?
16 A. Yes, that is correct.
17 Q. Could you please tell us what was left to the arbitration
18 commission to discuss? How was the task of the arbitration commission
19 defined on the 18th of October, 1991?
20 A. First of all, I would like to remind everybody that the idea of
21 the peace conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague was presented to our
22 side, more precisely to President Milosevic, by President Mitterrand as a
23 form of providing good services which would not be binding upon the
24 participants. The only thing was to try and find a common language as
25 between brothers who were having an argument. If nothing -- if there was
1 no success, everybody would go home out any consequences. However, this
2 did not materialise.
3 From the very beginning that international conference was not
4 something that was providing good offices but, rather, imposing a
5 solution, a solution that materialised very quickly. The conference
6 started on the 7th of September and already on the 18th of October
7 Lord Carrington, presiding over the conference, presented the so-called
8 treaty provisions for convention on Yugoslavia. In that document, yes,
9 that -- those were the provisions of an agreement on Yugoslavia, and that
10 agreement in essence put a dot on the I on the existence of Yugoslavia
11 and called upon all its federative republics to opt for independence and
12 to come to Brussels, to the European Union, to get the confirmation of
13 their independence.
14 The decision on the disappearance of Yugoslavia was made even
15 before the conference started, and the conference was the executor of
16 that decision in a very fast and efficient way. It is a true blitzkrieg.
17 Only a month was given to the federal republic to say what they had to
18 say, and after that a solution was imposed and it was take-it-or-leave-it
19 solution. All the other crisis all around the world last for 50 or 60
20 years and nobody tries to impose a solution on them within a month. In
21 Yugoslavia it was done immediately because there was a need to come up
22 with a pattern that would be offered to the future Soviet Union, which
23 was dissolving at the time. So Yugoslavia was something that had to be
24 concluded before the Soviet Union imploded.
25 When we were there, we were brought before a fait accompli and we
1 had to accept what had been defined beforehand, and if we did not do that
2 we would be subjected to sanctions. Our position was that Yugoslavia
3 existed as a state. It was one of the founders of the League of Nations
4 and the United Nations, and nobody can -- could annul it for as long as
5 at least half of its inhabitants were loyal to it. That was the case of
7 However, the conference gave the entitlement to the other half
8 that wanted to leave Yugoslavia, and those who wanted to stay in
9 Yugoslavia were denied the right to stay in that state. That was double
10 violence towards a state and towards peace because it was a way that
11 paved the road to an all-out crisis in the former Yugoslavia which
12 finally resulted in an armed conflict.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, I would like to say
15 that the witness said that Yugoslavia was a kind of a guinea pig, and it
16 should be translated as a guinea pig, and it was a guinea pig for the
17 Soviet Union. That's on line 16 on page 20.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Your Excellency, did you present your position on the right of
20 all the people to self-determination?
21 A. Both President Milosevic and myself as members of the expert team
22 and all the others -- all the other experts in all the other expert teams
23 presented that in a very clear way. The right to self-determination is a
24 constitutional right of the peoples who reside in Yugoslavia, and in that
25 they were entitled to use that right in agreement with the peoples who
1 remained in Yugoslavia and not in a violent and unilateral way. A
2 constitutional procedure was already in place for such a case. It was
3 not part of the constitution, but it had to be agreed before certain
4 people wanted to secede from Yugoslavia and leave Yugoslavia.
5 Unfortunately, not only did they not pay attention to such constitutional
6 solutions, but they rather resorted to a unilateral and violent secession
7 from the state, and they were supported very strongly by certain
8 international factors from certain states, and some of them were very
9 aggressive in their actions towards Yugoslavia as a state. I primarily
10 mean Germany, the Vatican, Austria, and some other forces that did not
11 shy from openly being against Yugoslavia, and let's not forget that in --
12 that CI in November 1990 -- like by accident circulated a secret report
13 that envisaged that Yugoslavia would dissolve within 18 months in blood.
14 Unfortunately, that happened almost on the dot.
15 I don't know if anybody had that intention for Yugoslavia to be
16 forced to embark on conflicts and violence. It remains to be seen.
17 However, the fact is that those reports and interpretations appeared,
18 that Yugoslavia could not remain existing as a state, and that's why it
19 had to be eliminated from the political map in a very fast and efficient
21 Q. Thank you. Your Excellency.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Jovanovic, could I advise you to speak a bit
23 more slowly for the benefit of the interpreters.
24 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, I'll do that.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On line 1, page 22, the witness
2 said the CIA, and that was not recorded in the transcript.
3 I would like to call up 1D20215.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
5 Q. Your Excellency, when it comes to the constitution and the
6 provisions on self-determination, does it make a distinction between the
7 population and the peoples or ethnicities?
8 A. The constitution recognises the right to self-determination to
9 every people. It does not recognise it for national minorities but for
10 peoples. The six Yugoslav peoples that united and became Yugoslavia had
11 that right pursuant to the constitution. However, that right could not
12 be exercised in a unilateral and violent way, arbitrarily. There was a
13 procedure envisaged by the constitution, and that could be done in
14 agreement with the other peoples who wanted to stay and remain living in
15 Yugoslavia. That procedure was not honoured. If it had been honoured,
16 all those things that happened would not have happened, and I mean by
17 that bloody conflicts, nor would have the international circles who were
18 not interested in preserving Yugoslavia been able to openly meddle with
19 Yugoslav business and to support the secession of others and work against
20 the loyalty of some in Yugoslavia.
21 Q. When you look at that document, do you recognise it? Is this
22 your document? Is this your document that you sent to the conference?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the fourth page of this
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Could you please tell us what did you mean when you said at line
4 5 and 4, "the international law on friendly relations and co-operation
5 among the states" until the end of at that same sentence?
6 A. I can't find the sentence.
7 Q. The fourth line from the top.
8 A. Yes, from the top.
9 Q. The right of self-determination is in that sentence. That's the
10 end of it.
11 A. Yes. That was the first question that we as Serbia sent to
12 Badinter's Arbitration Commission. This was a supported body to the
13 international conference on Yugoslavia. We had three questions for them,
14 and this one referred to the right of peoples to self-determination.
15 Lord Carrington rephrased question 1 and question 3 without ever
16 consulting us, and that's how he committed a kind of a violence on the
17 original text that we submitted. Later on when we asked him why he did
18 that, he explained that it was his right to redefine any proposals that
19 were submitted to him. Obviously, he could not justify that right in any
20 way or explain it by any other principle.
21 In any case, the right to self-determination was what was the
22 core of the crisis in Yugoslavia. Obviously some people didn't want to
23 live with others in the same state and there was no doubt about that.
24 Even the constitution envisaged that. The problem was how to exercise
25 that, whether it do it in a way envisaged by the constitution or in a
1 violent and unilateral way. On the other happened, the constitution
2 insisted on the rights of the peoples and not on the rights of republics
3 or territories, because their delineations were at the demarcation lines
4 that had been established without any political significance, and those
5 demarcation lines, those internal administrative lines were not enough.
6 They didn't suffice for some peoples to leave Yugoslavia. They had to
7 reach a preliminary agreement with those who wanted to stay in
9 Serbs in Croatia and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina were constituent
10 peoples which was confirmed twice, one by the federal constitution and
11 the other times by the republican constitutions of Croatia and Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina respectively, and as such they had equal rights as any other
13 people with whom they lived together, and those were Croats and Muslims
14 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They had the right to self-determination if
15 that was the case. The right as such was denied only to the Serbian
16 constituent people in -- peoples in Serb -- in Croatia and Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina. There was no explanation for that.
18 It was said that the republics of Croatia and Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina could secede from Yugoslavia within their then administrative
20 borders. In other words, that the example of Yugoslavia was where they
21 applied the principles from the former colonial Africa, when colonisers
22 drew their borders arbitrarily later on when the peoples of Africa were
23 liberated from the colonisers, those arbitrarily drawn borders became the
24 borders of the states in Yugoslavia. There were no coloniser who drew
25 any borders. Those borders were administratively arranged by the
1 socialist Communist powers not because they wanted them to become
2 international borders one day, the desire behind that was according to
3 what President Tito said, "A marble lines marbley [as interpreted] cannot
4 be broken and those lines were there to embellish the whole, not to be a
5 separation between its parts."
6 Unfortunately the constitutional provisions of the federal
7 Yugoslavia were not observed and the right to self-determination were
8 tied to territory, administrative boundaries. They declared internal
9 boundaries as international boundaries, and they declared that
10 international boundaries of the Yugoslavia that existed until then were
11 null and void. This was violence against the peaceful existence of
12 Yugoslavia, and it heralded the evil years that were to come. And it is
13 primarily the premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and then
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina that contributed to that.
15 Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance themselves seriously warned
16 against recognising these republics prematurely before all the necessary
17 business had been done before that. This early premature recognition was
18 accused by many international politicians, Kissinger, Dumas, Mitterrand.
19 So even in the West people realised that what is being done with
20 Yugoslavia was a very dangerous development that could lead to
21 undesirable consequences. However that was not taken into account,
22 because the interest of certain countries was to do away with Yugoslavia
23 as soon as possible and to recognise the new states as soon as possible.
24 Let us not forget that the German minister,
25 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was extraordinarily active at the sessions of the
1 European Union and that he demanded by way of an ultimatum to have
2 instant recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and that if that were not
3 done, that the very existence of the European Community would be brought
4 into question. Also, there were -- there was pressure exerted by the
5 Vatican. Cardinal Sodano, who was secretary of state at the time, openly
6 called upon Western ambassadors to have their countries momentarily
7 recognise Slovenia and Croatia.
8 Q. Thank you, Excellency. We don't have to repeat everything that
9 is contained in the statement, but I just wanted to ask you what this
10 document represented on the 18th and was it taken into account? Did it
11 yield certain effects, if you will?
12 A. As I've already said, the commission did take this into account.
13 He did not touch the second one, Lord Carrington, I mean, but the first
14 and the third one were rephrased by him, and then the Badinter Commission
15 in the first half of 1992 passed its well-known findings. There are 10
16 or 11 of them. And basically this was a death certificate for
17 Yugoslavia, paving the way to all the former republics to be
18 internationally recognised.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
21 document into evidence.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive it.
23 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated]
24 JUDGE KWON: Could we give the number again.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3020.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Do you have your statement before you? Do you have it in hard
4 copy, Excellency?
5 A. Not in hard copy. But I have it here on the screen. No, it's
6 not on my screen. I didn't bring it because I thought that I didn't have
7 the right to have any papers on me here.
8 JUDGE KWON: We'll print it out for you. Just a second.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 JUDGE KWON: Let us proceed in the meantime.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. In paragraph 41 if you remember, and you'll see your statement in
13 a minute, you said that the Bosnian Serbs had no intention of engaging in
14 war, in taking part in war, and that they wanted to remain in Yugoslavia.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D20242, could I please have that
16 called up.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. I would like to ask you to explain to us the position that you
19 presented then.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Do you remember this? Do you remember as Foreign Minister in
23 Belgrade on the 30th of May when you presented these positions? I would
24 particularly be interested in this part: [In English] "And it has been
25 and remains principles and consistent. We are energetically opposed to
1 all forms of violence and war." [Interpretation] Then the second and
2 third paragraphs. Could you present that to us? What was the position
3 that you presented then?
4 A. The Serbs in Bosnia had a maximum objective, and that is to
5 remain in Yugoslavia as its inseparable part. In other words, they
6 expressed full loyalty to their hitherto common state. However, this
7 right of theirs was directly being challenged by the two other
8 constituent peoples, the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who
9 insisted on Bosnia leaving Yugoslavia, leaving the federation, with its
10 entire territory. Of course the Serbs opposed that on the basis of the
11 right they had as a constituent people, that is to say that without their
12 agreement, such an important decision could not be made. Therefore, as
13 far as this wish of Bosnia-Herzegovina was concerned, namely to leave the
14 federation, it had to be discussed in accordance with the federal
16 As we know, this was disregarded, because at the request of the
17 European Community, the referendum was carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina
18 in contravention of the principle of consensus; namely, that there should
19 be no out-voting among the three constituent peoples. Rather, they had
20 to decide together on all important matters related to the future of
21 their republic. So the Serb people as a constituent people enjoying the
22 right to self-determination was in essence compelled to fight for this
23 right of theirs in a situation that was changed, different.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you remember the question of this vote? How was
25 it ultimately resolved in the Dayton agreement?
1 A. In essence the Dayton agreement rehabilitated the right of the
2 Serb people to self-determination and enhanced their constitutional
3 quality and was opposed to the right of the other two peoples to out-vote
4 them. In this way, the Dayton agreement rectified an injustice for which
5 a heavy price was paid in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we all paid a heavy
6 price, all of us in Yugoslavia. Had the Cutileiro Plan been adopted by
7 all, then none of this would have happened. All these terrible things
8 would not have happened in this terrible war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So
9 Dayton succeeded because it rehabilitated the principle of
10 self-determination and the quality of being a constituent people.
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina was an independent state consisting of two
12 entities. There was also a third entity that remained invisible, and
13 that is Herceg-Bosna, and that is why this agreement was successful and
14 that's why it was signed by all of those who were supposed to sign it.
15 Again, I'm saying three and a half years had elapsed
16 unnecessarily. Had the Cutileiro Plan been finalised and adopted, the
17 Dayton agreement would not have been needed at all and war would have
18 been totally unnecessary and all the things that happened during that
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender this document?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3021, Your Honours.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. In paragraph 47 of your statement, you say that you had
1 information about the Bosnian Serbs being blamed for different incidents.
2 Did you follow that at the time from the posts that you held? Did you --
3 did you manage to find anything out about that, and did you know how
4 accurate that was?
5 A. These news about these explosions were horrific, and everyone had
6 to be astounded by that, so many civilian casualties just because some
7 shell fell from somewhere. And, of course, there was a divergence of
8 views on that. As for the explosion in Vase Miskina Street and at
9 Markale I and II, very soon the Bosnian Serbs were blamed for that. It
10 was said that the shell had come from there, and on that basis the
11 Bosnian Serb side was condemned even from Serbia itself, because
12 sanctions had been imposed in part by Serbia, too, because of that, what
13 had happened. Also, there were other things involved, so as far as the
14 bakery was concerned, the explosion in front of the bakery, I found out
15 that there was a report of UN secretariat that said that the shell had
16 come from the Muslim side, not from the Serb side.
17 As far as Markale is concerned, Yasushi Akashi who was the
18 representative of the UN for Yugoslavia, he stated to a journalist that
19 it was well known that the shell had arrived from the Muslim side. And
20 later on Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary-General of the UN,
21 confirmed this, conveyed it to Mitterrand, namely that he was convinced
22 that the explosion was due to a shell that had arrived from the Muslim
24 So as far as Markale II is concerned, contrary to all other
25 pressures, media pressures, that this was the result of a shell that had
1 come from the Serb positions, artillery colonel -- an artillery colonel
2 from the UN, I think his name was Demurenko, he presented a position that
3 was quite different. However, he and his opinion were disregarded,
4 ignored, and what remained was that it was only the Serb side that was to
5 be blamed for that. As we know, Markale II was a pretext for NATO action
6 and also for the imposition of additional sanctions on Serbian
8 These are controversial matters. I learned of all of that. I
9 did not have any direct information from Bosnia-Herzegovina, but this is
10 the information I had, and I did notice that there were certain elements
11 that indicated a strong suspicion in respect of these shells, namely
12 whether they had come from the Serb side or from the Muslim side.
13 Q. Thank you. Did you have an opportunity of hearing from our
14 leadership, the leadership of Republika Srpska, about these incidents,
15 what their information was?
16 A. Sporadically when I would immediate them, and I did not have
17 incessant contact with them. But in situations where they met with
18 President Milosevic. Of course, I did ask about that, and I was assured
19 by them that this was not done by the Serb forces, by the Serb side,
20 rather, it was the Muslim side that did that, because in this way they
21 wanted to draw international attention to the Serbs and to infuriate the
22 international community against the Serbs and that would ultimately lead
23 to NATO action. This was a position that was put in very strong terms by
24 the leadership of Republika Srpska at the time. I heard that position
25 bearing in mind that I also heard what the UN secretariat had done and
1 Yasushi Akashi and other information that challenged or refuted the
2 allegations that this had been done by the Serb side.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D20243, could we have a look at
5 that, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
7 Q. Yes. This is your interview to Hungarian radio. I wanted to ask
8 you about the fourth paragraph here where it says that it doesn't matter
9 to you, it doesn't matter to Serbia what they would agree on, but,
10 rather, it's important that they reach some agreement.
11 Did Serbia present the Bosnian Serbs or anybody else a concept of
12 their own in terms of the conference itself and the final solution?
13 A. Serbia, primarily President Milosevic, insisted that all the
14 constituent peoples in Yugoslavia enjoyed the same right to
15 self-determination. That was done at The Hague conference and elsewhere.
16 However, when this unfortunate war started in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he
17 insisted on the right of Serbs to freedom and equality of rights since
18 the right to self-determination had already been endangered by war and
19 had been denied as such by war and by the refusal to sign the
20 Cutileiro Plan. So the Serb side advised the leadership of the Bosnian
21 Serbs to defend their right to freedom and equality of rights and not to
22 insist on the maximum right, and that is the right to remain in
23 Yugoslavia if it was not possible to exercise that right. The very
24 outbreak of the war showed that it was hard to exercise that right.
25 Serbia throughout all the negotiations with the international
1 mediators, Vance, Owen, Stoltenberg, and others, insisted on that, namely
2 that a solution be found within Bosnia-Herzegovina that would equally
3 ensure the freedom of all three peoples and that would prevent clashes
4 among them and would prevent them turning into -- from turning into
5 antagonist forces. This was not easy because maximum objectives were
6 present on all sides, and the war added more vehemence to the talks that
7 were being held, and it was hard to pursue solutions that were based on
8 compromise. However, Serbia fully insisted on what it had insisted upon,
9 and then that ultimately was shown in the plan of the Contact Group and
10 at the Dayton agreement. It is not surprising that then
11 President Clinton also gave public recognition to President Milosevic for
12 the contributions he gave to the Dayton agreement.
13 Q. Thank you. In the third paragraph here, you say:
14 [In English] "Whatever we -- Carrington, whatever the agreement
15 may be, we will accept it."
16 [Interpretation] A bit below you say:
17 "The conference must not be stopped before the three sides have
18 concluded an agreement on the basis of the basic principles already
20 Did you see any connection between these incidents and
21 interruptions in the conference?
22 A. You mean the conferences organised by international mediators?
23 Q. Yes, yes.
24 A. The war itself was a huge obstacle to peaceful negotiations.
25 Those forces that were not interested in finding a political solution at
1 a certain point in time strove to prevent it by deteriorating the
2 situation on the ground so that Lord Owen had to admit his impotence a
3 couple of times, because very often when the gaps between sides narrowed
4 and it looked like something can be resolved, the situation on the ground
5 would suddenly deteriorate and the whole thing would come to a halt.
6 The Bosnian Muslim side, which was militarily weaker in the
7 beginning but got better equipped and stronger as time went on, was
8 anxious to have a foreign military intervention and adapted everything to
9 that goal, their activity on the ground and their activity in
10 communication with other states. That was an obstacle in international
11 negotiations that would have proceeded faster had it not been for such an
12 expectation and objective of the Bosnian Muslim side in the civil war.
13 However, Serbia was anxious for a political solution as soon as
14 possible. If it failed in Lisbon with the Cutileiro Plan, they wanted it
15 on some other occasion. So Serbia endorsed all these four or five plans
16 and showed clearly in that way that it did not care for a territorial
17 expansion of Serbia. It cared for stopping the war and achieving a
18 solution that would be satisfactory to all the three sides in
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, a solution that would not prejudice anyone. That was
20 the final objective of Serbia which wanted to contribute to stopping the
21 conflict as soon as possible and finding a solution based on the basis of
22 accepting and respecting the right of all constituent peoples to
24 Q. Can you tell me about this next paragraph where you say: "We all
25 condemn the attack on the bread line," and then something about
1 sanctions. Can you tell us, was Security Council able to find out the
2 real truth, and how did it come about that sanctions were ultimately
3 imposed although the truth was quite different?
4 A. I was at that time in my country, not in New York, but I know
5 from what I heard that the UN secretariat had made a report, had produced
6 a report, stating that that shell could not have arrived from the Serb
7 side; that is to say, it could only come from the Muslim side. As far as
8 I know, that report was not debated at that session of the Security
9 Council. I don't know why. But one thing stands; namely, that certain
10 members of the Security Council, primarily those aligned with the United
11 States, were very anxious to tighten the screws on Serbia and Montenegro
12 and by tightening the sanctions and increasing the isolation of the
13 country. Anything was welcomed that could serve that aim, including that
14 explosion outside the bakery. As we know, the media ascribed it to
15 Bosnian Serbs immediately, and that was an irrevocable judgement that was
16 not supposed to be doubted. All the conclusions to the contrary were
17 simply ignored.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted,
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3022, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: Given the time, shall we take a break now if it is
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Jovanovic, we will have a break for half an hour
2 and resume at 11.00.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
4 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Your Excellency, you mentioned that in this Muslim tactic there
10 was a lot of orientation towards NATO, and it was all calculated to
11 elicit a NATO reaction. How did the NATO respond? To what extent was it
12 responsive to that?
13 A. When the representatives of the Muslim side, primarily the
14 Prime Minister Mr. Silajdzic and others advocated a military
15 intervention, very clearly they said clearly they wanted it as soon as
16 possible to shorten the war, but primarily it was also because the Muslim
17 side wanted to achieve its maximum objective and an entity of two ethnic
18 communities, and to that they adjusted the situation on the ground, and
19 when it was necessary, incidents were created or when incidents happened
20 such as the bakery and Markale I and II, they made the most of it to put
21 pressure on the international community to get it to get involved and
22 carry out a military intervention against Bosnian Serb forces.
23 That was done quite openly. It was not concealed at all, and
24 that was close to the heart of all these Muslim activists, and that was
25 probably quite prominent in all their contacts with the international
2 It's another matter what response they met with, but as we know,
3 the intervention did occur in the summer of 1995.
4 JUDGE KWON: How did -- how NATO responded is not relevant.
5 Shall we move on.
6 Was that your point, Mr. Tieger?
7 MR. TIEGER: That was part of it. In addition, I thought it was
8 an opportunity as well. I had ignored some suggestive questions earlier,
9 but this one I noted was -- was a question that reformulated an earlier
10 response that was directed to the information the witness received from
11 the Bosnian Serb leadership and then posited as information that the
12 witness had alluded to independent of that in the course of his
13 testimony, which is obviously problematic. So for both those reasons I
14 rose, but at this moment my emphasis would be on the need to take care in
15 the formulation of questions.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
17 Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I could respond to this now or
19 later to say why this is relevant, but I'll do that later.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. In paragraph 47 you mention Markale I and the connection with the
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see 1D20250.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
25 Q. When you talk about the bakery, which specific incident do you
1 mean? How was it known?
2 A. That's a bakery in the Vaso Miskin Crni street. That was the
3 first incident where a lot of civilians were injured. It was sensational
4 news to everyone, and of course everybody first accepted the
5 interpretation from the Muslim side that it had been done by the Serbs.
6 Later on came interpretations and statements made by international
7 players that were rather contradictory. I've already mentioned that the
8 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed his strong
9 impression that the shell had not come from the Serb side, and
10 Yasushi Akashi said something similar in his interview to a German
12 As we see, there were many different interpretations and
13 statements, but the position ultimately taken by Western governments was
14 that it had been done by the Serbian side, and on the basis of that a
15 media and political propaganda against the Serbian side started.
16 Q. Did you meet on the 7th of February together with President
17 Milosevic with Yasushi Akashi in Belgrade? Could you please look at this
18 document and in particular the third paragraph from the bottom.
19 [In English] "On Sunday ..."
20 A. Yes. If I need to read only that paragraph, I've read it.
21 Q. [Interpretation] No, no, all of it. Remind us, please, what was
22 the subject of this that was a day after Markale I. What was the topic
23 of your discussion?
24 A. Mr. Yasushi Akashi was very pedantic and precise, and he tried to
25 be impartial to all sides and take into account all the facts, that
1 distinguished him in a way from others. I'm not saying that others did
2 not try the same, but he was exceptional. He was very interested in
3 everything going on in Bosnia, in all the incidents and the suffering of
4 people, and he wanted to find a way to put An end to it, and in these
5 efforts he met with complete co-operation on the Serb side, primarily
6 President Milosevic, because he, too, wanted to put a stop to that
7 unfortunate war for our own Serbian reasons within the country but also
8 for humanitarian and other reasons.
9 It says in this paragraph that a plan of the European Union that
10 had been presented in Geneva previously was similar to another plan, the
11 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan supported by the European Union. As far as I
12 remember, Muslim representatives, including the late Mr. Izetbegovic, if
13 I remember well, were impatient to end this all by defeating the Serb
14 side, which was impossible without a military intervention, so that
15 Mr. Akashi was aware of all that, but his position did not allow him to
16 take sides, and as I remember it, it was a discussion between two parties
17 whose primary goal was to put a stop to the war.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this document, please?
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll receive it.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3023, Your Honours.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Did you address the court, we're still on paragraph 47, the
23 International Court of justice on account of these pressures? Paragraph
24 47, the second half of it. "[In English] The Muslim side in Bosnia
25 pursued a policy ..."
1 A. Yes, I'm reading it. Yes.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I call up 1D20203.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Do you recognise this document? Could you tell us what it is?
6 A. The Yugoslav side, I mean the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is
7 communicating with the international community and has prepared a report
8 on the crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and
9 sent that report through the Security Council, but no reply was received.
10 Perhaps it's not usual to reply. Maybe such reports are just received.
11 In any case, we had no indication what happened with the report later.
12 Q. This is 24th February. That's two weeks after Markale I. Do you
13 remember this document? Could we see the next page.
14 A. Where?
15 Q. It's on the screen. Is this your document? Did you send it to
16 the International Court of Justice about NATO activities and decisions?
17 A. Yes. Yes. This was sent in order to inform the
18 International Court of Justice and for that institution to deal with it,
19 because that operation contradicted the usual NATO commitments. It was a
20 defensive military organisation at the time.
21 Q. Can we go to page 4, please. 015. Yes.
22 Could you please look at paragraph 2 where it says that
23 Dr. Boutros-Ghali: "[In English] It is evident that such an
24 authorisation does not exist ..." Please comment. What is this about?
25 A. I would have to read first, if you will allow me to do so.
1 Q. I'm interested in the middle part of paragraph 2 when it says
2 that the right is contradicted. What does this refer to?
3 A. I would love to see the beginning of this document. I would like
4 to somehow place it in time and a place.
5 Q. Can we then go back to page 1.
6 A. Yes, please. Page 1 would be good.
7 Q. Tell us when you want to move on to the following page.
8 A. Yes. Now's the good time to see the following page. Thank you.
9 Next, please. Let's see that. Please turn the page.
10 Q. I believe that here you interpret NATO's decisions, and then on
11 page 3 and 4 are -- are your positions. Please.
12 A. Yes. If you will allow me, this is about NATO's decision to use
13 force in Sarajevo and its environs without a pre-consent being given by
14 the Security Council. NATO's original military organisation that enjoys
15 its status within the United Nations. However, when it comes to the use
16 of force, the Security Council has to agree. That agreement had not been
17 obtained, and that was the reason why we sent this warning and request to
18 stop such things happening in the future. NATO was not authorised to act
19 on its own when it comes to the use of force in third countries. There
20 is a procedure which has to involve the Security Council.
21 Q. Can we go to the following page to remind the witness what was
22 requested by way of measures from the court, and then we will see the
23 Court's answer. Do you remember this?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. When you are ready, we will go to the following page where we
1 will see the Court's reply to you. Do you remember that?
2 A. Yes, yes. I remember.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to tender
4 this document.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The Court simply did not take
6 our request into consideration. Somehow it excluded itself and thus it
7 paved a way for NATO to proceed.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3024, Your Honours.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. In paragraph 63 of your statement, you speak about a conference,
13 and that conference took place in London in the summer of 1992. You also
14 speak about your meeting with Prime Minister Major and Minister Hogg.
15 The last sentence in at that paragraph speaks about what you have just
16 testified to. Did you inform the general public about that? Was it
17 absolutely transparent that there was such a pressure put onto you?
18 A. First of all, it was not an international conference. It was a
19 bilateral visit of the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
20 whom I accompanied. Of course, we had talks with Prime Minister Major
21 and Junior Minister Hogg. The topic was the crisis in Yugoslavia and
22 everything that surrounded it, and since we presented our historical and
23 legal arguments about the right of Yugoslavia to exist, and especially in
24 the part that decided and opted for its continuation, we received a very
25 brief and curt answer by Minister Hogg, that we could have any sort of
1 arguments but they did not matter for them. What mattered for them, for
2 Great Britain and the rest of the Western countries, was that we had to
3 adopt their conclusions and decisions. Obviously we communicated that to
4 the general public and Prime Minister Panic, who was not prepared for
5 such a negative position towards us, but that was what had been the truth
6 from the very beginning, from the moment when the European Union had
7 started meddling with the crisis in Yugoslavia. Its positions were
8 formed beforehand. The rest were just technicalities. This was just a
9 reflection of what existed in the European Union, and that was a negative
10 position to the existence of Yugoslavia as a federal state.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the number of
12 document that he would like to call up.
13 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the number, Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D20253.
15 THE INTERPRETER: And could the witness and Mr. Karadzic make
16 pauses between questions and answers. Thank you.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Do you remember --
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Jovanovic, can I remind you
20 again that you need to put a pause between the questions and answers.
21 Please continue.
22 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, if I may, I don't believe the witness
23 is speaking particularly fast, but because his answers go on for a period
24 of time it obviously becomes difficult over time for the interpreters to
25 keep up, so just another reminder to the witness. I don't think he's to
1 blame in a conventional sense, but the circumstances are clearly making
2 it difficult for the interpreter.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's proceed.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would kindly
5 ask you to allow me not to repeat the contents of the statement. I would
6 just like to mention the contents of the documents.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Do you remember that you gave an interview in 1994 in the month
9 of December of that year, and the title of that interview was: "What is
10 the Cost of Bosnia?" Do you remember that interview?
11 A. Unfortunately, it was a long time ago. I gave a lot of
12 interviews. It's very difficult to remember their sequence. Could you
13 please allow me to jog my memory.
14 Q. Can we go to page 4 where you will find links to the paragraph in
15 your statement. Please start reading the fourth paragraph which starts
16 with the words "When former Prime Minister ..."
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Does this tell you what you remember?
19 A. Yes. Yes, this is it. Basically at the heart of all of those
20 things was the fact that the European Union wanted to avoid the
21 impression that it supports the secession of Yugoslavia. In order to
22 achieve that, it had to proclaim Yugoslavia as a state which had
23 disappeared, because in that case their support to the independence of
24 the former Yugoslav states would not have been a support to secession but
25 a form of assistance to the separate parts of a former state to obtain
1 their own states. That's why it was necessary for all the state
2 continuity of Yugoslavia to be interrupted. Our problem was to receive
3 acceptance for those peoples who wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, not to --
4 only to stay in Yugoslavia also to continue living in that state as a
5 state that had its continuity. Lord Carrington objected to that very
6 energetically. He repeated on several occasions that those who wanted to
7 stay in Yugoslavia could stay in Yugoslavia. You could -- they could
8 call it Yugoslavia, but it had to be a new state, not the continuation of
9 the former state and that was the essence of our problems.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3025, Your Honours.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Your Excellency, when Serbia advocated peace and you said that
17 Serbia agreed to all the plans, did it express any territorial
18 pretensions in respect of Bosnia? How did it support the Serbian side in
20 A. The position of Serbia from the beginning of the crisis was that
21 it did not have any territorial pretensions towards the other republics,
22 and that position was repeated by President Milosevic officially and
23 privately, and that was the truth. The only thing that we advocated was
24 an equal treatment of all constituent peoples and their equal rights to
25 self-determination. When we did not fully succeed in that because there
1 was a over-voting of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and that
2 they were forced to resist to such a nondemocratic and illegal solution.
3 Then we started advocating an equal treatment of Serbs in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. On several occasions we emphasised that for Serbia
5 everything that the three constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina
6 agreed on about Bosnia-Herzegovina, whatever they agreed on we would
7 accept it. When international representatives asked us for our
8 assistance with that, we not only issued statements, but we also held
9 them. Serbia was very constructive in corroboration to that. I can say
10 that we supported all the peace plans from the very beginning. We never
11 opposed any of that which was not the case with some other states; for
12 example, the United States of America, which did not accept four of the
13 five peace agreements.
14 Q. I'm charged here inter alia with my -- wanting to break up Bosnia
15 and joining parts of it to Serbia and what is your information? What do
16 you know about my positions on that? What were my positions? What were
17 the positions of Serbia on that? Was the Republic of Serbia in favour of
18 the break-up of Bosnia? Was I the one who expressed the wish to break up
19 Yugoslavia and to join parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia?
20 A. First of all, Serbia never had territorial pretensions towards
21 any of the former Yugoslav republics and especially not towards
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It left it to the peoples there to agree what they
23 would do, whether they would live in an independent state or whether they
24 would break up and leave. That was their own thing. It was not our
25 thing. As far as I followed or statements, you firstly expressed your
1 loyalty towards the joint state and your desire to stay in it and that
2 was the maximum number goal that you as the supreme representative of the
3 Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina advocated; however, the conditions
4 changed and they deteriorated and you adapted the maximum goal and
5 replaced it by a more realistic goal which was for the joint life to
6 continue and for Bosnia to be an international entity but that all the
7 peoples in that republic should have equal rights. That was your initial
8 position and an ongoing position all the time.
9 However, you encountered problems and that's why there were ups
10 and downs in your rhetorics. However, you never expressed a desire for
11 Republika Srpska that was being constituted to secede from Bosnia and to
12 be merged with Yugoslavia. You considered yourself a loyal part of the
13 joint state of Yugoslavia. There was no need for somebody to chose
14 something that it already was and since conditions changed your position
15 changed, and for the past several years the focus was on finding a
16 solution within the framework of Bosnia as a separate independent state.
17 Q. Thank you, Your Excellency. Let's look at 1D --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the number.
19 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the number.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D20195.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. The first part is about President Bulatovic. Let's look at the
23 second paragraph, and please tell us what is your position here? You
24 presented that position. Please look at the paragraph. You're talking
25 about June 1993.
1 A. Yes. In June 1993, there was a breakthrough in the efforts of
2 international representatives of Owen-Stoltenberg who had tried to break
3 up the stalemate. And then they first talked to Serbia and then with
4 other participants in the peace process, and they presented their idea
5 about the need to create a Bosnia as a union of states or a confederation
6 or something of the sort. They presented an idea involving the
7 percentages that its future constituent parts could keep to themselves.
8 Obviously that plan was supported by Serbia, and after that it was
9 presented in Zagreb and Sarajevo and so on and so forth.
10 That was the beginning of considerations of a concept that ended
11 up in the Dayton Accords. It was the first concept that started taking
12 into account the ethnical principle rather than only the territorial
13 principle. It was the first to -- to -- to see Bosnia as some sort of a
14 confederation, at least in the initial stages, and those three sides that
15 were very antagonistic could then approach, at the other end accept a
16 realistic situation with time. This is what I tried to explain in this
18 Q. Please look at the last paragraph about the Greater Serbia. Can
19 you please tell us whether you talked to me and the leadership of the
20 Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and whether you sent such aspirations and
21 whether Belgrade was in a position to accept those pressures on it.
22 A. That project of the Greater Serbia was imposed on Serbia as a
23 propaganda instrument, because in that way Serbia was kept in a defensive
24 position. Whether the others pretended to be the holders of the truth
25 and justice. The fact is that Serbia never wanted to be a Greater
1 Serbia. If it had wanted to be that, it would have achieved that after
2 the First World War when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians
3 were being created. If it had wanted to do that, it would have done it
4 during the war when a meeting was held in Jajce and when a decision was
5 made on the setting up of the federative republic of Yugoslavia. It
6 stayed in its borders. It did not have any pretension towards the parts
7 of the then Bosnia and Herzegovina or some other parts of what would be
9 I believe that this part about Greater Serbia took up a lot of
10 time for this court, inter alia, finally that manipulation with that term
11 was abandoned. And when it comes to you and Bosnia-Herzegovina, you
12 simply were not in a position to think along those lines because the
13 realistic situation that you faced on the ground was such that you had to
14 save your freedom and your equality, at that same time you had to honour
15 the freedom and equality of the other peoples in that country. Any
16 desire for joining Serbia was unrealistic. It was impossible. You never
17 presented that as your idea save for at the very beginning when you
18 emphasised that the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina considered Yugoslavia
19 as their state and their loyalty. However, as things developed, as
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina was acknowledged as an independent state, that
21 position of yours and that your loyalty towards Yugoslavia as a common
22 state was abandoned, and all that time you tied to find a solution within
23 the framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you were encouraged to do that
24 by Serbia and Milosevic.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.
2 JUDGE KWON: Still I think you're speaking a bit too fast,
3 Mr. Jovanovic.
4 THE WITNESS: I will do my best to improve.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 Any objection, Mr. Tieger?
7 MR. TIEGER: No, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3026, Your Honours.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Your Excellency, you have just told us that Serbia supported us
12 in all that. Did there come a time when there was a complete split
13 between the leadership of Republika Srpska and the leadership of the
14 Republic of Serbia and the federal state of Yugoslavia? What caused?
15 What plan, if you remember.
16 A. That was the Contact Group plan. Later on it turned out that it
17 became 90 per cent of the future Dayton Accords. Serbia believed that
18 that plan covered most of the needs of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina
19 and Republika Srpska and that the part that was not covered should be
20 left to future negotiations during peacetime, not during wartime. We in
21 Serbia were aware that that plan was not equal handed towards
22 Republika Srpska on the one hand and Herceg-Bosna on the other, because
23 it allowed Herceg-Bosna to have special relations with Croatia and
24 confederation with Croatia which was denied to Republika Srpska. What
25 mattered for Serbia was for war to stop, for peace to be established, and
1 that the rest of the issues should be negotiated in peacetime, and that
2 they knew that negotiations might take time, but everything was better
3 than to continue the war.
4 The Serbs in Bosnia were afraid that they would be manipulated
5 and deceived, and they did not trust that that plan would fully guarantee
6 their freedom and equality. That is why they showed a certain resistance
7 towards Milosevic, who did not want to procrastinate any longer, deemed
8 that a moment had arrived for us to interrupt all political relations and
9 others with Republika Srpska. I personally was against that, but I was
10 not important. I was a minority. I thought that whatever negotiations
11 could be continued were better than a lack of any negotiations and that
12 negotiations could lead to a joint opinion and an agreement.
13 The interaction of all relations with Republika Srpska was a
14 total interruption. The blockade on the Drina was established. It was
15 not officially recognised as a blockade but it was. In exchange for
16 that, Serbia was rewarded by some sanctions being lifted, some minor
17 ones, for an entire year, from approximately the summer of 1994 to the
18 end of the war. The relations between Serbia and Republika Srpska did
19 not exist. The only thing that existed was relations between Milosevic
20 and members of parliament of Republika Srpska. Through them he tried to
21 institute changes or, rather, shake up the leadership of
22 Republika Srpska, but he failed.
23 So we entered a period of very chilly relations. And that
24 decision itself was a bad one from my point of view because a country
25 that is under sanctions and isolation and that condemns these sanctions
1 does not have the right to treat someone else the same way, because this
2 automatically weakened own argumentation against sanctions. However,
3 that was the decision made by the state leadership, and it was strictly
4 observed all the way up until the end of the war -- or, rather, up until
5 the end of the Dayton process.
6 Q. Thank you. In line 13, the witness said "chilly relations," but
7 he also said "non-existent."
8 A. Yes.
9 JUDGE KWON: It's there at line 9. Let's continue.
10 THE ACCUSED: But it was repeated in line 13, after "chilly."
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Not counting on civility and mutual respect and things like that,
14 can you tell the Trial Chamber what the policies were and what the
15 political similarities were between President Milosevic and myself -- or,
16 rather, our leadership in Bosnia? Because I have been charged with joint
17 criminal enterprise here, that I joined up with President Milosevic and
19 A. As far as I know, the relations between President Milosevic and
20 you personally was a sort of marriage out of necessity, because you were
21 total antipodes politically and ideologically. It was clear that it
22 could not last for a long time. You were more liberal. You were in
23 favour of introducing a democratic regime without any reservations,
24 whereas Milosevic did that, too, but with a bit of reservation.
25 Although he himself hailed from the Communist Party, he was not
1 an ideological extremist. On the contrary. He was very pragmatic.
2 However, his immediate circle was still encumbered by ideological views,
3 and that probably was a restriction upon him too. So in these relations
4 that were not very cordial from the very outset, as far as I know --
5 well, they were justified from a working point of view, but they were not
6 cordial. And between the two of you, there weren't any identical
7 affiliations or identical views of international relations. So the
8 decision of Milosevic to stop all contact with you and Republika Srpska
9 and to introduce this blockade was a logical consequence of several years
10 of - how do I put this? - it's not a lack of liking, but these are
11 relations that -- that were not characterised by a particular cordiality
12 or mutual sincerity, if you will.
13 Q. Thank you. You mentioned the contacts between
14 President Milosevic and our parliamentarians and attempts to change the
15 government in Republika Srpska. Do you remember before and after that in
16 the democratic processes -- or, rather, in the elections, who was it that
17 President Milosevic supported as well as his inner circle? Which party
18 in Republika Srpska? First of all, did he support me and the Serb
19 Democratic Party?
20 A. Well, he never explained that to me specifically, but I think he
21 did support the Serb Democratic Party because it was the leading party
22 and the most responsible one in the struggle of the Serb people in Bosnia
23 for improving their position. He was not exactly thrilled by you, and
24 there wasn't much warmth there. When he tried to remove you through your
25 parliament, that was his - how do I put this? It was his obsession,
1 because quite simply he could not get majority support in parliament
2 against you. And he tried that very energetically. As a matter of fact,
3 he even intimated to Lord Owen and others that things were almost done
4 and that that would happen soon. So he did not realistically assess the
5 balance of power within your parliament itself.
6 As for others, I think that he had the late Dr. Koljevic in mind,
7 that he could perhaps replace you if he managed to have you replaced in
8 the first place, but that was not particularly voiced. It was just as a
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D20232 -- 1D2032. Could we have a
11 look at that. Could it not be broadcast. 1D2032. And could it not be
12 broadcast. 1D20232.
13 So now we have the document. So could it please not be
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Please take a look at this paragraph, Serbia and Montenegro, and
17 there's a reference to yourself there. Could you please tell us what
18 this has to do with what you told us about a moment ago. Of course --
19 A. Yes. There is a reference here to Vice-President Simic and
20 myself. I think that Vice-President Simic particularly highlighted that
21 point regarding this replacement. I already said what things were like
22 in Milosevic's head, if you will, and of course this was a point when
23 relations between the two parties were at the lowest possible level.
24 Practically there were no contacts whatsoever. So the rhetoric that is
25 expressed here in this part a consequence of the fact that there was no
1 relationship between the two.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted
3 under seal? Can we show the top of the page so that the witness can see
4 the institution is concerned, because he is presenting his assessments
5 there, but please let us not make this public.
6 Rule 70, Excellencies. That's why I asked.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive it under seal.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3027 under seal, Your Honours.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. I beg your pardon. To the best of your knowledge and
12 recollection, this breaking of relations and this pressure exerted by
13 President Milosevic in respect of myself, did this reflect on the
14 situation in Republika Srpska, especially my relations with the army and
15 the Socialist Party in Republika Srpska and other forces? Did you have
16 any knowledge about that, how that was reflected in that respect?
17 A. I did not have any knowledge about our internal situation in
18 Serbia, and also I did not have any special relation about the situation
19 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All the knowledge I received was either through
20 the media or through contacts and meetings every now and then with the
21 representatives of Republika Srpska in our country. Of course, I did
22 find out certain things sometimes when I talked to Milosevic. The
23 blockade was total, at least that's the explanation I received, and there
24 was no possibility of doing away with that blockade.
25 Now, whether something was done without my knowing about it, I
1 cannot say. I can say that all parts of the system in Serbia were not in
2 full agreement with that, and perhaps there were some small violations of
3 that blockade from Serbia vis-a-vis Republika Srpska. I don't know about
4 that. I can assume that such things may have happened.
5 As far as I'm concerned, when I was in New York, when I spoke to
6 the French Foreign Minister, I think it was Juppe at the time, when he
7 asked me about the breaking off of all relations with Republika Srpska,
8 he asked whether it was appropriate for them to continue communicating
9 with representatives of Republika Srpska. I explained our situation to
10 him as it was in terms of contacts and negotiations. I always spoke in
11 favour of negotiations rather than breaking them off. So in an indirect
12 way I encouraged the renewal of relations with the representatives of
13 Republika Srpska which Milosevic did not look upon kindly, but that is
14 what happened.
15 Q. Thank you. Could you tell the Trial Chamber about your own
16 knowledge about my position vis-a-vis Muslims as a whole - of course,
17 with the exception of fundamentalism - about my relations, about my
18 attempts to communicate with Zulfikarpasic, Filipovic, and others, such
19 Muslim leaders, Fikret Abdic, these Muslims with a European orientation?
20 A. On the basis of what I know from your statements, and also a
21 series of interviews that you gave during these years of the war and
22 after that, it was obvious that did not have some kind of a backward view
23 of the Muslims or of the Croats. When intolerance and antagonisms
24 started boiling in the Bosnian parliament, you cautioned even then
25 against crossing this red line; that is to say, abandoning talks all
1 together and entering the dark tunnel of conflict. You also used
2 metaphors and strong language in order to warn of this great danger that
3 could stem from that. From the talks that I had with you every now and
4 then, while they weren't very in-depth talks, but you never had any
5 negative preconceptions regarding the Muslims. You only pointed out that
6 because of the difficult experience you had with them from the past you
7 wanted to have fully settled relations on the basis of everyone enjoying
8 full free dough and equal rights.
9 You indicated that several times, because in the past during the
10 Ottoman empire, during the Second World War, and even towards the end of
11 the socialist government when the appetites of the Muslim side in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina grew, you wanted to protect yourselves from such
13 things by everyone being on their own and no one could exercise any kind
14 of tyranny or domination. That is the position you presented to me and
15 probably to others, both about Muslims and Croats.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D20191. Could we
17 please have a look at that. Could we please have that in e-court.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. On the first page we see your statement -- actually, two of your
20 statements, and there's a letter. Do you remember these statements?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, can you zoom in a bit.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you please zoom in a bit.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. In paragraph 72, you speak about humanitarian matters. Can you
25 tell us what my position was and what the position was of the Federal
1 Republic of Yugoslavia with regard to humanitarian convoys and the supply
2 of humanitarian aid to all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
3 A. As far as Serbia's position is concerned, and that can be
4 confirmed by the international representatives Mr. Akashi and others, we
5 invariably, consistently, and strictly advocated the unhindered movement
6 of humanitarian convoys so that they could reach their proper
7 destinations. We also indicated the possibility that it -- that they
8 could be abused and that arms might be transported that way too. This
9 position was repeated time and again to one and all, and all the
10 representatives can confirm that.
11 As for you in Bosnia-Herzegovina, you also stated your views in
12 favour of this unhindered movement of humanitarian aid, but on the ground
13 you heard about more things, and you were exposed to certain surprises,
14 namely that sometimes these convoys were abused for other things like
15 transporting weapons and so on. You stated that regularly to Milosevic
16 and to the international representatives. As I know -- as far as I know,
17 this situation was improved gradually, but it probably never was totally
18 clean, if you will, because the Muslim side was strongly tempted to use
19 these channels for receiving weapons and other types of aid.
20 Q. Thank you. Can we have the last page, please, although both
21 statements are of interest, but they can be looked at. Please could we
22 have the last page, your letter to Willy Claes. Do you remember that
24 A. Let me just take a look. I will remember.
25 Q. What are you informing Willy Claes of concerning my activities
1 with Abdic and my activities on the humanitarian plane?
2 A. Fikret Abdic was man number one of the Muslim side in that Cazin
3 Krajina, and as such he had contacts with both you and Milosevic. And
4 once you had a tripartite meeting in Belgrade, and you had agreement with
5 him that was supposed to accelerate solutions and putting a stop to the
6 war. Unlike some other Muslim personalities, he was a man with both feet
7 firmly on the ground and unburdened by megalomaniac ambitions, and as
8 such he came to talk with Milosevic who was also very pragmatic and you
9 as well, all of you working in that infernal hole which the civil war is.
10 As for humanitarian aid and convoys, I am repeating what has been
11 said before. Among other things, when the international representatives
12 complained of the problems they are encountering in providing aid to
13 Sarajevo because of the various dangers and obstacles and lack of safety
14 for the escorts, we offered them a different approach from Bar, passing
15 through a piece of territory of Republika Srpska free of fighting that
16 would provide greater security for the drivers and the escorting
17 personnel. This well-intentioned proposal was not accepted, and they
18 insisted on the old route from Split to Sarajevo despite all the
19 difficulties involved.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3028, Your Honours.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. In the same paragraph 72, you talk about humanitarian issues, and
25 you also talk about gas. What was the role of Serbia in all that, in the
1 supply of gas?
2 A. The problem of providing supplies to all the parties in the civil
3 war in Bosnia was an item on the agenda every day, because the civilians
4 and everyone needed to be supplied, and that included supplying gas.
5 Serbia itself was under embargo. It had its own gas production that was
6 insufficient, but it offered to be a transit country for supplying gas to
7 the civilian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe that proposal
8 was not accepted because it would have violated the regime of sanctions,
9 but what Serbia was able to provide as aid, civilian and other forms of
10 aid, primarily to Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina because it had no direct
11 contact with the others, it did provide, and of course that was a great
12 burden on the Serbian economy.
13 Q. And what was the fate of Russian gas to Sarajevo? Where did it
14 come from, and where was the role of Serbia in that?
15 A. I believe that gas went through Croatia, not Serbia, because
16 there were no gas pipelines to take it through Serbia except if it was
17 transported by these specialised lorries. I'm not familiar with the
18 details, but I know that Russia offered gas not only to one side but all
19 the parties, and I know Serbia was willing to assist, but how it all
20 ended, I don't know.
21 Q. May I refresh your memory with a document. 1D20208. Could you
22 please look at your letter to Lord Owen.
23 A. Yes. Just a moment. Yes.
24 Q. Could we see the signature at the bottom.
25 A. Yes. Yes. This is one of the letters dealing with that issue,
1 supplying gas to Sarajevo via Hungary. Serbia, of course, accepted this.
2 I don't know how this was done. Probably using tanks, lorries, cisterns.
3 And you provided assurances that these convoys will not be hindered by
4 Bosnian Serb forces, that these trucks would pass through safely.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3029, Your Honours.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
9 Q. Your Excellency, I have been indicted for a joint criminal
10 enterprise including persecution of Muslims and Croats and so on, and in
11 that joint criminal enterprise, according to the charges,
12 President Milosevic was involved, among others. Can you tell me, did you
13 have any insight into the treatment of refugees in view of their
14 ethnicity? Did you have any information about at that, and how many
15 refugees did we have [as interpreted]?
16 A. Yes. We had a great number of refugees, and they kept coming.
17 As far as I know, there were over 50.000 [Realtime transcript read in
18 error "150.000"] Bosnian Muslims and perhaps 20- or 30.000 Croats who
19 found refuge in Serbia from the firing raging in Bosnia. And of course
20 they were received according to our obligations under international
21 agreements. The International Red Cross arrived immediately. They asked
22 those people if they wanted to go somewhere and where they wanted to go.
23 We of course created no problems with that, and in the meantime they were
24 provided with all the basic necessities.
25 So that charge of involvement in a joint criminal enterprise is
1 or concept that is obviously much favoured by the Office of the
2 Prosecutor here and is constantly used not only against the Serb accused
3 but also against others, although they were later acquitted. But I
4 believe that concept should begin with the beginning of the Yugoslav
5 crisis and encompass those who are primarily culpable for destroying the
6 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including international
7 players, and those who despite serious warnings of Lord Carrington and
8 Cyrus Vance brought about the premature recognition of Slovenia and
9 Croatia and later Bosnia-Herzegovina. And finally, it should encompass
10 all those who are responsible for the war that NATO conducted in Kosovo
11 and Metohija, and the persons who are directly responsible should be
12 named, because that war was conducted without the consent of the UN
13 Security Council.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 4 I would like a direction.
16 The witness said 50.000, not 150.000 Bosnian Muslims.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now call 1D --
19 JUDGE KWON: By "we" who do you mean when you asked the witness
20 how many refugees did we have? You meant Serbia.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't say "we," I said "you."
22 How many refugees did you in Serbia have.
23 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Then the transcript will be corrected in
24 due course. Let's continue.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I want -- have this next document
1 broadcast. 1D20246.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. How do you view this fact that there were many refugees in Serbia
4 in light of this charge that President Milosevic and I together were
5 persecuting Muslims and Croats?
6 A. This charge is motivated by political reasons because nothing
7 like that existed in reality. Yugoslavia was and remained a multi-ethnic
8 country. We have a lot of our own Muslims. Until some years ago, we
9 also had a lot of Albanians who are also Muslims. There is no reason to
10 doubt that -- or to suspect, rather, Serbia of being anti-Muslim or
11 anti-Catholic in any way. That is a fact. And as far as I know, you
12 Serbs in Bosnia also had no antagonism, let alone hatred towards Muslims
13 and Croats. You only sought clear relations wherein everybody would
14 enjoy the same rights, equality, and freedom and live in peace together
15 or at least co-exist in peace alongside. So that concept of joint
16 criminal enterprise is tempting as a construct, but it has no basis in
17 reality or fact.
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Could we move into private session
20 [Private session]
15 [Open session]
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We are now in open session, Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: And of course I have no objection to the accused
18 eliciting relevant facts from this witness, but I think it's probably
19 best to refrain from inviting legal opinions on matters outside his
20 expertise related to modes of liability, and we certainly have been
21 straying into that. So with respect to anything the accused considers
22 bears on that issue factually that is within this witness's knowledge, of
23 course no objection, but moving into his opinion of the applicability of
24 modes of liability seems inappropriate.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
1 Mr. Karadzic, you have noted it. Please continue.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we see the bottom
3 of the page, the last paragraph.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. And I should like to ask you, your Excellency, to look at these
6 figures, line three and four from below, and tell us what they refer to.
7 Also, I only asked about facts, whether I opposed accommodating refugees
8 and whether I was in favour of expelling or persecuting Muslims and
9 Croats, and the witness answered.
10 Are these figures correct? At that time in 1993, there were
11 already 50.000 Muslims and 20.000 Croats.
12 A. Yes. That's consistent with what I said. These numbers later
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be
15 admitted, please?
16 JUDGE KWON: We will receive it provisionally under seal, and I
17 will leave it to the parties to sort it out later on.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3030, provisionally under seal, Your
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Your Excellencies, at
21 this point I have no further questions for His Excellency Mr. Jovanovic.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.
23 Mr. Jovanovic, as you have noted, most -- your evidence in chief
24 in this case in its most part has been admitted in writing in lieu of
25 your oral testimony. Now you will asked by the representative of the
1 Office of the Prosecutor, Mr. Alan Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. Mr. President.
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
4 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, we have only a brief time before we will adjourn
5 for the lunch break, but I'd like to begin by noting that in moving to
6 cross-examination, we're shifting gears a bit. I am allotted a
7 particular restricted period of time by the Chamber to ask particular
8 questions about the issues that are raised in your statement or perhaps
9 other issues, so -- and the Court expects me to focus in particular on
10 specifics, as well as you. So if I ask you a specific question, it is
11 not an invitation to expound or elaborate on the general subject but to
12 please focus on the particular question asked.
13 I raise that, because I noted that, for example, at one point
14 when you were asked about the -- a particular topic of discussion, you
15 provided information about the character of the person involved in the
16 discussion, what that person was interested in generally, who he spoke
17 with generally and so on. So I will ask you to focus on the question in
18 particular, sir.
19 Turning first to paragraph 25 of your statement. You indicate
20 there that just like Republika Srpska, and in that instance you're
21 referring to the RSK, it was not recognised by Serbia, but it was not
22 contested either, and I would suggest that that description of Serbia's
23 position vis-a-vis Republika Srpska, that is not contesting statehood but
24 not recognising them, doesn't fully describe the supportive relationship
25 that Serbia had vis-a-vis Republika Srpska. So for example, it doesn't
1 indicate, nor does the rest of your statement, what you testified to when
2 you were here in connection with the Slobodan Milosevic case, where you
3 said at transcript page 36224:
4 "It is certain that all three sides had their aiders and
5 abettors from the outside because there is no civil war without any such
6 external aid."
7 Can you confirm that that was your position in the Milosevic
8 case, sir?
9 A. Yes. I repeat, it was a civil war in which every party had its
10 own external helpers.
11 Q. You were also asked, this time at -- by the way, when I refer to
12 the transcript pages, I can certainly call them up so you can see them,
13 but mostly I'm doing that for the benefit of the Defence and the Court,
14 which is able to access that.
15 You were also asked at transcript page 36420 during your
16 Milosevic testimony if "each side had its supporters and you knew that
17 you were supporting one side, didn't you?"
18 And you answered:
19 "Politically, financially, and diplomatically, yes. They were
20 our people."
21 And can you confirm that that was your position and that when you
22 were saying "they were our people," you were referring to the Bosnian
24 A. First of all, by saying "they were our people," I understood that
25 we are one and the same people and we were living in two different
1 neighbouring states, and our sympathies and support to them is a natural
2 course of things, because one part of the same people cannot not support
3 and have sympathies for the part of the same people in a different
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I indicate a difference in
6 translation. When it is said "our people," it's meant as our people, the
7 same people as those in Serbia, but there is also the meaning of the word
8 "people" in the sense of nation people, and that's why differences in
9 translation occur.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I second that.
11 MR. TIEGER: Fine. I don't think that implicates anything here,
12 but of course I am aware of the potential for that distinction and will
13 try to distinguish where I can if I'm referring to a nation or a
14 constituent peoples or nations. I'll try to be as clear as possible.
15 Q. During your Milosevic testimony, sir, you were also asked about
16 the level of military support provided by Serbia to Republika Srpska, and
17 is it correct that you indicated, and that's found at transcript page
18 36420, that that was something you couldn't speak to because you were, as
19 you say:
20 "I do not now about that, because as I told you, I knew nothing
21 of military matters."
22 That's -- that's essentially what you testified to in the
23 Milosevic case; correct?
24 A. Yes, that's correct. I stated that, because military issues
25 passed me by completely. I did not receive any information from any
1 intelligence service on those issues, nor did I receive information on
2 the military situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All I learned was through
3 the press or casual or accidental meetings with some people.
4 Q. This Trial Chamber has received evidence from various sources
5 about the extent of military support by Serbia to Republika Srpska or by
6 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Bosnian Serbs. Let me ask you
7 this question: Were you -- without being aware of specifics as you've
8 told us, and without -- being in the position you just described, were
9 you nevertheless aware that the extent of military support provided by
10 the Serbian side to the Bosnian Serbs was substantial?
11 A. I could not say that. Anything I would say would be speculation,
12 because I have not a single specific direct piece of information about
13 that. Whatever I said would not be qualified, because it is not based on
14 original sources, on knowledge.
15 Q. In paragraphs 37 through 42 of your report --
16 JUDGE KWON: Statement.
17 MR. TIEGER: Statement. Excuse me. I saw the report in front of
18 me -- in front of my eyes at the moment.
19 Q. Excuse me, sir. In paragraphs 37 through 42 of your statement,
20 you make reference to the Cutileiro Plan, and I'd like to ask you about a
21 number of those references. First of all, you twice make reference to
22 the alleged fact that the plan was "accepted" by the Serbs and that they
23 would never have "signed Cutileiro's agreement" if they had intentions of
24 forcing their way out of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
25 First of all, Mr. Jovanovic, are you aware of the fact that the
1 Agreement on Principles was not signed as a formal matter, and that
2 indeed the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Dr. Karadzic, assured their
3 followers that it had not been signed and would not be signed until the
4 Bosnian Serb leadership got exactly what they wanted? Were you aware of
6 A. I was present when Witness Cutileiro submitted his report to the
7 international conference on Yugoslavia. He asked two weeks to make
8 finishing touches for finalising the report, but he said that all three
9 sides had given their consent, and all those present at the conference,
10 all heads of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, supported that,
11 including President Milosevic, who said that Mr. Cutileiro should be
12 given two weeks to finalise the reports and that Serbia would be among
13 the first to support Bosnia and Herzegovina restructured in that way.
14 Whoever wanted to test Mr. Milosevic could have just waited two weeks to
15 see whether he would indeed sign it. The only exception was
16 President Izetbegovic, who asked for immediate recognition of Bosnia and
18 I want to emphasise that the consent of all three sides had been
19 given to that text. Not the signature, but the consent, which is very
20 important. And the only the side that withdrew that consent after the
21 pressure of the US was the Muslim side, and that was the end of that
22 process, and its termination heralded the beginning of all the horrible
23 things that happened during the civil war in Bosnia.
24 JUDGE KWON: Shall we pause here, Mr. Tieger?
25 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at
2 quarter past 1.00.
3 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 1.17 p.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
7 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, we were discussing some of the portions of your
8 statement dealing with the Cutileiro Plan. In paragraph 39 of your
9 statement, you appear to insist that the position taken with respect to
10 the Agreement on Principles on March 18th was somehow incompatible with
11 any thought by the Bosnian Serb leadership of achieving their objectives
12 through military means. You state:
13 "Had they had such intentions, they would not have signed
14 Cutileiro's agreement."
15 That's at paragraph 39, and a similar provision in paragraph 49.
16 And Mr. Jovanovic, do you admit or deny or simply claim you are
17 not aware of any positions taken by the Bosnian Serb leadership that if
18 the negotiations failed to achieve what they wanted, that they would do
19 whatever is necessary to protect their interests, including using force
20 to take territories?
21 A. [No interpretation]
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Jovanovic, I'm afraid we are not getting
23 interpretation. Could you kindly repeat your answer.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]
25 JUDGE KWON: Again, we are not getting translation.
1 Mr. Karadzic, do you hear me?
2 THE ACCUSED: Yes, Excellency. I have Serbian.
3 JUDGE KWON: Could you speak in B/C/S.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]
5 JUDGE KWON: No, we are not getting interpretation still.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe it's about the channel. You
7 may have changed the channel as I use channel number 6, and I do receive
8 the interpretation.
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Now we -- it has been sorted out.
10 Please continue, Mr. Tieger. Or if you could repeat your answer,
11 Mr. Jovanovic.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. Having accepted the
13 Cutileiro Plan, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrated that
14 they cared for peace much more than for war. They themselves were scared
15 of war, but essentially it was a sacrifice on their part because they
16 gave up on their objective to remain within Yugoslavia for the sake of
17 living in a joint country, because that plan ensured the equality of the
18 Serbs as a constituent people. So the alternative to that plan was not a
19 war option for the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were literally
20 forced to go for that option. Let's not forget who started shooting. It
21 was the HDZ forces from Croatia who entered in Bosanski broad and burned
22 down the Serb village and then the murder --
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, I'm sorry to interrupt, sir, but I'm going to try
25 to keep us both to the guidelines I announced earlier about sticking to
1 the question. The question was about your awareness, one way or another,
2 of the positions taken by the Bosnian Serbs, not an interpretation of the
3 plan itself or the events that followed. So I -- do I understand you
4 correctly that it's your position that the Bosnian Serbs were, as you say
5 here, literally forced to go for that option, meaning the military or war
6 option, and as you stated earlier at page 29, they were compelled to
7 fight. That's your position; is that right?
8 A. Yes. Don't forget, I recall that in my statement that I attended
9 only one conversation between President Milosevic and President Karadzic
10 about a possible war in Bosnia-Herzegovina when Dr. Karadzic was
11 seriously concerned after the falling through of the Cutileiro Plan that
12 a war might break out there. Milosevic said: "Withdraw to the
13 territories where you are in a majority and don't do anything."
14 Q. And repeating your statement is particularly not necessary and
15 particularly inefficient.
16 A. Very well.
17 Q. Okay. So can I -- do I understand correctly then that you are
18 not aware of any expressions by the Bosnian Serb leadership either prior
19 to or during the course of the Cutileiro discussions to the effect that
20 if they could not achieve what they sought from those negotiations, that
21 they would do whatever is necessary, including winning territories by
23 A. No. I never heard such a statement from either of them or from
24 Milosevic. That option was simply never considered, simply because there
25 was a firm conviction that a peace process would lead to a solution.
1 Whether it was in somebody's head, I don't know, but there was nothing
2 like that mentioned in the talks.
3 Q. Let's talk about something that you alluded to earlier, and that
4 was at pages 46 and 49 of today's testimony, and that's the issue of all
5 Serbs in one state and its linkage to the break-up of Bosnia.
6 Now, the Cutileiro Agreement on Principles was premised -- or do
7 you agree it was premised on Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining a state within
8 its existing borders? Just yes or no.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And the reality is that the Bosnian Serb leadership never agreed
11 to that in part because the objective, the goal, or even the dream was
12 the eventual uniting of the Serbs in one state, whether a single state or
13 a federation of states; correct?
14 A. I know what the objective of Serbia was. It was never the
15 objective of Serbia to create any sort of territorial ambition against
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The objective was to protect Serbs in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina from possible danger from domination and unitarianism
18 by ensuring them freedom and equality. What the Bosnian Serbs dreamt of
19 and thought of as a possible development goes beyond rational reality.
20 Everybody is allowed to dream, but that was never the policy expressed by
21 Bosnian Serbs. They only expressed their huge fears in the event
22 independent Bosnia comes into being, and for that reason they started
23 these talks with Milosevic that I began to explain.
24 Q. Well, let me look at what they expressed both to their followers
25 and indeed to you, and let me break that down into two aspects of what we
1 we just talked about. Number one, Bosnia remaining or not remaining a
2 state, and then we'll move on to the issue of all Serbs in one state.
3 First of all, this Trial Chamber has received evidence to the
4 following effect, and I want to ask you if you were -- if you claim to
5 have been aware of that at the time. So from the 42nd Assembly session
6 in 1994, Mr. Karadzic said --
7 MR. TIEGER: That's P1394, e-court page 81 and 82.
8 Q. "We won the battle for our republic on 18 March. And that was
9 the first time that Alija said yes to three Bosnias on ethnic basis and
10 that was fatal for him. That was the moment when Bosnia collapsed."
11 He went on to say:
12 "If they had ignored us, kept silent, and acknowledged Bosnia,
13 and then said afterwards that some rebels were overthrowing their own
14 state, we would have faced difficult problems."
15 And at the 37th Assembly session, also in -- I believe in early
16 1994, he explained that this will be the first time in history that a
17 country is torn apart after the recognition and that the international
18 community accepts it.
19 So were you aware that Dr. Karadzic and other members of the
20 Bosnian Serb leadership were taking the position that Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina had essentially been ended as a state by the Agreement on
23 A. As far as I can see that statement by Dr. Karadzic was issued in
24 1994 and not immediately after the Cutileiro Plan. It reflects the
25 situation as it prevailed at the time, which means that the joint state
1 of Bosnia and Herzegovina stopped functioning as such, that the
2 situation, the factual situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was contrary to
3 what a state needs to be recognised and honoured as an independent state.
4 I don't see in that statement anything else but some degree of euphoria.
5 All the other statements by Dr. Karadzic in the Assembly of
6 Republika Srpska and elsewhere, as well as his interviews, exude a
7 totally different atmosphere, which is that the minimum of what they
8 wanted and sought in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the protection of their
9 rights as a constituent people, and to provide a full picture one should
10 look at all of those statements, all of those interviews, and then you
11 would be able to gain a fuller picture and a much better picture than you
12 are presenting here now.
13 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you were present, were you not, on the 21 January
14 1993 co-ordination council when Mr. Cosic spoke about the recognition by
15 Lord Owen of the intentions to create a state within a state and the fact
16 that discussions about rounding off Bosnian Serb territory was revealed
17 precisely that political objective to Lord Owen? Do you recall that or
18 do you want me to show that to you on screen?
19 A. I can't remember exactly, but I know that Lord Owen, who was the
20 first to launch the organisation of the future independent
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the so-called confederal principle, that he started
22 from the ethnic moment. What is imputed as being President Cosic's words
23 at the time was nothing new. The current Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina is
24 composed of two different entities. They are not independent states, but
25 those entities are -- have been recognised by international treaties.
1 The Lord Owen was the father of that idea sometime in mid-1994 or even
2 before that, and then that idea was adopted by the Contact Group first
3 and finally by the Dayton Accords. In that statement that is ascribed to
4 Mr. Cosic, I don't see anything particularly new.
5 Q. Mr. Cosic said on 21 January 1993 that a state, Bosnian Serb
6 state, was the main political -- "our main political will and objective,"
7 and only two weeks earlier at the previous council for harmonisation of
8 views or co-ordination council meeting, Dr. Karadzic had also stated
9 words to that effect, that is, "We do not recognise Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina as an independent and sovereign state. Instead of that, we
11 have formed our own state on the basis of the right to self-determination
12 and self-management." That was the position by the Bosnian Serbs, wasn't
13 it, the formation of its own state, not a recognition of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?
15 A. First of all, I apologise. Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised
16 internationally in April 1992. There was no need to subsequently put
17 that question.
18 As far as the state of Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina is
19 concerned, that was their goal sometime after 1993, and that goal was
20 finally achieved by the Dayton Accords. They have their own state, their
21 entity, which has been recognised and which is one of the columns of the
22 current independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. What Cosic said, maybe he
23 just misspoke. However, the Serbian state that we have according to him
24 was not contrary to the internationally recognised Bosnia which had
25 already been recognised as of April 1992.
1 Q. Well, let's move on to talk a bit about some of the aspects of
2 that state, and I'd said we'd talk about all Serbs in one state, and I
3 indicated to you we would -- I would direct your attention to some of the
4 things stated, not just dreamed about. So on February 25th, 1992, at the
5 8th session of the Bosnian Serb parliament, Mr. Krajisnik said:
6 "We have the opportunity to preserve the Serbian people in a
7 single state, to preserve the entire Serbian people in Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina and have it become part of the Serbian empire."
9 On January 9th, 1994, at the ceremonial session of the Bosnian
10 Serb parliament, Dr. Karadzic said:
11 "Our goal is to unite with Serbia. We do not want to hide that."
12 That's P5525, page 12.
13 A bit later in January 1994, at the 38th session, P1387, he
14 reaffirmed that:
15 "Our goal of unification with Krajina and Serbia is still valid."
16 Mr. Krajisnik on 21 August 1994:
17 "Our goal is that all this we are fighting for today becomes a
18 united state. May God grant this. All the territory now called
19 Republika Srpska or Serbian Krajina will be Serbia."
20 Mr. Jovanovic, were you aware or do you claim that you were aware
21 or not of expressions like this over and over by Dr. Karadzic and other
22 members of the Bosnian Serb leadership concerning the long-term objective
23 to unite with Serbia?
24 A. Thank you. First of all, let me remind you that all the Serbs
25 were united in the federal state of Yugoslavia. They stopped being
1 united once Yugoslavia was broken up by other forces. Cutileiro's plan
2 was adopted by the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They conceded to an
3 independence date with three cantons. When the others destroyed that
4 plan, not Serbs but the others, the situation occurred --
5 Q. And it's not pleasant for me to interrupt you, but I think you
6 can see or if you can -- you'll see the screen, I'm asking you if you're
7 aware of expressions like this. I'm not asking you to --
8 A. Yes. Yes. I was trying to explain that after that when the war
9 broke out, that option of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina with cantons
10 was dropped and other options were opened and everybody had a different
11 option, a different dream as to what they could achieve.
12 The statements that you mentioned, I did not notice them at the
13 time when I was in office, perhaps because that was happening in the
14 neighbouring State of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and all those things did not
15 reach others in time, and especially they didn't reach -- however, I see
16 them as emotional and euphoric state of mind which speaks more of
17 people's dreams than of the reality. Their goal may have been expressed
18 in different ways, but in essence it was what it was suggested to them by
19 Serbia all the time, and that was to accept the agreement with the other
20 two parties which ensured them important things, freedom and equality,
21 and that was their focus all the time. And as for euphoric statements
22 that could be given by ones or the others one or two times is something
23 that can happen in the heat of the moment, but this does not carry any
24 weight when it comes to making proper evaluations of the situation as it
1 Q. I'm going to look at that in just a moment, but I notice this is
2 not the first time in your responses that you distinguish between the
3 positions taken by the Bosnian Serbs at the time of the Cutileiro
4 discussions and positions taken afterwards. So with respect to what I
5 had asked you about earlier, that is Bosnia as a state, the -- the
6 reality, sir, is this, isn't it, that the first position in the Cutileiro
7 principles was that Bosnia was a state, and it was always said that
8 Bosnia was a state, but the Bosnian Serb leadership never accepted that.
9 That's the reality, isn't it, whether later on or at the time of the
11 A. I wouldn't agree with you. First of all, when they accepted
12 Cutileiro's plan, they accepted Bosnia as a state, because the plan could
13 not have functioned in any other way. Second of all, they accepted
14 Bosnia as a state by Dayton Accords. They continue to honour that fact
15 for as long as their recognised rights are honoured in
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. When the war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a new
17 and dangerous state of affairs began, and obviously that state of affairs
18 created an atmosphere in which some words and statements may have been
19 extravagant or unrealistic on any of the sides, including the Serbian
20 side in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I would not ascribe that much weight to
21 those words. I would -- would certainly pay more attention to the peace
22 process that lasted from 1992 and lasted until 1995. Those were
23 painstaking negotiations in which Serbs played a role, however
24 unconvincing that role may have been.
25 Q. Well, you say you wouldn't agree with me. The fact of the matter
1 is that you are not agreeing with what Mr. Karadzic himself said at the
2 49th assembly session --
3 MR. TIEGER: That's P1407, pages 116 through 117.
4 Q. "The first position in all Cutileiro principles, if you remember,
5 was that Bosnia was a state consisting of this and that, but it always
6 said that Bosnia was a state and we never accepted that.
7 Now, I told you that we would look at all -- we're talking about
8 with Dr. Karadzic had also said about all Serbs in one state. You
9 indicated that you were not aware of that, and that is essentially the
10 position you took during your testimony in the Milosevic case where you
11 repeatedly denied that all Serbs in one state was the underlying
12 objective of everyone on both sides of the Drina, and in that I'm
13 focusing on a question that was asked at transcript page 36367 of the
14 Milosevic testimony. That was your position then fairly and you repeated
15 that during your testimony; correct?
16 A. Yes, but let us remind ourselves that there is no nation, there
17 is no people which is divided which does not drive towards having a joint
18 state and unification. It's a natural thing with all peoples who are
19 divided. The division of Serbs into several groups was very fresh, and
20 that was after the destruction of the joint federal state. So it was not
21 surprising that from time to time that emotion erupted and that wish for
22 unification for a joint state. However, that was not the reflection of
23 political realities, let alone Serbian goals. The idea of the
24 Greater Serbia of all Serb people living in one state was something that
25 was not realistic and as such was not followed by the official Serbian
1 politics. Such statements that were provided by leaders on the Serbian
2 Bosnia sides for me were the expressions of hopelessness, and that's why
3 they had to feed themselves sometimes with those big words coming out of
4 their mouths.
5 Q. It may not have been official Serbian politics as you say, sir,
6 but let me focus you on a number of things that were said and recorded at
7 the January sessions of the council for harmonisation of views in 1993.
8 First Mr. Cosic:
9 "In my opinion, we have to recognise ourselves and finally agree
10 that the achievement of our main political goal, living in one state or
11 in the federation of states, is the long-term aim which could be achieved
12 only step-by-step or gradually."
13 Next Dr. Karadzic at the 9 January 1993 co-ordination council
14 session. That's 65 ter 06145, at page 68 in the English, 67 in the
15 B/C/S, essentially to the same effect:
16 "It's the long-term aim which could be achieved only step-by-step
17 or gradually."
18 And now your words at the 9 January 1993 meeting for the council
19 for harmonisation:
20 "We have to make a conclusion from it that the community," that
21 is the international community, "and conditions do not allow the ages old
22 dream on union of all Serbs in one Serbian country to become true."
23 That's at page 25 of the English and the B/C/S.
24 Now, sir, do you recall stating that, and does that accurately
25 capture what your position was in January of 1993?
1 A. I don't see anything disputable in that part of my statement that
2 you quoted from. For centuries the Serbian people lived across various
3 empires, and it was its goal to unify and live in one state for
4 centuries. The fact that I noticed that the international community did
5 not wish something like to repeat is just stating the facts, stating the
6 reality, and that was my starting point. It was not a practical
7 political goal. It was something that had been overcome, that was in
8 January 1993 when the new part of the peace process was in the pipeline.
9 It was the most promising part of it. At that meeting everybody
10 presented their own views. President Cosic is -- was a writer. He
11 interpreted the things about a bit more freely but not more
12 realistically. What I said is totally right. I would not add anything
13 to that.
14 Q. All right. And you have repeatedly emphasised that it was not a
15 practical political goal, meaning at that particular moment, but the
16 reality is that you, Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Cosic, and other members of the
17 Bosnian Serb and Serbian leadership insisted that goal was real and had
18 to be implemented step-by-step, gradually; correct?
19 A. You see, a joint state where all the Serbs and all the others
20 lived together was destroyed. That doesn't mean that the dream was
21 destroyed that something like that could be repeated, but that could be
22 repeated only through wider processes. We saw that through the process
23 of the unification of the parts of the former Yugoslavia to the
24 European Union where they would all be living in a joint state which
25 would be called I don't know what.
1 So one does not have to hold against the people who were
2 responsible for various parts of the Serbian people at the time that they
3 had that idea of the need to again have a joint state in -- in the
4 future. Every state has the same goal. The Albanians today, they dream
5 of a joint state. The people in Cyprus, the Greeks, Romanians,
6 Moldavians, they all have their own dreams, but dreams are one thing and
7 reality is the other thing. Reality was different to that dream. I
8 stated that and as such I rejected the dream as a possibility to push it
9 as the realistic politics.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection to the
11 transcript. Line 16, 17, the witness said that the Serbs lived together
12 and that the others lived together in Yugoslavia. The witness said that
13 according to the interpretation that the Serbs and the others lived in
14 the same state.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to say that we were
16 all great in that federal state, but when that state disappeared we all
17 became small and that was somebody's goal and that goal still pursued and
18 implemented to this day.
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. You just stated, Mr. Jovanovic, that you rejected that dream as a
21 possibility to push it, but the reality is that in January of 1993, you
22 simply acknowledged the reality of the moment that it couldn't be
23 accomplished "now in this moment," that's at page 25 of the transcript of
24 that session of the council for harmonisation, and on the next page at
25 page 26 in English but still page 25 in B/C/S, you described it as "the
1 first phase of the political way of struggle for our national goals."
2 So the reality is it remained as an objective to be implemented a
3 step at a time to the extent reality permitted at any given moment.
4 A. I don't see anything unnatural in that. Every people that is
5 divided and lives across various states has just one natural goal to get
6 together in one way or another; however, what they want does not mean
7 that it will be implemented tomorrow, the day after. It can be a hundred
8 years or a thousand years long process. You don't have to make a mound
9 of a molehill. We see something that is just an idealistic announcement
10 which is not a danger for political activities. Such a danger was not
11 only unrealistic but it was also not acceptable by Serbia at the time.
12 All that time we were very persistent there. We were consistent in our
13 goal to have the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina organised in the way
14 that all the three peoples could accept. We accepted all that. There
15 was no possibility for Serbia to expand across the Drina and to be
16 territorially expanded in that way.
17 Q. Well, let's talk about territory in that case. Were you aware
18 that there was a map appended to the agreement on principles, the
19 Cutileiro agreement on principles?
20 A. Yes, I was aware of the map. I can't remember it right now, but,
21 yes, I was aware of it.
22 Q. And -- and are you aware that that map depicted the absolute and
23 relative majorities in all the municipalities in Bosnia as a starting
24 point for the discussions about what territory the three entities
25 individually might comprise?
1 A. Apologise. How shall I put it? I was aware of that in one way.
2 Since I didn't participate in those talks, I did not get into the details
3 of majorities in various municipalities. I dwelt more upon the contours
4 of the former shape and size of the cantons.
5 Q. Let me show you that map quickly. That's D47 -- 486.
6 Now, the -- you can see the legend, so the red represents Serbian
7 majority or relative majority areas, the green Muslim areas as we can see
8 in particular in central, eastern, and far Western Bosnia.
9 Were you aware, Mr. Jovanovic, that the Bosnian Serb leadership
10 and Dr. Karadzic in particular didn't like that map and was pleased when
11 it was not accepted?
12 A. I'm not sure that the other two sides liked the map either. Each
13 of them had their own preferences. The fact is, however, that they
14 consented to the map. Let's not repeat why it did not become the Bosnian
15 reality. Here we can see parts with majorities being the one or the
16 other, and that's a well-known map. We're aware of it.
17 Q. Right. Well, first of all, there wasn't really much to consent
18 to. It was a reflection of the status quo, that is, the demographic
19 breakdown of Bosnia at that moment; correct?
20 A. Are you referring to the Cutileiro Plan and his map? Cutileiro
21 probably started from the situation at hand and the fact is that all the
22 three sides accepted such a map.
23 Q. Well, as I just indicated to -- so you were not aware that
24 Dr. Karadzic was not pleased with the map and in particular what he was
25 not satisfied with was Eastern Bosnia as well as Sarajevo and the Neretva
1 River valley. Did you know that?
2 A. I knew very little. However, even that little escapes me because
3 as soon as that plan fell through, the worst thing started happening in
4 Bosnia. It is certain that Dr. Karadzic did not like some of the parts
5 of the solution because some of the cantons were separated from each
6 other, and that was not as common as for the other two entities, although
7 their cantons are also separated, Posavina and others, but this was the
8 result of a compromise that they had to accept. And all of the colours
9 on the map depict majority ethnic groups which lived in them. The plan
10 started from the principle of co-existence between a majority and the
11 minority, and from that point of view was a good solution for Bosnia as a
12 whole. Unfortunately, it didn't take off the ground. As we all know,
13 things went a different direction which largely changed the future total
14 picture of Bosnia and Herzegovina as we know only too well.
15 Q. You were aware of the fact that the Bosnian Serb leadership
16 claimed large -- a large percentage of the territory of Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina and were aware that they attempted to justify that in part by
18 a reference to cadastral registers and survey maps, and that's what you
19 refer to in paragraph 45 of your statement; right? And also paragraph
21 A. Yes. Bosnian Serb leadership very often emphasised the fact that
22 they had or were entitled to 64 per cent of the territory based on the
23 cadaster. This is part of the historical heritage, because Bosnian
24 Muslims and Bosnian Catholics, as the prevalent part of the Ottoman
25 Turkish Empire settled in the cities, whereas the Bosnian Serbs as the
1 last category of the population had to live in villages in countryside,
2 so the cadastral result is also the result of the history which made
3 things to be in that way.
4 Q. You've referred repeatedly to Mr. Milosevic certainly during the
5 course of your testimony today and certainly at great length obviously
6 during the course of your testimony in his case. Were you aware of the
7 fact that Mr. Milosevic himself ridiculed and criticised this position as
8 transparently absurd?
9 A. I'm sorry. Are you referring to the percentage, 64 per cent, or
10 the map or --
11 Q. To the argument that the Bosnian Serbs were entitled to such a
12 large percentage of Bosnia's territory because of the cadastral registers
13 and their alleged ownership of that portion of Bosnia.
14 A. As far as I know, at first Milosevic did not have much
15 understanding for that kind of argument. Quite simply he was a city man,
16 but later on he relented, and he realised that this argument did have
17 some weight. It is not state ownership but still it is the ownership of
18 individuals, Serb individuals, and as such it did carry some weight in
19 the discussions that were still underway. It's not the only thing that
20 mattered and it's not the only thing that mattered in absolute terms, but
21 this is something that had to be taken into consideration duly in all the
22 talks that were held.
23 Q. I don't know how much later on you assert he relented, but in
24 November of 1995, he said this, referring to the Bosnian Serb claim that
25 the Contact Group offer of 50 per cent of the territory of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina was unfair:
2 "They said that this was unfair on the Serbian people although
3 there are 31 per cent of Serbs in Bosnia. 31 per cent get half of the
4 territory while 70 per cent get the other half of the territory and it's
5 unfair on those 31 per cent who got half the territory? There were still
6 those who took the bait, well, the Serbs own 62 per cent of the
7 territory, as if someone would believe it. It's known that it was all
8 socially owned property, the meadows, grazing land, and mountains were
9 nobodies property. What owners, for goodness sake?"
10 And that's found at P2604, page 6 of the English and B/C/S. That
11 was Mr. Milosevic's position articulated at the Supreme Defence Council
12 meeting in November of 1995.
13 A. At the time I was not in Belgrade, and I'm not aware of this.
14 However, I have to add something. Private ownership in a way was turned
15 into social ownership, but landowners, especially of small plots of land,
16 remained owners of their land. This never became social property. And
17 even now in times of transition land had to be returned to the initial
18 owners. Milosevic had poor relations with Republika Srpska leadership
19 because this happened at the time of Dayton when he had the last say and
20 that's indeed what he did. This statement of his is in my view part of
21 these ill feelings of his towards the leadership of Republika Srpska as
22 negotiators because he thought he was a better and more successful
23 negotiator and he thought that he could achieve more than those who acted
24 as litigants compared to him.
25 Q. In connection with the Bosnian Serb claim for territory within
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, were you aware, yes or no, that the Bosnian Serbs and
2 Dr. Karadzic in particular claimed a right to territories within Bosnia
3 and Herzegovina where they constituted a minority because of
4 World War II? Did you know that or not?
5 A. I did not know it that way, but I did know and I know to this day
6 that quite a few Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina disappeared during the
7 Second World War. They were either killed in a bestial way or they were
8 expelled. And this made the population of the Serbs in
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina sparser, and this is the result of a crime, genocide,
10 and it should not be simply stated as if it never happened. So from that
11 point of view I have some understanding for this argument of
12 Dr. Karadzic's.
13 Q. Well, the fact of the matter is that he said it in your presence
14 at the 9 January 1993 council for harmonisation. So at payment 63,
15 page --
16 A. Yes [overlapping speakers]
17 Q. -- remember that? That's when he talked about --
18 A. Possibly.
19 Q. And in referring to the territories that he considered should by
20 rights be Bosnian Serb, he mentioned essentially something similar to
21 what you just said, that when -- that -- that he would show the census of
22 1931 would get the response that this is history, and he said to them,
23 that is the internationals, quote: "That is not a history. This is a
24 continuation of the World War II."
25 A. Well, I think what he said is rather correct because this was a
1 real genocide that was committed against the Serbs, not an invented one,
2 in the Independent State of Croatia. No one can deny the figures that
3 the Germans themselves presented as 300, 400, 5.000, 600.000 persons
4 that --
5 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, I'm sorry --
6 A. -- disappeared and were killed in bestial ways and --
7 Q. I appreciate that that's a sensitive issue, so I hesitate to
8 interrupt you there, but I want to focus on the concept rather than the
10 Were you aware that among other reasons for claiming territory
11 within Bosnia-Herzegovina there were strategic concerns by the Bosnian
12 Serbs for focusing on particular territories within Bosnia that they
13 considered was -- should go to the Bosnian Serbs and should be held by
14 the Bosnian Serbs?
15 A. I don't know what is specifically meant by that, but it is a fact
16 that there was this strategy on all three sides to form their final
17 boundaries in such a way that would correspond to their strategic
18 interests. In his proposals, Lord Owen bore that in mind when he
19 intentionally interrupted the lines among the cantons of the Serbs and
20 others. This is something that is in the very nature of every policy and
21 of all politics. Everyone wants to satisfy their own objectives as much
22 as possible or simply has to give up on them if they prove to be
23 impossible. The other side, the Muslim side, very much insisted on
24 having a direct link with Sandzak and Serbia, and they probably had
25 dreams of their own. That is why they wanted this so-called green
1 transversal to be uninterrupted from Istanbul all the way to Sarajevo.
2 To what extent this is a dream is a dream is a different matter I think.
3 Q. Well, to what extent it's a dream, let's focus on what
4 Dr. Karadzic said to you and others at the 9 January 1993 council for
5 harmonisation of views. That's at page 96 in English, 95 through 96 in
6 B/C/S, where he stated that:
7 "The Neretva is disputable but we can live without Neretva;
8 however, we cannot live without Podrinje and Posavina."
9 That means -- and he continued:
10 "Without them we have no chance of establishing a state and
11 integrating in the future."
12 So that's a reflection of the strategic aims that you were
13 talking about in your answer a moment ago.
14 A. It is in the very nature of things that people that are separated
15 from their mainstream wants to be closer to its borders and if possible
16 to have contiguous territory, just like Muslim politicians wanted to
17 achieve the exact opposite, to make that impossible. So this is a
18 question of wishes. But it's a different matter what can be achieved and
19 what is achieved through negotiations. However you cannot deny anyone
20 the right to maximum wishes if that is part of politics and politics
21 always consists of maximum and minimums.
22 Q. Well, let's talk about how that was achieved Mr. Jovanovic,
23 because you were aware, were you not, that Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian
24 Serb leadership were insistent upon the implementation and enforcement of
25 what can be called the factual situation or the de facto situation or the
1 creation of a new factuality; correct?
2 A. This expression factual situation did not only come from the
3 Serbs but also from others, Lord Owen, too, he also proceeded from the
4 factual situation in his considerations as to how to proceed. A civil
5 war with certain elements of a religious war had been underway for three
6 and a half years with all its terrible dimensions and it also led to
7 certain movements in terms of territory and population as a result of the
8 war activities.
9 In the peace initiatives, this was not denied all together. It
10 was partly take into account, like other things; however, this is an
11 eternal law of war and warfare. It always led to changes in terms of
12 territory and in a certain -- and to a certain extent this is taken into
13 account in peace processes.
14 Q. You see the demographic breakdown of Bosnia and Herzegovina
15 before the conflict still on the screen before you. On the 9th of
16 January, 1993, at pages 63 -- 61 through 62 of the B/C/S and page 63 of
17 the English, Dr. Karadzic pointed out the areas which he said were "ours
18 according to the rights and according to the factual situation," and he
19 cited as examples on the Drina just, as examples, Bratunac and Visegrad.
20 Now, you can see the -- the fact that those were majority Muslim areas
21 there. Were you aware of the fact that Bratunac before the conflict
22 consisted of approximately 21.500 Muslims and approximately 11.400 Serbs,
23 and Visegrad approximately 13.300 Muslims and 7.000 Serbs. Those were
24 areas that Dr. Karadzic was claiming based on what had happened in the
25 preceding months, correct?
1 A. I have to say that I was not nearly that familiar with the
2 situation in the urban areas and the breakdown of the populations because
3 Bosnia was a land unknown to me from that point of view. And as things
4 evolved, I learned a bit more about the composition of the population in
5 particular areas. I learned that through the media and sometimes from
6 the representatives of Republika Srpska when they made certain comments
7 in that direction, so I cannot consider myself to be a knowledgeable
8 person as far as this demographic field is concerned.
9 Q. Well, you were certainly aware of the fact that the international
10 community during the course of 1992 and thereafter as well was condemning
11 the ethnic cleansing of Muslims and Croats from Muslim majority areas and
12 elsewhere by the Bosnian Serb forces that resulted in the shift in the
13 factual situation that we just discussed. You were aware of that; right?
14 A. I heard about that of course from foreign and domestic sources,
15 and I asked the leadership of Republika Srpska what this was all about.
16 They said to me that this was natural fear of the population that is
17 encircled by the other side. They want to avoid being with them and they
18 want to join the majority territories of their own people, and this
19 relocation took place in all directions, including Serbs from the regions
20 that were controlled by Muslims and Croats. That is the explanation that
21 I got.
22 Q. And when you came here to testify in Mr. Milosevic's case, called
23 by him to testify, you were at some pains to point out that Mr. Milosevic
24 and you personally condemned the ethnic cleansing that took place in
25 these municipalities.
1 A. That is correct. All the rumours that reached us, we expressed
2 our condemnation in public and privately. I also proposed to Milosevic
3 that these weekend fighters that went from Serbia to the other side and
4 fought there, and then they returned on Mondays with stolen goods, and
5 that such persons should be brought before a court of law or
6 court-martialed, and persons like Arkan and others should be detained in
7 Eastern Serbia or somewhere until the end of the war, because they
8 behaved like a private army. This was not accepted, but as far as I
9 managed to see, after that weekend warriors no longer crossed the river
10 and looted. Those were the fighters who came from Serbia, went over to
12 Q. I just want you to confirm a few of the things you said in the
13 Milosevic case. First you said the Bosnian Serbs "were condemned from
14 many quarters, often rightly so." That's T 36359.
15 You said:
16 "We constantly condemned ethnic cleansing, the use of violence,
17 and the shelling of those town." That's T 36421.
18 And you said:
19 "We condemned all crimes in the forcible take-over of territory
20 by all sides. We financially supported our people there but we did not
21 support crimes." That's at 3641 through 22.
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. I'd like to turn now to paragraphs 53 and 64 of your statement
24 where you talk about the meeting of 21 January 1993 of the council for
25 harmonisation of views.
1 Now, at paragraph 64 you state:
2 "My position was that it was less in the strategic interest of
3 the Serbian side that the national territories be homogenised and more
4 that they be economically viable and that national homogenisation must
5 not be achieved by violent means but rather through a peaceful exchange
6 of populations if both parties agree to it."
7 Now, that's not exactly my recollection of what you said. I
8 recall that you explained that natural homogenisation was a goal, a
9 strategic aim, and made no particular reference to both parties agreeing
10 to it. So perhaps we can take a look at that and that's found at P -- I
11 think the relevant portion is found at P00794. Page 2 of the English and
12 page 3 of the B/C/S. I think we'll stay on those for a while.
13 There you state that:
14 "The territory which is gained must be ethnically homogenised as
15 soon as possible." And you explain that's because it is a "strategic aim
16 which would be pursued and must be achieved." And then you contrast
17 that. You say, "If conversely freedom of movement would bring freedom of
18 settlement and the mixing of populations to our detriment, then what has
19 been gained would be gradually eroded. And in point of fact down the
20 road we lose all this."
21 So you emphasise there the strategic aim of national and ethnic
22 homogenisation; right?
23 A. In that statement I pointed out national homogenisation and
24 non- -- and not homogenisation at all costs. Economically viable
25 territories have to exist even at the expense of natural homogenisation
1 and of course both objectives have to be achieved by peaceful means and
2 certainly not by violent means and most definitely not by crimes. This
3 practice of population exchanges or moving out populations was
4 internationally accepted only until a couple of decades ago. Let us
5 start with the last one, Yugoslavia, Italy. They had an agreement on
6 persons who had opted in a different way: Italians who leave Yugoslavia
7 could receive damages. Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1953 had an agreement on
8 Turks that were moving out of Yugoslavia - Macedonia, and Kosovo that
9 is - and --
10 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, I'm not asking you for what you consider to be
11 other examples of efforts to nationally homogenise or of whatever you may
12 consider a justification for raising the issue of the strategic aim which
13 you considered should it be pursued. I just wanted to confirm the
14 reality of that statement in contrast to paragraphs 53 and 64.
15 Now, the fact is that that wasn't the first time that you had
16 raised concerns about the demographic structure of the Bosnian Serb
17 state. Just two weeks earlier on the 9th of January, 1993, at the
18 preceding council for harmonisation meeting, you pointed to a provision
19 in the Vance-Owen Plan concerning the right to freedom of movement and
20 expressed concern that it might spoil the demographic structure that had
21 been created since the conflict began; correct? Or do you need to see
23 A. I cannot remember all the details now. This happened 20 years
24 ago after all, but I said that in the context of preparing for the
25 renewal of the peace process that started in January 2003.
1 Since the situation was stated as it was on the ground, I wanted
2 to highlight that all violent means should be avoided and that this
3 homogenisation, this exchange of population, should be carried out only
4 in a voluntary way and accompanied by compensation. I think that that
5 text also states my opposition to ethnic cleansing as such and to all
6 forms of violence.
7 Well, look, this was preparation for the renewal of the peace
8 process where different ideas were being expressed and where ways and
9 means were being sought as to how further talks should be embarked on.
10 This was along the lines of what Lord Owen had in his mind. He did not
11 utter those words until the summer of that year, namely that Bosnia, the
12 future Bosnia, should be set up on an ethnic principle and that what
13 should be recognised is that there was an exchange -- or rather, no, not
14 an exchange but movements of population in different ways, and that could
15 not be denied. Some by force, some voluntarily, whatever was managed.
16 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, I'll show this if you want, but I'm going to quote
17 it for you, and the fact is that this was not a recognition or an
18 acknowledgement of movements of populations in different ways. It was an
19 expression of concern that the provision in the Vance-Owen Plan referring
20 to freedom of movement might disrupt the demographic structure, might
21 spoil, in your words, the demographic structure of the ethnic cleansing
22 that had taken place in the months before had created. You said at page
23 29 of the English, page 25 of the B/C/S of 65 ter 06145:
24 "Secondly, there is something that someone should explain to us.
25 Could the justified fear of spoiled demographic structure of Bosnia be
1 realised due to such a text? Would these provinces be prevented or
2 made -- making difficult for the Muslims, for example, to settle freely
3 in the Serbian countries. I remember Mr. Karadzic was pointing to that
4 danger at some time."
5 Now, Mr. Milosevic intervened and it's suggested you not worry,
6 no one will rush there, but you persisted and pointed out quote:
7 "It was said right to freedom of movement. It might also include
8 the right on settlement if it was not said differently. Therefore we
9 have to keep it in mind in order to avoid having misunderstandings."
10 That was another expression about the concern about any change in
11 the number of Muslims that were in Serbian territories to the
12 disadvantage of the Serbs; correct?
13 A. First of all, this Owen-Stoltenberg Plan was accepted by Serbia
14 without any changes. It was the other side that didn't accept it. That
15 shows that despite all of these countries, there could be spillovers of
16 the population, et cetera, Serbia accepted that, and of course this
17 change in the population as a result of different migrations, economic,
18 familial, et cetera, that exists in any state including in that
19 situation. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation was particularly sensitive
20 in the case of those who had been through the horrors of war, and they
21 always had a greater degree of concern that people who moved in from
22 other ethnic communities might threaten them in the future. That is
23 natural. But let us not forget that this meeting was held before the
24 renewal of the peace process and at that after that Serbia supported the
25 plan as it was along with the explanations that you just referred to.
1 Q. At -- at page 53 of your statement, you explain your alleged
2 understanding of Dr. Karadzic's comments at the 21 January 1993 council
3 for harmonisation of views meeting as saying that he was pointing to
4 "undesirable and unavoidable effect of any civil war" and that didn't
5 lead you therefore to believe that there was any plan of forcible
7 Now, first of all, Mr. Jovanovic, let's be clear on this. You
8 certainly don't consider that the mass departure of minorities or even
9 majority peoples from particular areas is in all cases an undesirable --
10 is it in all cases an unavoidable effect of a civil war, because as you
11 stated in the Milosevic case, you were insistent that the elimination of
12 Serbs from the Croatian Krajina resulting from Operation Storm was a
13 purposeful act by President Tudjman and Croatian forces. Was an act of,
14 as you put it, at 36095 and 96, the greatest ethnic cleansing and a mass
16 A. I did say that, but President Tudjman stated that before me,
17 saying that their goal was that Serbs do not make up more than 3 or 4
18 per cent of the population in Croatia, so I didn't say anything new.
19 That was the greatest ethnic cleansing after the Second World War,
20 because a total of about 400.000 Serbs were expelled from Croatia. But I
21 didn't say anything new there. I only repeated what Tudjman himself put
22 forward as a principle, as a goal before the beginning of
23 Operation Storm.
24 Q. And you don't have any specific information about what people
25 from Zvornik, that is Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Serb authorities from
1 Zvornik, said to Dr. Karadzic after the departure of Muslims from Zvornik
2 about how and why they had left, do you?
3 A. I don't know that part, but I heard vaguely that bad things were
4 going on there and that's why I asked from President Milosevic that Arkan
5 and his group be withdrawn and kept in detention somewhere in Serbia
6 until the end of the war, because the rumours were circulating that they
7 were completely out of control and prepared to do anything. That was
8 enough for me to draw Milosevic's attention to how undesirable that was.
9 But what exactly was happening in that part of the Drina valley,
10 including Zvornik, I have no first-hand information, only what I
12 Q. And the fact is that you were asked during your testimony in the
13 Milosevic case about this exact quote, that is the same quote from
14 Dr. Karadzic that you referred to in your statement, and after it was
15 quoted to you, the Prosecutor said:
16 "Now, he was describing massive ethnic movements to achieve Serb
17 domination of an area, wasn't he? Yes or no?"
18 And at that time, you said:
19 "That is the position that Dr. Karadzic was presenting, and I
20 have nothing to do with that." That's at T 36316.
21 A. Well, that is correct because I myself did not make that
22 statement, and I'm not competent to comment on it. It is as it is. I
23 did not say it, and that's what I -- why I gave that answer.
24 JUDGE KWON: Are you almost done, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I have about, I think, three
1 relatively short discrete areas. I was -- I'm moving quickly to try to
2 complete by 2.45. I don't know if it's possible or not, but I don't know
3 if that means the Chamber would like -- I'm not quite sure what you have
4 in mind by way of that inquiry, but I am almost done, but if you're
5 asking if I will manage to complete before 2.45, I'm not entirely certain
6 but I'll be close.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please -- please continue, but please conclude
8 by quarter to 3.00.
9 MR. TIEGER: I'm doing my best, Mr. President.
10 Q. Okay. You stated at paragraph 52, as far as the incidents in
11 Sarajevo were concerned, Karadzic told you that his policy was not
12 shelling, et cetera, and apart from an earlier reference to a few
13 specific incidents, that is essentially all your statement says about
14 Sarajevo. What it doesn't say, and as you testified to and explain
15 elsewhere is that you were aware of and condemned the illegal shelling of
16 Sarajevo by the authorities in Republika Srpska. Correct?
17 A. We condemned all shelling of Sarajevo no matter from which
18 direction, more than once, a different level. Both Milosevic and I did
19 that, and we wanted all those conflicts to end as soon as possible, not
20 to aggravate any more the overall situation where Serbia was a casualty
21 too. The issue of Sarajevo was never -- was always unequivocal to me.
22 It's a fact --
23 Q. In the interests of time let me ask you to confirm some of the
24 things you said in the Milosevic case. This is at transcript page 36169.
25 Do you remember -- Mr. Milosevic asked you:
1 "Do you what remember what our -- what was our position with
2 respect to the shelling of Sarajevo?
3 "A. Yes. I remember that from the very beginning at all levels
4 we, the Presidency of SFRY, the government of the republic, you
5 personally, and I in numerous statements condemned the shelling and
6 demanded that the parts of Republika Srpska cease that activity." That's
8 Further on at 3619 you confirmed that "Milosevic condemned that
9 kind of behaviour," that's a quote, at a meeting with Douglas Hurd on
10 approximately 18 July 1992. At transcript 36331, you stated that:
11 "The shelling of Sarajevo was something that was constantly
12 condemned by our government."
13 You said the same thing at 36322:
14 "We were constantly opposed to the shelling."
15 And you also stated that -- you asserted that this view:
16 "... was put into practice by Milosevic in Dayton" by "saying
17 that the entire Sarajevo ought to belong to Bosniaks to the Muslim part
18 of Bosnia and Herzegovina." That's unquote. 36332.
19 And then at 36342 you said:
20 "Let me stress once again," this is a quote, "let me stress once
21 again we always condemn the siege of Sarajevo."
22 That's all correct, isn't it, sir?
23 A. I stand by what I said at Milosevic trial, but I also stand by
24 what Dr. Karadzic said to me when he said that they were not doing that
25 shelling. It was not their military aim, that it was being done by
1 individuals in groups who had lost family members who were killed by
2 Muslims and who were doing it on their own initiative. That's the
3 explanation I received.
4 Q. Let me turn to page -- paragraph 69 through 71 of your report
5 where you refer to Srebrenica and the -- what you describe as the
6 misdirected or missent report. Now, that is a report as you explained in
7 the Milosevic case at transcript page 36364 that the leadership of
8 Republika Srpska had sent. You said:
9 "I got the information that the leadership of Republika Srpska
10 sent. It was a rather long text," referring to this same report.
11 That's -- you confirm that?
12 A. I believe that the leadership -- leadership is the wrong word.
13 It's the president of the municipality of Srebrenica who wrote that, and
14 we received that through the Foreign Ministry without any comment, and
15 since it was a Friday, I read that text. It didn't sound very convincing
16 to me. So I asked my secretary to take excerpts that are usable from it.
17 Q. Okay. I don't have time for the complete explanation.
18 A. Very well.
19 Q. First of all you may say now that "leadership" is a wrong word,
20 but do you confirm or do you want to see instead that you said at the
21 time of the Milosevic case: "I got the information that the leadership of
22 Republika Srpska had sent"?
23 A. No. I remember this well. This was sent to us by the president
24 of municipality. Perhaps through the leadership, but that paper came
25 from the Foreign Ministry by fax or otherwise. It was about seven,
1 eight, nine, ten pages. It didn't sound convincing to me, so I gave
2 instructions to be sent not to the president of the Security Council.
3 That was my mistake; i.e., I wrote that before I saw the heading.
4 Q. And when you say it wasn't convincing to you, that's because you
5 have maintained -- you knew, and as you have stated repeatedly since,
6 that Srebrenica was an atrocious massacre, a massive massacre, et cetera.
7 Let me ask you to confirm some of these quotes. So you said:
8 "If you're referring to Srebrenica in 1995, then that was an
9 atrocious massacre," in the Milosevic case. That's transcript page 36333
10 through 34.
11 You -- when asked who was responsible you said quote -- sorry,
12 this -- I'm now referring to an interview that you did with the Office of
13 the Prosecutor in, I think, about 2009 which I can show you in a moment.
14 If you need to, you said again it was a massive massacre. When asked who
15 was responsible, you said:
16 "Those who made such a crime, and I don't know whether they did
17 it with the knowledge of their superiors or not."
18 And when asked who those superiors were of those people you
19 mentioned Mladic and Karadzic. That's at page 27 of that interview. You
20 said in the same interview:
21 "It's very sad that Serbs were involved in that kind of crime.
22 It's terrible. Once this prisoner or enemy, he you should be respected.
23 It's always been the custom of Serbian armed forces throughout history,
24 so it was a very bad thing which happened there."
25 And then you continue you still didn't believe it was a genocide.
1 "It's a massive massacre, which is not acceptable of course."
2 And then in an interview that you did with Sloboda Bosna --
3 MR. TIEGER: That's 65 ter 24669, if we could call up the
4 transcript of that taped discussion you had, you said --
5 THE ACCUSED: This testimony. I'm sorry to -- this looks like
7 JUDGE KWON: It's not testimony but it's indeed long.
8 MR. TIEGER: I think you understand the circumstances,
9 Mr. President. I'm -- and this is the last question I have, in fact, but
10 I'm just trying to get -- to see if the witness, a, will confirm these
11 things that he said.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, why don't you put that question now.
13 MR. TIEGER: Well, if I could just get 65 ter 26449A called up.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, the witness is going to have to
15 return tomorrow anyway for re-examination, so maybe we can recess at this
16 time instead of putting unmanageable compound questions to the witness.
17 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber needs to rise now, so if you don't mind,
18 we'll adjourn for today.
19 MR. TIEGER: Sure, Mr. President. That's fine.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Jovanovic, we'll continue tomorrow the 9.00.
21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: You're not supposed to discuss with anybody else
23 about your testimony. Thank you.
24 The hearing is adjourned.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.46 p.m.,
1 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 27th day
2 of February, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.