1 Friday, 1 March 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. We apologise for the delay,
7 noting it was March we were waiting inside courtroom I.
8 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, please continue.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning,
11 WITNESS: MOMIR BULATOVIC [Resumed]
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:[Continued]
14 Q. Good morning, Mr. Bulatovic. Yesterday we spoke -- at the end we
15 spoke about the expulsion of people and I would like to address some
16 occasions where you discussed it in the SDC meetings.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 06244 on the
19 Q. And as it is coming up, Mr. Bulatovic, these are the shorthand
20 notes of the 8th Session of the SDC of 12th March 1993. Can we please
21 have page 31 in the English and page 25 in the B/C/S.
22 Mr. Bulatovic, I would like to quote what you said on -- and you
23 say here:
24 "We are obliged to help them," referring to Republika Srpska,
25 "but we are also obliged to understand that we can hardly co-operate with
1 someone who, like the Prime Minister of the RS advises us to ethnically
2 cleanse Sandzak and kill the Muslims there."
3 And can we have the next page in the English.
4 And then you also say:
5 "The Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Mr. Lukic, he advises us
6 to do it as soon as possible, for Muslims are not to be trusted. They
7 will stab us in the back, they will mine our railroad, and so on."
8 Mr. Bulatovic, that's what you said and that was your
9 information; right?
10 A. I remember this meeting very well. It was being decided how to
11 meet the requests of the Government of Republika Srpska for their
12 military conscripts to be arrested, those who are in the territory of the
13 FRY and how to deliver them by force to the VRS. That decision was not
14 taken and I'm very proud about that. This passage deals with the
15 decision-making process. It is true that this decision was not notified
16 to us in person, but we were just told that in the ranks of the
17 Government of Republika Srpska occasionally there are some extreme views.
18 It turned out that those extreme views were something we could not share,
19 they were not our convictions, and they could not support the making of
20 the decision that was asked of us to make.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we move on to page 46 in the English and
22 page 37 in the B/C/S.
23 Q. And you say here that is one -- and you speak about the murder of
24 Muslims committed by the Lukic group in this context. You say the
1 "That is one of the most important elements of our national
2 strategy, all the more so because the highest leadership of
3 Republika Srpska suggests that we should initiate organised ethnic
4 cleansing and that would be a disaster."
5 That was your position at that time; right?
6 A. I still don't have that text in front of me. If it could be
7 displayed, please.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: [Microphone not activated]
9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Prosecution, please.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry. It should be page 37 and -- not
11 page 37, it's page 37 in the e-court.
12 JUDGE KWON: I think we are seeing on this page, upper part, the
13 first big paragraph, last sentence of that paragraph. In English.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In English, but I can't see it now here in
15 the B/C/S. Can we see the previous page. That should be -- sorry, that
16 was a mistake here.
17 Q. You see here how you speak about -- it should be there:
18 "That is one of the most important elements of our national
19 strategy ..."
20 It should be the second paragraph of where you are speaking. No,
21 it's not. It can't be. Can we have the next -- the second-next page.
23 Here you see it basically in where you speak. It's the third
24 paragraph in which you speak, and that is -- that should be the quote
25 that I had:
1 "That is one of the most important elements of our national
2 strategy, all the more so because the highest leadership of
3 Republika Srpska suggests that we should initiate organised ethnic
4 cleansing and that would be a disaster."
5 That's what you said; right?
6 A. Yes. But look, this was a normal and responsible reaction to an
7 atrocious crime that was committed. This is a discussion about what the
8 paramilitary unit of Mr. Lukic had done. They had killed innocent
9 citizens of Serbia and Montenegro. They were killed on the train only
10 because they were Muslims. You see in the text a strong conviction of
11 that. There is talk about Lukic and he is described as a horrible
12 person. The text also speaks about our efforts to preserve peace and
13 tolerance. Sandzak, for your information, Your Honours, is an area
14 populated mainly by Muslims. That's why I said one of the main elements
15 of our state strategy was to preserve peace and tolerance. And the
16 sentence that comes next is linked to the previous one where we describe
17 an extremist excess by one person from the leadership --
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may say ...
19 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure the translation of Mr. Bulatovic's
20 answer has been translated.
21 Yes, we'll hear what you say, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to draw your attention to
23 the fact that Mr. Bulatovic said it was one of the most important
24 elements of our state strategy, all the more so because from the
25 highest -- it originates from the highest places in Republika Srpska,
1 whereas the interpretation refers to the "highest leadership of
2 Republika Srpska." He actually said from the highest places in
3 Republika Srpska. "Highest places" is not legally the same as the
4 "highest leadership."
5 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Bulatovic is kindly asked by interpreters
6 to speak a little more slowly, please.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Bulatovic, for the benefit of the interpreters,
8 could you kindly speak a little more slowly, please.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
10 Q. Mr. Bulatovic, when you -- I assume that "highest places" is the
11 correct translation as Mr. Karadzic says, and "highest places" means the
12 Bosnian Serb leadership or who would you mean?
13 A. It's clear. This is a continuation from the same session where
14 we strenuously condemn the then-Prime Minister of Republika Srpska,
15 Mr. Lukic.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this document please be admitted,
17 Your Honour? And I assume we do it like with the Defence exhibits, to
18 assume it -- to admit it in full. We do have -- in fact, throughout this
19 session we have references to where they speak about the Republika Srpska
20 and the relationships between the two entities.
21 JUDGE KWON: Why do we need entire transcript which takes place
22 in -- outside Republika Srpska? Yes, I will hear from the Defence.
23 Mr. Robinson.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. We join in the Prosecution's request because
25 these are snippets of the discussion. It's possible we could compact it
1 more if that was preferable to the Chamber and take only those portions
2 relating to Bosnia and excerpt those. But in principle the discussion
3 continues for more than the pages that are referenced here and it would
4 be useful, I think, for the Chamber to have the full discussion.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, if you are not minded to do
6 this, I just wanted to mention that the following pages are about
7 discussions, and that is in addition to those that I just mentioned. It
8 would be 31, 32, 45 to 47, that's where the topic basically comes up.
9 JUDGE KWON: I'm fine with admitting those pages, but why do we
10 have to admit even the irrelevant parts? Are we happy to admit those
11 pages referred to by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, Mr. Robinson?
12 MR. ROBINSON: In principle, Mr. President, but we'd also like to
13 take a look at it to see if there's other portions of the transcript
14 where this topic is discussed. So if you would allow us to do that, we
15 could come back to you with the pages that we would agree could be
17 JUDGE KWON: I take it you could live with this suggestion by
18 Mr. Robinson?
19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, of course.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Then we'll admit those pages referred to
21 by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Shall we give the number?
22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6161, Your Honours.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we now please have 65 ter 07528.
24 Q. And as it is coming up, Mr. Bulatovic, we have again shorthand
25 notes of a session of the SDC, and it's the 14th Session from
1 11 October 1993. You may remember that there was a session that -- where
2 General Perisic proposed a new scheme of payment of VJ officers serving
3 in the VRS and the SRK. And can we please move to page 26 in both
4 languages and it's the first paragraph in both. And you say here,
5 Mr. Bulatovic:
6 "Let's be completely frank in our close circles. We are facing
7 or shall very soon face the fact that a degree of ideologisation is
8 present in quite an extent both in Republika Srpska and the
9 Republic of Serbian Krajina and their respective armies, but it would be
10 difficult to introduce here that Chetnik ideology present over there."
11 You said that, Mr. Bulatovic; correct?
12 THE ACCUSED: Should it be indicated for the sake of interpreters
13 what part of the text is cited.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's the first paragraph, should be the
15 first paragraph in both.
16 JUDGE KWON: In English it starts from the last part of the third
17 sentence -- the third line.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. So --
19 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
21 Q. Mr. Bulatovic, I'd ask you whether you said that and you
22 haven't -- not yet answered that. You said that; right?
23 A. Yes, yes, certainly. I said that. I'm familiar with all these
24 transcripts from the Supreme Defence Council. I believe they are
25 accurate and they faithfully reflect everything that was said there.
1 This was a discussion about how the Army of Yugoslavia was coming into
2 being because the Yugoslav People's Army before that, if you will let me
3 explain why I said this --
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. Do I have your permission to explain?
6 Q. I would rather move on to the next page and perhaps it's --
7 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
8 Yes, let's continue. If Mr. Karadzic wishes to take up that
9 issue he will later on. Let's continue for the moment.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
11 Let's move to page 28 in the English and it's also page 28 in the
12 B/C/S, and it's again the first paragraph.
13 Q. And on the same topic you say here:
14 "If someone has spent a long time in Bosnia, it's hard to appoint
15 him to a position in Novi Sad now. We have to bear in mind that people
16 change in war in an atmosphere and in the logic of war and this is a
17 political option which we don't quite accept here but we support it
18 because it's in our interest."
19 Mr. Bulatovic, Novi Sad is a multi-ethnic town with a lot of
20 non-Serb population in Serbia; right?
21 A. Yes, it's true about Novi Sad, but at issue here is Novi Pazar,
22 and Novi Pazar has a 70 per cent Muslim population.
23 Q. It says here in your -- at least in the English it says
24 "Novi Sad." Is that a mistake or -- when you look at the B/C/S it says
25 "Novi Sad."
1 A. No, it's obviously a mistake. You don't have to know the
2 language. Look at the passage in B/C/S. In the original it says "Novi
3 Pazar"; in the translation it says "Novi Sad."
4 Q. You're right. You're right. I now see it. I was looking for
5 that word. Thank you.
6 You said already it's a multi -- it's a Muslim-populated area and
7 those who spent long time in the Republika Srpska would not want to live
8 among non-Serbs; right?
9 A. No, no, the conclusion is completely different. This discussion
10 is about officers, people with combat experience, people who had waged
11 war and who, in my view - as you can see from this document - cannot now
12 be transferred to be commanders in peace time in other environments.
13 Because it says here "war changes people." This is saying that we need
14 to take account of the realities and preserve peace in Serbia and in
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can these documents be
17 admitted, and I also mention here that the pages that are concerned with
18 Republika Srpska are pages 24 to 30. That's at least how I saw it, but
19 maybe Mr. Robinson will want to make the same comment as previously.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We have no objection. We'll
21 let you know -- or we'll let the Prosecution know also if we have some
22 additional pages we think should be included.
23 JUDGE KWON: What was the page number that we saw now?
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The page number that I was actually
25 discussing with Mr. Bulatovic was 26 and 28, but the entire is 24 to 30.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit them, pages from 24 to 30.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6162, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If the incorrect bits of the
6 translation are prejudicial to the Defence, I would like to have the
7 accuracy of the translation checked.
8 JUDGE KWON: That is --
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If this is to be admitted.
10 JUDGE KWON: This is being done on an ongoing basis.
11 Let's continue.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 06260 on the
14 Q. And, Mr. Bulatovic, as again shorthand notes from the SDC and
15 it's the 2nd of November, 1994, and it's the 28th Session. And just
16 so -- to remind you, in this session the rejection of the peace plan by
17 the Bosnian Serbs were -- was discussed, and General Perisic gave a
18 briefing on the military situation in Republika Srpska.
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we move to page 7 in the English and
20 page 7 in the B/C/S.
21 Q. Let's look at -- Mr. Perisic is speaking and it's the paragraph,
22 the upper paragraph in the B/C/S and the first paragraph also -- the
23 second paragraph in the English. And he says here:
24 "Out of a total number of population of the entire area,
25 20 per cent Serbs hold more than 70 per cent of the territory, which is
2 Mr. -- that's -- Mr. Bulatovic, you were aware that the
3 Bosnian Serb claimed a large percentage of the territory of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that was a matter of constant debate in the SDC;
6 A. What is true that we have a document before us which is authentic
7 and reflects faithfully the words of General Perisic. What follows from
8 this is not a political acknowledgement of how much territory Serbs
9 should hold. It was not we who discussed that; it was the
10 International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. There were
11 negotiations about this and similar views that resulted in the
12 Dayton Accords. It's true General Perisic said this, but this was said
13 in the context of our efforts to bridge our differences with the
14 leadership of Republika Srpska and to receive a political mandate for the
15 decisions that ultimately resulted in the Dayton Accords.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we move on to page 45 in the English and
17 it is page 40 in the B/C/S, and in the B/C/S it's at the bottom.
18 Q. And here we have again General Perisic and he's saying -- in the
19 B/C/S it's at the bottom. He's saying:
20 "Time in running out and what transpired now is pure one-party
21 army of the SDS. We can also pronounce the aforementioned army as
22 Chetnik army or the one that give us hell in the near future. We should
23 bear that in mind."
24 Mr. Bulatovic, that is how it was seen by Perisic at that time;
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What is the point? How can
2 President Bulatovic respond to Perisic's communist views?
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, no, I think that's an intervention that
4 is not appropriate. That's a matter that he should raise later in his --
5 JUDGE KWON: But the question as formulated is that you are
6 asking Mr. Perisic's view to Mr. Bulatovic?
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, I simply asked him whether that was --
8 JUDGE KWON: What he said --
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- Perisic's view and expressed here.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Bulatovic.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I must admit, Your Honours, that
12 it's very difficult for me to follow the sense. I have confirmed the
13 truthfulness of these documents. It is indisputable on that basis that
14 this is what General Perisic said at that point in time, but I think it's
15 illusory to ask what Momir Bulatovic thinks about that when you have
16 right below that what Momir Bulatovic thinks in that same period. And
17 then as the document goes on when we're to read it in its entirety you
18 could see that this opinion of General Perisic did not win out and it was
19 not the operative opinion. It's very simple to read on and to see what
20 Momir Bulatovic thought and what Slobodan Milosevic said and what was the
21 conclusion of that state body in response to the views of Momcilo
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I suggest to admit the entire
24 document because it's really only about the situation about
25 Republika Srpska, their stances, and the stances that the participants of
1 the SDC have on this topic. But of course I didn't much time to go into
2 much more details, so that's my proposal.
3 MR. ROBINSON: We agree.
4 JUDGE KWON: So whole of 70 pages is related to matters in
5 Republika Srpska?
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, I would say so, although the gist of
7 this discussion is from page 1 to 46, but it's nevertheless always coming
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Given the circumstances the Chamber will
11 admit it.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6163, Your Honours.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
14 Q. I would like to discuss one more bit from the transcript of the
15 "Death of Yugoslavia" interview, and can we please have P3060 on the
17 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, did you sort out the question
18 why it was noted as sometime in October 1994?
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I must admit, I haven't. But I -- I think
20 actually it is correct because when we look at other interviews that were
21 given at that time, I know them from other cases, they are actually in
22 1994. That's what I think. But --
23 JUDGE KWON: But witness testified it was around 2000, didn't he?
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, he did but I think he's mistaken.
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: But we will look into this and inform
2 everyone. But here is the wrong exhibit. I obviously have made a
3 mistake. Can we have 65 ter 24585, so obviously got the P number wrong.
4 JUDGE KWON: P6160.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. And can we move to page 25.
6 Q. And, Mr. Bulatovic, you speak here of a trip to Pale and you
7 already -- we already discussed it. And you say here:
8 "But it was an interesting and difficult journey because we saw
9 for ourselves what war means. When you saw a signpost on the territory
10 under Serbian control you knew that if the village was destroyed it must
11 have been a Muslim village. Everything was empty and destroyed. A
12 hundred or two hundred metres after that you have a village where
13 everything is normal, children go to school, and you can't even imagine
14 that this is a war zone."
15 And you also speak about Pale being a real city and that there
16 was no sign that a war was raging all around. And you say:
17 "That's when I realised how terrible war is because there were
18 ethnically pure Serb, Muslim, and Croat villages and this insanity must
20 Mr. Bulatovic, that's how you experienced the trip; right?
21 A. Yes, that is how I experienced the entire war in Bosnia, which
22 was tragic, it was equally unfair or unjust towards all, and it should
23 have been stopped as soon as possible. This road was going through Serb
24 territory and it was logical for us to pass through that way. In other
25 areas, unfortunately, it was the other way around, where Serb villages
1 were destroyed, where the Muslims and the Croats were predominantly
2 living. This was just tragic.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to have this
4 document -- these pages 25 and 26 be admitted. That's the context of the
5 travelling --
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- and observation.
8 JUDGE KWON: That will be added to the exhibit.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to have now the - I also don't
10 have the D number - 65 ter 06141 on the screen.
11 Q. And, Mr. Bulatovic, you have read this Council for Co-ordination
12 of State Policy notes of the 18th August 1992 meeting and you discussed
13 it with the Defence. And I only want to go to page 19 in the B/C/S and
14 page 18 in the English. And we have Mr. Milan Panic, the
15 then-Prime Minister, say here the following:
16 "This afternoon I received the following information: Ethnic
17 cleansing has begun. 15.000 Muslims from Sanski Most were given eight
18 hours to leave their homes and make 20 kilometres to Jajce in order to
19 reach the Muslims. This information was received from the
20 United Nations."
21 Mr. Bulatovic, this information that Mr. Panic is here providing
22 was true, was it not?
23 A. The only thing that is accurate according to me is the
24 following -- well, we don't know if this information is correct or not,
25 but what is the reaction is that if it is so, that must be prevented.
1 And that, in my opinion, is the only truth.
2 Q. And just to -- in the next page -- we need the next page in the
3 English but the B/C/S is the same. And you -- and Mr. Panic says:
4 "It's important that we discuss here whether it's possible to
5 stop the war and to take an attitude that we don't provide assistance to
6 ethnic cleansing and financing the war of the Serbs in Bosnia."
7 And can we now go to page 75 in the English and 92 in the B/C/S.
8 And Milan Panic asked General Zivota Panic what could be done and how to
9 stop the artillery fire on Sarajevo, the battle in Bihac, the battle in
10 Gorazde? Mr. Panic even says:
11 "We could be better help to them if we would take their weapons
12 from them."
13 And General Panic says:
14 "We cannot take their weapons away because that would be the war
15 between us and them."
16 That was a dilemma that the leadership in Yugoslavia -- Serbia
17 and Montenegro you yourself were in; right?
18 A. Well, I have been placed in an illogical position again to
19 interpret what the dilemma is between Milan Panic and Zivota Panic. The
20 transcripts are accurate, the words are accurate, but I would kindly ask
21 Madam Prosecutor and the Trial Chamber to act as in the previous case.
22 This document can be valid but in its entirety. It is very uncomfortable
23 if you're asking me about certain sentences according to some Richelieu
24 model. I think the entirety of the document is all right, but I cannot
25 comment authoritatively on certain sections of the text.
1 Q. Can we move on. Page 75 in the English at the bottom, I think
2 it's there, and then we have page 93 in the B/C/S and it's also at the
3 bottom. And Mr. Zivota Panic, or General Zivota Panic, states that the
4 Bosnian Muslims planned the attack and they will move forward towards
5 Jajce. They launched a heavy attack against Bihac. And then he refers
6 to information that the Serbs when they came across a Muslim village they
7 killed everybody from children to the elderly.
8 Mr. Bulatovic, doing this, that's ethnic cleansing in its worst
9 form, is it not?
10 A. I'm sorry. I cannot see the text that you have just read out to
12 Q. It's page 93 in the B/C/S at the bottom --
13 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation].
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yeah, it's actually the last bit here, the
15 last bit of Zivota Panic where he speaks about "Muslimansko selo ...,"
16 so --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask, this is a witness that
18 is too important and too prominent a figure for sentences to be
19 truncated. Can the entire statement by Zivota Panic be read out, please?
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, that's a matter for the
21 cross-examination -- for the re-direct --
22 JUDGE KWON: But the sentence itself that -- which may not be
23 correct that the witness should have chance to read it.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I don't think it's a matter of --
25 JUDGE KWON: But now he can read it.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
2 JUDGE KWON: So what is your question, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I actually wanted him just to confirm that
4 this was said and that this is -- I asked him, actually, this is ethnic
5 cleansing in its worst form, killing all inhabitants of a Muslim village.
6 JUDGE KWON: If it had taken place; is that your question?
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, actually. Only whether when it took
8 place that's ethnic cleansing in its worst form.
9 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, and I know Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff is
10 very fair, maybe she doesn't see this portion in the text, but it says:
11 "We obtained some information, which may not be correct ..."
12 And so I think what everyone's point is here is that you can't
13 put something to a witness as if it's a fact when even the speaker said
14 "it may not be correct." And then you also omitted the last sentence
15 which said "they have no control over these forces" which is also an
16 important element. So our point is if you are going to refer to text,
17 you should not be so selective so it distorts the meaning to the witness.
18 JUDGE KWON: My point is that now Mr. Bulatovic has the
19 opportunity to read the entire paragraph so he can answer the question.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
21 Q. Yes, can you -- can you -- that information that Zivota Panic is
22 referring to, was that true?
23 A. I would just like to read what Zivota Panic said in this same
24 place before that, just a little bit before on the same page. When
25 Karadzic was talking the other day you heard that he had no control over
1 the individuals who did this but you knew they did it. They launched a
2 grenade on Sarajevo and it seemed as if they launched a thousand
3 grenades. Some of them got drunk, they say, "Let's say launch one. I
4 mean it's very damaging to all of us."
5 Secondly, as to whether this information is accurate or not, we
6 don't know. It's possible here that we have paramilitary formations here
7 against whom we fought quite strictly. This is the greatest crime and
8 savagery which was not motived by any political goals but by looting,
9 theft, and the satisfaction of the lowest impulses. These were not
10 regular units under anyone's control. These were bands or gangs of
11 criminals that we tried to stop in every possible way, but as
12 President Karadzic himself said at the time, you could not have had
13 control over all of these individuals. These, as far as I'm concerned,
14 are the worst war crimes against civilians, but I would not agree that it
15 was part of any systematic plan of ethnic cleansing.
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, how much more would you need to
19 conclude your cross-examination?
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would -- I still have three topics. One
21 is the objective of the Bosnian Serbs and it is only one document, then I
22 will address very briefly the paramilitary formations and it's also one
23 document, and if time allows then I would also address one topic in
24 relation to Foca. I would think it's something like 20 minutes if you
25 would allow me that time.
1 JUDGE KWON: Please conclude by ten past 10.00. Yes, please
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
4 Q. Then, Mr. Bulatovic, you mention in paragraph 10 of your
5 statement that you -- to the fact that the peace proposals included some
6 kind of division of Bosnia and allowed the Bosnian Serbs to have a
7 certain level of autonomy, but the Bosnian Serbs as well as the leaders
8 in Croatia -- the Serb leaders in Croatia and in Serbia and Montenegro
9 wanted to live in one state. That was the end goal, so to speak; isn't
10 that right?
11 A. This was the starting position in the Socialist Federal
12 Republic of Yugoslavia. We all lived in one state so that one group of
13 political thought and political representatives of the people wanted to
14 keep the existing situation, to stay in the existing state, while another
15 group wanted to break-up this state and create independent states. So
16 that's when Pandora's Box flew open. The initial position of
17 representatives, political representatives, of the Serbian people
18 wherever they were in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was the
19 survival of the state. It was status quo.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we have document 65 ter 06145 on the
21 screen and it is a session of the Council for Co-Ordination of State
22 Policy held on 9 January 1993, so that means we are now in 1993 and can
23 we have both -- page 8 in both languages, please.
24 Q. And we have Mr. Krajisnik basically speaking here and summarising
25 the position of the Bosnian Serbs that there is a prevailing opinion that
1 it is crucial -- is a crucial comment when integration of all territories
2 that want to form an undivided country is possible. I think of territory
3 of Serbia, Montenegro, Serbian Krajina, and Republika Srpska."
4 And that's in 1993. So it continued, this wish to unite the
5 Serbian territories in three republics; right?
6 A. No, no, that is not right. This was the initial position here --
7 Q. Let me interrupt you.
8 A. -- that all of these territories are in one --
9 Q. Let me interrupt you. I was just reading what Mr. Krajisnik was
10 saying on the -- in 1993 on that session and he said that, did he not?
11 A. We are discussing a document here which is called the
12 harmonisation of the state policy.
13 Q. You -- I have to interrupt you.
14 A. Harmonisation makes sense --
15 Q. I have to interrupt you because we have very little time, as you
16 have heard. The answer is either yes or no, he said that. But the
17 transcript is correct, is it not?
18 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, this has no probative
19 value for him to simply say what is being in the transcript. He has to
20 be given the opportunity to give his comment on it, otherwise there's no
21 point in simply showing him something and asking him if the words appear
22 on the page.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please proceed, Mr. Bulatovic.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really don't know how to avoid
25 being interrupted in any way. It's correct. The document exists and
1 it's authentic what is stated here. But this is a document where
2 different opinions are being harmonised, where on the basis of individual
3 opinion, conclusions are drawn for political and state action.
4 Individual opinions here do not have to win out or become a guide-line
5 for the future action of state organs, either those in the
6 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or those in Republika Srpska.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to have this
8 transcript be admitted.
9 JUDGE KWON: What's the status of this document? I think we
10 discussed this in -- during the course of Jovanovic testimony.
11 Yes, Mr. Tieger, do you remember that?
12 MR. TIEGER: I don't believe that particular quote was used.
13 If -- I don't want to enter the fray about the extent of the admission of
14 documents, but these -- the co-ordination council sessions were the
15 subject of discussion between Mr. Robinson and myself about whether or
16 not those were so closely related to the kinds of documents we admitted
17 in their entirety that they should be as well --
18 JUDGE KWON: So my question was it was not formally admitted
20 MR. TIEGER: [Overlapping speakers]
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour, I checked that.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. It was discussed.
23 Yes, what pages are you tendering, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: My proposal would actually be to admit the
25 entire document, otherwise I just referred to one particular page, now I
1 can't find which it was.
2 JUDGE KWON: It is a document of 167 pages.
3 Mr. Robinson.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, in principle we favour the
5 admission of the entire document or at least all those portions that
6 relate to the discussion and Bosnia, and if that's too burdensome to you
7 then the Prosecution can identify the pages that they believe are
8 relevant and we would keep the option of adding to that if we think there
9 are other parts that are relevant.
10 JUDGE KWON: When do you think identify the pages?
11 MR. ROBINSON: I think we could do that by Monday.
12 JUDGE KWON: Very well. On that basis, we'll admit it.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. That's very
15 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit P6164.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
17 Q. Mr. -- the next topic I only very briefly want to discuss is
18 volunteers and paramilitaries. And can we please have 65 ter 06242 on
19 the screen, and it's the SDC minutes of 7th August 1992 and it's
20 5th Session of this. And you may recall that in this session you
21 referred to problems of convoys of armed men constantly bussing through
22 Pljevlja in Montenegro and how you wanted to stop it. I think you
23 remember that?
24 A. Yes, I do remember. That was a major problem.
25 Q. And I just want to refer to page 4 in the English and it's also
1 page 4 in the B/C/S and you describe the problem arising, and in
2 paragraph 5 on this page you say that:
3 "The fate and the existence of Muslims could have ended that
5 You don't need to go into all these details, but these armed men
6 were a threat to the Muslim population in Montenegro and it would be also
7 to the Muslim population in Bosnia; right?
8 A. This was a criminal paramilitary group that came from Cajnice,
9 the territory of the Republika Srpska, and it was also assisted by the
10 local population and they practically captured the town. They were more
11 numerous and stronger than police and regular military forces and their
12 political goal was to kill all Muslims. The Muslims made up 10 per cent
13 of the Pljevlja local population at the time. I physically came and
14 prevented this, and later we arrested these people. The problem with
15 paramilitary formations, if you permit me, is the fact that you cannot
16 stop them. Imagine a bus of armed people is supposed to be stopped by
17 one policeman on the road. You need to have five times more armed people
18 to stop something like that. The problem of the paramilitary forces was
19 our biggest problem. It was also something that could be -- we could be
20 blamed for the most and we were unable to stop them.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we move to page 5 in the English and
22 page 6 in the B/C/S and it is in the middle of the -- both pages.
23 Q. And you speak here about a self-proclaimed colonel who once was
24 an active-duty officer, and you say the following:
25 "Let's be honest, we needed those paramilitary formations for a
1 while. They are now a great burden and a problem. People now changed
2 sides based on these previous activities. It is now a sort of Seselj's
3 army, his ranks."
4 Mr. Bulatovic, does this refer to the Yellow Wasps, or to which
5 particular group is that referring?
6 A. It only has to do with one particular man, a madman, that's how I
7 perceive him, a self-proclaimed colonel. And he considered himself to be
8 one of Seselj's men. Seselj did not accept him at all. This was a time
9 of madmen that you could not put into any kind of legal framework.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can this document be admitted
11 and I don't request now entire document, but the discussion of the
12 paramilitaries and the effect they had in Montenegro, in particular, and
13 Bosnia. That's on pages 1 to 29. The rest is unrelated.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we agree, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Exhibit P6165.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I'm now asking a few questions
18 related to Foca and can we briefly into private session?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 [Private session]
11 Page 34568 redacted. Private session.
6 [Open session]
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are now in open session.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.
9 Q. Mr. Bulatovic, yesterday you mentioned that you were actually
10 on -- you would speak to all sides in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina
11 and you also mentioned that you had good relations with Mr. Izetbegovic.
12 And I wanted to ask you about one thing and that's -- relates to the
13 beginning of the war, or rather, before, shortly before. Mr. Izetbegovic
14 asked you to take over prisoners from the KP Dom in Foca who could not be
15 kept safe in the territory, that he was worried about. You remember
17 A. Yes, I remember that.
18 Q. And those prisoners were Muslims, right, and they were
20 A. These were prisoners who were serving their sentences at the
21 KP Dom, most of them were Muslim, because the majority population there
22 is Muslim.
23 Q. And you mentioned also yesterday that people from
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina fled from that territory into Montenegro, and among
25 them were also Muslims from Foca, Visegrad, Srebrenica, and so on;
2 A. Yes, but we're talking about two separate cases.
3 President Izetbegovic in this case asked me -- do allow me. Do allow
4 me --
5 Q. Yes --
6 A. President Izetbegovic --
7 Q. -- that's clear.
8 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry. Please continue, Mr. Bulatovic.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that time there was still a
10 single state there, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was
11 all the same whether someone served their prison sentence on the basis of
12 a judgement in Foca or in Danilovgrad. President Izetbegovic said that
13 he was afraid that paramilitary formations headed by Arkan - those are
14 his words - would go there and kill these people and he could not
15 guarantee their security. And I said: Let them come to us. They came
16 buses. They served their sentence at the prison in Spuz. The people
17 served their sentences, and at the same time they saved themselves. This
18 is a humanitarian gesture, and I thought it was my duty and obligation
19 and I'm proud of having done this. There were also lots of refugees. A
20 vast number of people were coming in. Some people disagreed with the
21 policy of Radovan Karadzic. A lot of people didn't want to serve in the
22 Army of Republika Srpska. A lot of people thought that their wives and
23 children should come to the territory of Montenegro, and they came there
24 and they had the status of refugees. My Montenegro then treated all of
25 these people equally, as their own citizens. All children were enrolled
1 in schools, regardless of whether they were Muslim or Serb, and people
2 continued to receive their retirement pensions. There is unequivocal
3 data about this from the UNHCR and also Mrs. Sadako Ogata thanked
4 Montenegro and me personally several times for all of that.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
6 Q. There's no dispute about that, Mr. Bulatovic. But you also know
7 that some of these Muslims from the territory, from Eastern Bosnia, were
8 arrested in May 1992 by Montenegrin police and they were turned over the
9 Serb police -- Bosnian Serb police and ended up in the KP Dom some of
10 them did. Such cross-border activity was not done clandestinely on the
11 local level; it involved higher levels, did it not? And my question
12 would actually be: Were you involved in this?
13 A. Yes, you mention a tragic incident. Recently it came to its
14 judicial epilogue in the court system of the Republic of Montenegro and
15 we heard that the Office of the Prosecutor of Montenegro contacted you,
16 the Prosecutor's office here in The Hague, asking for your opinion. And
17 what was said was that this was a case that had to be discussed within
18 the judiciary of Montenegro. Recently an official judgement of acquittal
19 was pronounced in relation to that indictment. No one is denying that
20 these people suffered a tragic fate. At one point in time, they were
21 repatriated to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, none of the official
22 organs from Montenegro could be held officially responsible for that.
23 There is moral responsibility but the perpetrator should be sought
24 elsewhere. After May 1992 when we officially recognised
25 Bosnia and Herzegovina and when we withdrew all our units from
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the 27th of May there was not a single case
2 of repatriation or, that is to say, returning persons who were refugees
3 or who had fled.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, no further questions. Thank
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, I take it you have some questions?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency. Thank you.
9 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
10 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President.
11 A. Good morning.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please call up 65 ter 6145.
13 Perhaps it already has a P number by now. It was displayed a moment ago.
14 That is what Mr. Krajisnik said.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, P6164.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would now like to
17 have page 7 in both English and in Serbian and then we're going to move
18 on to page 8 probably.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. We see here that Mr. Krajisnik started to speak.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And could we now have the next page
22 in both versions, in both languages.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. President, I'd like to draw your attention and the attention
25 of all the other participants to the second paragraph. The speaker of
1 the Assembly, Krajisnik, is presenting our view vis-a-vis the formation
2 and survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you remember that?
3 A. Yes, I remember that and I'm reading the paragraph now, and it
4 clearly reflects Mr. Krajisnik's view.
5 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to ask you to focus on the next
6 paragraph -- no, not the next one, just skip one. And then look at the
7 paragraph that the learned Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff quoted to you. And can you
8 tell us whose opinion is being presented here by Mr. Krajisnik?
9 A. He is talking about the opinion of the Assembly, if I understand
10 things correctly; because on the previous page he said that after the
11 initial proposal of territorial delineation, or rather, reorganisation of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, this was discussed at the
13 Assembly of Republika Srpska.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. What would you take as his position
15 and what would you -- and how would you characterise this, where it says
16 there was a prevailing opinion or the opinion prevailed that, and so on?
17 A. I will have to ask you to put an additional question to me. What
18 is the distinction?
19 Q. Please look at the second paragraph on this page, the one up
20 there. Whose position is he presenting there and whose position is he
21 presenting this other paragraph that starts with the words "the opinion
22 prevailed that ..." and so on?
23 A. If I remember correctly there were always groups that were called
24 realists and groups that were called idealists. Some thought that this
25 was a favourable moment whereas others thought that this could be
1 achieved in another way and through different means. What is undeniable,
2 I believe, is the wish to continue living within the common state or at
3 least to have special ties between and among all these territories.
4 However, this is a question of politics, who prevails when.
5 Q. Today you mentioned that it should be established whether an
6 opinion prevailed and was reflected in decisions. Is it your position
7 that it would be important to see the decisions, not only the discussion?
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, that's a leading question.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Okay. I shall withdraw it.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. President, it was put to you today that you or somebody else
12 in Yugoslavia as well advocated Serb plans about autonomy in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Did you take part in meetings of leaderships of the
14 Yugoslav republics with Lord Carrington early in June 1991 or throughout
16 A. Yes. Although I was president of Montenegro, I spent most of my
17 term involved in peace negotiations about the reorganisation of
18 Yugoslavia and the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I did a precise
19 calculation. During my four-year term of office as president of
20 Montenegro, I spent 110 days travelling and attending peace conferences
21 and mostly discussing Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 Q. You're talking about your first term?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you remember what the position was of the
25 conference and particularly of President Izetbegovic with regard to these
1 requests of ours, these demands of ours, maximum ones, to remain within
2 Yugoslavia or, on the other hand, to have some autonomy in
4 A. The crisis Staff in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
5 started when the then-ruling party, the League of Communists,
6 disintegrated, and in the then-Federation that was the only party that
7 existed. There was a long period of political torment and agony. The
8 political organs did not really have the capacity to resolve any one of
9 the issues involved. Because the organs were incapable of doing that, it
10 was agreed upon that we, the six presidents of the Yugoslav republics,
11 would find a political solution regarding the situation and the fate of
12 the country. We did this under a great deal of public pressure and the
13 media expected us to find a solution that would avoid war. The idea of
14 the war was quite present in the media of our country even before the war
15 started. Yugoslavia comes into existence and disappears as a result of
16 major upheavals. It is the result of the First World War, and it was one
17 of the first victims of the fascist aggression during the
18 Second World War, and instinctively people were afraid what would happen
19 when Yugoslavia would fall apart. The six of us, the Yugoslav
20 presidents, travelled and the public called our meetings the travelling
21 circus. As members of this circus, we were under constant pressure of
22 media questions, whether there would be a war. What I particularly
23 remember is that meeting, that was the last one in a series, that we had
24 in Stojcevac near Sarajevo, and where finally we had been asked by the
25 Yugoslav public to tell them whether there would be war, or rather,
1 whether there would be an agreement. At this meeting Slovenia declared
2 its decision to leave the Federation. Croatia personified by
3 President Tudjman said that it would leave the Federation because it
4 could not stay in it if Slovenia was not there. The most tragic person
5 of that meeting was Alija Izetbegovic. There are stenograms that show
6 this. And he said that if there's going to be a disintegration of
7 Yugoslavia, a civil war would flare up in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He said, I
8 still remember his words: Armed groups are already gathering in hills.
9 They're stopping people. There's no control over them. A war will break
11 And then he asked that this compromise solution be accepted, the
12 one that was submitted by him and the president of Macedonia,
13 Kiro Gligorov. This proposal was not accepted. I remember that
14 particularly because all the participants in the meeting were aware that
15 in this situation when there was no political solution there has to be a
16 war conflict. It wasn't that President Izetbegovic was accusing you,
17 Mr. Karadzic, or any other political personality. He was just
18 desperately struggling for a political solution that would not lead to
19 chaos and chaos did happen when there was no political solution.
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. In paragraph 7 of your statement you
21 mention that meeting so I would like us to see 1D7816 in e-court.
22 1D7816. First of all, let us take a look at the first page. Are these
23 the stenographic notes of that conference? No.
24 A. This is another document.
25 Q. I'm sorry. Again it's a meeting of the peace conference but it's
1 not in June. It's in November -- no, October 1991. Can we now please
2 take a look at page 25 and then 26?
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I just want to know how it
5 arises from the cross-examination because I didn't speak about such early
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I think thinking about the same.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, during the
9 cross-examination the Prosecution did put a question related to the
10 support of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, and President Bulatovic
11 himself towards the demands of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina for autonomy.
12 And perhaps he was being challenged in that way, or reprimanded, if you
13 will, but now I would like to show what the situation was in the case of
14 others. Was this a demand of Yugoslavia or --
15 JUDGE KWON: No, and I don't think Mr. Bulatovic was ever
16 reprimanded at all, but you are putting the question without knowing the
17 document yourself. Why don't you put your question first and then, if
18 necessary, you can put the document to the witness?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Can you tell us what the position was vis-a-vis our demand? If
22 we were not to stay in Yugoslavia, that we should within
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina have our autonomy? What was the position of
24 Lord Carrington? What was the position, say, of President Izetbegovic
1 A. The then-European Community was actively involved in the entire
2 process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The then so-called troika,
3 headed by Mr. Hans van den Broek, came to Yugoslavia, and they asked
4 Slovenia to postpone their departure from the common state. And they
5 also asked Croatia to postpone the exercise of their state independence
6 precisely in order to reach a solution for Bosnia. And the position of
7 the conference on the former Yugoslavia was a result of that and it was
8 supported by the leading powers of the world that were in the
9 Contact Group, and that included the United States of America.
10 Lord Carrington, in June 1992 --
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: October 1992.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- presented a plan and the plan
13 was that those republics who wished to have independent states can do
14 that. Point two was the republics that wish to remain together can do
15 so. Point three said that there was special rights to be enjoyed by the
16 Serb people in Croatia. And point four was resolving the question of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina at a special peace conference. For a simple reason,
18 all of those who are involved in diplomacy and who sincerely wished to
19 preserve peace know that Bosnia will behave just like Yugoslavia because
20 Bosnia is a mini Yugoslavia. European diplomats envisaged a separate
21 conference on Bosnia and this is shown by the fact that in this document
22 that was shown to me, the words of Mr. Izetbegovic are recorded.
23 Mr. Izetbegovic says himself in this text that he does not have the
24 capacity to speak on behalf of all three ethnic communities. According
25 to the then-constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina was a state, an equitable community of Serbs,
2 Croats, and Muslims. Mr. Izetbegovic held the position of the president
3 of the Presidency and this was based on the key aimed at equal
4 representation. And he said that he had to check all of this with the
5 representatives of the Serbs and Croats because as he himself said he did
6 not have the capacity to pass a decision on behalf of all.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Just briefly --
9 JUDGE KWON: I think it surely goes beyond the scope of
10 cross-examination. What Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff discussed with the witness is
11 what was happening in Republika Srpska rather than the issue whether or
12 not to support from the part of FRY or whatever.
13 We'll have a break now for half an hour.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I could finish within ten minutes
15 if it's easier so that we can let President Bulatovic go. Perhaps even
16 less than ten minutes.
17 JUDGE KWON: We'll break for half an hour now and then take that
18 opportunity to prepare yourself for more focused questions.
19 We'll resume at 11.00.
20 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 11 .05 a.m.
22 JUDGE KWON: You already changed your seat, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That's correct, Your Honour. And before
24 Mr. Karadzic continues, I want to answer your question that you had in
25 relation to the transcript for the "Death of Yugoslavia" interviews. We
1 ourselves received this transcript on the 1st of November, 1995, and we
2 believe that, indeed, the dates on this paper is correct.
3 JUDGE KWON: So would you like another opportunity to put that to
4 Mr. Bulatovic? Having heard Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff's comment, would you like
5 to add anything with respect to the date of your interview?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What was put to me does not have a
7 cover page or the indication of the author or anyone else. I do not
8 contest the contents, but I remember that the BBC was making the
9 "Death of Yugoslavia" series and did an interview with me in the office
10 of my friend in Podgorica, that was the only office where I could talk,
11 and I was no longer in power so I thought it was after 2000. But I don't
12 think it's very important.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll leave it at that.
14 Yes, Mr. Harvey, yes.
15 MR. HARVEY: Your Honour, I was going to get to my feet earlier
16 today, but may I please just take this opportunity to introduce
17 Nemanja Ljubisavljevic, who has been manning our Belgrade office for some
18 time and has been doing terrific work on an analysis of the B/C/S
19 documents in the case.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 MR. HARVEY: I was also going to note that the release date of
22 the film of "Death of Yugoslavia" was, in fact, the 3rd of September,
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. President, today on page 2 - in fact, it starts on page 1 and
4 straddles page 2 - a quotation was given to you from what you said on the
5 8th Session of the Supreme Defence Council held on 12th March 1993. I'll
6 read it now in English so it can be interpreted accurately:
7 [In English] "Mr. Bulatovic, I would like to quote that you
8 said -- what you said on -- and you say here:
9 "'We are obliged to help them,' referring to the
10 Republika Srpska, 'but we are also obliged to understand that we can
11 hardly co-operate with someone who like the Prime Minister of the RS
12 advises us to ethnically cleanse Sandzak and kill the Muslims there.'"
13 [Interpretation] And in your answer -- in fact, the question also
15 [In English] "The prime minister of Republika Srpska, Mr. Lukic,
16 he advises us to do it as soon as possible, for Muslims are not to be
17 trusted. They will stab us in the back. They will mine our railroad and
18 so on."
19 [Interpretation] In the second part of your answer you said this:
20 [In English] "Pasic deals with the decision-making process. It
21 is true that this decision was not notified to us in person, but we
22 just -- we were just told that in the ranks of the
23 Government of Republika Srpska occasionally there are some extreme views.
24 It turned out that those extreme views were not something we could share.
25 They were not our convictions and they could not support the making of
1 the decision that was asked of us to make."
2 [Interpretation] I should like to show you a document. Could we
3 please call up 1D7303. Unfortunately, the translation is not ready yet,
4 but you will be able to see for yourself what it is. It is the inaugural
5 speech of Prime Minister Lukic before this session of the
6 Supreme Defence Council, 19 January 1993. Could we look at page 5, I
7 think. Yes. I will now read slowly what I want to put to you:
8 "No matter how our enemies madly insist on continuing the war, we
9 have to insist on the undertakings that this Assembly assumed by adopting
10 the declaration to establish peace."
11 And then further below it says:
12 "As of today we have to start creating conditions for the
13 citizens who had left their homes due to war operations, the feeling of
14 personal insecurity and danger to their property, return to the territory
15 of Republika Srpska when permanent peace is established. We have to
16 guarantee to the citizens of other ethnicities all their rights according
17 to the constitution and the laws. We made those undertakings and we have
18 to meet them."
19 And now I should like to take a look at the document that follows
20 your session of the Supreme Defence Council, and that would be 1D7304.
21 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure if this is a correct way, a proper way
22 of conducting your examination-in-chief or your re-examination. Why
23 don't you put your question first instead of putting the document first?
24 This is a typical way of leading question.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Well, actually, I'll take the blame for that
1 because I advised Dr. Karadzic to do it this way and to ask the witness
2 in light of what Prime Minister Lukic said how that tallies with what he
3 had discussed in that meeting that was brought up by the Prosecution. So
4 I don't think that that is leading, to put something in a neutral way to
5 a witness and ask him how that tallies with the information that he had.
6 JUDGE KWON: Lukic's statement in the Supreme Defence Council was
7 put to the witness by the Prosecution, then he could have asked -- the
8 accused could have asked whether the witness knew Mr. Lukic's position as
9 a whole in general. And then he could put this document. Putting this
10 document first is way of feeding some information to the witness, isn't
12 MR. ROBINSON: But you're entitled to do that so long as you ask
13 the witness to comment on that in any way that he feels appropriate, so
14 you're not leading the witness by presenting him with information and
15 asking him for his views on it. It's a little more focused this way than
16 to ask such a broad question and hope for a general answer.
17 JUDGE KWON: Well, let's proceed.
19 MR. TIEGER: No, I mean, this is a -- we've gone over this ground
20 repeatedly, so I only rose to say this is actually a replication of an
21 exchange we had not too long ago when I rose to say essentially that the
22 formulation -- the last -- the formulation of the question doesn't
23 neutralise the information previously provided to the witness. I
24 referred to something that Judge Morrison had previously said basically
25 to that effect, and there was agreement by the Court that that's the
1 case. So I'm only standing to avoid an erosion of the standards that
2 have been established over a long period of time and consistently
3 maintained about the need to avoid leading questions. So I don't think
4 that was a precisely fair, or at least precisely accurate, recollection
5 by Mr. Robinson of the positions taken by the Trial Chamber on this
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, as you suggested, if Mr. Karadzic is
9 to put -- to be putting something in a neutral way to the witness and ask
10 how that would tally with the information that a witness has, but in
11 the -- and given the past practice he's very much prone to ask leading
12 questions. So that was the point that I made when I told him to put
13 general question first, but we'll see how it evolves.
14 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. President, in light of what His Excellency Judge Kwon said on
18 page 40, lines 20 and 21, about Lukic's statement at the
19 Supreme Defence Council, can you explain, was Lukic present and did he
20 state that at the Supreme Defence Council session?
21 A. No. From the whole context it is obvious that the position of
22 Mr. Lukic was conveyed to us in a hearsay way. We were just referring to
23 a common place that was indirectly passed on to us in the absence of
24 Mr. Lukic.
25 Q. Thank you. In the course of your work, did you encounter similar
1 positions of Mr. Lukic reflected in some reliable documents?
2 A. No. Those positions were never officially stated, but the
3 thinking of the Supreme Defence Council was that we did not want to
4 co-operate with Republika Srpska based on extreme views. But since we
5 were co-operating non-stop, in my view it is proof that their views were
6 acceptable to both us and the international community.
7 Q. Thank you. Mr. President, how does what we saw in the previous
8 document fit in with what reached you in that hearsay form?
9 A. The difference is obvious. An official address by
10 Prime Minister Lukic is something that cannot be objected to, whereas the
11 information we received at the Supreme Defence Council was cause for
12 great concern and for that reason was rejected by us.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 6 of this
14 document -- I apologise.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Can I just put this to you. This is the 7th Session of the
17 cabinet after that meeting of yours, so on the 19th of May. We have one
18 document from before the session and this one is after the session. I
19 will read carefully the conclusions of the government. First sentence:
20 "The report on the work of the commission for refugees and
21 humanitarian aid for the first quarter of 1993 has been endorsed."
22 And then further below it says:
23 "Of particular importance is to ensure balanced distribution of
24 aid relative to Muslims and Croats and the commission shall pay special
25 attention to this."
1 Mr. President, how do you look at this position of
2 Prime Minister Lukic compared with the hearsay statement which you lent a
3 lot of attention to, regardless of the hearsay aspect?
4 A. These stances expressed here I welcome and I am very glad that we
5 provided assistance in the implementation of these goals.
6 Q. Thank you very much.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I offer both these documents to
8 be MFI'd?
9 JUDGE KWON: Any objections?
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour. But I would like to
11 reserve the right to perhaps at a later stage when we have a full
12 translation of the document, to also request to add pages, if that is
13 only now admitted in parts. But if it is admitted in full, I have no
15 JUDGE KWON: Given the size of the document, we'll admit them
16 both in full.
17 Shall we give the number? We'll mark them for identification.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3060 and D3061 respectively MFI'd,
19 Your Honour.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. President, can you tell us from your experience what was the
23 degree of accuracy of that information, that kind of information that
24 reached you? To what degree did they prove to be wrong or correct?
25 A. It is well-known that the first casualty of every war is the
1 truth. Intelligence and security services that cover and monitor every
2 territory are not always slaves to the truth. They work for their own
3 interests, but most often it is the only source of information. You have
4 to work with that information although you could never swear that they
5 are completely correct or truthful.
6 Q. Thank you, Mr. President.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I have no
8 further questions for Mr. Bulatovic.
9 JUDGE KWON: Well, unless my colleagues have questions for you,
10 Mr. Bulatovic, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of the Chamber
11 and the Tribunal as a whole, I would like to thank you for your coming to
12 The Hague to give it. Now you're free to go. Have a safe journey back
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 [The witness withdrew]
16 JUDGE KWON: Before the next witness is to be brought in the
17 Chamber will issue an oral decision on the accused's motion to present
18 testimony of General Stanislav Galic pursuant to Rule 92 ter filed on the
19 13th of February, 2013. In the motion the accused requests that the
20 Chamber allows Stanislav Galic to testify pursuant to Rule 92 ter. On
21 the 27th of February, 2013, the Prosecution responded to the motion.
22 The Chamber recalls that on 21st of November, 2012, it found that
23 it was in the interests of justice that Galic be called to testify viva
24 voce. In reaching this decision the Chamber considered that Galic was
25 commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps during the indictment period and
1 that his evidence was central to the Sarajevo-related allegations. The
2 Chamber further indicated that it was likely that a voluminous amount of
3 material would be tendered through the witness. The Chamber, therefore,
4 considers that the motion is a request for reconsideration of the
5 Chamber's decision of the 21st of November, 2012.
6 The accused argues in the motion that following the testimony of
7 Dragomir Milosevic it is apparent that "more efficiency can be obtained
8 without diminishing the ability of the Trial Chamber to evaluate the
9 demeanour of the witness if Rule 92 ter is used." The Chamber is not
10 satisfied that the viva voce testimony of Dragomir Milosevic demonstrates
11 a clear error of reasoning on the Chamber's part in its decision of
12 21 November 2012 or that it is necessary to reconsider this decision in
13 order to prevent an injustice. The Chamber shall, therefore, not
14 reconsider its decision that Stanislav Galic be led live.
15 There's one further matter, Mr. Robinson. On the
16 26th of February we received the file as your fourth revised witness list
17 and we -- the Chamber noted that some additional witnesses have now been
18 put in the "reserve list" category. So, for example, these include
19 KW287, KW408, 424, 430. And I think, speaking for myself, this should
20 have been done explicitly -- should have been -- was done with the
21 explicit communication to the Chamber and the Prosecution, in particular
22 given the length of the list and the various changes already made. So I
23 would like you to identify the exhaustive list of those witnesses whose
24 status was changed to reserve witness on the -- on this further revised
25 65 ter list.
1 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Would you like me to do that
3 orally right now or in a written pleading?
4 JUDGE KWON: I would prefer a written submission.
5 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we'll do that.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In relation to this point, it would actually
10 also be helpful that the Defence would make submissions when they revive
11 someone from the reserve list; because, as we have seen, for the list for
12 April there is a witness on there that was actually on the reserve. So
13 he's now back active.
14 JUDGE KWON: Oh.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: So I think -- before doing this it should
16 basically also be done in advance with a submission.
17 MR. TIEGER: I need to supplement that slightly before
18 Mr. Robinson rises, particularly noting the expression on his face when
19 he heard the information to that effect. There is an explicit
20 representation by the Defence that the placement of a witness on the
21 reserve list means that witness will not be called, period. Now,
22 reserving the situation of something very unusual in which there would be
23 an explicit reason for doing so under exceptional circumstances,
24 et cetera. And it's for that reason and based on that representation
25 that the Prosecution didn't make specific applications to the Court
1 concerning aspects of that issue. So I think Mr. Robinson will confirm
2 that. I think that accounts for his -- what I understood from across the
3 courtroom to be some surprise at the resurrection without any notice
4 whatsoever, not to mention justification of a witness who had been placed
5 on the reserve list. But I think that does need to be made clear.
6 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I'll have to look into that
7 because I am surprised to learn that we've added someone from the reserve
8 list. It's our position that when we place someone on the reserve list
9 that we're representing to the Prosecution that they need not prepare for
10 that witness. And if we want to -- if we intend to bring that witness,
11 we're going to make an explicit notice to the Chamber and to the
12 Prosecution and give them long lead time so that they can prepare. So
13 I'll look into the situation with respect to that one witness and advise
14 everyone as soon as possible.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 Yes, let's bring in the next witness.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I have to leave the courtroom.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.
20 JUDGE KWON: Next one is Samoukovic?
21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, that's correct, Mr. President.
22 [The witness entered court]
23 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness make the solemn declaration.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
25 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 WITNESS: NEVENKO SAMOUKOVIC
2 [Witness answered through interpreter]
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please be seated and make yourself
5 Before you commence your evidence, Mr. Samoukovic, I must draw
6 your attention to a certain Rule of Procedure and Evidence that we have
7 here at the Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E). Under this Rule, you may
8 object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or
9 even from the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate
10 you in a criminal offence. In this context "incriminate" means saying
11 something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal
12 offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you might
13 have committed a criminal offence. However, should you think that an
14 answer might incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer
15 the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to
16 compel you to answer the question. But in that situation, the Tribunal
17 would ensure that your testimony compelled in such circumstances would
18 not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence,
19 save and except the offence of giving false testimony.
20 Do you understand what I have just told you?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
24 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Samoukovic.
1 A. Good day, Mr. President.
2 Q. Please remember to pause between question and answer and to speak
3 our sentences out slowly so that everything could be recorded in the
4 transcript. Mr. Samoukovic, did you provide a statement to my Defence
6 A. Yes, yes.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at 1D7819 in
9 e-court, please.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Can we please look at the monitor. Do you see your statement on
12 the screen?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And did you read and sign the statement?
15 A. Yes, I did.
16 Q. Please, can you make a longer pause between question and answer.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the witness the last
18 page so that he can identify his signature.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Is this your signature, sir?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you told
23 the Defence team?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today in
1 this courtroom that were put to you then, would your answer in essence be
2 the same as -- the answers in essence be the same as the ones in the
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I would like to
7 tender this statement. I don't have any associated exhibits. I would
8 like to submit this under Rule 92 ter.
9 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Ms. McKenna?
10 MS. McKENNA: No, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3062, Your Honours.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 I'm now going to read a brief summary of Mr. Nevenko Samoukovic's
15 statement in English.
16 [In English] Nevenko Samoukovic was elected president of the
17 Executive Board of the Municipal Assembly of Hadzici municipality.
18 Mr. Nevenko Samoukovic is aware that the ethnic composition of
19 Hadzici was predominantly Muslim. During the multi-party elections the
20 SDS did not hold any promotional events in order to avoid irritating
21 their Muslim and Croat neighbours, because the Serb population had been
22 irritated by them. At these elections Mr. Nevenko Samoukovic was
23 appointed chairman of the Executive Committee of Hadzici municipality.
24 This committee consisted of six members, three Serbs and three Muslims,
25 and in the beginning the committee functioned normally.
1 Following these elections, the ethnic composition of managers in
2 public and other enterprises did not correspond to the ethnic
3 distribution of votes in the elections. As a consequence, the Muslims in
4 authority tried to correct this; however, they were more concerned with
5 the ethnic background of the person rather than their professional
6 qualifications. This issue was especially acute after the referendum on
7 the secession of BH from Yugoslavia and the declaration of an independent
8 BH against the will of the Serbian people, who did not participate in the
10 Nevenko Samoukovic considers that those in authority became
11 increasingly unable to agree on various issues, both at the level of the
12 Executive Committee and Municipal Assembly and at the level of the
13 political parties; therefore, the municipal authorities were all but
14 defunct. To compound this problem, the technical Remont company was
15 located in the area of the municipality in addition to military barracks
16 and facilities which housed large quantities of infantry and heavy
17 weapons. Many Serbs were afraid that the Muslims would attack these
18 facilities in order to get hold of the weapons.
19 Mr. Nevenko Samoukovic is aware that during the period when the
20 SDA and the SDS leaderships were discussing how to ease tensions and
21 prevent chaos, but then the Muslims mounted their first armed attack on
22 Hadzici and the joint authority ceased to function.
23 Nevenko Samoukovic was not aware of the document called Variant A
24 and B. The document was never mentioned at any of the meetings which he
25 attended. When the armed conflict started, a Crisis Staff was created,
1 the armed conflict was considered to be a sufficient extraordinary
2 situation to establish the Crisis Staff. The Crisis Staff did not
3 receive any directions or instructions from anyone, including central
4 government. Further, there was an issue with communication because the
5 telephone lines were down for the most part of the time.
6 Nevenko Samoukovic believes that a large part of the Muslim
7 population residing in Hadzici moved out voluntarily due to the situation
8 and moved to the areas controlled by the Muslims. To his knowledge, no
9 one in the territory of Hadzici made a decision to designate certain
10 facilities as detention camps for Muslims. Certain facilities were used
11 to house the remaining Muslim population to ensure their safety from
12 uncontrolled groups or individuals. Muslim people who lived in Hadzici
13 and were aware what Muslim forces were doing to Serb citizens feared
14 reprisals. Many felt safer in the detention centre -- reception centre.
15 Nevenko Samoukovic is aware that the war strategy for Hadzici was
16 defensive in nature on the Serb side as the front line against the
17 Muslims did not move until the end of the war. The Serbs in the
18 municipality protected themselves and their homes. They did not have an
19 objective to make conquests.
20 Nevenko Samoukovic had not seen or heard Radovan Karadzic issue
21 any kind of order to anyone in the area of the municipality of Hadzici.
22 Nevenko Samoukovic is aware that Radovan Karadzic especially underlined
23 that the authorities had to look after all of their citizens regardless
24 of their nationality and party affiliation. He also emphasised that the
25 authorities had to organise the production of food and other assets and
1 ensure that the population and the army were supplied with the necessary
3 Mr. Nevenko Samoukovic denies that there were any concentration
4 camps in the territory of Hadzici. There were buildings where Muslims
5 were temporarily placed to protect them from the uncontrolled groups. He
6 was aware that the police station used one of its rooms for the purposes
7 of detention, but only for perpetrators of criminal offences. He had
8 heard that one prison existed and other buildings were used as detention
9 areas as they were in municipal buildings; however, he denies that there
10 were ever any concentration camps in municipality of Hadzici under the
11 Serb control.
12 [Interpretation] This is a brief summary and at this point I
13 don't have any more questions for Mr. Samoukovic.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
15 Mr. Samoukovic, as you have noted, your evidence in this case
16 was -- evidence in chief in this case has been admitted in writing, i.e.,
17 your -- through your written statement. And now you will be
18 cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor,
19 Ms. McKenna.
20 MS. McKENNA: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Cross-examination by Ms. McKenna:
22 Q. Good morning, Mr. Samoukovic.
23 A. Good day.
24 Q. I'd first like to focus briefly on the period prior to the
25 conflict breaking out. Now, during this period you were still the
1 chairman of the Executive Committee of Hadzici. At paragraph 9 of your
2 statement you say that the president of the SDS in the municipality of
3 Hadzici was the late Ratko Radic. And you state that it was largely the
4 political leaders of the party who conduct negotiations all the time
5 about how to ease the tensions in such a chaotic situation arising from a
6 non-functioning Assembly.
7 Now, Mr. Samoukovic, there's evidence before the Trial Chamber
8 that Ratko Radic stated at multi-party meetings in January 1992 that the
9 Serbs didn't want to be in Alija's state and that separation and division
10 was necessary and unavoidable. Now, would you agree that expressing such
11 a view was unlikely to ease the tensions in this situation?
12 A. With a yes and a no. Are you asking me to answer with a yes or a
13 no? Can you please explain to me what you mean by the words "Alija's
14 state"? Bosnia and Herzegovina always in modern history functioned as a
15 state comprising three peoples. The main principle, the basic principle,
16 in the creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina during World War II was the
17 second anti-fascist council of Bosnia and Herzegovina session which
18 stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina was not Serb, Croat, or Muslim, but it
19 was Serb and Croat and Muslim. And every child in elementary school that
20 did not know that definition would fail their history class. Ratko Radic
21 said that he did not want to live in Alija's state. I think I understood
22 you correctly that you said he did not want to live in Alija's state,
23 which probably implied that he did not wish to live in a state in which
24 one people would dominate another people. So this is a principle in
25 opposition to the founding principles of the Republic of Bosnia and
2 Muslims also used to say that they did not want to live in
3 Milosevic's Yugoslavia. So that is how that statement should be taken,
4 meaning that he did not wish to live in a state where one people would
5 dominate the other two people, and the purpose was to say that we have to
6 agree to live in a place where all three peoples would respect each other
7 and where all three peoples would have their own rights, not that one
8 people would dominate another.
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Samoukovic. We'll come onto that further. But in
10 your statement, paragraph 10, you explain that you resigned from your
11 position as chairman of the Executive Committee of the municipality at
12 the beginning of May. And at paragraph 18 you explain that when the
13 conflict began in Hadzici around the 10th of May you were home sick, so
14 not up-to-date with many events that took place at the time. Were you
15 aware that on the 8th of May a group of armed Serbs had entered the
16 Hadzici municipality building, expelling all the workers and taking over
17 the building?
18 A. Yes.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said "no," not "yes."
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
21 MS. McKENNA:
22 Q. And did you attend a multi-party meeting between key municipality
23 members on the afternoon of the 8th of May?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Well, again, Mr. Samoukovic, there is evidence before the
1 Trial Chamber - and that's for the parties' reference at P41,
2 Ramiz Dupovac's evidence - that Radic conducted -- concluded that meeting
3 by threatening that unless a resolution was reached there would be blood
4 deep up to the knees. Again, would you agree that this type of language
5 would be unlikely to ease the heightened tension of this time?
6 A. Sorry, could you please repeat your question. Perhaps the
7 translation is not good. I didn't understand.
8 Q. Certainly. Mr. Radic at a meeting of -- on the 8th of May stated
9 that unless a resolution was reached there would be blood deep up to the
10 knees. Now, my question for you is: This -- using this type of language
11 was unlikely to ease the tensions that were prevailing at this time;
12 isn't that correct?
13 A. Mr. Radic was - let me put it this way - a man who completed
14 craftsman's education. So the way he expressed himself was something
15 that was a consequence of his broadness of mind and education. I don't
16 know what the other side was saying in this instance. Was there some
17 kind of polemic or -- I don't know. I don't have complete insight. I
18 wasn't present at the meeting so I don't know what each of the sides was
19 saying. But in principle, I know that all of those meetings that were
20 held before were quite quarrelsome. They did try, but actually they did
21 not reach any kind of solution at any of the meetings. It wasn't just
22 Mr. Radic, but it was the president of the municipality who usually
23 chaired those meetings. He was an educated man, but he wasn't a
24 politically educated man, in the sense that he was never involved in
25 politics. So he didn't know how to conduct these meetings. He would go
1 straight for the heart of the problem and then there would be a quarrel
2 breaking out right at the start of the meeting so that party
3 representatives would then leave the meetings and they would leave the
4 meeting even after a third of it -- after one-third of it had gone on
5 because they could tell how the meeting would continue.
6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Samoukovic. I was just waiting for the end of the
7 translation. I'm going to move on to a different topic and I'll ask you
8 to focus -- to try to give answers that are as concise and precise as
9 possible. Thank you.
10 At paragraph 22 of your statement you say that you have -- you
11 had not heard or seen Radovan Karadzic issue any kind of order to anyone
12 in the area of the municipality of Hadzici. Now, the Assembly of the
13 Serbian people of Hadzici at its session of 11th April 1992 constituted
14 the organs and the bodies of the Assembly of the Serbian people of
15 Hadzici; isn't that correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And at the Assembly you were given a mandate to form the
18 municipal government; correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And also at this Assembly a decision was adopted to establish a
21 Serbian police station; is that correct?
22 A. There are minutes and if it's in the minutes then probably that's
23 so. I don't remember the meeting.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MS. McKENNA: For the parties' reference the minutes to this
1 meeting are D2916 and it is indeed in the minutes.
2 Q. Now, Mr. Samoukovic, just over two weeks previously, on the
3 24th of March, 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian people in
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina held their 12th Session.
5 MS. McKENNA: If I could have P961, please, which is a stenograph
6 of this meeting. And I'm interested in page 22 of the English and
7 page 39 of the B/C/S. And if I can direct the parties' attention to the
8 fifth paragraph -- the large paragraph in the English version --
9 obviously the large paragraph in both versions. And I'm just going to
10 read an extract from this which is a statement by Dr. Karadzic who says:
11 "We have a legal basis in the Law on Internal Affairs and we also
12 have the insignia and at a desired moment, and this will be very soon, we
13 can form whatever we want. There are reasons why this could happen in
14 two or three days. Such are the forecasts, but I can't tell you the
15 reasons now. At that moment, all the Serbian municipalities, both the
16 old ones and the newly established ones, would literally assume control
17 of the entire territory of the municipality concerned."
18 And then shortly after he continues:
19 "Then at a given moment in the next three or four days, there
20 will be a single method used and you will be able to apply it in the
21 municipalities you represent, including both things that must be done as
22 well as how to do them, how to separate the police force, take the
23 resources that belong to the Serbian people, and take command."
24 Q. Now, Mr. Samoukovic, this statement was made by Dr. Karadzic just
25 over two weeks previously to the Hadzici Assembly, setting up its own
1 bodies and its own police station. So, in fact, the very decision to
2 constitute that Assembly and to separate the police force was taken
3 pursuant to a directive by Mr. Karadzic, wasn't it?
4 A. No.
5 Q. When the Crisis Staff was formed, it took over the work of the
6 Assembly and its organs and services; isn't that correct?
7 A. In principle, yes.
8 Q. And you state at paragraph 14 that the Crisis Staff had around
9 15 to 20 members and was made up of the most influential and most capable
10 people, regardless of their party affiliation. Just to clarify, by this
11 do you mean the most capable and influential Serbs regardless of their
12 affiliation to the SDS?
13 A. By that I mean capable and influential persons, those who wanted
14 to work voluntarily. For example, I'm a member of the Crisis Staff. A
15 moment ago you said that I was elected president of the municipal
16 government, and in the Crisis Staff I did the work for which I was best
17 fitted. Since I'm a civil engineer, I worked in that field.
18 Q. We understand that point. My question is simply just clarifying
19 when you say that it was made up of people regardless of their party
20 affiliation, do you mean it was made up of Serb people regardless of
21 their affiliation to the SDS?
22 A. Of course the party affiliation did not matter at that point at
23 all. All those who expressed the goodwill and wish to help in that
24 situation was welcome. If I tell you that in the Crisis Staff we had an
25 elderly man who was only in charge of funerals, his job was funerals
1 only, nothing else.
2 Q. Let me make my question even simpler. Were there any non-Serbs
3 on the Crisis Staff?
4 A. As far as I can remember, no, at least not from that point in
5 time when I came to the Crisis Staff.
6 Q. And in paragraph 14 you also state that the Crisis Staff did not
7 receive any directions or instructions from anyone, including the central
8 government, and you worked independently. And further at paragraph 22
9 you state that even if you needed to get in touch with someone from the
10 Presidency or the government in Pale, you couldn't do it because the
11 telephone lines were torn. I'd like to look now at some documents
12 regarding communications between the Hadzici authorities and the central
13 government and Presidency. If we could have P2625, please.
14 Now, Mr. Samoukovic, these are minutes of a meeting of the
15 government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on the
16 18th of May, 1992. I'd like to turn to pages 2 in the English and
17 Bosnian -- B/C/S versions, please. And at "Ad-2," so at the bottom of
18 the page in English and B/C/S it states that:
19 "It was concluded that aid be given to the Novo Sarajevo and
20 Hadzici Crisis Staffs and that the amount of aid be determined according
21 to the situation in these municipalities."
22 So it's clear from this document, isn't it, that by that stage
23 the government was aware that the Crisis Staff had been set up?
24 A. The document shows that.
25 Q. And the document also suggests that the government was informed
1 of the situation in the Hadzici municipality, doesn't it?
2 A. How they were informed, I don't know, but if it is stated here
3 that we need help - and indeed we did need help - they probably had ways
4 of finding out. But telephones only operated locally, within the
5 municipality, the part that was covered by our telephone exchange because
6 our transmitter went through Sarajevo. So technically it was impossible
7 for us to have some kind of communication. We could communicate with the
8 city, with Sarajevo. We actually had two or three lines via railway
9 telephones with the other side in Sarajevo and certain contacts were made
10 later on with the other side through those telephones regarding
11 population exchanges and so on. However, telephone lines with Pale, we
12 didn't have them. We did in 1993 --
13 Q. Thank you --
14 A. -- when our passive transmitter was turned towards Trebevic.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
16 be asked to speak into the microphone. Thank you.
17 MS. McKENNA:
18 Q. The interprets have asked that you speak a little closer to the
20 But we're going to continue on this topic of communications
21 between the Hadzici authorities and the republican authorities.
22 MS. McKENNA: Could we please have 65 ter number 1548.
23 Q. Now, you'll see that this is a letter from Republika Srpska
24 government secretary Nedeljko Lakic to Romanija Petrol dated the 28th of
25 May, 1992, and he's asking Romanija Petrol to deliver 50 litres of fuel
1 to the Crisis Staff from Hadzici and to bill it to the Government of
2 the Serbian Republic of BiH. So you'll agree that this shows the
3 government intervening to give material support to the
4 Hadzici Crisis Staff?
5 A. I would not agree. If 50 litres is assistance, well this is
6 probably some individual who was up there in Pale and who introduced
7 himself as having some kind of connections with Hadzici in order to get
8 50 litres of fuel. I mean, what kind of aid is that, 50 litres of fuel?
9 I'm sure that it must be some individual who was up there in Pale, who
10 perhaps went for medical treatment or something, went there with his
11 family, introduced himself as a member of the Crisis Staff, that that
12 would be assistance to the Crisis Staff, 50 litres, no, surely not.
13 Q. Mr. Samoukovic, we'll come on to further assistance to the
14 Crisis Staff very shortly.
15 MS. McKENNA: But I would like to tender this document, please.
16 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6166, Your Honours.
19 MS. McKENNA: Could I please have Exhibit D317.
20 Q. Now, this is a report on combat-readiness of the Serb
21 municipality of Hadzici to the SRK command dated the 29th of May, 1992.
22 And I'd like to focus your discussion -- or focus your attention, rather,
23 on the discussion which is halfway down the page in the English and I
24 believe at the lower end of the page in the B/C/S, if we could scroll
25 down a little -- oh, maybe it's the second page in the B/C/S. But just
1 to explain, this is a discussion of an attack on Zunovica barracks on the
2 25th of May, 1992, and it states:
3 "Combat activities were not favourable for us, so the
4 Crisis Staff of Serb municipality of Hadzici asked assistance from
5 defenders of MRD Hadzici."
6 It continues:
7 "We asked for help from the commander of the HQ of the Serb
8 Republic of BiH himself, who presently sent a fighting group under the
9 command of Lieutenant-Colonel Petrovic Milisav, who after he arrived at
10 the location where the fighting was in progress, organised available men,
11 suspended the attack of Ustasha, and held them on the line that separates
12 two-thirds of Zunovica storage premises."
13 Mr. Samoukovic, do you recall this request for help?
14 A. [No interpretation]
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not hear the
17 MS. McKENNA:
18 Q. Mr. Witness, you will have to move a little closer to the
19 microphone. The interpreters cannot hear you.
20 A. No.
21 Q. You will agree that this document shows the Hadzici Crisis Staff
22 contacting the highest level of republican authorities for help.
23 A. Well, the Crisis Staff of the Serb municipality of Hadzici asked
24 assistance from the maintenance and repair depot in Hadzici -- it's in
25 Hadzici. We didn't ask for assistance in Pale. We asked for assistance
1 in Hadzici.
2 Q. Mr. Samoukovic, the document says:
3 "We asked for help from the commander of the HQ of the Serb
4 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina himself."
5 So again I'll ask you: Do you agree that this shows the Hadzici
6 Crisis Staff contacting the republican authorities?
7 A. Who asked for that? It was the maintenance and repair depot.
8 This is a report from someone at that institution and he says here
9 unequivocally that they were the ones who asked for help.
10 Q. I'll move on to a different document, which is P3087. Now, these
11 are minutes from the 26th government meeting of the
12 Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on the 11th of June, 1992.
13 And you'll note that on the first page the agenda item -- I'm sorry, it's
14 on the second page of the B/C/S version. Agenda item number 9 is:
15 "Request for giving loans to municipalities."
16 If we can skip forward to page 4 of the English and B/C/S
17 version, please. It states that, "The Decision regarding" -- I'm sorry,
18 this is at number 9. It states that:
19 "The Decision regarding loans from the reserves of the
20 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been made to the
21 municipality of Vlasenica 2.500.000 and to Hadzici 1.040.000 dinars."
22 So once again here you agree that we see assistance being
23 provided from the government to Hadzici?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And just one final document on this topic, which is P3064. These
1 are minutes of the 8th Session of the Presidency of the
2 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated 17th of June, 1992. And
3 you'll see that president -- present, rather, are Dr. Karadzic and the
4 other Presidency members. And if you look at the second paragraph in the
5 document, or rather, the third paragraph it states:
6 "The Presidency was briefed on the situation on the front,
7 particularly in Ilijas and Hadzici where enemy forces viciously attacked
8 our army positions the day before, and once again, as many times before,
9 violated the truce."
10 So again, this shows that -- it shows that
11 Republika Srpska Presidency being well informed of operations in and
12 around Hadzici, doesn't it?
13 A. Well, I think that since this had to do with the 25th of May, the
14 10th of June, the 16th of June, Hadzici was exposed to constant attacks.
15 That was a fact. Those who were involved in military matters knew about
16 that. This is an undeniable fact. This information certainly went up
17 there; that is to say that we were exposed to constant attacks. And
18 probably that assistance that we spoke about a moment ago had to do with
19 these constant attacks and the threats to the population.
20 Q. But it's a fact, isn't it, Mr. Samoukovic, that many
21 communications took place between the republican authorities and the
22 Hadzici municipality -- municipal authorities?
23 A. The municipal authorities, well I'm saying what kind of
24 communication we had. Now, whether the army had their own types of
25 communication, I mean, probably they did. What kind of an army would it
1 be otherwise? And after all that is something different of course. I
2 don't know about that. I'm not that knowledgeable about these technical
3 matters, but I assume they did have something like that, because this
4 also speaks about attacks. This also has to do with military reports.
5 Q. Let's turn then to your specific role as a Crisis Staff member.
6 In paragraph 12 of your statement you describe the various tasks that you
7 had a Crisis Staff member and you explained that you worked on -- one of
8 the tasks was working on the protection of property, taking care of the
9 abandoned apartments, which in the vast majority belonged to Muslims, and
10 making a list of those apartments in order to seal and secure them. Now,
11 you were appointed by Crisis Staff president, Ratko Radic, to -- as a
12 member of a commission to make a list of all abandoned flats and property
13 on the territory of Hadzici municipality; is that correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 MS. McKENNA: And actually if we may have D1084, please.
16 Q. This is your appointment -- or rather, Mr. Radic's decision to
17 form the commission in which you're appointed. And he states:
18 "The appointed commission is obliged to make a list of all
19 abandoned flats and property on the territory of
20 Hadzici Serb Municipality and also to seal them so they could be
21 registered and placed at the disposal of Hadzici Serb Municipality."
22 Now, by placing them at the disposal of the municipality, this
23 meant that the municipality could allocate those apartments to Serbs,
24 didn't it?
25 A. The question is allocate in which sense? Well, look, this
1 sentence here is be made available to the Serb municipality of Hadzici.
2 I remember that full well. We had this discussion as to why it was
3 included at all. It was put there because a commission had been
4 established to register these apartments, to seal them, and to prevent
5 looting, and that is why this sentence was included, so that it would be
6 well-known that the authorities are standing behind these lists of
7 property and the authorities would not allow those kind of things to
8 happen. And these apartments afterwards, when the refugees arrived from
9 Tarcin, Pazarici, and other places, these apartments were temporarily
10 being given to these refugees for their use.
11 MS. McKENNA: I'd like to look at P739, please.
12 Q. This is on the same topic. It's a letter from Dr. Karadzic dated
13 the 19th of July, 1992, to Sarajevo municipalities, including Hadzici.
14 And Dr. Karadzic says:
15 "In close co-operation with public security stations, you are
16 kindly requested to make an inventory of all housing facilities (summer
17 cottages, houses, and flats) in your municipality that are vacant
18 following the voluntary departure of Muslims."
19 And he states that:
20 "Pursuant to the Presidency's decision ... these facilities will
21 be given for temporary use to Serbs from the Muslim part of Sarajevo."
22 Now, Hadzici authorities received this instruction and acted upon
23 it, didn't they?
24 A. Our activity took place two months before this instruction. Two
25 months before this instruction we immediately registered this property in
1 order to seal it, protect it, et cetera. This instruction is from the
2 month of July and that decision of the Crisis Staff is from May.
3 MS. McKENNA: Could I please have 65 ter number 24665.
4 Q. Mr. Samoukovic, this is a letter dated just over one week later,
5 that's the 27th of July, 1992, from the municipal secretariat for housing
6 and public utilities signed by you as secretary to the commissioners of
7 the Serbian municipality Hadzici. And in it you ask that they inventory
8 all abandoned and vacant buildings that can be lived in and all vacant
9 weekend houses that can be lived in.
10 Now, in requesting this list to be made you were acting on the
11 instructions of Dr. Karadzic, weren't you?
12 A. Number one, I did not sign this. Here it says "on behalf of the
13 secretary," "for the secretary," and down here this is not my signature.
14 So, I mean, this document is unknown to me and you can see that it says
15 here "for." Somebody signed this on my behalf.
16 Q. Well, you will agree that the -- whoever -- whichever
17 representative of the Hadzici authorities who signed it on your behalf
18 was acting on the instructions of Dr. Karadzic?
19 A. Up here, take a look at the heading. It says "Serb municipality
20 of Hadzici, municipal secretariat." There is no more Crisis Staff.
21 There is a municipal government and secretariats that dealt with
22 particular fields. Now, whether this was done in accordance with this --
23 well, it's illogical for someone to come from Sarajevo to Hadzici and for
24 somebody in Hadzici to provide accommodation to people from Sarajevo.
25 That's illogical. That did not happen. There was not a single case of
1 that kind. Organs of government are already functioning here. It is
2 possible that there was some communication where the government did
3 something or -- but I'm not sure.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Samoukovic.
5 MS. McKENNA: I'd like to tender this document, please.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, just if I could just offer one reserve. I'm
8 just trying to check with Mr. Reid if this had been disclosed to us
9 earlier, but pending that we don't have any objection at this point.
10 JUDGE KWON: I see that number in the notice, but it is -- --
12 MR. ROBINSON: There was an earlier disclosure obligation, but it
13 may very well have been disclosed to us. I didn't have time to check
14 myself and I asked Mr. Reid who is very quick at that. So I'll get that
15 information soon, but in the meantime we can admit it. If there's a
16 problem I'll raise it with the Chamber.
17 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6167, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE KWON: Are you coming to a conclusion, Ms. McKenna?
20 MS. McKENNA: Your Honour, I have one additional topic.
21 JUDGE KWON: How long would it take?
22 MS. McKENNA: May I just -- your indulgence while I check how
23 much time I have left.
24 [Prosecution counsel confer]
25 MS. McKENNA: I can finish in five minutes, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE KWON: Please do so, yes, Ms. McKenna.
2 MS. McKENNA:
3 Q. Turning a totally different topic, Mr. Samoukovic, you explained
4 in your statement that there were no concentration camps in the territory
5 of Hadzici, but rather areas where Muslims were temporarily placed to
6 protect them. And you state that Muslim people would go to the reception
7 centre willingly and seek opportunities to leave their territory. Now,
8 there is evidence before the Trial Chamber from witnesses who were
9 unwillingly taken to Hadzici sports centre - and that's P161, P2403, for
10 the parties' reference - including a witness who was under house arrest
11 until 16th May 1992 when he was taken to the sports centre and
12 witnesses -- a witness who testified that between 25th of May and June --
13 22nd of June, there were 282 people detained in the sports hall. Now,
14 these people didn't actually express a wish to be held in the sports
15 centre, did they?
16 A. Well, I cannot answer whether they did or did not express their
17 wishes because none of them approached me nor did I have any
18 conversations with any of them, so I cannot answer that question. As far
19 as I know --
20 Q. Well, SJB commander, Glavas, who was a fellow member of the
21 Crisis Staff testified that people were taken from their houses by the TO
22 and the police. Were you aware of this occurring?
23 A. I knew that the police brought in some people and took them from
24 their houses. I heard about that. The police had their reasons why they
25 do things. They probably had some operative intelligence. And in the
1 police, like in every profession, there are incompetent people who are
2 not professionals, those who abuse their position and powers. But the
3 fact is some of them have already been prosecuted for that.
4 Q. Well, it was Mr. Glavas' evidence that the decision was made by
5 the Crisis Staff that all Bosniak men of military age were to be arrested
6 and detained from areas such as Binjezevo, Zunovica and Kucice. Now,
7 you've already stated that you weren't around at that period, but do you
8 agree that it's correct that only the Crisis Staff had the authority to
9 make this decision?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we get a reference and an
11 exact quotation?
12 MS. McKENNA: My apologies. That was an exact quotation and it's
13 from P2296, paragraph 26.
14 Q. Shall I repeat my question, Mr. Samoukovic? Do you agree -- or
15 Mr. Glavas testified that a decision was made by the Crisis Staff to
16 arrest Bosniak men of military age and detain them. Do you agree that --
17 A. No.
18 Q. Do you --
19 A. No. In my own statement I said as far as I know the Crisis Staff
20 never made such a decision.
21 Q. They never made such a decision to your knowledge, but you agree
22 that the Crisis Staff were the authority in the area?
23 A. The Crisis Staff was a body responsible for the situation on the
24 ground to the extent the Crisis Staff was able to work.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Samoukovic.
1 MS. McKENNA: Your Honours, I have no further questions.
2 JUDGE KWON: Given the time, we'll have a break for 45 minutes
3 and resume at 20 past 1.00.
4 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.35 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 1.26 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue, given the pace of hearing today,
7 I take it there would be no point of holding General Vasiljevic in the
8 waiting room anymore?
9 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. We'd appreciate that.
10 MS. McKENNA: I think that's right, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be done.
12 Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
15 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Samoukovic, you were asked when the Serbian
16 municipality of Hadzici was formed. Are you able to tell us what
17 comprised the Serbian municipality of Hadzici?
18 A. The Serbian -- in what sense when was it formed?
19 Q. On page 58 you were asked if it was formed on the 12th, or
20 whichever, April. I'm not asking you when it was formed. I'm just
21 asking you what that area comprised, what made up that municipality?
22 A. The Hadzici Serbian municipality didn't have any territory. It
23 was a political formulation.
24 Q. Thank you. When the war broke out, what did the Serbian
25 authorities control of the Serbian municipality of Hadzici?
1 A. A few days after the combat erupted, when the lines of defence
2 were established, we controlled perhaps some 15 to 20 per cent of the
3 territory of the municipality.
4 Q. And what was the majority population on the territory under your
6 A. [No interpretation]
7 Q. Thank you. And was there a Muslim municipality also in the
8 territory of the Hadzici municipality?
9 A. [No interpretation]
10 Q. Did they have a Crisis Staff and later the organs of the
12 A. Well, it was more or less the same.
13 Q. You were asked if there were any Muslims in the Serbian
14 Crisis Staff. Were there any Serbs in the Muslim Crisis Staff?
15 A. I said that as far as I knew there were no Muslims in our staff
16 and as far as I know there were no --
17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch what the witness
19 JUDGE KWON: What did you say after as far as you know there
20 were ...?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were none.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. There were no Muslim in ours. What about Serbs in theirs?
24 A. The same.
25 Q. There were none?
1 A. Right.
2 Q. Thank you. Did the Crisis Staff or the unit plan and execute
3 offensive actions with the intention of capturing this Muslim part of the
5 A. No. The lines of separation that were established in the course
6 of May and June held until the end of the war practically.
7 [Defence counsel confer]
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D13021.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Can you see whether this is a document confirming that the
13 Muslims had their own Crisis Staff?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And did you know the president of the Crisis Staff,
16 Mustafa Dzelilovic?
17 A. Yes. He was the president of the municipality and I was the
18 president of the Executive Board before the war time events.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MS. McKENNA: I'd just like to interject here that the
21 Muslim Crisis Staff was not the focus of the cross-examination.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I was wondering myself how it did arise from
23 the cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, Madam McKenna created
25 the impression that there was no division of power in the municipality so
1 that one would expect that there were Muslims in the Serbian Crisis Staff
2 and that the Muslims did not have their own authority or their
3 Crisis Staff. Page 60 of today's transcript, line 12, is where it is
4 stated: Why didn't you have any Muslims? As if the Muslims were
5 stripped of all of their rights.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. McKenna.
8 MS. McKENNA: If I may, I believe Mr. Karadzic is referring to
9 the line of questioning which was simply to clarify the witness's
10 assertion in his statement that the Crisis Staff was comprised of people
11 regardless of party affiliation. I am simply clarifying what he meant by
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, she didn't deal with the division of Hadzici at
14 all. Why don't you move on to another topic, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, it was implied that
16 this was in terms of ethnic belonging, but the witness was talking about
17 party affiliation and the question was that the Muslims were not included
18 in the Serbian Crisis Staff but, however, they had their own.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, witness testified that so you don't need
20 further evidence. Why don't you move on?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I just wanted to
23 Are you going to admit the document?
24 JUDGE KWON: No. Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. On page 56 you were told that Ramiz Dupovac testified here and in
2 his testimony he conveyed the words of Ratko Radic. I did not
3 cross-examine Dupovac because the statement was submitted under a
4 different Rule. Did you know Ramiz Dupovac?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Are you able to tell us what he is, what is he like and what did
7 he do?
8 A. He was the commander of the Territorial Defence staff.
9 Q. Thank you. Did he take part in the war afterwards?
10 A. Well, I really couldn't say.
11 Q. Thank you. You were asked about the communications between the
12 government and the central organs. Are you saying that you were
13 completely isolated or that your daily communications were reduced?
14 A. Our daily communications were reduced. Let me explain. The
15 communication towards Pale was a physical one. So if somebody was daring
16 enough, could go through some forests and in areas hard to pass to
17 communicate and those people were shot at. I dared to go on that trip
18 with my sister and her husband, and her husband was left without a leg
19 and we were forced to take him to Belgrade after that.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at D1072, please. It's
22 a Defence exhibit, D1072. This is a report on the work of the defence
23 ministry Hadzici office. Can we look at page 5 now, please -- 4, it's
24 page 4 in the English and it's page 5 in the Serbian. At the end of --
25 at the bottom of the page in the English -- actually, we also need page 5
1 in the Serbian. [Microphone not activated] Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. I would now like to present a paragraph to you. In English I
4 think it beginnings with the words "we tried to establish necessary
5 co-operation ...":
6 I'm going to read it in Serbian:
7 "Co-operation by means of various letters, requests, orders, and
8 even visits to the Presidency of the republic and the General Staff of
9 the army but without success. In mid-September, however, we managed to
10 break through the barrier and establish co-operation which is today at an
11 enviable level."
12 How does this tally with your experiences and knowledge about the
13 defence department's problems and what they state are their problems?
14 A. Well, it's just as I told you earlier.
15 Q. Thank you. Text was quoted to you from Mr. Glavas' statement and
16 I would like to give you a more complete citation from that in the
17 Serbian, and they can translate it:
18 [In English] "Document undated report on the work of the Assembly
19 of the Serb municipality of Hadzici in 1992. It has been ERN of
20 0228-7570 to 7571.
21 "I can say that I have never seen this report before; however, I
22 can see mention of December of 1992 the municipality is being organised
23 and various organs are functioning. It says in this document the
24 Crisis Staff took over complete supervision of the Assembly and its
25 organs and services."
1 [Interpretation] Are you able to tell us when the
2 Municipal Assembly and the Assembly board and the Crisis Staff worked
3 together at any point in time? Did the Crisis Staff take over control
4 over the Municipal Assembly at the parliament session?
5 A. At the beginning of the war, the Crisis Staff did all the
6 functions. The Assembly never convened. It was only in July, I think we
7 saw it from the documents that the Madam Prosecutor showed and at the
8 heading they're talking about the secretariats, meaning when the
9 Executive Board was formed, the secretariats after that, then the
10 Assembly began its work.
11 Q. And did the Crisis Staff continue to function?
12 A. No. With the cessation of the operation of the Assembly, then
13 the war time organs began to work such as the municipal Executive Board
14 and the Assembly.
15 Q. Thank you. With the cessation of the work of the Crisis Staff or
16 the municipality? We just want to clarify a possible error?
17 A. With the cessation of the operation of the Crisis Staff.
18 Q. What continued?
19 A. Then the organs of authority, such as the Executive Board and the
20 Assembly, were established. And as far as I can remember, this was in
21 the month of July.
22 Q. Thank you. On page 70, 71, you were asked about concentration
23 camps - moving on to a completely different topic - and how you said that
24 they came to the reception centre of their own free will in order to seek
25 shelter until they left for their territory. And then it was said
1 that -- what was said about Glavas. The question the way it was put --
2 I'm going to read it out so it can be properly translated:
3 [In English] "Q. Well, SJB commander, Glavas, who was a fellow
4 member of the Crisis Staff testified that people were taken from their
5 houses by the Territorial Defence and the police. Were you aware of this
7 [No interpretation]
8 "A. I knew that the police brought in some people and took them
9 from their houses. I heard about that. The police had their reasons why
10 they do things. They probably had some operative intelligence. And in
11 the police, like in every profession, there are incompetent people who
12 are not professionals, those are abuse their positions, position of
13 power. But the fact is some of them have already been prosecuted for
15 [Interpretation] Now I would like to show you what the commander
16 of the public security station, Mr. Glavas, was writing at that time.
17 Can we look at D1074. And while we're waiting, are you able to tell us
18 where those who were in police detention at the police building were
19 going, what was the outcome? What could have happened to them after
20 their interrogation?
21 A. Probably prison or reception centre, some probably home also.
22 Q. Thank you. I'm now going to read a report to the security centre
23 dated the 9th of August, 1992. It states:
24 "Upon the establishment of the Serbian police station of Hadzici,
25 i.e., in the phase of its formation as well as over the next 40 or so
1 days, the activities of certain small groups so-called 'free shooters'
2 was noted ..."
3 And then a little bit lower it says:
4 "This police station, among other things, the execution of tasks
5 and assignments was approached with due seriousness, primarily security,
6 protection of the legal and property, safety of the citizens, maintaining
7 of law and order, as well as the prevention and uncovering of crimes and
8 their perpetrators."
9 How does this fit in with your understanding of the work of the
10 police at that time?
11 A. I think that it corresponds to my answer, but I do want to say
12 that the police -- there were few of them and they really could not
13 manage to cover and carry out all of their duties and assignments.
14 Q. Can we look at the last page of the document? It's the
15 one-page-but-last in the English.
16 I'm also going to read a part of paragraph (d):
17 "As regards the procedure and jurisdiction in connection with the
18 treatment and guarding of prisoners, it can be noted that we had a large
19 number of detained persons who, once they were interviewed and after
20 other relevant information had been gathered, were taken to state prison
21 in Kula or were released. A small number of people brought in (currently
22 11 persons) are in prison in Hadzici and they are being treated properly
23 and in accordance with the law.
24 "We would also like to know that in the area of the Hadzici
25 municipality we do not have collection camps used by the army to bring in
1 the Muslim population without documents on the reasons for their
3 How does this fit in with your knowledge and experience about the
4 legality of the operation of the police?
5 A. As I said, the Crisis Staff as far as I know, I probably would
6 have heard of it or seen it, never adopted any decisions on the formation
7 of --
8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not make out the rest of
9 the sentence of the witness.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Samoukovic, for answering my questions and thank
12 you for behaving professionally during the war and everything --
13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The interpreters didn't catch your
14 last answer. If you remember, could you repeat it? What we have at the
15 moment is --
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Everything that is stated in this
17 report is in accordance and is not in collision with what I said.
18 JUDGE KWON: What did you say? The Crisis Staff never adopted
19 any decision on the formation of what?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As it is written somewhere here --
21 please help me, Mr. Karadzic.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. In the statement.
24 A. Camps are mentioned somewhere.
25 Q. In this report, (d), point (d), the last page and then the second
2 "We also emphasise that in the area of Hadzici municipality there
3 are no collection camps where the army is bringing Muslim population
4 without any documents on the reason why they are brought in."
5 Can you then explain what you said about the Crisis Staff.
6 A. What I've already stated, that the Crisis Staff never made such a
7 decision and that this report of Mr. Glavas is consistent with my
9 Q. Thank you.
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. That then concludes your evidence,
11 Mr. Samoukovic. Thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it. Now
12 you are free to go.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 [The witness withdrew]
15 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will now issue an oral ruling in
16 relation to the testimony of Obren Markovic and Tomislav Puhalac.
17 First, having reviewed the proposed Rule 92 ter statement for
18 Obren Markovic, the Chamber finds that the following portions contain
19 detailed information not relevant to the crimes in the indictment. These
20 are paragraphs 6, the last sentence of paragraph 21, paragraphs 27 from
21 "I know during these bombardments," and paragraph 32 from "an example of
22 such crimes" until "I am saying this because after the crime."
23 Next, having also reviewed the proposed Rule 92 ter statement for
24 Tomislav Puhalac, the Chamber finds that paragraph 19 contains detailed
25 information not relevant to the crimes in the indictment.
1 The Chamber therefore decides that the aforementioned paragraphs
2 and the documents included therein shall be redacted from the respective
3 Rule 92 ter statements and orders that redacted versions be uploaded onto
4 e-court prior to the witness's testimony. The Chamber also encourages
5 the accused with respect to the evidence he proposes to lead on Brcko to
6 be mindful that the indictment only alleges responsibility for crimes
7 purported to have been committed in Luka camp and to focus his attention
8 on his alleged responsibility for those crimes.
9 Let's bring in the next witness.
10 I would very much like to conclude next witness for today so
11 please bear that in mind, Mr. Karadzic and Ms. McKenna.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Defence will do its utmost and
13 the Prosecution too, I believe. But as far as the previous decision is
14 concerned, I'm not disputing it but I want to express my concern for the
15 record that the case file will --
16 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- will lack context.
18 [The witness entered court]
19 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness make the solemn declaration,
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
22 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
23 WITNESS: MLADEN TOLJ
24 [Witness answered through interpreter]
25 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Mr. Tolj. Please be seated and make
1 yourself comfortable.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 JUDGE KWON: Before you commence your evidence, Mr. Tolj, I would
4 like to draw your attention to a certain Rule of Procedure and Evidence
5 that we have here at the Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E). Under this Rule
6 you may object to answering a question from Mr. Karadzic, the
7 Prosecution, or even from the Judges if you believe that your answer
8 might incriminate you. In this context "incriminate" means saying
9 something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal
10 offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you might
11 have committed a criminal offence. However, should you think that an
12 answer might incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer
13 the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to
14 compel you to answer the question. But in that situation, the Tribunal
15 will ensure that your testimony compelled under such circumstances would
16 not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence,
17 save and except the offence of giving false testimony. Do you understand
18 what I have just told you?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tolj.
21 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
24 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Tolj.
25 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President.
1 Q. Did you give a statement to my Defence team?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. I'm waiting for the interpretation and I would like you to do the
4 same. Please do not start answering until the cursor stops.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now ask for 1D7818 to be
6 displayed in e-court.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Do you see your statement on the screen before you?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did you read this statement and sign it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Please hold your answers for a second.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please display the last
14 page for the witness to identify his signature.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is my signature.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect everything
18 you've said to the Defence team?
19 A. I believe so.
20 Q. If I were to ask you the same questions today, would your answers
21 be essentially the same as here in the statement?
22 A. They would be essentially the same.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I tender these
25 statements under 92 ter without any associated exhibits.
1 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3063, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm now going to read a brief
4 summary of Mr. Mladen Tolj's statement in English.
5 [In English] Mr. Mladen Tolj was appointed chief of the SJB
6 Hadzici in 1992. He states that after the multi-party election he could
7 feel the division between the Serbs and the Muslims in both the town and
8 the station. Due to this, a large number of policemen left the station
9 and Muslim [sic] reservists were drafted in to fill these gaps.
10 Mladen Tolj recalls that one day when the members of the
11 Green Berets came to the station and informed the police that the Serbs
12 would shell the police station so Green Berets had come to evacuate the
13 official vehicles and other equipment. They then took this equipment and
14 drove the vehicles away. Mladen Tolj did not return to work after this
16 Mladen Tolj went to register for work at the Hadzici police
17 station; however, he noted that there was not a single Serb working there
18 as the station had already been divided ethnically. Later he received an
19 invitation to join the Serbian Hadzici police which was located at the
20 premises of the construction company above the post office. To begin
21 with, co-operation with the Muslims was good -- at the beginning the
22 co-operation with the Muslims was good and the joint check-points and
23 patrols were set up.
24 Mladen Tolj cannot remember the exact date when the Muslim forces
25 began shelling Hadzici; however, women, children, and elderly were
1 quickly evacuated. A part of the Muslim population who expressed such a
2 wish were housed in the gym at the secondary school to be protected.
3 This was not a camp but temporary accommodation. Transport was arranged
4 for the Muslims who so wanted to travel to the Muslim-controlled area.
5 Mr. Mladen Tolj is aware of one incident at the gym when the
6 Muslims were -- where the Muslims were housed there when a group of Serbs
7 entered without authorisation and maltreated the people they found there.
8 Following this, a further group of Muslims expressed the wish to leave
9 Hadzici and transport was once again arranged. This incident was in
10 response to the Serb population in Hadzici discovering that the Muslims
11 were torturing the Serb civilians, their relatives, at the school -- at
12 the Silos camp. At the beginning of the war, a large number of Serbs
13 were taken to the Silos camp and beaten and tortured. Some were kept
14 until the camp until 1996. The municipal authorities allowed Muslims to
15 leave Hadzici without hindrance as often as possible.
16 Mladen Tolj would not consider any of the camps alleged to exist
17 by the Muslims to be camps. A temporary holding centre for the Muslims
18 existed which provided accommodation until they were transported from
19 Hadzici. A detention space existed for military conscripts who had had a
20 run-in with the law. Other premises were used whilst the situation [sic]
21 were being located from one building to another. Mladen Tolj is not
22 aware of any murders in any of these premises.
23 In relation to his work every person, regardless of ethnicity,
24 when brought to the police station were registered with the appropriate
25 records. The police in Hadzici did not receive all of their orders from
1 the political leadership in Pale municipality as the police had neither
2 the time nor the ability to contact anyone. The telephone lines were
3 down more often than they worked. Further, Hadzici municipality was
4 physically cut off from Pale as the Muslims had cut off the roads.
5 And that is the summary, and I think I made mistake that Muslim
6 reserves were drafted. I think it was Serbian reservists were drafted to
7 fill these gaps in the army. No questions for this witness for the
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tolj, as you have noted, your evidence in chief
10 in this case has been admitted in writing in lieu of your oral testimony.
11 Now you will be cross-examined by the representative of the
12 Office of the Prosecutor, Ms. McKenna.
13 MS. McKENNA: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Cross-examination by Ms. McKenna:
15 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Tolj.
16 A. Good afternoon.
17 Q. At paragraph 15 of your statement you state that you were
18 appointed commander of the Hadzici police station at some point during
19 autumn 1992. I'd like to show you 65 ter 24575, please. So in this
20 document which is dated 17th August, 1992, the Hadzici municipality
21 Executive Council recommends to the Ministry of the Interior in Pale that
22 you be appointed commander of SJB Hadzici. So you were appointed by the
23 Ministry of the Interior following this recommendation; is that correct?
24 A. Correct.
25 MS. McKENNA: I'd like to tender this document, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6168, Your Honours.
3 MS. McKENNA:
4 Q. Now, at paragraph 13 of your statement you mention a number of
5 detention centres and you also describe how all the people detained were
6 registered with the appropriate records in your statement. Now, under
7 the criminal code in force at the time, it's correct, isn't it, that the
8 police were authorised to issue a detention on custody that could last up
9 to three days.
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. And the code of criminal procedure also stipulated that at the
12 end of that three-day period police forces had an obligation to bring the
13 detainee before an investigative judge, who would then issue a decision
14 on continued custody or release; is that correct?
15 A. Right.
16 Q. Now, I'd first like to focus on the detention centre in the
17 garage in the municipality building. Non-Serbs were arrested and brought
18 in to be interviewed by the police in the municipality building premises;
19 is that correct?
20 A. The Muslim population was brought in not only by the police but
21 also by army units from combat. They were not only rounded up in houses.
22 They were brought in also from combat zones.
23 Q. And that included the people captured in the attack by your
24 police force on the village of Musici, didn't it?
25 A. I could not give you a specific answer regarding Musici village
1 because I was not at the police station at the time. I was on the lines
2 in position on one of the lines. I believe it was done by a combined
3 unit consisting of police officers and military police officers; they
4 carried out that attack.
5 Q. But the Trial Chamber has heard evidence that 40 men from Musici
6 were brought to the municipality building garage after the attack. Do
7 you accept that?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And while they were detained in the garage, you and other members
10 of the police interrogated them in the office upstairs; isn't that
12 A. Not all of them. Some, yes.
13 Q. You frequently worked together with Zoran Gasevic, didn't you?
14 A. We were sent on missions together quite often.
15 Q. Now, you agree that the garage in which the detainees were held
16 was a small concrete garage?
17 A. That was a garage in the ownership of the Municipal Assembly of
18 Hadzici, where a number of vehicles were kept as well as archives that
19 were kept in one part of the garage, and there was also plumbing inside.
20 Q. But at one time around 50 people were held there; isn't that
22 A. I cannot confirm the number because it fluctuated. Some people
23 were transferred to the gym usually when there was fighting. If some
24 people were captured in the fighting, they would be brought to the
1 Q. Well, in the garage on occasion men and women were held together;
2 isn't that correct?
3 A. I believe there were one or two such cases, as far as I know.
4 Q. The detainees had no means of cleaning themselves, did they?
5 A. For hygiene they had the same facilities as everybody else
6 because in Hadzici we did not have either water or electricity for a
7 while because the Muslim side had cut off the supply. It was a huge
8 problem for the entire population of Hadzici.
9 Q. Well, let's talk about your obligations in relation to those
10 detainees. You've agreed that the police were permitted to detain people
11 for three-day period, and after which they were required to bring the
12 detainee before an investigative judge. So that should have been what
13 you did in respect of those detained in the Hadzici municipality
14 building, shouldn't it?
15 A. In the building of Hadzici municipality, Ilidza, Ilijas,
16 et cetera, there was no courthouse, so there was no possibility for these
17 people to be turned over to the proper authorities for further procedure.
18 Communications towards Pale, Lukavica, and other places were cut off.
19 You could reach them only taking tracks through woods and that was
20 dangerous because every now and then there were raids by various groups
21 and even some of our policemen got killed or injured in that way when
22 they were intercepted by Muslim army units on those roads.
23 Q. Mr. Tolj, I'd like to focus on the issue of the detainees
24 under -- in your custody in the municipality building. Now, the
25 Trial Chamber has heard evidence - and that's at P2403 at paragraphs 48
1 and 51 - that men from Musici were held there for six days. It's also
2 heard evidence that people were held there for weeks, including one group
3 for as long as 33 days, and that's at paragraph 66 of P2403. Now, this
4 is detention far beyond permissible detention under the law in force at
5 the time; isn't that correct?
6 A. I agree, but if you understood my previous answer I said that
7 there were war operations engulfing the whole area. It was not possible
8 to transport people into proper premises before the competent organs that
9 would take charge from then on.
10 Q. Well, these people never received a decision on detention by any
11 authority in accordance with the law in force at the time, did they?
12 A. I believe so because - and I think I've said this before - the
13 police station was based on the premises in the offices of a construction
14 company. So we came in without any equipment, without any communications
15 equipment, without any amenities or proper facilities for police work.
16 We had no proper premises or equipment, and most policemen, sometimes
17 100 per cent of them, were engaged to hold the lines and had no time to
18 do their job, which was police work.
19 Q. Mr. Tolj, I'll ask you to listen carefully to the question that
20 I'm asking and to respond as accurately and as concisely as possible. We
21 have very little time. Let's come back to the interviews of the
22 detainees. Now, after the interviews some of the people who you had
23 determined didn't pose a threat would be transferred to the sports
25 A. Roughly that's right. People on whom no weapons were found were
1 taken to the sports centre because that was the safest place for them
2 because of various raids by groups out of control, people who were under
3 nobody's command, people who were not within the police or the army
5 Q. Well, let's then focus on the sports centre now. At paragraph 9
6 of your statement you say that a part of the Muslim population who had
7 expressed such a wish were put up in arrangement with them at the gym of
8 the secondary school centre so they would be protected. And you
9 continue -- you also state that after a while the Muslims who so wanted
10 were transported by buses to the side under the control of their people,
11 that is to say Kiseljak.
12 Now, the Trial Chamber has heard -- well, you've just accepted
13 that people who were taken to the sports centre from the municipality
14 building garages following their interviews -- is it your evidence that
15 these people asked to be taken to the sports centre from the municipal
17 A. Could you please repeat the ending because I'm not sure I
18 understood the question.
19 Q. Mr. Tolj, in paragraph 9 of your statement you suggest that the
20 people were taken -- or people went to the sports centre voluntarily.
21 I'm asking you whether it is your position that the people who were taken
22 to the sports centre after their interviews by your police in the
23 municipality building garage -- or in the municipality building, did
24 those people go to the sports centre voluntarily?
25 A. Very few went voluntarily. Most were brought there and kept
1 there with the best of intentions because that's where it was the safest
2 for them. There were cases when people were allowed to go home because
3 that was their wish. They would spend even less than 24 hours at home
4 and an incident would occur. They would be attacked and then they would
5 reappear, or rather, there would be these people who did whatever they
6 wanted as they roamed about, so then these people would return to the
7 centre because they felt safest there.
8 Q. Now, it was the public security centre who was responsible for
9 the organisation and security of the sports centre, wasn't it?
10 A. Not the public security centre. It was the army, or rather,
11 mobilisation. And it was the military authorities that provided security
12 for the entire centre.
13 THE ACCUSED: Transcript. [Interpretation] In line 10 of the
14 transcript it doesn't say that yet again these people who freely roamed
15 about and would mistreat other people, it wasn't recorded in line 10.
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
17 Let's continue.
18 MS. McKENNA:
19 Q. Now, at paragraph 10 of your statement you describe how after
20 Serbs broke into the gym and mistreated the people there, the political
21 and military leadership made the decision to transport part of the
22 Muslims at their own request from the gym to the Muslim-controlled side
23 at Kiseljak while the remainder was transported to the Kula prison, that
24 is, those who had violated the law. Now, it was Mr. Glavas's evidence,
25 your predecessor as SJB commander, that the Crisis Staff president
1 Ratko Radic gave the order to transfer 180 to 200 detainees to the Kula
2 prison on the 22nd of June, 1992. For the parties' reference that's
3 P2296, paragraph 50, and T11785 to 6.
4 Mr. Tolj, is it your position that all 200 of these people being
5 transferred to Kula prison had violated the law?
6 A. I am not of the view that all of them had violated the law.
7 Quite simply, the order was that they could no longer be held in
8 detention on the premises where they had been until then. They had to be
9 transferred to institutions, prisons, that were envisaged for that, and
10 then of course that the procedure was continue over there and everything
11 else. And as far as I know, immediately after being transferred to the
12 Kula prison some people were immediately released and they went to the
13 city of Sarajevo.
14 Q. Well, the Trial Chamber has heard evidence from people who were
15 part of that transfer, Witnesses Mehmet Music and Adem Balic, who were
16 transferred from the sports centre to Kula prison and held there until
17 they were transferred to further detention centres. So rather than being
18 voluntarily bussed to Kiseljak, as your statement suggests, these
19 detainees were being transferred from detention centre to detention
20 centre; isn't that correct?
21 A. I really don't know of the fate of individual persons who were
22 transferred to Kula prison and how they were then transferred from there,
23 how many were released, how many were transferred to other prisoners.
24 That was very hard for us to control, or rather, to have information.
25 The road we used from Lukavica to Hadzici was over 100 kilometres long,
1 round about, over the hills. Telephone lines weren't working either so
2 communication was very poor.
3 Q. Well, let's talk about those people who were being held in the
4 sports centre during the period in which you were SJB commander. It's
5 correct, isn't it, Mr. Tolj, that non-Serbs were held in the sports
6 centre right up until October 1992?
7 A. Well, in that period I was appointed commander and that's where I
8 found them. Perhaps there were about then persons there.
9 MS. McKENNA: Could we please have P1607 and page 2 in the
10 English and B/C/S, please.
11 Q. Mr. Tolj, this is a report on the situation in prisons and
12 collection camps for prisoners of war from the Republika Srpska Ministry
13 of Justice and administration representative, Slobodan Avlijas. I'd like
14 to turn to section 10 on Hadzici, that's English page 6 to 7 and B/C/S
15 page 5. And I should have noted, Mr. Tolj, that the date of this
16 document is 22nd October 1992. Now, on the topic of Hadzici it states:
17 "Ninety prisoners of war are accommodated in the Hadzici sports
18 centre. Organisation and security is provided by the
19 Hadzici Public Security Station."
20 So firstly, you accept that this document contradicts your
21 testimony that the Hadzici public security station was not involved in
22 the organisation of the sports centre?
23 A. In the organisation of the sports centre, I said at the very
24 outset how it was. And after that a certain number of policemen together
25 with members of the military provided security there. At first all
1 members of the police were involved in repelling attacks at the front
2 line. Once the situation was consolidated, at least a bit, then the
3 police started doing their own work too. I think this has to do with a
4 number of people who were not prisoners but rather victims of a failed
5 exchange at the level of state commissions.
6 Q. Let's speak about the exchange. Mr. Avlijas states that he
7 suggested that people be transferred to a section of KPD Butmir but did
8 not encounter understanding regarding the transfer because it depended on
9 the exchange of prisoners of war of Serbian nationality held in the
10 Tarcin Silos and in Pazaric.
11 It's correct, isn't it, that people were held in the sports
12 centre for the purposes of exchange?
13 A. A large-scale exchange had been agreed upon at the level of state
14 organs between the Muslim and Serb sides. On the Muslim side it was led
15 by Mr. Amor Masevic [phoen]. All the people were asked about leaving
16 Hadzici and also those who were in Pazarici and Tarcin who wanted to
17 leave Muslim-controlled territory. How do I put this? People were
18 polled. They were asked where they wanted to go and whether they wanted
19 to be exchanged, and then they were told that on such and such a date an
20 exchange would be carried out, buses were provided, and it was supposed
21 to happen at the separation line between the municipalities of -- at the
22 location called Kobiljaca.
23 Q. Can I direct your attention to the final paragraph in this
24 section - and I believe it's the next page in the B/C/S - and it states:
25 "In the cases of Zvornik, Hadzici, and Ilidza, we see that the
1 Public Security Stations keep people in custody without any authorisation
2 or justification in law because they have the authority to keep people in
3 custody for no longer than three days."
4 The people who are the subject of these -- of this document are
5 not people who are part of any sort of organised exchange, are they?
6 They are people who are being kept under illegal detention; isn't that
8 A. Really, I cannot answer. As far as I know, these were people who
9 were prepared, I mean to have these exchanges take place from both sides.
10 And there was a lot of pressure from families on our side and on the
11 Muslim side and state commissions were working. However, these exchanges
12 failed day after day and practically people stayed on for a long time
13 without any need for them to stay on such premises.
14 Q. Let's move to page 28 of the English of this document and page 27
15 of the B/C/S. And this is a letter of the same date from minister for
16 justice Momcilo Mandic to the Serbian municipalities of Hadzici and
17 Ilidza. And he states:
18 "Having carried out the control of this ministry, we have
19 established that there are 90 persons of Muslim ethnicity imprisoned on
20 the territory of your municipality ..."
21 Now -- sorry, "... on the territory of your municipality at the
22 premises of the sports centre in Hadzici ..."
23 Now, contrary to what you say at paragraph 9 of your statement,
24 the sports centre wasn't a space for temporary accommodation, but these
25 people were, in fact, imprisoned there; isn't that correct?
1 A. Temporary accommodation and prison in war time -- I mean, I don't
2 know how I would make a distinction --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not understand the
4 end of the sentence.
5 MS. McKENNA:
6 Q. Could you please repeat that sentence, as the interpreters did
7 not catch your evidence.
8 A. The reception centre, if I can call it that, in war time at times
9 when war is waged or this detention or these premises for keeping people,
10 practically all of this boiled down to the same thing terminologically.
11 Q. Well, let's talk about some evidence before the Trial Chamber of
12 one of the witnesses who was part of a failed exchange who
13 testified - and this is Zihad Okic whose testimony is at -- evidence is
14 at P124 and 125 - and Mr. Okic was under house arrest from the 11th of
15 May until the 7th of September, 1992. And on the 7th of September, your
16 colleague Zoran Gasevic came to his house and told him, his wife and his
17 children, that they had half an hour to go to a meeting point where they
18 would be bussed to an exchange at Kobiljaca. And Mr. Okic recounted that
19 about 200 Muslims were picked up from around the villages and travelled
20 to Kobiljaca where an exchange -- the anticipated exchange didn't, in
21 fact, take place. And so they were then returned to the sports centre,
22 around 500 people in total, where they were held, some of whom were held
23 until - and this is Witness Misic's evidence - for 12 days; and that's
24 P2403, paragraphs 113 to 117. Now, only on the 18th of September were
25 the women and children released to go home, so that out of 500 detainees
1 only 84 remained.
2 So I'd just like to clarify what your evidence is on this. These
3 witnesses -- these detainees were not, in fact, being voluntarily
4 accommodated, were they?
5 A. Well, just a moment ago I explained that a large-scale exchange
6 had been agreed upon, all for all. And among other things, people were
7 told: Pack, get on the buses, and we're going to Kobiljaca for an
8 exchange. On the other side there will be buses too and numbers would
9 not be looked at at all, how many people. So as many people on one side
10 and as many people on the other side, but then what happened? On the
11 Muslim side they obstructed this. They did not bring people. Their
12 state commission went together with our state commission and they
13 negotiated and they stayed until late at night and then Amor Masevic, the
14 then-president of the state commission said that they did not want that
15 but that talks would continue on the next day, and then on the next day
16 these activities should continue in view of the fact that people had
17 already packed their things, the bare necessities, things that they could
18 take by bus. There was no point in taking them back to their homes. It
19 was suggested - I don't know who it was from the state commission that
20 suggested this - that they spend the night at the sports hall and that
21 the buses would be prepared for the following day if this was ensured.
22 However, how did this happen? Unfortunately, at Kobiljaca there was
23 this -- actually all these buses actually left from both sides and
24 Mr. Masevic and his driver and we took them to the police station in
25 Hadzici and then he spent the night with -- at the house of the person
1 who was then the chief and then he went on to Sarajevo to continue these
2 activities and these activities because of the obstruction of the other
3 side --
4 Q. Mr. Tolj, once again I'll just ask you to keep your question --
5 your answers as concise as possible. My question is simply: Do you
6 agree that people, including people who were being held for the purposes
7 of exchange, were being held against their will at Hadzici sports centre?
8 A. I really cannot say that that was against their will. It was
9 with their agreement because people had been told: You will wait here
10 for the commissions to reach agreement and then we're going to have the
11 exchanges effected. Now, the fact that this took some time and that
12 practically this was undermined and this activity failed all together, so
13 it turned out that these people were in captivity for longer than normal.
14 Q. Well, let's speak then about some of the people who remained in
15 captivity up until the 22nd of October which is the document that we've
16 looked at. The Trial Chamber has heard evidence from Mehmet Music, who
17 was, for your information, one of the people who was taken to the
18 garage -- municipality building garage from Musici and subsequently
19 brought to the sports centre. So therefore, the police had determined
20 that he was not a threat to them under your own account. And on the
21 23rd of October, Witness Music was transferred by the police, by the
22 Hadzici police, together with 70 detainees to -- from the Hadzici sports
23 centre to Planjo's house in Svrake, in Vogosca, and that's at P2403,
24 paragraph 123. So this was a transfer that occurred during the period in
25 which you were commander. Do you recall this transfer?
1 A. Well, that was done on orders that arrived from the ministry to
2 transfer. The first time when I spoke the capacities at the Kula prison
3 were overextended. We did not know where the capacities were being
4 extended and where else they could be kept. So the orders we received
5 were for them to be transferred to Bajina Kula. That's what we did.
6 Q. So, in fact, individuals who your own police force had
7 ascertained were no threat to you were transferred first to Kula prison,
8 then to Lukavica, then back to Kula prison, back to the Hadzici sports
9 centre and now to Planjo's house in Svrake. So, in fact, these civilians
10 were not -- they didn't elect to be held at the sports centre; rather,
11 they were transferred from detention centre to detention centre as the
12 Hadzici authorities pleased. Isn't that correct?
13 A. Well, it's not that the police of Hadzici liked that or were
14 pleased. The police in Hadzici didn't do that. There were exchanges
15 that had been agreed upon. There were people who were brought for
16 exchanges primarily. Also, there were private and individual ones,
17 individual exchanges and exchanges at state levels, so some people were
18 transferred from prison to Hadzici because these exchanges usually took
19 place at Kobiljaca, at the separation line.
20 Q. Let me just clarify your evidence on this point. You say it's
21 not that the police of Hadzici liked that or were pleased. And then the
22 transcript reads:
23 "The police in Hadzici didn't do that."
24 Are you denying that the police in Hadzici were involved in
25 moving detainees from detention centre to detention centre in Hadzici
1 municipality and the surrounding municipalities?
2 A. If they were given an assignment, then they would carry it out,
3 that is to say they would effect the transfer.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tolj.
5 MS. McKENNA: Your Honours, I have no further questions.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. McKenna.
7 With the indulgence of the interpreters and reporter, we decided
8 to go until 3.00, so if you could conclude by then, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. I will
11 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
12 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Tolj, could you please give me answers that
13 are as short as possible so that we can finish by 3.00. When did you
14 leave Sarajevo and when did you get to Hadzici?
15 A. Well, it was the beginning, April 1992.
16 Q. Thank you. Do you know what the reason was for the fighting
17 around the village of Musici?
18 A. Well, information was coming in to the effect that there was an
19 armed group in Musici and that there was sporadic gun-fire from that
20 area. This is a village with mixed population, Serb and Muslim. People
21 felt unsafe, and an order was passed to cleanse the terrain and to
22 collect the weapons there.
23 Q. Thank you. You were asked, or rather, it was suggested that in
24 the detention unit in the municipality only Muslims were being detained.
25 Was anybody else being detained?
1 A. There were Serbs too because in part these premises were used for
2 police detention.
3 Q. Thank you. Today you said in line 89 -- on page 89 of today's
4 transcript that it wasn't only the police that was detaining people who
5 had violated the law, but also the army brought in those who were
6 captured in fighting. Here it was said "combat" and "in combat zone"
7 elsewhere. That is what was stated. Who was it the army brought into
8 the detention unit?
9 A. The army brought in those who were taken prisoner during combat
10 activities or if they found them with weapons, and so on, or if they
11 intercepted various groups. There were things like that too.
12 Q. Thank you. You said that as for civilians who had violated the
13 law there was an obligation of three days of detention and then they
14 would be brought before a judge. What about prisoners of war? Did they
15 have to appear before an investigating judge within three days?
16 A. It wasn't possible to organise that, to take them before an
17 investigating judge because there wasn't an investigating judge in our
18 area. We had not organised a court.
19 Q. Thank you. And on the whole, for prisoners of war was there this
20 obligation to keep them in detention for up to three days and to bring
21 them before an investigating judge?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. All right. Did you know this Mehmet Music and Adem Balic?
24 A. I knew Adem Balic. As for Mehmet Music, I know he was a
1 Q. Thank you. You were asked about people's departures and
2 exchanges. Did any lists exist of people who were supposed to cross over
3 to the Muslim side and how were those lists made?
4 A. Lists were made by going from person to person and asking them
5 whether they wanted to cross over to have some sort of record.
6 Q. Thank you. Who polled the Muslims in the Serbian territory of
7 Hadzici municipality?
8 A. In the Serb territory of Hadzici municipality, civilian
9 commissioners existed by street, by neighbourhood, they dealt with
10 distribution of food, and they also had lists of all inhabitants in their
11 area, and they went from door to door and made those lists.
12 Q. Did Masovici and the Muslim side know how many Muslim civilians
13 wanted to cross over?
14 A. Yes, because they could see with their own eyes, they could talk
15 with those people while they were waiting on buses, and it was evident
16 that that was no forced deportation; that it was of their own free will
17 that they wanted to go.
18 Q. In your experience, how long would a person's name be on the list
19 before being informed that a bus would be available within one or two
21 A. That was very difficult because once we got information that
22 something like that would be organised, that there would be a movement of
23 population, that there is will on both sides, then we would approach
24 people immediately, poll them, and based on that we made lists. So there
25 were no precise time-frames.
1 Q. On page 99 it was quoted to you that somebody came and told them:
2 You have 30 minutes to get ready. Were you able to see that it was
3 something forced or were they just given information when they would be
4 able to leave?
5 A. Those people knew they would be leaving, they knew that in
6 advance, and then they were told: The time has come. Get ready within
7 half an hour.
8 Q. Thank you. Were there any Muslims who didn't put their names on
9 those lists and stayed to live in Hadzici?
10 A. Yes, there were Muslims like that but I don't know how many. I
11 don't remember.
12 Q. There was some ambiguity here about the role of the Serb police
13 in guarding the school centre. First of all, tell us, how far was the
14 combat zone from Hadzici?
15 A. All of Hadzici was a combat zone. That belt was constantly
16 shelled, shot at, perhaps there was a little part of Hadzici facing
17 Ilidza close to the bridge that was a little spared from the shelling,
18 but mainly shells would land almost every day on Hadzici except for brief
19 periods of cease-fire if they were respected.
20 Q. What about the number of casualties, how many were wounded and
21 injured every day or at least in peak days of Crisis Staff?
22 A. In the early days four policemen were killed, five were wounded.
23 In attacks on the 10th and 25th a large number of soldiers were killed,
24 many were wounded.
25 Q. Did Muslim soldiers take our soldiers prisoners and did our army
1 keep Muslim prisoners?
2 A. Yes, there were prisoners taken on both sides.
3 Q. Could we see D1074. It's a report by Mr. Glavas. This is
4 related to transcript page 97. The question was:
5 [In English] Do you accept that this document contradicts your
6 testimony that the Hadzici public security station was not involved in
7 the organisation of the sports centre?
8 Your answer was:
9 "In the organisation of the sports centre I said at the very
10 outset how it was, and after that a certain number of policemen together
11 with members of the military provided security there. At first, all
12 members of the police were involved in repelling attacks at the front
13 line. Once the situation was consolidated at least a bit then the police
14 started doing their own work."
15 [Interpretation] Could we now see the second page, please, in
16 both versions. Item (b) says:
17 "In the period April and July 1992 police officers of this
18 station were involved in all combat operations and that was necessary at
19 the time, indispensable, whereas beginning with 1 August 1992 most of the
20 policemen had returned from the front lines and were again involved in
21 the activities of the Ministry of the Interior. In April not a single
22 policeman was involved in regular work and there were 105 in combat. In
23 May, none in regular activities, 120 in combat. In June and July only 3
24 and 5 respectively were in regular activities.
25 How is this consistent with your knowledge?
1 A. I too have confirmed that in the first two months policemen were
2 non-stop on the front lines, and later on to the extent of our ability we
3 got some of them to come back and do regular police work.
4 Q. And my last document, on page 91 , lines 8 through 12, you were
5 asked -- I'll read it in English:
6 [In English] "Q. The detainees had no means of cleaning
7 themselves, did they?
8 "A. For hygiene they had the same facilities as everybody else."
9 [Interpretation] Then you added: The police, army, and the
10 population, none of that made it into the record. Did you mean police,
11 army, and all the other population?
12 A. I meant everybody, the police, the army, and all the citizens.
13 There was no water. The water was cut off.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now show 65 ter 24666.
15 65 ter 24666, page 3. Let's first see the cover page and then page 3.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. This is a report on the work until December. Could you read the
18 first three lines dealing with water-supply, or I can read it:
20 "After the war broke out there was a breakdown in water supply to
21 the Serb municipality of Hadzici, so we were forced to make an improvised
22 pipeline to re-route the well located at the Hadzici maintenance and
23 repairs depot ..." et cetera.
24 How does this fit with your knowledge about the availability of
1 A. I could provide a broader explanation if there is time, but I
2 know until 1994 there was no water in Hadzici. The local sources were
3 reconnected using pumps and only closer parts of the town, wherever
4 possible, received water, and the rest we provided through water tanks
5 and distributed to the population.
6 Q. You also said there was no power, no electricity. Could we see
7 the next page.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, is that your last question?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm done with the documents.
10 This is the last one. There will only be a brief question afterwards.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Can I read this to you:
13 "As a result of war operations, electric power supply has been
14 completely discontinued."
15 How does that fit with your statement?
16 A. It's true that the transmission line of 35 kilowatts was brought
17 down and the breakdown was in such a place that we needed to secure the
18 site first and we even tried through the UNPROFOR to provide joint works
19 to repair it and that would last for a day or two and then it would break
20 down again. So there were many days in Hadzici without water or
21 electricity and there was just a little gas.
22 Q. On page 102 it was suggested to you in the question that those
23 people who were taken from Hadzici to Kula then to Planjo's house were
24 civilians. Did you consider those who were taken prisoner in combat or
25 disarmed through some -- in some operations as civilians?
1 A. Of course they were not civilians. They were captured in combat.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I have completed
4 my examination. May I tender this document.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive it.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3064, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, if you have any comment on the Defence
8 motion for modification of segregation regime for certain witness, you
9 will be heard first thing on Monday.
10 Mr. Tolj, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of the
11 Chamber, I would like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give
12 it. You are now free to go. We'll rise all together and resume --
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 JUDGE KWON: -- on Monday at 9.00.
15 THE ACCUSED: If I may, if I may ask whether Prosecution was
16 segregated from their own witnesses during their own case.
17 JUDGE KWON: I think he's not on the list of next week's
18 witnesses list?
19 MR. ROBINSON: No, he won't be testifying next week.
20 [The witness withdrew]
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.04 p.m.,
22 to be reconvened on Monday, the 4th day of
23 March, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.